CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY THROUGH THE HUNGARIAN “MIGRATION” DISCOURSE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues – in contrast with preexisting literature – that the Hungarian ‘migration’ discourse in 2015 cannot be understood solely as a securitization attempt as it also fundamentally targeted the level of identity construction. In order to demonstrate this, I synthetize the frameworks of Critical Discourse Analysis, securitization and hegemony theory in an innovative way, which will demonstrate the impact of the discourse on the level of identity. My empirical analysis of the Hungarian “migration” discourse reveals that the security frame of the situation and the feeling of instability, gained hegemonic character throughout 2015. This affected the level of identity from two aspects. On the one hand, the security frame led to equivalence among in-group actors (Hungarians). This was utilized by the Hungarian government to emphasize the line between the Hungarian Self and the Other (refugees and migrants). Thus, it built heavily on the exclusion of the Other. On the other hand, the feeling of instability aided the ontological insecuritization process, which was utilized to establish a situation where everyday routines were not working and the ontological insecuritization became possible. The other aspect of the discourse linked to ontological security, is that it also fixed the meaning of the new enemy-image (refugees and migrants). In this process, the Hungarian state and the border were directly linked to the ontological security at the individual level as referent objects and frameworks, in which the invasion of the refugees and migrants could mean the end of both Hungarian identity and Hungarian state.
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INTRODUCTION

Due to the growing number of humanitarian, political and military crises in the neighborhood of Europe, an exponentially increasing number of people have fled their home countries for the European Union. Thus the number of asylum applications in the EU-28 member states is also permanently growing, while 2014 was the first year when it reached 1.000.000.¹ This trend further intensified in 2015, with more than 1.300.000 asylum applications, owing to the rise of the so-called Islamic State, the continuing Syrian Civil War and broader destabilization in the MENA region.²

Hungary was one of the centers of this refugee and migrant crisis with approximately 370.000 arrested migrants and refugees³ and 180.000 asylum applications in 2015 due to its geographical location as a transit country on the route towards Western-Europe.⁴ In this atmosphere, the Hungarian government generated a new social, economic, political and foreign policy discourse in order to achieve its own specific goals. As many authors have pointed out,⁵ this was a successful securitization attempt which had a fundamental impact on the level of xenophobia

² Ibid.
³ A Magyar Rendőrség hivatalos honlapja, “Elfogott migránsok száma,” accessed 28 May, 2016, http://www.police.hu/hirek-es-informaciok/hatarinfo/elfogott-migransok-szama-lekerdezes?honap%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=2015&honap%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=5
and the attitude of Hungarian society towards refugees and migrants. All of these articles emphasize the role of a specific frame that was used by the Hungarian government during the refugee and migration crisis in 2015.

Although this study accepts their main conclusions concerning the successful securitization attempt, it is important to note that these researches are still incomplete, because they fail to go beyond the lens of securitization, and do not recognize that the Hungarian “migration” discourse fundamentally affected the Hungarian identity construction process at large. Thus, the main goal of this thesis is to fill this gap in the literature. To sum up, the main research question of this analysis is the following: *What was the impact of the Hungarian “migration” discourse, on the Hungarian identity construction process?* To answer this question I will utilize a novel analytical approach, by synthetizing the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, securitization and hegemony theory, which will demonstrate that the Hungarian “migration” discourse – in contrast with the notion of the already existing literature – is not only a securitization attempt, but had also fundamental impact on the Hungarian identity construction process.

Concerning the limits of this thesis, it is important to note that this study does not aim to analyze the features or the challenges of the refugee and migration crisis. For this reason the goal is not to offer alternative policies or solutions. Rather my focus is on the discourse and on the identity construction process in itself. In terms of terminology, I will use the words “migrant” or “migration” in quotation marks if I talk about the governmental discourse, regardless of its legal background. However, when I will talk about the situation in Europe I will follow the preferred

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terminology of the UNHCR and use the words “refugees and migrants,” which are in line with the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol and other related legal documents.  

Besides the novel conceptual contribution, on the empirical level, deeper analysis of the topic helps to understand the nature of the Hungarian “migration” discourse and the governmental campaign through the refugee and migration crisis. The time frame of the empirical analysis will be 2015. This frame provides the opportunity to limit the scope of the analysis, while it includes those significant events (i.e. the introduction of the Hungarian “migration” discourse, the emergence of the refugee and migration crisis, the governmental emergency measures) which are central to this study. Empirically, most of the sections have their own methodological background. These include an extensive analysis of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speeches; a summary of conducted interviews with the most prominent Hungarian security policy experts; in-depth analysis of the Prime Minister’s speech at Kötcse; and a demonstration of the role of non-linguistic discursive tools. All of these will be introduced in detail in the following sections.

In terms of structure the thesis is divided into three chapters. In the first I will establish the conceptual basis for the empirical analysis. This will create an innovative synthesis of Critical Discourse Analysis (Michael Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Normann Fairclough), securitization (Copenhagen School, Thierry Balzacq, etc.) and hegemony theory (Antonio Gramsci, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe) on the conceptual level. In other words, my goal is to create an original approach which will build upon these three pillars, while the primary goal of this new conceptual link is to help analyze the identity construction process in empirical cases. To capture how the identity construction happened I will also draw on the concepts of Anthony Giddens, David Campbell, Jacob Schiff, Catarina Kinvall and Jef Huysmans.

The second part will be empirical analysis of Hungarian “migration” discourse, in order to introduce its practical features. This is anteceded by a short contextualization and outline of the main characteristics of the 40-year-old Western-European “migration” discourses, as well as the securitization of Roma people in Hungary in 2009, an attempt that had significant similarities with the case of the refugees and migrants in 2015. Then, the introduction of how the framing of the refugee and migration crisis happened in Hungary from the perspective of language will primarily focus on the speeches/statements of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the so-called National Consultation campaign. This section will demonstrate the main linguistic features of the Prime Minister’s speeches with the help of the software Yoshikoder. In other words, the aim here is to capture what the Copenhagen School calls a *speech act*. Since my analysis builds on the extended version of securitization, I will also draw attention to the impact of the Governmental campaign, the non-linguistic discursive tools\(^8\) and the influence of Hungarian media and security policy experts, with whom I conducted interviews on public opinion. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 2, Hungarian “migration” discourse drew heavily on similar attempts and experiences in Western Europe and on the securitization of Roma people in Hungary in 2009. It was operating through linguistic and non-linguistic tools and the governmental campaign had a fundamental impact on its nature. Besides the Hungarian government, the Hungarian media and the security policy experts also influenced the discourse, which means that the attempt had not emanate from one single focal point.

The final chapter will demonstrate how the discourse facilitated the identity construction process in the Hungarian case. Through the established conceptual framework, I will be able to identify and analyze those specific elements of the “migration” discourse which were securitized

\(^8\) Including the role of the constructed border fence and the so-called “non-policies.”
and gained hegemonic character and, through this, influenced the Hungarian identity construction process. Chapter 3 recognizes two important points which are especially relevant concerning hegemony and securitization. These are the utilized security frame and the feeling of instability, both of which gained hegemonic character throughout the year and were permanently used for the identity construction process. This chapter also demonstrates that the Hungarian “migration” discourse had a fundamental impact on the identity construction process, since it strengthened the differentiation between the Self and the Other, as well as led to ontological insecuritization in the Hungarian society. On the one hand, the role of the security frame as a hegemonic tool was to help the emergence of equivalence among in-group actors, as it helped the framing of the situation. It was utilized to emphasize the line between the Hungarian Self and the Other (refugees and migrants). On the other hand, the feeling of instability – as another hegemonic interpretation – helped the ontological insecuritization process of the Hungarian society in parallel. It was utilized by the government to establish a situation whereby the everyday routines were not working and thus ontological insecuritization was possible. Furthermore the securitization of the issue left the space of physical security and started to target the ontological security at the individual level. It also tried to fix the meaning of the new enemy-image (refugees and migrants). In this process, the Hungarian state and the Hungarian border as referent objects and frameworks were directly linked to the ontological security of the individual level, in which the invasion of migrants could mean the end of Hungarian identity and the Hungarian state. The main ambition of the thesis is at the general level to offer a synthetized conceptual approach that can be utilized in similar cases, and thus to provide a facility and tool to not only see similar discourses as pure securitization attempts, but to also capture their impact on the identity construction processes at large.
CHAPTER 1 – CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS

The main goal of the following chapter is to introduce the conceptual foundations of the study, which will help us to establish an alternative, comprehensive and synthesized approach between the applied theories on a general level. In the analysis I bring together three existing theories/frameworks. Nevertheless, their synthetization will demonstrate us that a more nuanced empirical case study can be accomplished concerning the analysis of identity construction.

The three concepts of the following chapter are: the frameworks of Critical Discourse Analysis and securitization as well as hegemony theories. For the better understanding of the conceptual foundations, Figure 1 summarizes the main points of this chapter. I will introduce each concepts in the following sections separately, while the final section will focus more specifically on the identity construction process. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the goal of this thesis at the conceptual level is not to create a new theory, but rather to offer an alternative synthesis of existing frameworks, for more nuanced empirical analysis. Due to the limits of the study, I will not introduce and criticize all aspects of the three pillars, rather I will offer specific interpretations of them.

![Figure 1: Conceptual foundations](image)

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1.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

As Norman Fairclough reminds us, social life is an inherently open system, made up of practices which are partly discursive but they are also discursively represented. Discourse is a semiotic element of social practices, which includes language, nonverbal communication and visual images. They are always structured and relational. Furthermore, because discourses are elements of social practices, and because practices constitute the social life as an open system, discourses are similarly open-ended. Or, as one of the most prominent pioneers, Michael Foucault puts it, “discourse is constituted by the difference between what one could say correctly at one period (under the rules of grammar and logic) and what is actually said” and thus “the discursive field is, at a specific moment, the law of this difference.” In other words, discourse is a “formation and transformation of ‘things said.’” Similarly to Fairclough, Foucault also emphasize the role of regulated practices in this field which can be linked to non-discursive practices.

In this discursive field, language is a system of signs in which the values of any sign derive from its relations to other signs – whether it is equivalent to or different from other signs. As Jacques Derrida emphasizes, the social world – as a structure – has no center. What we call the center is “always taken from the history of meaning.” As he defines it, there was a rupture in the history of the concept of structure.

This moment was that in which language invaded the universal problematic; that in which, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse-provided” and “when everything

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12 Ibid.
13 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, 19-53.
became a system where the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences.\textsuperscript{15}

For this reason language does not reveal essential truth in itself, rather it is a series of collective signs, through which things are given meaning.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, language produces the social reality and the aim of discourse analysis is to capture how language tries to fix meanings.\textsuperscript{17} The main goal of the textually oriented Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is therefore to “connect the micro with the macro that is to uncover the way in which societal level knowledge, assumptions and ideologies affect the detailed way in which we talk, write and interact, and vica versa.”\textsuperscript{18} In Chapter 2 and 3, I will demonstrate, how the Hungarian “migration” discourse constituted the social reality through the emergence of new hegemonic interpretations. Language was an essential element in this process, and therefore the empirical analysis will build heavily on the in-depth analysis of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speeches, statements and interviews. As I will demonstrate through the “migration” discourse, the government tried to fix the meaning of the situation according to its own interpretation, while sideling any other counter frames that could have provided alternative interpretation of events. Concerning Critical Discourse Analysis, I will follow the summary of David Rear about the work of Norman Fairclough, who provided a three dimensional (text, discursive practice, social practice) framework for it. In this respect,

the textual dimension focuses on how discourses are realized linguistically. Discursive practice analyses how producers of texts draw on already existing discourses to create a text and on how recipients of texts apply available discourses to interpret them...The dimension of social practice itself examines how texts reproduce or challenge wider aspects of society, particularly how they relate to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination.\textsuperscript{19
This is why empirically the contextualization – the analysis of the Western European “migration” discourses and the securitization of Roma people – is essential to capture the impact of the Hungarian “migration” discourse in 2015. As I will demonstrate, the framing of refugees and migrants in 2015 permanently built on these experiences and this is why the discourse found fertile ground in the Hungarian society.

Additionally, Dirk Nabers emphasizes that the transmission of meanings happens through discourses, and these are the driving forces of social changes. In these processes of changes, international crises are extremely important as they are characterized by a "void of meaning, or a structural gap that has to be filled." ²⁰ From this perspective, crises of representation or of meaning are the root of any social or identity change. ²¹ Through the linking of CDA and hegemony theory, Nabers also demonstrates how “hegemonic discourses serve as the nexus between crises and social structures and how they make identity construction possible.” This is what I am particularly interested in. My goal is to show how the incoming of refugees and migrants in Hungary created a situation that could be labelled as a crisis by the government. I assume that this moment led to a structural gap in the discourse, which had to be filled. Throughout the first part of the empirical analysis I will focus on the role of language in the Hungarian “migration” discourse, to capture how it created a new, social reality through the specific semiotic framing of the crisis situation.

1.2. Securitization

As many other authors – including Szalai and Göbl, Blazek or Carulli ²² – have noted, the Hungarian “migration” discourse was a successful securitization attempt that had a fundamental impact on the level of xenophobia and on the attitude of Hungarian society towards refugees and

²¹ Ibid.
²² For the detailed references, see reference 4.
migrants. Although the main point of this study is to emphasize that the discourse was more than a pure securitization, it accepts their argument in the sense that the Hungarian “migration” discourse facilitated the securitization of the crisis. For this reason the framework of securitization is one of the three pillars of my analytical approach.

As the Copenhagen School famously claimed, security is a *speech act*, in which threats are socially constructed. Although they are constructed, the presentation of threats as existential legitimizes the emergency measures and the breaking of normal rules. 23 In this interpretation, “a successful securitization has three components: existential threats, emergency actions, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free rules.” 24 It is also essential to find an acceptance among the members of the audience. 25 Thus the referent object has to “hold a general legitimacy,” which proves for the audience that the given object should survive. 26 As the following chapters will demonstrate, not only the Hungarian state, but also the Hungarian border and more importantly the Hungarian identity emerged as a referent object from the discourse. According to the explicit governmental interpretation their existence was threatened by the crisis and the emergency actions to protect them could break even the normal rules – like in the case of the border fence construction.

