

From Silence to Salience

Free Trade Protest and the Scandalisation of TTIP from a Comparative Perspective

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Abstract

TTIP, the Preferential Trade Agreement between the EU and the US, developed a variety of public salience and preference differences within the EU. However, such agreements have not been salient before. Furthermore, the public in most of the EU member states revealed positive feelings towards free trade in general. Thus, it is puzzling that these salience and preference differences towards TTIP have emerged. Based on a Google Trends analysis and a media analysis that determined the coverage and tone on the matter, this thesis argues that TTIP is an opportunity structure which can be used by social movements. In cases when social movements took up the opportunity they triggered a scandalisation process. If these movements were professionalised enough in their organisational structure to transmit their framing, media followed up on and facilitated this scandalisation process. The level of media coverage and its tone on the matter then determined the public preference towards TTIP.

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Although it is the first page of my thesis, I wrote this part at the very end. Now, after this marathon, the finish line is very close. I want to take this opportunity to show my gratitude to people that have supported and helped me during this amazing yet demanding time.

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1 Introduction

Free trade agreements, including *preferential trade agreements (PTAs)*, should not be salient. These agreements are highly technical and do not intervene directly into the average people's everyday life. In fact, trade agreements are not salient. By now, Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), i.e. free trade agreements with a small number of selected trade partners, are a common feature of the EU trade policy. Until 2016, the EU signed preferential trade agreements with several dozens of partners worldwide (European Commission 2016a, 2016b). All these agreements had not triggered large protests and salience remained low. This was mainly due to the European Commission's tendency to rely on secret negotiations.

This had changed, however, since the EU began negotiating with the United States about a preferential trade agreement in July 2013 – the *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership* (TTIP). It led to high salience in almost every country of the EU after the first year of the negotiation process. After July 2014, hundreds of social movements and NGOs throughout the EU created a European Citizens Initiative (ECI) called “Stop TTIP”. This initiative organised highly successful street protests and signature collections in almost every country of the EU (Stop TTIP 2016). An interesting point here is that TTIP became salient in a few countries of the EU (e.g. Germany, Austria and the UK) even before the Stop-TTIP ECI was launched.

Additionally, the Eurobarometer (2014: T96) showed various support levels towards TTIP throughout the EU. In Germany, Austria and Luxembourg TTIP had a public support of less than 50 percent, while the rest of the Union was, on average, highly in favor of the agreement. This becomes even more puzzling, given that the Eurobarometer survey asking about the general attitude towards free trade resulted in positive feelings in all countries of the EU. Thus, the negative preferences towards TTIP in some of the countries cannot be explained by

an overall negative attitude towards free trade *per se* (Eurobarometer 2014:T49).

This thesis, therefore, is built on the paradox between the highly complex and technocratic content of preferential trade agreements which should result in public indifference, and the observable reality in which TTIP develops a variety of salience and preferences.

In other words, I try to explain the following *double puzzle*:

- a) How did TTIP become salient in some EU countries but not in others?
- b) Being salient, why do the preferences differ?

I will try to tackle these puzzles by using a theoretical framework on business power by Culpepper (Culpepper 2011). According to him, trade agreements should not be a salient issue. The major reason is to be found in the information asymmetry between managers on the one hand and politicians as well as media on the other hand. Yet occasionally this notion does not seem to hold. In these cases, the complexity of economic issues is successfully reduced for the broader public and the issue becomes salient. The *game changer* - managers are not *per se* winning anymore - is explained by scandals. The variable “scandal” is used to explain the shift from public indifference to public awareness; or as I call it: the shift from silence to salience. Once an issue increases its salience, actors, others than managers, have an incentive to inform themselves too and thereby reduce the informational asymmetry.

Although it is convincing indeed that scandals reduce the complexity of a topic, it remains a mechanism rather than an explanatory factor. Culpepper assumes scandals to be a reason for complex issues to become salient. These scandals work through “availability heuristics”, or, in other words, the “product of cognitive bias” (Culpepper 2011). This simply means that scandals only affect a topic if they are able to reduce the complexity of economic issues for the average voter (e.g., by specific keywords like *chlorine chicken*). Again, Culpepper perceives scandals (in combination with these “availability heuristics”) as an explanatory

variable for high political salience.

Using his broader theoretical framework, I want to argue that the double puzzle can be explained by two determinants: structures and agencies. First, the salience difference between TTIP and previous PTAs can be explained by *opportunity structures*. For the first time, it is the EU that has to adjust its rules as the minor trade partner and, therefore, TTIP raises concerns about a regulatory race-to-the-bottom. These opportunity structures in return have to be taken up by *agencies*, in my case social movements, and particularly a specific type of movement what I call *protest campaigners*. Such protest campaigners create scandals in order to oppose TTIP due to its focus on regulatory coordination. Then, these scandals are then taken up and facilitated by news media outlets to a level where they can influence public preferences. After a scandalisation process is boosted by media Culpepper's theory applies.

I will select Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom as my cases for a comparison, because TTIP becomes salient in all three countries – at least to some extent – before the rest of the EU became aware of this issue with the help of the ECI after July 2014. While at the same time preferences differ in Germany and Austria showing a negative support rate, while the UK is predominantly in favor of TTIP.

The next chapter starts with a literature review into the area of social movements, trade preferences, and the link between them. In particular, the theoretical framework of Culpepper's latest book is discussed because it serves as the basis for my analysis. Based on the literature review, I arrive to two key determinants that triggered the scandalization process. Chapter 3 proceeds with a description of the main methodology employed for the study, such as Google Trends, frame analysis of media articles and in-depth interview. Moreover, it provides further reasons for the selection of my three comparative cases. Chapter 4 presents the analysis of my double puzzle. In the concluding chapter I will discuss some further thoughts on my analysis with a particular focus on future research.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Literature Review

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs), i.e., free trade agreements between a small number of partners, like TTIP, should not be salient. The complexity of the agreement, which is the underlying reason for this assumption, can be seen in three major areas TTIP is dealing with. First, it should enable easier market access for companies in terms of trade in goods, services, public procurement and the rules of origin. Second, it should set up common technical regulations, as well as provide common rules for food safety, chemicals, cosmetics, textiles and other industries. Third, it should create new trade rules for investment, competition, intellectual property, and dispute settlements (European Commission 2015). These are the issues for which average citizens cannot assess the consequences for themselves because policies like public procurement do not directly intervene their everyday life. Previously, PTAs indeed were never salient in the EU. As mentioned above, the EU has already implemented several dozens of such preferential trade agreements without triggering similar public awareness.

Therefore, it is puzzling how TTIP developed to a salient issue for the broader public. Given the correlation between salience increase in most countries of the EU after July 2014 and the creation of the ECI “Stop TTIP”, I assume social movement protest was playing a crucial role during the first period of arising public awareness. According to Tarrow, social movements are defined as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 2011: 9).

Choudry (2014), who focuses on trade agreement protest, points at the difficulties to protest against PTAs in the US and Europe. According to him, large social protests against PTAs

actually do happen, but they are rather outside of the US and Europe. He concludes that the absence of large protests within the US and Europe is linked to unequal power distribution because it is mostly the EU or the US that are imposing their regulatory standards to the respective trade partners.

Previous social movement protests tackling economic policies have mainly been targeted against institutions like the WTO, IMF, and G7. The “textbook example” that is often referred to in this context is the *Battle of Seattle* against the WTO ministerial meeting in 1999. Kolb (2005), for example, highlights the importance of such international summits and sees them as an opportunitiy structure for social movments. As he writes: “International summits of supranational institutions such as the WTO, the IMF, or the G7 are of central importance for the making and mobilisation of transnational social movements” (Kolb 2005: 115). Furthermore, such protest events against the WTO and other institutions “serve as visible proxies [...] for abstract concepts like neoliberal globalisation or the global capital class” (Kolb 2005: 115). To rephrase this more generally, it is easier to orchestrate protest against institutions than against agreements. Agreements are detailed contracts while instutions are also symbols for neoliberal globalisation and, therefore, it is easier to project a vast varieties of protest claims against the latter.

This can also be seen in Berry/Gabay (2009); they show that interest groups that were involved in the *Battle of Seattle* do not necessarily had to share the same stance towards free trade. The authors analyses Oxfam and their involment in the *Battle of Seattle* concluding that Oxfam did not aim its protest against the WTO to target free trade *per se*. In contrast, Oxfam was even in favor of more free trade. As Berry and Gabay write:

“Oxfam’s most important campaign in recent years has been directed at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Oxfam has sought to influence public opinion and the foreign economic policies of WTO member states so that international trade rules can be made fairer for poor countries. [...] But for Oxfam, ‘fairer’ trade is largely synonymous with ‘freer’ trade.” (Berry/Gabay 2009:348)

But in terms of PTAs it is hard to orchestrate such diverse interests and incorporate movements that are both in favor and against free trade. These agreements are based on highly technical trade issues of regulatory coordination. Therefore, they can not easily serve as targets for a vast varieties of claims.

Del Felice (2012) makes this point more clear. She argues that the success of transnational collective action is generally linked to activism in normative fields, like human rights and democracy. In these fields, it is easier to reach a consent on what is globally perceived as “good” or “bad”. In other words, it is easier to start and manoeuvre a protest in these fields. This is not the case for trade issues. As Del Felice writes: “Activism relating to trade [...] taps into highly ideological policy approaches. [...] To some, neoliberal recipes can be identified as transformative and emancipatory, [...] others understand neoliberalism to be oppressing and unjust” (Del Felice 2012: 305).

Based on these findings, it is very likely that protest demands against TTIP are not framed in a relation to trade and economic terms but rather to normative issues. Ultimately, social movements root in continuous collective actions that emerge if people – among other factors - do not have regular access to representative institutions (Tarrow 2011). Given that TTIP is negotiated on the supranational level of the EU, the contention may actually emerge out of a broader understanding of democratic malaise rather than due to particular economic issues. The reason is the following: if citizens oppose political issues they have the possibility to make a deliberate choice between raising their concerns or leaving the community, i.e. the dichotomy of *voice versus exit* that was outlined by Hirschmann (1970). Voicing concerns normally happen in representative systems through political parties. However, political parties do not seem to play a decisive role in the early stages because TTIP is negotiated by the European Commission on the supranational level. Thus, the issue can be linked to a principal-agent problem and the increasing responsiveness-responsibility dilemma (Majone 2001, 1997;

Rodrik/Zeckhauser 1988; Mair 2009). Mair (2009), for example, states that the problem has to be found in the rising gap between a responsive and responsible government and that this gap is increasing through the process of Europeanisation. Parties increasingly miss to make a link between civil society and the polity and thus they fail to give voice to “the people”. Instead, parties become governors and shift from “representing interests of citizens to the state to representing interests of the state to the citizens” (Mair 2009: 6). This may not be much of a problem if it had not be for the legitimacy of elected politicians. Mair calls this elsewhere the “hollowing of democracy” (Mair 2006). Parties have to be responsive in the sense that they should be able to react to public demands. At the same time, the major concern for political parties is the demand for *responsibility*, i.e., the commitment of parties towards previously accepted rules, procedures and contracts implemented by former governments. This concern was strengthened by the process of Europeanisation. This means that “responsibility involves an acceptance that [...] the leader's hand will be tied” (Mair 2009: 12). The tension arises because “the advantage of tying one’s hand” - as Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) refer to it originally - gets problematic when it comes to legitimacy. Following previous commitments makes it harder to respond to electoral demands as governments become constrained by an increasing number of principals (voters, central banks, the European Commission or other EU member states). Governmental actions are more and more defined by the actions of the previous governments. As a result, the room for governmental manoeuvre decreases. Rodrik and Zeckhauser (1988) make this claim even more explicit by calling for a complete unresponsiveness of governments. The citizens’ demand for the government’s ability to react to unforeseeable circumstances will never be as beneficial as sticking to commitments. Yet if citizens do not feel their demands incorporated in the negotiation process, they will voice their concerns through contentious actions by relying increasingly on non-governmental channels; in particular social movements. In return,

“the movement engages in a discursive struggle over the very definition of politics. [...] The dynamics of economic globalisation and the hegemony of the neoliberal doctrine have weakened the potential support for issues of global justice in the party system. [...] The movement challenges the dominant definition of politics, enlarging the scope of its criticism from policy decisions to institutional assets and the understanding of democracy” (Della Porta 2005: 178-179)

Therefore, the puzzling observation of TTIP salience in some countries of the EU may be explained by the fact that social movements based their contentious action on the framing grievances toward the broader scheme of democracy or democratic legitimacy and less on economic issues, thereby enabled large mobilisation that increased salience.

Why do preferences towards TTIP differ, while they do not differ towards free trade per se, having public salience in some countries of the EU. Hence, my second observation is equally puzzling. From an economic perspective, the classical literature on trade preferences highlights either the social status of the actors, or the industry. The Stolper-Samuelson model assumes that free trade between countries will always lead to a disadvantage for specific groups of people, irrespective of the advantage for the country itself (Mansfield/Mutz 2009). The model uses a class-based explanation for free trade preferences. This basically means that higher education is strongly correlated with higher preferences for lower trade barriers (Ahlquist et al. 2014: 39). In contrast, the Ricardo-Viner model employs an industry-based explanation for free trade agreements. Whereby citizens’ preferences depend on the preferences of the respective industries they work in. It assumes that factors of production are static and cannot move easily. Therefore, people in export-oriented industries should support, while people in import-oriented industries should oppose trade liberalisation (Mansfield/Mutz 2009: 426).

Further elaborations have mainly used these two classical understandings as a starting point in developing the topic. Ehrich (2010), Rodrik (1997) and Bhagwati (1995) debate about the importance of fair trade for people’s trade preferences. Other explanatory variables for trade preferences range from the level human capital, work exposure to trade, economic status, values and identities (Mayda/Rodrik 2005), trade policy coalitions within specific sectors (Alt

et al. 1996), contact with economic ideas during college education (Hainmueller/Hiscox 2006) to the perception of the general effect on a given society (Mansfield/Mutz 2009). In addition, Ahlquist et al. (2014) point at the importance of trade unions in strengthening a class-based preferences for free trade, in the sense that not only the individuals' position within an economy is decisive in determining trade preferences, but also the embeddedness into organisations like trade unions. As convincing as many of these studies are, they have a hard time explaining the preference differences between TTIP while at the same time the general preference towards free trade remains the same throughout the EU.

Another literature string on trade preferences overlaps with political communication in arguing that media coverage has an effect on the policy preferences of individuals. While many studies usually focus on political policy preferences, others specify this logic towards the effect of media coverage on individual's economic expectations (Goidel et al. 2010; Boomgaarden et al 2011; Blood/Phillips 1995; Doms/Morin 2004; Hollanders/Vliegenthart 2011; Soroka et al 2015; Carroll 2003). Cases of highly negative or positive media coverage on TTIP may therefore be an explanation why the public preference towards TTIP differs from their preference towards free trade in general.

To be able to combine the different strings from this literature review, namely social movements, salience, media coverage and preference differences, I will rely on a broader framework outlined by Culpepper (2011). Hence, the following section pays some detailed attention to his theoretical framework as it provides the bridging link that overcomes the connective gaps between the different insights provided above, and thereby serves as the underlying theoretical foundation for my hypotheses.

