

**EU DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN
LEBANON: A NORMATIVE OR REALPOLITIK
ACTOR?**

By

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Submitted to

Central European University

School of Public Policy

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MA in Public Policy

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Budapest, Hungary

2016

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ABSTRACT

The European Union has been engaged in democracy promotion efforts in its neighborhood since the founding of the European Foreign and Security Policy. These efforts have been an important attribute in forming the EU's image of a normative foreign policy actor, devoted to the values of peace, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This work aims to examine the nature of the EU democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon, in order to detect possible improvements after the initial failure in the events of the Arab Spring. Using the document analysis, this work finds that the EU has been a Realpolitik rather than a normative actor in its democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon before the Arab Spring, prioritizing political stability over democracy. However, the analysis finds that the EU has indeed learnt from its mistakes, demonstrating normative nature of its goals, means and impact after the changes in its democracy promotion were introduced.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my family, for all the support and love you have given me. To my friends, for being a key part in the process, making it bearable and more fun. To my thesis supervisor, Professor Uwe Puetter for being patient and understanding and for helping me to learn how to love writing. To Professor Yahya Sadowski for introducing me to the exciting dynamics of the Middle East. To CEU for the best academic experience I could have ever imagined.

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List of Abbreviations

A New Response to the Changing Neighborhood – NRCN

Association Agreement – AA

European Foreign and Security Policy - EFSP

European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument – ENPI

European Neighborhood Instrument - ENI

European Neighborhood Policy – ENP

European Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity – PfDSP

European Union – EU

Normative Power Europe – NPE

Union for Mediterranean – UfM

World War II – WWII

Introduction

The European Union (EU) is the unprecedented form of polity with a strong value-based identity built on the ashes of the World War II. Considering the crucial role of the values of peace, democracy, respect for rights and freedoms and the rule of law, as the foundation of its existence and development, the EU is strongly committed to further promotion of these values. With the development of the European Foreign and Security Policy (EFSP), this normative dimension of European identity has been engaged on the international level. Special focus of this engagement was on the nearest European neighborhood, as a way to build mutually beneficial peaceful and stable environment for the further development of the EU. This was the start of EU democracy promotion efforts.

EU's democracy promotion efforts in the Southern Neighborhood are of key importance, due to the fact that this region presents a constant conflict point and a global security threat, taking into account the long tradition of authoritarian nature of the regimes in the region, rise of terrorist organizations, ongoing conflict in Syria and the rising migration challenges. The aim of this work is to examine the nature of the EU democracy promotion in the Southern Neighborhood with a special focus on Lebanon as a case study. Lebanon is an especially interesting case for examining EU democracy promotion due to the fact that the country is facing all the major challenges typical for the region, refugee crisis (Palestinian and Syrian), rise of Hezbollah as a both political force and the terrorist organization, threat of conflict spillover from Syria and political instability, even though it is formally a consociational democracy. For these reasons, the case of Lebanon can be assessed taking into account the specific characteristics of its political context in examining the nature of goals, means and impact of EU democracy promotion and deriving with the possible conclusions and policy implications for the EU and its democracy promotion engagement in the region.

Even though there is a significant scholarly body on EU democracy promotion, Normative Power Europe (NPE) and the challenges the EU is facing in the region, this work aims to contribute to the existing scholarship by addressing the specific issue of the nature of EU's democracy promotion in Lebanon with a special focus on the influence of the revolutionary events of the Arab Spring. These events have demonstrated EU's inability to address the issue in the right and proper manner, thus challenging its normative identity as a foreign policy actor. Moreover, there is an insufficient scholarly body accessing the effects of the changes introduced in the ENP.

By analyzing the official documents that set the framework of EU-Lebanon relations, this work aims to examine the nature of the EU democracy promotion before and after the revolutionary wave in the Middle East, and derive with the conclusion on whether the change introduced in the ENP was efficient in terms of changes in the nature of EU democracy promotion.

Relying on the NPE Concept coined by Ian Manners, the criteria provided by Nathalie Tocci and the EU democracy promotion literature relying on the work of Seeberg, Youngs and Pace, this work has constructed expected results of the analysis. It is expected from the analysis to prove that the EU was not a normative but rather a Realpolitik actor in its democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon prior to the Arab Spring. However, this work expects to find out that learning from failure, and introducing the changes in ENP after the revolution have changed the nature of the EU democracy promotion, making the EU a normative foreign policy actor.

Primarily, this work will offer an overview of the ENP evolution in the Southern Neighborhood and Lebanon as a specific political system with the challenges it is facing. Furthermore, the events of the Arab Spring and the changes it triggered in the ENP will follow. Lastly, in the chapter one, this work will justify the choice of methods and Lebanon as the

single case study. In the following chapter, the reader is introduced to the theoretical framework, offering the concept and the literature overview on NPE, its critique and the EU democracy promotion. Finally, chapter three will proceed with the analysis of the nature of goals, means and impact of EU democracy promotion in Lebanon, before and after the Arab Spring to examine whether the expectations will meet the results of the analysis.

By answering the question on whether the EU has been a normative or Realpolitik actor in its democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon, this work aims at contributing to the existing scholarship by shedding light on the normatively oriented improvements in the ENP, aiming to derive with policy implications.

1. Policy Context and Methodological Considerations

The first chapter aims to introduce the reader to the political and policy context of the EU-Lebanon relations. The chapter starts by introducing the policy framework of the European engagement in the Southern Neighborhood that started with the Barcelona process in 1995, further evolving to reach the ENP and the Union for Mediterranean. Following the description of the EU policy framework, the chapter focuses on Lebanon, its political system, main challenges and political forces within the country, in order to set the stage for the further focus of the EU democracy promotion on Lebanon. Furthermore, the reader is introduced with events of the Arab Spring that led to the revolutionary change in the region, and the EU policy approach. The changes in the ENP follow as the consequence of these revolutionary events. Finally, the chapter concludes with the methodological considerations justifying the choice of qualitative methods and Lebanon as a single case study.

1.1. The EU and the Southern Neighborhood – From Barcelona Process to the Union for Mediterranean

There is a strong value dimension linked to the very origins of the European Union, making values a distinctive attribute of EU's domestic and international image. In the aftermath of the most devastating conflict that the human kind has ever faced, the World War II (WWII), two biggest former enemies, France and Germany, have decided to come together and lead the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950. The idea was to form an economic cooperation among European countries that would make war 'not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible' (The Schuman Declaration 1950). With the widening and deepening of the Organization that has evolved in the EU we know today, the dimension of values has become increasingly important. 'European values of fundamental rights, rule of

law and democracy are shared values' (Johannes Hahn 2016) and an important part of European identity and European international engagement.

With the waves of the EU enlargement, the Union has encountered new neighborhood with its own specific political, economic, cultural and societal setting. In this new context, the EU has started the **Barcelona Process** of cooperation with its Southern neighborhood in 1995. This new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been launched as way to strengthen political, economic and security cooperation between the EU and the twelve countries in the Southern Mediterranean. The rationale behind this new model of cooperation was to enable a mutually beneficial stability for the partners on both sides. In addition, there is an important value aspect to Barcelona Process as well, the partners are committed to the respect of human rights and fundamental principles from the United Nations Charter and Universal Declaration on Human Rights, international law, rule of law and democracy, respect for sovereignty of the States, equal rights of people and their right for self-determination, respect for territorial integrity, principle of non-intervention in internal affairs and the peaceful settlement of conflicts, combat against terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking, and lastly promotion of regional security (EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law 2016). The Barcelona Process was the first official outreach to the Southern neighborhood that has set the basis for future cooperation with an emphasized value dimension.

