

CAN WE DO BETTER?

Grassroot parties' success in maintaining their movement origins

Comparative analysis of Podemos and Jobbik

By

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Abstract

This thesis aims to examine parties that criticize the traditional political system and traditional parties as well – whether or not they are able to do differently; or better from their perspective. I respond to this question by analyzing movement parties that typically aim to do something reformist compared to the parties that already exist. I analyze two parties in two different parts of Europe, with different historical backgrounds, both of which emerged from social movements, although with opposing ideologies. The leftist Podemos (*‘We can’*) in Spain and the radical right, Jobbik (*‘Jobbik’*) in Hungary, are both rooted in a movement and both claim that they can do better than the other parties that they believe have failed after the regime changes within their respective countries. This aim necessitates the exploration of empirical data that can be used to understand this complex phenomenon. Therefore, in this thesis, besides looking for an answer to the questions I also attempt to find those empirical materials that can be used to gain a deeper understanding of parties’ movement-like characteristics. The outcome of the thesis reveals certain characteristics of each party that might be connected to its movement origins. Podemos’ movement characteristics appear already in its operational structure, while Jobbik’s movement-like characteristics appear mainly in its informal relationship to its supporters.

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Introduction

Social movements with different political ideologies and non-political views have often turned into political parties around Europe in the last decades, - Green movements transformed into parties in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. in Germany the '*Die Grünen*' in 1977 or in France '*Les Verts*' in 1984), similarly leftist austerity movements (e.g. the '*Podemos*' in Spain in 2014 or '*Syriza*' in Greece in 2004), populist parties (e.g. Beppe Grillo's '*Five Star Movements*' in Italy in the 2010s) and radical rightist movements (e.g. the Hungarian far right party '*Jobbik*' in 2003). Newly formed parties with various types of social movement origins typically claim that they differ from traditional parties in the sense that they are the 'real' representatives of society and they have a direct connection to citizens.

As '*alternative amateur activists*' they claim that they are the real representatives of social movements' interests (Frankland, Lucardie and Benoit 2008); however, by partisan transformation these parties have integrated into the political system, therefore they have apparently accepted the traditional rules of politics. According to Kitschelt (2006), the form of a movement party is a 'transitional stage' of a party's life. In my research I address the question: how are these new parties trying to remain different from traditional parties, more specifically, how are they trying to remain '*civil*'? A party remains '*civil*' if it maintains real relations with its supporters who are at least partly involved in the party's operations. Either they can participate in various kinds of party events voluntarily or they might have a voice in the party's process and they are given the opportunity to raise their questions if they have concerns or they might even have a right to vote on decisions about the party's operation. Therefore I consider movement parties those that managed to remain (at least partially) '*civil*'. Accordingly, the more specific: what kind of strategies are these parties using to involve and mobilize those supporters who are not officially members of the parties? Answering these questions might shed

some light on what we should expect: whether the political spectrum and its strict layouts remain the same or the involvement of members and supporters of grassroots parties might modify it in the sense that they make society less alienated from politics in general.

The ‘*anti-party*’ politics, as Mair refers to the phenomenon, has three aspects that connect different newly formed parties. The first is the “*growing popular skepticism about the integrity and honesty of the political class, and in the increasingly widespread belief that the established politicians are potentially venal, self-serving and even corrupt*”. The second is “*the mobilization of the reformist populism*”, which emerged based on the assumptions that the “*established alternatives have failed*” therefore “*the party system itself needs to be replaced*”. Finally, according to Mair, the third level is the emergence of the “*right-wing anti-party protests*” (1994: 19).

In my thesis I address these questions by analyzing two recently formed movement-based political parties, Spain’s leftist party, *Podemos* (‘*We Can*’) and Hungary’s far right¹ party, *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom* (‘*Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary*’). Ideologically these two parties rhyme with Mair’s (1994) theory about “*reformist populism*” and the “*right-wing anti-party*”. However, these parties differ in various aspects besides their political ideologies, such as the size of the movement they were formed from, or the length of time that they needed to become ‘successful’, in other words to enter the country’s political structure. Moreover a decade passed between the formations of the two parties. It is, however, fundamental that they were both formed out of social movements and both of their politics contain criticism of the prevailing political elites. Therefore they can be used for a comparative analysis to understand the ‘*civil*’ aspects of the assimilation of grassroots parties and their pursuit

¹ I will use ‘*far right*’, ‘*radical right*’ and ‘*extreme right*’ synonymously because the right-wing party categorization does not exclusively define the three categories and because, as I will hypothesize, the differences among radical right parties do not significantly influence their movement-based characteristics.

to remain civil independently from their political ideologies. Answering these questions can help us understand more thoroughly how new parties tend to change the political structure by bringing politics closer to citizens. However, according to numerous studies on green parties that were the pioneers of movement parties, they have failed in several cases, in the sense that they have assimilated to the already existing party structure and (almost) completely lost their movement characteristics (see e.g. Frankland, Lucardie and Benoit 2008).

I study these issues by analyzing Jobbik and Podemos as two recent examples of movement-based parties by using mainly qualitative data. My analysis is based on various empirically observable data such as the organizational regulations of the parties, their online and offline activities, and the opinions of their members. Additionally, those recent events that reveal essential information of each party's operational mechanisms will be taken into account. Furthermore, I intend to gain a deeper understanding of the circumstances in which they emerged such as the countries' historical memories, political systems and the political attitudes of the two societies.

One might expect results, however, based on the analysis several unforeseen similarities between the two parties are revealed. As expected Jobbik, as a radical right party, is more centralized than the leftist Podemos thus the rights of the members and the opportunities of the supporters are more extended in Podemos than in Jobbik. Also, there are substantial differences in the strategies the two parties use to maintain their movement-like characteristics. The grassroots origin can be found in the organizational structure of Podemos, but not in Jobbik's. With regards to the parties' relation to their supporters both parties intention is to retain their movement-like appearances. Podemos mainly organizes its members and supporters through online platforms and give them the possibility to getting involved with the parties operations. Jobbik mainly focuses on an offline relationship with its supporters, partially on the subject of

its politics (through forums) but more relevantly on topics which are not directly connected to its politics but rather a sphere of the radical right subculture.

1 Theoretical framework and methodology

Studying parties that were formed out of social movements entails the need to understand both social movements and parties; however the focus must remain on grassroots parties or specific kinds of parties that have emerged from a movement (e.g. green parties). Therefore to grasp the issue of recently formed parties' relationship with civil society, the literature of social movements (see e.g. Della Porta and Diani 2008; Tarrow 2011) and party theories (see e.g. Panebianco 1988; Kitschelt 1989; Progunke 2002) will be merged. Both in the case of movements and parties, the theory should concern left-wing and right-wing ideologies movements' and parties' special characteristics. Some studies combine these two areas to understand those special characteristics of parties that formed from social movements: what makes them similar to social movements even though they have enrolled into traditional politics (Kitschelt 2006).

In my thesis I will consider political parties as movement-based if their emergence can be connected to a real social movement and if, after the party formation they still claim to be social movements. I do not consider movement parties that were formed at the point of a democratic transition of a country with the aim to be a political party in a democratic system even though their roots can be found in social movements.

Social movement literature includes a wide variety of movement forms, however, it focuses mainly on the movements themselves and on the circumstances that make it possible for a movement to be created and become successful (Della Porta and Diani 2008; Tarrow 2011); the literature mainly studies movements' partisan transformation tangentially, because it is a separate phase between movements and parties. Meanwhile, party theories focus mainly on the organizational questions of the parties (Panebianco 1988). Less literature focuses on the parties' strategies towards civil society. Verge's study (2012) deals with this topic to some

extent, however, she focuses on the relationship between parties and civil organizations. Partially the literature about green parties deals with their relations to civil society (Frankland, Lucardie and Benoit 2008). Further literature somewhat concerning this issue is about the radical right parties, which focuses mostly on their radical right characteristics and the circumstances in which radical right ideologies manage to expand, rather than their social movement characteristics (Norris 2005; Art 2011).

The basic theory about the appearance of new political parties, many of whom emerged from social movements, is the shift from material to post material values that can be observed in Western European countries after World War II (Inglehart 2008). According to Inglehart, this is an intergenerational change that already took place in Western Europe in the second part of the 20th century and it has led to the appearance of new movements and parties on the political spectrum, generally on the left. The main focus of these new social movements and parties are post materialist values, for example human liberties, feminist or LMBTQ issues or environmental values. Furthermore, Kriesi (1997) claims that the appearance of new movements (and new parties that frequently emerge from these movements) is a result of globalization and can be observed both on the left and on the right, however, there are substantial differences among the two sides.

Along with Inglehart, Kriesi claims that new parties emerge on the left for post-material issues from among those who managed to profit from the changing structures, as the ‘winner’ part of the society. Meanwhile Kriesi argues that the right movements also emerge for post material issues, however these issues are not the same as the issues of movements on the left, because right movements emerge from among those who became the ‘losers’ of globalization (1997). This theory highlights whys - even though I consider parties’ movement origin as a fundamental factor that implies their similarities; substantial differences might be found between parties in the ideological left-right dimension for example in the case of the

characteristics and expectations of their voters. This might lead to use of different strategies by the parties to maintain their movement characteristics.

