

# **DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS IN A STATELESS TERRAIN: THE LESSONS OF SIERRA LEONE AND SOMALIA**

By  
Olga Kuzmina

Submitted to  
Central European University  
Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Political Science

Supervisor: Professor András Bozóki

Budapest, Hungary  
(2016)

## **Abstract**

The present thesis has pursued the goal of making an empirical contribution to the literature on the United Nations peacekeeping, and, in particular, on the determinants of success in the United Nations peace operations. It is assumed that there is a set of necessary factors, apart from conflict pre-conditions, that are jointly sufficient for a successful multidimensional UN peace operation. In order to assess success in UN peacekeeping, the complex formula, combining the completion of mission's mandate, progress in achieving a stable political solution, and providing a secure environment for civilians and the UN personnel, was elaborated. The study focuses on two cases of the UN involvement in civil wars: The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Building on existing scholarly literature, UN documents, press materials, interviews with senior UN officials, digital materials and statistical data, the factors, attributed to successful peace operations by scholars, are tested in a comparative perspective. The study concludes that necessary factors that are jointly sufficient for a successful UN peace operation are: a group of administrative factors (competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures; internal and external co-ordination; sufficient duration; communications and logistical support), a group of local factors (sense of security of the parties; ownership; credibility of UN forces), and addressing real causes of the conflict, moderate UNSC interest, and organizational learning. The implications of this research provide the grounds for further verification and the analysis of more recent cases against the factors, provided in the present study.

## Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor András Bozóki, who has supported and guided me since the idea of the topic of the present thesis appeared in a final paper for the Comparative Politics course taught by him. I would also like to extend my sincere gratitude to all professors, whose courses contributed to the development of my skills and the present research: Carsten Schneider, Oana Lup, Levente Littvay, Attila Folsz, Zoltan Miklosi, Péter Balázs and Matteo Fumagalli. I am particularly grateful to Professor Sara Svensson for her insightful International Policy Practice course, that filled numerous knowledge gaps concerning international organizations for me. Professor Svensson also introduced me to my interviewee, Karin Landgren, to whom I am very thankful for her time, advice, and an invaluable contribution to my research. I would like to thank my academic writing instructor, David Ridout, for the hours of reading and commenting on the preceding drafts of the present thesis, and for the improvement of my academic writing skills during the Academic Writing course; and my peers, who provided valuable feedback on my ideas. Finally, I am greatly indebted to my family and friends, whose support made it possible for me to study at CEU.

# Table of Contents

<b>Abstract .....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Acknowledgements .....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>List of Acronyms.....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter One: Successful Peacekeeping.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<i>1.1. Peacekeeping.....</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>1.2. The United Nations peacekeeping.....</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>1.3. Generations of peacekeeping .....</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>1.4. Peacekeeping today.....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>1.5. Assessing success in peacekeeping .....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>1.6. Determinants of success in peacekeeping .....</i>	<i>20</i>
<b>Chapter Two: The United Nations Operation in Somalia .....</b>	<b>24</b>
<i>2.1. Conflict's background.....</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>2.2. The United Nations involvement .....</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>2.3. Evaluation of success .....</i>	<i>28</i>
<i>2.4. Factors contributing to the outcome .....</i>	<i>29</i>
<b>Chapter Three: The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.....</b>	<b>34</b>
<i>3.1 Background of the conflict .....</i>	<i>34</i>
<i>3.2. The United Nations involvement .....</i>	<i>36</i>
<i>3.3. Evaluation of success .....</i>	<i>38</i>
<i>3.4. Factors contributing to the outcome .....</i>	<i>40</i>
<b>Chapter Four: Lessons learned from comparison.....</b>	<b>43</b>
<i>4.1. Determinant factors of success in peacekeeping.....</i>	<i>43</i>
<i>4.2. Directions for change.....</i>	<i>46</i>
<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>Appendix I.....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Appendix II .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>Appendix III.....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>54</b>

## **List of Acronyms**

UN - United Nations

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

UN SG - United Nations Secretary-General

UN SRSG - United Nations Secretary-General Special Representative

UN HQ - United Nations Headquarters

UNOSOM - United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia

UNSOM - United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States

ECOMOG - West African Peacekeeping Mission

RUF - Revolutionary United Front

CDF - Civil Defence Forces

AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia

UNAMSIL - United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

UNOMSIL - United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNIOSIL - United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone

TRC - Truce and Reconciliation Process

## Introduction

At the end of 1991 around 12,000 men and women were serving in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces united by a common goal of maintaining peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter. In two years this number had risen to 80,000, and today constitutes 104,773 uniformed personnel of all ranks (UN peacekeeping 2016). This significant and sharp increase was caused by the phenomenal number of UN peace operations deployed in the 1990s. Thirty-five missions were deployed in that decade, with twenty-one of them deployed between 1991 and 1995. This number exceeded the total number of operations deployed throughout the previous forty-five years of UN existence, and imposed numerous challenges for the UN. New conflict environments were remote and volatile, and the missions tasked to stop conflicts were the most expensive, complex and largest in UN history (UN peacekeeping 2016).

The United Nations peacekeeping is one of the few internationally recognized tools in restoring peace and security in the world. However, this mechanism is often criticized and, as scholars argue, is in need of reform (Autesserre 2014; Howard 2008). Jair Van Der Lijn, a senior researcher leading the work on peace operations in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, points out: “It is still mostly equipped and mandated not to fail rather than win” (Van Der Lijn 2010, 3). Others, on the question of whether peacekeeping works, answer “a clear and resounding yes” (Fortna 2008, 173). Despite its pitfalls, there are no realistic alternatives that could replace a giant UN peace operations machine, and, with a few notable exceptions, it has been fairly successful in reducing tensions and limiting fighting (Henn 1994; Fortna 2008).

However, a question the international community struggles to answer is why the missions, deployed in roughly similar conditions with the same mandate, turn out to be dramatically different and lead to different outcomes. Moreover, the absence of common understanding of success in peacekeeping among scholars, practitioners and UN senior officials complicates the search for determinants of success even more. Being given a set of tasks to complete in course of the mission - the mandate - peacekeepers are expected to adhere to three principles of UN peacekeeping: consent

of the parties of the conflict, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. However, evaluating an operation only by completion of a pre-determined set of assignments gives a rather limited picture. Therefore, before exploring determinant factors of success, this thesis aims to establish a complex system of evaluation of what constitutes peacekeeping operations' success.

Scholars claim that there is no universal solution or scenario for a successful operation, but that does not mean that there is nothing to learn from the dark chapters and the hall of fame of UN peacekeeping. That is the ultimate goal of my analysis - to see what brought the UN most of its success in Sierra Leone and its failure in Somalia, and to provide a set of recommendations for further peace operations. The UN missions are complex endeavours which are hard to compare because of the unique character of every conflict, and for that reason this thesis looks at the nature of conflicts that the missions were deployed to cease, at the simultaneous developments on the ground in line with UN actions, and the situation in host countries after the withdrawal of the missions. Moreover, both cases are illustrative examples of multidimensional operations, functioning in a terrain with no stable government, which elevates the level of difficulty for the UN.

To date, researchers have undertaken numerous attempts of finding a set of components that make the UN successful in their peace efforts. A large number of criteria has been identified, and only few researchers in the field of international relations and conflict resolution, such as Lise Morjé Howard, Jacques Koko, Essoh Essis, and Jaïr Van Der Lijn have made an attempt to compile and review them in regards to specific cases. Nevertheless, the models, elaborated by them, vary and lead to diverse conclusions. In Howard's model three factors are jointly sufficient for a successful operation: favourable situational factors, consensual moderately intense interest of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and first-level organisational learning (Howard 2008). Koko and Essis claim that four groups of variables are explanatory when it comes to success or failure of the operation: the scope of resources invested in the operation; the duration and intensity of conflict and time of preparation for intervention; the political support for peacekeeping from the UNSC, and the

type of conflict (Koko and Essis 2012). Van Der Lijn, in his turn, emphasises eight groups of factors: 'Consent, willingness and sincerity', 'Cooperation from important outside actors', 'Sense of security of the parties', 'Timely deployment and at the right time', 'Competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures', 'Internal and external co-ordination', 'Ownership' (involvement of all parties in negotiations) and 'Causes of the conflict' (identifying and addressing all of them) (Van Der Lijn 2009). What is more, a number of scholars, working on a small-N level, as a result of in-depth qualitative analysis formulated their theories, underlying factors, that have been disregarded before. Thus, Virginia Page Fortna argues that it is necessary to shift a focus from missions' mandates and military resources invested in them to the actions of peacekeepers on the ground in preparing it for a stable peace to last (Fortna 2008). She emphasises the importance of political and economic measures for reducing violence and bringing stable peace. Séverine Autesserre claims that it is not mandates and directions from the UN Headquarters that hinder peacekeepers' successfulness, but the dominant expatriate narratives (Autesserre 2014). According to her, mundane elements, such as peacekeepers' social habits, standard security procedures, approaches to collecting information, and informal and personal initiatives greatly impact the result of an operation.

This thesis aims to make a contribution to the literature on UN peacekeeping and, through a complex review of two UN peace operations, to test determinants of success, set forward by scholars, in order to explain the reasons for pitfalls and successes in UN peacekeeping. The research focuses on two missions deployed on the African continent: the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Out of fifty-five completed UN peacekeeping operations, twenty-one missions were deployed in Africa, and nine out of sixteen current missions are deployed on this continent as well. Africa presents a challenge for peacekeepers in many ways, from political to infrastructural. Norrie Macqueen, a world expert on UN peacekeeping, argues that not only has UN been largely involved in peacekeeping in Africa, but the successes and failures it has achieved were also the most remarkable (Macqueen 2006).



At the same time, such type of case selection is explained by a considerable lack of scholarly research within the pattern of comparing the most similar cases with the most different outcomes. The volume of academic literature on failed UN operations is enormous, with the most popular cases being Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia (Polman 2004; Hawk 2002; Terence O'Neill and Rees 2005). Choosing to focus on failed cases either in small or large selection, few researchers have attempted to extract lessons from the operations that have resulted in mixed outcomes or success. This thesis considers a case which is largely perceived as a failure (Somalia), and one that is usually described as a success story (Sierra Leone). Along with that, the cases chosen for analysis are characterised by relatively similar initial conditions and resembling developments on the ground. Both missions were deployed in a setting of civil war, in countries in deep economic and humanitarian crisis, were transformed from a peacekeeping mission to a multidimensional operation as the situation developed, and experienced an intervention by a P-5 Member State. Moreover, the case of Sierra Leone is special in this regard, because in the first few months it was considered as a failure, but it ended as a success story. Therefore, by minimising the differences in the events preceding the UN involvement, as the well as in the organisational structure of the missions, I focus on those reasons that caused difference in the outcome.

In-depth within-case analysis serves to the purpose of deep understanding of the initial settings, while analysis of various discourses concerning the same events helps in getting a balanced picture. I use process-tracing of UN engagement in Somalia and Sierra Leone in order to trace the factors that contributed to the results of the operations, and track the events that were followed by a significant change in the course of the missions. Evidence is drawn from primary sources, such as UN documents, including UNSC resolutions, reports, letters and factsheets; news sources, newspaper and magazine articles, video tapes, interviews conducted personally and by other researchers, and secondary sources. Among other documents from the United Nations system are the statistical data on peacekeeping, press statements by the UNSC President, reports by the United Nations Secretary-General (UN SG) and reports by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, and the

United Nations Development Programme data. Secondary sources include academic books and articles by prominent scholars in international relations, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, African studies and conflict resolution. The research also includes an interview with Karin Landgren, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Burundi, former head of the UN Mission in Nepal and former UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Liberia.

