Cross-temporal analysis of LMP's left-right position with candidate and campaign-centric tools of measurement

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Abstract

The left-right dichotomy remains one of the strongest structuring forces of politics in Western and Eastern Europe alike, and several distinct methods exist for locating parties in ideological space. This paper presents a cross-temporal analysis of the position of LMP, a Hungarian green party by using both traditional and unconventional tools of measurement. LMP experienced a split in 2013, which was followed by the emergence of a public discourse reporting the right-wing shift of the party. Politicians of the latter sought to refute claims about an alleged ideological drift, and this thesis is the first empirical test of the question. Beside established methods like expert and elite surveys, campaign and candidate-centric approaches, like content analysis of district-level manifestos/résumés and data on candidates' past partisan–organizational affiliations are also used. Results underline the strength of the perception of the shift among candidates, possibly triggering changes in the tone of their campaign, but also the lack of substantial changes at the individual level.

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1. Introduction

The left-right dichotomy is not only the most important dimension that structures political contestation and party competition in Western Europe (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013, p.27), but the measurement and of parties' positions respective to it is also the subject of heated debates in political science.[1] As Franzmann and Kaiser said, present-day comparative politics tends to rely more and more on "spatial concepts that make use of political parties' positions in policy space" when conducting empirical research (2006, p.163). And while there is an abundance of methods, ranging from surveys to algorithms determining party positions in proximity space, one thing scholars certainly agree on is that there is no best way to measure party positions. Each method is associated with different levels of validity, reliability, flexibility and reliability, not to mention the availability of specific datasets (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013, p.30).

Krouwel and Elfrinkhof list five major ways of measuring and locating positions of parties along conflict dimensions and political issues (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014). According to them, one can distinguish three types of surveys based on the group of targeted subjects: expert surveys, voter surveys and party elite surveys. In addition, the roll-call behavior of representatives and the content analysis of coded partisan manifestos are also suitable tools for such purposes. Given the very different ways left-right datasets were constructed, it is somewhat surprising that they actually generate very similar estimates of party positions; cross-validation efforts emphasized high degrees of correlation, suggesting that when it comes to locations on left-right scales, human coders of party manifestos, computer-assisted content analyses as well as expert surveys measure roughly the same concepts (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013, p.44; Volkens, 2007, p.109).

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[1] An earlier and shorter version of this thesis has been published in Hungarian in May 2016, as Kovarek, Dániel (2016). Lehetnek más jelöltjeik? Az LMP bal-jobb tengelyen elfoglalt pozíciója. In: G. Dobos et al., eds., *Pártok, jelöltek, képviselők.* Budapest: Szabad Kéz, pp. 188–219.

If placement of parties along a one-dimensional left-right axis were not challenging enough, tracking and analyzing changes of these positions is an even harder nut to crack. Overall party positions in left-right terms tend to be outstandingly stable: experts provide generalizations of them, ignoring short-term programmatic changes (Volkens, 2007, p.109). The time series analysis of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (citizens perceptions on party position, CSES) and the Chapel Hill expert surveys revealed that in the last two decades, two thirds of all changes in party positions between elections was statistically small, with their size comparable to the simple random sampling error of mean scores (Dalton and McAllister, 2015). At the same time, as Benoit and Laver (2007) pointed out, even if parties' ideological and policy positions are measured only in a single country, the substantive meaning of "left-right" changes across time. These notions (either asked in expert surveys or coded in party manifestos) have meanings that are "strongly tied not only to country context, but also to specific political periods within a country" (Benoit and Laver, 2007, p.103).

In this thesis, I present a comparison of some of these methods in relation to a case study on a Hungarian party. Politics Can Be Different (*Lehet Más a Politika*, abbreviated as *LMP*) is the most successful green party of the two-and-a-half-decade-long history of democratic Hungarian politics, as it is the sole green party that achieved representation in its own right in the National Assembly, passing the parliamentary threshold in 2010 and 2014.

LMP stemmed from anti-globalist, environmentalist and human rights advocate movements, presenting a strong leftist character. After its liberal wing left the party in 2013, pundits and politicians alike argued that the party started shifting to the right, both in its messages and political personnel, trying to establish a *right-wing green party*. This discourse, in which the LMP found itself almost instantaneously after the party split, triggered fierce objections from its representatives and members.

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The emergence of a right-wing green party would be a novelty, given the present-day political landscape in Europe; on the other hand, political parties in Hungary yielded some of the largest shifts in party positions in the past: four of the seven largest changes in CSES scores in the last two decades came from Hungarian parties (Dalton and McAllister, 2015, p.770). Based on the above, LMP seems to be an appropriate case study for systematic analysis of party positions across time. As up to now no empirical study examined the alleged rightist shift, this thesis aims to be the first methodologically sound attempt answering the question whether the party's positions had indeed drifted towards the right endpoint of the ideological space.

In addition to the aforementioned "traditional" tools of measurement, I also employ two unconventional and rather rarely used methods: content analysis of résumés/manifestos of candidates and the partisan–organizational experience of politicians running for elected office. While the latter focuses on the past, analyzing formal ties of candidates with politically relevant and ideologically definable institutional actors, the latter one often contains future-looking pledges and policy proposals, made by the given candidate. What they share in common is that both analytical tools concentrate on the individual level (as opposed to traditional measures of party-level positions and ideologies) and that both of these methods rely on a campaign-centered approach.

Consequently, the analysis described below fulfills the requirements of Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, who claim that an improved method aiming to measure party positions validly and reliably should "combine the strengths of expert-judgment, textual analysis of party documentation and self-placement by political parties" (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014, p.1456). With this study, my aim is twofold: firstly, I seek to answer the research question about the LMP by presenting the first methodologically sound empirical analysis of the alleged right-wing shift of the Hungarian greens. My other intention is to cross-validate the

candidate and campaign-centered measures I use by comparing inferences drawn from them with ones from more conventional and frequently used tools.

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter gives a detailed account on the already existing methods for measuring parties' positions and contrasts it with the unconventional ones I use. The third chapter summarizes the key points of scholarly literature on green parties in Europe, the character and the split of LMP, as well as the main cleavages and the left-right dichotomy in Hungarian politics. The fourth brief section formulates the research question and the hypothesis. The fifth chapter of the thesis discusses the relevance and expected contributions of this study whilst it also justifies the choice of the case study, the units of analyses and the methodology used. The next section is an overview of the LMP's candidates in single-member districts (SMDs) and the composition of the sample of the elite survey I use. The penultimate and longest chapter presents the results of the comparative analysis of green SMD candidates fielded in 2010 and 2014 from various aspects, interprets them in the context of shifts in the party system. The last section concludes.

2. Methodological approaches for determining spatial positions of parties

2.1. Expert surveys

One way is to rely on data acquired from expert surveys, i.e. to ask knowledgeable experts (most often academics, but also journalists, civil servants or lobbyists) to "position parties on issues or on a continuum" (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014, p.1457). Expert surveys provide explicit measures of party positions, by directly asking about the parties' place on an ideological or policy scale. Such evaluations made by professionals on parties' locations tend to "summarize the totality of the parties' positions", including ones taken during recent campaigns, ones visible when it comes to the party's policy proposals as well as its manifestos (Dalton and McAllister, 2015, 765). The wide array of various sources experts rely on generally improve the internal consistency and validity of this measure (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013, 35). On the other hand, scholars who respond to expert surveys mix parties' preferences with their actual behavior, meaning that data acquired via this method cannot be used as an exogenous measure of (intended) stances of parties (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013, pp.35–36).

The popularity and prevalence of the method is partly explained by its cost-effectiveness, quantifiability and its minimal time demand. Many political parties can be placed on multiple issues and dimensions at the very same time by a single expert, allowing researchers to have access to the aggregated knowledge of others, without investing into context-specific knowledge and language skills (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014). Potential weaknesses of the method include selection bias when choosing the experts, cognitive bias as well as the lack of conceptual unambiguity (Backlund, 2013, p.15).

Concerning reliability, the comparison of the surveys of UNC–Chapel Hill and Rohrschneider–Whitefield, conducted on party stances in Central Eastern Europe shows that for political integration, market integration as well as general left-right ideological position closely related estimates are produced, with high correlation values ($r_s = 0.96 - 0.87$) indicating the internal validity of this measure (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2007, pp.1137–1138). Steenbergen and Marks found that most experts considered the same time frame and aspects of parties when making their judgments while also differentiating between pledged policies and actual parliamentary/legislative activity of the given party. Experts tend to position parties the most accurately if their judgment is asked along issues that are salient and important for the specific political party (Steenbergen and Marks, 2007).

Marks and his colleagues found that expert surveys, as well as content analyses of manifestos yield the largest errors if the subjects of evaluation are extreme parties (Marks et al, 2007). As Bakker and Hobolt point out, experts are more likely to have extensive knowledge about larger parties (or ones in government), and tend to provide a less-founded evaluation if their opinion is asked about a smaller party, or one that is in opposition (2013, p.36). While in the subsequent chapters of this thesis I will present existing findings of expert surveys on the position of LMP, this informational asymmetry, which makes estimates less valid and reliable for smaller parties, provides another reason to employ unconventional tools for measuring the hypothesized shift of the green party.

Albright and Mair designed an experiment with the aim to test whether a relationship exists between the reliability of expert surveys and the number of parties that scholars have to locate on the ideological continuum. While their hypothesis was that increasing the number of parties would lead to systematic bias, their study – using graduate students as "experts" – did not find any evidence that the mean or median party placements would have been affected by making the participants evaluate more parties. Their findings thus underline the reliability of

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expert surveys in locating ideological positions of parties (Albright and Mair, 2011). Benoit and Laver also claim that expert surveys tend to be more reliable and have less measurement errors than manifesto analyses in general (Benoit and Laver, 2007).

According to Chapel Hill expert surveys, LMP received an average score of 3.53 in 2010 and 4.29 in 2014 on an 11-point scale, where 0 stands for 'extreme left' and 10 for 'extreme right'. At the same time, on the libertarian/post-materialist versus authoritarian/traditionalist axis, the party's average position was 1.41 in its first parliamentary year and 2.93 four years later. The difference is statistically not significant in case of the general left–right scale (t = -1.58, p < .125), and suggests that despite seemingly moving closer to the political center, LMP's shift was not substantial. Contrarily, when we compare the party's position on the one-dimensional post-materialist/traditionalist scale, the difference is significant (t = -3.30, p < .003), meaning that – according to the interviewed experts – LMP valued "order, tradition, and stability" more and favored "expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation" less (Bakker et al, 2015).

Expert surveys tend to indicate a high level of stability of left-right party positions across time; even substantial changes have "limited efficacy" when it comes to academic experts to form their own opinion, resulting in the rather unlikely perception of parties not changing their policy positions at all (Dalton and McAllister, 2015, p.771; Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014). This suggests that the orientation of LMP's politicians on the post-material/authoritarian authoritarian scale is worth further investigation if the perceived size of this shift was large enough to surmount the inertia of academics' ratings.

2.2 Analysis of party manifestos

Party manifestos are official party documents with the explicit aim to communicate the ideological position and policy stances to voters. They usually contain the issues "on

which a party engages in political conflict" and assumed to mirror the position and stance of the dominant party line (Backlund, 2013, p.13). Most parties have electoral manifestos and rewrite them at every election,[2] making them a stable source of party positions across both time and space (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014, p.1462). Scholars in favor of this tool of measurement emphasize the "greater degree of impartiality" of manifesto analyses, as they are not dependent on the subjective perceptions of voters or experts; higher levels of objectivity is said to be achieved, as manifestos include the official statements on policies. Volkers points out that the classification scheme used in the Comparative Manifestos Project was successfully applied on manifestos prepared for elections on vertically lower (local) and higher (European Union) levels, allowing the possibility to compare multiple levels of party competition (Volkers, 2007, p.116).

McDonald and his colleagues recommend party manifestos for analyzing systematic movements and drifts in left-right positions of parties, claiming that this tool allows us to observe changes over "an appreciable amount of time" in case of a specific party. They also prefer CMP data to expert survey in studies that aim to make cross-national comparisons (McDonald et al., 2007, p.73). A further advantage might be, according to some, that estimating party placements do not require pre-existing contextual knowledge about the parties' policy positions (Dinas and Gemenis, 2010, p.428; Bakker and Hobolt, 2013, p.30). Nevertheless, coders are still expected have a significant amount of contextual knowledge, as they must understand acronyms and abbreviations of governmental projects or state institutions and possess prior knowledge about the status quo of specific public policy field; in the absence of the foregoing, no conventional content analysis can be carried out (Volkers, 2007, p.117).

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[2] A rare exception is the governing Fidesz-KDNP alliance in Hungary, which did not have a manifesto for the parliamentary elections of 2014.

