To Intervene Or Not To Intervene: When Does The EU Intervene Militarily?

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ABSTRACT:

This paper is dedicated to the study of EU's collective use of force. The main research hypothesis tested through the case studies hereinafter is that the EU behaves as a **risk averse actor** in its military interventions **deliberately** intervening only in small scale military operations where high political risks and interests are not at stake. I argue that this choice is a strategic one and I introduce EU's comprehensive approach to security as the key to understanding EU's strategic actorness and situating the role of EU's use of force in its external action.

Two main criteria applied to the selection of case studies are geographical proximity and closeness in time. The geographical proximity criteria relates to the fact that the study is focused on EU's immediate neighborhood and the closeness in time criteria relates to the fact that the research focuses on the period after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty. The two case studies are the crisis in Libya in 2011 and the hostilities in Ukraine which erupted after the annexation of Crimea.

The main purpose of the research is to identify and consequently explain the **main driving and inhibiting factors** behind EU's military interventions. Particular importance is attached to the **external/internal factors dichotomy.** The main **internal factor** I am focusing on is the decision making process within the **Council of Ministers** and the main external factors are the role of the warring parties in the conflict and the role of other relevant actors.

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INTRODUCTION:

The debate about institutionalizing European security began long before the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU came to being. The first attempt of European countries to establish a supranational European security institution was the the European Defense Community (EDC). However, the project failed after the French National Assembly rejected the ratification of the EDC founding treaty. The main argument advanced by the French National Assembly was that delegating state prerogatives in the field of security and defense will severely erode national sovereignty. Nevertheless, despite of the inability of European states to agree on delegating national sovereignty in the field of security and defense to a supranational common European institution the European integration project was launched through establishing The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which laid the foundations of what is today known as the European Union.

The **main political goal** of the founding countries of today's European Union in the aftermath of the devastating World War II was to prevent war at any cost and to establish long term peace and stability in Europe. The founding countries made the deliberate choice to pursue this goal through market integration which started by pooling crucial resources together in order to make war "not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible".[1] This long term vision for establishing peace and prosperity could be considered **strategic** if we define strategy simplistically as the use of particular means in pursuing a perceived political goal. As Norheim-Martinsen suggests "the essence of strategy (…) boils down to the extent to which any instruments of power

[1] Robert Schumann, Official Statement from the French Foreign Ministry, May 9, 1950, cited in Diebold. *The Schumann plan, p.1.*

– military or non-military - further a perceived political end".[2] Therefore, the long-term vision and peaceful nature of the European integration project are central to understanding the EU's reluctance to the use of hard power. The whole logic of military actorness contradicts with the logic of EU's security which is pursue the political goal of peace and stability through market integration. Therefore, for a long period of time the EU did not need a hard power instrument in order to pursue its long term goal to establish peace and prosperity in Europe. Furthermore, from a strategic actorness perspective as long as European countries had the NATO security guarantee backed by the US robust military capabilities the incentives for establishing what Jolyon Howorth refers to as "*internalized, Europeanist* set of security institutions"[3] were relatively low.

However, the situation changed dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent eruption of the wars in Former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The inability of the EU to end the violent conflict and bring stability and peace in the Western Balkans was particularly frustrating for the Union because the crisis was taking place in its own backyard. The Saint-Malo Summit in 1998 resulted in a strategic agreement between France and the UK which emerged as a response to the violent conflicts in Yugoslavia. France and the UK agreed on the necessity for the EU to develop 'the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'.[4] That is how the European Security and Defense Policy[5] of the EU was launched.

The Lisbon Treaty provided the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU with new legal dispositions broadening the activity scope of the policy. The first major challenge which put

[2]Norheim-Martinsen, Per M. *The European Union and military force: governance and strategy*. Cambridge University Press, 2012, 7
[3] Sven Biscop and Richard Whitman. *The Routledge handbook of European security*. Routledge, 2012, 7
[4] French-British Summit Declaration, Saint-Malo, 1998
[5] After the Lisbon Treaty the name of the policy was changed to the Common Security and Defence Policy

the newly introduced changes in the functioning of the policy to a test was the Libyan crisis. The crisis in the North African country was a **high intensity multidimensional crisis** which erupted in EU's immediate neighborhood. According to Sven Biscop "the crisis in Libya is **a textbook example** of a situation in which Europe, through the European Union, should have taken the lead and proved that it is an actor worth noting".[6] The situation in Libya was indeed a good opportunity for the EU to put the new dispositions in the field of security and defense to a test. Therefore, the EU engaged in heated debates over the role of the Union in the ongoing crisis. Three options for autonomous EU-led military intervention in the crisis were discussed but none of them materialized in deploying forces through the CSDP framework. Explaining the inability of the EU to carry out an autonomous military intervention in Libya via the CSDP platform brings me to introducing the central distinction between external and internal factors which will be further developed in the main body of the thesis.

Identifying and explaining the main driving and inhibiting factors behind EU's military interventions through the two case studies is the main purpose of my thesis. As it was stated in the previous paragraph the main distinction which emerged through the case studies analysis process is the distinction between external and internal factors. In the context of this paper by **external factors** I mean the role played by the warring parties in the conflicts on the one hand and the role of other relevant actors who influence EU's decisions to intervene or not to such as NATO, the UN and the US. When I talk about internal factors I refer to the **internal dynamics** of the decision

[6] Biscop, Sven. "Mayhem in the Mediterranean: three strategic lessons for Europe. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 19, April 2011." (2011).

making process within the **Council of Ministers**. Particular importance is attached to the role of France, the UK and Germany who exert distinctive influence through the decision making process.

Based on the conclusions about the main driving and inhibiting factors drawn from the case studies analysis I verify my main research hypothesis which is aimed at explain the logic of EU's military interventions. However, the analysis goes beyond merely answering the main research question and aims at situating EU's ability to intervene militarily within the Union's comprehensive approach to security. Therefore, the concept of a comprehensive approach to security is central to the conceptualization of EU's strategic actorness and more importantly the role of military interventions.

CHAPTER I. Contextualization and conceptualization of EU's hard power

SECTION A. Brief historical introduction

There is an interesting **externalization/internalization dichotomy** which underpins the logic of institutionalizing European security.[7] The security guarantees for Europe in the aftermath of World War II stem from two different sources. On the one hand, there was the external American logic associated with the Marshall plan and on the other hand there was the internal European logic associated with the ideas of the founding fathers of the European integration project. Regardless of the differences between the external and internal logic guidelines the important achievement for Europe was that the integration process was launched. However, the dichotomy between the external American logic and the internal European one which is embedded in the very foundations of the European integration process could contribute greatly to the better understanding of the main challenges that the CSDP is currently facing.

Another important historical note which is highly relevant to the ongoing developments within the European Common Security and Defense Policy is the **peaceful nature** of the European integration process. There were some particular ideational factors behind the internal European logic of integration. The logic behind merging economic interests at that time was to make war between France and Germany "not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible".[8] Therefore, avoiding war was amongst the key driving factors behind the European project. Moreover, a strong

[7] Ibid., 6

[8] Robert Schumann, Official Statement from the French Foreign Ministry, (May 9, 1950), cited in Diebold. *The Schumann plan, 1.*

alliance which presented a robust and reliable security guarantee for the peaceful European integration process emerged with the creation of NATO. Meanwhile, in parallel with the solid security agreement reached with the United States an internal project for institutionalizing European security started gaining its momentum within the framework of the European Defense Community.

The **European Defense Community** was the first internalized attempt for the EU to create a supranational security institution. The initiative of unifying Europeans on the matters of security and defense came to being with the Pleven Plan.[9] The Pleven Plan was an ambitious political project aimed at the creation of a Common European Army. Ironically, it was namely the French Assembly which rejected the plan. The main argument raised by the French National Assembly was that delegating national prerogatives in the field of security and defense will severely undermine national sovereignty. Consequently, the European Defense Community failed together with the idea of internalized European security institutions.[10]

However, one more important security arrangement made back than reinforced the external logic dimension of the dichotomy. An important event which followed the failure of the EDC project was the creation of the **Western European Union** (WEU). The creation of WEU went hand in hand with the accession of Italy and Western Germany who joined not only the European integration project but also NATO. These developments laid the foundations of the Atlanticist security model[11] and remained in place until the end of the Cold war. These brief historical

[9] After the name of the then French Prime Minister Rene Pleven

[10] Sven Biscop, and Richard Whitman. *The Routledge handbook of European security*, (Routledge, 2012), 7

[11] Ibid, 6

references serve the purpose of explaining the origins and logic underpinning European security architecture.