The thesis is structured as follows: in Chapter One, I discuss the theoretical basis of peacekeeping and its history, its interpretation by the United Nations, the main principles applied to missions of this kind, the changes that have occurred in the past decades, an assessment of success in peacekeeping, and determinants of successful operations identified by scholars. Theorising the term “UN peacekeeping” and conceptualising success in peacekeeping is necessary to form a credible basis for conclusions, and to identify criteria for labelling the mission as a success or failure. Chapter Two is dedicated to the United Nations Operation in Somalia, and presents the mission's and conflict's background, assessment of results, and analysis of the factors contributing to the outcome of the mission. Chapter Three follows the same structure, and presents the above mentioned sections in regard to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. I conclude with Chapter Four with the lessons learned from the comparison of two cases and the recommendations for further changes in UN peacekeeping.

# Chapter One: Successful Peacekeeping

In this Chapter I will discuss the theoretical basis of peacekeeping and its history, its interpretation by the United Nations, the main principles applied to missions of this kind, and the changes that have occurred in the past decades. Further, I will proceed with what constitutes a successful mission in the understanding of senior United Nations officials and scholars in the field. Understanding the nature and origins of peacekeeping, as well as its recent developments, is necessary to theorise this complex phenomenon with a rich history. At the same time, analysing the standards applied to successful peacekeeping missions helps to determine a set of criteria against which missions can be evaluated.

## *1.1. Peacekeeping*

The concept of peacekeeping is not easy to define, nor is it easy to find a common definition among scholars and practitioners. As MacQueen puts it, the reasoning behind this is that the vague definition of peacekeeping allows governments to refer to it in different contexts in order to conveniently justify their actions (MacQueen 2006). Answering a number of key questions concerning the phenomenon, he concludes that the main role of the peacekeeping is primarily Westphalian, that is to regulate the state-based international system (MacQueen 2006, 11).

Even though the term “peacekeeping” appeared with the birth of the United Nations, peacekeeping-like activities can be traced back to the nineteenth century (Bellamy et al. 2004). Peacekeeping at that time meant intervention in the affairs of other states under the pretext of protecting wider peace or the collective action to preserve peace between states. Alex Bellamy et al. consider the Concert of Europe, which informally existed from 1815 to 1914, to be the first example of international cooperative efforts with the goal of preserving peace in Europe. At the same time, by cooperating to preserve the status quo the members of the Concert guaranteed their influence in the region, and their secured interests. Even though the operations conducted by the Concert of Europe

bore some of the characteristics of modern peacekeeping missions, they were still actions to defend national interests of the Member States, therefore, the goal of preserving wider peace had been used more as a formal pretext.

One-hundred and four years after the formation of the Concert, the League of Nations, an organisation with the same central goal of maintaining collective security and a wider membership was created. Its operations resembled more the first-generation peacekeeping of the United Nations, and were constrained by power politics in the same way. Bellamy et al. note that the League lost its power after several main powers - Germany, Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union - refused to participate in it, and in just a few years the organisation ceased to exist (Bellamy et al. 2004). However, in the few decades of its existence, the League acted as a mediator in Aaland Islands dispute (1920), Albanian issue (1921), and Greco-Bulgarian conflict (1925); and supervised several aspects of the post-war agreements. The League provided valuable lessons for the international community and prepared the ground for its successor and the main convenor of peacekeeping operations, the United Nations.

### ***1.2. The United Nations peacekeeping***

Normatively speaking, the United Nations (UN) has not defined peacekeeping either in its basic document - the Charter - or in any other normative act. The only documents that provide us with precise definitions are the reports of the UN Secretary-General, capstone documents and various narratives. I argue that in the case of UN peace operations, the practice formed the definitions.

The web-site of the United Nations identifies peacekeeping as a separate kind of UN peace activities in the world (UN peacekeeping 2016). Other activities are conflict prevention and mediation, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. As for the activities that are associated with peacekeeping missions, the UN names the facilitation of political process, protection of civilians, assistance in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support of the organization of elections, protection and promotion of human rights and assistance in restoring the rule of law. The home page of the UN peacekeeping mentions that the boundaries

between these four kinds of activities have become more and more blurred (UN peacekeeping 2016). However, the distinction between various kinds of peace operations has not been clear from the beginning. Thus, Article 41 and Article 42 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter «Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression» state:

#### Article 41

«The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations»

#### Article 42

«Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations»

The formulation of these Articles provides a vague description of the missions the UN is entitled to deploy, and it provides even less distinction between peace operations in different stages of the conflict. Thus, Allen Sens, a well-positioned scholar in peace operations, even argues that the UN peacekeeping was an “improvisation” created out of the necessity to react to the conflicts taking place right after the creation of the United Nations and the drafting of the Charter (Price and Zacher 2004, 142). The first case that required UN attention was the conflict in the Middle East in 1948. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation became the first peacekeeping mission established to observe the terms of the Arab-Israeli ceasefire, and the longest mission that still operates today. In 1949 the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan was established with the same purpose - regulate the inter-state conflict, and, later, in 1956 the United Nations Emergency Force continued this practice in the Suez Canal zone and Sinai. However, even though the UN authorised 18 peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, its regulatory provisions were somewhere in between Chapter VI concerning the peaceful settlements of disputes and Chapter VII about the

coercive measures to the threats to peace and security. Even the former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld described it as being in a nonexistent “Chapter Six-and-a-half”. (Price and Zacher 2004)

Indeed, The UN peace operations is a phenomenon that has been evolving over time. In his report called «Agenda for peace» the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping as:

«the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well» (p.6)

It was only in 1992 that the same report introduced a new term, and a new kind of UN peace operations - the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding:

«action to identify and support structures with will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict» (p.6)

In 2000 the Brahimi report provided another definition of peacekeeping:

«a 50-year-old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars»

The changing nature of conflicts naturally required changes in the methods of UN peace operations. By 2000, UN peace enterprise involved three kinds of operations: conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. (Report 2000) Therefore, today peacekeeping comprises both military and civilian tools. Yet, how much weight should be given to each of them and to what extent are military elements permissible to use? The answer the UN system gives us is that «blue helmets» may resort to the use of force to defend themselves, their mandate and civilians. This is again an ambiguous wording that does not resolve the problem with formulating clear instructions for peacekeepers.

### ***1.3. Generations of peacekeeping***

Since the first peacekeeping operation was deployed, the UN peace enterprise has undergone dramatic transformations in accordance with the changes on the world arena and in the UN system.

In an attempt to summarise and classify the transforming operations formally falling under the same category - UN peace operations - scholars thought of so-called “generations”, identifying different types of missions under the same mandate (Kenkel 2013). Even though this classification is imperfect, it is based on clear criteria, such as the extent of the use of force, civilian work conducted in the course of the mission, and the cooperation with other organisations. To the present day, experts have managed to identify five generations of UN peace operations, depending on the above mentioned criteria (Kenkel 2013, 125).

The first generation of UN peace operations or traditional peacekeeping typically occurs in the aftermath of an armed conflict between two states, who have given their consent to the UN to intervene, after a truce or peace agreement has been concluded. Thus, traditional peacekeeping correlates very much to the three basic principles of peacekeeping: “consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate” (UN Peacekeeping 2016). The primary task of UN peacekeepers, when the first generation missions were first deployed, was to help the parties achieve a political solution, which was the condition of their withdrawal from the conflict site. Therefore, they were lightly armed, did not have authorisation for using force except in exceptional cases, and were very limited in their actions. The main presumption of the first generation peace operations was that the mere UN presence would create an environment encouraging peaceful political resolution and confidence building among the parties of the conflict, and that the parties would refrain from confrontation in case the UN is present. However, practice has shown that it was often not the case. The UN has placed too much faith in what Kenkel calls moral “suasion” - the idea of the peaceful conflict resolution based on exclusively moral notions (Kenkel 2013, 127). The first examples of UN peace missions of the first generation - the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation established in 1948, and the United Nations Monitoring and Observation Group in India and Pakistan (1949) - are active and relatively successful today, though with adjusted mandates and less forces deployed on the ground. However, further operations, such as

the United Nations Emergency Force to the Suez, are likely to fail to prevent deterioration of conflicts, due to their inadequate mandates.

The end of the Cold War transformed the international environment and brought a second generation of UN peace operations. This term is also referred to as “wider peacekeeping”, in a sense that the tasks peacekeepers are entrusted with grew in number and in scope. This generation brought civilian-related tasks into missions’ mandates, such as organization of elections, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, government capacity-building, restoration of the system of law and order, humanitarian aid, and human rights protection. However, while expanding in the number of tasks, the mandates did not change in terms of the use of force. Peacekeepers were still unable to effectively respond in case the parties resorted to violence, and were still acting under three basic rules applied to the first generation operations. The expanding tasks contrasted with unchanged capabilities eventually led to the biggest crises in the history of UN peacekeeping: the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, three hundred thousand lives lost in Somali civil war, and heavy civilian losses in Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia in 1995.

The push given by the above mentioned three crises led to the emergence of the third generation missions, this time differing dramatically from the previous two. The “peace enforcement” operations, deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, finally authorised “blue helmets” to use force not only in self-defence or defence of the mandate, and restored a balance between peacekeepers’ tasks and the means available to them. Also called “humanitarian interventions”, they were based on the responsibility to protect civilians in case of an armed attack. The principles, guiding previous types of peacekeeping operations, significantly changed. Third-generation missions were often deployed in an unstable setting with ineffective government or with no government at all; thus, in some cases acquiring consent of the parties was no longer an option for the UN, and the missions could be deployed without it. Another particular feature of peace operations of the third generation is the enhanced cooperation with external actors, often coalitions of states, in enforcing peace. Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation took the leadership in Yugoslavia in 1999, and the Australian-



Led International Force assisted the UN in East Timor in 1999. While the external forces were entrusted with the military involvement to restore peace, the UN was still a leading force in the political process, civilian tasks, and other assignments in accordance with its mandate.

The fourth generation refers to a concept, that appeared at the end of the Cold War, and was given particular attention in Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace in 1992 - post-conflict peacebuilding. Peacebuilding represents a new and ambitious form of UN peace operations, which in some cases gives the UN judiciary, legislative and executive functions of a transitional government when country's own government seized to exist. The main aim of this transformation was to ensure that a country, which was the setting of a conflict, had stabilised and could effectively handle incitements to conflicts, should they occur, and avert conflicting situations. The only two examples of such a kind of mission are the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (1999) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (1999). However, many other missions contained numerous peacebuilding elements, such as the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (2010), the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (2008), the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (2010), and others.

The fifth generation, that scholars believe has emerged nowadays, is based on a further developed third generation peace operations' characteristic, such as cooperation with other actors in fulfilment of a mandate. The "hybrid missions" are deployed under mixed command and consist of forces sent by the UN as well as other organizations, that sometimes have a separate mandate. Today there is an opportunity for particular states to acquire the UN special authorisation to act in the conflict area not in frames of the UN peace mission, as it was in the case of the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone (1999) and France in Côte d'Ivoire (2010). The UN certainly has become more flexible in crafting missions' mandates according to situations' needs, and more creative in identifying and applying necessary means.