As for the limitations, scholars rarely have sufficient knowledge about the circumstances of drafting and accepting manifestos. Shorter manifestos and ones issued by divided parties tend to be less accurate in measuring parties' stances and ideological positions; at the same time, parties currently in government usually publish longer manifestos, being in the need of explaining their position on a wide range of issues and having less room to strategically select from these issues (Marks et al, 2007). Others point out that categories often used in large-scale projects analyzing manifestos (like CMP) work with outdated and incomplete ideological categories and use a coding scheme that is not grounded well enough in salience theory (Backlund, 2013, p.17). Moreover, even the salience theory itself (regardless how well it is adopted during content analyses) face notable criticism, as opponents questioned whether selective emphasis of issues, which the basis of the theory, could be equated with positioning (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013, p.32).

One often-emphasized weakness of the methodology used by the Comparative Manifestos Project is the reliability, as "most manifestos are only coded by one single human coder"; if replication studies are made, they tend to yield unacceptably low levels of inter-rater agreement between the original coders and the ones involved in the replication (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014, p.1463). Some claim that this makes it extremely hard to distinguish between stochastic noise in textual data and actual differences in CMP estimates of party policy positions, meaning that a substantial share of apparent movements in parties' left-right positions are attributable to measurement error (Benoit et al., 2009, p.512). As a response to the reliability problems, the dictionary-based approach of automated content analysis had recently gained popularity, partly because it can reduce the high costs of human coding. While the level of human involvement may vary from study to study, such analyses have the smallest common denominator of using frequencies of words to estimate partisan stances

along ideological or issue dimensions – the meaning of which words are defined in advance (Backlund, 2013, p.18)

While placements by citizens, elites and academic experts show high levels of consistency, analysis of manifesto data fail to produce results that are closely related to the three aforementioned measures (Dalton and McAllister, 2015, p.767). Some claim that using manifestos as measures of party positions exaggerate changes is partisan stances, assuming that the greater variation in party positions stem from the imprecision of measurement (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013, p.44; Dalton and McAllister, 2015, p.777). Nonetheless, despite the lack of manifestos' consistency, Dalton and McAllister emphasize that these documents are especially valuable resources when it comes to cross-temporal assessment of parties' left-right positions. Others also agree that the Comparative Manifesto Project, a large-scale collaboration project providing data on fifty-one democracies since 1945 is probably the best method of tracking parties' policy positions over long time periods (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013, p.30; Zulianello, 2013). Within and across country comparisons, on the other hand, are more problematic, as the people involved in drafting the texts as well as the length and the scope of manifestos can vary greatly (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014, p.1462). Left-right dimensional scales, as coded in the CMP dataset, tend to have relatively low scale reliability when analyzed on a country-by-country basis, meaning that issues making up the left-right spectrum may be different in each country (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013, pp.34–35).

One of the noteworthy differences between position estimates of expert surveys and the Comparative Manifestos Project is that far-left parties are systematically located closer to the center when datasets of the latter measure are used. According to Volkens (2007), this is not a systematic error of coders, but reveals that ideological and policy space (*domains of identification vs. competition*) might be largely different in the case of a few parties – when it

comes to the far-left, they traditionally compete for the same electorate as more moderate left-wing parties, which is reflected in manifestos as well.

Manifestos often lack clear policy proposals, which might stem from the strategic nature of these documents. Electoral manifestos are not only aimed at the ideologically coherent core voters of the party, but also at a larger and more heterogeneous block of potential voters as well as other parties that might serve as coalition partners after the elections. As a result of this, statements are often intentionally vague and ideologically neutral and use selective emphasis on issues that are advantageous from the party's point of view (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014, p.1462).

Yet others question the relevance of the method on the grounds of claims about voters failing to adjust their perceptions on party positions even if a meaningful shift occurs in their policy statements published in electoral manifestos. Actual shifts, as coded by the Comparative Manifestos Project, seemingly have no causal implications for the electoral behavior of citizens, as voters do not even adjust their own partisan loyalties or ideological positions (Adams et al., 2011). However, as James Adams and his colleagues find, when citizens cast a ballot, they do react to their *perceptions* about parties' left-right shifts, but the latter have little to do with the shifts in the "Left-Right tone of the parties' actual campaign statements." Partly for this reason, I analyze not just the short manifestos, but former partisan affiliations of candidates as well, as they might have different weights in the formation of voters' perceptions.

Pelizzo (2003, pp.83–86) mentions several party systems in Europe that are "problematic cases" for CMP. According to him, discrepancies can be traced back to the fact that instead of signaling actual policy positions, data gathered from manifestos rather tell us how willing parties are to alter their position if circumstances change or if they want to make voters perceive their past positions differently. Agreeing with Pelizzo, Franzmann and Kaiser

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claim that parties themselves use electoral manifestos as shortcuts, with the aim to signal shifts in their policy stances to voters (2006, p.173).

2.3. Positioning parties based on voters' judgments

Citizens can be asked about their own ideological position and their responses can be aggregated, based on which scholars can locate parties in the political space. A more direct way for positioning parties is asking the electorate to place the parties on issues and dimensions, but the combination of self-placement and party positioning is said to be a methodologically even more sound approach (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014, p.1459).

One advantage of this tool is that it comes closest to the often-used spatial models where the utility of voters is maximized, if the distance between their own position and the political party they choose is the smallest (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013, p.36). On the other hand, according to Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, all of its three subtypes mentioned above suffer from the problems of misunderstanding concepts and the lack of clarity from the side of the respondents. Unlike experts, average citizens cannot be expected to have the same interpretations as the interviewers, and an additional amount of bias comes from the fact that participation rates in such surveys do not necessarily reflect the relative ratios of population subgroups with different levels of political knowledge. Furthermore, just like expert surveys, citizens' evaluations are also quite ineffective in tracking meaningful changes, showing great stability in left/right positioning (Dalton and McAllister, 2015, p.771).

2.4. Elite surveys

Elite surveys ask politicians to position parties (either only their respective one or all national parties) in an ideological space or on specific issues. Their answers (individual placements) are then combined to construct left–right scores through additive scales or more sophisticated statistical techniques (Bakker, 2009, p.414). While this tool of measurement can

be free from biased perceptions voters and experts share, it presupposes the unitary nature of parties, treating them as collective actors (Volkers, 2007, p.117) – an approach that encounters problems when internal factions have competing views on the official position of their party (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014, p.1460).

The method is seemingly less systematically and less often used in Europe than in the United States (mostly in connection with MEPs) and there is suspicion that those legislators who respond to surveys tend to be atypical and try to give strategic answers at the same time (Laver, 2014, p.204). Vulnerability of such surveys to manipulation by parties is also an issue worthy of special care and increased vigilance. Asking partisan candidates in open-ended questions about their attitudes and associations on the political left/right is an even more direct approach for identifying positions of elites and parties than eleven-point-scales, but it usually also yields larger non-response rates (Schmitt, Scholz and Conny, 2010).

Further problems Krouwel and Elfrinkhof mention are conflicting strategies of party officials when answering survey items, the difficulty of identifying elites in younger parties and the lack of well-developed party positions on all salient issues (2014, p.1460). While they claim that conducting elite surveys is a cost- and time-effective method (2014, p.1466), others point out that political elites are hard to reach and access, have rigorous time schedules and are often surrounded by a large number of gatekeepers (Mikecz, 2012).

2.5. Roll-call analysis

Positions of political parties can also be determined by their behavior in parliaments, analyzing bills, motions, voting records and legislative amendments of MPs of the given party. Such data is often abundant, available across time, well-fitted for quantitative analysis and relatively easy to access by researchers (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014, p.1461).

Limitations of the method can be traced back to the unequal salience parliamentary votes (depending on their subject), the hardships of cross-national comparisons (as national

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legislative bodies tend to collect and report these data in different ways) and the strategic use of roll calls (Krouwel and Elfrinkhof, 2014, p.1461). While underlining the increasing popularity of the method, Dinas and Gemenis claim that most legislatures outside the United States fail the adequately and systematically record all roll-call votes, making cross-country comparisons struggle with selection bias, as rules of requesting or initiating such votes differ from one nation to another (Dinas and Gemenis, 2010, p.445).

Others put it more harshly and directly call in question the value of roll-call analyses outside the US Congress, pointing out that in several parliaments only small part of all legislation comes from roll call voting (RCV). To put it simply, RCVs are not a random sample of all legislative votes, hence inferences drawn from their analyses will be biased (Carruba et al., 2006, p.692). Potential sources of non-random selection (i.e. strategic choice of RCV) that Carruba and his co-authors mention are different expectations of parliamentary leaders on party cohesion and discipline and the character of the political conflict on which the vote would take place. Consequently, they do not claim that this approach is *ex vi termini* wrong for measuring party positions, but emphasize that substantial theoretical work is still ahead in order to have a clear picture about the processes generating roll-call votes (Carruba et al., 2006, p.703).

2.6. Less frequently used methods: algorithms and speeches

Other, recently developed and currently less-used quantitative methods for locating parties in ideological space include ones like *Wordfish* and *Wordscores*, where algorithms determine party positions in a proximity space based on the numerical analysis of a great amount of partisan texts (Backlund, 2013, pp.19–20). Backlund prefers Wordfish to the latter, emphasizing its inductive approach and that it assigns fixed effects both to documents and texts, accounting for between-documents length differences and the phenomenon of some (non-political) words being used more often than others.

Attempts have been also made to use speeches of legislators for determining positions of parties. Proksch and Slapin elicit the limitations of empirical works on roll-call votes (including overestimation of intra-party group cohesion and the lack of evidence that RCVs are votes on significant issues) and propose speech analysis as an alternative method. In their study, focusing on MEPs' left-right position, they argue that legislators face fewer constraints and elaborate more nuanced positions when speaking compared to voting and that this approach is more likely to yield results free from sampling bias and be an exogenous measure (Proksch and Slapin, 2010, pp.589-590). Their findings underline that speeches are a valuable source of data for analyzing parties' ideology, but tend to comprise different words and expressions than party manifestos in general and also be of less use for studying the left-right dichotomy. Hakhverdian uses Wordscores to analyze legislative speeches in the United Kingdom, with the aim of analyzing left-right trends in governmental policies in the last five decades (Hakhverdian, 2009). He focused the Budget Speeches, which took place annually and in a highly institutionalized setting. Findings of his paper suggest that computerized content analysis techniques of this kind are able to produce valid time-series and also stand the test of cross-validation vis-à-vis expert survey results.

2.7. Towards a candidate and campaign-centered approach of positioning parties

Analyzing candidate manifestos instead of the central (party-level) ones seems to be a more appropriate measure for answering my research question. As Volkens points out, parties tend to avoid issues in their manifestos on which intra-party ruptures and divisions exist (2007, p.111). Consequently, if LMP had indeed changed its position along the libertarian – traditionalist axis (whether by voluntary exit, silencing or marginalization of clearly leftist/liberal members), then one can assume that it triggered the party to divert the focus of its central manifesto from values and issues that were related to this line of internal conflict.

SMD candidates as autonomous actors can be more sincere about their ideological position than a party; they are less constrained by the need to appeal for very diverse electorate with vague proposals. As LMP had no real chance to win any single-member constituency, one can assume that less effort was spent on vote maximization and contents of candidate leaflets might tell more about actual positions of politicians than in the case of other parties.

Applying manifesto research at local levels is a fairly rare phenomenon, as articles measuring (left-right) positions of parties via content analysis almost exclusively work with national or EU-level manifestos. One of the exceptions is the study of Agasøster, who uses local manifestos to study variation in policy emphases and positions within parties at the same election (Agasøster, 2001). According to her, local manifestos not necessarily have party consensus behind them, but still overseen and controlled to some extent by the central party, making them legitimate expressions of local party policy (2001, pp.77–78). She claims that local election addresses constitutes the only type of district-level electoral communication that can be comparatively analyzed in a large number of SMDs, and compare such documents in Scotland, issued by the candidates of the major parties in the United Kingdom. A more recent work of Shephard (2007) compares pledges and messages of party manifestos with ones apparent in individual-level election communication in Scotland, aiming to explain variance in candidate messages.

As opposed to the CMP standards of coding texts by a single individual, I choose multiple human coders to carry out the task of content analysis independently of each other; every time data on value categories or policy stances are presented out below, respective inter-reliability coefficients always follow.

The organizational and partisan background of candidates as proxies for their position on the left-right scale is even less frequently used. The newly democratized Central Eastern European countries tend to have more fluid party systems and volatile electorates than

established Western democracies (Kitschelt, 1995), meaning that it is not uncommon for candidates in multiparty countries to have past political experience from parties other than their current one. Previous empricial works scrutinizing these cross-cleavage affiliations in Hungary (e.g. Hajdú, 2016) did not study the potential relationship career paths including experience on the other side of the aisle and ideological positions of politicians.

3. Theoretical background
3.1. Green parties in Europe

Green parties of Europe occupy a wide range of ideological spectrum, ranging from reformed communist and socialist ideas to being liberal and center parties. Their visions include several principles – social justice, decentralization, individual liberties, participatory democracy, racial and gender equality – that are part of pre-existing political traditions and programs, thus we can find socialist, liberal, conservative, Marxist and anarchist elements alike among the objectives of green movements (Richardson, 1995, p.11).