The externalization/internalization dichotomy introduced earlier is still relevant to the conceptualization of EU's current capacity to intervene militarily. However, before proceeding to the events which took place in the aftermath of the Cold war era a few important conclusions about the period between World War II and the end of the Cold war could be drawn. The first important characteristic which emerged after introducing the historical developments within the realm of European security is the **intergovernmental logic** underpinning decision making on matters of security. This characteristic is related to the unwillingness of European states to delegate sovereignty to a common European supranational organization. Instead, the founding members of what is today known as the European Union chose to cooperate within the framework of NATO strengthening the strategic bond with the US. The second characteristic which is highly relevant to the conceptualization of EU military intervention is the peaceful nature of the European integration process. The developments[12] which followed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community hinted to the prioritization of merging economic interests and strengthening cooperation through the gradual creation of a single market. This economic integration logic is strongly related to the firm commitment of the member states to avoid war. Moreover, the strategic choice of the founding states of today's European Union to deepen economic integration under the security umbrella of the North Atlantic Alliance hints to the foundations of EU's distinctive approach to security. EU's unique approach to security and its implications for the workings of the

[12] 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community

Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU as well as the overall European security strategy will be the foundation of conceptualizing EU's military interventions.

However, before proceeding with **the European comprehensive approach to security**, the concise introduction to the origins of today's European security architecture needs to be completed. Therefore, a few notes relevant to European security during the Cold war period will be introduced. The first remark is related to the way the role of the EC has elegantly evolved through the creation of **the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism**.[13] Regardless of the fact that the EPC did not challenge the US position of a leader it nevertheless contributed greatly to the gradual development of the EU as an international actor. At this stage a particular international profile of the EC in international relations started emerging – the EC member states 'expanded their international role repertoire by adding the role of diplomat to that of international trader and aid giver'.[14] Furthermore, within the EPC foreign policy coordination framework the member states 'branded themselves as a collective civilian power'.[15] The notion of a civilian power will be introduced in greater detail hereinafter in order to juxtapose the use of hard power within the EU to the way the Union perceives itself (as a global civilian power). **Role theory** will be discussed in order to elaborate on the relationship between EU's self- perception as a civilian power and the existence of a hard power instrument in the CSDP toolkit.

Proceeding with the chronological tracing of the key developments preceding the creation of the CSDP requires making another important note on the EPC mechanism. The introduction of

[13] The European political cooperation mechanism was created in 1970 and served the purpose of providing a framework for foreign policy cooperation between EC member states.

[14] Michael Merlingen, "*EU security policy: what it is, how it works, why it matters"*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), 30.

[15] Ibid, 31

EPC has one more important aspect which has explanatory value for the better understanding of EU's military interventions. This important aspect is that with the creation of EPC 'day-to-day operation of the diplomatic system was managed by mid-level national diplomats who were called the European correspondents'.[16] This process of transferring the day-to-day organizational work to diplomats and later EU bureaucrats hints to the possibility of applying **constructivist lenses** to the study of the CSDP and the conceptualization of the hard power component in particular. Therefore, the influence of **bureaucratization and social networks** in CSDP's military structures should also be considered a relevant theoretical tool in evaluating the different approaches to the conceptualization of EU's military intervention.

The next historical development which resulted in transforming the EPC was the end of the Cold war. After the end of the Cold war a new narrative about raising EU's international profile started gaining momentum. One particular event which severely challenged this ongoing narrative about the transformation of the EU 'from a mere civilian power into an international actor capable of using military power' was the **civil war in Bosnia**. The strategic stalemate of the EU through the wars in Former Yugoslavia revealed the impotence of the Union to intervene militarily. Furthermore, the conflict showcased that the institutional interplay between the EU, NATO and the WEU did not empower EU to evolve as a military actor. The frustration of the EU during the wars in Former Yugoslavia required a response. One event of key importance in that respect was the **Saint-Malo summit** which in brief represented a strategic agreement reached between France and the UK. During the Saint-Malo Summit the two countries which previously

[16] Michael Merlingen, "*EU security policy: what it is, how it works, why it matters,"* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), p.31.

had a number of points of contention caused by their diverging perceptions of the EU as a security actor, agreed upon the need of developing EU's intervention capabilities. Furthermore, according to the Saint-Malo Declaration the EU needed to develop 'the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'.[17] On year later the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) came to being.[18]

The next section will introduce some key concepts relevant to the object of study.

SECTION B. Conceptual considerations and relevant literature

The scholarly literature is abundant in various articles offering different perspectives to the study of the workings of CSDP. In their paper "Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy" Chris J. Bickerton, Bastien Irondelle and Anand Menon try to systematize the existing literature on the CSDP by dividing it into three main themes which are the following:

1. CSDP and IR theories
2. CSDP and institutions
3. CSDP and less conventional approaches

The approach adopted by Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon gives a very good outlook to the existing literature. However, only a few theoretical approaches applied to the CSDP as a whole could also be applied to the military component of the policy. Therefore, this paragraph will

[17] French-British Summit Declaration, Saint-Malo, 1998
[18] Renamed Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) after the Lisbon Treaty.

introduce only the most highly relevant theoretical approaches to the study of EU's military interventions. The first theme of the academic literature on CSDP unifies a large number of articles applying IR theories and concepts to the study of the CSDP. This theme comprises prominent IR theories and concepts such as **realism, liberal institutionalism, constructivism and the notion of 'small powers'**.[19] To begin with the realist strand in IR theory comprises two perspectives to the workings of the CSDP. In terms of reviewing the existing literature drawing on a realist approach to the study of CSDP both the structural and classical realism approaches need to be considered. The structural realism perspective to the study of the CSDP is well represented by Barry Posen in his work "European Union security and defense policy: response to unipolarity?". In this paper Posen argues that "ESDP is best explained by the international relations theory known as structural realism, the modern guise of balance of power theory."[20] The main argument developed by Posen is based on the assumption that the developments which are taking place in the field of European security and defense are a consequence of EU's attempt to balance against US power. However, Posen is not the only representative of the structural realism account of the CSDP. In fact, there is an internal debate within the structural strand which is based on the tension between the concepts of 'soft balancing' and 'hard balancing'. In this regard the name of Pape also needs to be introduced. In his paper "Soft balancing against the United States." Pape argues about the lack of significant empiric evidence proving that the development within EU's security and defense field are a reaction against the US. The classical realism approach, on the other hand, applied to the study of the CSDP is most prominently represented by Sten Rynning[21] who

[19]Chris J. Bickerton, Bastien Irondelle, and Anand Menon, "Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1* (2011), p.12.

[20] Posen, Barry R. "European Union security and defense policy: response to unipolarity?," *Security studies* 15, no. 2 (2006), 149.

[21] Sten Rynning, "Realism and the common security and defence policy," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 1 (2011), 23-42.

challenges the structuralist argumentation which treats the dynamics of the CSDP as a result of a counter-balancing effort of the EU against the US. Another concern about the structural realist account of the CSDP expressed by Rynning is that it undermines the importance of agency. Therefore, Rynning tries to address this gap by bringing the focus to the agency of political leaders.[22]

The institutionalist account of the CSDP is represented by a number of prominent scholars. However, for the purpose of the current paper only Mérand (as a representative of the liberal institutionalism approach) and Menon's contributions will be concisely introduced. As it was already stated in the previous section which mapped the key historical developments leading to the emergence of CSDP[23] the influence of **bureaucratization and social networks** in CSDP's military structures need to be accounted for in conceptualizing the military component of the CSDP. In this regard Mérand's work is of particular interest for the purpose of understanding EU's military operations better. Mérand introduces an interesting theoretical approach to the study of the CSDP by applying Pierre Bourdieu's sociology framework to the study of the CSDP.[24] According to Mérand "the main drivers of ESDP in the late 1990s were not politicians but those diplomats and defense policy makers who built their careers "doing" European foreign policy and international defense."[25] However, the approach of Mérand could also be considered as a part of the governance strand in CSDP theorizing. Based on the thematic division of the literature suggested by Menon, Irondelle and Bickerton in their collaborative paper the governance approach

[22]Chris J. Bickerton, Bastien Irondelle, and Anand Menon, "Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1* (2011), p.13.