1.1 Partisan transformation: from social movement to political party

The classical explanation for a movement's partisan transformation according to Glenn, who refers to Michels' work, is that "*mass movements are inevitably channeled into formal organizations that favor an oligarchic elite rather than the masses*" (Michels 1962 in Glenn 2000: 164). This statement implies how a mass movement turns into a party; however, it does not explain the partisan transformation of smaller movements or social organizations. Another interpretation of movements' transformation into political parties is Kitschelt's theory, who considers the transition as: "*the political entrepreneurs change the institutional setting in which they operate and make investments in an organizational infrastructure of collective action as well as procedures of social choice that create collective preference schedules ('party programs')*" (Kitschelt 2006: 278). Further approaches about partisan transformations, according to social movement theorists, are mainly associated with structural circumstances, for example, Tarrow's (1991) research found that strong party systems facilitate this phenomenon. One might expect a new party to emerge in Spain: The two parties that had been governing in the previous 30 years were already declining; then the economic crisis hit Spain badly, resulting in both of the strong parties losing a great part of their supporters. This allowed free space for Podemos to emerge. Meanwhile in Hungary the Socialist party lost its strength by the end of their eight years in government, therefore the previously strong party system in Hungary had weakened by the time when Jobbik started to become powerful. The common attribute of the two countries is that, in both countries by the time the new parties emerged the previously strong parties had lost a relevant part of their supports.

Kitschelt (2006) gives a general overview of movement parties that is an appropriate base for my research. According to Kitschelt, movement parties are "*coalitions of political activists who emanate from social movements and try to apply the organizational and strategic practices of social movements in the arena of party competition*" (Kitschelt 2006: 280). The state of a movement party is a transitional form, however, not in a linear sense: according to Kitschelt, these parties are very unstable because of several contradictions between their movement-characteristics and their integration to the traditional political structure (Kitschelt 2006: 288). This transitional state might explain the failure of most of the movement-based parties that either integrate into the political system and become political parties or disappear. Bolleyer et al enlist two more difficulties movement parties might face: first, the "*equality between members and followers (high organizational inclusiveness) risks undermining individual members' commitment*" and the second is the "*highly inclusive selectorate (i.e. members with decision making power) can generate high levels of internal conflict*" (2015: 159). According to this, one can assume that if a party maintains its movement-like characteristics, it soon either starts to decline or transforms into a traditional party thus by becoming a real political party it starts to lose its original features.

Movement parties make little investment in the organizational structure, invest little in solving social choice, and they attempt to keep their political practices between formal democratic competition and extra-institutional mobilization (Kitschelt 2006). However there is a contradiction because a party cannot actually solve problems without being in government. This leads to two relevant areas where new parties should be studied: (1) the level of the institutional structure of the party and (2) the role of both members and non-member supporters in the party's life and in policymaking processes.

Katz and Mair (1992) approach parties' organizational structure as a complex system that cannot be described by only one characteristic. Their main concern is the party itself as a

political system but they collect three faces of the parties' organizations. The first one is "*the party as voluntary membership organization*" is the scale and the termination by the members. The strength of this can be described by the strength of the party congress and by the office holders' dominance over the members. The second is the "*the party as governing organization*" which refers to the organization of those party members who hold public office and which strength can be described by the office holders dominance. The third characteristic of the parties' organization is "*the party as bureaucratic organization*" which refers to the party's professional officials and what can be described by those characteristics that describe any other bureaucracy, such as permanence, hierarchy, and specialization.

John Glenn (2000) summarizes that new parties usually appear in social cleavages which correlates with Kitschelt's (2006) argument; Glenn says that "*only where an intensely felt, salient political interest harbored by a quantitatively significant constituency lacks representation in the existing party system are movement entrepreneurs likely to enter the electoral arena*" (2000: 164-165). Based on this idea, a political cleavage, political interest, and lack of representation are needed for a new party to emerge and assumedly for the transformation of social movements into (movement) parties that can be considered as a form of the emerged new parties. However, in harmony with the empirical evidence about the European green parties, one of the critics on party emergence with the focus on societal cleavages is the assumption that "*new political parties will follow the same path as parties in earlier parliamentary democracies*" (Glenn 2000: 165). This leads to a hypothesis that with time, a party loses more and more of its movement characteristics. This hypothesis was verified with the green parties' transformations around Europe (Frankland, Lucardie and Benoit 2008).

1.2 Newly formed parties

Based on Mair's (1994) theory, one can find two groups of parties, through which movement-based parties are approachable: the newly formed radical right parties and the green parties. The former group is appropriate because – even in case they were not formed from social movements – they show movement-party characteristics (Kitschelt 2006). The latter group is appropriate because the environmental movements and green parties are the most widely studied forms of post materialist value based formations.

Radical right wing parties appear – similarly to new left-libertarian parties – in a situation when there is an issue that is of interest to a large part of the society but is not represented by any existing party (Kitschelt 2006). In harmony with Kriesi (1997) - who concluded that the emergence of new radical-right parties is rooted in globalization, where it is more likely that those who ended up as 'losers' support the radical right - Norris (2005) summarizes the theories that might have led to the rise of the support of the radical right. The first theory mentioned by Norris is the classical sociological account according to which radical right emergence is a result of modernization, the rise of industrial and post-industrial societies and economic development. The other is the modern sociological view about the phenomenon, which also links it to modernization, however, it states that the emergence of the radical right ideology is a result of new social cleavages; however, it is mostly driven by the threat of '*the other*' (Norris 2005: 132).

Even though radical right wing parties vary in several aspects – such as their attitude towards democratic structure, their level of social exclusion, their level of nationalism, their moral traditionalism, and their opinion about redistribution (Kitschelt 2006) –, their minor ideological differences or their distinct opinion about specific issues does not determine their operations. Furthermore, their differences do not necessarily have connections with the level of

their movement characteristics that, in the case of radical right parties, usually appear in “*their strategies and tactics of expressing interests*” (Kitschelt 2006: 286).

The theory about movement-based parties can also be derived from the examples of green parties around Europe that have a wide range of literature and that were the pioneers of new parties with social movement origins that entered national parliaments in the 1970s and 1980s (Kitschelt 1989; Müller-Rommel 1989; Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992; Frankland, Lucardie and Benoit 2008). According to Kitschelt (1989: 1), “[*German*] *Green parliamentarians saw themselves as representatives of German protest movement and social experiments dating back to the 1960s*”. By analyzing 16 Green parties around Europe it seems that these parties have assimilated into politics and lost a remarkable part of their ‘*alternative amateur activist*’ characteristics, including the informal ties to the civil society they had at the point of the party formation (Frankland, Lucardie and Benoit 2008). According to Mair (1994) several parties declined after they had ceded their members more power in the parties’ decision making processes that might be a partial explanation of the green parties’ losses of their movement-like characteristic.

1.3 Relation to civil society

Ramiro and Morales state (2014), based on the theory of Kriesi and Baglioni (2003), that parties and Civil Society Organizations (CSO) are different in a way that while parties tend to aim for limited involvement of the members, the CSOs are more likely to promote membership involvement and mobilization. Based on this statement, they hypothesize that (even though this can be correct and according to this there might be relevant differences between CSOs and traditional parties in this dimension) it is likely that there are no such

differences (or the differences are minor) between CSOs and those parties – e.g. the green parties – that promote grassroots participation (Ramiro and Morales 2014).

Verge (2012) summarizes three strategies of how parties in general might maintain their ties to civil society. The first strategy is the “*creation of social-organizations*” that aligns with the party’s position and usually has some overlap with the parties in party members and the organizations’ leaders. Verge builds the first strategy on Progunke’s (2002) idea that the party’s aim of the linkage from party to the civil society is to gain a significant part of specific socio economic interests for an issue. Her second strategy is “*penetration*”, which means either to encourage party members to get involved in interest groups or to bring social activists as officers to the party. By “*penetration*” parties select specific interest groups, presenting themselves on the grassroots level, working against the rise of the competitors, and reach civil society leaders who are skilled enough to operate in the government and party politics (Verge is building on Ignazi et al. 2005; Schwartz 2005: 42; Blondel 2002: 239). The third strategy form, according to Verge, is “*collaboration*” which is the idea of common forums for contact and action. Verge’s overall theory about the parties’ close relation with civil organizations is that it might “*render a party’s commitment to social demands more credible in the eyes of the electorate*” (Verge 2012: 46-47).

1.4 Expected findings - hypotheses

In my research, I compare two recently formed grassroot parties that might seem completely different at first sight, because one of them is from the ideological radical right and the other is a left-wing party. My aim is to find out whether there are similarities between them concerning their social movement origins; therefore, their exact opposite political ideology might be a good control to see which of their characteristics are influenced by their ideology

and which ones are the results of their movement origins. One of these two parties is the ideologically left Spanish party, Podemos, which recently formed from a huge movement and entered the national parliament. The other party is the Hungarian far right party, Jobbik, which has a longer history as a party, has roots in a minor movement and succeeded as a party more gradually. Even though these two parties seem completely different, both were formed from a social movement and both oppose and have a very strict revulsion towards the traditional parties. The hypotheses were formed according to the two main areas that were mentioned before in which a party can remain movement-like: (1) institutional structure and the (2) role of both members and non-member supporters. In connection with the second area, not just the role of members and supporters is relevant, but also how the party communicates the importance of involving them.

As the two parties have the exact opposite political ideology, differences between them can be expected. However, their similar origins suggest that there might be some similarities among them that are assumedly the result of their analogous movement roots. In my research I will try to find answers to four hypotheses about the differences and the similarities between a movement-based party on the left and a similar party on the right.

If a party aims to participate in parliamentary politics, it has to make compromises both on organizational and on the structural perspectives. My view is that the aspect where a party might be able to remain different is the informal (or even formal) relationship with civil society, through which it can keep mobilizing its supporters. Therefore, two general expectations can be formed prior to the analysis. First, if a party preserves something of its social movement origins it would be the framing and identity formation it had as a movement (Tarrow 2011), through which it could maintain (an appearance of) a direct and informal relationship with its supporters. Furthermore, a party retains its movement origins if it manages to implement its claims about being a movement party into their processes by actually involving its members

into its operations. Specifying the general hypotheses, I form four hypotheses according to which the two parties can be studied.