No matter how heterogeneous is the set of green parties, the vast majority of them can be clearly regarded as left-wing movements (O'Neill, 1997, p.18), promoting secular state, being more suspicious of churches and favoring social justice programs. The majority of them could be labeled as left-libertarian movement parties (Frankland, Lucardie and Rihoux, 2008, p.6). Although the first green organizations and alliances were founded by devoted ecologists and civil society activists (among who liberals, conservatives and apolitical people were present alike), the green idea was embraced by various leftist groups that considered it as the answer for socio-ecological crises, being able to overcome the theoretical approach and framework of classic Marxism (Spretnak and Capra, 1986, p.176). Hence green parties were located on the left side of the left-right dichotomy, in many cases forming electoral alliances with other leftist parties. Even in those countries where the logic of the formation of coalitions and governments is less dependent on the left-right dichotomy, scenarios meaning the alliance of green and exclusively right wing parties are especially unlikely. This can also mean a strategic disadvantage for green parties, since as unequivocal members of the left bloc they cannot function as pivotal parties and have a more restricted coalitional potential (Poguntke, 2002, p.138).

Similarly to the international literature, the Hungarian one also regards green parties and the green movement as part of the left-wing political family, emphasizing the previous ones' leftist rhetoric and their continuity or functional correspondence with the New Left. Program elements of green parties overlap with several objectives of socialist, liberal and agrarian parties and they often provide the minimal majority as coalition partners for traditional socialist parties (Enyedi and Körösényi, 2004, pp.84 – 85.).

3.2. Position and ideological character of LMP

According to its founding declaration, Politics Can Be Different intended to aggregate leftist, liberal and conservative values while promoting its so-called *value synthesis*; although its members and activists aimed to overcome traditional cleavages, the party's basic principles remained leftist ones (Bozóki, 2014, pp.212-213). While the ideological composition of the membership and activist network of the party was in line with principles – conservatives, liberals, greens and socialists were alike present among them, political analysts claimed (Tóth and Török, 2015, p.473), its voter base mainly showed leftist characters. According to surveys, LMP voters prefer post-materialist values as opposed to national-conservative ones, define themselves a liberals and euro-optimists while being hardly religious at all (Keil, 2012; Republikon 2012; Mészáros, 2012).

Nonetheless, recent studies identified new and atypical voter groups that tend to support the LMP. Such socio-culturally well-defined subgroups of the electorate do not only consider themselves as rightists and conservatives, but they also tend to be rather skeptical with the European Union and more religious than average. One of such groups, labeled as 'working middle-generation', is mainly concentrated in the capital and in the county seats (Boros and Kadlót, 2015, pp.66 – 68).

Analyzing the ideological preferences of the electorate of LMP from 2009, the literature presumes that in the long run, the core of the party's potential voter base was

formed by first voters and disillusioned liberals, although in the parliamentary elections of 2010 it could have also received votes from a few Fidesz supporters who attributed intrinsic value to a National Assembly with several parties represented (Enyedi and Benoit, 2011, pp.25 – 38). Before entering the parliament, the LMP did not have to make choices on whether to cooperate or not with the left-wing Hungarian Socialist Party (*Magyar Szocialista Párt,* MSZP), meaning that the party was not affected by the strongest cleavage of national politics, anti-communism, i.e. involvement in (post-)communist organizations and alliances. This made the green party an acceptable alternative and potentially realistic choice for moderate and/or young voters of the right; nonetheless, LMP could still not expect masses of right-wing votes (and supporters) (Tóth and Török, 2015, p.392).

Studies using retrospective survey interviews seem to confute the theory on massive 'defection' of voters of the left-liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (*Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége,* SZDSZ), claiming that the idea is mostly based on spatial coincidences. While methodological concerns can be raised in case of both positions, it can be stated for sure that the 'orphaned' liberals made up a significant share, but not the majority of those who voted for the green party in 2010. Whilst the middle class status is a common, the young age is rather a distinctive feature when it comes to compare them with the previous voter base of SZDSZ (Szabó, 2013).

Moreover, given the party's participatory democratic character and young age it could not (or did not want to) take a clear a clear stance when it came to its own ideological position. As a result it was not clearly visible whether the LMP aims to position itself as an alternative green party, the successor of Fidesz, a new left-wing party or a movement mixing leftist, green and liberal elements. Three realistic scenarios existed: (i) the creation of a 'green-liberal, but clearly leftist' alternative against the governing Fidesz, (ii) the establishment of a centrist party that would have been open to form a coalition with both the

left and the right, and (iii) giving up ambitions on changing the government and promoting issue-based, green politics (Tóth and Török, 2015, p.476).

The candidate list of the LMP for the European Parliamentary elections in 2009 contained only a few individuals with political expertise; they usually gained it at the lower levels of Fidesz or SZDSZ. However, the party possessed no characteristic political profile, as the majority of candidates were strongly embedded into civic activism, NGOs and the cultural sphere (Várnagy, 2010, p.20).

3.3. Cleavages and the left-right dichotomy in Hungarian politics

The value preferences of the Hungarian society are best reflected by the left/right dichotomy (Enyedi and Benoit, 2011), while the self-definition of voters related to this dichotomy strongly correlates with the public image and positioning of parties they choose (Róbert, 2001, p.320). Although this axis is intersected by economic positions, questions that are regarded as valence issues (Fridkin, Fridkin Kahn and Kenney, 1999) or preferences on public policy, the left–right axis did not cease to exist as a point of orientation for voters, the vast majority of whom is able to position both herself and the parliamentary parties on a left/right scale (Róna and Sós, 2011, p.115). Similarly, the majority of the economic, cultural and political elites was able to classify themselves as a left or right-winger, while only one quarter of them choose the central position (Kristóf, 2011). From the second half of the 1990s till the general elections of 2010 the left-right dichotomy was the main organizing principle for the two-block system, covering not only the parties but also inter-organizational networks emerging around them. The two poles were clearly identifiable and unified, with no possible thoroughfare existing between them (Soós, 2012, p.15).

In the past few years of Hungarian politics, the rightist shift of voters' attitudes was a prevalent phenomenon that resulted in the median voter becoming unequivocally a right-wing voter with conservative value preferences (Enyedi and Benoit, 2011). As LMP had built its

whole strategy on positioning itself to the center (Tóth and Török, 2014) to address those in the middle, it would seem reasonable to accommodate its messages to the preferences of the target group (i.e. appearing to be less liberal and more conservative). Another rational reason for this strategy could be the continuous emptying of the center and the ongoing process of political polarization both in the cases of average voters and civil leaders or political elites (Körösényi, 2012).

Such cultural and primarily not economic understanding of the left-right dimension is not an exclusive feature of the Hungarian political system: as Bakker and Hobolt point out, this is usually the second most important orthogonal dimension of European political communities (2013, p.28). Kitschelt also argues that since World War II, the main axis of voter distribution in Europe is rather understood as a "complex configuration opposing left-libertarian and right-authoritarian alternatives" instead of the traditional (socialist vs. capitalist market policies) left-right unidimensional scale (1994, pp.30-31).

A number of theories link religious affiliation with political preferences. Left/right self-identification of voters in Hungary strongly correlates with the public perception and positioning of the parties they choose (Róbert, 2001, p.320). Frequency of church attendance increases the chance to vote for the right as well (Karácsony, 2003); being a socio-cultural explanatory factor of voting behavior, religious affiliation is even more determining than class structure (Enyedi, 2000).

Religious voters mostly prefer parties of the center-right; leftist and liberal parties, on the other hand are traditionally more aloof with churches (Körösényi, Tóth and Török, 2009). Voters of the socialist party, for instance, are coming from the non-religious segment of the society (Enyedi, Fábián and Tardos, 2014, p.533) and the social group labeled as the 'left-liberal intellectuals', concentrating in the capital and other cities of the countryside and

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strongly sympathizing with the Democratic Coalitions has the highest share of especially anti-religious voters (Boros and Kadlót, 2015, p.54).

In Hungary, the Catholic Church provides notable support to the Fidesz-KDNP, the latter one being the greatest conservative party alliance since 2002. The lower levels of the priesthood actively participates in collecting the recommendations of the right-wing candidates, promotes 'adequate' voting to believers in worship services and occasionally even distributes political flyers in front of churches. The leadership of the church denies to be involved in any directly partisan political activity; nevertheless several office holders of the church, the Catholic media targeting the public and internal letters all take a clear stance and tally with the basic principles appearing in manifestos of right-wing parties (Enyedi and O'Mahony, 2006, pp.176–177). To sum up the above, religiosity is not only a socio-cultural determinant forming voting behavior and correlating with right-wing party preferences, but the elite strategies of churches also aim to support the center-right parties.

3.4. Party split and the narrative of the right-wing shift

After the congress of LMP in November 2012 ruled out any possibility of negotiations on electoral cooperation with left-wing parties (both the MSZP and the Együtt 2014), the minority faction hallmarked by Gergely Karácsony and Benedek Jávor first formed an independent platform within the party, then – following the repeated refusal of their stance in January next year – established a new party. Approximately 20 per cent of party membership left to the Dialogue for Hungary (*Párbeszéd Magyarországért*, abbrevaiated as PM), created in February 2013 (Bozóki, 2014, pp.222–223.). Thanks to the fact that PM was declaredly founded as a left-wing and green party, LMP (still insisting on its 'value synthesis' principle) more and more frequently was 'blamed' by carrying out a right-wing shift.

The hypothesized right-wing shift of the party appeared in opinion columns (Szalay, 2012; Krug, 2013; HVG, 2014), but several splinter politicians of LMP like Jenő Kaltenbach

or Gábor Scheiring voiced their concerns that their former party substantially shifted to the right both when it comes to symbolic politics and the choice of potential voter base targeted (H.L.B, 2013; Scheiring, 2013). According to journalists the LMP started to go against the values shared by its own voters, while the politicians leaving the party argued that with the leadership of András Schiffer the greens declaredly aimed to collect votes of those right-wing citizens who disenchanted from the Fidesz. For this reason, the argument follows, LMP refused from formulating a leftist self-definition and consciously tried to build connections with conservative organizations and to put issues on its agenda that were traditionally regarded as rightist ones.

Leading politicians of LMP (including András Schiffer and Gábor Vágó), however, denied the relevance of both the interpretative frame of the right-wing shift and the ideologically understood left/right dichotomy (Pintér, 2013; Vágó, 2012). Political scientists and analysts were likewise divided on the issue. Tóth and Török, for instance, claimed that the LMP primarily presented a mixture of centrist and ecological politics to its voters, rejecting left or right wing politicking, which has only became more obvious and accentual after the party split (Tóth and Török, 2014, p.514).

Contrarily, according to Lakner, the LMP clearly tried to establish a left-wing pole (Lakner, 2012). Bozóki sees it similarly, writing that András Schiffer led a party that was leftist in its principles, but as a chairman he could maintain his positions only by gaining the support of conservative and right wing delegates of the countryside (Bozóki, 2014, p.226). Although the systematic comparison of candidates and programs along ideological dimensions could greatly contribute to the clarification of issues, such a comparative study has not been conducted up to date.

Similarly, one could assume to find evidence for both the null and the alternative hypothesis based on the scholarly literature. Young parties, for instance, generally speaking

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are more prone to alter their position on the unidimensional left-right scale, as they tend to have a more fluid political identity, still competing and searching for a well-circumscribed voter base (Dalton and McAllister, 2015, p.772). While parties' coalition history, established networks of supporters and the public image of their politicians often limit substantial changes in ideological positions, juvenile political formations are less likely to encounter the aforementioned obstacles. The ideological (i.e. left-right) polarization of party systems, on the other hand, is regarded as a factor inhibiting changes in party positions (Dalton and McAllister, 2015, p.775).

4. Research question and hypotheses

The main research question investigates to what extent LMP's recent candidate base is analogous with the one it had 4-years-before. Did the LMP shift towards the right by presenting a more conservative and less liberal/leftist 'pool of candidates' to voters in the election of Spring 2014 than back in 2010?

The null hypothesis (H_0) states that no significant change happened in terms of the ideological position of LMP's pool of candidates. The alternative hypothesis (H_1) expects a shift of LMP to the right, meaning that the SMD candidates of the green party favor and represent conservative values to a larger extent than it did four years before. Reviewing how religiosity structures the party system lets us to suppose that H_1 can also gain confirmation by LMP having candidates in 2014 that show closer ties with (or express greater sympathy towards) churches than its would-be MPs in 2010.

Beside the main focus of this thesis, i.e. measuring spatial positions of parties and LMP particularly along the left/right axis, I am also interested in the potential interaction of these movements with other ideological and issue dimensions. Did the party change its position on the materialist/post-materialist axis? Did the green character of the party become stronger by 2014, or, conversely, it partly lost its relevance during the first four parliamentary years of the party?

5. Justification and expected contributions

5.1. Relevance and theoretical justification

As the literature review already pointed out, green parties are usually more open to the left than to the right when it comes to coalition politics and consequently making participation in exclusively right-wing alliances unlikely. In Germany, the first-ever state-level coalition between the conservative CDU and the Greens was only forged in 2013 in Hessen, and it has correspondingly received considerable media attention. Instead of being a unique case, the alliance marked a starting point a trend that is signaled by the unaccustomed coalition agreement in Baden-Württemberg, where CDU has undertook the role of the *junior* coalition partner in May 2015 (Deutsche Welle, 2016).

