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THE POLITICS OF POST-WAR REINTEGRATION

By

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Declaration

I hereby declare that no parts of this thesis have been accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. This thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

Natalia A. Peral
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Abstract

At war's end, the international community faces the challenge of a massive displacement of population and the legacy of divided societies. These challenges have been tackled with either partitioning territories, or making institutional power-sharing arrangements among conflicting parties. Nevertheless, proponents of those solutions cannot explain the variation of post-war realities across time and space that observe societal divisions, as much as reintegrated societies. This work wonders why some societies remain divided, while others reintegrate? To what extent and under which conditions is ethnic reintegration possible after internecine conflict?

Drawing on existing theoretical arguments, I develop a theory of post-war reintegration to explain that societies remain divided because political elites of majority and minority groups have incentives to maintain those societies divided in homogenous or enclaved scenarios. To do so, those elites develop a majorization pattern through which they circulate existing resources within patronage networks, obstruct minority return and participation to exclude non-groups from those resources, and manipulate displaced co-ethnics to shore up their power base. Moreover I argue that their ethnic kin (national elites, host states and kin-states) have incentives to support such pattern.

I further argue that timely third party intervention in disrupting such majorization process, and in challenging their respective ethnic kin support, is necessary in conditions of homogeneity to move towards reintegration. Failure to disrupt this pattern on time is likely result in an assimilated scenario, because political elites are likely to expand policies that increase minority participation in order to derive resources from peace-builders, while at the same time they continue obstructing minority return to that community.

In societies divided in an enclaved scenario, the timing for third party intervention is less relevant to advance reintegration than the disruption of the ethnic kin support that feeds the enclave with resources. Thus, moving towards a reintegrated scenario demands the engagement of third parties in challenging ethnic kin support. The theory also expects that lacking resources within the enclave, local political elites will opt for reintegration as a way to survive politically in post-war settings.

To investigate my research questions I conducted ethnographic field research and intensive historical analysis via process-tracing in order to identify the sources of variable post-war reintegration in the cases of Bugojno and Jajce (in the Central Canton of Bosnia and Herzegovina), between 1995 and 2012. I also generalize findings to the Serb enclave cases in Northern and Southern Kosovo, between 1999 and 2015.

I found support to my argument that third party intervention in disrupting the majorization pattern established by political elites and their respective ethnic kin support, is necessary for moving toward reintegration. Likewise, this work demonstrates that what deter societies from reintegration is more related to the role assumed by political elites in post-war scenarios, than to societal mistrust and fears. Thus, post-war reintegration is not only a desirable conflict management strategy to pursue, but also a feasible one.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

As of this writing, worldwide news is that the parties to Syrian conflict are about to meet in a new edition of Geneva Peace Talks on Friday 29th of January. Meanwhile, Syria has left behind a death toll of more than 250,000 persons[1], almost 4.6 million refugees[2], and 6.5 million displaced people.[3] The international community currently focuses on ceasing the conflict, solving the refugee crisis and finding resources to alleviate the internally displaced. But soon we will face the challenge of the post-war management of displaced populations and refugees. The challenge will be unavoidable, as it has been in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter, BH), Kosovo, Rwanda, Afghanistan and Congo.

Surprisingly enough, academic and policy work is still lagging behind of the challenge I describe. When the time came in East Timor, Iraq, BH and Kosovo, the news were heated with arguments of scholars and policy makers that had no faith on the possibilities of rebuilding the social fabric of those societies, and suggested partitioning territories to accommodate contending parties.

Yet, it is understandable. For those who have witnessed ISIS's practices of ethnic cleansing such somber theoretical and political prospects might easily resonate. Moreover, human history shows several examples of that kind of solutions with diverse degrees of success. From the Treaty of Verdun in 843, that divided territories after the Carolingian Civil War, or the Treaty of Tordesillas of June 7, 1494 that

[1] Deutsche Welle (DW): 2016, January 1. *Death toll in Syria tops 55,000 in 2015.* From http://www.dw.com/en/death-toll-in-syria-tops-55000-in-2015/a-18953548.
[2] UNHCR: 2016, January 16. *Syria Regional Refugee Response* . Retrieved January 16, 2016 from: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php.
[3] Reliefweb: 2016, January 27. *Syria - IDPs and refugees in neighbouring countries - ECHO Daily Map*. Retrieved January 27, 2016 from: http://reliefweb.int/map/syrian-arab-republic/syria-idps-and-refugees-neighbouring-countries-echo-daily-map-27012016.

divided newly discovered territories between Portugal and the Crown of Castile, to contemporary arrangements like the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 that proposed the exchange of Turkish and Greek populations, or the Partition of India in 1947 into Hindu (India) and Muslim (Pakistan) states. Recent history also show examples of conflicts that have been resolved with partition, like Cyprus, and lately Sudan, with the creation of South Sudan as new independent state in 2011.

Nevertheless, rebuilding the social fabric after the war has to be a desirable goal to explore, in theory and in practice, because it poses a challenge of tremendous relevance for the peacebuilding prospects of conflicting societies. Understanding the possibilities of recovering the social fabric should be at least equally relevant as the understanding of economic recovery, governance recovery, and infrastructure recovery.

It is surprising that endeavors that study the possibilities of reconstructing the social fabric are rather limited, as we shall see in the first section of this chapter. When available, the solutions proposed swirl around various institutional arrangements that could accommodate conflicting parties in power-sharing arrangements, and these solutions find also their limits when variation take place within similar institutional designs, as we shall see.

The question is, regardless how laudable the goal of rebuilding societies might be, do we know to what extent is that possible? Not really. Such task can assume different types of configurations that describe whether the population has returned back home, and whether it participates in community life. I will discuss this issue later in the current chapter, and explore it with more depth in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2.

This thesis aims at filling the void of arguments that favor the rebuilding of the social fabric after the war. This thesis contributes by offering a theory of post-war

reintegration that shows the political processes at their core, and the extent to which the international community can engage to promote social reconstruction, what here I call "reintegration"[4]. The theory describes three alternatives whenever reintegration has not succeeded: in such case, post-war communities are either homogenous[5], or assimilated[6] or enclaved[7]. Along this thesis, reintegration is understood to be the most desirable outcome, because it reconstructs the social fabric with the return of those displaced by war, while providing for their participation in community life. Reintegration does not equal reconciliation or trust among those groups, because these are psychological and emotional processes, and as such they can also happen despite reintegration not being achieved.

Reintegration is basically a post-war solution to the massive displacement of population and the challenge posed by that crisis. It is also an option that is in line with the human rights system established in 1949, unlike partitioning solutions that demand the forceful relocation of populations. Furthermore, reintegration helps us delegitimize war practices of ethnic cleansing and genocide, while attempting the reversal of the consequences of those practices. After all, it does not make sense that the international community actively engages in deterring war and genocide, but neglect the consequences of such practices. What could be the value of the Syrian Peace Talks if at the post-war setting the international community engages in solutions that entrench social division?

[4] The reader will notice that I employed the terms "ethnic reintegration", "reintegration", "reintegrated scenario", "reintegrated community" to represent the same phenomena. All these concepts are used to describe communities with a high level of minority return (or population), and a high level of participation in community life.

[5] A homogenous community has a small number of minorities, or these are still displaced due to war, and those who returned do not participate in community life.

[6] An assimilated community has a small number of minority (or minority return levels), but they do participate in community life together with the majority.

[7] An enclaved community has high levels of minority return (or a high demographic presence), but a low level of participation in community life.

Summing up, this thesis proposes post-war reintegration as a desirable conflict management strategy after the war, and it studies to what extent is reintegration possible after conflict-induced displacement. Before doing that, this chapter introduces the theoretical grounds from where this thesis departs.

I.1 The Puzzle

During my last trip to Jajce (BH) in November 2013 what was once called the Bošnjak minority[8] controlled the municipality, after they managed to return home despite the severe obstructionism by Croat majority elites during the first ten years after the Bosnian war ended in 1995. Not many would have imagined back in 1995 that Bošnjaks and Croats would ever be able to live together without fear of being persecuted, expelled, or killed. In those years the town was dominated by a Croat majority that succeeded in preventing the population of Bošnjak origin from returning home and participating in all aspects of community life. At the same time, a sort of parallel government run by Bošnjaks provided alternative basic services such as education, health care and civic registry to those Bošnjaks that could return to Vinac, a village nearby Jajce and its surrounding area.

These two different realities of the post-war setting in Jajce reflect the different ways in which majority and minority groups interacted after the war and ethnic cleansing, but also highlights how short scholars have fallen in understanding post-war scenarios. Some societies did remain divided, but some others have

[8] I use the term "minority" as reflecting the group that remain out of power in a given space and time in a war's aftermath. It most cases this is also a numerically inferior group. "Majority return" refers to the return of a group of people to a territory where they are a majority, and "minority return" to territories where they are a minority. This corresponds to the standard understanding among the international community and the scholars that have studied the return process in BH.

reintegrated as well. Such variations are not exclusive of this particular case; neither do they take place only across time, as we shall see in this work.

We can observe that variations of post-war realities of majority/minority interactions take place across space as well. As of 2010[9], not all pre-war municipality demographics have been restored in the Federation of BH. Of the several municipalities of the Federation only Jajce, Bugojno and Fojnica are noticeable for their levels of minority return; regarding the Srpska Republic, scholars often mention Prijedor, Zvornik and Doboj as positive examples of reintegration. Yet, a closer look will show that despite a good level of minority return in Prijedor, the municipality is not really reintegrated[10], but rather assimilated[11]: a bit more than 70% of the Bošnjak minority is still displaced, while those who have returned represent less than 20% of the total population.

These variations are not exclusive to BH: Chapter 5 will show variation across time and space in Kosovo Serb enclaves in northern and southern Kosovo from 1999 to September 2015 as well. It is puzzling to observe this amount of variation within the same territory, particularly when the literature and practitioners tend to address post-conflict settings as obeying to similar conditions along the same territory.

All these variations took place in BH after the Dayton Peace Agreement (hereinafter DPA) of 1995 sought to provide a framework from where Bosnia could be reconstructed after the ethno-territorial war between 1992 and 1995. This war left

[9] Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BH: 2005, December. *Comparative Analysis on Access to Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons.* Retrieved March 2010 from http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/pdf/uporednaanalizaengleski.pdf. Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BH: 2005, December. *Comparative Analysis on Access to Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons.* Retrieved March 2010 from: http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/pdf/uporednaanalizaengleski.pdf. Barnett, M., & Zurcher, C.: 2009, The Peacebuilder's Contract: How external statebuilding reinforces weak statehood. In R. Paris, & T. D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations.* London: Routledge.

[10] This is a post-war scenario in which minority return and minority participation observes high levels.

[11] I defined "assimilated scenario" as a scenario that observes low minority return with high levels of minority participation.

most of the Bosnian population displaced either internally or externally, a total amount of 2.2 million, half of which were refugees in nearby countries. Ethnonational political contestation did not finish with the signing of the Peace Agreement. Although the DPA had promised the possibility to return home to the 1.2 million refugees and 750,000 internally displaced persons[12], efforts oriented to implement such process met a wide range of outcomes. Those included a high level of obstructionism by hardliners and manipulation of refugees and IDPs by local elites willing to benefit from massively relocating people.

Identifying dynamics that take place at a local level might help us to understand post-war divided societies with more depth and variation across post-war scenarios in particular. Thus, looking at the reintegration process at municipal level in BH provides a study of variation across municipalities with a similar institutional design and with an equal war experience of ethnic cleansing. After all, individuals and groups look to local communities to satisfy their needs following the war and when state services collapse[13] and yet, largely misinterpreted the specific post-war local dynamics.[14]

Bosnia and Herzegovina is all the more interesting because the DPA made a bold move by expanding the right to return granted by Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[15], stipulating that the right to return was specific to the return to the home of origin. However, several billions of USD over 20 years did not help to enforce this right and rebuild the social fabric.

[12] UNHCR: 1998, December 1, *UNHCR Global Appeal 1999 - Bosnia and Herzegovina*. From http://www.unhcr.org/3eaff43e9.html.

[13] Barnett, M., & Zurcher, C.: 2009, The Peacebuilder's Contract :How external statebuilding reinforces weak statehood. In R. Paris, & T. D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations.* London: Routledge, p. 31.

[14] Autesserre, S.: 2010,. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* . Cambridge University Press.

[15] UN. (1949). *Universal Declaration of Human Rights.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.

The case of BH is even more puzzling because since 1997 the international mandate to deal with reintegration has been expanded and strengthened. In December 2007, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) provided the OHR with the capacity to make "binding decisions" that could enforce measures to implement the DPA.[16] According to the PIC, "[s]uch measures may include actions against persons holding public office or officials who are absent from meetings without good cause or who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implementation."[17] These so-called "Bonn Powers" were complemented by increasing the capacities of the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF), whose role was transformed from a supporting actor to a responsible agency to target obstruction to return, integrated in the political agenda of the OHR.[18] Later on in 2000, a Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP)[19] also applied to all municipalities in Bosnia. These powers were not used selectively in Bosnia but rather implemented whenever needed.

This situation brings about the following important research questions: *Why do some societies remain divided while others reintegrate? How do we explain such variation and how and to what extent is ethnic reintegration possible?*

Despite the vast literature that deals with post-war settings, as well as theories explaining the conditions under which different groups cooperate in those contexts, there is no theory accounting for variation in post-war scenario outcomes that informs the conditions for either post-war societal division or reintegration. Different

[16] PIC: 1998, December 16)*PIC Declaration – Annex.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from http://www.ohr.int/?p=54101&lang=en.
[17] PIC: (1997), *op. cit.*, IX c.
[18] Toal, G., & Dahlman, C.: 2011, *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic cleansing and its reversa.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 222.
[19] OSCE: 2000, October, *Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP).* From http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_20001015114028l9eng.pdf.

explanations on why societies remain divided have been put forward[20], along with explanations as to why societies reintegrate[21], but there is no systematic theory that accounts for variation in post-war scenarios that could show us how the social fabric looks like after the war.

So far, practitioners and scholars have discussed how to handle post-war ethnically divided societies. Controversy has swirled around whether ethnic cooperation is possible after the war, or not; and therefore, if efforts should be directed towards the separation of those ethnic groups, or towards the search of mechanisms that reinforce cooperation-reintegration or reconciliation. There are two main groups of answers: one that argues that cooperation between ethnic groups is not possible and therefore groups should be separated, and another that argues that cooperation is not only possible but also desirable, and describe conditions that can facilitate the conviviality of previously warring parties.

Within the first group, the leading scholars argue in favor of partitioning territories along ethnic lines to ensure the prevention of further conflicts between the groups. Partition scholars argue that the ethnic identity of the population is charged with high levels of deep hatred and fear[22]. They also maintain that due to the war period, ethnic identities have hardened, and therefore are ripe for further conflict[23], or for triggering an ethnic security dilemma prone to leading the ethnic groups to choosing offensive strategies[24]. From a different scholarly perspective, Collier[25] also speaks of a pessimistic post-conflict scenario due to "subjective grievances" that were strategically generated by rebel groups during the conflict. Such grievances, the

[20] Partitionist Scholars (note24), Toal and Dahlman: 2011, op. cit.
[21] Pickering: 2007, Jenne 2010, Moore: 2013
[22] Mearsheimer and Pape: 1993; Downes: 2004, 2006; Kaufman: 1996, 1998; Mearsheimer and Van Evera: 1995; Posen: 1993.
[23] Kaufman: 1996.
[24] Posen: 1993.
[25] Collier: 2007, 212.

author argues, cannot be ignored in the post-war scenario because they are responsible for an increase in the risk of violence.

In line with this logic, partition scholars argue that territorial separation is the proper mechanism to prevent the recurrence of ethnic war and other forms of violence[26]. Their logical expectation is that antagonistic ethnic groups will not overcome hatred and fears and therefore conviviality is unlikely. Yet, such predictions seem to be disconfirmed in a wide range of cases. Contrary to their expectations, conviviality does take place in post-war societies, although such cooperation also varies over time and in a wide range of subnational units, as we shall see exemplified in the Bugojno case.

Indeed, Toal and Dahlman[27] have pointed out that ethnic cleansing has been successfully reversed in some municipalities of Bosnia, although not in others, and they conclude that the conditions that generate these local variations deserve further analysis. My thesis contributes with such type of analysis. The authors bring the most systematic empirical account to this date about post-war ethno-territorial dynamics in BH, while at the same time show why BH have remained divided. However, their theoretical explanations are based on critical geopolitics focusing on elites' practices within specific geopolitical projects to remake Bosnia.[28] We still need theories that could travel across geopolitical spaces.

The authors' study points out the role of ethno-territorial elites in implementing geopolitical projects that keep BH divided. However, such explanation does not help us to understand either the numerous scenarios in which societies remain divided, or the conditions that help make reintegration a success. Moreover,

[26] Kaufman: 1996, 1998; Johnson: 2008; Downes: 2004, 2006.
[27] Toal and Dahlman: 2011.
[28] Toal and Dahlman: op. cit., p. 8-9.

because critical geopolitics provides arguments that are geographically bound, the geopolitical projects identified in BH cannot necessarily be assumed to travel across cases that obey similar scope conditions. My thesis will address this aspect.

In contrast, the second group of scholars –the institutionalist- assumes that there are prospects for ethnic cooperation and conviviality in post-war societies, provided that certain institutional arrangements are put in place and keep conflicting groups apart[29], rather than helping their progress toward reintegration. In any case, the international community relies on peace agreements to implement either option. However, "[p]eace [a]gremeents do not end conflict; they set up a process that gives peace a chance to unfold over time".[30] In war's aftermath of Guatemala, for example, in the immediate five years the average of violent deaths was similar to war's annual average[31].

Institutionalist scholars[32] trust that institutional engineering settle differences in divided societies. Arend Lijphart proposes consociationalism as a mechanism that would mandate the sharing of power among different ethnic groups and through which intergroup consensus can be reached if the following four elements are present: grand coalition of ethnic leaders, a mutual veto power given to each, autonomy of education and language, and personal laws[33].

Donald Horowitz[34], on the other hand, believes in incentives for the compromise of elites on ethnic matters. Therefore, any institutional design should involve electoral incentives that enable leaders to go beyond their appeal to their own

[29] Simonsen: 2005, p. 303.
[30] Jarstad, A. K., & Sisk, T. (Eds.): 2008, *From War to Democracy Description Table of contents Excerpt Index Copyright Frontmatter Details 11 tables Page extent: 0 pages From War to Democracy Dilemmas of Peacebuilding.* Cambridge University Press.
[31] Pearce: 1999.
[32] Lijphart: 1977; Horowitz: 1985; Roeder: 2005; Brancati: 2006, 2009; Sisk: 2003. McGarry and O'Leary: 1993; Nordlinger: 1972; O'Leary: 2001.
[33] Lijphart: 1977;
[34] Horowitz: 1985.

ethnic group. Along similar institutionalist lines, Roeder[35] advocates for an approach he calls "power-dividing". The author contrasts power-dividing with power-sharing approaches, arguing that if people are distributed in multi-majorities configurations in which citizens can see themselves empowered at the expense of the state, the prospects for interethnic peace are much higher, as the citizens are likely to recognize their shared interests in defending the institutional order.

Sisk, Lyons, and Reilly[36] address the benefits of particular electoral designs in the process of generating peace. Similarly, Dawn Brancati[37] argues for decentralization as a mechanism to bring power closer to the people and facilitate opportunities to participate in government, increasing the integration of different ethnic groups into the political structure.

However, none of the abovementioned versions of institutionalism can explain the variation at the sub-national levels when the institutional design is kept constant. For example, the cases in BH of Bugojno and Jajce are both located within a similar institutional design in the Central Canton, yet they observe variation in the outcome of post-war scenarios. Institutionalist explanations also fail to explain variations across time whenever the institutional design remains constant. In the two cases I researched in BH variation across time was a distinctive element.

How do we explain that across same nation we find different post-war realities? For example, people belonging to formerly conflicting ethnic groups have in fact developed together a coffee shop in a municipality of BH (Dvrar) attracting Serb and Croat clients indistinctively. How would we explain that in Doboj, another town within the Srpska Republic, the population has mostly returned; while the population

[35] Roeder: 2005, p. 60-64.
[36] Sisk: 2003; Lyons: 2005; Reilly: 2003.
[37] Brancati: 2009, 2006.

in Zvornik (120 kilometers away) lacks successful returnee records? Furthermore, the institutional design cannot account for the wide variance of ethnic reintegration levels between Bošnjaks and Croats in the municipalities of Central Canton like Bugojno, Jajce, Travnik and Vitez. Likewise, Institutionalists cannot explain why some Serb municipalities in Kosovo are still operating under an enclave system (North Mitrovica, Zvecan, Leposavic, Zubin Potok), while others are on the path towards reintegration (like Strepce and Gracanica).

Pickering[38] provided an explanation for the abovementioned discrepancy. The author looks at the individual choices regarding peacebuilding efforts and reintegration specifically, and explains that social capital was relevant for the individual choices of displaced people of BH to return to pre-war home. However, her argument does not fully explain the puzzle presented above, because individual accounts do not explain variation at the subnational level. For example, the author brings the case of Goran, a self-identified "Croat" of Livno, who assigns a different meaning to the label "Croat" with different implications regarding the behavior towards Bošnjaks and politics in Bosnia. Thus, Pickering's work explains individual variations but not variation across different communities. While the author looks at the individual preferences, I am interested in the political context in which these individuals are inserted and the relevant actors that interact politically in that context.

Another group of scholars argues that intergroup contact reduces prejudices and bias, and in turn this contributes to improve relations among groups after conflict.[39] In theory this could explain the abovementioned variations, but unfortunately the practice showed it is not the case. In 2003, the UNHCR Program

[38] Pickering: 2007, p. 55.
[39] Allport: 1954, Amir: 1998.

"Imagine Coexistence"[40] put in practice contact hypothesis theories seeking to rebuild post-war communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, Eileen Babbit[41] points out the limitations of these contact hypotheses for post-conflict settings. Analyzing return and income generation projects in BH exercised through this program, the author states that the mere contact by itself, either by bringing people of different ethnic groups and inserting them together in the same municipality, or by creating ethnically mixed income generation projects, does not necessarily imply the coexistence [or reintegration] of the communities if they are not followed by specific projects that could address the improvement of their relationship (i.e. conflict resolution trainings, facilitated discussions, shared decision making processes).

Yet, both, the contact hypothesis, and the UNHCR program assume that people was already returned back home. Contact hypothesis do not help us explain why in some communities the minorities are enclaved (like Bosnjaks in Jajce before 2004), while in some others the minorities have not been able to return home (like Croats in Bugojno until 1998). Furthermore, contact hypothesis could not apply in contexts like Bugojno, because contact has to take place among already returned minorities -which was not the case of Croat minorities in Bugojno at that time.

Another line of research sees conviviality among previously conflicting groups as a desirable and feasible reality. This scholarly work has focused on inter-ethnic cooperation process and in the observation of the conditions and opportunities that enforce such processes[42]. Within this group, some have looked to the paths toward growing levels of trust among different ethnic groups[43]. However, while higher

[40] UNHCR: 2003, May, *Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and persons of concern.* Retrieved January 14, 2016 from http://www.unhcr.org/3f1408764.pdf.
[41] Babbit: 2006, p. 107.
[42] Fearon & Laitin: 1996.
[43] Widner: 2004; Bahry et al.: 2005; Ward, O'Loughin, Bakke: 2007; and Cook, Hardin and Levi: 2007.

degrees of cooperation and trust among previously conflicting groups might speak of their community ties, those factors could not explain varied levels of minority return and minority participation across cases and time. Like contact hypothesis works, these theories assume the presence of population within a given place. This thesis emphasizes the need to study factors that intervene in restoring pre-war population and their participation in community life.

One fertile effort to address my empirical puzzle is made by Jenne[44]. The author claims that third party efforts oriented to disrupt patronage networks and challenge post-war authorities, combined with efforts to assist minority return, have brought success to return programs. The author further argues that societies may fail to reintegrate due to an ethnic spoil system that majority elites use to shore up their political base in post-conflict setting. I draw on her work and I extend her argument to include two important elements: 1) the reversibility of reintegration, for what I add the distinction between reintegration and sustainable reintegration, showing that despite we might reach reintegration at one point, this might not sustain necessarily over time. 2) I expand the binary differentiation between reintegrated and non-reintegrated communities, arguing that reintegration failure can take three different forms (homogeneous, assimilated, and enclaved scenarios).

Moore[45], using ethnic reintegration as an indicator of successful peace-building, also argues that reintegration "requires strong international presence at local level, meaningful engagement with local actors and sustained commitment of resources and personnel." I build on his findings to explain the nuances of the role of third parties across different contexts, and to identify what sort of international

[44] Jenne, Erin K.: 2010, Barriers to Reintegration after Ethnic Civil Wars: Lessons from Minority Returns and Restitution in the Balkans, *Civil Wars*, 12:4, 370-394.

[45],Moore, A. (2013). *Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. p. 117.

engagement is necessary in conditions of enclaved, homogenous or in an assimilated community.

Thus, I expand on Jenne's theoretical explanations and Moore's findings to develop a theory of post-war reintegration. In doing so, I situate my research within a scholarly tradition that takes as a starting point that post-war ethnic conviviality is possible and desirable.

The fact that the existing theories do not account for variable reintegration success within a single post-conflict society, compel us to identify the conditions that favor reintegration success. Thus, this research is aimed at learning not only *whether and how reintegration is possible in post-conflict societies*, but also *how and why some communities follow alternative non-reintegrated post-war scenarios*. Thus, this research has both theoretical and policy implications. First, it seeks to join scholarly debates searching for answers on how to handle post-war societies. Second, it is intended to inform policy attempts to build peaceful societies in a responsible fashion. I expand more on the contribution of my work in Chapter 6.

The argument I present to answer those questions is applicable to cases that meet the following scope conditions. First, my theory departs from the assumption that civil wars leave behind divided societies in homogenous or enclaved scenarios. This is why the question targets the aspect of the maintenance of those scenarios in the post-war period and inquires on the conditions that make reintegration possible by challenging such processes. Thus, this theory does not explain cases like Tuzla, in BH, which have not been divided by war.

Second, this theory only applies to societies that faced civil wars with an identity component. Such societies displaced large numbers of population due to conflict, ethnic cleansing or genocide-like practices.

Third, although the Palestine-Israeli conflict could fit such scope conditions, this theory only applies to conflicts that have an identifiable starting date and a closing date with a peace agreement. The Palestine-Israeli conflict has not yet reached the point in which we can identify the initiation of a specific post-war period: it rather combines various failed peace-agreements attempts with others that have failed to sustain over time[46].

The spectrum of such cases seems to be currently in BH, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Congo, Burundi and possibly Iraq, and Syria once the war ends.. The near future will demand answers for what is largely ignored today: the impact of return when war ends, the political conditions that Syrians will face, and the decisions the international community will have to make in order to handle the post-war management of those refugees.

I.2 Why Study Post-War Outcomes and Ethnic Reintegration in Particular?

Because we can learn about the options at hand for the post-war management of the largest refugee crisis of all time in Syria. As of August 2015, media outlets are filled with news of the refugee crisis in Europe. People displaced due to wars in Syria and Afghanistan are seen by European media outlets either as a threat to their well-being or as people deserving human care. Yet political elites do not attempt to make statements regarding sustainable solutions to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who risk their life in search of survival. While this is the current challenge for decision makers as a direct consequence of war, war's end will confront them with the urge of providing sustainable solutions for reintegrating refugees in their pre-war

[46] I am thankful to Daniel Monterescu for raising questions on this aspect.

homes or their resettlement somewhere else in their country of origin. This work situates itself in this second challenge, this is, the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people in post-war societies.

We cannot deny that international displacement of people is an increasingly pressing issue. Between 2009, when I started this research, and now, 2015, the amount of displaced people worldwide increased by about fifty percent (50%); it escalated from 43.3 million displaced persons worldwide to almost 60 million (UNHCR 2010[47], 2015a[48]).

Figure I.1: Worldwide Displacement of People



Source: UNHCR 2015b[49]

This unprecedented displacement calls for urgent engagement of the international community to decide on policies and strategies to protect those who are currently displaced; but also defies us to think about how we can tackle this massive displacement once the war finishes. This thesis is concerned with this second aspect.

[47] UNHCR: 2010. See: http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html.
[48] UNHCR: 2015a. See: http://unhcr.org/556725e69.html#_ga=1.136354036.591206176.1447660924.
[49] UNHCR: 2015b. See: http://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html.

As of June 2015, a total of 18.9 million of those displaced are mostly hosted by developing countries, which accounts for 86% of the cases[50]. In the case of Syrian refugees, 90% of them have fled to neighboring countries.

Because we need to assume a global responsibility toward an unprecedented refugee crisis. Refugee crises have spiked in the last two decades, since the explosion of intrastate conflicts in 1990. 90% of the 104 intrastate wars (out of 111) involved and affected civilians[51]. During war humanitarian crisis demands solutions for protection, food and shelter. In post-war societies populations face the question whether it is safe to return to their pre-war home territories. It is certainly clear that the international community cannot turn a blind eye to such needs. Moreover, fighting the consequences of massive displacements suggests that the tools employed to violently induce such displacement do not enjoy worldwide legitimacy.

Understanding how and to what extent ethnic reintegration is possible can help the international community (UN offices, the EU and relevant international donors in post-war societies) to decide how to handle the post-war management of refugees and peace-building processes at large. Engaging in post-war interventions that delegitimize ethnic cleansing is compelling now that outrageous videos showing violent practices in Syria circulate around the world leaving no doubt of their existence (unlike in Bosnia, where ethnic cleansing is still heavily contested in many cases).

Because ethnic reintegration might be a tool for conflict prevention, and we need to study the conditions under which such scenario takes place. Recent research shows that low-level intensity conflict sparks in homogenous and geographically contiguous territories, concluding that segregation is unlikely to prevent intergroup

[50] UNHCR 2015a:2.
[51] Cairns: 1997. See as well Wallesteen and Sollenberg: 2001, p. 632.

violence.[52] Research also shows that **"**[i]ntolerance is greatest in ethnic enclaves for both minority and majority group members"[53] and conflict often escalates more quickly in such areas[54]. Ethnic reintegration success would thereby give a chance to the emergence of more tolerant societies and also prevent the further development of future conflicts. Long-term conditions of political stability require strong integrationist policies[55].

One might argue that ethnic reintegration is futile in societies that have faced internecine wars, where people saw neighbors killing or raping their family members. However, scholars incorrectly assume that people necessarily fear and hate those belonging to a different ethnic group after communal conflict.

This thesis questions such assumptions. People do not hate each other due to their belonging to a specific identity or due to fears that other identity brings about. People understand how political dynamics take place in ethnic wars and post-war scenarios. They understand that ethnic identity has been used as an excuse to commit the most atrocious crimes in search of political power. Anyone walking on any street in Bosnia could understand that what people hate and fear the most are political elites. The 2014 PASOS survey regarding trust in BH showed that political parties and the OHR have low levels of trust, with political parties rated as low as14%.[56] Such dissatisfaction with Bosnian elites came to the surface on February 2014, when people rallied on Tuzla, Sarajevo and Banja Luka protesting against the lack of solutions within the health care and education system.

[52] Balcells et al.: 2015, "The determinants of low-intensity intergroup violence: the case of Northern Ireland", *Journal of Peace Research*, p. 1-16.
[53] Massey et al.: 1999.
[54] Anderson: 1991; Denitch: 1994; Gilliland: 1996; Massey et al.: 1999.
[55] Massey et al.: 1999, p. 690.
[56] Balkan Insight: 2014, "Voting for the Devil you know". See: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/blog/bosnia-voting-for-the-devil-you-know-1.

This work offers a different angle regarding why ethnic wars happened in the first place. People do not fear each other, they fear what politicians can do when they instrumentalize ethnic identity in their search of power. I assume here that political elites rely on such instrumentalization to pursue their political agenda. Gagnon has already tested the success of political elites in using the ethnic card to demobilize population's political options.[57]

Because we need to provide for new options for the post-war refugee management. It is important to study what are the options left to refugees and IDPs once war ends, when they might be pushed to go back home. Post-war management of refugees should be treated as a political problem rather than a humanitarian one[58]. We have to acknowledge that countries feel overwhelmed and refugees are seen as competing for resources[59], exacerbating existing internal conflicts[60], or implying high costs for hosting countries[61]. The extensive current dispute between Europe and Turkey[62] shows that we are dealing with refugees crises wrong; and the way Germany dealt with BH refugees as soon as Dayton Agreement was in place also shows that we are not equipped to foresee how the "return" process affects the political dynamics of the peace-building process. Learning about the conditions through which we can reify reintegrated societies can contribute to establishing post-war refugee management solutions that could serve the interests of displaced people as well as the urgency of host states.

[57] Gagnon: 2004.
[58] Zaum 2011, p. 289.
[59] Milner 2011
[60] Betts and Loescher 2011: p.16; Sarah Kenyon Lischer: 2005; Loescher: 1993; Salehyan and Gledistch: 2006; Stedman and Tanner: 2003; Weiner: 1995.
[61] During the early post-war years of Bosnia, the ICG 1998 remarked that "Germany is host to the largest number of refugees in Western Europe. Of some 345,000 who fled there during the war, about 100,000 had returned by the end of 1997. German refugee policy is made largely by the Länder (state) governments. Given that Bosnian refugees cost the Länder more than 200 million DM a month, the desire to repatriate as many and as fast as possible is obvious."
[62] News of November 28th 2015.

Because all the above indicates that we need to learn how to responsibly engage the international community into the resettlement of refugees and IDPs and the process of rebuilding the social fabric.

To conclude, this thesis stands on the premise that engaging in post-war ethnic reintegration is not only a politically responsible aim but also a necessary step to accomplish in the process of building a peaceful world in which violence is no longer tolerated. For all what I exposed here, I assume that normatively speaking ethnic reintegration is a preferable option.

