Merging Religious Ideologies in State-Building Projects in the Middle East: A Comparison between the Religious Zionist Movement and the Islamic State

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Abstract

A new, powerful organization, the Islamic State (ISIS), emerged in the Middle East claiming to reestablish a caliphate system. Both the nature and the scope of violence committed by ISIS are unmatched in recent human history. However, in a region where the practice of monotheism is held to be of great significance, this is not the first religious state-building project. The study investigates the employment of religious ideologies in state formation processes of the Religious Zionist movement (a faction of the Zionist movement) and the Islamic State (ISIS) in the stage preceding state formation; namely, before 1948 and 2014 respectively. The aim is to analyze the ideological concordance as well as identity construction of two state-building projects that operationalize religion for the restoration of historical states. Through an intraregional comparison along with a critical discourse analysis, I depict the similarities and differences between the usages of religion in these processes. I specifically analyze each movement's own perception of the concepts of statehood, peoplehood, restoration, and legitimacy in order to draw comparative conclusions from the semantics. The research shows that despite significant differences between the two movements that include, ISIS's extreme fundamentalism and exclusion of out-groups and the Religious Zionists' willingness to cooperate with the secular, Zionist majority, the similarities prove to be higher specifically within the scope of the study: ideology and identity construction. Both cases aspire to (re)structure a state that applies a comprehensive, religious legal system as idealized by a nostalgic past. Religion is significantly instrumentalized - in several, similar manners - as a motive and basis for legitimate claims to implement an envisioned project with an imagined community. The analyses, further, reveal ISIS's plans and aspirations as well as puts it in a comparative perspective in order to better understand its motives.

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To my mama,

who supported me in all my decisions.

To my baba,

who taught me that education is the most important thing.

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Introduction

A. The Geopolitical Context and Research Aims

The Middle East is a region of complex relationships and conflict-prone identities. This is significantly due to two prominent agreements: the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 and the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The Sykes-Picot agreement led to the division of the Greater Middle East arbitrarily without taking into account different ethnic and religious factions (Shughart, 2006, p. 8). This agreement still has resonance on identity formation and is witnessed in several ongoing conflicts. The Balfour Declaration is a support declaration from the United Kingdom for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine ("Balfour Declaration," 2016), which led to severe conflicts in the region inspired by identity, religion, and conflicted claims for state formation and rights to territories.

Religion plays a fundamental role in identity formation, state-societal dynamics, international relations, and regional power. It has been used as an instrument by several governments and political parties in order to gain specific interests. Religion has also been a vital tool for shaping identity. It is, additionally and most importantly, a motive for state formation or basis for governance in many cases. Geography plays an important role in exacerbating the issues of the region as well. The Middle East is an area that holds historical, religious shrines to all monotheistic religions, which raises tensions over which actors have "territorial rights" over these "holy" sights (Kolers, 2009, p. 10). In addition, the strategic region is full of resources, particularly oil, that direct and influence the interests of different foreign actors who may accordingly assist or impede movements.

By the end of World War II, the Middle East witnessed a period of decolonization and the rise of new independent nation-states. During this period, the Zionist movement successfully established the State of Israel in 1948 as a Jewish homeland. In 2014, the Islamic State (hereafter ISIS) declared itself a caliphate state and invites the Sunni Muslims to the "homeland." Similar to the Zionists who claimed a historical restoration of a territory, ISIS claims a restoration of the previously abolished Ottoman caliphate in 1924 yet the future of its structure remains unknown (Liebl, 2009, p. 374).

There are various similarities between the processes that preceded state formation of the two cases historically, structurally, psychologically, and ideologically. The Zionist state, however, successfully became the state of Israel amidst hatred and animosity in the region employing religious elements to its claim. It also received quick recognition from the international community while the Islamic State is attempting to find a place in the same region using religion as a tool for gaining power yet remains unrecognized and proclaimed a terrorist group by numerous countries.

This research strives to answer the question *how religious ideologies are merged in processes of state establishments.* Ideology, in this study, refers to a set of beliefs that is shared by groups who "subscribe to it with a comprehensive cognitive map of their position and purposes" (Shimoni, p. 3). In other words, ideology is the dominant idea and implicit biases that direct political actions (Freeden, 2010, p. 6). It is also the "basis of social representations" (as cited in Freeden, 2007, p. 7). Accordingly, the paper analyzes the ideological concordance between movements that operationalize religion for the restoration of states from a constructivist approach.

The combination of religious ideologies and politics produce influential guidelines for these movements. Regardless of the argued similarities between the ideologies in these movements, the application is different; the role of religion is smaller in the Zionist movement as a whole in comparison to ISIS. Thus, my units of analysis are Religious Zionism (the religious faction of the movement) and the Islamic State. The main scope of the comparison is the time preceding the state formations. For the Religious Zionist movement, the analysis covers the period between the 1880s until 1948 while for ISIS, the scope extends from the 2000s until 2014.

This paper, further, discursively analyzes the relationship between religion and the construction of identity. These "fundamental" projects desire to refashion society using a traditionalist identity. They are motivated by "nostalgia for a golden era" (Marty and Appleby, 1991, p. 835) to construct a certain identity for their claim to a right to self-rule based on historical and holy texts. Thus, the histories as well as the notion of peoplehood complement each other as blocks of state (re)formation.

The research starts with the theoretical frameworks of the theory of the modern state as well as the interplay between nationalism, religion, and fundamentalism, which paves the way for a better understanding of this case-centered, empirical study (chapter one). Chapter two explains the methodologies used to conduct this study. Subsequently, I divide the thesis into two parts: part one is designated to the intraregional, descriptive comparisons of the two movements using secondary sources (chapter three); while part two is designated to discourse analysis using primary sources in order to compare and contrast the formation of ideology and identity to restore a state (chapter four). These chapters are followed by a conclusion.

B. The Selection of Cases and Point of Departure

The Islamic State is a fast-growing organization that is posing challenges and shifts of powers regionally and internationally. The immense rise of the organization caught most social scientists "off guard," as it started controlling vast amounts of territories, committing mass killings, and organizing terrorist attacks outside its controlled territories. It is, both, the nature and the scope of atrocities committed that stand behind the entrenched opinion that the phenomenon of ISIS is unmatched in recent human history. While the public display of the organization makes it easy to agree with such a statement, it also blurs the picture of what is going on "behind the scenes" – the *religious ideology for the state-building project*. In addition, I believe our current perception of the state of Israel as a democratic, free state led to overlooking its various inception branches and processes.

Without any intention to minimize the exceptional brutality of ISIS's actions, I argue that, despite all of its peculiarities, ISIS shares important similarities with other religion-based statebuilding processes. More precisely, this study seeks to compare ISIS with the Religious Zionist Movement. I try to identify similarities and differences between the two with the purpose of understanding the very nature of these projects. I focus on a narrow aspect of comparison with the aim of narrowing my elements of analysis as well as refraining from equating the whole Zionist movement with ISIS.

Religious Zionism and the Islamic State are the only aspired modern state-building projects that claim to restore historical territories by uniting an imagined community that is partially or fully defined through a religious aspect. Although this study analyzes state-formation processes, Religious Zionism, which is solely a faction of a movement, is one of the units of analysis. This is due to the fact that the religious Zionists envisioned a certain state structure independent of the secular vision. Despite their failure to implement a religious state structure, they cooperated with the secular Zionists in building what is now the state of Israel. Thus, in order to analyze this faction fully, it needs to be contextualized in the Zionism movement as a whole, which has secular dimensions.

There are various similarities between the two movements that include the use of religion as an element for ideological legitimacy and identity, claim to a historical land, internationalization of projects (a scattered community), regional context, and some mechanisms of power accumulation such as displacements of existing inhabitants. Both movements had blueprints for consolidating power that include economic plans, foreign relations and institutions that function as preliminary necessities for a state. Both cases, additionally, have components of transnational nature such as Diasporas and collective grievance in the forms of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia/Western domination. Moreover, these movements have repercussions in the entire region as they were/are struggling to impose a place within it.

Variations, on the other hand, include the international dimension as well as the time context of the birth of these projects. The 1940s is a "transformative" decade in modern history (Jensehaugen et al., 2012, p. 281). It is a period of decolonization and bipolarity. These factors were deployed for the success of the Zionist movement. By contrast, ISIS is a self-claimed state that has no boundaries. Contemporarily, it is a "globalized" era where there are several, rising, non-state actors playing critical roles in politics, which raises the question whether institutions and organizations would evolve to cope with such a structure. Unlike ISIS that does not define its borders, the Zionists call for the establishment of a state that fits the world order. Among other variations, the usage of violence is exceptionally dissimilar in nature and degree.

There are some limitations to this study, as in many cases primary documents in Hebrew on the Religious Zionists were overlooked in comparison to ISIS's that are accessible in Arabic and English. In addition, ISIS's short timespan bounds academic analysis on the situation. This is my study's limitation as well as my area of contribution; to my knowledge, this is the first attempt to put ISIS in a comparative perspective. Moreover, there is limited existing literature on ISIS that focuses on its state and identity construction; the literature is rather predominantly focused on understanding ISIS's goals and more specifically understanding how to deal with it. Thus, this study seeks to fill these gaps by studying the employment of religion on two state-building projects, one of which is a rising, powerful organization, in the Middle East.

Chapter One: Conceptualization

This chapter introduces the framework theories for this case-centered study. The first section (1.1) provides a literature review on the theory of the modern state in order to understand the envisioned forms, structures, and functionalities of the two state-building projects. The second section (1.2) provides a theoretical explanation of important concepts such as religion, nationalism, and fundamentalism as forms of ideology and identity. These concepts are key to understanding the cases; additionally, they channel the focus of themes in the methodology application.

1.1 The Theory of the Modern State

"The attempt to create new nation-states has been the inspiration for some of the most glorious and tragic moments of modern politics" (Roeder, 2007, p. 4).

The theory of the modern state enhances our understanding of the form and structure of the state projects both movements are seeking. It is important to understand the nature of the two state-building projects in the framework of the modern-state theory in order to understand their ideologies, goals and tactics. The phenomenon of the modern state is one of utmost importance in contemporary politics. The creation of a modern-state marked key historical events that challenged old systems and balances of power. The nation-state is a vital political institution that sets the parameters of international and domestic politics (Roeder, 2007, p. 4), yet there is not a consented definition to what it is.

Several historical events, treaties and conflicts led to today's understanding of the modern state. The state is a "modern" development that took place between the years 1816 to 2000 (ibid., p. 5). Pierson argues that despite the different definitions, there is a general agreement and understanding of the elements of the modern state. He, thus, uses nine requirements for the existence of a state that include: "(monopoly) control of the means of violence, territoriality, sovereignty, constitutionality, impersonal power, the public bureaucracy, authority/legitimacy, citizenship and taxation" (1996, p. 8). These points guide our contemporary understanding of the organizational structure and functions of the state. States come in different forms based on different ideologies and application of law yet they all abide by certain, basic definitions, structures, and criteria. The Zionists were keen to establish a state that fit the world order. ISIS, on the other hand, does not define its territoriality in terms of borders nor does it have impersonal power or citizenship. Nonetheless, it has a constructed notion of peoplehood that it attempts to unite under its sovereignty.

Held puts the modern state in context of a historical process that started with empires, feudalism, polity of estates, absolutist states¹, and finally developed into modern states (ibid, p. 40). Pierson disagrees that the absolutist state, the preceding form of the modern state, is a traditional state rather than a modern one (p. 44). He argues that we can treat the absolutist state as a "transitional form" that has survived several periods. Many elements that constitute the modern state were present in the absolutist state. This could be applied to the rise of religious states, after the decolonization period that are built on religious ideologies yet abide by the modern state perception.

The Islamic State could be categorized as an absolutist state whereas the caliph claims to have a divine right as a chosen leader to rule under certain guidelines and administration. The State constitutes several features of a modern state yet cannot be categorized as one. Additionally, it could be categorized as a theocratic, totalitarian state. A totalitarian state is one that extends its limitless power to regulate all aspects of life. Additionally it is a mixture of terror and ideology that any opponent to the state is viewed as an enemy (Conquest, 1999). It remains challenging to fit the form of ISIS into one definition. McCants emphasizes the ambiguity ISIS uses in identifying itself as a state. The word *dawla* (state in Arabic) refers to a modern nation-state as well as a caliphate. He, further, points to how former caliphates were called *dawla* such as the *Dawla Abbasiyya*.² (2015, p. 15). The Religious Zionists desired to build a theocracy to implement

¹ The absolutist state is defined as a state whereas power is vested in one authority that claims to have power by divine right (Spielvogel, 1991, p. 523)

² The Dawla Abbasiyya was "second of the two great dynasties of the Muslim Empire" ("Abbasid Dynasty," 2016)

the *halacha*,³ a comprehensive Jewish legal system. Their initial desire to, reveals a totalitarian side to the state that was not applied. Although the Religious Zionists did not depict 'enemies' explicitly as ISIS, they put the Jews in a superior hierarchical status over everyone else.

Despite the differences between the forms of states, Roeder argues that the following elements, "identity, grievance, greed, mobilization, and international recognition-must be present for a successful nation-state project" (p. 9). All these factors, arguably, were present in the Religious Zionist case. The Religious Zionists built an identity based on a blurred fusion between religion and ethnicity (Abulof, 2014). The anti-Semitism the Jewish diaspora faced, played an important role in identity shaping, mobilization, and ideology basis for their movement. In addition, they greedily aspired to acquire more land and displace inhabitants. The Jews were also partially mobilized under 'the return to the Promised Land' ideology and returning to the land where their dignities will be protected. Moreover, they claimed "territorial rights" in Palestine, which are rights of a certain group to legally control a specific area (Kolers, 2009, p. 10). Finally, the Zionists (in cooperation with the religious faction) received international recognition for the establishment of the state.

ISIS, on the other hand, is forming an identity built on Sunni Islam. Many Muslims claim that the West, in particular colonial powers, has deepened their divisions and threatened their identity. Similar to the Zionists, ISIS employed "greed" as it gradually started expanding by the idea of "cleansing" lands along with targeting resourceful places to sustain its project financially. In addition, it seeks mobilization in reestablishing a caliphate that was previously demolished in order for the Muslims to rule themselves as well as hasten the End of Days. Hence, ISIS arguably meets these criteria except for international recognition. The international dimension is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, part of the focus of this study is on the four common elements presented by Roeder.⁴

³ Refer to glossary.

