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**THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE FUTURE
POLITICAL NATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR**

The Concepts of the *New Europe* (1916–1919)

by

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Submitted to

Central European University

Department of History

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary

2016

ABSTRACT

During the course of this final thesis, I observe the Great War-era discourse on national self-determination through the spectrum of the contemporary periodical *THE NEW EUROPE* in the period between October 1916 and January 1919. The study focuses on the conceptual problems of nation, self-determination and autonomy within the intellectual sphere of this international society.

Firstly, I argue that the *New Europe* group adopted the notion of self-determination under the influence of the First Russian Revolution. The new concept was attached to the principle of nationality – a general scheme of European reconstruction based on national units – as a turnout with special democratic content. By this statement, I stand against the general equating between the two notions, but also against the LENIN- and WILSON-centred discourse of contemporary scientific literature.

Nextly, I study the conceptualization of the future Czechoslovakia as an exemplary case of related problems. I argue that while the British wing of the *New Europe* stood for the establishment of political nations and territorial autonomies, the founder TOMÁŠ GARRIGUE MASARYK argued for an ethnic approach and limited his views on minority rights to an extra-territorial sense. However, the Czech politician also developed a concept of political nationhood during the Great War in order to solve the German question of the Bohemian lands, making a good use of self-determination during this process. Finally, I make a comparison with the Yugoslav case to point out important differences between the conceptualization and the actual coming-to-be of political nations.

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INTRODUCTION

President WOODROW WILSON's espousal of self-determination in his Fourteen Points in 1918 kindled the flames of latent nationalism among many peoples in central and southeastern Europe.¹

– wrote the American political scientist ALEX N. DRAGNICH in his *Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia* of 1992. Being of Montenegrin origin, it must have been important for the author to start his book by mentioning the theory of self-determination in the second year of the Yugoslav Wars.

Yet, this comment featured a popular *and* imprecise piece of knowledge on the history of the notion. The concept of national self-determination did indeed have a great influence on the peoples and the future of Europe in the First World War (1914–1918) – but in contrast to Dragnich's words, Wilson's Fourteen Points did not feature it.

Connecting the President and the Great War-era popularization of self-determination strictly together has its dangers as various influential groups had already taken this issue up for a long time by 1918 – in fact, my thesis will deal with one of these that gathered around the periodical of the *NEW EUROPE* (1916–1920). Founded in Great Britain but run by a joint effort of individuals from Japan through Serbia to the United States, the press organ was used by its collaborators as an effective tool to advocate the establishment of nation-states in the Eastern parts of Europe. Consequently, the authors were quick to adopt the language of national self-determination. In fact, it will form the core of my endeavours to point out that with this decision, the *New Europe* preceded other famous supporters of the notion.

In order to demonstrate this successfully, I will deal with the history of self-determination before and during the First World War in the first chapter. As for this period, I will both use and transform ARNULF BERKE LORCA's expression of 'pre-history' as I will

¹ Dragnich, Alex N., *Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia* (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 1.

talk about the 'pre-pre-history' of the theory. Along with analysing the related scientific literature, I will also show that the notion had its long history before its Wilsonian adaptation – while most people connect it directly to the latter.

The second unit of the final thesis will present the history of the *New Europe*. The periodical was part of a monumental project to support the secessionist national movements of Eastern Europe – in other words, it endorsed an idea innovative at that time. I deem it essential to get to know the intellectual background of the press organ, especially since it was comprised of the most important theoreticians and politicians of the future nation-states.

During the course of the third chapter, I will observe the appearances and the usages of self-determination on the pages of the newspaper. Firstly, I will register the development of the notion expressed by the articles along with connecting self-determination and the concept of the 'principle of nationality' together. Besides that, I will also search for the definitions of 'nation', 'nationality' and 'autonomy' in the press organ. Finally, I will analyse the related articles on the regions on which self-determination was applied the most: the so-called 'Central Zone' and Central Europe. My main point will be that the *New Europe* adopted the famous principle long before its international breakthrough – and it did so due to Eastern European influence.

Continuing this line, I will dedicate the fourth chapter to the analysis of an exemplary case: that of the future Czechoslovak state. This issue was connected to the practical realization of self-determination and the interconnected ideas of ethnic and political nations. Czechoslovakia was planned to be a nation-state – founded upon a theoretical alliances between various nationalities. However, the territorial demands made in the name of the yet non-existent structures also meant the inclusion of sizeable future minorities.

My thesis will be that while his theoretical basis was ethnic to begin with, TOMÁŠ GARRIGUE MASARYK, the *émigré* leader of the secessionist movement, also developed a concept of a 'Czechoslovak political nation' during the Great War. This theory included not only the idea of autonomy, but also that of self-determination – and could peculiarly make use of it for its territorial demands concerning non-Czech/Slovak territories. Although going under a confused line of development, the political concept was nonetheless forged gradually during the Great War and was expressed in the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920. Finally, I will make a comparison with the case of Yugoslavia.

In terms of methodology, my work will be focused on the conceptual history of national self-determination. Thus, the first chapter will be dedicated to the analysis of the related scientific literature and the main historical developments of the Great War-era. This will be followed by the observation of the *New Europe*; I will show the evolution of self-determination discourse within the newspaper, also providing data in relation to the density and forms of usage. Additionally, I will connect the notion together with the so-called 'principle of nationality'. Next, I will show what the various collaborators exactly meant by 'nation'; whether it was a political or an ethnic foundation in their views. Finally, I will apply my findings to the discussions on the Central Zone, Central Europe and the future Czechoslovakia.

In order to undergo this procedure successfully, I will analyse the contents of the articles that appeared on the pages of the newspaper. I will also make use of the contemporary publications written by the collaborators of the periodical and the related materials found in the SETON-WATSON COLLECTION of the UCL SCHOOL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND SLAVIC STUDIES in London. Through this combination, I will point out the differences in space and time between the ideas propagated by the collaborators. As for the timeline, I will restrict my observation to the first nine volumes of the periodical – from

October 1916 to January 1919. While the years between 1916–1918 were important in connection to the pre-pre-history of self-determination, the following season of late 1918 – early 1919 collided together with the tract analysed by EREZ MANELA with respect to the colonial areas in his famous *The Wilsonian Moment*. I will end my study with the 117th volume of *The New Europe* that was published on 9 January 1919. By the following week, the Peace Conference of Versailles that terminated the era of the First World War had already assembled – and by this point, the new nation-states were already established on the basis of those theoretical backgrounds that were discussed frequently by the press organ.

1. SELF-DETERMINATION: AN INTERNATIONAL CONCEPT BEFORE AND DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

With all due respect, Mr. Wilson, but you have just reinvented the wheel – could have or might have said the cultured civilian of the early 20th century when meeting the American President during the Winter of 1918. Indeed: the theory of self-determination was not only existent, but was also heavily discussed long before its declaration by WILSON. The notion had its background in medieval Christianity and went under its first serious transformation during the 19th century when it was filled with the content of post-Enlightenment nationalism.

During the First World War, the European political left took up the discourse on self-determination – to be precise, it was LENIN and his Russian Bolsheviks who had the biggest impact on the history of the thought. After their takeover in November 1917, self-determination was put into practice – however, it was the Central Powers hostile to Russia who mainly made use of it. Then, January 1918 saw the endorsement of the notion by the British Prime Minister LLOYD GEORGE – followed by Wilson in February 1918. This historical line of evolution – with all its interesting turns and peculiarities – will form the backbone of the current chapter along with the analysis of the related scientific literature.

1.1. GIVEN BIRTH BY CHRISTIANITY, BRED BY NATIONALISM: A 'PRE-PRE-HISTORY'

In relation to the antecedent history of self-determination, works of considerable amount and importance were published during the course of the last years. Such writings weigh all the more since most of the major works do not deal with this aspect before the First World War – thus, readers can get the idea that the theory was barely existent prior to 1914, which misbelief might form the potential background of the already mentioned Wilsonian myth.

Consequently, I deem the filling of this gap to be important during the course of the first sub-chapter.

In his article titled *World War I, Self-Determination, and the Legacies of Medieval Jurisprudence* – published in a 2014 issue of Turkish periodical *Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih* (International Crimes and History) –, the American professor KARL SHOEMAKER successfully showed that self-determination had its long history before the Wilsonian adaptation.² On the other hand, ARNULF BECKER LORCA talked about the latter as the starting point of the legal notion's 'pre-history' in the *European Journal of International Law* of the same year.³ Consequently, the historical development of self-determination before 1918 could be called a 'pre-pre-history'.

Shoemaker traced back the origins of the theory to the Christian concept of state sovereignty in the late Middle Ages. On the other hand, POPE INNOCENT IV applied this theory also to the non-Christian world. The Spanish jurist and theologian FRANCISCO VITORIA continued this latter theoretical line in the 16th century, arguing for the emancipation of Latin American natives to the European colonizers.

MATT QVORTRUP also pointed it out in a 2015 issue of *Ethnopolitics* that the principle of self-determination was used already in 1527. During the course of the Habsburg–Valois Wars in the 16th century, the Treaty of Madrid decided that the province of Burgundy should belong to the realms of the former dynasty. In opposition to this, a local plebiscite was held by the French King FRANCIS I. This event marked the first time when the inhabitants – or to be precise, the property-owning male population – of a certain area had

² Shoemaker, Karl, „World War I, Self-Determination, and the Legacies of Medieval Jurisprudence,” *Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih*, No. 15 (2014), 61–62.

³ Lorca, Arnulf Becker, „Petitioning A Pre-History of Self-Determination,” *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2014), 497.

the chance to decide about their allegiance through a legal act as opposed to the political demands of monarchs.⁴

The pre-pre-history of self-determination became separated from the Church with the dawn of Enlightenment. From this point on, the rights of 'nations' became a topic of discussion in reason-based natural law. Additionally, the former Christian preconditions were replaced with a standard of civilization expected from communities. Finally, PASQUALE STANISLAO MANCINI – the Italian jurist and statesman of the 19th century – advocated that nation, this association defined by territorial, ethnic, linguistic and mental criteria should form the new basis of the international legal order.⁵

Retrospectively, Mancini was overshadowed by a more influential key figure of the contemporary Italian Peninsula: GIUSEPPE MAZZINI. According to the analysis of DENIS MACK SMITH, the self-determination of nations formed the essential core of the revolutionist's ideas. After the Great French Revolution that emancipated individual liberty as an international right, Mazzini waited for another radical turn for the sake of national liberty. Nonetheless, this development would only have been an inter-mediate step towards a new international formation in the European continent, organized on a loose federal basis. While nations that were tied together by means of geography, history, communal spirit and language would have been free to form their states, Mazzini also supposed that these communities would enter into an alliance with each other.⁶

The late influence of Mazzini on the development of the self-determination should not be undervalued. As STEFANO RACCHIA and NADIA URBINATI stressed in their introduction written to *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building and International Relations* (2010), the Italian politician was a

⁴ Qvortrup, Matt, „A Brief History of Self-Determination Referendums before 1920,” *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 14, No. 5 (Nov. 2015), 548.

⁵ Shoemaker, 68–70.

⁶ Smith, Denis Mack, *Mazzini*. Yale University Press, 1996, 11–15.

direct source of progressive and revolutionary ideas in the future. WOODROW WILSON himself was not evaded by the Mazzinian thoughts, which had a great impact on the American President.⁷

However, the influence of self-determination was not restricted merely to the spheres of mentality: the concepts also made its way to the international politics of the long 19th century. The Constituent Assembly of France during the Great Revolution already stood firmly against the idea of deciding in territorial questions without the involvement of inhabitants. The various stages of Italian unification between 1848–1870 made practical use of this thought as they were always legitimized by local plebiscites – in accordance to the Mazzinian principles.⁸ By utilizing the notion of self-determination, the Great Powers also legitimized and helped the secessionist movements of the Balkan peoples against the Ottoman Empire.⁹

All in all, the discussed theory had practiced a heavy influence on European political and mental history for hundreds of years before Woodrow Wilson even appeared on the political palette. However, the cases of occasional usage were not equal to the full emancipation of the idea. This development only took course during the turbulent times of the 'war that will end all wars': the First World War.

1.2. OVERTAKING FROM THE LEFT: BOLSHEVIK IDEAS AND POLICY (1913–1918)

On the eve of the Great War, Leftist parties already discussed the notion of self-determination heavily in the multi-ethnic empires of Austria–Hungary and Russia. With respect to the close future, a determining difference appeared between the views of Austro-Marxists and Bolsheviks. As opposed to the thoughts of OTTO BAUER who proposed the

⁷ Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati ed. *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building and International Relations* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2010, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 24.2), 1–3.

⁸ Qvortrup, 550–551.

⁹ Shoemaker, 61., 70.

federalization of the Habsburg Empire and the vindication of national self-determination by means of extraterritorial autonomy, VLADIMIR ILYICH ULYANOV – better known by his pseudonym 'LENIN' – argued for the understanding of the term as a right to secession. While the former understood nation as a cultural phenomenon, the latter stressed the connections of the national structure to territorial bases in his *The Rights of Nation to Self-Determination* (1913). Thus, Lenin essentially argued not for the preservation, but for the break-up of the Eastern multi-ethnic empires – which view gained huge importance soon enough.¹⁰

Up until 1917, the political matches of the Great War were dominated by the traditions of the 19th century. Several secret treaties and plans of war aims were born on both the sides of the British–French–Russian Entente and the Central Powers led by Germany and Austria–Hungary. As opposed to the struggle for power, the opinion of citizens had secondary importance.

Surprisingly, the first Great Power to bring a radical change into this mechanism was the one that had started the war as the most conservative of all – the Tsarist Russia. As EREZ MANELA pointed it out: the main watershed was the revolution of February 1917. On April 9, the so-called Provisional Government officially rejected the ideas of imperialist rule and conquest – instead of these, it propagated the self-determination of peoples as a new guideline for international politics. However, Manela's further comments were also important to consider as he warned the readers about the influence of the Bolsheviks on the communication.¹¹

According to BORISLAV CHERNEV, the Russian author of the article *The Brest-Litovsk Moment* in a 2011 volume of *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Lenin's usage of the notion

¹⁰ Zoltan Tarr, „Ethnicity, Nationality, and Nationalism in Early Austrian-Hungarian Social Science,” In Judith Marcus ed. *Surviving the Twentieth Century: Social Philosophy from the Frankfurt School to the Columbia Faculty Seminars* (1999, Transaction Publishers), 100–101.

