Bodies of Europe in the National Mind:
The Case of Hungary

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Abstract

In this thesis, my aim is to develop and test a theoretical framework that is appropriate for addressing empirical puzzles in which different types of otherings coexist in a puzzling relationship. Starting with an empirical puzzle connected to the contemporary Hungarian national elite-discourse, I argue that with incorporating Joshua Freedman's account on temporal and social othering into a practice-oriented securitization theory framework, one can analyze the historical evolution of different types of othering in a comprehensive way.

In this work, I analyze the case of Hungary with the help of a historical comparative discourse analysis, and deconstruct why and how different meanings of "Europe-bodies" have existed throughout time in the national mind. The discursive reflections on "Europe" as a geopolitical and cultural entity do not always reflect how the contemporary international and domestic structure is organized because the "Europe-perception" is always influenced by collective national historical experiences. I argue that at times when international structural change leads to heightened international temporal alternatives of progress, the domestic-international nexus of othering is crossed in unusual ways but those ways are also rooted in the historical changes of othering in the national discourse.

This work contributes to securitization theory literature with nuancing the way in which context and speech acts of the securitizing actor constitute the dynamics of different types of othering. Furthermore, the findings of this research connected to the national framing of structure and agency under different domestic and international conditions can also serve with relevant theoretical and empirical implications.

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Introduction

In this thesis, my analysis proceeds from an empirical observation connected to the contemporary Hungarian discourse. I develop an appropriate theoretical framework in order to address the research puzzle. Namely, Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary gave his *1848-Speech* on the 15th of March in 2016 before the Hungarian National Museum, on the occasion of the national anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution's outbreak. The Hungarian Revolution of 1848 was one of the European Revolutions of 1848, and it is preserved in the Hungarian national remembrance as a freedom-fight for national independence against the Habsburg Empire that ruled the country at that time. Remembering 1848 has always played a significant role in Hungarian memory politics and served as a reference point to the national interpretation of fighting for freedom. The memory of the 1848-revolution is also frequently mentioned together with 1956, the year in which the Hungarian revolution against the soviet oppression took place.[1]

Based on Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's 1848-Speech in 2016, one can observe a puzzling discursive phenomenon. On the one hand, certain discursive elements of the speech show inconsistency with his previous speeches. More concretely, this is the first speech in which he explicitly calls his domestic political opponents on to unite and so, suspends securitizing them – which is in sharp contrast with his previous discursive agenda. On the other hand, the speech also contains elements which seem to be self-contradictory for the first sight. Namely, he portrays Europe's and Hungary's relations both in hostile and friendly terms. He does so by locating Hungary both inside and outside Europe discursively.[2]

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[1] See e. g. István Deák, "The Revolutionary Tradition in Hungary and the Lessons of the 1956 Struggle for Independence," *Hungarian Studies* 20(1), 2006. 3-10.

[2] Viktor Orbán, "Orbán Viktor ünnepi beszéde" [Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 15 March]. (Budapest, March 15, 2016). (Official translation.) Accessed April 22, 2016, http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-15-march.

I argue that this observation worth investigation as it can only be appropriately explained through the lens of a new hybrid approach which draws on securitization theory[3] as well as Joshua Freedman's framework[4] about temporal and social othering. The main findings of the analysis are that heightened international social othering as well as temporal alternatives regarding Hungary's relations to "Europe" and the "European Union" resulted in a complex discursive construction in which different "Europes" are portrayed. I treat the Europe-concept as it is a discursively embodied spatio-temporal perspective[5] on "Europe" as a geopolitical body. A historical comparative discourse analysis was appropriate to address the puzzle and the emerged questions with respect to why different types of othering mechanisms are present in the contemporary Hungarian national elite-discourse in an unusual way. I also show that the suspension of domestic social othering was mainly instrumentally relevant to back the speech's message in terms of establishing a connection between Europe as a geopolitical body and the EU as an artificial body, a changeable form which should be replaced for various reasons, according to the speech.

This theoretical and empirical investigation which is employed in this paper contributes to securitization theory, a dynamically developing field of critical security studies. The contribution is that the incorporation of temporal and social othering into a socio-pragmatist approach to securitization can provide us a new toolkit for addressing research problems which contain puzzling securitizing moves. Furthermore, the addressed empirical case can also serve with relevant results. It gives an opportunity to look at certain academic debates from a new perspective. Namely, Central-Eastern and Western European countries' contesting collective memory regimes[6] within the

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[3] See e. g. Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11(2), 2005, 171-201.

[4] Joshua Freedman, "Status Insecurity and Temporality in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* October 26, 2015, 1-26. Accessed May 2, 2016, doi: 10.1177/1354066115603781.

[5] Brian MacWhinney, "The emergence of language from embodiment," in *The Emergence of Language*, ed. Brian MacWhinney, (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1999), 215.

[6] See e. g. Müller, Jan-Werner, 'On "European" memory'", in *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance* eds. Malgorzata Pakier and Bo Strath, (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), 25-37.

European Union could be seen from a fresh viewpoint through the lens of this approach. Especially, if global structural challenges are heightened, different national ways of thinking about the bodies of Europe can lead to high levels of disagreement on the forms of European coexistence. Simply put, structure and agency are interpreted in a blurred way in times of crisis.

This thesis consists of three main chapters. In the first chapter, I address the empirical puzzle and the emerging research questions as well as develop a theoretical framework in order to systematically explain them. Drawing on (mainly) practice-oriented securitization theory and Joshua Freedman's account on temporal and social othering, I distinguish four types of othering, as well as argue that the puzzle at hand contains them in an unusual way. Methdologically, a comparative historical discourse analysis is delineated and then, applied in the case of Hungary.

In the next chapter, I concentrate on domestic temporal and social othering in Hungary from a historical perspective. I conclude that Fidesz's identity accumulation – that is, its preservation of elements of its original identity next to its conservative move – impacts its formulation of temporal alternatives throughout time. Furthermore, the partly regularly used domestic and social othering intertwined with each other. Therefore, it is even more surprising that in the current discourse Viktor Orbán suddenly suspended it. I argue that although some features of Fidesz's previous domestic discursive field can help us to understand the puzzle, it seems that the causes of suspension are primarily rooted in the international context and how it was referred in the party's discourse previously and currently.

In the third main chapter, I turn my attention to the international field and the "two-Europes" discursive phenomenon. Deconstructing the current conceptual manifestation of Europe through the examination of Orbán's rhetoric since 1989, one can find that Europe as a geopolitical and cultural sphere was constantly equated with the nation's "best past self" – although its

contemporary manifestation was imagined in different ways. Initially, Fidesz connected the achievement of real Europeanness to Hungary's EU-membership and promoted to join the club of Western European states – the sooner, the better. However, later, when the EU-membership became not the only temporal alternative for the country's future in the national mind, but instead, Central-Eastern European-orientation became also central, the EU's social othering became even more frequent. In the current period, it seems that the structurally constrained incorporation of a new, global other into the national and international agenda triggered the heightened importance of international temporal alternatives too and made the Fidesz to construct the country as a unitary actor, also in the domestic context. At the end of the thesis, concluding remarks are further discussed and supplemented with suggestions for further research directions and possible applications of the developed framework and findings.

Chapter 1 – Theoretical Foundations and Methodology

In this chapter, I present the theoretical and methodological framework of this thesis. After introducing the empirical puzzle and the emerging research questions, I provide a focused literature review. Namely, I address two main approaches within securitization theory literature and argue that none of them is entirely applicable to explain the puzzle and questions under discussion. Therefore, I develop a theoretical framework with the incorporation of Joshua Freedman's accounts on temporal and social self-evaluation and othering[7] into a hybrid – but rather sociological – securitization theory approach. At the end of the chapter, I also give an overview about my methodological considerations and the strategy applied in this thesis, establishing an appropriate connection between the theoretical grounds and the empirical case in order to find explanation for the research questions.

1.1. The "Two Europes–One Hungary" Puzzle and the Emerging Questions

Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary is used to be characterized as an authoritarian leader[8] who promotes an "illiberal democracy" – also in the words of himself[9] – in Hungary. In his speeches, he regularly used to construct his domestic opponents (mainly other political parties and their members) in security terms. However, in his speech on the 15th of March, 2016, he constructed his domestic political opponents, as well as their supporters as all of them are desirable allies of him when he called them on to unite "regardless of party affiliation"[10]. In addition, the speech framed both the EU and the flows of migrants as threats. In this sense, Orbán used some versions of his

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[7] Freedman.

[8] See e. g. Paul Lendvai, *Hungary: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). or Bojan Bugarič, "Protecting Democracy Inside the EU: On Article 7 TEU and the Hungarian Turn to Authoritarianism," in *Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union*, ur. Carlos Closa, ed. Dimitri Kochenov, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

[9] Viktor Orbán, "A munkaalapú állam korszaka következik" [Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp.] (Speech, Tusnádfürdő, July 26, 2014). (Official translation.).

[10] Orbán, "Orbán Viktor ünnepi beszéde."

already-known metaphors which are referring to the EU as a "colonizer" in different ways.[11] However, a Europe-favoring dimension is also observable in this recent speech. This makes up another dimension of the puzzle since the speech characterizes "Europe" in "self" and "other" terms within the same discursive framework.

I argue that there are at least two main questions which directly emerge from these puzzling discursive constructions. Firstly, one should ask why a political leader, who used to characterize his political opponents in security terms, suddenly chooses to call on for unification. Furthermore, how and why in a particular way does it happen?

Secondly, another set of questions poses itself based on the speech at hand: why does a political leader characterize the same referent object in "self" and "other" terms in discursive momentums embedded into the same framework? How and why in a particular way does he establish the object's threatening nature and its worth for protection at the same time?

In order to address these questions and find explanation for the empirical puzzle from which they derive, it seems reasonable to look at securitization theory which claims that security issues are not essentially menaces but instead, something becomes a threat through discursive politics.[12] However, we have to be careful about securitization theory's explanatory power and only include those elements of it in the theoretical framework which resonate with the "requirements" of the puzzle's features.

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[11] See e. g. Viktor Orbán, "Nem leszünk gyarmat! – Orbán Viktor ünnepi beszéde" [We will not be a colony!] (Budapest, March 15, 2012). Transcript in "Közéleti retorika: metaforák és mítoszok a magyarországi politikai beszédekben" by Zsombor M. Tóth, (PhD diss., ELTE, 2015), 244-250.

[12] Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11(2), 2005, 171-201.

1.2. Explanatory Power Gaps of Securitization Theory

In this section, I provide an overview about the analytical frameworks of two main approaches to securitization. I argue that although both approaches can provide some useful theoretical grounds for addressing the aforementioned research questions, neither the Copenhagen School's approach, nor second generation securitization scholars' investigations can adequately explain them.