I.3 The Theory of Post-War Reintegration

My answer to the discussed puzzle uses arguments that build on existing explanations, while focusing on opening the box of the complexity of local dynamics and its relevant actors. I develop a theory of post-war reintegration that accounts for variation in post-war scenarios as a function of three main factors: local elites, ethnic kin elites and third party elites. Local elites want to consolidate their power and survive politically, ethnic kin elites support local elites for diverse political reasons, and third parties' peace-building goals drives them to seek policies that could facilitate reintegration.

I posit that after the war local elites (of majority and minority groups) keep societies divided (in homogenous and enclaved scenarios) through a *majorization pattern*[63] that is also supported by their ethnic kin (national elites, host and kin state). Such a majorization pattern relies on three mechanisms: 1) circulation of resources

[63] Briefly defined, *majorization pattern* refers to the activities in which political elites engage with in order to consolidate power conquered through war or to survive politically within the post-war scene. Such activities are oriented to increase own's group population, to circulate available resources within its group and to exclude population belonging to other groups from accessing those resources.

within patronage networks, 2) obstruction to non-groups from accessing those resources, 3) manipulation of displaced co-ethnics to increase their own demographics.

Timely third party intervention in disrupting the *majorization pattern* contributes to ethnic reintegration success when conditions of homogeneity exist. For such disruption to be possible, third parties have to challenge the exclusivity that local elites have over their resources, the legitimacy they build when they engage in *majorization* practices, and the support base that is provided by their ethnic kin. Nonetheless, an assimilated scenario is also theoretically possible despite third party intervention whenever it does not occur on time. In such cases local elites allow the expansion of minority participation in order to continue deriving resources from peace-builders, while they keep obstructing the return process.

The return process challenges the power base of elites through demographics more than opening spaces for participation do. In cases of enclaved scenarios I expect local elites to be more eager toward minority return, which increases their demographics, than toward minority participation, which challenges their power. That is why I assume that in cases of enclavization timing is not a necessary condition to advance to reintegration. However, disrupting the power base support of enclaved elites is. Therefore, to move from an enclaved scenario to one of reintegration requires that third parties work to disrupt the support of ethnic kin elites to the majorization pattern. I also expect that political elites in enclaved communities opt for political survival –considering the option of reintegration- whenever the enclave lacks resources to sustain over time.

Within the debate of positive or negative contributions of third party intervention (which I will address later on), I take the stance that I call "responsible

engagement", to signify that third party intervention is a positive contribution to reintegration only under specific circumstances. These circumstances are: their timely engagement, their work in disrupting majorization patterns and its ethnic kin support, their capacity to facilitate the creation of economic opportunities to sustain reintegration and remain in place until they are consolidated. Moreover, economic resources might not explain why people reintegrate, but they might explain why some reintegrated scenarios are sustained over time, like in Jajce; while others, like Bugojno, move toward an assimilated scenario even despite reintegration being achieved.

I also distinguish between two different mechanisms, one to reach ethnic reintegration and another to sustain such reintegration. The mechanisms that take place in the first effort do not impact on the second, because they are two separated instances.[64] My theory is largely about how to move toward ethnic reintegration from homogenous and enclaved scenarios. However, I briefly address some of the expectations for reintegration sustainability as well, leaving it to others to follow with further research.

I mentioned earlier that extensive powers have been granted to (and used by) the international community in BH; thus, helping reintegration might need more than fighting obstructionism and patronage networks, as Jenne rightly proposes[65]. I expect that for third parties to tackle the conditions that keep societies apart, they have to challenge the exclusivity that local elites have over the resources they control, their legitimacy to implement a majorization pattern without legal constrains, and the support of extra capacities provided by their ethnic kin.

[64] I am forever thankful to Professor William Moore for calling my attention to this.
[65] Jenne: 2010.

Summing up, this thesis focuses on understanding post-war variations of societal divisions and reintegration, and demonstrating that ethnic reintegration after internecine war is possible and desirable. Thus, not all societies remain divided, and when they do, it is due to factors that could have been challenged or prevented. Understanding the effects of war on the social fabric and studying their reversal after a peace agreement has been signed, requires relying on analytical tools that could identify the varied forms in which societal relations take place.

I.4 Dissertation Outline

This dissertation is organized in six chapters. Chapter II introduces the theory of post-war reintegration, with the mechanisms that shape reintegrated and non-reintegrated scenarios (assimilated, homogenous and enclaved). It explains how ethnic elites seeking to consolidate the power conquered through war establish a majorization pattern to maintain those divided scenarios. It also shows how relevant the role of ethnic kin support is to sustain those scenarios over time, and it further explains how only the timely engagement of third parties can disrupt the post-conflict pattern of majorization in homogenous contexts without the risk of negligently shaping an assimilated one.

Chapter III analyzes the case of Bugojno (BH) from 1995 to 2012, explaining the variation of post-war scenarios in this town across time, and discussing why ethnic reintegration was not sustainable over time.

Chapter IV studies the case of Jajce (BH) from 1995 to 2012, and the post-war variation between an enclaved scenario towards ethnic reintegration, placing emphasis

on the relevance of ethnic kin support for enclaves to survive, and of third party engagement for ethnic reintegration to take place.

Chapter V generalizes findings on the cases in Northern and Southern Kosovo.

Chapter VI closes with a general conclusion, present the theoretical contribution of this work, and policy recommendations for the international community operating in BH and Kosovo, and on other post-war scenarios in general. Furthermore, it discusses on the lessons learned and the challenges to consider for when the international community has to face the question of how to handle post-war in Syria and Iraq.

I.5 Conclusions

This chapter sought to place this thesis into existing debates of conflict management in order to highlight the need of a theory of post-war reintegration that could guide scholars and policy-makers on the understanding of the various configurations that take place within the social fabric at war's end.

This chapter showed the importance of studying variation of post-war scenarios and of ethnic reintegration in particular as a desirable outcome. While doing so, this thesis signaled the importance of post-war reintegration for the prevention of future conflicts, for the global responsibility of tackling conflict- induce displacement of population while de-legitimizing ethnic cleansing and for the responsible engagement of the international community in rebuilding the social fabric as a significant peace-building task. It also argued that reintegration is a possible and desirable strategy to pursue after conflicts of the dimension of those experienced in Syria at this time.

It continued introducing and addressing the puzzle of various levels of reintegration success across space and time and related research questions: why some societies remain divided after war while others reintegrate and to what extent and under what conditions is ethnic reintegration possible after war. This chapter put forward the relevant literature while highlighting that the theory of post-war reintegration brought about in this work addresses existing literature gaps and helps us to resolve such puzzle while answering the mentioned questions. It further explained why Bosnia Herzegovina is an adequate context for the study of those questions.

The chapter continued with a brief introduction of the theory of post-war reintegration, followed by a roadmap to this thesis indicating where such theory is fully explained and tested across two cases in BH (Bugojno and Jajce), and further generalized to Kosovo in a comparison of northern and southern Serb enclaves.

CHAPTER II: THEORY OF POST-WAR REINTEGRATION

In this chapter I develop a theory of Post-War Reintegration to explain why some societies remain divided after war and why others experience reintegration success; the aim of the theory is to explain variation of post-war outcomes. Highlighting the relevance of explanations at the sub-national level I look at the main actors of post-conflict settings and their actions in shaping post-war communities: local elites (of majority and minority groups), ethnic kin elites within the country and outside, and third parties engaged in peace-building efforts.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I start by introducing the concept of post-war outcomes and its four possible variations, namely: reintegrated, homogeneous, enclaved and assimilated outcomes. I offer this concept as a new dependent variable for researchers of post-conflict societies. I then present the argument of my theory in two steps. Firstly, I expose the causal mechanisms that maintain post-conflict societies divided. I explain the relevance of majority and minority elites in reifying a post-conflict pattern of majorization, expounding on how ethnic kin support helps co-shape post-war outcomes and sustain them over time.

Secondly, I put forward the role of targeted third party intervention as a necessary variable for reintegration to take place. I discuss three relevant issues of responsible third party engagement in post-war communities (a) timing - how failing to intervene in time can lead to an assimilated community; (b) reintegration sustainability - analyzing whether reintegration can be undone and explaining how the process could move backwards or generate an assimilated community; and (c) local ownership of the reintegration process vis a vis third party intervention. Once my

argument is presented, I describe the research design of this thesis, closing the chapter with conclusions regarding the theoretical and policy implications of my theory of Post-war Reintegration.

II.1 Post–War Outcomes

In this section I build a typology that allows me to answer why some societies reintegrated, and what different outcomes take place whenever ethnic reintegration is not successful. To do so, I use a two-dimensional conceptual typology –minority return and minority participation- to capture the post-war reality of majority and minority relations after a civil war. I distinguish four possible post-war outcomes (reintegrated, assimilated, enclaved, and homogenous[66]) that reflect the possible variations of such relations. These post-war outcomes can vary across space and time. A two by two table (Figure II.1) captures the possibilities in which the displaced population is accommodated –or not- in their pre-war home territories. By doing this I disentangle the widespread generalization that all post-conflict settings share similar conditions and I explain variations of reintegration success.

Figure II.1: Post-war Outcomes

[66] I am thankful to Harris Mylonas for pointing out that the names of these outcomes should refer to a completed process in a specific period of time rather than to the process itself. This helps to prevent confusions with scholars working on nationalizing policies. For excellent accounts of nationalizing policies see Harris Mylonas: 2012, The politics of Nation Building: Making co-nationals, refugees and minorities. New York: Cambridge University Press.



Thus, "post-war outcomes" serve as a dependent variable to measure the reconstruction of the social fabric after war; in other words, how far we have gone in undoing ethnic cleansing. It captures the situation of those who were displaced, their opportunities to return home and their possibilities to participate in community life. The following section theorizes about the conditions and causes of such variation.

The main reasons to assume minority return and minority participation as the defining elements of post-war outcomes of ethnic reintegration are two-fold. Minority return is a necessary first condition to reintegration since it implies that displaced minorities are back, or returning to their pre-war territories.[67]. Minority participation, on the other hand, reflects the capacity of such groups to develop the social, political and economic aspects of their lives without discrimination, exclusion, or segregation.

Minority Return refers to the post-war demographic presence of the minority group within a specific territory and time.[68] Minority Participation refers to the partaking of a minority group in the areas of social services (health and education), economy, political life and security, all of which are structures governed by a majority group

[67] Jenne: 2010.
[68] Please see the Research Design section in this Chapter for information regarding the logic of what I measure with this indicator.

within a specific territory and time frame. The dynamics between minority return and minority participation conceptualizes the different post-war outcomes, though not what causes them.

This model helps us understand that post-war settings do not fit the binary conceptualization of reintegration vs. non-reintegration, and that there is more than one non-reintegrated outcome, as per Figure II.2. The typology highlights that high levels of minority return do not necessarily translate into high levels of ethnic reintegration; similarly, low minority return does not equate to a "non-reintegrated" society. We will see in Chapter 3 that the post-war outcome of Bugojno in 1995-1998 is significantly different to the 2004-2015 one.

Whilst both of them can be characterized as non-reintegrated communities, the former shows clear signs of homogeneity (e.g.: both, low minority return and low levels of minority participation) whilst the latter is an assimilated one in which a low number of Croat minorities take part in the structures governed by the Bošnjak majority group.

Figure II.2. Reintegration vs. Non-Reintegration



This two by two conceptualization sheds light on less-noticed aspects of the post-conflict societies (like the alternative outcomes) and helps guiding the decision making process of peace-builders concerning ethnic reintegration. These outcomes do not refer to policies implemented by a State, or even by the local majority but rather to the specific conditions in which majority and minority groups intertwine in post-war societies at a given time and territory.

II.1.1 Reintegrated Outcome[69]

This outcome assumes high levels of both minority return and minority participation within the community. Here minorities have returned and/or remain in their pre-war homes, and they actively participate in social, political and economic life. High return levels have been widely confused with high ethnic reintegration levels. However, a reintegrated outcome is achieved only when both conditions, minority return and minority participation, have been met.

Active participation does not imply that minorities do not face social, political, safety or economic problems, but merely that such issues do not originate from, or relate to their status as minorities. There is an important difference between being economically deprived due to the specific condition of an identity and economic deprivation that responds to larger contextual and structural conditions, regardless of the identity of the person suffering from such deprivation. For instance, Jajce of today is a fairly reintegrated society, yet the population at large is facing economic problems derived from limited job opportunities.

[69] Notice that I use interchangeably "reintegrated scenario", "reintegration" and "ethnic reintegration" to facilitate the reading and to keep building within the existing debates of reintegration/ethnic reintegration.

In Štrpce/Shtërpcë, a municipality of southern Kosovo, the context is not much different than Jajce in terms of economic conditions. Although it is a recently reintegrated municipality, the unemployment statistics are not exclusively related to a specific group[70] either. Moreover, like Jajce, Štrpce/Shtërpcë transitioned from an enclaved outcome to one of reintegration due to changes in minority participation levels. In this municipality the Kosovo Serb minority used to manage its own affairs (with active support from Serbia) without participating in the government structures run by the Kosovo Albanian majority. However, since the elections of 2007, the political elites from this municipality have advanced every year in their political participation in the Kosovo government structures, and also in running education, cultural, health care and security programs supervised and legitimized within the Kosovo government. I show more of cases in Kosovo in Chapter 5.

II.1.2 Homogenous Outcome[71]

A homogenous outcome is a non-reintegrated one. It combines low minority return with low levels of minority participation and is a direct consequence of a massive displacement of population due to conflict. It is the most common outcome and point of departure within the post-war setting.

Ethno-territorial wars tend to segregate populations in areas controlled by a particular group. This is a product of a territorial gain and part of the logic behind the provision of resources and security. A peace agreement does not change these dynamics, not even when borders are redesigned. The population tends to concentrate in areas under the control of their own group in order to seek security and resources.

[70] For more info on this specific conditions see OSCE Report: 2010. Available at: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/75450?download=true.

[71] I used "Homogenized", "Homogeneous", or "Homogeneity" to equally refer to this outcome along the text.

Homogenized communities are the expression of successful ethnic cleansing and related techniques. Thus, their survival implies the survival of the ethno-territorial war logic within the post-war setting. Such is the case of Bugojno, controlled during wartime by the Bošnjak Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Bosne i Hercegovine, ABiH) and then governed by the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA) like any other territory under ABiH.

In other cases the majority group status is given by the outcome of a peace agreement and the consequent distribution of territories: Jezero, for example, remained as Serb majority territory in the Srpska Republic after the Dayton negotiations separated that area from Jajce.

Let's now focus on the aspect of minority return to highlight the need of clear concepts to approach post-war realities. There are cases in which societies observe high levels of return to a specific territory; yet, such return takes place exclusively among fellow citizens of the same group, mostly called "majority return". Such were the cases of municipalities of the Central Canton during 1995-1999, like Jajce, Bugojno, Travnik, Gornji-Vakuf/Uskoplje; and to that type of return was oriented the overall international strategy for Bosnia until 1999[72].

Return levels alone tell us nothing of how restored the social fabric is, and hides important conditions of the post-war outcome, like the reasons why only majority return takes place in a given place at certain point in time. This distinction explains why encouraging majority return further enhances homogeneity without contributing to ethnic reintegration. Future peace-building efforts need such awareness.

[72] In the Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the Peace Implementation Council, Geneva, December 16th 1996, she argued "*In 1997 I believe that the priority will have to be on returns to majority areas. This is what is most do-able and safest given the conditions on the ground*". See: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3ae68fbc24&query=asylum%20trend.

II.1.3 Enclaved Outcome[73]

This outcome combines high levels of minority return and low levels of minority participation in a specific territory administered by a given majority group. This combination implies two things: first, that similarly to an ethnic reintegration outcome, there is a high level of presence of minority groups that returned after the war or remained in the area within a "safe zone"[74] during the war. Second, that the existing minorities rely on services (education, health care, employment) that are not provided by the municipality (or territory's government capacities) in question, but rather by some sort of structure facilitated by the very same minority groups or ethnic kin actors that support them. Likewise, the low level of minority participation reflects either that the minority is excluded from the political system, social services and security forces, or that they lack the will to participate in them.

This definition helps us to avert the conceptual confusion in the literature that equates high levels of minority return with ethnic reintegration, while providing a tool to study the specific phenomenon of enclaves in post-war societies. The fact that high levels of minority return are a necessary condition in my model for both ethnic reintegration and enclavization illustrates that measuring minority return or comparing post-war minority demography with pre-war levels is not a sufficient condition to identify the point when ethnic reintegration is achieved.

An enclaved minority –regardless of the fact that it has entirely returned to pre-war homes- is not a reintegrated one. It is minority participation in the

[73] I also use the term "enclaves" and "enclavization" to refer to this outcome.

[74] "Safe Zones" are a result of two alternative (and sometimes concurrent) processes. They might be a natural outgrowth of ethno-territorial wars that push ethnic groups in protected areas inhabited by co-ethnics .They can also be a result of a policy implemented by the international community helping with the displacement of population during the war: such is the case of UNHCR policies in Iraq in 1991 creating safe havens for the Kurdish population that was displaced in the border with Turkey. In Bosnia for example the towns of Gorazde and Srebrenica were also categorized as safe heavens.

municipality in question, once they have returned, what allows for ethnic reintegration. This is the main methodological nuance I contribute to Jenne's work, which builds upon data of minority return to draw conclusions regarding reintegration success across the cases of BH, Kosovo and Croatia.

Enclaves are an entirely different political reality compared to the homogenous outcome as well. Both are the visible effects of a high concentration of a particular group, and while ethnic homogeneity refers to a high concentration of a majority group, enclavization connotes the high concentration of a specific minority group. From a reintegration perspective, it does matter whether minorities have returned to an enclave, but also if they have intermixed with other ethnic groups in the municipality.

Functionally, an enclave is a visible concentration of a minority group in a given territory that is "officially" governed by another group –the majority- that holds the political power over such territory, or it is expected to do so. To judge whether a community is homogenous or enclaved we need to look at the demographics of minorities within a given territorial unit. In this work we look at the local level, meaning selected municipalities in each case.

However, the same model could be applied to analyze a state level goal of ethnic reintegration. For example, are all the Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo enclaved communities? Well, yes if we look at the prospects of reintegrating Kosovo Serbs within Kosovo, ruled by the Albanian majority. However, if we look at a municipality level, Serbs become the ruling majority and Albanians the minority group.

"Enclaves" are defined by scholars as a geographical area controlled and inhabited by a specific group within a larger state.[75] However, they lack a specific definition for post-war settings, where it is a ubiquitous reality. Dahlman and Williams[76], using critical geopolitics, have approached an analysis of enclavization in post-war societies by studying Serbian enclaves in Kosovo. Although they seek to explain how such outcome impacts on post-war state-building, their study focuses on enclavization as a geopolitical policy, and not as a post-war outcome in which previously conflicting groups interact. It is also not methodologically clear how to differentiate that such enclavization policy is a policy exclusive of enclaves.

II.1.4 Assimilated Outcome

An *assimilated* post-war outcome has a low level of minority return, but the spaces for minority participation have been developed to a large extent. Minorities' demographic levels have not been re-established, the majority group outnumbered them, but they participate in the available health care services, they have opportunities to school their kids, and exercise their vote. They might have resolved property restitution issues, housing and economic survival. Hardships may not be limited to minorities as such, but extend to the entire population as well; for instance, in the currently assimilated community in Bugojno the Croat minority is not the only group facing economic problems, and a high unemployment rate extends to the entire society.

My definition stands apart from the existing literature on assimilated societies in the sense that it exclusively reflects minority groups' chances in post-war outcomes under the conditions of conflict-driven displacement of population. Unlike such

[75] Vinorukov: 2007 p. 10, Robinson: 1959.
[76] Dahlman and Williams: 2010.

literature, I am not concerned here with assimilation as a state policy that deals with how much a minority absorbs from the "host" society[77]; or how much it is pushed to do so by a nation-wide policy[78]. The focus is rather on the existential capacities of a minority group in their pre-war homes once the war has finished. An assimilated outcome speaks about the paradox of opening spaces for minority participation and inclusion in a society in which minorities are either of a limited number or fading away due to mortality rates, such as the situation of the Serb minorities in Bugojno[79].

There is an important difference between a homogenous and an assimilated outcome. Whereas in both cases minority demographics are generally low, minorities have no possibilities to participate in social life in a homogenous community. In an assimilated community, however, minorities have solved their education opportunities, either with a "two schools under one roof" design, or by sending students and teachers to other cities. For instance, Bugojno Croats attend primary school education in Gornji Vakuf/ Uskoplje[80].

II.2 Communities that failed to reintegrate

I showed in the previous section that post-war outcomes vary across time and space. Hence, we not only need new concepts to describe such variation, but also new theoretical approaches to explain it. As of 2010[81], most municipalities in Bosnia

[77] Gordon: 1964.
[78] Mylonas: 2010.
[79] Author's interview with Serbia Professor of History, Slavko Zubic 25th June 2011
[80] Author's interview with Ana Sapina, a teacher in Jajce of Croat origin living in Bugojno: May 2011. For more info on "bussing" children to attend schools somewhere else see (OSCE 2007): "Slipping Through The Cracks: School Enrollment and Completion in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Status Report of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. For more on the topic see Bozic: 2006, "Reeducating the Hearts of Bosnian Students: An Essay on Some Aspects of Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina", East European Politics and Societies, 20(2), p. 319–342.
[81] Data from the Ministry of Human Rights and Foreign Affairs of BH: 2010.

remained divided by war. For instance, the town of Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje in the Federation of BH has never restored its pre-war demographic values, unlike its neighbor Bugojno –which did it between 1999 and 2003. In fact, Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje is typical for the Federation and BH. Most municipalities in Bosnia have not restored their pre-war heterogeneity.

Despite the huge investment of resources by the international community in Bosnia, ethnic cleansing was successful in creating homogenized territories and the post-war period does not provide much evidence of its reversal either. Why do most municipalities in Bosnia remain divided by war? What are the conditions that prevent those societies from reintegrating? This section deals with these questions.

Less than a month after the Dayton Accord was signed, realist scholars Mearsheimer and Van Evera[82] argued that BH would always remain divided due to the hatreds that were unleashed during the war among the Bosnian population. They proposed to partition Bosnia in such a way that Serbs could join Serbia, Croats could join Croatia, and Muslim Bosnians would remain in a smaller Bosnia exclusively ran by them. Partitionist scholars blame the human side of the population, their fears, their hatreds, and their insecurity for the impossibility of future conviviality. They assume that the elites' political goals represent and express those negative emotions brought on by war, reproducing a security dilemma that makes conviviality unlikely.

I showed in the previous chapter how such argument is not only flawed but also unrealistic. It takes a long walk in any municipality of BH, reintegrated or not, to understand that the problem of a divided BH does not reside in the emotionally charged population but rather on ethno-political elites willing to reproduce the benefits that war brought to them. Such situation is equally valid for any other

[82] Mearsheimer and Van Evera: 1995, See: http://johnmearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0023.pdf.

territory that has faced civil wars with an identity component (be it ethnic, religious or cultural identity, or all of them combined).

My argument puts political elites' motives back at the core of the matter. I argue that there is a post-conflict pattern of "majorization" between local elites supported by their respective ethnic kin (inside and outside the country) that maintain societies divided. Such a pattern reproduces the wartime practice of ethnic engineering within the post-war setting in order to help local elites to consolidate their power and political survival.

My argument concerning why societies remain divided will advance as follows. First, I will show that there are conditions at war's end that provide a context for local elites to engage in a post-conflict pattern of "majorization". Second, I will show how the post-conflict pattern of "majorization" is enforced by local elites in post-war settings, and how such practices are a political legacy of war. Then, I will describe the relevance of ethnic kin support for the reproduction and sustainability of this pattern. Last, I will show how these dynamics take place in Homogeneous and Enclaved communities.

II.2.1 War's End and the Homogenous and Enclaved Communities

Ethnic cleansing leaves behind homogeneous territories controlled by specific groups. Sometimes it leaves enclaves of minority groups that had worked as wartime "safe areas"[83]. On other occasions homogenous territories or enclaves are created whenever different groups can capture different parts of a given municipality for themselves[84].

[83] I use indistinctively the terms "safe areas", "safe zones", "safe havens" to refer to the same phenomenon.
[84] Toal and Dahlman: 2010, p. 11.

To define ethnic cleansing I draw on the definitions provided by Mann[85], and Toal and Dahlman[86], and define ethnic cleansing as violence inflicted by members of a group upon members of another group, due to its identity and with the purpose of removing such a group (or its culture) from a given locality[87]. This way, ethnic cleansing is a wartime political practice of conquering and consolidating territories, dividing groups between numeric majorities and minorities, where demographics become the measure that differentiate winners and losers at war's end.

While homogeneous territories are a direct consequence of successful ethnic cleansing, enclaves as safe areas are a reaction to such ethnic cleansing. In some cases safe areas are artificially created by the international community to protect specific minorities during the war, like the "safe havens" in northern Iraq to protect Kurdish minorities[88]. In others, they are areas towards which minorities relocate during the war to find protection within their own group, and only later they might gain international security protection of some sort. The Serb enclave in Gracanica is one such example.[89]

Thus, homogenized and enclaved communities were shaped in wartime by the very same elites that remained in charge of those territories once the peace-agreement put an end to the war. "Safe zones" designed by the international community to

[85] Mann: 2005.

[86] Michael Mann argues that "[a]n *ethnicity* is a group that defines itself or is defined by others as sharing common descent and culture. So *ethnic cleansing* is the removal by members of one such group of another such group from a locality they define as their own. (…) [s]ince ethnic groups are culturally defined they can be eliminated if their culture disappears, even if there is no physical removal of persons (2005:11)." Toal and Dahlman's definition, however, helps us contextualize the role of ethnicity in such practices. The authors argue that "ethnic cleansing is never straightforwardly "ethnic" or motivated only by a desire to "cleanse" localities through the murder and expulsion of ethnic others. Criminal opportunism, local grievances, revenge and nihilism fueled by alcohol and drugs are also elements of the practice (2011:13)."

[87] Mann: 2011, p. 11.

[88] For a first-hand account on how this took place in Northern Iraq, see Ogata, Sadako (2005) *The Turbulent Decade: confronting the refugee crisis of the 1990s*. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.: New York.

[89] Author's interview with Mr. Grbic, Kosovo Serb Parliamentarian: November 2007.

protect minorities might be an exception, but not necessarily so. Ogata[90] recounts how Kurdish elites pushed in 1992 for building up their own government in the safe havens within Zakho Valley, in Iraq, created by the international community to resettle Kurdish refugees that were in Turkey.

Although in most cases the very same elites that created a homogenous territory during the war are the ones in power at war's end, the process to get there might also be related to the negotiation process of the peace agreement. In a few cases, the peace agreement negotiation implied swapping territories or redesigning maps without necessarily obeying to the deployment of forces and their control of territories after the war. Jajce is one such example in BH.

At war's end, Serb forces had to withdraw from Jajce and moved beyond the Inter-entity boundary line that divided the Federation from the Srpska Republic. In exchange, the Jezero municipality was created inside the Srpska Republic with part of the former territory of Jajce. HVO forces moved to establish control over Jajce once Serb forces withdrew from the territory. In other words, HVO forces arguably were the ones ethnically engineering the territory during the first years of the war until Serbian forces took over the territory. Yet, the HVO started to do so by the moment they reached there in 1995. Meanwhile Vinac remained as an enclave controlled by the Bosnian Army.

Another exception to the creation of homogenized territories by ethnic cleansing is the territorial loss at war. For example, the city of Gjakove/Djakovica in Kosovo was ethnically cleansed by Serbian troops during the Kosovo War in 1999[91]. The majority of Kosovo Albanians fled to Albania while KLA forces continued

[90] Ogata: 2005, p. 35-45.

[91] HWR). (2001). *Report Nr.6.* Retrieved January 14, 2016 from https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/kosovo/undword-06.htm

fighting Serbian troops in the territory. Following the deployment of the NATO and the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo, Gjakove/Djakovica became a homogenous city run by Kosovo Albanians, and Kosovo Serbs are not even allowed to return to their cemetery[92].

Despite the various ways in which homogenized or enclaved societies are created, they are all a direct or indirect consequence of ethnic cleansing. In these societies ethnic engineering and the use of ethnicity as a political tool will survive as practices in the post-war outcome, because their use in the wartime period have proven to be effective for conquering and consolidating territorial control and power. Such is the political legacy that war imprinted in the post-war setting.

This work will show how the signature of a peace-agreement does not necessarily put an end to ethnic cleansing, yet it is the responsibility of those securing the implementation of peace agreements to deter and prevent the survival of such practices within the post-war outcome. Such political legacy of war is considered here as a point of departure, not as a variable of impact. It matters for this work what local elites do with such legacy in the post-war outcome.

A caveat is necessary here. On very rare occasions these options (homogenous or enclaved societies) do not take place. Tuzla, for instance, is the only town in BH that was not governed by nationalist elites during the war, and its pre-war ethnic balance remained during the war and endured in the post-war period as well. Tuzla did encounter war, but policy-making and grass-root agency worked to diffuse conflict and nationalist politics[93]. Assimilated communities are also unlikely to be present at war's end. As we saw in the previous section, such outcomes assume that

[92] Balkan Insight: 2014b. See: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-serbs-urge-us-embassy-to-enable-safe-return.
[93] Amakolas: 2011.

even when minority groups might be low in number, they do participate in community life. Such a situation is unlikely to take place during ongoing conflict, when the population is trying to search for shelter and to survive war and persecution.

Thus, this work controls for wartime ethnic cleansing experiences to study why some municipalities remained divided in homogeneous or enclaved communities while others did not, observing instead a successful reintegration. The two municipalities under study here, Bugojno and Jajce, have both experienced the practice of ethnic cleansing within their territories. However, while minority groups in Bugojno were in a homogenized community after the war, the minority of Jajce was enclaved in the village of Vinac. The conditions that took place to maintain those communities divided in this way are explained in the following sections of this chapter.

II.2.2 The post-conflict pattern of "majorization": the role of local elites

I described above the homogenized or enclaved outcomes that emerge out of war. Those war outcomes establish which groups will be in a majority or minority position and what are the implications of this position for the post-war political game of their respective elites. War outcomes of homogenized or enclaved societies are the point of the departure, the context in which local elites operate. Local elites will have different interests and capacities within each outcome, and depending on whether they are elites of one or another group. If societies remain divided after war, it is logical to start by looking at the role of those local elites in post-war outcomes.

We need to inquire on what are the local elites' interests and why, what do they do, and explain why despite the peace agreement local elites they do not seem to move along the lines of ethnic reintegration, which is after all an indicator of the

peace-building effort at large, rightly pointed out by Moore.[94] Thus, the fact that societies remain divided is linked to the role that elites assume in post-war settings. The actions they take will depend on the position they hold (majority or minority) in the post-war outcome and on the capacities it provides.

Majority elites are elites of any group that after the war is demographically more numerous in a given territory than any other group in the same territory (operationally this means greater than 50 percent). Results of war grant these groups the resources and legitimacy to rule over such territory reinforcing this majority identity. There are local majorities that might not be in a majority position at the state level, like Bošnjaks in Bugojno and Croats in Jajce.

Minority elites are elites of any group demographically less numerous than the majority ones. They are neither in charge of governing structures, nor do they have full capacity to drive their social needs agenda in the war's aftermath. There are two types of minority groups: those within an enclaved territory and those within a homogenized one. I will refer to the first type as *concentrated minority* and to the second one as *dispersed minority*[95]. This distinction is necessary because these groups differ in the resources available and in the possibility to access them.

In the first case, although the results of war did not render territorial control for the elites of this group, they are in control of their own affairs in the specific area in which they are concentrated. Examples that fit this definition are Bošnjaks in Vinac

[94] Moore, Adam: 2013, p. 8.

[95] I draw this concept in particular and the distinction of different elites with preferences linked to their settlement pattern from Monica Duffy Toft: 2003, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of the Territory*, Princeton University Press. The author introduces the concept of "settlement pattern" to explain perspectives of ethnic groups and states regarding the indivisibility of a given territory that in turn would explain their proneness to sovereignty claims and ethnic conflict. Although I also take patterns as a given, unlike the author I deal specifically with the "settlement patterns" generated through war -which involves ethnic cleansing, genocide or forced resettlement. Besides the demographic distribution I looked into community participation of minority groups in each post-war outcome. Therefore, I have drawn on her conceptualizations and adapted them to fit the reality I want to explain.

(Jajce) 1995-2004, Croats in Nova Bila 1995-1999, Kosovo Serbs in Gracanica, Strepce, Zvecan, North Mitrovica, or Zubin Potok. Serbs in Kosovo are less than 10% of the total Kosovar population[96], and as a result of war they concentrated in the specific areas of southern and northern Kosovo they already controlled.

Dispersed minority is any group that is neither concentrated nor numerically higher than any other group in a given territory. They might be scattered in urban or rural areas like Croats in Bugojno right after the war. This is the general situation in most municipalities of BH, a combination of majorities with dispersed minority groups.

Although some analyses highlight the role of majority elites in shaping post-war politics,[97] post-war policies of enclavization,[98] refugees' manipulation to increase homogeneity[99] and how they impact the chances for reintegration,[100] those studies largely neglect the role of minority elites in shaping post-war societies and ethnic reintegration in particular. Furthermore, there are no systematic accounts on elites' political preferences and actions in different post-war configurations.

At war's end local elites have incentives to develop *a post-war dynamic of majorization* that consolidates the power gained through war. Or alternatively, they can ride the tide of ethnic reintegration aiming at consolidating themselves as elites in the new outcome –besides the existing elites. I call these elites, *tide riders*. In this section I will expose the local elites' dynamics of majorization to discuss why societies remain divided after war. I deal with this second type of elites' dynamics in the next section when I explain why ethnic reintegration is possible.

[96] Kosovo Census: 2011, https://ask.rks-gov.net/eng/.
[97] Pickering: 2007, *op. cit.*, Moore: 2013, *op. cit.*, Toal and Dahlman: 2011, *op. cit.*, Belloni: 2007.
[98] Dahlman and Williams: 2005, *op. cit.*
[99] Heimerl: 2005, Stedman and Tanner: 2003.
[100] Jenne 2010: *op. cit*.