[23] Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, "The European Union and military force: governance and strategy," (Cambridge University Press), 2012, 25

[24] Frédéric Mérand, "Pierre Bourdieu and the birth of European defense," *Security Studies 19, no. 2* (2010), 342-374.

[25] A similar explanation of the workings of CSDP was already introduced by quoting Michael Merlingen.

to the study of CSDP is a part of the third theme "CSDP and less conventional approaches". Mérand's contribution to the study of CSDP is undoubtedly highly beneficial for the better understanding of the working of the CSDP. However, another prominent scholar whose contribution is also particularly valuable to the study of CSDP is Anand Menon. Menon advocates the explanatory potential of institutionalism in his paper "Power, institutions and the CSDP: the promise of institutionalist theory".

The last approach which would be introduced in this section is the notion of "small powers" developed by Asle Toje. Toje's approach is particularly relevant for elaborating on the role of the EU as a security provider in international relations. Moreover, in its paper "The European Union as a small power." Toje attaches particular importance to the EU's efforts to build up hard power capabilities and uses the military component of the CSDP in order to study EU's behavior in international relations. Toje's main argument "that the behavioral pattern of the EU coincides with that of a small power"[26] is divided in three sections. The second one dedicated to the military component of the CSDP[27] is particularly relevant to the purpose of conceptualizing EU's military operations. In this section Toje introduces a number of important concepts. For instance, Toje argues that EU's security strategy "A Secure Europe in a Better World" which urges member states to develop a **strategic culture.** The notion of strategic culture will be addressed in greater detail hereinafter because of its great importance in contextualizing and situating CSDP's military component within the CSDP framework. Moreover, the notion of a strategic culture is directly related to the EU's **comprehensive approach to security** (CAS)**.** Norheim-Matinsen defines EU's

[26]AsleToje, "The European Union as a small power," *JCMS: Journal of common market studies 49, no. 1* (2011), 43-60.

[27] Asle Toje, "The European Union as a small power," *JCMS: Journal of common market studies 49, no. 1* (2011), 49.

CAS as the "raison d'état for the Union's overall security policy".[28] The concept of a comprehensive approach combining civilian and military instruments provides a very good explanatory framework for better understanding the role of CSDP's hard power component. The EU perceives itself as a civilian power[29] which explains its particular stance on the use of military force. Furthermore, it could be even argued that the EU attaches greater importance to the civilian component which explains why the military component of the CSDP has not contributed to raising EU's international profile the way its civilian actorness did. According to Tim Haesebrouck 'the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has mainly been used to deploy small-scale operations, which generally **did not provide the member states with clear security benefits**'.[30] In terms of the scope of the military interventions that the EU has carried out so far this statement is not that surprising. However, what appears far more interesting and controversial is the authors' suggestion that EU's military operations had no clear security benefits for the member states. The reason why this claim is controversial is that the notion of 'clear security benefits' in itself is firstly quite stretchy and secondly hard to evaluate.

Therefore, elaborating on the 'clear security benefits' of EU's military operations appears rather discouraging because of the overly abstract nature of the notion itself. However, a more practical approach to the conceptualization of EU's military interventions may bring greater added value to this field of research. In that sense instead of focusing on something as abstract as the notion of 'clear security benefits' the research will serve the practical purpose of **understanding the dynamics behind EU's decisions to intervene militarily.** Only an enhanced understanding

[28] Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, "The European Union and military force: governance and strategy," (Cambridge University Press), 2012, 49.
[29] See footnote 10
[30] Tim Haesebrouck, "Explaining the Pattern of CSDP-Operations: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis," *Romanian Journal of European Affairs 15, no. 2* (2015)

of the logic behind EU's military operations could open room for contextualizing EU's military operations and situating them in the broader picture of EU's comprehensive approach to security which underlies the emerging strategic culture of the EU as an entity.[31] Therefore, the main goal of the paper which will be pursued through the case studies will be to **identify the key driving factors behind EU's military interventions in order to assess whether the current military capabilities of the EU allow the entity to pursue its goals as an international security provider.** In that respect role theory provides a valuable explanatory framework for understanding better the link between the ideas underlying the logic of CSDP and the actual external behavior of the EU as a security provider.[32] In other words, role theory could provide valuable explanations of the connection between ideas and actions within the CSDP framework. In her paper "Small States in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Insights from Foreign Policy Role Conceptions." Tanja Klein uses Lisbeth Aggestam's definition of a role conception which is the following: "A role conception is a set of norms expressing expected foreign policy behaviour and action orientation. It can be thought of as a 'road map' that foreign policy-makers rely on to simplify and facilitate an understanding of a complex political reality." This definition of a role conception could also be applied to the EU as a collective security provider. Moreover, the way the EU as an entity perceives itself reflects in its attitude towards the use of force. Therefore, EU's comprehensive approach to security represents a powerful idea which underlies the self-perception of the EU as a security actor.

According to Norheim-Martinsen there are four main reasons which explain why the comprehensive approach could be considered as a solid foundation underlying the emergence of a

[31] Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, *The European Union and military force: governance and strategy*. (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 49.
[32]Tanja Klein, "Small States in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Insights from Foreign Policy Role Conceptions," (July 2014), 3

distinctive European strategic culture. Firstly, according to Norheim-Martinsen the comprehensive approach 'fits well into the conventional narrative of the European integration process as a project for peace by underlining the military dimension's secondary nature – i.e the EU prefers to act using its traditional strengths as a non-military power, and has successfully done so in the past'.[33] This first reason introduced by Norheim-Martinsen hints to the fact that **the current status quo of EU's capacity to intervene militarily is a deliberate choice.** Moreover, NATO still provides a robust security guarantee for European security which severely undermines the willingness of individual member states to allocate greater amount of funds in common military capabilities. The second reason is that the Comprehensive Approach (CA) allows the EU to construct a strategic 'self'[34] "without necessarily having to resort to the kind of negative stereotype imaging of an adversary that has often dominated national strategic cultures in the past". [35] Furthermore, the formation "of a European 'us' could also be reconciled with the idea of enlargement, which represents still **the quintessential foreign and security policy tool for the EU**"[36]. Another interesting note which could be included with regard to the second reason is that this image of EU's security self brings greater legitimacy to the Union in its external engagement and makes it a credible and desirable partner. Moreover, this second reason has implications for the relationship between the EU as an intervener and the target of the intervention. Katarina Engberg emphasizes the importance of the interaction between the intervener and the target of intervention as one of the two main central tenets in her book "The EU and military operations". The third reason identified by Norheim-Martinsen is that the CA "underlines that the CSDP

[33] Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and military force: governance and strategy. (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 49
[34] Ibid, 49
[35] Ibid, 49
[36] Ibid, 49

represents something different and that it does not duplicate NATO".[37] In that respect EU's deliberate choice to undertake "small-scale operations"[38] and specialize in them has a great potential to bring added value to international security and become a distinctive advantage of the EU as an international security provider. The fourth reason suggested by Norheim-Martinsen is that the CA "received greater prominence in the treaties"[39] although the term CA was not used.

Therefore, it could be argued that the CA is the key to understanding EU's military intervention. Identifying the driving factors behind EU's military interventions will allow for situating the role of CSDP military interventions in the 'grand strategy' of the EU underpinned by the powerful idea of a CA to security. However, the emerging European strategic culture creates particular expectations that will put the CA to a test. In that sense CSDP's military interventions could be considered a good case study of the way in which the security narrative advocated by the EU translates into concrete practices.

The next chapter introduces the methodology for identifying the driving factors behind EU's military interventions and presents the case studies which will be examined.

CHAPTER II. Methodology

There is a vast body of literature dedicated to the study of the workings of the European Common Security and Defense Policy. However, as it was previously stated, the main focus of the current paper narrows down the scope to **military interventions** which makes some theoretical

[37]Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and military force: governance and strategy, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 50
[38] See footnote 16
[39] Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, "The European Union and military force: governance and strategy," (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 50

contributions to the subject more relevant than others. Furthermore, narrowing down the scope of the research to the military component of CSDP reveals a significant gap in the academic literature. Therefore, finding a robust analytical foundation and a credible methodological approach to the topic appears like quite a challenging task. Luckily, however, the work of Katarina Engberg provides precious guidance to the object of study. Engberg has invested significant amount of efforts in conceptualizing EU's collective use of force and based on her solid experience as a practitioner she managed to elaborate a distinctive approach to the study object. Engberg's approach to the study of EU's military operations combines academic concepts with some significant practicalities which haven't been introduced to the study of the topic yet. For instance, by introducing the techniques of defense planning to the study of the topic Engberg adds an important technical instrument to the CSDP analytical framework toolkit.