Since the 1990s, a wide range of new critical theories have been created by researchers in the field of security studies, contributing to and challenging traditional realist and neo-realist approaches to security. Securitization theory, introduced by the Copenhagen School (CS), provided one of the most significant and dynamically developing new perspectives and since then became the subject of numerous theoretical and methodological academic debates.[13] In contrast with traditional security theories which characterize security problems as issues that always reflect the material circumstances of the world, critical theories tend to interpret security threats as constructed dangers, the "results of leaders efforts to understand and shape the world."[14]

However, it is also important to highlight that today it is more reasonable to speak about theories of securitization other than a standardized scheme. The reason for this is that researchers, who seek to advance or apply the framework of securitization theory, approach from various angles the way in which security issues are established and work.[15] According to the Copenhagen School, the word "security" has a performative character and therefore, it is able to transform social reality,

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[13] Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond," *European Journal of International Relations* 13(3), 2007,, 357.

[14] Thierry Balzacq, "Securitization Studies," *Academic Foresight,* September 2013. Accessed May 2, 2016, http://www.academic-foresights.com/Securitization.html.

[15] Thierry Balzacq and Stefano Guzzini, "Introduction: 'What Kind of Theory – if any – is Securitization?'" in *Forum: What Kind of Theory – if any – Is Securitization?,* by Thierry Balzacq, Stefano Guzzini, Michael C. Williams, Ole Waever and Heikki Patomäki, *International Relations* 29(1), 2014, 4.

to "do" things and not just reports states of affairs.[16] In this regard, the CS draws on speech act theory.[17] In sum, the Copenhagen School describes the concept of "security" in discursive terms on the one hand, and so, adopts a constructivist understanding of "threats" and "securitization" (the way in which security issues become securitized). On the other hand, the CS preserves the traditional security theories' "security" concept (security as the need for physical survival in the face of existential threats[18]) to some extent, as well as expands it to other than military and political sectors (societal, environmental and economic.)[19]

By contrast, through the lens of a more sociological/practice-oriented approach, adopted and preferred mainly by "second generation" scholars of securitization, we should understand security as a pragmatic act.[20] They argue that speech act theory facilitates only an excessively narrow methodological framework which cannot grasp certain equally important elements of securitization. They claim that turning attention to the practical dimension of securitization is necessary to interpret the "securitizing move" in an appropriate way. For instance, as Thierry Balzacq maintains, in order to dissolve the "unchanging code of practice," the reduction of security to a "conventional procedure," it is vital to analyze securitization as a strategic practice which emerges through and as a result of the interplay of contextual factors, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience and the effects of power possessed by the audience and the securitizing actor.[21] In the following sub-sections, I detail the strengths and weaknesses of both the philosophical (CS) as well as the sociological understanding of securitization in terms of their explanatory power regarding the puzzle at hand.

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[16] Thierry Balzacq, "A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions and Variants" in *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve,* ed. Thierry Balzacq (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 1.

[17] See. John L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). and John Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

[18] Maria Mälksoo, "'Memory Must Be Defended': Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical Security," *Security Dialogue* 46(3), 2015, 223-224.

[19] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 27.

[20] Balzacq, "A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions and Variants." 1-2.

[21] Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," 172.

1.2.1. The Copenhagen School: Authority and Universalization at Work?

According to the Copenhagen School, there are three main facilitating conditions – one of them internal, two of them external to the speech act – without which securitizing moves cannot be successful.[22] Firstly, the speech act has to follow the "grammar of security." It means that "a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out"[23] has to be constructed. Secondly, the external aspect of a speech act possesses two fundamental conditions. One of these is the social capital of the securitizing actor who must be in the position of authority. The other is – the third facilitating condition – that the referent object's features "either facilitate or impede securitization."[24]

However, one can argue that this securitization framework proves to be inappropriate to address the puzzle at hand based on the framework's basic features already. The theory is founded on the ground that the securitizing actor's capacities as well as effectiveness in securitization are deeply connected to the actor's authority. Furthermore, the theory also maintains the primary importance of universally applicable conditions. However, both of these arguments contradict with the move of the political leader in the puzzle. The theory cannot explain why a political leader – who is widely deemed to be authoritarian based on leadership characteristics and who used to construct his domestic political contestants as threats[25] – suddenly constructs his domestic political opponents not as threats but as his possible allies. The other research question also cannot be addressed through the lens of this theory for these reasons.

However, it is important to note that in spite of all these observations, some elements of the theory can provide useful tools which worth incorporation into the analysis. For example,

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[22] Buzan et al., 33.
[23] Buzan et al., 33.
[24] Ibid., 33.
[25] See e. g. Bugarič. and Lendvai.

distinguishing between discursive references in societal and political sectoral[26] terms can serve with additional findings regarding the domestic context. The CS claims that what constitutes an existential threat varies across different sectors. Although I do not use this sectoral approach in my research as a strict sectoral logic of security would exist, at certain points of the analysis, distinguishing between the political and societal aspects of securitizing moves serves with additional insights.

1.2.2. Second Generation Scholars: Context, Audience and Power Relations

From a more practice-oriented point of view, the Copenhagen School's approach can be criticized and supplemented from various angles. In this section, I address some of the most important theoretical investigations of second generation securitization scholars, paying special attention to Thierry Balzacq's threefold approach. Namely, his framework incorporates audience, context as well as political agency as equally important, mutually constitutive parts of securitization dynamics. His framework entails that the congruency or incongruency of these factors have an impact on securitization's dynamics and effectiveness. His accounts can serve as a useful analytical toolkit for addressing a research problem which inherently contradicts with the Copenhagen' School's theoretical basics. However, it is important to mention in advance that not all elements of socio-pragmatist approaches are applied in this thesis.

Balzacq argues that the CS treats securitization primarily as a "self-referential practice" whereas it also refers to its intersubjective nature:[27] Securitization is a speech act "through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat"[28]. Balzacq et al. claim that although the CS treats the "context" as a

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"facilitating condition" which might has an impact on the securitizing act[29], as well as adds that the "audience" has to be convinced to accept the "exceptional measures" of securitization,[30] it fails to incorporate these factors into its comprehensive framework. So, the CS's securitization concept corresponds rather to an illocutionary act, an act governed by universally applicable rules, in order to be successful.[31]

By contrast, Balzacq argues that treating securitization as a perlocutionary act which is "specific to the circumstances of issuance, and is therefore not conventionally achieved just by uttering particular utterances"[32] is more reasonable. In any intersubjective process such as securitization, the aim is to prompt a significant response, that is, a perlocutionary effect from the other.[33] Basically, Balzacq suggests approaching security as a pragmatic act and promotes that it is desirable not to make a preference order among the influential elements of securitization on a universalizing basis. For example, it is undesirable to examine only discourse or context based on the premise that certain universal rules can always reveal the nature of the securitizing move.[34] According to his point of view, discourse is not self-referential and taking a three-dimensional perspective – that is, incorporating context, audience and political agency into the studying of securitization's effectiveness – is essential to weigh which factors lead to the success or failure of securitization in particular cases, as well as to examine patterns and dynamics of certain securitizing moves.[35]

However, it is highly case- and puzzle-specific which practical factor(s) demand special emphasis from the researcher. In the puzzle presented at the beginning of this chapter, the problematic points are – at least partly – seem to be attached to the role of different contextual fields

as well as their discursive manifestations. Therefore, it is especially important to pay attention to the theoretical grounds of the role of context in securitization theory in general, and the role of domestic and international contexts, in particular.

In terms of how securitization scholars approach context in their framework, opposing epistemological arguments can be explored based on the existing literature. These mainly concern the tension between internalist versus externalist points of view, regarding the way and the extent to which the context can affect the securitization process and inform us about it.[36] The internalist perspective is agent-centered which entails that the structural field (context) can be influenced by the securitizing act but it is not able to shape that act. By contrast, according to the externalist point of view, contextual circumstances are discrete and equally relevant parts of the "semantic repertoire" of securitization. For example, according to Balzacq, this "semantic repertoire" consists of textual and cultural meaning and it is important to take into account that there are "brute threats" which are present regardless of leaders' discursive efforts.[37] The effectiveness of securitization, that is, convincing the audience about the threatening nature of the referent subject, namely, the threatening thing or event to be securitized,[38] depends on the way in which security as a symbol directs attention to the referent subject, as well as on the audience's information about the context.[39]

From the viewpoint of this research, taking an epistemologically externalist perspective to the context, as well as paying attention to the ontological differences between domestic and international contexts are reasonable for building up the framework of analysis. An externalist approach seems to be important in order to catch the relationship between the textual and cultural elements of the "semantic repertoire" of Viktor Orbán's securitization as well as the role of the particular

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[36] Balzacq et. al, "'Securitization' Revisited: Theory and Cases," 13.
[37] Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," 181.
[38] Ibid., 177.
[39] Ibid., 183.

community's (in the case at hand, Hungarian people's) historically and culturally shaped experiences, practices and interpretations.[40]

However, it seems to be equally important to differentiate between domestic and international contexts as the speech refers to both of them. These contexts consist of different inherent features. As Roxanna Sjöstedt argues, if the political elite of the country acts on or refers to the international field, it is much more likely that the elite discourse will be influenced by international ideas and norms, promoted by, for example, international institutions.[41] By contrast, with respect to the domestic context, what is being said can be highly influential[42] as it is in interplay with both "the national mood" of the public as well as the domestic political interests of parties to convince the public about their capabilities, that is, that their leadership would represent the best option regarding the country's present and future.

With respect to the agents of securitization, differentiation among various types of audiences seem not to be a relevant point in the examined case as the speech at hand was directed towards the general domestic public. The securitizing actor is also a constant part of the process which will be examined. However, as later it will be highlighted, we have to be careful about taking the securitizing actor as the same while we compare and contrast the actor's communicative actions to each other. Especially, if he plays a significant role on the political palette throughout a long period of time – as it happens in the case of Viktor Orbán – the actor can be embedded into different power structures, both domestically and internationally, as well as he can go through self-identity changes. Therefore, we need to interpret his moves in relation to these structural and power dynamics.

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[40] See e. g. Claire Wilkinson, "The Limits of Spoken Words: From Meta-Narratives to Experiences of Securtiy," in *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve,* ed. Thierry Balzacq (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 94-115. and Jef Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Agenda in Europe," *European Journal of International Relations* 4(4), 1998, 501.

[41] Roxanna Sjöstedt, Health Issues and Securitization: the Construction of HIV/AIDS as a US National Security Threat" in *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve,* ed. Thierry Balzacq (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 152.

[42] Sjöstedt, 152.

To sum up, securitization theories which employ a sociological approach to securitization can explain elements of the research puzzle. Different types of threats (domestic or international) need to be communicated in different ways towards the domestic public as these threats belong to different contexts (international or domestic). If the emphasis needs to be placed on the international threat(s) then it has to be communicated as such towards all people of the country. Therefore, including migration and Europe as international threatening subjects in the discourse could cause the securitizing actor's decision to suspend labelling his domestic political opponents in security terms and instead, call them on to unite against threats coming from the outside. It is also not surprising in light of the practice-oriented securitization approaches that collective memory[43] is highly mobilized and mixed with the contemporary contextual characteristics in the discourse, in order to convince the domestic audience. However, these versions of securitization theory are also not sufficient for providing an accurate explanation for the puzzle and questions entirely because they cannot explain: 1) why the call for internal unification happened just suddenly here in spite of the fact that certain external issues were previously also characterized as threats by the same securitizing actor (for the same audience, in the same contemporary governmental period); 2) why he describes Europe in contradictory terms within the same speech while previously (at least since the second Orbán-governmental period) he did not so in such a comprehensive way (for the same audience).