However as many authors point out the Copenhagen ‘speech act’ interpretation of security – similarly to the exclusively language centric CDA theories – is too narrow. Following their arguments, this analysis accepts those criticisms which try to expand the scope of securitization.

On the one hand, treating security as a pure speech act would exclude the role of images and image-rhetoric (i.e. in the media). 27 On the other hand, Szalai and Göbl building on the concepts of Thierry

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24 Ibid. 26.
25 Ibid. 27.
26 Ibid. 31.
Balzacq, emphasize the role of specific policy or technical instruments, like the barbered wire fence at the Hungarian-Serbian border, which also accelerated the securitization process beyond discursive means.28 Similarly, Holger Stritzel argues that the Copenhagen School excludes the social dynamics and the perpetually changing characteristics of meaning, reducing it to mere static events.29 This thesis also challenges the Copenhagen notion that the securitizing actor has one single or universal center. As I will demonstrate in the empirical case study, the securitization of the refugee and migration crisis was multilayered, in which a variety of actors – without one single center – accelerated the process. Concerning this, as Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans argue, speaking about security is never an innocent act. This is because security knowledge is produced by institutions, agencies, and the media as well as any actor who “argues over the reality of a threat.”30 Although this study cannot deal with the whole structure of the Hungarian security field, it will demonstrate the role of the media and security policy experts, since both groups failed to provide an effective counter frame against the governmental interpretation, reinforcing it instead.

Owing to “actors always act within a structural context which constitutes them and provides a frame of enabling and constraining conditions,” their social embeddedness also has to be taken into account.31 This leads Stritzel to the distinction between a socio-linguistic (network of constitutive rules, narratives) and socio-political (social, political structures) dimension of the context.32 For this reason the empirical analysis will also draw attention to the socio-linguistic and socio-political contexts of the Hungarian “migration” discourse. Chapter 2 will show that the

32 Ibid. 369.
analysis of the Western-European “migration” discourses and the securitization of Roma people can help a lot to understand these contextual characteristics.

1.3. Hegemony Theories

Critical Discourse Analysis and the framework of securitization have principal importance for the Hungarian case study because they shed light on how the framing of the refugee and migration crisis happened. Additionally, some of the discursive elements gained hegemonic character and reached the level of common sense which was essential for it to shape the identity construction process. For this reason the following section is dedicated to the introduction of hegemony theories.

In their prominent work “Hegemony and socialist strategy” Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe reformulated Antonio Gramsci’s concept and argued that “any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a center.” 33 They try to fix the web of meanings through articulation and through the constitution of nodal points, even if their total fixation cannot be possible. 34 As Rear emphasizes:

*Hegemony is the expansion of a discourse or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context crisscrossed by antagonistic forces.* 35

The problem is that when a discourse becomes hegemonic, the constituted social practices appear as natural and they reach the level of common sense. 36 Common sense is a collective noun. 37

As Ted Hopf summarizes the ideas of Gramsci,

*Hegemonic ideas are those that advance the interests of the dominant classes but are veiled in language that presents them as if they were advancing the universal interests of the people in general. Hegemonic power is maximized to the extent that these ideas become taken for granted by

35 Ibid. 7.
36 Ibid. 8.
the dominated Population. A taken-for-granted truth is one that people assume to be so without questioning its empirical or normative validity. A legitimate truth is one that people consciously regard as “right” in a given context.38

Common sense is an ambiguous and contradictory concept, where there is no need for the confirmation of truth anymore.39 It works structurally, through the numerous, unconscious daily practices.40 Hopf argues that there is a significant possibility that state elites and officials share the common sense with the society in their interpretations and daily practices.41

To sum up, hegemony and common sense reproduce our everyday life and our understanding of social relations. In this respect, “it is an act of power because it makes the world intelligible.” 42 Laclau and Mouffe showed that for hegemony the social always has to have an open character, without fixed floating signifiers. These are those elements which are “particularly open to different aspirations of meaning.”43 The articulation of hegemony also needs a confrontation with the antagonistic articulatory practices. This is the phenomenon of equivalence. Moreover, it is also a necessary condition to have an instable frontier which separates these articulatory practices from each other. Furthermore as Fairclough and Rear argue, hegemony can be always de- and rearticulated, while the outcomes become unpredictable for this reason. What I will be looking at during the empirical analysis is how this happened in the case of Hungary. The assumption here is that the government articulated a discourse, certain elements of which became hegemonic in Hungarian society, by relying heavily on the speeches/opinions of its most prominent members, on the security policy experts, and on the media. In practice, this also helped to frame

40 Ted Hopf, “Common-Sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics,” 323.
41 Ibid.
42 Nabers, “Filling the Void of Meaning.” 197.
the social debate concerning the refugees and migrants in a form that was adequate for its particular policy agenda.

Going back to Laclau and Mouffe, they argue that an organic crisis emerges when there is a generalized weakening of a relational system of social space, which also leads to the appearance of new floating signifiers. This is the surplus of meaning or the moment of dislocation. However, it is also important to note that hegemony has no center; it is rather a political type of relations. For this reason, in a given society there can be many different hegemonic nodal points. This is also what the analysis will show, as it will shed light on the importance of the media during this process.

Furthermore “hegemonic formation also embraces, what opposes it, insofar as the opposing force accepts the system of basic articulations of that formation as something it negates.” In this respect, as Fairclough puts it, power is about “the construction of nodal points, which achieve permanence for articulation and relations of equivalence between different struggles brought together around some positive hegemonic project.” Nevertheless, in this thesis I accept the critique of Fairclough towards the work of Laclau and Mouffe in the sense that their position on the abandonment of the distinction between discourse and non-discourse is problematic. However, Fairclough emphasizes the utility of their argument that the articulation of language happens with other elements of the social field within the discursive formation. These elements are not only linguistic, but also include institutions, rituals and practices – including the police or the military with their specific practices. Thus the empirical analysis will also demonstrate the role of the non-

45 Ibid.
46 Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*. 123.
47 Ibid. 126.
48 Ibid. 122.
linguistic discursive formations like the border fence and the so called “non-policies” which – besides language – helped certain elements of the discourse to become hegemonic.

1.4. Identity Construction

After the introduction of the three conceptual components, it is pertinent to tackle the main point, the process of identity construction. To summarize the importance of this chapter, I would like to emphasize again that I see Critical Discourse Analysis, securitization and hegemony theories as analytical tools, which will be synthesized in an innovative way, in order to get a more nuanced picture of the identity construction process.

As Dirk Nabers argues when he summarizes the work of Laclau and Mouffe, “identity is conceptualized as a precariously negative term, never closed in itself, ephemeral in character and relying on the constant movement of differential relationships.” For this reason identity cannot be complete under any circumstances. It is established through differentiating, and thus “all principles and values, therefore, receive their meaning from relationships of difference and opposition.”

The goal of hegemony as a political type of relations is to create equivalence among in-group actors while creates antagonism and excludes other social groups. As David Campbell demonstrates, the articulation of danger from the side of a state is not necessarily a threat to its existence or to its identity, but rather it is a “condition of possibility.” This is because states are never fully finished entities, they are in a permanent need of (identity) reproduction. “The tensions between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed.”

50 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
Michael Williams argues that when identities are securitized “their negotiability and flexibility are challenged,” and a “monolithic form of identity is declared.” In this respect, a successful securitization of identity, cannot be established without establishing the limits of the given identity: to divide between “us” and “them” and to determine who is friend or foe.\(^{53}\) However this thesis does not want to seek to resolve the debate on the question of whether the Hungarian identity – or more generally any state identity – is a single, coherent phenomenon or not. Even if such single identity does not exist, one can imagine the notion of the state identity as a frame, which was utilized through the discursive act. In this respect, state identity – akin to states themselves – is a social construct. But this does not affect the fact that it can be utilized as a referent object in order to reach certain policy goals. More specifically, the incoming of refugees and migrants – interpreted as a wave or flow – created an opportunity for the construction of this identity in Hungary, which could be easily utilized by the government. The refugees and migrants were perfectly fitting actors for the creation of a constitutive Other in contrast with the Hungarian – or on a broader level – with the European identity.

Concerning identity construction, one has to see also the basic argument of ontological security studies. Anthony Giddens defines ontological security as the “confidence that most human being have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action.” As such, ontological security is built around the assumption that individuals try to securitize their own identity through different, routinized behaviors, the main goal of which is to avoid uncertainty. The origins of these routines for a stable identity can be found in the unconscious basic trust system of the individuals, which is usually developed in early childhood.\(^{54}\) The attachment to different routines can be ambivalent, as their continuity is “achieved

through the constant vigilance of the parties involved.” The main problem is that these routines can principally clash with the physical interest or security of the individual, because the maintenance of their continuity emerges as a primary goal. Or according to another perspective, ontological security does not come from these routinized behaviors but rather from the very essence of distinctiveness, (“us” and “them”) which is connected to a set of identity markers. Although ontological security seeking can be interpreted in two ways, the stability of the identity of the Self is necessary for it. The in depth analysis of Viktor Orbán’s speeches, in addition to the analysis of the governmental “non-policy” practices, will demonstrate that the Hungarian government ontologically insecuritized the Hungarian society through these moves. In Chapter 2 and 3, a closer look on the empirical level will reveal how the situation was created in which a feeling of instability and ontological insecurity dominated the agenda.

It is also important to note that there is a fundamental debate among ontological security scholars, concerning the level of analysis. The first group – Alexander Wendt, Jennifer Mitzen or Brent Steele – project the notion of ontological security onto the state level, and argue that states are similar to people. The second group – Catarina Kinnvall, Alanna Krolikowski, Stuart Croft – rather try to shift back the analysis to individuals. This thesis agrees with the second group.

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55 Ibid. 98.
and argues that individuals are the primary ontological security seeking actors. Concerning the personhood of the states, the analysis builds on the arguments of Jacob Schiff and emphasizes that

states are states - particular discursive formations that are so constituted by us that we can attribute to them rationality, identities, interests, and the like, completely independently of whether they are or are not persons.\(^\text{64}\)

In this interpretation states can be a primary tool of ontological security-seeking or ontological insecuritization.\(^\text{65}\) To sum up, in this analysis I treat the state as a frame – regardless of its personhood – which can be utilized by certain groups, the ruling elites for instance, in order to create ontological insecurity at the individual level. Since individuals want to emphasize their distinctiveness in order to secure their identities, states are essential elements/frames to this process. The next chapters will introduce how the Hungarian government took an advantage of this by creating a feeling in the society which suggested that this distinctiveness – and through this the Hungarian identity – was threatened and its protection essential to the survival of the society.

**Conclusion**

To summarize this chapter, my main argument is that this entire process – that identity construction was at the center of the Hungarian “migration” discourse – can be better captured with the synthesis of Critical Discourse Analysis, securitization theory and hegemony theory. The importance of Critical Discourse Analysis is to capture how the linguistic and non-linguistic elements of the discourse, utilized by the government and other actors (experts, media etc.) constituted a new social reality, most essentially through references to the Hungarian identity and Self. As many authors have pointed out before, the Hungarian “migration” discourse securitized

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\(^{65}\) This characteristics make them similar to transnational televisions or to the church during the ontological security seeking process. See for example: Myria Georgiou, “Seeking Ontological Security beyond the Nation: The Role of Transnational Television,” *Television & New Media* 14, no. 4 (July 2013). 304–21. or Croft, “Constructing Ontological Insecurity.”
the issue successfully. The empirical analysis will also confirm this conclusion. However one has to see that this attempt built on the emergence of new, hegemonic characteristics of this discourse. As such, due to the crisis and the “migration” discourse a new common sense emerged in Hungary.

Thus the Hungarian “migration” discourse started to target the level of identity construction. First, it securitized the situation as well as fixed new hegemonic interpretation through unconscious daily practices. Second, by utilizing them the discourse tried to fix the meaning of the Self and the Other and their relation to each other. Finally, it tried to ontologically insecuritize the Hungarian society while in parallel offered a new way – in line with the governmental interpretations – to ontologically secure it.
CHAPTER 2 – THE HUNGARIAN “MIGRATION” DISCOURSE

The second chapter provides an empirical analysis of the Hungarian “migration” discourse. I will first briefly introduce two important aspects of its contextualization – the Western European “migration” discourses and the securitization of Roma people in Hungary in 2009. Furthermore, the chapter examines the speech act in the Hungarian “migration” discourse through the analysis of the statements and speeches of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the so-called National Consultation campaign. Additionally, I will introduce the role of the non-linguistic discursive tools – including the border fence and the so-called “non-policies.” Finally, the chapter will deal with the role of the Hungarian media and Hungarian security policy experts more specifically.

2.1 Contextualization

The Hungarian “migration” discourse did not emerge out of the blue, rather it became embedded in a particular context. This context has two main discursive features, which served as preconditions for its success. One of them is the forty to fifty year-old Western European migration discourse, while the second is the securitization of Roma people in Hungary in 2009. As such, the Hungarian discourse cannot be understood separately; it features a certain social-embeddedness, since it is a continuation of previous European and Hungarian phenomena. For this reason, the following sections introduce those phenomena in order to better understand those circumstances that made the emergence of the Hungarian migration discourse possible.

2.1.1 Western European “migration” discourses

The emergence of migration on the political agenda of Europe started in the 1970s due to the increasing number of incoming people from Turkey, the Middle-East and North-Africa. Firstly, this phenomenon was linked to socio-economic problems (i.e. labour and welfare) which later
changed to a security frame. For the description of migrants, different metaphors were used across Europe, which interpreted their income as a “flood” or as an “invasion” against state security. Virginie Mamadouh differentiates between three main stages concerning the geopolitical characteristics of the Western European anti-migration discourses. In the 1970s, the anti-discourse was usually built around the questions of labour or housing issues and migration was problematized as an invasion against the working-class. The second type of “invasion” emerged in the 1980s, when the discourse rather started to target the failure of the national governments concerning the integration of migrants, and the religious aspect became more and more significant. The third and final stage in the next decade, is the invasion against Western Europe itself, in which the discourse emphasized the common fate of the European Union and the action was demanded from the supranational level. This last step also led to the creation of those tropes which asked for the construction of “Fortress Europe” as a whole.