With further enlargement, especially the 'Big bang' enlargement of 2004 when ten former communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe became members of the EU, the EU has realized that its neighborhood is becoming increasingly diverse with numerous political, economic and security challenges for its member states. For this reason, in 2004 the new important EU policy has been launched, it is the **ENP**, as the most important part of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The policy objective was to form an Association Agenda with the partner countries in order to ensure their commitment to democracy, human

rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development (European External Action Service 2016). Not only that the EU is aiming to achieve a peaceful environment for its further development and growth, but there is an important emphasis on spreading the Union's values and forming a wider area that is committed to a long-term pursuit of these values.

As a next step in developing a framework for EU engagement and assistance provision in the Mediterranean, the Barcelona Process was included in the ENP in the form of the **Union for Mediterranean (UfM)** in 2008. The aim of this change is a more focused and regional, and sub-regional orientation to fulfilling value based objectives of the EU. However, it is important to note that further changes were introduced in this cooperation framework after the eventful changes in 2011 known as the 'Arab Spring' that have brought important changes in the Arab and South Mediterranean region. The EU has had to revise its models of engagement due to the clear lack of ability to respond to these events in an adequate and prompt manner. Values of good governance, democracy and the protection of human rights were at stake in the Southern Mediterranean, and the EU was unable to react in a way to protect them or secure them in the long-run

1.2. Lebanon – An Overview

“Overviewing the Lebanese context is pivotal for understanding the political conundrum facing Lebanon (Ruffa 2011,570).” Historical context and the geopolitics of Lebanon have been greatly influential for the country's political system and its main challenges. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, situated in the Middle East, Lebanon was put under the French control. In 1943, after gaining independence, and due to its multiconfessional society, the political system was set up as a “balance of power” among the three main religious groups by introducing the National Pact. Christian Maronites, as the majority sect obtained the position of the President of the Republic, the Sunnis are given the right to elect the Prime

Minister and the Shia Muslims obtained the Speaker of the Parliament position. With the changing demographic situation in the country, the fragile system based on sectarian divisions was under pressure, causing the conflict that escalated into a major Civil war between the Christians and Muslims that lasted from 1975 until 1990. The Civil war ruined the country's infrastructure, and made it deeply divided and an easy target for foreign influences. On one hand, Syria has had a decisive role in the country, keeping its political and military presence until 2005. On the other hand, the major player in Lebanese neighborhood is Israel, with an ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict which resulted in a major influx of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Moreover, each of the sects receives some sort of support from foreign actors. For all these reasons, 'Lebanon is never considered an autonomous actor in the international system, but rather a geopolitical battleground for foreign powers and their non-state or sub-state proxies (Hazbun 2016, 1053)'.

The turning point in modern Lebanese history is the assassination of the Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005, in Beirut. Since Hariri was an influential businessman and a political figure through the 1990s and early 2000s, in charge of country's reconstruction after the Civil war, his death has unified Lebanese people and directly challenged foreign influences in Lebanon, primarily Syrian, due to assumptions of Syrian involvement in his assassination (Afshar 2005). On March 14th, 2005, Lebanese people unified and took the streets of Beirut in a peaceful way, demanding political freedom and withdrawal of Syrian forces – the event was called the Cedar Revolution. The aim was to challenge the very core of Lebanese political system, based on divisions and to reconcile Lebanese society (Ahmari 2011). However, these peaceful protests have given way to the rise of Hezbollah, an Iran and Syria backed militant group that was fiercely opposing protests against Syria, blaming Israel for Hariri's assassination versus Saad Hariri, the son of the assassinated Prime Minister, backed by Saudi Arabia and the West (Worth 2011). Hezbollah openly opposed forming and supporting the

work of the Tribunal for Lebanon formed for investigating Hariri's assassination, generating a strong division between Lebanese political parties. The first time Hezbollah participated in the national elections was in 1992, when the political wing of the organization was formed. The group gained seats in the Parliament in the national elections in 2009, and has kept being a part of governments in Lebanon ever since (BBC 2016). Ever since, Hezbollah is a strong political and militant force controlling the southern Lebanese territory and disabling functioning of Lebanese political system.

Today, Lebanon is facing a political deadlock, the President who should have been appointed from the Christian Maronite sect after the elections in April 2014, has not been elected due to the inability for any candidate to reach a two-third majority in the Parliament (Bradley 2015). This stalemate is a perfect indicator of the fragility of Lebanese political system and deep sectarian divisions that still rule the society. At the same time, many burning issues are not being addressed in a proper manner, due to the government's weakness. Burning issues in the Lebanese political life are the Refugee issue with both Palestinian and Syrian refugees, poor investment climate, the role of Hezbollah, political Islam and many others.

For all of the reasons above and the complex historical legacy, when it comes to the EU Neighborhood Policy in the Southern Mediterranean "Lebanon is an interesting case to examine because the country does not present the same authoritarian institutions and character as other Arab countries in the region (Seeberg 2009:82)." Coming from this, it is interesting to investigate the value driven foreign policy role the EU could play within Lebanese consociational democracy, as a specific political system.

"The main goal of the European Union and Lebanon partnership is Lebanon's development as a stable, democratic, politically open and economically strong neighbor of the EU (European Commission 2014)." In order to achieve these goals, the EU has set a framework of bilateral relations which started in 2006, when the EU-Lebanon Association Agreement

came into force “establishing a framework for political dialogue, enhancing trade and promoting cooperation in economic and social fields (European Union External Action).” An Action plan followed, as a way to propose specific actions to achieve these goals. Furthermore, another Action Plan was introduced after the events of the Arab Spring reflecting changes in the ENP, which will be addressed further in this work. The effects of these Action Plans are tracked by issuing Country Progress Reports by the EU. Moreover, as a part of this bilateral cooperation, the EU offers its neighboring countries EU Financial Assistance within specific thematic and regional programs and European Neighborhood Instruments (EU External Action Service). Despite of all these modalities of cooperation, some of the issues like refugee situation in Lebanon and the strength of Hezbollah to paralyze the political system, that is why ‘Lebanese exceptionality is what the EU has to take into consideration when deciding on its foreign policy towards Lebanon (Seeberg 2009:87).’

After a brief contextual overview of Lebanon and the main contemporary characteristics of its political system and framework of cooperation with the EU, this work will proceed to further explanation of events that triggered change and EU democracy promotion efforts, in order to further narrow the scope of research in order to answer the research question on the nature of EU democracy promotion in Lebanon.