2.2 Quiet Politics and Its Failure

Culpepper provides a sound theoretical framework that I use for my analysis. While he focuses on political patterns of corporate governance and observes that it is mostly the will of managers that succeeds, I will outline Culpepper's analysis of business power in a more general way and adjust his concept to my research on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

Culpepper essentially argues that in terms of highly technical economic issues, political decisions are determined by managerial power: it is always the will of managers that prevails even against political opposition. The source of this managerial power arises out of the condition of low political salience, with political salience defined as an issue of "importance to the average voter, relative to other political issues" (Culpepper 2011: 4).

Culpepper's logic is the following: political parties and politicians only see the need to increase their knowledge about a topic and cover that topic if it is highly visible for their voters. Issues like tax- and pension reforms are policies for which the average citizen sees the consequence for themselves. She/he cares about the position of parties on these topics and she/he will hold the respective parties responsible for any defection in future elections; i.e. the voter will inform herself/himself.

But issues like preferential trade negotiations and agreements are normally not easy to comprehend. Due to their abstract and technical content, citizens do not clearly see the direct effect of these issues on their everyday life. It is therefore highly unlikely that they will hold politicians and political parties responsible for it in the next election. In this case, managers have a significantly higher chance in succeeding with their preferences *and* reducing the strength of their opponents, because politicians do not see a benefit in increasing their expertise on the issue for being (re-)elected.

Under this low salience environment, managers succeed with their “will” because they have superior tools; be it classical lobbying or the demand of politicians for their expertise on the topics.

Besides the possibility to influence this formal process by expertise and lobbying, a second advantage of business is the existence of informal working groups. Often these informal groups exercise extensive powers when it comes to agenda setting and given the expertise advantage of managers, their will dominates there too.

In my case, such informal institutions are for example secret negotiations. As Culpepper writes, these institutions have historically been created with the agreement of political parties without being legal institutions. They depend on current players in an institutional regime, yet they have been excepted by previous governments without having direct governmental oversight. If these informal institutions play an important role, as they do in the case of PTAs, then managerial power is further increased. I will try to argue in line with this for TTIP. TTIP is negotiated exclusively by the European Commission which received its mandate from the national governments in 2013 (European Commission 2015b). Concerning the Commission, “large firms” have a prioritized access and thus significant lobbying power (Coen 1997). In this context, Van Appeldorn (2000) points at the importance of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), pushing for neoliberal agenda on the supranational level. In line with this, Corporate Europe Observatory published a survey of the major lobbyists in the case of TTIP (Corporate Europe Observatory 2014).

Additionally, media representatives want to sell stories, hence topics of minor interest will not be sold as easily and successfully as high salient ones. Journalists therefore rely on the lobbying preferences of managers too. Low salience allows business to dominate the “tone of media coverage” (Culpepper 2011: 10). Hence business groups can “exploit [...] informational asymmetries that allow them to be effective lobbyists in trying to frame press

coverage” (Culpepper 2011: 10). Opponents often lack these advantageous tools. Yet, as Culpepper writes: “These tools of [managerial] influence are fragile only because they are a function of public inattention” (Culpepper 2011: 178).

When salience changes and the general public cares, business may lose a battle because politicians start to care about the public opinion of the voters and disregards much more powerful groups. The difference is thus clear: under low salience, the “biggest army” as Culpepper calls it, is not important but the perception of superior expertise of managers and their access to decision makers. With the change in salience, the *size of the army* does matter and managers will have to align with interest groups and persuade public opinion too. As he writes: “Business power goes down as political salience goes up” (Culpepper 2011:177).

Logically, the major interest of opponent groups is to raise the salience of a topic. Due to Culpepper, this shift happens under two circumstances. First, a shift may happen through *crises*, or more precisely: through *market crashes*. Market crashes may lead to a shift because they show very directly that the expertise of managers failed. One has to critically, add that this assumes that market crashes are predominately a consequences of manager’s mismanagement. Second, salience may shift through *scandals*. As Culpepper outlines, in both cases the public can be mobilized “by revealing a scandal or capitalising on a crisis” (Culpepper 2011: 6), in many cases by political entrepreneurs, which then again puts managers into a defensive stance and creates the opportunity for opponents to mobilize the public for their own claims by “associat[ing] the legislation with widely shared values (clean air, pure water, health and safety)” Culpepper 2011: 7).

If a scandal or crisis is available, media starts to move the public attention to it. This is then the essential mechanism for public awareness. Media will write more about issues because it increases their sales. With increased media attention, politicians acquire an incentive to demonstrate their capacity of dealing with the problem - mostly through the implementation

of control mechanisms to change or constraint an issue, whereby the issue becomes even more prominent among voters. Thus, media outlets are going to publish even more, making it a vicious circle. Under such circumstances, managers' success is all but guaranteed.

2.3 Hypothesising Quiet Politics' Failure

Scandals incentivise media to publish articles about the issue, and, with increasing media coverage, politicians are incentivised to deepen their knowledge, thereby reducing business power. Not only do I use Culpepper approach as my theoretical foundation, I will further try to extent it by focusing more specifically on scandals and the role of political entrepreneurs in the scandalisation process. Instead of using scandals as an explanatory variable itself, I perceive them as a mechanism for the shift from silence to salience. Thus, in the next section I want to turn to my hypotheses concerning the factors that determine the early stage of the scandalisation process in the context of my double puzzle (Table 1).

Table 1. Double Puzzle

TTIP	Germany / Austria	UK
Public Salience	✓	✓
Positive Preference	□	✓

2.3.1 The EU, Power, and International Trade

Preferential trade agreements should not be salient in the first place. These agreements are highly technical and do not intervene directly into the average voter's everyday life. In fact,

these trade agreements are not salient. As mentioned before, PTAs are a frequent tool that is used by the EU (European Commission 2016a, 2016b). All of these PTAs remained unnoticed by the broader society in the member states of the EU. Then again, as we can see, TTIP has developed high salience in some countries. As outlined by Culpepper, this salience is achieved by the scandalisation of TTIP.

I will argue that the underlying condition for triggering the scandalisation is based on the changing power position of the EU within the international environment of trade liberalisation, which now focuses on bilateral PTA's instead of multilateral agreements within the WTO.

Globally, the common ground for trade liberalisation was within the GATT and later the WTO. The major issue was, first, about the abolishing of tariffs and trade barriers. With the WTO, it was all about non-tariff barriers and liberalisation rounds basically dealt with a) the *investment protection agreement* against unilateral action of a state, b) the *agreement on public procurement* to avoid the “buy national” claims, c) *competition policies* to control governments spending and subsidies, and d) *dispute settlements*. De jure, the logic of these four disciplines was to negotiate trade issues without excluding or putting disadvantages on developing countries. De facto, the GATT/WTO framework was a platform in which the EU, and to a lesser degree the US, dictated the conditions for trade liberalisation (Csaba 2015).

Within the GATT and later the WTO, the EU was the dominant shaping power as one of the world's two largest trading blocs. The decisive trigger for EU's exceptional power position was the unification of the European markets through the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The European single market triggered strong access demands by the American side which until then largely followed a protectionist stance towards trade liberalisation. Their demands to enter the European market placed a strong bargaining chip on the EU and enabled the Europeans to push through with all their trade demands during the Kennedy Round in the

mid-1960s. After this, the EU allied themselves with the US to force these regulations upon other countries and thereby making the EU the primary policy shaper in international trade negotiations. This negotiation power was visible by the fact that the EU exported their trade rules, i.e. the EU introduced global regulations and key institutional changes to enforce trade rules. It was also visible by the fact that the EU was able to protect their own advantageous rules, i.e., they resisted liberalisation demands in the agricultural sector (DeBievre/Poletti 2014). Despite the push for pure market liberalisation in the early phase of the GATT, the EU generally focused on the promotion of a “market-plus” model of international trade that included market -making as well as re-regulation (Falkner/Müller 2014).

This role faded away by the mid-1990s when the WTO was created and the EU shifted from a *trade shaper* to a *status-quo power*. After the last successful liberalisation round in 1997, changes in the international power relations, triggered by the economic rise of the BRICS, strongly declined the policy shaping ability of the EU. At the same time internal pressure against more re-regulation, especially from the UK, strengthened that decline. External pressure from emerging countries and internal pressure from the UK, both strongly demanding a “market only” approach in international trade, reduced the power of the EU in pushing forward for more re-regulation. This decline became visible in the inability to persuade the developing countries to accept regulatory expansions during the Doha Round. This became also clear when the EU was giving in to the pressure of other actors, most vocally the US, to accept the failure of Doha and engage in preferential trade agreements instead (DeBievre/Poletti 2014; Falkner/Müller 2014).

With the EU giving in to PTAs, the “West” accepted the failure of Doha and instead focused on the idea of creating “coalitions of the willing” through preferential trade agreements. The move towards PTAs - in my case TTIP - brought several insights: first, trade is not the most important factor anymore and therefore Doha does not need to be saved under all

circumstances. Second, instead of trade, the focus is on services; and to open up the service sector one must align regulations between the partners, because the service sector is still the most regulated one. Third, the major issue besides opening the service sector is attracting investment. For this, investment security has to be at the basis of every new PTA. Lastly, sticking to PTAs and abolishing the liberalisation rounds within the WTO means creating a “us vs. them” mentality between the EU/US and the developing countries (Csaba 2015).

2.3.2 PTA's as an Opportunity Structure

Again, PTAs are not only about trade liberalisation. Rather, the focus lies on opening up the service sector and attracting investment through regulatory coordination. Regulatory coordination means that the parties involved in PTAs accept the rules of the other side and they attempt to bring regulations closer together without making them the same. Thus, PTAs are not about harmonisation, i.e., the complete alignment of rules and regulations. The reason not to require regulatory harmonisation lies in the fact that the EU's power position has faded away and they are not able to persuade others to align their regulation to EU standards. Demanding harmonisation may lead to the creation of regulatory opposition by the negotiation partners which may then endanger the PTA as a whole. Yet even regulatory coordination translates into one side making bigger adjustments to its rules and regulations. But the degree to which this happens depends on the relative strength of the negotiation partner. This strength is determined by the market size, rule stringency, regulatory capacity, and the possibility of exclusion. The bigger the partner's trading power the less likely it is for the EU to push the other side to make larger adjustments towards EU standards (Young 2015).

Analysing PTAs between the EU and Canada, Central America, Singapore, South Korea and the US (TTIP), Young concludes that none of these new generation PTAs aim at the harmonisation of regulations. Instead, it is a coordination while the degree of convergence is linked to the power of the other side. In other words, the stronger the partner, the less convergence towards the EU rules. Young shows that the highest degree of convergence is achieved in the PTA with the weakest partner – Latin America – while there seems to be almost no convergence towards EU standards in TTIP (Young 2015). Then again, this basically means that if the EU still wants to complete the TTIP agreement, regulatory coordination will happen from the European side.

One of the characteristics of PTAs also explains the paradox that the scandalisation of TTIP seems to include social movements, while the literature sees a rather minimal involvement of movements in trade agreements; especially in the EU and the US. What differs in the case of TTIP is the power-shift that leads the EU to converge its rules as the minor partner.

What I am driving at is that regulatory coordination comes with a second cost. To refer to Young again:

“Regulations tend to be rooted in domestic regulatory processes. [...] Consumer and environmental groups, at least in developed countries, tend to be much more actively engaged when trade policies touches on regulation. While traditional liberalisation tends to bring only benefits to consumers, regulatory co-ordination risks also bringing costs in the form of less safe or more environmentally harmful products.” (Young 2015: 1257).

With these new characteristics of international trade, so called *behind-the-border* issues, many groups raise their concerns because it requires severe domestic legislative changes. Interest groups that normally do not participate in trade politics become active players (e.g., environmental groups). The focus on behind-the-border issues is transforming the traditional costs and benefits of trade liberalisation. The old understanding that came with the liberalisation of at-the-border issues – *hurt the few and benefit the many* – does not hold true anymore.

The cost distribution differs because the focus lies on national rules. With beyond-the-border measures “the benefits of cheaper products compete with benefits from measures adopted to achieve desired public policy objectives, such as reducing consumer risk or containing environmental damage” (Young/Peterson 2006:800).

To stress again, TTIP is not about trade but the service sector and, above all, about attracting investment, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) lies at the root of many of these groups concerns. As Young and Peterson highlight, the strong increase in FDI that comes with PTAs triggers very salient concerns about FDI in the sense that firms may start a race-to-the-bottom for it, or as the authors write:

“The changing nature of international economic exchange [...] provoked [...] concerns that firms in their efforts to attract ‘foot-loose’ FDI governments might compete with each other by offering lower taxes or easing environmental or labour regulations. States would thus engage in a ‘race to the bottom’” (Young/Peterson 2006:801)

At the same time, the authors make it clear that the literature does not really indicate such a race-to-the-bottom. But then again, it is not about facts but beliefs. In the end it is irrelevant whether such a race-to-the-bottom in standards and regulations really happens. What matters is that these social movements believe it happens (Young/Peterson 2006).

The bottom line is that the power shift is a factor which is an opportunity for social movements to mobilise. PTAs in which the EU remained the bigger trade partner did not raise salience, while it was the case for TTIP.

2.3.3 TTIP and Social Contention

I claim that TTIP and its inherent possibility of a regulatory race-to-the-bottom is an opportunity structure and a necessary condition for triggering salience. This opportunity structure enables social movements to mobilise through the creation of a common identity based on shared beliefs and to use cognitive frames that can activate and sustain this identity.

Overall, frames simplify protest claims and thereby it creates a perception of “us vs. them” on which collective actions are ultimately based on. One of the most successful means to establish a common identity and to mobilise supporters is the concept of *bricolage*, which refers to the ability to combine established and well-known frames with new claims and frames (Tarrow 2011). Again, for this to be successful, an opportunity structure needs to be available. I mentioned before in the literature review, globalisation itself can be seen as creator of opportunities, but in my case I argue that the opportunity structure is not globalisation *per se*, but the power shift in international trade from previous PTAs to TTIP. This opportunity structure has been exploited by social movements in some countries of the EU and thereby it increased the salience in these member states of the EU. In other words, salience only increased if social movements exploited the opportunity structure

Besides the way how to frame grievances, the organisational set-up of social movements is crucial for the creation of social contention. In particular, the trade-off between a *robust* and a *flexible* movement structure, or in other words, a centralised and hierarchical organisation or a decentralised and non-hierarchical organisation. Both types have their advantages and disadvantages. A robust structure is very effective in achieving goals and mobilising people. The problem is that robustness leads to the danger and likelihood that such social movements become routinised in what they do and a division between the elites and the grassroots members may occur. Flexible structures, in contrast, have the advantage that they enable participation, as they are very flexible in coming up with innovative ways to challenge political elites. Nonetheless, lack of robustness leads to leadership problems and members may not be willing to follow. Therefore, most social movements combine both forms, i.e., they become hybrid movements.

Given the difficulties to mobilise around economic topics in the past, I assume hybrid movements or networks of hybrid movements, with a larger focus on flexibility, to play a

decisive role in the scandalisation process. Furthermore, according to Culpepper, media has to take up the scandal. Therefore, I see the link between social movements that creates scandals through framing and media that takes up the scandal, facilitates the salience, and supports the scandalisation process in the *professionalisation* of these movements. By professionalisation I mean a hybrid movement that is highly specialised in the diffusion of information, both internally and externally. Internally, in the sense that that movement has to be able to mobilise its supporters in various ways, e.g. through social media. Externally, in the sense that the movement has to be able to transmit its information to media outlets for reaching a broad diffusion of their framing. Therefore, I argue that social movements trigger the scandalisation process by creating the frames that scandalise TTIP, mobilise by ways that increases salience and transmit the scandal to media who facilitates the scandalisation process and the salience. If media takes up the frames, the coverage should be highly negative and should provide an explanation for the negative preferences towards TTIP.