As Jef Huysmans demonstrates, the security grammar actively appeared later not only among radical parties or politicians, but in official EU documents as well, for example concerning the Europeanization of Justice and Home Affairs. As such, immigration transcended the mere political sphere for the late 1990s and became securitized many times on a national and supranational level, a process in which migration was usually linked to territorial security, border control, counterterrorism and culture.

68 Ibid. 385.
69 Ibid. 388.
70 Ibid. 392.
Huysmans also points out that this happened in the European Union during a political crisis which had two main aspects. On the one hand, the crisis emerged due to the shift in the decision-making, which led to the creation of a two level political arena (nation-state and EU) in which the different actors were always competing with and complementing each other.\(^{71}\) On the other hand, the permanent democratic deficit of the EU created another political struggle, which maintains the status of the EU as a technocratic entity.\(^{72}\) As a technocratic entity its institutions – such as FRONTEX – contributed the security frame with their practices on the ground.\(^{73}\) For this reason the institutional practices – routines – actively accelerated the securitization of migration.

The main point of this section is not to introduce every aspect of this Western European securitization process but rather to emphasize that this context has not changed significantly during the last decades, which means that the Hungarian “migration” discourse could build on these experiences, discourses and discursive tools. As the analysis of the Hungarian case will show us, there are many common aspects between the European and Hungarian cases – including, for example, the shift from the socio-economic to the security frame and the geopolitical/security language, while the European political crisis has remained unchanged concerning the struggles with democratic deficit and multi-level governance.

### 2.1.2 Securitizing the Roma people in Hungary

The other important aspect of contextualization is the securitization attempt of Roma people in Hungary between 2008 and 2010. Understanding this topic can help us capture how the governmental “migration” discourse found fertile ground in the country and demonstrates also that the othering of refugees and migrants has Hungarian precedent.

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\(^{72}\) Ibid.

\(^{73}\) Dr. Sarah Léonard, “FRONTEX and the Securitization of Migrants through Practices.” *Paper to be presented at the Migration Working Group Seminar, European University Institute*, (9 February 2011).
As Tamás Csiki argues, the level of xenophobia in Hungarian society was always high after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the negative attitudes towards Roma people were only increasing in the first 18 years of independence. However, until 2008 the Roma issue was usually viewed within an economic or societal (integration-segregation) frame. This situation changed after certain events in 2008 (i.e. the Olaszliszka murder), and from this point a new, security-centered framing of the Roma people emerged which was usually concerned with public security. Csiki also introduces how the Hungarian radical right wing, including the parliamentary party “Jobbik,” introduced different securitization moves (i.e. Roma criminality discourse, threat marches, physical violence) after these events, through which process “the normally politicized issues of public safety and criminality, occasionally accompanied with active scapegoating and blaming in education and social welfare controversies were used in a securitizing discourse.”

Nevertheless, as Péter Tálas emphasizes, the fear of Hungarian society was rather virtual, without real experiences. This argument is supported also by those surveys which show that the majority of society has negative attitudes towards the not-existent “piréz” national group. As such the anti-Roma feelings are rather subjective, but this subjectivity significantly influences the majority of society. Similarly, although the “Roma criminality” discourse has become an

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75 On the 15th of October 2006, a certain Lajos Szögi hit with his car a Roma girl who did not get injured in the accident. Szögi wanted to check whether the girl was injured but when he left his car he was beaten to death by the relatives of the girl who thought that the girl had died in the accident.
77 Tamás Csiki, “Radical right-wing,” 4.
78 Péter Tálas, Tatárszentgyörgy után…Széljegyzet a biztonság szubjektív percepciójának veszélyeiről, Nemzet és Biztonság. (February 2009). 5.
79 The “piréz” national group was created by the TÁRKI Social Research Institute in 2006, and it was functioning as a social experiment which goal was to shed light on the level of xenophobia – without real experience – in Hungary. See for example: Sik Endre, “Nőtt a “pirézekkel” szembeni elutasítás,” 8 March, 2007, http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2007/kitekint/20070308.html.
80 Ibid. 6.
everyday routine of the radical right wing media, there are no statistics in Hungary which could substantiate their arguments, further strengthening the virtual characteristics of the discourse. To sum up, the constructed nature of this discourse builds on a virtual perception of ‘Roma otherness’ which found fertile ground in society due to pre-existing xenophobic attitudes.

As many others – including Szalai and Göbl – point out, one can witness the extensive borrowing of negative frames from the anti-Roma discourse, during the othering of the incoming refugees and migrants. As the empirical analysis of the governmental campaign will demonstrate, the attempt to securitize the Roma issue between 2008 and 2010 has striking similarities with the migration discourse, and most importantly it created a precedent in Hungary and in the Hungarian society to easily accept the anti-migration discourse.

2.2 The governmental speech act

After the introduction of the discursive context, the aim of the following section is to capture the linguistic element of the Hungarian “migration” discourse. Thus, the analysis will focus on the introduction of how the framing of the crisis happened in Hungary from a semiotic perspective. In other words, the goal is to capture what the Copenhagen School calls a speech act. In order to complete this section, I analyzed speeches/statements of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán during 2015 and the role of the so called National Consultation campaign.

Concerning the methodology of the first part, I will focus strictly on those 53 speeches of the Prime Minister which at least touched the topic of the refugee and migration crisis in 2015

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81 Tamás Csiki, “Radical right-wing”, 10.
83 Tamás Csiki, “Radical right-wing,” 7.
(Figure 2 demonstrates the distribution of these speeches during the year). After this, I analyzed the collected statements and interviews with the help of Yoshikoder 0.6.5.0. software.

![Figure 2: The total number of the Prime Minister's speeches which dealt with the refugee and migration crisis in 2015](image)

The analysis had two main stages. Firstly, Yoshikoder counted the number of references for the given categories. Secondly, its Concordance function provided 5-5 words before and after all of the chosen references, which made it possible to see their context as well. The analysis of these speeches, statements and interviews revealed an abundance of important characteristics of the governmental speech act and the discourse (Figure 3 contains the detailed summary of the numerical results).

Based on the data gained from the analyzed 53 speeches, the Prime Minster demonstrated an extensive use of references to migration and immigration throughout the year 2015. However, this does not mean that Viktor Orbán would reject or neglect the category of refugees. According

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85 The topics of the other – not covered – speeches of the Prime Minister were concerned with the opening of a new industrial factory or with the so called “Modern Cities” development program or with some kind of economic cooperation. For analytical purposes I did not include these speeches for the empirical research.
to his interpretation, there are ‘real’ or ‘political’ refugees besides migrants, however he argues that these categories are muddled by the European Union, in order to label all of the incoming people as refugees. According to him, the current situation is not about refugees but more specifically about migrants.

This leads us to the second conclusion of the Prime Minister’s speeches. The analysis demonstrated that two discourse markers are exclusively connected (with a few exceptions) to the phenomenon of migration. These are the term “illegal” and the Hungarian expression “megélhetési” which means that the migrant and refugee migrate due to economic reasons, for a better life and can be translated as livelihood migration. Through this discourse, the Prime Minister created an exclusively negative frame to describe migrants, in which the inflow of people is illegal. Here an important similarity with the securitization of Roma people emerges. Since the 2009 Roma discourse created the term “livelihood criminality” (again with the Hungarian world: “megélhetési”) which means that the terminology of the Prime Minister was building on the previous securitization experiences and thus his goal was to recall this negative frame. This phenomenon is similar to the first geopolitical level of the Western European “migration” discourses, which also built on labour competition and the economic aspects of migration.

Additionally, there is a recurring use of references throughout the speeches that attempt to obfuscate the individuals from the whole process of migration and show them as a mass or as a wave. This emotional distancing will appear again in section 2.4 concerning the analysis of the Hungarian media. It is also important to note the this practice of the Prime Minister operates with a geopolitical langue – including the term “invasion” – which shows a striking similarity with the previous Western-European “migration” discourses.

Furthermore, the speeches contained 68 different references to terrorism, a phenomenon which was clearly connected to the appearance of refugees and migrants on the border. As such,
the Prime Minister wanted to provide a clear security frame for the interpretation of the crisis alongside its economic aspects. This security grammar is again similar to the Western European and Roma discourses.

In the speeches, references to Hungarian and EU borders featured prominently. They appeared 410 times during the Prime Minister’s statements. Their contextualization clearly shows that the border – beside the traditional referent objects, like the country – appeared as a new referent object during the securitization process as an object that has to be protected, since it is the basis of the Hungarian state. This aspect will be further elaborated upon in the following section.

Finally there are also a prodigious number of references (319) to identity, culture, Christianity and civilization. This category will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 3, in which I will also explain why I treat these seemingly different references in one single category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total number of references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of references to refugees, migrants, immigrants(^{86})</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of references to refugees(^{87})</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of references to the border(^{88})</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of references to illegality and to the Hungarian expression “megélhetési” (livelihood migration) which means that the migrants and refugees migrate due to economic reasons, for a better life.(^{89})</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of references to terrorism(^{90})</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of references to the wave, flood, mass of refugees and migrants(^{91})</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of references to identity, culture, Christianity and civilization(^{92})</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of references to Islam(^{93})</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{86}\) In Hungarian: menekültek, bevándorlók, betelepülők, népvándorlás, migráció és e szavak ragozott formái.

\(^{87}\) In Hungarian: menekültek és ennek ragozott formái.

\(^{88}\) In Hungarian: határ és ennek ragozott formái.

\(^{89}\) In Hungarian: illegális, megélhetési és e szavak ragozott formái.

\(^{90}\) In Hungarian: terrorizmus és ennek ragozott formái.

\(^{91}\) In Hungarian: hullám, tömeg, áradat és e szavak ragozott formái.

\(^{92}\) In Hungarian: identitás, kultúra, kereszténység, civilizáció és e szavak ragozott formái.

\(^{93}\) In Hungarian: iszlám, muszlim és e szavak ragozásai.

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Figure 3: Total number of analyzed references in Viktor Orbán's speeches
Besides the frame of the Prime Minister, the second important aspect of the governmental speech act is the campaign throughout the year, which had two main elements: the so called national consultation program and the billboard campaign. As Szalai and Göbl put it:

*National consultations are a key element of illiberal democracy in Hungary: they have been used to supplant referenda, offering a semblance of influence to supporters of the government. These questionnaires are little more than propaganda pieces with questionable methodology, biased and suggestive question. They serve the purpose of communication between the government and its supporters, are issued by the first, and are usually tied to a populistic campaign. They provide tropes for supporters to shape public discourse, raise awareness about the government option, and are frequently used to demonstrate both the presence of democratic institutions and wide support for government policy against its critics.*

According to the analysis of András Szabó, the government spent almost 1.5 billion Forint on this migration-focused National Consultation and billboard campaign. This means that the government sent the National Consultation letter to every citizen with the right to vote and put up billboards all across the country. The data of the government shows us that they received more than one million responses, the number of those who were reached by this campaign must be even higher.

The National Consultation questionnaire, entitled *On Immigration and Terrorism,* included 12 questions, in three implicit categories. The first three suggest that there is an increasing terrorist threat in Hungary, due to the crisis. Questions 4-5 focus on illegal migration and on the increasing number of immigrants. The rest of the questions criticize Brussels’ immigration policy while in parallel trying to legitimize the Hungarian government’s decisions. In addition, the various billboards contained the following messages concerning the refugee and migration crisis:

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If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture!

If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our laws!

We do not want illegal immigrants!

The People have chosen: The country needs to be defended!

If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away Hungarians’ job!

The importance in both the national consultation and billboard campaign cases that they, similar to the frame used by the Prime Minister, directly link migration to security in addition to the economic challenges and, in many cases, more directly to terrorism. The target audience of these messages is clearly Hungarian society, since all of them were printed in Hungarian, without any translation. This made it possible to treat the whole issue in a security frame, which already shifted the debate concerning refugees and migrants from the beginning of the crisis. The striking similarities with the Western European “migration” discourses and the securitization of Roma people suggest that the Prime Minister consciously used these experiences to frame the situation.

2.3 Non-Linguistic Tools

In the previous section, I addressed the role of the governmental speech act, to capture how it constituted the emergence of a new social reality. The following section rather focuses on the non-linguistic elements of the discourse in order to emphasize that it is not only constituted by language but also – and more broadly – by practices. For this reason, I will analyze the role of the Hungarian border fence and the so called non-policies, in order to shed light on another aspect of securitization and hegemony.

To capture the importance of the Hungarian border fence among the non-linguistic discursive tools, it is paramount to understand the broader and symbolic meanings of borders. On
the one hand, “borders constitute the international system of states,” since they are indispensable for the territorial integrity of states. Their establishment, as well as their elimination, always have symbolic meaning. While this was the symbol of freedom in the case of the fall of the Iron Curtain, the emergence of “Fortress Europe,” in the Western European migration discourses became the symbol of “racial, ethnic and religious boundaries.” Furthermore, as Jef Husymans argues, borders are not only symbols, but also technological processes, in which political discourses are embedded. “They exist as specific routines, technological devices and knowledge that shape a European space of free movement by externalizing and stratifying dangerous, excessive use of freedom.” In this respect, they are daily routines on the level of common sense, which have hegemonic character and for these reasons they are essential for ontological security.

To understand these roles of borders is important for the Hungarian case because this interpretation is adhered to by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán when he declares that “a country with no borders is not a country at all.” Thus, he links the very existence of Hungary, as well as Hungarian identity, history, culture and nation, to the protection of the border. Conversely, an unprotected border would mean the end of the Hungarian state, and for this reason the end of Hungarian identity. Therefore, on June 17, 2015, the government announced that it would build a fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border (and later on the Hungarian-Croatian border).

