CEU eTD Collection (2016); Laurence, Anthony J.: Anti-corruption in Authoritarian Regimes: the Case of China

CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2016
Author Laurence, Anthony J.
Title Anti-corruption in Authoritarian Regimes: the Case of China
Summary Authoritarian regimes face two problems, described by Milan Svolik as the “problem of authoritarian control” (controlling the masses) and “problem of authoritarian power-sharing” (controlling the elites). As a way of alleviating the “problem of authoritarian power-sharing”, authoritarian regimes tend to use corrupt practices like bribery to maintain intra-elite loyalty or to ‘grease the wheels’ of bureaucratic rule. Why then do authoritarian regimes undermine their own source of power by enacting anti-corruption campaigns? Authoritarian regimes require legitimacy to replace the lack of democratic or otherwise accountable institutions or mechanisms that justifies their mandate of authoritarian rule. While economic prosperity and reform are two ways authoritarian rulers can maintain their legitimacy, economic liberalization is nearly a prerequisite to integrate into the global economy. Yet, intra-regime politics may prevent this from occurring. This intra-regime politicking tends to devolve into political factionalization which drives the internal power dynamics of authoritarian regimes. While using the anti-corruption drive in China that began in 2012 to investigate why authoritarian regimes enact anti-corruption campaigns, this research suggest the current anti-corruption campaign in China is multi-faceted to fight off Xi’s rivals in the Chinese Communist Party while simultaneously creating space for reform so as to maintain growth and political stability. Using the China File’s anti-corruption database entitled “Catching Tigers and Flies”, this thesis aims to identify the ‘tigers’ by systematically looking at figures involved with China’s state capitalist system who also were targeted by the campaign. Because of the aforementioned approach, this research fills the gap left in the literature surrounding the economic motivations behind China’s anti-corruption campaign.
Supervisor Kim, Youngmi
Department International Relations MA
Full texthttps://www.etd.ceu.edu/2016/laurence_anthony.pdf

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