1.3. Arab Spring

Arab Spring refers to the wave of civil uprisings against authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, which started in December 2010 in Tunisia. The act of self-immolation by a Tunisian fruit seller Mohammed Buazizi was an ultimate sign of protest against the oppressive regime of Tunisian President Zine El Abdine Ben Ali, who has transformed Tunisia into a police state (Peters 2012, xi). This act has set the whole region in motion, mobilizing people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to raise against their authoritarian leaders. The world was expecting to see Huntington’s fourth wave of

democratization (Salem 2015). The protesters achieved immediate success taking down dictators that ruled the countries in the region for decades. Arab Spring has thus marked the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, Gaddafi in Libya, it caused severe clashes of civilians and police in other countries caught by revolution, and it was the beginning of a brutal, still ongoing war in Syria. However, after the initial success in taking down authoritarian regimes, the Arab Spring was not followed by the Arab Summer, on the contrary, the power vacuum occurred, leading into the Arab Fall instead (Feldschreiber 2012).

Even though the EU was present in the region through the ENP, the colossal events of the Arab Spring have caught the EU off guard. ‘We must show humility about the past. Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region. This was not even Realpolitik. It was, at best, short-termism —and the kind of short-termism that makes the long term ever more difficult to build (Štefan Füle 2011).’ This speech given by the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy is the best reflection of the effects of the EU’s approach to the region prior to the revolutionary events. In spite of being formally committed to promotion of democracy, human rights and shared values in the region, based on the Association Agreements, the EU saw the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East as guarantees of stability and security, bringing its normative foreign policy orientation into question. The Arab Spring revealed ‘the gap between the creation of broad frameworks and plentiful initiatives and their non-implementation (Balfour 2012, 29)’, incentivizing the EU to revise its approach to the southern neighborhood.

Even though Lebanon, as the main focus of this work, was not among the main countries involved, the events of the Arab Spring have definitely had significant impact on the situation in Lebanon. ‘Dual power’ situation between the pro-Western and anti-Syrian forces of March 14 Alliance from 2005 Cedar Revolution, on one side, and the pro-Syria, backed by

Iran, March 8 Alliance, led by Hezbollah, is a part of Lebanese political reality (Seeberg 2009,83). Considering the fact that Arab Spring triggered the conflict in Syria, it is easy to conclude that the fragile consociational democracy in Lebanon, has been affected by these events. In addition to this, the conflict in Syria has caused a major influx of Syrian refugees to Lebanon, a country already struggling to properly address the issue of Palestinian refugees. Even though Lebanon was not among the countries fighting an authoritarian regime, it is interesting to analyze the change in the EU-Lebanon relations after these events due to the fact that Lebanese ‘sectarian divisions entrenched in the system invite external involvement (Seeberg 2009, 133)’, making it an important security factor. Moreover, Lebanese divisions make it ‘a proxy battlefield for the Syrian regime crackdown (Seeberg 2009, 135)’, putting this small country in the epicenter of regional events. EU-Lebanon relations are thus interesting to observe with regards to the interests vis-à-vis norms and the modalities of EU democracy promotion and its effects.

1.4. Changes in the European Neighborhood Policy

Revolutionary events of the Arab Spring have significantly challenged the ENP democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East. EU’s credibility as a normative actor devoted to democratic values, rule of law and human rights was in jeopardy after putting stability, prevention of migration to the EU and EU security as priorities of its ENP engagement on the ground. For this reason, the EU has decided to introduce changes in its relations with the Southern neighborhood. The EU Commission and the High Representative have proposed a new form of cooperation – *Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity*, oriented towards the promotion of “deep democracy”, a higher level of differentiation in relations with each partner country and a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law (European Commission and European Union External Action, Joint Communication March 2011). In addition to this, they issued a Joint Communication - *A New*

Response to the Changing Neighborhood, demonstrating EU's devotion 'to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth and manage cross-border links (European Commission and European Union External Action, Joint Communication May 2011).'

Despite the open, publicly stated commitment to democracy promotion, through advanced new means by the EU, the scholarly body is divided on both the degree of changes and the true driving force behind it. Khalifa argues that 'rather than presenting an authentic change in its democracy promotion policy, the EU seems to be adopting a wait- and-see approach until it is clear where the winds of change are taking its southern neighbors, leaving them space for flexibility (Khalifa 2013,49.)' Moreover, the author argues that the EU should not revise its policy from a moral stand, but instead, in a way that will protect its interests in the wider neighborhood, setting security concerns, democracy and governance and economic developments as its priorities (Khalifa 2013,53)'. Tömmel, on the other hand, finds that the changes in the ENP, introduced after the Arab Spring are rather limited by the EU institutional interests and those of EU member states, making 'the democratic values that the Commission and the High Representative formulate as conditional for assistance by the EU, not only targets to which the partner states are expected to conform but also the basis for building the necessary consensus among the member states in order to exercise governance in the EU's immediate neighborhood' (Tömmel 2013,35). Lastly, on the same note Teti, Thompson and Noble argue that these new changes are nothing more than 'articulating rhetorical variations on themes already present in pre-2011 policies (Teti, Thompson and Noble 2013, 75).' Moreover, these newly introduced frameworks for cooperation are using a rather minimalistic definition of democracy limiting the scope of goals and activities in democracy promotion efforts, as well as the scope of legitimate methods to pursue these goals (Teti, Thompson, Noble 2013).

Due to the discrepancy between official statements of the EU on the reform in the ENP and the scholarly analysis on the topic, it is rather important to analyze the way these changes are applied in the case of Lebanon. A case study of a country that is an instable democracy, in the context of neighboring countries which have gone from autocratic regimes to the rise of political Islam, and a strong influence of external powers and Hezbollah as a none-state actor, is suitable to address the nature of EU democracy promotion.

1.5. Methodological Considerations

In order to investigate the nature of EU democracy promotion in Lebanon, this work will use qualitative research methods. “The focus of qualitative research on analysis and interpretation as well as its tendency to answer the questions ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ instead of ‘how many’ “(Ormston, Spencer, Barnard and Snape 2014, 3) is suitable for a complex issue of EU democracy promotion within a specific political context, requiring an in depth understanding and the analysis of qualitative data. The emphasis on pragmatism in choosing the approach that best fits the research design is an additional advantage of qualitative research (Ormston, Spencer, Barnard and Snape 2014, 20). Thus, the theoretical approach that this work is going to rely on is based on the existing literature on normative power, work of Ian Manners and Nathalie Tocci primarily, addressing the nature of EU’s foreign policy engagement. The theoretical framework follows the evolution of normative power concept through the work of Ian Manners, and it offers the criteria for normative power evaluation by Nathalie Tocci. Moreover, when it comes to democracy promotion, this work will use the theoretical framework provided by Seeberg, Youngs and Pace. These authors critically assess EU democracy promotion with putting specific attention to the political context and the norms-means interaction in the EU’s engagement in the region. Even though this work finds qualitative research methods fit for this research design, limitations of qualitative research are taken into account. “The main disadvantage of qualitative approaches to corpus analysis is that

their findings cannot be extended to wider populations with the same degree of certainty that quantitative analyses can, due to the fact that their findings are not tested to see whether they are statistically significant or due to chance (Atieno 2009,17).”