In doing so, the government created a new element of the technological security frame, which constitutes the image of a solution for the crisis. It provides the image of impenetrable

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99 Jaume Castan Pinos, “Building Fortress Europe? Schengen and the Cases of Ceuta and Melilla” (Queen’s University Belfast, August 8, 2011). 4.
100 Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity. 97.
101 Ibid.
102 Kötcse
security even as, according to Hungarian police data, just over than 3400 migrants crossed the border in March 2016 alone. For this reason, the border fence is an imagined solution through technology and knowledge. It protects something (the border) which is on the level of common sense, while its protection also became a daily routine for the government as well as for the Hungarian police, military and society. Finally, on another symbolic level, the border fence also constitutes the image of Self and Other. As Huysmans argues, migrants are usually seen as strangers and not as outsiders. In this respect, the border fence is a physical manifestation on the non-linguistic discursive level of an imagined boundary which draws a distinction between the familiar (Self) and the stranger (Other).

Besides the importance of the border fence, I would like to introduce the role of the so called non-policies as well. As András Szalay and Gabriella Göbl emphasize, an important element of the anti-migration campaign were the non-policies of the government, which they define as “the conscious neglect of a policy issue for short term benefits in terms of securitization.” Szalai and Göbl emphasize the role of the Hungarian transit zones in this respect, which were established originally in Budapest. As they argue, in these zones the government not only failed to provide adequate legal and humanitarian assistance, but also shifted the burden and the responsibility to care for the refugees and migrants on NGOs, who became responsible for the maintenance of these zones. Consequently, the conditions were increasingly worsening in these places, further exacerbated by the government providing the refugees and migrants with insufficient- or

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104 Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity. 16.
106 Ibid. 22.
107 One of these examples was that the migrants and refugees got a map to find the city of Vámosszabadi, however the map did not include roads, train and bus stations just the names of a few Hungarian city.
misinformation.\textsuperscript{108} As a consequence, the media could also capture a chaotic situation, with the reinforcement of their negative image. Later, the government established similar zones near the main border crossing points, with low capacity, hurried border procedures and unlawful detention procedures.\textsuperscript{109} As such, the zones became part of the border fence, and of the security frame. They are now new, technocratic routines which help to frame refugees and migrants in line with the governmental interpretation.

All in all, non-policies have two important aspects and linked dimensions that concern the remainder of this thesis. They destabilized the known social world, providing a structure vacuum which had to be filled and, as such, provided a chance for the emergence of a new, hegemonic interpretation. At the same time, they helped to reinforce the pre-established negative image of migrants or, in other words, helped the society to decide among the competing interpretations of refugees and migrants.\textsuperscript{110}

To sum up the importance of this whole section, one has to see that the Hungarian “migration” discourse does not exclusively build on linguistic tools. It heavily relies also on non-linguistic elements, which actively constituted the emergence of a new security frame. The border fence, the transit-zones and the non-policies are also parts of these discursive formations. While some of them are built on the level of common sense, which operate with old and new daily routines in order to gain hegemonic character, others rather create a gap of meaning and provide space for the emergence of new hegemony, and in this process they also reinforce the negative image of migrants in society.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} András Szalai and Gabriella Göbl, “Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary.” 23.
2.4 Non-governmental actors

Besides the governmental linguistic and non-linguistic tools, the Hungarian “migration” discourse did not have one, single center, and it was influenced by other, non-governmental actors. However, this was usually in line with the governmental interpretations. In this section, I will analyze the role of the main group of them, including the Hungarian media and security policy experts/policy analysts, since many Hungarians who followed the news reports on a daily basis, regularly encountered their views and came to rely on their representations, interpretations and framings of events.

2.4.1 The Media Discourse

The following sub-section is dedicated to summarizing the Hungarian media discourse concerning the crisis as well as the governmental “migration” discourse. In the second part of the section I will also demonstrate how the discourse was impacted by the most prominent Hungarian security policy experts, who appeared in the media on a daily basis during the crisis.

Media has a crucial impact on the framing and the agenda-setting of various issues. With respect to the case of refugees and migrants, the case of Hungary is not an exception. For example, a group of researchers from the University of Queensland in 2013, analyzed the media framing of refugees and migrants who arrived in Australia.¹¹¹ As their main conclusion demonstrates, the media images usually obfuscate the individuals from the news, and framed the refugees or asylum seekers without recognizable features, from a distance in large groups.¹¹² The practice creates emotional distance between the viewers and the subjects.¹¹³ This makes it easier to establish a

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¹¹² Ibid. 399.
¹¹³ Ibid.
security-led interpretation, while it sidelines the humanitarian lens on the issue.\footnote{Ibid.} In the previous section, the analysis of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speeches revealed a similar tactic, as he usually framed the incoming people as a “\textit{mass}” or a “\textit{wave},” which can also dehumanize refugees and migrants. Meanwhile, in August 2015, one of the editors of the Hungarian Public Media prohibited showing children of refugees and migrants in news footages. Later, the Hungarian Public Media argued that this decision had been made in order to protect the rights of the children.\footnote{“Tilos menekült gyerekeket mutatni a köztéven?” (25 August, 2015), http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150825_Belso_utitas_a_koztevenel_tilos_gyerekek} 

As some analysis points out, the Hungarian media was not able to challenge the governmental framing of the events, and could only – and in some cases unwittingly – assist its discursive campaign. Gábor Bernáth and Vera Messing demonstrate that the intensive governmental campaign, the exclusiveness of the political discourse and the exclusion of the organizations with professional experience from the media made the emergence of alternative interpretations of the crisis impossible.\footnote{Gábor Bernáth, Vera Messing, “Bedarálva: A menekültekkel kapcsolatos kormányzati kampány és a tôle független megszólalás terepei.” \textit{Médiakutató}. XVI/4. (2016). 8.} Their methodology follows an extensive media content analysis in the first part of 2015. Bernáth and Messing emphasize the role of the emergence of the “\textit{livelihood migrant}” category in the discourse, which functioned rather as an empty signifier for the society without clear definition.\footnote{Ibid.} They also recognize that those media channels which are close to the government dealt significantly more with the migrants and refugees in the first part of the year, while it is generally true that the “migrants” almost never got a voice in these media reports.\footnote{Ibid. 13.} The analysis also points out that the interchangeable use of the terms “immigrant,” “migrant,” and “refugee” by the government was adopted by the Hungarian media which led to the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[Ibid.]\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.}
\item[]\footnote{“Tilos menekült gyerekeket mutatni a köztéven?” (25 August, 2015), http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150825_Belso_utitas_a_koztevenel_tilos_gyerekek}
\item[Ibid. 13.]\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.}
further destabilization of these expressions.\textsuperscript{119} This destabilization attempt is similar to the so-called “non-policies” in the transit zones, which were introduced in the previous section. Concerning the images in these news reports, Bernáth and Messing demonstrate that one-fifth of the sample used pictures of “migrants” as criminals, while 20 images out of the 59 use the technique of distancing.\textsuperscript{120} To sum up, their main conclusion is that the mainstream Hungarian media – wittingly or unwittingly – paralleled and reinforced the governmental campaign.\textsuperscript{121}

Another analysis by Adrienn Bognár and Béla Janky based on the sample of University students argues that for October 2015 most of the students had a stable but divided opinion about the crisis, which was not influenced by different media reports.\textsuperscript{122} They also emphasize that those who follow the news of the two main private channels had a significantly more negative attitude towards refugees and migrants, even though one of these channels was usually critical of the government.\textsuperscript{123}

Bernáth and Mesing also emphasize the role of different security policy experts\textsuperscript{124} – most importantly György Nógrádi – who routinely appeared in the media and further strengthened the governmental frame of the discourse. Since it is difficult to measure the impact of the security policy experts on the discourse and on the societal attitude, I rather decided to ask for their own interpretations about their role during the crisis. My interviewees were György Nógrádi, Gábor Török and Péter Tálas, who are the most famous and influential security policy experts/political analysts in Hungary. Usually they appeared on a daily basis in the different media platforms during the height of the crisis. I also chose this sample because their opinions were typical divergent,

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid. 14.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid. 15.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. 16.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid. 147.
helping me to capture the different parallel interpretations and discourses. While Nógrádi rather supported the government’s securitization attempts, Tálas took part in the desecuritization of the crisis and Török evaluated the events according to their impact on the political gains and losses of Viktor Orbán. During these talks I tried to get answers to the following topics:

- What are the most important tasks and the main responsibility of a security policy/policy expert during the evaluation of an event or crisis situation?
- How big an impact can be made by an expert on the social-political discourse?
- How do you see your own role concerning the interpretation, evaluation and the changing of the media discourse during the crisis?
- Do you think that the Hungarian experts facilitated the securitization of the crisis?
- Is it possible/Can you state an independent opinion?
- Do you differentiates between media channels? Whether you accept their interview requests or not?
- What is your current opinion about the crisis?

The interviews clearly demonstrated that the experts held fundamentally different interpretations of their own tasks and roles. Török differentiated between those experts who “want to provide a normative opinion” and between those “who rather want to present the data and available information.” According to Tálas, the task and the responsibility of the expert depends on whether he/she talks to the public (to inform it), or to the politicians (to inform, to summarize the different stances, or to strengthen political opinion). Nógrádi did not make a distinction and argued that the main task is to tell the expert’s own opinion.

125 The full, Hungarian transcripts of the three interviews can be read in the Appendices. Originally I also planned to conduct an interview with Georg Spöttle, but he did not respond to my request.
Another difference emerged, when I asked them concerning the expert’s discursive impacts. Török rejected that the opinion leaders and experts would somehow influence the public because they are not known by the vast majority of the public and the public merely seeks confirmatory opinions by reading the experts selectively. Instead, he said that they can have a bigger impact on politicians, who read their opinions in various press reviews. According to Tálas and Nógrádi, the experts can have an impact on society if they appear a lot in the different media platforms.

Every interviewee agreed on the answer that it is possible to have an independent (but not neutral) opinion as an expert. Similarly, they did not differentiate between the media channels, according to their political background (while Török said that the personality of given reporter is more important), however Török and Tálas argued that it is more typical that the given channel does not invite them if the channels want to spread a different message.

According to Tálas, the Hungarian experts facilitated the securitization of the crisis (when they interchangeably used the definitions of refugees and migrants; when they provided a civilizational context; and when they argued that the whole Islamic community is a danger for Europe), while Török rather argued that merely “everyone did his/her job.” However, both of them agreed that Nógrádi was a key figure during the events. Concerning this, Nógrádi did not want to evaluate his own role in this process. According to Török, Nógrádi provided a strong, negative and normative opinion, long before the government. Tálas argued that he tried to introduce a different interpretation of the events from the beginning, while Török emphasized that the counter messages did not reach as many people as Nógrádi, whose opinion was better articulated. Török saw his own role as a less important one. For the question whether the experts tried to further securitize the issue, Nógrádi answered that the decision is always in the hands of the politicians, and the expert can only give his/her opinion – as such he rejected that the experts would securitize the events.
As this short analysis demonstrates, the experts have diverging opinions and interpretations about their role in the discourse. The most interesting point for us is probably that both of his colleagues emphasized the role of Nógrádi in this process. He not only declared his opinion directly before the government, but he was also among the first to suggest the physical closure of the border. It also seems that Nógrádi rather wanted to avoid answers reflecting the evaluation of his own role during the process. As he became an expert “celebrity,” many media channels started to attack his personality, but Nógrádi remained influential and probably the most popular expert in Hungary. As Török defined it, Nógrádi was the “biggest winner of the crisis, besides Viktor Orbán,” it was according to him a “Nógrádi György show.”

To sum up, the Hungarian experts were divided during the crisis. Although they did not equally support the governmental discourse, the most influential of them, György Nógrádi clearly dominated the media, and his opinion – in line with the governmental decisions – reached significantly more people than the others’ messages. In this respect, he became a securitizing actor, who took part in the discursive moves of the government.

The accepted governmental framing together with the role of Nógrádi in this process, meant for the Hungarian media that it could only assist the governmental discourse and was not able to provide a counter frame against it. As Chapter 3 will emphasize it, similarly to the media the parliamentary opposition and the desecuritizing actors (NGOs) also failed to resist the governmental discourse which meant that the securitization of the situation and the emergence of new hegemonic interpretations became possible without a significant counter-frame.

CONCLUSION

The aim of Chapter 2 was to provide an empirical analysis of the Hungarian “migration” discourse. The Hungarian “migration” discourse clearly aimed at securitizing the issue of refugees and migrants. This attempt heavily built on the previous experiences concerning the Western
European “migration” discourses and the securitization of the Roma people in Hungary. Chapter 2 demonstrated that the statements and speeches of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as well as the governmental campaign – operationalization of linguistic and non-linguistic tools – had a fundamental impact on the nature of the discourse. The chapter also showed that the Hungarian media could not challenge the frame of the government concerning the migrants and refugees and rather reinforced its discourse. In this process, the role of György Nógrádi – as the most prominent security policy expert in the media during 2015 – further strengthened the discursive frame of the government long before the escalation of the situation. As Chapter 3 will demonstrate these characteristics of the discourse led to the emergence of securitization and new hegemonic interpretations which made the identity construction possible.
CHAPTER 3 – IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE HUNGARIAN “MIGRATION” DISCOURSE

While Chapter 2 provided a general overview concerning the Hungarian “migration” discourse, this final part will demonstrate how the discourse affected the identity construction process during the crisis. In order to do this, I will rely on the novel synthesized conceptual approach, introduced in Chapter 1. In terms of structure, the first section will emphasize the role of securitization and the emergence of the new hegemonic interpretations in the discourse, while the second will present the ontological insecuritization process, which was followed by the emergence of a new enemy image. Finally, the chapter introduces the practice of the Hungarian government, in which it offered a new way to ontologically securitize the Hungarian Self.