Engberg's analytical tool presents distinctive analytical advantages for the study of EU's military interventions. However, due to the fact that the case studies examined in this paper are both non-intervention cases some important considerations regarding the application of the tool need to be introduced. The analytical tool was developed for analyzing EU's military interventions. Therefore, the non-intervention case in Libya where three military options were considered by the EU does not pose any significant problems for applying the tool. The case of Ukraine, however, where no military option was considered by the EU makes the application of the tool quite challenging. Therefore, the approach I chose to apply to the case studies is to focus mainly on the distinction between internal and external driving and inhibiting factors behind EU's military interventions. In this sense I am not going to apply the analytical tool in its integrity in neither of the two case studies. Thus, I will only focus on those factors of the analytical tool which are relevant to my topic. In the Libyan case I am going to use factors drawn from defense planning

techniques. In the Ukrainian case, however, I am mostly going to focus on the distinction between internal and external driving/inhibiting factors. The analytical tool developed by Engberg will be presented in its integrity hereinafter and after that I am going to elaborate on my approach to adapting the tool to the specifics of my two case studies.

Main factors	***Driving (+)***	***Inhibiting (-)***
Indicators:		
A. Factors External to the Organization		
1. Political		
1.1.View of the warring parties		
1.2.View of other relevant actors		
2. Pol-mil		
2.1 Character of the conflict		
2.2 Mandate of the mission/operation		
2.3 Tasks of the mission/operation		
3. Resource		
3.1 Military forces in place		
B. Factors Internal to the Organization		
1. Political		
1.1 Values		
1.2 Interests		
1.3 Internal cohesion/division		
2. Pol-mil		
2.*1 Civilian precedent*		
2.2 Tasks of the mission/operation		

3. Resource

3.1 Military precedent

3.2 Availability of C&C (command and control structures)

3.3 Availability of relevant forces

3.4 Availability of financial resources

In her analysis Engberg examines whether each of the 15 factors is either driving or inhibiting military intervention. Furthermore, Engberg applies the analytical tool to all of the three military options considered by the EU in the Libyan crisis. Drawing from Engberg's approach to analyzing EU's military interventions in a systematic manner based on this analytical tool was quite helpful for me throughout the research process. Nevertheless, despite of the fact that my analytical framework was inspired to a great extent by Engderg's approach to the study of EU's military operations I chose to elaborate my own approach to the object of study. Before I start the analysis of the main riving and inhibiting factors I introduce the main strategic goal of the EU as an actor in the conflict in order to juxtapose it to the relevance of applying hard power instruments in pursuing this goal. After that I proceed with identifying and consequently explaining the most influential internal and external factors either driving or inhibiting a potential military intervention. The distinction between internal and external inhibiting/driving factors is central to the approach I applied to the case studies. After identifying the main driving and inhibiting factors I elaborate on the implications of the EU's choice not to intervene militarily. I also attach particular importance to the question "was the EU unable to intervene militarily due to the lack of political will, the lack of relevant military capabilities or due to the influence of either any of the warring parties or any of the other relevant actors?".

The **main research hypothesis** which will be tested through the case studies hereinafter is that the EU only undertakes **'small scale'[40], 'modest military operations'[41]** behaving as **a risk averse enterprise** in its military interventions 'and can be expected to operate within the **low-to-middle bandwidth of political and operational risks**'.[42] Asle Toje describes EU military operations quite concisely with the following statement:

> *"When the list of EU missions is examined in detail, however, it is apparent that the EU favors small-scale, low-intensity, pre- and post-crisis management operations- all of which are relatively low on the international agenda. According to their own evaluations, most of the EU operations have achieved the goals they have set themselves- although it should be noted that the bar has invariably been set low"*[43]

This particular statement provides very good evidence of the fact that the EU is deliberately undertaking only smaller scale and lower risk military interventions. Therefore, the existing operational capacity of the Union is a **deliberate choice** which fits in EU's comprehensive approach to security framework. Thus, in the current paper EU's comprehensive approach will be considered as the key to conceptualizing EU's military interventions. Furthermore, military operations launched through the CSDP platform would not be treated as an isolated component of the policy. On the contrary, the paper will try to account for the need of integrating military and civilian capabilities which is an indispensable step which the EU needs to take on its way of

[40] Katarina Engberg, The EU and military operations: a comparative analysis, (Routledge, 2013), 30.
[41] Ibid, 30
[42] Ibid, 30
[43] Asle Toje, "The European Union as a small power." *JCMS: Journal of common market studies 49, no. 1* (2011), 51.

building a strategic culture based on a comprehensive approach to security. Therefore, conceptualizing EU's military operations as a separate strand of EU's external action for various purposes such as balancing against the EU, trying to become a global superpower and so on will not be considered. Instead of making such assumptions in the current analysis I am more interested in considering the assumption that the deliberate choice of the EU to specialize in this particular kind of small-scale military operation could be beneficial not only for itself but also for the international community in the sense that such a strategic choice could bring added value to international security. It is also very important to account for the fact that after all NATO still provides a credible security guarantee for the EU – it is there and it is working. Fact of the matter is that NATO's security umbrella raises a number of concerns about the necessity of investing in EU military capabilities in the presence of robust capabilities which the EU could access based on the Berlin Plus agreements.

As it was already stated above the aim of this paper is to **analyze the driving and inhibiting factors behind EU's military operations.** The existing gap in the study of EU's military interventions makes the current study challenging and yet inspiring in the sense that it could contribute to the better understanding of EU's military operations as a collective security provider. The current academic debate on EU's military tool is largely restricted to the theoretical implications of the mere presence of a hard power instrument in EU's CSDP toolkit. Therefore, most of the research efforts in the field are focused on evaluating EU's military tool as such separately from the rest of the instruments the Union uses within its comprehensive approach framework. This paper will try to analyze the dynamics within the CSDP in order to draw conclusions about its role as part of the EU's overall posture as an international security actor. Moreover, this paper is aiming to go beyond evaluating EU's military operations in terms of their

scope, political ambition or successfulness. Instead of evaluating EU's military operations the paper will attach greater importance to explaining the purpose they serve. In other words an attempt will be made to **juxtapose the existing capacity of the EU to intervene militarily to the political goals of the Union as a collective security provider.** Katarina Engberg has a significant contribution in terms of establishing the link between political factors and resource constraints. She argues that introducing this link is central to the study of EU's military operations. Therefore, this paper will also try to account for the importance of the **relationship between political will and military capability constraints**. In this respect the fact that a reliable analysis of EU's military operations requires taking into account both ideational and material factors needs to be emphasized. For instance, because of the intergovernmental logic of decision-making within the CSDP framework one should not be tempted to assume that political will has universal explanatory value for all the workings in CSDP. Neither should one assume that the difficulties for the EU to establish its own military capabilities could be simply explained through the unwillingness of many EU member states to increase defense budget spending.

The purpose of the analytical tool developed by Engberg is to be applied to EU's military interventions in order to identify the main driving and inhibiting factors behind EU's decisions on the collective use of force. However, Engberg also applies the analytical tool to two non-intervention cases – the cases of the Lebanon war and the crisis in Libya. The non-intervention case in Libya examined by Engberg is off course of particular interest for this study. However, the purpose of the paper differs significantly from the purpose of Engberg's book. Therefore, as it was already stated earlier I am going to use a different approach in applying the analytical tool. It is important to emphasize the fact that the author who developed the analytical tool is after all a practitioner with solid experience in the field which explains her advanced knowledge in the field

of defense planning. However, due to the lack of such an extensive experience (both as a scholar and practitioner) I am going to **focus mainly on the political dimension** in identifying the driving and inhibiting factor behind EU's decisions to intervene militarily. I acknowledge the added value derived from applying defense planning techniques to the study of EU's military operations. However, due to the specificity of the case studies which I am working with the relevance of applying defense planning techniques is restricted. In the Libyan crisis on the one hand three military intervention options were considered. Therefore, for the purposes of this study applying defense planning techniques in the Libyan crisis could only be relevant in order to verify whether the EU disposed with the relevant resources required for carrying out the planned military tasks. In that respect the fact that the EU as an entity did not launch a military intervention through the CSDP framework should be considered a significant evidence for explaining the "political goals-resource constraints gap". Thus, evaluating the performance of operations which never materialized will not be considered in the paper. However, the capability deficiencies revealed through the active participation of individual member states can still be beneficial for mapping EU's capability constraints as a security actor. Elaborating on EU's capability constraints is directly related to the main research hypothesis which is that EU's limited military resources are a **deliberate choice** justified by EU's strategic choice to intervene in small scale conflicts avoiding high political risks. In that sense elaborating on EU's resource deficiencies revealed through individual EU member states military engagement in the conflict allows me to test the analytical framework I have already provided in this chapter. In other words I am interested in verifying whether my main research hypothesis could explain the non-intervention case in Libya.