¹¹ Erez, Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 37.

during the Great War combined the argumentations of both revolutionary socialism and nationalism as shown by his works *The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Rights of Nations to Self-Determination* (1915) and *The Socialist Revolution and the Rights of Nations to Self-Determination* (1916). In these pamphlets, the Bolshevik leader argued for the right of independence of 'oppressed' nationalities – however, his final goal to reach the socialist ideal still counted on the disappearance of nationalism.¹²

Accordingly to these ideas, the new Russian government after the Bolshevik *coup d'état* of November 1917 issued the proclamation titled *The Rights of Peoples of Russia to Self-Determination* in a mere week after the revolution. As shown by BETTY MILLER UNTERBERGER in his book *The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia* (1989): Lenin and his most influential companion, LÉON TROTSKY pushed for further reforms in politics and diplomacy. In addition to the declaration of self-determination as a right of nations for political independence, the Bolshevik leaders also stressed the cultural rights of minorities in their planned system. Finally, a special attention to the colonial world was also included in the proclamation of November 15.¹³

The policy of the Bolshevik government was nothing less than a watershed both in the flow of the First World War's international politics and the history of self-determination. First of all, the new leadership of Russia aimed at a worldwide revolution – and for their goal, they had the resources of a country that belonged to the ranks of the Great Powers before 1917. It did not matter that the utilization self-determination meant that the Russian Empire was about to be dissolved – compared to the chance of the old World falling apart, this might have seemed to be an unremarkable loss. Additionally, the Bolsheviks could gain the support of non-Russian minorities along with other oppressed populations. Combined

¹² Chernev, Borislav, „The Brest-Litovsk Moment: Self-Determination Discourse in Eastern Europe before Wilsonism,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep. 2011), 370–371.

¹³ Unterberger, Betty Miller, *The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia* (Chapel Hill; London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 83–84.

with the publication of the secret treaties concluded during the Great War, a serious challenge awaited the answer of the contemporary Great Powers situated in the opposing camps of the war.¹⁴

Out of the latter, the Central Powers were the ones to be quick and clever enough to react first. As shown by Chernev, Germany and the Habsburg Empire skilfully adopted the language of self-determination when billing their demands to revolutionary Russia on the peace negotiations of Brest-Litovsk. The Imperial Foreign Minister of Austria–Hungary, Count OTTOKAR CZERNIN had already started to work out a scheme on this basis with the German Chancellor GEORG VON HERTLING even before the Bolshevik proclamation of November 15. Naturally, the Central Powers demanded the utilization of the principle in relation to the nationalities situated in the realms of the Russian Empire – while the minorities that inhabited the former states were not taken into account during the negotiations.¹⁵

The representatives of Russia, Germany, Austria–Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918. Sticking strictly to the points of the contract, shockingly large and important peripheral territories – Ukraine, Belorussia, Bessarabia etc. – were detached from the body of the Russian Empire.¹⁶ However, the real importance of Brest-Litovsk lied elsewhere. As TRYVGE THRONTVEIT emphasized it in his article *The Fable of the Fourteen Points*, the treaty marked a real revolutionary change in the spheres of political ideologies and diplomatic practice, being the first international contract to be signed on the basis of self-determination.¹⁷

During the turbulent period of late 1917 – early 1918, several radical turns took place within the sphere of war politics. As a consequence, the Great Powers of the Entente –

¹⁴ Manela, 37.

¹⁵ Chernev, 372.

¹⁶ Ibid., 379.

¹⁷ Throntveit, Tryvge, „The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (June 2011), 458.

Great Britain, France and the allied United States – faced the serious danger that they would become gravely handicapped as opposed to both the Bolshevik government and the Central Powers. Popular support at home, reliance of alliances and stability of colonial rule: all were at stake due to the winds of change. Thus, a reaction was a must – and this necessity eventually lead to the famous 'Wilsonian moment'.

1.3. ANSWERS FROM THE WEST: THE 'WILSONIAN MOMENT' (1918–1919)

The first reaction to the condensing smoke signals coming from the East was given on 5 January 1918 from the side of the Entente – however, the initiator was not the President of the United States. In fact, it was the British Prime Minister LLOYD GEORGE who endorsed the idea of self-determination first. As interpreted by THRONVEIT, the politician tried to counteract the dangerous poison of Bolshevik influence by adapting to the ideas announced by the hostile force to a certain extent. As a part of this, he did not apply the notion only to the territories and the populations subject to the hostile forces, but to the British Dominions as well. Thus, Lloyd George also espoused the notion of the 'consent of the governed' – which was first advocated during the course of the war by WOODROW WILSON.¹⁸

Speaking of the American President, it must be emphasized that the Wilsonian form of self-determination had other, earlier sources than the already discussed wartime impacts. As shown by MANELA, the republican ideas of individual rights, Anglo-American liberal tradition and the Monroe Doctrine all influenced this development.¹⁹ In addition to this, ALLEN LYNCH – who attempted to reconsider the traditional approach to the subject in the *Review of International Studies* of 2002 – also cited the moral influence of Presbyterian

¹⁸ Throntveit, 459.

¹⁹ Manela, 23–24.

faith on the American President when it came to the subject of messianistic approach towards thoughts, tasks and obligations.²⁰

Manela presented that the core elements of the notion were already apparent within the thoughts of Wilson by the end of the 19th century. In fact, the politician in connection to the Philippines advocated the notion – the islands annexed by the United States as a consequence of the Spanish–American war of 1898. According to Wilson, the acquisition of these territories meant an obligation in the image of a civilizing mission to prepare the local population for effective self-government in time.²¹

The events of the Great War gave a further boost and importance to the theories of Wilson. Leading the United States of America since 1913 – a neutral state in the conflict that was still not accepted as a Great Power at that point –, the American President wanted to have some words in relation to the events of the First World War. Even more, Wilson tried to make use of the turbulent events to leap towards a worldwide transformation as pointed out by THRONVEIT.²²

In his 'Peace without Victory' speech of January 1917, Wilson already introduced 'government by consent', 'equality of nations' and 'international co-operation' to the World as the fundamental basis of his vision. Manela emphasized it with a right that this was a direct challenge to the conservative empires representing the Old World – no wonder that they flatly rejected the fire-eater reformist. It was only due to the United States entering the war in April 1917 and the already discussed revolution at the turn of 1917/18 that an international passage for the Wilsonian thought was opened.²³

²⁰ Lynch, Allen, „Woodrow Wilson and the 'Principle of National Self-Determination': A Reconsideration," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1 April 2002), 423.

²¹ Manela, 28.

²² Thronveit, 455.

²³ Manela, 16.

Early 1918 saw the final declaration of self-determination by the American President – which notion, however, was not mentioned in the famous Fourteen Points of January 18 but in the less known Four Points of February 11 as pointed out by Manela. Using the term as a synonym to that of 'self-government', Wilson finally vested the nations with the right of government by consent. However, as emphasized by the politician, this was only applied to populations with 'well-defined national aspirations'.²⁴

'Well-defined' demands of 'nations' – two unstable expressions within one statement that provided a ground for several interpretations ever since Wilson's announcement of early February. Indeed: both the contemporaries and the posterity understood these notions in different ways and it took a lot effort to unfold the original meanings behind them.

First of all, as Thronveit stressed it, the vague term of 'political independence' allowed space for a lot of interpretations. Statehood, autonomy or even rights leading 'only' to an equal treatment of peoples – all could have been and was in fact understood as applications of 'self-determination'. Thus, a lot of tensions were created between various states and nations – while in many cases, both parties were followers of the same thought.²⁵

As for 'nation', both Manela and Lynch pointed out that the initial stage of the Wilsonian interpretation was a term based on popular sovereignty – however, the historians had different approaches in terms of sources. Manela stressed that while Wilson borrowed the actual notion of 'self-determination' from the Bolsheviks, he applied it to state populations intentionally to oppose to the ethnic approach to the latter.²⁶ Contrastingly,

²⁴ Manela, 41–42.

²⁵ Thronveit, 425–426.

²⁶ Ibid., 42.

Lynch laid emphasis on the influence of American nation-building – a civic construction – on Wilson.²⁷

Wilson's final shift from the state-based aspect to the ethnic understanding was due to exigencies dictated by the wartime situation. Accepting the points made by both Manela and Lynch, it is clear retrospectively that the multi-ethnic empires of Eastern Europe fitted the American President's initial ideas. For example, MAGDA ÁDÁM showed that in her *The Versailles System and Central Europe* that the American President wished to preserve the Habsburg Empire – looking up on the latter both as a well-functioning economic unity and as a fundamental element in the European balance of power. While seeing reforms and federalization on ethnic lines as a necessary prerequisite of sustainable future, Wilson – like the other leaders of the Entente – did not sanction any plans to dissolve the Monarchy until the failure of the peace negotiations with the latter by the Summer of 1918. Even at that point, the politician was hesitant doing so – it was not until the failure of the monarch Charles IV's attempt of federalization in late October that he accepted the disappearance of the old state from the map of Europe.²⁸

With the empires of the East falling down, the creation of nation-states remained the only alternative. Wilson was criticized widely for his connected decisions during the Peace Conference of Versailles – the scientists SHOEMAKER and Lynch were both followers of this tradition. The former judged the American President for the lack of clear definitions in connection to national self-determination.²⁹ On the other hand, the latter stated that Wilson did not possess an adequate knowledge on the conditions of Central and Eastern Europe –

²⁷ Lynch, 424.

²⁸ Magda Ádám, *The Versailles System and Central Europe. Variorum Collected Studies*. (London: Ashgate Pub. Company, 2003), 4–14.

²⁹ Shoemaker, 71–72.

furthermore, he made compromises between the clear utilization of his ideas and the political interests of both new states and the old Great Powers of Europe.³⁰

While the critiques had their foundations, they missed important points. It must be remembered that 'self-determination' had to be flexible both as a tool of propaganda and as a guideline of reconstruction to get accepted by the conservative partners. On the other hand, the American politician already showed considerable knowledge on the national problems of the Dual Monarchy at the end of the 19th century³¹. Furthermore, it is not to be forgotten he was actually supported by a massive group of experts in Versailles.³² Finally: if we accept that the 'ethnic turn' of Wilson was a compulsion forced on him by external conditions, all the divisions that moved the outcomes closer to the original project might be more understandable.

Nonetheless, sticking to the local examples of self-determination would be a mistake: the American President's final goal was to achieve a new international system – the famous League of Nations. Lynch successfully argued that through this organization, both European and collective security was aimed at. Thus, the local applications of self-determination had to be viewed as mere intermediate steps from this aspect – like MAZZINI's vision a few generations earlier.³³

While his concept had its various mistakes, shortcomings and gaps, the period of late 1918 – was rightfully described by Manela as the 'Wilsonian moment'. Being both an initiator and a file-closer of events, the American politician proposed and adopted new ideas that could uplift people from the Cape of Good Hope to the Arctic. On the other hand, the – necessarily – undefined nature of his ideas awakened such hopes that proved to be irrational

³⁰ Lynch, 426–427., 432–433.

³¹ Unterberger, 18.

³² For example, see Reiser, Wesley J., „Self-Determination and the Difficulty of Creating Nation-States: The Transylvania Case,” *Geographical Review*, Vol. 99, No. 2 (Apr., 2002), 231–247. Reiser discusses a notable example where the Wilsonian notion of self-determination and the ethnic diversity of Central Europe collided with each other – which problem was to be dealt with by American experts.

³³ Lynch, 426.

retrospectively as President's notions had to be reconciled with the needs and the demands of the victorious Entente.

However, while self-determination was not put into reality in its total form, the Versailles settlement created a wide system of autonomies for minorities – both in extra-territorial and territorial senses. On the other hand, the League of Nations – the supposed international guard – lacked the power and many times, the will to sanction the violations made to these. This turned out to be a problem as the new states in the Eastern parts of Europe tended to act against the rights of minorities – seen as obligations forced on them – in order to promote ethnic structures.³⁴

While modern scientific literature showed that the Bolsheviks initiated the self-determination discourse, it was Wilson who could finally achieve the widespread acceptance of the idea – with a reason. Both the Russian revolutionaries and the American politician aimed at reconstruction on an international level from the peripheries. However, LENIN and TROTSKY wanted to destroy the old World – Wilson, on the other hand, wanted to reform it. When radical socialism and reform-minded liberalism collided with each other, those statesmen whose views were a bit more conservative than those of Bolshevism naturally sided with the latter.

The acceptance of self-determination finally proved to be a must for all parties of the Great War. Both the Wilsonian and the Bolshevik ideas appealed to those the most who were losers of the current structure – in other words, the overwhelming population of the World. In a war that was raging to an extent unseen before, this phenomenon deeply endangered the stabilities of the belligerent states. In the case of the Central Powers, the additional aspect of utilizing the new notions for their own benefits was already mentioned.

³⁴ Motta, Giuseppe, „After Versailles. Territorializing Minority Policies in Central-Eastern Europe,” In Bianchini, Stefano, ed. *Self-Determination and Sovereignty in Europe. From Historical Legacies to the EU External Role* (Ravenna: Longo, 2013, Europe and the Balkans International Network), 17–28.; Ádám 2003, 227–229.

On the other hand, the Entente was under heavy pressure from revolutionary Russia, the pliable hostile camp and the United States. The latter supplied loans vital for Great Britain and France to continue their fight – the impact of which on the acceptance of Wilsonian self-determination was stressed rightfully by RODNEY C. WATKINS.³⁵

However, while many modern works dealing with the Great War-era have made the important shift of looking beyond the central figure of Wilson, there are still painful gaps yawning in terms of pre-pre-history. As shown by Shoemaker and QVORTRUP, self-determination was a notion that developed from the medieval concept of state sovereignty, filled with the national context in the 19th century.

A same type of wantingness appears in relation to the years preceding 1917 and for the territories outside of Russia and the United States. The lack of this aspect on self-determination discourses in the First World War might culminate in the production of a false image: that the notion suddenly popped up from nowhere sometime between 1917–1918 and out of the genius heads of Lenin and Wilson.

Consequently, the international scientific discourse is also still in large debt when it comes to the development of the self-determination discourse in the Great War. While the Bolsheviks have become more and more discussed besides Wilson, other examples are still overlooked. Nonetheless, the examples of Unterberger – who connected this subject to the history of Czechoslovakia –, the 1995 volume of the Pilsudski Institute titled *Wilsonian Central Europe*³⁶ – which dealt with regional ideas and their applications – and Manela – who observed the impact of the Wilsonian notion on the colonial world – have to be mentioned.

³⁵ Watkins, Rodney C., „Multinational Self-Determination,” *Peace Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1998), 227.

³⁶ Micgiel, John S., ed. *Wilsonian East Central Europe: Current Perspectives*. New York: Pilsudski Institute, 1995.

It was also the author of the *Wilsonian Moment* who stressed that the self-determination and self-governance discourse became increasingly vivid among the liberal and labour groups of the Great War-era Great Britain even before 1918. However, Manela connected this to the influence of the American president.³⁷ In contrast, British historians HUGH and CHRISTOPHER SETON-WATSON stated in 1981 in connection to an ominous First World War-newspaper:

[The *New Europe*] was 'Wilsonian' long before Wilson himself.³⁸

Even though the relationship of the late authors' – the sons of the editor ROBERT WILLIAM SETON-WATSON – to the press organ might be called biased, their statement still contains an interesting piece of information: a peculiar one that makes it worthwhile to deal with the aforementioned newspaper during the course of the final thesis. As a start, the next chapter will cover the history of the *New Europe* to provide a background for the observation of the usage of self-determination on its pages.

³⁷ Manela, 36–39.

³⁸ Hugh Seton-Watson and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe. R. W. Seton-Watson and the last years of Austria-Hungary* (Methuen – London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1981), 195.