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[43] In terms of collective memory, I take Berenskoetter's approach, supplemented with Mälksoo's accounts on it. According to Berenskoetter, memories provide "temporal orientation devices that make past meaningful by providing a sense of where "we" have come from and what "we" have been through". Felix Berenskotter, "Parameters of National Biography," *European Journal of International Relations* 20(1) 2014, 270. However, as Mälksoo argues, it is also important to be aware of that memories often became subjects of power games and political interest. Mälksoo, 223.

1.3. Temporal and Social "Othering" in Different Contexts of Securitization

In order to fill the gap that the main theoretical approaches of securitization theory cannot answer adequately, I argue in this section that we have to incorporate Joshua Freedman's theoretical framework about temporal and social "othering"[44] into the theoretical grounds of the current analysis. Relating his account to second generation securitization scholars' approach to the context of securitization, one can differentiate among four types of othering and find that all of them are observable in Orbán's recent speech. Re-framing the research puzzle in this way can give us further insights about how it is worth to examine it in order to be able to provide a comprehensive explanation.

1.3.1. Temporal and Social "Othering" in Freedman's Framework

Freedman gives a general framework about the importance of differentiating between social and temporal self-evaluating state-behavior, depending on the way in which states evaluate or define their present selves. He argues that states (like individuals) may see either themselves (temporal self-evaluation) or other states (social self-evaluation) as "others". He also acknowledges that these state behaviors are not mutually exclusive, instead, they can be present in a state's self-evaluation at the same time. However, while some states prefer social othering, others rather evaluate their present selves based on temporal comparisons with possible past, present or future selves.[45]

On the other hand, one can claim that Freedman treats states as unitary actors and concentrates on the international arena: he implies that states do not have competing versions of temporal othering due to different domestic actors' contesting alternatives. Instead, only a particular way of temporal othering influences states' behavior on the international level. If this temporal

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[44] Freedman.
[45] Ibid.

othering is relevant in the state's self-evaluation then it may overwrites its social self-evaluation in the international arena. Table 1 describes Freedman's state-centric view on the two types of othering:

	Social/spatial othering	Temporal othering
state	self-evaluation: based on comparison to other states in the international arena	self-evaluation: based on comparison to the given state's past or future self in the international arena

Table 1: Social and Temporal Othering in Freedman's Framework

1.3.2. Temporal and Social "Othering" in Domestic and International Contexts

Freedman's approach provides useful insights in terms of the difference between social and temporal othering, but it cannot explain differences between the domestic and international contexts, as well as their connection points and occurring influence on each other. However, if we take Balzacq et al.'s and Sjöstedt's securitization theory frameworks and relate them to Freedman's argumentation, it can serve as a ground for differentiating between the domestic and the international levels (contextual fields) in terms of how temporal and social othering happen on the one and the other field.

The domestic context is different from the international one, since political actors are all have a general interest: progress of the state. Therefore, the state is primarily seen as the other of its past, present or future self: so, temporal othering is dominant. However, social othering also used to appear domestically under certain conditions: namely, if actors (e. g. political opponents) are securitized by the governing party because of their different viewpoints on the basis of progress (i.e., their preferred temporal alternatives) are deemed unacceptable.

In the international context, actors do not necessarily believe in progress or rarely understand it in the same way. Therefore, states mainly use social othering. However, for example, if more states or certain regions share the importance of evaluating their present selves in terms of temporal

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othering, it may take place. This is what characterized, for example, the EU's founding states when they created the European Union as a new, common temporal alternative against Europe's past self.[46]

The aforementioned findings that derive from interrelating securitization theory's and Freedman's frameworks are summarized in Table 2:

	Social/spatial othering	Temporal othering
Domestic level	CAN BE TRIGGERED (by disagreement on possible temporal alternatives among domestic political actors)	DOMINANT
International level	DOMINANT	CAN BE TRIGGERED (if there is an agreement on progress)

Table 2: Social and Temporal Othering on the Domestic and International Levels

I argue that in Orbán's 1848-Speech in 2016, all four forms of othering appear, interestingly for the first time in this kind of puzzling coexistence. However, without further research, one can only explore three of them and their relationship is still not clear. If ones re-frames the introduced puzzle in accordance with this new approach, domestic social othering – that was otherwise regularly triggered up in Orbán's speeches – becomes suspended in the speech. However, international othering – with respect to Hungary's relations to the EU – is also portrayed in a puzzling way as

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[46] Ole Waever, "European Security Identities," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34(1), 1996, 121-122.

Orbán characterizes Europe as Hungary's social other, whereas also refers to it as Europe would share the same temporal alternative as Hungary in terms of Europe's progress.

However, if we would like to explain how these types of othering are intertwined with each other in the speech, why Orbán locates Hungary's self both inside Europe as well as outside it in, in addition, why it happens only now for the first time that he suspends domestic social othering, we have to:

1. see how different types of othering appeared in the securitizing actor's discourse (especially in those speeches which were directed towards the Hungarian people) throughout time (1998-2016);

2. relate the current speech to the findings and to the proposed theoretical framework.

1.4. Methodology

In my research, I employ a qualitative methodological approach in order to explore discursive and contextual dynamics which can lead to puzzling othering mechanisms in the securitizing actor's discursive constructions. Applying a historical comparative discourse analysis, the focus of this work is on the emergence and transformation of national narratives connected to domestic and international temporal as well as social othering on the discursive field.

Based on a contemporary empirical puzzle, a theoretical framework was developed on the grounds of securitization theory and Joshua Freedman's accounts on temporal and social othering. I argued that in order to explore the puzzling relationship of different types of othering which even seem to contradict with the securitizing actor's usual discursive solutions for addressing threats, none of the two theoretical frameworks is sufficient alone. However, if we establish a connection between them and further develop it, it can lead us to a new framework which is not only applicable for

analyzing the empirical research problem but also can serve with contributory results to the aforementioned theoretical literatures.

Given this tight connection between empirics and theory from the beginning, the selection of the case of Hungary seemed to be obviously an appropriate choice as the puzzle itself comes from Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's recent securitizing move. Taking Orbán and his party, Fidesz (Magyar Polgári Szövetség, Hungarian Civic Union)[47] as the main securitizing actor, we can see that if we would like to understand the research questions connected to his present speech, we need to employ a historical comparative analysis. It has to colligate the whole period in which he was actively involved in the Hungarian political sphere. It is important due to the fact that his party went through more image-changes during throughout time, in addition, domestic and international contextual changes can also generate discursive changes and varying patterns of certain othering mechanisms. Based on these considerations, the analysis takes the timeframe of 1989-2016.

In terms of data selection, the main empirical sources of this analysis are the transcripts of Orbán's speeches. I pay special attention to those speeches which were directed primarily towards the domestic public of the country, however, some references are made to other speeches as well which were also widely available for the domestic audience. I did not experience difficulties in terms of the understanding and availability of the material as my mother language is Hungarian and so, I was able to analyze and translate to English (for the sake of giving examples) even those speeches which were only available in Hungarian. If otherwise not indicated in footnotes, all translations included in the body of the text are mine.

During the analysis, I concentrated on the deconstruction and historical evolution of social and temporal othering regarding the domestic context, on the one hand, and with respect to the international context, on the other hand. In domestic terms, I focused on the discursive changes of

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[47] The abbreviation derives from the party's original name, Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége.

temporal alternatives as well as their interconnectedness with social othering patterns. In terms of the international context, I also turned attention to the interrelated nature of temporal alternatives and social othering, supplemented with a particular focus on the deconstruction and historical meaning-changes of the current "Europe"-concept(s) in the Hungarian national discourse. Regarding both the domestic as well as the international spheres, context, agency and speech acts are treated as mutually constitutive parts of the discursive field.

Chapter 2 – Domestic "Othering" from a Historical Perspective

In this chapter, I address Fidesz's discursive constructions of temporal and social othering connected to the domestic context. I argue that according to Fidesz's discourse, the "best possible self" of the country needs to be derived from the revolutionary past. Furthermore, the "best possible self" of the country is strongly interconnected with the protection of certain unchangingly significant national and European values (freedom, political independence etc.) However, this temporal alternative was suggested among highly different domestic circumstances, as well as parallel to the securitizing actor's identity-changes and -preservation dynamics throughout time. Consequently, there were also inconstant elements attached to the preferred domestic temporal alternative. Various political parties and their members were constructed as the promoters of other temporal alternatives that threaten the country's security. I claim that the reasons behind the puzzling coexistence of four types of othering in Orbán's 1848-Speech in 2016 cannot be explained exclusively with the examination of the domestic context. However, its examination can lead to certain implications – delineated at the end of this chapter – which bring us closer to the research problem's solution.

I develop this argument in two stages. In the first section, I claim that in spite of the different temporal alternatives which were suggested by Fidesz throughout time, the party (or at times, the coalition) constantly equated the preferred temporal alternative with "the best past self" of Hungary. In other words, the reference to the aforementioned national and European values was a constant element of the preferred temporal alternative's discursive manifestations. However, it was connected to the country's "best present/future self" in varying ways and so, the same historical legacy proved applicable to serve differing political goals and to attribute different contemporary interests to Hungary. I argue that these dynamics are grounded in the interplay of Fidesz's "identity-accumulation," that is, the securitizing actor's constant preservation of discursive, value-based

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elements of its original libertarian image parallel to its conservative move. These conditions established a domestic context which made it possible for Fidesz to show a high degree of discursive consistency regardless of connecting the (at least partly) same values and collective memory to its inconstant contemporary political agenda.

In the second section, I maintain that these phenomena were also strongly interconnected with Fidesz's continuous social othering of its political opponents. The securitization of domestic temporal alternatives which were other than the party's own remained a constant feature of Orbán's rhetoric. However, the patterns of domestic social othering did not entirely follow the patterns of domestic temporal alternative-formulation and -justification. Furthermore, the line between the portrayal of domestic and foreign threats is also blurred at times, although in various ways. As I also address the effects of referencing to political supporters on how the domestic other was characterized, one can find that in societal security terms, the nation was more likely to be portrayed as a whole, whereas the nation-state was typically represented as divided in political terms. I conclude that the causes which led to the current discursive solution of suddenly including all four types of othering in a puzzling relationship in a speech cannot be elucidated solely through researching the evolution of domestic social and temporal othering in Fidesz's discursive agenda. What is more, the question regarding exclusively the rapid suspension of domestic social othering also cannot be adequately answered through the lens of such an approach. This suggests that it is reasonable to hypothesize that both the change of domestic, as well as international contextual references in the current discourse are rooted in the changing ways of reference to the international context and/or the transformation of the context itself.

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2.1. Temporal Alternatives in Fidesz's Discourse

With respect to the way in which historical legacies were connected to present contextual dynamics by Fidesz, I argue in this sub-section that the party constantly connected the act of revolution to its present political agenda and established continuity among "the best past self" of the country and the party's own self and acts. In other words, the need for an act of change on the contemporary agenda was always justified with appealing to acts of the country's "best past self". This "best past self" was discursively connected to certain values and party-attributes which were preserved throughout time, regardless of Fidesz's image-changes.