Proceeding with the specificity of my case studies I would like to highlight the fact that both the Libyan crisis and the crisis in Ukraine are non-intervention cases which makes a number

of the factors included in the analytical tool developed by Engberg irrelevant to the analysis and the purpose of my study. Another major distinction between the two cases is that while in Libya three options for military intervention were considered by the EU in the Ukrainian case a military intervention was never formally considered an option by the Union. On the contrary,

The case studies which will be examined in order to verify the main hypothesis are the following:

1. The military operation carried out in 2011 by the EU in Libya
2. The non-intervention case of the crisis in Ukraine

The crisis in Libya, on the one hand, is chosen as a case study in its capacity of the first test for the CSDP after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, the more important reason for focusing on this particular mission is that it revealed a number of operational challenges that the EU is facing as a regional security provider. Many scholars and international analysts severely criticized EU's performance in that mission while some even went as far as suggesting that ''The CFSP died over Libya – we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it.''[44] According to Carnegie Europe "the aspiration for the EU to lead robust military interventions died in the Libyan sands in 2011".[45] Therefore, the purpose of applying the analytical tool to this military intervention will be to verify the main research hypothesis which is that the EU only undertakes small scale military operations. Thus, the purpose of the analysis of this case study will not go as far as evaluating whether the EU has failed or not but rather in order to verify the validity

[44] Nicole Koenig, "The EU and the Libyan crisis–in quest of coherence?," *The international spectator* 46, no. 4 (2011), 13.
[45] Daniel Keohane, "Libyan Lessons for Europe" *Carnegie Europe*, (February 2016) http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=62645

of the main argument of the paper. If, indeed, the EU deliberately chooses to intervene in small scale, low risk military operations, then the Libyan case will be the hard test for verifying whether this is true. The main purpose of the analysis will be to identifying the main political end of the EU and juxtapose it to the relevance of military intervention. Identifying the main inhibiting factors which explain why neither of the three military options considered materialized will enable me to verify whether the Libyan case was indeed an evidence of the inability of the EU to carry out a robust military operation. Another factor which will be analyzed in order to verify the main research hypothesis will be the political risk (was it too high) in undertaking the operation. Identifying the driving and inhibiting factors behind EU's decision to intervene in Libya will serve the purpose of verifying whether this operation is an exception from the main hypothesis or whether it actually confirms it.

The non-case with the political crisis in Ukraine, on the other hand, will be examined in the context of the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko's call for an "EU military operation" in the conflict zone in the east of Ukraine, the Donbas region.[46] However, for the EU considering a military intervention in Ukraine goes hand in hand with considering **high political and operational risks** for the Union which could potentially explain why by far the EU has not even considered a military option in Ukraine. In this case again the analysis will start by identifying possible driving and inhibiting factors by focusing mainly on the distinctive influence of external factors on the one hand and internal factors on the other hand. Particular importance will be attached to the fact that some EU member states were distinctively active to promote sending a clear signal on behalf of the EU to both warring parties that a military CSDP option is not

[46] Peter Teffer, "Ukraine calls for international peacekeepers," EU Observer, (February 2015) https://euobserver.com/foreign/127712

considered. Furthermore, even the EU countries which were in favor of a firmer stance towards Russia did not consider military means appropriate for achieving **EU's main political end in the conflict.** Ironically, it is namely the main political end of the EU which excluded a CSDP military option. The fact of the matter is that **avoiding direct confrontation with Russia was the main strategic goal of the EU during the crisis**. However, this stance did not exclude active engagement of the EU in the country by other means in order to achieve this goal and still defend the position of EU member states in the conflict.

CHAPTER III. Case studies

The two case studies which will be examined in this chapter are both geographically situated in EU's **immediate neighborhood**. Furthermore, in terms of chronology both cases developed **after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty.** The two criteria of geographical proximity and closeness in time of the research imposed restrictions to the case studies because **after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty the EU has not intervened militarily in its immediate neighborhood[47].** In that sense despite of the fact that neither of the case studies led to a military intervention launched through the CSDP framework there is still a lot of empirical material which is particularly relevant to the study of the post-Lisbon treaty phase of the CSDP. Furthermore, identifying the main driving and inhibiting factors through foreign policy analysis will be highly beneficial with regard to the particular implications of the military instrument of the EU for guaranteeing security in its immediate neighborhood. More importantly, particular

[47] Aside from the ongoing military operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is in place since 2004. Therefore, the decision to launch a military operation was taken long before the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty which is why the operation is not examined as a cae study

importance will be attached to the relationship between the internal dynamics within the Council and the likelihood of military intervention in the union's immediate neighborhood. In this regard the role of **France, the UK and Germany** which are often referred to as the "three big" member states of the Council will be attached particular importance through the case studies analysis. According to Major Robert S. Perry the willingness of "the big three" to provide the operational leadership is among the three main specific conditions which need to be in place so that an EU military operation can come to fruition.[48] Another scholar who has approached the relationship between internal dynamics within the CSDP intergovernmental decision making framework and EU's military interventions is Niklas Novaky. Novaky applies collective action theory in order to explain the decision making process which led to the collective EU decision to launch operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Novaky argues that "the employment of EUFOR Althea was possible because the participating EU member states saw it as a lucrative joint product activity that produced both public and private goods".[49] However, despite of the fact that collective action theory could indeed make a valuable contribution to explaining how a particular EU military intervention comes to being the main insight that this paper will borrow from Novaky's article is rather **the particular influence of France, Germany and the UK** Novaky accounts for in his case studies. Unfortunately, due to time and volume constraints the paper can only concisely elaborate on their **accord or disaccord** on particular matters in order to evaluate the importance of both their individual positions and ability to agree upon a final decision on military intervention.

[48] Maj. S. Perry, Robert. "Determining Factors for EU Military Intervention", *School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, (2013), iv*

[49] Niklas Nováky, "Deploying Military Force under CSDP: The Case of EUFOR Althea," *20th International Conference of Europeanists-Crisis & Contingency: States of (In) Stability*. (Ces, 2013), 1

Returning back to Novaky who accounts for the particular influence of the France, UK and Germany triad throughout the decision making process in his article "Deploying EU military crisis management operations: a collective action perspective". In the article Novaky justifies choosing these three countries as his main case studies in the following way:

> "firstly, they are Europe's **utmost military powers**, which means that CSDP military operations are likely to depend on their capabilities; and secondly, their views on the purpose of CSDP are **different**, which maximizes the likelihood the benefits they expect to gain from the operations would be **different**."[50]

Drawing on this argumentation the role of the France, UK and Germany triad reveals another distinctive feature of the decision making dynamics within the Council – the **different priority** individual member states attach to particular military operations. Individual member states are usually not equally interested in engaging in a military intervention. Therefore, elaborating on the particular influence of "the three big" is a part of a bigger picture which is the ability of the member states to identify common security interests and act upon them collectively within the intergovernmental CSDP framework. The **segmented structure of the individual member states interests** is a distinctive characteristic of the functioning of CSDP. Furthermore, because of the intergovernmental decision making principle within CSDP, the importance of this characteristic increases dramatically and points to the relevance of applying socialization theoretical frameworks for explaining the internal dynamics within the Council of ministers not

[50] Niklas IM. Nováky, "Deploying EU military crisis management operations: a collective action perspective," *European Security* 24.4 (2015): 491-508.

only at a ministerial level but also at the level of bureaucrats performing particular organizational task related to the every day functioning of CSDP. However, for the purpose of the current research paper only the ministerial level dynamics will be addressed and theorized due to time and volume limitations. One key characteristics of the internal functioning of the CSDP directly related to the intergovernmental nature of decision making is that usually individual member states could relatively easily assess whether they have particular interests in a particular military intervention. However, that does not make the task of examining the internal logic of the institution any easier because both institutionalism and social theory can provide relevant explanations why the position of individual member states is not as easy as simply declaring interest or non-interest with a particular intervention. Internal bargaining, as well as the so called 'balance sheets' between member states make the interplay between member states particularly complex.