It is necessary to understand that a big number of missions cannot be classified under one particular generation, especially the later ones, because they are often comprised of different elements in different stages of the conflict. Thus, a single mission may be peace enforcing in the stage of ongoing conflict, peacekeeping-kind after the conclusion of a stable peace agreement, and peacebuilding in the aftermath of the conflict situation. Even though few missions undergo the full cycle from peace enforcement to peacebuilding, it is crucial to note that the generations are interconnected, and the boundaries between them are very often blurred. Moreover, the classification above is just one out of many developed by scholars.

Another example of a comprehensive classification was presented by A. Bellamy, P. Williams and S. Griffin in “Understanding Peacekeeping”. Like the majority of experts, they agree with traditional first-generation, third-generation peace enforcement and fourth-generation peace building categories, but also add “Managing Transition” operations and “Wider Peacekeeping” to the list. Managing transition category refers to the operations deployed in the period of time between signing a peace accord and the completion of a political transition, usually until the first elections or a new state’s independence. These operations are similar to the second generation peacekeeping because of their civilian component and the principles of traditional peacekeeping that second-generation operations are based on. Bellamy et al. argue that thirty-two operations dealing with de-colonization and conducted during the Cold War fall under this category (e.g. United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia). The authors also argue that these operations enjoyed success incomparable with that of other types of missions, because of relatively secure setting conditions, clear agenda and time frames, active contribution to peacemaking and favouring international environment. However, they claim that the consent principle, limited military capabilities, UN logistical issues, and over focusing on holding elections as the only requirement for a stable peace, kept limiting peacekeepers in their actions and fulfilling their mandate. At the same time, “wider peacekeeping”, also called by some second-generation peacekeeping missions or “Chapter 6,5 peacekeeping”, refers to the missions deployed in much less secure environment, right after a peace

accord was signed or even before that. The term “wider” can emphasize the variety of tasks given to peacekeepers, or the new conflict environment in which peacekeepers have to work. Nevertheless, Bellamy et al. attribute six main characteristics to this generation of peacekeeping mission: it occurs in intra-state conflicts in a context of ongoing violence; peacekeepers execute civilian-related tasks, such as election organisation and monitoring, delivering humanitarian aid, capacity building etc.; the peacekeepers enjoy larger support from external humanitarian organisations, and have to cooperate with them; the mandates of the missions are highly vulnerable to changes on the ground; and the capacity gap between the resources available to peacekeepers and the tasks they have to accomplish. It is not surprising that some of the biggest failures of UN peacekeeping fall under this category: the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia in 1992-1995 and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda in 1993-1994. In contrast to a general perception of UN involvement in Sierra Leone as a success, the authors believe that the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone and United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone were a failure, because of the numerous security breaches throughout the country and the mission’s inability to produce a stable ceasefire.

#### ***1.4. Peacekeeping today***

It is necessary to analyse the current state of peacekeeping before diving into prospective reforms. The Global Peace Operations Review identified ten trends in peace operations, conducted by the UN and other organisations for a better understanding of current realities and prospective changes (Gowan 2015).

First of all, despite the active cooperation and involvement of regional organisations into peace operations, the UN remains the leader in the number of deployed peacekeepers. However, the African Union and African sub-regional organisations, European Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have been particularly active in deploying peacekeeping personnel in the recent years.




Figure 1. Overall Military Deployments in Peace Operations, 2000-2014

Richard Gowan, "10 Trends in Peace Operations", *Global Peace Operations Review* (17 June 2015).

As shown by Figure 1, after NATO substantially withdrew their peacekeepers from Afghanistan, the UN again became the largest organisation-deployer of peacekeepers in the world (89,406 troops as of February 2016, and 122,778 officers in total, serving in current peace operations). Apart from the missions conducted by the above mentioned organizations, current peacekeeping missions also include the Multinational Force and Observers, involving states from Australia to Fiji, ensuring compliance with the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace on the Sinai Peninsula, and the Operations Helpem Fren in the Solomon Islands and Astute in Timor-Leste conducted by Australia and New Zealand.

Secondly, African countries and organisations become more involved and influential in the issues concerning their continent. Through contributing to UN peacekeeping activities and initiating missions under the command of the African Union, African states have more opportunities in affecting peacekeeping trends on their continent. Current African Union missions include the African Union Mission to Somalia approved by the United Nations, assisting in maintaining national security

and in country's political transition; and the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic under the approval of the UN as well, following Central African coup d'état, with the purpose of stabilising the country. Thus, Ethiopia is the largest contributor of personnel to the UN peacekeeping operations with 8,324 peacekeepers in total, including 8,193 military personnel (Contributors 2016). For example, 4,464 Ethiopian troops serve in the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei in Sudan, 2,549 in the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur, 1,298 in the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan; a more limited number of peacekeepers was also contributed to the missions on the African continent and in Haiti (UN Mission's 2016). Other large troop contributors from the African continent are Rwanda (6,001), Senegal (3,717), Burkina Faso (2,921), Nigeria (2,831), Ghana (2,759), Morocco (2,301), Tanzania (2,342), South Africa (2,072), Niger (2,046), Togo (1,813), Chad (1,493), Kenya (1,232) and Cameroon (1,172) (Contributors 2016).

Another trend concerning the UN agenda is that the UN is still dealing with the outcomes of Arab revolutions from Libya and Yemen to Syria. While the UN's activities in this area remain mostly political and mediation-like, the organization is often criticised by the League of Arab States as being ineffective in the long-run because of applying measures that are not robust enough.

Robust actions involving military elements, having been proved to be effective in decreasing a number of fatalities, are, at the same time, difficult and expensive to maintain for a long period of time. Moreover, even in the presence of a significant number of peacekeepers with sufficient mandate, the situation can still deteriorate because of uncoordinated actions and mixed command.

The fifth trend refers to an increased number of political missions authorised by the UN Security Council in recent years. This tendency is also particularly alarming, as such missions are often deployed in dangerous situations in countries far from reaching stable ceasefires or having concluded fragile agreements. As a result, the UN personnel is exposed to high risks, the missions' capabilities are limited, and the UN public image is undermined.

Another dilemma of current UN peacekeeping is the need to maintain the "legacy" missions that had been deployed several decades ago and still remain active on the ground, and to constantly

address new conflicts with a limited amount of resources available. According to Gowan, more than a half of UN troops are deployed in the missions that are over ten years from their launch, and have not yet achieved their goals. The UN has managed to maintain a constant number of around 15 missions operating at the same time, including old and new ones. However, the UN has to exercise caution in closing missions, whether the recent or old ones, over the lack of resources and pressure from the main contributors, because it can easily undermine the progress achieved in the conflict area, and return the host state back to where UN started.

The seventh trend represents one of the main criticisms of the UN peacekeeping operations – the slow pace of deployment on the ground after the mission has been authorised. There is no common standard for the time needed to set a peacekeeping mission, simply because every case bears its unique characteristics, but in practice it takes from several months to over a year to execute the decision of the UN Security Council to set a mission. Being a very complex and important stage of the mission, that has to be executed carefully, the preparation can still be conducted in a relatively short period of a few months, as was the case of the reinforcement of the UN force in Lebanon in 2006. Unfortunately, a lengthy process of deployment characterised the UN Mission in Mali in 2013, the expansion of the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan in 2013 and few other missions (Gowan 2015).

The next trend, and, possibly, one of the causes of the previous one, is the weak contribution of Western powers to UN peacekeeping in terms of personnel and financing. Being 26th in the ranking of the largest contributors of total personnel, Italy is the main contributor of troops, military experts and police personnel among European countries (1087). France (934), Spain (618) and the Netherlands (605) contribute their forces as well, but their contributions are significantly lower than those of the countries taking the top three positions - Bangladesh (8496), Ethiopia (8296), and India (7798). This dissonance influences the success of operations dramatically, as peacekeepers coming from developed countries are usually better trained, armed and coordinated as opposed to those coming from poorer states. As for the financing of the operations, the biggest imbalance is 28%

contribution of the United States, comprising more than a quarter of the budget for peacekeeping operations, and total contribution of 52% by P-5 Members of the UN Security Council, comprising more than a half of the budget, while the other 188 states contribute the other half. Both of these imbalances inevitably constrain UN peacekeeping, as noted by many experts.

Gender imbalance in peace operation staff is another current unfortunate trend identified by Gowan. As of 2014, women account for three per cent of military staff in UN peace operations, ten per cent of police personnel and twenty-one per cent of civilian staff. Gender balance in mission leadership also remains a crucial issue in UN peacekeeping - twenty-five per cent of peacekeeping and political missions are headed by women. However, as women are being appointed to more leadership positions, the UN is showing its commitment to eliminate this gap, at least on the leadership level.

Finally, the tenth positive trend concerns innovative methods in UN peace missions. Flexible and creative methods should be at heart of the UN response to new threats and challenges, such as Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and the UN actually demonstrates its capacity to innovate, as noted by Gowan. However, according to the former UN Secretary General Special Representative to Liberia, Karin Landgren, the UN still struggles with thinking out-of-the-box and adopting extraordinary decisions, as well as with reacting to new unprecedented challenges. Thus, UN's response to Ebola outbreak in Liberia has been slow particularly because of the unprecedented nature of the crisis (Landgren 2016).

### ***1.5. Assessing success in peacekeeping***

First, it should be noted that there is no universal definition of success in peacekeeping in either academic or practitioners' community. It is widely accepted that the measures of success vary, and every researcher analyses the existing sets of criteria and composes the most comprehensive set in their point of view. However, there are still identifiable trends in measuring success of peacekeeping operations.

The first intuitive criterion of the evaluation of success would be the completion of the set of tasks assigned to peacekeepers, or the mission's mandate. The UN Security Council's resolution, establishing a mission, also sets guidelines and tasks the mission has to accomplish, as well as the authorisation of the use of force in course of the implementation of the assignment. The comprehensive language of the mandate allows us to assess this dimension of success by comparing the results with the initial tasks set by the UN (Howard 2008). However, some results and tasks are more difficult to assess than others. For instance, the protection of UN personnel and convoys are fairly easy to assess, while civilian-related tasks, such as establishing stable democratic institutions or monitoring and promotion of human rights are vaguer. Moreover, reliance solely on the UN's assessment of results upon the completion of the mission may provide incomplete information which can result in the false perception of the mission's outcome.

There is a broad consensus that the level of success of peace operations cannot be measured by simply comparing results with the mandate of the mission. Lise Morjé Howard, an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University, has conducted a large-N analysis of UN peace operations in civil wars, and notes that there could be cases when the UN formally fulfils its assigned mandate, but the peace established as the result of the mission does not correspond to the "human rights, economic fairness and opportunity, democratisation, and environmental sustainability" (Howard 2008, 7). Therefore, it is necessary to explore the criteria outside of the UN's mandate. In this regard, Howard proposes to measure "the state of the country after completion of the UN intervention" (Howard 2008, 7). Yet, she does not agree with applying very high standards of success to post-conflict reconstruction and development. To Howard, those missions that result in a mixed success in terms of building just, stable, market democracies, should not be labeled as failures. According to Landgren, "There is no appetite for having peacekeeping missions stay in the country until there are perfect conditions" (Landgren 2016). Moreover, it is a rare case for the UN to completely terminate its involvement in a conflict region after the withdrawal of the mission.