In 1989, one year after Fidesz was created, Viktor Orbán, the leading figure of a radical, libertarian party gave two memorable speeches in which he claimed that the main goals of the present are the same as the goals of 1848 and 1956. In his speech at the reburial of Imre Nagy,[48] Prime Minister of the revolutionary government of Hungary in 1956, Orbán discursively established the need of the regime-change, as well as its legitimacy on the basis of the historically unchanging nature of real Hungarian political goals:

> Since the starting point of the Russian occupation and Communist dictatorship, the Hungarian nation has had the opportunity, courage and power only once to try to achieve those objectives which it proposed to itself already in 1848: national independence and political transformation. Our objectives have not changed, we stick to the goals of '48 and '56. [49]

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[48] Imre Nagy was a Hungarian statesman, independent Communist and the Prime Minister of the 1956 revolutionary government of Hungary. His attempt to establish Hungary's independence from the Soviet Union cost him his life. He was executed on the 16th of June in 1958 and rehabilitated on the 16th of June in 1989. See e. g. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Imre Nagy – Premier of Hungary," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Accessed May 2, 2016, http://www.britannica.com/biography/Imre-Nagy. or Rupert Colley, "Imre Nagy – a Summary," History in an Hour, June 16, 2013. Accessed May 2, 2016, http://www.historyinanhour.com/2013/06/16/imre-nagy-summary/.

[49] All translations are mine if otherwise no indicated. **"**Az orosz megszállás és a kommunista diktatúra negyven évvel ezelőtt történt bevezetése óta a magyar nemzetnek egyszer nyílt alkalma, csak egyszer volt elegendő bátorsága és ereje ahhoz, hogy megkísérelje elérni a már 1848-ban kitűzött céljait, a nemzeti függetlenséget, a politikai szabadságot. Céljaink máig nem változtak, ma sem engedünk a 48-ból, így nem engedünk 56-ból sem.**"** in Viktor Orbán, "Orbán Viktor beszéde Nagy Imre és mártírtársai újratemetésén" [Viktor Orbán's Speech at the Reburial of Imre Nagy and his Fellow Martyrs.] (Speech, Budapest, June 16, 1989). Accessed May 2, 2016, http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2008-06-16/orban-viktor-nagy-imre-es-martirtarsai-ujratemetesen/.

Later, his inclination to characterize the country's best future alternative as it derives naturally from the country's "best past self" behavior in 1848 and 1956 did not decrease. What is more, in spite of the party's move to the political right, he even supplemented these historical justifications with referring to the regime-change itself and connected it not only to Fidesz's own "past self" but also to the country's ultimate goals. For example, in 1996, when Fidesz was over its first significant image-transformation into a nationalist-conservative party with a new name, "Hungarian Civic Party" (1995),[50] Viktor Orbán claimed in one of his speeches that although there is a contemporary tendency in Hungary to "set the peaceful, negotiatory character of the regime-change in the 1990s against the revolutionary character of '56, this contrast is not justified." [51] He continues the speech with acknowledging that there is a generational difference in terms of perceptions of the regime-change and claims that it was indeed a result of a negotiation process. However, he also argues that "the Hungarian nation did not remain outside of these changes"[52] and so, implies that the real character of the Hungarian nation is revolutionary in itself.

After 2003, when the party changed its name to "Hungarian Civic Union" and further centralized its inner structure, the interconnectedness of the revolutionary tradition and the country's best temporal alternative in the discourse did not diminish. Although traditionally right-wing political values became even more incorporated into the speeches, they were always related to the revolutionary mission of the party as well as its achievements:

> In order to not go back in time even farther, the civic side has had three missions since 1956. After the defeat of the revolution, the Hungarian civic community renewed. It put everything that remained from the memory of the revolution and the civic tradition on a boat– with the goal to rescue them. The memory of the revolution, the national oneness, the cross-border Hungarians, the Christian values, the Hungarian culture from Áron Tamási to Sándor Márai [...] when the flood ended, it complied successfully its second mission too.

50 Gábor Tóka, "Pártimázsok Magyarországon, 1992-2002" [Party Images in Hungary, 1992-2002] in *Magyarország politikai évkönyve* [*Political Yearbook of Hungary 2003*], ed. Sándor Kurtán, Péter Sándor and László Vass, (Budapest: DKMKA, 2003), 1540.

51 "Szokás manapság Magyarországon az 1990-es rendszerváltásnak a békés, úgymond tárgyalásos jellegét szembeállítani 56 forradalmi karakterével." in Viktor Orbán, "'56 és a mai fiatalok" ['56 and the Young People of Today".] (Speech at the ceremony of Lajos Batthyány Foundation, October 20, 1996).

52 "a magyar nép nem maradt kívül ezeken a változásokon" in Orbán, "'56 és a mai fiatalok."

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[...] Under the regime change, the values which were previously banned got absolution suddenly. [...] And our third mission – which we had thought that would be the easiest, but turned out to be the most difficult one – just started thereafter: furnishing Hungary in line with those values which were just pulled ashore with enormous difficulty. [...] However, it turned out that [...] it was more difficult than it had been expected by anybody. For the end of 2002, the civic side performed this mission too: we consummated freedom and democracy. Civic Hungary was established and became an available option. [53]

Conservative value protection and Christianity became even more emphasized after Fidesz formed a coalition with the Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP) in 2006 and which coalition rose to power in 2010, as well as in 2014 – with two-third election victories in both cases. In these periods, Orbán also tended to equate the preferred temporal alternative with a way towards a political community built upon freedom and national independence. Certain statements which can be deemed as contradictory (e. g. promoting an "illiberal democracy" with reference to the fulfilment of such principles as liberalism and freedom) were embedded into a framework which mixed the party's original, libertarian character with its new rightist, Christian image:

Accordingly, the 2010 elections, and especially in light of the 2014 election victory, can safely be interpreted as meaning that in the great global race that is underway to create the most competitive state, Hungary's citizens are expecting Hungary's leaders to find, formulate and forge a new method of Hungarian state organisation that, following the liberal state and the era of liberal democracy and at the same time of course respecting the values of Christianity, freedom and human rights, can again make the Hungarian community competitive and which adheres to and completes the unfinished tasks and unperformed duties that I have just listed. [54]

As this example also shows, referring to a mission that always inherently belonged to the Hungarian nation can be also explored in the speeches of the second and third Orbán-governmental

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[53] "Hogy visszább ne menjünk az időben, 1956 óta három küldetése volt a polgári oldalnak. A forradalom leverése után megújult a magyar polgári közösség. Mindent, amit lehet a forradalom emlékéből és a polgári hagyományból felrakott egy nagy hajóra – az átmentés céljával. A forradalom emlékét, a nemzeti összetartozást, a határon túli magyarságot, a keresztény értékeket, a magyar kultúrát Tamási Árontól Márai Sándorig. [...] Amikor véget ért az özönvíz, második küldetését is sikeresen teljesítette. [...] A rendszerváltásban hirtelen feloldozást kaptak a tilalom alatt álló korábbi értékek. [...] A harmadik küldetésünk pedig - amiről azt gondoltuk, hogy a legkönnyebb lesz, de kiderült, ez a legnehezebb -, ezután kezdődött: berendezni Magyarországot a nagy nehezen partra tett értékek jegyében. [...] Kiderült azonban, hogy [...]nehezebb, mint azt bárki gondolhatta volna. 2002 végére a polgári oldal teljesítette ezt a küldetését is: kiteljesítettük a szabadságot és a demokráciát. A polgári Magyarország létrejött és választható lehetőséggé vált." in Viktor Orbán, "Új küldetés" [New Mission] (Budapest, June 17, 2005). (Edited version.)

[54] Viktor Orbán, "A munkaalapú állam korszaka következik" [Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp] (speech, Tusnádfürdő, July 26, 2014). (Official translation.)

periods. In the 1848-Speech of 2016, Orbán also constructs a temporal alternative in a highly similar way: he derives the capability and the need for current change from "the best past self" which is rooted in the line of the "good" national tradition (1848, 1956 and the change of regime).[55] He also attributes a revolutionary character to the creation of Hungary's new constitution (Fundamental Law, 2012.)[56] However, it is still not clear why this speech does not contain domestic social othering in spite of the finding that the formulation and justificatory basis of the preferred temporal alternative is highly similar to the way in which temporal alternatives were stated in Orbán's previous speech acts in terms of referring to the domestic context.

2.2. Interconnected Temporal and Social Othering in Fidesz's Discourse

In this section, I examine the ways and grounds of domestic social othering in Viktor Orbán's speeches. It is argued that in Orbán's speeches temporal alternatives other than Fidesz's own successively triggered domestic social othering – regardless of period, Fidesz's position and party-image changes. However, the discursive formulation of securitizing political opponents does not always follow the pattern of how Fidesz justified its temporal alternatives.

Firstly, I argue that "the best possible self" of the country which is rooted in the revolutionary past was not always characterized as the threatened subject of the social other. Futhermore, at times, when referring to the past was even part of the discursive argument of Fidesz, the party did not always portray the domestic political opponent as a domestic threat. Instead, the domestic political opponent was described as a foreign oppressor or a supporter of a foreign oppressor from the country's past. Highlighting the foreign dimension of the domestic threat was

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[55] Orbán, "Orbán Viktor ünnepi beszéde."
[56] Bojan Bugarič, "Protecting Democracy and the Rule of Law in the European Union: The Hungarian Challenge," *LSE Discussion Paper Series* 79, 2014, 1. Accessed May 7, 2016, http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS%20Discussion%20Paper%20Series/LEQSPaper79.pdf

also discoverable in discursive momentums when not the past but rather, the present/future threatening effects of the political adversary's behaviour were emphasized. Connecting the nature of the threat to the international context suggests that not only the referent subject's deeds but also its nature were characterized as dangerous. Most of the time, political opponents are framed as oppressive forces, either in domestic or in foreign terms. Furthermore, one can conclude that based on these patterns, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the international context can have an influence on Fidesz's domestic social othering, even in today's discourse.

Secondly, my attention shifts to the exploration of different types of social othering in Fidesz's discourse. From this perspective, I argue that Fidesz has continuously constructed domestic enemies as they fall out of the Hungarian nation since the party's supporters were constructed as only they and nobody else could belong to the national community. In other words, Orbán constructed his political opponents not only in security terms but also as they cannot be true Hungarians if they do not follow the same temporal alternative as Fidesz. In this regard, social othering in "societal terms"[57] shows a pattern throughout time, that is, Fidesz constructed its supporters as the whole nation, whereas in "political terms"[58] they were explicitly differentiated from adversaries based on political orientation. According to the aforementioned findings, it is concluded that it is worth to hypothesize that the current change of Fidesz's discursive agenda is rooted in international contextual changes and othering behaviour. Additionally, although the sudden change cannot be inherently derived from the domestic context, the discursive manifestation of social othering-suspension in societal terms throughout time could contribute to the unproblematic and self-consistent suspension of political social othering in the current discourse.