The nature of EU democracy promotion will be primarily examined by using document analysis as a type of a qualitative research method. Since this work is primarily examining the EU and its democracy promotion effort as a part of the broader policy framework – EU Neighborhood Policy, with a focus on Lebanon, the documents that are going to be analyzed here are primarily documents setting a framework for EU-Lebanon relations within the Neighborhood Policy. These documents are also determining this work’s time frame from 2006 to 2015, meaning from the year when the first document of this kind came into force – EU-Lebanon Association Agreement (AA), until the last Progress Report on Lebanon by the EU, published in 2015. Apart from the AA which sets the basic framework for EU-Lebanon relations within the ENP, this work will analyze EU-Lebanon Action Plans which transform the set goals into the concrete courses of action. Moreover, this work will use the Country Progress Reports, Reports from the EU Delegation in Lebanon, and assessments of European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), and its improved version – European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) as forms of financial support for democracy promotion in Lebanon, and the wider Southern neighborhood and assessments of EU’s progress in its foreign policy engagement. Additionally, this work will rely on official communications coming from the European Commission, the European Council, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy. These communications are a valuable source of analysis, demonstrating both the EU’s political stand on the most important issues, but also the ways the EU wants to form its foreign policy image in the world. These communications are a way to understand the context and the dominant political discourse at a specific point in time and on specific issues. The process of

developing an interpretation in this way is thus fairly straightforward, it begins by raising questions and it continues by answering them through examination of evidence, which then lead to new questions, letting the process guide you (Trachtenberg 2006:146).

1.5.1. Lebanon as a Single Case Study

“The distinguishing characteristic of the case study is that it attempts to examine: a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin 1981, 59). Choosing a single case study for the research design offers both advantages and limitations. “A single case study is characterized with high internal validity, however, there is a problem of low external validity, limited ability for generalization (Panke 2012, 137).”

The choice of Lebanon as a single case study for this work derives from its specific political system, a consociational democracy based on sectarian divisions, surrounded by authoritarian regimes that toppled down in the wave of revolutions, making it an interesting case for the analysis of democracy promotion. Despite its proclaimed democratic system, the fragility of the political situation in Lebanon and its specific geopolitical and geographical context, make democracy promotion efforts rather challenging for the EU. Moreover, Lebanon is a place where EU interests and values clash due to the important role of Hezbollah as a major security concern for the EU and a force of political Islam, especially after the events of 9/11. Additionally, Lebanon is home to both Palestinian and Syrian refugees, presenting a migratory concern for the EU. Due to its sectarian divisions it is also a place where many diverse international interests clash, making the tensions in the conflict-torn region even more emphasized. The dynamics of norms vis-à-vis interests within the democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon with the Arab Spring as the turning point that put EU normative foreign policy

image into question, is thus an interesting case for the analysis with possible important policy implications.

2. Normative Power Europe and EU Democracy

Promotion

The second chapter offers a theoretical framework for this work. Primarily, it introduces the concept of Normative Power Europe, explaining its evolution and significance. Furthermore, the chapter focuses on the work of Ian Manners, the author of the concept, offering the base line for the analysis. The realist critique of the concept follows. In order to offer the key criteria for the analysis and evaluation of a normative foreign policy actor, the chapter introduces the work of Nathalie Tocci. Lastly, the chapter focuses on scholarly work on EU democracy promotion, offering a holistic theoretical foundation for answering the question on the nature of EU democracy promotion in Lebanon.

2.1. The Concept of Normative Power Europe

Due to its specific nature as a supranational system that emerged from the ashes of the WW II, the nature of the EU, the nature of its internal relations and especially, the nature of its presence in the world has been a topic of many scholars' research. It is crucially important to understand the way the EU is perceived internally, by its members, but also externally, in the wider international community, due to that fact that this image influences not only the process of EU policy making, but also the success and influence of its policy engagement in other countries.

2.1.1. The Evolution of the Concept

Ever since the European Economic Community (EEC) started aiming towards enlargement and became an important actor at the international stage due to its economic and political strength, the question of EU's role in the world has been constantly gaining increased attention by many scholars. In that manner, 'Duchene, Galtung and Bull are in a way "the founding

fathers” of present day conceptualization of Europe’s international role” (Orbie 2008). Even though a thorough analysis of the evolution of these perceptions is beyond the scope of this work, it shall be briefly addressed as a way to better understand the way the Normative Power Europe (NPE) (Manners, 2001, 2002) concept has evolved and why it is chosen as the theoretical framework for the analysis of EU foreign policy presence in Lebanon, in this work.

The evolution of the concept started in the 1970s in the changing context of the European security setting after the end of the Cold War and the provision of the enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) from six to ten members. This enlarged Community was now able to ‘make it possible to move away from naked force toward politics and so to civilize conflict in one of the centers of gravity of the balance of power’ (Duchene 1971,82). This is how the concept of ‘Civilian Power Europe’ was coined by Duchene, to set a tone for the role the EEC will have primarily in Europe as a balancing factor on security issues, but also in its general foreign policy presence. Galtung, on the other hand, tends to promote an image of EEC as a foreign policy actor that tends to dominate Eastern European countries and countries of what was then addressed as the Third World, or what we call today the developing countries (Kreinin, 1974). In this case, we can see that dimension of interests is more emphasized than the value dimension. Lastly, Bull offers a more realist perspective on EEC foreign policy performance, by arguing for the EEC ‘governments to come together to identify their common and distinct strategic interests, and in relation to these discuss strategic plans and doctrines, defense budgets, arms and armed forces’ (Bull 1982,164). This view on the role of EEC is highly interest driven and does not, in fact, bring up the value dimension as an important one. In conclusion, we can see that from the beginning of the 1970s until present, the role and foreign policy image of the EU, as well as the driving forces behind it, have been highly contested.

2.1.2. Normative Power Europe

After understanding the basic dispute in the scholarly work between the civilian and the military power Europe, this work will introduce and define the concept of Normative Power Europe given by Ian Manners. Manners offers a new, rather comprehensive and thorough understanding of EU foreign policy presence. Unlike the authors before him, he analyses not only the foreign policy actions of the EU, but also the historical basis for its identity and the way it was formed. 'Because of its particular historical evolution, its hybrid polity, and its constitutional configuration, the EU has a normatively different basis for its relations with the world' (Manners 2002, 252). For this reason, 'the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is' (Manners 200,252). Manners is the first author deriving the nature of EU's foreign policy from the basic nature of the EU as the unprecedented form of polity. This normative approach is thus chosen because it 'attempts to strike a critical path between culturally insensitive universalism and the reification of cultural relativism in order both to critique and change the EU in the world politics' (Ian Manners 2010, 36). The normative approach then clearly has important policy implications which makes it perfectly suitable for the analysis of the ENP and the EU's democracy promotion efforts in the case of Lebanon.

In addition to this, it is important that the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) drifts away from the analysis of how state-like the EU is and how civilian or military it is in relation to that, missing the key issue of the EU being a unique political formation and thus having a unique role in relation to other actors (Manners, 2001). Coming from this, 'Normative power is the ability to shape or change what passes for normal in international relations, and which will undoubtedly have utilitarian, social, moral and narrative dimensions to it, just as it will undoubtedly be disputed' (Manners 2001,10). This definition of NPE, given by Manners allows the multidimensional analysis of EU foreign policy, the value-based rationale behind it and the

implications this kind of policy has on the wider international community. Based on these characteristics of the approach, it allows a thorough and comprehensive understanding of the EU policies implemented abroad as well as the critique of these policies. The main strength of this approach is the fact that it has external legitimacy gained from relying on international law and institutions seen as universal and all the values deriving from them seen as cosmopolitan and universally applicable.