2.3.4 Determinants of the Scandalisation Process

To sum it up, my argument is that PTAs had not been a highly salient issue until TTIP emerged. However, the EU power-shift in the international trade regime has made the issue of trade potentially more salient. For the first time it is the EU that has to converge their regulations significantly as the minor partner, which results in the possibility of a regulatory race-to-the-bottom in terms of regulations and standards. This shift comes with regulatory concerns for several actors that creates the opportunity for social contention. Hence, the power shift of the EU is basically an opportunity structure.

This opportunity structure then needs to be exploited by social movements. These movements are triggering the scandalisation process by reducing the complexity of TTIP through simple, negative frames (e.g. chlorine chicken). At the same time, they are able to trigger public

salience by means of frame diffusion that reaches a high amount people.

The remaining steps of the *scandalisation process* follow Culpepper's argument, outlined in the last chapter. Whether this scandalisation process ultimately succeeds by leading to stable or even increasing level of salience depends on the role of media. If media takes up the scandal, salience is facilitated and the issue should eventually enter into what Culpepper has called "noisy politics". If media ignores the scandal, salience should not be supported and the scandalisation will fail. Without a scandal and media coverage, politicians will not have an incentive in informing themselves about it and the business power remains strong.

Media coverage, as I have shown in the literature review, does also play a role in influencing the perception of an issue. Thus, in cases of high media coverage, the tone of the coverage should resemble the the public preferences for TTIP. Yet on this stage of the scandalisation process Culpepper's analysis applies, as increasing media coverage lays the ground for bringing an issue into focus of the average citizen.

3 Methodology

3.1 Measuring Public Salience

The puzzle of my thesis depends heavily on the argument that TTIP is salient in some member states of the European Union. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer poll is only indicating numerical positive or negative preferences towards TTIP among EU countries but not the level of public awareness. Therefore, it may very well be that a country's public has a relatively positive attitude towards TTIP in the Eurobarometer poll, while, at the same time, the issue is actually not salient. Under such a premise, every further analysis concerning the difference in TTIP preferences has to be flawed. Let me rephrase this thought: Luxembourg (43% against TTIP), Germany (41% against), and Austria (53% against) are the three countries with the most negative public perception of TTIP. In all three countries the support rate is even lower than the rate against it. The numerical gap is then left to people who showed their indifference. If we assume that the public in Austria, Germany and Luxembourg are uniformed or unaware of the TTIP negotiations, then how much explanatory power does the Eurobarometer poll have? It will not explain much. The negative perception will lose all its explanatory power, because the survey participants may only have answered the survey to cover their lack of expertise, which would then lead to strongly biased results. Therefore, a better measurement for public salience is needed. Hence, to measure salience in my case, I will use *Google Trend* results for the keyword "TTIP" from July 2013 until September 2014. The starting point has been chosen as it resembles the starting point of the TTIP negotiations, with the first EU-US negotiation round taking place in mid-July 2013. The endpoint – September 2014 – is chosen because of the launch of the ECI in the same month.

Google Trends is an application by Google that provides an insight into the amount of

searches for a specific keyword in a specific time period for Google's search engine. After entering a keyword, it provides a graph that outlines the popularity of the respective keyword over a selected period of time. In terms of reading the graph, once the mouse is placed on the graph a number appears and as Google writes:

"the numbers that appear show total searches for a term relative to the total number of searches done on Google over time. A line trending downward means that a search term's relative popularity is decreasing. But that doesn't necessarily mean the total number of searches for that term is decreasing. It just means its popularity is decreasing compared to other searches."¹

A decreasing graph indicates that the popularity of other terms is higher and therefore the salience decreased. Obviously, this is not a perfect measurement either, yet it is better than the alternatives.

One classical way of measuring salience is media coverage. This was the method that Culpepper applied to assess issue salience. Yet, in my case media coverage is not a feasible proxy for salience because I argue that media only follows up on social movement and it is movements that trigger salience, not media.

Jonathan Mellon (2014) has shown that *Google Trends* may very well be a feasible alternative to a second classical measurement of issue salience, namely the "Most Important Problem" (MIP) questions. The survey institute, Gallup, asks its interview participants which issue they think is the most important problem facing their country today. The problem with this salience measure is that it allows interviewees to give only one issue as a response.

Mellon has tested several validity concerns of Google Trends against the Gallup's "MIP"-question and three issues are indeed worrisome. First, it is possible that Google users do not correlate with the representativeness of population given by surveys. Concerning the representativeness of Internet users, Mellon writes:

"A potential problem [...] is that users are not fully representative of the population as a whole demographically, and, as such, some groups are underrepresented [...]. [Previous] analysis [...] shows that younger age, higher education and higher income predict increased probability of using the internet." (Mellon 2014: 50)

¹ https://support.google.com/trends/answer/4355164?hl=en&ref_topic=4365530

Yet, the author is able to show in his analysis that this does not lead to a significant bias, especially if compared to the classical “MIP” survey question. Hence, Google Trends can be used as an alternative measurement for high/low salience.

A second problematic issue and constraint of Google Trends is *content validity*, referring to possibility that the keyword that has been used is linked to more than one meaning. To give a very trivial example of my own: if one would be interested in the public salience of the recent Volkswagen scandal in Germany using Google Trends with the Keyword *Volkswagen*, the results may indicate high salience throughout the period of analysis. However, the results may not say much about the awareness of the scandal as users may have an intention to buy a Volkswagen and tried to google *Volkswagen* to get information about the cars. In my case, this problem can be solved by relying on the keyword “TTIP” which has been used by media, interest groups and politicians in all the member states of the European Union. Using “Free Trade Agreement”, “Free Trade Protest”, or similar words, would not have the same validity due to the possibility that users may have searched for other agreements.

A third issue that Mellon sees as worrisome for a comparison of salience throughout the EU is *language*. It is difficult to use Google Trends for countries with different languages. It is possible that a search term may be spelled in different ways throughout these countries. Again, to give a very trivial example of my own: if someone tries to analyze the public salience for Mikhail *Gorbachev* in the recent Ukraine conflict, Google trends would not be able to give valid EU-wide data because *Gorbachev* is written *Gorbatschow* in German, *Gorbachev* in French, and *Gorbačov* in Croatian. Again, this is not the case for TTIP.

I have tried to argue that the risk of these three concerns for my analysis can be reduced to a minimum, and therefore, I will use *Google Trends* as proxy for the public salience of TTIP in member states of the European Union.

Additionally, I use the function *related google searches* on Google Trends to measure

possible salience trigger in countries that show salience. The related searches function shows search terms that have been googled in the same session as another search term yet not at the same time. By this, one can assess the interest of Google users.

After a pre-testing of TTIP salience through *Google Trends*, I discovered – among a few others - relatively high salience in Germany, Austria, and the UK. While two of the three, namely Germany and Austria also show negative preferences towards TTIP, whereas it is the opposite for the UK, I decided to pick these three countries as my comparative cases for my double puzzle.

3.3 News Media Analysis

3.3.1 Media Outlet Selection

Given the importance of media coverage for social movements trajectories as well as the dominant role of media in Culpepper's approach, I decided to conduct a frame analysis of newspaper articles that were including the keyword *TTIP* to analyze the coverage of media articles. I use the increase of media coverage on TTIP as a proxy for a successful scandalisation process and the beginning of what Culpepper called “noisy politics”. The media analysis was limited to three cases mainly due to language constraints.

The main selection criteria for media outlets in all three countries was the *coverage of the political spectrum*, the *prominence* of the media outlet in order to assure a high readership coverage as well as *accessibility* of the newspaper. The time period analysed started from July 2013 and ended in August 2014.

For Germany I selected Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Die Welt and Die BILD. The cross-media reach (CMR) – i.e., the combined amount of readers that exclusively read either the printed

version or online version, plus readers that follow both – ranks the selected news media outlets as following: Die BILD is the most read outlet with 18.6 million readers, followed by *Der Spiegel* with 11.05 million. Die Welt reached 3.93 million and Die Zeit 3.72 (Statista 2016).

For Austria, I selected Der Standard, Die Presse and Die Kronen Zeitung. The CMR is the following: Die Kronen Zeitung lead with 2.6 million, followed by Der Standard with 663 thousand and Die Presse with 436 thousand readers (Kleine Zeitung 2014: 6).

For the UK, I selected *the Guardian*, *The Independent* and *The Telegraph*. In the case of the UK, none of the tabloids are covering TTIP before the end of my time range. For this, I checked *the Sun* as well as *the Daily Mail*. The CMR shows the following: The Guardian reached 5.26 million, The Telegraph reached 4.9, and the Independent 3.66 million reader (Hollander 2013).

3.3.2 Media Article Analysis

In order to collect the relevant articles for my data analysis, I mainly used the search tool LexisNexis, typing in the keyword “TTIP” for a period of analysis from July 2013 until August 2014. Upon the search completion, I collected 311 news media articles. From which 134 articles are coming from German newspapers, 143 articles are from Austrian, and 34 articles from the UK ones.

In the German case, I used LexisNexis to analyze *Die Zeit* (46 articles), *Der Spiegel* (36 articles) and *Die Welt* (46 articles). Die *BILD* (6 articles) was somehow more difficult, because LexisNexis is not providing access to it. To be able to include it nevertheless, I relied on the *Bild Online* search tool for the keyword *TTIP*.

For Austria, I used LexsiNexis to analyze *Der Standard* (20 articles) and *Die Presse* (29

articles). Again, the *KronenZeitung* (94 articles) was an issue because LexisNexis did not provide a free access to it. Also, there is no search button on KronenZeitung online. To solve this, I used the media search tool genios.de. Though problematically, the free version of Genios only enables the ranking of newspaper articles according to a keyword and a time range, including the respective title; not the access to the entire article. Therefore, for the KronenZeitung no frame analysis was conducted. Nonetheless, given the clearly negative nature of all article titles, I used them as a proxy for the content and coded them negatively.

In the case of the UK, I used LexisNexis for all three newspapers, namely, the Guardian (18 articles), The Telegraph (8 articles) and the Independent (8 articles).

The next step then was a frame analysis of the content of these media articles to assess the tone of media coverage. The criteria for a frame was that it has to be an argument in favor or against the implementation of TTIP. Based on that, I coded each frame with a (+) in case of *in favor*, and (-) in case of *against*. Given the fact that most articles referred to TTIP included several frames, often positive and negative, I added a value to each articles using five categories from (+2) to (-2). (+2) was used in cases when the articles included only positive frames without a single negative one. (+1) was used in which both kind of frames, negative and positive, were available, yet the amount of positive frames outnumbered the amount of negative one, and (0) was given to articles in which both negative and positive frames have been more or less balanced. The same logic then applied to (-2) and (-1). Ultimately, I re-coded the articles into three categories, by merging values of (-2) as well as (-1) to “positive” and articles with a value of (-2) as well as (-1) to “negative” and balanced became “neutral”. Based on that last re-coding I created a graph showing the tone of newspaper articles per month for each of my cases. The rationale behind this two-step coding is to increase external validity as much as possible.

The result of the analysis can be found in the appendix of this thesis, whereby I did not

include Die KronenZeitung due to issues mentioned above.

3.4 In-Depth Interview

After receiving first results from the Google Trends and Google Trends Related Searches Analysis, I conducted an in-depth interview to get “contrasting and complementary talk” on my research puzzle (Hennink et. all 2011: 109; Rapley 2007: 18). The interview was conducted with Dr. Felix Kolb, CEO of Campact, on the 12th of April 2016 and it lasted for 40 minutes.

The interview was arranged in a private space in the interviewee’s private home so that we were able to interact easily without any “outside interaction” of the interviewee’s family members or fellow partners (Rapley 2007: 18). It took place in a separate room at his home in Bremen, Germany. According to Silverman (2013), this might significantly decrease the probability of negative bias present in the interviewee’s talk.

As discussed by Hennink et al. (2011), I prepared a semi-structured interview guide for the qualitative data collection. The content of my topic guide was generated before the interviewed took place. Right before the interview, minor changes were brought to the guide based on the information I have already received from my own research for previous drafts of this thesis.

According to Hennink et al. (2011: 112), the interview guide should have introduction, opening questions, key questions and closing questions. First, I introduced myself, told him about my educational background, explained the purpose of the research and data collection.

The interview guide that I wrote in advance did not have fully written questions. Instead, I mainly relied on major keywords, not to be constraint to the formulation in the interview guide and to easily come up with questions during the interview.

During the actual interview, I tried to establish trust relationship for the interviewee to feel and behave like during a regular conversation. The interviewer practice I tried to implement was neutrality together with elements of self-disclosing (Rapley 2007: 19). I offered my own thoughts for comparison only when I felt it was significantly relevant or when I was explicitly asked for it by my interviewee.

Before the start of the interview, we negotiated the terms of confidentiality and I politely asked for the permission to audio-record the session, which was granted by my interview partner. I further explained my treatment of the audio record. I clearly stated that I plan to record the session in order to create a verbatim transcript. Once the verbatim transcript is created, I would send the text file via email to the interviewee and ask for a second approval of the content – which was given by Felix Kolb without any amendments – and after this second written approval I would delete the audio file – which I did.

I proceeded with opening questions that referred to his own academic text on social movements; see Kolb (2005). The idea behind this opening question was to show my interest and awareness of the broader topic and his academic contribution to it. It increased the level of trust and created a comfortable environment.

The further questions were mainly related to the keywords on the interview guide. The interview went smoothly. I was following the interviewee's talk such that I did not have to use all of the keywords that I prepared. However, I nevertheless referred to my guide that helped me to formulate suitable questions when I planned to change the direction of the talk.

After the interview was finished, I produced the transcripts to provide a support of the arguments used in the research. I did not exploit the received information.

The validity of the interview data is largely dependent on the way I interpret the observations, in the sense that the points that I derive out it should be supported by the data I have collected and should be related to earlier research (Silverman 2013). The validity of the interview

conducted by myself was high, since the data collected was of a direct relevance to the research puzzles investigated throughout the thesis.

The interview transcript was presented to my thesis supervisor in an earlier draft of this thesis and therefore I decided not to include it into my appendix due to confidentiality issue that arise out of the fact that this thesis is going to be published online by the Central European University. If needed, I will make the verbatim transcript available upon request.

4 TTIP and its Scandalisation

4.1 The *Noisy Politics* of TTIP

The status quo of the protest against TTIP is an EU-wide campaign, *Stop TTIP*, that is supported by more than 500 European organizations ranging from social movements and NGOs to trade unions. The idea of the *Stop TTIP* campaign is to coordinate the Anti-TTIP movements all around the EU under one transnational social movement (TSM) and to internationalize the protest. What can be seen with the transnational social movement *Stop TTIP* is the *externalisation* of the national Anti-TTIP campaigns and a *transnational coalition forming*. In other words, national social movements are mobilizing against an international actor, in this case the European Commission, through a coalition of actors across borders (Tarrow 2011: 403-446).