⁴ Chapter two expands on all these used and the usage of these elements for the study.

Having explained the components of a modern state, it is also important to differentiate between a state, a nation, nationalism, and religion. McLennan et al. define the nation as a constitutive of "some historical identity, some geographical contiguity, some shared cultural characteristics" to constitute a nation (1984, p. 217). Roeder defines the nation-state as "a claim that a specific population (purportedly a nation) should be self-governing within a sovereign state of its own–one that may not yet exist" (2007, p. 12). In other words, the nation-state is a process that takes place, whereas groups who share common features such as culture, language, ideology, or religion decide to govern themselves and entertain sovereignty with a legitimate claim. Thus, a nation refers to peoples with common political aspirations while a state requires political institutions to protect identity and unification. The nation and the state should "coincide" to produce the nation-state that fits the concepts of contemporary politics (ibid). The Zionists had a clear nation-state building project; however, it remains unclear whether ISIS is striving to build a "nation-state" or a "state." I argue that ISIS is constructing a 'nation' as demonstrated by their manifestos.⁵ It is also important to note that ISIS is building an unusual form of state based on a caliphate system.

Nationalism and religion, discussed further in the next section, are confined in this study to sources of ideologies and social identities. The national identity and the religious identity fuse in the Zionist movement while the Islamic State is building its project solely on religious identity.

1.2 Forms of Identity and Ideology Sources

This section is divided into two sections that address ideological sources and identity politics. The first section (1.2.1) discusses religion and nationalism separately, as well as the interplay between them. These concepts help understand the ideology and identity construction of the movements. The second section (1.2.2) discusses religious fundamentalism, which addresses the questions of who the fundamentalists are, how they act, and what their goals are in order to broaden our understanding of the movements' actors and their motives.

⁵ I expand on this argument in the discourse analysis in chapter 4.

1.2.1 Religion and Nationalism

Nationalism and religion are often treated as separate spheres as nationalism is usually viewed as a secular, Western, and modern notion as opposed to religion. Both nationalism and religion are sources of ideology and forms of identity politics that are instrumentalized for legitimacy and social unity in order to achieve political gains. Religion offers its followers a strong and collective identity. It offers purpose and promises. This identification process paves the way for loyalty and justification for radical actions (Gupta, 2008, p. 49). On the other hand, Hobsbawm argues that nationalism is a created "new secular religion" drawing on a historical past by rulers seeking societal cohesion and legitimacy (1983, p. 303). This "invented tradition," however, must be desired by the people. Nevertheless, Kubalkova (2000) stresses that due to globalization, people retreat to religion as a source of transcendental identity. Religious identity has a transnational scope that not only fits the current globalized period but that may also appeal to people for its resilient characteristic.

Recent literature has shifted its focus on the interplay between the nationalism and religion (Abulof, 2014, p. 156). A subtype of nationalism is religious nationalism, which is argued to be a modern type of nationalism (Gorski and Tuïrkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2013, p. 194). Religious nationalism used to be treated as an oxymoron for the secularity of nationalism as well as the universality of religion. Nevertheless, it refers to "a social movement that claims to speak in the name of the nation and that defines the nation in terms of religion" (Martin, 2013, p. 194). Religious nationalism is a characteristic of Religious Zionism wherein it is a political movement yet defines the nation in terms of religion.

The Religious Zionists were caught in between the secular, modernist Zionists and the traditional *haredim*, who held anti-Zionism views (Don-Yehiya, 1994). The Jewish identity refers to religious heritage and ethnicity. One can be Jewish without practicing Judaism. The Jewish nation, therefore, is one that is connected through a common origin and common characteristics for a common political goal – reestablishing the state. ISIS, on the other hand, is a mere religious

movement that is building a state in the globalized era. It identifies its community using religious, transnational identity. Although the Qur'an refers to the *ummah* or the "community of faith,"⁶ transnationalism and pan-Islamism persist (Piscatori, 1994, p. 367). Unlike the Zionists, ISIS does not address a community with a common origin but rather a community with a common religion. In addition, ISIS has not been successful in creating a social cohesion for its imagined "community;" the majority of Sunni Muslims do not and may not identify with the State.

1.2.2 Religious Fundamentalism

"Fundamentalism is primarily a twentieth century phenomenon, with 'historical antecedents, but no ideological precursors."" (Marty and Appleby, 1991, p. 814)

Religion provides people with a personal and social identity as well as instructs behaviors (ibid, p. vii). When religion is strengthened with politics, it could possibly conceive "fundamentalism." It becomes, thus, movements of "political religion" that have sanctified natures (Aran, 1991, p. 314). Marty and Appleby offer an explanation on the nature and goals of fundamentalism,

The movements got their name from the choice: they reached back to real or presumed pasts, to actual or imagined ideal original conditions and concepts, and selected what they regarded as fundamental. The verb includes a clue: fundamentalists are selective. They may well consider that they are adopting the whole of the pure past. But their energies go into employing those features, which will best reinforce their identity, keep their movement together, build defenses around its boundaries, and keep others at some distance (pp. ix-x).

Fundamentalists want to recreate a historical time when the masses were in better connection with divine power. Another pattern of fundamentalism is the rhetoric of the End of Days or fulfilling prophecies. Not only is one required to prepare for the apocalypse but one is also required to pave the way for it to take place, which gives meaning to the projects' missions. Fundamentalists strive to change and remake existing orders with a "comprehensive system" embedded in religion (p. 824). Hence, fundamentalism has a totalitarian aspect (p. 331). In addition, fundamentalism is usually created from "social and political frustration" that creates a

⁶ Ummah is often translated as "nation" because the Arabic word is applicable to a form of peoplehood who shares common characteristics. In the context of Muslim ummah, it is a body of people who share the same faith.

high religious momentum, which cannot be sustained by existing orders or religious structures (Aran, 1991, pp. 313-14). This leads to an eruption that is often violent where they seek to self-preservation but neutralize others.

The authors argue that despite disagreements on what constitutes or explains fundamentalism, there are certain characteristics that religious fundamentalists entertain. First, they "fight back;" they are "traditionalists"⁷ who fight, figuratively and literally, certain patterns of life and threats to their identity (ibid.). An active plan rises with real or perceived danger to their identity (p. 822). The Religious Zionists fight the dominance of secularity in the state-building project while ISIS fights Western imposition and "un-Islamic" lifestyles. Second, they "fight for;" they fight for certain inherited beliefs and ideas that they strive to reinforce (p. ix). Both groups fight for identity, territory, and reinforcing religious conceptions. Third, they "fight against others (p. x);" for fundamentalists, there are always "others" who come in the form of modernizers, infidels, or even "moderate" people within their groups as they divide the world into believers and non-believers based on their claim to absolute truth (p. 819).⁸ Finally, they "fight under God;" they carry out God's will on earth (p. x), which is true for both cases.

There are several, general and shared characteristics of fundamentalist actors and projects that are illuminated in the units of analysis. I argue that both cases are fundamental projects. The Religious Zionists generally fit the criteria and definitions of fundamentalists even though they cooperate with the secular Zionists, which could be argued as a moderate stance. I further explain this argument in chapter three.

⁷ There is a difference between traditionalism and fundamentalism. The former is a correlate of the latter. When people go beyond traditionalism to create conditions for resistance, they create fundamentalism (176). 8 The Palicious Zionitti' and ISIS's perpendice of the self and the other are clearly manifested in the second part of

⁸ The Religious Zionists' and ISIS's perception of the self and the other are clearly manifested in the second part of this study.

Chapter Two: Research Methodology

This chapter deals with the study's methodology. It is divided in two sections that describe the aims and choices of the methods conducted. Each section introduces a method and its usages; the first section (2.1) introduces the method: comparative area studies (intraregional comparison) while the second section (2.2) introduces the method: critical discourse analysis in addition to presenting the primary sources that are used in this research.

2.1 Intraregional Comparisons

Basedau and Köllner introduce three methods of comparative area studies: intraregional, interregional, and cross-regional comparisons (2007, p. 110). Intraregional comparisons are comparisons of cases in the same region. At the beginning of the research, I use this method aiming to reveal similarities and differences between the two state-building projects. I use secondary sources in a descriptive manner that pave the way for comparisons that dig into the ideologies, histories and processes of each project. The histories take in consideration the international settings as well as the events and factors that led to or influenced the emergence of ideologies.

The purpose of this method is to contextualize the small-N units of analysis. Regional dynamics and similar surrounding conditions deepen similarities (ibid., p. 119); thus, the connections between Religious Zionism and ISIS are extended by the regional context. There are ideological similarities between Judaism and Islam that are connected by their geographical place of origin and culture (Heilman, 1995, p. 72). Geographically, the Middle East, in this paper, covers North Africa, Israel, the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. Culturally, monotheistic religions are crucial features that are embedded in society.

There are merits and disadvantages to small-N comparisons. An important disadvantage of small-N comparisons is limit of the extent of generalizations. Nevertheless, as Bunce suggests, this small sample allows for deeper analyses and more attention to detail; in addition, it eliminates possible wrong categorizations by large-N studies (1995, p. 980). The detailed comparisons of

this cross-national, diachronic study enrich the knowledge of the area of origin and pave the way for developing concepts (Basedau and Köllner, 2007, p. 114) enhancing the knowledge of nationalism, religion, and state establishment and the relationship between these variables. This understanding of the complex relationship between the variables extends our understanding of cases that employ religion for state-building projects or governance outside the region.

2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

Next, I conduct a qualitative discourse analysis using primary sources, when accessible, for the ideological comparisons as well as identity formations. Discourse refers to social practice or action (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 4) in the form of spoken and written language (ibid., p. 19). Discourse is the "patterns, commonality, relationships that embrace different texts and occasions" (ibid., p. 6). There are several methods to discourse analysis. I use Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) (ibid., p. 21); the method aims to analyze the relationship between text and social procedures (cited in Georges, p. 6). Thus, it is a useful method to analyze ideologies, the construction of identity, power relations as well as authoritative claims based on religion.

Ideology functions on the normative and the operative realms. The normative layer is usually found in authoritative texts such as religious Holy Scriptures or constitutions (Wodak, 2006, p. 309). The operative layer is when ideas operate in everyday mundane life. Thus, the operative is usually found in speeches or school curricula, for example (ibid., p. 311). This study predominantly goes into deeper analysis of the latter. The analysis of religious texts is confined in the context of how they are used in the operative realm.

It is important to note that a method of legitimizing and constructing identity is through discourse (ibid., p. 112). Discourse does not only construct identity but it can also restore a certain status quo because identity is discursively created and recreated constantly (ibid., p. 106).

The formation of identity constitutes elements of the 'self' versus the 'other^{*9} – the similarities and distinctions – that contrast the in-group and out-group (ibid., p. 104). Additionally, this identity is usually perceived as threatened; thus, discourse is used to "maintain, support, and reproduce" it (ibid, p. 113). The (re)construction of identity usually incorporates homeland and solidarity rhetoric. Both cases have identities that combine exceptionally specific yet transnational¹⁰ elements. This method is important to the research question because of the significant role peoplehood play in legitimizing the state-building projects as well as building a "nation."

Subsequently, I concentrate on official and personal statements made by the two movements to detect important themes in the semantics. There is more than one document that redundantly shed light on the same concepts the same way. My aim is not to demonstrate frequency but to demonstrate certain perceptions and representation of expression in relation to ideology and identity. Thus, I exclude several references to the same ideas from different documents. In addition, even though discourse is not restricted to language but extends to nonverbal movements, intonation, pauses, etc., I focus my research on verbal, specifically written, language. I treat speeches, book excerpts, blueprints, and ideology magazines that present firsthand, credible voices, as mere texts.

The division of codes covers the following concepts that are under the umbrella of *ideology* and *identity*:

a) *Peoplehood* (identification of the self and the other) as well as closely related concepts such as *representation* (authentic expression of the will of the people), *grievance* (collective memory), and *mobilization* (necessity/urge/duty/provocation).

b) *Statehood* (homeland, state-formation, state terminology, state structures/functionalities).

c) *Legitimacy* (the manifestation of the will of God/legitimate claim/the application of religion).

⁹ The self and the other identity construction is usually in the form of a positive self-image vs. a negative otherpresentation (Wodak, 2006, p. 105).

¹⁰ For ISIS, transnationalism is key to its identification of the community. For Zionism, there is a Jewish nation; thus, transnational identity here refers to the Jews having additional national identities as they come from all over the world (i.e. Jewish Polish).

- d) Restoration (return of land/people)/historical ties (historical belonging to the land/shared history/nostalgia).
- e) Religious reference/divinity (reference to God or Holy Scriptures/ Godly promises). I include the concept of *divinity* here, although it is not analyzed individually in the analysis part, because it touches upon the above-mentioned concepts.

Some codes were anticipated before the beginning of the analyses (inductive) while some were drawn from the primary sources (deductive). In the analyses sections, these concepts are italicized. The analysis looks into general themes rather than scrutinizing every word. This decision was made based on the incorporation of several sources for analysis. I chose a number of sources, some of which are lengthy, rather than one document from each movement because I aim to demonstrate the general yet emphasized ideas of both movements. In addition, some sentences that were categorized under unused themes in this research were disregarded.

The sources are chosen based on importance and accessibility. Another aim was to find comparable documents for each movement resulting in a set of four paired documents. The used documents are all available in English. However, at times I compared the translations between Arabic and English to reach the best-intended meanings since the sensitivity of the issue requires a careful study of the semantics. I divided every paragraph in each original document numerically in order to facilitate for the reader allocating the original text. The paragraph division is based on the indention spacing in the original text regardless of the size of the paragraph. In documents where there are chapters, I restarted numbering with the first paragraph of the chapter.

The first analyzed documents are two speeches by each leader of both movements concerning the declaration of establishment of each state. The first is Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's speech on May 14, 1948 titled *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*, which is available on the Israeli Foreign Affairs website. The second is ISIS spokesman's Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani speech on June 29, 2014 titled *This is the Promise of Allah*, which is available as an English document in an article by Al-Jazeera titled *Sunni Rebels Declare New Islamic Caliphate*.' Even though the focus of this thesis is on Religious Zionism, as expressed earlier, the religious factions strived to influence the secular Zionists and cooperate with them. Thus, I

found it appropriate to analyze the final outcome of this cooperation in the form of declaration of a state. I find these documents to be of significance particularly because the announcements of the projects entail a specific representation of the nature of the movements. Additionally, these address a specific community as well as the international community.