2. PROJECT: THE *NEW EUROPE*

In a study of a 1990 volume dedicated to the memory of the Czechoslovak president TOMÁŠ GARRIGUE MASARYK, the American historian PAUL LATAWSKI pointed at London as one of the main centres of the self-determination discourse in the Great War and the circle of the *New Europe* as an especially eager receptive of the notion.³⁹ However, the observation of the usage of this term by the press organ also requires a preliminary traversing of its history as it is an often neglected and forgotten one. The intellectual basis behind the British newspaper was composed of individuals with important connections to the Eastern parts of Europe – the main field of the former notion’s utilization in the Old Continent. The international association company was lead by ROBERT WILLIAM SETON-WATSON and Masaryk – locals and outsiders, nurses and careful parents of the ambitious project in different contexts.

2.1. THE BIRTH OF THE 'WEEKLY' (1914–1916)

The Scottish-originated SETON-WATSON started to show signs of peculiar interest towards the distant Habsburg Empire during his education at university. Gaining a chance to travel to the realms of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy between 1905–1910, Seton-Watson did not only explore the dual state, but also met the representatives of various national elites. During this time, Seton-Watson could also get to know the Czech politician and intellectual TOMÁŠ GARRIGUE MASARYK.⁴⁰

The tour proved to be a mind-opening one for the Scottish traveller. It turned out that most nationalities of the empire – or at least their elites – were deeply unsatisfied with the current situation. The British citizen eventually started to publish articles on the conditions

³⁹ Latawski, Paul, „The 'Discrepancy between State and Ethnographic Frontiers': Dmowski and Masaryk on Self-Determination,” In Winters, Stanley B., ed. *T. G. Masaryk (1850–1937): Volume 1: Thinker and Politician* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1990), 94.

⁴⁰ Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, 19–40.

of the Habsburg dominions under the pseudonym 'Scotus Viator'. Seton-Watson's main aim was to inform the British public of the aforementioned problems and to form an opinion of constructive criticism – which, however, was combined with a feeling of hope. Seton-Watson believed that the Monarchy was still able to transform for the better – thus, he advocated the need of federalization along ethnic lines.⁴¹

Seton-Watson also initiated a project that had great importance with respect to the later developments. Getting widely accepted as an expert of the Eastern European territories, the Scottish intellectual planned to start a quarterly review to provide more details upon these matters to the European public and to support various national movements. The planned newspaper eventually gained the title *The European Review*, intended to study the nations of the Old Continent from political, cultural, religious and economic aspects. Many of Seton-Watson's friends from the Monarchy appeared on the provisional lists of collaborators. The preliminary advertisements were made not just in English, but in various Eastern languages as well.⁴² However, the actual publication of *The European Review* was cancelled due to the First World War.⁴³

The revolutionary change in the course of international politics in 1914 influenced the Scottish expert towards new directions. From this point on, Seton-Watson expected nothing less from the war but the unification of the Southern Slavs and Romanians living in and outside of the Habsburg Monarchy in their own national states. However, this did not equal to the demand that the ancient empire should dissolve – this turn took its course only in October, under the influence of Masaryk.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Géza Jeszenszky, „Seton-Watson és a 'magyarellenesség',” (Seton-Watson and 'Hungarophobia'), *História*, Vol. 9, Issue 1 (1987), 20–21.

⁴² The prospects of *The European Review* can be found in: Seton-Watson Collection (hereafter cited as SEW), UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, box 2/2, fold. 1.

⁴³ Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, 98–99.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 101–102., 111.

The Czech politician – being the leader of the tiny Realist Party but also a member of the Austrian parliament (*Reichsrat*) – demanded the equalization of nations in Austria–Hungary until 1914 and opted for Czech independence only after the start of the First World War. However, local resources were not adequate for the realization of this new aim; external support also had to be gained. Thus, Masaryk established the intelligence service and propaganda organization of the so-called 'Maffie' (Mafia) in co-operation with his young follower, EDVARD BENEŠ. The Czech leader also possessed important connections back from the pre-war era – Seton-Watson being one of them.⁴⁵

Masaryk could present his new aims to the Scottish intellectual in Rotterdam, October 1914. His dream was a state composed of the historical crown lands of Bohemia and the areas of Northern Hungary inhabited by the Slovaks in his project. Seton-Watson sent this plan to the British Foreign Office secretary SIR GEORGE CLERK - and through the complicated ways of bureaucracy, a memorandum titled *Independent Bohemia* reached even the Foreign Secretary SIR EDWARD GREY himself.⁴⁶

Emigrating from the Habsburg Monarchy in late 1914, the Czech politician finally decided to move to London in September 1915. Besides gaining lead of the local Czech associations, Masaryk also obtained a spot on the newly-founded School of Slavonic and East European Studies of the London University's King's College. He also held the opening lecture of the institution titled *The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis*. The importance of this event was shown by the fact that the Prime Minister HERBERT HENRY ASQUITH also intended to attend it. However, Masaryk did not represent his ideals and thoughts only through lectures: he was also a regular contributor to various British

⁴⁵ Neville, Peter, *Tomáš Masaryk and Eduard Beneš. Czechoslovakia* (London: Haus Publishing, 2010, The peace conferences of 1919–23 and their aftermath), 7., 21.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

newspapers. Under his leadership, the Czech associations also initiated a campaign of pamphlets from 1915 on.⁴⁷

Seton-Watson also did not hesitate to engage in the field of propaganda either. Being a collaborator to the publication *War and Democracy*, he gave voice to his new ideals already in late 1914. Two years later, the expert attempted to discover the main causes of the Great War in his *German, Slav and Magyar*. However, the Scottish intellectual wished to publish his ideas in much larger details than mere pamphlets.⁴⁸

Seton-Watson's determination to gain more publicity was verified by Masaryk. The Czech politician – possessing knowledge on the earlier project of the *European Review* – started to agitate his patron to found a new 'weekly' as soon as he arrived to Great Britain. Masaryk emphasized the necessity of this with the need of counter-weighting the influence of Austrophile voices. Furthermore, he also argued that the hesitant attitude of the British government towards the Habsburg Empire made the appearance of a firm political voice necessary.⁴⁹

Thus, the Great War-era project of the 'weekly' was not a product of decisions made in a certain heated moment, with many of its themes present in the pre-war thoughts of Seton-Watson and Masaryk and with its intellectual network set up already by 1914. The First World War meant a change in terms of aims and directions, though – which new approach was indicated in the choice of the name itself: *The New Europe*. While it was down the track to achieve the actual publication, the founders could already rely on many others in their efforts.

The idea of the *New Europe* found one of its main supporters in the figure of HENRY WICKHAM STEED. Working as the Viennese correspondent of *The Times* between 1908–

⁴⁷ Hanak, Harry, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War: A study in the formation of public opinion* (London – New York – Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962), 102–131., 210.

⁴⁸ Seton-Watson, letter to Prof. Phillips, 30 November 1916. SEW, box 2/3, fold 3.

⁴⁹ Masaryk, letter to Seton-Watson, 2 May and 22 August 1916. SEW, box 17/16, fold 6.

1912, the pressmen went under a mental transformation in relation to Austria–Hungary similar to that of Seton-Watson. More importantly, Steed was in close relationship with the mighty and influential press baron LORD NORTHCLIFFE.⁵⁰

The founders of *The New Europe* were happy to greet the archaeologist RONALD BURROWS – the principal of the King’s College – among their ranks. The liberal MP A. F. WHYTE was also an important addition to the group. Being the secretary of the First Lord of Admiralty SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL, Whyte meant an important source of political influence for the association.⁵¹

However, Steed, Burrows and Whyte could only provide mental capital for the project – Masaryk and Seton-Watson had to deal with the financial issues themselves. The Czech politician took the obligation to uptake the first-term expenses of the *New Europe* with the help of various organizations connected to him.⁵² After this period, Seton-Watson was left alone in dealing with this matter – which was a heroic task indeed, since the press organ was in a constant loss throughout its existence. On the other hand, the expert could rely on the rich heritage of his parents in his determinations.⁵³

The structure of the newspaper evolved due to the negotiations between Seton-Watson, Masaryk and the publisher Constable & Co. Ltd.⁵⁴ The cover of the press organ was ornamented by two mottos in case of each number. One of them was the official war cry of the group: *La Victoire Intégrale* – ‘to the final victory’.⁵⁵ As an important addition to the main structure of the newspaper, Masaryk thought that the column of reviews could have been used not only for publishing news to be commented by the authors, but also to

⁵⁰ Thompson, J. Lee, *Politicians, the press, & propaganda: Lord Northcliffe & the Great War* (Kent – London: Kent University Press, 1999), 169–170.

⁵¹ Hanak, Harry, „*The New Europe*, 1916–20,” *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 39, No. 93 (June 1961), 373–376.

⁵² Seton-Watson, letter to Masaryk, 4 October 1916. SEW, box 17/16, fold. 6.

⁵³ May, 54.

⁵⁴ W. H. Smith & Sons, letter to Seton-Watson, 14 September 1916. SEW, box 2/2, fold. 1.

⁵⁵ Hanak, „*The New Europe*”, 376., 384.

contain shorter articles and answers for letters sent in by readers. It was also his idea that the *New Europe* should be sent to every people mentioned on its pages.⁵⁶

The individuals who formed the group of the *New Europe* were invited and selected personally by Seton-Watson and Masaryk.⁵⁷ 'Collaborating' with the newspaper did not equal to a regular contribution to its work – it was enough for the enthusiastic ones to drop their names, advices or authority in the lot.⁵⁸ On the other hand, these efforts were not awarded with any sum as the *New Europe* was organized on a purely voluntary basis.⁵⁹

While several members of separatist national movements from the Habsburg Empire published on the pages of the press organ, the official list of collaborators featured only one of them – Masaryk of 'Bohemia'. On the other hand, Seton-Watson and his friends could actually collect a truly international guard of co-workers coming not only from Great Britain or Austria–Hungary, but also from Japan, the United States, France, Italy, Russia and Serbia.⁶⁰

Masaryk himself was more than a mere contributor: his distinguished role was signed by the fact that he was the one to write the first leader of the *New Europe*. Titled *Pangermanism and the Eastern Question*, the article dealt with the German war aims – a frequently discussed topic on the pages of the newspaper.⁶¹ The Czech politician also published several writings on the Dual Monarchy and the Czechoslovak movement. Finally, Masaryk could provide up-to-date pieces of information to his companions on the situation of Eastern Europe through the network of the 'Maffie'.⁶²

Nonetheless, it is without doubt that Seton-Watson was the most important person of the group. The Scottish intellectual acted as the editor of the newspaper – but in addition to

⁵⁶ Masaryk, letter to Seton-Watson, 13 October 1916. SEW, box 17/16, fold. 6.

⁵⁷ Seton-Watson, letter to Prof. Pollard, 25 October 1916. SEW, box 2/3, fold. 3.

⁵⁸ Seton-Watson, letter to Dr. Prothero, 23 October 1916. SEW, box 2/3, fold. 3.

⁵⁹ Seton-Watson, letter to Masaryk, 4 October 1916.

⁶⁰ Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, 439–441.

⁶¹ Hanak, „*The New Europe*”, 379.

⁶² Unterberger, 7–8.

this, he also wrote several articles on its pages, either under his own name or the pseudonym 'Rubicon' – the latter possessing a double meaning as the expert crossed rivers formally sacred to both himself and the contemporary world. In his writings, Seton-Watson usually dealt with the subjects of Austria–Hungary and the Southern Slavs.⁶³

2.2. THE ACTIVITY OF THE *NEW EUROPE* DURING THE GREAT WAR (1916–1918)

The opening number of the weekly appeared on 19 October 1916, starting with a letter of introduction dated for 10 October 1916. According to this invocation, *The New Europe* aimed at observing the international network of foreign and war politics and providing related information to the public.⁶⁴

The press organ also intended to provide a rallying ground for those who aimed at the future reconstruction of Europe on the basis of nationality, minority rights and the correction of state borders with respect to economic and geographic details. The association of the newspaper also strongly supported the determinations of the Entente war as they could only hope the realization of their aims after the victory of the latter.⁶⁵

The *New Europe* also advocated provocative ideas of democratization in connection to the relationship between politics and public opinion, with special respect to the involvement of the latter into foreign policy. This course of change was initiated not from below, but from the upside as the main audience aimed at were politicians and other key figures in the countries of the Entente.⁶⁶ Consequently, the *New Europe* appeared not only in Great Britain, but also in Italy, France and the United States.⁶⁷

On one hand, the staff of the newspaper tried to agitate the British public opinion to leave its traditional apathy towards the conditions of the outside world and to inform it about

⁶³ May, 52.

⁶⁴ „The New Europe,” *The New Europe*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (19 October 1916): 1.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ May, 53.

⁶⁷ Hanak, „The New Europe”, 394.

the less known areas of the European continent.⁶⁸ On the other hand, while supporting the war efforts of the Entente whole-heartedly, the association of *The New Europe* also tried to interfere in contemporary political mechanisms and to utilize an opinion of constructive criticism in relation to governmental acts.⁶⁹

The innovative newspaper gained widespread popularity shortly after the publication of its first volume. Positive critiques were voiced from the sides of the *Times*, the *Observer*, the *Spectator*, the *Punch* and the *New York Times*⁷⁰. In other words, *The New Europe* was greeted with an enthusiasm both in Great Britain and the United States.

However, negative judgements also appeared soon. *The New Europe* was charged with Bolshevik and Philosemitic sympathy by the organs of the Polish *Tygodnik Polski* and the *New Witness*. The pacifist groups accused the company with neglecting British interests by pressing for the continuation of war efforts – in their interpretation, for the sake of the group's 'mania' to re-draw the map of Europe.⁷¹ The Italian press also sported a hostile attitude due to the *New Europe*'s critical opinion towards the wartime politics of the Mediterranean country.⁷² Finally, SETON-WATSON also had to defend his newspaper from the accusations of being anti-clerical and anti-Catholic.⁷³

The hostility towards the *New Europe* also took a material form in the field of British politics. While he was physically incapable to perform his duties in the army, Seton-Watson was suddenly called into service in March 1917. It turned out later that it was the Italophile, pacifist and liberal MP JOSEPH KING who initiated this act, hoping to neutralize the group of the newspaper.⁷⁴

⁶⁸ Hanak, „*The New Europe*”, 375.

⁶⁹ Seton-Watson, letter to Dr. Prothero, 23 October 1916.

⁷⁰ May, 53.

⁷¹ Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, 282–283.; Hanak 1962, 189.

⁷² Hanak, „*The New Europe*”, 394.

⁷³ Seton-Watson, letter to Randall, 5 February 1918. SEW, box 2/3, fold. 4.

⁷⁴ Messinger, Gary S., *British propaganda and State in the First World War* (Manchester University Press, 1992), 165.