3.1 Securitization and new hegemonic interpretations

Building on Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, this section summarizes how securitization and the emergence of new hegemonic interpretations affected the Hungarian “migration” discourse, which will help to capture the identity construction process in the following sections. As Chapter 1 emphasized, Dirk Nabers argues that crises of representation, or of meaning, are the root of any social or identity change, while “hegemonic discourses serve as the nexus between crises and social structures and how they make identity construction possible.”126 After the introduction of the Hungarian “migration” discourse, it is clear that the incoming of refugees and migrants was interpreted as a crisis from the beginning, not only by the government, but also by the media, by the security policy experts and more broadly by the EU. This was also a crisis of representations, in terms that it questioned the principles of such concepts as borders and states, which were previously taken for granted.

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Before I talk about the new hegemony, it is important to reemphasize – as many other authors point out – that the Hungarian “migration” discourse was a clear securitization attempt.\textsuperscript{127} As Chapter 2 demonstrated, this process had every element – “\textit{existential threats, emergency actions, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free rules}”\textsuperscript{128} – necessary for a successful securitization. Furthermore, it was a multilayered attempt, in which a variety of actors – the government, the media, and security policy experts – accelerated the process. This is not to say that the government did not use the securitization consciously, however it is important to see that the government was not the exclusive center of this process. And this is the first point where hegemony becomes central. As Ted Hopf formulates, “\textit{hegemonic power is maximized to the extent that these ideas become taken for granted by the dominated population},”\textsuperscript{129} while Laclau and Mouffe emphasize that it “\textit{embraces what opposes it, insofar as the opposing force accepts the system of basic articulations of that formation as something it negates}.”\textsuperscript{130} Hegemony builds on common sense, where there is no longer need for the confirmation of truth.\textsuperscript{131} It works structurally, through numerous, unconscious daily practices.\textsuperscript{132} Since the securitization of the refugees and migrants had no single center – it was accelerated by a number of actors – this security frame is exactly the main hegemonic point of the discourse.

Besides this aspect, it was the feeling of destabilization and uncertainty which gained hegemonic character in Hungarian society. As such, the crisis led to the emergence of a new social reality, in which none can tell who the enemy is. This feeling of destabilization and uncertainty accompanied the whole crisis in 2015. The main point to see here is that this characteristic was

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Including: Szalai and Göbl, Blazek or Carulli. For the detailed references see: Reference 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, \textit{Security}. 26.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Ted Hopf, “Common-Sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics,” 321.
  \item \textsuperscript{130} Laclau and Mouffe, \textit{Hegemony and Socialist Strategy}. 139.
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Gramsci, Hoare, and Smith, \textit{Selections from the Prison Notebooks}. 423.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} Ted Hopf, “Common-Sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics,” 323.
\end{itemize}
permanently and consciously strengthened by the Hungarian government. On the one hand, the tool of the so-called ‘non-policies’ helped to destabilize the interpretation of refugees and migrants especially in the transit zones, while on the other hand the explicit linguistic mixing of the different terms – such as *refugee, migrant, immigrant* – further strengthened this situation. Moreover, in both cases – concerning the security frame and the destabilizing grammar – the parliamentary opposition was not able to resist the governmental discourse, and not only accepted but started to also actively use these very frames.  

While many NGOs published a number of analyses in which they wanted to clarify the situation and the different legal definitions, they were losing ground in the mainstream media throughout the year. Besides this, Two-tailed Dog, the Hungarian mock political party ridiculed the governmental security frame through humorous billboards, but did not offer a specific counter frame about migrants themselves, and lost ground in the second half of the year. As Szalai and Göbl conclude, these desecuritizing actors tried to use the same instruments – billboards and social media – but their attempt remained unsuccessful due to their low visibility. For these reasons, a new hegemonic discourse emerged with a new common sense which built on the exclusive usage of the security frame and on the feeling of instability and uncertainty concerning the refugees and migrants.

**3.2 Identity construction: Destabilization of the Hungarian Self and ontological insecuritization**

This section will demonstrate how identity construction happened in the Hungarian case through the strengthening of differentiation and ontological insecuritization, while also pointing out why securitization and the new hegemonic interpretations were essential in this process.

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134 Ibid. 7.
136 Ibid. 29.
Empirically, this process will be captured through the analysis of the Prime Minister’s speech at Kötcse and through the analysis of his speeches with a special focus on identity construction and ontological security. Finally, I will also draw attention to Viktor Orbán’s concept, in which he offered a new mechanism of ontological security for the Hungarian society.

As Chapter 1 argued, identity cannot be complete under any circumstances and it is established through differentiating, and thus “all principles and values, therefore, receive their meaning from relationships of difference and opposition.”137 Furthermore, as Chapter 1 also emphasized, ontological security is built around the assumption that individuals try to securitize their own identity through different, routinized behaviors whose main goal is to avoid uncertainty. Or, in another interpretation, its very essence is distinctiveness, (“us” and “them”) which is connected to a set of identity markers.138 Thus states are primary tools of ontological security-seeking, since they help individuals to emphasize this distinctiveness.

The Kötcse Civil Picnic is an annual event of the FIDESZ (governmental) party, which usually takes place in September. During these days the party’s most prominent members, supporters, and invited guests discuss the most important policy oriented questions behind closed doors. The analysis of the Prime Minister’s Kötcse speech from 5 September, 2015 reveals much from the perspective of ontological insecuritization and identity construction.139

The content of the speech was built around four main pillars: identity, religion, nation and culture. In the introduction part Viktor Orbán provided a ‘divine’ explanation for the current situation, in which he, the government and their supporters are the chosen ones by God. Then he

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137 Ibid.
defined the main argument of the speech and argued that what “we are experiencing now is the end of an era: a conceptual-ideological era.” This was the era of the “liberal babble,” which ends is an opportunity “for the national-Christian ideology way of thinking and approach to regain dominance.” He claimed that the current “invasion” of refugees and migrants emerged due to the failure of the liberals, as they forced their own ideology on other nations. He argued that the current situation is the “identity crisis” of liberalism. However, he also emphasized that this is a “good crisis,” because the former bad crisis affected the Christian and national identities.

After this part, he elaborated the Christian aspects of the current situation. In his interpretation of Christianity, providing support to someone is morally good, but only if this would not weaken the national economy. This meant that Christian values should be concerned with the individual and not the state level. According to him, the problem of liberalism is that it mixes these categories and that is why liberalism is a “hypocrisy.”

Finally, Orbán emphasized that the situation was an opportunity for the Hungarians to define themselves and “to restore the prestige and appeal of national identity and Christian identity, in opposition to the liberal identity.” The Prime Minister closed his speech with four main conclusions:

- “A country with no borders is not a country at all.”
- “Hungary must protect its ethnic and cultural composition.” And a community has the right to decide on its composition.
- “If you are not economically successful you will be trampled underfoot.” In this process sovereignty is the key.
- “Everyday patriotism” is the solution. “This is not something of an intellectual nature, but a vital instinct, a daily routine.”
What does this whole speech tell us from the perspective of ontological security? Most importantly the speech introduces how the differentiation between the Self (Christian and national) and the Other (liberal) happens. This is connected to divine origins, or to a missionary vision, which means that challenging his opinion would also challenge God’s will. Moreover, the Prime Minister creates a sense of identity crisis or, in other words, the sense of ontological insecurity. He talks explicitly about the crisis of liberal identity (the Other), but he also sees a physical threat (posed by the refugees and migrants) to the identity of the Self, which is manifested in an invasion. Moreover, he explicitly states that this is the moment to define ourselves (or to define the Self), which again strengthens the differentiation.

Following the principles introduced in the Kötcse speech, I decided to treat the references to identity, culture, Christianity and civilization in a single category in Figure 3, as they are equally concerned with ontological security. These four references are mixed and used interchangeably in the speeches of the Prime Minister and used synonymously. Throughout the year, there were 319 references in his speeches to this category, and their number increased as the number of incoming refugees and migrants grew. (Figure 4 demonstrates their distribution ratio in the different months). It is also true that September was the peak in every analyzed category. As such, there is congruence between the references and the number of refugees and migrants. This shows us that the physical manifestation of a real or imagined threat – posed by the refugees and migrants – was translated into the language of ontological security. In this, conscious strategy, or the identity – imagined or real – of the Hungarian Self, was destabilized.
Figure 4: References to identity, Christianity, culture and civilization in the Prime Minister's speeches in 2015

If one applies Yoshikoder’s concordance (contextualization) function to this category, it becomes striking that in the Prime Minister’s interpretation there are many different civilizations. One of them is the European, which is almost equal to Christianity. For Orbán, this is the category of Us, or the Self, which has to be protected. While according to him, there are parallel identities in Europe, one of which supports multiculturalism and thus tries to undermine “Our” identity, which is again European, Christian and national.

In terms of Christianity, the Prime Minister emphasized many times that not only the government but also Hungary, and Europe as a continent, are Christians. In this respect, he also declared that “Hungary will be Christian or will not be at all.”\textsuperscript{140} The current situation, in his opinion, means that the special, Christian form of living (like the traditional family model) is under attack.

References to culture are used quite similarly to civilization. In this interpretation there are different cultural categories while the European-Hungarian is a historically singular category. The crisis means for him that other cultures (Others) are coming to Europe, which leads to the emergence of a threat. To sum up, the Prime Minister’s method is almost the same in every case. He consistently uses references which are linked to identity and, through this, to the ontological security of the Hungarians. He is also consistent in the sense that there is a new, “unfamiliar” phenomenon which poses a threat to all of these identity markers.

As one can see, identity construction operated through the strengthening of differentiation (between the Self and the Other) and through ontological insecuritization in the Hungarian case. And this is the reason why the emergence of new hegemonic interpretations and securitization were essential for the success of this practice. As Chapter 1 already emphasized, the goal of hegemony is to create equivalence among in-group actors, while creating antagonism and excluding other social groups. Furthermore, when identities are securitized “their negotiability and flexibility are challenged,” and a “monolithic form of identity is declared,” thus a successful securitization of identity cannot be established without establishing the limits of the given identity: to divide “us” and “them” and to determine who is friend or foe. In practice, this meant that securitization and the new hegemonic interpretations – the usage of the security frame and the feeling of instability, as introduced in the previous section – had a significant role in this process.

The role of the security frame as a hegemonic tool was to help the emergence of equivalence among in-group actors, as it contributed to the framing of the situation. Thus it is utilized to draw a line between the Self (Hungarian) and the Other (refugees and migrants) and strengthened the

\[141\] Ibid.
\[143\] Ibid.
identity construction through this differentiation. The feeling of instability – as another hegemonic interpretation – helped the ontological insecuritization process in parallel. It created a feeling of a situation in which the everyday routines – which would be essential for ontological security – are no longer working, and thus the destabilization of the Hungarian Self is possible. Furthermore the securitization of the situation from the beginning also helped to fix the meaning of a new enemy-image (refugees and migrants) and the Self (Hungary). Thus, it left the space of physical security, and started to target the ontological security of individuals. This is what we can see when the Prime Minister talks about the threatening of the Hungarian identity, civilization, culture etc. or about the possible collapse of the Hungarian State. This collapse is directly linked to the physical defense of the border which also has a greater meaning – the border of the Hungarian Self. As I emphasized before, the state as a frame can be essential for the ontological security of individuals; through this move the very basis of the ontological security (and the Hungarian Self) is destabilized.

However, this was not the end of the government’s practice, as it also offered a new path to secure the destabilized Self. On the one hand, the fourth conclusion of the Prime Minister’s Kötcse speech – that “everyday patriotism” is the solution, which “is not something of an intellectual nature, but a vital instinct, a daily routine” – has paramount importance, as he explains how this Self can be ontologically secured: through everyday patriotism as a daily routine. He clearly calls for the emergence of a new routine, which should be a principle of this new ontological security and thus the principle of the stabilized Hungarian identity. And this everyday patriotism has to be connected to the Hungarian state, which is the provider of the physical security of its citizens.

To sum up its importance one has to see that Orbán constructed a situation in which the Self is ontologically threatened or insecuritized, while at the same time he provides a solution through a Christian-national ideological basis which is granted by the body of the Hungarian state.
Meanwhile, the usage of the security frame as a hegemonic tool for the interpretation of the refugees and migrants offers another path for this ontological stabilization. This security frame can successfully strengthen the limits of the Self, and thus it also helps to easily decide who is friend and who is enemy.

**CONCLUSION**

Building on the conceptual foundations of Chapter 1 and the empirical analysis of the Hungarian “migration” discourse in Chapter 2, the goal of Chapter 3 was to show how discourse affected the level of identity construction. In order to do this, the first section introduced how the securitization and the new hegemonic interpretation emerged throughout 2015. In this respect, I demonstrated that the security frame and the feeling of instability were the two most important securitization and hegemony tools, later utilized for identity construction. The second section presented two aspects of the identity construction process – the differentiation and the ontological insecuritization. The security frame helped in the creation of equivalence among in-group actors and the interpretation of the situation. Thus it was utilized to demarcate and to differentiate between the Self and the Other. In parallel, the feeling of instability created a situation where the traditional routines – necessary for ontological security – were no longer working. Through this, the destabilization of identity on the individual level became possible. The discourse also fixed the meaning of the new enemy-image (refugees and migrants). In this respect, the Hungarian border the state and the Hungarian identity as referent objects and frameworks were directly linked to the ontological security of the individual level, in which the invasion of the refugees and migrants could mean the end of them. Finally, this chapter shed light on the governmental practice which discursive goal was to offer a new way of ontological stability – through everyday patriotism.
CONCLUSIONS

The main goal of this thesis was to identify the impact of the Hungarian “migration” discourse on the Hungarian identity construction process. In order to do this, Chapter 1 provided an alternative conceptual approach, which built on the synthesis of the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, securitization, and hegemony theories in an innovative way. The analysis demonstrated that the Hungarian “migration” discourse – in contrast with existing literature – is more than a pure securitization attempt, as it fundamentally affects the Hungarian identity construction process.