Therefore, the level of the post-withdrawal engagement should also be accounted for in measuring peacekeeping success.

Duane Bratt develops on a broader assessment of peacekeeping success, and proposes to ask four questions when assessing the mission's results: "Did the operation complete its mandate? Did the operation facilitate a resolution to the conflict? Did the operation contain the conflict? And did the operation limit the casualties of combatants, civilians and peacekeepers?" (Bratt 1997). Indeed, the dynamics in the development of peacekeeping prove that the importance of political solution to a military conflict can not be emphasised enough. For Landgren, the real peacekeeping success is in achieving a political solution (Landgren 2016). Besides, this dimension also imposes difficulties in measurement, as the former UN's criterion of a stable political solution - fair elections - is no longer valid.

Hence, in order to get an unbiased picture, one should conduct a broad assessment of the completion of mission's mandate, its influence on achieving a stable political solution, and providing a secure environment for civilians and UN personnel. Based on these criteria, the missions can be categorised into successful, moderately successful and failed operations.

### ***1.6. Determinants of success in peacekeeping***

Even though the topic of the reasons of UN peacekeeping success and failure is not new to political scientists, there is no general agreement on the determinants of a successful operation, never mind a precise formula for success. With regards to such changeable topic as peace operations, constant revision is required, as conflicts follow new patterns, and the response to the same problems several years ago might not be adequate for today's situation. Table 1 in Annex I presents a comparative analysis of the factors that prominent scholars in the field of UN peacekeeping consider determinant in successfulness of the UN peace operations.

Having conducted a complex review of the academic literature on peacekeeping, Jaïr Van Der Lijn distinguishes several groups of factors that are considered prominent, and examines them in relation to four UN peacekeeping operations: in Rwanda, Mozambique, Cambodia and El Salvador.

Importantly, the author chooses the cases with complex UN peacebuilding efforts, that represent the latest generation of UN peace operations. Out of eleven groups of factors, eight proved to be determinant: 'Consent, willingness and sincerity', 'Cooperation from important outside actors', 'Sense of security of the parties', 'Timely deployment and at the right time', 'Competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures', 'Internal and external co-ordination', 'Ownership' (involvement of all parties in the negotiations) and 'Causes of the conflict' (identifying and addressing all of them) (Van Der Lijn 2009, 71). 'Sufficiently long duration' is confirmed under certain conditions, but the importance of the 'Impartiality and the non-use of force' together with 'Clear, appropriate and achievable mandate' is rejected. He recognises that despite the numerous attempts of producing a "blueprint" for a successful UN peace operation, the academic world still lacks a comprehensive explanation that would fit to all cases of UN involvement (Van Der Lijn 2009, 71).

A more inclusive system of evaluation was developed by L.M. Howard, that compared the initial mandate of ten post-Cold War missions in civil wars completed before 2005 with the process of their implementation, as well as the results achieved (Howard 2008). Identifying five potentially determinant factors from scholarly literature, such as the 'Situational difficulty of civil war', 'Security Council consensus', 'Security Council interest intensity', 'Peacekeeping rules followed' and 'Organizational learning', she finds that with four factors varying in ten different cases, only the first-level 'Organizational learning' always correlated with the outcome. In cases where organisational learning, defined as the ability of the UN to gather technical information from the field; coordinate international efforts; integrate with the post civil-war environment; and exercise leadership, fostering the consent of the parties; took place, the mission resulted in success or mixed success (Howard 2008, 328). Apart from this condition, she argues that the consent of the warring parties and a moderately intense UNSC interest are also necessary for the successful outcome.

However, the most all-inclusive analysis of UN peacekeeping operations on a large scale was conducted by scholars in the field of conflict resolution, Jacques L. Koko and Essoh J.M.C. Essis in their book "Determinants of Success in UN Peacekeeping Operations" (Koko and Essis 2012).

Comparing 46 operations, they claim that four groups of variables can explain success or failure of the operation: “The scope of resources invested in peacekeeping; the duration and intensity of conflict and time of preparation for peacekeeping intervention; the political support for peacekeeping from the UNSC, and the type of conflict” (Koko, Essis 2012). More importantly, they emphasize that the nature of an operation plays more of a role in determining success than the essence of the conflict, which means that the UN has control over the outcome in all cases. Even though the conclusions they make can be compromised because of using only quantitative methods in their research, and because of an imperfect definition of success, which they define as the completion of the mandate, this book still represents the most comprehensive attempt to solve the puzzle of UN peacekeeping success and failure.

Erik Brattberg, a Senior Fellow at the McCain Institute for International Leadership in Washington, compares UN peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Sierra Leone with an identical purpose – to find the reasons for a success of one mission and a failure of another (Brattberg 2012). The reason for choosing these particular cases was a similar setting in which the missions were deployed initially. Analyzing dramatically different outcomes of two missions, Brattberg finds such factors as mission’s mandate flexibility, resource commitment and overall interest and willingness of the international community to resolve the conflict, accountable for contributing to missions’ success (Brattberg 2012, 161).

Virginia Page Fortna, Chair of the Political Science Department of Columbia University, makes her contribution to shift a focus from missions’ mandates and military resources invested in them to the actions of peacekeepers on the ground in preparing it for a stable peace to last (Fortna 2008). Thus, she claims that credibility of UN personnel in the eyes of the parties of conflict matters greatly, and that political and economic measures work are as much effective as military ones, even in the absence of ceasefire (Fortna 2008, 171). By changing incentives of the “peacekept”<sup>1</sup>, reducing

---

<sup>1</sup> The term refers to the population of the host country, and is introduced by Séverine Autesserre in *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention* (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

uncertainty and mistrust and providing mediation services, peacekeepers lower the risk of resuming violence and contribute to a stable peace.

Séverine Autesserre, Associate Professor of Political Science, working in international relations and African studies at Columbia University, argues that what prevents peacekeepers from building sustainable peace are the everyday modes of operation, the lack of local embeddedness and local knowledge, and dominant standardised narratives (Autesserre 2014, 250). She emphasises the importance of flexibility when it comes to crafting everyday routines of peacekeepers, openness to fresh ideas and developing in-depth understanding of the area of deployment for mission's leadership as well as for the regular personnel and soldiers.

As we can see from Table 1, scholars agree on the importance of factors related to the competent leadership, building trust and creating the sense of security and ownership among the “peacekept”, as well as addressing the real causes of the conflict. Furthermore, there seems to be a broad agreement on the low significance of the principles of peacekeeping, such as impartiality and non-use of force, comparing to other factors. As for the consent of the parties of the conflict, UNSC interest to the matter, the time of deployment, the opinions vary. Therefore, this thesis aims at contributing to the development of the theory of peacekeeping and to the debate on the determinant factors of success in UN peacekeeping, and broadening the amount of scholarly research on the familiar and yet relatively unexplored topic.

## Chapter Two: The United Nations Operation in Somalia

This Chapter provides the background of the civil war taking place in Somalia since 1988 to the present day, the description of the UN involvement, an assessment of results, and an analysis of the factors contributing to the result of the mission.

### *2.1. Conflict's background*

The conflict, that the UN mission intended to stop, had its roots in the colonial past of the Somali people. Somalia is a clan society, divided into five families: the Hawiye, Darod, Isaac, Dir, and Rahanwein, that were divided into smaller clans and subclans (Hawk 2002, 32). As a result of colonial power politics, the Somali people ended up in four states: Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia<sup>2</sup>. The society has been divided territorially, historically, by lineage and custom, but has been united by common ethnicity, language and, in most areas, religion.

The troubled past of the country contributed to the poor administrative capacity of Somalia, and made it possible for authoritarian leaders to manipulate clan politics to preserve their power. General Mohamed Siad Barre, who came to power in the military coup in 1969, relied on repressive tactics to maintain his authority, at the same time heightening inter-clan hatred, and led Somalia to the civil war in 1988. As the conflict between Siad Barre and opposition movements in the north proceeded, more than 300,000 people were displaced, a famine started to spread, and the “triangle of death” - a zone impossible to leave and controlled by militia, where starvation was used as a mean of manipulation - was formed (Hawk 2002, 34). As Siad Barre was forced to flee to Kenya, a power struggle continued, this time between two leaders of the opposition - Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Mohamed Farrah Aideed.

---

<sup>2</sup> More about historical division of Somali people in Hawk, Constructing the Stable State, 2002, pp. 32-33.

## ***2.2. The United Nations involvement***

Early UN activities in Somalia included humanitarian aid, that was distributed in the country from 1991. However, the deterioration of the situation forced the UN humanitarian personnel to leave the country. After numerous efforts of the UN SG then, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, his successor Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs James O.C. Jonah and visits of UN senior officials to the country, all the parties of the conflict were urged to a ceasefire and negotiations. As the result of the talks conducted in the UN headquarters (UN HQ) in New York in February-March 1992, all conflicting parties signed an Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire. Significant regional actors, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) were all involved in negotiations. The first mission in history authorised by the UN with no legitimate government to give its consent, the United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), was deployed in April 1992, in a setting of civil war broken out between the group supporting the Interim President of Somalia Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the faction supporting General Mohamed Farah Aidid, in order to monitor the ceasefire and to ensure UN humanitarian aid security. According to the Resolution 751 (1992), which established the mission, fifty UN observers were deployed in Mogadishu in accordance with the request by Somalia and the UN SG reports on the situation in Somalia.

However, it soon became evident that the mandate of UNOSOM did not allow it to be effective and to complete its tasks. On-site visits of the UN SG and UN senior officials indicated that the situation was more complex than it was first assumed, and that a number of urgent steps were needed. As a result, in accordance with the Resolution 775 (1992) UNOSOM I was strengthened up to four additional security units of 750 people each and four zone headquarters of UNOSOM. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) were engaged in airlift operations in the conflict zone. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Health Organization (WHO) were also part of the UN humanitarian efforts.

Nevertheless, the capital of the state, Mogadishu, was divided between conflicting militias without a central government. UNOSOM's personnel was put in great danger, and humanitarian help was often undelivered because of hindrances created by the parties of the conflict. On December 3, 1992, the UNSC recalled Chapter VII of the UN Charter and by its resolution 794 (1992) decided to authorize the use of force by UNOSOM personnel with the purpose of establishing a secure delivery of humanitarian help. At the same time, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) led by the United States, also authorized by the UNSC, was deployed in Mogadishu in order to ensure a secure environment for the humanitarian aid delivery. Acting together, UNITAF and UNOSOM were relatively successful, and resulted in peace talks in Addis Ababa where 14 Somali political factions took part. Three agreements signed at the end of negotiations process, concerning peace, ceasefire and the conference on national reconciliation, were expected to finally resolve the Somali crisis. Additionally, the efforts were made to revise UNOSOM mandate.

By its resolution 814 (1993) on March 26 the UNSC expanded the size of UNOSOM and marked the establishment of the United Nations mission for Somalia II (UNOSOM II) with the expanded mandate of undertaking any actions required to prevent any resumption of violence. The attacks on UNOSOM personnel continued, and reached its peak on October 3, 1993, in the battle of Mogadishu. Eighty-four US soldiers were wounded, eighteen were killed, and the body of one soldier was dragged through the streets of the city. This resulted in an international scandal, and the US decision to withdraw its forces from Somalia (Bill Clinton - address on Somalia 1993). However, after the US withdrawal, around 20 000 UN troops still remained in Somalia. On February 4, 1994, the UN revised UNOSOM II's mandate and excluded the use of force in monitoring the implementation of the agreements. A year after that, in March 1994, UNOSOM II was withdrawn from Somalia.