However, this intention fired back as Seton-Watson was employed by the Department of Information – the British intelligence service. The expert was welcomed by familiar faces as many of his colleagues worked at the same place. The government generously allowed all of them to continue their work in their newspaper.⁷⁵ It is no wonder that the co-editor GEORGE GLASGOW saw this moment retrospectively as the 'conquest' of the Department of Information by the *New Europe* group.⁷⁶

For Seton-Watson, the new situation had two main consequences. First of all, as he was not allowed to remain the editor of the press organ, he had to transfer this position to WHYTE.⁷⁷ However, he still continued to work for the cause of the press organ in his free time – now gaining rich opportunities to collect information. As an employee of the intelligence service, Seton-Watson was tasked to make reports on the internal situation of the Habsburg Monarchy – the contents of which also appeared on the pages of the *New Europe*. Furthermore, Seton-Watson could now act as a 'fifth column' in the government, working for the interests of his group.⁷⁸

All in all, the negative turns of 1917 had positive outcomes for The New Europe. Due to the gained advantages, the propaganda campaign of the association reached its peak in 1918. Several articles were planned to appear in the form of individual leaflets – for example, this was the case with MASARYK's *Bohemia and the European Crisis*.⁷⁹

2.3. AND THEN CAME VICTORY: 1918–1919

The last year of the war also saw the establishment of the British Department of Enemy Propaganda under LORD NORTHCLIFFE in February. As indicated in its name, the organization aimed at producing material to exercise an effect on the populations of hostile

⁷⁵ Michael L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914–18* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 82.

⁷⁶ Hanak, „*The New Europe*”, 394.

⁷⁷ Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, 205.

⁷⁸ Messinger, 166–167.

⁷⁹ Seton-Watson's memorandum on paper shortages, 1918. SEW, box 2/2, fold. 1.

countries. Naturally, Austria–Hungary was also targeted – with the related section headed by STEED and supervised by SETON-WATSON. In other words, the thoughts endorsed by the *New Europe* could finally form an important basis of British propaganda.⁸⁰

After the Department of Information, the association of the press organ could conquer yet another important sphere in state administration. However, despite having strong control over the production of anti-Austrian propaganda, Steed and Seton-Watson still faced a couple of restrictions. For example, the British government prohibited them to make generous promises to the nationalities of the Habsburg Empire – as the peace negotiations with the latter lasted until March. In addition to this, the government of Great Britain also had pledges towards some of its allies laid down by various contracts of the war that were to be safeguarded.⁸¹

Steed and Seton-Watson moved their field of activity to Italy in March 1918. On the frontlines facing the troops of the Dual Monarchy, they published a newspaper titled the *Truth* – aiming at the Slavic and Romanian soldiers of the enemy forces in their native languages. The deserters of the Joint Army also helped them to demoralize their former comrades.⁸²

Furthermore, the Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities of Austria–Hungary gathered together in April 1918 due to the joint determinations of Seton-Watson and Steed. With the support of Lord Northcliffe at hand, the experts could influence both the British and the Italian governments to move closer to their aims. As a final goal, the couple tried to establish a common front of subject peoples and belligerent states against the Habsburg Empire.⁸³

⁸⁰ Sanders and Philip, 89–92.; Messinger, 171.

⁸¹ Sanders and Philip, 224–227.

⁸² Sanders and Philip, 227–228; Messinger, 172–175.

⁸³ Sanders and Philip, 227., 229.; Messinger, 177.

As a consequence of these efforts, the activity of the Department of Enemy Propaganda was a true success in connection to the Dual Monarchy. Its influence did not take effect only on the frontlines, but penetrated through them and reached the local population. Among other factors, this also contributed to the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire in October 1918 – awaited and advocated so eagerly by the *New Europe* throughout the Great War. While it would be an overstatement to owe this result exclusively to the activity of the group, their related influence was unquestionable.⁸⁴

The long-anticipated final triumph of the Entente created a new situation for Seton-Watson and the group of the newspaper. There was no need to argue neither for the destruction of the Habsburg Empire nor for the boost of the British moral anymore. On the other hand, the new task to prepare for the Peace Conference of Versailles appeared, as emphasized by the number celebrating the German capitulation (18 November 1918).⁸⁵

However, the final victory of the principles advocated by the *New Europe* was preceded by four years of fight – for the secessionist movements of Eastern Europe and in connection to this, for the triumph of national self-determination. In fact, the association made great use of the notion – earlier and independently from the most famous Great War-factors mentioned in the first chapter. However, this did not mean that the notions of *The New Europe* were absent from any external influences. Furthermore, its self-determination discourse had various peculiar aspects that are to be dealt with during the course of the next chapter.

⁸⁴ Sanders and Philip, 228–229., 245.

⁸⁵ Hanak, „*The New Europe*”, 384.

3. THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN NATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION – IN THE *NEW EUROPE*

In the introduction of 10 October 1916, the association of the *New Europe* stated their firm visions in relation to the future of the Old Continent. *European reconstruction, on a basis of nationality, the vindication of national rights, the emancipation of the subject races of central and south-eastern Europe* – all were listed within one page.⁸⁶

The future self-determination discourse of the press organ had to be integrated to this set of ideas – which, however, contained a lot of yet undefined notions to be reconciled with the old-new term. During the course of this chapter, my aim is to clarify the meanings and the relationships of various thoughts present on the pages of the *New Europe* in order to achieve a better understanding on both these and their application by the guard of the newspaper.

3.1. HAND-IN-HAND?: THE 'PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY' AND SELF-DETERMINATION

The public opinion of Great Britain had already seen the declaration of the so-called 'principle of nationality' in 1914. Among others, the journalist C. ERNEST FAYLE, the leading articles of the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Morning Post* argued for the dissolution of the hostile Habsburg Monarchy on the basis of national units. This line was to be followed by many others in the following years – for example, by the group of the *New Europe*.⁸⁷

In terms of definition, late scientific literature seems to equate the principle of nationality to self-determination and handles the former as a synonymous term that appeared earlier during the course of the Great War.⁸⁸ This approach would fit perfectly in

⁸⁶ „The New Europe,” *The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 1 (19 October 1916): 1.

⁸⁷ Hanak, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary*, 43.

⁸⁸ Latawski 1990, 87.; Regan, Richard J.: *Just War: Principles and Cases* (CUA Press, 1996) 129.

the earlier mentioned development of pre-pre-history. However, I argue that while being connected, there were fundamental differences between the two notions.

As for evidence, the leading article of the *New Europe* on 17 October 1918 might have coincided with this opposing approach of mine. Produced by BURROWS, STEED and SETON-WATSON, the writing *Our Peace Terms* was in fact a draft of declaration proposed for the Entente for the moment of victory. The co-writers expected the Allied powers to state

2. That [the consent of the governed] necessarily involves the right of every national unit to control its own destinies, and to decide its State-allegiance (self-determination).
3. That the principle of nationality is a vital factor in the European political situation, and the satisfaction of legitimate national aspirations must precede the creation of an international order.⁸⁹

In my view, the separate mentioning of the principle of nationality and self-determination in different articles was not to avoid a simple repetition of words, but signified a distinction between the notions. This statement, however, requires an examination of the terms within the discourse of the *New Europe* in order to achieve a better understanding on their nature and their relationship to each other.

The principle of nationality already appeared in its virtual form on the pages of the first number⁹⁰ – on the other hand, it took several issues to unfold the entire meaning of the notion. It was for sure that the association of the *New Europe* saw the term as an imperative one with regards to the future of the Old Continent – the Russian statesman VLADIMIR KOVALEVSKY announced this view on 2 November 1916. The author stated that as nationalism produced those tensions which lead to the out-break of the First World War, the

⁸⁹ „Lord Bryce on the Principle of Nationality,” *The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 1 (19 October 1916): 30–31.

⁹⁰ [Steed, Henry Wickham – Burrows, George – Seton-Watson, R. W.], „Our Peace Terms,” *The New Europe*, Vol. IX, No. 105 (17 October 1918): 3. (As for authorship, see Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, 315.)

new settlement has to yield to this force without compromises in order to secure permanent peace for the troubled continent of Europe.⁹¹

In the next issue, the article *The Reorganization of Europe* – most possibly written by MASARYK – added an important element to the notion: the aspect of democracy. In contrast to the Central Powers that represented the archaic and disgusting spirits of brutal centralism and absolutism, the countries of the Entente fought as a federation of free nations – for the 'democratic principle of nationality'.⁹² The lines of *Wanted – A Foreign Policy* (4 December 1916) unfolded this further, explaining that the new project of reconstruction would not involve the idea of forceful conquests.⁹³

In line of this development in discourse, the leader of the 18 January 1917 issue (*The Allies' Programme*) stressed that the new European settlement after the war must count with the rights of nations to free development and to decide on their own fate – however, this was separated from the principle of nationality this time. Writing in anonymity, Steed and Seton-Watson mentioned the latter as a process formative, yet not emancipated in terms of international law and diplomacy by the times of the Great War. However, as a new aspect contradicting the earlier words of Kovalevsky, the authors also announced that political, religious and economic factors might have an equal or even a bigger weight with respect to the future settlement as that of nationality.⁹⁴

A similarly confusing co-existence of the democratic and national ideas appeared in the March article of HUGH A. LAW, dealing with the topic of the British-dominated Ireland. The writer demanded that the principle of nationality *and* the universal rights of liberty

⁹¹ „Russia and the Yugoslav Idea,” *The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 3 (2 November 1916): 79–81.

⁹² „The Reorganization of Europe,” *The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 4 (9 November 1916): 101. While the article appeared without the name of the writer mentioned, Masaryk's authorship is proved by one of his letters to Seton-Watson. Masaryk to Seton-Watson, 2 November 1916. SEW, box 2/11, fold. 16.

⁹³ „Wanted – A Foreign Policy,” *The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 9 (14 December 1916): 263.

⁹⁴ [Steed, Henry Wickham – Seton-Watson, R. W.], „The Allies' Programme,” *The New Europe*, Vol. II, No. 14 (January 18, 1917): 2–3. (As for the question of authorship, see Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, 191.)

should be respected in connection to this island – in other words, the Entente that stood for the application of these principles should give ‘self-government’ to the Irish.⁹⁵

In connection to ‘self-government’, it must be pointed out that synonymous expressions to ‘self-determination’ have already appeared in the *New Europe* before the actual notion itself – with WOODROW WILSON being *one* of the sources. The view that nations should be free to control their destinies appeared in Steed’s and Seton-Watson’s *The Allies’ Programme*, the article commenting on the Entente’s answer on 10 January 1917 to Wilson’s ‘Peace without Victory’ speech.⁹⁶ This concept was developed into a right or ‘liberty’ of choice in the February 1 issue – this time, connected directly to the policy of the American President.⁹⁷ However, the final words in relation to the question before the actual introduction of self-determination were written down on March 29 – by an unnamed Russian Socialist after the victory of the February Revolution in Russia, who asserted that every nation should have the possibility to decide on its own political fate.⁹⁸

After more than half a year dominated by the principle of nationality, finally a new and determinative notion entered the pages of the newspaper in April 1917. Reflecting on the policy of the Russian Provisional Government, the article titled *Poland’s Freedom* in the April 5 issue welcomed the developments made by the new political power. The term ‘self-determination’ was mentioned for the first time and was equated to the rights of national unity *and* exercising power to determine the latter’s future through democratic means.⁹⁹

The writing grabbed two peculiarities of the self-determination discourse of the *New Europe*. Firstly, the *Poland’s Freedom* was published before the Russian proclamation of April 9 that advocated the principle openly for the first time during the Great War – which, as a matter fact, showed the knowledgeable nature of the group on the news of Eastern

⁹⁵ Law, Hugh A., „Ireland in Europe,” *The New Europe*, Vol. II, No. 21 (8 March 1917): 236.

⁹⁶ [Steed – Seton-Watson], „The Allies’ Programme,” 2.

⁹⁷ „President Wilson and Europe,” *The New Europe*, Vol. II, No. 16 (1 February 1917): 79.

⁹⁸ „A Russian Socialist’s Creed,” *The New Europe*, Vol. II, No. 24 (29 March 1917): 340.

⁹⁹ „Poland’s Freedom,” *The New Europe*, Vol. II, No. 25 (5 April 1917): 380–381.

Europe. Secondly, the association of the press organ clearly and directly connected an international break-through not to the later examples of LENIN and Wilson, but to the first revolution of Russia.

This 'Februarian' viewpoint was stressed the most by the various versions of a memorandum (*Self-Determination / The Self-Determination of Nations*) produced by the group during the course of 1917. The writing stated that the acts of the New Russia placed the ideological struggle of the war on a new level. The unknown author also emphasized that the Western Powers have to accept the new idea of self-determination. In addition to this, the author also advocated that the principles of democracy should be respected as opposed to the secret treaties and power interests.¹⁰⁰

Introduced on 5 April 1917, the term of 'self-determination' was mentioned in seven issues of the *New Europe* until the Bolshevik revolution. It was used twice in connection to the Polish policy of the Provisional Government. On the other hand, the article *Imperialism: British and German* by J. C. POWELL (12 April 1917) utilized the notion to the British Empire – notably, through a quotation from the Italian Liberal newspaper of *La Tribuna*, which showed another example for the early adaptation of the concept.¹⁰¹ Finally, self-determination was used three times with respect to Central European subjects (Austria–Hungary and Romania), too.

In contrast to the strong badinage to the policy of the Provisional Government, the articles of the *New Europe* denounced the Bolsheviks as misusers of self-determination. Commenting on the policy of Lenin in November 1917, ALEX LEEPER – the expert of Russian topics as indicated by his pseudonym 'Rurik' – stated rightfully that the ideology of

¹⁰⁰ *Self-Determination / The Self-Determination of Nations*. SEW, box 3/3 fold. 2.

¹⁰¹ Powell, J. C., „Imperialism: British and German,” *The New Europe*, Vol. II, No. 26 (12 April 1917): 401.

the new government negated the concept of nationalism in the end. Therefore, their utilization of self-determination was nothing more than a 'mere idle phrase'.¹⁰²

As for the twisted adaptation of the concept by the Central Powers, Seton-Watson set up an interesting scheme. Naturally, Scottish intellectual pointed it out that self-determination was not applied to those nationalities that inhabited the realms of the hostile empires. However, in addition to this, he also announced that in fact, the governments of Germany and Austria–Hungary understood the notion not as one valid for peoples, but for state structures.¹⁰³

In connection to the problems raised by the Bolshevik policy and its influence on the matters of the Eastern part of Europe, the number of the articles dealing with self-determination grew radically. Within the three-month-long period between 15 November 1917 – 3 January 1918, the notion was mentioned five times – which was a considerable change when compared to the preceding half year. This time, no other topics were included than those of the Eastern troubles.

It seems like 'state' was used as a counter-concept of 'national self-determination' – as shown by the critique of the approaches of both the Central Powers, Wilson and LLOYD GEORGE to the Habsburg question in early 1918. While the ideas of the Entente politicians included the new principle of the Great War, the former were labelled as dangerous 'half-solutions' opposed to the actual will of the nationalities inhabiting the Eastern state by the authors of the *New Europe*. On the other hand, the editorial board expected a reformist Italy to be the champion of self-determination in Europe until the anti-Austrian turn of the

¹⁰² Rurik [Leeper, Alex], „Why Russia cannot make a Separate Peace,” *The New Europe*, Vol. V, No. 57 (29 November 1917): 199. As for the equality between 'Rurik' and Alex Leeper, see Hanak, „*The New Europe*”, 371.