I expect that there are substantial similarities between the two parties' relation to their supporters that I would consider as results of their similar social movement origin. I base this expectation on Kitschelt's (2006) theory that, even when a radical right party does not emerge from a social movement, it has movement party characteristics due to the strategy of expressing interests by involving civil supporters. That is why I assume that, especially when a radical right party has roots in a social movement, the influence of its roots on its relation to civil society is similar to that of other grassroots parties' with more left-wing political ideology from their movement origin. Therefore my first hypothesis is:

H1: *Both Podemos and Jobbik use similar techniques to involve their supporters into their political operations and offer them similar opportunity to make themselves heard.*

A 'typical' radical right party usually has low level of formal membership (in member/voter ratio), its organizational structure varies constantly and is led by a small group of dominant leaders (Kitschelt 2006). In contrast, I expect that when a radical right party is movement based it does not necessarily have all of these characteristics. I expect that in this sense a movement based radical right party is more similar to a movement based left-wing party than a non-movement based radical right one. Therefore my second hypothesis is:

H2: *Compared to the other parties in the Hungarian political spectrum Jobbik has more members than the other parties, similarly to Podemos compared to the other parties in Spanish politics.*

I assume as the two analyzed parties are both movement parties that the role of their members in the operational mechanisms are very similar. They have a right to voice, vote and generally influence the parties' mechanisms. Therefore my third hypothesis is:

H3: *Similarly high “inclusive selectorate” (Bolleyer at all 2015) can be expected within both parties.*

Additionally, my last expectation is that there are substantial differences between the two parties’ ideas about what ‘being civil’ means, which leads to differences in how they are trying to remain civil. Therefore my fourth hypothesis is:

H4: *Jobbik and Podemos’ ideas about the ideal form of state are different because it is determined by their ideologies. Even though both communicate the importance of the involvement of civil society Podemos’ aim as a radical leftist party is to achieve direct democracy and Jobbik as a radical right party aims at a more centralized system.*

1.5 Methodology

The comparison of two parties’ movement-like characteristics and operational mechanisms implies risks in separating those similar characters that are due to their analogous movement origins and those that are due to the fact that both are political parties. A further difficulty with such a comparison is finding those similarities that exist but are not noticeable at first because the two parties under study are so different. Considering these difficulties the most reliable way to understand them is to involve several different kinds of empirical data into the analysis.

For revealing a party’s relation to its social movement origin and its success to maintain its movement-like characteristics implies the need of qualitative techniques. Some characteristics of this phenomenon might possibly be analyzed quantitatively, however, these features of the party explain less than the details of the operation of the party itself. The number of party members or the number of events it organizes would be appropriate indicators, but

without a deeper look into what the role of the party members is in the operation of the party, or into what kind of events the party organizes, they do not explain properly how each party functions. Having a high number of party members does not mean that they have any voice in the party. Similarly, organizing several events for the presidency of the party is not the same as organizing frontal presentations for the party members and the supporters, which is again, not the same as organizing events where the party's presidency discusses the issues with the members and the supporters.

I study these questions from the aspects of the parties using mainly qualitative methods. I collected various types of empirical data that might be able to describe how a party actually operates and how these operations connect with the parties' movement origins. Therefore, I analyze various observed data about the phenomenon supplemented by interviews with volunteer members of the parties. I analyze the parties' organizational structures, their regulations, the parties' members' ideas of their operations and the importance of their movement origins through interviews. Additionally, I study those recent events that might explain the parties' operations deeper. To understand the phenomenon more thoroughly I involve their online and offline activities and the events they organize into the analysis. Comparing the data about the two parties, their substantial differences should be kept in mind for avoiding over-generalization, thus I go through the history of the two countries as well as the political attitudes of the two societies.

After understanding the circumstances in which the parties emerged, first I take a deeper look in their organizational structure and operational regulations. Based on the parties' functional mechanisms, I analyze how they are using the online spaces for communication, as well as what kind of events they organize which are also usually published primarily on online surfaces. After summarizing how they function in theory and how they do in reality, I expand

the results with those difficulties that both parties face recently that might add to the comprehension of the two parties' operations.

Additionally, I have made interviews with party members about their opinions of parties' operational mechanism and its movement-like characteristics. Their opinions will help make the analysis even deeper. These interviews were made with members of the parties who were sitting in the parties' headquarters in the capital city of the countries. Thus the interviews with Podemos members were done between 29th April and 4th May 2016 in the party's headquarter in Madrid (Spain) with volunteer workers there, while the interview with a Jobbik member were done between 16th and 20th May in the party's headquarter in Budapest (Hungary) with a paid Jobbik employee. Since the opinions of members will always vary greatly within the same party as well, the results of the interviews are for illustrative purposes only, based on them one should not generalize the party members' opinions.

2 Background analysis of Hungary and Spain

Prior to the actual analysis, I overview those circumstances each party emerged from and what characterizes people's political memory of each country. After understanding those conditions the party emerged from, the movement specificity can be seen from a different perspective. Furthermore, a quantitative analysis on the attitudes of the societies in the two countries as well as studying the background of the voters of the two parties is important to understand the parties' operations.

2.1 Historical background of the two countries²

On the surface, both Hungary and Spain went through a transition to democracy; first Spain started to become a democratic system in 1975 after the death of Francisco Franco, then Hungary in 1989, at the end of the socialist regime. After the transition both countries had a “pure” parliamentary system. In Hungary, besides the parliament there is also a president elected by the parliament and in Spain, there is a non-elected monarch. Neither in Spain (Iglesias 2015), nor in Hungary has the democratic transformation completely replaced the previous political elite leading to conflicts in both countries. Both the Spanish and the Hungarian political spectrum mainly have been dominated by two parties and this two-party dominance has changed recently in both countries.

Even though the analogy between Hungary and Spain is remarkable, there are substantial differences between the two countries' histories and between the societies' attitudes. These differences led to a leftist movement and to the emergence of a party with leftist political

² Sections of the chapter ‘Historical background’ are taken from a final paper written for the course ‘Analyzing Democracy’ in the Winter Semester of the Academic Year 2015/16 (submitted: 30/03/2016). Similarly parts that refer to Podemos are drawn from a final paper written for ‘Comparative Politics’ in the Fall Semester of the Academic Year 2015/16 (14/20/2015).

ideology in Spain and the radical rightist movements that became stronger and emerged as a party with radical right ideology in Hungary.

2.1.1 Recent history of the two countries

In the sixteenth century, Spain was the major power in Europe with its extended colonial empire. However, soon after the golden ages it started to lose power and in the 19th century it also lost a great part of its colonial territories. The twentieth century's history, both the Civil War (1936-39) and Franco's dictatorship (1939-1975) is controversial in the Spanish political memory and the society and the authorities have just started the process of facing them (Balfour 2008). The Civil war occurred as a conflict between the Republicans and the Nationalists, the latter group led by Francisco Franco. By winning the Civil War, Franco became the leader of a *fascist* dictatorship (Riley 2005) for almost 40 years. With the death of Franco in 1975 Spain transitioned into democracy.

After some economic and political prosperity in the 19th century, Hungary went through hardship in the 20th century including the two World Wars and the Horthy regime, followed by the communist authoritarian system. Being on the losing side in the First World War resulted in Hungary's unfavorable peace treaty according to which the country lost a great part of its territory and its citizens. This became one of the main issues for the radical right nationalism in the interwar period. Likewise it became one of the main issues for the radical right movements and parties in the present. Hungary ended up on the side of the Axis powers in the Second World War, therefore it came out of the war as a defeated party again. After the Soviet takeover, a communist³ dictatorship started in Hungary, which began to consolidate after the revolution

³ In the case of the previous system in Hungary I do not separate communism and socialism, because even though it was a socialist system it is usually referred to as communism

in 1956, where – even though the principal human rights were not fulfilled – people felt that their life was acceptable because their everyday needs were satisfied. In the end of the 1980s the democratic transition took place in Hungary in an unusually peaceful way within the region, the result of which might be that people do not appreciate the new democracy as much as something they had fought for and that they failed to replace all members of the previous regime. Furthermore, the new economic system made the life more difficult for several members of society by losing their jobs that guaranteed the fulfillment of their basic needs. Therefore, unsurprisingly a great part of the Hungarian society remembers the communist period nostalgically (Wirth 2013).

In Spain, since the beginning of the democratic transition the conservative-Christian democratic Popular Party (*Partido Popular – PP*) and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español – PSOE*) have been replacing each other (Singer 2015). This two-party dominance started to change in the 2011 Spanish general election when PSOE lost 40 per cent of its 2008 votes, PP gained an absolute majority and Izquierda Unidad (IU) and further electoral parties (Ciudadanos, Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD)) started to increase the number of their supporters. Later, in the 2015 Spanish general election, one of the recent parties that entered the Spanish parliament (*Cortes Generales*) was Podemos, gaining 20% of the votes and thus becoming the third strongest party in the Spanish Parliament.

After the regime change, in 1990, Hungary's first democratically elected government was formed by the ideologically right Hungarian Democratic Forum (*Magyar Demokrata Fórum – MDF*). Four years later, in the next election, the Hungarian Socialist Party (*Magyar Szocialista Párt – MSZP*) managed to form a government in coalition with the liberals (*Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – SZDSZ*). From that point the Hungarian political spectrum was by and large dominated by MSZP and Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance (*Fidesz Magyar Polgári Párt - FIDESZ*) for fifteen years. Although smaller parties entered the Hungarian Parliament in

every term (such as *SZDSZ*, the Independent Smallholders Agrarian Party (*FKGP*), the Christian Democratic People's Party (*KDNP*) and the former radical right party, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (*MIÉP*)), the two-party dominance changed only in the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary election when Fidesz gained more than half of the votes and a third party appeared, the extremist right Jobbik, and gained 17% of all votes.