Later, as Boutros Boutros-Ghali promised “not to abandon Somalia”, the UN contributed to the creation of several regional missions, such as AU’s Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was authorized by the UNSC in 2007. It was later replaced by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), that is still active in the region. A transitional government was established in Somalia in 2004, which in 2012 was replaced with the Transitional Federal Government. In 2013 the UN established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), to provide UN “good offices” functions in order to support the peace and reconciliation process led by the government. Moreover, there are discussions about deployment of another UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia, but, they are not likely to have any results soon. Senior UN officials report that the risks are too high to deploy peacekeepers in the area, despite the progress made by AMISOM (Full-Fledged 2015).

Sixteen UN member-states contributed military personnel to UNOSOM I, and thirty-four states contributed to UNOSOM II. The authorized strength of UNOSOM I consisted of 50 military observers, 3,500 security personnel and up to 719 military support personnel. UNOSOM II was significantly stronger: 28,000 military and civilian police personnel and the provision for approximately 2,800 international and local civilian staff. However, these numbers were gravely decreasing as the mission proceeded and were equal to 14,968 of all ranks in the end of the mission (Figure 2).

The number of troops allocated to UNOSOM was seen negatively by scholars. A political scientist and former Vice-Rector of the United Nations University, Ramesh Thakur, claimed that the force deployed in Somalia was “insufficient for the purpose of coercive enforcement, yet extravagant for the task of peacekeeping” (Thakur 1994, 399). He also identified a so-called “UN-dilemma”: the UN must not deploy its peacekeeping missions in areas with the high risk of failure, but also should not use any difficulties as an excuse for inaction (Thakur 1994, 409). Thakur underlines the ironic nature of the very term “peacemaking” as the substitute for “peace






Figure 2. UNOSOM strength, number of troops

enforcement”. According to him, it is an oxymoron, and in the core of this type of mission should be an agreement among all the parties concerned in the conflict. He called on the UN to stop being a biased pro forma actor in the conflicts where it can not significantly contribute (in his opinion, Somalia), and focus on those issues where it is indeed effective and needed.

### 2.3. Evaluation of success

The UN peacekeeping efforts in Somalia in 1992-1994 were called a “setback” by the UN SG then Boutros Boutros-Ghali while he was announcing the peacekeepers withdrawal from the country (“A Setback in Somalia” 1995). According to him, the mission failed its major objective – the establishment of a stable government, but did stop starvation and the humanitarian crisis. The killings of 132 peacekeeping were also seen as a measurable failure of the mission by the international community.

Assessing UN peace activities in Somalia, it makes sense to evaluate UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II separately as distinctive parts of a peace process that led to different results. However, the final part of the judgment has to be combined, as we are compelled to evaluate UN peace efforts according to their preliminary goal - to maintain peace and security. The role of

UNITAF in the UN peace operation in Somalia was that of a paramedic - “to offer first aid and apply a tourniquet until the patient could be placed under a physician who would oversee its long-term rehabilitation”, while the physician - the UN - was to bring the country to its normal conditions (Hawk 2002, 48).

UNOSOM I failed to avert the humanitarian crisis and left the country in a state of chaos and starvation. UNITAF, accommodated to much broader means, managed to establish a relatively secure environment for humanitarian aid delivery, and, judged separately, can be evaluated as a “remarkable success” (Hawk 2002, 45). The UNOSOM II, with its broad mandate and limited resources, especially after the mass US and European military withdrawal, turned out to a complete failure. Evaluating the peace process at large, we still see the negative outcome (Hawk 2002).

Somalia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with 73% rate of poverty, 31.8% adult literacy, a life expectancy of 55 years, and 67% youth unemployment rate (UNDP in Somalia 2016). After the withdrawal of the UN, Somalia experienced the 2006-2009 Somalia and Ethiopia versus Somali Islamist umbrella group, the Islamic Court Union and other military groups war, and is still in a state of war between Somalia and AMISOM on one side and militant Islamist groups on the other side, over control of the country. The security and humanitarian situation in the war-torn country is extremely fragile, and causes significant challenges, first and foremost, for the Somali people, but also for the Transitional Federal Government and the UN (UN SC Press Statement on Somalia 2016).

#### ***2.4. Factors contributing to the outcome***

Upon the completion of the mission, UNOSOM II leadership named “the stubborn opposition and obstruction of the SNA group to the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreements and the Nairobi Conference declaration” the main reason of the mission’s failure (Report 1994). However, the causes of that were much more complex. Assessing UN efforts in Somalia, it is possible to identify triggers that changed the course of the mission dramatically. At the same time, more complex reasons,

that had affected the outcome since the beginning, can be traced by reviewing the missions' narratives.

The first complex factor which affected the UNOSOM's outcome from the first day is the time when it was deployed. First of all, the repressions unleashed by Somalian government to preserve power and to keep order were not followed by active involvement of the UN in the matter. Secondly, while the UN intervened only in 1992, the first major crisis had hit Somalia back in 1988. In 1990, when the armed opposition had already spread throughout the country, the international community again showed signs of disinterest in helping Somalia. The UN did not support the mediation efforts by some regional governments, and the most serious attempt by the government of Djibouti in reaching an agreement among the factions in Somalia (Sahnoun 1994). As a result, by the time of the UN involvement in the situation, around 300,000 people had died because of hunger and hunger-related issues, the country was experiencing a major humanitarian crisis, 500,000 people had been resettled to bordering countries, and the number of deaths only in Mogadishu in March 1992 amounted 30,000 (Sahnoun 1994, 8). The lost time had reflected later in many aspects of the mission's work. First, the Somali people, who were dying of starvation and were observing the UN doing nothing, could not trust them when they finally came (Terence and Rees 2005, 110). Second, the wide-spread famine forced many Somalis to join military factions in order not to die, as there were not many alternative options. Finally, had the UN intervened earlier, the delivery of humanitarian aid would not have been so hampered, as the military factions were smaller in numbers on earlier stages (Sahnoun 1994, 8). Therefore, from the day UNOSOM started its work, its actions have already been obstructed by the earlier UNSC decisions, or, in that case, the lack of them. More importantly, it profoundly affected other important factors of the mission's success, such as the trust of the local population and local leaders.

Secondly, the limited amount of food supplies dispatched to Somalia and its inadequate way of delivery caused the eruption of violence over the scant supplies, and became counter-productive (Sahnoun 1994, 9). Had the UN allocated the resources expected by relief-organisations and Somali

people, it would have created a basis for people's trust and readiness to compromise. The centralisation of the aid in Mogadishu also did not contribute much to Somalis relief in other parts of the country, and caused even more resentment.

The first event that distinctively led to further deterioration of the situation was the exclusion of the special representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia (SRSG), Mohamed Sahnoun, and one of the opposition's leaders, Aideed, from the decision-making process (Terence and Rees 2005, 111). In August 1992, two weeks after the long-awaited deal, allowing five hundred peacekeepers to enter Mogadishu, was concluded between Sahnoun and Aideed, the UNSC approved the UN SG's request to expand the number of peacekeepers to three thousand. Such incoordination infuriated Aideed, making him believe that the UN was using him to impose trusteeship over the country, and, ultimately, undermined the dialogue process led by Sahnoun (Howard 2008, 25).

The second defining moment came with the rapid and unexpected withdrawal of US and European forces after numerous deaths of US soldiers, and raising disapproval of the US involvement in Somalia by the American general public, which left the remaining personnel incapable of completing UNOSOM II's mandate. This event, in fact, is a part of a bigger picture of how the unlimited freedom of UN Member-States to decide whether to participate in UN operations and on what conditions profoundly affects the results the UN delivers. In the case of Somalia, the freedom to withdraw forces and equipment prematurely, to ignore the pledges of financial support and to instruct their personnel in contradiction with the orders of the UN Command, "scuttled" the operation (Polman 2004, 16). An abrupt US decision to withdraw forces on October 15, 1993, precluded a pattern for Italy (October 16), Egypt (October 16), Turkey (October 17), Greece (January 1994), France, Belgium, Germany and others to leave Somalia for unexplained reasons or under the pretext that the operation had no chance of success (Polman 2004, 17).

Moreover, the operation did not manage to gain people's trust, as uncoordinated actions created a perception of the UN as another military group seeking for power, and, in the end, Somalis met UN convoys expressing signs of disapproval and screaming "UN, go home!" (UNOSOM video

2012). Ignoring general Somali public and their traditional practices, as well as local customs, and country's specific scenery and context did not lead peacekeepers to achieving a desired objective. Brief reconciliation conferences conducted outside of Somalia in luxury hotels did not correlate with traditional process of ongoing consultation (Hawk 2002, 46). The US intelligence technology was inappropriate for local low-tech militias and the specific setting of Mogadishu (Howard 2008, 27). And, finally, the UN replaced the SRSG Mohamed Sahnoun, whose primary focus was the contact and constructive dialogue with the local population, with Ismat Kittani, who was mostly concerned about the reaction of UN HQ to his actions. The dismissal of Sahnoun "seems to be the turning point of the UNOSOM mission, and perhaps of the entire UN operation in Somalia" (Lalande 1995, 74). However, in perspective this decision seems to be just a part of the process of ignoring local needs, and shifting UN focus elsewhere.

The remoteness from the field also manifested itself in the information, the UNSC relied on, while making decisions. The United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library and the UNSC Documents directory hold no note of reports submitted by the UN SRSGs, humanitarian organisations or other actors operating on the field. As Sahnoun notes, he was not requested to give his testimony to the Council, and it relied only on UN SG reports in its decision-making (Sahnoun 1994, 13). Constructing knowledge of the area of deployment is to be based on complete and unembellished narratives, which can only be achieved coming from different sources and including close communication with local civilian population and officers. The UN operation in Somalia experienced the "dominant narrative" problem - acceptance of a common version of what is going on, instead of approaching the mission with fresh ideas. The UNSC needs to hear what it needs to hear, and not what it wants to hear, and the primary responsibility for that lies on the ability of the UN SRSG to deliver a clear, timely and veracious message (Landgreen 2016). Nonetheless, the Council, for its part, has to be open and ready to receive this message, and to take appropriate actions.

The factor, that many scholars attribute to being crucial in deciding the outcome of UN peace activities in Somalia - the lack of resources in comparison with the outcome the mission was to deliver

- mattered, but it was hardly crucial. The lack of resources that mattered was during the UN humanitarian mission in the early stages of the UN engagement, as argued by Sahnoun (1994). Overall, the number of personnel allocated to the field missions was adequate, unlike the coordination among them and the cooperation with the UN HQ and the support from it. The mission's management failed to maintain law and order even among UN staff, which was clearly illustrated by the embezzlement of 4 million US dollars, officially acknowledged by the executive leadership (Report 1994).

## Chapter Three: The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

This Chapter presents the background of the conflict in Sierra Leone in 1991-2005, the description of the UN involvement, an assessment of results, and an analysis of the factors contributing to the result of the mission.