The next set of comparisons is two primary sources that reveal the anticipated structure of the state projects. I use excerpts from an unfinished book by Chief Rabbi Herzog written,¹¹ approximately, in 1948 before the declaration of the State. The book reveals the State's proposed constitution. Herzog demonstrates the dilemma of the Jewish question – is it secular or religious? Excerpts are available in the book *The Origins of Israel 1882-1948*. The second source is the Islamic State's leaked document, *Principles in the Administration of the Islamic State* retrieved from an article by the Guardian titled *The ISIS Papers: Leaked Documents Show How ISIS is Building its State*. This article was published in December 2015¹², more than a year after the declaration of the State. The Islamic State's document is a blueprint for the organization's structure and plans of consolidating power, which is a distinctive document that discloses the internal governance of the group, while the Religious Zionists' book is an envisioned plan of governance.

Subsequently, I use the book *Orot*, published in 1920, by Chief Rabbi Kook. I find it the most appropriate manifestation of the views of the religious Zionists. I compiled various parts of the book that are available in English online into one document that can be found in *Appendix A*. Kook focuses on the essence of Jewish identity and the Jewish connection to *Eretz-Yisrael*.¹³ The book is used in comparison to ISIS's propaganda magazine, *Dabiq*. The first issue is titled *The Return of Khilafah*; it was published in Ramadan 2014 shortly after the announcement of the caliphate. I analyze selected articles from the issue for the sake of brevity. The selection process is based on the relevance of the articles to the research question. In addition, many parts were

¹¹ Rabbi Herzog succeeded Rabbi Kook as the Chief Rabbi in British Palestine in1937. Kook is believed to be one of the most influential Jewish thinkers of Religious Zionism who inspired many followers to his school of thought. The next chapter discusses his views elaborately.

¹² Although this document is beyond the time-scope of the study, I find it appropriate to use for several reasons. First, it is a blueprint of governance, which ISIS followed to construct its state regardless of the date it was written. Second, it is a leaked document, which means it may have been written earlier but it was enclosed. ¹³ *Eretz-Yisrael* is the Hebrew name for the historical 'land of Israel.'

disregarded due to repetitiveness of themes or of quotes of some of the speeches previously analyzed separately, which is not in the focus of this study, as mentioned earlier. I provide page and paragraph numbers for the length of the issue.

Finally, I analyze Rabbi Kook's letter and Caliph Al-Baghdadi's speech.¹⁴ The former is available as a lecture "on the Jewish People" on *The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash*'s website. The letter is written in 1907 to Rabbi Shmuel Alexandrov, addressing the essence of the Jewish character. The latter, titled *A Message to the Mujahedeen and the Muslim Ummah in the Month of Ramadan* is found on the website: *Internet Archive: Digital Library*. The speech calls the Muslims for *hijrah*.¹⁵ Although the documents differ in nature and in their addressed audiences, the aim of the comparison is to reveal the views of these two prominent leaders. The letter is the most accessible primary document, to my knowledge, that reveals the Rabbi's personal thoughts and views.

The comparative CDA allows for more comparable cases. It aims to reveal the similarities and differences in: a) the processes of state-formations that aimed to reestablish states with religious ideologies and historical links; b) the processes of the construction of identity; c) the employment of religion in these movements. The analysis ultimately allows for interpretations and better understanding of the present by analyzing how ISIS identifies itself and the world around it in comparison to the Religious Zionists.

¹⁴ Another discourse analysis, by Amaryllis Georges, has been conducted on Al-Baghdadi's speech. This study was consulted for further clarifications of meanings. This is the only source chosen, to my knowledge, where a CDA has been previously used. Other analyses of the documents I analyze, are usually on different themes such as the discursive development of the notion of peace in the Zionist discourse. ¹⁵ Refer to glossary.

Part I

Comparative Area Studies

This chapter discusses the origin, history, ideology, and leaders of the Religious Zionist movement and the Islamic State. The first section (3.1) goes into the history of the Religious Zionist movement and the development of its ideology. It contextualizes the religious movement in its position within the Zionist movement. In addition, it discusses the character and aims of the fundamental Jew. The second section (3.2) follows the same logic for the Islamic State. The third section (3.3) draws a comparison between the two intraregional cases.

3.1 The Genesis of the Religious Zionist Ideology and Movement

"And I will give to you and to your descendants after you, the land of your temporary residence, all the land of Canaan as an eternal possession and I will be a God to them." (Old Testament (Torah), Genesis 17:8)¹⁶

The Jews set up the kingdom of Israel in 1000 B.C. based on a belief that it is the "Promised Land" from God (Goldberg and DuPre, 2004, p. 204). However, they started to scatter all over the world where they faced a painful history that dates back to slavery in Egypt to anti-Semitism in Europe in the 1800s. They were discriminated against and faced violence, maltreatment and displacement. Their problems were not to be solved by assimilation, insulation, or religious reform because the Jews would remain minorities; thus, many found the solution to be, creating a Jewish national home (Shelef, 2010, p. 2-3).

In 1896, a Jewish journalist, Theodor Herzl, called for a political movement for the Jews to establish a homeland. His experience of anti-Semitism in Europe ignited his passion to emancipate the Jews from oppression. The idea of establishing a homeland especially in Palestine was not an original one, as many preceded Herzl. However, his pamphlet *The Jewish State* inspired the Zionist Movement and received popularity among the Jews who viewed Herzl as their leader. Herzl organized and led the First Zionist Congress, which held people from many different countries and occupations supporting his program and ideas. The congress was successful and led to the organization of the Zionist Organization where Herzl became president. He was able

¹⁶ God was speaking to the forefather, Abraham, promising him the land of Canaan, which is the southern Levant and particularly today's Israel.

to mobilize people, use their historical grievance and religious beliefs as well as common identity to organize a movement to apply the idea of a Jewish Homeland ("Theodor Herzl, 2016").

The Zionists claimed to speak for the entire Jewish nation yet (Shelef, 2010, p. 147) the vast majority of Jews all over the world were either "ambivalent" or "hostile" to the idea of Zionism, which hindered the movement at first (ibid., p. 153). Jews coming from all over the world also meant that a "common national basis" had to be constructed (ibid., p. 149). Although the Jews share a history, culture and religion, there are identity differences. Namely, there is a difference between Jews and Zionists; the former refers to those who were not obligated to migrate to Palestine (ibid., p. 148). Israeli Jews with their own langue and culture are also different from Jews elsewhere (ibid., p. 152). There are additionally various opinionated divisions among the Jews.

There were two factions of Jewish nationalism at the outset; there were the "territorialists" who wanted to establish a Jewish state anywhere and there were the "Zionists" who wanted to establish a Jewish state in Zion (Jerusalem) (ibid, p. 3). The Zionists had three prominent nationalist movements that answered foundational questions, these include: the secular, Labor Zionist and Revisionist Zionist movements as well as the Religious Zionist movement (ibid, p. 4).

The Religious Zionists were engaged with politics to save the religious dimension of Zionism. On one hand, there are some religious Jews who see significant religious meaning in returning to the Promised Land and actively "fight." To them, it was a fulfillment of prophesies. They believed that establishing a Jewish state and immigrating to Palestine would accelerate redemption (Abulof, 2014, p. 527). On the other hand, there are the *haredim* who "inactively resist" as they try to find seclusion from worldly, corrupt matters for religious reasons; refuse to assimilate in secular cultures as well as reject Zionism (Heilman, 1994, pp. 174-175). The activists are not completely different from the inactive as they both believe they are the true expressions of Judaism yet they defend their identities differently. For the purposes of this study, I focus on those who actively fight.

Some religious figures were previously involved in the establishment and development of the Hibbat Zion groups (Shimoni, 1995, p. 42), who are the pioneers of the 'return to Zion' ideology in the 1880s (ibid., p. 85). The Religious Zionists find religion to be the core of the state. They believe *halacha* must rule their state (Heilman, 1995, p. 87). Thus, to separate religion from the state is a misguided interpretation (Salmon, 2002, p. xiii). In addition, the religious Zionists believed the disputed location of the homeland should be established from "the River of Egypt to… the Euphrates" as dictated in the Torah (Shelef, 2010, p. 7).¹⁷

The Religious Zionists created their "subculture." They had their own "norms of interpretation, identification and sources of charismatic authority" (Shimoni, 1995, p. 133). They "also rejected the notion that it was possible to normalize a nation defined as exceptional by the Almighty" (Shelef, 2010, p. 134). They believed Jewish nation is unique because of its connection to God,¹⁸ which should not be negated from Zionism. They opposed the implementation of a secular culture, as they thought it would destroy religion. Ultimately, some created their political organization in response to the threat of secular Zionists' "cultural-educational matters" (ibid, p. 128). Their goal was to purify the homeland from secular cultures. Consequently, the Mizrahi movement (1902–1957), which is an acronym for *merkaz ruhani* (spiritual center), was created under the leadership of Rabbi Yitzhak Yaakov Reines (ibid).¹⁹ Their manifesto stated,

"[Mizrahi] sees fit to divide the experience of Zionism as a generality into two spheres" [one;] the sphere of the body... which requires only financing and energetic diplomatic activity aimed at obtaining for our people a safe refuge in the land of our father recognized by international public law. And [two;] the spiritual sphere which is the real animator of Zionism" (as cited in Shimoni, 1995, p. 143).

Mizrahi believed that Zionism is a twofold mission. Although they strived to protect the Jewish religion, they believed that redemption requires a miracle that Zionism does not claim; Zionism is solely a movement to elevate the status of the Jews driven by religious motifs (ibid, p.

¹⁷ The Bible constitutes different verses that envision the boundaries of land. Thus, disagreements among Religious Zionists are all plausible and equally religious. However, initially, the Religious Zionists relied on this verse found in Genesis 15:18.

¹⁸ Chapter 5 expands, further, on this point.

¹⁹ This movement eventually gave birth to another, Ha-poel Ha-mizrahi, which combined religious and socialist ideas.

143). Thus, Mizrahi did not advocate the idea of messianic redemption in their political activity, which eventually led to an alternative voice to speak out; it was of Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Ha-Cohen Kook who came to be known as "the foremost mystic luminary of Jewish orthodoxy" (ibid, p. 145). Rabbi Kook, the first chief Rabbi in British Palestine, stated that the Israeli state is "the pedestal of God's throne in this world" and that "Zionism is a heavenly matter" (Shelef, 2010, p. 135). Kook believed that nationalism was a "God-given" tool to preserve religion and enhance the Jews' religious observance (Shimoni, 1995, p. 145).

Kook founded the *Mercaz Harav* Jewish learning institution that produced several religious activists. Graduates from the institution saw that Zionism is not merely a secular, political movement but one that fulfills divine promises and *atchalta d'geula* (the start of redemption) (Heilman, 1994, p. 186-187). The Kookist view dealt with the state and its institutions as sacred. The state was an entitlement from God and the army was God's tool on earth. It is also part of the scripture that violence is needed for defense (Shelef, pp. 188-190).

Religion was the center of their interests and a justifying factor for certain actions. This religious activism led fundamental Jews to "fight for" liberation of Zionism from secularism and revolve it around religious purposes in addition to "fight back" threats to their identities. Hence, fundamentalists started to nudge others that the movement is based on religious promises, which involved them in the political arena to purify the national will (Heilman, 1994, p. 188). These fundamentalists insisted that the secular Zionists were advancing the cause of redemption by their strong national movement that does not compromise religion based on Kook's viewpoint. Kook also held the view that the secular Zionists were not purely secular; within their souls, there is a religious seed (Finkelman, 2010, p. 318). Hence, the Religious Zionists were convinced that the Zionists would return to practicing their faith, which further facilitated cooperation (Salmon, 2002, xvi-xvii).

The Religious Zionists put demands on the Labor Zionists that led them to shift from a secular to a more religious public realm as the Labor movement eventually allied with the

Religious (Shelef, 2010, p. 123). There were formal agreements between the Zionist Organization and the Religious Zionists to abide by Jewish traditions such as keeping Sabbath, *kashrut*,²⁰ etc. Similarly, by 1947, Ben-Gurion agreed to hand over formal control of "important aspects of the public realm to the religious" (ibid, p. 123). In the same way, the Revisionist movement started to become more religious. Jabotinsky, one of the key figures of the movement, thought that the usage of religion would accelerate the establishment of the state (ibid, p. 123).

Religious Zionists as well as many nonreligious Zionists found it challenging to eliminate religion as a legitimate reason for the success of the movement and the choice of its establishment location in the Middle East. Although the employment and significance of religion varied, many secular Zionists found Judaism as an important but insufficient, legitimate factor for state formation. Ultimately, both camps used religious symbols. For instance, Biblical text was used to call Jews to migrate/return to Palestine (Abulof, 2014, p. 524). Even though the Bible was used, it was treated by many as a historical text.

These secular Zionist groups used religion, when needed, to legitimize their cause. For example, in Ben-Gurion's speech after the 1948 independence war with Arab countries, he discredits the role of the Muslims and Christians for attacking a holy city. He argues that the land is holy to all monotheistic religions yet the Muslims fought in a "savage, barbaric" manner and the Christians stood in silence. He states, "it was proven to whom this city is truly precious and holy, and to whom the sanctity of Jerusalem is just an empty phrase" ("Prime Minister's Statement; Report of the Foreign Minister," 1948, p. 109). He makes a statement that the Jews are the only actors who respect the holiness of the land, which elevates their legitimacy to claiming the land. Ben-Gurion ends his speech by quoting the Torah to describe the ongoing situation; the verse refers to fighting alone and bringing one's own salvation (ibid., p. 110). This biblical verse entails a religious message and a historical reference.

²⁰ This mainly refers to dietary laws.

Ben-Gurion also stated at the Peel Commission in 1936, "'the [British] mandate is not our mandate,' but rather 'the bible is our mandate'" (cited in Abulof, 2014, p. 524). Although it is unclear whether Ben-Gurion referred to the Bible as a religious or a historical text, a 'mandate' is an authoritative, guiding decree rather than a book of historical narratives. Thus, I believe his reference to be religious. In addition, in 1937 Chaim Weizmann²¹ stated, "I told the Commission: God has promised *Eretz-Yisrael* to the Jews. This is our Charter" (ibid., 2014, pp. 524-525). The employment of religion was not only to legitimatize the movement to the Jews but also to the rest of the World to promote the Jews as religious, righteous people as well as appeal to Christians who share the same Bible.