There was a socialist regime in Hungary and a fascist-like authoritarian system in Spain, therefore the latter retained a capitalist system and was not excluded from the western market economy. However, the comparison of the countries' recent history reveals similar circumstances considering the emergence of a radical party, either on the left or on the right. The unfinished process of facing the events of the twentieth century in both countries might open the space for radical parties to create a framing that attracts voters. This is especially true in the case of Jobbik, whose ideology links together Hungary's traumas with the cleavages in the society after the regime change.

2.1.2 Emergence of the new parties

Podemos is a typical example of the movement based leftist parties and it is halfway between a movement party and a traditional type party. Based on Inglehart's theory (2008), a new movement for post materialist values can appear despite an economic crisis, because the value shift is a slowly-occurring phenomenon, therefore, in a country where post materialist values already gained ground, a short-term economic decline will not reverse the peoples' preference towards post-materialistic values. If we accept that Spain had already been through the value shift that leads to the emergence of new social movement, a movement can appear after the economic crisis that hit Spain very hard.

Podemos as a party was officially formed in January 2014. It has its roots in Spain's anti-austerity movement (*15-M Movement or Movimiento 15-M*) that started in 2011 against inequality and corruption and it entered politics first during the European Parliamentary election in 2014 where it gained 8% of the national votes, which equals 5 seats in the European Parliament. Then in December 2015 in Spain's general election it earned around 20% of the votes. The program of Podemos is considered to be left wing, it contains progressive proposals such as the defense of public services, intervention in the economy or social redistribution, and values that are rooted in the previous protests and which might be able to deepen the democracy as the level of transparency increases (Rendueles and Sola 2015).

In contrast to what Kitschelt (2006) stated – that typically radical right parties of any kind are not forming from social movements – the Hungarian Jobbik party emerged from a small student movement in 2003. The movement was the Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség (*'Right-wing Youth Community'*) that was formed in 1999 by university students with the aim of uniting 'nationalistic' thinking among the youth. It transformed into a party in October 2003, after the right-wing parties' weak performance in the 2002 national elections. According to the party's website this transformation was heavily encouraged by several strongly anticommunist, right-wing public figures (among them: politicians who used to be freedom fighters of the 1956 Hungarian revolution (Mária Wittner, Gergely Pongrácz), journalists (István Lovas) and actors (Mátyás Usztics)).⁴ The fact that the Right-wing Youth Community's transformation was encouraged by public figures should be kept in mind during the analysis because this might question Jobbik's pure grassroots formation.

⁴ Based on Jobbik's webpage: <https://jobbik.hu/jobbikrol/kezdetek-jobbik-megalakulasa>

At the same time, the movement-origin of Jobbik is underpinned by a documentary film about Jobbik, Jobbik generation⁵ ('Jobbik' nemzedék). In this film Gábor Vona, present leader of the party, states that back in the times of the student movement there were members of the organization with different party preferences, however, they agreed on the main issues. He says they had the naïve dream that after they graduate and everyone joins their preferred parties they will have a common memory from their best years that creates a base for discussion and a spiritual foundation for collaboration that the difficult situation of the country might make necessary. This statement suggests that in the beginning Jobbik was really a movement, however several of its members had participated in parties before and at the time of party formation, it was supported by senior politicians.

After Jobbik was formed as a party it did not get into Parliament until 2010. Its first successful election was the 2009 European elections where it earned almost 15% of the votes with which it earned one mandate in the European Parliament. A year later in the 2010 general election Jobbik earned 17% of the votes and thus it became the third biggest party in the Hungarian Parliament (behind Fidesz that earned 53% of the votes and MSZP that earned 19%).

Both Podemos and Jobbik have concerns about existing dominant parties which is strongly present in their politics. Manuel Maroto, who was elected into the Commission for Democratic Guarantees within Podemos, explained how Podemos' *"political language and election manifestos might reclaim political spaces that were previously abandoned by traditional parties, particularly PSOE..."* (Junor 2015). Similarly Pablo Iglesias, the general secretary of Podemos, describes in his article about the party the state of the traditional party political situation in Spain as *"The old political parties in Spain appear to the citizens as little more than machines for getting access to the state administration by electoral means. In fact*

⁵ Presumably it was created by movie-makers are related to Jobbik around 2010. <http://szebbjovo.hu/jobbik-nemzedek-dokumentumfilm-jobbikrol/>

the elections that followed the 15-M movement had the feeling of an optical illusion: politicians and parties that were utterly discredited, perceived as the main problem by the citizens, were apparently inescapable, still dominating the realm of formal democracy” (Iglesias 2015: 19). Furthermore, he writes about the new parties that, according to him, had been foreseeable at the time of the economic crisis in 2008. He classifies Podemos among these parties by explaining that before the crisis Spain had been used as an example for economic success in the EU, but according to him that was purely the result of the *“development model based on real-estate bubbles and corrupt urban projects, overseen since the post-Franco Transition by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and Partido Popular (PP)”* (Iglesias 2015: 9-10).

Similarly, in the case of Jobbik, critiques towards the previously governing parties can be found both in its communication and election program (2010). The latter is constructed in a way that for every issue it first explains the problem in a section called *“last twenty years”* and then explains their planned reforms in a section called *“brighter future”*. This structure itself implies that the party is critical towards the parties of the 20 years that followed the Hungarian regime change regardless which party was in government. Similarly, the manifesto of Jobbik (2003) forms critiques towards the previously dominant parties: *“Considering its methodology, Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary is a radical organization because we have been focusing on real issues and real solutions in terms of our political activity. We believe that the deep crisis of politics lies in the enormous gap between the words and the actions of political parties”*.

2.2 Political attitudes of the countries

Even though both in Spain and in Hungary people claim that the society is not interested in politics, there are significant differences between the two countries concerning this phenomenon based on the results of the sixth round of the European Social Survey which took

place in 2012 (ESS 2012). The ESS data from 2012 is the most appropriate for the comparison of the two countries, because this is a period which is the closest to both Jobbik's and Podemos' party formation. However, it is important to note, that political interest has significantly increased in Spain and significantly decreased in Hungary between 2010 and 2012. However, most of the results about trust and satisfaction have not changed significantly in Hungary between 2010 and 2012 except the satisfaction with the country's government that has increased. Meanwhile these results have changed significantly in Spain and to understand the emergence Podemos the results from 2012 are more relevant, therefore comparing the results of the sixth ESS round is not misleading.

In Hungary only 3.9% of the respondents said that they were very interested in politics and 35.8% of them said that they were not interested at all, meanwhile in Spain 11.8% of the respondents said that they were very interested in politics and only 29.3% said that they were not interested at all (*Table 1*). Based on these results one can see that people were remarkably more interested in politics in general in Spain than in Hungary. This difference might be unsurprising result of the 15 years older democracy in Spain than in Hungary; even though 15 years does not seem like such a great difference, it means that in Spain everyone under the age of 40 were born in democracy while in Hungary only those under 25 were born in democracy. Considering the adult population that means a significant difference.

Table 1 - Political interest

	Spain	Hungary
Very interested	11.8%	3.9%
Quite interested	23.0%	22.4%
Hardly interested	35.8%	37.8%
Not at all interested	29.3%	35.8%
Total	N=1885	N=2003

Persons Chi Square=91.405; df=3; P<0.000

To understand the circumstances of the emergence of the two parties it is important to point out that the Hungarian society is more rightist than the Spanish. The average placement on the left-right scale where 0 means very leftist and 10 means very rightist the Spanish respondent placed themselves on 4.54, while the Hungarians on 5.41 (*Table 2*). While it is not surprising, it is important to note that not only are the two parties different, but also the whole societies' political ideology is unlike each other.

Table 2 - Placement on the left-right scale

	Spain	Hungary	Significance
Placement on the left-right scale (0=left – 10=right)	4.54 N=1734 Std=2.392	5.41 N=1663 Std=2.111	F=125.680; P<0.000

While political interest was higher in Spain - the trust in political institutions was generally higher in Hungary than in Spain. The only exception was the police towards which the trust in Spain was significantly higher (*Table 3*). The most outstanding differences were in the trust in politicians and political parties of the countries: in Hungary, people's trust in politicians was 3.26 on a ten point scale and 3.24 in political parties. These results were only 1.91 and 1.88 in the Spanish society. This might mean that the Hungarian society accepts what is given easier than the Spanish people. Based on that result it is easier to understand the different size of the movements the parties have their roots in.

Table 3 - Political trust

	Spain	Hungary	Significance	EU average
Trust in country's parliament	3.43 N=1802 Std=2.544	3.91 N=1927 Std=2.582	F=32.695; P<0.000	3.97
Trust in the legal system	3.70 N=1851 Std=2.584	4.66 N=1934 Std=2.494	F=135.309; P<0.000	4.85
Trust in the police	5.88 N=1875 Std=2.465	5.34 N=1964 Std=2.413	F=47.455; P<0.000	6.02
Trust in politicians	1.91 N=1868 Std=2.169	3.26 N=1954 Std=2.536	F=312.430; P<0.000	3.23
Trust in political parties	1.88 N=1868 Std=2.191	3.24 N=1943 Std=2.464	F=323.995; P<0.000	3.21

In general people were more satisfied with their lives in Spain than in Hungary (*Table 4*), however, they were less satisfied with the country's state of economy. This is not surprising considering how damagingly Spain was affected by the economic crisis. The Hungarian society was more satisfied with both the current government and with the state of democracy in the country. The former might not be surprising after less than two years of the new government of Fidesz that followed eight years of socialist government, which the society was not satisfied with in general. At the same time the satisfaction with democracy in Hungary was not so evident because in its first years the Fidesz government had already started to cut off the democratic institutions.