### *3.1 Background of the conflict*

After a peaceful transition to independence in 1961, Sierra Leone was in relatively good position compared to other post-colonial states. However, decades of poor governance brought the country to an economic crisis with corrupt authoritarian rule (Fortna 2008, 55). By constantly expanding the number of militia and their powers, the government aggravated the situation in regards to social services, which resulted in massive emigration of professionals from the country. Thus, the conflict in Sierra Leone was rooted in the deep economic crisis of the state and struggles over the political power and the control of the diamond areas, rather than ethnic and religious tensions.

The active phase of the conflict began in March 1991, when a group of rebels, calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia. At first, the group was small in numbers, and was supported by the rebels' leader in Liberia, Charles Taylor, who later became the president of Liberia (Fortna 2008, 56). In just a few months the group managed to capture diamond-mining towns and to gain support from the population, suffering from the results of thirty years of ineffective government. In the face of troubling economic conditions, the government forces often colluded with rebels and robbed civilians, as it was the most profitable way of earning money (Berdal and Economides 2007, 248). Sierra Leone civilian population, defenseless against the atrocities committed by the government, formed its own military groups, called the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).

A series of coups d'état followed. In May 1992 the president Joseph Momoh was overthrown by the Captain Valentine Strasser, who then ruled the country by decree. In January 1996 Julius

Maada Bio drove Strasser from power and held national elections, which, however, failed to prove his legitimacy, and led another candidate, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power. All the leaders of Sierra Leone government from 1992 to 1996 attempted to achieve a diplomatic solution with the rebels, but the process did not bring any visible results back then.

The Abidjan agreement, achieved in November of 1996 by the RUF and Sierra Leone government, was the first one since the conflict broke out, and implied RUF demobilisation, granting them amnesty, and monitoring of the situation in the country by a Neutral Monitoring Group, presumably the UN peacekeeping mission. However, the ceasefire failed, as RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, refused to accept the UN presence in Sierra Leone, and fighting continued. In May 1997 another coup followed, this time initiated by the military junta the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), who then allied themselves with the RUF. The international community, including the UN, was forced to cooperate with the military junta that seized the power, in order to achieve a diplomatic solution in the conditions of continuing warfare.

The first international force to intervene was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which deployed the West African peacekeeping mission (ECOMOG) first to Liberia in 1990, and then to Sierra Leone in 1997 (ECOMOG 1998). First, they used diplomatic means to negotiate with the military junta, that initiated the coup of 1997, but, even backed up by economic sanctions, it proved to be ineffective. The junta was eventually overthrown by ECOMOG's 13,000-force in February 1998, consisted mostly of Nigerian, and also of Ghanian Guinean and Mali peacekeepers (Berdal and Economides 2007, 254). Nevertheless, they lacked logistical support and resources to continue fighting with the remaining rebels, which is why they were first assisted by the UN, and have gradually transferred their tasks to the UN later. The main and crucially important contribution of ECOMOG to the resolution of Sierra Leone crisis was reinstitution of the democratically elected president Kabbah and his government (Durch 2006, 157).




### 3.2. *The United Nations involvement*

March 1995 marked the appointment of a UN SRSG in Sierra Leone, who was supposed to assist in negotiations between the government and the rebels (UNAMSIL 2004). However, the first action on the situation in Sierra Leone was undertaken by the UN only in 1997 by establishing oil and arms embargo (Res 1156), which was terminated in June 1998 (Res 1171), eight days before the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), a small contingent of 50 observers tasked to monitor the military and security situation in the country, demobilisation and disarmament, and to assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law (Res 1181). As became evident in the following months, the mission's limited contingent, hampered by security situation in the country, was not prepared for the rebels' attacks, did not have resources to repel them, and was evacuated from Freetown in January 1999 (Getting away 1999, 2).

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established on October 22, 1999, in order to observe the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement, signed in May 1999 and formally ceasing violence between the government and rebellion movement. While signifying ceasefire, the agreement also granted RUF amnesty for the crimes committed in 1996-1999, declared its transformation into a political party, gave its members a right to hold positions in the government, and provided guarantees of the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Sierra Leone (Letter Dated 12 July 1999, Annex). The initial mandate authorized 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, and was increased on 19 May 2000 to 13,000 of all ranks and to 17,500 in total on 30 March 2001 (Figure 3). The main contributors of military and police personnel were Pakistan, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Zambia and Guinea.

In May 2000 UNAMSIL experienced a major crisis, which became a milestone for the whole operation. Constantly breaking the cease-fire, the RUF attacked and detained several contingents of UNAMSIL. By May 15, 352 peacekeepers, including 297 troops of the Zambian battalion, 29 soldiers of the Kenyan battalion, 23 of the Indian battalion and 3 military observers, were kept hostage (UN SG Fourth Report 2000). These disturbing events gave the green light for the United Kingdom to



*Figure 3. UNAMSIL strength, number of troops*

begin evacuation operation, which had been planned back in 1998. In a matter of few days after the decision had been taken in the beginning of May, the UK forces arrived in Sierra Leone and quickly achieved their goals. After the field mission's leadership assessed the situation of the ground and reported it to the UK government, the mandate of UK operation, which was comprised of 4,500 soldiers, sailors and marines, was expanded to security assistance to UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone government.

After the UK intervention, UNAMSIL was reinvented, which mostly concerned the areas of its deployment. Through spring 2001 UNAMSIL was gradually taking control over RUF-held territories, including the key diamond districts. By December 2001, UNAMSIL troops were positioned in all districts of Sierra Leone. The mission assisted in organising, conducting, supporting and securing results of the national and parliamentary elections in May 2002, as tasked by the resolution 1389 (2000).

Having completed the main tasks set by its mandate, UNAMSIL began gradually withdrawing its forces from August 2005, and completed the process by the end of 2005 (Res 1610). UNAMSIL was followed by the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), which was

mandated to assist the government of Sierra Leone in a number of tasks, and to secure the results achieved by UNAMSIL (Res 1620).

### ***3.3. Evaluation of success***

The case of Sierra Leone is particularly interesting in the history of UN peace operations. The evaluation of the results of the mission varies from “success story”, by the UN senior officials, to “the latest in a string of peacekeeping failures on the African continent”, by some scholars (Thakur and Schnabel 2001,104).

The UN’s evaluation of UNAMSIL’s results is highly positive: “UNAMSIL may serve as a model for successful peacekeeping, as well as a prototype for the UN's new emphasis on peacebuilding” (UNAMSIL 2005). As a result of UNAMSIL’s work, 75,490 combatants were disarmed and demobilized, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission provided a historical record of the war, more than 3,500 local police officers were recruited and trained, democratic elections were conducted in 2002, and government income from diamonds export rose from \$10 million in 2000 to \$160 million in 2004, greatly contributing to the country’s economy. In order to assess the perception of the mission by the local population, in January-February 2005, Yale University and New York City College conducted a public opinion poll among 900 Sierra Leoneans of different age groups, professions and from 14 districts (Yale University 2005). They found out that 100% of the respondents believe that the security situation had improved after the establishment of UNAMSIL, 84% evaluated disarmament process as good, 94% believe that the UN had been helpful when they got involved, 79% noted peacekeepers’ helpfulness in solving local problems, and 94% noted the successful work of the UNAMSIL radio in transmitting information to local people. The question that caused the most ambivalence was the one concerning the respect shown to Sierra Leoneans by the UN staff: only half of respondents said that UN staff always respected civilians. Among the negative things done by UNAMSIL, most often the respondents named the issues of sexual exploitation. Overall, the poll proved the positive perception of UNAMSIL and its outcomes.

The mandate given to UNAMSIL by the resolution 1289 (2000) was completed, in some areas with a mixed success: to ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel, to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan; in others with full success: to provide support to the elections, to encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning.

According to scholars who perceive UNAMSIL as a failure at large, the mission failed to respond to attacks by the RUF and to the numerous violations of the Lomé agreement (Thakur and Schnabel 2001, 104). Despite of the UNAMSIL's mandate to protect civilians, Human Rights Watch reported crimes, such as rape, murder, abduction, forced conscription, and amputation, committed mostly by the RUF, but also by the CDF, in June 1999, May 2000 and November 2000. Even though from February 2000, the authorised strength of the mission was increased to 11,000, and the mandate was expanded under Chapter VII and included the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, Human Rights Watch documented continued atrocities and, in a letter to the UNSC members from 20 June 2000, urged for a more robust action to ensure the protection of the civilian population.

In the aftermath of UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone held general elections in 2007 and in 2012, which, according to observers, passed peacefully, and are a credible sign of a stable political solution found with assistance of the UN. However, human security in Sierra Leone is still compromised by the country's undeveloped economy. Sierra Leone remains one of the poorest countries in the world, taking 181st place out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index (2016). The rate of unemployment is as high as 70%; 60% of population live below the national poverty line, and only 41% of adults are literate (UNDP 2016). However, HDI trends show a gradual improvement in such aspects as life expectancy, education and GNI per capita; which allows us to detect a slow, but positive impact of UNAMSIL on country's future (HDI Report 2013).

### ***3.4. Factors contributing to the outcome***

Even though UNAMSIL is largely perceived as a success story, its description until June-July 2000 resembles to one of a failed operation. The crisis of May 2000 UN tentatively divided UNAMSIL into two stages: before and after May 2000. Resolutions 1289 (2000), 1299 (2000) and 1346 (2001) all revised the concept of the mission, and, in line with other factors, transformed it into a successful one.

Just like too much faith is usually put into elections as a sign of after-crisis political stability of a country, too much faith was put into the achievement of a peace agreement in Sierra Leone. This false optimism seems to be the main reason of the UN failure with UNOMSIL in the first place. Moreover, the ceasefire must be concluded on the conditions that do not compromise the future of the country for the sake of a short-term peace. Containing a bunch of concessions to the rebels, the Lomé Peace Agreement was flawed to an extent that prevented it to be a basis for the long-term stability and future prosperity of the state.

The success of the operation in the case of Sierra Leone was largely determined by the unified front of the international community. At first, active involvement in Sierra Leone was unpopular with P-5 Members, especially with the United States; but since 2000, particularly after May 2000 crisis, the case attracted international attention. Thus, the military personnel to UNAMSIL was provided by 29 countries including Asian, European, African, South and North American countries (UNAMSIL 2005). The police personnel was provided by 28 UN member-states (UNAMSIL 2005). The United Kingdom was restructuring the army of Sierra Leone while UNAMSIL and its international partners were involved in training local police forces. That being said, joined forces were one of the factors of success of the mission. The withdrawal of Nigerian forces, which comprised roughly 90% of the ECOMOG, notwithstanding, the unified international forces preserved control on the situation, and the situation did not deteriorate.

A crucial complex factor that affected the mission dramatically after the crisis in May 2000 was what Howard calls “organizational learning” (Howard 2008). It is particularly underlined in

scholarly works and the UN SG reports that the mission's leadership, including two newly appointed deputy SRSGs, made sure that new personnel is properly trained and educated, the coordination among commanders and troops on the field is smooth, as well as between them and personnel-contributing countries' representatives in the HQ. Before that, it was noted that "different contingents had different perceptions of the mandate and tasks of UNAMSIL" (UN SG Fourth Report 2000).

The continued commitment and persistence of the UN, despite the crisis in May 2000, and its ability to cooperate with ECOMOG and the UK forces benefited the mission a lot, as noted by the UN SRSG for Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2003, Oluyemi Adeniji (IRIN 2002).

