

Nationalism and Foreign Policy: Sino-Japanese Security Relations

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Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Youngmi Kim

Word count: 16,966

Budapest, Hungary

2016

ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses Sino-Japanese security relations from 1989-2015 by separating the entire period into two phases: 1989-2010 and 2012-2015. Given insufficient studies on the relationship between nationalism and international relations, the thesis bridges the gap by assessing the communication between two variables, nationalism and international politics, which shaped the security ties between China and Japan for decades. National identity plays a critical role in coordinating the communication between the two variables. This qualitative research-based thesis applies process tracing and discourse analysis as methods to present the findings and employs nationalism and constructivism as theoretical frameworks for the analysis. Based on the findings, the thesis argues that nationalism and interactions between states influenced each other in shaping Sino-Japanese security relations, especially during the crisis of 2012-13. By doing so, the thesis provides an alternative explanation about the dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from the idealist approach.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

During the working process of this thesis, I have received academic and moral support as well as encouragement from my professors at Central European University. I would like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Professor Youngmi Kim, and my academic writing instructor, Professor Zsuzsanna Toth, for their patience and guidance since the beginning of the working process. I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to my parents for their moral and financial support during my academic life in Budapest, Hungary. Last but not least, I would also like to thank the academic coordinators and professors from the Department of International Relations, and I will not be able to unlock another academic achievement successfully without their academic and technical guidance throughout the whole school year.

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INTRODUCTION

In East Asia, there is a time bomb that can explode at any time. The region is prone to protracted conflict and bloody war due to mistrust, disharmony, and threat perception amongst the regional great powers such as China, Japan, and South Korea. North Korea keeps attracting the attention of the international actors on its assertive manner of nuclear testing. Meanwhile, the rise of China regarding both economic development and military empowerment has been a major concerning issue for both regional and global powers. The increasing assertiveness of China's foreign policy raises considerable skepticism amongst its neighbors.¹ Recently, the most important regional actor, which is directly threatened by the expansion of Chinese power, is Japan because the Article 9 of the Japanese National Constitution limits its overseas military operation with allies. In other words, the Article 9 mentions the renunciation of war and the prohibition imposed on Japan from maintaining war potential featured as "embrace of pacifism," and Japan has to rely on the United States for taking care of its security.² In the last few decades, China and Japan committed to improving the sour relations shaped by the negative historical legacies resulting from war and violence, and the dark shadow of history remains an enormous obstacle for the two countries to restore the relations.

Nationalism has been remarkably resilient in East Asia for decades. The increase in bilateral economic interdependence could not effectively mitigate the sense of intense nationalism in either China or Japan.³ The current Sino-Japanese security relations have deteriorated due to the maritime disputes over Diaoyu islands in Chinese or Senkaku islands in

¹ Oriana Skylar Mastro, "Why Chinese Assertiveness is here to Stay," *The Washington Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (2015): 151-170.

² Sayuri Umeda, "Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution," *Library of Congress*, February 2006, 1. Also available at <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/japan-constitution-article9.pdf> (accessed March 02, 2015).

³ Yinan He, "History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict," *Journal of Contemporary China* 16, no. 50 (2007): 1-24; Yew Meng Lai, *Resurgent Nationalism and Changing Security Perceptions in Contemporary Japan-China Relations*, Singapore: IACSIT Press, 2011, accessed February 25, 2016, <http://www.ipedr.com/vol20/23-ICHSC2011-M00059.pdf>.

Japanese since the 1990s.⁴ Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are located around 120 nautical miles southwest of Okinawa (as shown in Figure 1), and the islands consist of both non-living and living resources such as oil and fish.⁵ The islands are in between China, Taiwan, and Japan, and the islands are under the control of Japan with competing claims from China and Taiwan.⁶ Japan took the control over the islands based on the international law under the principles of *terra nullius*⁷ because the islands were uninhabited as discovered by the Government of Okinawa in 1885.⁸ Later on, the Japanese government sold four of the islands to Koga family as privately owned islands in 1932.⁹ Besides, material and ideational factors drive the dispute,¹⁰ and the primary factor that makes the dispute protracted is the rise of nationalism in China and Japan.¹¹ Before 2012, four dispute crises respectively occurred in 1990, 1996, 2004-5, and 2010 resulting from the conflicting claims over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands between China and Japan, and nationalism also played a significant role in these crises.¹² The crises were occasional, yet the dispute had remained on the top of the Chinese and Japanese governments' priority agenda until 2015 after it reoccurred and escalated in 2012.

⁴ Paul J. Smith, "China-Japan Relations and the Future of Geopolitics of East Asia," *Asian Affairs* 35, no. 4 (2009): 230-256.

⁵ Mark J. Valencia, "The East China Sea Disputes: History, Status, and Ways Forward," *Asian Perspective* 39 (2014): 183-218.

⁶ Erik Beukel, *Popular Nationalism in China and the Sino-Japanese Relationship*, Danish Institution for International Studies, 2011, accessed February 25, 2016, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/17664/uploads>.

⁷ *Terra nullius* refers to the unoccupied or uninhabited lands, which can be annexed through occupation.

⁸ Roberto Bendini, *The Struggle for Control of the East China Sea* (Brussels: European Union, 2014).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ James Manicom, "The Interaction of Material and Ideational Factors in the East China Sea Dispute: Impact on Future Dispute Management," *Global Change, Peace, and Security* 20, no. 3 (2008): 375-391; Smith, "China-Japan Relations"; Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*.

¹¹ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*.

¹² Ibid.

Figure 1: The Map of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands

(Source from RT/Reuters)



Since 2012, the dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands has intensified into a new level after the Japanese government nationalized some of these islands by purchasing them from the Japanese citizens.¹³ It led to the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment in China followed by anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan, adding fuel to the fire.¹⁴ Ekman Alice and Pajon Céline explicitly state that “[t]he nationalist factor has emerged as an important component of the increasing friction between these two neighbors in the East China Sea.”¹⁵ Nationalist factor or nationalism shaped the security relations between China and Japan; simultaneously, there was a revival of nationalism, which resulted from the change in a structural relationship between the two countries.¹⁶ Therefore, *there is a puzzle as to how nationalism shapes the foreign policy of a state. What gives rise to nationalism in China and Japan? How does nationalism influence Sino-Japanese security relations?* The first research question is the theoretical question serving

¹³ Sheila A. Smith, “Japan, China, and the Tide of Nationalism,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, Last modified September 19, 2012b, <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/japan-china-tide-nationalism/p29080>; Laura Schwartz, *Competition and Confrontation in the East China Sea and the Implication for U.S. Policy*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, February 2014, accessed February 26, 2016, http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/psa/EastChinaSea_Roundtable_report.pdf.

¹⁴ Schwartz, *Competition and Confrontation*.

¹⁵ Alice Ekman and Céline Pajon, *Nationalism in China and Japan and Implications for Bilateral Relations*, The Institute Français des Relations Internationale, March 2015, 4. Also available at https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/av74_ekman_pajon_nationalism_china_japan_couvint_2.pdf (accessed February 25, 2016).

¹⁶ Lai, *Resurgent Nationalism*, 114.

as a guide to assess the overall picture of nationalism and international relations. The question is directed from nationalism toward foreign policy because the connection from this direction is clear and precise compared to the direction from foreign policy toward nationalism. The second and third questions examine the reasons behind the dynamic nationalism in China and Japan and the interactions between them in the post-Cold War era. Without tracing the past activities and events, it would be very challenging to justify the 2012-13 crisis as the new rise of nationalism in China and Japan and as the renewed tension of Sino-Japanese security relations. The thesis posits that nationalism influenced the foreign policy of China and Japan; meanwhile, the interactions between the two countries shaped nationalism. Thus, the relationship between nationalism and foreign policy is bidirectional.

The justification of the case study on Sino-Japanese security relations with the role of nationalism is based on four main reasons. Firstly, it represents the example of the sharp rise of nationalism in the post-Cold War era. Particularly, the rise of nationalism in China and Japan had significant effects on the regional peace and stability. Secondly, the Chinese and Japanese governments primarily led nationalism by pursuing nationalist policies within its own states and toward one another. Thirdly, China and Japan shared the contentious historical relations during the three calamitous wars including World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Finally, China and Japan are two of the world great powers based on their global competitiveness in economic and military sectors. Economically, staying behind the United States, China was the second world largest economic power with the GDP of roughly \$11 trillion followed by Japan with \$4 trillion in 2015 in the nominal terms, according to IMF World Economic Outlook.¹⁷ Militarily, by 2013, China was the second largest military expenditure after the United States by spending around \$188 billion, and Japan was ranked as the eighth largest military spending

¹⁷ Statistics Times, *Projected GDP Rank (2015-2020)*, Last modified February 07, 2016, <http://statisticstimes.com/economy/projected-world-gdp-ranking.php>.

which reached \$48,6 billion, as estimated by SIPRI.¹⁸ China and Japan had increased their military expenditures, and the maritime territorial disputes between them raised a considerable concern over regional as well as global peace and stability.

The thesis aims to address four important issues. First, the gap in the existing literature on neglect-of-nationalism and neglect-of-international relations remains wide.¹⁹ In other words, nationalism studies do not give much importance to the factors shaped by international politics playing an essential role in influencing interstate disputes. Meanwhile, international relations studies pay closer attention to the interactions between states or the structure of international relations instead of nationalism. Second, the thesis explores the influence of nationalism in international politics and investigates how the interactions between China and Japan also affect nationalism. Third, the thesis tests the theories of nationalism and international relations in assessing the disputes between China and Japan. Last but not least, the core objective is to develop a causal argument within a single-case study without attempting to generalize on the other cases since the Chinese and Japanese governments were the active components in the dispute escalation of the 2012-13 crisis.

This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter reviews the literature on the concept of nationalism and the relationship between nationalism and international politics. The chapter provides theoretical frameworks for studying the case of Sino-Japanese security relations. It basically answers the first question of the thesis. The second chapter covers the methodology of the thesis. The third chapter assesses the bilateral security relations between China and Japan in the first phase (1989-2010). The fourth chapter focuses on the relations in the second phase (2012-2015). In chapter three and four, the discussion of each chapter looks at both the influence of nationalism on Sino-Japanese security relations and the effects of interactions between China

¹⁸ Sam Perlo-Freeman and Carina Solmirano, *Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2013*, SIPRI, 2014, 2. Also available at <http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1404.pdf> (accessed February 27, 2016).

¹⁹ Michael Alan Brittingham, "The 'Role' of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy: A Reactive Model of Nationalism & Conflict," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 12, no. 2 (2007): 148.

and Japan in pushing the revival of nationalism. The two chapters start with the background of each crisis followed by the role of nationalism in shaping foreign policy and the interactions between the two governments in shaping nationalism. Moreover, there is a discussion section providing an interpretation of findings at the end of chapter three and four. Finally, the thesis will conclude with the closing remarks of the whole discussion.

CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW

Nationalism and international politics studies tend to overlook one another, and the gap remains wide due to insufficient studies on the relationship between the two variables. The steady rise of nationalism exerts a powerful influence on international politics, making the recent research on the area more prominent. Nationalism had grown after Cold War ended,²⁰ and “everyone agrees that nationalism has had an enormous influence on international politics in the twentieth century.”²¹ In the modern world, nationalism is one of the most influential forces and has been vibrant and vigorous, but nationalism studies have been relatively ignored.²² Edward Carr is the early prominent scholar establishing the nexus between nationalism and international relations. He claims that “[i]nternational relations were henceforth to be governed not by the personal interests, ambitions and emotions of the monarch, but by the collective interests, ambitions, and emotions of the nation.”²³ The latter part implicitly reflects the role of nationalism in international relations because nationalism is the main component of the nation. As stated by Etzioni, nationalism is an ideology that praises the nation, and people regard nationalism as the final goal.²⁴ It is suggested that nationalism plays a vital role in international politics.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the concept and typology of nationalism and the relationship between nationalism and national identity. The review of the literature does not cover the origin of nationalism because the scope of the thesis is limited to the relationship between nationalism and international politics on how these two important variables influence one another. The second part discusses the relationship between nationalism and international relations theories, and it serves as a crucial part of building a

²⁰ Joseph Chan, “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,” in *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights*, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 214.