Table 4 – Satisfaction

	Spain	Hungary	Significance	EU average
Satisfaction with life as a whole	6.90 N=1884 Std=2.335	5.59 N=1996 Std=2.427	F=290.887; P<0.000	6.86
Satisfaction with present state of economy in country	2.17 N=1880 Std=2.041	3.35 N=1952 Std=2.295	F=282.704; P<0.000	3.90
Satisfaction with the national government	2.52 N=1857 Std=2.534	3.61 N=1902 Std=2.632	F=167.620; P<0.000	3.88
Satisfaction with the way democracy works in country	3.98 N=1834 Std=2.499	4.49 N=1906 Std=2.489	F=39.364; P<0.000	5.21

Some differences can be expected if the distinctions between the two countries are examined on the basis of political ideology. Altogether, the results do not differ from the results of the overall analysis but it is remarkable that among people with rather rightist ideology there were much more who were not interested in politics in Spain than in Hungary (*Table 5*). This explains how a rightist movement and party could become successful in Hungary but not in Spain.

Considering the fact that both trust in political institution and satisfaction with them are generally below (in the case of Spain) or around the EU average (in the case of Hungary), we can consider these results low, thus Mair's (1994) theory about the relation of 'anti-party' politics that links people's disenchantment with current political elite to the emergence of both reformist-populist and radical right movements seems applicable for the emergence of Podemos in Spain and Jobbik in Hungary.

Table 5 - Political interest by political ideology

	Right		Central		Left	
	Spain	Hungary	Spain	Hungary	Spain	Hungary
Very interested	12.5%	5.7%	9.7%	2.9%	17.9%	8.3%
Quite interested	24.3%	38.6%	22.7%	17.2%	27.6%	30.4%
Hardly interested	36.1%	39.5%	37.6%	40.1%	34.5%	36.3%
Not at all interested	27.0%	16.2%	30.0%	39.8%	19.9%	25.0%
Total	296	438	N=930	N=980	N=507	N=240
significance	Persons Chi Square=31.152; df=3; P<0.000		Persons Chi Square=56.854; df=3; P<0.000		Persons Chi Square=12.673; df=3; P=0.005	

Analyzing separately the different political ideologies shows that the Hungarian society had more trust in political institutions (except the police) independently from political ideology, however in both countries people with rightist political ideology trust in the institutions more. The only institution that shows some difference related to political ideology is the Parliament itself - rightist people in Hungary put more faith in the Parliament than in Spain, but there was no difference in the level of trust in the two countries among people with central political ideology or among people on the left. Since both countries had a conservative government at the time of the survey (FIDESZ in Hungary and PP in Spain) the level of trust in the non-rightist part of the society is the level of trust in the opposition (*Table 6*).

Table 6 - Political trust by political ideology

		Spain	Hungary	Significance
Trust in country's parliament	Right	4.43 N=284 Std=2.698	5.59 N=433 Std=2.591	F=33.699; P<0.000
	Central	3.48 N=900 Std=2.452	3.60 N=956 Std=2.346	F=1.067; P=0.302
	Left	2.82 N=493 Std=2.405	2.98 N=241 Std=2.3195	F=0.769; P=0.381
Trust in the legal system	Right	4.04 N=292 Std=2.630	5.89 N=432 Std=2.399	F=96.201; P<0.000
	Central	3.83 N=916 Std=2.575	4.33 N=962 Std=2.306	F=19.515; P<0.000
	Left	3.22 N=502 Std=2.439	4.12 N=239 Std=2.592	F=21.162; P<0.000
Trust in the police	Right	6.70 N=294 Std=2.385	6.24 N=432 Std=2.392	F=6.644; P=0.010
	Central	5.95 N=927 Std=2.337	5.11 N=966 Std=2.248	F=63.652; P<0.000
	Left	5.29 N=507 Std=2.467	4.80 N=241 Std=2.559	F=6.263; P=0.013
Trust in politicians	Right	2.75 N=293 Std=2.443	4.73 N=434 Std=2.764	F=98.251; P<0.000
	Central	1.84 N=926 Std=2.082	2.99 N=966 Std=2.307	F=130.062; P<0.000
	Left	1.56 N=507 Std=1.977	2.63 N=241 Std=2.242	F=43.717; P<0.000
Trust in political parties	Right	2.66 N=295 Std=2.541	4.64 N=433 Std=2.667	F=99.777; P<0.000
	Central	1.79 N=925 Std=2.062	2.98 N=960 Std=2.249	F=142.860; P<0.000
	Left	1.60 N=507 Std=2.097	2.74 N=241 Std=2.227	F=46.964; P<0.000

Through analyzing satisfaction with political institutions, Hungarian respondents were generally more satisfied; however, Spanish people were more satisfied with their life as a whole.

Controlling with ideology, the pattern seems the same; however, it shows no difference between the Spanish and the Hungarian leftist respondents in how satisfied they are with democracy in their countries (*Table 7*).

Table 7 - Satisfaction by political ideology

		Spain	Hungary	Significance
Satisfaction with life as a whole	Right	7.49 N=295 Std=2.193	6.59 N=438 Std=2.109	F=31.413; P<0.000
	Central	6.88 N=930 Std=2.322	5.31 N=979 Std=2.366	F=212.968; P<0.000
	Left	6.67 N=506 Std=2.331	5.02 N=242 Std=2.446	F=79.164; P<0.000
Satisfaction with present state of economy in country	Right	2.92 N=296 Std=2.342	4.70 N=435 Std=2.442	F=97.205; P<0.000
	Central	2.26 N=929 Std=2.003	3.15 N=962 Std=2.054	F=90.150; P<0.000
	Left	1.56 N=506 Std=1.721	2.52 N=240 Std=2.045	F=44.102; P<0.000
Satisfaction with the national government	Right	4.48 N=294 Std=2.847	5.70 N=429 Std=2.639	F=34.880; P<0.000
	Central	2.63 N=922 Std=2.315	3.31 N=953 Std=2.281	F=40.726; P<0.000
	Left	1.18 N=505 Std=1.873	2.25 N=240 Std=2.067	F=49.786; P<0.000
Satisfaction with the way democracy works in country	Right	4.98 N=292 Std=2.620	6.24 N=433 Std=2.245	F=48.618; P<0.000
	Central	4.04 N=913 Std=2.335	4.25 N=955 Std=2.236	F=3.926; P=0.048
	Left	3.23 N=500 Std=2.360	3.15 N=239 Std=2.132	F=0.237; P=0.627

2.3 Demographic characteristics of the two parties

The quantitatively measurable characteristics of the two parties are very similar. Both are currently the third biggest parties in their countries' Parliaments. Podemos earned 20% of the votes in the Spanish general elections in December 2015, while Jobbik earned 17% of the votes in the first general election it participated in 2010 and more than 20% of the votes in 2014 (EED).

Podemos' popularity can be understood by analyzing the results on the provincial level. Their popularity after the European Parliamentary elections in 2014 negatively correlated with the provincial unemployment level. This means that the less people were unemployed in a Spanish province in 2014 the more people voted for Podemos, and it is more popular in provinces where the GDP per capita is higher, which probably correlates with the lower level of unemployment. The voters of Podemos seem to belong to the middle class rather than to marginalized groups of society (Betancor 2014), which underpins the theories of the appearance of new leftist parties, concerned about post-material values. Furthermore, based on the analysis on CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) data of May-June 2015 it turned out that third of the voters of Podemos used to vote for PSOE and 20% of them used to be supporters of IU. The voters of Podemos are more dissatisfied with Spanish politics than the voters of PP's or PSOE's and they were less mobilized by previous elections. Unskilled or skilled workers, as well as the members of the older middle class voted for PSOE rather than for Podemos. Similarly, people with higher household income were less likely to vote for Podemos (Rodon and Hierro 2016: 13-14).

In the case of Jobbik, the support of the party is independent from socio-economic background, although the elite is rather underrepresented among the supporters of the far-right (Bíró Nagy et al 2011) and the supporters of Jobbik do not come from the marginalized part of

the society either (Róna 2014). Furthermore, among Jobbik's supporters, as in most radical right parties, there are more men than women and the level of religiousness is low, even though the party built a great part of its ideologies on Christianity. Compared to other radical parties in Europe, Jobbik's supporters are higher educated and they have the highest level of economic background among the radical right parties' supporters in Europe (Róna 2014). The uniquely high educational and economic status of the supporters might be the result of Jobbik's roots in a higher educational student movement. These results contradict Kriesi's (1997) theory about the losers of globalization and the emergence of the radical right. Further unique characteristic of Jobbik's supporters is that it is more popular in the parts of Hungary that are densely populated by Romas, which is distinctive compared to other radical right parties in Europe that are generally more popular in areas where less immigrants or citizens of minority groups live (Róna 2014).

Altogether, besides their rate of representation in the national parliaments, there are further substantial similarities among the electorate of Podemos and Jobbik. Both parties have a young supporter group and they are more likely to come from the middle class, with higher income backgrounds. These similarities can be explained by the fact that both parties have their roots in universities, however, in the case of Jobbik that was a student movement and in the case of Podemos a movement in which university professors had key roles.

3 Qualitative analysis of Jobbik and Podemos

In the analysis, first I go through the parties' organizational structures, mainly based on their documents of organizational regulations. Second, I go through their activities on online platforms where they are most likely to maintain their relations with supporters and also I take a look on their activities on offline platforms. Additionally, I analyze those recent events from the parties' lives that reveal further substantial information about the parties' operations.

3.1 Organizational structure

Both Jobbik and Podemos claim that they would like to make changes in the political system and most importantly they both criticize the function of the existing political parties that, according to them, are too elitist, therefore too separated from society. This similar attitude of the two parties fits into Mair's (1994) 'anti-party' politics theory. Considering the two societies' low level of trust in and moderate satisfaction with political institutions and the political elite compared to the European average, the parties' critical attitudes towards the traditional political elites might make them attractive to voters.