2.1.3. The critique

In spite of the clear advantages of this specific theoretical approach, we have to take into account the critique coming from the scholarly thought. The Normative approach is being criticized as too reductionist and thus it is believed that the realist approach is more suitable for understanding the systemic pressures that shape EU foreign and security policy in its international behavior (Hyde-Price 2006). In addition to this, the realist critique adds the future dimension to the issue arguing that ‘if member states wish the EU to become a serious international actor, they should ensure that on the major issues of the day it acts as a ‘calculator not a crusader’ and pursues its foreign policy based purely on the interest of its member- states, if it wishes to become a serious actor in international stage’ (Hyde-Price, 2008, 29). The main argument coming from the realist critique is that even though the EU is engaged in shaping and changing international rules and values it is doing so ‘as an instrument for collectively exercising hegemonic power, shaping its ‘near abroad’ in ways amenable to the long-term strategic and economic interests of its member states’ (Hyde-Price 2006,234). Practically, the scholars of realist orientation are emphasizing the interest dimension behind EU’s international engagement and a push towards changing the international ‘rules of the game’ only to satisfy and improve the interests of its members. Lastly, ‘EU foreign and security policy thus needs to be based on a clear understanding that the pursuit of an ‘ethical’ agenda will be heavily constrained by the structural dynamics of a competitive, self-help system’ (Hyde-Price 2008,

37). In conclusion, the realists offer an alternative approach to what should the EU foreign policy be based on as well as what goals should be pursued.

This work will use the Normative Power Europe concept described by Ian Manners to examine the nature of ENP democracy promotion engagement in Lebanon, it is to see, after the analysis, which of the competing schools of thought is better able to understand and explain the models and outcomes of ENP in Lebanon.

2.2. Criteria for a Normative Foreign Policy Actor Evaluation

In order to pursue with the analysis of the nature of EU democracy promotion in Lebanon, and examine whether the EU has indeed been a Normative rather than Realpolitik actor, criteria for this analysis will follow. The standards of what a Normative power are set within the ‘three dimensions of a normative foreign policy:

1. What an actor wants – its goals
2. How it acts – its deployment of its policy means
3. What it achieves – its impact’ (Tocci 2008, 5).

A normative power should be ‘oriented towards ‘taming’ and regulating power’ (Tocci 2008, 5).

Nathalie Tocci provides exact definitions of what normative goals, means and impacts are. These definitions are crucial for us to be able to analyze the way the EU has pursued its democracy promotion in Lebanon.

Normative foreign policy goals are those that aim to shape the milieu by regulating it through international regimes, organizations and law (Tocci 2008). Furthermore the author defines **normative foreign policy means** as instruments (regardless of their nature) that are deployed within the confines of the law, and lastly, **normative impact** is one where a traceable path can be drawn between an international player’s direct or indirect actions and inactions (or

series of actions) on the one hand and the effective building and entrenchment of an international rule-bound environment on the other (Tocci 2008).

We can conclude that the criteria provided in Tocci's work are very reliant on the external legitimacy of international law. Considering the fact that Manners's definition is based on promoting these norms and making them as a way of pursuing normative foreign policy, the conclusion emerges that a normative power tends to promote the achievements and values of international institutions with universal membership and widely accepted international law. Thus, a normative foreign policy actor should demonstrate the ability to help support and promote the global initiatives formed after WWII based predominately on values of peace, security and non-coercive conflict resolution.

2.3. EU Democracy Promotion

'The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy [...] to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union [...] to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities 1992,123).'

'The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.' (European Commission 2007, 23)

'The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighboring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborliness, founded on the values of the Union

and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.’ (European Commission 2007, 14)

The Lisbon Treaty points out democracy as one of the guiding principles of EU’s foreign policy. Coming from that, democracy promotion is an important aspect and a force of EU’s international engagement. Moreover, since ‘a lack of democracy in some countries creates serious problems for the EU, especially for security matters, with regards to failed states, refugees, migration, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (Elmar Brook 2007,14)’, it has become one of the key aspects of ENP, with an aim to create stable and prosperous neighborhood. After the introduction of the normative power concept and the criteria for evaluation of a normative foreign policy actor, it is important to shed light on the existing literature addressing the other part of the research question of this work, which is EU democracy promotion. For the purpose of this analysis, the main focus will be on the work of Youngs, Pace and Seeberg.

The trigger for more structured and proactive EU democracy promotion strategy in the Middle East was the 9/11 terrorist attack which shed light on the major security threat rising in the EU’s close neighborhood. The idea was to form a new model based on the success stories of political reform and enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe. This model of democracy promotion was established within the newly launched ENP in 2004. However, this scaled-down version of enlargement, taking refuge in NGO support, women’s rights and human rights legislation and avoiding to tackle any controversial aspects of non-democratic Arab regimes, was not enough to initiate any kind of serious democratic wave of change (Youngs 2006). On the other hand, with the evolution of ENP, the EU has developed the external governance framework, which enables support to democratic reform through the extension of EU rules and legislations by developing diverse policy commitments and instruments (Youngs 2009). Coming from this, ‘some more technical EU governance norms have been adopted by Arab

states (Youngs 2009, 912).’ However, ‘this is not enough to constitute effective democracy promotion, in fact, it is doubtful that European governments have actually wanted to see systemic democratic change in Arab countries, for a range of geopolitical reasons (Youngs 2009,912)’.

After Youngs’s emphasis on the priority of geopolitical interests over democratic transition in the Southern Neighborhood, this work will address the limits of EU normative power in the region, relying on the work of Michelle Pace. ‘In seeking to claim the status of a ‘normative power’, the EU’s democracy promotion efforts follow a (mistakenly) sequential logics... democracy in itself is not envisioned as an ultimate goal in EU eyes, but as one of the means to another objective – stability and prosperity (Pace 2009,42).’ Instead of pursuing its own interests (economic development and increased security primarily) in the region under the agenda of democracy promotion, and expecting the democratization to come on its own, the functioning state and the rule of law should already be in place as the basis of democratization process (Pace 2009). Michelle Pace has emphasized in her work that due to the lack of coherence ‘EU is imitating itself in a policy area where it could potentially have normative impact (Pace 2009, 40)’.

While focusing on democracy promotion on Lebanon, Peter Seeberg in his work on Lebanon, critiques EU democracy promotion as primarily realist, vague and inconsistent (Seeberg 2009). The author points out that the EU is neglecting determining factor of the Lebanese political situation like the role of Hezbollah – a strong force of political Islam and a ‘resistance’ movement at the same time, forming a ‘dual power’ situation and the specificities of Lebanese consociational democracy – based on sectarian divisions and highly vulnerable to influences of Iran, Syria and other regional powers. In conclusion, based on the analysis of EU-Lebanon action plan and the power interplay in the country, ‘the EU policy on Lebanon is launched in the Action Plan as a normative enterprise, however, the EU is acting as a realist

actor in normative clothes (Seeberg 2009, 95)’. Lastly, one additional, overarching characteristic of EU democracy promotion is pointed out by scholars in democracy promotion field, and that is ‘time-consistency problem: democratization – and, thus, democracy promotion – is a middle- to long-term endeavor, and (potential) rewards do not come quickly (Wolff and Wurm 2011, 80)’.