Chapter 2 introduced the main characteristics of the discourse. Concerning its preconditions, it showed that the framing of the refugees and migrants built heavily on other Western European “migration” discourses and on the securitization of the Roma people. The chapter also demonstrated that the governmental campaign, operating through a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic tools, had a substantial impact on the nature of the 2015 discourse. The analysis also demonstrated that the non-governmental actors – including the media – were not able to resist the governmental framing of the situation, and they could only reinforce it. Furthermore, György Nógrádi, as the most prominent security policy expert of Hungary in 2015 had a significant impact on the strengthening of the governmental discourse, even before the escalation of the situation.

As the securitized governmental framing became generally accepted, new hegemonic interpretations emerged. Concerning this, two points are extremely important, which were used for the identity construction throughout 2015. These are the utilized security frame and the feeling of instability which gained hegemonic character in the discourse.
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the discourse targeted the level of identity construction as it strengthened the differentiation between the Self and the Other and led to ontological insecuritization in Hungarian society. On the one hand, the role of the security frame as a hegemonic tool was to help the emergence of equivalence among in-group actors, as it helped the framing of the situation. This was utilized to emphasize the boundary between the Hungarian Self and the Other (refugees and migrants). Thus, it built heavily on the exclusion of groups like refugees or migrants. On the other hand, the feeling of instability – as another hegemonic interpretation – helped the ontological insecuritization process in parallel, which was utilized to establish a situation where the everyday routines were not working and thus ontological insecuritization was possible. Furthermore, the securitization of the issue left the space of physical security and started to target ontological security on the individual level.

The other aspect of the Hungarian “migration” discourse concerning identity construction is that it also fixed the meaning of the new enemy-image (refugees and migrants). In this process, the Hungarian state and the Hungarian border become fixed as referent objects and frameworks were directly linked to the ontological security of the individual level, in which the invasion of the refugees and migrants could mean the end of both Hungarian identity and the Hungarian state. Besides these empirical conclusions, on a more general level the newly-synthesized conceptual approach can be utilized in similar cases. This enables us not only to see similar discourses as pure securitization attempts, but also capture their impact on the identity construction process at large.

For further research it would be important to establish comparative case studies which could tell us more about the nature of this process – whether it is similarly present in other cases. In this regard, analysis of the French, Austrian, German, Italian and other EU member states’ cases would be of great interest to map possible differences among the various discourses. Exploration of these differences could also help uncover the different societal attitudes towards refugees and migrants,
as well as provide insights into important aspects of common policy challenges the EU faces. Focusing on the Hungarian case in greater depth is also essential, keeping in mind that, in parallel to “migration” discourse, the government also implemented an anti-EU discourse, in which the Hungarian enemy-image built on the role of Brussels in this process.
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APPENDICES

The Hungarian transcript of the interview with György Nógrádi

 Ön szerint mi a legfontosabb feladata és mi a felelőssége egy politikai elemzőnek/biztonságpolitikai szakértőnek egy-egy esemény vagy válsághelyzet értékelése kapcsán?

A válasz az, hogy készüljön fel és a saját véleményét mondja, de úgy, hogy abból felkészült, ismeri a hazai és nemzetközi irodalmat és képbe van, hogy minek milyen összefüggései vannak.

Hogyan látja Ön, milyen hatást tud gyakorolni egy-egy szakértő az adott társadalmi/politikai diskurzusra?

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Tud esetleg személyes példát mondani?

Nem. Nem az én feladatom, hogy saját magamról beszéljek, nem is akarok. Teljesen nyilvánvaló, hogy Magyarországon néhány szakértő az, aki rengeteget szerepel és nagyon sok olyan van, aki vagy nem szerepel vagy periférián van. Nyilván aki szerepel és lehetősége van, annak a hatása teljesen más, mint annak, aki nem szerepel.

Ön hogyan látja a magyar biztonságpolitikai szakértők szerepét a menekültválság értelmezése/értékelése során?

Úgy hogy a legkülönbözőbb álláspontok vannak. Nagyon sok olyan szakértő van, aki a politikai nézetei meghatároznak és nagyon sok olyan szakértő van, aki azt mondja, amit az adott szituációhoz ő reálisan tart, és ahogy a helyzetet látja. A kettő más.

Tapasztalatai alapján egyáltalán lehetséges-e egy politikai szakértőnek, hogy a politikai hovatartozásától független véleményt mondjon?

Természetesen! Ez a normális. A világ minden részén ugyanez van, hogy a saját véleményét mondja, ami vagy egyezik pártokkal vagy nem, vagy időlegesen egyezik vagy nem, egyezik kormányokkal vagy nem. Így van.

Az Ön szerepét hogyan látja a menekültválság értékelése során?

Nem az én feladatom megítélni.

Ön szerint, a magyar biztonságpolitikai szakértők elősegítették-e a menekültválság biztonságiasítását?

A válasz az, hogy a biztonságpolitikai szekértőnek részint a tájékoztatás, részint a sajtóban véleményközlés a feladata. A megoldás mindig a politikáé, mindenütt a világon, így Magyarországon is.
A gyakorlatban van-e olyan tapasztalata biztonságpolitikai szakértőként, amely alapján különbséget tesz bizonyos médiumok között, hogy vállalja-e a megkeresésüket vagy sem?

A válaszom az, hogy eddig bármelyik médium megkeresett én szívesen mentem. Minden szereplésem ingyenes. Egy dolog, hogy én mindig, mindenütt a saját véleményemet mondom. Tehát a szélsőjobbtól a szélsőbalig, ha hívnak, szívesen megyek, de egy véleményem van.

Ha már menekültválságról beszélünk, megkérhetném, hogy fejtse ki a saját véleményét a menekültválság jelenlegi helyzetéről?


Hogyan értékel a magyar állam intézkedéseit a menekültválság során?

A válaszom az, hogy soha életemben nem mentem bele belpolitikába, most se szeretnék. A migránskérdésben, viszont amit a magyar állam tett, azzal viszont egyetértek.

18 April, 2016

The Hungarian transcript of the interview with Gábor Török

Az első kérdésem az lenne, hogy Ön szerint mi a legfontosabb feladata és melyek a felelősségi területei egy biztonságpolitikai szakértőnek/ politikai elemzőnek egy-egy esemény vagy válsághelyzet értékelése során?

Hát én értem, hogy különböző elemzői meg szakértői feladatok vannak a nyilvánosságban, inkább azt mondom, hogy én mit gondolok. Szerintem különböző felfogások vannak ezzel kapcsolatban, én arra törekszem mindig, hogy segítek megérteni a dolgok mozgatórugóit, feltární az okokat. Tehát azt gondolom, hogy két fajta hozzáállás létezik. Az egyik egy alapvetően igazságkereső, amelyik normatív szempontot értékesít a nyilvános megszólalások kapcsán, tehát azt igyekszik megmondani, hogy szerinte mit kellene tenni. Mondjuk például, hogy kellene e kerítést építeni a határra vagy sem. A másik pedig, bizonyos értelemben önkörlátozóbb, amelyik azt gondolja, hogy a vélemények területén nincs a szakértőnek elsőbbsége, viszont a szakértő attól szakértő, hogy talán többet lát bele, a dolgok mögötti mozgatórugókat jobban érti, mint az átlag választó, ezért amikor a nyilvánosság előtt megcsőlő, szaktanácsot ad politikusoknak, akkor a feladata az, hogy a már megtörtént események mozgatórugóit, miértjeit segítsen megérteni, illetve ha tud, akkor adjon valami prognózist arra vonatkozóan, hogy mi várható. Ez egy minimalista, viszonylag önkörlátozó
felfogás, de én általában ezt tartom a feladatnak. Ami nem azt jelenti, hogy időnként ne lehetne ezen túlterjeszkedni, mert az embernek lehet személyes preferenciája, véleménye és én sem szoktam ezeket mindig teljesen elrejteni, de ha feladatról beszélünk, vagy mondvaj hasznosságról, tehát mondjuk, a nyilvánosság mit várhat el az elemzőktől, a véleményvezérektől, a megszólalóktól akkor szerintem ezt.

_Hogyan látja, mekkora hatást tud gyakorolni egy politikai elemző az adott társadalmi-politikai diskurzusra Magyarországon?

Ez egy érdekes kérdés, mert szerintem ezt általában felülbecsülik. Tehát én azt gondolom, hogy a véleményvezérek, ezek a punditok, ezek leginkább a politikai elithez tudnak szólni. Bármennyire furcsa, ugye a politikai elit mindig azt gondolja, hogy azért fontos, hogy mi hangzik el a nyilvánosságból, mert az befolyásolja az embereket. Szerintem a választópolgárok jelentős része nem követi ezeket a megszólalásokat, részben pedig azokat keresi, amelyek a saját véleményével egyeznek.

Tehát olyan médiát fogyaszt, olyan megszólalókra kíváncai, akik egyébként is azt mondják, amit ő gondol. Tehát ebben az értelemben, ahogy azt a médiairodalom mondja, egy ilyen két szakaszos, két lépcsős hatás működik, hogy a véleményvezérek azok legfeljebb megerősíteni tudnak véleményeket, de megcáfolni nem. Ugyanakkor, az kétségtelen, és ezt magam is tapasztaltam, hogy a nyilvánosságban való megszólalások, azok leginkább ezt a tág értelemben vett politikai elitet érik el, amiben részben a gazdasági elit is benne van,

Tehát akik számára ez mondaniálisból bíz, az azok, akik aktívában a politikával foglalkoznak. Vagy azért mert maguk is ezt csinálják, vagy azért mert a személyes sorsuk szempontjából fontos. Tehát gazdasági elit és különböző elitcsoporthoz, és igazán a véleményvezérei megszólalások – akár elemzőkről van szó vagy akár szakértőkről – azok ebben a körben tudnak hatást kiváltani. Nagyon furcsa egyébként, mert ilyenkor mindig a politikusi visszajelzés az arról szól, hogy azért fontos, hogy mit mond az elemző, mert az hogyan hat a választókra és széles tömegekre, holott a széles tömegek egyáltalán nem is ismerik az elemzőket, nem is követik őket, vagy ha követik, akkor csak azért követik mert a véleményük megerősítését várják tőlük. De önmagukban a politikai elitre – ezt magam is tapasztaltam több alkalommal – elég jelentősen tudnak hatni ezek a megszólalások. Dühíti őket, örülnek neki, tehát ott érzelmi reakciókat is kivált, azt viszont gondolni, hogy ennek ennél szélesebb körben is van ismertsége, az tévedés. Egyszer a – már nem tudom kinek a megbízásába – a medián készített egy, a véleményvezérekre vonatkozó kutatást, hogy mennyire ismertek a véleményvezérek. És hát döbbenetesen alacsony számok jöttek ki. Tehát még azok esetében is, akiket naponta látunk a televízióban, akár húsz éve, azokat is a választópolgárok kevesebb, mint fele tudta egyáltalán elhelyezni valahol. Ami azért – ahhoz képest, hogy a frontpolitikusok többsége 70, 80 vagy afölötti százalékos ismertséggel rendelkezik – a véleményvezéreknek ehhez képest elenyésző a befolyása. Tehát a celebvilágának a befolyásolási körét, meg a véleményvezérei befolyásolást, azt én nagyon nem keverném össze. Egy szűk bázisról van szó.
Bocsánat, csak ha jól értem Ön lát ebben egy törést, akkor az elitek sokkal kevésbé keresik a saját véleményüket és inkább elolvassák vagy meghallgatják a kritikusabb hangokat is?


Mondjuk egy miniszterelnökök vagy miniszter, azt gondolja, hogy erről szól a politika és mivel ott a politikusi megszólalások majdnem azonos súlyt képeznek a véleményvezéri megszólalások is, ezért azokat valamilyen oknál fogva, fontosabbnak gondolják. Szerintem ez teljesen túl van egyébként a körükbén értékelve. Tehát azt gondoljuk, hogy egy elemző, azért mert mond valamit az ATV esti műsorában, vagy a HÍR TV-ben, annak lesz valamilyen hatása, az teljes tévedés szerintem. Valójában azonban a magyar politikában ez mégis csak megvan. Szerintem egyébként vagy tapasztalatatom szerint egyébként – nincs ez mindenhol így a világban, tehát helyén tudják kezelni azt, hogy egy politikai műsortanban ki mit mond: a kutyát nem érdekel, de Magyarországon ezek felüüértékeltek és ezért érdekes a dolog, hogy a legtöbb visszajelzés is ebből a körből érkezik. És ugye, Ön azt mondta, hogy nyitottabbak a politikákra, nem erről szól, hanem hogy ők nagyon figyelnek arra, hogy nem a véleményük megerősítését keresik, hanem funkcionálisan viszonyulnak ehhez. Tehát azt gondolják, hogy – és ebben igazuk is van – hogy a nyilvánosságban kimondott minden szónak van valami jelentősége, és szeretnékn ez nem a véletlenre bizni. Szeretnékn, ha azok becsülénének, akik hozzájuk közelebbi véleményt mondanak, tehát egy ilyen típusú harc zajlik szerintem és ennyiben fontos a politika számára. Egyébként ugye Magyarországon az is történt az elmúlt egy évében, hogy a politika a saját erejével megpróbálta átalakítani ezt a véleményvezéri, megszólalók kört, tehát hogy ne bízza a véletlenre, hogy mit fognak mondani a szakértők, elemzők.