The *post-war dynamics of majorization* refer to the actions taken by majority and minority elites to ethnically engineer in their favor territories they control while trying to keep societies ethnically divided. Although such dynamics are typical of the post-conflict setting, they are rooted in wartime practices of ethnic cleansing.

Local elites engage in *majorization dynamics* through three mechanisms. First, they rely on *patronage networks* to distribute resources to co-ethnics. Second, they engage in *obstructionism* to exclude the out-groups from accessing those resources and penalize co-ethnics cooperating with non-group members. Third, they *manipulate refugees and IDP's* to increase their power base by promoting the return of their co-ethnics. These mechanisms help elites either to consolidate the power already acquired, or to politically survive within the post-conflict outcome. These practices fulfill the very same political objectives that ethnic cleansing carried during the war: creating areas under the political control of one specific ethnic group while preventing others groups from contesting such power.

By *patronage networks* I mean a collectivity of co-ethnics (clients) that rely on ethnic elites (patrons) to have access to post-war resources in exchange for their political support and protection.[101] Many scholars describe how politicians establish a clientelistic relationship only with those who deliver or promise to deliver support,[102] exchanging privileges and favors[103], within democratic environments and post-conflict societies as well.[104] Such clientelism also serves elites to co-opt individuals with popular support or personal powers (such as local military control, intra-elite

[101] Jenne: 2010, p. 342.
[102] Kitschelt and Wilkinson: 2007, p.10.
[103] Eisenstadt and Roniger: 1984, *Patrons, Clients and Friends. Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society*, *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press*, pp. 29–50.
[104] Reno: 1998, Nordstrom: 2004, Kaldor: 2007.

connections, or wealth) into the clientelist network[105], increasing the available resources. Those elites provide resources like employment, housing and properties, goods, and even security to co-ethnics who, in exchange, legitimize them with votes.

Furthermore, elites use these patronage networks to convert the spoils of peace into political support.[106] Resources made available by the international community to help the reconstruction process are channeled by elites through these patronage networks, largely depriving out-groups from accessing them. In a context of scarcity, a patronage network is an effective tool to distribute available resources to a more limited target group.

The return of a large number of IDP's and refugees challenges the provision of services within a municipality and leads to greater competition for scarce employment and other resources[107]. However, this should not be an argument to deter minority return or participation, because scarce resources are allocated along ethnic lines. Thus, attention must be placed in elites that circulate resources to co-ethnics.

Drawing on Jenne[108] and the refugee literature[109], I define *obstructionism* as organized intimidation of members of out-groups from returning to the community and, of co-ethnics from participating in structures governed by the majority, using administrative, procedural or violent means to impede their movements or participation. I include the use of those means to punish co-ethnics who help out-groups to return or to access resources. Minority returnees losing their houses twice,

[105] Hensell, S, and Gerdes, F.: 2012, "Elites and International Actors in Post-War Societies: The Limits of Intervention", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 19, No. 2: April, pp.156.
[106] I*bid*.: 156.
[107] Zaum: 2011, p. 288.
[108] *Ibid*.: note 2.
[109] Heimerl: 2005, Loescher: 2006.

once during war and again after reconstruction, are recurrent accounts in my interviews and in empirical accounts of the post-war Bosnia of 1995-1998.[110]

While inflicting violence is an overt way to obstruct return while reinforcing a perception of insecurity, delaying the resolution of property issues, refusing to evict people from houses belonging to persons willing to return, delaying the provision of tools to rebuild houses, burning existing dwellings and properties being rebuilt are also various ways in which obstructionism has taken place across BH. Threatening co-ethnics with job insecurity if they participate in majority government structures have been a common case of obstructionism in Kosovo Serb enclaves.

Obstructionist practices also apply to those who disregard local elites' political goals and practices. Whenever people cross ethnic-boundaries they are often considered "traitors", and punished by denying them access to resources. An informant I met in Bugojno described her access to resources from the municipality (such as job and useful contacts), but she was afraid of losing her "preferred" treatment if she was seen frequenting Croat friends because she would be considered as a "traitor". I could not see how this bore any resemblance with the Bugojno I saw in 2011, at the time of our encounter. I could understand, however, that her perception was deep-rooted in her experience of immediate post-war Bugojno, even when such practices might have been discontinued.

One caveat is necessary here. The emotional component within a population unwilling to accept the return of those who fought against them is undeniable.[111] It is also true that prospective returnees compete with existing population for resources.

[110] Pickering: 2007, Ogata: 2005, Belloni: 2007, Zaum 2011, ICG: 2002.
[111] Even recently Croats rejected the return of the Serb minority to Croatia (OSCE, Croatia's Refugee Challenge: 2004).

Yet, there is a huge distance from this emotional standpoint to the actual engagement in orchestrated obstructionist acts.

Finally, I define *manipulation of refugees and IDP's* as elites' decisions on why, how and when co-ethnic refugees and displaced people will return to a given territory, as well as efforts to resettle them in areas selected by those elites.[112] The manipulation of displaced population is also used to manipulate electoral results. For instance, elites in BH, especially Bosnian Serbs, used the electoral system to boost a favorable turnout in the elections of 1996.[113] A loophole in the existing OSCE electoral regulations allowed IDPs and refugees to choose between voting in their residing place (or preferred return place), or their pre-war municipality[114]. Serbs used that loophole to trick IDPs and refugees into voting in favor of their co-ethnic elites' power consolidation plans. The tricks varied from restricting the option to absentee ballot in their pre-war homes, to telling FRY refugees that they had to produce confirmation of voting slips to maintain their status, entitlement to benefits and return to FRY.[115]

Scholars who have worked on the BH peace-building process have shown empirical accounts of this post-war ethnic engineering by local elites.[116] However, we still don't understand variation in local elites' behavior, and therefore variation in post-war outcomes. Under which conditions do minority elites decide to engage in majorization dynamics? Why, for example, could the minority elites in Jajce maintain

[112] For more on refugee manipulation see Refugee Literature: Heimerl: 2005, Loescher: 2003, Zaum: 2011.
[113] Zaum: 2011, Pickering: 2007.
[114] OSCE Provisional Election Commission: 1996, "Rules and Regulations".
[115] International Crisis Group (ICG). (1996a, September 22). *Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Retrieved January 12, 2016 from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/Bosnia%202.pdf. International Crisis Group (ICG). (1996a, September 22). p. 50-51.
[116] Pickering: 2007, Belloni 2007, Woodward 1995, Toal and Dahlman 2011

an enclaved community in Vinac for 10 years after the war, while elites' minorities in Bugojno refrained from encouraging minority return and participation?

I assume here that minority elites are not victims of policies implemented by majority elites. Minority elites in one municipality are majority elites in others. Thus, it is not a game of majority elites, but rather a dynamic that takes place within a context in which the elites are positioned. Moreover, minority elites also make decisions regarding minority return and minority participation. What explains the decisions minority elites make in different contexts is the available capacities they have in each of them to consolidate power or/and political survival within the post-war outcome.

Local Elites' Capacities

The post-war outcome in which ethnic groups' elites are located will translate into resources and legitimacy, determining the capacities of local elites. This capacity will guide their political preferences towards minority return and minority participation in post-war settings; thus, regarding ethnic reintegration, *Local Elites' Capacities* is a function of resources and legitimacy and is coded as *high, limited*, or *insufficient. Resources* are of economic, political and social nature, and include the control of spoils of war in general[117], related networks and institutions, access to communication and media[118], money and goods.[119]

An alternative source of assets is the spoils of peace[120], meaning the assistance provided by the international community to the peace-building process. Some authors

[117] Jenne: 2010, *op. cit.*

[118] For a detailed description on the use of the media as a strategic resource in post-war Bosnia, see Jusic' Tarik: 2000: "Media policies and the settlement of ethnic conflicts" in Dimitrijevic' Nenad (Ed.) *"Managing multiethnic local communities in the countries of former Yugoslavia"*, 231-250, Open Society Institute.

[119] Toft: 2003 *op. cit.*

[120] Pugh: 2002. Literature refers to it as peace dividends as well (see Barnett and Zurcher: 2005, op. cit.).

refer to them as "windfalls of peace" to point out the nature of an unearned income.[121] These resources range from donations to specific money allocations to the reconstruction process, to humanitarian help such as food, goods and shelter.

Legitimacy is the elites' capacity to make decisions perceived as fair in the name of a given group. It is sometimes treated as the "perceived justness of the cause"[122], or the support provided by in-groups.[123] Yet in post-war societies elite legitimacy is more assumed than present. The political scenario is rather confusing and the population is in need of answers and solutions. Whoever provides those solutions is implicitly granted the legitimacy to make decisions that would bring about those solutions. In this sense, legitimacy is somehow an output of the capacity of having access to resources and their distribution. Any challenge on the resources would immediately signify a challenge to the legitimacy.

Some caveats are in order here. First, in post-war societies there are different types of leaders (political or not) whose legitimacy is not based on the resources they provide, but on the social status they hold. Such is the case of religious leaders. Besides the legitimacy they derive from their social status, they might have the political legitimacy to make decisions in the name of a given ethnic group if they garner access to resources they can distribute in post-war settings.

Second, as legitimacy might be largely an outgrowth of resources, challenging ethnic leaders' legitimacy seems to require a challenge to the power base they draw those resources from. Yet, it might not be entirely so for their political survival as leaders, provided that some do have enough charisma to sustain their legitimacy. However, this is not the type of legitimacy that would allow them to take action in

[121] Girod: 2014, Ahmed: 2012, Bueno de la Mesquita and Smith: 2010, Morrison: 2009.
[122] Toft: 2003, *op. cit.* p. 23.
[123] Jenne: 2010, *op. cit.* p.372.

post-war settings, unless they have some sort of resources from where to provide solutions to their constituency.

Understandably, resources and legitimacy are not equally distributed among the elites of homogenous and enclaved societies, so capacities vary.[124] In both cases the majority and concentrated elites have some degree of access to resources they can distribute. Elites of dispersed minorities, however, cannot rely on any concentration of resources (limited or not) and therefore their chances to draw legitimacy out of them is also limited.

The elites of majority groups concentrate the most resources. As "recognized" majorities and "war winners", majority elites hold control over community resources and bear the legitimacy to distribute them, resulting in high capacity levels. Concentrated minorities, however, can gain access to resources only on the territory they are confined in, and therefore the legitimacy for its distribution is also conferred within such territory, resulting in *limited capacity* levels. When the spoils of war include natural resources (for example, the Kurdish enclaves in Iraq are in possession of oilfields [125]), they have strong operational capacities to implement their political goals.

Some elites depend entirely on the spoils of peace; others can self-sustain with the spoils of war they have access to. This aspect makes the difference between the capacities of concentrated and dispersed minority elites: the latter have lesser (*insufficient*) capacities than the former because elites of concentrated minorities have access to both types of spoils. When elites have their own national resources their capacities are even higher, as they can sustain their own policies and even disregard

[124] See Toft: 2003, *op. cit.,* for more on specific settlement patterns and the capacities, legitimacy and investment they offer. Although this section draws on her work, the approach to the concepts and the associated values has been modified considerably.

[125] Most of those territories have been under control of ISIS since the 3rd of August of 2014. (See Reuters 2014).

international help, because such resources reduce incentives to comply with donors or elites of their ethnic kin.[126]

The higher the capacities elites rely upon, the higher the chances for power consolidation and political survival they perceive. Thus, *majority* and *concentrated minority* groups' elites perceive to have higher opportunities for power consolidation and survival.

Dispersed minorities however, are small in size and are generally the most vulnerable group. Thus, if there is any political elite left,[127] it might not be able to gather resources to help people within their ethnic group. Therefore, due to their *insufficient* capacities to consolidate power, they perceive that their political survival is rather limited in such contexts. Nevertheless, they might rely on spoils of peace (such as a Kosovo Serb parliamentarian who accessed different resources provided by the international community) and exchange of favors with their ethnic kin (like encouraging return to areas where they are a majority) in order to survive politically as an elite in the post-war scene.

Local Elites' Political Preferences

Elites' preferences depend on their capacities for power consolidation and political survival in a given post-war outcome, which is linked to the position they occupy in each community. If we recall that after war elites are part of homogenous or enclaved societies, majority and minorities preferences will vary according to the capacities they have in each of them.

Elites are inserted in crises of multiple dimensions, including destroyed infrastructure, a society economically devastated, politically tense, and with a

[126] Caspersen: 2007, pp.639-640.

[127] In some cases elites have left areas during the war period and moved to territories where they are in a majority or are concentrated. A Kosovo Serb parliamentarian I met in 2007 in Kosovo proudly referred to his Pristina origin, and highlighted that moved to the Gracanica enclave during the war together with all the Kosovo Serbs of Pristina at that time.

humanitarian crisis that implies the need to resettle and relocate displaced population. Elites' decisions on how to manage those challenges relates to how they perceive their chances to consolidate power and politically survive. The challenges become more acute because the wartime experience linked the conquering of a given territory to a particular identity. The regions and municipalities conquered by a group becomes its stronghold of power and domination.

War taught those elites that ethnicity actually works as a device to pursue and protect political goals; this political legacy is therefore embedded in all political dynamics that take place in a post-conflict outcome. The instrumentalist approach to ethnic conflict explains the role of "ethnicity as a boundary enforcement device",[128] used by rational agents to compete and allocate scarce resources,[129] or to lower the cost of such competition.[130] Yet these approaches search for answers to the question of conflict drivers; except for Jenne[131], who uses this approach to explain variation in ethnic reintegration. My work departs from the instrumentalist assumptions that ethnicity serves as a technology to delimit the winners team in order to prevent diluting their share of spoils of war and peace.[132]

Because ethno-territorial wars leave a territory divided between ethnic groups, and some groups might have specific strongholds within that territory, ethnic elites might be losers in one area but winners in others (even if it is just a municipality, an area of it or a region), and such factor would enter in the rational calculations they make in post-war settings. Thus, when looking at the ethnic reintegration process in a

[128] Caselli and Coleman: 2006; 2013, p. 162.
[129] Bates: 1974, 1982; Posner: 2005.
[130] Chandra: 2004; Fearon: 1999; Caselli and Coleman: 2006, 2013; Jenne: 2010.
[131] Jenne: 2010, op. cit.
[132] I do not discuss here why we need ethnicity to do that job because I deal with post-war outcomes of wars fought with a strong ethnic component. Thus, ethnicity was already instrumentalized during wartime.

given territory we also have to look at the political chances left to elites when they are losers in some territories while their ethnic kin is a winner in another. Such cooperation might persuade local elites in losing positions to politically survive within a non-favorable post-war outcome.

As majority elites in a Homogenous society perceive that they can consolidate power, they will seek to protect the territories conquered opting for not allowing minority return and minority participation that could challenge such plan. In this context, elites of dispersed minorities have no power to consolidate or protect, therefore they will not promote their minorities to return or participate in communities controlled by other groups. Besides, because their ethnic kin might be in a majority position somewhere else, this political position might help them keep their strongholds intact.

It was interesting to see in my interviews how local elites of dispersed minorities in Bugojno complained about Bošnjak elites' obstruction to minority return, while their ethnic kin holding majority positions in nearby towns were doing the same against the Bošnjak minorities of those localities. It was particularly interesting when those denouncing such practices were holding positions at the Canton level, so theoretically enjoying some leverage regarding the elites of other municipalities. Moreover, it is through these political jobs that elites of dispersed minorities have survived politically. It then makes sense that they would not promote their co-ethnics' return, particularly if they were located in areas consolidating their ethnic kin strongholds.

In short, in homogenized societies, majorities will rely on patronage networks to circulate available resources to co-ethnics, while trust in obstructionism to prevent minorities to return and participate in their pre-war homes, and manipulate co-ethnic

refugees or IDPs to increase majority return. In turn, these majority returns increase their power base and consolidate even further the homogenous outcome.

In enclaved societies the dynamics are a bit more complicated; because the existence of an enclave administered by a concentrated minority means that they are parallel to the administration run by majorities. In this context, minority elites have limited capacities to consolidate their power. While they might have resources to run government structures and provide services to their fellow co-ethnics, such resources are confined to the limits of the territory they control. Consolidating an enclaved community allows concentrated minorities to survive vis a vis a majority that at the same time excludes them from the homogenous societies they control.

For example, consolidating the Bošnjak enclave in Vinac was as much a strategy vis a vis the context they were exposed to as a strategy for Bošnjak elites to consolidate their power near Jajce and survive politically in a homogenous context. In Kosovo, consolidating the enclaved communities served Kosovo Serb elites to concentrate the resources provided by Serbia while rejecting the Kosovo Government.

When the options are dispersed minorities in homogenous societies or concentrated ones in enclaved ones, minorities are always better off in enclaved societies, even when such outcome cannot be guaranteed in the long run without resources of their ethnic kin, as we shall see in next section. To guarantee that these communities survive local elites need to work for the return of minorities, because this will increase their power base to attract more resources and legitimize their role while surviving as the provider of those resources. Minority participation in structures provided by the majority is rather discouraged. Discouraging minority participation is key for not recognizing the majority ruling over such territory.

Majorities in enclaved societies have insufficient capacities to influence the course of action in those territories. They are also unlikely to recognize those enclaves, because such recognition would imply acknowledging their lack of control of the entire territory. Thus, majorities in this context will not promote return or participation to the enclave. The Croat majority ignored the thousand Bošnjaks concentrated in Vinac for about 10 years.

In an enclaved community concentrated minorities will circulate their available limited resources to co-ethnics through patronage networks. To guarantee their ruling over co-ethnics they will obstruct their participation in structures provided by majority elites, in case those exist. When those structures do not exist due to majority obstruction, a double obstructionism takes place: one by the majority and another by concentrated minorities.

Elites of concentrated minorities present themselves as the "real" protectors of their group members, assuring that resources from the international community also reach their enclaves. Because demographics are relevant for those resources to keep circulating towards the enclave, minority elites will seek to increase minority return towards the enclave. All in all these actions will consolidate the power that elites have in those territories since war ended, therefore maintaining the enclaved outcome.

In sum, at war's end there are two possible outcomes: a homogenous society run by majority elites, or an enclaved one run by concentrated minorities. Those societies will remain under such a division due to the majorization dynamics local elites engage with. The position that those elites occupy translates into resources and legitimacy, which are the capacities they rely on to establish their political preferences within such outcome: those with high and limited capacities will seek to consolidate their power, while those with insufficient capacities will attempt to survive politically

as an elite. Elites take different actions to deter minority return and minority participation in those societies, thus reintegration becomes unlikely. When minority return is promoted in the context of an enclaved community, it only serves to further consolidate such enclaves because minority participation is equally discouraged by majority and minority elites.

The next section I show how ethnic kin (within the country and outside) have political and/or economic incentives to provide extra capacities to local elites in order to co-shape the majorization pattern and help in sustaining it over time.

Table II.1 Actors, Processes and Outcomes in Communities that failed to reintegrate:

Actor	Process	Outcome
	Communities that fail to reintegrate	
Local elites (of Majority and Minority Groups)	***Majorization Pattern*** patronage networks obstructionism manipulation of IDP's & Refugees	**Mantainance** of **Homogenous** and **Enclaved** Scenarios
Ethnic Kin (national elites, host state, kin states)	***Support to Majorization Pattern*** w/ economic and political resources	

II.2.3 The Ethnic Kin support

In the previous section I showed how local elites maintain homogenized and enclaved communities through three main mechanisms (patronage networks, obstructionism and manipulation of IDPs and Refugees) that combined form a post-conflict pattern of majorization. This section argues that ethnic kin support to that majorization pattern by *national elites* and *kin-states*, is a necessary and sufficient

condition to sustain those outcomes over time. Such kin support helps co-shape those outcomes in cooperation with local elites.

The existing literature has largely neglected kin support as a relevant variable for the study of post-war outcomes and ethnic reintegration in particular. Then, filling that gap, I address how these actors operate in the post-war scene, and show how, national elites and kin states are the key relevant actors to sustain local elites' capacities. I finish discussing whether and how variation of political interests among these actors does exist and how relevant they are for shaping post-war outcomes.

Various works on Bosnia Herzegovina[133] and Kosovo[134] have empirically acknowledged the role of ethnic kin in post-war settings, particularly the role of national elites and kin-states. Yet, that role is theoretically understudied, whereas its implications for the ethnic reintegration process are largely neglected. Moore[135] refers to local and national cooperation as a wartime legacy with impact on the peace-building outcome when such cooperation has been called into question at wartime, but the role of kin-states in his work is mostly overshadowed by national and local elites.

William and Dahlman[136] provide an explanation of why and how Serbia sustains Kosovo Serb enclaves in Kosovo. However, the authors consider enclavization as a political strategy of geopolitical conquest rather than a post-war outcome on its own. Hence, it does not help us to explain the role of kin-states in the variation of post-war outcomes, or in the success of ethnic reintegration in particular. Is enclavization a default policy of all kin-states under all circumstances? When could the policy of enclavization come to an end?

[133] Pickering: 2007, Toal and Dahlman: 2010, Moore: 2013.
[134] Listhaug et al.: 2011, OSCE Reports: 2005, 2008, 2010, King and Mason: 2006, Williams and Dahlman: 2010, Tahiri: 2011, Simonsen 2004
[135] Moore: 2013, p. 24-25.
[136] William and Dahlman: 2010.

Moreover, the authors place too much emphasis on Serbia downplaying the agency of local elites, who are the direct responsible towards their population. Similarly, Tahiri[137] looks at state-building outcomes placing more emphasis on Serbia than on Kosovo Serb elites, or more exactly, presenting the latter as the victims of the former.

In contrast, this thesis takes a bottom-up approach and tries to understand dynamics from the local perspective. The main decision of shaping one or another outcome is taken and defended at the local level, mostly due to the fact that daily decisions on allowing minority return and expanding opportunities for minority participation or not are sustained at local level. It is at the local level that the gains of majorization are primarily collected and so are the costs of such policies.

The work of Toal and Dahlman[138] is a path to understanding the complexity of relations between various elites within BH and their respective kin-states. The authors highlight the cooperation of local, national and kin-states elites in sustaining ethno-territorial dynamics in post-war BH, empirically demonstrating how they have affected the return process. For instance, they acknowledge the role of Croatia and BH national Croat leadership in the resettlement of co-ethnics in Croat dominated areas of BH, and cite Ivana Djuric's work[139] to show the role of the diaspora in that process as well.

I distinguish between the role of local and national –even regional elites- to understand the post-war dynamics that keep those territories divided. Local elites bear a direct access to the local population they also integrate, along with a higher responsibility in shaping post-war outcomes. It is on them to demand, accept or reject

[137] Tahiri: 2011.
[138] Toal and Dahlman: 2010, p. 176.
[139] Djuric: 2000.

the support of other ethnic kin actors, including kin-states. Moreover, kin-states elites are subjects of a foreign state, which bears different implications for the whole dynamics of post-war reintegration.

Although all these actors are relevant to understand why societies remain divided, their role in the process varies considerably. National elites or kin states elites cannot run a municipality, no matter how much they engage with it. Serbian elites cannot run Kosovo Serb enclaves despite the fact that they might name local elites as kin-states elites by making them part of government structures[140].

We need to highlight the agency of local and national actors vis a vis kin-state elites, rather than assume the former being the puppets of the latter[141]. Thus, on empirical terms such a distinction can help us advance policies that address the agenda of post-war reintegration.

I understand that ethnic kin actors' support responds to economic and political objectives. Ethnicity is used with the same goals of majorization of their fellow local leaders, and so are the tools they use to keep the majorization pattern active. I expect that ethnic kin actors support co-ethnics and cooperate in co-shaping the majorization dynamics. This guarantees that spoils of war and peace are circulated to consolidate the power conquered through war.

There might be different interests at play, and in the 1996 elections in BH forty eight parties competed, but all of them worked to consolidate the ethnocratic rule[142]. Ethnicity was a tool of war and it is a tool of post-war dynamics as well. It is the instrumental use of ethnicity that explains the alignment of these actors behind the consolidation of the outcomes that war left behind, not ethnicity itself. This is my

[140] Such was the case of Oliver Ivanovic, at times a radical "bridge watcher" in Mitrovica, at times a Kosovo parliamentarian in 2004-2007, and at times a State Secretary of Serbia for Kosovo.
[141] Caspersen: 2008.
[142] Toal and Dahlman: 2010, p. 187.

main divergence from proponents of partition and perennialist explanations of why BH is still divided: ethnicity is the tool, not the reason that keeps society apart.

Now let us see how these various actors support local elites in the maintenance of a divided society.

As *National Leadership,* I describe elites that have a national role, be it as elites of a host state (like Albanians in Kosovo, or Croats, Serbs and Bošnjaks in BH); or elites of a consociational region (like the Srpska Republic or the Federation in Bosnia); or elites with a national impact (as those leading ethno-political parties like SDA, HDZ and SDS in BH); or elites with regional impact (like the Croat leadership in the Hercegovina region). They are not local government elites, but they have the capacity to make decisions for them at the state level or within political party structures. They could eventually cut resources that arrive to local governments. For instance, Hercegovacka Banka was the main entity through which the Croat separatist movement and parallel institutions were financed[143].

National elites have resources and organizational capacities. They also provide the moral support of legitimacy and the sense of a municipality belonging to the larger territory conquered by their ethnic kin somewhere else. Each municipality conquered contributes to the pride that ethnic groups derive from victory. The survival of national elites also depends on the survival of municipalities under their political – ethnic- color.

Kin-States are highly understudied actors, not only in post-war periods but concerning their war engagement as well. Yet, as they are a legitimate international actor whose foreign policy is highly engaged in the post-war settings where their ethnic kin lives, this fact might pose different challenges to the international and

[143] Bieber: 2001, in Moore: 2013, p. 100.

regional order, and even conflict with the host state of their protected minorities. In fact, Croatia and Serbia's engagement in post-war Bosnia and Kosovo respectively became a trade coin for European Union access, but also a high concern for the security of the Balkan region from the EU perspective. Thus, the neglect of the role of this actor in post-war societies needs to be addressed by the post-conflict theory. This work hopes to contribute to that path.

Although kin-states are neither the only suppliers of resources to local leaders[144], nor can they always control them[145], kin-states derive economic and political benefits from such protection. By arguing that they are entitled to speak out for their ethnic kin, they manage to keep playing in the international arena. For instance, the constant Serbian claim of protecting the rights of its ethnic kin in Kosovo kept it at the center of all negotiations destined to improve the reality of local Serbs in Kosovo.

With such engagement Serbia managed to derive benefits coming from the EU, such as the current "Accession Package". Although the Brussels Dialogue is largely destined to improve the life of Kosovo Serbs within Kosovo, Serbia speaks for them within this negotiation: it is not a dialogue between the Kosovo Government and Kosovo Serb minorities. The Kosovo Government itself rejects the participation of that minority within the dialogue process[146], and Serbia plays its foreign policy using

[144] Caspersen: 2008, p. 358.
[145] Caspersen: 2008.
[146] In the meeting in Brussels in the early 2013 negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, Krstimir Pantic, who had been listed as part of Serbia's delegation, introduced himself as the Mayor of Mitrovica. Kosovo's head of delegation, Deputy Prime Minister Edita Tahiri demanded the meeting to be stopped until this actor was removed from the negotiating table in the capacity of an "illegal mayor" (meaning a Mayor appointed by Serbia, and not resulting from municipal elections ran by Kosovo). Ms. Tahiri's arguments to this demand were: *"I came here to dismantle you, not to negotiate with you", "Kosovo Serbs are our citizens, they cannot sit on the Serbian side; whereas Serbia's parallel structures in Kosovo such as this mayor are illegal structures that should be dismantled", "if they wanted to come they should have come with the Kosovo delegation as Kosovo Serbs".* Author's interview with Kosovo head of delegation, Deputy Prime Minister Edita Tahiri: Vienna, December 5th 2013.

them as assets on the negotiation table. On most occasions of the Brussels Dialogue Serbia has included Kosovo Serb elites as part of the Serbian Delegation.

Kin-states have more capacities than any other kin actor to impact post-war outcomes: 1) they can claim that they are seeking to protect minority conditions and play this card at the international level; 2) they can finance institutions and help to implement alternative educational, healthcare, and even security systems; 3) they can be a patron of political parties that mirror the political system of the kin-state, and more easily finance and connect those links; 4) they can offer political rights such as dual citizenship, voting rights, spaces in political institutions, limitless border crossing, etc.

If kin-states enjoy border proximity with the territory in question, this becomes one of the strongest mechanisms through with the support is circulated. Whenever there is border proximity, kin-states increase their capacity to operate in those territories and to entrench the idea of contiguous territory. For example, dwellings construction in the Kosovo Serb enclave in North Mitrovica is a complicated subject. Several buildings are built with resources that come via Serbia or are provided by the Serbian government, and in several cases there are Serbia offices still operating in the municipality. Thus, kin-states' resources are a strong support to the majorization dynamics within the municipality.

Types of Ethnic Kin Support

Ethnic kin support can be political or material, and although they can be overt or hidden, I only consider it here when it surfaces either because it is overt, or made overt by accounts of different actors in the area. In this work I do not aim at quantifying the actual support, but rather to identify if the ethnic kin supported the local elites in their majorization policies.

It has been the case that national and kin-state elites switch alliances and support along between different local elites and for different domestic policy reasons. So although I describe the possible incentives for the ethnic kin elites, I do so only to account for the various reasons of such support. Therefore, support incentives are exogenous. I am more concerned with the effects of this support on the majorization pattern developed by elites, rather than pointing out master plans of regional ethno-territorial projects, as Toal and Dahlman refer do in their work.

I measure political support as political decisions, policies or actions that contribute to the obstruction of minority return and/or participation implemented by local elites and those who contribute to manipulating displaced people.

I also consider the political support provided through administrative orders, development and the implementation of laws. When decisions of national and kin-states elites affect local processes without the engagement of local elites (or even against them), I also count it as ethnic kin support to the local process of majorization. This is so because most likely hardliners will replace a priori (without international engagement) local elites that attempt to move away from the majorization pattern.

Several decisions of actions at the local level were taken at the headquarters of main political parties[147]. For example, the SDA leadership in Sarajevo was unwilling to allow a joint municipal government in Mostar due to the need of using it as a bargaining chip for political positioning at the Federation.[148] The resolution of those disagreements often resulted in favor of national elites[149], who would restore majorization pattern, meaning practices that shore up their power. In the 2014 elections in Kosovo, for example, the government of Serbia formed its list –Lista

[147] Sarajevo hosts the headquarters for the SDA, Mostar for the HDZ, Banja Luka/Pale for the SDS; and Banja Luka for the SNSD.
[148] Moore, p. 93.
[149] Moore, p.94, describes how in Mostar the clashes between the local and the Sarajevo SDA leadership finished with the local leader leaving the city and the hardliners taking over.

Srpska- and asked to Kosovo Serbs openly to participate in Kosovo government elections under this list[150].

Political support was also provided through the use of the media. SDA had its media outlets across the Federation, HDZ in Western Herzegovina and Central Canton and SDS in the Srpska Republic and Pale[151]. Through those outlets the national leadership circulated nationalist ethno-territorial propaganda, and even acts of intimidation.[152]

In the case of kin-States, they can also provide an extra political resource, like diplomatic support to local elites. Because they are an international actor, they can voice or even justify their demands on the international scene. Serbia, for example, has brought up the case of Kosovo Serbs in the UN General Assembly when the situation of Kosovo is discussed.

Because Canton elites are in charge of reviewing local level regulations and can overrule them[153], another form of political support is to uphold decisions and regulations that affect minority return and participation. Otherwise, the entity or the BH states have no competences over the municipalities.[154]

I measure material support when financial, economic and/or material resources are provided to be distributed exclusively within the patronage networks or are used to help the obstructionist and manipulative practices of local elites. For example, the Ministry of Displaced Persons and Refugees in Brcko gave the control over the

[150]See: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/kosovo/8126527/Serbia-calls-for-boycott-of-Kosovo-elections.html.
[151] Toal and Dahlman: 2011.
[152] Ogata: 2005.
[153] Jokay, C. (2001). Local Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In E. Kandeva (Ed.), *Stabilization of Local Governments* (pp. 93-138). Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative- Open Society Institute.
[154]*Ibid*

distribution of the rationing cards and housing permits to the local SDS.[155] Economic support also took the form of financing housing reconstruction. The Tudjman government supported HDZ housing projects south of Mostar with the aim of relocating displaced Croats from central BH and Sarajevo.[156] Serbia provides salaries to Kosovo Serbs in northern municipalities of Kosovo and finances the infrastructure and various services.[157]

Ethnic kin support to majorization patterns in homogenous or enclaved societies tends to equally sustain those dynamics and help co-shaping them. However, in enclaved societies the ethnic kin support is more compelling; basically because they imply that a majority governs somewhere else, but also has authority over the same territory. Whether the majority had opted to leave that enclave untouched and unchallenged is another issue. Such was the case with Bošnjak enclaved minorities in Vinac and Kosovo Serb enclaves. Therefore, relying on national elites sometimes in the form of a host or kin-state is essential for the survival of the enclaved community.

The effect in both outcomes is the same because the ethnic kin support provides extra resources that in turn translate into even more capacities for the elites. Ethnic kin support does not determine the post-war outcome, but it contributes to increasing the capacities of local elites for shaping them and this in turn contributes to its sustainability over time. To put it differently, ethnic kin support helps to maintain Homogenous and Enclaved communities.

I draw on the existing literature on the involvement of kin-states in ethnic conflict onset to establish that such involvement matters for its effects on shaping those outcomes, rather than for the reasons that might inspire their actions. Moreover,

[155] Moore, op. cit.: p. 86.
[156] Toal and Dahlman: 2011, p. 177.
[157] See OSCE Report on parallel administration various from 1999-2008.

incentives to support local elites might be varied. Sharing a language and historical bonds is a reason for support[158] and trans-border loyalties[159]. Yet ethnicity is rather a "boundary enforcement device"[160] that also organizes how the internal and external support will be provided to local elites.

However, national actors might have more vested interests in the post-war outcome than kin-states as external actors with their own domestic[161] or geopolitical interests[162]. When kin-states intervene to support their kin the ethnic justification is rather a "window dressing" to further realpolitik ambitions.[163] This is also why contiguous countries are more likely to intervene in internal affairs[164]. Following the developments of Croatian support to Bosnian Croats, and Serbian support to Kosovo Serb leaders, this seems to be an accurate description.