It was challenging to separate religion completely from the Zionist movement as a whole yet it played a fluctuating role. The Religious Zionists found true meaning in missions to apply religion while the secular Zionists used religion occasionally to legitimize their claims as opposed to the *haredim* who opposed the idea of the establishment of the state and completely secluded themselves from the political arena at this period.

3.2 The Genesis of ISIS's Ideology and Movement

"God has promised those of you who have attained to faith and do righteous deeds that, of a certainty, He will make them Khulifa on earth, even as He caused [some of] those who lived before them to become Khulifa" (Qur'an, Surah Al-Nur, Verse 55).²²

After the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1926, Al-Azhar University in Egypt hosted the *Congress of the Caliphate* in order to promote the caliphate ideology (Liebl, 2009, p. 387). The congress passed two vital resolutions. The first, concerning the caliph, he has to be an individual with the capacity to defend Islam; The second resolution states that a caliphate can be established through conquest, as long as the caliph is Muslim, which justifies violence and invasion (p. 388.). Liebl concludes by saying, "there exists now in the Muslim world legitimate caliphal bloodlines; organizational and economic foundations; and potentially legal authority to restore the caliphate today. All that is needed is the will" (ibid.).

²¹ Weizmann is a Zionist leader and the first president of Israel.

²² Khulifa means caliph (refer to glossary).

The will to establish an Islamic State is witnessed by three attempts deviating from Al-Qaeda Organization. However, the leader, Osama Bin Laden opposed such movements arguing that these are premature states that lack public support. Nonetheless, Abu Masaab Al-Zarqawi²³ established a separate branch from Al-Qaeda to create ISIS in 2004; The Council for *Mujahedeen*²⁴ was created for resisting the USA in Iraq and was an umbrella organization for many different ones. The Council later became the *Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)*. Upon the US-led invasion of Iraq, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdady, a former Al-Qaeda leader, created and was head of the *shari'a* committee of the *Army of the Sunni People Group*. This group joined the *Mujahedeen Council* in 2006. Eventually, Al-Baghdadi succeeded the ruler of the *ISI* organization after his death (Zelin, 2014).

Fomented by the political upheaval in the region along with a strong military and resources,²⁵ ISI expanded to the *Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)*. On June 29 in 2014, ISIS declared itself a caliphate "state" with the leadership of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdady ("Terrorism in the Arab World: ISIS as an example," 2015, p. 12). The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is an organization that aims at recreating the Islamic caliphate system and the application of *shari'a* law. ISIS started by targeting places with Sunni majorities in Iraq, further in Syria, and followed by several other places. Regardless of its name,²⁶ the organization is expanding beyond Iraq and Syria or the Levant region. It is currently present in south Yemen, Libya, Sinai Peninsula (Egypt), Somalia, Nigeria, and Pakistan.²⁷

Although ISIS is a new organization, the Islamic political thought and goal of creating a caliphate state has been a significant motif for several movements and leaders. Nevertheless, these movements vary significantly, which leads to questioning the authenticity of religious revivalism (Marty and Appleby, 1991, p. 839). There is not one reference point to Islamic

²³ Leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

²⁴ Mujahedeen is an Arabic word for those who engage in *jihad* (refer to glossary).

²⁵ According to Zelin, the organization has targeted places within Iraq and Syria that are rich in resources in order to expand.

²⁶ The group refers to itself as the "Islamic State" after its expansion; some refer to it as or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or Da'esh yet ISIS is still popularly used.

²⁷ The expansion to other provinces is mainly due to other jihadists pledging allegiance to ISIS (McCants, 2015, p. 140).

fundamentalism as each movement is different depending on the context, goals, and history. The first theorists of modern Islamic fundamentalism, however, were Egyptian Hassan El Banna and Pakistani Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (Juergensmeyer, 2006, p. 184). Mawdudi proclaimed, *al-Islam deen wa dawla*, Islam is a religion and a state, in addition to the concept of, *iqamat el deen*, the establishment of religion (Marty and Appleby, 1991, p. 824). He advocated the merge between religion and the state as a guideline for society (Carimo. 2014, p. 219). The two thinkers called for the application of *shari'a*, the Islamic law, and for resisting Western influence that threatens Islam.

There are several reasons why ISIS was established. First, socially, there is a rise of population and decrease of level of education and employment. Second, politically, states have failed to unite and accommodate different political thoughts and directions but have rather worked to suppress and oppress them giving rise to fundamentalist ideologies. Third, historically and psychologically, the subjugation to violence, mass killings, prison treatment, torture and civil war created an environment/experiences whereas extremist thoughts and leaders developed. Fourth, religiously, there is the ideology of establishing a caliphate as a religious duty ("Terrorism in the Arab World," 2015, p. 13).

The ideology of a caliphate system (*khilafat*) is based on "representation" and succession. Some believe that the *khilafat* is one of the basic principles of Islam. ISIS believes that without the caliphate, most of the *shari'a* was not applied. Some members of ISIS stated, "Islam has been reestablished" with the formation of the State (Wood, 2015). It is, additionally, "bestowed" upon Muslims who can be the caliph. Al-Baghdady or Caliph Ibrahim is the delegated leader to carry out God's will with power invested in him by spiritual authority.²⁸ Al-Baghdady is a Quraish tribe descendant – Prophet Mohammed's tribe – a significant criterion for being a caliph.²⁹ Therefore, not only does the ideology become a duty, the leaders are chosen and the aim is clear, justifiable, and noble.

²⁸ Caliphs are "leaders of the faithful," who demand obedience from the Muslim world (Byman, 2015, p. 165).

²⁹ Although the *Congress of the Caliphate* did not require this criterion, it remains of significance.

ISIS's ideology draws on Wahhabism.³⁰ It shares with Wahhabism concepts of tawhid (migration), (worship of one God), hijrah da'wah (invitation), and takfir (excommunication/infidelity).³¹ Both movements find it essential to have state power in order to enforce their ideology (Al-Ibrahim, 2015, p. 410). In addition, both movements have missions of pan-Islamism striving to expand beyond confined territories in order to spread their messages. ISIS, however, seeks to unite divided Muslims by reestablishing the caliphate (ibid., p. 412) in addition to regaining Muslim dignity everywhere. Nonetheless, ISIS has plans and aspirations to dominate the entire world (Al-Tamimi 2014, p. 11).

The ideologies of ISIS and *Wahhahism* divide the world into *Dar al-Islam* (House of Islam) and *Dar al-Kufr* (House of Infidelity). Thus, believing they have the "monopoly over religious truth," they call or invite the masses to "migrate" to the House of Islam. Another important discourse for mobilization is that of the apocalypse and how one should prepare for the End of Days. The location of ISIS is not only a result to certain circumstances; Syria plays a significant role in "being the scene of the last battles" according to *hadith* (Byman, 2015, p. 172). ISIS believes it is the army of Islam that is to defeat eighty flags (infidel forces) in battles according to the prophecies (McCants, 2015, p. 104). Thus, the usage of violence even outside its territories is not just for power and seizing land; it is to fulfill the prophecies. Furthermore, many believed that the *Mahdi*³² would appear after the turmoil of the political situation in the Middle East following 2012 (McCants, 2015, p. 27). The instability, as well as the site of the doomsday prophecies, triggered apocalyptic thoughts and interpretations.

Unlike most Islamist organizations that seek to "awaken" Muslims (*sahwa*) and reject Western intervention, ISIS is building a state "on its own terms" (Byman, p. 170). ISIS has preliminary characteristics of a state; these include the building of institutions, developing an

³⁰ Wahhabism is a form *Salafi* ideology and Islamic movement that is mostly popular in Saudi Arabia.

³¹ Refer glossary for explanation of the significance of these Islamic values.

³² The Mahdi is the awaited savior who would lead the "ideological struggle" until the End of Days (McCants, p. 29). McCants states that half of the Arabs believed that the apocalypse is near according to polls (p. 99).

economy, offering aid, running education,³³ having judicial bodies, establishing an army, and implementing a taxation system. It promotes its ideology through *da'wah* meetings, the distribution of pamphlets, and social media (ISIS wants to build, purify, and expand a state based on the *baqiya wa tatamadad* (lasting and expanding) motto Al-Tamimi, p. 11). Through this "state's" activities and plans, the group is constructing a distinct identity.

ISIS has created a black flag with white Arabic calligraphy to unify people under a common entity with common goals and aspirations (Byman, p. 171). It recreated the flag that was used by the prophet in his wars against infidels and symbolizes the authority inherited from the former caliphates (McCants, 2015, p. 26). This identity construction creates an incentive for foreign fighters to join under banners of unity and righteousness (ibid., p. 147). In addition, ISIS expects all Sunnis to pledge allegiance to the caliphate yet as most fundamental movements, it rejects existing religious elites and their authorities (Piscatori, 1994, p. 363). Nonetheless, regional regimes, religious leaders, some Jihadists,³⁴ and a large number of ordinary Muslims around the world reject the caliphate (Byman, p. 165). ISIS has drawn a distinction between those who pledge allegiance to the State and those who rebel against it as well as those who divert from what the movement sees as pure Islam (Al-Ibrahim, p. 412) in order to justify the usage of violence against them.

Violence and suppression under its rule takes place in various forms. ISIS is tremendously exclusionary. It claims to apply *dhimma* (protection pact) (Al-Tamimi, p. 10) to the minorities in Syria in forms of subjugation such as paying *jezyah* (special taxes). In return, the minorities are offered protection. Other forms of dealing with minorities or disloyal Sunnis are conversion or death (Al-Tamimi, p. 11). Regardless of its violence, some people welcomed ISIS's rule in Syria since it develops the country's infrastructure and drives out other rebel groups (McCants, p. 89). In addition, it provides a system of carrots and sticks for governance. It

³³ Education is limited to Islamic texts (Al-Tamimi, p. 11).

³⁴ There is division of thoughts and plans among Jihadists.

provides public services, distributes food, and rewards tribes who supports it – "carrots" – and harsh punishments that include stoning prostitutes, cutting hands off thieves, etc. – "sticks" (ibid., p. 152).

ISIS, however, takes different approaches in Iraq where it struggles to create an image of a "protector" of the Sunnis in the sectarian-divided country. Besides the minorities that are usually Christians, ISIS has an anti-Shi'a Muslims rhetoric that dates back 900 years (Hashim, 2016 p. 43). The Sunnis in Iraq were previously marginalized and involved in various sectarian conflicts, which ultimately led to the rise of extremist groups (ibid., p. 47). Through the strengthening of sectarianism, ISIS was capable of gaining the support of several prominent Sunni tribes in Iraq (ibid., 55). Driven by interests, it collaborates with local tribes for support. ISIS welcomed all those who wanted to join including those who joined for religious and nonreligious reasons such as applying God's plans, fighting the final battles, gaining money, or due to lack of choices (McCants, 2015, p. 98). It, additionally, recruits former officers who served under Saddam's rule who are capable of running a state (ibid., p. 154).

ISIS advocates "puritanical religious ideology;" the ISIS fundamentalist project is exclusionary by nature. It is built on *takfiri* ideology that divides the world into believers and *kufar*. Thus, it advocates a superior, extremist stance to mobilize Muslims and foreign fighters, as fundamentalists believe they are on the victorious, truthful side that applies God's commandments on earth.

3.3 Case Comparisons

The two religious state-building projects, the Religious Zionist movement and the Islamic State, use religion as a driving motif for their movements that strived to restore a specific territory or a specific period of time. The Religious Zionists were part of a bigger, political movement unlike ISIS. However, the similarities between the movements are worth analyzing.

The genesis of each fundamentalist movement extends back to several attempts to fight against some form of imposed domination and oppression. The Jews were fighting against their dispersion and discrimination that inspired many different groups with different visions to subscribe to the idea of a Jewish homeland over an extended period of time. Comparably, ISIS is fighting against Western imposition and Western notions including secularism, democracy, and nationalism. There were several groups attempting to build an Islamic state.

The Religious Zionists fit the criteria and definition of a fundamentalist group.³⁵ However, given that they were the minority group who had to face the reality that a Jewish state was going to be established regardless of their voice, they had to cooperate with the secular majority. After the establishment of the state when they were not in a vulnerable position any longer, the Religious Zionists employed violence by groups such as 'Gush Emunium' (bloc of the faithful) that extend beyond the time-scope of my analysis. However, such groups build on Religious Zionism and the legitimate use of violence. I argue that some Religious Zionist leaders were forced to behave more "moderately" in particular situations. Becoming moderate is partially due to being enforced to strengthen politics with religion rather than strengthen religion with politics. Nonetheless, they still find "politics as a mode of religious expression" not vice versa (Heilman & Friedman, 1991, pp. 313-314).

The Religious Zionists are nostalgic for an ideal past where the Jews, the chosen people, were identified spiritually. They desire rebuilding the kingdom of Israel, where their righteous ancestors were, under the guidelines of *halacha*. They are fighting for the preservation of their unique identity as well as the territory where their kingdom once stood. The restoration of the land is God's promise and will to the Jewish people as well as a preparation for the messiah as dictated by the Torah. Thus, they actively engage with politics in order to protect Judaism from being marginalized. They were able to cooperate with secular groups with the hope of influencing the structure of the state by merging religious ideologies.

³⁵ As seen in the previous chapters and sections, their behavior fits fundamentalist behavior. The discourse analysis also reveals their fundamentalist character.

Similarly, ISIS is nostalgic for an authoritative period of the previously abolished Ottoman caliphate to recreate a time similar to the prophet and the four virtuous caliphs' (Heilman, 1995, p. 73). It desires to rebuild the caliphate under the guidelines of *shari'a*. The succession to rule is also viewed as God's promise for the Muslims to rule with superiority as expressed by the Qur'an. The caliphate is, additionally, a method to hasten doomsday. The merge of religion and the state reveals how selective fundamentalists are in selecting traditional and modern systems (Marty and Appleby, 1991, p. 824). Islamic fundamentalists seek political power in order to establish an Islamic state that would be based on the prophetic model. They believe that Islam cannot be applied without state power; moreover, they find political activism to be the key to their goals (ibid.).