The organizational structures of Jobbik and Podemos are surprisingly distinct, even if differences between the two parties are given – such as their political ideologies, their length of existence and their ideas about the ideally involved civil society. These differences naturally lead to some diverse characteristics between the two parties; however, do not necessarily make them exact opposites. Meanwhile, the organizational structure of Jobbik is more similar to those of the traditional parties; Podemos involves a weakly bonded group of party members into its official structure.

Analyzing the organization structure is easier in the case of Podemos because the party shares its precisely detailed organizational document (*Documento Organizativo*) that publicly lays down the structure of the organizational actors and their functions on its webpage. In contrast, Jobbik does not make its regulations accessible for everyone, however, it leaked out. This difference in itself raises several questions in connection with the strength of the parties' movement relations. If supporters (as well as opponents) do not have access to such a document, how available can a party be for the public?

To study Podemos' organizational structure it should be divided into two main segments, which are strongly connected. The core part of the organizational structure is similar to traditional parties': the group of party members who participate in elections. According to Katz and Mair (1992) this is the governing organization, however, in Podemos it is not separated strictly from other members of the party. One of the interviewed volunteers in Podemos' office described the importance of the connections between the party level as follows: "*We are divided up into different circles (Círculos Podemos) [...] the good thing about the structure is that there is always a link to somebody who has a link to a different area with the higher people*".

Based on the *Documento Organizativo*, the basic unit of the party is the formation of Circles (*Círculos*). Through the Circles, Podemos maintains the participation, debate, and active relation with society. According to the interviews with the volunteers, those members of the party who are willing to participate in the work of the Circles really have the possibility to influence the processes of the party. The Circles have regular meetings, called Assembly (*Asamblea*), where party members discuss and vote about those relevant issues that later might go up to local or national level of the party for further discussion and decision. One does not have to be a member of the party to participate and share his or her opinion in an Assembly; however, voting in issues is the right of only the members. According to the volunteers who are

working in the Podemos office in Madrid, generally in smaller districts or cities there are only a small group of people who participate in the assemblies organized by the local Circle, while in larger districts and cities the number of participants in the assemblies is usually higher. The number of regular participants varies from 10 people in assembly for up to 40-50 party members who regularly participates. Nevertheless, the assemblies are organized regularly in every circle, regardless their size, the only difference being the frequency of the events. In bigger circles it is more difficult to organize assemblies that are good for everyone, therefore they have it once in every two weeks while in smaller places they have it every week.

Being a member of Podemos, means to be registered with Podemos, which is ca. 350.000 people around the country.⁶ According to the regulations, everyone can register who is over the age of eighteen, is committed to the building of Podemos, and accepts its Ethical Code. The Ethical Code contains those issues that are important in Podemos, such as human rights, equality, direct democracy, transparency in every level of politics, etc. Anyone who accepts the Ethical Code not only agrees with these issues but also promises that they will promote these values within one's capabilities. The document ends with a statement: *"I freely agree to these commitments, understanding each one of the points written here and taking on their defense as the best guarantee for the building of a fairer society in which all people may be freer."*

The general secretary of the party is Pablo Iglesias, whose role is important. He and the other members of the presidency, demonstrate the grassroots characteristics of the party, as they do not have prior political experience, Iglesias, for example, was a political science professor. Even though the role of Iglesias is strong in the party, the decisions are not made by him alone, all the issues are voted on by the party members. This operational mechanism is what Bolleyer

⁶ podemos.info/organizacion. Accessed June 2, 2016.

at all (2015) describe as “*highly inclusive selectorate*” and which they link to possible internal conflicts within the party.

In contrast to the very detailed description and regulation of Podemos’ organizational structure, there are only a few details that can be found on Jobbik’s webpage. Based on this, Jobbik’s organizational structure is a more centralized, hierarchical and traditional system, built up from national presidency and representatives. It claims that it is built from bottom to top because most of the office-holders of the party do not come from the political elite. However, in the first election it participated in 2006 Jobbik run in coalition with MIÉP, which was a radical right party in the 1990’s, which lost a great part of its supporters by that time. Overall, the grassroot party elite is very similar between the two parties, not just in a sense that they, at least in theory, did not participate in politics before but also that both parties were formed in an university environment.

As mentioned earlier, the foundational rules and organizational structure of Jobbik are not public; a fact that in itself, might suggest that the parties organizational structure is not too democratic and does not give as much possibility to the public to get involved as the party claims. Kertész (2013) managed to access the regulations and he has found several paragraphs that underpin that the party has a centralized organizational structure that gives expanded rights to the presidency. The founding regulation gives the right to create or eliminate local organizations; the organizational and operational regulations of local organizations and caucus can be vetoed by the presidency. The presidency has the right to create or modify the Ethics and Disciplinary Rules and the Financial and Economic rules of the party. The final decision in disciplinary cases is also the right of the party’s presidency and it has an exclusive right to nominate and to make decisions. The president himself has the right to propose the recall of the president of the national caucus at any time. Formation of any sub organization cannot take place without the support of the national presidency. Finally, the presidency has the exclusive

right to propose the modification of the foundation regulation, thus it is impossible for local organization to democratize the structure (Kertész 2013: 192). The extended authority of the party's president was demonstrated in the party's recent events that I will elaborate on more in the last subsection of this chapter.

Researchers have managed to access the regulation documents of the party, however there supposed to be attached rules, which are still unavailable and which might contain further important parts of the operation of the party's organization. In Jobbik's foundational rules (Jobbik Alapszabály 2009), one can find the rights of the members of the party, which is, according to that, to vote on personnel issues, such as the election of board members and members of the caucus. Members in general are not involved in the policy making process, once the office-holders of the party have been elected they get to decide about operational issues. As the foundational regulation forms it, the members have a right to send their written observations to the boards, organizations, or office holders for which they must receive a substantive response within 60 days. One may have several concerns with this regulation in the case of a movement party: firstly, it is not clear what a substantive response exactly means and secondly, 60 days is a long enough time that by the time the member gets a response the issue is likely to be outdated and already been decided. According to the regulations, the voice of the members is limited in Jobbik, even though they have a right to vote on personnel decisions they are almost perfectly excluded from the further relevant issues of the party. As the interviewee in Jobbik's headquarter stated it: *"the members of the party are allowed to have contrary opinions; however, the president makes the ultimate decisions"*.

Even though the local organizations are autonomous in the sense that they can decide on the strategy concerning local issues they have to follow the main ideology of Jobbik, meaning they cannot have different ideas about local issues than the national level of the party. Moreover, Jobbik still creates events that offer the opportunity of informal participation for

supporters. At these events the supporters, even if they are formal members of the party, do not have the voice to form the politics of the party effectively, however, they have the possibility to tell their opinion during the forums and ask questions about issues they have concerns about.

Reaching Jobbik is not as easy for a supporter as in the case of Podemos. Similarly to Podemos the party members can help the work of the party; however, they do not have a voice in the party's operation. Registering with Jobbik does not require more than the basic personal information such as name, place and time of birth and address, additionally it asks for the level of education, occupation and previous party membership. Based on the webpage, those who register for membership can select what kind of activities they would be able to participate in; partly these activities are administrative tasks (such as transportation by car, photocopying, sharing posters or flyers, organizational works), activities that require special skills (such as writing articles, online campaigning or expert works) and financial support.⁷ Further difficulties that one a prospective members of Jobbik faces are those conditions that one has to satisfy in order to be accepted: For example, since 2009, someone who was a member of MSZP, SZDSZ or the workers party ever, or was a member of the conservative MDF still in 2007 cannot be a member of the party (Jobbik Alapszabály 2009). The original regulation also states that those who were in office in the socialist institutions cannot be accepted as party members, either (Jobbik Alapszabály 2003). The rights and obligations of Jobbik members did not change between 2003 and 2009.

Jobbik, on its webpage gives answers to a few frequently asked questions; one of them being: what is the guarantee that if Jobbik gains power it will not be the same as the current parties in the parliament? As an answer to this question, they claim that they support the civil control over politics such as the official possibility to recall representatives, the elimination of

⁷ <https://jobbik.hu/csatlakozzon-hozzank>. Accessed June 2, 2016.

parliamentary immunity, and the control of severe punishment of politicians' crimes.⁸ This shows, that Jobbik considers remaining different not based on how its organizational structure is constructed, but how it conducts itself if it gains power.

The quantitatively measured party membership used to be a good indicator of a party but, as it has decreased significantly and is now generally low around Europe, it is no longer a good indicator (Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012). However, it still could be used to characterize movement parties that are likely to have more members than traditional parties compared to their sizes. Rather than their number, the members' role should be analyzed. Additionally, beyond party membership new forms of party-related participations have appeared such as "supporters, friends, and online members" (Gauja and Jackson 2016) in the recent decades around Europe - as we can see a relevant role of the supporters around the studied parties. It seems that being a party member is more common in Spain than in Hungary. In the case of Spain both the traditional parties and the newly formed Podemos have more members compared to country's population than in shortly after Jobbik was elected into the national parliament (*Table 8*).

Table 8 - Party membership in Spain and in Hungary

Hungary (in 2011)*		Spain**	
Party	number of members (country population ratio)	Party	number of members (country population ratio)
Jobbik	12,430 (0.13%)	Podemos	399,048 (0.86%)
Fidesz + KDNP	40,320 + 15,500 (0.41% + 0.16%)	PP	865,000 (1.86%)
MSZP	33,200 (0.34%)	PSOE	623,000 (1.34%)

* Based on http://nol.hu/belfold/nem_partoljuk_a_parttagsagot_-1069921 Accessed May 30, 2016.