²¹ James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5.

²² John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, ed., *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3; Sinisa Malesevic, *Nation-States and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 5.

²³ Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1945), 8.

²⁴ Amitai Etzioni, “On Ending Nationalism,” *International Politics and Society* 2 (2001): 144.

theoretical framework for the analysis of the security ties between China and Japan. Meanwhile, the justifications for taking constructivism as a theoretical framework to study Sino-Japanese security relations will be provided.

1.1. Nationalism in the Academic Literature

The concept of nationalism has been treated as interdisciplinary involving various fields of studies after the spread of anti-colonialism and ethnic nationalism,²⁵ and it remains powerful in the contemporary world.²⁶ In the studies of nationalism, one should first understand what it means by the term “nation.” According to Smith, a nation is “a named community possessing [a] historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs.”²⁷ Making a distinction between nation and nationalism is necessary. The nation is the social fact while nationalism is the political action,²⁸ and nationalism is more tangible than the nation.²⁹ Nationalism has multiple meanings as given by various scholars based on different backgrounds such as history, sociology, and economics, and there is no consensus amongst scholars on the precise definition of nationalism. Not only does the concept of nationalism remain contested but also the root or origin.³⁰ However, it is crucial to begin with a few basic definitions of nationalism despite its controversy over the origin.

²⁵ Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism*.

²⁶ Lowell W. Barrington, “‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism’: The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science,” *Political Science and Politics* 30, no. 4 (1997): 712-716.

²⁷ Anthony D. Smith, “When is a Nation,” *Geopolitics* 7, no. 2 (2002): 15.

²⁸ Ole Waever, “Societal Security: The Concept,” In *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, ed. Ole Waever et al. (London: Printer, 1993), 38.

²⁹ Edward Shils, “Nation, Nationality, Nationalism and Civil Society,” *Nations and Nationalism* 1, no. 1 (1995): 93.

³⁰ Aviel Roshwald, *The Endurance of Nationalism: Ancient Roots and Modern Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1.

1.1.1. The Concept of Nationalism

There are previous studies on nationalism developed by prominent scholars including Benedict Anderson, John Armstrong, John Breuilly, Ernest Gellner, and Anthony Smith. For Breuilly, nationalism is treated as political movements trying to exercise the power of the state by using nationalist arguments to legitimize such actions.³¹ The nationalist arguments include the existence of the nation, the independence of the nation and values, and the priority of national interests.³² Breuilly agrees with Smith that there should be a clear distinction between nationalism and ethnocentrism that makes the definition more precise.³³ Meanwhile, he rejected the historian assumptions and definitions from Dante, Shakespeare, and Marcu on nationalism that based on national consciousness including languages, customs, manners, and statements since these components do not reflect the modernity of nationalism.³⁴ Contrary to Breuilly, Gellner does include and emphasize cultural elements in the definition. Gellner defines nationalism as “the striving to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof, and not more than one roof at that.”³⁵ The focus of nationalism based on Breuilly and Gellner is the top-down approach rather than the human agent.³⁶

Instead of limiting nationalism to either political or cultural form, Hearn argues that nationalism is the combination of claims toward identity, jurisdiction, and territory on the behalf of the population.³⁷ In this regard, Hearn takes a middle position between the narrow and broad definition, and the three claims as mentioned in the definition can be found in the world today.³⁸ By taking Hearn’s definition, it is necessary to understand the contextual meaning of the three core components mentioned in the definition: (1) the claim to identity refers to the categorization

³¹ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 2.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 3-5.

³⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (Victoria: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 42.

³⁶ Malesevic, *Nation-States and Nationalism*, 129.

³⁷ Jonathan Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 11.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

of groups based on cultural factors and abstract qualities; (2) the claim to jurisdiction entails power entitlement and law enforcement as well as establishment authority; (3) the claim to territory involves the concern over both occupied and displaced lands.³⁹ The condition of nationalism based on Hearn's definition is that the three claims are interdependent. Similarly, Smith defines nationalism as the ideological movement attaining and maintaining identity, unity, and autonomy for the population.⁴⁰ Hearn and Smith together shared a paramount element, which is "national identity." It is the case that nationalism involves both political and cultural form, which partly reflects interstate relations from the dimension of nationalism.

1.1.2. Nationalism and National Identity

To begin with, it is crucial to understand the typology of nationalism by Breuilly, which ultimately helps reflect the nexus between nationalism and national identity. There are many forms of nationalism, namely, cultural, political, liberal, fascist, and communist.⁴¹ These forms are quite narrow and specific. However, according to Breuilly, based mainly on political significance, there are two broad distinctive forms of nationalism in which it can be treated as nationalist oppositions to the state or as actions and policies conducted by the government.⁴² The latter form is known as governmental nationalism and can be further categorized into internal and external situations. Concerning the internal situation, the government seeks to undermine the particular groups or individuals by categorized them as "anti- or non-national character."⁴³ Regarding the external situation, the government aims at expanding the country's territory claimed as its national belonging.⁴⁴ Similarly, from the perspective of Poggi on state-led nationalism, a state is Janus-faced looking both inward and outward by respectively cultivating

³⁹ Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 11.

⁴⁰ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 7.

⁴¹ Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism*.

⁴² Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 8.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

“authority and legitimacy among its members” and guarding “its interests in an arena of competing states.”⁴⁵ Brubaker makes a precise claim that a state or regime’s policy is the major factor that drives nationhood and nationalism.⁴⁶ In this context, there is an emphasis on state policy in nationalism, which ignores the internal fragmentation of a state in shaping the policy.

However, internal politics does play an essential role in the policy-making of a state. Breuilly discusses the policy of a state toward the others in relation to nationalism by underlining the significance of internal politics.⁴⁷ If foreign policy does not involve internal politics, the basic understanding of the policy will be explained by international relations, not nationalism.⁴⁸ To illustrate, as Hearn discussed the connection between power and nationalism in the existing literature, one of the conclusions is that nationalist movement does arise by population and elites even though the movements are always cultivated or coordinated by the elites.⁴⁹ To fully comprehend the foreign policy that involves nationalism, internal politics should not be neglected. From the perspectives of nationalism, internal politics is an active component in shaping the policy of a state rather than international politics. In other words, it reflects the prominent role of both internal politics within a state and external politics between states. Both actors and policies are counted as essential elements to understand nationalism and interstate relations.

Importantly, there is a shared objective of every nationalist movement that national identity is the primary purpose of nationalism striving to achieve.⁵⁰ National identity means “the features possessed by a country that distinguish it from other countries.”⁵¹ National

⁴⁵ Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 118.

⁴⁶ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 17.

⁴⁷ Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 8.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 143.

⁵⁰ Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*; Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 11; Smith, *Nationalism*, 8.

⁵¹ Honghua Men, “China’s National Identity in Transition: Domestic and International Perspectives (1982-2012),” *Social Sciences in China* 35, no. 2 (2014): 191.

identity is divided into domestic and international or internal and external dimensions.⁵² The domestic dimension refers to the belongingness, mentality, and behavior of citizen's commitment toward the country, and the international dimension refers to the country's role in the international community.⁵³ Similarly, the internal identity means the nation-state's cohesion or uniformity while the external identity describes the distinction of the nation-state from others.⁵⁴ However, the internal coherent and the external distinctiveness of national identity is sometimes blurred,⁵⁵ for the national identity can be reshaped by both domestic and international factors.⁵⁶ In short, it is suggested that there is a strong connection between nationalism and state policy or between the two dimensions of national identity. Nonetheless, national identity is influenced not only by nationalism or state policy but also the interactions between states. Therefore, it invites the international relations theory as a complementary instrument to understand nationalism in world politics and international structure with an emphasis on the significant role of the interactions between states.

1.2. Nationalism and International Relations Theories

As far as Brittingham observed, there are two problems related to nationalism and foreign policy: neglect-of-nationalism and neglect-of-international relations.⁵⁷ There is insufficient research on the relationship between nationalism and international politics,⁵⁸ and it is the

⁵² Paul A. Kowert, "National Identity: Inside and Out," *Security Studies* 8, no. 2-3 (1998): 1-34; Men, "China's National Identity."

⁵³ Men, "China's National Identity," 191.

⁵⁴ Kowert, "National Identity," 4-5.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁶ Men, "China's National Identity," 191.

⁵⁷ Brittingham, "The 'Role' of Nationalism," 148.

⁵⁸ Paul D'Anieri, "Nationalism and International Politics: Identity and Sovereignty in the Russian—Ukrainian Conflict," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 3, no. 2 (1997): 1-28; Stephen Shulman, "Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 3 (2000): 365-390; Brittingham, "The 'Role' of Nationalism"; Zoltan Buzas, "How Nationalism Helps Internal Balancing But Hurts External Balancing: The Case Of East Asia," Paper prepared for *CIPSS/CEPSI Workshop on International Security and Political Economy*, Montreal, Canada, September 19, 2014, accessed February 23, 2016, http://cepsi-cipss.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CIPSS_Buzas-Working-Paper-432.pdf.

substantial gap in the literature in which this thesis attempts to make a contribution by exploring the relationship between the two components through the assessment of Sino-Japanese security relations. The impacts of nationalism on international relations cannot be assessed merely from theoretical framework of international relations even though some theories can be used to study nationalism.⁵⁹ There have been different takes on nationalism studies in international relations theories such as realism, liberalism, English School, and constructivism. The currently dominated international relations theories are neorealism and neoliberalism. However, neorealism focuses mainly on the role of materials such as military, and neoliberalism discusses more on the wealth of nations. The underlying assumption of the two theories is the anarchic structure of the international system, leaving little space for domestic politics to maneuver in the system.⁶⁰ According to Mayall, in making an analysis of the nationalism effects on international relations, one must start with international society when the influence of nationalism in world politics is rising.⁶¹ In the international politics analysis, we can make a comparison on the impacts of the nationalism on states and the international system in general.⁶²

Interestingly, English School and constructivism have much in common; for example, the two theories view state identity based on culture.⁶³ However, the primary focus of the English School is the construction of norms and institutions rather than identity which is the primary focus of the constructivists. Therefore, social constructivism is taken as the theoretical framework for the analysis. The shared argument by the English School and constructivism on international relations is that nationalism should be taken into account for discussing interstate relations instead of being left out from the theorem. Brittingham and D'Anieri do not reject the claim of the English School in studying nationalism and international politics, but the two authors have

⁵⁹ Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, 8; Brittingham, "The 'Role' of Nationalism."

⁶⁰ D'Anieri, "Nationalism and International Politics," 2-4.

⁶¹ Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, 5.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism and the English School," In *Theorising International Society: English School Methods*, ed. Cornelia Navari (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 58.

different takes on the ground from the English School. For instance, constructivism can be used to examine the effects of nationalism and national identity in international politics.⁶⁴ Moreover, to study the relations between nationalism and international relations or the foreign policy of a state, the constructivist approach should be employed as a framework to study the emergence of nationalism resulting from the interactions between states.⁶⁵ Therefore, constructivism is the potential theory for the analysis. Next, the discussion moves to focus on the nexus between constructivist approach and nationalism to have a further understanding on how constructivism can be employed to explore the evolution of national identity exerting influence on nationalism.