Kin-states also derive political benefits in domestic politics. For example, the links between Croatia and the Croat-dominated area in BH were strong because Bosnian Croats were allowed to vote in Croatia [165], and Herceg-Bosna was in military, security and business senses a part of Croatia.[166]

Even more important than acknowledging the ethnic kin's motivations for engaging in a post-war outcome, is to provide accounts of their engagement. Not acknowledging their contribution and role amounts to ignoring why ethnic reintegration is such a difficult endeavor. Moreover, acknowledging kin-state involvement opens questions regarding foreign policy and a new dimension for the conquest of ethnic reintegration: international negotiations.

[158] Gartzke and Gleditsch: 2006.
[159] Davis and Moore: 1997; Saideman: 2002.
[160] Caselli and Coleman: 2013.
[161] Saideman: 2001, p. 22-26.
[162] Cetinyan: 2002, p. 666-668,
[163] Byman et al.: 2001, p. 23.
[164] Miller, 2007, p. 9.
[165] Moore, p. 95.
[166] Bourg and Shoup: 1999, p. 377, cited in Moore, p. 95.

Local elites might be able to consolidate homogenized or enclaved societies, but they cannot sustain them over time. National and kin-states elites are necessary because they have alternative states apparatus to derive resources from.

Kin-states are highly important for the reintegration process and the lack of reintegration success. It is puzzling that scholars have completely neglected this aspect. Why are kin-states that relevant, even more than any other actor within the ethnic kin support? Because they are, in most cases, neighbors to the country in question (like Croatia and Serbia to BH, and Serbia to Kosovo, Iran to Syria), what helps piercing their frontiers.

However, it is not only the strength of this cooperation during the post-war period that is relevant for the survival of this pattern. Studying variation in peacebuilding outcomes in Mostar and Brcko, Moore[167] found that when the links between local, national and regional elites are weakened during the wartime period, it is easier for international peacebuilders to "cultivate alliances with local moderates". Yet, It is difficult to estimate how the influence of the wartime legacy to weaken those links can be more relevant than any other influence. For instance, the deaths of Tudjman and Milosevic redefined the political landscape after them and moderates began to surface in public debates. So, it is rather kinship backing what matters. It is when those relationships are weakened (regardless of when that takes place) that post-war settings see a chance for moderate voices.

Thus, I draw on Moore to argue that the strength of this connection between local elites and kinship networks at national and regional level during both wartime and post-war period is key to understanding the possibilities for the emergence of an alternative moderate leadership within the post-war setting. If local power is contested

[167] Moore: 2013, p. 83-86, 87.

during either war or post-war time by their kinship networks (national or regional co-ethnic elites), there is an opportunity for alternative elites to emerge.

There might be more splits among hardliners who diverge regarding the role of national or regional elites in a given municipality[168], or they might compete for votes on the post-war scene[169]. Alternately, different actors might find in that weakening of the ties the opportunity to voice their differences regarding the specific conduct of politics in the post-war outcome. I call such alternative, moderate leadership "tide riders".

In conditions of "majorization", being an alternative leader of a moderate position generally implies risks and courage analogous to riding tides on turbulent waters. The very same practice of "majorization" penalizes co-ethnics that oppose such practices. The empirical accounts of BH are full of those examples. For instance, Pickering[170] gives accounts of death threats to co-ethnic municipal officers working on minority return by local Serb activists in Sarajevo and Bihac. In my own research, several interviewees mentioned being labeled as "traitors" by their own co-ethnics and leadership if they exposed their interaction or help members of other ethnic groups.

Thus, conceptualizing those actors as "moderates" that move beyond the majorization practice denies the risks they assume while doing that. I provide the concept of "tide rider" to highlight that they are local actors willing to put many aspects of their life –even their life- at risk in order to ride the tide of ethnic reintegration. I do not assume here that their motives are purely altruist. I am interested exclusively in showing the alternative leaders to elites engaged in majorization patterns, while highlighting the challenges they assume, something that

[168] Like the split between HDZ and HDZ90 in Jajce in 2000.
[169] Like the formation of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) out of the former wartime Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
[170] Pickering: 2007, p. 25.

cannot be captured in the concept of "moderate" used in the literature as opposed to hardliners.

The concept of "tide rider" equips us better to observe such alternative leadership at the empirical level. As long as those in power are elites that use available resources to keep the majorization process ongoing, they also foreclose alternative voices. Without external support such tide riders are unlikely to occupy a central role within the municipality to ride the reintegration process.

To conclude, ethnic kin provides political and economic resources to support the local elite's majorization pattern. These co-joined factors explain why several societies still remain divided after war.

II.3 Communities that Reintegrate

I argue here that whenever a reintegrated outcome was possible, a third party intervention took place in a timely manner, targeting the majorization dynamics and the ethnic kin support to it. While timing is a necessary condition to move from a homogenous society to a reintegrated one, targeting ethnic kin support is necessary to move from an enclaved to a reintegrated society. I also argue that whenever the conditions that reify a homogenous outcome are not targeted on time, an assimilated outcome develops. This is so because timing is more relevant for guaranteeing the return of the displaced people than for their participation in their pre-war homes.

Thus, the role of third parties in post-war outcomes requires their "responsible engagement" in targeting the right factors at the right time within each context (homogenous or enclaved societies). Otherwise it might co-shape an alternative non-reintegrated outcome through negligence.

An assimilated society is also possible at a later stage whenever reintegration was achieved but not sustained over time through economic opportunities; in the Bosnian cases we will briefly look at the conditions for the sustainability of a reintegrated outcome. This section's primary concern is to study the conditions through which a reintegrated society is possible.

To tackle the majorization pattern third parties have to address the way in which local elites manage their capacities (spoils of war and peace), in addition to those provided by its ethnic kin in its support. It is the exclusive, unconditioned and non-standardized use of those resources that allows elites to implement the majorization pattern.

I proceed as follows. I begin by discussing the role of third parties in post-war societies oriented to achieving ethnic reintegration. I continue with three related issues of the responsible engagement of third parties in post-war outcomes: a) the relevance of timing and its impact on shaping assimilated societies, b) the sustainability of reintegrated societies over time, and c) the issue of local ownership. I consider these aspects to be relevant for a responsible third party engagement because in the light of these aspects the international community should assess whether committing to ethnic reintegration is possible or desirable. It is certainly neither an easy task nor one that could be done without these considerations if the international community would not like to do more harm than good.

Table II.2 Actors and Processes: Communities that reintegrate



II.3.1 Targeted Third Party Intervention

Third party intervention is largely discussed for conflict termination, yet, studies of third parties role in post-war societies is limited and mostly divided between those who see positive contributions and skeptics. Some scholars debate the positive role of third parties in the reconstruction of war-torn states[171], in fostering democracy and economic growth[172], developing institutions to palliate liberalization[173], improving post-war wellbeing[174], and solving commitment problems of a settlement.[175] International intervention is most needed in cases with high levels of hostilities and destruction of local capacities.[176] Other scholars have a negative

[171] Krasner: 2004; Doyle and Sambanis: 2006, Chesterman: 2005.
[172] Doyle and Sambanis: 2000, 2006.
[173] Paris: 2004.
[174] Sang Ki Kim: 2015.
[175] Walter: 1997 ; Walter: 1999,
[176] Doyle and Sambanis: 2006, p. 4.

view about interveners' contribution.[177] Some understand that the problem of BH is the role of the international community, not the role of local and ethnic kin elites.[178]

I situate myself among those who argue about the positive effects of third party intervention on the post-war outcome. However, I also understand that on some occasions peace-builders "have reinforced previously existing state-society relation - weak states characterized by patrimonial politics".[179] I draw on the perspective that argues that interveners can deter obstructionism to the ethnic reintegration process and disrupt the logic of ethnic spoils[180], to argue for the conditions under which third party intervention contributes to reintegration success. I also highlight the conditions under which third parties might reproduce existing developments. In this case, third party intervention would not only be irresponsible but also useless.

Comparing peace-building outcomes in Mostar and Brcko, Moore discovered that third party independence and coordination, and the social and political embeddedness of peace-builders were key in the Brcko process.[181] Although the author considers ethnic reintegration as an indicator of peace-building, analytically speaking those elements speak about the capacities of the intervener, not about the peacebuilding effects over the reintegration success or alternative post-war outcomes. Still, we lack answers to the question of independence to do what and how, coordination towards which end, and embeddedness for which purpose. No doubt those elements are relevant; however, third parties' capacities are not sufficient to help us explain variation across cases.

In Chapter 1 I mentioned how increasing resources among peace-builders did not translate into reintegration success. Even more, minority return sparked when BH

[177] Pugh: 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs: 2006.
[178] Chandler: 1999, Pugh and Cobble: 2001.
[179] Barnett and Zurcher: 2009, p. 24.
[180] Jenne: 2010.
[181] Moore, 116-134.

was reducing resources. Thus, it is important to discover towards which end capacities like coordination, independence and embeddedness are allocated to. Moreover, as I look exclusively to what conditions help moving from a divided society to a reintegrated one, third party actions have to have a specific impact on that process. Third parties are already engaged in those territories in some way or another contributing with larger demands of the peace-building, state-building and post-war reconstruction processes.

I argue that for a reintegrated outcome to take place, third party intervention is necessary to target the disruption of the majorization pattern and deter the ethnic kin support to such pattern. Because capacities explain the existence of the former, and an extra supply of capacities explains the role of the latter, the main purpose of third party intervention is to defy the operational capacities of local elites allocated to the majorization pattern and those provided by the ethnic kin.

The *Majorization Pattern* is tackled by two main mechanisms: 1) *challenging exclusivity over resources* will challenge their control by local elites. I measure this as the actions implemented by third parties to condition assistance to elites upon advancing minority return and participation and the direct assistance to minorities wishing to return.[182] When third parties do not make their engagement contingent upon progress in ethnic reintegration there are no incentives for local elites to use resources as a function to reintegration[183]. 2) *Challenging legitimacy:* elites have to manage resources available through the spoils of peace (provided by international donors and peace-builders) and war (those captured by controlling the state). I measure this mechanism by the actions implemented by third parties to establish standards of management of minority return and participation, and the existence of

[182] Jenne: 2010.
[183] Boyce: 2002, Bearce and Tirone: 2010, Stone: 2010, Jenne: 2010.

sanctions (like removal from office, or embargos) whenever those standards are not met. For instance, the breach of standards set by the OHR in BH for the use of media or the protection of human rights (and returnees' specifically) drove many mayors out of office and prevented them from taking any other political positions.

A third type of actions that third parties engage in to challenge both exclusivity and legitimacy is the promotion of an alternative leadership, which I call "*tide riders*". I measure this promotion as the cooperation third parties establish with leadership that helps the process of return or minority participation.

Such leadership might have been part of the existing leadership, or it may be new to the political scene. As I explained earlier, these elites opt for reintegration, taking and enduring certain costs for this decision, and providing an alternative to the elites of the majorization pattern. These leaders might not control the spoils of war but might be able to rely on the spoils of peace if so provided by the international community. For instance, seeing the lack of involvement with the return process of the Serb community in Bugojno, the UNHCR resorted to one politician of a Serb area to mobilize the return of several hundred Serbs.[184]

Similarly, if resources (job development programs or housing reconstruction, for example) are removed from the hands of local elites and distributed among alternative NGOs (not linked to existing elites), this helps reduce local elites' exclusivity over the spoils of peace, and creates legitimate interlocutors with the donor community. Peace-builders can grant alternative legitimacy to local elites when they choose with whom to interact[185]: in this sense, they either legitimize obstructionist leaders, or empower tide riders.

[184] Author's interview with Mr. Simic, a Serbian leader of the Cipuljc village: Bugojno. 2011
[185] Joyce: 2002, p. 351.

Supporting tide riders also help solve the "back-the-decent-winner" problem, that is, the promotion of patrons of the patronage networks who are willing to favor stability but without radically transforming the political, economic, and cultural structures[186]. In order for patrons to promote this outcome of stability, internationals provide them with tools and resources,[187] (spoils of peace).

The *disruption of ethnic kin support to the majorization pattern* contributes to challenging the support base of local elites. For international elites to do that without competing with ethnic kin elites, they need to propose a joint cooperation towards building reintegrated communities. In order to achieve this, the international community needs to frame such cooperation within negotiation processes that seat those actors at the table to accommodate interests that might be diverse and even competing. The aim is not to remove the support of the ethnic kin elites, but rather to redirect it towards the reintegration process.

It is necessary to negotiate guarantees that protect the reintegration process for all the relevant actors and for each aspect of minority participation to ensure that those who return have opportunities to participate in all aspects of community life. This is particularly so when a kin state provides strong support to concentrated minority elites, or when the territory is of strategic importance to donors (like enclaves in Iraq). Because ethnic kin support reflects the political agenda of the actors involved, the international community should set the rules of what is possible within such support[188]. The Bolzano Recommendations have been a standard answer in the discussion of how this can be made possible for kin states, stipulating that their

[186] Snyder: 2011.
[187] Snyder: 2011, 47. Barnett and Zurcher: 2009, called this condition as the "Peacebuilder's contract".
[188] Waterbury, Mira: 2010, also foresaw the contribution of third party intervention to shape kin states behavior and its relationship with ethnic kin. See: *Between State and Nation: Diaspora Politics and Kin-state Nationalism in Hungary*. Palgrave McMilliam, p.12.

support is acceptable as long as there is no interference without the intervened State's consent.[189]

Although disrupting the majorization pattern among elites is a first step to achieving ethnic reintegration, it needs to be accompanied by strategies to alter elite incentives and assurances to out-groups that these interventions will be sustained for the long haul to persuade them that ethnic reintegration is a stable equilibrium. The very first step is the key mechanism that sets the other two in motion. Without disrupting the majorization pattern and challenging the operational capacities of local elites, the next steps will not be possible. This is so because the disruption of the post-conflict game sets in motion a new phase of strategic calculations for local elites; that has to include the "third party factor".

Third party intervention to disrupt a majorization pattern and deter its ethnic kin support can be done in a timely manner, or not. *Timely Third Party Intervention* refers to actions taken within a window of time that allows returnees to come home before they settled somewhere else or are relocated into majority areas.

Identifying optimal intervention timing in post-war settings is a complicated task. Several scholars had approached to a definition to what "adequate" timing might be to proceed with interventions in specific conflicts and negotiations. Zartman[190] suggested to 'wait for the ripe moment' and 'the hurting stalemate' between the parties; Rubin[191] proposed creating such ripeness; Druckman[192] linked timing to a

[189] Bolzano Recommendations, 2008: Article 4: 'A State may have an interest and even a constitutionally declared responsibility to support persons belonging to national minorities residing in other States based on ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious, historical or any other ties. However, this does not imply, in any way, a right under international law to exercise jurisdiction over these persons on the territory of another State without that State's consent'. OSCE/HCNM, 'Bolzano/Bolze Recommendations on National Minorities in Intrastate Relations & Explanatory Note, June 2008.

[190] Zartman and Berman: 1982, 66-78; Zartman: 1983; Touval and Zartman: 1985, 258-60; Zartman: 1985, 1989.

[191] Rubin: 1991.

[192] Druckman: 1986.

crisis that could allow interveners an opportunity (turning point) to re-frame the issues at stake; while Ayres and Saideman[193] worked on variable types and timing of intervention in intrastate conflicts, arguing that different types of intervention require different timings. However, there is not much discussion about the role of intervention timing in post-conflict settings. Steenkamp[194] and Jenne[195] warned about the chances of losing momentum for advancing "further transformations" or "reintegration".

Yet the question remains: what is the right timing for post-war intervention to achieve reintegration? Some have pointed out that if minorities are not returned within the first years, they might settle somewhere else[196]. I draw on Doyle and Sambanis'[197] idea on "timely humanitarian assistance" in peace-building efforts, Jenne's "timely third party assistance"[198] in ethnic reintegration processes, and the general idea that post-war societies are still conflictive during the first five years[199].

Based on these, I argue that timely intervention has to take place within the first five years. An empirical justification for such discretion is within the time-period of children schooling. I assume that minorities are less eager to resettle back to their pre-war homes after they have spent a considerable amount of time relocated somewhere else. A long time in a specific job, schooling for kids in a certain place, and engaging in a social network of friends and acquaintances are enough reasons for diminishing the will to return home.

Thus, I measure *timely intervention* as the intervention that takes place within the first five years, and non-*timely third party intervention* after those first five years. For instance, the push for the Kosovo plan on Reintegration came only after 2008,

[193] Saideman and Ayres: 2009.
[194] Steenkamp: 2009, p. 135.
[195] Jenne: 2010, p. 374.
[196] Jenne: 2010.
[197] Doyle, Sambanis: 2006.
[198] Jenne: 2010.
[199] Fortna: 2003.

when most members of the Serb minority were already resettled in Serbia or consolidated in enclaved communities.

II.3.2 Responsible third party engagement in the process of ethnic reintegration

I have so far argued for third party engagement in the process of ethnic reintegration. However, such argument cannot be rushed without considering certain aspects that call for a responsible engagement. After all, I am arguing for a strong participation of foreign countries with foreign interests in internal problems of another country. Thus, although I make a case for international intervention in ethnic reintegration, I also want to point out that such intervention has to be responsible enough to consider its timing, the sustainability aspect of the reintegration that it helped to create, and the local ownership component of it. Otherwise, the international engagement in post-war reintegration might create more harm than good.

I argue for "responsible engagement" not only due to the vast amount of resources that the international community invests while the causes of war seem to remain intact[200], but also because there are limits even for internationals themselves. Peace-builders' abuses of refugees in BH, Kosovo, Liberia and Congo have already been brought to trial[201], and some were accused of turning a blind eye to abuses, such as sex trafficking in Bosnia.[202]

[200] In one of the last reports on BH, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center described how the ethno-territorial agenda is still prolonging displacement. See: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Europe/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/pdf/201411-eu-bosnia-overview-en.pdf, November 19th 2014.
[201] The Weekly Standard: 2005, "The UN Sex Scandal", http://www.weeklystandard.com/article/6292, BBC: 2005, "DR Congo sex abuse claims upheld", see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4156819.stm.
[202] The Guardian: 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/15/bosnia-sex-trafficking-whistleblower

At the same time I offer policy-makers a framework to make informed decisions in awareness of the limits, conditions and consequences of their intervention.

It was also pointed out somewhere else how peace-builders' aid intended for refugees in fact strengthened genocide perpetrators[203]. This reinforcement of existing state-society relations was referred to as the "peacebuilder's contract", which is the sacrifice of higher peacebuilding goals for the sake of stability.[204] A report from Human Right Watch questioned how the interaction with the international community granted local elites underserved legitimacy, when in general those local elites were warlords involved in wartime ethnic cleansing and managed to retain control over key economic, infrastructure and humanitarian sectors in the post-war period[205].

Nevertheless, it is clear that achieving meaningful levels of minority return implies that third parties confront the "entrenched power of ethnocratic regimes with some power of their own."[206] Thus, third party intervention is needed, and so the third party awareness of the consequences of its actions.

The first issue to be aware of is *the relevance of timing and the negligent indirect creation of an assimilated outcome.* Timely intervention is necessary for a homogenous society to move towards reintegration; otherwise, this outcome will likely move towards an assimilated one. When third parties miss the opportunity to achieve minority return they can only help in expanding the participation levels of the low number of minorities that exist in a territory. As a consequence of this failure, an assimilated outcome results in these communities.

[203] Terry: 2002.
[204] Barnett and Zurchner: 2009.
[205] Human Rights Watch: *The Unindicted: Reaping the Rewards of "Ethnic Cleansing" in Prijedor*, 1 January 1997, D901, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8368.html [accessed 14 January 2015].
[206] Toal and Dahlman: 2011, p. 193.

I assume that when third parties target the majorization pattern, local elites will attempt to keep the spoils of peace (resources offered by peace-builders) while at the same time minimize the costs[207] of the interveners' policies to challenge that pattern. I therefore expect majority elites in homogenous communities to be more willing to negotiate minority participation than minority return because the latter is a direct challenge to their power base and stronghold consolidation. In this sense, timing is relevant for the promotion of minority return.

Because the spoils of peace provided by peace-builders are used by local elites, a *non-reintegrated intervention* only increases the capacities of local elites. In such cases, an increase of capacities makes the majorization pattern more effective. Local elites are likely to accept third parties conditionality because they want to stay in office as long as possible[208]. However, as minority return is a direct challenge to their power base, I expect local elites to accept minority participation first, as a way to send compliance signals to the peace-builders.

I also expect third parties to rely on sanctions and removal from office to force local leaders to improve their actions towards minority return. I anticipate local elites to be more resistant to changing their policies unless their support base is also affected. Only when third parties intervene in challenging their power base do I expect the homogeneous and enclaved societies to move toward a reintegrated one.

Local elites can keep disregarding third party conditionality and sanctions for as long as they can rely on national or kin-state elites. This is so because even when third parties could compromise their spoils of war and peace, resources could still be provided by their support base. This is even more valid for contexts of enclaved communities and particularly those with border proximity with a kin-state. From this I

[207] Barnett and Zurcher: 2009, p. 31.
[208] Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow: 2003.

also deduce that a timely intervention is a necessary condition to move from a homogenous society to a reintegrated one, but it is not necessarily so regarding an enclaved outcome. It those contexts the disruption of the ethnic kin is a necessary condition to moving towards reintegration.

The second issue to be aware of is that *achieving reintegration and sustaining it over time demands different conditions.* Sustainable reintegration conditions deserve further research, which exceeds this project. However, I will anticipate conditions that I inductively deduce from my own findings in Bugojno and Jajce. Once a third party facilitated the reintegration process, the sustainability of this outcome is tied to the existing economic opportunities for the population.

Third parties should consider this and maybe foresee how to facilitate those opportunities before exiting. In this sense, even when a reintegrated outcome was reached, it can be undone, reverting from reintegration to an assimilated society because minority returnees might leave in search of better opportunities. Once they are granted, participation spaces remain legally available for just a few members of the minority population that remain in the municipality.

Reversion to a homogenous society from reintegrated is unlikely because once there is an intervention to open spaces for minority participation they remain more stable than demographics, and despite any changes on it. If third parties do not plan for facilitating economic opportunities in territories lacking natural resources and they exit leaving the population in a vacuum of external resources, then the assimilated outcome is most likely.

The third issue to be aware of is *the demand of local ownership vis a vis third party intervention.* Many will find outrageous the argument that a process of local ethnic reintegration has to be led and facilitated by the engagement of third parties,

that by definition are not only external to the locality but also –most of the time- to the country in question. However, several authors point at the benefits and tensions of including local ownership in peacebuilding processes led by the intervention of third parties[209].

Looking at the Kosovo process, Narten argues that local ownership is needed to prevent challenges to the peacebuilding process by the local element. Chesterman and Reich are more skeptical of the benefits of local inclusion in the process. If the process could be led by local elements, third party intervention would not be necessary in the first place, Chesterman argues. In addition, Reich believes that promoting local ownership might reproduce patron-client dynamics existing in post-conflict societies. Yet no particular argument has been discussed for the process of ethnic reintegration. Because my argument seems to be at odds with a locally owned ethnic reintegration process, I think it is necessary to show some caveats here that could contribute to further research on this subject.

First, I am not arguing that local elites should be outsiders to this process, or that this process should not be locally driven. I am arguing that at war's end the conditions are set in a way that encourages local elites to consolidate the power conquered through war. In these circumstances third parties should be able to place certain constraints on these dynamics. In this sense I am sympathetic to Chesterman and Reich's arguments.

Second, it is the protection of a local process unobstructed by self-interested political elites what concerns me here, not the exclusion of local elements from it. Given that the international element is already engaged in those societies, the failure to target the factors that maintain societies divided is what causes more harm than

[209] Chesterman: 2005; Reich: 2006; Narten: 2008; Donais: 2009.

good, for it allows political war dynamics to survive in post-war settings. Ordinary people are therefore trapped and conditioned by this reality. Little agency is left to them in the process of ethnic reintegration if the international community does not facilitate alternative dynamics first.

In this context I argue that local ownership of the reintegration process is something that can take place only after the peacebuilders challenge the negative dynamics brought about by the post-conflict majorization dynamics existing between majority and minority elites. Moreover, when the international community in BH switched the policy perspective towards "ownership" inclusion, several processes started to fail, like the negotiations over the constitutional changes and the police reform.[210]

Third, taking ethnic reintegration seriously requires not turning a blind eye to the political voices that ethno-territorial wars left imprinted in post-war societies. Similarly, it does require avoiding Manichean views that oppose interventionism vs non-interventionism, implying the former is more positive than the latter. Such debate has left nothing but inaction in post-war societies. Peace-building processes do not call for non-interventionism: they call for "Responsible Engagement". Such engagement requires awareness of the local dynamics and the need for the international community to avoid reproducing those dynamics.

Fourth, this work does not deny the existence of local alternative political voices; in fact it tries to capture them under the concept of tide riders, although not fully developed in this work and acknowledging that certainly they might not be the

[210] Moore: 2010, p. 55.

only alternative voice. Studies on bottom-up resistance to the peace-building process might be a starting point for further research on this topic.[211]

II.4 Research Design

In this work I am interested in both the outcome and the process of post-war outcomes. I inquire how those outcomes are formed and maintained over time in order to explain the conditions of their variation. To test whether my theory accounts for such variation, I ran an in-depth case study of post-war municipalities that faced ethnic cleansing, controlling for important intervening variables (size, demographics, pre-war heterogeneity, institutional design and pre-war economic development).

The municipalities I selected –Bugojno and Jajce- were similar in all these characteristics but one: the post-war outcome existing in those municipalities in 2010. As I wanted to track the process that had led to such outcomes, I took 2010 as the pivotal year for my case selection.

Bugojno and Jajce were both pre-war heterogeneous urban towns; Bugojno had one of largest military industries of Bosnia and Jajce was a very active touristic spot with around 250,000 visits a year.[212] 46,889 inhabitants lived in Bugojno, 42% of which were Bošnjaks, 34% Croats, and 18.5% Serbs, the rest being "others" and self-described "Yugoslavs"[213]. Jajce had 44,108 before the war, Croats represented a 35% of total population, Bošnjaks a 39%, Serbs counted for 17%, and the rest were

[211] Mc Ginty: 2008, 2012. Richmond: 2010.
[212] Sarajevo Times: 2015, October 8. *Tourist Season in Jajce: City visited by more than 100.000 Tourists.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from: http://www.sarajevotimes.com/tourist-season-in-jajce-city-visited-by-more-than-100-000-tourists/.
[213] Census 1991. Data Source: Federal Institute for Statistics, cited in Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BH: 2005, December. *Comparative Analysis on Access to Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons.* Retrieved March 2010 from: http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/pdf/uporednaanalizaengleski.pdf. p.35.

"others" and those identified as "Yugoslav".[214] Both municipalities experienced ethnic cleansing, particularly during the period of the Bošnjak-Croat war between June 19th 1992, and February 23rd 1994, when a ceasefire was signed.[215] And the war left roughly similar amount of casualties in both towns (See Table II.2).[216]

Figure II.3 Map of Bugojno and Jajce in Central Canton



To select cases among the 143 municipalities of BH that could meet all the variables I needed to control for, my first step was to observe the UNHCR data for all pre-war heterogeneous municipalities regarding minority return levels as of 2010.

[214] I*bid*

[215] Fowkes: 2002.

[216] The data was obtained directly from Stefano Costalli and Francesco Moro. Such database is featured in the following articles: Costalli & Moro: 2011. The patterns of ethnic settlement and violence: a local-level quantitative analysis of the Bosnian War. *Ethnic and Racial Studies , 34* (12), 2096-2114; and Costalli & Moro: 2012. Ethnicity and strategy in the Bosnian civil war : Explanations for the severity of violence in Bosnian municipalities:. *Journal of Peace Research , 49* (6), 801-815.

This step is explained by the design of my dependent variable that establishes minority return to be the first necessary step to observe ethnic reintegration. From the pool of these cases I originally selected four municipalities with various levels of minority return; unfortunately, I needed to wait until preliminary fieldwork to grasp an idea of minority participation levels in those municipalities.

My preliminary fieldwork with this objective took place between April and July of 2011. The cases originally considered were Bugojno, Travnik and Jajce. These were part of one of the two heterogeneous cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and had similar values for the controlled set of variables.

Table II.3: Case Comparison

Municipality	Demographics 1991											Returnees						Violence (nr.deaths) (Costalli-Moro)
	Bosniac	%	Croats	%	Serbs	%	Others	%	Yugo	%	Total pop	Bos	%	Croat	%	Serb	%	
Bugojno	19.697	42,01	16.031	34,19	8.673	18,5	927	1,98	1.561	3,33	46.889			9.632	60,08	3.292	37,96	-798
Jajce	17.615	39,94	15.811	35,85	7.582	17,19	638	1,45	2.462	5,58	44.108	8.734	49,58			745	9,83	-699

I use process tracing to reveal the detailed micro-correlations that lead to different post-war outcomes, and at the same time I can increase the number of empirical observations to capture nuances of the mechanism that links conditions with outcomes. Thus, I am not only able to compare the general macro differences or similarities between one case and another, but also the micro-accounts that enrich such comparison. Moreover, process tracing helps me explain the variation within each case across time, which in turns informs the more macro comparison of my cases. For instance, it was due to this methodological combination that I could unveil

the relevance of local elites and ethnic kin actions in maintaining non-reintegrated communities.

Bennett and Checkel[217] argue that combining process tracing with case comparison whenever feasible is among the best practices of process tracing. The authors reason that "[i]n a most-similar case comparison, (…) process tracing can help establish that the one independent variable that differs is related through a convincing hypothesized causal process to the difference in the cases' outcome".

To conduct a longitudinal analysis, I divided the study of my cases into outcome periods. My time segments represent different outcomes. For example, in Jajce I will have two case periods (1995-2004 and 2005-2012), whereas in Bugojno I will have three (1995-1998, 1999-2003 and 2004 to 2012). Each segment represents a variation in the post-war outcome.

I examine these outcome periods to establish whether there is a variation in the role of elites, ethnic kin support and third party intervention as predicted by theory. For instance, if in the periods when Jajce and Bugojno were divided (1995-2004 and 1995-1998, respectively) local elites engaged in mechanisms that shape the majorization pattern predicted, this fact would support my theory. Similarly, if the changes in minority return and participation take place after third parties intervened in challenging the mechanisms through which local elites keep societies apart, then this supports the expectations of the theory of post-war reintegration as well.

Because I combine this longitudinal analysis with a controlled comparison of Jajce and Bugojno, cofounding variables are to a greater extent controlled.

In Chapter 5 I run a controlled comparison of Serb enclaves in Southern and Northern Kosovo, to test the generalizability of my theory beyond Bosnia and

[217] Bennett and Checkel: 2014, p. 29.

Herzegovina. Kosovo provides comparative opportunities across cases and over time while controlling for national level variables. Both groups shared the same war experience during Kosovo war in 1999, bear a similar identity and in both regions Kosovo Serbs remained in an enclaved outcome in the immediate post-war, yet after later on they faced different path toward reintegration.

II.4.1 Data Collection

I conducted a total of 83 original semi-structured interviews for the two cases in BH. I selected my interviewees based on their position within municipalities or the Canton government structures (sometimes the same leader occupied both positions at different periods of time). I interviewed political elites of all periods of the last 20 years, school directors, teachers and students, NGO leaders and activists, the Chief of Police, Canton Ministers, and returnees.

As for the international community I interviewed locals who had worked with them, the Red Cross Director in Jajce, OSCE Representatives of two different periods, and the OSCE regional Director. 39 interviews were conducted in Jajce during the periods of May- August 2012, and October-November 2013; and 44 in Bugojno during the periods April-July 2011, May-August 2012, and November 2013. I replicated interviews with three relevant figures to confirm and cross-check information provided in previous interviews. One interview was conducted in Travnik with an OSCE representative, and three were held in Washington with OSCE Representatives: two of them were ambassadors and another was a field officer who used to work in BH.

To select interviewees I relied on key informants within municipalities and then I contacted them myself or through one of my assistants when there was a

language barrier. My language skills were not good enough for conducting interviews but became sufficient to understand the emphasis and nuances of the word choices. Doing this helped me to check my assistant's word choice while translating on a few occasions when I sensed that the emphasis was different. Besides these drawbacks of my limited language skills I found this to be an extremely positive contributor to my fieldwork. This limitation helped me to gain trust among population as it was perceived that neither the Serbs, nor the Croats or the Bošnjaks influenced me; or, as they said, "brain washed" me into any particular viewpoint.[218] My origin, afar from any emotional involvement or stake in the BH conflict (and equally in Kosovo), made interviewees feel more comfortable to be open to me.

I spoke with 17 key informants of Bošnjak, Serb and Croat origin in both municipalities and in Sarajevo. They were unwilling to be part of an interview but agreed to provide information on how to access different actors, to provide their opinion about them, or advice on how to approach them. I complemented this data with various other sources, such as evidence provided by UNHCR Bosnia, Municipal Administrations of Bugojno and Jajce, and evidence sometimes provided by my interviewees from their own personal memories; I also gathered information from the media and secondary sources.

Aware of ethnic sensitivity, I tried my best to use language assistants who belong to a different municipality. Several times I traveled to Bugojno with assistants from Jajce, and in Jajce I resorted to an assistant from Sarajevo. Although this was not always possible, I did try to ensure that the language assistant would be someone

[218] On a couple of occasions I even helped researchers from the region to gain access to interviewees, and interviewees would call me asking whether they could trust them.

interviewees would feel comfortable with, either for reasons of ethnicity or personal acquaintances. Generally, I had a Bošnjak, a Croat and a Serb language assistant.

I requested extreme confidentiality from my language assistants: I explained them that they could not share any part of the interview with anyone, including their family members. They all signed a confidentiality agreement with me, committing not to disclose any information received or handed in to me during the interview or related to it (such as the process through which we found phone numbers to contact specific leaders, what often involved people sharing contact info with me and asking not to disclosing the fact that they had "offered" it).