All of the authors above have evaluated EU democracy promotion efforts as rather interests-driven (non-normative), inefficient, not enough context specific and thus with very limited chance for success. However, this work will proceed with the analysis of the changes introduced in the ENP after the revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring. Using the theoretical framework based on the Normative Power Europe concept by Ian Manners, and Nathalie Tocci’s criteria for the evaluation of goals, means and impact, the analysis of the nature of EU democracy promotion in Lebanon will follow. The aim is to examine whether the EU was promoting democracy as a normative actor in Lebanon before the Arab Spring, and if not, whether that changed after the Arab Spring.

3. The Analysis of the nature of EU Democracy Promotion in Lebanon - Goals, Means and Impact

In order to evaluate the nature of EU democracy promotion in Lebanon, it is important to underline that normative foreign policy in this work takes the meaning of ‘‘normative’ as being strongly based on international law and institutions, and thus the most ‘universalisable’ basis upon which to assess foreign policy (Tocci 2008)’. Using Tocci’s conceptual framework to evaluate whether the EU is actually pursuing these ‘universalisable’ norms, this work will answer the questions ‘what an actor wants (its goals), how it acts (the deployment of its policy means) and what it achieves (its impact) (Tocci 2008, 3)’, actor being the EU. In addition, relying on Youngs’s remark that the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion strategies – ‘the governance mode’ depends on the domestic political system (Youngs 2009, 859), political context in Lebanon, before and after the Arab Spring is an important factor to take into account. Tocci sees the political context as an additional point of reference when accessing EU’s normative power. Additionally, Wolff and Wurm relate consistency as an important factor for a normative democracy promotion.

Based on the theoretical framework relying on the concept of Normative Power Europe, the criteria provided by Tocci and the offered views on democracy promotion, this work has set expectations from the following analysis. Primarily, the expectation is that the analysis will demonstrate that the EU was not a normative foreign policy actor in its democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon before 2011 and the events of the Arab Spring. However, this work expects from the analysis to show that the EU has indeed evolved, after the changes in the ENP, into a normative foreign policy actor in its democracy promotion engagement. This means that the goals, means and impacts of these efforts should be evaluated as normative in the post-Arab Spring period.

The analysis will be conducted on the basic documents setting the framework of cooperation between the EU and Lebanon. To analyze the nature of EU democracy promotion goals, this work will use the Association Agreement between Lebanon and the EU from 2006, as the base line for cooperation. For the period after 2011, the goals will be analyzed from the European Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity and A New Response to the Changing Neighborhood, as two important communications issued by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, reflecting the goals to be achieved after the changes in the ENP. The nature of democracy promotion means will be examined through the analysis of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument and the European Neighborhood Instrument as well as the Action Plans for 2007-2012 and 2013-2015. Lastly the nature of impact will be examined through the analysis of Country Progress Reports for the both periods, before and after the changes in the ENP.

3.1. Normative Goals, Normative Means, Normative Impact?

EU democracy promotion in Lebanon prior to the Arab Spring

3.1.1. Normative Goals? – EU-Lebanon Association Agreement

The EU-Lebanon Association Agreement came into force in 2006, setting the legal foundation for the bilateral partnership within the ENP and ‘it forms an important part of the EU’s democracy promotion attempts in Lebanon (Seeberg 2009, 82)’. ‘The EU seeks to help Lebanon develop into a stable, democratic, politically open and economically strong neighbor (European Commission 2007).’ The main objectives of the EU-Lebanon partnership are set within the Association Agreement (European Union External Action 2016), here, we will address it as the guiding document of their cooperation, setting the goals to lead it.

In the very beginning of the agreement, there is an emphasis on the normative dimension of this cooperation. ‘Relations between the Parties...shall be based on respect of *democratic principles* and fundamental human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement (European Commission 2006, 2)’. However, further analysis of the document demonstrates a diversion from the normative principles. In the EU-Lebanon Association Agreement, democracy is mentioned only twice, and only in the way that suggests the need to respect democratic principles as a mode of cooperation, without setting democracy as a goal to be achieved.

On the contrary, the central topic of the agreement are the economic relations, primarily, free movements of goods and all the necessary legal and institutional adjustments needed for Lebanese companies to fulfill in order to be able to meet the European standards of trade. Even though it is openly stated that ‘this Agreement will strengthen Lebanon's position in its negotiations to access the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Lebanon 2016)’, making it clearly beneficial for Lebanon, it can be argued that the goals of the Association Agreement were not necessarily normative.

Taking into account the description of the political context in which the ENP was launched and in which the Agreement came into force, we can conclude, that the goals of the EU were rather oriented towards protecting their interests than changing the ‘milieu’ (Tocci 2008,55) in Lebanon. As seen in the context description, the main EU interests in Lebanon were the ones concerning security issues, illegal migration and the willingness to increase economic presence in the region ‘for the European Union, the Agreement will provide new opportunities to promote products and services, attain and exploit resources (Association Agreement)’. Moreover, ‘this market opening will outline a new economy, thus enabling younger generations to build their future within their own societies (Delegation of the European

Union to the Republic of Lebanon 2016)’, this statement is clearly oriented towards controlling the immigration from Lebanon to the EU. Finally, the idea behind the Agreement was to maintain a dominant economic position vis-à-vis Lebanon and enable penetration of the European companies in the Lebanese market, with the aim to support its way towards a financial center of the region. Even if the promotion of economic development will lead to the economic growth, and thus form a base for an increased political stability, we cannot see these efforts as normative ways of promoting democracy due to the uneven economic power between the two countries and the fact that the EU ‘failed to reciprocate by refusing to rid itself of the restricting interference of the Common Agricultural Policy and other Community policies (Darbouche 2008, 57)’.

Coming from the analysis, the conclusion is that, even though the EU has proclaimed its devotion to democracy and its willingness to promote democratic values, rule of law and piece as ‘universalisable’ values, in practice, its goals stated in the Association Agreement were more oriented towards pursuing its own economic and security interests in Lebanon. Here, in terms of goals, the EU was rather a Realpolitik than a normative foreign policy actor.

3.1.2. Normative Means? – EU-Lebanon Action Plan 2007-2012

In order to access the nature of means the EU has been using as a part of its democracy promotion strategy in Lebanon, this work will rely on the EU-Lebanon Action Plan 2007-2012 which ‘transforms the objectives from the EU-Lebanon Association Agreement into detailed actions (European Union External Action 2016)’, thus addressing the instruments/means for pursuing these actions. Even though the Action Plan is a way of operationalizing the Association Agreement, it goes further beyond the Agreement and it demonstrates normative means to be employed to pursue democracy promotion.

Unlike the Association Agreement, the Action Plan demonstrates its normative dimension in the very beginning - ‘the EU-Lebanon relationship will depend on the degree of

Lebanon's commitment to common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities, in compliance with international and European norms and principles (European Commission 2007,2)'. It clearly involves the milieu shaping by requiring devotion to international norms and 'universalisable' values. Moreover, among the priorities for action are 'political dialogue and co-operation, based on shared values, including issues such as democracy, political life promoting the protection of human rights, consolidating the freedom of media and expression (European Commission 2007,3)', giving democracy a priority over economic issues, unlike in the Association Agreement. The normative nature of the means employed for democracy promotion is clearly seen from listing 'the streamlining of procedures for political reform, efforts to improve transparency and good governance in line with the UN Conventions, establishment of political dialogue and plans for decentralization (European Commission 2007, 4)' as means to achieve democracy and rule of law, listed as priority action in the list of actions.