1.2.1. Constructivism and Nationalism

Throughout the observation on the scholarship of Alexander Wendt, Martha Finnemore, Peter Katzenstein, and Emanuel Adler, D'Anieri comments that social construction theory is one of the theoretical frameworks that can “incorporate nationalism and national identity in international relations theory.”⁶⁶ Similarly, in Brittingham's study on China's foreign policy and nationalism through the lens of constructivism, the finding is that Chinese nationalism is not about the domestic political manipulation but the reactive response toward international events.⁶⁷ The study captures the direction from international politics toward nationalism. Taking one direction to study the relations between states, the discussion will not be able to capture the entire picture of the complex relations. Brittingham extensively builds a solid basis in discussing nationalism and interstate conflicts, yet he fails to provide the direction from nationalism toward international politics. By looking at national identity as a form of nationalism, Brittingham treats nationalism as role identity, which can be very beneficial for foreign policy analysis.⁶⁸ This thesis does not treat nationalism as role identity because national identity has its role to play in Sino-

⁶⁴ D'Anieri, “Nationalism and International Politics,” 1.

⁶⁵ Brittingham, “The ‘Role’ of Nationalism,” 147.

⁶⁶ D'Anieri, “Nationalism and International Politics,” 4.

⁶⁷ Brittingham, “The ‘Role’ of Nationalism,” 147.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 150.

Japanese security relations, but it does not reject the importance of role identity in foreign policy analysis.

According to Holsti, roles are separated into two: role conception and role prescription.⁶⁹ Role conceptions are domestic needs and demands which are self-defined, and role prescriptions are the expectation of the other governments and legal norms which are imposed by the outside.⁷⁰ As Holsti argued, role conceptions of policymakers are more critical and rigid compared to role prescriptions, and role conceptions are the primary sources of foreign policy decisions and actions in international politics.⁷¹ In this circumstance, internal factor refers to nationalism while external factor refers to the interactions between states. At this point, Holsti fails to acknowledge the important role of external factors, which is opposite to Brittingham. As compromised between the internal and external significance, D'Anieri comments that nationalism can influence international politics while international politics does also exert influence over nationalism, leading to the change of future interaction.⁷² It illustrates the bidirectional relationship between nationalism and international politics. Since the importance of nationalism in the foreign policy of a state has already discussed, the review on the literature continues to discuss the crucial role of the interactions between states from the constructivist views.

The underlying assumption of constructivism is that agent and structure are mutually constructed,⁷³ and identity is not pre-given but constructed by the intersubjective knowledge.⁷⁴ The logic starts with the discussion of identity. Alexander Wendt, one of the prominent constructivist scholars, takes identity as “a property of intentional actors that generates

⁶⁹ Kalevi J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 3 (1970): 245-6.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 243.

⁷² D'Anieri, “Nationalism and International Politics,” 5.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁷⁴ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992): 425.

motivational and behavioral dispositions.”⁷⁵ In other words, identity is self-understanding in which the meaning is not independent of other actors. Identity is constituted by both internal and external structure. He defines identity into four types including personal or corporate, type, role, and collective. As suggested by Brittingham, role identity has been an interesting subject and a useful take on foreign policy analysis.⁷⁶ Role identity is not independent of the relation to “Others” because they could not be established by oneself, and “the sharing of expectations on which role identity depend is facilitated by the fact that many roles are institutionalized in social structures that pre-date particular interactions.”⁷⁷ He makes three arguments in supporting role identity as a framework for the analysis: (1) there is no pre-existing property because identity is recognized by Others through substantial rights and behavioral norms as role identity; (2) the concept of role implies either conflictual or cooperative manner; (3) the ability of a state to make a choice on their role identity is limited when there is a high level of intimacy.⁷⁸ Role identity of a state can be seen more clearly through the adoption of social conceptualization of the international system.⁷⁹ Therefore, role identity of a state in perceiving the Other as a friend and ultimately as an enemy is shaped by the interactions between states in which the argument is contradictory to nationalism studies focusing mainly on the significant influence of nationalism on identity and interstate relations.

1.2.2. Role Identity and State Security

In discussing the security relations between states, it is beneficial to comprehend the relationship between role identity and state security. As D’Anieri mentioned, the identity of a state is constructed not pre-given, but the important issue here is to figure out how identity was

⁷⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 224.

⁷⁶ Brittingham, “The ‘Role’ of Nationalism,” 150.

⁷⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory*, 227.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 229.

constructed throughout the history to understand the current relations between states.⁸⁰ To analyze role identity, it is important to realize the two logics of identity formation. They are natural selection which is the materialist approach and cultural selection which is the idealist approach.⁸¹ As Wendt argued, role identity will become more precise under the social conceptualization as it is associated mainly with the cultural selection.⁸² In cultural selection or socialization, it “works directly through their capacities for cognition, rationality, and intentionality,” and there are two cultural selection mechanisms which are imitation and social learning.⁸³ Amongst the two mechanisms, social learning is one of Wendt’s major interests because it is the core of his theoretical approach.

Concerning role identity, Wendt hypothesizes that “actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think Others see or ‘appraise’ them, in the ‘mirror’ of Others’ representation.”⁸⁴ There are many Others, and the Other which is significant to the Self is relevant to power and dependency relations.⁸⁵ The significant relationship between Others and the security of Self is related to the national interests which are defined in both objective and subjective interests. Those interests are physical survival, autonomy, and economic well-being based on Alexander George and Robert Keohane, and collective self-esteem is added by Wendt.⁸⁶ Wendt argues that the relationship between the two types of interests is “under-determined,” and it is partly because “states have certain security needs (objective interests) that they define their subjective interests as they do.”⁸⁷ For Wendt, national interests mean “the reproduction requirements or security of state-society complexes.”⁸⁸ States have to meet these four interests to secure, but a state typically sets the objective or priority, which influences its

⁸⁰ D’Anieri, “Nationalism and International Politics,” 4.

⁸¹ Wendt, *Social Theory*, 320.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 229.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 324.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 327.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 235.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 234.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

foreign policy. When Wendt touches the security aspect, he argues that the threat to the security of Self is shared ideas, and it constitutes role during the interactions between states.⁸⁹ Through social learning, Self and Others will end up with the creation or internalization of “shared knowledge that they are enemies, locking in Hobbesian structure.”⁹⁰ Therefore, the eventual result of social learning is the shared sense of threat rather than friendship.

Regarding security and threat, Wendt seriously takes into account the concept of “security dilemma” which is a crucial concept for the analysis of interstate relations, and one should not ignore the concept while studying the security ties between countries. With the self-help system of Hobbesian anarchy that security is militarily competitive, Wendt argues that the intentions of states make security dilemma acute not the nature of weapons.⁹¹ Security dilemma is taken seriously in neorealist theory in claiming that the cause of the dilemma is uncertainty which could lead to arms races, conflict, and war.⁹² Mitzen challenges that “conflict can be caused not by uncertainty but by the certainty such relationships offer their participants.”⁹³ There is not much discussion on security dilemma about state identity for Wendt. Mitzen takes the relation for further analysis through the study of “ontological security” which implicitly makes a significant theoretical contribution to Wendt’s discussion on internalization. State seeks not only the physical security but also the ontological security or the security of Self which can be achieved by “routinizing relationships with significant others.”⁹⁴ The problem of the relationships is that not all actors repeat the routine. Mitzen argues that role identity defined by actors themselves without recognition of the others makes the system unstable.⁹⁵ Importantly, security-seeker can be perceived as a competitor, and it is also the case for China and Japan which views each other as a

⁸⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory*, 255.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 332.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 265.

⁹² Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2006): 341.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 343.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 341.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 359.

threat to the national security. However, Wendt and Mitzen treat states as black boxes without tracing what happens inside each state. Both scholars pay more attention to the interactions between states instead of the interactions between domestic actors in assessing the identity construction. It is opposite to nationalism focusing on internal politics rather than international politics.

Based on the review of the existing literature, the discussion reflects a basic assumption that there is a strong and intimate relationship between nationalism and international politics. From the perspective of nationalism studies, internal politics is a powerful force that shapes international politics. From the view of international politics scholars or the constructivists, the interactions between states are significant forces affecting interstate security relations. Nationalism influences international politics or the other way round. Nationalism refers to the actions by not only the public but also the government in claiming toward national identity. Both public and governmental nationalism shapes the foreign policy of a state and influences the security relations between countries. Different from the conventional view on the understanding of nationalism as opposition to the state, the modern reality is that the rise of nationalism is also about the actions of the people or the policies of the government against the other states, especially the rival neighbors.

There are a few empirical works on how nationalism influences international politics. For example, Brittingham's study "The Role of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy: A Reactive Model of Nationalism & Conflict" argues that external sources influence nationalism in China.⁹⁶ The study examines Sino-U.S. relations from 1989 to understand Chinese nationalism in the 1990s. Brittingham's argument views the relationship between nationalism and international politics as one-way direction, not two-way direction. Brittingham overlooks how nationalism can also play an essential role in reproducing state identity. Brittingham acknowledges the limitation

⁹⁶ Brittingham, "The 'Role' of Nationalism."

of the previous studies on the relationship between nationalism and international politics; however, he does not capture the complete picture of the relationship between nationalism and international politics. The thesis does not only address the theoretical puzzle on neglect-of-nationalism and neglect-of-international relations raised by Brittingham but also work on the empirical puzzle that nationalism and international politics influence each other over time as D'Anieri argued. This thesis provides an assessment of the security relations between China and Japan from 1989 by looking at the interactions between nationalism and international politics or the interactions between China and Japan in the two phases, 1989-2010 and 2012-2015. The next chapter discusses the methodology on how to present the findings and to approach the conclusion that the relationship between nationalism and international politics is bidirectional.

CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY

In order to study Sino-Japanese security relations, this qualitative thesis employs process tracing and discourse analysis as research methods. The process tracing describes the casual path of the security relations between China and Japan in which the conflicts between them involves mainly the issue of Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. By doing so, it traces the casual argument within the single-case study on how the role of nationalism of the two phases is different from one another and what gives rise to nationalism in China and Japan in shaping Sino-Japanese security relations. The conflict is more about the matter of national identity rather than the control over the resources.⁹⁷ The dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands is widely used as East China Sea disputes. The thesis divides the discussion into two phases: 1989-2010 and 2012-2015. The first phase involves four crises, 1990, 1996, 2004-5, and 2010, which are related to nationalism as an important factor behind the intense security relations between the two countries. The second phase consists of two crises which are the crisis of 2012-13 and 2014-15, and the renewed tension occurred in late 2012 leading to the intensification of the conflict until 2015. Instead of comparing the nationalism within each country, the thesis analyzes the role of nationalism in both countries with the interactions between China and Japan. This casual path becomes blurred when it comes to the second phase due to the complexity of the case. The indistinctiveness on the path serves as the strength of the thesis in which it proves that the relationship between nationalism and international politics is bidirectional.

The discourse analysis keeps tracking the transformation of state identities by assessing the Chinese and Japanese public, academic, and official discourses during the crisis. After spotting the important events, the discourse analysis attempts to determine the representations and positions of China and Japan included in various series of discourses that referred to those incidents. Then, it uncovers layers within the discourse to explore the changes because the

⁹⁷ Valencia, "The East China Sea," 183.

representations within a discourse are not equally lasting.⁹⁸ Discourse analysis serves as a complementary tool to support the process tracing because the construction of the identity through representation by either China or Japan has a significant influence on the security relations between the two countries. The discussion will start with the background of each event, and the discourse analysis will come to support the argument by looking at the representations and positions of the two countries. For example, public and official discourses on nationalism attaching to Daiyou/Senkaku islands in the first phase was not as strong as in the second phase, and the representations and positions of each state in each phase are in different levels regarding the consistency and repetition of the discourse. The discourse analysis helps explain how China has constructed itself by constructing Japan, and it is also the case for Japan. The conclusion of each phase seeks to formulate the broad identity covering those crises to examine the identity transformation, and the assessment of the conflict intensification will follow.