Logistics of public transportation between municipalities are an entertaining haphazard in the central canton region, even more so if the researcher has to go to Sarajevo for specific research tasks. On several occasions friends drove me back and forth between Bugojno and Jajce because bus delays turned their timetable unreliable, or would be limited to specific hours. Due to work reasons, most of the interviewees requested a timing that would not fit the early returning of the bus from Bugojno to Jajce, for example.

For my analysis of Kosovo I relied on fourteen interviews semi-structured I conducted for a previous project[219] during 2007-2009 with parliamentarians and politicians of Albanian and Serbian origins and on my fieldwork experience during those years. I also conducted eight new interviews for the current project with the Minister of Return, a parliamentarian of Serb origin in the Kosovo government structures; with the Permanent Secretary of Municipalities; with an EULEX authority; with the OIM Director, with Kosovo Deputy Prime Minister/Chief Negotiator; with the Representative of the Kosovo government in North Mitrovica, and with the

[219] Such project was my MA Thesis at Sabanci University, completed in 2009. The project also involved a cross-national survey of 350 cases that is not used in this work.

Advisor of Foreign Affairs of the Serbian PM, Zoran Djindjic. I complemented this data with several other sources, such as evidence available on the EU website, newspapers, and secondary sources. Furthermore, because I have been involved as external advisor to the negotiation process in Kosovo on different occasions from March 2011 to September 2014, I could have a closer look into the dynamics of the reintegration process of Kosovo Serbs within the Kosovo Government institutions.

II.4.2 Dependent Variable: Post-war Outcomes

My dependent variable "Post-war Outcomes" assumes four possible values: reintegrated, homogenous, enclaved and assimilated. I categorize post-war outcomes by looking at the conditions for minorities in two aspects, *minority return* and *minority participation*. The combination of these indicators establishes the values of my variable "post-war outcome".

I measure *Minority Return* by looking at the population values of a given minority over time. Such data could be acquired from population statistics, sometimes from UNHCR statistics on return, sometimes crossing both. In such cases, I add up conflicting values and establish an average estimate.

In this research I combine data from the UNHCR and the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees in BH. I relied on individual accounts of the Catholic Church of Bugojno and the Serbian Perish of Bugojno, and data obtained in interviews to confirm that the returning trend indicated by statistics is confirmed by those accounts, and I used conflicting statistics to inquire further over their causes.

For *Minority participation*, I relied on qualitative and quantitative data (whenever possible) to assess whether there is a) no minority participation, b) participation with segregation, or c) full participation in each case period. There is a

qualitative difference between those indicators. *No participation* refers equally to the absence of spaces to participate and to the unwillingness of the minority to participate in available spaces. Because it is the use of the services that matters for my variable, both the lack of spaces for participation and the refusal to participate equally affect the minority participation variable. I consider overt rejection of minorities to the spaces offered by majority as an indicator of *no participation*. Examples are not voting or not using services like public schools or hospitals.

Participation with segregation refers to those cases in which minorities are provided with services by the majority, but separated from their population, like "two schools under one roof", or "separated public schools for minorities".

In the case of *full participation* minorities might have specific needs covered within an integrated system in which both majority and minority population participates. An example of that is the high school system in Jajce in which students of different ethnicities attend specific history and religious classes, while sharing the rest of the courses together with students of a majority origin.

I assess qualitatively whether minorities participated, not participated, or participated with segregation in the following areas: 1) Integrated Social Services: health care, education, housing and property restitution. I also assess whether minority is included in the management of those services. 2) Political participation: I assess whether the minority has political opportunities for participation, and whether they participate with votes or in government and parliament structures. Notice that in my indicator I consider equally the assessment of availability of spaces for participation to the minority partaking. For example, I do not distinguish between no participation due to obstruction and no participation due to rejection from the minority. In my dependent variable I am interested in the final result, participation vs non

participation. The reasons of the level of participation are measured in my independent variable. 3) Security: I look at the perceived safety of minority groups and their integration in security structures. 4) Economic reintegration: I collected data about minority discrimination for job positions.

II.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I offered a new dependent variable, "Post-war Outcomes", and I developed a theory that accounts for its variation. I explained that societies remain divided due to the role that local elites assume with the support of their ethnic kin. Reintegration success puts third party role at the center of the process. Timely third party intervention, challenging the exclusivity that local elites have over resources, the legitimacy they count on to keep the majorization pattern ongoing, and the support base they rely upon facilitates reintegrated outcomes in societies divided by war.

Clearly, the drivers of societal division are not primarily fears and hatreds of population, but rather in the political goals of relevant elites within the territory. Ethnicity is not a reason for societal division but rather a political tool that serves elites' purposes oriented to that end. Reintegration is therefore more possible than what the literature has assumed it to be. Although it demands strong intervention from peace-builders and their engagement in tackling political dynamics at its core, such intervention is justified in a responsible and effective use of resources within post-war societies. Otherwise, a non-responsible engagement in post-war settings reproduces further societal divisions, doing more harm than good.

The process described by this theory has contributed to a variety of post-war outcomes within a single country. My argument help us understand the causes of the

movement from a homogenous society to an assimilated one –non-timely intervention- showing how even third parties contribute to keeping societies apart by their negligence. This theory also explains that the process through which we reach a reintegrated society differs from the one that sustain such a process.

In Chapters 3 and 4 I test my theory on the cases of Bugojno and Jajce. Both cases provide an excellent context to test my theory for several reasons: both have endured ethnic cleansing during war, both were pre-war heterogeneous societies with similar demographics and similar levels of development, and both are municipalities of the Central Canton in Bosnia; however, they vary in my dependent variable. I test my theory vis a vis consolidated partitionist explanations of post-war societal divide, using process tracing. In chapter 5 I test the applicability of my findings to an alternative context, Kosovo, thereby testing the generalizability of my theory.

CHAPTER III: BUGOJNO, UNSUSTAINABLE REINTEGRATION

Bugojno is one of those places in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) where the consequences of war were still painfully visible when I conducted my fieldwork, and even more so at a societal level. During my first hours there I was immediately informed by one of my language assistants, Mahira, that Bugojno has Croats' and Bošnjaks' cafés: "people do not mix", she said. It took me one more day until Niki, a Serbian male I interviewed, helped me discover the so called "federal places". At that time, few recreational places fit this category, only some cafes and a pizzeria near Theater Fedra, which was also fairly "federal". I have attended to several performances with the participation of people from all cultural –and ethnic- backgrounds.

Without doubt, societal relations are still stagnated; reconciliation takes time. This stagnation was the motive behind many inquiring about the reasons of my selection of Bugojno to study the ethnic reintegration process[220]. Although I logically wondered if such a low level of societal interactions in their spare time was a reflection of low levels of ethnic reintegration or just a reflection of deep wounds that take time to heal, I do understand that they are both different and independent processes.

Further research can explore how ethnic reintegration and reconciliation relate to each other. I focused solely on how majority and minority groups relate in social, political and economic life, leaving aside the emotional and psychological levels of those interactions.

[220] I am thankful for the advises from Elissa Helms and Paula Pickering, as well as for the questions of the participants of the ASN 2013 Conference, related to this aspect.

While studying post-war Bugojno, I found that it indeed became a reintegrated scenario by 1999, yet the scenario did not last beyond 2003. This chapter shows that reintegration is possible after a homogenous scenario, and at the same time explains why reintegration may not always be sustainable over time. It further shows that local elites' actions along these years are in line with those expected by the theory of post-war reintegration.

Figure III.1: Post-conflict outcomes in Bugojno 1995-2012



I conducted a longitudinal study of this case to establish the factors that explain variation in the outcome of post-war scenarios. In order to establish that, I inquire the following: 1) whether local elites maintained Bugojno divided after the war through a majorization pattern; 2) if yes, whether if its ethnic kin supported this pattern; 3) whether third parties intervened to tackle such pattern and ethnic kin support, and how; 4) whether local elites' preferences after the war changed due to a timely engagement of third parties in local post-war dynamics and if this factor drove decisions of local elites to increase minority return and minority participation.

I started by dividing the post-war period in three time segments, each reflecting three different post-war scenarios (Figure III.1). Then, I observed what the preferences and actions of local elites were and whether those actions were supported and sustained over time by their respective ethnic kin. I continued by looking at how and when the international community got engaged in disrupting the post-conflict pattern established by the elites acting in Bugojno. In the next step I analyzed why while timely third party intervention is a necessary condition for a reintegrated scenario to take place, this was not the case with its sustainability.

I relied on elite interviews, media reports, documents and secondary sources to evaluate the changes taking place in each period. I tested whether the international community in BH (Higher Representative, OSCE, UNHCR) was engaged in a timely manner in the homogenous scenario, disrupting the post-conflict pattern between the elites of majority and minority groups and their support base by the ethnic kin from the Central Canton, BH government structures, national parties, and kin-states like Croatia.

Changes across periods cannot be explained by existing theories: if a security dilemma was the reason for local elites' maintenance of a homogenous scenario between 1995 and 1998, how could we explain the reintegrated scenario that took place in the following four years? Likewise, those changes cannot be explained from an institutional perspective when the institutional designs of BH at large, and the Central Canton and Bugojno in particular, have remained the same. The findings presented in this chapter help answer those puzzles while at the same time show the explanatory power of my theory of post-war reintegration.

III.1 The war's heritage and its survival: the homogenous scenario 1995-1998

In July 1993, at the peak of the Bošnjak-Croat conflict, both sides committed a number of crimes that remain unresolved to this day. After the war, the municipality of Bugojno was a territory controlled by the main Bošnjak Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Bosne i Hercegovine, ABiH). As any other area controlled by the ABiH, at war's aftermath, the leading Bošnjak political party, the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA) governed the town.

Before the war, 46,889 inhabitants lived in the municipality, 42% of whom were Bošnjaks, 35% Croats, and 18.5% Serbs, the rest being "others" and self-described "Yugoslavs"[221]. By 1997, the total population number seemed stable (40,000), yet, with a significant difference: the war succeeded in displacing the Croat and Serb population, reducing them to 5% (2,000) and 1% (400) of the total population, respectively. Since then, Bošnjaks lead the majority of the demographic distribution with 94% (38,000)[222]. The once heterogeneous town emerged as a clear homogenous scenario that, as we shall see, was maintained through the local elites' majorization pattern while the first three years of post-Dayton went by.

The war left behind the tragedy of the disappearance of 26 Croats (members of HVO[223]) in 1993. IPWR reports[224] that in 2002 Enis Sijamija, a former commander of the militia police unit of the Bosnian Army's 307th Motorized Brigade, accused Mr. Mlaco (a Bošnjak wartime president of the municipality and 1995-1999 Mayor), of

[221] Census 1991. Data Source: Federal Institute for Statistics, cited in Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BH (2005, December). *Comparative Analysis on Access to Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons.* Retrieved March 2010 from http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/pdf/uporednaanalizaengleski.pdf. p. 35.

[222] Data obtained by ICG from SFOR, Gornji Vakuf as reported in International Crisis Group (ICG). (1998, July 31). *The Western Gate of Central Bosnia: the Politics of Return in Bugojno and Prozor-Rama.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6d14.htm.

[223] HVO stands for Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane, in English the Croatian Defense Council, it was the military force of the Croats of BH until Dayton and the official military formation of what was known as Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia that existed between 1991 and1994.

[224] IPWR: 2002. Regional Report: Bugojno Revelations. *Tensions in central Bosnian town of Bugojno are running high after ex-Bosniak commander exposes crimes against local Croats.*

perpetrating war crimes. He blamed Mlaco for their arrest in July 1993 and subsequent imprisonment in collective centers by the time the HVO was surrendering, also accusing Enes Handzic, then Head of civilian police, for being directly involved in crimes against those prisoners. The 26 HVO members were taken away from the Iskra Football Stadium on October 12th 1993 and since then it is assumed they were executed[225]. According to Sijamija, after interrogating the HVO prisoners Hadzic drove them away to the Rostov camp, which was used by a paramilitary Mujahedin unit called the White Pigeons[226]. Several Croats I interviewed referred to this case while explaining why the Croat minority return was so low.

Simply put, Mlaco, a post-war Mayor of Bošnjak origin, was accused of the ethnically motivated disappearance of these Croats. The Croats of Bugojno formalized this claim at the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), that is, up to this writing, investigating Mr. Mlaco as a war criminal. As the case is still pending and the Croat minority has not returned in big numbers since 1999, there has to be much more than this to explain why both minority return and participation before 1999 were so low.

At Dayton, on November 2nd 1995, President Alija Izetbegovic and then Federation President Kresimir Zubak signed an agreement providing for the voluntary return of 600 families to "Pilot Project" towns in the Federation, 200 of which would return to Bugojno by December 8th, 1995.[227] By March 1996, the process was still unsuccessful despite negotiations facilitated by the UNHCR, the OHR, representatives

[225] The general understanding is that 21 of those 26 are considered missing. See: OHR: 1999, December 2. *Decision suspending Dzevad Mlaco from his position as Mayor of Bugojno and from any other elected offices in Bugojno.* Retrieved November 20, 2015 from http://www.ohr.int/?p=67489&lang=en.

[226] IWPR: 2002, *op. cit.*

[227] ICG: 1997, May 1. *Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Pesons in Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Retrieved on January 12 2016 from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Bosnia%208.pdf, p. 23.

of the US, and the Federation Mediator[228]; and by March 1997 it had stagnated, returning by then only 128 families out of the 200 agreed.[229] By 1998, the UNHCR reports the return of approximately 950-1000 Croats and 28 Serbs (within 7 families)[230]. The return process would stagnate under these conditions until 1999.

The stagnation in minority return levels conforms to a group of interconnected factors that take place within a post-conflict pattern of majorization to which both majority and minority elites contributed; despite the fact that majority elites bear a higher moral responsibility than minority elites given their control over government structures and available resources.

As expected by the theory of post-war reintegration, majority elites resorted to a wide range of tactics to pursue a strategy of obstructing return to prevent non-group members from competing for available resources -allocating those resources exclusively within their patronage networks- and to increase return but only of their group members, thus manipulating the distribution of refugees and IDPs along ethnic lines in a post-war style of ethnic engineering.

These tactics were widespread and covering all possible areas of life. For instance, by April 18th, 1996, Bugojno was part of the municipalities blacklisted by the OHR. In a letter sent to the Croat member of the BH Presidency Kresimir Zubak, Ambassador Steiner informed that the town was only entitled to humanitarian support and would no longer receive any *"financial resources from shared taxes and*

[228] *Ibid.*
[229] *Ibid.*
[230] "UNHCR Statistics Package, 1 June 1998. Some 800 were members of 243 families that returned by April 1997 as a result of the Dayton Pilot Project. Croat representatives in Bugojno estimate that another 150-200 Croats returned outside of the Pilot Project, most of them in 1998. Bugojno Department for Return and Reconstruction, June 1998." cited in International Crisis Group (ICG). (1998, July 31). *Op.cit.*

transfers", including reconstruction aid[231] because it failed to convene interim municipal assemblies (IMAs) as required and agreed in the Sarajevo Agreement on the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of March 30th, 1996.[232]

Political obstruction extended also to electoral periods, in which overt violence was also a card played on many occasions. The first municipal elections in Bosnia were planned for September 16th 1996. However, on September 13th a grenade exploded outside the house of a Croat member of the Local Electoral Commission; in protest, Bosnian Croats withdrew members of polling committees from the polling stations for the next day for one hour, temporarily interrupting voting.[233] Although it cannot be said this act was the responsibility of local elites, it was indeed an act of a mobilized co-ethnic with a clear intentionality to threaten the Croats. However, the identity of those responsible is still unknown.

Political obstruction was so intense in this period that the mentioned embargo finished only in March 1998, almost 2 years later. And then it was only lifted once the OSCE certified that Bugojno had effectively implemented the elections results of 1997, when the SDA and coalition members won the elections and 20 seats in the municipal council and the HDZ got 10 seats[234]. Thus, political representation of minorities did not start to work properly until third parties implemented leverage over obstructionist elites in a timely manner.

The international community did not always intervene when it could, nor even as it should have, mostly failing to engage responsibly in the process. This was so due to their lack of capacities to operate at a municipal level, which was perceived as a

[231] Letter from Ambassador Steiner to then President Kresimir Zubak, Vice President Ejup Ganic, Prime Minister Kapetanovic and Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, April 18th, 1996. Cited in ICG. (1997, May 1). *Op. cit.*
[232] UN: Security Council, Document S/1996/224 cited in ICG (1997, May 1). *Op. cit.*, p. 26.
[233] ICG: 1996, September 22. *Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/Bosnia%202.pdf. P. 43.
[234] ICG: 1998, *op. cit.*

lack of coordination among the international community or as a lack of leverage. In this context, ethnic leaders were outlasting international elites on their management of return, on their control over spaces of political participation, on a successful implementation of segregated education, and for a while, on the security front as well.

The OSCE used to have considerable leverage due to the fact that it was the body in charge of certifying the elections and entrusted to penalize violations of the election rules[235]. As such, it could have used its power to gain concessions from the parties to improve the conditions in which elections were to be held[236]; yet, it failed to do so, not only in Bugojno but in Bosnia at large.

The Contact Group[237] was eager to hold elections, and due to its pressure and the several statements of internationals that undermined the role of the OSCE, this institution was no longer taken seriously. Thus, the OSCE lost its capacities to change conditions in the field.[238] Since then, the OSCE and the OHR have lost power against the role taken by the Contact Group, forcing them to seek cooperation with local elites instead of using their leverage to press the parties to engage with the implementation of DPA.

Given that local authorities, and not the OSCE, were now in charge of organizing the election, ruling parties won advantages in the sabotaging process as they could tell the local electoral commission to resign if they were dissatisfied.[239] By the end of 1996, Bošnjak majority elites in Bugojno enjoyed full capacities to control

[235] DPA Annex III, see: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bureaus/eur/dayton/06Annex3.html.
[236] ICG: 1996, *op. cit*., p. 15.
[237] The Contact Group is formed by United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Italy, Germany and France.
[238] ICG: 1996, *op. cit*., p. 15-17.
[239] *Ibid:* p. 16.

political conditions, even despite the fact that the embargo had reduced the available spoils of peace. The conditions for political participation soon deteriorated.[240]

Nevertheless, the international community in BH continued to seek venues for advancing policies that would overcome societal divisions. By mid-August Ambassador Frowick warned municipalities that were thwarting the political process (Bugojno, Capljina, Drvar, Sanski Most and Stolac in the Federation, and Doboj, Lopare, Prijedor, Teslic and Zvornik in Republika Srpska)[241]. In all those municipalities there was a homogenous scenario similar to the one existing in Bugojno at war's end. Not all of them were run by Bošnjak elites: some of those municipalities were governed by Croat elites and others by the Serbian SDS. All of this seems to indicate that majority elites in homogenous scenarios tend to be guided by similar political preferences of majorization.

In a smart move to recover leverage in the eyes of majority elites, Frowick announced that the OSCE would "reserve for itself the right to invalidate electoral results, including the election of individual candidates, in those towns or municipalities where there was a systematic interference with democratic freedoms, including freedom of movement, and gross manipulation of election procedures [until] 14 September, or in the immediate aftermath of the elections."[242]

Obstructionism also reached the level of diverting international help for reconstruction (spoils of peace) within patronage networks, while implementing all sorts of overt and hidden measures to exclude minority groups from accessing such resources. It was common to hear among the Croat population I interviewed that the

[240] *Ibid:* p. 17.
[241] *Ibid.*
[242] Statement of the OSCE Head of Mission, Ambassador Robert H. Frowick, August 19th, 1996 cited in ICG 1996, *op. cit.* p.17

Bošnjak authorities before 1999 had done little to nothing to protect Bosnian Croats from violence, intimidation, discrimination and other kinds of abuses.[243]

Interviewees referred particularly to several situations regarding the difficulties to regain possession of their pre-war home[244], the bombing of the Catholic Church by the end of July 1996[245], and the burning in the Serbian village of Cipulic.[246] These were very effective tools to simultaneously obstruct the return of Croats and Serbs to Bošnjak dominated Bugojno, and to deny access to resources to those who did manage to return.

The obstructionism was not always so violent: a less direct form of obstructionism took shape in delayed or ignored administrative procedures, like not resolving issues of property restitution, or not providing materials to repair the ruined houses[247], all of which would meet the most unbelievable excuses from local government officials[248].

By March 1997, the UNCHR was ready to make its first move towards a reintegration process. Internationals' effort in this regard came through a bombastically announced project that collected more deception than success, despite otherwise exposed. This project was called "Open Cities Initiative"[249], and it was an effort destined to surmount the stymied process of return and invigorate the role of municipalities as facilitators of the necessary opportunities for minority participation.

[243] Author's interviews with Croat Professor , Returnee. May 2011
[244] Author's interview with Pero Pejak, Bugojno Official for Return and Reconstruction, Bugojno: May 2011. See also *Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: periodic report*, Elizabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/56 of 29 January 1997, at par. 29.
[245] Author's interview with a Croat Professor *op.cit.* and with Catholic Priest Marko: May 2011.
[246] Author's interview with Priest Slavisa: June 2011, May 2012.
[247] Author's interview with Architect Zvenko Antunovic, Croat leader: May 29th, 2011, Bugojno
[248] Author's interview with Ana Sapina, *op.cit*
[249] OHR: 1997, July. *RRTF Report Annex 7.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from http://www.ohr.int/?ohr_archive=ohr-rrtf-report-july-1997-annex-7&lang=en&print=pdf.

Interesting enough, the project relied on the voluntary enrollment of municipalities. Bugojno was one of them.

In my interview with Mr. Mlaco, he showed me his signature on this project to clarify his commitment to return while he opened a folder and provided me with copies of such documentation.[250] Nevertheless, this initiative rendered limited success, as the international community failed again in establishing a mechanism within this project that would disrupt any other attempt to implement mechanisms of majorization in Bugojno and the other municipalities engaged in the process. Accepting the task of returning a few hundred people rather helped the majority elites to justify their commitment to return within the confinement of the project, and at the same time excused their wrongdoings with answers like the one provided by Mr. Mlaco: "*I did what they asked me to do, see the number[of refugee quotas] here*".[251]

During my interviews with Mr. Mlaco I understood that he was trying to communicate me: 1) that his policies towards Bugojno were no different than those implemented by fellow majority Croat mayors somewhere else in BH, under which Bošnjak were in a minority position; 2) in line with that, he also expressed his fears towards an international community that seemed to have strongly –and I felt he implied unfairly- advanced against him; 3) as a consequence of this, he also tried to express that he was ready to commit to the requested actions, as the quote above shows.

In terms of health services, the hospital seemed open to anyone regardless of their ethnic belonging; however, the reality in terms of personnel was quite different, as hospital employees belonged –and still do- mostly to the Bošnjak majority. Although it is understandable that during this period of no significant minority return

[250] Author's interview with Mr. Dzevad Mlaco, Former Mayor of Bugojno 1995-1999: June 2011.
[251] Author's Interview with Dzevad Mlaco, Bugojno November 2012.

the majority group occupied all the available working spaces, nothing explains why the situation did not change much when the return process started to be planned and organized.

In terms of education, minority groups in Bugojno were not allowed to open any school under the Croat program. To be exact, this was partially the responsibility of the Bošnjak majority elites that refused to provide venues for such purpose[252], and partially of the Croat minority elites that decided to follow the Croatian educational program.[253] However, things changed by the end of 1998, when Fra Mirko (then Bugojno's Catholic priest) saw an opportunity in one available school and started to organize a sort of education program for Croat kids in the premises of the Church and other destroyed and vacant buildings, with the economic support of international donors.[254]

When I asked members of the Croat leadership why they were not more active in helping refugees and IDPs to return home, their general argument was that the political conditions of majorization established by the Bošnjak leadership did not give them a chance to provide for the security for those who wished to return[255]. One of them, Mr. Antunovic, emphasized that Bošnjak leaders obstructed the return process in order to consolidate an ethnically cleansed municipality.[256]

Yet these four leaders were extremely active in the political life of Bugojno, and even Mr. Antunovic was in charge of the negotiations about the return process at

[252] Author's interview with Fra Mirko: November 2012.
[253] Author's interview with Greta Kuna, the Central Canton Education Minister 1996-2010. As a Minister she defended the idea of two schools under one roof in the Central Canton
[254] Author's interview with Fra Mirko: November 2012, Bugojno.
[255] Author's interview with Antunovic: 2011; with Croat leader A: November 2012; with Croat leader B: November 2012; with Priest Mirko: 2011.
[256] Author's interview with Architect Zvenko Antunovic, Croat leader: May 29th, 2011, Bugojno. In several interviews conducted in Bugojno I have found similar references to the obstructionism of Bošnjak leaders, and to the "hidden plans" of Croats leaders to make Bugojno as a part of Hercegbosna.

the Canton level, with strong support from the HDZ leadership[257]. They were certainly aware that the Croat leadership in nearby towns of Prozor-Rama, Jajce and Mostar (the Hercegbosna stronghold) was implementing exactly the same levels of obstructionism as the Bosnian leadership did in Bugojno. Ethnic kin was key to reinforcing this majorization pattern, while misinformation and pressures to prevent returning were common currencies within Croatia, which hosted several thousand refugees[258].

An essential tool to continue ethnic cleansing-like practices in post-war Bugojno was the manipulation of refugees and IDPs into false propaganda and fears, in such a way that this manipulation could reinforce the portrayal of the town as a hostile place for minorities. Unfortunately, Bugojno Croats and their ethnic kin in Croatia or within BH were not alone in using those practices. They were widespread and used by all the elites of BH, as reported in all other municipalities in which pre-war demographics were rather heterogeneous, and extended to all ethnic groups: Serbs in Pale and Drvar; or Bošnjaks in Prijedor and Prozor-Rama, to mention some.[259]

In all cases, the media –mostly owned by the respective political parties- was an effective channel through which local elites could transfer the sort of false facts that could influence people's decision to return home. Thus, media portrayals of security conditions were not to be trusted. For example, after an investigation of IPTF monitors, it was discovered that the beating of a Croat by the Bugojno police on July

[257] Antunovic was also Canton Minister at that time.
[258] ICG: 1998, *op. cit.*
[259] ICG: 1998, *op. cit.*

30th 1997, reported by the Split-based Slobodna Dalmacija, was in fact the story of an intoxicated Croat resident that was briefly detained.[260]

The Croat ethnic kin support to manipulation of refugees was such that even the OHR had to warn about their disruptive contribution to the post-conflict majorization pattern. According to an ICG report[261], in early 1998 the OHR referred to the HDZ as the major obstacle to the DPA implementation, proclaiming that the pressure from the HDZ and the HVO on Croats to prevent relocation is *"*very counterproductive, and aims to destroy the presence of Croat-Catholics in Central Bosnia*"*.[262]

In my three interviews with Mr. Mlaco he was very eager that I should get this fact right, placing emphasis on how badly the international community has understood this point. "[W]e were in war, we signed Dayton, but their [Croats] plans of Herceg Bosna were still alive"[263], said Mr. Mlaco. Meanwhile, he offered me to check a book –which he presented as proof- with detailed information and scanned documentation regarding crimes committed by HVO forces and Croats against Bošnjaks.

When I asked how it was possible for the SDA party[264] to have access to such information, he pointed out that such is the standard practice in a war: "the one who comes takes possession of whatever he finds"; and such is the situation everywhere for "us" or "them". He added, "To je to" (That's it!) to emphasize that it was not just a practice at the hands of Bošnjaks in BH. He used arguments of this sort each time I addressed the obstructionism he was accused of implementing with his subsequent removal from all possible political positions in BH.

[260] ICG: 1998, *op. cit.*
[261] ICG: 1998, May 14. *Minority Return or Mass Relocation?* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/Bosnia%2015.pdf. P. 3.
[262] Dnevni Avaz: February 27th, 1998 cited in *Ibid,* p. 3.
[263] Author's interview with Mr. Mlaco *op.cit*
[264] The book is a collection of documents that allegedly Bošnjak leaders found in municipalities previously managed by HVO forces in the Central Canton while the war was ongoing.

As the theory of post-war reintegration explains, such are the conditions of a post-conflict pattern of majorization between majority and minority elites. As if an implicit arrangement between them would state: *"*do not touch my stronghold and I do not touch yours!" Meanwhile, each leadership goes on accusing each other for the very same criminal acts that both engage in but in different territories. Chapter IV shows that in Jajce, just a few kilometers away, the Croat leadership was responsible for the same sort of activities.

These examples show a pattern of majorization by which the majority group circulates resources within co-ethnics, obstructs minorities from accessing them and manipulates refugees and IDPs in its favor, increasing their own demographics. In turn, minority elites within a homogenous scenario seek for political survival in positions within the municipality or Canton, as we have seen, without doing much for pushing the numbers of minority return or advancing minority participation in education or health services. Moreover, they rather cooperate with their ethnic kin strongholds to mobilize co-ethnics towards such areas. Such was the case of Prozor-Rama, receiving several hundreds of Croats displaced from Bugojno, and of Bugojno, hosting 2,000 Bošnjaks from the Croat stronghold in Prozor-Rama[265].

The ethnic kin support of such activities was the necessary backbone of the majorization pattern. The ethno-territorial character of the war and the participation of kin-states as signatories and guarantors of the peace process in Bosnia, entrenched the role of ethnic kin in Bosnian history. Yet, this is not thoroughly explored in most of the literature on international relations, post-war reconstruction and conflict resolution.

[265] ICG: 1998b, *op. cit.*

The DPA signed on November 21st 1995, sat a framework and defined a context that actors involved in the process of reconstructing, rebuilding and reintegrating Bosnia could use for their benefit or ignore to some degree. This was possible due to the peculiar circumstance that the agreement did not provide for an ultimate authority that could demand compliance from the parties in the agreement.

Nevertheless, kin-states of Croatia and Serbia were equally legally engaged with the Bosnian leadership in "theoretically protecting" the peace of BH, as the DPA was signed by then Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (in the absence of Karadžić), Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović. Yet, the implementation at local level would also require the compliance of local leaders. Thus, the open question of this period was: who would be ready to enforce it, other than the international community, particularly when ethnic kin seems to work to sustain the pattern established by local elites?

For instance, ethnic kin were relevant for Dzevad Mlaco to remain in power, to the point that the international community understood that only pressuring the SDA leadership in Sarajevo could help bring some changes in Bugojno[266]. One of my informants[267] pointed out that Mlaco was basically untouchable due to his relationship with a strong Bosnian figure, Mr. Selmo Cikotic, Minister of Defense since 2007 and still in place during my fieldwork period.

Although such allegations might remain unconfirmed, the facts say that Cikotic was removed from his position as military attaché at the Bosnian Embassy in

[266] ICG: 1998b, *op. cit.*
[267] Author's interview with Anonymous interviewee., Bugojno, June 2011

Washington DC due to accusations by Croat officials regarding the torture and assassination of Croats in Bugojno in July 1993[268].

Dzevad Mlaco was also the wartime president of the municipality when Selmo Cikotic was the field commander of the operational group Zapad and chief of staff of the Bosnia Third Corps during the war[269], also serving a senior member of the Muslim delegation that held peace talks with Croatians in 1993[270]. While these controversial figures remained accused as war criminals, the investigation has not advanced much until this day.

As for the role of the international community during this period, some other steps were taken in an attempt to tackle the security conditions for minorities and their prospective returnees. In March 1997, UNHCR created the "Open Cities Initiative"[271] conditioning donor assistance –spoils of peace- upon positive developments on minority return. Following the orders of the High Representative, the aid in Bugojno was cut and the IPTF Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner decided on the dismissal of the chief of police due to his refusal to guarantee the security of minority returnees.[272] This action was part of the strategy implemented by the IPTF Commissioner[273] and Deputy Commissioner to use pressure on the Ministers of Interior into dismissing police chiefs who would infringe upon the DPA framework or against whom there was evidence of war crimes and human rights violations.[274].

[268] See: New York Times: 1997, June 28, *Allegations Halt Army Training For Bosnian General in the U.S.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from: http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/28/world/allegations-halt-army-training-for-bosnian-general-in-the-us.html.
[269] See biography: http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/index.php?The-Hon-Selmo-Cikoti263.
[270] See: New York Times 1997, *op. cit.*
[271] NATO/SFOR: 1997, June 16. *Report.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u970616a.htm.
[272] ICG: 1996b, November 24. *Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Bosnia%203.pdf. p.15
[273] "PTF Commissioner has considerable leverage over the Ministries of Interior of both entities owing to his influence with donors regarding aid to the Bosnian police force" , *Ibid*, p. 23.
[274] ICG: 1996b, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

By 1997, with the help of IPTF, Bugojno was among the pioneer municipalities of Central Canton to implement ethnically mixed policing[275], and with great success. 60 Bošnjaks and 48 Croats are part of the force; this reintegration of the police improved the overall security, and minorities have gained in terms of participation opportunities and personal security.[276]

In general, minorities returning home were no longer facing harassment.[277] Although some incidents were still taking place by early June 1998, when a reconstructed Croat house was destroyed[278], their frequency and intensity would not compare to 1997 levels. At that time several Croat-owned homes were damaged or destroyed by rockets and anti-tank mines, but the standard Police practice was to arrest the suspects, charge them with the crime and release them afterwards.[279] All this confirms the theoretical expectations that local elites will be more eager to open spaces of participation than to increase minority return. As these steps in minority participation were matched with an increase in minority return in less than a year later, we cannot argue that it ever became an assimilated scenario during this timeframe.

During this period, conditioned assistance did not work entirely well, mostly due to the lukewarm intervention that resulted in different cases of trial and error, like the case of Open Cities Initiative. Third parties were also unable to coordinate one course of action, like the OSCE being undermined by the Contact Group in 1996, and losing leverage vis a vis local ruling parties such as the OSCE after such

[275] UNSG: 1997, September 8. *Report S/1997/694.* Retrieved November 2011 from http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u970908a.htm.
[276] ICG: 1998b, *op. cit.*
[277] UNHCR: 1998, April. *Open Cities Update.*
[278] ICG: 1998b, *op. cit.*
[279] United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants: 1998, January 1. *U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1998 - Bosnia and Herzegovina.* From http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8ab10.html .

undermining[280]. Stronger actions were still necessary for a successful enforcement of the reintegration process.