SECTION A. The non-case of EU's military intervention in Libya

The analysis of the Libyan case will start by identifying EU's main political interest in the crisis. The main strategic goal of the EU in Libya on the **long run** is to have **peace and stability** in the North African country while its **immediate interest** (short-term) after the conflict escalated was to **put an end to the hostilities**. However, such a presentation of EU's short term interest in intervening in the conflict is over-simplified. The reality of the situation back in 2011 was that the due to internal divisions within the Council and between different institutions both on the intra-national and supra-national level the EU was having a hard time agreeing upon its common interest for intervention. The idea behind introducing the main long-term and short-term political ends of the EU in the beginning of the section is to juxtapose these interests to the relevance of applying

military force for achieving them. Therefore, at the end of this section I am going to return to the main political ends of the EU in the Libyan crisis and I am going to make use of the distance of time advantage (the crisis was in 2011) in order to juxtapose the implications of the EU's inability to lead an autonomous military intervention in Libya with regard to its political goals.

EU's engagement with the crisis in Libya is particularly interesting because it illustrates quite well the main challenges which the EU is facing as a collective security provider. However, the case of EU's efforts to engage in the Libyan crisis via the CSDP framework did not lead to the materialization of an actual EU led military operation in the conflict zone despite of the fact that the EU was considering three potential options for intervening militarily:

1. Imposing a No Fly Zone in Libya
2. Enforcing a maritime embargo
3. Supporting UN's humanitarian mission through EUFOR Libya

Thus, despite of the fact that all of the three options were discussed, none of them resulted in deployment of forces on the ground. Nevertheless, the EU engaged in the crisis and still played a significant role in the North African country as an external actor. The EU was particularly efficient in rapidly delivering humanitarian assistance. In fact, overall the union "provided 152 billion euros for humanitarian aid and civil protection making the EU **the biggest humanitarian donor in Libya**".[51] Moreover, the EU exerted influence through **imposing sanctions**. Therefore, it appears that the EU performed quite **efficiently** and **coherently** in using its civilian instruments.

[51] Fabbrini, Sergio. "The European Union and the Libyan crisis." *International politics* 51.2 (2014): 177-195.

However, observers were far more critical in assessing EU's efforts to deploy military forces via the CSDP framework. Nicole Koenig argues that EU's efforts to use its military instrument reveal the well-known '**capabilities- expectations**' or the '**conception–performance'** gaps. In order to elaborate on these gaps in EU's performance she applies sociological role theory. Koenig elaborates on the traditional "civilian power Europe" role concept which was first introduced by François Duchêne and consequently became one of the most prominent and widely accepted concepts defining EU's actorness in international relations.[52] Koenig carries out her analysis by examining EU's self-conception "as projected by EU-level representatives and political leaders in Germany, France and the UK."[53] Koenig "draws on insights from **283 political speeches, public interviews and declarations** by key political figures representing the aforementioned actors and issued between February and October 2011."[54] The main theoretical insight in Koenig's article relevant to the topic is that: "While Libya is only one case, it visibly showed that basic consensus on the Union's role still lies with its traditional role concept of civilian power." [55]

However, this article will approach the relationship between the EU's role conception and its engagement in the Libyan crisis through the CSDP external hard power instrument from the perspective of the concept of EU's comprehensive approach to security which was defined as a concept of central importance to the current research paper. As it was already stated the advantage of this paper is that it works with the Libyan case study in the aftermath of the crisis which allows for a better outlook on the implications of EU's engagement in the crisis. One important figure about the crisis

[52] Duchêne, François. "The European Community and the uncertainties of interdependence." *A Nation Writ Large?*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1973. 1-21.

[53] Koenig, Nicole. "Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis." *European security* 23.3 (2014): 251.

[54] Ibid: 251

[55]

which needs to be emphasized is that while the EU was **the biggest humanitarian donor in the crisis** its military considerations never materialized in actual EU led military intervention. Therefore, one can argue that **the EU appears to be far more efficient and successful in using its civilian instrument than in trying to employ its hard power instrument.**

However, such a stance tends to over simplify the complexity of external action. There is a big difference between using civilian and military instruments in international relations and especially in the context of EU's sui generis approach to external action. Moreover, in the case of the EU it should be highlighted that the Union has traditionally been quite successful in the use of civilian instruments whereas the use of a hard power instrument has been included in the EU's toolkit relatively recently. In this regard there is one particularly important observation which needs to be introduced. As it was already stated the EU managed to **take humanitarian action quite rapidly and coherently whereas the political debate over a potential military intervention of the Union revealed deep multidimensional divisions within the Union as an entity**. Therefore, it turns out that the EU managed to be far more expeditious in applying its civilian instruments whereas the **multidimensional divisions** over military intervention led to a position of stalemate and impossibility to take action which resulted in the fact that as time was advancing and immediate action needed to be taken NATO took command over both the air campaign and the enforcement of the maritime embargo.

The distinction between EU's ability to apply civilian instruments and the challenges it faces when it needs to agree upon a military intervention reveal the key challenges that the Union is facing in developing its hard power capabilities which is the lack of consensus on EU's role as a military actor. This ideational division is the structural stalemate impeding the EU to agree on particular military interventions. This structural division is particularly pronounced in EU's immediate neighborhood which explains why the EU has not intervened militarily in its neighborhood since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. There is a traditional distinction on the EU level between the

attitude of member states towards the use of civilian instruments and the use of military ones. For instance, in terms of civilian external instruments used through the Libyan crisis the EU Commission responded by launching the civil protection mechanism and the humanitarian assistance mechanism. These instruments were in the EU Directorate general for Humanitarian Aid and Civil protection (ECHO) toolkit which explains why the EU was able to take **immediate** supranational action. Therefore, in terms of civilian external instruments the EU has institutionalized the use of such instruments so well on a supranational level because it has traditionally been successful in responding immediately to an emerging crisis by applying those instruments. At the same time when it comes to the use of military means by the EU the logic changes dramatically. The EU has experience in applying civilian instruments in international crisis. This reality is particularly pronounced in terms of its role as a humanitarian assistance provider an aid giver. More importantly, it is easier for the EU to achieve consensus when it comes to the use of civilian means which supports Koenig's argument that the Union still acts in line with the civilian power narrative. However, the lack of consensus about the role of the EU as a military actor has a negative effect on the functioning of the CSDP's military instrument. The traditional resistance of some EU member states to the use of force on behalf of the EU is dramatically aggravated by the intergovernmental logic of the decision making process within the CSDP which requires consensus among member states. However, because of the divisions among member states about the collective use of force in general and the heterogeneity of interests among member states (which makes some states more interested in interested in intervening) according to the particular situation military intervention within the CSDP framework becomes a complicated issue. The combination between the general lack of consensus about the role of the EU as a military actor and the heterogeneous nature of interests of EU member states resulted in preserving the intergovernmental decision making logic in CSDP even after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty.

Therefore, the main focus of the research in this section is on factors internal to the organization, i.e the internal dynamics because limiting the scope of the analysis to the internal factors behind EU's military interventions would allow drawing conclusions about the implications of the **segmented structure of interests** within the Council for military intervention in EU's immediate neighborhood. As it was stated earlier internal factors will be given higher priority due to the fact that testing the effect of the intergovernmental decision making framework within CSDP for the overall potential of the EU to agree on external military intervention is of key importance to the research purposes of the paper. However, it is important to highlight the fact that the Libyan case study provides access to a massive amount of empirical data because the hostilities in the North African state represented a **multidimensional crisis** which required a comprehensive approach from the international community. Therefore, despite of the fact that the EU's engagement in the conflict raised concerns about the level of integration between civilian and military instruments within the CSDP framework, the international community as a whole managed to deliver a comprehensive resolve to the crisis. Furthermore, the political decision to engage militarily in a **high-intensity** international conflict is related to very **high political risks**. In the Libyan crisis the EU engaged militarily through the active participation of individual states instead of agreeing upon collective intervention. For many critics this was the end of the political viability of the CSDP. However, there is also a different perspective to the issue which is that the **'**lack of material capabilities**'**[56] which would have made "a campaign based solely on European capabilities would have been longer and possibly caused more collateral damage in the form of civilian deaths, since the Europeans were short of targeteers, reconnaissance and appropriate

[56] Koenig, Nicole. "Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis." *European security* 23.3 (2014): 250.

munitions"[57]. From that perspective the fact that NATO took command over military engagement in Libya could be considered beneficial to the EU in the sense that it reduced both the material and political cost for the EU in the crisis.