Religious Zionism's ideology is a fusion between religion and nationalism. The Jews believed they had a historic, religious right to return back to *Eretz-Yisrael*. They advocated the return of the Jewish nation that should live according to its glorified ideology under the observance of a Jewish law. ISIS's ideology, on the other hand, is purely religious. It believes the establishment of a caliphate is merely a religious obligation to be performed. In addition, all its plans and actions are justified through religion. This fundamentalist group built a 'state' claiming to be fulfilling God's will. It uses religion for specific state guidelines and applies *shari'a* law as its constitution.

Each movement had a clear structure of the state to rule under a comprehensive legal system that touched upon all aspects of its community. Both movements strived to 'purify' a certain population, land, and gather a divided community. The Religious Zionists aimed at saving Judaism from the secular, Zionist cultures. Although, the religious and secular factions cooperated, they had different visions for their projects. The religious faction, being the minority, struggled to influence the secular majority.

ISIS has a more extreme purifying program that plans to make its territory purely for God's followers and intolerable of the 'others.' The movements differ in their connection to religious and national identities. The Religious Zionists acknowledge differences between identities yet they are inclusive of all Jews all over the world while ISIS is selective of its followers. Despite advocating a religious, universal identity, ISIS is tremendously selective of Sunni-Muslims.

In sum, the two movements are similar in their normative ideologies and aspirations. Nonetheless, they somewhat differed in their application. Although there are some significant differences, the cases prove to be more similar than different in terms of history and ideology. The next chapters explore the discourses of the movements to reveal further similarities and differences.

Part II

Discourse Analysis

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Chapter Four

This chapter goes into the analysis of the primary sources of the two movements. It is divided thematically, according to the themes discussed in chapter two. However, given that some concepts overlap, the partition is not constantly clear-cut. A brief discussion as well as excerpts of examples follows each section to bring in the analyses and the comparisons together. The first section, *statebood*, discusses each movement's envisioned state. It discusses its form, structure, and administration. The second section, *peoplebood*, predominantly touches upon the division of the *ingroup* and *out-group*. Additionally, the notions of *representation*, *grievance*, and *mobilization* are discussed in connection to identity. The third section, *restoration*, discusses claims to a reestablishment of land and/or return of people. It also discusses *historical ties*, which is the people's connection to the land, their shared history and nostalgic past. The fourth section is about *legitimacy* in claims and in application. *Ideology* and *religious references/divinity* are concepts that are touched upon in every section. Thus, these notions are treated as umbrella concepts rather than individual ones.

4.1 The Projects' Statehood

Each movement has a particular vision for its state-formation project in terms of ideology, nature, and structure. The Zionists, however, had two opposing visions – a secular and a religious one. The Religious Zionists, being the minority, sought to combine features of both a theocratic and a secular state. Dissimilar to ISIS that created a successfully detailed structure for its state, the Religious Zionists proposed a state form and structure before the declaration of the State of Israel that was not fully applied.

In Ben-Gurion's declaration of state speech, the notion of *statehood* is expressed several times differently, which begins with how the Jews initially "attained to statehood" on *Eretz-Yisrael* (Ben-Gurion, 1948, para. 1). This statement carries a historical narrative as to how the Jews once had their state. In addition, it sets the stage for an aspired second phase of attaining "statehood," which is the purpose of his speech – declaring the State of Israel. Ben-Gurion utilizes several modern state terminologies, such as "sovereign" state (para. 9 & 16) as well as "independent

nationhood" (para. 2). In addition, he uses secular, nationalistic elements that include the revival of the Hebrew language, development of the economy, prosperity of the people (ibid.), as well as the usage of the word "nation" in its various forms such as "nationhood" or "national" referring to the state and its people (para. 3, 4 & 6). The Zionists constructed a state that fits the criteria of the modern nation-state in terms of sovereignty, territoriality, and nation, as well as abiding by international law and human rights.

ISIS similarly uses modern *state* terminology despite its traditionalist structure of the state. These terms include, "independence" ("Principles in the Administration of the Islamic State," 2015, chapter 6, para. 5), "sovereignty," and "borders" (chapter 9, para. 6-7). ISIS speaks of "protecting the borders of the Islamic State" yet it does not define what its borders are. The choice of word, borders, entails a protection of a certain territory regardless of the fluctuation of its extension. Moreover, the Islamic State's rhetoric touches upon 'nationalistic' discourse as well. It refers to its community as *ummah*, which is translated by the organization as 'nation' (Al-Adnani, para. 6), as well as to the Muslims' shared past ("Principles in the Administration," chapter 8, para. 8). I presume ISIS's rhetoric of a 'common history' refers to the prophet's time, which excludes a common place of origin and background for the so-called "Muslim nation." Nonetheless, neither *ummah*,³⁶ fits the definition of the term "nation" in the classical sense usually used in Political Science, nor do the Muslims have a shared past.

Many nation-states converted to Islam, which is different from the Jewish case where the Jews originate from the same place and share a common ancestry and history. While I fully subscribe to the opinion that ISIS is not a nation, I believe that its ambiguous use of this term suggests that it is in the process of building one. Namely, throughout the analysis of its documents, it makes visible its attempt to force a 'common history' and language onto people, in order to shape this new, imagined 'nation.' I find support for such an interpretation in ISIS's blueprint for education, *shari'a* teaching and application, accordance of the Arabic language,

³⁶ Hereafter, *ummah* will be used to mean community or peoples.

assimilation of migrants (foreigners), and administration ("Principles in the Administration," 2015). This approach to creating a community, whose social bonds are glued with the idea of a shared culture and history, resembles nation-building processes in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism. The important difference is ISIS's insistence on fundamental, religious, cultural norms.

ISIS, additionally, notes its developing state-societal relations and ensures a good standard of living for the "citizens" ("Dabiq," 2014, p. 13, para. 13-18). Again, the term 'citizens' is used to force a nation into being. Therefore, the Islamic State (according to its own sources) is building and developing the society by providing goods as well as engaging in relations for the support of the project. Clearly, one can only speculate its real intentions from its discourse. Nevertheless, it is my strong conviction that its rhetoric suggests its intentions to move from being a "state" towards a "nation-state."

The Forms and Ideologies of the States

The Religious Zionists sought to influence the secular Zionists in composing the structure of the state. Rabbi Herzog³⁷ confirms in his book excerpts that the religious Jews are not against the secular Zionists' mission but are rather 'afraid' of the outcome (Herzog, ca. 1948, para. 2). He questions what the "character of a Jewish state according to the Torah" is – whether it is a theocracy or a democracy³⁸ (para. 6). He uses an indefinite article suggesting an unknown yet anticipated state, which demonstrates his hypothetical rather than practical question. Herzog's question is restricted to the "Torah" as a source of reference, which directs his answer to his definition of a theocracy – a state with a religious constitution. Expectedly, he states that, accordingly, "the form of the state is a theocratic monarchy;" although Herzog is speaking of a hypothetical state, he does not use modal verbs such as 'should' yet he uses the present tense, which has a more authoritative tone (para. 9).

³⁷ Rabbi Herzog succeeded Rabbi Kook as Chief Rabbi in 1937.

³⁸ His understanding of the two is rather simplistic. For him **democracy** is granting equality for all its citizens (para. 1), while **theocracy** is a state with a "supranational" constitution (para. 6).

Herzog mainly focuses on the ideological form of the State; namely, how the state can be religious and democratic. In his writings, I find two arguments for his surprisingly moderate position on this important issue. First, Herzog believes the main problem is the masses' lack of faith, which has created this division of opinions (para. 3). **If all** Jews were religious, they would *return* their land and build it according to the written and oral Torah as well as have Rabbis as leaders (ibid.). Second, he acknowledges the fact that the state-building process is dependent on international approval by the United Nations (para. 5). Thus, he strives to influence the implementation of religious governance; knowing the Religious Zionists' fragile stance, he attempts to harmonize theocracy and democracy.

This "moderate" view on the form of the future state was not shared by the whole movement. Kook's writing, for example, breathes much less understanding for compromising Judaism in the state-building process. Respectively, he argues that "the most exalted ideological content" [Judaism], is "engraved" in the State and that the two are inseparable (Kook, 1920, para. 10). For him, the Jews are a *nation* who believes in pursuing the "Divine good" (para. 8). Thus, building the *state* has to acknowledge the nature of the *nation* and bring about satisfaction to it.

The form of the Islamic State is a specific, accepted one; it is a theocratic, caliphate state. ISIS strives to build a "Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology" ("The Principles in the Administration," 2015, subtitle). Although establishing a caliphate is an undisputed duty of the Muslims (Al-Adnani, 2014, para. 33), it is the one obligation that is missing in Islamic life (para. 31). This religious duty requires the allegiance of all the Muslims as well as the modification of the group's name, changing it from the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham to the Islamic State to better accommodate its universality (para. 34). Framing the Caliphate in a "religious duty" context facilitates ISIS's *takfiri* ideology application. Subsequently, those who oppose the State are inevitably infidels.

The formation of this unique nature of the State was due to the group's capability of carrying out God's commandments (para. 64). This statement entails power together with fear of

God. Hence, the State is God's goal and the *mujahedeen* are God-chosen.³⁹ The *mujahedeen* found it disadvantageous to fight without a caliph who would unite the Muslims ("Principles in the Administration," chapter 1, para. 2). Therefore, declaring the Caliphate with clear programs is an urgent response to the *muhajirin* to unite "under one banner, one word, and one caliph" regardless of where they are from (chapter 2, para. 4).

The Structures of the States

Besides the form of the state, its structure is of utmost importance. Herzog's envisioned monarchy's most important bodies are the king, the Torah, the Great Rabbinical Court and the Great Sanhedrin (Herzog, ca. 1948, para. 9).⁴⁰ The written and oral Torah provide the foundation of law (para. 7). Herzog equates the function and authority of the Torah with the constitution as he draws a comparison between the roles of the leaders of a democracy and a theocracy who are subjected to the authority of the constitution and the Torah respectively (para. 4). Herzog acknowledges that if they were to establish a theocracy based on *halacha*, the non-Jewish residents and the diaspora would be alienated. Therefore, once more, he uses the sensitivity of the wider international environment in order to reduce the differences between the more extreme religious minority and the secular majority in regards to the issue of the state.

The Religious Zionists deviated from applying a totalitarian form of state unlike the Islamic State. The Islamic *statehood* is not merely about dominance; it is a rule that merges the private and the public in order to coerce the masses to follow *shari'a* (Al-Adnani, 2014, para. 4). ISIS's goal is to unify all aspects of life of its supporters to ensure loyalty to the State ("Principles in the Administration," 2015, chapter 2, para. 14). ISIS is not built solely on Islamic values of *jihad* or *da'wa* but on a "comprehensive system" that requires the leaders of the *ummah* to "realize its concepts," administer, and implement an Islamic system and constitution (introduction, para. 6-7). Thus, the Caliphate is not only for religious matters; it is also a leadership over political

³⁹ In essence, this is similar to Kook's position about the State being divine and the people being God-chosen.

⁴⁰ The Great Sanhedrin is "the supreme religious and judicial body in Israel according to Talmudic tradition." (Herzog, ca. 1948, p. 160)

affairs, which precedes the religious *imamah* ("Dabiq," 2014, p. 25, para. 11-12). Thus, the current step is building a political state and engaging in political affairs. ISIS is merging and strengthening religion with politics into a fundamental project.

Summary

In sum, both movements advocate the application of a religious legal system as well as religious governmental bodies. Rabbi Herzog refers to Holy Scriptures for rules and guidelines for the structure, religious bodies, and leaders of the State. Similarly, ISIS has certain, restrictive rules to the nature and function of the caliphate as well as who the caliph is. Nonetheless, leadership is absent from the Zionist discourse. There is no discussion of a specific leader although many leaders took prominent roles in the movement. There is marginal reference to the lineage and characteristic of the leader of the Jewish State. The personalization of the leader is perhaps important for ISIS because it is striving to recreate a certain time – the prophet and the four virtuous caliphs' time – unlike the Zionists who are striving to rebuild a more impersonal kingdom.

There are major differences in the delivery manner of each movement. Rabbi Herzog speaks of an "if only" situation; if only the population was religious. The Islamic State forces people to be religious by warnings from Holy Scriptures or by implementing punishments. Additionally, it is exclusionary of the "infidels" as part of its organization. Herzog takes in consideration the character of the people that limits the dream of establishing a theocratic state. The Islamic State, on the other hand, is ready to alienate and punish anyone who does not abide by the religious rules, which is mostly witnessed in the *takfiri* ideology. The Religious Zionists did not have coercive programs to apply religious legal systems against the will of the people as ISIS, which makes them a less fundamentalist group. However, not only would this application be against the will of the people but also against the majority of the Zionist leaders, which is different from the case of ISIS.

Among other differences, the Religious Zionists refer to democracy and "Western" notions as well as international agreements/law as positive concepts while ISIS refers to them as highly undesirable, dominative, and deviating from the truth. The Zionists (whether the secular or religious texts) are keen to respect the international order by employing democratic features and indicating their borders while ISIS is directly acting against the status quo. In addition, ISIS speaks of how nationalism and ethnicity cause division in order to elevate the appeal of religiosity while the Zionists draw on 'national identity.'

Table 1.	Examples	of Theme:	Statehood
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	Religious Zionism	The Islamic State
Comments		
Form	"Is it necessary for the Jewish state, which recognizes the decisive rule of the Torah, to be a theocracy? The answer is clear and simple: Absolutely yes! Surely it is a foundation of the faith of Israel that the written Torah is given by God through the hand of Moses" (Herzog, para. 7).	"Indeed the establishment of the Islamic State, its concept does not stand on the basis of a mujahid soldier fighting and bearing his arms but rather it is a comprehensive system requiring the leaders of the <i>ummah</i> [Muslim nation] to realize its concepts." ("Principles, introduction, para. 6)
Structure	"There is no mention in our sources, the [M]ishnas, beraitas, toseftas, [T]almuds or Maimonides, to a parliament. Rather, everything is presided over by the king (who, it is understood, has advisors) and the Great Rabbinical Court. It is notable that the Great Rabbinical Court is the parliament and the senate together" (Herzog, para. 10).	"The state requires an Islamic system of life, a Qur'anic constitution and a system to implement it" ("Principles," introduction, para. 7)
Declaration Statement	"Accordingly, we, members of the People's Council, representatives of the Jewish community of Eretz-Israel hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in <i>Eretz-Israel</i> , to be known as the State of Israel" (Ben-Gurion, para. 10).	"The Islamic State – represented by ahlul-halli-wal-'aqd (its people of authority), consisting of its senior figures, leaders, and the shūrā council – resolved to announce the establishment of the Islamic khilāfah, the appointment of a khalīfah for the Muslims" (Al-Adnani, para. 34)

4.2 The Notion of Peoplehood *Representation*

Ben-Gurion mentions the People's Council and their *representative* authority of the Zionist Movement and the Jews in *Eretz-Yisrael*. His opening sentence is charged with important concepts. First, the notions of *peoplehood* and *historical ties* are expressed to claim the right to declare the State. He begins his speech by expressing how *Eretz-Yisrael* was the origin of the "Jewish people," making it clear who the rightful actors are (para. 1). In this sentence he *legitimizes* claims as well as identifies the *people*.