The intervention of the UK forces, which seems to have been a turning point for the whole operation, indeed, filled a gap in professionalism, troops and strategic support, as well as further provided an important assistance to UNAMSIL in logistics, training and coordination. What is more, UK operation undermined the RUF morale and strengthened the government and the people of Sierra Leone strategically (Durch 2006, 181). UK operation contained all the necessary elements to be successful: it was well-funded, equipped, prepared, coordinated, and there was a strong political commitment behind it. However, it would be an exaggeration to assume that a short-term intervention of a contingent of Western troops alone can turn the situation around. And it was essential that the intervention was followed by the constant support to UN troops, which reinstated credibility of the international forces in Sierra Leone, which UNAMSIL had lost in the eyes of the RUF (Thakur and Schnabel 2001, 129). It is worth mentioning, though, that the UK intervention was based on the bilateral agreement between the UK and Sierra Leone, and was not authorised by the UNSC and is not reflected either in its resolutions on Sierra Leone dating 2000, or in UNSC Presidential Statements, except for expressing its appreciation for the logistical support to the operation to relieve surrounded peacekeepers (S/PRST/2000/24). Therefore, the intervention sent the international community a message that the rules of the use of force under international law can be broken, and that UN Member States can act unilaterally no matter if they have UNSC authorisation or not.

The case of UNAMSIL provides evidence of a crucial role that communications and logistical support play in determining the final outcome. Taking into account the low level of literacy of Sierra Leone population (36%), it was important to find a way to transmit an unbiased coverage of events, communicate with locals and to create a positive perception of the UN among them (UNDP 2004). At first, radio UNAMSIL covered only the Freetown area, but its coverage gradually expanded to all parts of the country. The radio station transmitted news, public information, coverage of the peace process and elections in 2002, but also entertainment and music programs. Taking around 10% of the mission's budget yearly (from \$200,000 to 500,000 per year out of \$500,000,000 budget), UNAMSIL radio's role was crucial in informing civilian population about developments on the ground and creating the atmosphere of trust (Kimani 2007). Many locals even named radio UNAMSIL the best thing the mission had done along with the restoration and maintenance of peace, reconstruction and development projects, and the disarmament process and training of the police and military (Yale University 2005). Therefore, even if setting up a radio station in a middle of warfare does not bring immediate results, it is an important peace-building measure that positively affects significant underlying factors, such as the trust of the local population.

A long-term process of disarmament and demobilisation, as well as UN's commitment to Truce and Reconciliation Process (TRC), expressed in establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, provided combatants an alternative to fighting and assured the people of Sierra Leone that the perpetrators of war crimes will be brought to justice. Although TRC often lacked coordination and was constantly under-funded, it played its significant role in peacekeeping and building sustainable peace (Durch 2006, 200).

## Chapter Four: Lessons learned from comparison

### *4.1. Determinant factors of success in peacekeeping*

Table 2 in Annex II presents a comparative analysis of the determinant factors of success and failure in UN peacekeeping operations identified in Chapter One, present or absent in UN peace operations in Somalia and Sierra Leone. While some factors are relatively easy to trace, such as addressing the causes of the conflict and organisational learning, other are more intricate, as they changed in the process or were unclear in the course of the operation. For instance, the initial mandate based on the non-use of force changed with peace-enforcing one in both cases<sup>3</sup>; UNSC interest to the matter varied throughout the missions, as well as the consent of the parties of the conflict.

Table 2 shows that, in order to be successful, a UN peace operation needs to be characterized by the following factors: a group of administrative factors (competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures; internal and external co-ordination; sufficient duration; communications and logistical support), a group of local factors (sense of security of the parties; ownership; credibility of UN forces), and addressing real causes of the conflict, moderate UNSC interest, and organizational learning.

A number of important observations has to be made from the comparison of the two operations. Even though resource support is important, the number of troops is not an absolute measure of peacekeepers' capabilities. Several thousand peacekeepers can be beaten by 800 guerrillas, as in the case of Somalia, if UN forces lack necessary equipment, training and coordination. In contrast, a battalion of a few dozens of well-prepared troops can significantly change the course of the whole mission, as in the case of Sierra Leone. Thus, when the best-equipped troops from India and Jordan were withdrawn in the fall of 2000, the newly arrived peacekeepers from Nigeria and

---

<sup>3</sup> For more information on the mandates of UN operations in Somalia and Sierra Leone see Table 3 in the Annex III



Pakistan performed even better because of the training they received, equipment they had, and new, more coordinated military leadership (Durch 2006).

Moreover, as more and more scholars emphasise, to act locally, the UN has to use local practices, or adapt their practices for a local context. And this can not be done without interacting with local populations and conducting in-depth field research. Regular communication with local people is as important as coordination with the UN HQ, and it contributes to a number of factors that make an operation successful: it creates mutual trust, develops a sense of ownership and security, which breeds cooperation, and gives the UN personnel the necessary knowledge to act in its full capabilities. Examples of this can be found in the case of Sierra Leone: by establishing radio UNAMSIL as a channel of informing locals about UN's actions, developments on the field and daily events, the UN secured its image in the eyes of civilians and strengthened its ties with them. On the other hand, in the case of Somalia the absence of communications and trust-building hampered UN actions by creating an image of the UN as another military faction fighting for power and control, and making locals unwilling to cooperate. There is no doubt that, in order to function effectively, the UN has to replace expatriate attitudes with attention to local context, conferences in far-off hotels and offices with more traditional consensus-building practices and generalised knowledge with more context-specific training.

As the research has shown, in order to be successful, the operation needs to be characterized with a number of factors which can be grouped into the "local context" category. That includes: local people's trust, appropriate technology, recruitment of local personnel or international staff attentive to local needs, and in-depth knowledge of the local area. It should be done in several ways: interacting with local population instead of isolating themselves in peacekeeping camps, involving local leaders in negotiations and consensus-building, taking into attention local traditions and practices, informing local people about operation's mission and developments, and adapting technology and equipment to the local conditions. For sure, this work is time-consuming and costly, but it can also save the UN time and resources, and save innocent lives.

Concerning the credibility of UN forces in the eyes of the combatants, Fortna's and Austesserre's hypotheses that it is an essential component of the success of an operation are confirmed as well. The Sierra Leone case showed that credible UN forces not only secure the trust of the local people, but also demoralise combatants. The UK intervention in Sierra Leone boosted the UN's credibility and made a large number of combatants give up fighting and disarm.

In regards to the three principles of UN peacekeeping: impartiality, non-use of force, and consent, the evidence shows that they are neither sufficient nor necessary for a successful operation. The UN used force in both cases, lost consent of the host state in the process, and was not impartial in regards to Sierra Leone's leadership. Cooperation from outside actors and UNSC interest to the matter turned out to be an ambiguous criteria when it comes to determining success. To benefit the operation, cooperation with outside actors has to be coordinated, like in the case of the UK intervention to Sierra Leone, in order to avoid overlaps and information gaps in the chain of command. The mere presence of UNSC interest does not guarantee success either. It takes a certain degree of interest to dispatch a mission in the first place, but, after that, attention has to be directed to the real causes of the conflict, and has to be maintained on an equal level throughout the operation to avoid sudden withdrawals that can compromise the course of the mission, like it was in the case of the US withdrawal from Somalia. Thus, Howard's hypothesis about the moderate UNSC interest being a necessary determinant factor for success can be confirmed.

What Table 2 does not reflect, though, is the significance of the timely deployment of the mission for the outcome, the resources and the losses in the process. Both in Somalia and in Sierra Leone the UN intervened when conflict had already been developing for a few years, and qualitative evidence drawn from interviews with important actors involved in the conflict resolution suggests that earlier deployment would have saved the UN time and resources, would have simplified the resolution of the conflict, and, undoubtedly, would have spared the civilian populations from the suffering they experienced and would have saved lives. At the same time, it is unclear whether the UN would have been able to gather necessary resources for intervening earlier, considering the

outburst of new conflicts after the end of the Cold War. Another issue concerning timing is the length of the operation. As was pointed out by Landgren, UNAMSIL was followed by a long special political mission, which contributed to further stabilisation of the situation and made the Sierra Leone people realise that UN was not abandoning Sierra Leone and would continue to help in reconstruction of a stable state (Landgren 2016).

#### ***4.2. Directions for change***

In the face of the increased challenges encountered by peacekeepers in the 1990's, the UN Secretariat has begun paying more attention to peacekeeping setbacks since 2000, when the results of the review conducted by the High-level Panel on United Nations Peace Operations were published in a "Brahimi report" (UN Peacekeeping 2016). The report indicated the necessity of renewing political commitment of UN Member States, significant institutional reform and increased financial support (Brahimi report 2000). According to the report, only operating under a clear, achievable and credible mandate, and being properly supported financially, militarily and in terms of other resources, UN peace operations can be successful.

The most recent comprehensive review of UN peace operations was conducted by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations in 2015, that, operating by the request of the UN SG, on 17 June, produced a report "On uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people", containing the recommendations for UN peace operations reform. Covering a range of topics, the report emphasises several important dimensions the UN needs improvement in: conflict prevention, political solutions, responsiveness to the needs at the field, and engagement with local communities (Hippo report 2015).

The recommendations, given in the report, completely correlate with the findings of the research presented in the preceding chapters of this thesis. "Hippo report" emphasises the need for a more field-focused UN Secretariat and more people-centered UN peace operations, which is in line with the argument about the crucial significance of attention to local needs; it underlines the importance of two-way communication with a local population that builds trust, leads to better

protection of civilians and peacekeepers and provides the UN credible first-hand information from the field; and points out the lack of preventive efforts in the early stages of a conflict.

However, although these recommendations were laid out on paper, the UN machinery is likely to act on them gradually, especially given the complexity of the changes required. Unfortunately, the integrated ways of thinking and traditional practices of those, who are closest to the field, are the slowest and the last to change, as they are deeply ingrained in the minds of peacekeepers (Autesserre 2014). In order to improve the UN capability to respond to unexpected challenges, the mindsets of all those serving to maintain peace and security, from regular peacekeepers to senior leaders, have to be open to fresh, dissentient ideas and ready to reject old practices that lost their applicability. UN flexibility proved to be a decisive factor in transforming UN operation in Sierra Leone into a successful enterprise, and can be a cornerstone of success for following endeavours.

## Conclusion

As the former UN SRSG for Sierra Leone, Oluyemi Adeniji, once said: “You cannot do peacekeeping half-heartedly, particularly this new generation of peacekeeping, which is only peacekeeping in name because it involves peacemaking and peace building. If you have to deal with these three simultaneously, then you have to be conscious of the fact that it will demand a lot more resources. You cannot economise on it otherwise it will fail” (IRIN 2002). This thesis has shown that by cutting costs on peacekeeping and expressing false optimism, the UN sets itself up to pay a high price for its unreasonable actions. However, it should not be forgotten that a primary responsibility for expressing credible commitment to UN peace efforts lies on UN Member-States.

The present thesis has pursued the goal of making an empirical contribution to the literature on UN peacekeeping, and, in particular, on determinants of success in UN peace operations. The United Nations Operation in Somalia and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, as well as the preceding missions as integrated parts of the peace process (UNOMSIL and UNITAF), have been analysed, and the UN actions have been assessed from a comparative perspective. In order to identify determinants of success in UN peace operations, a complex formula of the definition of success was elaborated. A thorough analysis of two cases helped in identifying a list of necessary factors of success in UN peace operations.