Hanem maguk tolják be a stúdióba a különböző médiafelületekre a saját szekerőket, saját elemzőket. Ugye tehát ezért van az, hogy néhány szakértő bizonyos támákmában, elképesztő nagy médiafelületet hasít ki magának, mert az nem véletlenül történik vagy a média sajatos szereplési elvei miatt, hanem itt politikai szándékok vannak mögötte. Ez teljesen másképp volt Magyarországon, mondjuk 20 évvel ezelőtt. Most már ez is professzionális lett. Csak jelzem egyébként, hogy ugyanaz működik a nem professzionális politikai elemzésnél is. Amikor Ön kismamaként otthon nézi valamilyék reggeli műsort és kíváncsi arra, hogy mit adhatna enni a gyerekekének és szakértőket lát, hall szereplőként, akkor az az érdekes helyzet van, akkor ezeket a szakértőket nagyon gyakran, különböző, ezzel foglalkozó public affairs cégek küldik be a stúdióba, különböző megbízásokkal. Tehát már ott is az a helyzet, hogy a szakértői világot is teljesen eluralta a megrendelő-megbízó viszony. Ahol esetleg véleményhasonlóság van, azt próbálják támogatni, felületeket biztosítani. Mondjuk, ha van egy olyan szakértő, aki arról beszél, hogy fontos ezt a terméket fogyasztani, ami az ő termékük, akkor ennek igyekeznek nagyobb médiafelületet biztosítani. Tehát ez nem egy politikai jelenség Magyarországon. Ugyanez van a legtöbb helyen. Ezért ha állampolgár lennék, sokkal óvatosabb lennék a szakértői véleményekkel kapcsolatban.

Ha már megrendelőknél tartunk. Ön szerint léteik olyan, hogy független elemzői kategória? Akár Magyarországon, akár világszinten. Értelmezhető ez?

Én erre azt szoktam mondani, hogy először is el kell választani két fogalmat: a semlegességet és a függetlenséget. Tehát szerintem semlegesség nem létezik. A semlegesség az egy értéknél

Ha már felmerüült a migráció. Hogyan látja a tavalyi menekültválságot és hogyan látja annak most a helyzetét? (tartalmi értelemben)

Ugyanakkor én szeretem az ilyen helyzeteket politikai elemzőként, meg egyébként választópolgárként is, mert azt gondolom, hogy a politika valós arca az leginkább a rendkívüli helyzetekben mutatkozik meg, tehát olyan szituációkban, amikor kizökken a politika a normál kerékvágásából. Ez tipikusan az a helyzet volt. Amikor a rendezett, megszokott eljárásrendek nem működnek, ugye amit láttunk Magyarországon is tavaly nyáron. Ugye a keleti pályaudvaron, meg akár az m1-es autópályán, az tipikusan ez a helyzet volt. És ezek mindig megmutatják, hogy a politika hogyan működik, milyen állapotban van, tud-e egy ilyen helyzetre reagálni. Úgy gondolom, hogy a magyar miniszterelnöknél pont erre érzett rá és olyan politikusi képességeket mutatott meg ebben, amiket korábban talán nem. És ezt is jutalmazták a magyar választók, akkor amikor visszaerősítették a Fideszt és az ő számaiit is megerősítették. És aztán voltak más politikusaink, akik meg másképpen reagáltak erre és más képet is mutattak magukról meg úgy általában a helyzetről. De úgy általában ezek az alkalmak, mint ez a migráció különösen addig, hogy ez teljesen felkészületlenül érte Európát, jól megmutatta azt, hogy a politikai intézmények által berendezett ilyen automatizált működési módok alapján működő világunk, az mennyire sérlékeny. És az emberek mennyire hiszterizálhatóak. A politikusok mennyire impotensek tudnak lenni, és itt nem csak a magyar politikusokra gondolok, hanem Európa is megmutatja, hogy mennyire nehezen tudunk egy váratlan helyzetet kezelni. Bizonyos értelemben majdnem úgy reagált erre az Európai politikai vezetés, mint hogyha a marslakók érkeztek volna meg, egyik pillanatról a másikra, Európába. És egyszerűen nem tudtuk, hogy mit csináljunk. Kőszöntük őket, sóval és kényérel várjuk őket, vagy kerítéseket húzzunk eléjük. Tehát, hogy egyszerűen teljesen ezek a normális, hagyományos, józan paraszti észből következő gondolkodás, ez teljesen kivesz látszott ebből a bürokratizált Európai politikai viselkedésből. És ezek mindig azért jökk, az ilyen rendkívüli helyzetek, mert újra ráüberekedt a politikusokat és a választókat is, hogy mire való a politika, hogyan működik a politika. Hogy mennyire le lehet egyszerűsíteni az alapvető kérdéseket, elődöntő válaszokra. Például, akarjuk-e, hogy a határokon bárki átjöjjön, vagy kerítéseket húzzunk előjük. Tehát, hogy a határokon kívül jöjk a politika, jak, ahol úgy megkérjük, hogy mit csináljunk? Szögesdrótot emeljünk vagy lőjünk a határon? Szükségünk van-e arra, hogy ide idegen emberek bejöjjönnek vagy nincs szükségünk arra? Szóval egy csoport, tők jó kérdés merült fel, amik a hagyományos elosztási meg így napi rutinből fakadó politikai versenyben nem jelennek meg. Amikor a banán méretéről kell vitát folytatni, vagy az uborka görbületéről. És ebben az értelemben sokkal akaratlan és most válaszolok a kérdésére, bocsánam, hogy ilyen hosszan beszélték – én ezt a migrációs kriázist vagy válságot kifejezetten pozitív dolognak tartom az Európai politika szempontjából.

_Hogyan értékel a migrációs válságról szóló diskurzus alakítása során?_

Nem hiszem, hogy nagy szerepet lett volna ebben. Azt gondolom, hogy egy vitatott helyzet volt, vagy tulajdonképpen egy olyan megszólalásom, ami akkor vitát indukált. Az is pont ezzel kapcsolatos, amit most az előzőekben mondottam. Mert amikor, az első napjait éltük a migrációknak, már abban az értelemben, amikor először jelentek meg Magyarországon, akkor arról írtam nagyon röviden a Facebookon, hogy mit jelent egy ország szuverenitása. És, hogy azt érdemes átgondolni, hogy államnak nevezhető-e az a politikai formáció, amelynek nincs válasza arra, hogy hol kezdődnek a határai és hol végződnek a határai, és hogy államnak nevezhető-e egy olyan politikai alakulat, amely képtelen azt eldönteni, hogy kiket enged be a határain vagy kiket nem. Bizonyos értelemben ezzel is csak egy ilyen, klasszikus alapkérdést próbáltam feltenni. Bizonyos értelemben
a rendkívüli állapot politikájára vagy a leegyszerűsítésre vonatkozóan, hogy a politikában ez egy fontos szempont a határok kérdése, a határok megvédésének kérdése. Akkor ebből elég komoly vita lett, tehát elég sok kritikát kaptam, hogy ezzel itt hitet tettem az orbáni politika mellett, miközben eszembe nem jutott, nem ez volt a célon vele. Azt hiszem, hogy ez az egy ilyen hozzáadott értéket volt, minden más az abban az elemzői keretben maradt, amiről az elején beszéltem. Inkább értelmezni próbáltam a történéseket, és megállapítani azt, hogy Orbán Viktor ebből mennyit tud profitálni. Ennek a költség-hasonló elemzésnek/politikai sikeresség elemzésnek a keretében mozogtam, nem éreztem azt, hogy akár a felkészültségszemből vagy a tudásomból fakadóan jogosult lenne arra, vagy akár egyáltalán feladatom lenne az, hogy véleményt mondjak arról, hogy mit kellene csinálni. Én ezt máig nem tudom, hogy mit lett volna a helyes megoldás ebben az ügyben.

Hogyan látja, megpróbálta a magyar politikai elemzői/biztonságpolitikai szakértői közösség, tudatosan vagy tudat alatt biztonságiasítani a válság kérdését? (Egyfajta egzisztenciális fenvegetésként beállítani a menekültválságot és ezzel az államot féljogosítani arra, hogy különleges eszközöket használjon.)

Szerintem nincs ilyen, hogy magyar politikai elemzői vagy biztonságpolitikai szakértői kör. Bizonyos értelemben azt kell mondanom, hogy mindenki tette a dolgát. Tehát a függő elemzők, azok a megrendelő-megbízott viszonyak megfelelően – az aktuális politikai érdekek alapján – próbálták keretézni a történéseket, a megmondóemberi kör az a saját politikai preferenciája és biztonságpolitikai attitűdje alapján ment az ügyben. Szóval én nem látok semmi különlegeset. Szerintem az elkötelezhetetlen, mert ő volt az, aki már tulajdonképpen a kormányt megelőzte, egy erőteljes, normatív véleményt fogalmazott meg és a migrációt is egy erőteljesen negatív kontextusban tálalta tulajdonképpen végig, az egész folyamat során. És bizonyos értelemben a kormányt is megelőzte, hogy megelőzze, hogy súlyos állításokat tett. És az ő szakvéleménye az most kivételtelen egy jelentősebb körhöz jutott el. Éppen azért, mert tavalý nyáron a vacsoraasztal témá lett a migráció – tehát nem egy klaszikus politikai témá volt, nem az volt a kérdés, hogy ki jár jól, ki rosszul, tehát nem a hagyományos témák szintjén ment a magyar közöletben, hanem képes volt a választópolgárokat megmozgatni. Ezért a fogyasztók, a befogadók, az emberek kíváncsi voltak elemzői, szakértői véleményekre is. És ezután Nógrádi György, valami elképesztő munkabírással és lendülettel jelent meg a nyilvánosságban. Szokta is idézni, hogy hány tévé, meg rádió beszámolás volt, elképesztő. Ráadásul nagyon karakteres, meg jól befogadható véleményeket mondott. Ezért én, a személyes tapasztalataim alapján azt tudom mondani, hogy az ő véleménye a politikai véleményekhez hasonló súlytal tudott megjelenni a választói közgondolkodásban. Ez az ő népszerűségét is jelentősen növelte, illetve hát az ellentáborát is felépítette, amit jól mutatnak azok a médiatámadások, amik őt érték ebben az ügyben. Tehát a szerepe egyszerűen külcskerdéssé vált és ez nagyon ritka. Ami inkább érdekes, hogy vele hasonló súlyú szakértő nem jelent meg a másik oldalon. Tehát ha most azt kellene mondanom, hogy mondjak valakit, Tarjáni Péter jut eszembe, aki az ATV-ben gyakran megjelent és egy ellentétes értelmezést adott. De részben nem olyan formában tette ezt, mint Nógrádi György, nem olyan befogadható formában, meg azért ez egy szűkebb terület volt, annyi emberhez nem jutott el, de nem lett egy ellen-Nógrádi György. Igazán
vitákat se lehetett, szakértői vitákat se lehetett rendezni. Mert ezek a vélemények vagy nagyon hatékonysági kérdések körül forogtak, vagy nem voltak élég jól artikulálva. Tehát én azt gondolom, hogy ez egy Nógrádi György-show volt. Igazán a migrációból Magyarországon két ember profitált: Orbán Viktor és Nógrádi György.

Onnek a gyakorlatban van olyan tapasztalata, amely alapján különbséget tesz médiumok között, hogy vállalja-e a megkeresésüket vagy nem?

Hát ez egy jó kérdés, mert el kell gondolkoznom, hogy mi a helyzet ezzel kapcsolatban. Szerintem nem önmagában a médium a fontos, hanem sokkal inkább az újságíró. Tehát minden fajta médiumba tudok mondani olyan újságról, akivel az ember szívesen lelű beszélgetni, vagy ha stúdióba hívják, akkor szívesen elmegy, és olyat is, ahol ez kevésbé jó. És elsősorban szerintem itt a felkészültség az, ami igazán fontos. Tehát olyan helyre menni, beszélgetni, ahol rosszak a kérdések, az nagyon le tudja húzni az egész interjút. Úgyhogy én nem, ilyen alapon nem válogatok. Mondjuk az érdekes, hogy a köztelevízióba vagy közrádióba, évek óta nem keress elekort, és a fiatalok között sem. És utána az érthető, mert az embert egy darabig nem keresik. Tehát csak a legkitartóbbak maradtak a pályán és azokhoz is megtehető az Infórádióba, HÍR TV-be, ATV-be időnként. Tehát nem, ilyen szempontok nincsenek, csak az ostobaság és az értelmeség kategóriájában érdemes szerintem választani, mert amúgy egyébként a politikai elfogultság kevésbé igazolható ebből a szempontból, mert azt is lehet színvonalasabban és jó válaszokat adni ezekre a kérdésekre.

April 21, 2016

The Hungarian transcript of the interview with Péter Tálas

On szerint mi a legfontosabb és mi a felelőssége egy politikai elemzőnek vagy szakértőnek, egy-egy esemény vagy válsághelyzet értékelése kapcsán?

Hát én azt gondolom, hogy egy szakértőnek döntően különböző feladatai vannak – függően attól, hogy ki rendeli meg ezt a feladatot. Ami a társadalom felé, ott megértetni alapvetően magát a jelenséget és fogalmazzunk úgy, hogy elmagyarázni mik az okok, miért vannak, mit lehet ellene tenni és körülbelül, hogyan kell látni ezt az egész kérdést. És ezt azért gondolom nagyon fontosnak, mert egyébként azt láthatom, hogy az útóbó évtizedekben, de 2001 óta egész biztos, a biztonság objektív és a szubjektív jellegének a viszonya megváltozott. Ugye az objektív jelleg az azt jelenti, hogy a tények, információk, adatok elemzése, amit úgy szoktunk mondani, hogy „szakértői objektivitás.” Azért teszem idézőjelbe, mert nyilvánvalóan a szakértő sem tud teljesen elvonatkoztatni attól, hogy o személyesen mit gondol erről a dolgozó, de alapvetően igyekszhet, például oly módon, hogy gyakorlatilag az álláspontokat mutatja be vagy az olvasatokat mutatja be. A másik (szubjektív), ami nagyon lényeges, amit a média és a politikai közbeszéd befolyásol – és amiben a szakértőnek van ugyan szerepe, de nem meghatározó. Itt azt kell látni, hogy a média és a politikai közbeszéd alakítja döntően és a szakértő sokkal kevésbé tudja ezt befolyásolni (a maga
módján tudja egyébként), de mégiscsak a szakértő ebben egy mellékszereplő az én megítélésem szerint, még akkor is, ha van egyébként hatása. Tehát azt gondolom, hogy ez az ami a társadalom felé: megértetni, az okokat bemutatni, minél realisabb képet adni, és egy picit távol tartani a társadalmat, hogy a társadalom ne érzelmileg közöltülisen ezekhez a dolgokhoz. Én legalábbis azt gondolom, hogy a társadalom túlnyomó többsége, ha elmagyaráznak neki dolgokat, akkor azt megérti és tud dönteni.