The rationale behind the creation of a TSM was to make use of the *European Citizens Initiative (ECI)* tool. The ECI is an “**invitation to the European Commission to propose legislation** on matters where the EU has competence to legislate” (European Commission 2016c). An ECI, if accepted by the Commission, will result in the meeting of ECI members with representatives of the Commission. Also, it will allow to take part at a public hearing in the European Parliament where the ECI members can voice their concerns. Moreover, “the Commission will adapt a formal response spelling out what action it will propose in response to the citizens’ initiative, if any, and the reasons for doing or not doing so” (European Commission 2016c). The requirements for such an ECI are twofold. First, the creation of a so called “citizens’ committee” that has to include at least seven citizens from seven different EU member states. Then such a citizens’ committee launches a “citizens’ initiative” which is basically a petition or campaign. Secondly, after the start of this initiative, it has to be

supported by a minimum of one million EU citizens from at least seven EU member countries, with a signature quorum for every member state according to its size (European Commission 2016c).

The TSM *Stop-TTIP* founded a *Citizens' Committee* in April 2014 and registered the *Citizens' Initiative* "Stop-TTIP" on the 15th of July, 2014. By September 2014, the European Commission rejected the admission for the ECI. As a result, the TSM Stop-TTIP decided to launch a self-organized citizen's initiative (sECI) in September and started the signature collection for the sECI on October 7th, 2014. Despite the fact that a sECI lacks all the advantages of a ECI, it still enables publicity for the movements involved and their claims. After 30 hours, the sECI collected more than 200 thousand signatures. On October 24th, Austria, Germany and the UK already reached their country quota. By December 4th, two month after the beginning, the sECI was able to fulfil the requirements outlined by the European Commission for a successful ECI, namely, to collect one million signature from seven different member states according to a country-specific signature quorum (Stop-TTIP 2016).

With the start of the TSM *Stop-TTIP* and the (s)ECI, the protest against TTIP reached what Culpepper called noisy politics. Thus, the major question about this shift from silence to salience, or from "quiet" to "noisy politics" has to be found before the internationalization of the protest.


4.2 Public Awareness of TTIP in Selected Countries

For the Google Trends analysis, I used the Keywords *TTIP* for a period from July 2013 until August 2014. I perceive the launch of a EU-wide citizens' initiative as a signal of high TTIP salience among several countries of the EU as such an initiative demands the signing of

movements from at least seven EU countries. That was the point where the scandalisation process succeeded and entered what Culpepper has called “noisy politics”, a situation in which the outcome is ultimately determined by party interests and coalition forming.

I have selected Germany (blue), Austria (yellow), the United Kingdom (red), Italy (purple) and France (green). As Graph 1 shows, salience is high in Germany and Austria. Compared to these two countries, it is only the UK that has at least some levels of salience although at a much lower level.²

Graph 1. Google Trends



Unfortunately, Google Trends enables only the comparison of maximum five countries. Nevertheless, to be able to get an overview on TTIP salience, I have kept Austria, Germany and UK, and compared them to every single EU member country. A small number of EU countries did reach some levels of salience but I excluded them from my analysis due to two reason: First, all of the countries very small states and thus I would assume that Google Trends did not properly check the results towards the size of the country. In these case, including these cases as public salience bears the risk of mixing up the results. Therefore, I claim that salience is highly in Germany and Austria. It is much lower in the UK, yet compared to other EU member states still high enough to claim TTIP salient. In addition, this

²<https://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=TTIP&geo=DE%2C%20GB%2C%20AT%2C%20FR%2C%20IT&date=6%2F2013%2016m&cmpt=geo&tz=Etc%2FGMT-2>

does not mean that in all other countries there is no awareness at all. It solely means that the level of salience is too low compared with Germany, Austria and the UK. Hence, I ended up having three countries with a relatively good level of public awareness concerning TTIP, two of which have a negative public perception (Germany and Austria) and one with a positive perception on the issue (UK). To make this further comparable, I also added France and Italy, to show that TTIP there is basically a non-salient issue.

A climax was reached in Germany in May 2014, which sets this day to 100 (percent) relative salience and compares the other countries Google searches in relation to this 100. Overall the scale thus goes from 0-100. This means, for example, that Austria reached a 60 percent salience level in April 2014 and approximatively 80 percent salience in May 2014, when the Germany reached 100 percent.

As we can see, the first increase in public salience emerged in Germany in the end of 2013 and then increased until May 2014, where it reached a peak. The development in Austria is similar, with slightly higher salience levels. Again, the starting point is in the end of 2013, with a peak in May 2014. This would support the assumption that a scandalisation process started in those two countries as assumed in the previous chapter and justifies the selection of Germany and Austria as relevant cases for the analysis.

Public salience in the UK appeared only after it has already increased in Germany and Austria. The level of salience remained relatively low, with a first peak in May 2014. A larger increase only occurred after the period of my analysis. Although the level of salience in the UK seems to be comparatively low, it is important to note that the reason for this has to be seen in the way Google Trend displays salience. It is relatively low – almost constantly below 20 percent – compared to the highest peak in Germany (100 percent), yet still higher than in other countries.

4.3 Case 1: Germany

Germany is probably the most important choice for the analysis of the scandalisation process. Most of the protests against TTIP happened in Germany. Two of the biggest ones took place in Berlin, in the summer of 2015 with more than 250 thousand protesters and in Hannover in the spring of 2016 with more than 35 thousand protesters (Comfort 2015; Scheper 2016). Graph 2 shows the the level of salience in Germany for the analyzed period. As it can be seen before in Graph 1, following a continuous positive trend Germany reached a maximum of 100 percent salience in May 2014 compared to other selected countries. After the peak point in May 2014, there was a sharp decrease in salience that held until July 2014 from where on it developed a relative stable trend between 20 and 40 percent compared to the highest point of 100 reached in May 2014.

Graph 2. Salience in Germany.³



If one looks at the data collected only for Germany (Graph 2), *Google Trends* indicated the beginning of the scandalisation process in December 2013. More precisely, it happened between the 8th and the 14th of December with a salience level reached 13 percent (blue dot), as well as the 15th of December with a slightly lower salience level of 12 percent. As one can

³ Data Source: Google Trends (www.google.com/trends).

see, the salience dropped after the 15th, starting to recover its continuous increase from the period between the 22nd and the 28th of December. Therefore, the trigger of the scandalisation process must be linked to some events around the period of the first considerable spike (blue dot).

At that time, more precisely between the 16th and 21st of December, the third negotiation round between US and EU officials took place in Washington D.C. This would be a plausible explanatory factor for triggering the awareness of TTIP. But then again, Google Trends shows a salience drop during exactly the discussed time period. Also, another question remains: why should the salience only increase with the third negotiation round and not the first or the second, which took place between the 7th and 12th of July as well as between the 11th and 15th of November?

A further analysis of *Google Trends* provides more insight into the issues that might have been triggering the process. I have divided the entire period of analysis into four distinct time ranges, namely February-June 2013, June-November 2013, December-April 2014 and May-September 2014. This allows to make a clear analysis of the search interest on a particular keyword over indicated time and to compare query differences for TTIP (Table 2).

Popular queries (PQ) refer to the most googled *related search terms* in a session in which TTIP was googled too. The table ranks them accordingly, with the first PQ being the most popular related search term. Increasing queries (IQ) refer to the related search terms that increased most in comparison to the previous time range (in percent). In contrast to the PQ, these are not necessarily the most googled related search terms.

What the table shows is that related searches that are looked up in the first two time ranges of TTIP are too small to be shown. Only from December 2013 additional search terms are occurring in relation to TTIP. None of the results indicate that the salience increase is due to the EU - US negotiation round. Instead, from the second place onwards, the popular search

queries are mostly linked to the TTIP protest and the respective actors that are involved in these protests. *Campact* and *Attac* are both social movements that have been involved in campaigning against TTIP from the very early start of the negotiation process in the summer of 2013.

Table 2. Related Searches for Germany

Feb - Jun 2013		Jun-Nov 2013		Dec-April 2014		May-Sept 2014	
Popular Queries (ranking)	Increasing Queries (in percent)	PQ	IQ	Popular Queries	Increasing Queries	Popular Queries	Increasing Queries
-	-	-	-	Freihandels abkommen TTIP	TTIP stoppen > 5000 %	Freihandels abkommen TTIP	TTIP TISA + 1.350 %
-	-	-	-	Petition TTIP	TTIP unfairhandelbar > 5000 %	Freihandels abkommen	CDU TTIP > 500 %
-	-	-	-	Freihandels abkommen	Was ist TTIP > 5000 %	Gegen TTIP	CETA + 350 %
-	-	-	-	Campact TTIP	Petition TTIP + 400 %	TTIP petition	TTIP verhindern + 300 %
-	-	-	-	Campact	Campact TTIP + 160 %	TTIP CETA	AFD TTIP + 200 %
-	-	-	-	TTIP Abkommen	Campact + 130 %	Campact	Was ist TTIP + 180 %
-	-	-	-	Attac TTIP	-	Campact TTIP	Parteien gegen TTIP + 150 %

This becomes even more visible if we look at the increasing queries: *TTIP Unfairhandelbar* is another German social movement that serves as a highly flexible umbrella movement for a large variety of anti-TTIP organizations in Germany, and its search volume has increase for more than 5000 percent compared to the previous time range. Less significantly, but not least interesting, the search volume for *Campact* in relation to the search term *TTIP* has increased

for 160 percent. The popularity of *Campact* as a search term can also be seen in the last time range, when the overall scope is already have made a move towards parties, as can be observed in the last column. This already indicates the success of the scandalisation process as the issue enters party politics and hence, noisy politics. The salience that is clearly shown in the Graph 2 may be reflected by *Campact* and the umbrella movement *TTIP Unfairhandelbar* represented in Table 2.

4.3.1 Social Contention and TTIP

According to the information collected during my interview, *TTIP Unfairhandelbar* is movement network that connects the disperse hybrid movements against TTIP under a common umbrella to coordinate campaigns, exchange information as well as strategies and discuss possible frames. The founding members are the Umweltinstitut, MehrDemokratie, BUND and Campact.

Several newspaper articles that focused on the scandalisation of TTIP connected the very start of the campaign and two distinct social movements – Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and PowerShift. CEO was among the first movements which published a detailed report on the matter in October 2013 (Corporate Europe Observatory 2013), however, they did not trigger the scandalisation as we could see in Table 2. Instead it is *TTIP Unfairhandelbar* that drove the process, in particular only one member movement – Campact.

Campact is – what I call – a *protest campaigner*; a social movement that was not found for the purpose of enabling collective action against a particular topic, but for the purpose of organizing protest in general. Campact's main purpose is to mobilize its members and supporters through online-based petitions that targets large segments of the society and eventually to support actual protests that are linked to these campaigns. It is important to

notice that protest campaigners do not come up with their own issues to use as a reason to protest, but they survey their supporters for possible topics of their interests. Thus, for *protest campaigners*, organizing protest is an aim in itself. This kind of online-based collective action has proven to be highly successful. Previous campaigns targeted fracking, food security and water privatization, and it led to a steady increase of supporters and e-mail subscribers. Due to this, every new campaign was pre-tested among Campact supporters which reveals a high level of professionalism when it comes to the framing of collective action. Thus, one of the fundamental factors for a successful social movement, the framing of an issue by combining already existing frames and new frames (bricolage), is indeed done by protest campaigners.

The reason that Campact took up the issue, was mainly due to their non-involvement in the protests against ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement). ACTA was a multinational treaty dealing with the implementation of common standards for intellectual property rights. They were “hit-by-surprise” by the protest potential against ACTA and this should not happen again. Thus, they started to inform themselves about the possible “next big thing” and TTIP happened to be it.

After the coordination against TTIP became institutionalized through the creation of *TTIP Unfairhandelbar*, Campact soon took over as the major protester due to their strong mobilization capacity from previous campaigns.

The first big TTIP campaign by Campact was the launch of an online petition in December 2013. After the start of the campaign on the 11th of December, more than 100 thousand signatures were collected within the first few hours of the campaign and almost 300 thousand were achieved until the end of the month (Strasser 2013a; Strasser 2013b, 2013c). Furthermore, the three first TTIP newsletters have been sent by Campact on the 12th, 15th and 27th of December. In other words, two of the three first newsletters are within the first period

of salience increase. The date of the third newsletter submission is the same as the starting point of the continuous salience increase after the first drop.

The major frames that have been used at the beginning of the campaign, and which I derive from the newsletters, have been *secret negotiations*, *water privatization*, *GMO*, *fracking*, *data protection*, *parliamentary ratification*, *ISDS*, *Hormone meat*, *chlorine chicken*, and *ACTA*.⁴

These frames couple around two distinct narratives about a regulatory race-to-the-bottom. First, a race-to-the-bottom is considered in terms of regulatory standards and consumer protection. Based on this, I merge the frames *GMO*, *fracking*, *hormone meat* and *chlorine chicken*. All these frames aim at mobilising around the fear that an agreement with the US will lead to the adoption of slightly lower US standards and procedures. The most famous case here is undoubtedly the chlorine chicken.

A second narrative is the *democratic race-to-the-bottom* which mainly refers to the democratic malaise argument. Here I include *data protection*, *parliamentary ratification*, *secret negotiations*, *Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)* and *ACTA*.

Campact, and TTIP Unfairhandelbar as the umbrella movement, was able to diversify the framing of grievances by using TTIP as a proxy for fears against globalisation and the neoliberal agenda. Overall, TTIP Unfairhandelbar combined frames from a varieties of issues that can be coupled under two distinct narratives and then Campact professionalised the distribution of the scandal by launching an online campaign and petition that increased the scale of the scandal by sending newsletter, including these frames, to their supporters.

⁴ The newsletters were sent to me by Felix Kolb via Email. I will make them available upon request.


4.3.2 Media Coverage and Tone

The role of *protest campaigners* like Campact and movement networks like *TTIP Unfairhandelbar*, in which Campact plays a dominant role, is a plausible explanatory factor for triggering the scandalisation process in Germany.

Still, the role of media in this process is not yet very clear. Several questions occur: first, is the salience increase really related to social movements as I claim or may media coverage play a role. Second, whether social movements are able to use media to transmit the message of their protest campaign. Third, closely related to the second question, is the tone of media coverage in line with the public preferences towards TTIP that are seen in the Eurobarometer poll and thereby support my claim about media effect on people's economic preferences.

Graph 3 shows the amount of newsmedia articles that have been published online and/or in the printed version of the selected newspapers on the issue of TTIP between the beginning of July 2013 and the end of August 2014.

Graph 3. Amount of Articles per Month by Newspaper (Germany).




The first peak occurred in July 2013 alongside the official start of the TTIP negotiations. Yet after this first peak of media coverage, the selected German newspapers did not really cover

the issue until the end of 2013 year. The next significant increase in media coverage happened only after December 2013, with a very minimal media coverage in between of these two points. Based on this graph, I would argue that social movements indeed triggered the scandalisation process in Germany. Thus, Graph 3 is in compliance and shows the same pattern with the google trends related searches analysis. Also, the graph indicates that the selected German newspapers were able to quickly took up the issue after *Compact* triggered the scandalisation process through the launch of their online campaign. In this respect, the selected media outlets were following up protest campaigners, not vice versa.

Besides the amount of coverage, the tone of the coverage plays a crucial role. Graph 4 shows the overall tone of the analyzed articles' coverage for the selected German media outlets.

Graph 4. Amount of Articles per Month by Tone (Germany).