** Based on Wikipedia, which seems to be the only available source for these numbers, however, the numbers seem to be right considering the results of Van Biezen et al (2012)

8 <https://jobbik.hu/jobbikrol/kiskate>. Accessed June 2, 2016.

Considering the different level of centralization of the organizational structures of the parties that might be caused by their different ideology, further possible explanations can be found, for example the different level of political trust in the two societies implies why a grassroots party need to be more convincing about its movement-like characteristics in Spain where peoples' trust in political institutions, especially politicians and political parties, is significantly lower even compared to Hungary.

3.2 Relations with the civil society

Both parties use online and offline platforms to keep in contact with the civil society, however, the strategies and the aims of the relations with the civil societies are different. Podemos is focusing mainly on online platforms aiming to involve its supporters into the party's mechanisms meanwhile Jobbik's relationships with its supporters are mainly offline with the aim to strengthen the ideological connections.

3.2.1 Online activities

Both Jobbik and Podemos use social media actively to maintain their relationship with their supporters, therefore I believe that it is not their quantitatively measurable activity that tells most about the function of this platform but those details of posts and events that might explain for what they are using the social media. Besides their social media activity, I am analyzing their other online activities and surfaces in case they use other sites as well. This part of the analysis of the usage of the online platforms is more important in the case of Podemos, because it uses several different webpages to keep contact with its members and to involve them

into the policymaking processes. Although Jobbik has an extended online network around its website.

Both Jobbik and Podemos utilize the opportunities offered by various social media sites. While the main platform of Podemos is Twitter, they do not only use it actively; their Twitter site is the main contact information of the office-holders on the webpage. It is remarkable that in the case of Jobbik, the number of followers of the main twitter page is extremely low compared to the number of likes of its main Facebook page (*Table 9*). However, that might be explained by the difference in the practice of the usage of social media in Spain and Hungary.

Comparing the two parties one can find that the followers per country population ratio in the party's Twitter pages is very high in the case of Podemos, while it is negligible in the case of Jobbik. A further result that is worth noting is that in the case of Facebook, Jobbik performs better than Podemos if one considers the likes – country population ratio.

Table 9 - Social media activity of Jobbik and Podemos

	Jobbik	Podemos
Facebook page of the party	317,597 likes (3.22%)*	1,065,778 likes (2.29%)
Twitter page of the party	7996 followers (0.07%) (7,555 tweets)	1,092,117 followers (2.35%) (60.834 tweets)
Party leader's Facebook page	271,799 likes (2.29%)	584,896 likes (1.26%)
Party leader's Twitter page	1276 followers (0.01%) (50 tweets)	1,740,723 followers (3.74%) (11,957 tweets)

Date of access: 2016.05.14.

*likes/followers – country's population ratio

Podemos' activity both on Facebook and Twitter is higher than the two other main parties' in Spain, which shows that in the case of Podemos the importance of social media in maintaining the relationship with supporters is greater than it is in general in Spain. In the case of Jobbik the difference is not relevant for Twitter; however, its Facebook activity is higher than the two traditionally important parties' of the country (*Table 10*).

Table 10 - Social media activity of the previously dominant parties

	Hungary		Spain	
	Fidesz	MSZP	PP	PSOE
Facebook page of the party	201,641 likes (2.04%)*	130,801 likes (1.32%)	146,419 likes (0.31%)	126,278 likes (0.27%)
Twitter page of the party	27,547 followers (0.28%) (36,408 tweets)	12,026 followers (0.12%) (6,381 tweets)	537,782 followers (1.16%) (38,298 tweets)	429,613 followers (0.92%) (55,240 tweets)

Date of access: 2016.05.14.

*likes/followers – country's population ratio

Both parties sub organizations have separate Facebook pages and most of them are using them actively. The activity of local Facebook pages shows a difference between the two parties⁹ (Table 11). The first most conspicuous distinction is number of likes compared to the number of habitants of a city. In the case of both parties it can be said that the smaller the city, the bigger the ratio of likes compared to the population's number. However, this trend is more obvious in the case of Jobbik. This most likely correlates with the parties' level of activity in different types of settlements, thus Jobbik maybe more active in the countryside and in smaller cities than Podemos.

In contrast with the number of likes, the number of events a local Facebook page organizes seems to be lower in smaller cities. It is important to note, that since Jobbik has been around longer, the number of events cannot be compared. At first sight, it seems that the local Facebook pages of the two parties organize approximately the same amount of events in every type of city. In the case of Jobbik some pages' events are dating back 5 years (e.g. Jobbik Szeged has 109 events, the first one being 'Majális a ligetben' (*Picnic in the park / May Festival*) which took place on 1st of May, 2011. Therefore, it is assumable that Podemos

⁹ The analysis of the local Facebook activity was based on a small, randomly selected sample from the countries settlement. In the case of Hungary all the cities were used over 50,000 habitants and among the settlements with 10,000 to 50,000 habitants and under 10,000 habitants 30-30 elements sample were selected. In the case of Spain, all the cities were used over 500,000 habitants, 10-10 elements sample were selected among the cities over 50,000 habitants and 30-30 elements sample were selected from the cities under 50,000 habitants.

organizes events more frequently. The majority of the events are Assemblies in the case of Podemos and Forums or Open hours in the case of Jobbik.

Table 11 - Local Facebook pages' activity

	Jobbik		Podemos	
	Average likes/habitant ratio (max, min)	Average number of events (max, min)	Average likes/habitant ratio (max, min)	Average number of events (max, min)
>500,000 habitants	0.31% (only Budapest)	22 (only Budapest)	1.27% (0.31%, 2.24%)	17 (0, 69)
200,000-500,000 habitants	(Debrecen has no Facebook page)	(Debrecen has no Facebook page)	1.35% (0.05%, 3.53%)	17 (0, 50)
100,000-200,000 habitants	2.10% (0.90%, 4.98%)	24 (0, 109)	2.82% (1.01%, 7.66%)	27 (0, 73)
50,000-100,000 habitants	2.89% (0.21%, 9.47%)	9 (0, 39)	3.24% (0.18%, 6.86%)	16 (0, 47)
10,000-50,000 habitants	9.42% (0.50%, 32.66%)	1 (0, 10)	5.16% (0.28%, 20.04%)	6 (0, 23)
<10,000 habitants	(1 page out of 30 villages)	(1 page out of 30 villages)	(3 pages out of 30 villages)	(3 pages out of 30 villages)

Date of access: 2016.05.24.

Both parties organize their events on social media, and their events appear on the parties' webpages as well. However, the role of the events is different in several aspects. Jobbik mostly organizes lectures about nationalism, Hungarian history, and further topics that are related to the party's nationalist ideology and the proportion of the events where party members are given the possibility to express their views or ask their questions is lower. In contrast, the majority of Podemos' events are the Assemblies where members discuss the party- and politics-related issues every week. Furthermore, Podemos' other events also include current issues related to politics, such as the spring festival.

Podemos uses further online surfaces besides social media, among them Plaza Podemos, where the party keeps in contact with its members and is defined as follows: "This plaza is a space of political participation where you can discuss, propose initiatives, and share your ideas

in order to build PODEMOS together”.¹⁰ On this platform party members can raise ideas and initiations they are concerned about and if it reaches the support of 10% of members a referendum will be held among them. According to an interviewee, 5% of all the suggestions in Plaza Podemos go up to referendum.

Among the most supported ideas on the Plaza there are various kinds of issues such as income-related questions, issues connected with various levels of the education, or the electoral system in general, e.g. the voting regulations from abroad. As an example that is connected to this thesis, one of the new ideas raised recently (therefore there is no reaction to it yet), was a member’s concern that Podemos does not give the opportunity to participate for those who do not use Internet.

The interviewed Jobbik member claimed that for Jobbik the personal relationship is more important because the party considers it the most effective way to convince potential voters or even members. That explains why there is such a great difference between the social media activities of the two parties. However, Jeskó, Bakó and Tóth (2012) explored an extended and dense online network of various websites connected to the radical right subculture around Jobbik (*Figure 1*). The biggest websites in the networks are the new site of Barikád, the site of the HVIM youth movement, the Kurucinfo new site, the website of the Hungarian Sziget Festival and the online Szent Korona radio which are all strongly connected to Jobbik. Barikád is the official paper of the party and Kurucinfo is the most important, quasi-illegal news site of the radical right. The HVIM movement’s history is connected to Jobbik’s and the two organizations signed an agreement of cooperation in 2009. The movement represents the aims of the radical right including the revision of historical Hungary (even its name refers to it with the 64 counties; however, Hungary has never had that many territories). The leader of HVIM

¹⁰ ”Esta plaza es un espacio de participación política en la que puedes debatir, proponer iniciativas y compartir tus ideas con el fin de construir de forma conjunta PODEMOS.”

It seems that both parties use social media actively (Jobbik mostly facebook and Podemos both Facebook and Twitter), but their further activities in the online sphere are distinct. While Podemos organizes its followers mostly on Plaza Podemos to involve them in its operations, Jobbik's extended online network is not directly created by the party, however Jobbik is strongly involved in the network and there are significant overlaps between Jobbik and the related sites rooted in the Hungarian radical right subculture.

3.2.2 Offline activities

Further information one can find about the parties' activities is that Podemos seems to organize their supporters mostly online, while Jobbik focuses more on offline platforms where it can keep in touch with its supporters.

As mentioned earlier, Podemos' offline activities are mainly covered by the Assemblies that are parts of the organizational structure. The party organizes only few other events where supporters have the opportunity to meet the party's members and representatives (such as the Spring Festival (*Fiesta de la Primavera de Podemos*) was on the end of April). These events are also concerning the party's program and political related topics. Even though the movement Podemos emerged from was a demonstrations-based one, the party seems to have lost its active appearance on public demonstrations.