Amennyiben a politika kér valamit a szakértőtől, ott különböző dolgok lehetnek. Lehet az, hogy elemezze például a különböző álláspontokat. Tehát nem annyira az a fontos a migrációs válságban, hogy én mit gondolok. Politikai szempontból az a fontos, hogy a politikai pártok és a politikusok mit gondolnak. Tehát a saját véleménymellett nekem pontosan tudom kell, hogy a Jobbiktól egészen a Szocialista Pártig ki milyen álláspontot képvisel, hogy értelmezni tudjam ezt a diskurzust és esetleg befolyásolni.

És hát van olyan, amikor a szakértőt egész egyszerűen megkéri a politika, hogy a saját szakértelmével nyomatékosítsa a politikai döntéseket. Ha tetszik, ismertesse meg nem csak politikai, nem csak média szempontból, hanem szakértői szempontból is az adott eseményt. Mind a három legitum történet, nyilvánvaló az egy egyéni hozzáállás kérdése, hogy ezt mennyire hajlandó képviselni, hogy a politika felszólítására az ember mennyire képes nem csak azonosulni – mert nem feltétlenül kell azonosulni a politika álláspontjával – de meg kell tudni értetni a politikát, hogy az milyen logika alapján cselekszik, és azt gondolom, hogy ez segítség lehet, hozzá a politikusnak.

Tud e esetleg személyes példát mondani arra, amikor Ön hatást gyakorolt egy-egy társadalmi vagy politikai diskurzusra?

Hát azt gondolom, hogy azért ilyenek már voltak, tekintettel arra, hogy én viszonylag súrú szereplője vagyok a médiának, de még inkább azzal, hogy írunk sokat. Tehát azt gondolom, hogy bizonyos kérdések tálatása, bizonyos megközelítés, bizonyos értelmezési keretekben ad az ember a társadalomnak és a politikának is. A szakértő általában nem a médiában befolyásolja a politikát. Az én intézetem (Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont) majdnem minden nagy stratégiának a megalkotási folyamatában részt vett. Tehát mondjuk a katonai stratégia – és ez kormánytól teljesen független volt, tulajdonképpen a 90-es évektől – és ott egyértelműen befolyásoltuk, abban az értelemben, hogy szövegszerűen látjuk, hogy mit tettünk bele mi, mit fogadtott el ebből a politika és mit mondunk, hogy vegyenek ki és az szerepel-e benne. És nyilvánvalóan abban az értelemben is, hogy tudom, mert halom, hogy amikor a migrációs kérdésről van szó, akkor van egy Nógrádi György álláspont és van egy Tálas Péter álláspont, amire hivatkoznak akár a politikában, akár a médiában akár a közbeszédben. Tehát ezt az ember nagyjából látja, és azt gondolom, hogy ilyen értelemben befolyásolja az ember, akár a közvéleményt, akár a politikát.

Ha már a menekültválság szóba jött, hogyan látja a saját szerepét a válság értelmezése, értékelése és az arról szóló médiadiskurzus alakulása során?

Az én megközelítésem – és ez a szakmámból fakad, hogy én a Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpontot (SVKK) vezetem már élég régez, még régebb óta dolgozom ott – alapvetően mindig stratégiai kontextusba próbáljuk helyezni az eseményeket. Tehát nem csak az adott eseményt, hanem ennek
az okait, a folyamatot, a rendszerét, a megoldási lehetőségeket próbáljuk bemutatni. Ebben a legfontosabb talán az, hogy emlékeim szerint mondjuk az SVKK volt az első olyan – aki részben egyébként kormányzati megrendelésre is – gyakorlatilag a migráns hullámot vagy inkább menekült-hullámot elkezdté úgy értelmezni, hogy ennek különböző kritikus pontjai vannak és ezeket a kritikus pontokat egyszerre, rendszer szerűen kellene kezelni. És az az igazság, hogy azt is látjuk, hogy van ahol sikerül ez és van ahol nem sikerül, és ahol nem sikerül ott nyilván valóan el kell mondani azt, hogy miért nem sikerül. Ez nagyjából azt gondolom, hogy ez mindenféleképpen egy olyan, amiben szerepem volt.

Összességében tudom, hogy a diskurzusban – vagy legalábbis úgy érzelkelem, hogy a szakértői diskurzus kirobbanásában – is szerepem volt. Emlékeim szerint a Külgysö Intézetben tartott Nógrádi, Tálas, Nagy Boldizsár vita volt, amikor először igazán megmutatkoztak azok a különbségek, amiket képviselnek a különböző szakértők. És én ott egész határozottan többek között – nem azt mondanám, hogy a kerítés építés a megoldás és az egyetlen megoldás, sőt nem is a leghatékonyabb megoldás. És innentől kezdődött el egy olyan diskurzus, amit vissza tudok követni a sajtóban is, és amiben lájom azt, hogy milyen különbségek vannak. De ezek a különbségek hangsúlyozom, főleg abból fakadnak, hogy ki honnan nézi ezt a dolgot. Én alapvetően stratégiai kontextusban lájom ezt, tehát abbl indultunk ki, hogy ez a mostani menekültválság ez a kezdete valaminek, aminek nagyon konkrét, pontos okai vannak, és aminek a kezeléséhez önmagában a nemzeti megoldások nem elégségesek. Én híve vagyok – mind a mai napig – az európai megoldásnak, miközben lájom azt egyébként, hogy hiába híve az ember az európai megoldásnak, az európai megoldás nagyon nehezen alakul ki vagy jön létre, de továbbra is azt mondom, hogy ez az egyik nagyon fontos oka. A másik pedig, amivel szembemegyek tudatosan, az alapvetően az a szemlélet, hogy Európának és Magyarországnak nem kell befogadnia menekülteket. Ezt nem pusztán humanitárius kérdésnek tekintem, hanem sokkal inkább stratégiai kérdésnek és ugye azt szoktam mondani, hogy vannak olyan demográfiai folyamatok, vannak olyan társadalmi-gazdasági-politikai folyamatok, amelyek szükségessé teszik Európának – akár tetszik, akár nem – hogy pótolja a demográfiai hullámvölgyben lévő és az előregedő társadalmaikt. És ezt máshonnan nem nagyon tudja pótolni, úgy hogy egy egységes Európai Unióban gondolkodunk, mint kívülről. Természetesen lájom én a többi megoldást is, már, hogy ki mit képvisel. De azért az én szemléletemet döntően megítsak a magyar szempontok határozzák meg. Nevezetesen az, hogy ha Európa bezárkózó lenne, akkor ennek a bezárkózott Európának egy nagyon periferizálódó része lesz, és Kelet-Közép-Európa, mert Kelet-Közép-Európa fogja megfogadni azt a demográfiai hullámvölgyt, amit Európa elszenned, hiszen innen fogják pótolni a centrum országok a munkaerőjüket. Innen fogják elvinni az értelmeséket, innen fogják elvinni a szakértelmet és azt gondolom, ha innen elmege a szakértelmes és az értelmeség, akkor a modernizálódnak az egyik legfontosabb elemét fogjuk elfogadni. Tehát ez arról szól, hogy akarunk-e modernizálódó társadalom lenni, vagy megelégszünk egy ilyen periferiális, szegényebb, vegetálóbb európai társadalomként létezni és lemondunk arról, hogy itt felzárkózás következzen be. Nagyjából ebben a kontextusban értelmezem. Ennek természetesen humanitárius vetületei is vannak, de ez nem jelenti azt, hogy ne vitatnám azokat az európai előírásokat biztonsáspolitikai szempontból, ami például a menekültek szabad mozgását nem korlátozza. Én azok közé tartozom, akik azt mondják, hogy Európának joga van eldönteni, hogy egy menekültet hova és milyen feltételekkel fogad be és ez nem kizárólag a menekültek az akaratán műlik, mert
ő nem bevándorló, hanem egy kényszerhelyzetből van itt. Érttem én a humanitárius okokat, de összességében azt gondolom, hogy egy ekkora tömegnél és egy ilyen gazdasági-társadalmi-politikai helyzetben azt kell mondani, hogy a menekülteknek bizony nincs ugyanolyan joga, mint az európai polgároknak. Ami nem jelenti azt, hogy Őket ne illetnék meg jogok, de csak szociális és jóléti megfontolásból, a menekült nem rendezheti át Európa térképét.

 Ön szerint, hozzájárult-e a magyar biztonságpolitikai szakértők a menekültválságnak a biztonságiasításához?


És nagyon ellene megyek az olyan típusú leegyszerűsítésnek, amik ilyen jól hangzó szavakat dobnak be a közutatba, miközben nem látjuk, hogy mit takar a tartalmuk. Tehát ellene megyek például annak, hogy általában beszéljük a muzulmánok integrálhatatlanságáról. Ezt általában úgy szoktam megtenni, hogy megkérdezem, hogy tulajdonképpen mit is jelent az integráció az adott szakértő számára. Amikor mindig zavarba jön, mert az ember tudja, hogy egyébként az integráció

Még egy fontos dolog. A szakmai vélemény elmondását nem szabad összetevékesíteni a lojalitással vagy a szervilizmusssal. Én általában úgy szoktam megfogalmazni, hogy én a mindenki kormányhoz lojális vagyok, de szakmai kérdésekben egészen a döntéseig elmondom a véleményemet. És utána, ha dönt a kormány, akkor ezt tudomásul veszem. Vagy ha olyan, akkor tudomásul veszem, de ha úgy érzem, akkor kritizálom is. Ez nem jelenti azt, hogy én a kormány ellen beszélünk. Általában fontos, hogy tudok-e szakmai értelemben érvelni. Voltak már nagyon rossz helyzetek. Tehát én tanácsadója voltam a kettővel ezelőtti magyar miniszterelnöknek, aki tett olyan kijelentéseket, amivel én nem értem egyet. És akkor az ember kulturáltan és szakmai alapon próbálja megfogalmazni ezeket. Nagyon röviden a sztori arról szólt, hogy a magyar miniszterelnök valami terrorfenyegetés okán be akart tiltani egy ellenzéki tüntetést, hogy ott robbanthatnak. És megkérdeztek, hogy én mit szólok ehhez. És a következő volt a mondásom. Alapvetően a szakértőnek nem az a feladata, hogy döntsön a politikus helyett. A szakértő elmondhatja a véleményét, de a politikus felelőssége a döntés. És a politikus nyugodtan
értelmezheti másképp és nyugodtan dönthet a szakértő ellenében is. Csak látni kell, hogy például most a menekültválság kapcsán a kormány gyakorlatilag úgy tesz, mintha jobban félne a menekültkérdéstől és a terrorizmustól, mint a szakértő, mint mondjuk én. Ehhez megvan a szíve joga. De én pedig elmondom azt, hogy szerintem nem annyira veszélyes, nem úgy kell értelmezni, a terrorizmus nem úgy érint bennünket.

_Gyakorlatban van-e olyan tapasztalata, amely alapján esetekben különbséget tesz bizonyos médiumok között, hogy vállalja a megkeresésüket vagy sem?_

Ez egy nagyon nagy dilemma. Fiatalabb koromban még lett volna. De tekintettel arra, hogy az ember tisztában van a saját súlyával, tehát hogy a meghatározó biztonságpolitikai véleményformálók közé tartozik, nem teheti meg azt, hogy az egyik médiumot előnyben részesíti a másikkal. Én, akikhez tudok, elmegyek, amikor időm engedi. És az az igazság, hogy az ECHO TV-től, a 444-ig mindenhol vannak ismerőseim, és nekem szerencséül van ebben a tekintetben, mert a média munkásait is tülnyomó többségben ismerem. Vagy azért mert, akkor dolgoztak, amikor én is a közteleviszióból dolgoztam. Vagy azért mert tanítványaim voltak, vagy azért mert valamilyen szakmai kapcsolatunk volt. Nem teszek ilyen különbséget, ebben megint csak azt követem, amit egyébként a politikai semlegesség kapcsán. Tudom, hogy mindenki a saját közönségének játszik, én pedig a saját mondandómat mondom el mindig. Akinek kellemetlen ez a vélemény, mert nem ezt akarja üzenni, az legközelebb nem engem fog meghívni. De tekintettel arra, hogy ismerem a média működését, tudom mi az, hogy riporternek lenni, szerkesztőnek lenni és tudom, mit engedhetek meg magamnak, ennek megfelelően a médiumot eszköznek tekintem. És ösztintén szóla nem vagyok megilletővé attól, hogy most ezt a kérdést kapom, vagy azt a kérdést. Azt mondom el, amit gondolok, akkor is, ha a riporternek vagy a szerkesztőnek más véleménye van. Ezzel nincs semmi gond egyébként. Kettő, van egy ilyen filozófia, ezt a Rácz András – barátom és szakmabeli társam – szokta mondani, hogy sokkal jobb, ha én magyarázom el a közönségnek, mintha más. Azt akarom mondani, hogy ez nekem soha nem jelentett problémát. Az egy másik kérdés, hogy én egyébként milyen véleménnyel vagyok bizonyos médiumokról, az ő politikai elkötelezettségük okán. Én ott egy szakértőként vagyok ott és az a kötelességem, hogy amit gondolok, azt mondjam el, és amit gondolok, azt minél szélesebb társadalom ismerje meg. Ráadásul jól viselem a konfliktusokat ebben a tekintetben, sőt talán a legjobban. Picit inspirál is a vita – legyen ez TV, rádió vagy írásbeli vita. Én nagyjából azt látom, hogy azok a viták fogják meg a hallgatóságot, ahol nem elbeszélünk egymás mellett. Nem alkalmazkodunk, hanem egy pici konfliktus is kialakul. Ennek megfelelően el szoktam menni, majdnem minden médiumhoz.

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