The Islamic State's spokesman, on the other hand, begins by greetings to those who are "sent" to fight for the sake of "all creation" (A-Adnani, 2014, para. 1); hence, he *represents* those who engage in *jihad* as legitimate saviors of the world. Nonetheless, ISIS does not have a *representative* authority since it still does not have the full support of the targeted, imagined community. ISIS's spokesman points out how people may criticize the State for its formation without public support, yet he finds that as long as this mission is fulfilling God's promises and commands, it is the righteous path to follow. Others will eventually support the State when Allah has mercy on them (para. 70-71). In my opinion, the belief that following God regardless of the support of the people is sufficient is a tremendous indication of religious fundamentalism. The leaders of ISIS are not impeding their mission because of lack of authoritative representation.

Religious and National Identity

The concept of *peoplehood* is further expanded in Ben-Gurion's speech. The "Jewish people" formed their "spiritual, religious, political identity" in the land of Israel. They created a culture and contributed to the world "the eternal Book of Books" (para. 1.). The Jewish identity is, thus, one related to *statehood* and *divinity*. It is unclear, however, whether he thinks the Bible is of spiritual or historical significance. Given the description of it as the "eternal Book of Books," I interpret that the Bible for Ben-Gurion is more than a "historical" book.

In a purely religious context, Herzog describes the Jews as the people belonging to God who should be faithful to the written and oral Torah like their ancestors (para. 2-3). There is a *religious, historical,* shared heritage to who they. A more extremist view of the Jewish *peoplehood* is revealed in Kook's letter. His peculiar notion of Jewish *peoplehood* is embedded in spirituality. He describes the true Jew as one who has the blessings of Abraham, the forefather (common

ancestry of the nation); this blessing is entrenched and unalterable in the souls of the Jews (1920, para. 4). Who they are is unique in character – they are the chosen people (para. 2).⁴¹

The Religious Zionists use *religious* elements to identify the people yet this identity is confined to a national one. This is revealed when Rabbi Herzog discusses the status of the non-Jewish residents. He describes them as those who reside in a country that is "under a Torah government." They belong to other nations who are not of Jewish faith or are merely those who do not follow the Jewish faith (para. 5). Thus, it is essential for a "Jewish" member to have Jewish faith according to Herzog. He clarifies that he intentionally leaves the convert to Judaism out of the discussion (ibid.). In my view, the convert would create a problematic discourse. Herzog is aware of the Jewish nation being mostly secular yet he defines them through their connection to God and the land. The covert is one who shares the same faith but not the same history, which would complicate his description of the non-Jewish residents. It is, thus, easier to exclude those who do not share the faith than to include converts who practice Judaism yet are not 'Jewish' nationals.

ISIS refers to the *people* as the *ummah* that constitutes Muslims who are the honored, blessed people of prophet Mohamed (Al-Adnani, para. 6, 13, 19, 29 & 30). Therefore, ISIS's definition of *peoplehood* is dominated by notions of *divinity* in terms of belonging to God and the prophet. ISIS, by contrast, accentuates the importance of religious *identity* over national *identity* (Al-Baghdadi, para. 30). This religious identity is highlighted when Al-Baghdadi states that ISIS is the state of the Muslims; "Iraq is not for the Iraqis" but Allah owns the earth (para. 41). Thus, none of these lands belong to any national group but to Allah and his followers. The internationalization of the project offers a newly constructed identity for them whereas they are mere Muslims irrespective of their race, color, and nationality. The allegiance is to religion solely ("Principle in the Administration," chapter 2, para. 8), which is different from the Zionists' identity.

⁴¹ He uses various quotes from the Bible to draw historical lessons as well as confirm the glory of God and His chosen people.

The In-Groups and Out-Groups

The Zionists are inclusive of all Jews all over the world (Ben-Gurion, para. 5). They pinpoint the out-groups in the context of the groups they interact with such as the Arabs or Nazis (para. 15). Nonetheless, the *out-groups* do not end here. Kook, more generally, demarcates the world into the glorified Jews and the gentiles, whom, he argues, are tremendously different from each other (1920, para. 9). Kook argues that any "true son of Israel" feels the power of spiritual identity (1907, para. 7). This is clearly an exclusionary statement of the seculars. He argues that those who rebuild the nation build it on artificial matters neglecting the exceptionality of the nation (para. 7), which mildly discredits the secular Zionists.

As for ISIS, Al-Baghdadi refers to the *ummab*, as a whole, inviting them for *hijrah*. He states in the same sentence, three times, that the State is for all Muslims emphasizing that the State is inclusive (para. 41). Additionally, in ISIS's documents, the general term "Muslims" is used yet the intended audience is Sunni Muslims, which I take as a statement that other sects such as the Shi'as are not true Muslims. Furthermore, ISIS addresses the "soldiers of the Islamic State" several times in its speeches yet it is ambiguous whether it is a term to mobilize the people or whether it means the physical warriors. Nevertheless, I believe that the separate reference to the "soldiers" constitutes some sort of hierarchy within the *in-group*; those who actually fight, have higher statuses.

The Islamic State is not inclusive as it represents itself at many times. The Islamic State explicitly divides the world into two camps: the camp of Islam and the camp of *kufr* (Al-Baghdadi, para. 32), which incentivizes an extreme "us against them" discourse. People are either with them (the "truth") or against them (*kufr*). It is not only the Western "garbage" ideas that they attack (Al-Adnani, para. 37), it is also important for ISIS to discredit other Islamic groups. It is only rational that if Islam is the main, common ideological factor, these groups must be condemned. It claims that these groups are the ones who delay victories for Islam because of their divisions and because of their claim that the Caliphate is not the true one (ibid., para. 34). It is unclear what

this entails about the rest of the Sunni Muslims in terms of whether they are completely excluded from the *in-group* or whether they are perceived as a deviated faction. Table 2 demonstrates some of the identification of the *in-groups* and *out-groups* from the perceptions of both groups.

Table 2. S	Summary of the	In-Groups and	Out-Groups
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	Religious Zionism	The Islamic State
Who are the in-groups? (Categorization)	 All Jewish people (A specific nation/ religious, national identity) The Religious Zionists acknowledge all Jews yet Herzog indicates the necessity to follow Judaism. 	 Religious, universal identity Slaves of Allah⁴² "Defenders of the land of Islam" Ahlus-Sunnah (the Sunnis)
What are the traits attributed to the in- groups? (Predication)	 The chosen people Spiritual, inherited essence. Superior by God's love (Kook, 1907, para. 5) 	 Believers/ Monotheists⁴³ The "best" <i>ummab</i> Belonging to Allah and Mohamed Superior by God's promise
Who are the out-groups? (Categorization) ⁴⁴	 Gentiles (non-Jew) Arabs (though they are offered citizenship within the new state) Nazis (those they fought against in WWII) 	 People of bid'ah (heresy) Shi'a Apostates Secularists/Democrats/Nationalists Jews Kurds Alawites Ikhwān (Muslim Brotherhood Party)
What are the traits attributed to the out- groups? (Predication)	In these documents, the Religious Zionists do not discuss the out-groups yet they emphasize the higher status of the Jews as a spiritual nation.	 Disbelievers (<i>kufar</i>) Infidels Hypocrites Idolatrous

Mobilization

The internationalization of the projects meant that both cases have to extensively build their projects on the idea of 'migration' to an inhabited land. Thus, both have to appeal to their targeted audience in order to *mobilize* them to support the movements. Al-Baghdadi in a speech with the aim of influencing the importance of *hijrah*, urges people to support the state. He uses imperative statements with an authoritative and incentivizing tone for *mobilization*. The phrases

⁴² I believe a more accurate translation from the Arabic word would be 'worshipers of Allah,' which denotes a less oppressed community.

⁴³ The emphasis on "monotheists" is perhaps due to the general Muslim belief that Christians worship three gods (the trinity) and that Jews are infidels, which is a way to represent themselves as 'exclusive' monotheists.

⁴⁴ (nationalism 114)

include examples such as "take up arms," (para. 22), "rush" to the State as *muhajirin* (para. 44). In addition, he talks about the *ummah* in terms of brotherhood whose "blood mixed" under the State (para. 40), which is a way to *incentivize* people to value their missions and experience a sense of unity and belonging to the State.⁴⁵ Additionally, Al-Baghdadi uses 15 Qur'anic verses to induce fear of God, fear of eternal life (apocalyptic rhetoric), the rewards of obedience and migration, and the importance of being Muslims.

Ben-Gurion, likewise, strives to *mobilize* the Jews to support the declaration, as well as urge them to migrate to the newly established state (Ben-Gurion, para. 17). He uses the term "homeland" (para. 2, 5, 6 18) to invite the Jews to come back to the land that is opened for them (para. 5, 12). Kook *mobilizes* the Jews by reassuring their potential greatness and superiority that lies in its religious heritage, which defeats all other nations (1920, para. 2). Although Kook uses religious elements for mobilization, he denotes worldly glorious attainments, such as being a superior nation, unlike ISIS that confines the benefits of joining the State to the afterlife.

Grievance in Relation to Identity

The concept of *peoplehood* is also linked to that of *grievance*. The Jewish people are those who were "exiled" and in "dispersion" (Ben-Gurion, para. 1; Herzog, para. 4),⁴⁶ as well as those who faced a "catastrophe" and "massacre" together with Jews in non-European countries (Ben-Gurion, para. 5) The Zionists argue that they have the right, "like all other nations," to be their own fate's "masters" (para. 9).

Grievance is likewise found in ISIS's *peoplehood* discourse. ISIS makes three references to the Sykes-Picot agreement. First, it refers to the agreement along with the indirect Western rule over Islamic states that have violated and exacerbated differences in Muslim identity ("Principles in the Administration," chapter 5, para. 1). This division explains the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. Thus, ISIS argues that remapping the region was urgent (chapter 5, para. 7). Second, the

⁴⁵ This is also linked to the "nation-state" building.

⁴⁶ I made a decision not to take note of the repetition of themes rather than the perceptions of each group (as mentioned in chapter two); however, here, I made a reference to two documents because the former represents the secular view and the latter represents the religious view.

agreement is mentioned in the context of where the camps of *muhajirin* would be established, "near the prior borders of Sykes-Picot 'Iraq and Syria' lines" (chapter 2, para. 7). The State is determined to impose its power and expansion by using words such as "prior," which entails the demolition of past-imposed agreements by the West and the rise of authentic, Islamic rule. Third, the agreement was made with the intention of depriving the Sunnis of their assets and strategic geographical characteristics (chapter 5, para. 12).

Summary

To sum up, each case communicates an immensely specific notion of a community. The Religious Zionists perceive the Jews to have a unique character. The Jews are defined through the spirituality in their essence, bond to the land, and connection with God. It is an inherited identity. Their identification of the Jews naturally excludes *others* who do not have these characteristics. ISIS, on the other hand, refers to its imagined community as believers and followers of Allah without a strikingly unique distinction, which explains their overemphasis of the 'self' versus 'the other.' Remarkably, despite their identifications, the Religious Zionists are more inclusive than ISIS.

The two movements also imply a hierarchical status of their community. For the Jews, Kook differentiates between the spiritual Jews and the secular Jews; the latter either fall and collapse or reawaken their connection to God (1907, para. 7). In addition, there are the converts to Judaism who do not share the same origins with the Jewish people; they are still "non-Jewish" yet they share the same faith. Furthermore, the gentiles (the non-believers) are those whose souls are different from that of the superior Jews' (para. 9). There are also the Arabs, who are part of the 'others' yet they are to have full citizenship.

For ISIS, there is a glorified status for the *mujahedeen*, who are the leaders of the State. The true believers, Sunni-Muslims, follow them in order. Nonetheless, there is no differentiation between the *muhajirin* (regardless of their background) and the *ansar*, which emphasizes the

demolition of national identity. The Muslims also have a 'superior' rhetoric. Al-Adnani provides a direct Qur'anic verse describing the *ummah* as the "best" among all people as they believe and obey God's commands (para. 6). In addition, the *ummah* is the one promised by God to rule (para. 8).

	Religious Zionism	The Islamic State
Comments		
Religious/National Identity	"Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books." (Ben- Gurion, para. 1)	"It is a khilāfah that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Shāmī, Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghribī (North African), American, French, German, and Australian. Allah brought their hearts together, and thus, they became brothers by His grace" (Al-Baghdadi, para. 40)
In-Group/Out-Group	"The difference between the Jewish soul, in all its essence, inner desires, strivings, character, and standing, and the soul of all the gentiles, on all of their levels, is greater and deeper than the difference between the soul of a man and the soul of an animal" (Kook, 1920, para. 9)	"The world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of <i>kufr</i> (disbelief) and hypocrisy" (Al- Baghdadi, para. 32)
Mobilization	"You chose us from all of the nations.' If we shall know our towering stature, then we will know ourselves, and if we forget our greatness, we forget ourselves, and a nation that forgets itself is certainly small and debased" (Kook, 1920, para. 2)	"So fear Allah, O slaves of Allah. Listen to your khalīfah and obey him. Support your state, which grows everyday" (Al-Adnani, para. 36)
Grievance	"After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion" (Ben-Gurion, para. 1)	"The programmes focused on glorifying the ruling authorities and discarding differences between sects, stripping Sunnis of their identity" ("Principles in Administration," chapter 8, para. 3)

4.3 Restoration of Land and People

Restoration of land and/or people is a substantial concept for the two state-building projects. Restoration is closely linked to the idea of a *historical tie*; these projects claim a historical land and nostalgic golden era. Each document denotes a reestablishment of a specific territory and/or a specific community.