Jobbik, as it emerged in 2003, when Internet coverage was limited (the national election in 2002 was the first when parties used the internet in their campaigns, although only 10% of the households in Hungary had Internet connection back then – (Boros 2011)), therefore offline platforms have been substantial in Jobbik's operations. However, among the Hungarian parties, regarding the involvement effects in the online campaigns Jobbik became the most active by 2010 (Boros 2011).

The pattern of Jobbik's offline events is more diverse than Podemos', especially those organized by groups connected to Jobbik but not directly linked, similarly to the webpages around Jobbik's sites. Jobbik itself organizes events on national holidays and anniversaries of specific national historical occurrences (such as the anniversary of the Trianon peace treaty at the end of WWI) that, as mentioned in the historical background, may be framed according to the party's ideology. Jobbik also organizes demonstrations on the subject of important public events (it was only a movement when it participated in demonstrations for the recount of votes after the 2002 elections, later Jobbik's leaders and members participated in the demonstrations against Ferenc Gyurcsány in 2006 after the "Öszödi beszéd"¹¹ (Róna 2014). Recently, one of their highest profile demonstration topics was the foreign currency loans in 2014 and immigration in 2015 (Róna and Molnár 2016).

Besides active participation in demonstrations, Jobbik has strong ties with other radical right organizations which also strengthen its movement characteristics, especially, because it seems that there is now such a network of organizations around other Hungarian parties (Athena Institute 2013). A few among the most important organizations are the already mentioned HVIM youth movement and several paramilitary organizations such as the Véderő ("Defence Force"), the Betyársereg ("Bandits' Army"), or the Magyar Gárda ("Hungarian Guard Movement"), later known as the Új Magyar Gárda ("New Hungarian Guard Movement"), and the Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület ("Civil Guard Association for a Brighter Future"), later the Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom ("Hungarian Self Defense Movement"). Even though Jobbik distanced itself from the former two extreme radical organizations (Véderő, Betyársereg), there are several overlaps between the members of Jobbik and the members of these organizations,

¹¹ "Öszödi beszéd" refers to a speech of Ferenc Gyurcsány (prime minister of the socialist government) in a closed party event in Balatonöszöd in May 2016 leaked out four months later, in September 2016. The speech included sentences such as: "We fucked it up" and "We have been lying in the last 1.5-2 years", and it became a trigger for a long-term movement for the oppositions, especially for the supporters of the radical right against the socialist-liberal government.

that imply some links between them and Jobbik. The Magyar Gárda and the Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület were both directly connected to Jobbik and both were banned, thus they were recreated with a new name.

Jobbik organizes volunteer actions also, for example – as the interviewee mentioned in Jobbik's headquarter in Budapest – 2015 was the year of charity. For Jobbik MPs it was mandatory to spend at least one day a month volunteering and to donate a part of their salary to support organizations monthly. Furthermore, individual members and supporters, as well as NGOs, got the opportunity to participate in various types of volunteer work with Jobbik.

It seems that Podemos does not have a similar, ideology based network of organizations around the party. This implies that both parties connect to their movement-like origins in different ways: While Podemos incorporates its origins into its organizational structure, Jobbik focuses on maintaining an ideological community.

3.3 Recent events

Recently both parties have started to go through a difficult period that might be in connection with the parties' real function as a party. The way in which each party handled the difficulties shows substantial differences among them. Jobbik leader, Gabor Vona, with the aim of being successful in the next elections, has not renewed the mandate of several members of the presidency. This shows that in Jobbik the leader has unlimited power in the cases of personnel issues in the higher levels of the party, even though, members have the right to vote in personnel decisions. The rules of nominations and elections are laid down in the Electoral Regulations (according to the Foundational Rules) that is not available for the public. On 28th May, 2016 Jobbik elected a new presidency, resulting in Vona's reelection as president and all

presidential roles filled by people close to Vona. His popularity decreased relevantly, even though he still gained 80.5% of the votes. As an outcome of the election the party claims that the transition to be a 'people's party has finished.

At the same time Podemos has been facing a difficult period since the election that took place in December 2015 in Spain. None of the elected parties had enough representatives to form a government; therefore the parties had to face the possibility of forming a coalition. Even though the party's presidency started negotiating with PSOE, the decision in Podemos was made with the involvement of all party members; everyone had the same vote to decide whether they could imagine the party to form a coalition with one of the other parties. In the poll 150.000 party members participated 88% of which voted against forming a coalition with the PSOE and the Ciudadanos ("Citizens") and 92% of the voters voted against a possible coalition with Ciudadanos and a smaller nationalist party.¹² The results showed that the majority of the party's members would not like the party to form a coalition with either of the parties; this put Spain as a country into a difficult position since it led to the need of a new election, However Podemos' image that the society can really influence the party came true.

These recent events are examples for the parties' operations, they were happening during the period of the thesis writing process and I consider both important enough to mention. Considering the results the thesis have, such as Podemos focusing mostly on the democratic thus movement-like organizational mechanism, Jobbik's movement like characteristics are not implemented in its organizational structure, therefore the two parties 'different reaction to difficulties should not be a surprise.

¹² <https://twitter.com/ahorapodemos/status/722024230674677760>. Accessed May 28, 2016.

Discussion and conclusions

As shown in the chapter of background analysis of the two countries, Spain and Hungary have several similar characteristics, but they have substantial differences as well. The two countries have young democratic systems, however Hungary transitioned from a socialist dictatorship and Spain from a fascist systems. The difference in the two authoritarian systems itself might partially explain why a radical right movement could emerged in Hungary's rather rightist society and a leftist one in the more leftist Spanish society. The political attitudes of the two societies are significantly distinct, this might be the result of Spain's fifteen years older democracy. Spanish people in general are more interested in politics, have lower political trust and satisfaction with political institutions, but the society is generally more satisfied with their life as a whole. The supporters of the two parties are similar: Podemos, as a new leftist party has voters with a better socio-economic background. Jobbik's supporters are also from the higher educated middle class, which is atypical of a radical right party and it contradicts the theory about supporters of radical right movements being the losers of globalization (Kriesi 1997). The number of party members is significantly different between the two parties, however this does not necessarily mean that one is more movement-like than the other, both parties' membership fit into the pattern of party memberships within the countries.

The movements that the two parties emerged from are very different. The student movement that Jobbik has roots in was a grassroot student organization with the aim of joining rightist-nationalist youth. Podemos, on the other hand, has emerged from an anti-austerity movement that occurred after the economic crisis and organized huge demonstrations around the whole country. Both parties achieved their first success in European Parliamentary elections, however Jobbik in 2009 and Podemos in 2014. A year after their first success both parties entered their country's parliament as the third strongest party.

In their communication, both parties insist that they differ from the traditional parties and that they are open to supporters. However, based on its organizational operations, Jobbik gives almost no real influential power to its members and its supporters' role is mostly a formality. Organizationally, Podemos, at least until now, has kept up its movement origin more successfully by giving a real opportunity to members to influence the party's operation and give significant right of voice to supporters as well.

The role of the parties' members in their operation is the most crucial difference between the two parties regarding their movement characteristics. Jobbik members have a right to vote on personnel decisions, however, other areas of the party's operation are rather formal, moreover, members' right to express their opinions is limited in the sense that they can only communicate their concerns in writing. Podemos' members are more involved in everyday decisions and they have a real opportunity to make their proposals and voice their concerns. Considering the second and the third hypothesis I formed about the number and the role of the members, I expected the membership of each party would be relatively high within their countries and their role would be significant in the parties' operations. We can see that even though the membership is not higher than those in other parties in each country, the influential power of the members is significantly greater in Podemos compared to Jobbik.

In my first hypothesis I assumed that both parties use similar techniques to involve supporters and offer them similar opportunities; this was only partially underpinned. In involving supporters, the two parties function similarly in the sense that they both use social media actively and organize events frequently, where supporters have the possibility to share their opinions or raise their questions. However, supporters' opportunities in Jobbik are mainly restricted to raising their questions to office-holders of the party during forums or open hours. In Podemos they have the possibility of participating in Assemblies where they can get involved in the discussions about operational questions with members at the lower levels of the party.

Furthermore, based on the results, Podemos encourages members to get involved in its operations, while Jobbik focuses on maintaining a radical right community. Jobbik focuses more on Tarrow's (2011) framing and identity building aspect and it seems its operations focus much more on Verge's (2012) three strategies a party might use to maintain relationship with the civil society, through non-political organizations.

Finally, I do not consider my fourth hypothesis to be underpinned by the results. Based on the ideas of the members of the two parties, their intentions about being civil are very analogous; however with further research I found that in reality Podemos better implements the ideas in its operational procedures than Jobbik. Nevertheless, the different attitude in connection with their contrasting ideological background can be found in their radically opposite organizational structures.

Altogether, I can conclude that besides the expected finding that Jobbik is more centralized than Podemos – which is probably the result of the fact that Jobbik has a longer history as a party as well as that radical right ideology itself indicates a more authoritarian structure – both parties have managed to preserve relevant characteristics, which still make them movement-like parties and in this sense they are similar to each other.

This specific study has its own limitation regarding the very different features of the two parties that make it easier to reveal the similarities resulting from their parallel origins. On the other hand, this also makes it more difficult to decide which differences they have in their operations genuine and which are only due to the fact that one of them lost more of its movement characteristics than the other. Furthermore, the study of any movement based party has its limitations. Collecting the relevant data is challenging in a sense that a party's movement-like characteristics can appear in various aspects of its operations, such as the organizational structure, in its relations to its supporters or even in the network around it.

However, the thesis has managed to underpin the relevance of a movement origin in a party's operations and revealed some difficulties a party faces when it tries to achieve real odds in an electoral competition and maintain its movement-likeness at the same time. Furthermore, the thesis also reveals several different layers from the complex phenomenon of a party's movement-like operation that can be used as a base for further study.

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