This thesis uses secondary data to study the security relations between China and Japan. The data such as online news from local and international sources, websites from the Chinese and Japanese governments, journal articles from scholars and expertise, reports and policy papers from both government and non-governmental institutions, and books are the significant sources and serve as ample evidence for the analysis. Besides, the speeches of government officials mentioned in media and scholar texts could not be ignored, in particular for the discourse analysis. Some government websites such as Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, Japan Ministry of Defense, and Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet are useful sources. However, there are two pitfalls resulting from the limited accessibility to the primary sources of the official statement. First, to support the arguments, some authors of the online news or journal articles have already framed the information stated in the media and scholar texts. Some crucial pieces of information are left behind. Second, the limited ability to get

⁹⁸ Kevin C. Dunn and Iver B. Neumann, *Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2015), 121.

access to original texts can leave the conclusion to be challenged by the actual meaning. The two governments communicate with each other by using their own languages which are translated into English by online news and websites including Aljazeera, BBC, China Daily, CNN, East Asia Forum, Foreign Policy Research Institute, New York Times, Reuters, The Economist, The Guardian, The Japan Times, The Washington Post, and Xinhuanet. Using the translated texts from these mentioned sources might risk the discussion, but it allows for the access to the speeches of government officials. The solution is to verify the use of the texts from different sources through the comparison of the local and international online news even though there could be some remaining loopholes.

Regarding the theoretical framework, there is one important element in the discussion. It is the concept of “national identity” that bridges nationalism and international politics. Nationalism claims to achieve national identity as the important goal,⁹⁹ and international politics based on social constructivism perspective is complementary to the claim of nationalism studies by looking at role identity of states as a friend or an enemy due to the limited institutionalization of the international system.¹⁰⁰ For nationalism, the form of nationalism is seen as state-led or government-led which is developed by John Breuilly because nationalism in China and Japan is more of top-down interaction, especially in 2012. Also, Xi Jinping came to power as Chinese President in November 2012 while Shinzo Abe returned to office as Japanese Prime Minister in December 2012. The two administrations use the card of nationalism to gain their political consolidation by diverting the attention of the public to the maritime territorial disputes. Therefore, the role of nationalism related to the internal politics in unifying the internal identity cannot be neglected. For international politics, social constructivism of Alexander Wendt is an essential theoretical framework with the core assumption that the social structure constitutes the identities and interests of states. The recent dominant theories of international relations such as

⁹⁹ Smith, *Nationalism*, 10.

¹⁰⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory*, 228.

neorealism and neoliberalism do not capture much on the role of national identity in international politics or interstate conflicts. The thesis does incorporate the concept of ontological security as discussed by Jennifer Mitzen on the role of routine to understand the outbreak of conflict. Mitzen's argument on role identity is very precise in which the defining of identity by the actor will make the system unstable if there is no recognition of the others.¹⁰¹ It illustrates that national identity sits in the middle of the relationship between nationalism and international politics, and the change of the identity has a significant implication for both nationalism and international politics in discussing Sino-Japanese security relations.

¹⁰¹ Mitzen, "Ontological Security," 359.

CHAPTER III: SINO-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONS IN PHASE I (1989-2010)

In China and Japan, the level of nationalism over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has been steadily increasing since the end of Cold War. Undoubtedly, the rise of nationalism has gradually affected the security relations between the two countries. The national sentiment started with the emergence of anti-Japanese nationalism in China around the early 1980s, and it grew stronger after the beginning of the 1990s.¹⁰² Before 2012, there were four dispute crises between China and Japan over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. The first crisis occurred in 1990 followed by the crisis of 1996, 2004-5, and 2010.¹⁰³ The length and severity of each crisis were different from one another because the behavior of the two governments kept changing throughout the four crises. Meanwhile, amongst the four crises, the incidents in 1996 and 2004-5 were more complicated than in 1990 and 2010. The four crises reflected the dynamic of nationalism in the two countries and illustrated the various representations of one another by the two governments.

The Chinese and Japanese governmental nationalism was wax and wane, which fluctuated from one dispute crisis to another. The governmental nationalism refers to the nationalist policies or actions of the government.¹⁰⁴ The government formulates policies toward both domestic and external audiences. In other words, there are two communication processes within the security relations between China and Japan. The first one is the interactions between the Chinese or Japanese government and its people. The second one is the interactions between the Chinese and Japanese governments during each crisis. Governmental nationalism in China adopted a pragmatic policy toward Japan and avoided the harmful effects of the dark shadow of history. However, the policy had been challenged by the increase in popular nationalism in China

¹⁰² Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 10.

¹⁰³ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*.

¹⁰⁴ Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 8.

and the lack of Japanese government's willingness to constraint the nationalists.¹⁰⁵ Hence, this chapter discusses the four dispute crises by tracing the evolution of China and Japan's national identities affecting Sino-Japanese security relations.

3.1. The Crisis of 1990

The first crisis happened in 1990, one year after Chinese people pressured the government on the poor leadership over the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. In 1990, the Japanese government permitted the Nihon Seishsha or the Japanese Youth Federation to renovate a lighthouse which was established on the Senkaku islands in 1978.¹⁰⁶ The Japanese government was ready to recognize the lighthouse as an official navigation mark.¹⁰⁷ As a response, in October, a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson condemned the action of the Japanese government and perceived the lighthouse establishment as the violation of China's sovereignty.¹⁰⁸ The incident provoked anti-Japanese movements in China, and the Chinese burnt the Japanese flag and destroyed Japanese goods.¹⁰⁹ Interestingly, the Chinese government tried to ban the protest and imposed a media blackout, yet students in the capital learned about the issue through BBC and Voice of America.¹¹⁰ Then, the Chinese turned to complain the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) because people attempted to acquire the conflicting demands in which the government should had considered any response to the activities of Japan in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.¹¹¹ Concerning about the public demands, the Chinese government could not stand idly.

¹⁰⁵ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 4.

¹⁰⁶ Zhongqi Pan, "Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2007): 74.

¹⁰⁷ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 12.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Pan, "Sino-Japanese Dispute," 74.

¹¹⁰ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 12.

¹¹¹ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*.

In this crisis, the Chinese and Japanese government acknowledged that the crisis affected its national identity. In China, a document was released by stating that “the forces of antisocialism, both at home and abroad, are bound to take every advantage and opportunity ... to infiltrate our society, to confuse and misguide us, and to carry out activities to undermine our purpose.”¹¹² According to the statement, China started to view Japan as a threat to China’s national identity in attempting to change the reality. For Japan, the islands were regarded as essential nationalist symbols exploited by the right-wing parties as a weapon to attack the government.¹¹³ The two countries asserted their claims to the islands and viewed one another as a threat to national identity. However, amid growing tensions, the two governments were still able to maintain stable security relations. As can be seen, Japan did not make any further diplomatic protests against the nationalist movement in China while the Chinese government was striving to manage the situation. Importantly, the greater economic interactions between China and Japan were keys to promoting stable Sino-Japanese relations.¹¹⁴ As a result, the fight to win over the dispute was temporarily removed from the priority agenda of the two governments.

3.2. The Crisis of 1996

The dispute crisis in 1996 was more intense than in 1990. In July, the Japanese Youth Federation built another makeshift lighthouse on the islands, and it was the solar-powered aluminum lighthouse with five-meter height.¹¹⁵ After the lighthouse had been built, the Japanese government ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea by declaring an exclusive economic zone with the inclusion of those disputed islands. The Youth Federation again pushed the

¹¹² State Education Commission, “Opinions of the State Education Commission in Regard to Further Strengthening the Work of Moral Education in the Middle and Primary Schools (April 13, 1990),” *Chinese Education & Society* 29, no. 4 (1996): 90.

¹¹³ Pan, “Sino-Japanese Dispute,” 86.

¹¹⁴ Katherine G. Burns, “China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends,” in *Economic Confidence-Building and Regional Security*, ed. Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999), 55.

¹¹⁵ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 12.

government to affirm the lighthouse as a Japanese landmark, yet there was no any official comment from the government. For China, instead of viewing the second lighthouse establishment as merely the violation of China's sovereignty, the action was regarded as the act of militarism and aggression.¹¹⁶ For instance, based on a nation-wide survey, 95.9 percent of the respondents viewed the Diaoyu islands as parts of China's sovereignty, and 91.5 percent of which agreed that the new built lighthouse was a revising Japanese militarism against China.¹¹⁷ Chinese people framed the actions of the Japanese government and people as threatening to China's national security. At the state level, during the discussion with Hong Kong officials, the Japanese Foreign Minister reasserted the claim over the islands, and a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry made no compromise with Japan. Moreover, the key military magazines and newspapers of China published series of articles in criticizing the "revival of Japanese militarism" and claiming that "the Japanese actions were parts of a wider conspiracy."¹¹⁸ In March, the Foreign Minister of the two governments agreed to conduct bilateral talks over the disputed islands by focusing on the economic development of the surrounding waters.¹¹⁹ Nevertheless, the promise of cooperation at the state level could not effectively mitigate the tension because the Chinese public was acutely sensitive about the dispute.

The domestic policy of the Chinese government was to constrain the public sentiment in order to convey a positive message to Japan. Chinese activists organized protests against the incursions of Japan in the East China Sea. Particularly, the activists in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan followed by the Chinese community in the United States and Canada were those who arranged the demonstrations.¹²⁰ A Chinese man said, "Chinese people are very sensitive about

¹¹⁶ Pan, "Sino-Japanese Dispute," 86.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 13.

¹¹⁹ Robert S. Ross, "Managing a Changing Relationship: China's Japan Policy in the 1990s," Paper presented at the Seventh Annual Strategy Conference, The U.S. Army War College, Pennsylvania, April 23-25, 1996, 8.

¹²⁰ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 13.

territorial issues, especially when it's an issue of Japan encroaching on Chinese territory.”¹²¹ After circulating petitions, the protestors in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan demanded Japan to withdraw the claim. The demonstrations in Mainland China were forbidden, and the Chinese government detained a Chinese activist immediately after landing in China.¹²² In early October, those Chinese demonstrators went to the islands and raised their flags which were later removed by the Japanese.¹²³ Moreover, Chinese people sent an official letter to both Chinese and Taiwanese governments, urging the governments to deploy troops to claim back the islands.¹²⁴ Besides, there was a publication by a Chinese dissident magazine, *China Spring*, which aimed at unveiling a document of the Central Propaganda Department on the Chinese government over the prohibition of the demonstrations, and the disclosure of such document added fuel to the fire and turned the demonstrations into the larger scale.¹²⁵ Besides the public actions, the Chinese government sent vessels to operate a short-term trial oil drills nearby the disputed islands.¹²⁶ These activities were characterized as low-key responses. Given the different levels of public tolerance, the Chinese and Japanese governments were in different situations.

The Chinese government sought the balance between the domestic and international politics during the crisis. For instance, the media discussing the dispute was minimal, and the student demonstrations were suppressed.¹²⁷ The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Beijing University to calm the students. Also, the government denied the web access of students for ten days, for the government did not want the situation to be escalated. Nonetheless, the government efforts could not win over the strong public reaction. As can be seen in the summer and fall of 1996, there were some publications of books and articles discussing the controversy with Japan.