¹⁰³ Rubicon [Seton-Watson, R. W.], „Austria in the Crucible,” *The New Europe*, Vol. VI, No. 68 (31 January 1918): 75–76.

American and British governments.¹⁰⁴ In case of the latter development, WHYTE announced that in order to formulate an adequate post-war settlement, the combined efforts of European experience and American idealism are needed.¹⁰⁵

While the mentioning of 'self-determination' was only occasional between April – November 1917 and became more frequent from the Bolshevik *coup d'état* on, the policies of Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson meant a breakthrough. From 10 January 1918 on, the notion was mentioned in every issue. Thus, it can be concluded that the members of the *New Europe* group raised their heads when the principle of self-determination was used by the Provisional Government of Russia, started to be keen on the subject with the revolution of Lenin and could not take their eyes off it from the beginning of the last war-year on.

It also has to be mentioned that the *New Europe* group proposed an international settlement similar to the Wilsonian League of Nations, advocated as the 'League of Peace' – before the American President.¹⁰⁶ Nonetheless, the former notion was viewed in sympathetic way before the United States entered the war – unlike Wilson's views on 'peace without victory'. The latter solution was seen as being equivalent to the victory of the Central Powers with the possibility given to consolidate their rule over the areas conquered by them.¹⁰⁷

However, the heavy discussion on self-determination did not mean that the principle of nationality would have disappeared from the pages of the newspaper – although its usage became extremely rare with a total mentioning of seven from April 1917 to January 1919. The Romanian politician TAKE IONESCU developed the discussion of the earlier notion further. In his article of 17 May 1917 (*The Greatest Danger*), the author traced back the appearance of national sovereignty as a notion to the English, American and French

¹⁰⁴ Powell, J. C., „Italy and the Liberation of the Slavs,” *The New Europe*, Vol. VI, No. 68 (31 January 1918): 91–92.

¹⁰⁵ Whyte, A. F., „The Versailles Mustard Seed,” *The New Europe*, Vol. VI, No. 72 (28 February 1918): 196.

¹⁰⁶ Hanak, „*The New Europe*”, 386.

¹⁰⁷ Masaryk, „*ad Wilson*,” 1917. SEW, box 17/16, fold. 6.

revolutions. The Romanian writer also stated that in reality, the principle of nationality was an application of the former term to the inter-ethnic relations of the World.¹⁰⁸

On the other hand, the interesting unfolding of self-determination's pre-history by the *New Europe* group also took course. While Seton-Watson simply connected the origins of the notion to MAZZINI,¹⁰⁹ the Russian historian ALEXANDER ONOU provided a more detailed background for the readers. In his article *Patriotism and Internationalism*, the author originated the idea from Christianity, Humanism and the Great French Revolution. With this view coinciding with the actual pre-pre-history of self-determination, Onou stated that the notion appeared as a counter-effect to the Napoleonic expansion. Finally, the Russian historian saw the break-out of the First World War as a decisive moment for the idea – now proclaimed as a right on an international level and finally embraced by the New Russia of early 1917.¹¹⁰

Self-determination merged on the side of the principle of nationality, not as its substitute: this was proved by the cases where the two notions were utilized together. An interview with the Russian Socialist GEORGI PLEKHANOV was extremely exciting in connection to this phenomenon: the politician talked about the 'right of nations to dispose of themselves' – in other words, self-determination – as the *application of the principle of nationality in its most democratic form*.¹¹¹ Based on this statement, I argue that the principle of nationality was seen as a general scheme of European reconstruction strictly connected to the national approach – the democratic elements were later attachments to this. In contrast, self-determination was applied to individual units and was intertwined with the idea of democracy from the beginning. It is also important to emphasize once more that the *New*

¹⁰⁸ Ionescu, Take, „The Greatest Danger,” *The New Europe*, Vol. III, No. 31 (17 May 1917): 129–130.

¹⁰⁹ Rubicon [Seton-Watson, R. W.], „The Czechs and Austria,” *The New Europe*, Vol. VI, No. 70 (14 February 1918): 144.

¹¹⁰ Onou, Alexander, „Patriotism and Internationalism: A Russian View,” *The New Europe*, Vol. VII, No. 79 (18 April 1918): 8–9.

¹¹¹ „Mr. Plehanov on Roumanian Claims,” *The New Europe*, Vol. IV, No. 44 (16 August 1917): 159.

Europe adopted the latter notion not from Lenin, Wilson or even George Lloyd, but from the discourse of the first Russian Revolution.

However, the group of *The New Europe* based both of the two central notions on an idea that was to be cleared: that is of the 'nation'. This discussion was interesting all the more as serious differences appeared in relation to the understanding of this term within the association – which in fact had important connections to the future of Europe.

3.2. 'BUT WHAT REALLY A NATION(ALITY) IS?'

Speaking of the issue of terminology, the most formative article on the national idea in the *New Europe* might have been the *Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations* – produced by MASARYK. Published in the 14 December 1916 issue of the newspaper, the Czech politician's writing aimed at dividing Europe into three zones according to political and ethnographical aspects. This determination involved a discussion of the national idea that triggered an interesting and important debate within the group.

Masaryk stated that the 18th century saw the birth of the nationalism as a political notion, providing a new way to unify communities. Following the ideas of the German philosopher JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER, the author made a distinction between the 'organic' national community and the 'artificial' state structure. In connection to this, Masaryk also argued that while the Western countries provided homes for almost homogenous peoples, the empires of the East were either mixed (Austria–Hungary, Prussia) or represented special cases (Russia) which was a source of great tensions in these territories.¹¹²

In opposition to the thoughts of the Czech politician, the British historian A. F. GILES published the article *What is Nationality?* on 28 January 1917. The author criticized

¹¹² Masaryk, Thomas G., „Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations,” *The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 9 (14 December 1916): 272–274., 277.

that in his view, Masaryk confused 'race' (ethnicity) with 'nation'. Giles argued that rather than colliding the latter with the state, a historical line of development should be set up from single races through mixed nations to statehoods. As for examples, the British historian brought up the cases of Belgium, Switzerland and Scotland as ethnically diverse, yet nationally united communities. Giles's article was followed by the promise of the editor that Masaryk will answer to these arguments in a future article titled *The Problem of Nationality* – which was never published.¹¹³

While his answer was absent from the *New Europe*, Masaryk did react to the criticism in a letter – to SETON-WATSON. The Czech politician accepted the Belgian, Swiss and Scottish examples brought up by the British historian as communities formed historically. On the other hand, Masaryk still held the view that nations were based on racial foundations. In addition to this, he thought that nationality would be a better term in general to apply for the current European conditions – the main attribute of which would have been the languages of various groups. His further remarks on Giles's thoughts were especially important:

Mr. Giles' [sic!] objection is typically English [...] [He] confounds this so called [sic!] „*political nation*” with nationality. The state creates in its members the consciousness of common citizenship, but no nationality.¹¹⁴

It was not accidental that the Czech politician wrote this letter to his friend, the editor of the newspaper. The Masarykian concept of 'ethnic nation' clashed with the notion of 'political nation' within the association of the *New Europe*, the latter view being supported by Giles and his British companions – for instance, by Seton-Watson as well.¹¹⁵

JOHN MAVROGORDATO, an expert on topics in relation to Spain, gave the most informative description for the latter group's thoughts. In his article *From Nationalism to*

¹¹³ Giles, A. F., „What is Nationality?,” *The New Europe*, Vol. II, No. 14 (18 January 1917): 27–28.

¹¹⁴ Masaryk, letter to Seton-Watson, 1917. SEW, box 17/16, fold. 6.

¹¹⁵ Seton-Watson, R. W., „Nationalism and Internationalism,” *The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 10 (21 December 1916): 317–318.

Federation, the author stated that in addition to language, religion, customs, biological marks and the presence of political movements should also count as the marks of a nation.¹¹⁶

Ironically, Masaryk's view collided not only with those of his British friends, but with the earlier ideas of his own self, too. 'Political nation' was a widely accepted concept within the *fin de siècle* Czech national movement with respect to the ethnically mixed nature of the historical lands of the Bohemian Crown. Masaryk seceded from this idea from 1900 on – from which point on, he defined 'nation' not on a territorial basis, but by means of language and culture.¹¹⁷ As proved by the debate with Giles, the Czech politician kept this viewpoint even in opposition to his British supporters who followed a contradictory concept.

This tense discrepancy between the views of the future Czechoslovak president and the supporters of his national movement resulted in an interesting contradiction. It seems that Seton-Watson and his fellow-countrymen, while supporting the ethnicity-based secessionist movements, envisioned political communities in the future Europe. On the other hand, Masaryk promoted the ethnic view of nations – the future state of which in Eastern Europe could have hardly been homogenous due to both the conditions of the region and the demands of various movements. However, this phenomenon was a general problem in relation to these territories.

3.3. IN THE FOCUS: THE 'CENTRAL ZONE' AND 'CENTRAL EUROPE'

The name chosen by the founders and the aim of reorganizing the Old Continent along national lines coupled with the conditions set up by the war-time situation all led in the same direction: that the society of the newspaper would pursue their aims mainly against the

¹¹⁶ Mavrogordato, John, „From Nationalism to Federation,” *The New Europe*, Vol. VII, No. 80 (25 April 1918): 69–70.

¹¹⁷ Szpoluk, Roman, *The Political Thought of Thomas G. Masaryk* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1981), 103.

Central Powers. Indeed: the material 'new Europe' was to be built on the ruins of the defeated Germany, Austria–Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria.

Furthermore, the ambitious goals of the group were in fact parts of a counter-project against the German plans of building the empire of the so-called *Mitteleuropa* ('Central Europe'). The first leader of the newspaper – written by MASARYK and titled *Pangermanism and the Eastern Question* – announced that the latter was comprised of Germany's alliances and conquests in the Central areas of Europe. On the basis of this foundation, the rulers of the hostile empire aimed at nothing less but the conquest of the Old Continent, Africa and Asia.¹¹⁸ This sensationist statement was not true as the German government did not pursue the goal of becoming a 'world-power', 'only' that of becoming equal to Great Britain and Russia.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, even the ignorant citizens of the British Isles could feel the threatening weight of such a danger on their skins.

Under the influence of Masaryk, the *New Europe* even adopted the German term of 'Central Europe' as a spatial notion to make use of it as a weapon against the original users.¹²⁰ While the expression was never defined precisely on the pages of the newspaper, other wartime writings related to the group – and especially to Masaryk – did circumscribe this area. In the memorandum *At the Eleventh Hour* of 1916, the Czech politician equated this area to 'the East of Germany, Austria – Hungary, the Balkans and the Eastern part of Russia (Poland)' [sic!].¹²¹

TADAYUKI HAYASHI showed the development of the Central European concept in Masaryk's wartime writings in a study of 1996. The author argued that from 1915 on, the Czech politician equated the so-called 'zone of small nations' to the aforementioned term,

¹¹⁸ Masaryk, Thomas G., „Pangermanism and the Eastern Question,” *The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 1 (16 October 1916): 15.

¹¹⁹ Smith, Woodruff D., *The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism* (New York–Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 172.

¹²⁰ Nolte, Claire Elaine, „The New Central Europe of Thomas Garrigue Masaryk,” In *Wilsonian East Central Europe: Current Perspectives*, edited by John S. Micgiel (New York: Pilsudski Institute, 1995), 12.

¹²¹ *At the Eleventh Hour*. SEW, box 2/3 fold. 3, 29.

adopting it from the famous work of the German politician FRIEDRICH NAUMANN. Hayashi righteously made use of the already mentioned *Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations* of the *New Europe*, too – which he also signed as a part of this course of development.¹²²

However, the Japanese scientist dismissed Masaryk's note below the article that the zone of small nations or in other words, the 'Central Zone' did not equal to 'Central Europe' – the latter was actually a part of the former. This is important to realize as the Czech politician stressed that within this area situated between the big ethnic cores of Germany and Russia, the rule of empires over the small nations caused a tension between the national and the state structures.¹²³ Thus, I argue that the 'Central Zone' was not an equivalent of *Mitteleuropa*, but *Zwischeneuropa* ('the Europe in between') – a term which was also used firstly by the German geographers of the First World War.¹²⁴

Due to the offset between the traditional power structure and the various national movements, Masaryk described the problems of the area as the formative 'Eastern Question' of Europe¹²⁵ – which was formerly understood as the controversies posed by the clashes of the Balkan nations and the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁶ With respect to its serious nature, the aim of the *New Europe* group was to untie this Gordian Knot of problems through the peace settlement after the Great War. Masaryk's *The Reorganization of Europe* specifically listed the Southern Slav, Romanian, 'Bohemian', Polish, Ruthenian and Italian national

¹²² Hayashi, Tadayuki, „Masaryk's 'Zone of Small Nations' in his Discourse during WW1,” In *Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present*, edited by Tadayuki Hayashi and Fukuda Hiroshi (Slavic Research Center, 2007), 3–20.

¹²³ Masaryk, „Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations”, 274.

¹²⁴ Ignác Romsics: *Nemzet, nemzetiség és állam Kelet-Közép- és Délkelet-Európában a 19. és 20. században*. ('Nation, Nationality and State in East-Central and South-Eastern-Europe'; Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó Kft., 1998), 18.

¹²⁵ Masaryk, „Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations”, 272–273.

¹²⁶ Hayashi, 4.

questions, all waiting for solutions – and posing various kinds of problems in the making of the 'new Europe'.¹²⁷

3.4. HOPES AND FEARS: THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE OF CENTRAL EUROPE

It was natural that one Eastern state was entirely within the focus of the *New Europe*'s project of re-settlement: the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire. MASARYK already argued in the first leader that the past and the present of the Monarchy was one of absolutism, centralism and oppression – currently in the form of the Austrian-German–Hungarian dual rules over the subject nationalities. Relying not only on emotional impacts but also the strategic considerations of the war, the Czech politician stressed the importance of Austria–Hungary in the German plans.¹²⁸ He unfolded this further in the *Reorganization of Europe*. In this article, Masaryk described the Dual Empire both as a huge basis of human resources and a fundamental geographical bridge for the German expansion towards Africa and Asia.¹²⁹ Consequently, the ancient Habsburg Empire had to be destroyed for once and all.

Both the principle of nationality and self-determination was utilized effectively as a weapon in the propaganda of the *New Europe* against Austria–Hungary. While the application of the former was obviously equivalent to the dissolution of the multi-ethnic empire, the latter put an emphasis on the coinciding will of nationalities. As the author of the early 1918 article *Le Paix Integrale* stressed, commenting on the declaration of self-determination by LLOYD GEORGE: nothing could block the peoples' right to secede from the Monarchy – if separation had not been allowed to them by the Great Powers of the Entente, then a civil war would have torn the Habsburg Empire apart.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ „The Reorganization of Europe”, 102. The article also mentioned the problems concerning the Danish and French nations – which, however, were not parts of the Central Zone or Central Europe.

¹²⁸ Masaryk, „Pangermanism and the Eastern Question”, 10–15.

¹²⁹ „The Reorganization of Europe”, 100.

¹³⁰ „Le Paix Integrale,” *The New Europe*, Vol. V, No. 65 (10 January 1918): 386–387.