In addition to these, the EU-Lebanon Action Plan proposes a 'European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for the support of the political and economic reform agenda of the Lebanese Government (European Commission 2007, 2)'. ENPI includes financial support for different thematic programs, 'for the 2007-2010 period, the total financial assistance was 388 billion dollars, out of which, 19, 8% were committed to the support for political reform (European Commission 2014, 25)'. Under the ENPI, the financial allocation is set between Lebanon and the EU within the National Indicative Program. 'NIP 2007-2010 focused on responding to the country's urgent post-conflict needs following the 2006 conflict with Israel, namely reconstruction and recovery activities and political and socio-economic reforms (European Commission 2014, 26).' In addition, the EU democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon are marked by another normative mean – European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 2007-2013 aimed at promoting democracy in the third countries. All

of these operationalized means for achieving set activities are in alliance with law and international norms, thus making them normative, in line with Tocci's criteria.

To conclude, the EU was using normative means in its pursuit of democracy promotion in Lebanon in the period 2006-2010, thus on the basis of means employed, the EU was a normative foreign policy actor.

3.1.3. Normative Impact? – Lebanon Progress Report

When it comes to the nature of impact of EU democracy promotion in Lebanon prior to the revolutionary events in the region, this work will rely on the European Neighborhood Policy Country Progress Report from 2009, for Lebanon. The aim of the document is to provide the assessment of implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in Lebanon. The report was published in 2010, thus it offers an overview of the impact of the ENP prior to the Arab Spring.

Based on the report, Lebanon has made progress in terms of electoral reform in 2009, being among the two countries in the Southern neighborhood to have an EU Election Observation Mission, and it has become a member of UN Convention against Corruption in 2009 and lastly, it demonstrated openness and diversity in the media (European Commission 2010). However, the general assessment of the report states that '2009 was marked by very slow progress on political, economic and social reforms (European Commission 2010, 1).

By applying the criteria for normative impact in foreign policy on EU democracy promotion in Lebanon in the first period from 2006-2010, offered by Nathalie Tocci, we can conclude that the EU did not achieve normative impact in its foreign policy involvement in Lebanon. Normative impact would be demonstrated in the country's deeper involvement in the international policy and law (Tocci 2008), however, 'Lebanon's accession to the WTO was blocked, the initiative for the abolition of the death penalty was stopped, the enforcement of law protecting domestic women workers was weak and the situation with the Palestinian

refugees has been left unchanged (European Commission 2010)’. Additionally, even the ENPI commitments for the period 2007-2011 demonstrate the decreasing financial support the EU was offering to Lebanon going from ‘50 million euros in 2007 to 33 million euros in 2011 (European Commission 2014)’. In conclusion, the assessment on the political dialogue and governance which should have been aimed at strengthening of Lebanon’s integration in the international system, based on shared values within the ENP was not normative as planned.

3.1.4. Normative power Europe – before the Arab Spring?

To summarize the analysis if the nature of EU democracy promotion in Lebanon in the first period of the ENP from 2006 until 2011, the EU was not pursuing normative goals and did not achieve normative impact, even though the means that EU was using were evaluated as normative, according to the criteria provided by Nathalie Tocci. Bringing the insights on democracy promotion emphasizing the EU’s interests in stability in the region (Youngs 2009) over the need for serious democratization and deep political reform, we could conclude that the EU was not, indeed a normative foreign policy actor in its democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon. Even though normative rhetoric was present, as well as the financial assistance and the normative means, EU’s performance in Lebanon before the Arab Spring can be evaluated as closer to the Realpolitik than Normative side of the spectrum.

3.2. Normative Goals, Normative Means, Normative Impact?

EU democracy promotion in Lebanon after the Arab Spring

Based on the described political context after the Arab Spring and the fact that ‘the new European Neighborhood Policy will be based on differentiation and greater mutual ownership [...] and more effective ways to promote democratic, accountable and good governance (Review of the European Neighborhood Policy 2015)’, the expectation is that the analysis will demonstrate a normative nature of EU democracy promotion efforts after the Arab Spring. This

work expects that the EU has moved towards normative goals and maintained normative means that led to normative impact of democracy promotion in Lebanon.

Democracy promotion literature critiques the EU democracy promotion on the basis of being too interest drive, not country specific and seeking stability instead of political reform (Youngs 2009, Seeberg 2009, Pace 2009). However, after the revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring has passed and the changes were introduced in the ENP, relying on the critique we can expect for the EU's democracy promotion efforts to be normative. In order to seek for the answers, the analysis will proceed. To address the question of normative goals, this work will analyze the European Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity and the Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission – A New Response to the Changing Neighborhood, considering that these two documents reflect the change in the ENP and its adaptation to the new context. Furthermore, when it comes to the analysis of the nature of democracy promotion means after the Arab Spring, the analysis will focus on the new EU-Lebanon Action Plan 2013-2015 and the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI), as the replacement and the advancement of ENPI. Lastly, to address the nature of the impact of European democracy promotion activities in Lebanon, this work will address the latest European Neighborhood Policy Lebanon Progress Report for 2014, published in 2015.

3.2.1. Normative Goals? – European Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity and a New Response to the Changing Neighborhood

After demonstrating the clear inability to offer an appropriate response to the revolutionary events in the Southern Neighborhood, the EU's normative foreign policy actor image was shaken. In order to restore its credibility and try to regain its image, in March 2011,

the EU has publicly announced ‘the shared interest in the democratic, stable, prosperous and peaceful Southern Mediterranean and the new approach that should be rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to the common values (European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy COM 2011/200, 1)’. Even though these documents are not country specific, but oriented towards the wider region of the Southern Mediterranean, they are present the new guiding principles and goals of the ENP for all the countries, with a tendency to add to the Association Agreements.

Unlike the Association Agreement from 2006, both the PfDSP and NRCN, put democracy promotion and the commitment to democratic values as the priority in its relations to the Southern Neighborhood. While the PfDSP puts an emphasis on the democratic transformation and institution building and the support to the civil society as the leading democracy promotion efforts, NRCN aims for greater support for building ‘deep democracy’. Deep democracy is ‘– the kind that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by rights to exercise free speech, form competing political parties, receive impartial justice from independent judges, security from accountable police and army forces, access to a competent and non-corrupt civil service — and other civil and human rights (European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy COM 2011/303, 2)’.

To track the nature of EU goals after the Arab Spring, in the Joint Communication on the Review of the Neighborhood Policy from 2015, the EU emphasizes its milieu shaping intentions by announcing that ‘the revised ENP will actively ensure that our overall engagement is conflict-sensitive and fully compliant with international law, including international humanitarian law (European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy JOIN 2015/50, 2)’. In addition to this, by emphasizing that ‘human rights and democracy will be an agenda item in our political dialogue

with all partners in mutually agreed format (European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy JOIN 2015/50, 5), the EU has demonstrated an important step forward in its democracy promotion goals, consistency and the tailor-made approach to the partners. This is definitely an important improvement, demonstrating its serious devotion to the set goals, after the bad results from the period prior to the Arab Spring. This shift towards a more comprehensive, more holistic and a consistent approach to democracy promotion is a clear sign of EU's move towards more normative goals in its democracy promotion efforts in the Southern Neighborhood. Unlike in the Association Agreement, the EU does not only list democratic values as important, but rather puts them as a priority to be achieved through its foreign policy presence in the Southern Neighborhood. In conclusion, in terms of goals, the EU has proven a shift towards a normative actor in democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon.