¹²¹ CNN, “Anti-Japan Mood Foster Chinese Unity,” Last modified September 18, 1996, <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9609/18/island.dispute/>.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ross, “Managing a Changing Relationship,” 11.

¹²⁷ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 14.

Meanwhile, the gesture of the Chinese government toward Japan at the United Nations General Assembly was a paradox. On one hand, China conveyed a robust message to Japan with the competing claim to the disputed islands; on the other hand, the Chinese government promised the Japanese government to prevent the nationalist groups from further intensifying the tension over the dispute in order to maintain good bilateral relations.¹²⁸ The major challenging task for the Chinese government was to harmonize the domestic and international politics.

The Japanese government was in a different circumstance because there was no intense public nationalism in Japan. The Japanese public was not as sensitive as the Chinese public, so there was merely a verbal response through official statements toward China from the Japanese government. For instance, the Foreign Minister of Japan mentioned that the government did not plan to recognize the lighthouse, yet there is no commitment to removing it from the islands.¹²⁹ The Japanese government and people did not have passionate interests in developing the areas around the disputed islands, and it was the reason why the issue was manageable without further escalation toward the use of military vessels.¹³⁰ In general, the diplomacy of the Chinese and Japanese governments toward each other was cooperative rather than confrontational.¹³¹ The Japanese government and public did not readily perceive China as a significant threat to its security since the Chinese government firmly committed to keeping peace in the region by constraining the anti-Japanese sentiment in the country. Meanwhile, the position of Japan was moderate in dealing with China. As a result, the tension was relaxing in October 1996 although there was an increase in anti-Japanese demonstrations. Even though the two governments could effectively manage the situation, the threat perception of the Chinese people remained high leaving a solid basis for the coming crises.

¹²⁸ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 14.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ross, "Managing a Changing Relationship," 14.

¹³¹ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*.

3.3. The Crisis of 2004-5

During 2004-5, several events took place over the disputed islands due to the mutual suspicion between the defense communities of China and Japan. The incidents were different from the previous ones because the policies of the Chinese and Japanese governments became a bit more assertive toward one another. The anti-Japanese sentiment in 2004-5 was the result of poor relations between the two governments.¹³² It was marked as the significant rise of governmental nationalism in Sino-Japanese security relations. From 1996 to 2004, the dialogues between Tokyo and Beijing over the disputed islands were effective enough to calm the public anger in Japan; however, it was not the case in China. Several incidents in 2004 eroded the relations, but the two governments could ultimately control the situation in 2005. However, the sense of nationalism in China remained active.

In 2004, the outburst of anti-Japanese sentiment in China profoundly influenced the view of Japan on China,¹³³ and it was a dramatic shift in the domestic and foreign policy of the Chinese government. In January, Japanese patrol boats attacked Chinese fishing vessels near the disputed islands.¹³⁴ In March, Chinese activists landed on the disputed islands, and the Japanese Coast Guard arrested those activists before deporting them to China.¹³⁵ It was the first time that the Japanese police made an arrest.¹³⁶ It was also the first time that the Chinese government was more tolerant toward the activists.¹³⁷ The Chinese government reacted strongly against the detention of the Chinese activists by urging the Japanese government to release its citizens

¹³² Sheila A. Smith, "Japan and the East China Sea Dispute," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, August 2012a, 371. Also available at <http://www.fpri.org/article/2012/08/japan-and-the-east-china-sea-dispute/> (accessed April 16, 2016).

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 14.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ Kerry Dumbaugh and William H. Cooper, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Issues for U.S. Policy*, *Congressional Research Service*, 2008, 21. Also available at <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40093.pdf> (accessed February 20, 2016).

¹³⁷ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 14.

immediately and unconditionally.¹³⁸ The domestic policy of the Chinese government became looser while the foreign policy toward Japan became tougher compared to the previous crises.

In Japan, the Japanese governmental nationalism focused mainly on its foreign policy toward China. In March 2004, the Lower House Security Committee called for a more robust Japanese stance and passed a resolution on preserving the territorial integrity.¹³⁹ It was a critical moment that the Japanese Diet passed a resolution on the Senkaku islands. Moreover, Maritime Self-Defense Forces reported 12 occasions of Chinese naval invasions into the exclusive economic zone of Japan in the East China Sea in July alone.¹⁴⁰ Meanwhile, Japan's Foreign Ministry assistant spokesperson, Okuyama Jiro, stated that Japan had "no intention of raising tension" and called for "a quiet and peaceful manner" in addressing the issue.¹⁴¹ From the perspective of the Japanese government, these Chinese military activities demonstrated that China is flexing its naval muscle in the disputed areas. It implicitly illustrates the rise of China as a new identity in which Japan started to view China as being more assertive.

The dispute is not only about the past but also the present, meaning the early 21st century. In addition to the emotional public reactions, the Chinese and Japanese governments manipulated the dispute by attaching it to the change of national identity.¹⁴² Japan was worrying about the rise of China in the region because the Chinese government became increasingly assertive. In the 2004 long-term defense planning vision, the Ministry of Defense of Japan noted that "China's growing nuclear and missile capabilities, as well as its naval and air forces, were of concern to Japan."¹⁴³ It is the significant turning point for Japan's foreign policy toward China after the defense planning of Japan recognized the rise of China as a direct threat to Japan's national

¹³⁸ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 14.

¹³⁹ Reinhard Drifte, "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute between Japan and China: Between the Materialization of the 'China Threat' and Japan 'Reversing the Outcome of World War II'," *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, no. 32 (2013): 27.

¹⁴⁰ Dumbaugh and Cooper, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 24.

¹⁴¹ James J. Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: Not the Best of Times," *Comparative Connections* 6, no. 3 (2004): 118.

¹⁴² Smith, "The East China Sea Dispute," 371.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 382.

security. Hence, the Japanese government started to engage in the dispute actively. In February 2005, Japan officially decided to place the lighthouse under the control and protection of the Japanese government.¹⁴⁴ Then, there was an immediate response from the officials of the Chinese Foreign Ministry by perceiving the action as “a serious provocation and violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty,” and the unilateral action was “illegal and invalid.”¹⁴⁵ Both governments attempted to frame each other as a threat to their national security.

Similarly, China viewed Japan as a provocative actor who intensified the tension leading to the damage of Sino-Japanese security relations. The tension between China and Japan involved the visit of the Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine, for the Shrine dedicated to the 2.5 million Japanese people who engaged in war since 1853. The sensitive issue was about the Tokyo War Tribunal in 1948 executing 14 “Class A” war criminals.¹⁴⁶ The Chinese government believed that the annually repeated visit was a “bitter reminder of Japan’s militaristic past.”¹⁴⁷ While the dispute was about the conflicting claim over the islands, the Chinese government manipulated the issue of Yasukuni Shrine by referring to the past militaristic identity of Japan. As a result, Sino-Japanese security relations were getting worse, and the anti-Japanese sentiment in China continued. Even though series of events disrupted the security ties between the two countries, the Chinese government was still committed to taking the leading role in improving the relations with Japan in March 2005. Therefore, the dispute was eventually stale in 2005.

3.4. The Crisis of 2010

Five years after the 2004-5 crisis, the incidents in 2010 flared up the tension over the disputed islands. The dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2010 became known as the

¹⁴⁴ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 15.

¹⁴⁵ China Daily, “Japan Action Violation of Chinese Sovereign,” Last modified February 12, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/12/content_416200.htm.

¹⁴⁶ The Economist, “The Ambiguity of Yasukuni,” Last modified October 6, 2005, <http://www.economist.com/node/4454297>.

¹⁴⁷ China Daily, “Japan Action Violation.”

“fishing trawler incident.”¹⁴⁸ In September, there was a clash between a Chinese trawler and two Japanese Coast Guard ships near the disputed areas, and the Japanese authorities arrested the Chinese crews.¹⁴⁹ The detention led to a protest of 30-40 Chinese who demanded an apology in front of the Japanese embassy.¹⁵⁰ During the crisis, China viewed itself as an honest actor that had always been sincere toward Japan and perceived the action by the Japanese authorities as illegal. For instance, the Chinese government unsurprisingly countered the detention of its crews with a statement that China was “seriously concerned over the Japanese action” and “made solemn representation to Japan.”¹⁵¹ Moreover, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Song Tao, requested Japan to halt its “illegal interception” of Chinese fishing ships.

For Japan, the government defended its position by arguing that the Chinese fishing activities were within the Japanese territory. The Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshito Sengoku, responded to the incident by saying that the action of the Japanese authorities was “fair-and-square in accordance with the law.”¹⁵² The secretary further commented, the government was dealing with the situation “calmly,” and it “does not get over-heated.”¹⁵³ In addition, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Seiji Maehara, publicly equated the Chinese response toward the dispute as being “hysterical.”¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, there was persuasive evidence leaked from the Japanese Coast Guard officer in showing the intentional ramming of the Chinese captain. The evidence was a video footage indicating the captain as a drunk and volatile person,¹⁵⁵ and the video showed that the Chinese captain revved the engine and rammed the boat into a Japanese

¹⁴⁸ Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.”

¹⁴⁹ Matsuda Yasuhiro, “How to Understand China’s Assertiveness Since 2009: Hypotheses and Policy Implication,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, April 2014, accessed April 22, 2016, http://csis.org/files/publication/140422_Matsuda_ChinasAssertiveness.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ Beukel, *Popular Nationalism*, 17.

¹⁵¹ Yasuhiro, “Understand China’s Assertiveness,” 5.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Smith, “The East China Sea Dispute,” 376.

¹⁵⁵ Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,” 30.

patrol vessel.¹⁵⁶ Japan framed the Chinese fishermen as being violent and represented the Chinese response as being emotional.

Besides the framing of the crisis by the government officials, there was a division amongst scholars who have different interpretations over the fishing trawler incident. Sheila Smith and Linus Hagstrom, non-Japanese authors, did not explicitly position themselves in the dispute while most Japanese authors put the blame on the Chinese trawlers.¹⁵⁷ The representations of China and Japan's national identities by Smith and Hagstrom were dissimilar, and the two authors moved the discussion beyond the incident to the assessment of the dominant narratives. Smith argued that the incident in 2010 started with a small clash which easily developed into further diplomatic confrontations.¹⁵⁸ To exemplify the confrontation, China was "reportedly using economic instruments to force Japan to release its captain."¹⁵⁹ The rise of China with an attempt to use the economic forces made Japan to perceive China as being deterrent in dealing with the dispute. The threat perception ignited an extensive debate in Japan over its ability to respond to the rise of China, and Japan was skeptical about China's coercive diplomacy during the crisis.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, there was the growth of nationalism in Japan with a firm position pushing for the strong defense of the Senkaku islands because the territorial dispute over the islands became increasingly important for the Japanese.¹⁶¹ For Smith, the rise of China was identified as a threat to Japan's national security. Importantly, Smith showcased the prominent role of public sentiment in Japan's foreign policy toward China, which was different from the previous three dispute crises.

For Hagstrom, the dominant discourse during the 2010 crisis was about the power shift in East Asia. The power shift contextually was interpreted as the rise of China and the decline of

¹⁵⁶ The Economist, "All at Sea," Last modified November 10, 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2010/11/japan_and_chinese_fishing_boat.

¹⁵⁷ Yasuhiro, "Understand China's Assertiveness," 30.

¹⁵⁸ Smith, "The East China Sea Dispute," 370.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 375.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 374.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 379.