Ben-Gurion uses the terms "return" and "restoration" in the same sentence to emphasize the perpetual hope of the Jews to return to their land and regain their dignity and freedoms (para. 1). It also demonstrates the right of the Jews to their ancient "homeland." Along the same lines, Al-Baghdadi paints an urgent and grieving picture about the status of Muslims whose rights are violated all over the world (para. 24). The State and the Caliph are to rescue the Muslims by restoring and defending their rights (para. 40) as well as allowing them to "return" to previous glories (Al-Adnani, para. 37).

Each statement demonstrates its own peoples' grievance where they are violated and degraded. The Jews are dispersed and massacred while the Muslims are oppressed under infidel rules. These statements are also *mobilizing* their respective communities to support their projects. Throughout the documents I analyzed ISIS exaggeration of grievance discourse to further legitimize its project and incentive the Sunnis to join the State. It argues that even previous Muslim rules were corrupt in order to highlight the misplacement of the Muslims under any rule but the righteous Caliphate. These regimes used education to glorify worldly leaders, neglecting Islamic teachings and forsaking different sects and *identities*. They, additionally, separated religion from the state, which is idolatrous ("Principles in the Administration," chapter 8, para. 2-7). This contrast paints a picture of the structure of ISIS, which would correct previous teachings (para. 11) and destroy nationalism.

Other synonymous words to restoration were used in the Zionist discourse, such as the phrase "rebirth of Israel" (Herzog, para. 11), "reestablish/reestablishing" (Ben-Gurion, para. 2 & 5), "rebuild" (ibid., para. 4), and "redemption" (ibid., para. 17). A depiction of the ancient Israeli Kingdom that the Jews claimed in comparison to their declared State in 1948 is shown in (Figure 1). Comparably, ISIS uses phrases such as the "return" of the Caliphate as well as Islamic leadership (Al-Adnani, para. 62, 68 & 79); "renewal of the caliphate" ("Principles in the Administration," chapter 1, para. 1). In addition, ISIS uses a 'diaspora' rhetoric by advocating a "return of the Muslim youth to their land" (ibid., chapter 5, para. 18). ISIS is referring to the displacement of Sunnis from the Levant under corrupt governments. The difference worth

noting here is how ISIS, unlike Zionists, ties the land to the 'Muslims' rather than to any national identity.




Figure 1.The map of the Kingdom of Israel in 1200 BCE in comparison to the map of the declared State of Israel in 1948. Source: Stratfor

Relatedly, *historical references* are articulated by ISIS to the demolished Ottoman caliphate ("Principles in the Administration," 2015, introduction, para. 5), which possessed a vast amount of territory (shown in Figure 2) yet ISIS does not clarify what territory it is restoring or whether it is restoring the entire empire. I take ISIS's rhetoric to be channeled by a reestablishment of a glorious, authoritative period rather than a constriction to a connection to a specific territory. Nevertheless, although the importance of the land is not as significant to ISIS as it is to the Religious Zionists, the choice of location to ISIS is not fully inadvertent. Dabiq plays a crucial role in ISIS's *religious apocalyptic* reference. The introduction of ISIS's propaganda magazine – Dabiq – starts out by explaining its name. It is prophesized that the last battles will take place in this Syrian city. The Muslims (*in-group*) will fight the "Romans" ⁴⁷ (*out-group*) in Dabiq until doomsday (p. 4, para. 4).

⁴⁷ Cerantonio, an influential Australian recruiter, clarifies that Rome refers to the Roman Empire with Istanbul as its capital, which refers to the last caliphate while others assume that Rome is a general reference to infidels (Wood, 2015)




Figure 2. A map of the Ottoman Empire until 1914 in comparison to ISIS's controlled territories in 2014. Sources: World History in Context (Left). World Mag (Right).

The Zionists also make *historical references* explicitly such as "historical and traditional attachment" (Ben-Gurion, para. 2), "historic connection," and "natural and historic right" (para. 4 & 10). The Jews build on the discourse of the "ancient homeland" and their rights to the territory. The significance of *Eretz-Yisrael* is emphasized by Kook. The land is not a secondary issue to the Jews but a central one. It is not an external means to the goal of gathering the nation; it is the *identity* of the Jews (1920, para. 12). The land is bound with *Segulot* (divine inner attachment) with the nation (para. 13), which is expressed several times in the Bible.

Kook's (1920, para. 16) observations end with a powerful statement that "Judaism of Eretz-Yisrael is the Salvation itself." Thus, to Kook, the specific land of Israel is not just the building of any Jewish state; it is the salvation of the nation. It is the core of their ideology, identity and aspirations. The Jewish state, therefore, should be restored on its spiritual attribute. Kook makes a statement that the *divinity* of the land cannot be compromised or secularized as well as implies the expected failure of the secular Zionists in their worldly mission even if it brings national unity and strengthens Judaism in the diaspora (para. 15). I interpret Kook's statement as an elusive warning to the secular Zionist supporters to "nudge" them into finding spiritual meaning to restoring the land.

Kook separates the concept the *restoration* between physical and spiritual spheres. He believes that at the outset of the "revival" of the nation, there will be a lack of spiritual awakening

(1920, para. 4). The nation will be under the delusion that the goal is reached with the *return* of the land yet there will be no spiritual awakening (para. 4). Kook stresses the importance of spirituality in (re)building a better future for Israel. Contrary to secular Zionism, Kook confirms that Israel will be restored by the love of God. "By [the love of God] Israel will be redeemed, both the individual and the community"⁴⁸ (1907, para. 7). Thus, there are two phases of restoration, which is the separation line between the Zionists, who are after the physical, and the Religious Zionists, who are after both physical and spiritual restoration.

The concept of restoration is also used in the form of nostalgia. Rabbi Herzog states how the present is "unfortunately" different from the past as those Jews who are true, faithful believers are no longer the majority (para. 5). He expresses his concern for the secularization of the state. ISIS expresses a related lamentation concerning the division between secularity and religiosity. They believe that rebuilding the caliphate uniting the people under one caliph and *shari'a* law has become a fantasy for the Muslim "nation" due to periods of separation of religion and state ("Dabiq," p. 24, para. 1-2). Furthermore, the Islamic State articulates the establishment of the state as a "dream" that has become a "reality" (Al-Adnani, para. 63). Likewise, to the Zionists, the state-building project is an "age-old dream" (Ben-Gurion, para. 17).

Both cases call for a restoration of a historical land as well as a restoration of people. Restoration of Israel can take place under conditions of obedience, love of commandments, and love of God in addition to the foundation of life on the Divine nature within (Kook, 1907, para. 8). The Islamic State, similarly, stresses on Allah's "conditions" of fulfilling the promise of succession, which are submission to and faith in God alone conforming to the prophet's teachings. The restoration missions of both movements are inseparable of spirituality. The cases differ in their historic connection to the land; to the Religious Zionists, the specific territory is significant as well as historic (place of origin) and spiritual while to ISIS, the land signifies religious weight.

⁴⁸ He calls the individual "Israel" as a way to connect the nation to the land.

Table 4. Examples of theme: Restoration

	Religious Zionism	The Islamic State
Comments		
Restoration	"We recognize that a spiritual rebellion will come to pass in <i>Eretz-Yisrael</i> amongst the people of Israel in the beginnings of the nation's revival." (Kook, 1920, para.)	"Now the khilāfah has returned, humbling the necks of the enemy. Now the khilāfah has returned in spite of its opponents. Now the khilāfah has returned; we ask Allah (the Exalted) to make it to be upon the methodology of prophethood." (Al-Adnani, para. 62)
Historical ties	"The historic connection between the Jewish people and <i>Eretz-Israel</i> and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home" (Ben-Gurion, para. 4).	"God ennobled his true soldiers whom he selected to establish the caliphate state whose fortresses had fallen at the hands of global Zionism in al-Astana [Istanbul] 100 years ago" ("Principles in Administration, introduction, para. 5).

4.4 Legitimacy of the Projects

Legitimacy of the state is presented in the forms of a legitimate claim (whether historical or religious), basis of governance, structure of the state, and leadership. It is noteworthy to mention, however intended, that the religious leaders of both movements mention and praise God at the beginning of their scripts, which transmits a religious, credible image that appeals to the masses and alerts the audience to listen attentively to their messages.

In this regard, Al-Baghdadi goes further by establishing that whoever goes Allah's way can "never be led astray," which allows him to make authoritative statements throughout the rest of the speech (para. 1). Additionally, the speech is made in the month of Ramadan and makes note of a verse describing the revelation of the Qur'an in Ramadan. I believe that there is no reason to think that this is a matter of pure coincidence. Rather, that the choice of declaring a caliphate in this holy month is intended to draw parallels between the revelation of a book of guidance and a newly revelation of guided governance.

Ben-Gurion and Al-Adnani's speech transcipts use their own calendars. The declaration of the State of Israel is documented on Iyar 5, 5708 (May 14, 1948) on a Sabbath night, while the declaration of the Islamic State is documented on Ramadan 1, 1435 (June 29, 2014). The choices

of expressing dates in Hebrew or *Hijri* calendars, as well as declaring their states on holy periods are methods of self-representation as legitimate groups linked to religious rituals.⁴⁹

Legitimacy and authenticity also comes in the form of the structure of the state. As mentioned in the *Statehood* section (5.1), the Jewish state's most important state bodies besides the king, who has divine authority, are the Torah, the Great Rabbinical Court and the Great Sanhedrin (Herzog, para. 9). In Herzog's vision of the state, he imagines all state bodies to be religious according to religious sources. Additionally, the functionalities of the essential bodies that are not mentioned in these sources are designated to other religious state bodies (para. 10).

ISIS finds legitimacy in declaring how the Caliphate abides by the shūrā (consultation) council for the application of a rightful caliphate (Al-Adnani, para. 34). The State represents itself as the closest model for the true, "unquestionable" *imamab* (Dabiq, p. 27, para. 1 & 10). The merge of *statehood* and *divinity* creates a *legitimate* state for the Muslims. In addition, the religious nature of the State makes those who undermine it, sinners against God. This is applicable to the Caliph himself as it is not permissible for him to abolish the State (ibid., para. 5) since these are godly matters that were bestowed upon the *ummab* by God. Although ISIS holds the caliph as a God-chosen leader, it puts the Caliphate before him. I find the reason behind this is to remove the human factor from the divine image of the State. In my interpretation, this does not signify a lesser importance of the Caliph but only attributes a humanized element that is by nature of less value in respect to the divine.

Leaders of the state also provide *legitimacy*. Herzog believes the king has to be from the house of David, who is a biblical king, at the time of the *restoration* of Israel⁵⁰(para.11). This is a religious reference to the future, envisioned state. Nonetheless, although Herzog wrote parts of this book before the declaration of the State of Israel, there is no sign of this king nor is there opposition to the secular application without the presence of such a leader. Additionally, I find even more explicit derivation of state legitimacy from religion in Herzog's insistence that the

⁴⁹ This form of expression is also used in other primary sources used in this study.

⁵⁰ This lineage is related to the awaited the Messiah who would come and redeem the people.

main criterion of the judges of the Court is a great knowledge of the Torah (para. 9). Therefore, even the more moderate representative of Religious Zionists seems to think that the leaders of the state should follow the guidelines of the Holy Scriptures in order to apply and bring to life a religious state.

The Islamic State does not only emphasize the structure of the rightful leadership but also who the leader is. Al-Baghdadi is a God-chosen caliph. He is announced as the universal caliph and *imam* (Al-Adnani, para. 34). He was pledged allegiance and his authority expands over vast territories (para. 36) The leadership of Al-Baghdadi as a caliph is rightful given his lineage, experience and fulfilling all the criteria for the position of a caliph (para. 34). This being said, I find in ISIS's discourse numerous justifications for the Caliph's actions that do not breathe the divine authority. For example, in some occasions the Caliph is portrayed as one who ensures harmony in society by stopping rebellion and acting in the best interest of the Muslim 'citizens' to the extent of killing fellow Muslims who are apostates who disturb society (Dabiq, p. 24, para. 8). Such justification derived from practical rule rather than divine, casts a shadow of doubt on the authenticity of his actions.

The two movements find religious legitimacy in their operative ideologies. They use Holy Scriptures to support their claims as well as demonstrate their abidance by religious guidelines. However, even though both groups are religious, ISIS uses direct quotes from Holy Scriptures extensively in contrast to the Religious Zionists. My interpretation is that the Caliphate is deemed unnecessary by many Muslims that ISIS attempts to persuade them with its religious significance. As for the Jews, the focus is on the religious significance of a spiritual reawakening and on connecting the Jewish identity to spirituality. The movements also differ, for ISIS justifies its brutal rule in light of shaping a cohesive, virtuous society that is absent from the Religious Zionist discourse. Nonetheless, both cases draw on godly promises to be great and victorious. Table 5. Examples of theme: Legitimacy

Religious Zionism	The Islamic State
"The power of Israel lies in its eternal holiness, in the light of G-d and His Torah, in the yearning for spiritual light, which is the ultimate valor which triumphs over all of the worlds and all of their powers" (Kook, 1920, para. 3)	"Succession, establishment, and safety – a promise from Allah reserved for the Muslims, but with a condition" (Al- Adnani, para. 3).

Conclusion

Two religious state-building projects originated in the Middle East, where the practice of monotheism is a strong social factor. The Religious Zionist movement and the Islamic State (ISIS) seem incomparable at first glance, mostly due to ISIS's extreme violence, which I agree is of unmatchable nature. Nevertheless, I decided to narrow the elements of analysis in order to grasp the essence of these projects without equating them. The aim of this study is to demonstrate *how religious ideologies are merged in state-building projects*. More specifically, using *intraregional comparison* as well as *critical discourse analysis*, I analyze the ideological concordance as well as identity construction between the two cases that operationalize religion to restore a historical territory or a historical period. I particularly analyze each movement's own perceptions of *statehood, peoplehood, legitimacy* and *restoration* in relation to the employment of religion.