According to Steinert and Yordanova, CDU and the Greens have been seen as long-time 'enemies' in terms of policy preferences whilst former personal hostilities also existed at the levels of high-ranking party officials. Nevertheless, the green party had gradually moderated its policy position and in several policy areas the CDU and the Greens had moved towards each other by the time the question of coalition formation came up in Hesse (Steinert and Yordanova, 2015). As the authors argue, it was somewhat ironically the series of federal-level 'Red–Green' coalitions (i.e. ones made with the Social Democratic Party) that enabled the subsequent alliance with the conservatives, as the Greens already had to gave up their anti-establishment character, change and moderate policy positions as well as accept 'consumer capitalism' in the SPD-led coalitions.

If the analyses conducted in this thesis find results that support the claims of substantive changes in policy positions, this might also adumbrate the future alliance-formation strategies of LMP. Even according to the most careful scenarios, having converging issue positions often provide incentives for party elites for engaging in coalitional bargaining

after legislative elections. In the light of the recent German developments, the relationship of dominant right-wing catch-all parties and small, but relevant green ones are subject to changes, parallel to the ideological shifts of the latter. Carter also report (2013, p.85) the increasing willingness of West European green parties to form coalitions with center-right parties recently, citing Irish, Finnish, Swedish and Austrian parties as notable examples.

As I argued above, in this study I will treat candidates' religiosity and affiliation with Christian churches as proxies for being closer to the right end of the unidimensional left-right scale. Based on the existing literature, one could find it noteworthy and surprising, at least, if politicians of LMP were to pick up a more religious image, in accordance with the alternative hypothesis. Because of the programmatic heritage of Green politics (like freedom of choosing one's lifestyle or gender equality), voters of the camp are 'clearly related to secular orientations', irrespective of whether they possess church membership or not (Dolezal, 2010, pp.539–541). As findings of Europe-wide surveys, reported by Dolezal suggest, Green voters are less integrated in the dominant church in every country (except Italy), and in the majority of the cases they are significantly less attached to traditional denominations as well. This might be partly due to the programs of their parties, clearly directed against 'traditional moral values'. In a few Western European countries, Green parties are even the ones that get the strongest support from the religiously unaffiliated group of voters (Knutsen, 2004).

Enmity between Christian churches and the Greens is not only apparent at the level of voters. Australia is probably the best-known case of an open conflict between these two parties: there, the Australian Christian Lobby and other "church and para-church" organizations gave extensive voting advices before elections, aiming to discourage believers to vote for the Greens (Smith, 2009). Considering all the above, a pro-religious and pro-church shift undertaken by the party would not only mean a step towards crossing the

left/right cleavage of the Hungarian party system, but would also signal a very offbeat strategy for a green political party.

5.2. Methodological justification

This study relies on two main sources of data: candidates' written introductions and their survey responses. The block using content analysis builds on the personal manifestos of LMP candidates in single-member districts: these were the texts published both electronically on the party's website and in printed format as flyers. In most European countries local manifestos are the main pieces of partisan information communicated to voters during campaigns and their distribution is regarded as the most basic form of local canvassing (Agasøster, 2001, p.78). In Hungary, they have a similarly elevated role among local campaign activities, often in the absence of other local messages with billboards or TV ads mainly transmitting parties' national messages.

Opting for content analysis seems to be a reasonable methodological choice, given that the scholarly literature is convinced that content analysis of manifestos is probably the most suitable method for cross-temporal comparison of party positions (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013; Dalton and McAllister, 2015). Benoit and Laver (2007, p.103) points out how the meaning of left/right might be dependent on specific time periods, distorting comparison of position estimates. However, when analyzing the hypothesized drift of LMP, this is less likely to be a source of bias, given the short time frame of the empirical analysis. District-level manifestos will ensure methodological uniqueness of the content analysis: Agasøster (2001) focused on the 1997 British General Election only and according to my best knowledge, no study has used these documents for comparing party positions *across time* so far.

5.3. Single-member district candidates as units of analysis

Introductions and pledged programs of single-member district candidates seem to be a reasonable choice for content analysis for several reasons. Unlike to top candidates of PR list and party elites, they produce campaign texts of standardized length and structure, distribute them as flyers and leaflets or send them to local news outlets as introductions. These documents tend to be more diverse in representing views of the party, while manifestos could be actually written just by one or two party members, as it happened in 2010 in the case of LMP (Petőcz, 2014). Being sufficiently brief to be actually read by inquiring citizens, they also reach voters to a much higher extent than manifestos do, meaning that a shift prevalent in these documents might result in changes of the voting patterns as well. While earlier attempts of content analysis of local manifestos had to rely on self-selective sampling, with leaflets collected from the candidates or their staff members one by one (Agasøster, 2001, p.78), I had the opportunity to work with the full population of texts from 2014 and a nearly-full one from 2010.

SMD candidates are usually successful members of the local society élite with high prestige and authority (Körösényi-Tóth-Török, 2009, p.244) and due to their reputation, visibility and possession of high-rank positions of regional party organizations they are the ones who embody the party itself for the voters of the constituency. The article of Zsófia Papp shows that (Papp, 2013) MPs of LMP in 2010 conducted a less personalized campaign compared to those of other parties, and focused more on their party than their own person. Nonetheless, they did not fall short of their competitors in using campaign tools of personal appearance. This anticipates that if the hypothesized rightist shift did not only appear at the individual level of party members, SMD candidates could follow the altered emphases and value preferences, successfully presenting them to the voters. One can also expect these candidates to be less driven by ideology than their PR counterparts or the party elites. Section 7.8. explores this relationship.

In case of green parties with only few years of political experience, selection of candidates tends to be local; moreover the will of elected MPs (and candidates for the position) are usually subordinated to the party, the latter one being more influential (Frankland, Lucardie and Rihoux, 2008, p.265). As green parties have more direct connection between members and candidates than their catch-all or cartel counterparts, the research can provide grounds to further investigation focused on party membership. Fitting into a broader context, results can also establish base to analyze how green/alternative parties with anti-establishment attitudes react to voters' preference changes and facilitate further research measuring the extent to which territorial units with extensive candidate-nominating rights can 'take over' or transform the image and ideological position of the given party.

5.4. Theoretical background of quantified text analysis

I examine manifestos/introductions of candidates with the help of quantified text analysis. The method also known as content analysis aims to answer one's research question by analyzing a well defined population of texts, either completely or partly. By carrying out a contingency analysis, i.e. investigating frequencies of occurrences of content categories within sampled blocks of texts a data matrix is created which can be subject of statistical analysis (Roberts, 2000, p.260.).

In this study I use representational thematic text analysis, that is I rely on the assumption that the authors of manifestos meant what they wrote and shared. In other words, I neither intend to go against the strategies of the texts' sources nor to draw conclusions that would be against the intended meaning of these textual materials (Pool, 1959; Shapiro, 1997).

5.5. Value dimensions and categories used in the content analysis[3]

During the quantified content analysis, ideological and belief-related umbrella terms

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[3] On the methodological aspects of coding see the Appendix.

of frequencies of occurrences are linked to frequencies of occurrences, using the frame of mind of Inglehart and Welzel (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). I also created relevant value dimensions based on the reference categories of the World Values Survey[4] and categories standing for religious affiliation as well as ecological or post-material civic experience.

The classification I use follows the logic of previous studies on value dimensions of the party, for example Keil's work on the university and college student voters of LMP and DK (Keil, 2012). He distinguished four value dimensions following an empirical analysis: a *national conservative*, an *apolitical*, a *post-material* and a *consumer-materialist* one. The frame of analysis I use abandons the apolitical dimension, since the subjects of analysis are active political actors and the majority of values associated with it (happiness, true friendship) are irrelevant for candidate manifestos.

I extended the post-material one into *green/post-material* as it would be hard to separate these two value dimensions. Originally created as the complementary of the category, the *material* variable produced notably low coefficients of inter-rater reliability when coded (even after several rounds of additional instructions on correction and recoding), thus I decided to exclude from the analysis and forgo interpreting the results of related data matrixes.

I have also created a category for *leftist values*. For the classifying and circumscribing *left-wing* and *right-wing (national-conservative)* values I used one of the latest work on the Hungarian party system as a starting point; a study that uses expert classification for cultural, ideological and economic issues and stances (Tóth and Török, 2014, pp.523- 526).

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[4] See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org for details [Accessed 27 May 2015]

6. On the candidates of LMP

6.1. Brief overview of fielding SMD candidates

LMP announced in February 2010 that it wants to field candidates in all 176 single-member districts on the parliamentary elections upcoming within two months (LMP, 2010). The green party could register 95 candidates by the respective deadline, with three eventually denied from being registered by the National Elections Office, meaning that LMP was preparing for the general elections with 92 SMD candidates.

Four years later, with a new electoral system and its elements facilitating the nomination of candidates, would-be MPs of LMP managed to get the necessary amount of signatures in all the 106 SMDs. Table 1 summarizes some demographic characteristics of LMP candidates running for office in 2010 and 2014. Previous studies have pointed out that age, gender and the urban/rural divide are all variables structuring the LMP's electorate, as voters of the green party tend to be younger, more likely to be female and also concentrated in the capital, while also functioning as internal, within-party cleavage (Szabó, 2013; Keil, 2012; Petőcz, 2014). Although the share of female candidates shows very similar figures in both elections, this is not the result of internal regulations: the green party uses gender quotas only in the case of party lists.

Table 1: Some demographic data of LMP candidates in 2010 and 2014. Based on own calculations. Age was missing in case of a very few candidates, percentages there are understood respective to the population of politicians with birth dates known.

	2010	2014
N	92	106
Female	18 (19,6%)	23 (21,7%)
SMDs in Budapest	26 (28,3%)	18 (17,0%)
Under 30	14 (16,3%)	11 (11,1%)

The party received seats on both elections exclusively from party lists: in 2010, out of the 16 candidates receiving parliamentary mandates 11 competed for individual seats as well while in 2014 all the five politicians of LMP who got in to the National Assembly attempted to gain seats from single-member districts as well.[5]

6.2. The candidate database and the sample of survey respondents

The candidate database I use in the second half of this study is based on data collected during the *Candidates and representatives 2012 – 2015* research (OTKA K106220) by students and research assistants. Beside the electoral results of individual and party list candidates, the dataset also includes variables on basic demographic characteristics as well as former elected public and partisan positions. The questionnaires, filled out either electronically or during personal interviews, contained items on campaign tools used, value systems and role perceptions of representation; answers received were attached to the database, to the rows of respective parliamentary candidates.

Table 2: Candidates of LMP in single-member districts and the sample of politcians responding to the surveys of the Center for Elite Research

	Women		SMD: Budapest		Under 30	
	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014
Sample	17,6%	28,8%	44,1%	18,6%	20,6%	16,4%
Population	19,6%	21,7%	28,30%	17,0%	16,3%	11,1%

Based on own calculations.

As Table 2 shows, notable differences are present between the sample and the original population of parliamentary candidates are gender (in 2014) and the ratio of SMDs in Budapest (in 2010) – in both cases, it is the overrepresentation of the group with a smaller

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[5] The electoral system in Hungary allows candidates to be fielded both in single-member districts and to run for mandates in country-wide party lists at the same time.

share that occurs. Conducting a series of Spearman correlations I made sure that age is neither related substantially to other variables, used later in the study,[6] nor to the operationalized measures of the left-right scale (discussed below).[7] Based on this, out of the three aforementioned demographic aspects I used gender and the capital/countryside dichotomy as variables for weighting, keeping in mind later when discussing the results that those aged under 30 were overrepresented by 4-5 per cents in the subsample of survey respondents.[8] Tables 3/a and 3/b show the medians of the original and the weighted sample on the issues that the study will later use as indicators of the left and right pivot.

Table 3/a: Medians of responses in the original survey sample

	Median	
	2010	2014
Own position (0 – 11, left – right)	4,0	5,0
Position of the party (0 – 11, left – right)	4,0	5,0
Position of the party's voters (0 – 11, left – right)	3,0	4,0
Church attendance (0 – 7, weekly – never)	7,0	6,0
Abortion, women should decide freely (1 – 5, no – yes)	4,0	4,0
Affirmative action for women (1 – 5, no – yes)	3,0	3,0
European integration (0 – 10, gone too far – deepening further)	6,5	5,5
EU membership (1 – 3, rather good – IDK or N/A – rather bad)	1,0	1,0

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[6] Statistically significant (p<0.05) relationship was only found in the sample from 2010, where variable *k29* containing answers on deepening/reversing European integration, measured on a Likert-scale was related to age. The respective coefficient of correlation showed an association of weak–medium strenght (r_s = 0.481).

[7] Contrary to the variable pairs *gender – stance on abortion* or *capital/countryside – frequency of church visits*.

[8] When results are presented in later chapters, passing the critical value (i.e. statistical significance and rejection of the null hypothesis) was never dependent on the weighting; conclusions are thus valid to the original, not corrected sample of respondents as well.