While the first media coverage of TTIP in July 2013 shows only a few negative articles, and mainly positive and balanced ones, the tone did change from December 2013 and a significant increase in negative tone can be observed. In fact, it is mainly *Die Welt* that predominantly kept framing their articles on TTIP in positive tone after December 2013 without using much reference to any of the social protests against TTIP until March 2014. Only by March 2014 Campact and BUND were mentioned for the first time in the article that describes the anti-

TTIP protest. Interestingly, these article develops a rather negative tone compared to the average tone in *Die Welt's* average balanced tone. Similarly, *The BILD Zeitung* starts mentioning social movements only in May 2014, by pointing at Campact, yet without framing the article in a negative way.

In contrast to that, the two newspapers that started framing the issue in a mostly negative way, *Die Zeit* and *Der Spiegel*, mentioned social movements much earlier. *Die Zeit* refers explicitly to *Campact* in an article from January 2014. *Der Spiegel* broadens that perspective by referring to the rising online protest and anti-TTIP petition in an article from December 2013. While *der Spiegel* yet did not mention a particular movement, this changed in January 2014, when *der Spiegel* is referring to BUND – like Campact – one of the founding members of TTIP Unfairhandelbar. Two articles from January 2014 then also explicitly refer to Campact. What this shows is that not only did the tone of media coverage change after Campact started to launch their TTIP campaign, but the reference to them and other movements that are part of TTIP Unfairhandelbar indicate a direct link between the tone of coverage and the social movement campaign against TTIP. Thus, *TTIP Unfairhandelbar* and *Campact* seem to have been able to transmit their framing to news media outlets that took up the scandal and started framing their articles on TTIP in a negative tone.

4.4 Case 2: United Kingdom

The UK, being my second case study, is showing somewhat different patterns in the TTIP scandalisation process. As Graph 1 shows, the initial level of salience in the UK is very low and it sees an increase only around May 2014 when TTIP reached 19 percent salience compared to Germany (100 percent). Right after this first rise, the salience level diminished

again and TTIP regained it only with the start of the EU campaign at the end of the period of my analysis.

Graph 5 shows the Google Trends result for the UK only. Although the graph seems to be indicating increasing salience from January 2014, this is somehow misleading. While this is true if we analyse the UK in an isolated environment, we have to put this salience with respect to the German case. In this regard, Graph 1 shows the adjusted overall picture. Graph 5 has to be read as: no salience increase until May 2014 compared to Germany. Only in May 2014 salience does increase, yet drops again afterwards until the EU-wide campaign starts.

Graph 5. Google Trends Result (UK).



I used Graph 5 because it is easier to locate the scandalisation trigger for May 2014. The peak point, with a salience of 19 percent for the UK, is reached between the 18th and the 24th of May 2014. By the end of May, salience has faded away. I will stick to my main arguments for the UK as well, despite the fact that salience differs strongly from the German case. Based on the hypotheses I have outlined before, I argue again, that the first salience increase in May 2014 is due to social movements that took up the issue because TTIP is an opportunity structure for protest mobilisation. Hence, particularly for the period from May 2014 onwards, the google trends related searches analysis indicates the involvement of social movements (Table 3).

Table 3 provides some interesting findings. The first three time periods do not provide any related searches because the search volume was quite insignificant. Again, this supports the claim that TTIP was not salient until May 2014. This changes in the last period of analysis. From May 2014, several highly related searches occur. Another interesting finding is that the National Health Service (NHS) is the most popular related query. In contrast to Germany, the most popular query is thus not related to the TTIP petition or a synonyms for TTIP but a specific policy field.

And lastly, a social movement – 38 Degrees – is again among the most popular queries.

Table 3. Related Searches (UK)

Feb - Jun 2013		Jun-Nov 2013		Dec-April 2014		May-Sept 2014	
Popular Queries (ranking)	Increasing Queries (in percent)	PQ	IQ	Popular Queries	Increasing Queries	Popular Queries	Increasing Queries
-	-	-	-	-	-	TTIP NHS	UKIP TTIP > 5000 %
-	-	-	-	-	-	38 Degrees TTIP	38 Degrees TTIP + 500 %
-	-	-	-	-	-	38 Degrees	38 Degrees + 450 %
-	-	-	-	-	-	What is TTIP	TTIP NHS + 300 %
-	-	-	-	-	-	TTIP negotiations	What is TTIP + 110 %
-	-	-	-	-	-	TTIP Petition	TTIP Guardian + 40 %
-	-	-	-	-	-	UKIP TTIP	-

Therefore, I argue that the first peak can indeed be labelled as the the start of the scandalisation period. With respect to the German case, the scandalisation process started much later, in May 2014, and did not really increase much in salience after that. Instead, after the first peak in salience, it fell again and only raised shortly before the end point of my

analysis. Once the anti-TTIP protest in the UK took up pace, it soon was able to gather more than 200 supporting social movements and NGOs, ranging from traditional NGOs like Greenpeace to global justice movements like War on Want (Cooper 2014). Based on the above results obtained from the analysis I state that despite the large amount of support, the scandalisation trigger has to be found again in a *protest campaigner*, namely 38 Degrees.

4.4.1 Social Contention and TTIP

38 Degrees is the UK-version of Campact. It resembles the structure of Campact and belongs to the category of movements that I call *protest campaigners*. For 38 Degrees, just like for Campact, protest is the most important purpose. Some possible protest topics are proposed to them and then pre-tested before a campaign is launched. The basic mobilisation happens online through the collection of signatures which are then handed to politicians and only then, as a secondary order, street protest is supported. The underlying mobilisation source for 38 Degrees, its supporter and newsletter subscribers are as large as for Campact.

In the interview, Felix Kolb said that Campact was pre-testing the TTIP issue among its supporters to test for the “protestability” of the issue. Similarly, 38 Degrees pre-tested the Anti-TTIP campaign among its supporters and published the findings. The poll started in the beginning of May 2014 and was answered by approximately 150 thousand supporters (Cooper 2014; Walker 2014). 98 percent of the respondents have been in favour of an anti-TTIP campaign. Those who indicated to be in favour then were asked about the content of the analysis. In the poll, 38 Degrees asked whether they should run a campaign in cooperation with other “similar organisations across Europe” and whether they campaign should tackle the national health service, as an example of the threatened public service, and ISDS. All three have been voted highly in favour (Walker 2014).

In comparison with Campact who pre-tested the topics already in middle of 2013, 38 Degrees started relatively late. The pre-testing was done until the 24th of May 2014 and then followed by the start of the Anti-TTIP campaign. This relatively late campaigning against TTIP in the UK was also confirmed by my interviewee and it can explain the relatively late salience increase in the UK. In this regard, the peak period overlaps with the period of the TTIP pre-testing and publishing of the poll results. I argue that a protest campaigner is the trigger of the scandalisation process. To stress it again, the results of the Google trends related searches analysis are in line with this argumentation (Table 3). The first three most popular queries in a session where TTIP was googled refer to the British National Health Service (NHS) or 38 Degrees. In other words, they referred either to the British protest campaigner, or one of the major frames that was used for their anti-TTIP campaign.

Going back to the frames that have been used in the pre-testing, a sharp difference to the German case occurs. While Campact used extensively the concept of *bricolage*, i.e. linking mainly established frames of older campaigns to new frames in order to mobilise, 38 Degrees basically constrained its bricolage to one frame: *NHS privatisation*.

The privatisation of the national health system is a large, ongoing campaign of 38 Degrees that was already in place a year before the beginning of the TTIP campaign (Lawrence 2013). 38 Degrees protests against the “fear” that the Tory Government under Cameron plans at “fast-tracking” further liberalisation of the NHS, and thereby they mainly framed it in a way that the UK is losing its universal health system if TTIP will be implemented.


Another big difference for 38 Degrees is the missing link to a national wide umbrella movement. An UK-version of *TTIP Unfairhandelbar* is not available. As the second social movement, War on Want, is relatively active in the anti-TTIP campaign. Most notably, they organised an Anti-TTIP protest march between the 8th and 12th of July 2014 in which they

also mainly used the NHS frame (Milevska 2014). But an institutionalised connection like *TTIP Unfairhandelbar* in Germany seems not to be existent.

4.4.2 Media Coverage and Tone

The media analysis for the selected media outlets in the UK differs greatly from the German media analysis. With on average less than five articles per month, the UK media coverage is relatively low (Graph 6).

Graph 6. Amount of Articles per Month by Newspaper (UK).




What the graph shows is that, despite the fact they took up the issue earlier than their German counterparts and that the coverage of TTIP is quite low, there is no consistency in the coverage. Often only one, sometimes two, of the three selected media outlets cover the issue. While during one month the Guardian is covering the issue other remain salient, and vice versa.

What is even more important, the news media outlets with the highest CMR do not cover the issue at all. The most read newspaper in the UK is *The Sun* with a CMR of 13.48 million readers, followed by the *Daily Mail* with 11.97, the *Metro* with 7.85 and the *Daily Mirror*

with 7.89. All of the highest readership papers are tabloids, or newspaper media that focus mainly on the soft news. The Guardian is only on the fifth place with a CMR of 5.26 million readers (Hollander 2013). In other words, the media outlets that did cover the issue did not really reach a large spectrum of the public. Thus again I claim that media coverage is not triggering the salience increase in the UK.

In terms of the tone in the analysed articles, it seems to be a trend towards a strongly negative coverage after 38 Degrees took up the issue in May 2014 (Graph 7).

Graph 7. Amount of Articles per Month by Tone (UK).



The first months of my analysis shows a predominantly positive tone, while this trend seems to be reversed by the end of the period. I claim that this does not tell much as the very low coverage for TTIP raises a question of how much of explanatory power the tone of the coverage has. Probably not much.

Nevertheless, it is worth analysing whether the news media outlets that write about TTIP refer to any social movement. As we can see in my Appendix, 38 Degrees, as well as War on Want were indeed mentioned. While War on Want was mentioned in July 2014 by the Guardian and the Independent, 38 Degrees was already included in an Independent article from April 2014, in which the authors already referred to 38 Degrees' internal pre-testing of TTIP. The reason

for War on Want prominence in July 2014 is mainly due to their Anti-TTIP protest march between the 8th and 12th of July 2014 (Milevska 2014).

Both movements largely mobilised around the *NHS privatisation* frame which is also visible in the newsmedia coverage. In three out of four articles that refer to one of the two movements, the NHS plays a dominant and negatively-toned role. Other frames in these articles are very limited; the ISDS, democratic sovereignty and regulatory race-to-the-bottom seem to play a role.

Overall, the existence of a protest campaigner that launched a campaign after pre-testing TTIP, without receiving much media coverage can serve as an explanation for the salience difference between Germany and the UK. It is also able to explain the fact that two small increases are visible. In my opinion, this could be read in the following way: if protest campaigners are available and they exploit the opportunity structure of TTIP, they indeed trigger the scandalisation process through increasing its salience. I have shown the link between salience and protest campaigners by the google trends related search term analysis. Yet, the mobilisation of protest campaigners through their subscribers' list, newsletter and other components of their professionalisation is not enough to sustain the scandalisation process. For this, media coverage is crucial. In the German case, when media took up the scandal that was created by social movements, as a result, salience increased. In the UK, where this was not the case, salience dropped again. Also, given the influence of media coverage on trade preferences, one can argue that the more positive perception of TTIP in the UK is related to the missing media coverage.

4.5 Case 3: Austria

I argue that protest campaigners exploit the opportunity structure provided by TTIP and therefore trigger the scandalisation process both for Germany and the UK. This process was then facilitated in the one case, and stopped again in the second case, depending on whether or not media took up the scandal. During my pre-testing period of TTIP salience another interest case occurred in Austria. Just like Germany, Austria shows high salience (Graph 8) and a negative public preference towards TTIP while in terms of general free trade preferences a majority displays a favorable attitude.

Graph 8. Google Trends (Austria)⁵



The salience process resembles the German case (Graph 1). For a better understanding, Graph 8 provides an overview of the salience process only for Austria. As it can be seen, the trigger of the scandalisation process is pulled in December 2013. More precisely, the first two related peak points are from the 1st to the 7th as well as from the 15th to 21st of December. -Given the German and the UK analysis, one could again assume that *protest* play a crucial role in triggering the salience. Yet in the Austrian case, the analysis for the google related searches look somewhat different (Table 4).

⁵<https://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=TTIP&geo=AT&date=7%2F2013%2015m&cmpt=q&tz=Etc%2FGMT-2>

Table 4. Related Searches (Austria)

Feb - Jun 2013		Jun-Nov 2013		Dec-April 2014		May-Sept 2014	
Popular Queries (ranking)	Increasing Queries (in percent)	PQ	IQ	Popular Queries	Increasing Queries	Popular Queries	Increasing Queries
-	-	-	-	TTIP Petition	TTIP Petition > 5000 %	TTIP Österreich	TTIP Österreich + 140 %
-	-	-	-	-	-	TTIP Petition Österreich	TTIP Petition Österreich + 70 %

Similar to the German case, the related searches analysis does not show any results for the first two time ranges. In contrast to the UK, some considerable results occur for the third time range from December to April 2014. Again, this correlates with the period in which TTIP becomes salient.

Opposite to what I showed for Germany and the UK, the related searches analysis for the last two time ranges do not refer to a protest campaigner under the most popular queries nor under the increasing queries. Instead, both, PQ and IQ, show searches in relation to a *TTIP petition*.

While the third time range refers to a petition in general, the fourth time range shows a more explicit result by displaying “TTP petition Austria”. In both of my previous cases, petitions against TTIP are part of the Anti-TTIP campaign, launched by *protest campaigners*.

Overall, the conditions in Austria seems to resemble the German ones: negative attitude towards TTIP, positive attitude towards free trade in general, high salience from December 2013 onwards and – according to the related search term analysis – the availability of a petition at the start of the scandalisation process. Hence, I argue that this is a justified starting point to assume social movements to be the trigger of the scandalisation process again.

4.5.1 Spill-over Effects

The important question is: who started a petition in Austria? The most vocal petition was started by Greenpeace and included five broad fields: Environment, Consumption, Democracy, Agriculture and CETA. Similar to Campact and 38 Degrees, Greenpeace thereby diversified the grievance framing of TTIP as much as possible and incorporated the same range of frames as Campact did. Similarly to Campact, Greenpeace has used the tool of online-based signature collection with the aim of hand-overing it to politicians (Greenpeace 2014). The Greenpeace petition started in the middle of January 2014 and can explain the second salience peak in the same month. It cannot explain the salience start for Austria though.

One factor that seems to play role is the start of the TTIP negotiation round. While salience in Germany decreased during that time, it continued rising for Austria. But the salience started even before that happened. At the time of the salience increase, Campact started to launch their online campaign and Felix Kolb indicated in the interview that the subscribers list of Campact includes some “40-50 thousand subscribers” from Austria which could serve as a possible sign of spill-over effects. Or at least a reason that triggered the Greenpeace online-based campaign, after the immediate success of the Campact campaign became visible.


Spill-over effects seem to be plausible too if we take into consideration that both countries belong to the same language family and that German newspaper – at least online – are also visited by Austrians. If this is indeed the case, the analysis of selected Austrian newsmedia outlets should provide further clarity.

4.5.2 Media Coverage and Tone

In the Austrian case, a media selection for the analysis is less scattered than in Germany with a rather small media market. This market has a relative high amount of quality newspapers on the national level and only a few tabloids. The difference in the CMR between these few tabloids and the quality newspaper is quite significant. Die Kronen Zeitung and Heute reach 35.9 percent and 14.5 percent of Austrian newspaper readers. In contrast, Der Standard and die Presse reach 9.2 percent and 6 percent of Austrian readers (Kleine Zeitung 2014: 6).