The intraregional comparisons demonstrate the significant similarity between the histories and geneses of both movements. Each group identifies itself partially or fully through religious elements. Although each finds religious significance in restoring their lands, the ideas and applications of (re)establishing a homeland were ignited by some form of *grievance*. The Religious Zionists used religion to influence a bigger political, Zionist movement while ISIS is using politics for a religious movement.

Religion in the two cases is a driving force as well as a goal. Both movements draw on religion as a basis for their ideologies, as well as legitimacy and appeal to an imagined community. Each case targets a specific community of people using religion as a method of identification that distinguishes between the 'self' and the 'other.' However, the Religious Zionists drew on, both, national and religious identity, unlike ISIS that condemns any national identity. The Zionists strived for public support that is witnessed in their consideration of the nature of the people when envisioning the structure of the state, which is not observed in the case of ISIS. ISIS is tremendously exclusionary and imposes a *takfiri* ideology to differentiate among the Muslims, as opposed to the Religious Zionists who believe all Jews are *in-groups* including the seculars. To the

Religious Zionists, specifically Rabbi Kook, every Jew has a resilient spiritual seed. It is important to note that each case was/is rejected by the majority of its targeted audience at the outset. Thus, it remains unknown what the future of ISIS is in the upcoming period.

The critical discourse analysis, further, demonstrates various similarities in the semantics of the two aspired movements. Religious Zionism and the Islamic State employ religion in numerous, similar ways. Both created a specific structure of a 'theocratic' state that is almost totalitarian in nature. I find that both movements' normative ideologies parallel one another yet their operative ideologies diverge on several points. Namely, both cases desired the application of a comprehensive, religious, legal system. Nonetheless, the Religious Zionists found themselves minorities in a bigger, political movement, which they ultimately cooperated with in hope of influencing the structure of the state. ISIS, on the other hand, is an entity that stands by itself and against anyone who disagrees with its ideologies and actions.

The Religious Zionists aimed to influence the secular Zionists. They were somewhat successful in ensuring the maintenance of some cultural, religious aspects such as keeping Sabbath and *kashrut*. In addition, many secular factions started responding to their demands and employing religious symbols in their discourses. In the declaration of the State of Israel speech, there is reference to the spiritual identity that even the seculars could not separate from the essence of the Jews. Nonetheless, they failed to influence the majority to implement religious state-bodies and law. ISIS, on the other hand, successfully declared a state as it envisioned and has accumulated tremendous power yet it does not entertain the support of its targeted community. In addition, it remains an unrecognized "state" and declared a terrorist group by numerous countries.

After conducting the analyses, I conclude that there are various similarities between the two movements. I summarize the key concepts in (Table 6). In addition, through the analyses of ISIS's documents, some of its aspirations and unclear notions in relation to "state" and "nation" become clearer. ISIS is intentionally vague about its usage of the term "state," which could be

explained through an inaccurate translation of the Arabic word *dawla* or through its religious duty to spread the Islam beyond any borders. Nonetheless, its aspiration to build a nation is illuminated through its documents. ISIS is constructing a common history, language, and culture that according to the definitions of Roeder and McLennan et al. define a "nation."

Future research could compare these religious ideologies to secular ideologies such as communism, for example, in order to shed light on the similarities and variances ideologies have in terms of values, means, perception of the 'self' and the 'other,' and perceptions of restructuring the world. Future research could also expand to cases where religion is instrumentalized for political governance outside of the region.

	Religious Zionism	The Islamic State
Themes		
Ideology	Theology could incorporate democratic features but the state has to be built on <i>halacha</i> .	 Theology (Islamic State based on <i>shari'a</i>) Takfir
Peoplehood	All Jewish People	Sunni Muslims
Grievance	Dispersion/Mass killings/Anti- Semitism	Western Domination/Islamophobia
Leaders	 Religious, prominent leaders. King from the House of David.	God-chosen
Legitimacy sources	 Written and Oral Torah Halacha 	 > Qur'an > Hadith > Shari'a > Leaders
Religious References	 Holy Scripture Praise to God God's assistance 	 Holy Scripture Praise to God God's assistance
Mobilization Tactics	HomelandDignity	 Religious duty Godly promises/Rewards Dignity

Appendix A

Compilation of excerpts of the book, Orot, by Rabbi Kook

Kook, Isaac (1920). Orot Excerpts in Samson, David and Tzvi Fishmen (1995). The Teachings of HaRav Avraham Yitzhak HaCohen Kook: Eretz-Yisrael. Torat Eretz-Yisrael Publications. Jerusalem

Page 5:

(Paragraph 1) "Our life history is long and therefore our life path is extensive in scope. We are indeed great, and accordingly, our mistakes are great, our tribulations are awesome, and our consolations are as equally monumental."

(*Paragraph 2*) "Retreating from all of our enhanced Jewish specialty is a cardinal misconception, representing a crisis in the understanding that "You chose us from all of the nations.'.... If we shall know our towering stature, then we will know ourselves, and if we forget our greatness, we forget ourselves, and a nation that forgets itself is certainly small and debased."

(Paragraph 3) "A storm of revolution will appear, and people will come to see clearly that the power of Israel lies in its eternal holiness, in the light of G-d and His Torah, in the yearning for spiritual light, which is the ultimate valor which triumphs over all of the worlds and all of their powers.... these are the pangs of Mashiach which come to refine and purify the entire world through the pains which they cause."

Page 44:

(*Paragraph 4*) "We recognize that a spiritual rebellion will come to pass in Eretz-Yisrael amongst the people of Israel in the beginnings of the nation's revival. The material comfort which will be attained by a percentage of the nation, convincing them that they already have completely reached their goal, will constrict the soul, and days will come which will seem devoid of all spirit and meaning. The aspirations for lofty and holy ideals will cease, and the spirit of the nation will plunge and sink to the depths."

Page 72:

(*Paragraph 5*) "Israel will rise to stand on its feet; will rise with valor in its cherished land; will express the statement of its prophecy from the source of its soul; it will awaken to revitalize the seeds of its Divine life that are dormant in the heart of every man and every living thing - ` Every soul shall praise G-d, Halleluya!"

Pages 150-151:

Kook, Isaac (1920). Orot Excerpts in Lecture #09: Letter 44, Section D (continued) The Uniqueness of the Jewish People. Retrieved from <u>http://etzion.org.il/en/lecture-09-letter-44-section-d-continued-uniqueness-jewish-people</u>

(*Paragraph 6*) "When life flourishes, when it has the worthy revelations of creation and science, it is totally impossible that opinions should be set by only one stamp, by one style. The formation of life's character always goes from lower to higher, from lesser life-content to higher life-content, from a weak glow to a powerful, brilliant glow."

(*Paragraph 7*) "But all this is when life has, together with free creativity and science, the basic foundation of the singular spirit of the nation, the aspiration to the Divine good that is lodged in the nature of its soul. Europe rightly gave up on God, Whom it never knew. Individual humanists adapted to the sublime good, but no entire nation. No nation or tongue could understand how to aspire to the good, the all, let alone how to stamp with this the foundation of its existence. Therefore, when in our day nationalism grew strong and penetrated the system of philosophy, the latter was forced to place a big question mark over all the contend of absolute ethics, which truly came to Europe only on loan from Judaism, and as any foreign implant, could not be absorbed in its spirit."

(Paragraph 8) "The question of ethics does not prick us at all if we will be what we are, if we will not force ourselves to be cloaked in foreign clothing. We feel within all of us, our total nation, that the absolute good, the good for all, is that for which we should yearn, and upon this foundation it is worthy to found a kingdom and conduct politics. We see from our flesh that the absolute good is the eternal, Divine good that is in all of existence, and we yearn constantly to follow in its tracks in the national and universal sense. Therefore, love of God and cleaving to God is for us something essential that cannot be erased or altered."

Page 156:

(*Paragraph 9*) "The difference between the Jewish soul, in all its essence, inner desires, strivings, character, and standing, and the soul of all the gentiles, on all of their levels, is greater and deeper than the difference between the soul of a man and the soul of an animal, for the difference in the latter case is one of quantity, while the difference in the first case is one of essential quality."

Page 160:

(Paragraph 10) "One's state is not the source of ultimate contentment. This may be said about a normal state, whose value does not exceed that of a large mutual responsibility society, in which many ideas, which are the crown of human life, remain, but float above it without touching it. However, in the case of a state that is ideological to the core, that is engraved in its very being with the most exalted ideological content, such a state indeed provides one with his greatest source of contentment.

(Paragraph 11) That is our state, the State of Israel, foundation earth of the Heavenly throne, consumed by the wish that God be acknowledged as One, for this in truth is the sublime happiness. It is true that this sublime happiness requires a prolonged clarification in order for its light to emerge during days of darkness, but it will not fail because of this to be the most sublime happiness."

ERETZ-YISRAEL

One

Kook, Isaac (1920). Orot Excerpts in Samson, David and Tzvi Fishmen (1995). The Teachings Of HaRav Avraham Yitzhak HaCohen Kook: Eretz-Yisrael. Torat Eretz-Yisrael Publications. Jerusalem

(*Paragraph 12*) "Eretz-Yisrael is not a peripheral matter, an external acquisition of the nation; it is not merely a means toward the goal of the general coalescing of the nation, nor of strengthening its material existence, nor even its spiritual.

(Paragraph 13) Eretz-Yisrael is an independent unit, bound with a living attachment with the nation, bound with inner Segulot with the nation's existence. As a result, it is impossible to comprehend the essence of the inner Segula of the Kedusha of Eretz-Yisrael, and to reveal the depths of its love, through any form of human conceptualization; but only through the Spirit of Hashem which acts on the nation as a whole.

(*Paragraph 14*) This Ruach *Hashem* on the nation, the natural spiritual formulation of Israel's soul, sends its rays in natural colors in all paths of sensitivity. It shines its exalted rays in direct accordance with the exalted Ruach HaKodesh which fills with life and exalted joy the hearts of the holy thinkers and those who are involved in the deep contemplations of Israel.

(*Paragraph 15*) The thought regarding Eretz-Yisrael that it has merely a peripheral value to facilitate the subsistence of the unified nation; even when it comes to fortify the concept of Judaism in the Diaspora, in order to preserve its form, and to strengthen the belief and fear of Hashem, and to strengthen the performance of the commandments in a proper fashion - this orientation toward Eretz-Yisrael is not worthy of lasting fruition, for its foundation is rickety in light of the towering, unshakable Kedusha of Eretz-Yisrael.

(Paragraph 16) The concept of Judaism in the Diaspora will only find true strength through the depth of its involvement in Eretz Yisrael. Only through its longing for Eretz-Yisrael will Diaspora Judaism consistently receive its inherent qualities. The yearning for Salvation gives the Judaism of the Diaspora its power of stamina; whereas the Judaism of Eretz-Yisrael is the Salvation itself."

Glossary

Arabic Definitions⁵¹

Al-Islam deen wa dawla: The phrase means "Islam is a religion and a state." It is Mawdudi's ideology of merging religion and the state.

Ansar: Supporters/locals. It was first used to refer to the locals in Medina who helped the Prophet upon his arrival.

Baqiya wa tatamadad: The phrase means "lasting and expanding," which is a motto used by ISIS.

Dar al-Islam: House of Islam.

Dar al-Kufr: House of Infidelity.

Da'wah: Invitation to Islam (preaching).

Dhimma: Protection pact on non-Muslims residing in an Islamic state.

Hadith: Literally, the word means "sayings." It refers to a compilation of the prophet's sayings, which is used as an authoritative guidance for the Muslims

Hajj: Pilgrimage to Mecca, which is one of the five pillars of Islam.

Hijrah: The word means migration, which denotes the prophet's migration from Mecca to Medina. Usually, it entails an individual duty in Islam to migrate from *Dar al-Kufr* to *Dar al-Islam*.

Hijri: The Islamic lunar calendar. *Hijri* is a derivative of the word *hijra*, marking the migration of the prophet.

Imamah: The succession of leadership.

Iqamat el deen: The phrase means "the establishment of religion," which is Mawdudi's school of thought.

Jama'ah: Congregation.

Jihad: Jihad is an Islamic duty to maintain and spread Islam through a struggle, which could be spiritual or physical (war).

Jezyah: Special taxes imposed on non-Muslims in an Islamic state.

Khilafat/Khulifa: Khilafat means the caliphate system, which is the political state that controlled the Muslims after the death of the Prophet/a caliph is the leader of a caliphate or a leader of the Muslims. The words are derivatives of the Arabic word "succession."

Kufar: Infidels.

Muhajirin: The word literally means migrants. It was first used to describe the prophet's companions who joined him in his migration to Mecca.

⁵¹ I consulted the Encyclopedia Britannica for several definitions.

Mujahedeen: Those who engage in *jihad* or "warriors of faith." Even though *jihad* is an Islamic duty for all Muslims, this term is used to describe the physical, male fighters.

Munafiqeen: Hypocrites.

Sahaba: Companions of the prophet.

Sahwa: Awakening.

Sam': Listening.

Shahada: Testimony of faith.

Shari'a: The Islamic legal system that regulates the private and public lives of the community.

Ta'ah: Obedience.

Tawhid: The word means 'oneness;' in other words, monotheism, which is the foundation of Islam.

Takfir: Excommunication/ the labeling of infidelity, which has become an applied 'ideology' to distinguish between believers and infidels.

Taghut: False leader.

Ummah: It is often translated into 'nation' yet it means a body of people who share the Islamic faith.

Zakat: The word means alms. It is an Islamic religious duty. It is one of the five pillars of Islam

Fiqh: Literally, it means 'full comprehension' but in Islamic context, it means jurisprudence.

Hebrew Definitions:

Atchalta d'geula: The phrase means the beginning of redemption.

Eretz-Ysirael or Eretz-Israel: The land of Israel.

Halachah: Traditional Jewish legal system, which is extracted from the Written and Oral Torah.

Haredim: Ultra-Orthodox Jews.

Kashrut: Jewish dietary laws.

Mitzvoth: Godly commandments.

Segulot: Divine inner attachment.

Oral Torah: "The Jewish legal corpus is divided into the Written Law, which is the Five Books of Moses, and the Oral Law, which comprises the traditions contained in the rabbinic literature. In this context for Herzog, faith in the Written and Oral Law signifies adherence to traditional Jewish faith and practice." (Kaplan & Penslar, 2011, p. 160)

Talmud: The word means "teaching" or "instruction." It is a compilation of guiding texts of Rabbinic Judaism.

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