Table 3/b: Medians of responses in the weighted survey sample

	Medián	
	2010	2014
Own position (0 – 11, left – right)	5,0	5,0
Position of the party (0 – 11, left – right)	4,0	5,0
Position of the party's voters (0 – 11, left – right)	4,0	4,0
Church attendance (0 – 7, weekly – never)	7,0	6,0
Abortion, women should decide freely (1 – 5, no – yes)	4,0	4,0
Affirmative action for women (1 – 5, no – yes)	3,0	3,0
European integration (0 – 10, gone too far – deepening further)	5,6	6,0
EU membership (1 – 3, rather good – IDK or N/A – rather bad)	1,0	1,0

Based on own calculations.

7. Comparative analysis of single-member district candidates

7.1. Partisan experience and history of candidates

Before having a closer look at candidate manifestos and self-positioning, one can review some of the formal political affiliations of LMP politicians – the ones that are relevant from the aspect of the left/right dichotomy. That is, their political experience preceding their involvement in LMP in parties with an ideological position that can clearly be placed on the conservative – liberal axis. Thereby past partisan involvement in such parties also mean that voters can regard them as 'former leftist' or 'former right wing' politicians.

I classify a candidate as someone having formal left wing partisan affiliation if he or she was a member or a candidate of MSZP, MSZMP, SZDSZ, DK or Együtt-PM before becoming a candidate of the LMP,[9] or if (s)he mentions in his/her introduction once being member or candidate of left wing parties in general. I classify a candidate as someone having formal right wing partisan affiliation if he or she was a member or a candidate of Fidesz, KDNP, MDF, MDNP, MIÉP, FKGP (or other splinter party of the independent smallholders) or Jobbik,[10] or if (s)he personally stated his/her formal right-wing partisan membership or candidacy. Former experience in green parties was way less frequent than the two variables on party politics above; when operationalizing, the necessary criterion was to once being a member or candidate of Élőlánc, Zöld Demokraták, Magyarországi Zöld Párt, Zöld Alternatíva, Zöldek Pártja or any other party that was referred as a *green party* by the candidate herself.

Although the LMP also fielded candidates in single-member districts who were previously members of other parties with no green or ecological affiliation – like the MCF

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[9] While theoretically it could have been possible in 2014, the latter two cases had no occurences.

[10] The latter three cases had no occurences.

Roma Összefogás Párt or the Centrum Party – I did not seek to classify these political formations neither as leftist, nor as right wing ones. The starting point for documenting formal partisan affiliations were reviewing the introductions and short manifestos distributed by the candidates themselves; they had unified structure and were similar in length. As correspondence of partisan affiliations and party names was unequivocal, I had the opportunity to use automatic text analysis.

Needless to say that introductions provide only filtered information. In 2010, for instance, not even incumbent politicians of the Socialist Party, trying to renew their mayoral or parliamentary mandates embraced their partisan affiliation in their visual campaign material (Ughy, 2011). We can thus presume that candidates of this small party, aiming to renew the quality of Hungarian politics and collect protest votes did not emphasize their former political experience – especially not when, for instance, it would have tied them to the morally corrupted socialist – liberal establishment.

For this reason I complement the data gained from candidate introductions and manifestos with alternative sources of information. Similarly to other previous studies analyzing political career routes of the green party (Republikon, 2010) I relied on available electoral history data, i.e. data on individual or party list candidacy between 1998 and 2014 in parliamentary elections and participation in municipal elections as a candidate between 2002 and 2014. The previous one is available in the combined dataset of the Centre for Elite Research, while the latter is the result of using the summary lists of local candidates downloaded from the official site of the National Election Office.

Naturally, not even the combination of autobiographies and publicly available candidate databases can give us the full picture: green politicians might still exist who participated institutionally in public life in way that neither automated, nor human data collection tools could detect it. But as the aforementioned analysis underlines, these

candidates were politicking only at local levels, without holding any party offices or intentions to gain any mandates, thus "it is almost impossible to find any sign of their past political activity that they pretermitted in their biographies" (Republikon, 2010, p.4). This neither diminishes the value of comparison nor weakens the conclusions possibly drawn from it. As the hypothesized right-wing shift is examined from the aspect of SMD candidates, the group of politicians most visible at local levels of politics, having a party membership decades ago not resulting in party office or candidacy will not create an association in the eyes of the local public between characteristic leftist or rightist politics and the LMP.

Table 4: Formal former party affiliations of single-member district candidates of LMP

	2010	2014
N	92	106
Leftist party affiliation	3,3%	2,8%
Rightist party affiliation	5,4%	5,7%
Green party affiliation	1,1%	2,8%

Based on own calculations.

As Table 4 suggests, we can see very similar values in case of LMP candidates in 2010 and 2014 when it comes to former left wing or right wing party membership or candidacy. The party fielded somewhat less candidates with leftist (MSZP / MSZMP / SZDSZ) and somewhat more with rightist (FIDESZ / KDNP / MDF / MDNP) political experience in both years; the results are not changed substantially either if we remove Katalin Ertsey from the set of candidates with former right-wing affiliations, who was politically active only during the liberal era of Fidesz, between 1988 and 1990. If LMP indeed shifted to the right between the two general elections, this was not visible when looking at the partisan past of SMD candidates.

Given the rarity of viable green partisan initiatives before the appearance of LMP, the

low number of LMP candidates who were previously institutionally affiliated with other green parties is not surprising. In 2010 Áron Földi, a local municipal representative of Élőlánc (Republikon, 2010, p.12) was the single candidate with eco-political partisan experience, while four years later the party nominated three candidates of this category in SMDs, including him.

7.2. Relevance of the left/right divide and the hypothesized change in LMP's position

Some argued that the environmental dimension is orthogonal to the traditional left/right partisan divide, as policies aiming to protect the environment cut across traditional economic views and policy means, hence across corresponding partisan alignments as well (see for instance Dalton, 2008). Contrarily, Kitschelt (1988) classified Greens as part of the wider "left-libertarian" party family that is supposed to include other "new politics" parties. Gallagher and his colleagues (1995, pp.187–190) similarly placed the new Green party family to the left side of the political spectrum. Earlier works of the literature emphasized that the environmental dimension has been incorporated into the left-right dichotomy, establishing leftward-leaning Green parties whose elites knew that voters on the left side of the aisle are more receptive to the environmental agenda (Kitschelt, 1988; Rohrschneider, 1993).

The aforementioned studies are not the only ones that clearly classify Green parties as left-wing ones. The recent study of Carter also argues the homogeneity of the green political family, which is characterized by strong libertarian and left-wing policy propositions. He uses data from both expert surveys and the Comparative Manifesto Project (Carter, 2013). According to the results of the Europe-wide analysis, 14 out of 17 electorally successful green parties are clearly leftist ones, with the remaining three categorized by the author as centrist ones. On an 11-point Likert-scale, European green parties score a mean of 3.1, with a standard deviation of 0.98. Based on the answers to expert surveys, Green parties are

consistently ranked as the most or the second most left-wing party in each country in terms of policy throughout the last three decades (Carter, 2013, p.84). Not even this recent study, using data from 2010, named a single Green party in Europe that would be clearly located on the right of the political spectrum;[11] even the few centrist cases were on the left side of the left/right divide. This holds true even if we take the recent willingness of some West European green parties to work with center-right parties in government into account: coalition politics does not change the libertarian and leftist nature of these parties. Based on the foregoing, if LMP candidates fielded in 2014 turned out to be clearly right-wing ones, we would witness the first signs of the a contemporary right-wing Green party,[12] something that would be both uncommon and worthy of the attention of European political science.

7.3. Content analysis: leftist, rightist, green and post-material values

As for the first direct measure of the left – right axis, let's have a look at the results of the content analysis. We coded any instances as a left-wing value when the candidate defined herself explicitly as leftist or liberal or in case (s)he attacked conservatism or right-wing values. Beside this, we categorized here the sentences that signaled standing up for minorities in Hungary and phrases or clauses that praised greater redistribution, aiding those in disadvantaged situation, the poor and the homeless, promoted the reduction of wealth inequalities, social justice, interest articulation of those living from wages ('working class') and the improvement of social welfare system.

We also classified themes to this category that are represented by leftist and liberal

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[11] The *Latvian Greens* both participate in national elections and regarded by the wide public as a right-wing party, but they contest elections jointly with the Latvian Farmers' Union, therefore their own platform is unknown an they were excluded from Carter's analysis.

[12] The predecessor party of the Greens in Finland did not participate in the Civil War in 1918, which leads some to automatically classify them – in line with the domestic traditions – as a right-wing party, but that's purely a definitional issue, having nothing to do with the ideological poitions and attitudes of elites and voters of the party. Consequently, even right-wing actors of the Finnish party system count the Greens 'with the left in parliamentary mathematics' (Paastela, 2013, 23-27).

actors of Hungarian politics and are clearly located closer to the progressive end of the progressive – traditionalist axis. Inter alia these are secularization and diminishing the role of churches; protection of individual rights and human rights related to freedom of speech and opinion; the issues of gender equality, intra-family violence and abortion and tolerant stances took on alternative family models and sexual minorities.

When recording the frequency of right-wing values, we concentrated on the following themes: national traditions and embracing the national community; supporting anti-communism and the Hungarian minority living in the neighboring countries; standing up for the traditional family model; respect for authority and order-mindedness; pitting individual liberty against "thinking in terms of nation". A text was also coded here if it contained an example of criticism or disapproval of secularism, abortion or liberal values or in case the candidate explicitly declared herself being a conservative or right-wing politician.

Green and post-material values were identified by coding the keywords of environmental protection, harmony, the objective of healthy life, the explicitly stated 'green' self-definition and values, expressed preference for the improvement of community and cyclist transport; intentions on creating clean energy jobs or investing to renewable sources of energy; protection of animals, separate waste management and sustainable development. We also classified here occurrences reflecting classic post-materialist value systems like participatory budget, critique of globalism and consumer society, tools of direct democracy, transparency, human dignity preferred to material goods, strengthening communities and human bods or pitting well-being against welfare. Table 5 summarizes the share of short manifestos of LMP candidates of the last two elections containing elements of leftist, rightist and green/post-material values.[13]

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[13] Out of the candidates running for office in 2010, nine politicians did not prepare introductions and manifestos thus these materials were not available on the website of the party either. As a consequence, hereinafter I understand the population of texts as the original number of candidates (92) reduced by these nine candidates

Table 5: Ratio of candidate manifestos containing left-wing, right-wing and post-material values in 2010 and 2014

	2010	2014
N	83	106
Candidates presenting left-wing values in their manifestos	51.8%	40.6%
Candidates presenting right-wing values in their manifestos	10,8%	12,3%
Candidates presenting green and post-material values in their manifestos	89,2%	70,8%

Own calculations based on the work of independent coders. Inter-rater agreement on left-wing values: Krippendorff's α = .803, Cohen's κ = .8, Scott's π = .8; percentwise agreement: 90%. On right-wing values Krippendorff's α = .893, Cohen's κ = .892, Scott's π = .892; percentwise agreement: 95,6%. In case of green and post-material values agreement was somewhat lower: Krippendorff's α = .672, Cohen's κ = .667, Scott's π = .666; percentwise agreement was 90%.

It is apparent that LMP represented less characteristically left-wing values in the last elections if we examine the objectives and important principles of candidates running for single-member district seats. In 2010 one out of two candidates who was approved by the National Elections Office and presented a manifesto to voters included leftist elements in their flyers, while four years later it was true only for four out of ten candidates. In 2014 there were more candidates (both in numbers and in share) who embraced right-wing values, but this difference cannot even generously be regarded as a significant one.

Thus while among the same set of politicians *the rate of occurrence of values and objectives traditionally associated with the left decreased by more than 10 per cent, the*

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(83); this latter number will be displayed in headings and percentage shares are to be understood respective to this as well. The nine candidates were fielded in electoral districts of six counties, had both men and women among them, their group was made up of politicians under and over 30 years; we have no reason to believe that their abscence could cause systemic biases. In cases where candidates are examined from an aspect where the methodology used was not (exclusively) content analysis by the independent coders (e.g. formal party affiliations), the population means the originial value in 2010 and 2014 alike.

relative number of campaign materials presenting conservative value systems and concepts basically stagnated. It worth pointing out, however, that the ratio of politicians mentioning conservative values and goals is notably higher among those SMD candidates that run on both elections. 31.3 % of these sixteen candidates did so when writing their manifestos. This ratio is 2.5 times larger than the share of candidates coded as conservatives within the set of all SMD candidates fielded by the LMP in 2014.

The share of candidates showing green and post-materialist values dropped by nearly 20 per cent at the second general election the LMP participated in, although the strength of conclusions drawn from this analysis is somewhat weakened by the lower levels of inter-rater reliability. Nevertheless, still a consistently high share of candidates present these aforementioned values, but it would be a mistake to believe that a massive green and post-materialist block of the same candidates ran for office in both elections. In reality, the vast majority (81.1%) of those politicians who referred to these value dimensions in their résumés and manifestos in 2010 did not try to win parliamentary mandates in the colors of LMP four years later.