In terms of media coverage, my analysis of selected Austrian media outlets indicates quite low coverage until March 2014 (Graph 9).

Graph 9. Amount of Articles per Month by Newspaper (Austria).



Until then, the media coverage on TTIP was dominated by Die Presse who published on the matter in July and November 2013 as well as January and February 2014. Die Presse referred in that time range only to two actors, yet both of them German ones: BUND and Attac. As was mentioned previously, BUND was one of the founding movements of *TTIP Unfairhandelbar*. This supports a possible spill-over effect, although not from Campact.


Der Standards published only two articles before it coverage increases in March 2014. Yet one of the articles was describing the issues surrounding TTIP by referring to Der Spiegel. On

March onwards, Der Standards coverage increased and references are mainly made towards movements that actively protest in Austria, e.g Greenpeace.

In the same month that Der Standard increased its coverage, Die Kronen Zeitung started to talk about TTIP too. Die Kronen Zeitung soon dominated the coverage, but due to its restricted access I cannot test for spill-over effects there.

Austrian newspapers not only seem to have taken up the issue later than their German counterparts, but also the coverage remained lower. In terms of media coverage tone, Graph 10 give a further insight into the matter.

Graph 10. Amount of Articles per Month by Tone (Austria).



Starting from November, the tone of the coverage is highly negative with basically almost no positive coverage. Therefore, the tone and scope of media coverage in Austria can serve as a possible explanation for the negative preference of the Austrian public towards TTIP. The fact that Austrian newspaper are reporting on the issue even more negatively than their Germany newspaper counterparts may also be possible reason for the higher negative TTIP preferences in Austrian, compared to Germany. Even more interesting, the tone changes in November 2013, the same month in which Die Presse refers to Der Spiegel in describing the protest.

Based on these findings, I cannot assume a protest campaigner to be direct scandalisation trigger in the Austrian case, but the presented media analysis shows signs of spill-over effects

between Germany and Austria. Therefore, Campact and TTIP Unfairhandelbar may be an indirect trigger, before Greenpeace and Die Kronen Zeitung took up the scandals.

5 Conclusion

My thesis is built on the argument that the TTIP's shift from silence to salience for the average citizen is done through a scandalisation process. In this regard, Culpepper is certainly right with his assessment of scandals being necessary to trigger public salience for highly complex technocratic topics. Only through these scandals media will show an interest in covering the topic resulting in increased level of politicians' awareness about the issue and making it harder for business to "get what they want". What I tried to show in this thesis and what I consider as the main contribution of it is the fact that scandals do not simply occur and do not necessarily have to be instrumentalised by *political* entrepreneurs.

What I tried to show is that the concept of scandals is not an explanatory variable itself, but rather a mechanism. I argue that this mechanism is part of a broader *process of scandalisation* that is determined by structures and agencies.

The major reason for TTIP becoming salient, while previous free trade agreements of the EU did not, is the power shift between the agreement participants. While the EU was the major trade partner in the previous trade agreement such that smaller trade partners had to adjust their regulations to the EU regulation level, the power position of the EU has changed with TTIP. It is the US that is the bigger trade partner right now to which the EU adjusts its regulation. This triggers fears about a possible regulatory "race-to-the-bottom" in social, democratic, or environmental terms and standards.

The EU shift of the power in international trade will not be able to trigger the scandalisation process alone. The second determinant that I have outlined is social movements. In this sense the power shift is an opportunity structure. If social movement exploit the opportunity structure they can trigger the scandalisation process which then causes the initial salience increase.

What my analysis shows is that social movements in all three comparative cases took up the opportunity structure. In Germany, it was taken up by a highly flexible umbrella movement as well as a professionalized movement – protest campaigners – that based its contentious strength mainly on online signature collection and a large number of newsletter subscribers. In the UK, social movements that took up the structure were also very professionalized. But in contrast to Germany, no larger umbrella movement existed.

While protest campaigners play a crucial role in Germany and the UK, such a professional movement does not exist in Austria. Instead Austria seems to be influenced by spill-over effects from Germany that eventually triggered Austrian campaigns by NGOs like Greenpeace and, later on, the Kronen Zeitung.

Whether social movements succeed with the scandalisation and the issue enters the area of “noisy politics” ultimately depends on whether media take up the scandals from them or not. In Germany, where media coverage was high and the tone was negative, salience increases strongly and public perception resembles the tone of the media coverage. Additionally, the media coverage was triggered by the Anti-TTIP campaign of the protest campaigner Campact and the umbrella organization TTIP unfairhandelbar, not vice versa. My frame analysis showed that the selected media outlets in Germany explicitly referred to both.

In the UK, in contrast, where media coverage is low and the tone more or less balanced, the scandalisation process diminished again and public perception seems not to be influenced by media. The selected media outlets referred to 38 Degrees only once. Thus, I argue that social movements failed to transmit their frames to the media.

While Austria resembled the German case in coverage and tone, no protest campaigner was available, yet I showed that the early stage of the Austrian media coverage may also have been influenced by spill-over. Later on, the KronenZeitung plays a crucial role in facilitating the salience.

While my results point at some interesting links between social movements, particularly protest campaigners, and media coverage, further detailed research on both of these actors would provide a broader picture.

In terms of social movements and the way they are able to transmit their frames, the role of the internet and TV may serve as an interesting continuation of research. Applying an analysis that includes both textual and visual sources would provide more insight. In particular, analyzing TV documentaries and YouTube videos on the issue also seems to be important.

Regarding media outlets, one may raise the question why these tabloids in the UK did not take up the scandalisation process at all. While in this thesis I did not provide an insight into this issue, I still assume that my results might indicate some interesting links to media systems' differences between countries. Further research on the particularities of these national media systems as outlined by Hallin & Mancini (2004) may provide further interesting possibilities of explaining the shift from silence to salience.

6 Appendix

6.1 Media Outlet Analysis (Germany)

Die Zeit

Date	Title	Actors	Frame	Numeric Value	Value
7.2013	Wie ist Freihandel noch möglich?		Data protection (-); Surveillance/NSA (-)	-2	Neg.
	US Datenschützer wittern ihre Chance		NSA (-); EU data regulations (+), Data protection (0), liberalisation (+), Consumer protection (-), social protest (-),	-1	Neg.
8.2013					
9.2013					
10.2013	Das Interesse an Merkels Handy ist wirtschaftlich begründet		low US interest in TTIP (0), possible negotiation failure (0)	0	Bal.
11.2013					
12.2013	Für NSA Kontrolleur Rogers ist Datensammeln keine Überwachung		Investigating US surveillance can endanger TTIP (0)	-1	Neg.
1.2014	Aus Angst vor den Bürgern	Campact	Online protest (-); regulatory coordination (+); secret negotiations (-), ISDS (-)	-1	Neg.
	Die EU verspielt eine große Chance		intransparent & undemocratic negotiation procedure (-); secret negotiations (-); parliamentary concerns (-), power imbalance (EU-US) (-); Trade Priorities Act (i.e. gives Congress bigger say in TTIP) (-); Employment (+); trade incentives (+); elimination of bureaucratic obstacles for companies (+); harmonising norms (+); tackling sustainability through transatlantic cooperation (+);	0	Bal.

2.2014	Goliath gegen Goliath		social protest (-); business support (+); employment (+); economic growth (+); dissonance b/w US&EU in negotiations (-); IDIS (+/-); Chlorine chicken (+/-); standards not harmonising, but recognising (+); GMO (-);	0	Bal.
	Transatlantische Freiheit oder ekliges Chlorhühnchen?	CDU; LeftParty; Greens	economic advantage (+); standards (-)	0	Bal.
	Die Revanche des Nordens		Global economic dominance (-) geopolitics (+/-); developing countries discrimination (-); Alternative to WTO (0)	-1	Neg.
	Gemeinsam einsam		Potential conflict line b/w France & Germany (-)	-1	Neg.
	EU will laut Geheimdokument Sonderrechte für Konzerne		Investment security/ISDS (-); Financial liberalisation (-); secret negotiators (0); parliamentary ratification (-)	-2	Neg.
	Im Namen des Geldes		ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.
	Freihandel für Wohlstand		irrational debate (0); economic prosperity (+); reduction of trade barriers (+); BIP (+); third parties / developing countries (-); employment (+)	1	Pos.
	Göring-Eckardt fordert Ende der Geheimniskrämerei	Greens	standards reduced (-); intransparency (-); secretcy(-); [greens -] ; EP elections (0); ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.
	Endlich wird öffentlich gestritten		Common standards (+); ISDS (-); intransparency (-)	-1	Neg.
3.2014	Kommt Fracking durch Freihandel?	ATTAC France; Friends of the Earth; PowerShift, CEO	Fracking (-); ISDS (-); democratic issues of ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.
	Grüne leaken Geheimdokument zum Freihandelsabkommen	Green Party	trip leak (-)	-1	Neg.
	Snowden kritisiert Europas Einknicken vor der NSA		Surveillance (-)	-2	Neg.
	Milliarden für die Feierfonds	CEO	Eurocrisis - investor protection through ISDS / arbitral court (+/-) [CEO]; ISDS (-); ISDS = Business model (-);	-1	Neg.

	Regierung gegen Investorenschutz im Freihandelsabkommen		ISDS (+/-);	0	Bal.
	Unterm Strich nützt TTIP der Wirtschaft		tariffs (+); trade barriers (+); bureaucracy reduction (+); lower prices for the same products (+); economic growth (+); employment (+); prosperity (+); unemployment fear (-); export increase (+); educational advertisement (aufklärungsbedarf) (+); democratic sovereignty (+); ISDS (+/-); in transparency (-); reforming system (+);	1	Pos.
	Brüssel beugt sich dem Bürgerwillen		water privatisation (-) [successful citizens protest in a previous campaign on water]	-2	Neg.
	Wer Geld hat, kauft sich das Ohr der Mächtigen	CEO	Business power (-); Lobbyism (-); market access (-); Business-EU cooperation (-); no privileged access to EC for NGO (-); employment (-); consumer protection (-); wages (-);	-2	Neg.
	Auch in den USA sinkt die Lust am Freihandel		resistance in US (-); secondary issue for Obama (-); NGOs / Unions (-); ISDS (-);	-2	Neg.
	Länder auf der Anklagebank		iSDS (-)	-2	Neg.
4.2014	Zum Teufel mit dem Freihandelsabkommen		economic growth (+), export benefits (+); ISDS (+);	2	Pos.
	Was bringt der Freihandel wirklich?		economic growth (+/-); employment (+/-), more rational debate needed (0)	0	Bal.
	Bizarre Befragung		economic benefits (+); protest against chlorine chicken/GMO/Fracking (-); environmental standards (-); secret arbitral courts (-); TTIP leaks (-); missing competence of EU bureaucrats (-); CETA (-); ACTA (-)	-1	Neg.
	Deutsche befürchten amerikanische Standards		standard harmonisation(0); no transparency (-), undemocratic (-); chlorine chicken (-); ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.

	Ein Herz für Kanadas Konzerne		Ceta (-) ISDS (-); global role model (+)	-1	Neg.
	TTIP bedroht Europas Bauern und Verbraucher		US agricultural model (-), Chlorine chicken (-); GMO (-), Monsanto (-), reduction of agricultural export (-), big farms model (-), regulatory race-to-the-bottom (-), deregulation (-); US standards (-)	-2	Neg.
5.2014	Vier Stunden und viel Konfliktpotential		Angela Merkel - TTIP (+); labor rights (-); consumer protection (-); environmental standards (-)	-1	Neg.
	Amerika diktiert nichts		export nation (+); food/ environment / labor standards (-); no deregulation agenda (+); building bridges (+); labor rights (-); chlorine chicken (-); GMO (-); common regulations and rules (+); employment (+); ISDS (-/+); CETA (+); business power (-); global role model (+); secret negotiations (-/); NSA (0);	0	Bal.
	Fair handeln	DGB	US social system (-); EU living standard (+), labor rights (-); liberalisation (-); secret negotiations (-); wage dumping (-);	-1	Neg.
	Im Zweifel für den Arbeitgeber		labor rights (-); social standards (-); ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.
	Internes TTIP-Papier der Union aufgetaucht	CDU	ISDS (0); Chlorine chicken (0); EU standards (0);	0	Bal.
	TTIP gehört öffentlich diskutiert		diverse social protest (-); GMO (-); Chlorine chicken (-); legal/social system (-); environmental standards (-); secret negotiations (-); CETA (-); TISA (-); public participation (-);	-2	Neg.
	Die Jugend will ein anderes TTIP	Green Party	EU ignorance (-); youth protest (-); food standard (0);	-1	Neg.
6.2014	Eine Wahnsinnstat		Chlorine chicken (-); GMO (-); consumer rights (-); culture (-); democratic sovereignty (-); liberalisation (-); regulatory race-to-the-bottom (-); ISDS (-); employment (+);	-1	Neg.

			economic growth (+);		
	EU-Kommissar sieht durch Freihandel keine Gefahr für Kulturförderung		cultural subsidies/protection (+); ISDS (+/-)	1	Pos.
	Ein globaler Erpressungsversuch		investor security / ISDS (+/-); benefits (-); creating global standards (+/-)	-1	Neg.
	Zum Glück kein Wahnsinn		Response of EU Commissioner <i>de Gucht</i> to "Eine Wahnsinnstat"	2	Pos.
	Die Kontrolle gefährlicher Produkte wird dem Bürger überlassen		democracy (-); market first (-); ISDS (-); regulatory cooperation council (-); lobby power (-); consumer protection (-); different law systems b/w US & EU (0); democratic legitimacy (-);	-2	Neg.
	Was handeln wir uns da ein?	TTIP Unfairhandelbar (- start of ECI)	hormone food (-); deregulation (-); economic prosperity (+); different law systems US / EU - Risk vs Precautionary principle (-); car industry (+); financial regulations (-); ISDS (-); democracy/sovereignty (-); chemicals (-);	-1	Neg.
7.2014	Die Macht der Lobby	CEO	business interest (-); consumer rights (-); lobbyism (-); economic growth (+); employment (+); standard reduction (-); cultural diversity (-);	-1	Neg.
	TTIP ist überall		social protest (-); trade agreement common practice (+); secret negotiations (+); ISDS (+); geopolitics (+); economic benefits (+); industrial demand for TTIP in Germany (+);	1	Pos.
8.2014					

Der Spiegel

Date	Title	Actor	Frame	Numeri c Value	Valu e
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7.2013	Experten warnen vor transatlantischer Eiszeit		Economic Growth (+), Data Protection (-)	0	Bal.
	Spähvorwürfe belasten Start der Freihandelsgespräche		NSA (-); Economic Growth (+); Employment (+); Regulatory Coordination (+); Data Protection (-)	1	Pos.
	Abschotten oder für Bürger öffnen?		Complexity (+) no black/white in standards - chlorine chicken, food, medicaments (+); regional regulatory specifics (+); legitimate processes (+), process delegation (+);	2	Pos.
8.2013					
9.2013					
10.2013					
11.2013					
12.2013	Zeitplan für Handelspakt wackelt		Missing Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) (0); slow negotiations (0); employment (+), NSA (-)	0	Bal.
	Keine Kontrolle, nirgends	(Campact) - although not directly mentioned, but reference to online campaign	Big Business (-); secret negotiations (-), missing parliamentary participation (-), Monsanto (-), investment protection (-), regulatory standards decrease (-), arbitration procedure (-), Water Privatisation (-), Fracking (-), internet protest & petition (-)	-2	Neg.
1.2014	Obama lädt Merkel ein		common interests (0)	0	Bal.
	Agrarbündnis warnt vor Chlorhühnchen und Genpflanzen	Agrarbündnis; AbL - Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft; BUND	Consumer protection (-); Transparency (-), democratic control (-); Chlorine chicken (-); GMO (-); benefits for specific industries (+); employment (+), consumer protection (-), Lobbyism (-), Monsanto (-), secret negotiations; against <i>Agrarwende</i> (-), food standards (-)	-1	Neg.