While referencing to the country's "best past self" played a significant discursive role in terms of constructing present temporal alternatives, the justification of labelling political opponents as

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[57] Buzan et al., 119-140.
[58] Ibid., 141-162.

threats was not always made on the basis of the past self of these actors. Instead, it was claimed that

their danger lies in their present nature that poses a threat to the future of Hungarian people:

> We need to change the current government. We do not need to do it primarily because it is
> the successor of MSZMP [Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, Hungarian Socialist Workers'
> Party] and so, it represents historical traditions other than ours, but because it damages our
> future. [59]

However, Fidesz did not always locate the threatening nature of its political adversaries into the

future. At times, Orbán's speeches directly equated the government with the oppressors of the past –

what is more, not only in domestic terms. In these instances, the referred periods were usually the

same as those in which the "best past self" of Hungary is located. In other words, the "best past self"

is related to the "worst past self", that is, the state of being under oppression. In these speeches,

Orbán claimed that the past self was destroyed by domestic and/or foreign powers which had a

similar nature as "the government of today":

> The new aristocracy tries to systematically eviscerate the country, in the same manner as the
> foreign aristocracy tried it in the 19th century. In 1848-49, Hungarians defeated the foreign
> aristocracy and constrained them to run away. Now, a similar task is waiting for us, we have
> to defeat the new aristocracy [...] we owe to our ancestors with the fulfilment of our
> historical obligation. [60]

The portrayal of the government as a foreign, oppressing force bears the message that its legitimacy

can be questioned: not only their acts are threatening but their mere presence is also dangerous as

they threaten national independence.

One can argue that this discursive phenomenon is rooted in the nature of the domestic

context and its discursive portrayal by Fidesz in 1989. Under those conditions, the preferred

temporal alternative was connected both to the present and the past. The "best past self" of the

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[59] "Szükségünk van rá, hogy a jelenlegi kormányt leválthassuk. Ezt pedig nem elsősorban azért kell megtennünk, mert a
volt MSZMP jogutódja, más történelmi hagyományokat képvisel, hanem mert tönkreteszi a jövőnket." in Orbán,
"Keresztény Értelmiségi Kerekasztal: Nemzeti összefogás 1956 szellemében."

[60] "Az új arisztokrácia módszeresen próbálja kizsigerelni az országot, éppen úgy, ahogy a XIX. században az
idegen arisztokrácia próbálta ezt megtenni velünk. A magyarok 1848-49-ben legyőzték az idegen arisztokráciát,
és megfutamodásra kényszerítették. Most hasonló feladat ránk, le kell győzni az új arisztokráciát, fel kell
számolni a kiváltságosok kiváltságait. Ez lesz a nagy győzelem, amelyhez erőt adhatnak régi nagy diadalaink, ez
az út vezet a mindennapi győzelmeken keresztül a sikerhez. Őseinknek tartozunk azzal, hogy ezt a történelmi
kötelességünket teljesíteni fogjuk." in Viktor Orbán, "A szabadság ma sem eladó" [Freedom is not for Sale, Even
Today.] (Speech, Tápióbicske, April 4, 2007).

country was highly intertwined with the fight for freedom and independence – those Hungarian and European values which were perceived as the conditions of progress. In order to achieve them, fighting against domestic as well as foreign oppressors was equally needed. So, discursive reactions of portraying domestic opponents in foreign terms could be deemed as more natural discursive phenomena, reaction to "brute threats" which are just "out there:"[61]

> However, can we speak about national independence when Russian forces which occupied Hungary after the 1956 Revolution are standing in our cities again? Can we speak about political democracy and responsible government if we have not been able to have free elections for 40 years? Can we identify to whom the Hungarian government is responsible?[62]

However, it seems that later in the discourse – as the previous examples also showed – characterizing domestic referent subjects as they give primacy to the influence of foreign powers and/or are the inheritors of historical threats remained significant. Labelling Communist or radical right-wing parties as threats have been regularly justified on this basis.[63] At times when this referencing disappeared for a while, a tendency still remained to establish a connection between the enemy and the threatened goals of the future which are, at least in general terms, still characterized as the same as they were in the past. In addition, when the blurred lines of domestic as well as foreign nature of past oppressions are not explicitly mobilized for securitizing domestic opponents, they are frequently associated with their inappropriate handling of contemporary problems on the basis of their preference to subordinate national goals to international ones. For instance, in 2005, Orbán constructed all of his political opponents, regardless of party-orientation, as they pose danger for the way of political thinking of the national public because they prefer to deal with foreign political

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[61] Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization"

[62] "De beszélhetünk-e nemzeti függetlenségről, amikor Magyarországot az 1956-os forradalom után újra megszálló orosz csapatok itt állnak városainkban? Beszélhetünk-e politikai demokráciáról, felelős kormányról, ha 40 éve nem tarthattunk szabad választásokat? Vajon kinek felelős a mai magyar kormány?" in Viktor Orbán, "Orbán Viktor beszéde a Kossuth téren" [Viktor Orbán's Speech at Kossuth Square.] (Speech, Budapest, Kossuth tér, March 15, 1989). Accessed May 2, 2016, http://2001-2006.orbanviktor.hu/hir.php?id=241.

[63] See e. g. Orbán's rhetoric between 2002-2010.

problems rather than with the community's well-being which in turn, results in the domestic public's

alienation from politics:

> Since the change of regime, the years which have been passed served with the lesson that freedom alone cannot bring security and well-being. Furthermore, we had another experience which is perhaps even more bitter: everything else is more important for politics than the personal lives of people. They are debating about the text of the European Union's constitution and whether it is right to go to war in the Middle East. Liberal, socio-democratic and conservative politicians, shouting down each other, try to prove it that their own view of the world is the most perfect one. Meanwhile, they are not talking about human destinies, the difficulties of everyday life, and the life of people. It is natural that under such conditions, a lot of people turn away from politics apathetically, and consequently, Hungarian democracy has lost its spiritual reserves. Because the spiritual and practical content of democracy is not for the sake of itself, but it is filled with reason by the people and the community they created. We have to see that our democratic public life needs a change of attitude. [64]

In this instance, Fidesz does not express judgment on the rightness of any foreign policy

decision (e. g. intervention or EU-attitudes) made by the governing party (MSZP-SZDSZ coalition at

that time). However, by portraying the government as it prefers to react to the international context

instead of dealing with domestic problems, Orbán represents his political others' as they have "bad"

and dangerous temporal alternatives. In contrast with his opponents, the securitizing actor represents

itself as he can deem preference-orders – that is, giving primacy to domestic problems – based on

the goals of the community. So, according to the speech act, freedom and democracy can only be

achieved with the right methods and have to be interpreted in the right way. The reference to the

international context served as a tool to securitize domestic actors based on their foreign-orientation.

Referring to the national community has been in itself of key importance in Orbán's rhetoric

since 1989. In 1989, the reference to the whole nation as his supporters, that is, implying that his

political opponents, who do not share the same view of national progress, fall out of the nation, was

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[64] A rendszerváltás óta eltelt évek egyik megrázó tanulsága, hogy a szabadság önmagában nem hoz biztonságot és jólétet. E felismerés mellett azonban egy másik, talán ennél is keserűbb tapasztalattal lettünk gazdagabbak: a politika számára mindig minden fontosabb, mint az emberek személyes élete. Vitáznak az Európai Unió Alkotmányának szövegéről, s arról hogy helyes-e háborúzni a Közel-Keleten. Liberális, szociáldemokrata és konzervatív politikusok, egymást túlkiabálva igyekeznek bizonygatni, hogy melyikük világnézete tökéletesebb. Mindeközben pedig csak épp emberi sorsokról, mindennapos nehézségeinkről, kinek-kinek az életéről nem esik szó. Természetes, hogy ezt látva, sokan fásultan fordulnak el a politikától, s ennek egyenes következménye, hogy a magyar demokrácia mára elveszítette lelki tartalékait. Mert a demokrácia szellemi és gyakorlati tartalma nem önmagáért való, azt az egyes ember, s az általa alkotott közösség tölti meg értelemmel. Be kell látnunk tehát, hogy demokratikus közéletünknek szemléletváltásra van szüksége. in Orbán, "Új küldetés."

still a realistic discursive claim. It can be called realistic, because it reflected the domestic settings. Since then, similar level of national unity has never emerged in Hungary.[65] However, in spite of the multi-party system's political diversity, Orbán continued to use regularly first-person-plural pronouns in his speeches although initially these were aimed to represent Fidesz's political supporters. However, after 1998, and especially after the party's election defeat in 2002, these pronouns seem to refer to the Hungarian nation as a whole:[66] "the nation cannot be in opposition."[67]

However, it is important to highlight that this unification tendency only happened in societal terms. Referencing to political opponents in security terms did not decrease. He mixed anti-Communist discursive elements with references both to the historical past as well as to the contemporary period: "We will not allow them to smuggle the Holy Crown back to the Museum, to recompose the House of Terror, to dispossess Hungarian farmers and destroy the Status Law."[68] In this instance, he referred to the newly elected MSZP-SZDSZ coalition as they aim to decriminalize the memory of Communism with the recomposition of the House of Terror Museum[69] as well as destroy a number of other achievements of Fidesz's first governmental period. He also portrays his political opponents as the successors of the Communist dictatorship after the Cold War as he states that their moves are "traditions in Hungary since 1947"[70], using the word "tradition" with a highly negative connotation here.

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[65] Andrea Szilágyi and András Bozóki, "Playing it again in Post-Communism: The Revolutionary Rhetoric of Viktor Orbán in Hungary", *Advances in the History of Rhetoric*, 18:sup1, S153-S166, 2015, 160. Accessed May 2, 2016, doi: 10.1080/15362426.2015.1010872.

[66] Szilágyi and Bozóki, 160-161.

[67] Viktor Orbán, "A haza nem lehet ellenzékben" [The Nation Cannot Be in Opposition.] (Speech, Budapest, May 7, 2002). Accessed April 28, 2016, http://2001-2006.orbanviktor.hu/hir.php?aktmenu=2&id=1159.

[68] "Nem fogjuk engedni, hogy visszacsempésszék a múzeumba a Szent Koronát, hogy átrendezzék a Terror Házát, hogy kisemmizzék a magyar gazdákat és hogy szétrombolják a státustörvényt." in Orbán, "A haza nem lehet ellenzékben."

[69] The museum is widely deemed by the political and academic community as controversial due to its parallel representation of Nazism and Communism, portraying in this way the two totalitarian system as of equally criminal regimes. See e. g. Péter Apor, "Eurocommunism: Commemorating Communism in Contemporary Eastern Europe", in *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance*, eds. Malgorzata Pakier and Bo Strath (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2010): 233-246.

[70] Orbán, "A haza nem lehet ellenzékben."

According to the aforementioned findings, one can claim that in societal terms, the ground for calling on for national unification in political terms was prepared to a certain extent by the securitizing actor's frequent, implicit or explicit discursive representation of the public as a unified agent in societal terms. However, as it was argued in this chapter, Fidesz's continuous securitizing moves against its political opponents as well as their contextual patterns suggest that one cannot derive the puzzling relationship of four types of othering in the current discourse solely from the evolution of Fidesz's domestic othering. In addition, as the domestic context alone cannot fully explain the sudden suspension of domestic social othering too, we can hypothesize that the suspension is a consequence of changes in the international context and its discursive representation.