However, not only the Monarchy counted in the scale – in fact, the interests and determinations of the local Great Powers of the Entente posed a more complex problem. For instance, while being opposed to its oppressive system, the association of the *New Europe* had to handle the topic of Russia carefully as the latter was an ally of Great Britain.¹³¹ Consequently, the otherwise sympathetic cause of Polish independence could not have been supported until the fall of Czarism as stressed by SETON-WATSON in 1916.¹³² No wonder that the authors of the *New Europe* celebrated the Provisional Government's endorsement of self-determination loudly.

On the other hand, the yet-to-be-fulfilled national movements already announced excessive territorial claims that opposed the principle. For example, the Romanian government was criticized for its demands in relation to the Hungarian-inhabited lands of the Central Plains and the ethnically mixed region of Banat.¹³³ In connection to this, the statements of DUMITRU DRĂGHICESCU must not have appeared as hopeful with regards to the future. In his article *Hungary and the non-Magyar Peoples* (25 April 1918), the Romanian author denounced the oppressive policy of the Hungarian government – which he, however, could have accepted in the case Magyars would have constituted an absolute majority in their country.¹³⁴

Interestingly, while enlisted among the oppressed nationalities, Poles were also described as imperialists and the violators of self-determination. Indeed: being one of the dominant nationalities within Austria–Hungary, the Galician Polish elite exercised an oppressive rule over the Ruthenian population of the province and supported the

¹³¹ Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, 196–197.

¹³² Seton-Watson, letter to Dr. Rajchman, 28 November 1916. SEW, box 6/1, fold. 9.

¹³³ „The Climax of the War,” *The New Europe*, Vol. IV, No. 40 (19 July 1917): 5–6.

¹³⁴ Drăghicescu, D., „Hungary and the Non-Magyar Peoples,” *The New Europe*, Vol. VII, No. 80 (25 April 1918): 38.

government in opposition to the other Slavic nationalities.¹³⁵ Furthermore, the excessive claims of the national movement to the Western borderlands of Russia – the former parts of the Polish state before 1772 – posed the danger that they would collaborate with the Central Powers in order to reach their goals.¹³⁶

No wonder that various writers warned the public – and their co-workers – about the dangers hiding within the depth of nationalism. Right below the aforementioned article of Drăghicescu, JOHN MAVROGORDATO stressed the danger that the clash between nations might create hatred and instability.¹³⁷ Furthermore, the anonymous author of *Through Liberation to the New Commonwealth* (5 September 1918) indicated that the historical lack of the 'consent of the governed' coupled with the tensions produced by the long times of oppression might result in the establishment of oppressive systems in Central Europe.¹³⁸

Nonetheless, the future existence of minorities was inevitable – due to both the ethnic conditions of the area and the need of creating states strong enough to oppose the might of Germany. It was not accidental that Masaryk, the leader of the Czechoslovak movement especially stressed the importance of economic and strategic factors in the after-war settlement. However, Seton-Watson was hesitant to accept this compromise of the principle of nationality – thus, the Czech politician always tried to put this aspect in a neutral setting to make it acceptable for the Scottish intellectual.¹³⁹

As for the problem, the authors of the *New Europe* proposed two solutions – both based on self-determination. First of all, the fulfilment of national needs was seen as intermediate step towards the future establishment of greater structures – similarly to the related

¹³⁵ „Poles, Czechs and Yugoslavs,” *The New Europe*, Vol. III, No. 34 (7 June 1917): 229–231; The Polish Question with its Bearing upon Austria. *Supplement to The New Europe*. *The New Europe*, Vol. V, No. 59 (29 November 1917): vii.

¹³⁶ „Mittel-Europa in Search of a New Policy,” *The New Europe*, Vol. V, No. 60 (4 December 1917): 242., 246–247.

¹³⁷ Mavrogordato, „From Nationalism to Federation”, 69.

¹³⁸ „Through Liberation to the New Commonwealth,” *The New Europe*, Vol. VIII, No. 93 (5 September 1918): 169–172.

¹³⁹ Masaryk, letter to Seton-Watson, 2 November 1916.

thoughts of MAZZINI and WILSON. Seton-Watson emphasized that in *An Open Letter to British Labour* (21 February 1918) larger federations might prove to be better solutions than nation-states, inspiring the local communities to co-operate with each other. Surprisingly, the writer stated that even Austria–Hungary could be re-created after the war – if its nationalities decide upon this by their own will.¹⁴⁰

In addition to the promotion of supra-national structures, the establishment of minority rights was also advised as a solution for problems – already in the introduction of 10 October 1916. Within the discourse of the *New Europe*, it was the author of the *La Victoire Intégrale* who representatively grabbed the main lines of this settlement. Firstly, the writer mentioned the possibility of voluntary migrations as means of lowering the quantity of minority groups. In addition to this, civil liberties and the cultural rights to the use of national language, worship and education were set as standards for the future nation-states.¹⁴¹

Besides supra-national federation and minority rights, self-determination-based autonomy was also a living concept within the *New Europe* group – all of which aspects were grabbed by the memorandum titled the *Draft Treaty of Peace* of ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE in December 1917. As a start, the British historian stated that the complete fulfilment of self-determination was impossible in those cases where ethnic claims and structures collided with each other. The author proposed that territorial autonomy should be set as a standard for those groups who could not gain independence. Furthermore, he also stated that the all involved populations should have a word in the issue of secession from each other. As a matter fact, Toynbee even made a map in which the Habsburg Empire would have survived in a reformed form as a federation of Central European nations.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ „An Open Letter to British Labour,” *The New Europe*, Vol. VI, No. 71 (21 February 1918): 167.

¹⁴¹ „La Victoire Intégrale,” *The New Europe*, Vol. IV, No. 45 (23 August 1917): 228–229.

¹⁴² Toynbee, Arnold J., *Draft Treaty of Peace* (28 November 1917), 2–3. SEW, box 2/3 fold. 3.

Masaryk mentioned 'autonomy' for the first time in his *Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations*. Making a comparison between the national movements in Austria–Hungary and Russia in late 1916, the author stressed that while separatism was usual in the former case, the nationalities only craved for 'autonomy' within the Tsarist empire. However, Masaryk did not make it clear what he meant by the latter. The Czech politician was actually a promoter of national autonomy in Austria–Hungary before the Great War – which notion he used in both territorial and extra-territorial meanings.¹⁴³ On the other hand, the British authors might have had concepts more clear about the nature of the term. The article of an unknown author titled *The Transition from Old to New Europe* featured the British Commonwealth as an empire formed by autonomous entities all around the World.¹⁴⁴ In other words, the Western approach was territory-based – this viewpoint was reflected in Toynbee's already mentioned memorandum.

To sum it up, while both autonomy, the principle of nationality and self-determination were either confused or compromised within its discourse, the *New Europe* still set a relative standard of strict lines in relation to these notions to the new nation-states. The representative figures of the secessionist national movements had to adapt their concepts to the proposed lines – no matter if they agreed on these or not. However, this did not mean that they lacked the possibility to play both with the terms and their own theoretical formulations in order to fit the requirements set by their supporters in the West and the problems of the future. The most representative example of this tendency was that of Masaryk and the Czechoslovak movement – based both on the demands and the making of compromises to nationality and self-determination from early on.

¹⁴³ Szpoluk, 106–108.

¹⁴⁴ „The Transition from Old to New Europe,” *The New Europe*, Vol. III, No. 28 (26 April 1918): 33.

4. THE PROBLEMS OF AN EXEMPLARY CASE: MASARYK'S CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE *NEW EUROPE*

A founder, a leader, a source of great ideas: all were true for MASARYK – in relation to both the *New Europe* and the Czechoslovak moment, but even to the principles of nationality and self-determination. While the Czech politician invented none of these notions, he must be listed as one of the main propagators – or as I will argue it during the course of this chapter, also as an influential user and transmitter of the profound terms.

However, the Masarykian ideology had unbreakable ties to the formulation of a future nation-state: that of Czechoslovakia, which case, on the other hand, posed various contradictions in relation to the famous disciples of the Great War. The area of these questions in related propaganda ranged from conceptualization through nation-building to autonomy as a solution of the minority question.

4.1. THE 'MASARYKIAN RIGHTS' OF 'CZECHOSLOVAKIA': STATE, NATION, SELF-DETERMINATION

The ancient Habsburg Empire, a fundamental element in the European balance of power, shall be eradicated for the sake of a little and unknown nation – this is how the main concept of Czechoslovak secessionism might have sounded for the British in 1914. Indeed: the main aims of the movement equated to the destruction of Austria–Hungary. However, this idea was too wild for a long time the Great War-era government and the public of Great Britain to accept.¹⁴⁵ Little was known about the Czechs: they were commonly mistaken for either Hungarians or Gypsies. In fact, many of them were treated as enemies – being

¹⁴⁵ Zbynek Zeman and Antonin Klimek, *The Life of Edvard Beneš: Czechoslovakia in Peace and War* (Clarendon Press, 1997), 21.

citizens of the hostile Austria–Hungary – upon their arrival to Great Britain, as noted by unfortunate Czech prisoners of war in their letters to SETON-WATSON.¹⁴⁶

This situation could only have been countered by means of propaganda and cultural diplomacy – both arts mastered by MASARYK and his followers. Making use of political and academic circles, media and the network of small Czech colonies in the countries of the Entente, the main effort of this selected group was to establish a myth to justify their cause.¹⁴⁷

This myth was a national one: that of Czechoslovakia. The idea itself was not new as the historical bonds between Czechs and Slovaks were realized and theorized already during the course of the 19th century.¹⁴⁸ However, the jarring conditions of the Austrian and Hungarian states created a fork between national developments. As for the Czechs, the priority was to achieve autonomy in the Habsburg Empire based on the historical rights of the Bohemian Crown.¹⁴⁹ The Slovaks, on the other hand, focused on developing a linguistic-ethnic concept distinct from both the Magyars and their relatives.¹⁵⁰

The re-foundation of the common cause needed the figure of Masaryk – born and raised in Moravia, but descending from the Slovaks on his father’s side and raised in the borderlands of the nationalities. As a politician, Masaryk argued for a joint struggle against the German- and Magyar-dominated state structure in the late 19th century – although at that time, the projected aim was only national autonomy within the Habsburg Empire.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ Czech prisoners of war, letter to Seton-Watson. SEW, box 6/1, fold. 1.

¹⁴⁷ Orzoff, Andrea, *The Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe 1914–1948* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 23–24.

¹⁴⁸ Neville, 5–6.

¹⁴⁹ Szpoluk, 139.

¹⁵⁰ Bosák, Edita, „Czechs and Slovaks: An Uneasy Coexistence,” In *Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1988: Seventy Years from Independence*, edited by Gordon H. Skilling (Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 69.

¹⁵¹ Marzik, Thomas D., „The Slovakophile Relationship of T. G. Masaryk and Karel Kálal prior to 1914,” In *T. G. Masaryk (1850–1937): Volume 1: Thinker and Politician*, edited by Stanley B. Winters (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1990), 191–192.

The old-new concept of 'one language, one (ethnic) nation' was revived and developed with the help of the similar-minded KAREL KÁLAL.¹⁵²

However, the historical narrative of the common myth in the Great War was based exclusively on the romantic Bohemian historiography of the 19th-century – most of all, on the prominent works of FRANTISEK PALACKÝ. Thus, it was the Czechs who appeared in front of the public of the Entente as a progressive and enlightened nation. The peak of the latter people's development was the religious movement of Hussitism – the profound effect of which on European history was underlined strongly. It was a notable consequence of this historical position that the position of the Slovaks – the supposed co-nation – was absolutely underdog within the Czechoslovak national myth.¹⁵³

It was ironical retrospectively that while he had accepted and promoted many of the historical narrative's major points, the distinctive element of Masaryk's pre-war thinking was a variance from the historical discourse of Czech nationalism in connection to a fundamental argument. In opposition to the often-voiced historical state rights of the Bohemian Crown, the Realist leader argued that the latter were nullified by the policy of Habsburg absolutism and by the representatives of the nation itself during the reformist era of the 19th century. The claims to autonomous development within the empire of the Austrian dynasty had to be put on a new basis – thus, Masaryk stressed that self-government was a 'natural right' of the cultured and economically successful Czech ethnic nation.¹⁵⁴ Nonetheless, the prodigal son found its way back to the traditional discourse during the First World War.

Democracy was also a central element in the *fin de siècle* Masarykian thought. The politician developed this theoretical line in the early 20th century in opposition to traditional

¹⁵² Bosák, 70.

¹⁵³ Orzoff, 26–27., 50.

¹⁵⁴ Szpoluk, 105–106.

liberalism. As opposed to the both individualist and in terms of state, centralizing trends of the 19th-century ideology, Masaryk announced that the national community itself should steal a march on other factors of public life as the main carrier of rights. Additionally, the leader of the yet tiny Realist Party also explained the needs of tolerance, empathy, reason and self-restraint, or with his synthetic term: *humanitá* in the lives of nation and state.¹⁵⁵

As a consequence, Masaryk could easily join the discourses of European democracy and the principle of nationality in the Great War – but also that of self-determination, right upon its appearance in the first Russian Revolution. The Czech politician placed the centre of his activities in the seething empire soon promote the establishment of the famous Czechoslovak Legion. In a Petrograd interview of 21 May 1917, Masaryk openly adapted the term of self-determination and advocated it as universal right to national union and secession.¹⁵⁶

This turn of the Czechoslovak movement had an influence on the politics of Austria–Hungary through the networks of the 'Maffie'. The majority wing of the Czech public initially saw separatism as a lunatic dream and reposed its confidence in the dynasty of the Habsburgs – hoping for a change of fortune for their cause. However, the endorsement of self-determination – as proposed by the formerly despised secessionists – provided a new argument for the establishment of national autonomy within the multi-ethnic empire. Thus, the re-opening of the Austrian *Reichsrat* on 30 May 1917 saw the declaration of self-determination by the Czech deputies.¹⁵⁷

During the turbulent Russian winter of 1917–1918 – introduced by the Bolshevik *coup d'état* –, Masaryk produced the vital writing of *Nová Evropa (The New Europe)*. Writing for the Czech audience, the politician placed national self-determination (*právo*

¹⁵⁵ Orzoff, 29 – 32.

¹⁵⁶ Zeman, Zbynek, *The Masaryks: Making of Czechoslovakia* (Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991), 95.

¹⁵⁷ Orzoff, 40., 46–47.

národů na sebeurčení) within the centre of his argumentation for Czechoslovak independence and European reconstruction. Masaryk handled the notion as a part of the principle of nationality (*národností princip*) – explaining it as a connected right that took effect in various national cases.¹⁵⁸

The main problem of the Masarykian ideology was actually the same that had largely determined the discourse of Czech nationalism during the long 19th century: the questions posed by the sizeable German population in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Ethnicity-based nationalism with the connected principles of nationality and self-determination – the logical outcome of these ideas would have been the secession of non-Czech territories from the historical provinces that were claimed by the *émigré* movement.

Late commemoration and scientific literature usually solves the problem by beating that the Masarykian movement made use of rights based on history in connection to the question – which, in my view, is a false and oversimplifying view. Such a standpoint could not have been sold to the supporters and associates within the *New Europe*. In opposition to this, I argue for a skilful co-utilization of historical *and* ethnic arguments in this case.