	Der Freifahrtschein	Campact, CEO	Battle of Seattle (-); Powershift from Governments to Business (-); Regulatory Coordination (0); Economic growth (+), Employment (+), Food standard (-); Environment (-), Labor rights (-); Fracking (-); Hormone food (-); property rights (-); secret negotiations (-); business dominance in lobbyism (-), car industry (+); ISDS (-); ACTA (0); Petitions (-)	-1	Neg.
	Angst vor dem Zorn der Bürger	Campact	secret negotiations (-); parliamentary ratification (+); employment (+); dominance of internet protest - Fracking/Chlorine chicken/ GMO/ data protection(0 / -); EU transparency move (+); ISDS (+ & -);	-1	Neg.
2.2014	Widerstand gegen Freihandelsabkommen wächst		opposition within German government (-); EU standards (-); Geopolitics (+); ISDS (-); lacking democratic control (-); suability of standards - questioning standards (-); consumer protection (-); Food standards (-); NSA (-); employment (+); social protest (-);	-1	Neg.
	Durch die Hintertür	CEO	ISDS (-); CETA (-)	-2	Neg.
3.2014	Freihandelsabkommen zwischen EU und USA wackelt	Online campaign	most innovative vision in the transatlantic relationship (+); GMO (-); Transparency (-); Member state resilience (-)	-1	Neg.
	Grüne veröffentlichen vertrauliches EU-Dokument		TTIP leak (-); secrecy (-); ISDS (-); culture (-); Public services (-)	-2	Neg.
	Zahltag für die Geier	CEO	Economic stimulus program (+); ISDS (-); Hedgefonds (-); ISDS = Business Model (-)	-1	Neg.

	Die Letzten Freunde des Freihandels		rising protest (-); environmental standards (-); consumer protection (-); increasing concerns in companies (-); ISDS (+); Food standards (+); chances (+); environmental standards (+);	-1	Neg.
	Willkommen im Zeitalter der Leakpolitik		surveillance (0); NSA / GCHQ (0); TTIP leak (0)	-1	Neg.
	Ex-Weltbankchef Zoellick will Investorschutz kippen		ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.
	Wir brauchen Waffengleichheit von Staat und Konzernen		secrecy (-); ISDS (+/-); secrecy because of countries request in ISDS (+); power relation business - states in ISDS (-);	-1	Neg.
	Dank Putin - wieder beste Freunde		secondary issue for Obama (-); geopolitics (+);	0	Bal.
	Obama brennt nicht für den Freihandel		increasing scepticism in US (-), increasing opposition in EU in US perceived (-);	-2	Neg.
4.2014	USA bestreiten Schikane gegen Freihandelskritikerin	Campact	US border control discrimination (-)	-2	Neg.
	Deutsche zweifeln am Freihandelsabkommen		economic growth (+); employment (+); biggest common economic area (+); secret negotiations (-); consumer/environmental standards (-); decreasing public support rate (0); Chlorine chicken (-); ISDS (-)	-1	Neg.
	Bundesrat muss Freihandelsabkommen zustimmen		biggest negotiation project since Nato (0); high bureaucratic obstacles (0), harmonisation of standards (-), ISDS (-); investor security (+)	-1	Neg.
	War da was?		NSA (-); Economic Growth (+); Employment (+)	1	Pos.
	Gabriel wirbt		global standards (+), fostering trade (+); employment (+)	2	Pos.

	Die Macht der sozialen Medien ist schon ungeheuer		global standards (+); trade (+); Export (+); Hormone meat (+/-); ISDS (+/-); social media power (-)	1	Pos.
5.2014	Firmen setzen wenig Hoffnung in Freihandelsabkommen		Small and medium enterprises (+/-); regulatory harmonisation - easier export(+); food standards (-); data protection (-)	-1	Neg.
	Wir müssen noch ein Chlorhühnchen rupfen		creating biggest common market (+); GMO (-); value standards (-); chlorine chicken (+/-); big business (-); better US standards (+); parliamentary ratification (+); ISDS (+/-); SME (+);	-1	Neg.
	Verbraucherminister Maas will deutsche Standards durchsetzen		consumer protection (-); data protection (-); economic benefits (+); employment (+); tariff reduction (+); Chlorine chicken (-); GMO (-); NSA (-); SME (-);	-1	Neg.
	BDI drängt auf Abbau von Zöllen bei Freihandelsgesprächen		biggest economic area globally (+); significant prosperity increase (+); economic growth (+); employment (+); consumer security (-); data protection (-); secret negotiations (-); food standards (-); us big business interests (-); ISDS (-);	-1	Neg.
	EU-Kommissar fürchtet Wirtschaftsspionage der USA		NSA (-); EU standards (+/-); ISDS (+/-); economic surveillance (-);	-1	Neg.

	Im Säurebad	Online protest; LobbyControl; Greenpeace; BUND; Attac	culture (-); "kulturation"; European democratic understanding (-); geopolitics (+); Americanisation of Europe (-); ISDS (-); NSA (-); left/right conspiracy theorists rise (+); role model (+); hormone meat (-); EU standards (+); ISDS (-); labor standards (-); economic growth (+); german companies (+); car industry (+); SME (+); regulatory control institution planned (+); democracy (-); environmental standards (+/-); consumer protection (+/-); chlorine chicken (+); Anti-Americanism (+);	-1	Neg.
6.2014	Der Zombie hat mehr Feinde bekommen		culture (-); economising cultural sphere (-);	-2	Neg.
7.2014	Maas sieht Freihandelsabkommen mit USA gefährdet		surveillance (-); social protest (-); economic benefits (+);	-1	Neg.
	Dann können wir das Freihandelsabkommen vergessen		CETA (-); global role model (+); ISDS (+/-);	1	Pos.
8.2014	Giftige Partnerschaft		economic growth (+); economic prosperity (+); employment (+); EU standards (+); Different law systems (-); Clone meat (-); GMO (-); Hormone-treated animals (-); chlorine chicken (-); chemicals (-); lobby power (-); agrarian SME (-); labor rights (-);	-1	Neg.

Die Welt

Date	Title	Actor	Frame	Numeri c Value	Valu e
7.2013	USA und EU verhandeln im Schatten der NSA		Economic Growth (+); Employment (+); GMO (-); Data Surveillance/NSA (-)	0	Bal.

	Hoffnung auf freien Handel		Surveillance (-); Economic Growth (+); Employment (+);	1	Pos.
	Die Angst vor dem Chlor-Huhn		Food standards (-); Economic growth (+), NSA (-); regulatory coordination (+);	0	Bal.
	Rückspiegel		negotiation start (0)	0	Bal.
	Freihandelsabkommen - Experten bezweifeln Erfolg		economic growth (+), employment (+), no economic growth (-); regulatory co-ordination (+/-); GMO (-), culture (-); no short term benefits (-); ISDS (+)	-1	Neg.
8.2013					
9.2013	Der Neue WTO-Chef erhält keine Schonzeit		Geopolitics (-), support of export sector (+)	0	Bal.
10.2013	Spähaffäre		surveillance (-), economic growth (+), employment (+), data protection (-)	0	Bal.
11.2013	Das ist der Koalitionsvertrag im Wortlaut		deepening economic relations (+)	2	Pos.
12.2013	Bali ist kein Neuanfang, sondern das Ende der WTO		TTIP second-best option to WTO (+)	2	Pos.
1.2014	Das große Dilemma des EU-Handelskommissars		EU commissioner concerned about protest (0); impressive commissioners (+), no transparency (-); public consultations by EU (+); Anti-attitude (Anti-US, Anti-free trade) (+)	1	Pos.
	Erfahrener Diplomat aus Belgien		experienced commissioner (+), tariff reduction (0), regulatory coordination (0), economic growth (+)	2	Pos.
	Der Händler		ISDS concerns of EU (+), haltering of negotiations (+), public consultations (+)	2	Pos.
2.2014	Zahlensalat		Economic growth (+)	2	Pos.
	Hendricks torpediert Handelsabkommen		ISDS (-) Economic growth (+); democratic legitimacy (-); standards (-) Fracking (-); regulatory coordination (+)	-1	Neg.

3.2014	Der Streit um das Freihandelsabkommen zwischen der EU und den US hat bisher nur die Globalisierungsgegner gestärkt	Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung; Campact	democracy/Neoliberalism (-) economic growth (+); protest endangers the idea of free trade in general (+) reduction of standards and rights (-); chlorine chicken (-); ISDS (-); anti-attitude/Anti-americanism(+);	-1	Neg.
	Wirtschaft kompakt		increasing scepticism (0), reducing standards (-)	-1	Neg.
	TTIP hat für USA nicht oberste Priorität		US priority list (-); TPP (0), TISA (0)	-1	Neg.
	Freihandelsabkommen ist Gabriels Verliererthema	Campact	social protest (-); regulatory co-ordination (0); reducing tariffs (0); economic benefit (+); BIP (+); triggering fear (-); Environmental protection [-]; consumer protection (-); labor rights (-); ISDS (-); Big US companies benefit (-); secret negotiations (-), NSA (-); ACTA (-);	-1	Neg.
	Der Mindestlohn ist Zement für den Arbeitsmarkt		economic growth (+); employment (+); prosperity (+)	2	Pos.
	Großer Markt für kleine Firmen		SME + Export (+); European SME profit more than US SME from it (+); reduction of barriers (+); integration of 2 economic blocs (+); difficult negotiations b/w equal partners (-/0)	2	Pos.
	Firmen beklagen Normen.Wirrwarr im USA-Handel		german export industry demanding faster progress (1); Majority supports TTIP (+); regulatory coordination/harmonisation (+); reduction of tariffs (+); employment through SME (+); ISDS (-); Consumer/environment protection (-);	1	Pos.
	Freie Menschen müssen freie Märkte nicht fürchten		german interest (+); export benefit (+), ISDS (+); critics - dont get it (+); regulatory coordination / some norms (+); benefits of free markets rules (+)	2	Pos.
	Obama will Europa aus der Energiefalle helfen		export (+); environmental standards (+);	2	Pos.

4.2014	“Schengen-Cloud” könnte zum Handelskrieg führen		Chlorine Chicken (-); GMO (-), ecological / democratic standards (-); NSA (-), tensions b/w US & EU side (0); EC protects standards (+); surveillance (-);	-1	Neg.
	Die Kosten müssen die Verbraucher bezahlen		Economic growth (+), consumer standards (-) environmental issues (-), car industry (+), food safety (-)	-1	Neg.
5.2014	Der Wert des Freihandels		SME export sector (+);	2	Pos.
	Wie Gabriel den Freihandel retten will	Campact	online signatures (-); economic growth (+); employment (+); reduction of safety / environmental standards (+/-); consumer standards - Chlorine Chicken (-); secret negotiations (-); ISDS (-); car industry (+); SME (+);	0	Bal.
	Das enorme Selbstbewusstsein des Martin Schulz	CEO	social protest (-); Chlorine chicken (-); GMO (-); secret negotiations (-); lobby power (-); EU standards (-); non-tariff barriers (+); employment (+); economic growth (+) car industry (+); common market (+), ISDS (-)	-1	Neg.
	Rewe fürchtet die Chlorhühnchen aus USA		Consumer protection (-); hormon meat (-); GMO (-); SME (+/-); food standards (-); agricultural procedure / standards (-); biggest free trade area (+); employment (+), economic growth (+); global trade domaine (+);	-1	Neg.
	Es wird keine Chlor-Hühnchen geben		No transparency (-); NSA (-); online campaigns (-); standards (+); chlorine chicken rejection (+); SME (+); reduction of regulatory obstacles (+); Second home market for companies (+); trade in goods increases (+); cheaper products (+); economic growth (+); shaping globalisation (+); global role model (+); export nations benefit (+); parliamentary ratification (+); ISDS (+/)	1	Pos.

	Wir sind nicht in Nordkorea, Frau Künast	Online campaign	secret negotiations (0); ISDS (-); standards (EU standards (+); social protest (-); economic growth (+); employment (+); common rules (+); pressuring /influencing global financial markets (+);	1	Pos.
	Hamburger Fischmarkt		environmental standards (+); consumer protection (+); NSA (-); secrecy (+);	1	Pos.
	An die Urnen, Querulanten, Bauern, Google-Hasser!		Democracy (-), Big Business interest (-); ISDS (-); Chlorine chicken (-)	-2	Neg.
	Keine Angst vor Amerikas Chlorhühnern		chlorine chicken (-); economic growth (+); employment (+); geopolitics (+); EU global market dominance (+); EU arrogance (+); Anti-Americanism (+); financial regulation (+);	1	Pos.
6.2014	Chlorhühnchen nicht schädlich		chlorine chicken (+);	2	Pos.
	Verbraucher entdecken Tierwohl		chlorine chicken (-)	-2	Neg.
7.2014	Gabriel kämpft für den freien Handel		business power (-); surveillance (-); global role model (+); environmental standards (+/-); ISDS (+/-); secret negotiations (-); regulatory race-to-the-bottom (-)	-1	Neg.
	Spionageaffäre darf Handelsabkommen nicht schaden		surveillance (-); Trade agreement common practice (+); export nation (+); employment (+); standards (-); chlorine chicken (+);	1	Pos.
	Freihandelsgegner profitieren von Spionageaffäre		surveillance (-); public opinion (-); easier market access for export nations (+); deregulation (+); SME (+);	1	Pos.
	Kühlen Kopf bewahren		surveillance (-); Trade agreement common practice (+); export nation (+); employment (+); standards (-); chlorine chicken (+);	1	Pos.

	150 Organisationen bilden Allianz gegen Freihandel	Compact, MehrDemokrati e	EU-wide social protest (-); economic growth (+); EU standards (+/-); hormone meat (+/-); chemicals in cosmetics (-); ISDS (+/-); secret negotiations (-); parliamentary ratification (+); irrational fear (+); surveillance (-);	-1	Neg.
	Rettet das Freihandelsabkommen mit den USA!		irrationality (+); surveillance (-); economic growth (+); export nations (+); anti-americanism (+); SME (+); prosperity (+); standards (-); secret negotiations (-); ISDS (-);	1	Pos.
	Hohes Wachstum		economic growth (+);	2	Pos.
	Tod eines Handelsabkommen		common market (+); global role model (+); economic growth (+); employment (+); EU standards (-); protest development (-)	0	Bal.
8.2014	Deutschland weiter offen für Freihandel mit Kanada		work permission (+); accepting education degrees (+); ISDS (-); secret negotiations (-); social protest (-); common practice (+);	1	Pos.
	Gabriel muss bei CETA Farbe bekennen		blueprint for TTIP (0)	0	Bal.