2.3. Implications

Based on the findings of this chapter, I argue that the there is a continuous presence of referring to Hungary' "best past self" in Fidesz's discourse. The achievement of this "best past self" is highly interconnected with a revolutionary fight against "the worst past alternative" of the country, that is the state of being oppressed. I claimed that in Orbán's speeches, regardless of identity-changes, domestic political opponents were most of the time framed as they not only mean a threat to the country's future but they are "naturally" oppressors. Either because of their contemporary attitudes or due to the "fact" that they are the successors of oppressing party-regimes of the past. At times, they are also connected to a foreign aspect of oppressing the country – either by their oppressing nature or by their "abnormal" preference order, that is, not giving unconditional primacy to domestic issues.

We can also observe that in societal terms, Hungarians were constructed as a unitary actor. A unitary actor, that constantly revolts against oppression. So, domestic opponents in political terms were continuously securitized, whereas the nation, in societal terms, was represented as a whole.

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Therefore, domestic political opponents were not only securitized but also excluded from the nation in this way.

I conclude that in the discourse, the nation a hurted (oppressed) body, a body as a sum of all Hungarian people's body is continuously implied. We cannot observe discursive patterns of suspended domestic social othering throughout time, the dangerous, oppressive domestic other was constantly portrayed in a negative relation to the nation as the bearer of true Hungarian and European values. So, we have to ask now that why is it that in the speech at hand, domestic political opponents are represented as they belong to the common body of the nation. In light of the findings, with the discursive move of suspending domestic social othering, locating oppression inside the country is also suspended. This suggests that the "worst past temporal alternative" of the country became attached to something else: to Europe. So, it seems that in the speech which posed the puzzle, Hungary is both against and for Europe's temporal alternative. Hungary not only locates itself both inside and outside Europe but it does so because of coexisting temporal alternatives attached to the Europe-Hungary relationship in the national mind. How did they evolve throughout time? How are they connected to the social othering of Europe in the Hungarian mind? Why does it seem so that Europe and the EU mean today two contradicting things in the Hungarian national mind? We have to turn our attention to the international context, in order to continue the puzzle's explanation.

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Chapter 3 – Europe and the National Self from a Historical Perspective

In this chapter, I argue that the discursive phenomenon of referring to two Europes, that is, locating Hungary both inside and outside Europe in Orbán's 1848-Speech in 2016, is rooted in the varying ways in which the body of Europe was located in the national mind previously. I claim that different Europe-bodies existed throughout time in the Hungarian discourse, even parallel to each other. For defining the meaning of the bodies of Europe phenomenon in the national mind, I took Patrizia Violi's and Brian MacWhinney's accounts on "body" and "embodiment." MacWhinney is referring to language comprehension and production as processes through which embodied meanings are created and extracted.[71] He calls these processes of "active embodiment" as perspective-taken systems. According to his framework, one of the four levels of these perspective-taken systems are "the set of competing spatio-temporal reference frames"[72] in discourses. According to Violi, these frames are highly interconnected given their intersubjective embeddedness in social structures. [73] They do not necessarily depend on the body itself but rather on the ways in which it is framed in discourse.

Based on these considerations, under the term "bodies of Europe" I understand those discursively manifested perspectives of the European geopolitical body, Europe as a region, that frame Europe as a whole or certain parts/actors of it (countries, groups of countries, sub-regions) as 1) a cultural space, the homeland of European values (e. g. freedom or Christianity); 2) preferred structures for ensuring Europe's security (e. g. the EU). I argue that the "two-Europes" concept in

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[71] MacWhinney, 214.
[72] Ibid. 215.
[73] Patrizia Violi, "Beyond the Body: Towards a Full Embodied Semiosis," in *Body, Language and Mind* 2 ed. Frank R. Dirven, (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2008), 241-264.

the puzzle at hand can be deconstructed through incorporating into our analysis this discursively embodied grounding[74] of the Europe-concept, influenced also by contextual circumstances.

The changes of Europe-perceptions in the Fidesz-discourse reflect this conceptual evolution. Therefore, the varying meanings of the Europe-concepts as well as their preservation and coexistence can be effectively examined by analyzing the discursive constructions in Orbán's speeches from a historical perspective, starting from the regime-change of 1989-90 in Hungary. I argue that the dynamics of social and temporal othering – due to both domestic and international contextual changes – underlie the changes of national elite-perceptions about Europe and therefore, can serve as applicable guiding points to gain insight into the various interpretations of the European body in the national mind.

Focusing on the international context-related social and temporal othering in Fidesz's discourse, I address the roots of the emerging tensions on the nexus of domestic and international contexts of securitization/othering. In the first section, I claim that after the regime-change, the Hungarian-EU temporal alternatives of self-progress were coincident due to the country's desire to become a member of the European Union, as well as the EU's focus on enlargement. Although the road towards Hungarian EU-membership was not a purely smooth transition and so, both short-term social and temporal othering appeared at times (1996, 1999-2002) in Orbán's speeches, in sum, common temporal alternatives prevailed until the 2000s. This entailed that the West, in general and the EU, in particular were perceived as the means towards national progress, freedom, as well as economic and social development. Behind all these beliefs and goals lied the linguistically also manifested way in which the EU was characterized by Central-Eastern European (CEE) countries aspiring for membership, namely that the European Union referred to Europe as a whole at that times. Therefore, for CEE countries, getting membership into the EU primarily meant a way of

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[74] Violi, 258.

returning to Europe and its historical values, as well as leaving the Communist legacy behind. This point of view also implied that Europe as a region was equated with the Western European (WE) sub-region.

In the second section, I concentrate on how and why the EU became a heightened social other of Hungary from the early-mid 2000s. While in the early-2000s this tendency was mainly due to the positional change of Fidesz, the financial crisis of 2008, as well as the legal-political debates between the Union and the second Orbán-government (2010-2014)[75] entailed significant heightening of social othering in the discourse. To name but a few, the EU's declaration on the fiscal deficit of Hungary in 2010, then the debates over the new media law, as well as the conflicts over the new constitution (Fundamental Law) of Hungary all contributed to the worsening relationship.[76] During these periods, the EU started to be the signifier of the sum of its parts in the discourse and so, the emphasis shifted towards the tensions between the domestic and international contexts in terms of disputes over the legal and mental boundaries of the nation-state and the supra-national levels. These phenomena further enhanced the detachment process of "EU" and "Europe" in the Hungarian discourse which had started in 1999-2000 when the emphasis on the regional divide between CEE and WE became connected to a preference of CEE regional cooperation instead of favouring only the belonging-to-the-West idea. Consequently, "Europe" as a region started to refer to both CEE and WE: it also became equated with the sum of its parts. In other words, the term "Europe" started to simultaneously refer to both of its sub-regions which are relevant within the context of the EU-Hungary relationship, namely CEE and WE.

In the third section, I shift my attention to the current era and the speech at hand. I argue that the fact, that migrant or refugee flows as "social others" of Europe made the domestic-international nexus even more salient, put additional emphasis on the structural problems. However,

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[75] See e. g. Zoltán Kész, *Euroscepticism in Hungary,* (Brussels: New Direction Foundation, 2014), 30-33.
[76] Ibid.

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it is important to note that structural problems were already highlighted by the economic-financial crisis of 2008, albeit, the crisis was not connected to an international social other of Europe. Consequently, international temporal alternatives became heightened which entailed the suspension of social othering domestically. This is what we can observe in Orbán's 1848-Speech. From this perspective, on the one hand, the speech constructs the "EU" as it signifies only one of its parts, Western Europe. By contrast, CEE, in general and Hungary, in particular are located discursively outside of the EU. On the other hand, "Europe" is constructed as a region with two sub-regions (CEE, WE) without overlap (EU) in terms of agency. The EU is equated with Western Europe. What is more, one can argue that the speech proposes that if WE is not willing to cooperate in the structural renewal based on 1848-Europe as a model for fighting for the freedom of nations (that is something which is exclusively known by CEE countries from practice), then WE neither can have a real European agency nor can it belong to the alliances of responsible European leaders.

Considering the above findings, one can argue that the different international temporal alternatives are rooted in different kinds of historical experiences between the CEE and WE regions. Western European countries have been sharing the view since the creation of the EU that Europe's temporal Other is the "Europe of the balance of power."[77] In other words, with the creation of the EU, Europe determined its new structure in relation to its own historical image. The European balance of power system was on the one hand, a tool *vis-á-vis* external threats and on the other hand, it also determined the internal organization of European states.[78] However, after the Second World War, this kind of organization of Europe was perceived as the system of aggression and dominance. Therefore, at that times, the European integration project was understood as the new alternative for Europe's future in which European values (such as freedom and pluralism) can get the best chance

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[77] Waever, 121-122.
[78] Ibid.

to prevail.[79] As Western European countries were the "founding fathers" of the integration project, this historical experience and its perception influence how they relate themselves to the EU even today. However, according to Orbán's speech, this consideration is in sharp contrast with the CEE viewpoint that would promote the structural move toward the nation-state paradigm. In line with this, one can claim that the reasons why these tensions can be provoked when the defects of the contemporary international structure become heightened are rooted in the various historical experiences connected to agency and so, in the different national and regional connotations of "European" values, as well as the kinds of intersubjectivity (e.g. integration or alliances) which are preferred for the sake of value-protection.

3.1. Temporal Alternatives and Europe's Discursive Role

After the Cold War, Central Eastern European countries aimed to start membership talks both with NATO and the EU, in order to take part in the integration project, distance themselves from Russia and to benefit from joining "the Western club" of freedom and political democracy. The wish for finding a long-term solution to free themselves from the possibility of being a subject of oppression again made these countries to draw temporal parallels between their past and present experiences, as well as their view of the desired future. In Hungary, although Fidesz did not become a ruling party until 1998, it became associated with the aspiration for liberal social and political values already in 1989 when Viktor Orbán gave two memorable speeches (also referred in the previous chapter).[80] Both speeches contained concrete references not only to the domestic era but also to the international context. According to the speech he gave at Kossuth Square on the 15th of March, both contextual fields are highly connected to the memory of the 1848 revolution in Hungary which "set

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[79] Waever, 121-122.

[80] Orbán, "Orbán Viktor beszéde a Kossuth téren" and Orbán, "Orbán Viktor beszéde Nagy Imre és mártírtársai újratemetésén."

the European standards of national independence and political democracy."[81] He constructed the country's best future temporal alternative as it is rooted in the revolutionary past which is a common European legacy. Consequently, Orbán's speech represented the temporal alternative of the state – belonging to the West, in general and the European Community, in particular – as a mean towards recreating the country's real European identity with its accession to the EU. This aspiration was highly coincident with the European Community's (European Union after 1993) enlargement perspectives which – after some hesitation and the NATO's mediation – became a real future possibility for CEE countries as well.