There were a few main reasons behind the EU's inability to lead an autonomous military intervention in Libya. The first category of reasons is related to the fact that the Libyan crisis was a **multidimensional crisis** where **open hostilities** were at play at the time the EU was considering launching its military intervention. It was a **high-intensity** conflict which required taking **high political risks.** Furthermore, after the initial engagement of the two countries on whose military capabilities the EU is mostly relying on (France and the UK) a significant gap between the political will to intervene and the lack of sufficient military capabilities emerged. Furthermore, the third of "the three big" countries of the EU – Germany was reluctant to the idea of military intervention which also had significant effect on the decision making process. The situation in Libya escalated very quickly which required taking an immediate action. This circumstance had particular implications for the EU because of the **intergovernmental logic** of the EU which was introduced earlier and the **dense administrative framework** of the policy.

The main inhibiting factors explaining EU's inability to carry out an autonomous military intervention in Libya can be divided in two main categories. The main internal inhibiting factors are the deep divisions within the Council and more specifically the contradicting visions of France and the UK on the matter of intervention. However, these are just the **political inhibiting internal factors**. Another important factor in the non-intervention case in Libya were the significant

[57] Engberg, Katarina. *The EU and military operations: a comparative analysis*. Routledge, 2013: p. 159

resource deficiencies of two of the three biggest countries in the EU – France and the UK. These deficiencies were revealed through the active engagement of both countries in the initial phase of the conflict. Throughout this initial phase it became clear that the lack of key military capabilities severely undermines the ability of the EU to carry out a military intervention autonomously. The lack of key military capabilities could be defined as the material inhibiting factors which explain why an autonomous EU intervention never materialized through the CSDP framework. Katarina Engberg summarizes quite concisely the main **material** constraints which inhibited an EU-led to military:

> *"but the campaign revealed well-known EU shortfalls in the EU's capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), air-to-air refueling, provided up 80 percent by the US, smart munitions and strategic and tactical transport and medical support (IISS 2012, UK Parliament, House of Lords 2012). All nations except for the UK ran short of modern missiles and precision guided weapons"*[58]

After this good summary of EU's resource constraints in the Libyan conflict I am coming back to the short-term and long-term interests of the EU in the crisis which were introduced in the beginning of the chapter in order to juxtapose them to inability of the Union to carry out an autonomous military operation. From the distance of time EU's inability to intervene autonomously in the air campaign and the fact that NATO took command could be analyzed from a cost-benefit analysis perspective. Such a perspective reveals that it was actually positive for the EU that it did not take the high operational risk of carrying out autonomously the air campaign.

[58] Katarina Engberg, The EU and military operations: a comparative analysis, (Routledge, 2013), 158

Such a decision would have resulted in longer time for carrying out the campaign and higher collateral damage risks. From a long-term perspective, however, EU's significant role as the biggest humanitarian donor in the crisis was beneficial and quite relevant to the political goal of achieving peace and stability in the North African Country.

The Libyan case was a **high intensity conflict** where **high political risks** were at play due to the open hostilities which were taking place. Therefore, the crisis required the EU to go beyond the small-scale intervention scenario. However, according to Engberg's analysis "the task of enforcing a maritime embargo could, in principle, have suited the EU very well. The tasks entailed manageable risks and the EU had acquired considerable experience from the naval campaign in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. Any enforcement of maritime embargos in the Mediterranean would be based on European capabilities available in the area. The EU, furthermore, possessed the necessary command and control arrangements in the form of the British OHQ Northwood".[59] Nevertheless, the inhibiting factor which explained why the EU did not carry out the enforcement of the maritime embargo autonomously was NATO's willingness to have 'the unity of command of air and maritime forces '. However, despite of the fact that that was the main argument advanced by NATO the reality of the situation was that **EU's hesitations were the main cause for NATO to take command over both the air campaign and the military embargo under the 'Unified Protector' operation.** With regard to the third option considered by the EU which was EUFOR Libya the main inhibiting factor was external. The purpose of EUFOR Libya was deployed to secure the movement and evacuation of displaced persons and to support humanitarian agencies in their work. However, a UN mandate was required for launching the operation but such a

[59] Katarina Engberg, The EU and military operations: a comparative analysis, (Routledge, 2013), 171

mandate was never acquired by the EU due to the fact that the EU never requested EU's military support for its humanitarian mission.

SECTION B. The non-case of Ukraine

The main short term political goal of the EU in the Ukrainian crisis was to **avoid any direct confrontation with Russia** because on the long-run the EU is interested in preserving its relationship with Russia due to the high levels of interdependence between the two actors strengthened by their geographical proximity. There are a number of both political and resource constraints behind the EU's approach towards the Ukrainian crisis. However, in this section priority will be given to the external factors inhibiting the EU from considering a military option in Ukraine. As it was already showed in the Libyan case the fact that the Union did not intervene militarily does not mean that the Union did not play a role in the conflict. In that sense the decision of the EU to launch a civilian operation in Ukraine fits very well with Koenig's argument that the EU still acts in line with its conception of a civilian power which means that it prioritizes civilian over military instruments. Although I am not going to try to use EU's self-conception as a civilian power in order to explain why the Union did not consider a military option in Ukraine I still consider role theory quite relevant to the case. The civilian operation launched by the EU in Ukraine and the lack of a military option indeed fit very well with the argument that he EU still acts as a civilian power. However, the reality of the situation and more importantly the lack of European military presence deployed through the CSDP framework provides robust evidence backing the main hypothesis which is that the EU is unwilling to engage militarily when there are high political risks at stake. Moreover, there is another important variable which has to be added to the equation which is the role of Russia. The role of Russia and more precisely the unilateral

use of hard power by Russia created a very peculiar context. In his paper "Why so Soft? The European Union in Ukraine" Novaky refers to the Pew research center and provides empirical data assessing EU's citizens attitude towards Russia. The data reveals that there has been growing mistrust amongst Europeans towards Russia and more importantly that "Russia's intentions are increasingly perceived as threatening". Therefore, the perception of the immediacy of the threat further complicates the issue and brings back deterrence rhetoric to the political debate. However, the EU deliberately chose to respond through economic sanctions and diplomatic efforts in mitigating the escalating hostilities in the Eastern parts of Ukraine.

Novaky indicates four reasons constraining EU's position towards Russia. However, one of them stands out amongst others and again brings the research back to the **different interests of EU's member states** which are being dramatically aggravated by the heterogeneous nature of the EU as an entity which came as an unavoidable consequence of progressive enlargement. The heterogeneity of EU member states has much more pronounced effects in the field of security and defense than in any other field of European integration because of the intergovernmental logic of the CSDP. Moreover, in the case of Ukraine the immediacy of the threat posed by Russia exposes EU member states located in closer proximity to Russia to high political risks. Furthermore, some member states are highly dependent on Russia in terms of energy security. Therefore, the context in the Ukrainian crisis is much more different than the context in the Libyan crisis where the threat of retaliation was significantly lower. However, the deep divisions within the Council resulting from the dramatically differing positions of individual member states again appear to be among the main obstacle to any considerations of a military option. However, the external factor explaining these insurmountable divisions is the role of Russia.

"With regard to the deployment of CSDP missions, realists tend to argue that the EU will intervene only in low-intensity conflicts if its most powerful member states – that is, France, Germany, and the UK- believe that there is some kind of political gain to be realized".[60] In his paper "Why so Soft? The European Union in Ukraine." Niklas Novaky argues that EU's civilian mission in Ukraine launched within the CSDP framework "was driven by a broader geopolitical logic, that is to soft balance Russia".[61] Although Novaky's argument that the strategic goal behind EUAM (EU's civilian mission in Ukraine) may be challenged his main assumption that **the mission serves a broader geopolitical logic** is highly relevant to the object of study. Despite of the fact that the main research question in this study is "When does the EU intervene militarily?" military intervention per se is not the central study interest of the research. Instead, the study is more interested in situating EU's hard power instrument in the broader picture of EU's comprehensive approach to security which promotes an integrated approach to security which combines civilian and military instruments. Moreover, the paper is aiming at reaching conclusions about EU's strategic actorness. As it was already repeatedly highlighted the main goal of the paper goes beyond assessing EU's mere capacity to intervene militarily. The research tries to test the hypothesis that the Union only undertakes **'small scale'[62], 'modest military operations'[63]** behaving as **a risk averse enterprise** in its military interventions 'and can be expected to operate within the **low-to-middle bandwidth of political and operational risks**'.[64] Therefore, the two case studies of non-intervention on behalf of the EU could be explained through the high political risks they both present. From a political risks perspective the risks of any direct confrontation with

[60] Nováky, Niklas IM. "Why so Soft? The European Union in Ukraine." *Contemporary Security Policy* 36.2 (2015): p. 244.
[61] Ibid: p.244
[62] Engberg, Katarina. The EU and military operations: a comparative analysis. Routledge, 2013: p.30.
[63] Ibid: p.30
[64] Engberg, Katarina. The EU and military operations: a comparative analysis. Routledge, 2013: p.