III.2 Times of change: the path towards Ethnic Reintegration (1999-2003)

By 1999, to the surprise of many, Bugojno became a paradigmatic case of high return levels among other municipalities of the Central Canton and BH. It reached a 90% (7,500) registered return among the Serb community and 60% (10,000 approx.) among the Croat population.[281] One of the reasons for such improvement in returnee numbers was allegedly the sanctioning and removal of then Mayor Dzevad Mlaco from his post.

Despite several years of obstructionism accusations against him, the SDA Mayor had remained in office from wartime until November 29th 1999[282]. The High Representative Carlos Westendorp suspended Mlaco from his post as Mayor and from all elected offices in February 1999, and then Wolfgang Petritsch removed him from the House of Peoples where he was delegate, together with his post at the Cantonal Assembly.

In 2000 the Prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal charged Mr. Mlaco for the crimes committed at the "Iskra" Stadium[283], but up to this date Mlaco's responsibility regarding those atrocities has not yet been clarified. He remains as an icon of

[280] ICG: 1996a, *op. cit.*

[281] UNHCR Statistics Office: archival data requested on May 2011. Return Statistics until 2005 render 38% for Serbs (3,292), and 60% for Croats (9,632) according to the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BH: 2005, December. *Comparative Analysis on Access to Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons.* Retrieved March 2010 from: http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/pdf/uporednaanalizaengleski.pdf.

[282] See: OHR: 1999, November 29. *Decision removing Mr. Dzevad Mlaco from his position as Delegate to the BiH House of Peoples and from his position in the Cantonal Assembly.* From http://www.ohr.int/?p=63720&print=pdf.

[283] The Centre for Peace in the Balkans: 2000, March 10, *Indictment Against Dzevad Mlaco?* Retrieved November 2011 from: http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=/content/balkans/bosnia/bos33.incl.

obstructionism within the ethno-territorial logic that survived in the post-war setting; but also as a teacher in the central school of Bugojno that gathers under its roof two different schools, one for Croats and another for Bošnjak students.[284]

Mr. Antunovic and several Croat returnees I interviewed[285], linked the removal of this Major from the municipality to the increase of minority return in Bugojno. During 2000 and 2001 the minority return reached its peak for both groups, Croats and Serbs. However, it started to decrease again by 2003, to the point of becoming an insignificant number since then on (see Figure III.3)[286]. Mr. Antunovic and the data collected by the Catholic Church coincide with this data referring to a peak of Croat return during 2000-2002.

The situation was similar for the Serb minority[287]. In my interview with Orthodox Priest Slavisa, he referred to the way in which conditions for Serb minorities have improved since 1999. He explained that before that, when Mlaco was in charge of the municipality, the Priesthood could not even plan returning to Bugojno. Therefore, he moved to Cipulijc (where the Serbian Orthodox Church was) only in 1999. Since that time, Priest Slavisa said that political conditions are better despite generalized economic problems that affect minorities much more.[288]

Figure III.2: Minority Return in Bugojno

[284] Author's Interview with Primary School Director: Bugojno, May 2011, interview with Ana Sapina, *op. cit.*
[285] Authors' interview with Croat returnees, two of them teachers -one from high school and other from primary school-, and a young self-employed Croat returnee, June 2011.
[286] Figure III.3 represents the values collected by UNHCR during the years here presented. I use this data because it is the only available one that I could use for diachronic comparisons.
[287] This is according to records of Bugojno's Serbian Orthodox Priest and a Serbian Historian from Bugojno, both of whom were interviewed by the author.
[288] Author's interview with Priest Slavisa: May 2011.



Once people returned home, demands for education started to rise. By August 23rd 2000, when SDA leader Mustafa Strukar occupied the seat of Mayor, Bošnjak and Croat leaders arrived at an agreement regarding education that is still valid nowadays, implementing the "two schools under one roof" system[289]. Under this system, two different school programs, one Croat and another Bosnian operate in the same building at the same time, dividing the students in each respective group.

Although it is not the best option, it certainly was an important step considering the entire lack of education services for the Croat minority. Despite the fact that some of its promoters, internationals included, considered this system as a transitory measure, it has been in place for quite some time. Participation with segregation was anyways one step forward from the lack of minority participation during the previous period. This step was possible mostly for the timely move of international community, led by the OSCE, to negotiate with ethnic kin elites of the

[289] See Agreement of August 23rd 2000, signed in Bugojno between the Mayor and the Chair of the Bugojno Municipal Council, under supervision and auspices of OHR. Curiously enough, the agreement was signed by the assistant to the Mayor for Social affairs, not by the Mayor. The Agreement also carries the signature of Ulrich Bucher as Special Envoy of the High Representative. (Official Photocopy collected in Bugojno Municipality).

Central Canton in a concerted effort that would improve conditions for everyone in this region.[290]

Regardless of the fact that the system replaced the segregation of one group by another, with self-segregation as an improved version of the previous scheme, it did provide the chance for primary school students to receive classes in ruined buildings or in premises of the Church[291]. Although the OSCE later pushed for a unified administrative system to save resources, the Croat leadership did not agree with this point, considering it as a threat to the autonomy that Croats would enjoy over their own education[292]. We should also keep in mind that this advancement was limited to the level of primary education, the only compulsory level in BH, while secondary education under the Croatian program is still provided in the neighboring town of Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje,[293] which is still a Croat stronghold.

The local elections of 2000 brought six Croats to the Municipal Assembly[294] out of 15 members, without any obstruction to their participation. From 1999 onwards, a Croat, Pero Pejak was put in charge of addressing the problems of return, repossession and reconstruction in Bugojno. He was one of the most cooperative and helpful public officers I have met in my fieldwork years. Pejak had a systematic account of returnees and the properties that were rebuilt and to what percentage. Unlike different experiences with then minority elites of Jajce (as Bošnjaks now rule

[290] Author's interview with Mariajnovic, OSCE regional office in Travnik, a citizen of Bugojno himself, Author's interview with Greta Kuna , *op.cit*
[291] Author's interview with Greta Kuna *op.cit*, and interview with Priest Mirko, *op.cit*
[292] Author's interview with Greta Kuna, *op.cit*
[293] Author's interview with Ana Sapina, *op.cit*
[294] Data from archives at Bugojno Assembly collected in May 2011.

Jajce) he proudly shared the results of his work that was –in this case- very well recorded.[295]

Minority elites' preferences regarding Bugojno were also changing, mostly due to strong shifts within the ethnic kin support, but also due to changes introduced by the international community while using its "Bonn Powers". By 2000, HDZ, the formerly strong Croat party of the Central Canton had lost 15 of the 23 seats held in the 1996 elections.[296] Later on, it had to endure challenges by fellow New Croatian Initiative (NHI) and the HDZ 1990, with different approaches regarding Croats in Bošnjak strongholds[297] considering the death of Tudjman and the consequent loss of support by the Croatian government that was overtly switching its foreign policy preferences towards the EU.[298]

The new conditions also saw the cooperation and support of the international community with an alternative type of leadership. From the past tendency of seeking cooperation with hard-liners, this period brings the joint work between tide riders and third parties in the promotion of return, as well as on the process of increasing minority participation.

Since 1999, the Catholic leadership and community have been actively engaged in promoting Croat return. The Catholic cathedral in Bugojno provided a social network for Croats, and served as a focal point for supervising the distribution of aid and sharing information about reconstruction assistance. In a concerted effort with the international community (UNHCR), Father Mirko, the priest at that time, whom I considered a tide rider of the reintegration process, made trips to the Croatian

[295] I also have to say that the Bugojno Mayor (SDA) at the time of my fieldwork and his secretary made sure that I could access to all the information I could need. My experience in Jajce was –to my surprise- a little bit different. In Chapter IV I share it with the reader.
[296] Data from the Central Electoral Commission. See: www.izbori.ba.
[297] Cuvalo: 2010. *The A to Z of Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Scarecrow Press. Pp. 51-52.
[298] European Commision Enlargement . (n.d.). *Croatia - EU-Croatia relations.* See: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/croatia/eu_croatia_relations_en.htm.

coast and to Livno to encourage the return of refugees. He also travelled to Prozor-Rama to dissuade Croat displaced persons there from obstructing the return of Bošnjaks in May 1998.

Church members supported the return of Croats from Prozor-Rama to the village of Sebesici; however, when a mass was celebrated there, the Catholic Bishop of Mostar, who was invited, chose not to attend.[299] Priest Mirko was regarded as an active person moving beyond religions, nationalism and ethnicity. A Serb leader[300] and an Imam[301] have equally referred to him as a key person in the process of reintegration in Bugojno.

Several sources have referred to the extremely important role of Fra Mirko, Nun Ines, Caritas, and the Serb leader Nicola Simic, as actors that could make a difference in the process of return[302]. In an interview with Fra Mirko[303] he describes his role in this process and how internationals would coordinate efforts with him:

> *"I would talk about safety for those who decided to come back, because I was living then in Bugojno and I knew what the real situation was. Internationals would talk about the necessity of return and its political significance and they would inform us about the possibility of obtaining grants for housing restoration. The number of people who decided to come back wasn't that large, because people had their own problems that we couldn't solve. Most of the people wanted to know whether they were going to be safe if they came back, were going to have a job, and people who had children asked*

[299] ICG: 1998, *op. cit.*
[300] Author's interview with Nicola Simic, Serb leader and SDP politician: June 2011, November 2012.
[301] Author's interview with main Imam of Bugojno: May 2011.
[302] Author's interview with main Imam of Bugojno: May 2011. Author's interview with Serb returnee: June 2011. Author's interview with Croat returnee: June 2011.
[303] Author's interview with Priest Mirko: November 2012.

about school for their children, because in Bugojno there was just a school for Muslim (Bošnjak) children." (Fra Mirko, November 2012, Bugojno).

When asked about his participation in the returnee process, Nicola Simic described a similar scheme of cooperation with internationals[304]. A common feature of both stories is the strong engagement of internationals and the coordination of efforts to convince minority returnees that security conditions were settled enough for them to go back home. Given his proximity to the population, the local leader would travel to areas where Bugojno's IDPs stayed and talked them into the opportunities for return. Logistic, financial and security support was provided by the OHR, UNHCR and SFOR in order to assist minorities in their process of return.

Despite the modest numbers of returnees seen in Figure III.2, all leaders interviewed from Croat, Serb or Bošnjak groups agree that during this period some more modest estimates of return would be that 8,000 Croats and 3,000 Serbs made their way back, although –as we shall see- they left several years later.

The role of the international community, however, grew relatively stronger within this period, not only in terms of how they started to cooperate with the alternative leadership, challenging the exclusive command and associated resources in the hands of local hardliners. It was not until 1999 that the OHR was provided with higher capacities in terms of mandate and leverage. Although the so called "Bonn Powers" were granted to the OHR at the Conclusion of the Peace Implementation Conference held in Bonn on December 10th 1997[305], it was not until the Madrid Declaration one year later in December 16th 1998 that such powers were further

[304]Author's interview with Nicola Simic, *op.cit.*

[305] Following the successful negotiation of the DAP in November 1995, a Peace Implementation Conference was held in London on December 8-9th 1995 to mobilize international support for the Agreement. The meeting resulted in the establishment of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC).

recognized and legitimized among the international community and further enforced by other internal regulations[306].

In this capacity, the High Representative can take actions against persons holding public office who are found to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms of its implementation[307]. Certainly such powers in the hands of the international community in a foreign country met negative reactions from either side of the political spectrum in BH, the region, the EU, the USA, and worldwide political debates at academic levels and the policymaking community.

The powers, however, were an answer to a stagnated peace-building process trapped into surviving ethno-territorial dynamics. Without such powers, mayors like Mr. Mlaco would still dominate the political scene of Bosnian municipalities and the return process would have been even more unlikely.[308]

The punishment for the lack of cooperation from the BH leadership on the aspects provided by the DPA from 1999 onward, was the most undemocratic and powerful tool of all, including the risk of a life-long revocation of full participation in the political life of Bosnia. Despite the negative consequences of such tool for the development of democracy in Bosnia, it has to be recognized that before such measures, the DPA provisions were hard to implement.

[306] Article III of the Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and article 7.10 of the Rules and Regulations adopted thereafter which provides that *no person who has been removed by the High Representative shall be permitted to be a candidate in the elections*.

[307] Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference, Bonn, December 10th, 1997. PIC: 1998, December 16. *PIC Declaration – Annex.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from: http://www.ohr.int/?p=54101&lang=en.

[308] There is another side to this story. Besides holding concerns regarding the peace-building process, some of the international actors were hosting refugees (like Germany, with 350,000 of them), and they started to push for their resettlement, providing with this sort of powers to the OHR was essential for such resettlement to really succeed.

The DPA, Annex 7, Chapter I, article II, relied on the creation of conditions for return as a responsibility of the party signatories of the agreement (the Bosnian government, and Croatia and Serbia as kin-states for their respective communities in Bosnia). More specifically, it was their responsibility –following the agreement- to create the political, economic and social conditions that would allow for voluntary return[309]. Despite such provisions, reality proved that local elites and their respective ethnic kin were working in an opposite direction to the DPA.

III.3 The consolidation of an assimilated society (2004-2012)

The success of the minority return of the previous years slowed down during this period. Today it is estimated that only 4,500 Croats and 300 Serbs still live in Bugojno.[310] It is logical to expect that those minorities that have not yet returned in the first 10 years would not do so after that period of time. Reasons might be strictly linked to the normal developments in life: kids grow up in another state or another part of the territory, studying sometimes in better conditions than what BH may offer, and also parents develop a new life and establish new relationships.

However, what looks more puzzling are the cases when returnees went back to their pre-war homes, remained there for 3 or 4 years, only to leave again. Such was the case for many Serbs and Croats in Bugojno after 2004, and it seems that this has since become the new normal. Whatever personal reasons those returnees may have had to

[309] Article II: Creation of Suitable Conditions for Return: 1. "The Parties undertake to create in their territories the political, economic, and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, without preference for any particular group. The Parties shall provide all possible assistance to refugees and displaced persons and work to facilitate their voluntary return in a peaceful, orderly and phased manner, in accordance with the UNHCR repatriation plan." Article II: Creation of Sustainable Conditions. Annex 7: DPA.

[310] See Figure III.3, built upon data collected on the Sarajevo premises of the UNHCR in May 2011..

leave Bugojno after trying their luck for some years, it is reasonable to conclude that the economic situation has been a main driver of such processes.

According to public registries[311], Bugojno has currently (2011) 43,000 inhabitants, out of which 5,000 are students, 5,000 are retired, 5,500 are employed and 5,000 are registered as unemployed. This is confirmed by the only available statistics in this regard, which also shows that a significant proportion of inhabitants do not even consider themselves as citizens of Bugojno, or they work somewhere else in a nearby town. Unfortunately there are no statistics of such phenomena, but I have met members of minority groups from Bugojno that are either part of the black market or work in Jajce, Gornji Vakuf, Donji Vakuf, and even Split (Croatia), sometimes commuting every day.

Mr. Antunovic points out that Croats have limited employment opportunities, although he recognizes that this tendency does not exclude the members of other groups. He argues that not even Croat companies hired Croat employees because the general market is more focused on the Bošnjak community; thus, several thousands of Croats left Bugojno after facing a lack of opportunities of different sorts[312].

As for 2010, when I met the Hospital Director Dr. Melika Mahmutbegovic,[313] there were 135 employees in the primary health care sector[314]: one Serb (a driver) and five Croats (four medical employees and another who was not medical staff). The rest of the employees were all of Bosnian origin. According to the Director, "the nationality is mostly Bosnian, but this is not our fault, it just happened like this after the war." Dr. Mahmutbegovic refers to the war's end status quo when minority return

[311] Information provided by the Municipality of Bugojno.
[312] Author's interview with Zvenko Antunovic.*op.cit*
[313] Author's interview with Hospital Director Dr. Melika Mahmutbegovic, June 2011.
[314] Notice that Local governments have a say only in Primary health care, and the rest of the administrative staff of the Hospitals is coordinated from the Canton level. There is no data available for that sector.

was still unthinkable. It is fair to recognize that employment opportunities within the hospital also depend on the general economic conditions of Bugojno and, BH at large. However, Hospital Directors are responsible for the fair distribution of the available job opportunities.

The problem with employment is that relevant policies cannot be enforced in the same way as property restitution laws or decrees because it apparently has been easier for the international community to provide support for building and re-building dwellings than to help generate economic hubs to provide sustainable work for a large sector of the population. The reader might argue that this is a more difficult task to accomplish.

While certainly that is the case, it is still puzzling that the international community did not have strong incentives to tackle a problem that every single citizen of Bugojno has kept fresh in their mind: it used to be one of the richest towns of pre-war Bosnia due to the gun factory established in its surroundings.[315] The factory survived for as long as the international community let it be. After being closed by internationals, this industry was not replaced with another. Lacking alternative jobs, and facing a "colonization" of existing opportunities by citizens of the local majority group, there are no chances for returning minorities to claim property or a job spot. Unlike the regular procedures to tackle property issues, internationals cannot enforce the eviction of "jobs colonizers".

It was striking for me to see a huge number of youth (most of whom are well educated, up to university level) crowding coffee shops, be they "Croat", "Bošnjak" or "Federal". In those coffee shops they spend less than 25 cents Euro to buy several hours of entertainment, socialization, and waiting for whatever life brings. There is

[315] Author's interview, withSerb returnee, Nikica. June 2011.

nothing more to buy, there is nothing more to get. There is nothing more to do, except when family members in the diaspora come to visit in the summer.

Walking on the streets of Bugojno is like walking along the streets of a city that seems frozen in a time when someone had to do something but did not, and even worse, nobody knows who that "someone" is or should be. Currently, Bugojno feels like a close resemblance of the play "Waiting for Godot".

Unemployment does not display ethnic divisions, but politicians do. Young college graduates[316] described to me the related problems of getting a job in Bugojno, contacting the right person, and even paying for reaching a job opportunity. Whether they use "*stela*", a sort of network of favors among known people, or family and friends networks, the circuit of searching and providing jobs goes mostly to the same ethnic group. Nonetheless, the lack of economic opportunities equally affects all ethnic groups. "If there wasn't any jobs also Bosnians would start leaving"[317], said a young woman at the Croat Cultural Center.

One unique success story in terms of an economic development that could help mitigate this situation was the creation of NUPP, an institution that gathers members of the agricultural sector and provides them with equal opportunities for developing their capacities and their production.[318] However, the development of such fora and opportunities remain very limited in scope.

Furthermore, all the internationals have also left the town since 2003. The implications of the international exit are manifold because the hole they left after their mandate was not foreseen at the time of deployment. Internationals used to be a fruitful source of resources and a stimulus for the entire Bugojno economy, explains

[316] Author's interview with Mahira: May 2011, and interview with female undergraduate student, May 2012.
[317] Author's interview with one of the Secretaries at the Croat Cultural Center: June 2012
[318] Author's interviews with N.U.P.P representatives: Bugojno, May 2011.

Niki[319], who worked extensively in the black and white markets created by the presence of the international community. He was a driver, an interpreter for the Red Cross, and an assistant of SFOR for language services and errands.

Internationals not only left an economic vacuum but a political one as well. Former cantonal minister Greta Kuna notices that nowadays the internationals no longer request to implement a unified education system as they did back in 2003, when even Warren L. Miller went to Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje to voice that demand[320]. Even drawbacks on returning levels are coincidental with the transfer of the functions from the RRTF, established in 1998, to the local governments in 2003. Since then the internationals have transferred several responsibilities to nationals, like returnee issues, elections, and human rights protection and security. The momentum for profiting from a high number of returns has already passed by now.

Much reflection is needed on the role of internationals in establishing a sustainable system that could work at a local level to provide for job opportunities to those willing to remain in their pre-war homes. The impact of international deployment in small towns is significant, not only when they deploy but also when they exit. Building a sustainable ethnic reintegration process requires us to foresee such impact and engage in the search of options for the local population before their mandate expires. The case of Bugojno is a clear example of a momentum that was lost. The responsibility does not lie only in the hands of local leaders but also in the hands of those with a mandate for reconstructing Bosnia and Herzegovina and building a peaceful environment: third parties. The answer of the Hospital Director, for instance, highlights that the economic sector was not considered while deterring obstructionism.

[319]Author's interview with Niki, Serb citizen: June 2011.
[320]Author's interview with Greta Kuna: *op. cit.*

Third parties' engagement in Bugojno went as far as the political dimension of the problem, and returnee issues were part of same package: tackling the majorization pattern and addressing the ethnic kin that supported them. However, third party engagement in those tasks should have advanced further in the economic sector as well, to facilitate that once that the refugees or IDPs return, they have chances to develop a normal life in their pre-war home. Whereas the empowerment of tide riders, like Fra Mirko, Mr. Simic, and Nun Ines in key moments of the return process was essential to boost returnee levels, internationals missed the opportunity of using those actors as channels for change and development in the municipality.

III.4 Conclusions

Three different post-conflict scenarios emerged in Bugojno over the period 1995-2012 (see Figure III.1). As one of the strongholds of the SDA during the years between 1995 and 1998, the municipality presented an ethnically homogeneous scenario entirely dominated by the Bošnjak majority. When minority return was made possible in 1999-2003, the municipality enjoyed a short period of ethnic reintegration, but that vanished afterwards, when the minority groups either began to leave the town or faded away due to the old age of the minority population that stayed.

Thus, assimilated scenario emerged in Bugojno until these days. Although minorities participate in different areas of community life, minority demographics have fallen considerably, if not due to immigration in search of better opportunities, out of normal mortality rates. "Serbian community is literally dying out" argues a Serbian historian.[321]

[321] Author's interview with Mr. Zubic: *op. cit.*

We observe in this case that a reintegrated scenario was possible. Minority return was extremely successful with the return of the majority of its members (60% for Croats 90% for Serbs), and spaces for participation in community life were slowly opening to reach current levels, with , some minorities integrating the governing structures of the municipality.

Under the conditions of the period of 1995-1998, ethnic reintegration seemed very unlikely to occur in Bugojno, especially given the hard-liner and obstructionist leadership that controlled the municipality right after the conflict and the social reality that features segregation even in public spaces. If we looked exclusively at this period of time, we probably would not find much disagreement with proponents of partitionist theories, who foresee that societies remain divided due to fears and hatreds. It is only under the light of increased reintegration that we can be sure that such arguments are short-sighted.

The changes that took place between the homogenous and reintegrated periods were driven by a timely engaged third party working at full capacity to disrupt the existing post-conflict patterns of majorization established between the ethnic elites of minority and majority groups with the ethnic kin support of national and kin-state elites. Likewise, changes also took place after third parties challenged the exclusivity and legitimacy of hardliners by cooperating with a tide rider leadership that helped to mobilize minority return and develop opportunities for minority participation within a context of extreme obstructionism and lack of support from local elites. Those alternative dynamics were facilitated by sanctioning and removing obstructing leadership who relied on different mechanisms to impede minority return and participation.

This case further confirms the hypothesis of the post-war reintegration theory that expects that a reduction of the ethnic kin support would translate into a weaker post-conflict pattern of majorization. In fact, the acceptance of the OSCE negotiated solution of "two schools under one roof" by Croats of Bugojno (and BH at large) reflected a change within Croatia foreign policy, which was switching towards EU and cooperation with ICTY.[322]

Several empirical works have demonstrated that minorities used to return to their pre-war homes only long enough to recover their properties and re-sell them. We saw in section IV.3 that while such an argument could explain the increase in return levels, it would not entirely be able to explain why minority participation has also spiked during the same period of time. While it would make sense to observe their return to pre-war homes in order to sell property, it would not make sense for minorities to move their entire families and enroll their kids in the available schools.

Jenne rightly points out that local elites are not guided by ethnic fears and hate but rather by the logic of ethnic spoils. Yet, her perspective does not explain why minority leaders in Bugojno would not work for the return of their co-ethnics but rather opt to survive politically in Canton positions, or to divert efforts towards spreading false fears that would contribute to the opposite.

To expand the logic of ethnic spoils that Jenne argues for beyond the interests of majority elites, I describe a majorization pattern to which minority elites also contribute when they do not openly work to increase minority return and participation. Similarly, this logic exclusively driven by local elites does not address the empirical puzzle of why the national leadership and the kin-states that had signed the DPA as peace guarantors would remain silent, oblivious or blind to these dynamics. Unless we

[322] Vachudova: 2005. *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism.* Oxford University Press.

assume that local elites have more power in their stronghold than what their national counterparts and kin-states could put together to protect the peace they had committed to while signing the DPA, which we know it is not the case. Adding ethnic kin support to the analysis, regardless of how obvious this seems in empirical terms, is not a minor theoretical contribution.

The theory of post-war reintegration assumes neither that elites are driven by a security dilemma, nor that they are the exclusive drivers of the logic of ethnic spoils. It does establish that local elites, ethnic kin elites, and third parties' role in post-war settings do impact the outcomes of post-war scenarios.

Although we have not tested here the relationship between ethnic reintegration and reconciliation, the Bugojno case helps us derive some conclusions that might deserve further research. The way that youngsters spend their time in cafés is an example of how social relations are stagnating. This situation might respond to the fact that ethnic reintegration has not been sustainable over time, which in turn did not allow for people to get to know each other and grow in each other's life. Changes within each human being may take longer to occur than changes at the societal level to enforce equal rights and opportunities for majority and minority groups alike. Thus, if we would like to give the reconciliation process a chance, we first need a sustainable reintegration process.

CHAPTER IV: JAJCE, SUSTAINING REINTEGRATION

Jajce is an extremely beautiful town in the heart of Bosnia. The waterfalls and its rivers, the woods, the cultural heritage and the history, as the town that gave birth to Yugoslavia, makes it very appealing. Unfortunately the war has left several wounds that have been healing for years, or at least it seems so. The population is very active and so is its youth, there is no air of segregation, although many have referred in my interviews to places that "used to be" frequented only by specific groups.[323] A walk around Jajce is an invitation to diverse cultural activities in which the whole town participates, an exploration of all the Bosnian traditions combined in one attractive town.

Unfortunately, Jajce has not been as peaceful and relaxed as it feels nowadays. Since the end of war, between 1995 and 2004, a small local Bošnjak minority was enclaved in Vinac village and developed a parallel administration run by the SDA party and controlled by the Bosnian Army. During those years, the Croat-controlled town of Jajce was a sort of forbidden place for Bošnjaks willing to return home.

Things changed considerably by 2005, when a reintegrated scenario took place in the Municipality at large. The once Croat-controlled town opened its doors to everyone, and in Vinac the SDA dismantled its parallel administration and reintegrated fully within Jajce's public administration -currently run by a Mayor of the SDA.

[323] Author's Interview with Mirko Ljubez, Croat Professor, Technical School Jajce: May 2012.

Figure IV.1: Jajce Municipality 1995-2015



This chapter explores the factors behind Jajce's transition from an enclaved scenario to a reintegrated one. I conducted a longitudinal analysis to trace the process that maintained the enclaved scenario during the first nine years after Dayton, as well as the reintegrated one of the current period.

In this chapter I tested whether the conditions hypothesized by the theory of ethnic reintegration were present, namely: 1) if the enclave is maintained by minority elites that circulate spoils of peace and war exclusively to its co-ethnics, obstruct their participation in structures run by majority, and manipulate IDPs and refugees towards the enclave. It is also expected that majority elites partake of the majorization pattern discouraging minority return and participation. 2) If ethnic kin supports the actions of respective local elites, sustaining the enclaved scenario over time. 3) If third party intervention challenging local elites' exclusivity over resources, their legitimacy and

their support base explain the successful reintegration of the Bošnjak minority in the Jajce municipality.

I relied on elites' interviews, media reports, data and documents from the UNHCR, online files from the NATO, OHR and secondary sources to evaluate the changes taking place in each period. Changes across periods cannot be explained by existing theories: if a security dilemma was the reason for local elites maintaining an enclaved scenario between 1995 and 2004, how could we explain the reintegrated scenario that took place in the following years up to this day? The findings presented in this chapter help answer those puzzles while at the same time show the explanatory power of the theory of post-war reintegration.

IV.1 War's legacy: an enclaved Vinac in a homogenous Jajce (1995-2004)

The war left Jajce crippled in many ways. The negotiations with Milosevic to reach the Dayton Agreement partitioned the Jezero area in a homogenous Serb municipality within the Republika Srpska. Jajce was one of the 29 municipalities that were partitioned into 58 new municipalities of a more homogenous demographic. This partition pushed the Serb minority to Jezero but left Jajce to be contended between Bošnjaks and Croats.

Although in September 1995 a joint move between the HVO and ARBiH took over Jajce[324], the respective armies had a different reach of the municipality at the time of the Dayton brokered peace. In a sort of "fait accompli" the town started to be administered under two parallel administrations: one run by Croats, the HDZ and the HVO; and another run by the Bošnjaks, the SDA and the ARBiH. Such was the

[324] See: http://www.spokesman.com/stories/1995/sep/14/croats-muslims-advance-thousands-more-refugees-on/.

disposition of army forces once Serbian troops were ordered to leave the town based on the implementation of Dayton Agreement. Thus, the war left two armies stationed waiting for Serb forces to depart. One army reached the town, the other reached Vinac, a large village 12 km away.

As a result, this once highly heterogeneous town turned into homogenous units partitioned first by Dayton, to create Jezero, and then by the armies willing to take absolute control of Jajce. Thus, its original demography changed completely. The war left the town[325] with 17,500 inhabitants[326] out of its original 42,557.[327] Before the war, Croats represented 37% of total population, Bošnjaks represented 39%, Serbs accounted for 17%, and "others" composed the remaining 7%. By 1999, Jajce was homogenously Croat by 73%, with only 3,978 Bošnjaks (23%), mostly concentrated in Vinac, and some 795 Serbs (5%) distributed around widely "dispersed villages and mostly of old age." [328]

Unable to reach Jajce, the SDA started to run a parallel administration in the enclave of Vinac[329], controlled by the Bosnian Army since August 1995[330]. About 20 employees administered various affairs for Bošnjaks only[331]. Because return was possible only to this area the former Vinac population was the first to do it, and some others would later follow.

However, massive return started to take place only after 2002. The practice of establishing a parallel administration in the wake of losing territorial control was also

[325] This number does not include Jezero, to be able to compare values under the new post-war circumstances of Jajce.
[326] Considering estimates of 1999.
[327] Census: 1991, Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BH: 2005, December, *Comparative Analysis on Access to Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons.* Retrieved March 2010 from http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/pdf/uporednaanalizaengleski.pdf.
[328] Author's interview with Mariana, a Serb returnee: June 2012
[329] Author's interview with Mr. Nisvet Hrnjić, Mayor of Jajce 2008-2012: June 2012, Jajce.
[330] ICG: 1998, June 3, *Return of Displaced Persons to Jajce and Travnik.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/Bosnia%2016.pdf, p.14.
[331] I*bid.*

part of the strategy that HVO forces and the HDZ elite adopted in Bošnjak-controlled Travnik. Nova Bila -outside Travnik- represented for Croats more or less what Vinac represented for Jajce: an option to survive and from which to keep consolidating power.[332]

Table IV.1: Jajce Population Estimates[333]

	Bošnjaks		Serbs		Croats		Other		Total
1991 Census	17,380	39%	8,663	19%	15,811	35%	3,153	7%	45,007
1991 Estimates	16,600	39%	7,263	17%	15,611	37%	3,083	7%	42,557
1999 Estimates	3,978	23%	795	5%	12,727	73%	0	-	17,500

Statistics of registered minority return[334] to Jajce during this period are somewhat confusing, but also low. According to the UNHCR[335] only 1,828 Bošnjaks and 640 Serbs returned after 1999. However, ICG[336] offers an estimate from a municipal office of 5,000 minority returnees, which is confirmed by Toal and Dahlman[337], who argue that 1997 and 1998 saw the peak of minority return. One of my interviewees explained that in 1997 they were the first Bošnjaks who were granted permission to enter the town, bearing a document proving they were authorized to do so; he emphasized that such permits were rarely accessible for Bošnjaks or

[332] Ibid. p. 2.
[333] Dahlman, C., & Toal, G.: 2005, Broken Bosnia: The Localized Geopolitics of Displacement and Return in Two Bosnian Places. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers , 95* (3), 644-662.
[334] A typical statement in Jajce is that everyone considers himself/herself as a returnee for the peculiarity of being a municipality controlled by different armies in different periods of time. I will consider here only Bošnjaks and Serbs as minority returnees, given the control that the HVO army, and later the Croatian political leadership implemented in Jajce at the end of 1995.
[335] UNHCR Data collected in Sarajevo: May 2011.
[336] ICG: 1998, p.1.
[337] Toal & Dahlman: 2010, Bosnia Remade, p. 280.

Serbs[338].The fact that minorities required such permits to be able to go back to their pre-war homes is in itself an ostensible violation to Annex 7 of the DPA. In this sense, this document in itself was a tool to obstruct minority return.

Actions against returnees took multiple forms, including intimidation, violent attacks and threats, and landmines[339] to prevent people from reaching certain areas where property was available[340]. On one occasion in April 1997, the local police tried to justify itself by declaring to the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) that Bošnjaks had returned to their pre-war houses to burn them[341], although the owners of those 12 houses were all living in Zenica, except for one who lived in Croatia.

Obstructionism was in place by the majority Croat elites and their associates; luckily on some occasions the international community could find those responsible and sanction such practices. Obstructionism was not the only tool at hand, it was also necessary for Croat elites to increase their power base. To do so, local elites with the cooperation of their ethnic kin from areas where Croats were not the majority, resorted to manipulating the Croat IDPs remaining in those areas.