However, one can observe that signs of othering the EU in the Hungarian discourse appeared already in the second half of the 1990s. In 1996, the condemnation of the "West" manifested in the discursive framework, although it was embedded into the argument for the importance of overcoming historical social othering in the present. Viktor Orbán claimed that Hungary can only grab the emerging opportunities of the contemporary era if the country sees in the West not the alliance of unhelpful betrayals but "a new frame for the life of the Hungarian nation."[82] It is claimed that Hungarian people – regardless of generational experiences – should focus on the contemporary West as it embodies the effective protection of those values (freedom, independence etc.) which were sought by Hungary in 1848 and 1956.[83]

> Shall we hate the West? I believe that it would not be fortunate. If someone takes into account the ambitions of '56 then he/she may risk using the phrase that well-being, freedom and life of European quality can be most likely achieved if we find new frames for the political life of the Hungarian nation. Most probably, the new frame can be the community of Western European countries, the community of the European Union. In this sense, today, our forsaken situation in '56 means not a basis of repugnance towards the West. Instead, we can draw our words in the sense that if we want to realize the socio-political ambitions of '56 then Hungary can do it

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[81] "Az 1848-49-es forradalom és szabadságharc a magyar nemzet számára felállította a nemzeti függetlenség és politikai demokrácia európai mércéjét." in Orbán, "Orbán Viktor beszéde a Kossuth téren."
[82] Orbán, "'56 és a mai fiatalok."
[83] Ibid.

with the best chance as a member of the community of European nations, a member of the European Union.[84]

One can find that in this speech, Orbán securitizes the West, on the one hand. He claims that the West contributed to the lost revolution in 1956 when it did not support Hungary in fighting against the soviet oppression. So, in the past, the West behaved as a social other of the country. On the other hand, the same historical legacy (1956) also serves as the ground for Fidesz's reasoning why past experiences should not lead to present social othering, precisely due to the current goals of the country which are coincident with the goals of the revolution, as well as the envisioned temporal alternative of future Hungary. It is claimed that this future temporal alternative can only be achieved if the country becomes the member of the European Union, the community of Western European countries.

One can also find that the mostly-preferred temporal alternative becomes equated with joining the "EU," the "West," as well as "Europe." Using "Europe" as a geopolitical body, the organization of the European Union and the Western European sub-region as synonyms, the securitizing actor implies that Hungary's EU accession would mean not only a move from outside Europe to the inside. It would also mean a move from the Central-Eastern European region to the Western club. He both constructs Hungary as inside and outside Europe, leaning the country's before-accession contemporary self and Central-Eastern Europe rather towards the outside. Comparing these observations to Orbán's 1848-Speech in 2016 can make us to conclude that appealing to the revolutionary tradition as a constant rhetorical strategy of Fidesz can serve either taking the side of the EU integration process or the side of reasoning against it.

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[84] "Gyűlöljük-e hát a Nyugatot? Azt hiszem, hogy ez nem lenne szerencsés. Ha valaki számba veszi ´56 törekvéseit, akkor talán megkockáztathatja azt a kifejezést, hogy a jólétet, a szabadságot, az európai minőségi életet leginkább akkor tudjuk elérni, ha új kereteket találunk a magyar nemzet politikai élete számára. Az új keret pedig nagy valószínűséggel a nyugat-európai államok, az Európai Unió államainak közössége lehet. Ilyen értelemben tehát '56-os magunkra hagyottságunk ma már nem a Nyugattal szembeni érzéseket alapozza meg. Inkább úgy fogalmazhatunk, hogy ha ´56 társadalompolitikai törekvéseit végre akarjuk hajtani, akkor ezt legnagyobb eséllyel az európai népek közösségének tagjaként, az Európai Unió tagjaként teheti meg Magyarország." in Orbán, "'56 és a mai fiatalok."

During the first Fidesz-governmental era, the EU's and Europe's discursive role changed for the first time, although it was not a long-lasting phenomenon. The reasons behind this short-term discrepancy between EU-Hungary temporal alternatives derived both from the domestic as well as the international context. In 1999, the EU's proposal about prolonging membership-talks angered the government and led them to work on strengthening the country's CEE-orientation.[85] Viktor Orbán stated that

> [...] it is not a tragedy if the EU-accession will not happen in 2003. Now, we are not the members of the EU and as we can see, there is life outside the EU too. However, we are not preparing for that.[86]

Therefore, the EU and the West started to lose their discursively equalized meaning with Europe: Europe started to signify the sum of its parts which are both CEE and WE. However, the Hungarian aspiration for EU-membership did not disappear – it only lost its privileged discursive position and became not the only international temporal alternative for Hungary's self-progress.

To sum up, during the 1990s, the EU started to signify Europe as a whole in the Hungarian discourse. In Fidesz's discursive constructions, the EU signified not only the West but also became associated with the way of ensuring the ultimate temporal alternative which was derived from the Hungarian collective memory (1848, 1956). It was perceived that although in the past, the West was the social other of Hungary in certain ways and so, contributed to the loss of freedom, in the present, it is the site of those European values and socio-political structures which were aimed to be achieved in the revolutionary past and which are belonging to the Hungarian national identity even in the present. In order to reach these goals, the only way would be the accession to the EU which would mean an accession to the family of those nations that embody real-Europeanness. However, it is also

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[85] Gábor Gavra, "A kormányzó Fidesz és az EU-csatlakozás: Igenek és nemek" [The Governing Fidesz and the EU accession: Yes- and No-s], *Magyar Narancs*, 2003. Accessed May 5, 2016, http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/a_kormanyzo_fidesz_es_az_eu-csatlakozas_igenek_es_nemek-62225.

[86] "Nem történik tragédia, ha nem valósul meg 2003-ban a csatlakozás. Most sem vagyunk az Unió tagjai, s mint látjuk, van élet az EU-n kívül is. De nem erre készülünk. Azért sürgetjük az integrációt, mert az újabb lökést adna a gazdasági fejlődésnek." in Viktor Orbán's statement, *Világgazdaság,* December 17, 1999. Cited in Sándor Révész, "A Fidesz átmenetele – 2000," Népszabadság online, November 27, 2011. Accessed May 16, 2016. http://nol.hu/archivum/20111127-a_fidesz_atmenetele___2000-1288881.

important to note that discursive signs of CEE regional orientations also appeared in the late nineties-early 2000s due to periodic disappointment in the realization-dynamics of heightened expectations (1998) connected to EU-membership. Consequently, the discursive construction of Hungary also changed throughout time: the original aim to treat EU-membership as the mean to move inside Europe and the West was replaced at times with implying that the country's starting position is located inside Europe. Interestingly, one of the most critical points was when the Fidesz-government perceived Hungary's achieved position as a guarantee for fastening membership talks At that time, the EU's indication of "slowness" resulted in a discursive position-insecurity attached to Hungary by the Fidesz and so, legitimated the securitization of the EU as well as the parallel claims about CEE-orientation, the extension of the "Europe"-concept to CEE countries without EU-membership.

3.2. The EU as a Intensified Social Other

Although some early signs of the EU's social othering in the Hungarian discourse became remarkable already in the late 1990s, it was only in the 2000s when the Fidesz – due to its positional change from government into opposition, as well as international contextual changes – started to securitize Europe regularly. Following the party's two-third election victory in 2010, the tensions became even more salient and frequent, due to legal and political debates. As a result of these, the "EU" as a signifier of "Europe" as a whole had been deconstructed to an even greater extent, and the use of "Europe" in the discourse referred rather to a region in which different tensions between the CEE and WE sub-regions manifest themselves. Under these conditions, it is claimed in the speeches that CEE has the power to help the EU out of its social and economic crises. In addition,

the speeches also implied that there should be a role-change or at least a role-equalization between WE and CEE in terms of which region should lead the EU's decision-making in the future.

"The European Union's existence can only be justified if it is capable of solving such questions which are cannot be solved by the nation-states separately. If it gives better answers..." [87] Only one year after Hungary's full EU-membership, it was argued by the Fidesz that Hungarians should not forget that the EU is only a form of coexistence. It is only a certain kind of cooperation which derives its justification from its capability to offer effective means for addressing problems with which nation-states face. Furthermore, emphasizing CEE's key importance in terms of creating a "powerful, stable, dynamic and secure Europe" [88] became even more central in Fidesz's speech acts after 2008. Namely, the economic and financial crisis triggered further "developments" of the idea that Hungarian politics has a distinct "Central-European, what is more, a unique European"[89] character. It was claimed that based on this inherent resource, it could prevent both European civils' trust-loss in the EU and the possibility of the Union's transformation into an "enormous monster, incapable of existence."[90] So, after 2008-2009, Orbán started to label the EU in enemy terms not only because of questioning the ruling party's capabilities to secure Hungary but also due to an internationally accepted structural change. Speaking about "a new age" of the EU became interconnected with imagining new domestic temporal alternatives for the country. New alternatives which will necessarily entail the "collapse of the political left" on a pan-European level and so, the desired step out of the "coexistence of the

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[87] "Az Európai Uniónak akkor van létjogosultsága, ha meg tud oldani olyan kérdéseket, melyeket a nemzetállamok külön-külön nem tudnának. Ha jobb válaszokat ad…" in Viktor Orbán, "Új küldetés" [New Mission] (Budapest, June 17, 2005). (Edited version.)

[88] Viktor Orbán, "A következő tíz év," [The Next Ten Years] in *Népszabadság* (Report of the Euromoney Conference of Vienna, Budapest, January 24, 2005).

[89] "soha olyan világos még nem volt a magyar politikában, amelynek tudjátok, az a közép-európai, sőt egyedülálló európai vonása van" in Viktor Orbán, "Nemzedékek írják a történelmet" [History is Written by Generations.] (Speech, Congress of Fidelitas, Székesfehérvár, April 15, 2007).

[90] Orbán, "A következő tíz év."

old and new world" in the last twenty years. [91] In other words, in Fidesz's discourse, closing up the age of neoliberalism in Europe became equivalent with closing up the age of transition in CEE and Hungary. [92]

The second Orbán-government used its two-third election victory for creating a new Hungarian constitution ("Fundamental Law") and promoting a new foreign policy doctrine called "Eastern opening."[93] However, it seems that the growing social othering of the EU did not entail the discursive construction of separateness: for instance, the internationally disputed norm-violating behaviour of the country was claimed to be a non-justified statement based on the argument that Hungary's domestic features – even if they are in significant change – are compatible with being a country within the EU.

> When I mention the European Union, I do so not because I believe that it is impossible to construct a new state built on illiberal and national foundations within the European Union. I think this is possible. Our membership of the European Union does not rule this out.[94]

By contrast, there are also some examples when Orbán explicitly separated "Brussels bureaucrats" from the meaning of real "Europeanness". This discursive dynamic points towards replacing the construction of the country's position outside the EU in terms of agency but structurally still inside with claiming the nation-state's separateness from the EU and incapacitate the Union from its belonging under the umbrella of real-Europeanness.

> Today, when self-proclaimed democrats are protecting democracy from us and criticise us heavily in the name of some cloudy concept of Europeanness, simply because we are not prepared to accept what Brussels bureaucrats tell us in the name of Europe, we too can say the same thing as István Tisza, and I quote: "We openly confess that we stand on national foundations.[95]

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[91] Viktor Orbán, "Jobboldali korszak Európában" [Right-Wing Age in Europe] In *Magyar Nemzet*, July 25, 2009. Accessed May 8, 2016, http://2007-2010.orbanviktor.hu/irasok_list.php?item=13.

[92] Orbán, "Jobboldali korszak Európában."

[93] Kész, 32-38.