Japan in the region based on the observation on the articles published by New York Times and The Washington Post.¹⁶² For example, on September 20, 2010, an article framed the incident as “a test of wills between Japan, the region’s established power and now-fading economic giant, and China, a rising force that feels its time has come to take what it regards as its rightful place in Asia.”¹⁶³ Not so much different from New York Times, The Washington Post discussed the dispute under the title “Rising Power” by arguing that the “clash with Japan was probably an opportunistic test of the new Japanese leadership” in the region.¹⁶⁴ Hagstrom additionally found some key phrases related to the rise of China from various authors as mentioned in his article. Those phrases include “a dominant position over Japanese politics and economy” by Jaeho Hwang, “the rise of China and its increasingly assertive diplomacy” by Soeya Yoshihide, and “a rising China’s great-power-hegemonic-consciousness” by Amako Satoshi.¹⁶⁵ Some authors including Shigeki Hakamada, the professor of Aoyama Gakuin University, viewed the Japanese response toward China as a “meltdown” under the title “Meltdown of Japan.”¹⁶⁶ As can be seen, the situation was not only manipulated by the two governments in representing each other as a threat to its national security but also narrated by the scholars, authors, and medias as the rising China and the declining Japan.

3.5. Discussion

Throughout the four major dispute crises, defined as the first phase, over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, China and Japan’s nationalism and identities had changed over time. In China, the anti-Japanese nationalism had been highly resilient since the crisis of 1990, but the

¹⁶² Linus Hagstrom, “Power Shift’ in East Asia? A Critical Reappraisal of Narratives on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Incident in 2010,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 5 (2012): 267-297.

¹⁶³ Martin Fackler and Ian Johnson, “Arrest in Disputed Sea Riles China and Japan,” *New York Times*, Last modified September 19, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/world/asia/20chinajapan.html>.

¹⁶⁴ The Washington Post, “Rising Power,” Last modified September 27, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/26/AR2010092603022.html>.

¹⁶⁵ As cited in Hagstrom, “Power Shift’,” 276.

¹⁶⁶ Hakamada Shigeki, “Meltdown of Japan,” *Global Forum of Japan*, Last modified December 31, 2010. <http://www.gfj.jp/eng/commentary/101231.pdf>.

nationalist activities and protests were at the moderate level. The nationalist sentiment in China grew stronger from one crisis to another. The Chinese governmental nationalism tried to balance its policy toward domestic audiences and the Japanese government in the first two crises, 1990 and 1996. On one hand, the Chinese government was striving to manage the anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment in the country. On the other hand, the government responded to the plan of the Japanese government on the lighthouse at the disputed islands through diplomatic protests. Even though the Chinese government was eager to balance the policies toward internal and external audiences, it was completely obvious that the government preferred maintaining good relations with Japan. However, the Chinese governmental nationalism in responding to Japan became assertive in 2004-5 and 2010 with active militaristic postures in the disputed islands. Furthermore, the government asserted that Japan violated its sovereignty, and the activities of the Japanese government and activists in 2004-5 and 2010 were illegal. China officially represented itself as a sincere actor coping with the crisis in a peaceful manner. Therefore, the internal and external identities were inconsistent during the first two crises due to the non-alignment position between the Chinese public and governmental nationalism, but they were harmonious during the last two crises when the Chinese government turned to be assertive and coercive toward Japan.

For Japan, during the four crises, the Japanese governmental nationalism toward China had always been active. The anti-Chinese national sentiment inside Japan was too weak during the first three crises, 1990, 1996, and 2004-5. Concerning national identity, the government viewed the actions of the Chinese government during the last two crises as threatening to Japan's national security. The perception of the Japanese government and public on China had changed from viewing China as a peaceful rise to an assertive rise. The Japanese internal and external national identities were consistent with one another except the 1996 crisis in which the Japanese government was reluctant to affirm the lighthouse. Importantly, the last crisis illustrated the minor rise of nationalist sentiment in Japan, which was an additional ingredient for developing

into the acute crisis in 2012. During the dispute crisis in 2004-5 and 2010, the Chinese and Japanese governments started to reflect their national identities about the security due to the change of government policies toward the internal and external audiences. Nevertheless, the four dispute crises were occasional because the position of the Chinese and Japanese public as well as governmental nationalism kept changing. From late 2012, the beginning of the second phase, the Chinese public and governmental nationalism turned to be more consolidated against Japan whereas the Japanese public and governmental nationalism were more fragmented than the first phase. The next chapter discusses the new rise of nationalism in shaping Sino-Japanese security relations as well as the impact of the interactions between the two governments on nationalism.

CHAPTER IV: SINO-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONS IN PHASE II (2012-2015)

The security relations between China and Japan steadily deteriorated during the first phase, 1989-2010, and the dominant discourse over the power shift about the rising China and the declining Japan remained active in the second phase, 2012-2015. Since late 2012, the Chinese and Japanese public and governments had started to take the discourse more seriously, for it reflected the external identity in which no nation wanted to appear weak in the eyes of the other nation. The national identity of China and Japan continued to evolve as a result of the change in the interaction patterns between the two governments over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. A number of incidents in the second phase gave rise to the mutual suspicion between the two countries due to the different perception of the external identity. There was the new rise of nationalism in China and Japan during the crisis of 2012-13, which consisted of several internal and external policies formulated by the two governments to strengthen the military might. The Chinese and Japanese public as well as governmental nationalism grew stronger, and the crisis was more severe and persistent than the previous phase.

This chapter explores the dispute crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands between China and Japan from 2012 to 2015. There is an assessment of Sino-Japanese security relations to determine the contributing factors that intensified the tension. As demonstrated in Chapter 1 on the literature review, nationalism has a significant influence on international politics while the interactions between states do affect and stimulate nationalism. This chapter discusses the second phase of the dispute crisis by arguing that the relationship between nationalism and international politics is bidirectional; in other words, the two variables influence each other during the dispute crisis through the evolution of internal and external identity. The public discourses in the two countries and the official discourses of the two governments truly triggered in 2012 and remained active until 2015. This chapter is divided into three sections: the crisis of 2012-13, the crisis of 2014-15, and the discussion of Sino-Japanese security relations in the second phase.

4.1. The Crisis of 2012-13

The incidents in 2012 were marked as primary factors in renewing the tension between China and Japan. Sino-Japanese security relations dramatically deteriorated after the Japanese government nationalized some of the isles in the disputed areas. The crisis broke the routinized relationship between the two governments that had tirelessly tried to restore the security relations in maintaining the regional peace and stability. In April 2012, there was a statement by Shintaro Ishihara, the Governor of Tokyo, disclosing the plan to purchase the isles from the private owners. The governor stated that “[i]f we leave them as they are, we don’t know what will happen to the islands,” and he added that “Tokyo will protect the Senkaku Islands.”¹⁶⁷ The crisis started with the additional action of the Japanese government in purchasing the three isles in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in September 2012.¹⁶⁸ From the Japanese perspective, the decision was rational and legitimate according to the domestic law of Japan because those islands are located within the territories of Japan.¹⁶⁹ The isles nationalization is known as an ownership transfer from private to government.¹⁷⁰ After the nationalization was officially completed on September 11, 2012, there was a suspension of the diplomatic linkages between China and Japan. Sino-Japanese security relations became intense with a stronger sense of nationalism in both countries.

4.1.1. Anti-Japanese Nationalism in China

The Japanese government decision provoked the anger of the Chinese public and government. To begin with, there were emotional reactions from the Chinese public. Anti-Japanese demonstrations in China reached more than 100 cities after the purchase of the isles by the Japanese government on September 11, 2012, and the landing of the Japanese activists on the

¹⁶⁷ The Japan Times, “Ishihara Seeking to Buy Senkaku Islands,” Last modified April 18, 2012, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/04/18/national/ishihara-seeking-to-buy-senkaku-islands/#.VyxxDhV94b0>.

¹⁶⁸ Ryoko Nakano, “The Sino-Japanese Territorial Dispute and Threat Perception in Power Transition,” *The Pacific Review* (2015): 1-22.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 12.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Senkaku/Diayu islands a week later.¹⁷¹ The Chinese government had tried to control the rise of nationalism as the previous crises, but the nationalization agenda of Japan was a sensitive issue for the Chinese public in which the Chinese government lost control over the situation.¹⁷² Several stores owned by the Japanese were attacked during the rallies.¹⁷³ Moreover, Chinese netizens reminded the public about the invasion of China by the Japanese military on September 18, 1931,¹⁷⁴ and it was on the same date that the Japanese activists landed on the disputed islands on September 18, 2012. By referring to the past incidents, the netizens portrayed Japan's national identity as the return of militarism. Besides the public's reaction, the Chinese government was actively engaged in the crisis by flexing its military muscle in the disputed areas. The government perceived the nationalization as "a direct violation of the already fragile status quo"¹⁷⁵ and as "consolidating [Japanese] de facto control of the islands."¹⁷⁶ Therefore, the Chinese government repeatedly sent patrol ships, missile destroyers, and air force planes to the disputed territories.¹⁷⁷ This assertive military posture followed the growth of the public nationalism, based on the analysis of Gries, Steiger and Wang.¹⁷⁸ As can be seen, the public opinion served as a powerful driver of China's foreign policy toward Japan. Public and governmental nationalism in China seemed to be more assertive compared to the previous crises against the policy of the Japanese government over the disputed islands.

In addition, the Chinese government continued responding to the crisis with several nationalist policies in 2013, and the policies accelerated the flare-up of the security tension. Japan

¹⁷¹ Sheila A. Smith, "Japan, China, and the Tide of Nationalism," *Council on Foreign Relations*, Last modified September 19, 2012b, <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/japan-china-tide-nationalism/p29080>.

¹⁷² Peter Hays Gries, Derek Steiger and Tao Wang, "Popular Nationalism and China's Japan Policy: The Diaoyu Islands Protests, 2012-2013," *Journal of Contemporary China* (2015): 7.

¹⁷³ RT, "'No to Beijing Terrorists': Japanese Stage Anti-China March over Islands Reference (Video, Photos)," Last modified September 23, 2012, <https://www.rt.com/news/japan-china-islands-demonstration-751/>.

¹⁷⁴ Smith, "Tide of Nationalism."

¹⁷⁵ Schwartz, *Competition and Confrontation*, 3.

¹⁷⁶ Nakano, "The Sino-Japanese Territorial Dispute," 12.

¹⁷⁷ Nakano, "The Sino-Japanese Territorial Dispute."

¹⁷⁸ Gries, Steiger and Wang, "Popular Nationalism," 11.

is not the only one to be blamed for the intensification of the dispute crisis. In January, a Chinese frigate reached the fire-control radar at the Self-Defense Force destroyer of Japan.¹⁷⁹ Surprisingly, the Japanese government made no assertive response toward the provocation except a diplomatic protest. The Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated in Washington that “[n]o nation should make any miscalculation or underestimate the firmness of our resolve.”¹⁸⁰ The message from Abe was a signal to the Chinese government not to underestimate the Japanese capacity in dealing with the dispute either by peaceful means or military measures. However, China countered by stating that the actions in the East China Sea were legitimate according to the domestic and international laws.¹⁸¹ Without being threatened by the official message from Abe, China again tested the Japan’s response by officially establishing the Air Defense Identification Zone,¹⁸² known as ADIZ, with the inclusion of the disputed islands in the East China Sea.¹⁸³ No one knew the reasons behind the decision of the Chinese government to create the ADIZ, and China did not give any early warning to the neighbors before making the policy announcement.¹⁸⁴ During the crisis of 2012-13, public and governmental nationalism occurred not only in China but also in Japan.

¹⁷⁹ Nakano, “The Sino-Japanese Territorial Dispute.”