BILD

Date	Title	Actor	Frames	Numeric Values	Value
7.2013	Handys, Kleidung, Autos - so günstig könnt es werden		different norms (+); french culture (0); NSA (-); cheaper prices (+); economic growth (+); employment (+); agriculture (-); biggest benefit UK (+); small states in EU(+);	1	Pos.

	Deutschen winkt Lohn-Plus von 5 Prozent		income increase (+); consumer benefit (+); NSA (-); economic surveillance (-); economic growth (+); employment (+); agriculture - GMO (-)UK (+);; Small states EU (+)	1	Pos.
8.2013					
9.2013					
10.2013					
11.2013	Chlorhuhn-Debatte lenkt von TTIP-Chancen ab		chlorine chicken (-); investment (+); standards (+); business interest (-); employment (+); SME (+); car industry (+); transparency (+); culture (+); ISDS (+); food standards (-);	1	Pos.
12.2013					
1.2014					
2.2014					
3.2014					
4.2014					
5.2014	Entscheidet der Zoff um Chlor-Hähnchen die Europawahl?	Campact	trade and tariffs barriers (+); SME (+); employment (+); export industry (+); consumer benefits (+); ISDS (-); democracy (-); fracking (-); secret negotiations (0); Chlorine chicken (-); food standards (+);	1	Pos.

	Chlorhühnchen-Streit bei Anne Will		Chlorine chicken (-); GMO (-); economic growth (+); employment (+); Eu standards (-/+); ; secret negotiations (-); de-bureaucratisation (+); SME (+/-) transparency (-);	-1	Neg.
	Kann eine EU-Grüne schnell die Welt retten?		fair trade (-); food / agriculture quality (-);	-2	Neg.
6.2014					
7.2014					
8.2014					

6.2 Media Outlet Analysis (Austria)

Der Standard

Date	Title	Actor	Frame	Numerical Value	Value
7.2013					
8.2013					
9.2013					
10.2013					
11.2013					
12.2013					
1.2014	Stop and Go bei EU-Freihandelspakt mit USA		ISDS (0/-); economic benefits (+); EU Standards (+);	1	Pos.
2.2014	Freihandelsabkommen wackelt	Spiegel Online	political opposition (-); EU standards (-); ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.
3.2014	Freihandel: FPÖ will Volksentscheid		information deficit (-); EU Standards / EU norm lowering - food (-), shaping globalisation (+)	-1	Neg.

	Obama sagt EU-Spitzen Energiedeal zu		energy supply (+); energy independence from Russia (+); standards (+)	2	Pos.
	Ein Abkommen zwischen Chlorhendl und europäischer Note		Chlorine chicken (-); [Greens -; SPÖ - Neo +] GMO (-); EU standards (+);	-1	Neg.
	Streit um Investorenschutz	Greenpeace; Global2000	ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.
4.2014	USA wollen Fleisch schicken und Daten holen		agriculture (0); ISDS (0); Data standards (0)	0	Bal.
	Freihandel: Grüne sehen Lügengedichte der Regierung		social protest (-); unclear gov position (-)	-2	Neg.
	Koalition bremst Freihandel	Caritas; Greenpeace	transparency (-); ISDS (-); political demand for reform (+)	-1	Neg.
5.2014	Auch Amerikaner vergiften sich nicht täglich		chlorine chicken (+); deregulation (-); consumer protection (-); consumer independence (+); export nations - GER; Ö; Spain (+); other countries of the world (-) economic growth (-); ISDS (+/-) secret negotiations (-); austria benefits (+);	0	Bal.
	Handelsabkommen TTIP		secret negotiations (0); EU Standards - chlorine (-); ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.
	Länder stellen sich geschlossen gegen TTIP-Abkommen		federal countries (-)	-2	Neg.
6.2014					
7.2014	Freihandel: Konzerne dominieren Lobbying	CEO	business lobbyism (-); secret negotiations (-);	-2	Neg.
	TTIP muss transparent sein		fighting for standards (+) / transparency (-)	0	Bal.
	Furcht vor US-Verhältnissen in Europas Chemieindustrie		car industry (+); chemical industry (-); Regulatory Cooperation Council (-)	-1	Neg.
	USA sind nicht gewillt, auf die EU zuzugehen -> interview w/ Bernd Lange S&D Germany		transparency (-); NSA (-); Standards (+/-); public myths (+)	-1	Neg.
	Die Macht unabhängiger Schiedsgerichte		ISDS (+); Germany against it (-)	0	Bal.

8.2014	Chlor und Hormone		food standards (-); chlorine chicken (-); consumer protection (-);	-2	Neg.
	Wir verhandeln nicht mit Engeln (Interview de Gucht)		chlorine chicken (+/-); GMO (-); respecting/reacting to public concerns (+); Regulatory Cooperation Council (+); ISDS (+)TISA (+/-)secret negotiations (-/+) NSA (+); parliamentary ratification (+)	1	Pos.
	Die eingesetzten Waffen sind sehr unterschiedlich		trade barriers (+); transparency (-); chlorine chicken (+); EU Common market 30 yrs ago some issues (+); ISDS (0)	1	Pos.

Die Presse

Date	Title	Actor	Frame	Numerical Value	Value
7.2013	Verhandlungen über Freihandel mit Washington werden Jahre dauern		surveillance - esp. in Germany an issue (-); economic growth (+); employment (+);	1	Pos.
	Was auf dem Spiel steht		precautionary principle (-); Standards (-/0); liberalisation (+); economic performance (+); employment (+); south european labor market situation (+); regulatory coordination (+); food standards (-); consumer protection (-); chemicals (-),	1	Pos.
8.2013					
9.2013					
10.2013					
11.2013	Zweite Runde im Ringkampf EU-USA	BUND	diverging standards as an obstacle (-); climate policies - argument in GER (-); GMO (+); business lobby (-); data protection (+);	-1	Neg.

	Den Amerikanern fehlt eine strategische Vision		global role model (+); multilateral framework for discussion of differences (+);	2	Pos.
	Chlorhühner fliegen nach Europa	Attac	public fear (-); hormone meat (+/-); chlorine chicken (-); clone beef (-); cultural values (-); EU regulations (+); economic benefits (+); economic growth (+); [social standards (-);	-1	Neg.
12.2013					
1.2014	Berlin bremst EU-USA Verhandlungen		partial negotiation stop by EU (-); rising protest in GER (-); ISDS (-); economic growth (+); german export (+); surveillance - GER (-);	-1	Neg.
	Dompteure im Flohzirkus		great recession (+); economic benefit (+); deregulation (+); employment (+); safety standards (-); chlorine chicken (-); ISDS (o/-); secret negotiations (-)	0	Bal.
	Auf einen Blick		economic growth (+); global role model (+);	2	Pos.
	Neue Sorge ums Wasser		public provision (-);	-2	Neg.
	Europas Angst vor dem starken Bruder		public fear (-); food quality (-); secret negotiations (-); hormone meat / chlorine chicken (-); NSA (-); business interests (-); SME (-); race-to-the-bottom (-); ISDS (-); economic growth (+)	-1	Neg.
2.2014	Auf einen Blick		easier export (+); Austrian economic benefit (+); employment (+)	2	Pos.
	USA bremsen bei Handelsabkommen		US slow down negotiations (-); austrian SME (-);	-2	Neg.

3.2014	Schutz für Investoren		biggest global free trade zone (+); global role model (+); ISDS (-); no transparency (-); business power (-)	-1	Neg.
	USA und EU leben transatlantische Harmonie vor		economic benefits (+); geopolitics (+); standards (-); energy politics (+)	1	Pos.
	Kanzler verspricht Transparenz		secret negotiations (-); transparency demand (+); food standards (-); ISDS (-); economic benefits (+);	-1	Neg.
	Countdown für Schutzklauseln		partial negotiation stop (0); ISDS (-);	-1	Neg.
	Was Chlorhendl und Carla Bruni gemein haben		economic growth (+); employment (+); global role model (+); GMO (-); chlorine chicken (+/-); french culture (-); financial regulation (+); ISDS (-);	0	Bal.
4.2014	Faymann gegen Sonderklagsrechte	SPÖ	ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.
5.2014	Stimmungswandel bei Freihandel		food standards (-); Environmental standards (-); social standards (-); economic growth (+); employment (+); secret negotiations (-); chlorine chicken (-); ISDS (+/-); data protection (-); NSA (-);	-1	Neg.
	Auf einen Blick		food standards (-); EU standards (-)	-2	Neg.
	Eine transparentere EU ist möglich		transparency (-);	-2	Neg.
	Wieder Kritik an TTIP		ISDS (-); employment (+); food security (-); big business (-);	-1	Neg.
	Landeshauptleute lehnen US-Handelsabkommen ab		GMO (-); ISDS (-); secret negotiations (-); Austrian Gov and no transparency (-);	-2	Neg.
6.2014	Investitionsschutz: Wo verläuft die rote Linie?		ISDS (0)	0	Bal.

	Wie aus einem harmlosen Huhn ein Kampftier wurde	Kronen Zeitung	Kronen Zeitung major protestor (0); conspiracy theory (0); export increase (+); standards - chlorine chicken (-); anti-americanism (+); ISDS (-); Common practice - ISDS (+);	0	Bal.
7.2014	Im Trippelschritt zum Handelspakt		economic growth (+); employment (+); global role model (+); geopolitics (+); NSA (-); social protest in Germany (-); ISDS (-);	0	Bal.
	US-Abkommen ohne Mehrheit		cultural fight (+); transparency (-); ISDS (-); Regulatory Cooperation Council (-), democracy (-)	-1	Neg.
	TTIP-Verhandler beruhigen		EU standards (+); ISDS (-/+); cultural fight (+);	1	Pos.
8.2014	Erste große Hürde für US-Handelsabkommen		CETA (0); ISDS (-/+); democracy (-); common practice (+); decision making (-);	0	Bal

6.3 Media Outlet Analysis (UK)

Guardian

Date	Title	Actor	Frame	Numerical Value	Value
7.2013	NSA spying row: bugging friends is unacceptable, warn Germans		NSA (-)	-2	Neg.
	In the geopolitics of trade, Pangloss meets Machiavelli		geopolitics (+), economic growth (+), EU employment (+),	2	Pos.
8.2013					
9.2013					

10.2013	Superversion not subversion is the real threat to the state		common regulations/standards (+), secret negotiations (-), trade barriers reduction (+), new IP laws (-), data protection, public procurement and financial services (-), democratic sovereignty (-)	-1	Neg.
	Who owns Britain? Anybody but us		removing EU regulations/standards (-)	-2	Neg.
11.2013					
12.2013	Trade deal troubles		secret negotiations (+)	2	Pos.
	Secrecy and transatlantic trade		secret negotiations (-), democracy (-)	-2	Neg.
1.2014					
2.2014					
3.2014	Give and take?		corporate power (-), democracy (-), reduction of trade barriers/tariffs removing (+), weaker common regulations (-), ISDS (-)	-1	Neg.
	Forget tactics. Stand up and rally against the Ukip vision.		food safety (-), GMO (-), environmental regulations (-)	-2	Neg.
4.2014					
5.2014	The UK's response to Pfizer's takeover bid is incoherent and misguided		secret negotiations (-), corporate power (-), Britain's economic interest (+)	-1	Neg.
	Write-down of two-thirds of US shale oil explodes fracking myth		extraction of shale gas/oil by 'fracking' technology (-), environmental damage (-)	-2	Neg.
	Where European project goes next		democracy (-), lack of governmental control (-)	-2	Neg.
6.2014					
7.2014	European official commits to safeguarding NHS in EU-US trade deal		economic growth (+), NHS (-)	0	Bal.
	Its a scandal that profits come before food safety	War on Want	NHS (-), ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.

8.2014	Constant growth can only make most of us poorer		democracy (-), ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.
	World Trade Organisation has reached its make or break moment		WTO alternative (+)	2	Pos.
	Two-third of voters in Tory marginals want NHS exempt from US trade pact		secret negotiations (-), economic growth (+), NHS (-), ISDS (-)	-1	Neg.
	Where's the outrage over trade deal?		ISDS (-), secret negotiations (-)	-2	Neg.
	Queue to privatise British institutions		NHS privatization (-)	-2	Neg.

Telegraph

Date	Title	Actor	Frame	Numerical Value	Value
7.2013	The European Union is to push for an agreement on banking and financial services as a key part of this week's historic trade talks		trade barriers/tariffs reduction (+), strengthening regulations (+), financial regulatory effects (+)	1	Pos.
	Battle lines drawn for EU-US trade talks		geopolitics (+), economic growth (+), trading bloc (+), NSA (-), trade barriers/tariffs reduction (+), bureaucracy reduction (+), common standards (+)	1	Pos.
8.2013					
9.2013	Clegg woos US on free trade pact		US employment (+)	2	Pos.
	Britain leads push to convince Washington to back transatlantic free trade deal		US employment (+), US export increase (+), US car industry (+)	2	Pos.
10.2013	Allegations of US hacking Angela Merkel's phone is a proper headache for David Cameron		NSA (-), economic growth (+)	0	Bal.
11.2013					
12.2013					
1.2014					
2.2014					

3.2014	If we value the special relationship, free trade deal is a prize we must not let slip through our fingers		trade barriers/tariffs reduction (+), free and fair competition (+), productivity, profit margins and prices for consumers (+), US car industry (+), geopolitics (+), economic growth (+)	2	Pos.
4.2014					
5.2014	Historic trade talks stall as confusion over changes leads to antagonism		largest trading bloc (+), economic growth (+), trade barriers/tariffs reduction (+), flood of US goods (-), GMO (-), labor rights (-), fracking (-)	-1	Neg.
6.2014					
7.2014	Opponents of the EU-US trade deal should watch this video		modest trade liberalisation (-), higher regulated market due to combined standards (-)	-2	Neg.
8.2014					

Independent

Date	Title	Actor	Frame	Numerical Value	Value
7.2013					
8.2013					
9.2013					
10.2013					
11.2013	Good for business or bad for democracy?		trade barriers/tariffs reduction (+), common standards/regulations (+), democracy (-), ISDS (-), GMO (-), financial services (0), economic growth (+), EU employment (+), EU exports (+), transparency (+)	1	Pos.
12.2013					

1.2014	Freer trade is worth having, but giving big business more power is too high a price for it		ISDS (+), common environmental and health standards (+), corporate control (-),	1	Pos.
2.2014					
3.2014					
4.2014	NHS could be 'carved open' by US healthcare profiteers	38 Degrees	NHS (-), economic growth (+), UK's sovereignty (-)	-1	Neg.
5.2014	Interesting times ahead in Brussels as Italy, with its demands for a softening of austerity, clashes with the dominant power of Germany		economic growth (+), GMO (-), consumer protection (-); ISDS (-), common regulations (-) NSA (-)	-2	Neg.
6.2014					
7.2014	PM must exclude NHS from EU-US trade deal or it could be sued, union warns		NHS (-), democratic control (-), ISDS (-)	-2	Neg.
	David Cameron's trade deal with America outrages critics	War on Want	economic growth (+), EU employment (+), lower labor rights (-); lower environmental standards (-), ISDS (-), GMO (-)	-1	Neg.
	Protesters fear trade deal with US will 'carve open' health service	War on Want	NHS (-), growth (+), reduction of trade tariffs (+)	1	Pos.
	David Cameron urged to exempt the NHS from TTIP deal after unions claim it is at risk from being sold to American corporations		NHS (-), ISDS (-), economic growth (+), employment (+), trade barriers/tariffs reduction (+)	1	Pos.
8.2014					

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