Green and post-material experience is examined separately from value preferences, as shown in Table 6. Under this category I meant, *inter alia*, supporting environmental and animal protectionist foundations and associations, participation in the work of human right offices, local NGOs and humanitarian groups, working as experts or activists for the liquidation of wealth and gender inequalities or having work experience in remedial teaching, organic farming as well as biologic or energetic research.

Hanspeter Kriesi equates the voters on the two side of the material – post-material cleavage to the voter bases supporting left-wing and right-wing parties; in his understanding, voters with post-material value systems are mainly leftists and libertarians, voting for left-wing parties and New Left movements. Contrarily, those on the material side of the cleavage,

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evoking the values of the old middle class find their political home in authoritarian and right-wing parties (Kriesi, 1998).

Table 6: Share of LMP candidates presenting green and post-material experience in their manifestos and résumés in 2010 and 2014

	2010	2014
N	83	106
Candidates with green and post-material affiliation / experience	54,2%	34%

Own calculation based on the work of independent coders. Inter-rater agreement: Krippendorff's α = .797, Cohen's κ = .794, Scott's π = .792; percentwise agreement 90%.

In the case of the second variable, measuring previous participation in environmentalist and ecological organizations, green workplaces and post-materialist civic activism the difference of values is substantially significant: while five years ago half of the candidates reported such experiences, this ratio has dropped to one third in the subset of candidates running for mandates in 2014. This is somewhat peculiar, as the LMP, "aiming to overcome the logic of left/right wagon camps with its centrist self-positioning" (Tóth and Török, 2014) emphasized its eco-political and green nature to a considerably smaller extent in 2014 than it did four years before. The strategy of not belonging to any block was not compensated by an issue-based ecological politics, at least in the case of SMD candidates.

7.4. Free associations in connection with the left and the right

The relationship of candidates with the left and the right is probably most directly measured by the open-ended question that asked for associations of candidates on the two political sides without spatial limitations. This last item of the survey (*One last question: briefly formulate what does 'left' and 'right' mean to you?*) was only asked in 2014, meaning

that no temporal comparison is possible. The aggregation of answers nevertheless still serve as a useful addition for the description of green candidates fielded in SMDs and, as a cross-sectional 'snapshot', it gives the first description of green candidates' opinion on the left and the right.

We received answers from 37 (left) and 36 (right) candidates of LMP, nominated in SMDs. I grouped the answers and created six distinct categories. The categories were both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The first category contains the *descriptive answers*. These were "textbook answers", attempts to give definitions or classic slogans of the left and the right wing, without expressing any agreements or disagreements with them by the respondent. Moreover, in several cases the candidates themselves emphasized that they are providing established frameworks of interpretation or heuristics in their answers (e.g. "the social idea that…" "only slogans come to my mind like…", etc.).

The second category is made up of *expressions with positive connotations* and values worth supporting according to the candidate. They can refer to the fact that the given political camp has good aims and goals (*"fighting for better work and living conditions"*) or can connect the specific side of the left/right axis with *valence issues,* which are by definition enjoy the support of the whole society thus these issues necessarily appear in positive light.

Contrarily, the third category collects *negative evaluations and sentences*; content assigned to this group contained either plain vulgarities and invectives (*"idiots" "obviously lying"*) or value-based criticisms and charges associated with corruption or authoritarianism (*"a system with the camouflage of being nationalistic" "characterized by latent anti-semitism, religious intolerance and xenophoby"*).

The fourth group is the home of answers arguing that *the concept is hollowing and outdated by now*; claims about the senselessness of the left/right axis and beliefs about the given side being uninterpretable in the Hungarian context. Given the founding principles, the

post-material character of LMP (both aiming to overcome the logic of left/right wagon camps with the value synthesis and ecopolitics) and its anti-establishment nature, we can assume that candidates of the green party tend to favor these type of answers to a greater extent than politicians of other parties do so.


Figure 1: Free associations of candidates for the left. The author's own work.


Figure 2: Free associations of candidates for the right.

Elements of the remaining two categories are located *outside the set of politically relevant answers*: the fifth group contains very simple, inverse (*"not right and not center"*) or repetitive (*"left"*) answers, while the sixth includes the quasi-non-responses (*"nothing"*) and jokey items from candidates who aimed to avoid actually giving a meaningful answer (*"this is the direction where one should look in [Buda]pest when arriving to crossroads"*). Figures 1 and 2 show the associations on left and right by all respondents from the LMP.

Based on the analysis one can see that when it comes to the left − right dichotomy, candidates of LMP filling out the survey feel themselves somewhat closer to the previous one. One third of the answers on the left contained some positive connotation or value judgment, and only slightly more that one tenth was a negative expression or an invective. Compared to this, only 11 per cent of all answers for the right were positive and every fourth candidate had negative thoughts about the right-wing.

The anti-establishment character and the phenomenon of overcoming the dichotomous politics are not present markedly in the candidates' thinking. Only 10 to 20 per cent of respondents believed that the left or the right were senseless or hollowed concepts, and even if we add the "non-responses" (i.e. items in the aforementioned fifth and sixth groups) to them, which might be understood as protest stances they do not reach 1/3 of all candidates. The third way politics of being "neither right, nor left" is not even close to be as dominant as one could have expected, and contrary to the hypothesis the situation is the same when it comes to the conservative/right-wing values.[14]

The content analysis performed on the coded open-ended questions can give us a detailed account only on the specific subgroup of LMP candidates that run for office in 2014. Nonetheless, it still makes it *very implausible that politicians of the green party identified themselves as right-wing ones* or that they (openly) favored right-wing values. As one can

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[14] Ten candidates expicitly mentioned conservatism and conservative values as free associations in connection with 'right'.

see, the prevalence of *these ideological positions did not even approximate the majority* among the SMD candidates of LMP in 2014.

7.5. The position of candidates based on self-identification

The overwhelming majority of party politicians are able to position themselves on the left/right spectrum and to carry out self-categorization and self-definition in the light of this dichotomy (Körösényi, Tóth és Török, 2009, p.170). The same is true for the positioning of parties on the very same axis (Enyedi, 2004, p.12). The questionnaires given to parliamentary candidates contained an item in both electoral years, asking the specific politician to determine his/her position on the left–right axis with the help of a 11-point Likert scale (*Many people use left and right as expressions to describe political stances. Where would you place yourself on a scale where 0 stands for 'left-wing' attitudes and 10 marks 'right-wing' ones?*).

As the first step of the analysis I carried out a series of Chi-square tests: neither the original variable, nor the one converted into a threefold way (left − center − right) had significant results (X^2 11-point Likert =12.82; p = .171; X^2 left-right-center = 3,26; p = .196). I went on with a Mann-Whitney U test that, as a ranking-based non-parametric test, can be used for investigating relationships between a dependent variable measured on ordinal scale (here: 11-point Likert-scale) and a dichotomous (here: year of candidacy) one.[15]

Distributions of answers measured on the 11-point Likert-scale for candidates of the two elections were not similar, as assessed by visual inspection. According to the test results ($U = 904$, $z = 1.867$, $p = .062$) there was no statistically significant difference between the left/right self-positioning of candidates from 2010 (mean rank = 33.84) and 2014 (mean rank = 43.23). SMD candidates of the LMP for the last election then *presented substantially fewer leftist and post-material values* (see Table 5) *that our weighted sample could not confirm that*

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[15] One of the pre-requisites of the test is the independence of samples, thus before running the test I removed those two candidates who gave responses both in 2010 and in 2014 and corrected the weights.

there was a change in their left/right placement.

Candidates were also asked to place their *party* and the *voters of their party* on the same scale. In case of the variable on party's position, the distributions for the two candidate subsets were not similar, as assessed by visual inspection. According to the Mann-Whitney U test the mean rank of candidates from 2014 (44.74) was substantively and statistically significantly higher than the one of candidates from 2010 (31.58). The null hypothesis thus can be rejected and one can conclude that SMD candidates fielded in 2014 regarded and believed their party leaning more towards the right that those who ran for office four years earlier ($U = 974$, $z = 2,686$, $p < .05$). The same can be said about LMP's perceptions on its own voters: candidates in 2014 (mean rank = 45.73) saw their voters more right-wing than ones in 2010 (mean rank = 31.58); the difference is significant ($U = 1021$, $z = 2,841$, $p < .005$). *Politicians of the green party, running for office in single-member districts, then perceived the right-wing shift of both their party and their voter base, but we cannot claim that the left/right self-positioning of candidates had followed this trend.*

As it was discussed in Section 2.1., the Chapel Hill trend file showed no evidence of movement along the overall left-right scale but pointed out significant differences in the position of the party on the post-material/traditionalist axis. This *seems to cross-validate the unconventional methods I used for spatial positioning, as both arrived to similar conclusions.* Between the pool of SMD candidates in 2010 and 2014, substantial differences exist if their green/post-material experiences and affiliations are examined, or if one compares the ratio of those manifestos that present green/post-material values. On the other hand, the share of candidates with previous left/right-wing partisan experiences and manifestos containing these values stagnated, parallel to the findings of the Chapel Hill expert survey.

One might raise the question whether the politicians filling the questionnaires understand the same ideological dimension under the labels of left/right that is used in in this

thesis. I compared the left-right self-positioning item in the 2010 survey with another item, existing solely in this survey and measured on the same scale (*Liberal – Conservative. Where would you place yourself?*). I computed Cronbach's alfa (Cronbach, 1951) for these two variables (*k31* and *k34)* that yielded a value of 0.78, suggesting the high internal consistency of these two scales within the specific sample. Thus it can be said that the candidates indeed answered very similarly to the two questions, and the left/right and liberal/conservative axes were closely associated in their frame of mind when answering the survey.

7.6. The attitudes of candidates on EU and post-material issues

Relationship with the European Union is associated with the left/right position of politicians and voters in Hungary: while the leftist opposition is traditionally on the pro-EU side, the right-wing have an ambivalent and more critical approach towards its institutions and fundamental values (Fidesz-KNDP) or even occupies an outright Eurosceptic and anti-EU position (Jobbik). We are able to perceive a similar disposition along the cultural left/right axis if we examine smaller social groups as well. Voter groups that sympathize with left-liberal parties mainly see the benefits of EU membership. Contrarily, pro-governmental or radical voters with strong right-wing self-identification feel that they did not profit from Hungarian membership personally, seeing Hungary as a secondary member of the European Union and accession as a curtailment of sovereignty (Boros and Kadlót, 2015).

Surveys depict members and voters of LMP as a specifically pro-European group; voters of the party had a higher share of respondents who would have voted for joining the EU again in December 2010 than any other party. LMP voters were also the ones with the lowest share of those who criticized EU on the base of its bureaucracy or lack of responsivity. Supporters of the party were also leading the polls when it came to the share of those who believed that EU contributes to the strengthening of democracy in Hungary, and they had an

outstandingly large ratio of those who associated positive effects on Hungarian living standards to EU-membership (Medián and Policy Solutions, 2010).

Studies conducted later, in the middle of the parliamentary cycle, drew a similar picture about the voter base of LMP (Bakonyi, Hann and Lakatos, 2011; Republikon, 2012). 'Europeer/westerner' was the third most popular political/ideological stance to identify with for the green youth (Keil, 2014, p.197) and a positive EU image is dominant among younger, college or university student voters (Keil, 2012) and middle-aged working supporters (Boros and Kadlót, 2015, pp.69–72) of the party alike. An Eurosceptic, or – to use party chairman András Schiffer's expression (Index, 2014) – *eurocritical* turn of the party would then not only be an interpretable shift on the ideologically defined left/right (libertarian/authoritarian) axis with a clear direction, but would drastically go against the value judgments of supporters and voters of LMP.

I examine the relationship of candidates with the European Union across time with the help of two survey questions. Surveys from both 2010 and 2014 asked candidates' opinion about European integration (*Some say that the European integration should be deepened further. Others claim that integration has already gone too far. What is your opinion*?), with responses measured on an 11-point-scale ranging from 0 to 10. I first analyzed the responses with the help of Chi-square tests (both in its original format and with item responses merged) then I continued with a Mann-Whitney U test. As the lack of statistical significance in cases of both tests suggested maintaining the null hypothesis, *one cannot claim that opinions of SMD candidates fielded in 2010 and 2014 had differed on the desired directions of European cooperation*.

Whilst the wording of the survey item on evaluation of EU membership is not exactly the same in 2014 and 2010 (*According to you, was joining to European Union rather good or bad?* and *Did joining to the EU come rather come with benefits or drawbacks?*), the

agreement content-wise and in terms of the scale of measurement (good/bad/none of them –
no response vs. rather with benefits / rather with drawbacks / doesn't know – no response)
makes it possible to treat them as quasi-identical questions and compare the answers given to
these cross-sectional questions.