3.2.2. Normative Means? – EU-Lebanon Action Plan 2013-2015

Even though the EU has demonstrated the usage of normative democracy promotion means in the first period of ENP efforts in Lebanon, the analysis will proceed to address whether the nature of means designed to follow the changed ENP is still normative. In the new Action Plan for 2013-2015 period, 'in order to provide the best possible support to consolidate the healthy democracy [...] the Action Plan aims to operationalize the goals set in the Association Agreement (European Commission 2013)'. According to the action plan, the EU's focus will be on electoral reform, improvement of good governance, efficiency and transparency and the human and vulnerable groups' rights protection. Improvement in these sectors is a way towards contributing to democratic consolidation in Lebanon. The EU will intervene in these sectors by deploying means like 'capacity building and trainings in order to achieve greater alliance of justice sector with international standard; support the Parliament with staff training in order to improve the legislative process and the quality of legislation;

support the implementation of international electoral standards and the recommendations from European Electoral Observations Mission; build capacities to support cooperation with the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (European Commission 2013)’. Based on the Action Plan, this work concludes from that the EU is still using rather normative means for democracy promotion in Lebanon. All of these means are ‘deployed within the confidence of law (Tocci 2009)’ and aimed at shaping the milieu through inclusion of international law and standards in the Lebanese judicial and political system, thus making them normative.

In addition to this, even though the ENPI was considered normative, the EU has replaced it with ENI which ‘reflects real needs and considerations that have emerged over the years and offers funds in a faster and more flexible manner (EU Neighborhood Info Center – News Service, 2016).’ ENI offers financial support as a mean to achieve the ENP objectives in Lebanon. The additional indicator of the normative nature of EU democracy promotion means is the fact that ‘35% of the generous amount for bilateral partnership of EUR 130.000.000-159.000.000 is aimed at supporting activities that are a part of democracy promotion efforts for the 2014-2020 period (European Union External Action, 2016)’.

Lastly, the EU democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon are marked by an improvement in another new normative mean – European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), established in 2014. The main improvements are connected to ‘increased ability to address the new realities and react more promptly to human rights violations, more available funding and more support for the civil society as driving force towards democracy (European Commission Democracy and Human Rights 2016)’.

To conclude, the EU has demonstrated consistency in using normative means in its democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon.

3.2.3. Normative Impact? – Lebanon Progress Report 2015

The evaluation of the nature of the democracy promotion impact that was achieved from 2011 until 2015 will be based on the Lebanon Progress Report for 2015 and the latest Joint Communication addressing the Implementation of the EU Neighborhood Policy for 2014, from 2015.

The Joint Communication has assessed the democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon as successful, contributing to further integration of Lebanon in international policy framework. ‘Even though the realities in the Neighborhood paint a very nuanced picture of developments in democratization and good governance (European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2015)’, the Document portrays Lebanon as an important contributor to the stability in the region, a country that demonstrated great strength in preventing the conflict spill-over from Syria and handled the unprecedented refugee crisis, as a consequence of this conflict. Moreover, ‘Lebanon has demonstrated progress in the justice sector reform, border management in relation to the cross-border challenges and it entered another dialogue on migration with the EU (European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2015)’.

The Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy for 2014 Report estimates Lebanon’s progress on deep and sustainable democracy as limited. Furthermore, the Report notes progress on the issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms, with improvements in general legal framework on this issue. However, many other areas are evaluated as insufficiently successful in implementing the policies set in the Action Plan. These areas are ‘civil society, electronic media and freedom of expression (European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2015)’. Moreover, ‘due to the political instability and weakened institutions that are a consequence of the conflict in the region, Lebanon failed to choose the President, additionally weakening the work of the

Parliament (European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2015)’.

This analysis demonstrates the importance of political and policy context for the success of democracy promotion efforts, addressed in the work of Youngs. Even though the progress of the EU democracy promotion in Lebanon, after the Arab Spring was evaluated as insufficient, the limited results that have been achieved are easily traceable to the EU and its provided support, helping Lebanon to enter on the road on the incremental milieu change. For these reasons, this work evaluates the impact of EU’s advanced democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon after the Arab Spring, as normative.

3.2.4. Normative power Europe –after the Arab Spring?

The analysis of the goals, norms and impact of the EU democracy promotion in Lebanon after the Arab Spring, demonstrates the normative nature of these efforts, portraying the EU as the normative foreign policy actor. Furthermore, the results of the analysis demonstrate that the improvement in the ENP towards Lebanon have been a shift in the normative direction, putting the emphasis on shared values, international law, the need for milieu change and the willingness of the EU to devote more funds and efforts to build an image of a normative actor in the international arena.

3.3. Chapter Conclusions

The expectations of this work given in the beginning of the chapter have been proven to be true, after conducting the analysis of the guiding documents within the EU-Lebanon cooperation framework. Even though, based on the nature of goals, means and impact, the EU was not initially, a normative foreign policy actor in its democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon, the situation improved significantly after the changes in the ENP had been implemented. Not only that the EU’s goals, means and impacts can be evaluated as normative, but, in addition the EU has become much more vocal and publically devoted to its democracy

promotion efforts in Lebanon. Even if these normative goals are connected with the pursuit of possession goals (Tocci, 2008) (in the case of Lebanon, dealing with migration, security issues and terrorist treats), the normative impact is easily traceable to the EU and its increased involvement and financial support in the country. For these reasons, the nature of EU democracy promotion efforts in Lebanon can be evaluated as normative and constructively contributing to milieu shaping in accordance with the rules of international law and ‘universilisable’ values.

Conclusion

The aim of this work was to examine the nature of EU democracy promotion in Lebanon. By offering the overview of the EU-Lebanon relations within the wider political context and within the ENP framework, this work has addressed the most important challenges EU is facing in promoting democracy in Lebanon. It is important to examine the nature of these efforts due to the fact that the EU tends to promote itself as a normative foreign policy actor in the international arena. Pursuing interests over values, would thus challenge this image. Failure to offer a prompt an adequate response to the eventful Arab Spring has put the credibility of EU's normative claims in question. This work has offered an overview of changes in the ENP that have followed as a consequence. Relying on the NPE concept and the scholarship on democracy promotion, this work has provided a detailed analysis of goals, means and impact of EU's democracy promotion efforts before and after the Arab Spring. In line with the expectations deriving from the literature and understanding of the political context, the analysis has shown that the EU was a Realpolitik rather than a normative actor before the Arab Spring. However, the nature of its democracy promotion in Lebanon changed to normative after the Arab Spring, prioritizing milieu shaping over the pursuit of selfish interests. This work concludes that the EU truly values its normative foreign policy image and thus, it is prepared to learn from its mistakes, devotedly improving its foreign policy engagement. This work finds that consistency and a context sensitive approach to democracy promotion are key features for an improved democracy promotion policy. The scholarship on the nature of democracy promotion would benefit from examining specific regional challenges – refugee crisis and the role of political Islam, in the light of the nature of EU democracy promotion.

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