¹⁸⁰ David Lague, “China Navy Seeks to ‘Wear Out’ Japanese Ships in Disputed Waters,” *Reuters*, Last modified March 6, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-navy-idUSBRE9251GU20130306>.

¹⁸¹ James J. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Going Nowhere Slowly,” *Comparative Connection* 15, no. 2 (2013): 115.

¹⁸² Air Defense Identification Zone or ADIZ is an area beyond the national territory that unidentified aircrafts are obliged to be interrogated and intercepted before crossing into the defined airspace for identification. For more information see David A. Welch, “What’s an ADIZ,” *Foreign Affairs*, Last modified December 9, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2013-12-09/whats-adiz>.

¹⁸³ Tom Watkins, “Rumble in East China Sea,” *China US Focus*, Last modified December 4, 2013, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/rumble-in-east-china-sea/>.

¹⁸⁴ Zheng Wang, “What China Can Learn from Its ADIZ Decision,” *China US Focus*, Last modified December 27, 2013, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/what-china-can-learn-from-its-adiz-decision/>.

4.1.2. Anti-Chinese Nationalism in Japan

Anti-Japanese nationalism in China spurred the anti-Chinese nationalism in Japan. On September 22, 2012, hundreds of the Japanese nationalists marched toward the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, protesting against China's foreign policy in the East China Sea.¹⁸⁵ The rally in Japan was the counter movement against the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. Public discourse in Japan framed China as terrorists. For instance, the protestors carried placards reading, "Sink the Chinese boats in our waters" and "Do not give in to the Beijing terrorists."¹⁸⁶ Regarding the public opinion, the Japanese people had no positive impression of China. According to a government survey, 80.6 percent of the respondents held no friendly feeling toward China; similarly, the Kyodo News survey found that 84 percent of the respondents had an unfavorable impression of China.¹⁸⁷ The crisis not only ignited public protests and discourses in Japan but also stimulated the official discourses amongst the Japanese politicians.

The Japanese government was trying to constrain the situation from further escalation, but the government tolerance was drying up by the Chinese military activities in the East China Sea. During the anti-Japanese protests in China, Japan made an assumption that the demonstrations and boycott movements would stimulate the Chinese government to become assertive toward Japan.¹⁸⁸ Instead of countering the actions of China in the disputed territories with aggressive policies through military operations, the Japanese government under the Abe administration was committed to strengthening the military power to safeguard Japan. In July 2013, Japan's Ministry of Defense released the 2013 Defense White Paper. The paper noted the increasing assertiveness of China in the Japanese maritime territories with a warning message to China that the Chinese actions in the disputed islands are "dangerous actions that could cause a

¹⁸⁵ RT, "'No to Beijing Terrorists'."

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Toru Horiuchi, "Public Opinion in Japan and the Nationalization of the Senkaku Islands," *East Asia* 1, no. 31 (2014): 32.

¹⁸⁸ Nakano, "The Sino-Japanese Territorial Dispute," 12.

contingency situation.”¹⁸⁹ The paper stated that “China has attempted to change the status quo by force based on its own assertion, which is incompatible with the existing order of international law.”¹⁹⁰ As a result, Japan decided to expand the military expenditures for the first time in 11 years to enhance military hardware.¹⁹¹ The rise of China and Japan’s public as well as governmental nationalism made Sino-Japanese security relations rather vulnerable; meanwhile, the interactions between the two countries pushed the governmental nationalism into a higher level. In other words, nationalism and interactions between China and Japan were the major influential factors behind the unstable security relations during the crisis of 2012-13. Nonetheless, the role of national identity could not be ignored while discussing Sino-Japanese security relations.

4.1.3. National Identity Gap

There is a national identity gap between China and Japan in which each state did not recognize the identity of one another. The gap arises when either one or both states regard each other as “highly significant for what makes their own country distinctive.”¹⁹² During the crisis, the national identity confrontations took the center stage in Sino-Japanese security relations. The national identity coordinated the influence of the two variables, nationalism and international politics or interactions between China and Japan, over one another. Both China and Japan did not want to appear weak in the eyes of each other. The protests in China directed toward both Japan and their own government. The change of China’s national identity resulted from the fragmentation of the internal identity between public and governmental nationalism. For instance,

¹⁸⁹ Ministry of Defense, “Defense of Japan 2013,” 2013, 39. Also available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2013/11_Part1_Chapter1_Sec3.pdf (accessed May 16, 2016).

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁹¹ Nakano, “The Sino-Japanese Territorial Dispute,” 12.

¹⁹² Gilber Rozman, “The Sino-Japanese Clash: What is Behind it?” *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, May 2013, accessed May 7, 2016, <http://www.fpri.org/article/2013/05/the-sino-japanese-clash-what-is-behind-it/>.

Chinese nationalists accused their government of “being weak on Japan.”¹⁹³ Moreover, the Chinese public took the issue of the conflicting islands seriously with a rhyme reading, “[e]ven if the government does not take care of the elderly, we should take back the Diaoyus.”¹⁹⁴ The Chinese government tried to reassure public that the party was answering the demands of the nationalists. Therefore, the military posture of China has shifted from having unarmed surveillance fisherman and ships to fully armed naval warships, jetfighter along with the establishment of ADIZ.¹⁹⁵ The new military posture was undoubtedly represented as the rise of China’s assertiveness toward Japan in which the threat was very explicit compared to the postures before the dispute crisis of 2012-13.

The change of national identity also occurred in Japan. Japan had been known as a unique country provided that the Japanese military operation was constraint by the war-renouncing constitution. After World War II, the Article 9 of the Japanese National Constitution stipulates that “[t]he Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.”¹⁹⁶ The pacifist constitution was reinterpreted to justify the development of the defense capacity of Japan. Hence, the total renunciation of war or military means had gradually faded away from the Japanese people over time due to the change of the regional status quo with the assertive rise of China.¹⁹⁷ The remarkable overturn of the constitution occurred under the Abe administration. With his return to power in late 2012, Abe attempted to restore national pride by transforming Japan to become a “normal” state fighting a defensive war.¹⁹⁸ In April 2012, the ruling party showed a draft proposal of the constitutional revision to the upper and lower house of the Diet to win the two-third majority, and Abe revisited the draft in December 2012 to redefine the U.S.-Japanese

¹⁹³ Gries, Steiger and Wang, “Popular Nationalism,” 12.

¹⁹⁴ As cited in Gries, Steiger and Wang, “Popular Nationalism,” 12.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Umeda, “Japan: Article 9,” 2.

¹⁹⁷ Herbert P. Bix, “Whither Japan? Seven Decades After Defeat,” *Monthly Review* 67, no. 6 (2015): 24.

¹⁹⁸ Bix, “Whither Japan,” 28.

alliance and expand the commitment of Japan's contribution to the international peace.¹⁹⁹ In 2013, Abe's cabinet was not able to win the majority support to pass the proposal, but the government sought to increase the Japanese Self-Defense Force capabilities as shown in the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines and 2013 Medium Terms Defense Program documents.²⁰⁰ These activities slightly changed Japan's peaceful identity toward China because Japan did raise the budget for military expenditures and tried to revise the constitution for broader military operation capacity, which undoubtedly threatened the national security of China. Therefore, the change of the national identity of China and Japan pushed them to perceive each other as a threat to their national security. As a result, it exacerbated Sino-Japanese security relations.

4.2. The Crisis of 2014-15

The crisis of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2014-15 shifted the attention of the two governments from the clashes over the maritime territorial dispute to the current and future national identities related to the evolution of their military policies. The constitutional reinterpretation of Japan with an attempt to open a wider space for Japan's militaries to operate overseas raised a major concern on China's national security. In this latest crisis, governmental nationalism played a more prominent role in Sino-Japanese security relations than public nationalism. The internal and external identity of China and Japan transformed into a new feature. In China, the internal identity was more consolidated because the Chinese government became more assertive toward Japan. In Japan, even though there were more public supports for the enhancement of the military capacity against China, the internal identity of Japan was more fragmented given the fact that the Japanese, who upheld the pacifist constitution, resisted against the constitutional reinterpretation. Nevertheless, the rise of China's assertiveness in the region

¹⁹⁹ Matthew P. Funaiolo, "Conceptualizing Japan's Foreign Policy Trajectory Through Social Identity Theory," *East Asia* 32 (2015): 377-8.

²⁰⁰ Andrew L. Oros, "International and Domestic Challenges to Japan's Postwar Security Identity: 'Norm Constructivism' and Japan's New 'Proactive Pacifism'," *The Pacific Review* 28, no. 1 (2015): 154.

and the increase in the popular support allowed the Japanese ruling party to pass the bill in late 2015. The evolution of the national identity again served as a catalyst fueling the deterioration of Sino-Japanese security relations because the two governments did not recognize the peaceful identity of each other.

4.2.1. The Continuation of Identity Evolution

Under the Abe administration, Japan strengthened its global military capacities regardless of the opposition from the Japanese public. The attempt to reinterpret the constitution gave rise to the fragmentation of the Japanese internal identity. During the visit at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an international security conference, Abe stated that “Japan intends to play an even greater and more proactive role than it has until now in making peace in Asia and the world more certain.”²⁰¹ Abe argued that the Japanese government was trying to ease the constitutional constraint on Japan’s military in which the constitution limits Japan’s global contributions.²⁰² Abe perceived the current and future national identity of Japan as a peace-loving nation that loathes war and obeys the law and order.²⁰³ On June 31, 2014, the Japanese public rallied against the new security policy because the Japanese cabinet was about to adopt a resolution on defense in the next day. On July 1, Abe made a press conference with an important announcement saying that “the Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on the basic policies for developing new security legislation.”²⁰⁴ Moreover, Abe believed that the new security policy included the right to

²⁰¹ Aljazeera, “Japan Eyes Greater Role in Asian Security,” Last modified May 31, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2014/05/japan-plans-greater-role-asian-security-20145302372195133.html>.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Cabinet Secretariat, “Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister,” *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, Last modified July 1, 2014, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201407/0701kaiken.html.

collective self-defense of Japan as a “deterrent mechanism” responding to China’s challenge.²⁰⁵ Abe realized that the level of public support was not strong enough to pass the security bills because a poll conducted by the Yomiuri newspapers on the security plan revealed that the support fell from 57 to 48 percent after the announcement.²⁰⁶ The internal division between the Japanese public and the ruling party over the defense policy could not allow the Diet to pass the bills within a short period.

There was a modest response from the Chinese government with some criticisms about the new defense policy that the Japanese government planned to achieve through the constitutional reinterpretation. China equated the reinterpretation as a ‘brutal violation’ of the Japan’s pacifist constitution after the Abe’s statement in July 2014, according to the official Xinhua news agency.²⁰⁷ It was surprising that there was no any harsh response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry. China moved cautiously and avoided making any deliberate provocation. Chinese officials paid a very sharp attention to the announcement of the defense plan adopted by the Japanese government without regard for the public resistance.²⁰⁸ Furthermore, the ministry expressed doubts over the constitutional reinterpretation about the commitment of Japan to the peaceful development.²⁰⁹ China condemned the Japanese government for “undermining the post-World War II international order.”²¹⁰ For six decades, the Chinese government and people had viewed Japan as an abnormal non-military power because China’s leaders and People’s Daily

²⁰⁵ Takahashi Toshiya, “Why Abe is Pushing for the Right to Collective Self-Defence,” *East Asia Forum*, Last modified June 20, 2014, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/06/20/why-abe-is-pushing-for-the-right-to-collective-self-defence/>.

²⁰⁶ Makiko Inoue and Neil Gough, “Polls Slow Japan’s Plan to Revise Constitution,” *New York Times*, Last modified July 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/world/asia/polls-slow-japans-plan-to-revise-constitution.html?_r=0.