Among the candidates of LMP running for office in 2010, 72.7% of them thought that
EU membership of Hungary was overall a positive thing; the same ratio was 62.7% four years
later. The share of candidates who emphasized the drawbacks was 21.2% and 5.1%,
respectively. Most striking results, however, comes from the temporal comparison of 'don't
know/none of the above' answers and the share of candidates with non-responses:[16] in 2010,
6.1%, in 2014 32.3% of respondents belonged to this category. The Chi-square test performed
to analyze the relationship between the year of elections and the variable on
benefits/drawbacks of EU membership found a significant difference ($X^2 = 11,72$; p < .05),
thus the nullhypothesis can be rejected and it can be stated that the two set of candidates
nominated in the two elections differed from each other significantly in terms of the
evaluation of the European Union.

While we see a *decrease of ten percentage points in the number unequivocally pro-
European LMP candidates*, the changes in the other two categories are probably even more
noteworthy. Contrary to what the alternative hypothesis expected, *the disillusioned
candidates did not jump on the bandwagon of Euroscepticism; what we see instead is the
share of uncertain politicians increasing fivefold, accompanied by decrease of the ratio of
candidates who had clearly negative views on EU-membership*. Summing up the responses to
the two aforementioned survey items, it seems that Schiffer's "eurocritical" turn mostly
manifested as the multiplication of the number of candidates lacking a solid stance on the
issue – a group that was virtually non-existent earlier.

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[16] The database with the survey responses from 2014 contained no answers and 'none of the above' as separate
variables thus I first merged them in order to make comparisons available with the variable from four years
before.

It should be noted, however, that the EU had recently become more unpopular both in the eyes of the Hungarian public and politicians, as support of membership and trust in European institutions had decreased in both groups (Martin, 2014). Speeches and official party documents even signal a conscious process aiming to undermine trust in EU and generate skepticism (MET, 2012). Section 7.10. interprets the changing Europhil/Eurosceptic attitudes of LMP candidates in the broader context of all parties of the party system.

Beside the relations with the EU, there were two other issues that i) have a clear disposition on the left/right axis of the current party system and ii) were asked with identical wording in 2010 and in 2014. Responses given to these survey items thus can bring us closer to locate the ideological positions of LMP's SMD candidates in the assumed triangle of left-wind opposition, right-wing pro-governmental parties and Jobbik (Tóth and Török, 2014, p.524). These issues are abortion and affirmative action to help women to progress in the economy. In both cases, the conservative/liberal (i.e. cultural and ideological left/right) stances are clearly identifiable in Hungary.

Responses to the respective questions (*'Women should freely decide on abortion. To what extent do you agree with this?'; 'Women should be favored when jobs are filled in and promotions are given. To what extent do you agree with this?'*) were measured by a scale ranging from 1 to 5 with the two endpoints being *'fully agree'* and *'completely disagree'*.

Table 7: Analyzing the hypothesized relationship between answers to post-material questions and the year of candidacy.

	Mann–Whitney U			Chi-square test	
	U	z	p	X^2	p
Abortion	630,50	-1,207	.228	3,244	.518
Affirmative action for women	580,0	-1,596	.110	5,273	.260

Based on own calculations.

It is visible that none of the tests have found statistically significant associations between the

year of candidacy and the answers provided for two worldview-related questions. Consequently we were unable to reject the nullhypothesis of the right-wing shift operationalized in this specific way.

7.7. Religiosity and church affiliation of candidates

Religious affiliation of candidates can be studied from many aspects. Firstly, I investigate self-declared organizational association of politicians – in most cases this means membership in churches and religious associations. Secondly, I present an overview of those activities of candidates that are socio-culturally clearly related to churches and organized religious life and presented in a similar way in public speech: participation in worship services, holding offices in local church groups or working as catechists, for instance. Part of the necessary data was available in the database of candidates' survey responses, while the rest was produced as the result of the independent coders' work.

Hereinafter I understand relations with state-acknowledged (established) Christian churches under religious beliefs and close or formal relations with churches. Denominational differences play only a minor role in political behavior both in Hungary, similarly to most European countries.[17] While among the SMD candidates of LMP there was someone who mentioned his Buddhist affiliation, non-Christian religious beliefs have no explanatory power regarding electoral behavior and cleavage formation in Hungary, thus they cannot be indicators of the right-wing shift.

While attitudes on Jews in Hungary entails distinct leftist, rightist and party-specific stances (Tóth and Török, 2014, p.524), very few would argue that more/less candidates with Jewish origin or religious background gave a more leftist/rightist character to a party. Beside the lack of deterministic relationship, the LMP did not even have candidates mentioning

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[17] While affiliation with charismatic churches often entails supporting leftist parties (Enyedi, Fábián and Tardos, 2014, 533.), there were no candidates reporting such demoninational conncetions or beliefs.

connections with Judaism in manifestos or survey answers.

As a first step I carried out the content analysis of manifestos and résumés of candidates of both elections from the aspect of religiosity and church affiliation. According to the codebook, the coders marked occurrences if the candidate *explicitly declared her religious affiliation*; if *(s)he refers to membership or holding an office in any established church* (e.g. being a presbyter or having a senior position in a congregation)*; if (s)he mentions *affiliations with Christian groups or membership in such organizations* (e.g. Catholic circles in universities or participation in the work of Christian charity organizations) or in case the candidate reports *having qualifications necessary to become a religious teacher or worked as a catechist* in these manifestos and résumés.[18] Table 8 contains the share of candidates reporting religiosity or church affiliation within the set of candidates in 2010/2014, examining the complete population.

Table 8: Ratio of candidate résumés/manifestos reporting religiosity and church affiliation.

	2010	2014
N	83	106
Religious / church affiliated candidates (per cent)	3,6%	6,6%

Own calculation based on the work of the independent coders. Inter-rater agreement: Krippendorff's $\alpha = 1$, Cohen's $\kappa = 1$, Scott's $\pi = 1$; percentwise agreement is 100%.

Based on the table it is well visible that in the last election, within the population of single-member district candidates, there were nearly twice as many candidates (in percentages) reporting formal church affiliations or religious beliefs – nevertheless, their share still remains relatively low. Of course, one cannot equate this result with the exact share of religious candidates; on the other hand, in any case it shows that *the ratio of those who felt*

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[18] Contrarily, the codebook emphasized that reporting non-Christian beliefs, affiliations with non-Christian churches or membership in charismatic (small) churches (e.g. Faith Church) should not be coded.

the necessity or importance to report such set of values to voters was higher in 2014.

For further investigation of religious affiliations relevant from the perspective of the culturally-ideologically understood left-wing/right-wing (authoritarian – libertarian axis) I used the survey sample. Both waves asked about practicing religion in an organized manner (*How often do you go to church / to worship service?*).[19]

Distribution of responses for candidates of the two elections differed, as assessed by visual inspection; according to the Mann-Whitney U test, there was no statistically significant difference ($U = 622$, $z = -1.126$, $p = .260$) between the religiosity of candidates nominated in 2010 (mean rank: 42.06) and fielded in 2014 (mean rank: 36.82). Higher values suggest lower levels of religious activity here; meaning that the *numerical data is in line with the alternative hypothesis but the results do not allow us to speak about a significant difference* between the two subsets of candidates. Chi-square test leads to the same conclusion: in 2014, one could find both nominally and proportionally more candidates in categories indicating more frequent church attendance rates, but sufficient evidence is not available to reject the null hypothesis.

7.8. Comparison of LMP's PR candidates with ones fielded in SMDs

While the main focus of this thesis is the analysis of candidates who ran for mandates in single-member constituencies, it worth having a look at how they compare to other supporting and activist groups of the LMP. According to May, one can distinguish three distinct tiers of party supporters, each of whom tend to have a different ideological position, often resulting in intra-party conflicts (May, 1973). As his *Law of Curvilinear Disparity* explains, parties divide hierarchically into three hierarchical categories, labeled as top leaders,

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[19] Before comparing the two sets of data the responses (in numerical format) to the open-ended question in the 2010 survey were grouped acording to the categories present in the 2014 one.

sub-leaders and non-leaders. Each stratum is said to face differential incentives: whilst top leaders can enjoy material incentives, solidarity and purposive benefits, sub-leaders are mostly left with demands instead of privileges, meaning that only the most committed and ideologically radical ones end up being active party members. The conclusion of the article is that out of the three aforementioned groups, sub-leaders will be the most radical, with non-leaders usually taking the most moderate line on partisan issues and being located closes to the center.

Challenging May's article, Norris argued that overall party leaders are likely to be more radical than their followers, as they face considerable risks and costs during their career (Norris, 1995). According to her, this requires strong commitment to party principles, an attitude that is reinforced by campaigns, but immersion in the party's ideology does not stop there. MPs and other high-ranking politicians have to defend the positions of their political family on a daily basis if gained an elected office.

In the context of LMP, it is not clear how one should classify the party's SMD candidates. They are certainly 'candidates for elected office', which is by itself, labels them leaders in the Mayian taxonomy. Nonetheless, being standard bearers of a minor green party these candidates have no realistic chance to win mandates in their respective constituencies. Although they are usually congressional delegates as well, that again has minimal relevance, given the model of grassroots democracy the party uses. It is safe to say that most material, status and power-related incentives are at an unreachable distance from them and that they share several features of *sub-leaders*, being mostly active at regional or constituency level and often having a volunteer self-recruit background.

By contrast, those appearing in prominent places of party lists are usually members of central party units and/or hold elected positions as well. As for the candidates aiming to gain parliamentary seats from the party list, we do not have first-hand introductions and manifestos

from them (with the exception of those who also competed for mandate in SMDs). For this reason, I will exclusively rely on their survey responses when aiming to make a comparison.

Table 9: Mean values of ideological and issue positions of LMP candidates in 2010 and 2014.

	Mean values of LMP candidates' positions (standard deviations in parentheses)				
	PR (national & county)	PR (only national)		SMD	
	2010	2010	2014	2010	2014
Own position (0 – 11)	3.90 (1.79)	3.55 (1.63)	4.34 (1.70)	3.76 (1.54)	4.43 (1.73)
Position of the party (0 – 11)	3.92 (1.06)	3.75 (1.11)	4.40 (1.08)	3.91 (1.04)	4.38 (1.11)
Own voters' position (0 – 11)	3.73 (1.09)	3.62 (1.15)	4.36 (0.92)	3.73 (1.01)	4.30 (0.83)
Abortion (1 – 5)	3.92 (1.27)	4.00 (1.10)	3.92 (0.94)	4.12 (1.02)	3.94 (1.02)
Affirmative action (1 – 5)	3.20 (1.28)	3.72 (0.92)	3.06 (1.08)	3.36 (1.22)	3.00 (1.04)
EU integration (0 – 10)	6.51 (2.60)	7.00 (2.16)	6.24 (2.06)	6.35 (2.44)	6.27 (2.15)
Church attendance (0 – 7)	5.65 (2.29)	5.62 (2.38)	5.47 (1.90)	5.68 (2.25)	5.33 (2.06)

Based on the author's own calculations.

Provided that the Hungarian electoral system had two ways for gaining PR mandates (territorial lists at the levels of counties and a nation-wide list where lost votes were also channeled), I noted them separately in the table. The slight difference that existed between nation-wide list PR candidates and SMD ones in 2010 (probably most visible when looking at the values on deepening EU integration) has disappeared by 2014; the core party elite and the candidates fielded by them became pretty much alike. This might be due to the shrinking electoral arena: as the number of seats in the National Assembly (and consequently the size of the parliamentary group) was reduced, less and more experienced politician competed for the scarce political prizes.

Secondly, it seems that no major differences existed between these two tiers of the party, contrary to the expectations of May and Norris. The small membership of the party, the lack of experienced political cadres after the split in 2013 or the small sample size of the survey can all partly explain this. Still, perhaps the most plausible explanation might lie in the fact that these questionnaire items do not target *the core ideology of the party*, which is not a position alongside a one-dimensional left/right scale, but environmentalism and other post-material values. It might very well be the case that a research targeting these dimensions would find significant differences between leaders and non-leaders.

7.9. Ideological positions in different subgroups of candidates

One of the often-expressed views on the LMP's internal conflicts was that the liberal – conservative antagonism corresponded to a conflict between party members from the capital and ones from the countryside. According to Bozóki, after the party gained seats in the National Assembly, the issues dominating its agenda were mainly related to deficiencies in the rule of law or fundamental rights – and it quickly drew the antipathy of the rural faction of LMP (Bozóki, 2014, p.225). The latter sought to replace issues on the agenda that are 'of great importance for the liberals in Budapest' with social anomalies, believing that those affect a greater share of the society directly.

As Bozóki puts it, the capital-based and the rural factions of the party apparently identified with different problems and leading figures; the parliamentary group was more liberal than average members whilst within the *party on the ground* "deep green activists with traditional right-wing values" possessed strong lobby positions (Bozóki, 2014, p.226). He also argues that (congressional) delegates of rural party units were also more conservative and rightists than average. The same thought is reflected in a sentence of a former green MP, who said that "the Hungarian society and the Hungarian intelligentsia is not in [such] a shape that

it could exceed the popular/urban, liberal/conservative and countryside/Budapest […] divisions within one single political organization." (Petőcz, 2014, p.157).