Russia in the Ukrainian crisis was considered unacceptably high for the EU. Furthermore, the costs of such a confrontation for the EU could be so high that the EU made avoiding direct confrontation its main political goal. This explains why a military option was not even considered – avoiding direct confrontation with Russia could not be achieved through a military option because Russia was quite clear about its unwillingness to tolerate any EU military engagement in the crisis.

Therefore, the relationship between the EU and Russia is the key to identifying and explaining the driving and inhibiting factors behind EU's engagement in the conflict. The nature of the relationship is quite complex and it does not develop only at the EU level. There are also the bilateral relations between individual member states and Russia. From the perspective of the particular influence of the "three big"[65] the individual bilateral relations of these countries with Russia some important conclusions could be drawn. The positions of EU member states could be roughly divided in two main categories. The first category was in favor of clearer support of the EU for Ukraine. In other words, according to this group of countries the positions of the EU should have been to explicitly take the side of Ukraine in the conflict. The position of the second group of countries was more cautious in the sense that countries in this camp were more unwilling to take sides in the conflict. Novaky labels these two groups as EU's 'hawks' and 'doves'.[66] As it was already stated earlier particular importance will be attached to the positions of the "big three". From this perspective it is important to emphasize the fact that Germany and France on the one hand were in the 'doves' camp whereas the UK was in the 'hawks' camp. This context affirms that in the Ukrainian case deep divisions between member states were at play again.

[65] i.e France, Germany and the UK

[66] Nováky, Niklas IM. "Why so Soft? The European Union in Ukraine." Contemporary Security Policy 36.2 (2015): 244-266

However, despite of the fact that the EU did not consider a military option in the Ukrainian crisis, it still managed to exert significant influence though other means. For instance, at the initial phase of the conflict EU's intention to propose a civilian CSDP monitoring mission could be interpreted as a negotiating strategy in the sense that Russia was so reluctant to the idea of accepting a monitoring mission carried out by an organization where it is not a member that it finally agreed to the OSCE alternative. Another interesting strategic long-term perspective to EU's deliberate choice to not even consider a military option is that deploying a civilian mission allows the union to still have presence on the ground without taking too high political risks by upsetting either of the warring parties. With regard to the civilian mission deployed by the EU there is one key circumstance to be introduced – the fact that the mission was launched in a response to a Ukrainian request.

CONCLUSION

Examining the record of EU's operations carried out through the CSDP framework it appears that **the EU favors civilian missions and the use of civilian instruments in its external action over the use of military instruments.** This tendency implies that the EU still acts in line with the conception of a civilian power. However, this shouldn't necessarily be considered a negative characteristic of its external action. After all, EU's cooperation and integration in the field of security and defense is a peculiar part of the European project with particular implications for the national sovereignty of individual member states which explains why progress is being made slowly and with lots of precaution. Therefore, I argue that EU's capability to intervene militarily should be assessed from the perspective of the strategic goals of the Union because the ability to relate means to goals and manage to achieve your political goals is the core of a strategy. Therefore,

as long as the EU manages to achieve its political goals mostly through civilian means its capacity to intervene militarily does not seem as dramatic as most critics of EU's military efforts pursued through the CSDP framework present it. However, the problem is when the EU needs to resort to a military option but cannot do so due to resource constraints and lack of consensus. Thus, the most important factors determining when the EU intervenes militarily (with particular focus on its immediate neighborhood) are **political** and **material.** The most important potentially inhibiting factor which need to be considered when assessing the likelihood of a European military intervention is the **intergovernmental decision making mechanism** within the Council which is often the main explanation for the inability of the EU to agree rapidly on a military intervention. The different interests and relative costs for taking part in a military intervention for individual member states result in a quite **fragmented landscape** of interests and incentives for undertaking collective action. Fabrini defines the constraints arising from the intergovernmental nature of CSDP decision making as a structural dilemma.[67] According to Fabbrini "the Libyan crisis showed that leaders' personal temperaments, distinct national interests and contingent domestic electoral perspectives bring the decision making to unpredictable outcomes".[68]

The two case studies which were examined in Chapter III back the hypothesis that the EU only undertakes **'small scale'[69], 'modest military operations'[70]** behaving as **a risk averse enterprise** in its military interventions 'and can be expected to operate within the **low-to-middle bandwidth of political and operational risks**'.[71] Furthermore, it appears that the EU continues

[67] Fabbrini, Sergio. "The European Union and the Libyan crisis." *International politics* 51.2 (2014): 190.
[68] Ibid: p.190
[69] Engberg, Katarina. The EU and military operations: a comparative analysis. Routledge, 2013: p.30.
[70] Ibid: p.30
[71] Engberg, Katarina. The EU and military operations: a comparative analysis. Routledge, 2013: p.

to act in line with the civilian power concept prioritizing the development and application of civilian over military instruments. However, as I argued in the beginning of my work this is a **deliberate choice**. An important issue which was tested throughout the research process was whether this deliberate choice could be considered a strategic one. The answer to this question largely depends on the interpretation of the question. If the question refers to the general debate of EU's strategic culture than it could be argued that EU's deliberate choice not to intervene militarily is very often linked to the emerging strategic culture of the Union based on its comprehensive approach to security. However, a more pragmatic explanation for EU's unwillingness to undertake military action when high political costs and risks are at stake could apply cost benefit analysis consideration in explaining the logic of military intervention. For instance, in the Libyan case the German foreign minister presented cost benefit consideration in defending Germany's stance in the Libyan crisis.

With regard to the central distinction between internal and external factors explaining the likelihood of an EU-led military intervention in the Ukrainian crisis **external inhibiting factors** were at the core of EU's reluctance to even consider a military option through CSDP in Ukraine. Therefore, in the case of Ukraine shows that the analysis should give higher priority to the external factors inhibiting any EU-led military option in the conflict.

In the Libyan case particular attention was attached to **internal factors** which were the **main inhibiting factors** explaining the inability of the EU to lead an autonomous military intervention. Nevertheless, the most influential external factors were also accounted for in the final paragraph of the previous section (the lack of UN mandate for EUFOR Libya for example). However, the case of Ukraine is very different than the Libyan one. The most important difference which emerges in comparing the two case studies is that it appears that external inhibiting factors

were the main reason behind the EU's strategic choice to not even consider a military option through CSDP in Ukraine whereas in Libya the most influential inhibiting factors were mainly internal.

In conclusion, I would like to summarize the main finding I came to throughout the case study analysis. Through the research process I discovered that the distinction between driving and inhibiting factors used in the analytical tool developed by Engberg is irrelevant to my two non-intervention cases. Therefore, I chose to put the emphasis mainly on the most influential inhibiting factors explaining EU's non-interventions. After identifying and explaining the most important inhibiting factors in both cases here I would like to concisely present the main implications of EU's non-interventions from the perspective of the union's strategic actorness. In the Libyan case EU's inability to carry out a military intervention autonomously had a negative impact on its immediate interest to stop the hostilities. However, from the distance of time and more importantly from a cost-benefit analysis perspective by not intervening autonomously the EU avoided both material risks related to the lack of some key military capabilities and higher collateral damage risks which were avoided thanks to the fact that NATO took control over both the air campaign and the enforcement of the maritime embargo. In the Ukrainian case EU's deliberate choice not to consider a military option was quite relevant to its main priority which was to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. Therefore, from a strategic actorness perspective it could be argued that in both cases the EU gave higher priority to civilian means in pursuing its political interests – in Libya by becoming the biggest humanitarian donor and in Ukraine by launching a civilian CSDP operation.

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