In July 1997, the OSCE Election Appeal Sub-Commission (EASC) investigated allegations that IDPs registering to vote in Jajce were not in fact residents as of July 31st, 1996. It was found that local authorities, including the police, participated in the forging and distribution of false documentation to allow those Croats IDPs to vote. The governing HDZ party was found liable of the registration irregularities and for violating Annex 3 of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and

[338] Author's interview with Hodzic.
[339] Add Red Cross Interview
[340] OHR: 1997, Aug. 21. See: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/bh-media-rep/summaries-tv/bhtv/default.asp?content_id=947. Interesting enough, the Mayor of Jajce said that the landmines were placed by Serbs; however, UNHCR spokesman Mr. Janowski denied the veracity of such claims, arguing that the mines were recently planted because the houses in that area were previously repaired by their owners.
[341] OHR: 1997, April. See: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/hr-rol/thedept/hr-reports/hrcc-hr-rep/97-weekly/default.asp?content_id=5044.

the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) Rules and Regulations (PECRR). The reader should keep in mind that the OSCE had previously established in BH a vetted process to allow candidates and political parties to run for an election; the process included the signing of a will respecting DPA, PEC and the electoral code of conduct.[342] Accordingly, the EASC struck the first, second, and third names off the HDZ party list.[343]

In early August 1997, an outbreak of violence made Bošnjak returnees flee again. In those incidents the international community suspected that the local police was involved but that "certain actions were orchestrated by persons as yet to be identified". They also said that local authorities, if not directly involved in the events, "did not live up to their responsibility to maintain law and order"; despite the fact that the SFOR increased patrolling, the fear was consolidating[344].

Consistent with the predictions, this period witnessed a rare combination of increasing numbers of return cohabiting with severe obstruction by Croat elites, and ethnic kin support to obstruction implemented by mobilized co-ethnics and their cooperation in manipulating displaced co-ethnics. While increasing return numbers helped the Bošnjak minority to consolidate power in Vinac, increased obstructionism helped the Croat elites to consolidate themselves in Jajce.

Besides more patrolling by the SFOR, the international community decided to act promptly to sanction the responsible officials. On August 26th, the IPTF demanded the removal from office of the Chief of Police Marko Lucic, his Deputy, Marko

[342] Chandler: 1999, p. 114.
[343] OHR: 1997, July. See: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/chronology/bulletins/default.asp?content_id=4980.
[344] OHR: 1997, August. See: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/hr-rol/thedept/hr-reports/hrcc-hr-rep/97-weekly/default.asp?content_id=5057.

Bilandzija, as well as ordering disciplinary sanctions against eight other policemen for failing to take actions to prevent abuses against 500 Bošnjak returnees.[345]

A helping hand to Jajce's Croats came by their ethnic kin, the Croat Federation President Vladimir Soljic, when he refuted accusations against those police officers and argued that the measures recommended were harsh; the issue then remained unaddressed, and it was passed on to the Canton level for further investigation.[346] President Soljic's lack of will to touch their Croat fellows in Jajce was evident, particularly when the IPTF report clearly proved that police actions towards protection of Bošnjak returnees were either non-existent, deliberately negligent, or even that the police refused to act when IPTF itself demanded so.[347]

The IPTF Commissioner, Mr. Steiner, insisted on further investigation to the Federation Deputy Minister of the Interior, Jozo Leutar, who suggested taking actions on his side.[348] By mid-December, the Disciplinary Court of the Cantonal Ministry of Internal Affairs in Vitez dismissed Lucic and transferred Bilandzija to a non-supervisory post for one year. Mato Marceta, the other official in the chain of command, resigned from the police force, while the other officers received a 20 percent salary reduction for three months.[349]

While this fight against obstruction was happening in Jajce, Bošnjaks managed to keep increasing their power base in Vinac, where the HDZ could not obstruct them. Between 1996 and 1998, more than 5,000 Bošnjaks returned to the village and its

[345] NATO/SFOR: 1997, September 10. *Press Conference.* Retrieved January 12, 2016,see: http://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/1997/t970910a.htm.
[346] Human Rights Watch (HWR). (1998, June). *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Beyond Restraint.* Retrieved January 12, 2016, see: https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/reports98/bosnia/#N_107_.
[347] It should also be remembered that in August On 5 August 1997, President Soljic and Vice-President Ganic signed a letter committing to the return process throughout the Middle Bosnian Canton (ICG 1998c).
[348]Human Rights Watch: 1998, op. cit., and NATO/SFOR. (1997b), November 12. *Press Conference.* Retrieved January 12, 2016, see: http://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/1997/t971112a.htm.
[349] HRW: 1998, *op. cit.*

surroundings. As predicted by the theory of post-war reintegration, the enclaved scenario was further maintained as a way of surviving and consolidating power. It was a double process, and each side was doing its part to reinforce their respective scenarios, Croats in Jajce, and Bošnjaks in the Vinac enclave.

The political divisions that the war brought over the territory were further entrenched by the local elections in 1997, as the displaced Croats that had occupied Bošnjak houses also helped to mobilize votes for the HDZ. Internationals appointed Enver Sabic as the SDA Assembly speaker, but Sabic himself dismissed this role by saying "…this was just on paper, to pretend we were multiethnic".[350] However, his appointment did help to create a link between an SDA-legitimized actor and internationals in Jajce. Sabic's acceptance to take part "on paper" in the Municipal Assembly might have worked to establish a connection with the providers of the spoils of peace. Nevertheless, nobody has given up their political control over different parts of Jajce.[351]

Nicolas Bilic, former mayor of Jajce and also accused of obstructionism, described in picturesque details how Christian Schwarz Schilling tried in 1997 to bring together SDA and HDZ representatives (Sabic and Bilic, respectively) into a negotiation regarding returnees, or at least to persuade them of giving up on their positions, and finding a solution. "He left us a bottle of whisky and said: "when I return in some weeks I want to know who drank the bottle of whisky, or whether you are sharing it". When he returned the bottle was still there, untouched. Things were a bit more complicated than he expected... It was not that simple: we [Sabic and him] both needed to take care of our people."[352]

[350] Author's interview with Enver Sabic, Bošnjak leader: June 2012.
[351] Author's interview with Emir Sahman. Bosnjak leader with responsibilities over Vinac: May 2012.
[352] Author's interview with Nicola Bilic, former Mayor of Jajce, 1995-1998: July 3rd, 2012. Human Rights Watch reports another date for such meeting. It is not clear if Bilic was confused with the dates,

Once returnees were in Vinac, Bošnjaks put in place a school system inside their own enclave.[353] There were also separated hospitals and primary health care[354], but because most Bošnjak returnees would not be able to register in the town, they would remain in a limbo, without access to health care in the place they had left behind or in their own municipality[355].

One key aspect to the consolidation of local elites' power was to guarantee that they could provide their co-ethnics with help for reconstruction, property access and different sorts of aid. Several of my interviewees pointed out that forced evictions of Bošnjaks who remained in Jajce during the war took place in order to redistribute their houses among Croat families eager to return. Circulating resources within patronage networks helped consolidating the Croat economic and political power. Being able to show that someone was a displaced Croat from any other town controlled by another ethnic group was sufficient to gain access to houses formerly owned by Bošnjaks. As long as displaced Croats gained property for themselves in a Bosnian context of deprivation and segregation, Croat leadership continued maintaining its power.

The Croat majority exclusively exploited resources available in the town. They later succeed in controlling the two hydropower plants of the town (Jajce I and Jajce II), which in turn are managed by the so-called Herzeg-Bosna Company (Elektroprivreda Hrvatske Zajednice Herceg-Bosna),[356] a well-connected Herzegovina lobby in Mostar.[357]A Croat interviewee pointed out that the town was not destroyed while the Serbs were in town, but rather its destruction came after a policy of HDZ

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or there were 2 different meetings that Bilic was not aware of (http://hri.org/news/agencies/srna/1996/96-12-16.srna.html).

[353] Author's interview with Director of Berta Kucera School: November 2012.

[354] Author's interview with Ivo Barisic, Health House Director: July 6th, 2012.

[355] ICG: 1998, p. 6.

[356] Author's interview Samir Beharic, journalist, activist & photographer: July 2012.

[357] Author's interview with Dr.Vesna Miketa: June 2012.

leaders to take over the resources in order to profit from them by selling pieces of the infrastructure, or distributing them to "Herceg-Bosna".

Several people I casually talked to in cafés, supermarkets and theaters regarding the HDZ and SDA in the present and the past considered them "partners in crime" in terms of the business arrangements they are assumed to share, "even while the fight for return was taking place", according to Dr. Miketa. This interviewee, an independent candidate of Croat origin, further argues that both elites' businesses go as far as necessary, but without stepping on each other's toes.[358] This suggests that while each side consolidates their power and they implement all necessary measures to guarantee that, they also engage in cooperative businesses as long as those increase each other's spoils. However, no concrete proof about such agreements was provided, beyond than opinion of my interviewees.

Croat local elites were not alone in the task of consolidating their power in Jajce. Ethnic kin support to the majorization pattern established by Croat elites was materialized through strong links with government structures in Croatia and HDZ hardliners of Herceg-Bosna established in Mostar. For a period of time structures of the Croatian government were involved in *"*collecting applications from Croats refugees abroad for resettlement in HVO-controlled areas.*"*[359] While the Zagreb Office of Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR) gathered the applications, the Ministry for Reconstruction and Development provided them with an address in Jajce[360]. Even more, the ICG reports that the *"*leaflet inviting Bosnian Croats to

[358] Author's interview with Dr. Miketa: op. cit., with a key Bošnjak informant, and with Mariana, a Serb returnee, op. cit.
[359] ICG: 1998, January 19, *A HOLLOW PROMISE ? The Return of Bosnian Serb Displaced Persons to Drvar, Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc.* Retrieved January 12, 2016 from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/Bosnia%2012.pdf. P. 6.
[360] *Ibid.*

"choose" a place to live and a job in HVO-controlled areas listed contact numbers in "The Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosna" and ODPR in Zagreb"[361].

Further manipulation of IDPs came in place to counteract the absentee ballot system. The OSCE and OHR[362] helped to implement this system in order to overcome political obstruction. However, Croat elites started to illegally register co-ethnics who were not eligible to vote in Jajce.

The manipulation of refugees and IDPs from other regions of Bosnia was not an exclusive practice of the Jajce elite, nor was the established cooperation with Croatia and HDZ Herzeg-Bosna. ICG reports that the Croat populations in central canton were pressured to consolidate into areas which were HDZ-controlled and ethnically pure Croat.[363] According to Pierce and Stubbs, Croat returns to areas outside of the Herceg-Bosna control undermines the political, social and financial hegemony of that part of the HDZ, known as the 'Herzegovina lobby', whose power base is in Herzegovina (in the South West of Bosnia), in the Croatian Diaspora, and in sections of the ruling elite in Zagreb.[364]

With these post-conflict dynamics in place, there was hardly ever any room for political moderates. Several key leaders have referred to, and accused –without names- extremist forces within their parties that prevented them to do what they had to do for the sake of return and reconstruction in the town. Interestingly enough, all the main leaders of the most obstructionist period in Jajce have made reference to the same situation. They presented the situation as if there was someone more powerful than the appointed Mayor and the president of the HDZ making and enforcing

[361] *Ibíd.*
[362] OHR: 1996. See http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=3661.
[363] ICG: 1998c, *op. cit. p.12.*
[364] Pierce, P., & Stubbs, P.: 2000.

decisions for them. Some interviews have referred to "Herceg Bosna forces", meaning the Croat leadership in Mostar.

Croatia was certainly a factor entering the calculations of even the general population. I was also told that Croats started to leave in 2002 towards Croatia, which granted them with houses and job opportunities.[365]

Given the violence of early August, and the generalized and systematic obstruction within the Central Canton, the international community started to be more involved in concerted efforts between local elites, national authorities and various agencies of the international community operating in BH. To push for an increase of return levels, and appalled by the events in Jajce, the UNHCR came up with the idea of a working group under the JCC sub-commission for refugees integrated by the Federation Minister of Refugees and his Deputy and Canton officials forming a working group with the OHR, OSCE, SFOR and the UNIPTF.[366]

Negotiated efforts between all relevant actors in Jajce proved to be a workable option. However, they needed to move beyond the existing dynamics of the majorization patter, meaning they demanded active engagement of local elites. If the agreements would keep the status quo untouched, and therefore legitimize with silence the majorization game of the elites, the agreements were doomed to fail to challenge the key causes of the unsuccessful reintegration. That was the case of several returnee agreements across Bosnia. When dealing with Bugojno we learned how Mlaco justified his "cooperative behavior" using such agreements. In Jajce the leadership went even a step further: they started to complain when 100 families reached town instead of the agreed 80.[367]

[365] Author's Interview with secretary of HRVATSKA House, Bugojno: November 2012.
[366] NATO/SFOR Report 1997, August 6th, http://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/1997/t970806a.htm
[367] Author's interview with Duranovic: May 2012. The interviewee used the numbers to represent the idea not to refer specifically to a given situation.

The agreement between Croats and Bošnjaks to establish the multiethnic cantonal police that OHR and IPTF had pushed for the whole year was regarded as a fairly successful effort. In August 1997 the Canton police was constituted with a balanced composition conforming to the Census of 1991. There was a police station in Jajce and one sub-station in Vinac, which was at least a multiethnic one.[368]

The International community also tried to coordinate efforts to increase the political participation of the Bošnjak elites within the Municipality. When the elections came in September 1997, Bošnjaks made use of the absentee voting, almost breaking the tie between HDZ with an SDA-led coalition. However, they were not allowed to take over their positions at the Municipal Assembly that 'casually' was next door to the HVO premises in Jajce. Across these years, and particularly between 1996 and 1998, only three Bošnjaks took part in the structure of municipality government, but all of them were mainly a decorative figure[369].

Despite international efforts to improve Croat-Bošnjak relations, the HDZ was still securing its place in the municipality. Meanwhile, Bošnjaks were still unable either to return to Jajce, or to sustain Vinac as their enclave for much longer, even when return started to increase by 2002, and the "Berta Kucera" school was running a Bošnjak education program.[370] Obstructionism was still in place, Bošnjak elites were consolidating the provision of different services, not only schooling but health care as well.

Although the international community was acting against obstructionism, the situation in the enclave seemed to be silently accepted as a temporary option for the Bošnjaks. Sabic, a key Bošnjak leader, expressed how internationals were not eager to

[368] OHR: 1997, August 5, Agreement on the Constitution of Police in Central Canton. See: http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/fed-mtng/default.asp?content_id=3621.
[369] Author's interview with Emir Sahman: op. cit.; Duranovic: op. cit., and Sabic: op. cit.
[370] Author's interview with School "13 September" Director: June 2012.

advance with the return process. He also added that the international community did not allow a bus full of Bošnjak families to arrive to Jajce's cemetery on the "Day of the dead".[371] In my interview with Bilic, then Mayor, he argued that "Bošnjaks do not celebrate the "Day of the dead", that is a Christian celebration", and continued: "it seemed an excuse to prompt conflict in Jajce", "we wanted to avoid that and the international community understood it".[372]

Territorially constrained by a Jajce controlled by Croats, and a new Serb dominated municipality in Jezero, the enclave of Vinac was fated to perish, because it was a village without economic significance to serve as a parallel run territory that Bošnjaks could consolidate in their favor for good. After all, it was a rural area, and not even Bošnjak Croats were willing to return to such places –such as Dobretici.[373] Vinac bore no geopolitical significance in itself, but it did in terms of what it represented within the larger context of the political dynamics of elites seeking to consolidate power and survive politically within a territory.

Despite being limited in capacities to consolidate the enclaved scenario, Bošnjak elites were in a better position than co-ethnics in dispersed minority positions in nearby towns. Vinac provided them with a chance to recover an apparent "lost territory" of the Bošnjak- Croat dynamics of the Central Canton. Maximizing the benefits that the Bosnian Forces deployment brought to the Bošnjak elites, they engaged in seemingly contrary policies: on one hand, expanding spaces for minority participation in Vinac, while helping the return process to the area, on the other, seeking to reach the Croat controlled municipality of Jajce.

[371] Author's interview with Enver Sabic: *op. cit.*
[372] Author's interview with Nicola Bilic: *op. cit.*
[373] Toal and Dahlman: 2011, p. 281.

The Croat elites were aware of that, and sustained obstructionist practices up to 2002. This majorization pattern fed by both elites' actions kept two different strongholds within the same territory for almost 10 years. Maintaining the enclave in Vinac was key for the Bošnjak minority success in the 2004 elections.

In line with the hypothesized conditions of my theory, enclaved scenarios do not survive without natural resources, or an influx of resources by ethnic kin. Lacking the first ones, Bošnjaks in Vinac held onto the enclaved scenario, relying on SDA resources arriving from the Central Canton. They held to a majorization pattern that allowed them to increase Bošnjak return vis a vis intensive obstructionism by Croat elites, and to develop some sort of political control in the areas relevant for the life of the returned minorities, such as schooling and health care. The majorization pattern in which both elites partook brought both elites looking after assets of the industrialization sector. Although Croat elites took control over them during this period, we shall see that after 2004, Croats and Bošnjaks even cooperated in the business brought by the privatization process.[374]

Toal and Dahlman mention that the OHR pushed the cantons to end the parallel administrations, and they assert that Jajce did so in March 1999.[375] However, there is no evidence referred to such move by the OHR, or about the ending of the parallel administration of Jajce in that particular year. I also could not find such evidence myself. My interviewees, however, spoke of different dates. For example, the Hospital Director mentioned 2005 as the decisive date when the hospital capacities started to be transferred within Jajce municipality[376], as we shall see in the next section. This date is symptomatic of the electoral results of 2004 that gave

[374] Author's Interview with Dr. Miketa: op. cit.; and with Mr. Ljubez, op. cit.
[375] Toal and Dahlman: 2011, p. 281.
[376] Author's interview with Hospital Director of Jajce: op. cit.

Bošnjaks the possibility to run the Municipality. In the next section I describe how that was possible, and the reintegration dynamics that followed since then.

IV.2 Shaping Ethnic Reintegration in Jajce (2005-2015)

Although the international community seemed to have been engaged in Jajce since the very beginning of the post-war period, it was not until 2005 that these efforts had results. For internationals to be able to push the process forward there was a need of further cooperation among Croat elites.

Unlike Bugojno and Prozor Rama, in which sanctions and removing the acting leadership from office worked well to disrupt majorization practices, the HDZ leadership in Jajce kept ignoring such warnings. The removal of two mayors and a police chief seemed not to be sufficient for discouraging obstructive practices and the manipulation in their favor of Croat IDPs distributed in some other areas of Bosnia. Moreover, the challenges to reintegration were not coming solely from the majorization practices of majority elites. Bošnjak elites in Vinac were running a parallel structure of government that allowed them to consolidate power and survive politically in the convoluted times of Croat dominance.

According to data from the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, however, by 2005 almost 50% of Bošnjaks and the 9% of Serbs had returned to Jajce.[377] This achievement was the result of international efforts in two fronts: the disruption of the post-conflict majorization pattern, and their active search for an alternative Croat

[377] Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BH: 2005, December. *Comparative Analysis on Access to Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons.* Retrieved March 2010 from http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/pdf/uporednaanalizaengleski.pdf.

leadership willing to stop obstructionism and start the implementation of Property Laws.

The disruption of this pattern implied that the international community had to seek ways to challenge the extensive exclusivity that Croats enjoyed over the resources of Jajce, as well as their legitimacy to carry on with obstruction and manipulative practices against displaced people. The task was not easy. Since 1995, mayors in Jajce were either appointed by the HVO commanders or "unreferenced" party members, and then removed and appointed again in between periods[378].

That is the case of Nicola Bilic, who is perceived in the entire town to be one of the main obstructionist leaders. In our interview, however, he mentioned how he had to leave his position as president of the HDZ due to disagreements with his party[379]. He returned once more as adviser or main second hand for Jozo Lucic, who was later removed by internationals as Chief of Police[380].

From 2006 onwards, the very same Nicola Bilic was one of the founding fathers of HDZ 1990[381]. He explained this move as a step taken in view of his disagreement and distance from the logic of HDZ –implying "extremism". He did not mention the word directly, but he referred to "such policies as we have been talking about[382]". I inferred "extremism" because in a previous question I had asked him to elaborate about obstructionist policies and extremism against Bošnjaks in Jajce. Several years afterwards, this person, who only spent a couple of years as Mayor, was

[378] Author's interview with Nihaz Duranovic: *op. cit.*
[379] Author's interview with Nicola Bilic: *op. cit.*
[380] The decision to remove Jozo Lucic from his post is no longer available online. Toal and Dahlman also give account of such decision, as well as the people I have interview in Jajce. It is cited later on in the interview with Ivo Saraf. Notice that up to this date Mr. Lucic occupies prominent political positions in BH.
[381] HDZ 1990 is a political party that originated from a split of Bosnia HDZ in April of 2006.
[382] Author's interview with Nicola Bilic: *op. cit.*

referred to as a main obstructionist whenever an interview with a Bošnjak leader took place.

However, interestingly enough, there was only one mention of Jozo Lucic, the current Minister of Police and former Chief of Police (and Major) of Jajce, removed by internationals[383]. Even Ivo Saraf himself, a leader who filled the position of Mayor after Bilic and Lucic were removed from office, mentioned that the former "failed to make transition from war to post-war conditions", implying that those leaders were still supporting practices accepted during the war period.[384]

Despite the fact that we might never know who the real mastermind of Croat elites behind the majorization pattern in Jajce was, we do know that in several cases – unlike the case of Bilic- investigations found those responsible and removed them from respective power positions. The international community was not short of answers to those obstructionist and manipulative practices. Moreover, it is fair to say that they reacted promptly. For instance, on the occasion of violent evictions to a spontaneous return in 1997, Deputy HR Wagner, demanded the return of the evicted returnees and extended this demand to all Canton municipalities.[385]

This action was later followed up by a very smart move from the OHR, who organized a negotiation table with all incumbent actors of BH at the State and Canton level, and those from the international community (OHR, UNHCR, SFOR, SRSG Eide, OSCE, and IPTF).[386] In that meeting, these actors agreed in the formation of the Multiethnic Cantonal Police; moreover, the Central Canton elites presented their Cantonal Plan for refugees, and all municipalities agreed on establishing a returnee

[383] I have contacted Mr. Lucic by email and phone on two different occasions of my different fieldwork trips to Jajce. In both occasions he could not find time on his agenda.
[384] Interview with Bilic: *op. cit.*
[385] ICG: 1998, p 5, *op. cit.*
[386] OHR 1997, October. See: http://www.ohr.int/?ohr_archive=ohr-3rd-federation-meeting-on-the-central-bosnia-canton-14-oct-1997&lang=en&print=pdf.

information center and supporting immediate return.[387] Despite this strong move by the international community and the commitment obtained from Canton officials, things did not change substantially within Jajce.

These prompt actions of internationals did not go without intense criticism. Several interviewees[388] have pointed out the need to set limits to third parties as well, concerning their involvement in corruption and in terms of their capacities to operate. It was often mentioned that some of them used their diplomatic immunity to engage in illegal activities or collaborate with those leaders they should control[389]. They also pointed out the low capacity levels of the IPTF force in Jajce, very poorly trained and poorly equipped[390].

Regardless of how much distrust was around the international community, we also have to recognize their key contributions to the reintegration process, particularly if the international community wants to learn lessons that could inform future efforts. Among those contributions an important one was the identification and backing of key political figures with whom an agenda of reintegration could advance. Such was the case when internationals worked together with Branco Cavar to advance the implementation of property law.

In our interview, Mr. Cavar made several references to the pressures he had from his party and internationals, and his feeling of being trapped between them. After these accounts I was under the impression that he played the role of *tide rider*, advancing the issues of returnees and their relocation to a normal life, and at the same time struggling to survive on that path while fighting the internal pressures of his

[387] Ibid.
[388] Interviews with Dr.Misketa: op. cit.; Bilic: op. cit.; Mr. Duranovic: op. cit.; Mr. Ljubez: op. cit.; Sabic: op. cit.
[389] Author's interview with Goran, a Red Cross Croat employee: May 2012.
[390] Author's interview with Chief of Police, Jozo Budes: May 2012.

party. *Branko Čavar*[391], recalls Samir from the Youth Center, "saw the chance [of reintegration]", "HDZ wanted to displace him, but he was supported by others" [392]. It was only under his period that Bošnjaks started to return, and steps were made in that direction despite the pressures from the HDZ –his own party.

Čavar's first years of mandate up to 2000 were controversial due to HDZ pressures to not implement the property law, and he suffered threats from diverse and unrecognized sources. Nevertheless, *Čavar* started to implement the law[393] and to finally issue eviction orders from 2001 onward [394]. Bošnjaks who worked on the process of return and property restitution still believe that without *Čavar*'s decision to move the process forward, Bošnjaks would not have had a chance for reintegration.[395] In previous years the international strategy was oriented to negotiating with ethnic kin leaders within the Canton structures in order to gather their help in the implementation of property law in Jajce. However, the strategy did not bring results[396] because there was no elite in town willing to evict fellow co-ethnics occupying houses belonging to the Bošnjak minority, as I mentioned above.

For Mr. *Čavar*, however, minority return and property law implementation were the "right thing to do";[397] yet, this did not happen without difficulties. He had to

[391] For the curious reader, notice that there is a huge difference between my findings and those of Toal & Dahlman (2011). In their book the authors portrayed Mr. Cavar among the obstructionist crowd of several Croat mayors. They relied on one interview with a Travnik based OSCE officer for this finding. I relied on the account of three Bošnjaks (Kumar, Durajnovic, Sabic) who were part of the Jajce Municipality at the time of Mr. Cavar; two Bošnjak returnees (Hodzic, Beharic.); and another person from the NGO sector of Jajce (Director of Youth Center). No single interviewee mentioned anything remotely negative about Branco Cavar: actually rather the opposite, they all insisted on his pivotal role for changes to start happening in Jajce.

[392] Author's Interview with Director or Youth Center: op. cit.

[393] Author's interview with Branco Cavar, Jajce Mayor 2000-2004: May 2012, November 2012.

[394] Dahlman & Toal: 2005, p. 657.

[395] Author's interview with Duranovic: November 2012, op. cit. Author's interview with Bošnjak returnee: May 2012, op. cit.

[396] Toal & Dahlman: 2011, p. 282.

[397] *Čavar*: ibid.

find a way through different sorts of pressures and threats.[398] Mr *Čavar* further expounded that without international support and backing, none of the reforms introduced or the steps accomplished during his mandate would have been possible.[399] In Dahlman and Toal's[400] account of this period, they identify *Čavar* as one more obstructionist actor. Nonetheless, Bošnjak and Croat interviewees have referred to him as the turning point in Jajce's post-war history, and as a good Major, opposing him to those others that have previously obstructed minority return and participation in Jajce.

Čavar's period is a key moment in Jajce's history. Although only after 2001 did *Čavar* make the decision to advance with evictions, the previous year seemed to combine a strong role of hardliners in Central Bosnia and a stronger role of Croatia, as it was pointed out. The success of this period seems to be a result of the consistent work of the international community in trying to address both of these issues while supporting *Čavar*. First, the OHR worked for an agreement between Croatia and the Federation to regulate the role of Croatia in BH.[401] Second, it established standards by sanctioning and removing obstructionist leaders. Third, it backed *Čavar,* ensuring he could implement the needed changes.

Up to this point we can understand how changes were taking place within the Croat leadership, but little have I said of Bošnjak elites. I did establish before that expanding on various structures of government, provided an opportunity to those that returned to Vinac to have a school, health care system and a public office that could receive their demands. We also saw that the capacities for Bošnjak elites to consolidate power there were rather limited. In such conditions, the expectations of

[398] *Čavar*: ibid.
[399] I*bid.*
[400] Toal and Dahlman: 2010, p. 280-282, *op. cit.*
[401] OHR: 1998, November 22. *Special Agreement on Relations between Croatia and BH Federation.* Retrieved January 12 2016, from: http://www.ohr.int/?p=55063&print=pdf.

the theory are that when conditions are not in place for power consolidation, minority elites make use of the enclaved scenario to politically survive until reintegration becomes a more viable option.

It was not until 2004 that this option appeared, when, after almost 10 years of Croat ruling, the elections brought the SDA to the Mayor office and the majority of the Municipal Assembly. This was the first electoral victory of the Bošnjak elite in the highest post in office: Mr. Nizmet won the majority of votes. Previous electoral competitions, like in 1998, only gave some sort of parity in the Municipal Assembly, which could not be properly exercised anyways due to high Croat obstructionism.

By the elections of October 2012, Jajce was even ready to accept independent candidates in the competition for the main political post of the town, a scenario that nobody would have ever dreamed of during the past periods. Since then, Bošnjaks succeeded in electing a Major for three consecutive mandates. It is interesting to notice that since the elections of 2005, no single Croat party has been able to win elections again. Independent candidates have tried their chances, some of Croat origin, like Vesna Miketa in 2012, without calling upon the vote of any particular group.

The abovementioned change is explained through many angles, the most important being the drawbacks suffered within the Croatian leadership in BH after a drastic change of the role of Croatia towards their kin in Bosnia, largely influenced by international intervention. Many factors lined up for that change to take place. Tudjman –an iconic figure and supporter of Croatian nationalism- had died in 1999. The Croat member of the BH presidency, Mr. Ante Jelavic, was removed from functions by the OHR in 2001 due to his overt demands to Croats of BH to refuse to

cooperate with internationals and rather work for the partition of the country[402]. Such partition would have left Croats of Jajce well behind, because the town was the only Croat stronghold far away from the Herzegovina pivotal center of the sought-out "Third entity" for BH.

On April 6th 2001, a joint operation of the OHR, IPTF and the Federation Financial Police of SFOR took over the offices of the Hercegovacka Banka in the Croat majority towns of Mostar, Medjurgorje, Grude, Siroki Brijeg, Posusje, Oraske, Vitez, Livno and Tomislavgrad.[403] This operation struck down the main financial source of the Bosnian Croat separatists that integrated the Croat National Congress (HNS).

Extreme Croat nationalism had its days counted in Jajce. Long behind would remain the years of political cooperation to manipulate displaced co-ethnics to shore up their ruling. The elections of 2004 managed to push the chances of a consolidated Croat town even further away. Croats plans for Jajce had failed for good once Bošnjaks won majority in Jajce's election for Mayor.

Soon after Bošnjaks got in charge of the municipality, and by an order of the Ministry of Health of the Canton, the Hospital and the primary health care center were finally unified in 2005. Thus, the health care system in Jajce works now for any citizen of the town.[404] We can fairly say that Vinac parallel structures have ceased to exist right after the electoral success of Bošnjaks in Jajce, which constituted the first step to an increase in minority participation in the town, for all areas of life. After this step in political participation came the others. The SDA parallel institutions in the

[402] OHR Press Release: March 7th 2011.
[403] SFOR informer online: 2001; see: http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/111/s111p08a/t0104188a.htm.
[404] Author's interview with the Director of the primary health care system in Jajce: July 2012.

enclave were unified within the public administration of Vinac. Later the negotiations to find a reintegrated system for schooling in Jajce began.

During this period the school system moved a step further in an integrated Croat program for high schools (Gymnasium and Technical school), in which language and religion are taught separately according to personal preferences[405]. Although the primary schools are still running on the "two schools under one roof" modality, students of Jajce are still the only ones in entire Bosnia that can opt for an integrated education, but for now only during high-school. This integrated system was established at the Technical School only by 2007; first with the help of the OHR and then of the OSCE, both high schools started to run as reintegrated institutions, although based on the Croat program of education.[406]

By 2012, of a total of 694 students, 364 are self-identified Croats, 316 portray themselves as Bošnjaks, 3 as Serbs, and 5 students did not fill in the identification paper or declared themselves as "other".[407] This was a significant improvement since the original 200 Croat students of 1996.[408] Currently the school is one of the few around Bosnia that participates in the Nansen Project, Forum of Education Mediation, by which selected students and professors are trained with skills of conflict resolution and dialogue.[409]

Economic indicators of unemployment seem to affect all ethnic groups alike. The control of companies remained in the hands of the Croat leadership. However, an

[405] Author's interview with school Directors of Nikola Sop: July 2012; Berta Kucera and 13th of September schools.
[406] Author's interview with School Director of Technical School: 29 November of 2012.
[407] I*bid,*
[408] *Ibid.*
[409] Author's interview with Mirko Ljubez: *op. cit.*

interviewee pointed out the cooperation between SDA and HDZ leaders on profiting from corruption money from the privatization process.[410]

Security-wise, the effects of the joint cantonal police of 1998 that reintegrated personnel observing Dayton principles were accompanied by higher safety after the 2004 elections. There have been no ethnically motivated incidents since then, according to the Municipal Chief of Police, Jozo Budes.[411]

To sum up, the movement from an enclaved scenario to a reintegrated one confirms the conditions hypothesized in the theory. Timely third party intervention challenging the majorization pattern established by the Croat majority and its ethnic support was also accompanied by backing the figure of Mayor Branco Cavar as a tide rider. The limited capacities of elites within an enclaved scenario made reintegration within Jajce a political option.

The enclaved scenario served the purpose of shoring up enough power to be able to survive politically until conditions could be settled to run for the main position in office. When minority participation was achieved at the political level, the enclaved structures were unified within those of the municipality, and a reintegrated scenario has come to stay up to this day.

IV.3 The relevance of sustainability mechanisms: the reasons behind a surviving reintegration

After the case of Bugojno we learnt that once a reintegrated scenario was achieved, its sustainability is not always assured. The lack of economic opportunities drove many Croats far away from Bugojno, many of whom made use of a Croatian

[410] Author's interview with Vesna Miketa: *op. cit.*
[411] Author's interview, with Jozo Budes: *op. cit.*

passport that provided alternative economic benefits. We know that countries that have undergone civil wars have lagged in their economic development despite the fact that policy in such societies tends to be more oriented towards growth.[412] Thus, we also know that economic recovery takes longer than political processes. Jajce, however, has done very well, all other economic factors of Bosnia considered. Statistics of unemployment are also important in Jajce.[413]

Nonetheless, the economic opportunities of Jajce are radically different than those of Bugojno. Jajce's touristic capacities are promising, and the peace of the post-war period has helped to develop them further. In May 2015[414] Jajce established its first Touristic Information Center to place even more emphasis on developing its leisure sector. Jajce is rich in natural attractions like the waterfall in the middle of the town, the Pliva Lake a few kilometers north, and the rich national and cultural heritage, dating back to Medieval and Ottoman Empire periods.[415] Besides the rich cultural heritage, the town carries a meaningful symbolic importance for the history of BH, because it was in Jajce that the Yugoslavia of Tito was created.