The analysis below presents the first empirical test for these aforementioned propositions, to complement earlier time-series findings of this thesis. Beside the Budapest/countryside divide, I also carry out analyses along the two other dimensions that were earlier taken into consideration when weighting the sample: age and gender.

Table 10: Analyzing the left/right division between specific subgroups of LMP's single-member district candidates by self-placement on a one-dimensional left-right scale.

	Mann–Whitney U			Chi-square test	
	U	z	p	X^2	p
Gender (male/female)	580.5	.012	.991	7.73	.562
Age (over/under 30)	350	-.940	.347	9.04	.434
Geography (Budapest/countryside)	941	2.75	.006	19.62	.020

Based on the author's own calculations.

We see neither significant, nor substantial differences when analyzing gender (mean ranks: 40.48 vs. 40.55) and age (mean ranks: 44.08 vs. 37.97), meaning that there were no statistically significant differences between the left/right self-positioning of male and female, as well as younger and older candidates, respectively. Having a closer look on the subgroup of rural and Budapest-based[20] politicians, however, strikingly supports the ascertainments of Bozóki and Petőcz discussed above in this chapter. Politicians of the Hungarian green party fielded in rural single-member districts were significantly closer to the right end of the left/right axis (mean rank = 45.11) than those running for office in Budapest (mean rank =

[20] As a proxy for the capital/countryside dichotomy, the geographical location of the constituency (SMD) was used; this approximation is not without fallacies, yet it is probably more robust than any other result potentially yielded by efforst to identify links between candidates and the capiral based on cultural ties, past experiences or place of birth.

30.36). Chi-square tests yield the same results, indicating that categories of gender and age are statistically the same in terms of left-right self-positioning, while a major difference is detectable parallel with the urban/rural divide.

Note though, that out of the three analyzed factors this last one can have the least variability across time (i.e. from 2010 to 2014), as the ratio of constituencies within and outside is institutionally define. Nonetheless, two triggers of potential change should still be taken into consideration. Firstly, the new electoral law, entering into force with the 2010 parliamentary election redrew the boundaries of SMDs, but that did not entail a meaningful numerical change; the ratio of Budapest-based ones within all constituencies changed from 18.1% to 17%. Secondly, smaller parties do not always have resources and local support to field candidates in all districts, and this was especially true to the LMP in 2010. As the chapter comparing the attributions of the sample and the population pointed out, proportionally LMP could field way more candidates in Budapest than in the countryside, resulting in having 28% of its candidates running for parliamentary seats in the capital. This number was even higher in the uncorrected sample (44%). This means the relative preponderance of leftist (liberal) candidates, suggesting that *even if no change happened at all* in the candidates' left/right position on average, the *data would still indicate some degree of it*, taking into account that a substantial share of its rural candidates, who are more likely to be right-leaning and conservative, did not manage to collect enough recommendations. Given that, the lack of statistically measurable change is then an even stronger disproof to pundits' and columnists' claims on a right-wing turn of the party.

7.10. LMP's position in the context of all parties in the party system

How does the difference between LMP's position in 2010 and in 2014 compare to underlying and incremental changes present in the party system? Can it be that the powerful

right-wing shift that characterized both Hungarian voters and political elites before the 2010 elections (Enyedi and Benoit, 2011) has continued till 2014 as well? Or quite to the contrary, was it the ongoing polarization that triggered leftist parties and candidates to move towards the left end of the imaginary unidimensional left/right scale, as a reaction to the radicalization of governmental stances and the appearance of the extreme-right in the parliament? Either way, LMP's place, both when it comes to its candidates' self-positioning and their perception on the party('s voters) is better understood in the broader context of the relevant parties running for office in both elections.

Table 11: Mean values of ideological and issue positions of relevant partisan candidates in 2010 and 2014.

	Mean values (standard deviations in parentheses)							
	Fidesz-KDNP		MSZP / Unity		Jobbik		LMP	
	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014
Own position (0 – 11)	7.85 (1.74)	8.13 (1.66)	1.64 (0.73)	1.93 (1.46)	8.59 (1.87)	7.87 (1..81)	3.76 (1.54)	4.43 (1.73)
Position of the party (0 – 11)	7.78 (1.53)	7.87 (1.80)	2.57 (1.26)	1.95 (1.30)	8.21 (1.91)	7.62 (1.77)	3.91 (1.04)	4.38 (1.11)
Own voters' position (0 – 11)	7.08 (1.61)	7.63 (1.57)	2.00 (1.18)	2.10 (1.24)	7.59 (1.58)	7.33 (1.88)	3.73 (1.01)	4.30 (0.83)
Abortion (1 – 5)	2.80 (1.43)	2.59 (1.07)	4.54 (0.84)	4.53 (0.60)	1.85 (1.08)	2.03 (0.81)	4.12 (1.02)	3.94 (1.02)
Affirmative action (1 – 5)	2.53 (0.96)	2.90 (0.90)	3.36 (0.87)	3.32 (0.96)	2.25 (1.12)	2.21 (0.95)	3.36 (1.22)	3.00 (1.04)
EU integration (0 – 10)	5.52 (2.52)	4.23 (2.62)	8.14 (1.82)	8.46 (2.21)	1.09 (2.07)	0.82 (1.32)	6.35 (2.44)	6.27 (2.15)
Church attendance (0 – 7)	5.62 (1.90)	2.22 (1.11)	6.00 (1.59)	5.24 (1.62)	5.04 (2.53)	3.76 (1.94)	5.68 (2.25)	5.33 (2.06)

Based on the author's own calculations.

For a robust comparison, I compare mean values of all previously discussed, numerically measured survey items answered by SMD candidates in 2010 and 2014. Given that the smaller splinter parties of the leftists *Unity* alliance (EGYÜTT, Democratic Coalition, PM and MLP) did not exist at the time of the parliamentary elections of 2010, I have to

juxtapose the whole alliance with the MSZP as its successor when comparing candidates. As short candidate manifestos are not available for all parties, no content analysis complements the analysis this time.

Among the mean differences of the left-right positions, it is actually the value on self-positioning that is the largest. The reason why even so only the shifts on the other two scales could pass the test of statistical significance is its relatively great standard deviation (which is also greater than it was four years before), suggesting that the pool of green SMD candidates had also become more heterogeneous by 2014.

It seems that out of the two possible scenarios that were assumed at the beginning of this subchapter, the one assuming continued and ongoing right-wing shift clearly lacks support by the data. The political elite as a whole (or at least its characteristic subgroup, the partisan SMD candidates) did not become more conservative; in fact, it was only the governing Fidesz-KDNP alliance that was consistently more right-wing in 2014 in all three dimensions (candidate–party–voters) according to its politicians. Contrarily, Jobbik's politicians reported a slight shift towards the center, which is in line with the party's recent efforts to get rid of the extremist label and appear as a moderate catch-all party (Mandák, 2015).

Stances on issues that have clear liberal and conservative poles show surprising stability. The idea of affirmative action for women as well as being pro-choice or pro-life seemingly did not change at all; despite the heated debates of media and the National Assembly on women's rights and status, a high degree of constancy prevails. Relationship with the EU has proven to be a polarizing issue, as the allied Left fielded even more pro-European candidates than before. In the meantime, LMP did not follow their path, but nor were its candidates affected by the Eurosceptic rhetoric of Fidesz and the far-right Jobbik. Expressed level of support for more integration has fell in the case of the latter parties'

candidates, with a particularly substantial drop on behalf of Fidesz politicians; note thought that Jobbik's base value was already in unprecedented lows.

8. Conclusion

The thesis provided a comparative analysis of single-member district candidates of Politics Can Be Different (LMP), fielded in 2010 and 2014. LMP, which was the first Hungarian green party to achieve parliamentary representation, reportedly carried out a culturally and ideologically understood right-wing turn in 2013, according to several politicians, pundits, analysts and columnists. This study was the first attempt to compare SMD-candidates of the party with regard to their left-wing and right-wing values and self-identification, as well as to their positions and stances on issues that have a clear place on a unidimensional left-right scale. For this, I carried out the content analysis of short candidate introductions (containing both autobiographic and programmatic elements) and the statistical analysis of candidates' survey responses.

A great virtue of this study can be that it was able to dissect perceptual and substantive shifts on the left-right continuum. The impression of LMP being drifted towards the right was so powerful that even its own politicians (i.e. candidates running for office in single-member constituencies, including a few high-ranking party leaders) were convinced that the membership and voter base of the party was located substantially closer to the right end of the ideological scale in 2014 than they were four years earlier. At the same time and using the very same 11-point-scale, one cannot see meaningful differences at the individual level; the self-identification of the green politicians is significantly not different from their predecessors. This somewhat paradoxical duality might explain why candidates shown hardly any signs of changes on certain issue positions like abortion or affirmative action for women, yet presented substantially less policy proposals and values that can be clearly linked to the (culturally and ideologically understood) left. Apparently green candidates in Hungary perceived a right-wing shift of their party and refined their image and agenda accordingly.

This shows that the 'rightist turn' was rather a perceptual phenomenon and not a real attitudinal change; the discourse presented by pundits, columnists and politicians of the opposition was a powerful but mostly an ungrounded. LMP changed some of its outlook to fit better for an imaginary voter base, part of which could have been more than doubling candidates with religious background – a move that resonated well with the right-wing political elites' recent "rediscovery" of their religiosity, manifesting in more frequent church attendance rates. The fallback of candidates presenting green and post-material organizational experience or presenting such values in their manifestos in 2014 cross-validates my measures, as it mirrors the findings of the Chapel Hill expert survey.

Within the subset of those who competed for mandates as LMP candidates in both elections the prevalence of conservative values is much higher, but their position was not reinforced by newcomer candidates. This suggests that the perception of the right-wing turn might rather be due to the visibility and leading intra-party role of *those who stayed* and not a consequence of *those who arrived*. The aftermath of the party split was not a conscious selection of right-leaning candidates – as new entrants were just as liberal as the old pool of candidates – but the realignment of power relations in a way that a conservative core within the LMP was strengthened.

Nonetheless, conclusions drawn from this analysis have only limited generalizability, given that it focused on a subset of parliamentary candidates: ones running for office in single-member constituencies. SMD candidates represent their parties' core values to voters or spoor changes occurring in them; yet, analyzing them cannot necessarily show the big picture about the ideological position of party leaders or the party on the ground (Katz and Mair, 2002).

Finally, it is worth mentioning that in 2010, just slightly more than half of the originally nominated single-member district candidates of LMP could eventually run for

office. Due to missing data, this thesis did not have the chance to analyze candidates who were barred from running by the National Election Office. Notwithstanding, a research aimed to explore their attitudes and ideological positions could be a valuable contribution to help us understand the political elite of the most successful green party of Hungary.

Appendix

The content analysis was carried out by university students with BA degrees from the fields of social sciences, either enrolled into graduate programs or fulfilling their internships. While they were politically interested students actively following public life, they had no specific knowledge about the candidates or campaigns of LMP and neither did they have conflicts of interest resulting from interpersonal relationships with green politicians.

As independent coders, they did not know each other, had no knowledge about the boundaries of the set of the whole text population or the intersection that they coded together and they also received parallel messages with textually identical instructions. For performing the task they used the software Textual Content Analysis (TCA), which is not only able to code manifest and latent themes alike but to produce a statistically analyzable data matrix. They had previous experience in coding interview transcriptions and survey responses during their bachelor-level or studies or courses in the so-called colleges for advanced studies; coding partisan manifestos and using TCA, on the other hand, was a novelty for them.

Candidate résumés and manifestos assigned to the juncture (i.e. coded by all independent coders) were selected by random number generation. If the inter-coder agreement was not measurable in the case of a specific variable (due to low item number or the complete lack of occurrence), then the coders received a new random sample, which was coded in a way that they only had to record the occurrences of the given variable in question.

Codes denoting value dimensions were neither mutually exclusive, nor collectively exhaustive. That is, it was possible to classify a candidate as representing both left-wing and right-wing values if (s)he indeed had a résumé containing elements from both categories; on the other hand, coders were not forced to assign a value dimension for each and every (quasi-) sentence, as a substantial share of district-level manifestos contained biographic data and

other local content of non-political nature. Given that the overwhelming majority of the brief résumés did not contain more that two occurrences of leftist/rightist values maximum, I decided to use binary variables, for instance, whether the given candidate presented post-materialist values/had green partisan experience before LMP or not. This approach, besides its practical advantages, also improves inter-rater reliability, as disagreements from double-coding the same quasi-sentence as multiple occurrences evaporates.

For calculating the reliability coefficients I used ReCal2 (Freelon, 2010) and the KALPHA macro for the SPSS software package (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007; De Swert, 2012). As for their acceptable values, I used the established thresholds prevalent in studies, that is (Frey, Botan and Kreps, 2000; Krippendorff, 2004) I regarded reliability coefficients higher or equal to 0.7 or 0.8 as signs of high inter-rater agreement, while results between these numbers and 0.667 were treated as values suitable for drawing provisory conclusions. As it will be visible later on, coefficients used in the course of the analysis had, with a single exception, values of way higher dimensions than the required minimal threshold.

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