An attempt to theorize success in peacekeeping resulted in a formula that combines the completion of a mission’s mandate, progress in achieving a stable political solution, and providing a secure environment for civilians and UN personnel. What is more, based on these criteria, the UN peace operation in Somalia, which is perceived as a failure, and the UN peace mission in Sierra Leone, which is perceived as a success, in fact, both have mixed outcomes.

As a result of the analysis, it has been identified that the necessary factors that are jointly sufficient for a successful UN peace operation are: a group of administrative factors (competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures; internal and external co-ordination; Sufficient duration; communications and logistical support), a group of local factors (sense of security

of the parties; ownership; credibility of UN forces), and addressing real causes of the conflict, moderate UNSC interest, and organizational learning. It should be noted, though, that even if the competent leadership and personnel, clear command structures, and internal and external coordination are not fully developed at the beginning of an operation, through organizational learning they can be more fully established. Its possible function of a tool for flexibility attributes organizational learning great importance.

Review of the literature has provided theoretical considerations for departing from the criteria concerning decisions made in the UN HQ to the ones made on the field. Using a thorough review of the UN involvement in civil wars in Somalia and Sierra Leone, it has been demonstrated that a number of “local” procedures, such as gaining local people’s trust, developing appropriate technology, recruiting local personnel or international staff attentive to local needs, and acquiring in-depth knowledge of the local area are all necessary for an operation to bring expected results. As noted by Landgren, mandates of missions are often crafted with “strategic ambiguity”, meaning that senior field officers have a certain degree of freedom in interpreting them (Landgren 2016).

An overview highlighted that three principles, applied to peace operations by the UN: impartiality, non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and consent of the parties of the conflict, need a revision, as they were not necessary for a successful outcome in the case of Sierra Leone.

Finally, the review of the latest reports on UN peacekeeping reform revealed that the formula, elaborated as a result of the present research is, generally, in line with recommendations, given by the High-level Panel on Peace Operations, formed on request of the UN Secretary-General. Comparing UN reports with scholarly literature on peacekeeping, we can identify the same way of thinking when it comes to essential shifts for successful peace operations.

The implications of this research are expected to be valid for UN missions dealing with intrastate conflicts. However, interstate conflict missions and other types of UN operations deserve a separate review, since its results are likely to differ from those presented above. Further research

should explore UN peace operations in a similar setting, that were completed more recently, such as the UN Mission in the Sudan (2005-2011) and the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (2007-2010). Testing the criteria laid out in this thesis with a larger number of cases will help to verify their credibility and to formulate a more accurate and reliable theory concerning determinants of success in UN peacekeeping. Moreover, adding quantitative methods to the analysis will also add to the credibility of the theory. One more perspective focus of research could be the responsiveness of the UN to the recommendations laid out in the “Hippo report”. Tracking changes in accordance with the 2015 report would help to explore the practical implications of theoretical reviews and to identify possible obstacles for effective reforms.

## Appendix I

	J. Van Der Lijn	E. Brattberg	L. M. Howard	Koko and Essis	V. P. Fortuna	S. Autesserre
Impartiality	×		×		×	
Non-use of force	×		×		×	
Clear, appropriate and achievable mandate	×	√		√ (in terms of resources)		
Consent, willingness and sincerity	√	√	×		×	
Co-operation from important outside actors	√					
Sense of security of the parties	√				√	√
Timely deployment and at the right time	√			√		
Competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures	√		√		√	√
Internal and external co- ordination	√				√	
Ownership	√				√	√
Addressing causes of the conflict	√				√	√
Sufficiently long duration	~√					
UNSC interest			Necessary, but not sufficient, moderate	√		
Organizational learning			√ (the most important)			√
Credibility of UN forces					√	√

**Table 1. Comparative analysis of determinants of success in UN peace operations proposed by prominent international relations and conflict resolution scholars (√ - Confirm, × - Deny, ~√ - Conditional)**



## Appendix II

**Table 2. Comparative analysis of determinants of success in UN peace operations in Somalia and Sierra Leone**

Factor	Somalia	Sierra Leone
Impartiality	√	×
Non-use of force	~	~
Clear, appropriate and achievable mandate	×	×
Consent, willingness and sincerity	×	~
Co-operation from important outside actors	√	√
Sense of security of the parties	×	√
Timely deployment and at the right time	×	×
Competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures	×	~
Internal and external co-ordination	×	~
Ownership	×	~
Addressing causes of the conflict	×	√
Sufficiently long duration	×	√
UNSC interest	~	~
Organizational learning	×	√
Credibility of UN forces	×	√
Communication and logistical support	×	√

√ - Present    × - Absent

~ - Varied

## Appendix III

**Table 3. Mandates of UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL in comparison**

Country Mission Dates		Somalia		Sierra Leone	
		UNOSOM I	UNOSOM II	UNOMSIL	UNAMSIL
		04/92- 05/93	05/93-05/95	07/98- 10/99	10/99- 12/05
Military	Monitor Ceasefire	√	√	√	√
	Peace Enforcement		√		√
	Disarmament			√	√
	Demobilization, Reintegration & Retraining		√		√
	Observe Withdrawal			√	√
	De-mine		√		
	Weapons Collection		√		√
	Protect Civilians				√
Displaced Peoples	Refugee Return		√		
Humanitarian Assistance	Humanitarian corridor			√	
	Assist civilians	√	√	√	√
	Protect intl workers		√		√
Civil Policing	General monitoring			√	√
	Police retraining			√	
	Technical assistance				√
Legal Affairs	Constitutional/judicial reform		√	√	
	National reconciliation		√		
	War crimes tribunals				√
	Human rights oversight			√	
Miscellaneous			Economic development		Confidence building measures

## Bibliography

S  verine Autesserre, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention* (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

BBC News, *ECOMOG: peacekeeper or participant?*, 11 February 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/55719.stm>.

Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).

Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, ed. *United Nations interventionism, 1991-2004* (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2007).

“Bill Clinton - address on Somalia (October 7, 1993)”, Youtube video, 3:42, posted by MCamericanpresident, 27 July 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VmLGzZkTr5U>.

Duane Bratt, “Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.3, No.4 (Winter 1996): 66-83.

Duane Bratt, “Explaining peacekeeping performance: The UN in internal conflicts”, *International Peacekeeping*, 4:3 (1997): 45-70.

Erik Brattberg, “Revisiting UN Peacekeeping in Rwanda and Sierra Leone”, *Peace Review*, 24:2 (2012): 156.

William J. Durch, ed. *Twenty-first-century peace operations*, (Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace and the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006).

Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

“Full-Fledged UN Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia Would Be ‘High-Risk Undertaking,’ Security Council Told.” 2015. *African Business News*, July, 1–1.

Oliver Furley and Roy May, ed. *Ending Africa's wars: progressing to peace* (Burlington, VT : Ashgate, 2006).

Richard Gowan, “10 Trends in Peace Operations”, *Global Peace Operations Review* (17 June 2015).

Kathleen Hill Hawk, *Constructing the Stable State: Goals for Intervention and Peacebuilding* (Praeger Publishers, 2002).

Francis Henn, “UN peacekeeping: The mirror should be polished”, *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 264, Issue 1541 (June 1994).

Lise M. Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Human Development Index, *Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World*, available from <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/SLE.pdf>.

Human Rights Watch, *Sierra Leone: Getting away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape*, Section VII (New York 1999).

Integrated Regional Information Network, *IRIN interview with Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji* (9 July 2002), available from <http://www.irinnews.org/q-and/2002/07/09/irin-interview-ambassador-oluyemi-adeniji>.

Kai MiChael KenKel, “Five generations of peace operations: from the “thin blue line” to “painting a country blue”, *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 56, 1 (2013) : 122-143.

Mary Kimani, “Broadcasting peace: radio a tool for recovery”, *Africa Renewal Online* (October 2007), p. 3., available from <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2007/broadcasting-peace-radio-tool-recovery>.

Jacques L. Koko and Essoh J.M.C. Essis, *Determinants of success in UN peacekeeping operations*. Lanham, (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America 2012).

Serge Lalande, *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping*, ed. Daniel Warner (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995).

Karin Landgren, personal communication, March 24, 2016.

Norrie MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

Linda Polman, *We did nothing: why the truth doesn't always come out when the UN goes in* (London : Penguin, 2004).

Richard M. Price and Mark W. Zacher, *The United Nations and Global Security* (New York: Palsgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Mohamed M. Sahnoun, “Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia”. *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 5 (1994). Royal Irish Academy: 5–13. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30001816>.

John Terence O’Neill and Nicholas Rees, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era* (Routledge, 2005).

Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, ed. *United Nations peacekeeping operations: ad hoc missions, permanent engagement* (Tokyo : United Nations University Press, 2001).

United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available from <http://www.un.org/en charter-united-nations/>.

United Nations, *Contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations*, 29 February 2016, available from [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/feb16\\_1.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/feb16_1.pdf).

United Nations Development Programme, *UNDP in Somalia* (2016), <http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/countryinfo.html>.

United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

United Nations Development Programme, *UNDP in Sierra Leone* (2016), <http://www.sl.undp.org/content/sierraleone/en/home/countryinfo/>.

United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Reports: Sierra Leone* (2016), <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SLE>.

United Nations, General Assembly, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping: report of the Secretary-General*, A/47/277 - S/24111 (17 June 1992), available from [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277).

United Nations, General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("Brahimi report")*, A/55/305 - S/2000/809 (21 August 2000), available from [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305).

United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people ("Hippo report")*, A/70/95-S/2015/446 (17 June 2015), available from [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/95](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/95).

"United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)", United Nations, 2000, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomsil/Unomsil.htm>.

"United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)", United Nations, 2003, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosomi.htm>

"United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)", United Nations, 2003, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm>.

"United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)", United Nations, 2009, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/>.

"United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) 1992", YouTube video, 1:43, posted by Keydmedia Online, 20 November 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PR26QT7MDx8>.

"United Nations Peacekeeping", accessed March 25, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>.

United Nations, Security Council, *Letter Dated 12 July 1999 from the Chargé D'Affairs Ad Interim of the Permanent Mission of Togo to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/1999/777 (12 July 1999), available from [http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL\\_990707\\_LomePeaceAgreement.pdf](http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_990707_LomePeaceAgreement.pdf).

United Nations, Security Council, *Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2000/455 (19 May 2000), available from [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2000/455](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2000/455).

United Nations, Security Council, *Security Council Press Statement on Somalia*, SC/12333-APR 3365 (21 April 2016).

United Nations, Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, S/PRST/2000/24 (17 July 2000).

United Nations, Security Council, *Resolution 1610 (2005)*, S/Res/1610 (30 June 2005).

United Nations, Security Council, *Resolution 1620 (2005)*, S/Res/1620 (31 August 2005).

United Nations, Security Council, *Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2000/455 (19 May 2000).

United Nations, UNAMSIL end of mission press kit, *Yale University/New York City College Survey finds Sierra Leoneans happy with UN peacekeepers* (December 2005).

United Nations, *UN Mission's Summary Detailed by Country*, 29 February 2016, available from [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/feb16\\_3.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/feb16_3.pdf).

Jaïr Van Der Lijn, "If Only There Were a Blueprint! Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peace-Building Operations", *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 13, (2009), 45-71.

Jaïr Van Der Lijn, "Learning Lessons in African Peace Operations", *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 14 (February 2010), 1-5.