[94] Viktor Orbán, "A munkaalapú állam korszaka következik."

[95] Viktor Orbán, "Orbán Viktor beszéde a Tisza István-szoborcsoport újraavatásán" [Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the Re-inauguration of the István Tisza Statue Group.] (Speech, Budapest, June 9, 2014). (Official translation.)

One can conclude that equalizing "Europe" with the some of its parts (CEE+WE) was a major step towards the total disentanglement of the EU from its "naturally European" character in the Hungarian mind. It also laid down the ground for constructing the country outside the EU in terms of agency but structurally still inside or at times, constructing the country within Europe but outside the EU.

3.3. Heightened European Temporal Alternatives in Securitization Contexts

In this section, I interrelate Orbán's 1848-Speech in 2016 with the findings of this chapter's previous sections. I argue that unlike in the case of legal-political EU-Hungary disputes when international social othering became heightened due to the domestic reorganization of the state, the "migration" or "refugee" crises created another kind of international environment. Namely, the reorganization of the international structure became a matter of emergency and so, international temporal othering heightened. It happened in addition to the already-existed social othering of Europe in the Hungarian discourse. Furthermore, as a result of these, in order to construct the state as a unitary actor, domestic social othering is suspended. Under these conditions, the domestic-international nexus becomes blurred as temporal alternatives become international-context-driven in both contexts. Table 3 summarizes the essence of the aforementioned findings.

	Social/spatial othering	**Temporal othering**
Domestic level	Hungary as a unitary actor – DOMESTIC SOCIAL OTHERING SUSPENDED	Europe of 1848 (and Hungary of 1848) as the desired temporal alternative (both domestically and internationally) which is against Brussels' today's alternative (forced upon nation-states domestically, internationally)
International level	Europe (Brussels) as a threat to Hungary as a whole	Hungary as a part of Europe (i.e. as both Europe and Hungary are threatened by the flows of migrants) – has a say in Europe's progress. However the way in which Europe's temporal other is imagined by Hungary is different from Brussels' alternative.

Table 3: Four Types of Othering in Orbán's Speech

The current Hungarian discourse constructed the country both inside and outside Europe because of the national reconceptualization of Europe again. In this sense, the speech aims to remind the audience to the EU's "original nature and role" as a form of coexistence and cooperation which is in fact, changeable. On the other hand, constructing the EU and the country in bodily terms contribute to the implicit message of the speech, that is, equalizing "real Europeanness" with CEE and Hungary, emphasizing the dangerous and uncontrollable temporal alternative of empowering the EU with higher degrees of agency than that of nation-states, as well as deconstructing the common set of EU and Hungary and so, implying the EU's national exclusion out of the Europe-concept.

The migration or refugee crises as a global problem made Europe not only to try to find the appropriate way to handle its social other. According to the speech, migrants are characterized as

> [...] the masses of people coming from different civilisations pose a threat to our way of life, our culture, our customs, and our Christian traditions. [96]

However, the emergence of this global crisis also seems to heighten international temporal alternative-negotiations in terms of rethinking the political structural defects of cooperation in the continent. These changes on the international stage also resulted in a growing focus on the domestic-international nexus. According to Orbán's speech:

> This danger is not now threatening us as wars and natural disasters do, which take the ground from under our feet in an instant. Mass migration is like a slow and steady current of water which washes away the shore. It appears in the guise of humanitarian action, but its true nature is the occupation of territory; and their gain in territory is our loss of territory. [97]

The perception of threatened territorial sovereignty results in discursive manifestations of intersubjective relations in bodily terms to a much greater extent than it happened previously, regarding both the domestic as well as the international contexts. On the domestic level, the speech constructs the nation-state as a unitary actor and in order to do so, suspends the domestic social othering of political opponents. However, on the international level, heightened international temporal alternatives result in the discursive othering of the EU as the promoter of the bad temporal alternative from Hungary's, CEE's and whole Europe's point of view.

> Europe is not free, because freedom begins with speaking the truth. In Europe today it is forbidden to speak the truth. A muzzle is a muzzle – even if it is made of silk. It is forbidden to say [...][98]

> At first, they [Brussels' bureaucrats] are only talking about a few hundred, a thousand or two thousand relocated people. But not a single responsible European leader would dare to swear under oath that this couple of thousand will not eventually increase to tens or

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[96] Orbán, "Orbán Viktor ünnepi beszéde."
[97] Ibid.
[98] In the original Hungarian text, "muzzle" is a compound word based on the words of "mouth" plus "basket". Orbán, "Orbán Viktor ünnepi beszéde."

hundreds of thousands. If we want to stop this mass migration, we must first of all curb Brussels. The main danger to Europe's future does not come from those who want to come here, but from Brussels' fanatics of internationalism. We cannot allow Brussels to place itself above the law. We shall not allow it to force upon us the bitter fruit of its cosmopolitan immigration policy.[99]

Furthermore, it is not only claimed that the geopolitical body of Europe, the body of Hungary, as well as of European citizens are threatened both by migrants and the European Union but it is also implied that their relation to each other needs reconsideration:

> We do know, however, that the current European constellation is an unstable one, and so we have some testing times ahead. The times in which we live press us with this question, which is like a hussar's sabre held to our chest: "Shall we live in slavery or in freedom?" The destiny of the Hungarians has become intertwined with that of Europe's nations, and has grown to be so much a part of the union that today not a single people – including the Hungarian people – can be free if Europe is not free. And today Europe is as fragile, weak and sickly as a flower being eaten away by a hidden worm.[100]

From this point of view, migrants as securitized referent subjects are only of secondary importance, the discursive instruments to construct the EU in security terms because of its proposed solution based on the ideas and values of internationalism. However, according to the securitizing actor, ideological-theoretical considerations should not be the primary basis of judging opportunities of structural renewal. Instead, one has to look at practice: the particular European revolutionary tradition of the past which is best-known by CEE countries and particularly by Hungary. Hungary, CEE countries and Europe are characterized as the natural layers of the same European body and value system, whereas the EU is equalized implicitly with Western Europe. It is also implied that if Western European states prefer to follow their current, dangerous temporal alternative which entails the protection of the idealistic but practically ineffective ideas of integration and internationalism, these states should be excluded from the European core.

At the end of the day, it seems that in the speech "Europe" is constructed as a geopolitical entity and the bearer of a unique past which allows it to find its new future temporal alternative

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[99] Orbán, "Orbán Viktor ünnepi beszéde."
[100] Ibid.

based on tradition. However, its two sub-regions, CEE and WE are represented as being without any overlap in terms of agency in the present situation. Additionally, WE's real European agency is questioned on the basis of its threat to the European homeland, meaning that the "EU" as the signifier of Western Europe transformed into its total opposite: discursively the EU became excluded from contemporary real Europeanness.

However, it is also implied that if Western European countries choose the right option for structuring the future, they will be not excluded. According to the speech, this would be the best possible future temporal alternative: acting together in the spirit of true Europeanness (rooted in 1848-Europe) and restructuring the current integration-based system with a more effective one, based on the unquestionable sovereignty of nation-states. The dangers of not doing so would lead to the prevalence of "hidden, faceless world powers" and the uncontrollable agency of the EU: "we will be swallowed up in the enormous belly of the United States of Europe". Referring to dangers of certain constellation of agency can be interpreted here as means to push an international temporal alternative, regarding the European future and to direct attention to the two-dimensional meaning of the European Union (agency plus structure), from which only one viewpoint (EU as a form or structure of European cooperation) is compatible with the international temporal alternative, offered by the securitizing actor. It is also worth to consider that the creation of the EU after World War II meant the creation of a new temporal self of Europe itself in contrast with its past self (the Europe of the balance of power) perceived as its own other.[101] In this sense, the securitizing actor disentangles contemporary Europe from its EU-identity as the best possible self with deconstructing its agency – which is now similarly heightened due to structural reasons as it was during the post-Cold War enlargement – and making it only into a form of coexistence.

[101] Waever, 103-132.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I addressed the question of why and on what ways do different types of otherings coexist in a discursively unusual relationship. In order to address the empirical puzzle connected to the case of Hungary, I developed a new theoretical framework, drawing on securitization theory and Freedman's accounts on temporal and social othering. After re-framing the puzzle in accordance with the theoretical framework, I applied a historical comparative discourse analysis. It proved to be well-applicable as after analyzing both the domestic as well as the international contextual aspects of Viktor Orbán's discourse, I was I able to provide a comprehensive explanation.

The way in which today's Europe-idea evolved in Fidesz's discourse shows a tendency of proceeding from coincident temporal alternatives between the international and the nation-state levels towards the appearance and heightening of international social othering and finally, due to the new global emergency situation, the heightening of international temporal othering too. It seems that in the Hungarian domestic context, the protection and promotion of differing temporal alternatives – which also show some preserved similarities – have been continuously coupled with securitizing moves initiated by Fidesz. In the international context, the temporal alternatives which were preferred by Fidesz were also continuously connected to the same historical legacy, "best past self" of the country – the way in which it was imagined both in national and international terms since 1989. However, in contrast with the domestic context, the change of temporal alternatives in structural and agency-terms resulted in a successive transition towards higher degrees of othering of the European Union, on the basis of that it became even less connected to the achievement of the ultimate, unchanging goal – the Europe of 1848 and the nation-state of 1848.

The contribution of this analysis is threefold. Firstly, it provided as well as tested a theoretical framework which can serve with additional perspectives both for those who aim to apply securitization theory or who take Freedman's approach as their starting point. The main point is that

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the theoretical framework delineated in this thesis can provide a toolkit to examine empirical cases in which othering happens in a puzzling way in the international as well as domestic contexts. In the new framework, temporality and spatiality are incorporated into both contextual fields. Secondly, the empirical case addressed in this paper is a highly relevant one, as it reflects not only on national discursive manifestations of the Europe-body but also, it highlights that Europe's sub-regions have different historical patterns in terms of their discursive relation to the body of Europe. Thirdly, based on the results of this paper, one can find a number of new research directions too.

One can conclude that an outer social other of "Europe" as a whole, an agent which can disturb the existing structure and reflect its errors, can lead to a reconsideration of structure and agency both on the pan-European as well as on the nation-state level. This can lead to hypothesize that there are a number of implications of this research which point towards new, interesting areas of research. One of these is that in terms of the agent-structure debate in relation to securitization theory – that is widely equated with the debate on the context's internality or externality in relation to securitization's agents and their speech acts – needs reconsideration through case studies. This research direction follows from the findings presented in this paper. Namely, it would be worth to focus on how the discourse of those actors which agency is questioned – e. g. the EU – due to structural change, is changing throughout time in terms of its communication process with its members. Why does it fail to react with self-protectory discursive elements, if it does so, or why does it seem to accept certain members' claims about its agent versus form nature? What does characterize the communication process-changes between members of the questioned entity if they do not share each others view in terms of how to handle the existing entity under the new global conditions? Addressing these questions could further nuance the framework and findings of this work.

Last but not least, one has to mention that even if we aim to test certain types of securitization theories on new case studies or apply Freedman's framework to cases which demand

distinguishing between the domestic and international levels, the integrated framework developed by

this thesis can serve as a useful theoretical contribution and also worth further nuancing.

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