In addition to this, I would also like to connect the questions of ethnic and political national concepts to the theoretical foundations of Czechoslovakia. As shown by his debate with A. F. GILES, Masaryk continued to view nation as an ethnic-linguistic constitution during the First World War. However, I will show that the notion of a Czechoslovak political community was developed gradually and side by side with this standpoint – a project that aimed to solve the aforementioned German question. This dual line can be trailed on the basis of documents in connection to Masaryk's activity within the *New Europe* group.

¹⁵⁸ Masaryk, T. G., *Nová Evropa. Stanovisko slovanské* (Praha: Nakladem Gustáva Dubského, 1920), 74–81.

4.2. SOLUTION: POLITICAL NATION? – THE GERMAN QUESTION OF 'BOHEMIA'

The idea of a joint Czecho-Slovak state – running under the working title of 'Bohemia' – was introduced during the negotiations between SETON-WATSON and MASARYK in Rotterdam, October 1914. The notes made by the Scottish intellectual during the meetings were more than eye-catching; according to these, Masaryk's reasoning for a program of maximum lines in relation to the borders mixed both history and the principle of nationality:

His arguments in favour of the historic Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia plus the Slovak districts [of Northern Hungary], as opposed to a new Czecho-Slovak racial state, rest on the extreme difficulty of drawing a tenable frontier on a basis of ethnography.¹⁵⁹

It seems like Seton-Watson himself would have been more satisfied with the latter option as shown by his editorial notes titled *The Czecho-Slovaks* on a map that appeared in the 25 January 1917 issue of the *New Europe* (*Bohemia – The Racial distribution of the Czechs & Slovaks*). The Scottish intellectual indirectly pointed it out that far more Germans (a population of 3,5 million) would have been situated in the new state than Slovaks (2 million). The editor argued for minor frontier revisions that would have lowered the numbers of the minority with half a million. Thus, the Germans would have constituted 'only' the 25% of a population otherwise dominated by Czechs and Slovaks.¹⁶⁰

The answer to this posing came from Masaryk a month later (22 February 1917) on the pages of the circumstantial study *The Future Status of Bohemia*. The Czech leader once again made an interesting use of the principle of nationality. Pointing out the ethnically mixed nature of Bohemian, Moravian and Silesian landscapes, Masaryk understood the Czech demands as a 'fair application of the principle of majority' – supporting a settlement according to the historical borders of the crown lands.¹⁶¹ The aforementioned map of

¹⁵⁹ Memorandum based on Seton-Watson's 'original notes of conversations at Rotterdam with Masaryk'. SEW, box 17/16 fold. 3., 6.

¹⁶⁰ „The Czecho-Slovaks,” *The New Europe*, Vol. II, No. 15 (17 February 1917): 64.

¹⁶¹ Masaryk, Thomas G., „The Future Status of Bohemia,” *The New Europe*, Vol. II, No. 19 (22 February 1917): 171–172.

'Bohemia' supported the latter argument as it featured those areas where German and Czech (or Hungarian and Slovak) populations were interspersed (*see the map in the appendices*).¹⁶²

What is more just – that 10 million Czechs should be under foreign rule, or that 2½ million Germans should be under Czech rule?

– asked Masaryk the famous question for the first time in 1917. On the other hand, it must be noted that the politician left the possibility open for modifying borders –flashing further demands at the same time for the Czech-inhabited areas of Lower Austria, Prussian Silesia and the province of Lusatia populated by the Slavic Sorbs.¹⁶³

Until this point, the Masarykian ideology might have appeared to bear an aggressive tone in order to gain firm control over the German areas of the historical provinces – however, its approach actually had more of a reconciling nature. Envisaging a monarchical state in 1914, Masaryk argued against the possibility of a Russian ruler – as he deemed this solution to be unacceptable for Germans.¹⁶⁴ He also proposed the confusing designation of 'Bohemia' for the planned state due to similar considerations. Other than showing an intermediate solution for the already debated Czech–Slovak matters, the politician also stated that it would be more likely for the Germans (and the Poles of Silesia) to live under the authority of this name – a neutral reminder of historical co-existence.¹⁶⁵

In addition to trying to insinuate the cause of 'Bohemia' into the favour of the minority, Masaryk also counted with the threatening shadows of Pan-German nationalism. According to his words exchanged with Seton-Watson in Rotterdam, this phenomenon was to be countered by promoting a return to local identity. Masaryk stated firmly in the first of year of the war that once Germany is defeated, the Germans of the Bohemian Crown would cease to gravitate towards their co-nationals. This would have been supported by a tolerant

¹⁶² *Bohemia (The Racial distribution of the Czechs & Slovaks). Supplement to „THE NEW EUROPE” January 25th, 1917.*

¹⁶³ Masaryk, „The Future Status of Bohemia”, 172.

¹⁶⁴ Memorandum based on Seton-Watson's 'original notes...', 2.

¹⁶⁵ Masaryk, „The Future Status of Bohemia”, 163.

national policy based on *humanitá*, securing cultural rights to the minority.¹⁶⁶ In *The Future Status of Bohemia*, Masaryk stressed that once being in a dominant position, Czechs will not oppress Germans – as historically, they had always wanted to reach only an equal state of affairs.¹⁶⁷

While he promoted an ethnicity-based concept during the World War, it was also clear that Masaryk gradually evolved the idea of a political nation – to which duality, the concept of self-determination was also added in 1917. Excitingly, the *New Europe* saw the first declaration of the principle on the Czech side not by the *émigrés*, but by their fellow-countrymen at home. During a June session of the Austrian *Reichsrat*, the Young Czech party member ADOLF STRANSKÝ demanded the independence and the union of his nation and the Slovaks on the basis of self-determination. The politician also promised that Germans would gain their own autonomy within the lands of the Bohemian Crown.¹⁶⁸

It is to be recalled that it was actually the *émigrés* who influenced the Czech deputies of the *Reichsrat* to adopt the new conceptual language of the Great War. In other words, what went around, came around: a group that was an integral part of the *New Europe* association made an impact on their Austrian colleagues – and as a result, the demands voiced by the latter could have been utilized for the propaganda of the former in Great Britain. On the other hand, this also meant that through the words of Stranský, it was Masaryk who spoke to the audience to an extent. Thus, it was of great importance that the word 'autonomy' was said out loud for the first time in relation to the German question.

The possibility of independent structures existing *within* the historical provinces was already there in the *fin de siècle* thinking of Masaryk – in opposition to the idea of political nation. Turning away from the latter concept, the politician proposed the establishment of

¹⁶⁶ Memorandum based on Seton-Watson's 'original notes...', 4.

¹⁶⁷ Masaryk, „The Future Status of Bohemia”, 171.

¹⁶⁸ „Slav Speeches in the Reichsrat,” *The New Europe*, Vol. III, No. 37 (28 June 1917): 377.

extra-territorial autonomy as an alternative to a joint community. This solution would have secured both cultural self-government and the chance of equal participation in common affairs for the minorities.¹⁶⁹

As a consequence of a long and rugged development, the main notions of the ideology were at fever pitch in Masaryk's own *New Europe* (*Nová Evropa*). For the first time, Masaryk made a difference between 'nation' (*národ*) and 'people' (*lid*). While still keeping his distance from the Western concept of 'political nation' (*národ politický*), Masaryk also proposed that nation could be explained as a political community. He supported the latter argument by putting the terms of 'nation' and 'nationality' (*národnost*) beside each other – signifying a distinction between them. On the other hand, it was noticeable that the Czech politician did not talk about 'Bohemia' anymore, but the country of the Czechoslovaks (*Československý stát*). In other words, a nation-state was projected more clearly than ever before – which, however, would have been a home to other nations.¹⁷⁰

As for the latter, Masaryk wrote about national minorities (*národní minority*) with full national rights granted within the framework of the new land. In connection to this, the notion of autonomy was discussed mainly in a culture-based, extra-territorial manner – with Austro-Marxism listed as an important source. On the other hand, the author's side-note slightly mentioned that territorial designs (*autonomie teritoriální*) also formed a part of the main concept.¹⁷¹

As opposed to the extra-territorial basis of Masaryk, Seton-Watson pushed for the latter possibility in a *New Europe* issue of February 1918. The Scottish intellectual noticed that the German parties of Bohemia demanded the establishment of their separate province

¹⁶⁹ Szpoluk, 108–109.

¹⁷⁰ Masaryk, *Nová Evropa*, 74., 178.

¹⁷¹ Masaryk, *Nová Evropa*, 93–95., 164.

(*Deutsch-Böhmen*) in the Habsburg Empire. Seton-Watson commented on this development in an uncomprehending manner – stating that the new state of Bohemia would naturally provide territorial autonomy for the minority.¹⁷²

Seton-Watson either misunderstood or more possibly, tried to divert the intentions of Masaryk in connection to the question of autonomy. His public propositions must have been answered from the Czech side sooner or later. With the leader being pre-occupied with his travels in Russia and the United States, it was VLADIMÍR NOSEK who did this act – right after the Entente's victory. The publicist was a reliable substitute, being one of the leaders of the Czech community in London and an enthusiastic promoter of the Czechoslovak cause in Great Britain.¹⁷³

Nosek's communication *The German Minority in Bohemia: A Czech View* appeared on 14 November 1918 and dealt specifically with the question of 'German-Bohemia'. Naturally, the author argued against the secession of these territories from the historical provinces. Among other reasons, Nosek also utilized the principle of self-determination – for the Germans themselves. According to his arguments, the general opinion of the minority was not known; on the other hand, some of its representatives were in open opposition to the idea of separatism. National autonomy stood as an alternative of the latter option. However, Nosek maintained the culture-based view of Masaryk: the territorial independence of *Deutschböhmen*, he argued, would have deprived the remaining territories from precious economic resources and would have blocked the successful realization of Czechoslovak self-determination as a consequence.¹⁷⁴

Notably, the arguments of Nosek were repeated by the memorandum of Masaryk titled *Germans in the Czechoslovak Lands, especially in Bohemia* in December 1918 – made

¹⁷² Rubicon [Seton-Watson], „The Czechs and Austria,” 149.

¹⁷³ Hanak, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary*, 111.

¹⁷⁴ „The German Minority in Bohemia: A Czech View,” *The New Europe*, Vol. IX, No. 109 (14 November 1918): 117–118.

by him already as the President of Czechoslovakia. The document stressed with full confidence that the Germans wanted to join the new state.¹⁷⁵ Thus, Masaryk could finally point out a common will behind the establishment of a political community.

All in all, the era of the First World War saw Masaryk's re-discovery of 'political nation' – which, however, necessarily co-existed with the ethnicity-based approach. The Czechs and Slovaks were a people to be liberated – but their state must have been formed into that of various nationalities. The realization of the latter necessity and the external pressure from the British wing of the *New Europe* association lead jointly to the re-conceptualization of political nationhood. On the other hand, while the pre-existing idea of cultural rights was included within the Czechoslovak project, territorial autonomy – exclusive to the declarations of Seton-Watson and his compatriots – was not.

Masaryk's wartime words could have easily been empty promises – it was dependent on the policy of the new Czechoslovakia if these were to be fulfilled. The president actually tried to put his ideas into reality, proposing a chance for Germans to become a co-nation within Czechoslovakia. This offer, however, was turned down by the representatives of the minority who opted mainly for secession – which possibility was naturally blocked by the leaders of the new state.¹⁷⁶

Nonetheless, the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 did provide democratic rights for all communities and left the window open for the future coming-to-be of a real political nation. The preamble announced the will of the Czechoslovak nation (*národ Československý*) to act in accordance to the ideas of modernity, 'embodied in the motto of self-determination' (*obsažených v hesle sebeurčení*). The entity provided rights for its national, racial and religious minorities (*menšín narodních, náboženských a rasových*). The

¹⁷⁵ *Germans in the Czechoslovak Lands, especially in Bohemia. Prepared by Pres. Masaryk.* SEW, box 6/1, fold. 2., 3–4.

¹⁷⁶ Hahn, Fred, „Masaryk and the Germans,” In *T. G. Masaryk (1850–1937): Volume II: Statesman and Political Force*, edited by Peter Hanak (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 102–105.

term 'national minority' was used only once; in my view, it must be connected to a population of an autonomous 'self-governing territory' (*samospravné uzemí*) – not of the Germans, but of the Subcarpathian Rusyns.¹⁷⁷ Thus, the contrast between 'national' and 'racial' minorities made sense, with the latter being applied for the nationalities living within the two distinct parts of the state. Consequently, the self-determining nation of Czechoslovakia, while its core was an ethnic concept, evolved into a legal-political construction.

With respect to this historical promise, the final outcome could be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, the Third Reich of the Nazis utilized the concept of national self-determination – and made a consequent and famous use of the local German minority to destroy the First Czechoslovak Republic.¹⁷⁸ On the other hand, the representatives of the latter finally learned to co-operate with the national leadership of the Masarykian circle, actually gaining positions within the government during the inter-war period.¹⁷⁹ All in all, it must be said that the political nation of Czechoslovakia might have worked as a concept – but it was not given enough time to prove its viability.

4.3. POLITICAL-TURNED ETHNICITY: COMPARISON WITH THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA

Besides the group of MASARYK, another famous movement also aimed at the creation of a nation-state on the basis of inter-ethnic alliances: that of the Southern Slavs. This project also included the establishment of a political nation. However, both the basis and the outcome along with the utilizations of self-determination and autonomy were different – which makes it worthy to make a comparison between the two cases.

¹⁷⁷ *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého*, Wolters Kluwer, <http://ftp.aspi.cz/opispdf/1920/026-1920.pdf> (accessed on May 2, 2016)

¹⁷⁸ Qvortruop, 552.

¹⁷⁹ Hahn, 116–117.

The concept of Southern Slav ethnic unity had appeared, obtused and gained strength once more during the course of the long 19th century, similarly to its counterpart.¹⁸⁰ On the other hand, while the concept of political nation was developed in relation to the German question in the Czechoslovak case, the same approach was applied to the actual 'branches' of the Yugoslav peoples during the Great War. 'Equality' between the nationalities of different cultural and historical background was stressed ever since the case of Southern Slav unification was at issue.

However, while the inventor Masaryk lead the cause of Czechoslovakism in charge of a united group, the ranks of the Yugoslav movement were divided. The population living under the authority of Austria–Hungary was represented by the *émigré* Yugoslav Committee – on the other hand, the cause was also supported by the actual state power of the Serbian Kingdom. In fact, the former organization was set up by the government of the latter; but in time, the members of Yugoslav Committee started to announce ideas different from those of the main supporters. In contrast to the scheme of hegemonic unification projected by the Serbian Prime Minister NIKOLA PAŠIĆ, the Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian politicians from Austria–Hungary envisioned a community of equal peoples.¹⁸¹

Interestingly, none of the sides were integrated parts of the *New Europe* association in the sense that – with a few exceptional cases – they would have brought the debate with themselves into the pages of the press organ; it was mostly the British collaborators who did this. In fact, the Southern Slav cause was represented by one collaborator on the official list like that of 'Bohemia'. The Serbian geographer JOVÁN CVIJIĆ must have been a choice of compromise from the side of SETON-WATSON: he was not a leader like Masaryk, but he was

¹⁸⁰ Djordjevic, Dimitrije, „The Idea of Yugoslav Unity in the Nineteenth Century,” In *The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914–1918*, edited by Dimitrije Djordjevic(Oxford: Clio Press, 1980), 2–4., 12.