²⁰⁷ Amy King, “China’s Response to Japan’s Constitutional Reinterpretation,” *East Asia Forum*, Last modified July 27, 2014, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/07/27/china-responds-to-japans-constitutional-reinterpretation/>.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

editorials represented the national constitution of Japan as the pacifist constitution.²¹¹ The constitutional reinterpretation changed the perception of the Chinese leaders from viewing Japan's national identity as a peaceful state to an assertive one.²¹² The Chinese government and people criticized the new defense policy of Japan, but there were no remarkable public and official protests from China. China made low-key responses to the additional move of the Japanese government making the constitutional reinterpretation. The governmental nationalism of China and Japan again framed themselves as being peaceful and the other as being assertive while public nationalism against the other nation took a step backward in 2014.

4.2.2. The Vulnerability of Sino-Japanese Security Relations

The bilateral security relations between China and Japan remained unstable in 2015 although there was an effort to restore the relations in late 2014. Even though China and Japan became more assertive with stronger military postures, the cooperation seeking common ground between the two countries was possible. In November 2014, a meeting was a breakthrough in Sino-Japanese security relations after the Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Japanese National Security Chief Shotaro Yachi together established a four-point consensus to improve the relations.²¹³ Nevertheless, the efforts to cool down the tension were ineffective because the road toward a full cooperation was rough and bumpy. As can be seen, China's 2015 Military Strategy Document on the global aspirations of China stated that "[t]he Chinese Dream is to make the country strong. China's armed forces take their dream of making the Chinese military strong as part of the Chinese Dream. Without a strong military, a country can be neither safe nor strong."²¹⁴

²¹¹ King, "China's Response."

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Shannon Tiezzi, "A China-Japan Breakthrough: A Primer on Their 4 Point Consensus," *The Diplomat*, Last modified November 7, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/a-china-japan-breakthrough-a-primer-on-their-4-point-consensus/>.

²¹⁴ Tao Zhang, "Full Text: China's Military Strategy," *Ministry of National Defense: The People's Republic of China*, Last modified May 26, 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805_2.htm.

China kept strengthening its military capacity; meanwhile, Japan continued taking a bolder step to increase the defense posture.

For Japan, the government moved toward the assertive stance and framed China's assertiveness as a direct threat to its security. In June 2015, the Japanese government attempted to create a special unit for policing the East China Sea.²¹⁵ The government released the latest Defense White Paper approved by the Cabinet on July 21 of the same year. One of the sections in the paper was about the security relations with China. The document stated that China "continues to act in an assertive manner, including coercive attempts at changing the status quo, and is poised to fulfill its unilateral demands without compromise."²¹⁶ Moreover, the Japanese government raised concerns over "Chinese military activities, etc., together with the lack of transparency in its military affairs and security" and needed "to pay utmost attention" to the activities.²¹⁷ Japan perceived China's activities in the disputed areas as being assertive and coercive toward Japan and described China's attitudes about information related to military as a lack of transparency. Hence, Japan could not ignore the military activities of China in the disputed areas. As a response, Foreign Ministry of China claimed that the White Paper about the China's threat and the military transparency was misleading, malicious, and exaggerated.²¹⁸ Due to the harsh security environment, Japan continued increasing the military expenditure by 0.8% in the fiscal year 2015 compared to 2014.²¹⁹ The national identities of the two countries had transformed from being a peaceful country to a more assertive state in the eye of one another.

²¹⁵ James J. Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: To August 15 – Toward September 3," *Comparative Connections* 17, no. 2 (2015): 123.

²¹⁶ Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan 2015," 2015a, 33. Also available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_Digest_part1_web.pdf (accessed May 9, 2016).

²¹⁷ Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan 2015," 35.

²¹⁸ The Guardian, "China Says 'Malicious' Japanese Defense Review Creates Tension in Asia-Pacific," Last modified July 22, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/22/china-says-malicious-japanese-defence-review-creates-tension-in-asia-pacific>.

²¹⁹ Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan 2015," 2015b, 246. Also available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_3-1-3_web.pdf (accessed May 9, 2016).

China faced a further threat from the new security policy of Japan. In September 2015, the Japanese government took a great leap on military posture by successfully adopting two new security laws. There were bitter confrontations in the Diet and public protests outside the building against the new security bills.²²⁰ One of the laws was about lifting various restrictions on Self-Defense Force of Japan through the amendment of ten existing security-related laws including the Article 9 of the pacifist constitution.²²¹ Another one enacted a new permanent law permitting Japan to deploy the Self-Defense Force abroad in supporting military operations under the auspice of the United Nations.²²² Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki in *The Japan Times* viewed the new laws as the departure of Japan from pacifism. As predicted, there were serious responses from the Chinese government through diplomatic protests. According to Xinhua news, which is a state-run media, “Japan’s military stance has potentially become more dangerous as its hawkish and historical revisionist Prime Minister Shinzo Abe now holds an active war button ... could usher Japan into war again for the first time in 70 years.”²²³ Moreover, the overturning of Japan’s defense posture was finished, and China accused Abe of betraying the pacifist stance and marching toward war.²²⁴ “The move has breached the restrictions of Japan’s pacifist constitution,” said the Defense Ministry of China.²²⁵ Therefore, the Chinese government assumed that war is possible between China and Japan because the Japanese government partly lifted the cap from the defense forces.

²²⁰ Yoshida Reiji and Aoki Mizuho, “Diet Enacts Security Laws, Marking Japan’s Departure from Pacifism,” *The Japan Times*, Last modified September 19, 2015, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/19/national/politics-diplomacy/diet-enacts-security-laws-marking-japans-departure-from-pacifism-2/#.Vy87xhV94b0>.

²²¹ Reiji and Mizuho, “Diet Enacts Security Laws.”

²²² *Ibid.*

²²³ Tian Liu, “Commentary: Japan Takes Step Toward Old Militarism with New War Stance,” *Xinhuanet*, Last modified September 19, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/19/c_134638807.htm.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*

²²⁵ BBC, “China Warns Japan over Expanding Military Role Abroad,” Last modified September 19, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34301456>.

4.3. Discussion

The crises in the second phase reflect the strained security relations between China and Japan. The bilateral security relations over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were prone to direct military clashes due to the sharp rise of governmental nationalism and diplomatic confrontations between the two countries. The modest rise of governmental nationalism started at the end of the first phase, and it surged at the beginning of the second phase. In 2012, the Japanese governmental nationalism over the disputed islands was not under the significant influence of public nationalism. The nationalization of the three isles by the Japanese government fueled the Chinese public nationalism with anti-Japanese nationalist demonstrations pushing for a stronger Chinese governmental nationalism or policy toward Japan. The Chinese government continued activating the military operations in the disputed islands; as a result, there was an anti-Chinese nationalist movement in Japan along with the diplomatic protests from the Japanese government. Public nationalism significantly influenced the governmental nationalism of both countries in 2012, resulting in the erosion of Sino-Japanese security relations. However, it was not the case in the next few years after 2012. From 2013, Japan increased its military spending for advancing the defense forces in the East China Sea. The activity stimulated the Chinese government to declare Air Defense Identification Zone by including the conflicting islands.

The interactions between the two governments made the security relations more vulnerable. The year 2013 was the turning point in which the interactions between China and Japan exerted profound influences over the relations, and the serious clashes happened in 2014-15. The crisis of 2014-15 placed Sino-Japanese security relations in the most perilous situation, and war became possible in the mindset of the two countries' leaders, especially the Chinese officials. Due to the unity of internal identity, the Chinese government actively engaged with the dispute crisis. The government had intimately and carefully watched the constitutional reinterpretation of Japan and the new security policy in 2014 because the lifting of the cap for

broader military operations directly threatened the national security of China. Importantly, the Japanese government enacted the two new laws in late 2015 showing that Japan was determined to strengthen the military capacity in spite of public resentment against the new legislations. The Chinese government viewed the new Japanese military postures as the return of militarism that Japan had made a dreadful mistake on many Asian countries including China in the past. These interactions in a negative tone with stronger diplomatic protests and more assertive military postures had continuously shaped the foreign policy of the two countries, which further intensified Sino-Japanese security relations and international politics as a whole. Meanwhile, China and Japan's national identities had changed from being peaceful to being assertive and coercive.

CONCLUSION

The thesis solves the puzzle about the influence of nationalism over foreign policy. The exploration of Sino-Japanese security relations over Senkaku/Diayu islands in the East China Sea shows that the puzzle with a single-direction influence of nationalism on foreign policy does not comprehensively explain Sino-Japanese security relations. The interactions between China and Japan did shape the security ties during the crisis. China and Japan's public as well as governmental nationalism was wax and wane depended on the change in internal and external identity. In China, public and governmental nationalism was less consolidated during the first phase, 1989-2010, and became unified in the second phase, 2012-2015. In Japan, public nationalism was deeply divided from governmental nationalism in the second phase. Taking a single-direction lens to assess Sino-Japanese security ties, one would argue that Japan should not have become assertive due to the rise of public nationalism against governmental nationalism in reinterpreting the constitution. However, the changing of China's security policy, known as the external factor, could not allow the Japanese government to stay calm. The government has to ease the constraint of the military operation by the pacifist constitution to safeguard the Japanese people from the increasing assertiveness of China. Without counting the role of foreign policy in Sino-Japanese security relations, the thesis will make an erroneous argument because the interactions between China and Japan throughout a number of crises substantially contributed to the strained relations.

The thesis deals mainly with Sino-Japanese security relations through the assessment of series of crises from 1989-2015 by employing process tracing and discourse analysis as methods. As mentioned earlier, the gap in the literature was about insufficient studies on the relationship between the two variables, nationalism and international politics. The thesis findings support the core assumption of the D'Anieri in arguing that nationalism and international politics exert influence over each other, not a single-direction influence. The thesis posits that public and

governmental nationalism in China and Japan shaped Sino-Japanese security ties; meanwhile, security policies of each country on the disputed islands stimulated the rise of nationalism in the two countries. The bidirectional relationship between nationalism and international politics or security relations produces action-reaction cycles. For example, the incidents in 2012-13 comprehensively illustrate the cycles. It started with the security policy of Japan through nationalizing the three isles in the disputed areas, and the policy renewed the rise of public and governmental nationalism in China pushing for more assertive military postures of China in the areas. As a response, the Japanese government increased the military expenditures and attempted to revise the pacifist constitution. Besides, the evolution of internal and external identities of the two nations played a coordinating role allowing the rise of nationalism in China and Japan and the flair-up of Sino-Japanese security tension to happen.

The thesis provides an alternative explanation of Sino-Japanese security relations, but it does not deny the other theories of nationalism and international relations in explaining the renewed tension of the security relations between China and Japan. The thesis took up the suggestion from Brittingham and D'Anieri on nationalism and international relations by looking at role identity developed by Alexander Wendt. The Chinese and Japanese governments avoided viewing one another as a peaceful nation, and they perceived each other as an assertive neighbor because they are learned and reinforced in response to how they treat each other. It is what Wendt called "the 'mirror' of Others' representation of Self."²²⁶ Through the process of interactions, China and Japan viewed each other as a threat to their national security, especially during the second phase. By taking nationalism and constructivism as foundations to examine Sino-Japanese security relations, the thesis argued that the ideational forces resulting from the dynamic of the internal and external environment created intense Sino-Japanese security ties. Therefore, the thesis does contribute to the gap in the literature by bridging nationalism and international

²²⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory*, 327.

politics to explore the intense Sino-Japanese security relations, and it explains the bilateral security ties between China and Japan from the idealist approach as an alternative to the materialist approach.

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