¹⁸¹ Benson, Leslie, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 22– 23.

both a great theoretician of common nationhood, an oppositional in contrast the politics of Pašić – and also a suspicious viewer of the Yugoslav Committee’s activity.¹⁸²

Contrarily to the Southern Slavs of Austria–Hungary, the Slovaks did not produce an independent alternative to that of Czechoslovak ethnicism. The members of the ‘co-nation’ were either loyal supporters of the common cause or belonged to Martin-centred movement that fully marked off itself from the Masarykians until 1918. In the late October of the last year of the war, the latter finally chose to make a union with the Czechs – in opposition to the ruling Magyars.¹⁸³ Formerly, however, the Slovaks only wanted equal treatment within the Habsburg Empire; even their foreign representatives did not aim for more – as shown by the Memorandum of the Slovak League of America.¹⁸⁴

Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that those Slovaks who supported with the idea of a joint existence – the so-called ‘Hlasists’ – did not necessarily negate the existence of separate interests from those of the Czechs. This group found its main basis in the wealthy Lutheran minority of the otherwise Catholic-dominated Slovak nationality, with the former providing the cultural connections between the two co-nations historically. However, many of the Hlasists aimed primarily not at the dissolution of their people, but at their development and emancipation by means of joining the Czechoslovak cause.¹⁸⁵ However, it must be noted that they did not break the unity of the common cause during the war, while their ideas were not exactly same as those of Masaryk. In the absence of a strong alternative concept, it is no wonder that the *New Europe* group did not notice any major differences between the Czechs and Slovaks.

On the other hand, the intent of creating a political nation was expressed clearly by the Yugoslav Committee – with which the British members of the *New Europe* association

¹⁸² Mitrović, Andrei, *Serbia’s Great War, 1914–1918* (Purdue University Press, 2007), 87., 136., 178.; Seton-Watson 1981, 140.

¹⁸³ Zbynek, 126.; Bosák, 65.

¹⁸⁴ Memorandum of the Slovak League of America (1914–15). SEW, box 6/1, fold. 1, 2.

¹⁸⁵ Bosák, 66–67.

sided naturally. On the inaugural meeting of the Serbian Society of Great Britain, STEED promoted the future fusion of the Southern Slav peoples into one ethnicity – in the meantime, however, he stressed the need of establishing a political union based on equal rights.¹⁸⁶ Similarly, while Seton-Watson thought that the common cause of Southern Slavs could have only prevailed through Serbia,¹⁸⁷ he denounced the methods of Pašić as being despotic.¹⁸⁸

Supporting the Austro–Hungarian wing was easy all the more, as its representatives adopted the concept of self-determination for their cause in opposition to the Serbian government.¹⁸⁹ The most enthusiastic supporter of the notion was the Croatian politician ANTE TRUMBIĆ. Thus, an interesting contradiction occurred with the Czechoslovak case: Masaryk was also a propagator of self-determination and a theorist of political notion similarly to his *émigré* colleagues – but he also aimed for the hegemonic unification of Czechs and Slovaks like the opponents of the latter; he was both Trumbić and Pašić at the same time.

The affiliation of the British collaborators with the political concept of the Yugoslav community lead them into setting up schemes of territorial autonomies – but they propagated their views even firmer than in connection to the German question of Czechoslovakia. In the 11 October 1917 issue of *The New Europe*, SIR ARTHUR EVANS published a whole plan of a federalist structure along with a map of the future Southern Slav state. Evans envisioned provinces mainly based on historical backgrounds with own diets, possessing territorial rights of jurisdiction.¹⁹⁰ A map attached to the issue featured these territories – although without the exact internal borders between them (*for the map, see the*

¹⁸⁶ „Italy and the Southern Slavs,” *The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 2 (26 October 1916): 42.

¹⁸⁷ Seton-Watson, letter to Gregory Kombol, 8 March 1915. SEW, box 3/3, fold. 2.

¹⁸⁸ [Seton-Watson, R. W.], „A Critical Moment for Yugoslavia,” *The New Europe*, Vol. IX, No. 109 (14 November 1918), 104. (As for authorship, see Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, 330.)

¹⁸⁹ Mitrović, 291.

¹⁹⁰ „Diagrammatic Map of a Future Southern Slav State by Sir Arthur Evans,” *The New Europe*, Vol. IV, No. 55 (11 October 1917): 416.

appendices).¹⁹¹ In contrast, the January 17 map of 'Bohemia' presented only the territory inhabited by the Czechs and Slovaks – as one ethnicity.

Notably, the Masarykian proposition of extra-territorial cultural autonomy also appeared once in the Southern Slav case – in connection to Macedonia. In the issue of 28 March 1918, the Serbian Socialist DUŠAN POPOVIĆ dedicated a whole article to the problems of the territory debated by Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. As a solution, the politician advised the repartition of the Central Balkans – but also the assurance of national rights on the lines proposed by KARL RENNEN and OTTO BAUER.¹⁹²

Other than discussing internal matters, Evans's vision also dealt with the issue of external borders – which involved the topic of self-determination; but as opposed to Czechoslovakia, not for the sake of expansion. On the contrary: it was the Italian 'greediness' from which the Southern Slav-inhabited Dalmatia had to be protected from. The association of the *New Europe* tolerated the violation of the principle of nationality when it came to Istria, understanding the transfer of the peninsula to the Mediterranean Great Power as a necessary sacrifice for the sake of the latter's strategic needs. In contrast, the Italian acquisition of the Dalmatian shores was a holy river not to be crossed for them.¹⁹³ The Yugoslav Committee built theoretical barricades once more to defend the population represented by them, making a good use of self-determination in the process.¹⁹⁴ Nonetheless, even the Italian collaborators of the *New Europe* felt that their partners were partial in relation to the 'Adriatic question'.

¹⁹¹ *A Diagrammatic Map of Future Southern Slav State Showing Principal Railway Communications and with Some Suggestions as to the Future Organization (by Sir Arthur Evans). Supplement to „THE NEW EUROPE” 11 October, 1917.*

¹⁹² Popović, Dušan, „The Macedonian Question,” *The New Europe*, Vol. VI, No. 76 (28 March 1918): 337.

¹⁹³ Evans, Arthur, „Free Russia, Greece, the Southern Slavs – and Italy?,” *The New Europe*, Vol. III, No. 28 (26 April 1917): 46–47.

¹⁹⁴ Djokić, Djekan, *Nikola Pašić & Ante Trumbić: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes* (Haus Publishing, 2010, Makers of the Modern World), 77.

I understand that you fight for „selfdetermination” [sic!] the principle of nationality, open diplomacy etc. Is the Italian Government the only Government acting against all these principles? [...] Why not blame in your paper the Czecs [sic!] for their attempts to absorb three million or so of Germans and Hungarians?

– complained one of them to Seton-Watson in January 1919.¹⁹⁵ Indeed: the Italian claims for the rocky shores of Dalmatia were no less excessive than those of Masaryk for the German-inhabited hills of Eger. However, the Czechoslovak movement could skilfully utilize both the principle of nationality and self-determination for their cause; their counterparts failed to do the same. Then again, in the former case, demands were voiced against a hostile population, but with the intent of a future co-operation with it – while the Italian claims were deemed to be imperialism of the worst kind by the association of the *New Europe*.

This latter opinion was firm enough so that Evans could draw exact borders for the future Southern Slav state in his plan. In contrast, despite its sympathetic tone, the discrepancy between the Masarykian vision and the ethnic realities resulted in the construction of a map that lacked the external definition of ‘Bohemia’: the document featured only those territories that were either inhabited solely by Czechs and Slovaks or where German–Czech or Slovak–Magyar populations were intermixed.

As for the Great War-development of political nations, the Yugoslavs seemingly came before the Czechoslovaks with the Pact of Corfu in July 1917. The agreement between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government contained wordy promises for equal treatment in the future state. National self-determination (*prava samoopredeljenja naroda*) could be found twice within the document; once as a right to union, once as a defence against conquest – the latter aimed against Italian expansionism.¹⁹⁶ Naturally, the editorial board of the *New Europe* celebrated the Pact of Corfu as a breakthrough in inter-Yugoslav

¹⁹⁵ Aldo Cassuto, letter to Seton-Watson, 6 January 1919. SEW, box 2/3, fold. 11.

¹⁹⁶ *Krfska Deklaracija*. Vojnoistorijski Institut, Beograd, http://www.znaci.net/00001/138_7.pdf. (accessed on May 2, 2016)

relations. However, the policy of Pašić re-awakened their suspicions soon; by the end of the war, they demanded the recognition of the Yugoslav Committee by the Entente as an official organization – so that the former could stand a chance against the government of Serbia.¹⁹⁷

The chaotic establishment of the actual Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes justified these worries. The constitution of the new state was created in 1921 – one year later than that of Czechoslovakia. During its talks in the Constituent Assembly, the skilful political manoeuvres of Pašić resulted in the victory of centralizing trends. The Croatian and Slovenian parties of opposition went into passive resistance, deciding not to sanction the following acts.¹⁹⁸ The final document did not feature the term of self-determination and unlike Czechoslovakia; however, the power of the ethnic concept was not efficient enough to stabilize the state.

Seton-Watson mentioned grave problems undermining the foundations of the Southern Slav state already in 1923 – the very same ones that had appeared during the Great War.¹⁹⁹ On the other hand, the Scottish intellectual also received a memorandum from Masaryk in the early years of the inter-war era, in which the conflicts between Czechs, Slovaks and Germans were presented as minor ones to be solved by history.²⁰⁰ Thus, the story of Czechoslovakia seemed to be a hopeful one with respect to the future; the skies above the Southern Slav Kingdom, on the other hand, were dark. The latter vision also dominates late commemoration with respect to the inter-war settlement, with which view I will deal with in my conclusion.

¹⁹⁷ [Seton-Watson], „A Critical Moment for Yugoslavia,” 102–103.

¹⁹⁸ Benson, 34–36.

¹⁹⁹ Seton-Watson, R. W., *The Political Deadlock in Yugoslavia*. SEW, box 9/2, fold. 3.

²⁰⁰ Masaryk, T. G., *The Slavs after the War*. SEW box 8/1, fold. 3., 3–4., 6.

CONCLUSION

Famously, the Peace Settlement of Versailles created nation-states – or rather 'mini-empires' – in the Eastern parts of Europe after the First World War. Self-determination was compromised heavily – for the sake of strategic, political, economic and other interests of both the Great Powers of the Entente and their small allies.²⁰¹ Czechoslovakia was one of the great tenants of this outcome, having gained almost all of the territories demanded by its creators.²⁰²

On the other hand, the British wing of the *New Europe* association was not so happy to see either the violation of the principles they stood for or the heavy punishment of the former enemies that prepared the ground for another worldwide conflict in the future. The same view of the readers and their disappointment in the principles advocated by the weekly eventually lead to a grave financial crisis that proved to be fatal for the press organ in 1920.²⁰³

Nonetheless, the eventual fall was preceded by four years of intense activity – full with fights for and interesting debates concerning the notions of national and nationality, autonomy and self-determination from early 1917. First of all, I had argued that the oversimplifying view of equating the principle of nationality and national self-determination to each other should be shaded: the first was as a general scheme of reconstruction based on national units, while the second was a democratic sub-notion applied to this structure.

Nextly, I would like to point out the influence of the first Russian Revolution in relation to the latter notion – not only on the *New Europe*, but also on other parties in Western and Eastern Europe. In my view, a gap must be filled within the historiography of

²⁰¹ Sharp, Alan, *Consequences of Peace: The Versailles Settlement: Aftermath and Legacy 1919–2010* (Haus Publishing, 2015, The Makers of the Modern World), 26., 108–109.

²⁰² Zeman and Klimek, 45.

²⁰³ Hanak, „*The New Europe*”, 384–388, 397–398.

self-determination with respect to this period. It is also to be stressed that the press organ's view were counter-concepts both the similarly state-based approaches of the German 'Central Europe' and the early Wilsonian policy of 1918. Additionally, the *New Europe* group also worked independently from and in opposition to the policy of the Bolsheviks.

On the other hand, the association of the *New Europe* was not a united one in relation of the discussed notions. It seems like the Western collaborators stood firmly for establishment of political nations and territorial autonomies. In contrast, the co-founder MASARYK propagated an ethnicity-based approach and limited his views to cultural rights in connection to the latter question.

Nonetheless, I also pointed out that the Czech leader also developed a concept of political nationhood – both due to own intentions and external pressure – to solve the German question in the lands of the Bohemian Crown. The result was finally reflected in the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920. While its start was not so bright, it can be argued that the scheme started to work in time – the same could not be said about the case of Yugoslavia, where the concept of the common Southern Slav community was intermixed with the opposing projects of centralization and political nation. These diversions were exciting all the more, since national self-determination was a central part of both cases – while it could support the evolution of the Czechoslovak ethnic concept on the one hand, it lead to fatal tensions in relation to the Yugoslav matters.

This summary leads the line of the discussion to the question of the new states in the Eastern part of inter-war Europe, which were based both on the applications and the denials of the right of self-determination. In my view, this was an inevitable outcome: the clear utilization of the principle in the ethnic sense was in opposition not only to power interests or the original views of WILSON himself, but was also made impossible by the ethnically mixed nature of the area.

The outcome, however, allowed the utilization of self-determination in various ways depending on time, space and situation. One could argue for political independence by using the term – which could have also been understood as a way to vindicate equal rights within a state ruled by another nation. While the former approach dominated the era right after the end of the First World War, the necessity of accepting the Versailles settlement resulted in the takeover of the latter opinion. Accepting this narrative, it could be said that as soon as the era of the Great Depression saw the destabilization of the new states, a possibility appeared to return to the understanding of self-determination as a right to secession – grabbed by the Nazis and their allies. On the other hand, it could also be said that if there was a strong will behind the reconciliation of national groups (e.g. Czechoslovakia), the latter might actually had taken effect in time – but maybe only the time given was not enough for the new settlement after Versailles to finally stabilize itself.


APPENDICES

1. MAP: THE PEOPLE OF 'BOHEMIA' IN THE *NEW EUROPE* ('CZECHS & SLOVAKS')



Bohemia (The Racial distribution of the Czechs & Slovaks). Supplement to „THE NEW EUROPE” January 25th, 1917. Note: the brighter, striped colours stood for the ethnically mixed (German–Czech, Slovak–Magyar) territories.

2. MAP: THE PLAN OF THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE IN THE *NEW EUROPE* (SIR ARTHUR EVANS, 1917)



A Diagrammatic Map of Future Southern Slav State Showing Principal Railway Communications and with Some Suggestions as to the Future Organization (by Sir Arthur Evans). Supplement to „THE NEW EUROPE” 11 October, 1917.

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