It is common to see the streets of Jajce flooded with tourists and students from all over BH and former Yugoslav territories. As the home of the "Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ)" Museum, Jajce has a

[412] Hoeffler: 2012.

[413] According to Municipal Data of 2013, there is a 55.65% of unemployment rate in Jajce. A total of 3559 persons are registered as unemployed in Jajce. UNDP: 2013, December, *Strategy for Jajce 2014-2023.* Retrieved January 12, 2016. See: http://www.mojemjesto.ba/files/documents/Strategija%20razvoja%20Jajce.pdf, p. 11.

[414] See: UNDP: 2015, June. *Tourist Info Center opened in Jajce.* Retrieved in October 2015, from: http://www.ba.undp.org/content/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/presscenter/articles/2015/06/01/otvoren-turisti-ki-info-centar-u-jajcu.html.

[415] Among the attractive cultural heritage of Jajce are: the underground church / Catacombs,– the Church of St. Mary (Fethija Mosque) with St. Lucas tower, the temple of the god Mithras, the Jajce Fortress, Omer bey´s and Krslak house (traditional old style Bosnian houses), Dizdar, Sinan-Bey and Sultan Esma Mosque, St. John´s Church in Podmilacje, the "King's grave", the Franciscan Monastery and the Catholic Church of Blessed Virgin Mary, the Catholic Cemetery, the Partisan cemetery, and an Ethnographic Museum (see more in http://www.visitjajce.com/en/index.php/what-to-do/cultural-and-historical-heritage/medievil-period, an here for details about the cultural heritage in Jajce http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/2098/).

guaranteed spot in the to-do list of the so called "Yugo-nostalgic". AVNOJ[416] was the main political body for Partisans resisting the Axis occupation during World War II, and it administered Partisan territories from November 26th 1942. In what is known as a second AVNOJ conference on November 29 and 30, 1943, Yugoslavia was created, and Tito was named Marshall of Yugoslavia and Prime Minister.

Jajce is also known for its hydro-electric capacities, the Jajce Hydro Power Plan is one of the largest in Bosnia. Although this company is still in Croat hands, its privatization brought Croat and Bošnjak elites together to enjoy its benefits.[417] However, even nowadays there are still no job opportunities for non-Croats within this company[418], which used to employ up to 3000 people before the war and employs only 300 these days.[419]

Although the touristic appeal of Jajce and its hydro-capacities might seem modest for a reader used to big cities, to the eyes of the local inhabitant they are reasons of pride and hopes for a better future. Jajce's reintegration has been sustained already for 10 years. The economic opportunities of Jajce work in favor of the reintegration by the hand of tourism. Even when Croats also might have access to extra possibilities in the "European" Croatia, or when young Bosnians might depart in search of a better future.[420] All these factors considered, a reintegrated scenario seems to sustain.

[416] See: http://muzejavnoj.ba/.
[417] Author's interview with Beharic: op. cit.
[418] Author's interview with Myriam a returnee of Serb origin: June 2012.
[419] Author's interview with Dr. Miketa: op. cit.
[420] The World Bank estimated that between 2008 and 2010, 10,000 young people emigrated from Bosnia. See: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---ed_emp_msu/documents/publication/wcms_230114.pdf.
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IV.3.1 Why was it not too late for reintegration?

I have argued already that *timely third parties intervention* is a condition to achieving ethnic reintegration in homogenous scenarios as the one of Bugojno. However, such is not the case for enclaved scenarios that attract to themselves the minority population willing to return, or serve as an entity where to go in search of the help needed. Thus, "time" is a condition relevant only to cases in which return enforcement is necessary.

Where minorities are left searching for opportunities for resettlement, it is unlikely that they move back home after several years have passed. Timing is more relevant for people to return than for participating with the majority in different areas of life. Enclaved scenarios pose mostly a challenge in terms of minority participation. Return is the first step for the other things to move through, and this is also confirmed for the case of Jajce. However, the return of Bošnjaks has not necessarily helped to reach Jajce's pre-war demographic levels.

Thus, reaching a reintegrated scenario after an enclaved one, all necessary conditions holding, seems to be possible even after this scenario has lived long. For it, the first necessary step for reintegration –the return of minority- is more safely guaranteed within such scenario. Non-timely interventions in homogenous scenarios, however, have a total different fate. Once displaced people have consistently been denied their right to return, their relocation somewhere else works to the detriment of future chances for reintegration. However, in cases like the one in Jajce, reintegration is at the door of changing conditions in minority participation.

To conclude, even when Bošnjak elites knew that the Vinac enclave would be short-lived, they also knew that concentrating capacities within such a limited territory would be a stepping stone towards the Jajce Municipal structures. Thus, they held onto Vinac for as long as the conditions for such change were in place.

IV.4 Conclusions

Two different post-war scenarios emerged in Jajce between 1995 and 2012 (see Figure IV.1). Divided between a municipality run by a Croat majority, and a Bošnjak-controlled enclave in Vinac, the minorities in Jajce were in an enclaved scenario and at the mercy of the majorization practices running in both directions. Minority return was slowly conquered, but minority participation in majority structures was a challenge of a similar dimension. By 2005, the Bošnjak minority was fully reintegrated –and unified- within the municipality. The reintegrated scenario has been sustained for the last 10 years, helped by the hopes placed in future economic opportunities of a hot touristic spot in BH.

This scenario features the following elements: a nearly 50% of Bošnjak return, a Technical Secondary School that seems unique in the BH, which at least has participation with segregation under the "two schools under one roof" format, a reintegrated health care system that unified the structures of Vinac and Jajce, a society free of ethnically driven conflicts, streets full of cafes that are not differentiated any longer by the ethnic color, and problems that are not specific to a particular ethnic group but are rather addressed as societal ones. I was at the Municipal Assembly of Jajce when the whole town gathered to discuss the plans for the Pliva River. I could not find many differences between those debates and those that can take place in my own town of origin –which is not much bigger than Jajce.

The changes that took place to move from an enclaved scenario to the present of reintegration confirm the expectations of the theory: 1) The disruption of the majorization pattern by the engagement of third parties challenging the exclusivity

and legitimacy of local elites over the spoils of war and peace, when they backed Mr. Cavar and sanctioned obstructionist elites and the manipulation of displaced co-ethnics. 2) Third parties further intervened to establish concerted processes with relevant actors, who included the ethnic kin of local elites. Such efforts concluded in successful negotiations that brought about changes for those policing Jajce, as well as for those returning home. 3) Furthermore, my findings also confirm that an enclaved scenario holds for as long as it serves either the consolidation of power plans, or political survival. The Bošnjak elites had capacities to opt for the second political choice, and thus the enclave in Vinac lasted just long enough to protect Bošnjaks' political interests.

CHAPTER V: POST-WAR REINTEGRATION IN KOSOVO

This chapter aims at testing the applicability of the theory of post-war reintegration to a non-Bosnian context. Kosovo is a good case for this purpose because although it differs from Bosnia in the type of institutional design (being a unitary state, not a federation), it also has several similarities in terms of the conflict-induced displacement of a population that upon return became a minority. This role was fulfilled by the Kosovo Serbs, both in the north and in the south of the country.

The post-war State of Kosovo emerged as the result of the Kosovo-Serbian war. The Kumanovo Agreement[421] finished the war on June 9th 1999 and allowed for the NATO led forces –the KFOR- to secure the territory. On June 10th, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1244 stipulating the rapid withdrawal of Serbia from the Kosovo territory (see Annex 2.2). After this Resolution some personnel for liaison, Serb patrimonial sites, and key border crossings could be accepted to return under specific conditions[422]. The UNSCR 1244 also set up the UN Mission for Kosovo (UNMIK) to internationally administer Kosovo until the resolution of a final status.

On February 17th, 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence. An International Civil Office (ICO) was set in place to oversee the Independence of Kosovo and its advance in protecting minorities –as stipulated by the Ahtisaari Plan. Since then, the UNMIK has remained with limited functions but none of them

[421] See: http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm.
[422] UNSCR 1244, see: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SRES%201244.pdf.

governmental ones. Such oversight finished in September 2012, but NATO is still deployed until this date.[423]

Looking within Kosovo, I compare the conditions of the Serb minorities in the South and the North of Kosovo. Both groups shared the same war experience, bear a similar identity, the same host government, the same Kin-State, and the same members of the international community have been engaged in both regions. Moreover, Kosovo Serbs in both regions have remained in an enclaved scenario after the war.

This chapter will explore why southern Kosovo Serbs engaged in the reintegration process mostly right after the Kosovo Declaration of Independence, while Kosovo Serb enclaves in the north have been more reluctant to do so. In other words, I inquire why the northern Kosovo Serb enclaved scenario has been maintained longer than the enclaved scenario in the South.

This chapter will show that these differences are related to the ethnic kin support this minority group had in each region, particularly from its kin-state. It further shows the relevance of border proximity and a previous experience of war with the host-state in question as factors that help entrenching an enclaved minority.

Furthermore, this chapter shows that a reintegrated scenario requires the engagement of third parties in disrupting the post-conflict pattern of majorization implemented by both local elites of minority (Kosovo Serb) and majority (Kosovo Albanian) groups and their respective ethnic kin support. Such a task demands that the international community challenges the exclusivity that local elites have over the management of the available resources, the legitimacy they enjoy to allocate those

[423] Reuters: 2012: See: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-independence-idUSBRE8610RE20120702.

resources to reinforce the majorization process, and the support base of their ethnic kin, which provides them with extra capacities for distributing said resources.

I offer two arguments. First, I argue that what maintained Kosovo divided had less to do with Partition scholars' arguments of ethnic hatred and fears than with the political dynamics of majorization created by Serb minorities and Serbia, seeking to consolidate their power in the North, and by Kosovo Albanians trying to consolidate power in Kosovo at large. More importantly, southern Kosovo Serbs enjoyed more restricted capacities than their counterparts in the north to maintain the enclave for a longer period, while the proximate border with Serbia was key for northern Kosovo Serbs to access more resources and therefore maintain the enclaved scenario.

Second, this enclaved scenario will be perpetuated unless the international community keeps challenging the support that Serbia provides to Kosovo Serbs in the North. It also has to sit Serbia at a negotiation table to discuss reintegration together with the Kosovo Albanian majority, and Kosovo Serbs with a voice of their own, because the involvement of kin-states in post-conflict dynamics obeys more to its domestic and foreign policies than in argued ties of identity.

V.1 Southern and Northern Kosovo Serbs at War's end

At war's end Kosovo remained governed by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government under the UNMIK and run by the Albanian majority including some sort of Kosovo Serb representation. During the war, Kosovo Serbs moved either to existing southern Serb majority villages and municipalities, or to those in the north bordering Serbia. Most rural Serbs remained in their place of origin[424]. Although the

[424] ESI: 2004, p. 11. See: http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_53.pdf.

Kosovo Serb population in Kosovo was never larger than 10% by the most generous estimates[425], the war pushed for the concentration of the few other Serb families that were scattered across Kosovo. Only in five municipalities (Strepce and Novo Brdo in the south, and Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Zvecan in the north) were they a majority, albeit only 40% of the total Serb population lived in those areas; the rest was scattered across the territory.[426] It was towards those five regions that the Serbs of Kosovo displaced.

By July 26th 1999, a bit more than a month after the war finished, the UNHCR[427] reported numbers across Kosovo reflecting that more than 50% of the pre-war Kosovo Serb population remained in the country, albeit generally relocated, particularly those from urban areas. The Kosovo Serbs that displaced themselves concentrating in Southern Kosovo went to Partesh, Novo Brdo, Strepce, or Gracanica[428]. Later on the Ahtisaari Plan echoed this reality by establishing Partesh, Novo Brdo and Gracanica as new municipalities in Kosovo.

[425] Statistical information of the Serb population before and after the war is problematic (UNHCR: 1999b) for several reasons, the most important being that playing with its number is also a political strategy in itself. ESI (2004) describes how the information of displacement and refugees used and published by the UNHCR is provided by Serbia, so the source in itself is questionable. Those constraints come from the fact that Serbia has manipulated statistics to play politically with them, and Kosovo has not been able to properly collect new statistical information. The last census of 2011 was partially boycotted by Kosovo Serbs and the Roma population from the south of River Ibar, and totally boycotted by Kosovo Serbs in the north. Nevertheless, it seems that proper statistics might be collected by autumn of 2016, when the Kosovo Government is expected to run a census in those areas. Meanwhile, I rely here on statistics provided by ESI research. The institute seems to have a reliable methodology to estimate statistics of Kosovo Serbs and it is undoubtedly more politically objective than estimates that might come from both either Serbia or Kosovo States.

[426] ESI: *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[427] UNHCR: 1999a, see: http://www.unhcr.org/3c3c552f4.html, 26th July.

[428] Ibíd. Those Serbs coming from the municipality of Gnjilane (with a population of about 4,000 people, as estimated by the local Orthodox Church) concentrated in villages like Partesh. Despite physical assaults and destruction of their property, they still chose to live there under the protection of KFOR. Most Serbs from Pristina concentrated in Gracanica. 2,700 Serbs out of 4,800 were still living in Novo Brdo in 1999, although requesting protection by the KFOR to remain there to keep their farming activities. Kosovo Serbs from Prizren moved mostly towards Strepce, where their kin was already a majority (of around 9,000 people); most of the displaced were located in the suburban Brezovica settlement managed by the Yugoslav Red Cross. (UNHCR: 1999b), see: http://www.unhcr.org/3c3c52a04.html, 6th September.

A few months after the establishment of the UNMIK, the Kosovo Serbs and the Roma population -believed to have collaborated with them- were attacked by mobilized Albanian groups seeking revenge and their expulsion from Kosovo. In this case, like in 2004, the international community, and the KFOR in specific, was helpless.[429] Kidnappings, daily intimidation, grenade attacks, looting, and even missing people were a common daily feat, committed generally by mobilized Albanians.[430]

Despite rather pervasive physical assaults, the KFOR presence tended to maintain peace to some extent. However, a Kosovo Serb parliamentarian I interviewed recalls how her father went missing despite the fact that he was being escorted by a KFOR unit; up to this date she has no information about her father or the reasons behind his disappearance.[431]

Some other Serbs from the villages of Kamenica, Vitina, Lipjan have also relocated or migrated towards Serbia, but there is no clear information about where they went[432].

Other Serbs relocated in northern Kosovo, bordering with Serbia; some municipalities increased their proportion of Serbs substantially, while others increased

[429] The independent International Commission for Kosovo, 2000, p. 104.
[430] UNHCR: 1999a, *.op. cit.*
[431] Author's Interview with a Kosovo Serb Parliamentarian of Strepce: November 2013.
[432] In the Kamenica region some 8,000 out of 13,000 persons remained, and mostly in villages (UNHCR: 1999a, *op. cit.*), but these numbers seem to start dropping considerably by September of the same year (UNHCR: 1999b, *op. cit.*). Today there are only 3,019 Serbs there, according to the municipality office of communities and return (OSCE: 2015a), see: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13119?download=true, 23th September. Of the 12,000 Serbs who lived in Vitina before the conflict, approximately 7,000 are estimated to remain. As of today, in OSCE estimates only 113 remain, or 280 according to the municipal office of return (OSCE: 2015b), see: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13133?download=true 23th September. According to the UNHCR, the municipality of Lipjan had around 10,000 Serb inhabitants (UNHCR: 1999b, *op. cit.*), but nowadays the office for communities and return (generally managed by a Minister of Serb identity) reports 2000 people, while the Kosovo Agency of Statistics claim only 513 (OSCE: 2015c), see: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13121?download=true 30 September.

the existent concentration of them. At war's end the municipalities of Mitrovica, Zvecan, Leposavic and Zubin Potok remained as Kosovo Serb enclaves.

Mitrovica was divided as a consequence of war; the River Ibar posed a geographical division that extended to the ethnic divide, leaving a majority of Kosovo Serbs in the north, and a majority Kosovo Albanians in the south. Before the war the municipality of Mitrovica had a 78.9% Albanian majority and a 10.5% of Kosovo Serb minority.[433] The division is said to have been created by the French KFOR, which stopped at River Ibar and set a check point with barbed wire across the bridge[434], emphasizing the geographical and political division of the city. The reasons for this decision are still not fully understood even by the international community operating in Kosovo at that time[435], but some have claimed that it was intended to be a "cordon sanitaire" thought to prevent further violence in the area.[436]

By 1999, about 8,000 internally displaced ethnic Albanians were located in the southern part of Mitrovica, waiting for an improvement of their situation[437]. Nowadays the whole town has 22,500 inhabitants (5,000 to 7,000 of them being displaced from other areas of Kosovo)[438], and Albanians inhabit Mitrovica South.

In Zubin Potok community leaders indicate a current Serb population of 11,000 people (including 1,000 displaced persons). However, the accuracy of this figure is brought into question by the 1991 census, in which only around 6,200 Serbs

[433] Census 1991, referred to in ICG: 2000; see: https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/4313/uploads, 20th of June.
[434] ICG: 2000, 2. https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/4313/uploads, 20th of June.
[435] O'Neill, William: 2003, 45. *Kosovo: an unfinished Peace.*
[436] King, Ian and Mason, Whit: 2005, p. 169.
[437] *Ibid.*
[438] OSCE: 2015d; see: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/122119?download=true, September.

were registered for this area.[439] Currently there are 13,900 Kosovo Serbs in the municipality, according to other sources.[440]

To conclude, the war left enclaved scenarios of Kosovo Serbs in the south and the north of Kosovo. In the latter case they profited from the border proximity with Serbia. The KFOR has generally being tasked with the protection of those enclaves. This is the scenario in which post-war dynamics take place. In those enclaves Albanians were in a minority and also suffered security problems that did not provide conditions for their return –even after the KFOR reinforced its presence in the north by deploying soldiers on every street corner.[441] However, the international community's goals, and the peace of Kosovo, were linked to addressing the situation of the Serb minority. Thus, this analysis follows such premises and considers those areas as the enclaved scenario of Kosovo Serb minorities within the Kosovo State controlled by an Albanian majority, and studies post-war dynamics under this light.

Since the end of war, the main concern of the international community operating in Kosovo has been how to reintegrate Kosovo Serbs within the national structures of government, education, security, and health care. The next sections will track the pathway of Kosovo Serbs in these areas from the enclaved scenario they maintained in the south until 2008, and until 2013 in the north. Although we cannot really talk about a fully reintegrated northern Kosovo, the pathway has been opened and we will evaluate here what their chances are for continuing that way. Meanwhile, Kosovo Serbs in the south have developed increasing reintegration within the Kosovo Government structures.

[439] UNHCR: 1999b, *op. cit.*
[440] OSCE: 2015e: see. http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13135?download=true, September.
[441] UNHCR: 1999b, *op. cit.*

Figure V.I: Map of Kosovo with Kosovo Serb majority areas as of 2000[442]



V.2 Southern Kosovo Serb municipalities

The Municipalities of southern Kosovo made a slow step forward on the path to ethnic reintegration when in 2009 participation levels within Kosovo government structures increased considerably. Although since early 2014 Serbia has reconfirmed its parallel structures in municipalities of this region as well, the international community has challenged this strategy once more by conditioning Serbian access to the EU to their dismantlement.

[442] Dahlman and Williams: 2010.

Figure V.2: Post-conflict outcomes in Southern Kosovo 1999-2015



V.2.1 1999-2008: Maintaining the enclaves in the South: local elites and ethnic kin (FRY/Serbia)

The first five years after June 1999 were marred with different eruptions of violence against Kosovo Serbs by mobilized Albanian co-ethnics who aimed at pushing them far away from the country. Violence also took place within the enclaves; to the point that internationals were recommended a to avoid them because they were declared not to be safe enough.[443] Overt violence took place mostly during 1999 and had another peak in the riots of March 2004. In February 2000 there were grenade and arson attacks in Kosovo Serb enclaves, mostly related to a violent situation in Mitrovica, but generally, violence started to decrease that year.

Mobilized Kosovo Albanian co-ethnics managed to scare Kosovo Serbs to the point of making them feel unwelcome and insecure, including some degree of psychological manipulation, like informing Serbs that "if they were hired after 1990, they are not legally employed".[444] After violence increased, a Kosovo Serb delegation reached out to the UNSC, where its leader Rada Trajkovic expressed that Serbs were

[443] King and Mason: 2006, p. 70.
[444] Ramet 2006, 542, 52 note.

leaving their places of residence, and she feared that Kosovo appeared to be dominated by one single ethnic group.[445]

Milosevic ordered Kosovo Serbs to not cooperate with the UNMIK and threatened to cut-off pensions and benefits to those who did.[446] Majorization patterns also involved the persecution of co-ethnics not aligned with extremist politics. Moderates were portrayed as cooperating with actors of the other ethnicity, or simply as a potential challenge to the existing elites' resources and legitimacy. Both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs who chose to ride the tide of reintegration faced condemnations, life threat and violence by mobilized co-ethnics. Momcilo Trajkovic, a moderate Serb opposed to Milosevic suffered four attempts against his life, and Belgrade daily newspaper *Borba* published arguments that pointed at him being a traitor.[447] Other Serbs feared the same fate.[448]

Members of the LDK were threatened as well. Former KLA members were accused of committing attempts against the life of various LDK leaders, who competed against them for the control of territorial power. The elections had rendered LDK as a winner with a 58% of votes, and PDK (the party originated out of the KLA) obtained just a 27% of the total turnout.

In general, post-war first elections are won by the "freedom fighters", those activists who resorted to armed violence to deal with the conflict. Contrary to this trend, in the case of Kosovo the first elections were won by the peaceful movement that struggled for independence but was opposed to engaging in armed battle. However, part of the history that is frequently concealed from the narrative of

[445] UN Security Council Report, see: http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000609.sc6873.doc.html.
[446] King and Mason 2006, p.68
[447] Ramet 2006, p542, *op.cit*
[448] *Ibid.*

Independence, is that even the LDK itself has persecuted its own "reformist" members.

In one of the first interviews I conducted in Kosovo, a former member of the LDK was pointing in that direction, especially after Rugova's death. This interviewee had had three assassination attempts and was protected at home by the UNMIK police and an invisible US security escort while in movement. Later on, that person had to leave the country in order to lower his political profile within the Kosovo political scene. For obvious reasons, no formal accusation has been made so far, in a stark contrast with the relatively common accusations against KLA members. It was not easy for alternative voices to come to surface, even within the Kosovo Albanian majority challenging their own leaders on decisions about how Kosovo should be conducted, not necessarily regarding minority issues. The chance of challenging their resources and legitimacy was enough of a reason to fear for their integrity.[449]

Tensions also took place along Kosovo Serbs when Kosovo Albanians were trying to return to previously ethnically mixed villages. Serbs did not welcome Albanians in their enclaves and tried to obstruct their return. In Strepce, for example, Serbs damaged the cars of Albanians, and in return Albanians "disrupted a regular KFOR-escorted convoy of Serbs out of Strepce".[450]

Violence peaked again in March 2004, but this time to and unthinkable level, showing the collapse and failure of the international community to protect people from both ethnic groups against post-war violence. Around 51,000 people participated of the riots during two days, in which mobilized Albanian co-ethnics attacked Kosovo

[449] Author's interview with former LDK member: January 23rd 2006.
[450] OSCE, p.7 http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13307?download=true

Serbs.[451] The conflict sparked when Kosovo Albanians accused Serbs of the murder of three kids who appeared dead in the River Ibar in Mitrovica.

The riots left 19 people killed (both Albanians and Serbs), 900 injured, and around 700 homes were destroyed, belonging to Kosovo Serbs, Askalis and Roma.[452] The attack included the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Serbian School and Hospital. As an aftermath, 41,000 Serbs, Roma, Ashkali and other non-Albanian minorities were displaced.[453] Human Rights Watch[454] reported that such riots were not only ethnically motivated but also expressed the disappointment of Kosovo Albanians with the governance of the UNMIK and their national elites over the final status of Kosovo, not yet discussed.

After the riots many Serbs in Gracanica wanted to leave; however, their leadership had different plans: they wanted them to stay in the town to retain territorial claims over Kosovo.[455] The manipulation of the Serb population in Kosovo was more overt than what was recognized by policy makers or even showed by academics. The fact that the statistics of the Kosovo Serb population are one of the most problematic pieces of information to have access to, shows that demographic estimates have always been manipulated by both sides.

Dragan Velic, a Kosovo Serb leader in Prishtina, had promised that he would move them out of the country but went on to ignore such commitments; and later the UNMIK confirmed that such provisions were not available.[456] This shows how much the Kosovo Serb community relied on its leadership and patronage networks to make

[451] HRW: 2004, 1. See: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/kosovo0704.pdf.
[452] ICG: 2004, 1.
[453] HRW: 2004, op. cit., p. 1.
[454] HRW: 2004, p. 2.
[455] Associated Press: 2004, March 24. See: http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2004/03/24/causes_explored_in_kosovo_violence/.
[456] Associated Press: 2004, op. cit.

their living in Kosovo, but most importantly, it also shows to what extent they were at the mercy of their leadership's political goals.

Data confirms my predictions that majority elites and co-ethnics, as well as minority elites and co-ethnics, relied on different mechanisms for political survival and power consolidation in their respective scenarios. The Kosovo Serbs who remained in an enclaved scenario attempted to protect the spaces they had inhabited in the past and the regions where they had concentrated after the war. The protection of these regions was later legally recognized, firstly by the Ahtisaari Plan, and later in Law L-041[457], which created six new Kosovo Serb municipalities after the Kosovo Independence. Kosovo Albanians, on their side, sought to ensure that they would finalize a status that grants them full control over Kosovo.

During this period, Serbs oscillated between participating within the Kosovo structures created by the UNMIK, and favoring parallel structures provided by their kinstate. The reasons of this swing are to be located within Serbs' evaluations regarding their capacities to survive as an enclave within a country run by an almost overwhelming Albanian majority. Some of them understood that Kosovo was likely to be partitioned to the north of Ibar River, so they factored this information in their decisions regarding participation in Kosovo structures.[458] Their oscillations were also related to divisions within their leadership due to the influence of Serbia and the security problems they were facing.[459] The Kosovo Serb leadership in the south was rather moderate: the SNC of this area was very active in Prishtina and the Gjilane region[460], under the figures of Bishop Artemjie and Momcilo Trajkovic. They were in

[457] Law N.3/L-041.
[458] Ramet, 2006, p. 547.
[459] UN Security report: 2000. See: http://www.unmikonline.org/SGReports/S-2000-177.pdf.
[460] Those locations are currently known as Gracanica and Partesh municipalities.

the opposition to Serbia (FRY); and a very active opposition to Milosevic as well.[461] The participation of Kosovo Serbs within the Kosovo governing structures was generally a policy of the international community, seeking the creation of a peaceful and multiethnic society. The first move on this direction was the creation of the Joint Interim Administrative Structures (JIAS). From 15 December of 1999, an agreement was reached between the UNMIK and Kosovo Serb leaders of SNC to participate in the JIAS, to increase security and the presence of the UNMIK in areas populated by Serbs, and to have access to public services. However, their participation was hampered[462] and pendular. In June 29th, 2000, another agreement was signed addressing the very same problems[463], although this one was exclusively signed between the JIAS and the SNC.

One more agreement came less than a month later, on July 2000, signed by UNMIK representative Bernard Kouchner and the leader of the SNC, Bishop Artemije.[464] This agreement promoted the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the Kosovo government structures and the first municipal elections to be held in October 2000. No Kosovo Serbs from the south or from the north of Kosovo participated in these elections; yet, their elites got even more spoils of peace, materialized in salaries,

[461] UN Security Report *Op.cit*, p.2
[462] Ibid, p. 2-3,
[463] See: http://www.kosovo.net/snc-unmik.html.
[464] For more detail see, http://www.kosovo.net/snc-unmik.html and http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200007/00716-006-trae-pri.htm.

or solid per diems[465] provided for all the conferences they were mobilized to with USA sponsorship.[466]

Salaries to those participating in all Kosovo governing structures were anyways paid despite the fact that they not always effectively integrated those structures. In conditions of scarce resources, internationals were their only path to gaining access to those salaries, besides the extra resources coming from Serbia.

While the numerous agreements signed did not achieve much more than showing in the media that some group of Kosovo Serbs were somehow figuring out how to work with the UNMIK, looking backwards, that contribution might not be insignificant after all. In the Kosovo context at that time, in which Serbia (FRY) still had a huge influence, those signs were also a message for Serbia proper, a message that certainly came at a political cost.

Kosovo Albanians have also been integrated slowly into the JIAS since January 2000, after dissolving the parallel government they implemented since Serbia occupied the country in 1989.[467] Reactions towards the agreements between the UNMIK and the Kosovo Serb leadership were generally to express suspicions against the Serbs' plans for Kosovo.

Thus, any initiative of international policy for strengthening a multi-ethnic Kosovo was understood by Kosovo Albanians as a policy that risked helping to consolidate the enclaved scenarios existing in the south and the north of the

[465] From my experience in conflict management trainings in Germany (which gathered leaders engaged in conflict and post-conflict processes), the UN and many international offices relied on a per diem to seat several actors at a negotiation table. Such per diem in most societies represented a standard post-war salary. From Africa to Central America this was a constant example. Sometimes participation in these sorts of efforts does not represent much more than accepting opportunities at hand in conditions of scarcity. Certainly, only the so called "leaders" or "community representatives" who claim to speak in the name of those communities can have access to this sort of spoils. Participating is a way to capture those spoils, something that the UN has known very well.

[466] If interested on this, the reader can consult the various track II dialogues between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs sponsored by the USA government from September 1999 to July 2000. See: http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/000723_airlie_decl.html.

[467] UN Security report: 2000, p. 2-3,.

country.[468] Therefore, they were understood to respond to Serbia's plan of holding the grip of Kosovo.

Kosovo Serbs continued taking part in institutions that would not challenge their enclaves but rather institutionalize them. The "Joint UNMIK-SNC Understanding" granted legitimacy over the Kosovo Serb enclaves, brought to light their recognizable leaders and allowed these to appoint representatives of their community in those institutions.

The UNMIK also brought about regulations 2000/39[469] and 2000/45[470] that helped to structure the competences for Serb dominated municipalities, banned ethnic discrimination and set Albanian and Serbian as official languages.

Third parties continued making efforts to guarantee the participation of Kosovo Serbs and their protection within the Kosovo institutions. SRSG Bernard Kouchner, for instance, built the "Constitutional Framework for Kosovo"[471] to include minority rights and interests, reserving Serbs 10 out of 20 minority seats in the Kosovo parliament (out of 120 seats), one ministerial position for Kosovo Serbs and another for a non-Serb minority, as well as provisions to guarantee the right to return and property restitution.

After Milosevic, the international community saw in Serbia a factor for Balkan stability[472]: the UNMIK and Serbia started to cooperate since then on better terms. Meanwhile, Serbia established the Coordinated Centre for Kosovo in August 2001 as a liaison with the UNMIK, led by Nebosja Covic. In what is known as the Haekkerup-Covic Deal, they negotiated the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the Kosovo parliamentarian elections of November 2001.

[468] See: http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200007/00716-006-trae-pri.htm.
[469] See: http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/re2000_39.htm.
[470] See: http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg45-00.htm.
[471] See: http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/FrameworkPocket_ENG_Dec2002.pdf.
[472] ICG: 2002, .p. 16-18

In exchange, the UNMIK[473] committed to providing an Office of Return, to work on missing people, to bring about the resolution of property claims, to hire more Serb personnel in the Justice system and ensure Serbs' access to education in their own language. Interestingly enough, most of these had actually already been covered by Serbian structures, which remained the same despite the fact that the agreement also foresaw the foreclosure of some parallel structures. It did help to appoint Serb judges and bring Kosovo Albanian prisoners back to Kosovo[474].

However, in practical terms the agreement did not provide anything new that the UNMIK had not offered before, or was unwilling to do. Thus, it seems that this was more of an action guided by the Serbian diplomatic interests of building trust with the international community than a policy oriented to help Kosovo Serbs within Kosovo.

Their enclaves and parallel structures were maintained, and double salaries became a common feature of the enclaves. Similarly, the double standard was observed in Kosovo Serb political participation within Kosovo government structures. Although in 2001 the turnout reached 46% in Serb inhabited areas,[475]. After the riots of 2004, Kosovo Serbs were only occasionally seen in Kosovo institutions. Things would remain this way until the elections of 2009.

During these years, participation was use by Kosovo Serbs to obtain extra gains through to help maintaining the enclave. For example, in 2004 the Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica linked Kosovo Serb participation in Kosovo elections to the acceptance of Serbia's Belgrade Plan for decentralization. Because

[473] ICG: 2003, Report 143, *Kosovo's Ethnic Dilemma: The need for a civic contract, p. 4-5.:* http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Kosovo%20143.pdf. Also, see the Haekkerup-Covic Document: http://www.vetevendosje.org/repository/docs/unmik_fry.pdf.

[474] *Ibid*, p. 5.

[475] Legislative Elections 2001, see: http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1112/e1117a.htm.. In these elections, the Povratak (Return) Coalition got 11% of the total votes. This was possible because Kosovo Serbs displaced in Serbia and Montenegro had the right cast their vote as well.

third parties did not support such plan, Kostunica called on Serbs to boycott the Kosovo elections, despite appeals from Solana and Patten.[476] The elections of November 2007 witnessed the same pattern, although this time the boycott was a concerted decision between PM Kostunica and President Tadic.[477] Thus, the Kosovo Serb turnout was just one percent in the 2007 elections.[478]

One of the Kosovo Serb lists that participated in the elections can be duly considered as tide riders of the entire post-conflict pattern. The Serbian Liberal Party (SLS) obtained seats and joined the PDK-LDK coalition in government with two cabinet positions.[479] Some Kosovo Serbs, after all, were ready to accept the new reality [of reintegration within Kosovo structures] as reasonable.[480]

Meanwhile, enclaves were maintained with an active involvement of Serbia, either with its resources, or with a "carrot and stick" policy consisting of marginalizing those who would not align with Serbian goals, while promoting those who did, in different positions in the Kosovo parallel structures or in Serbia proper. [481]

Serbia managed to keep running parallel structures along all of the Kosovo Serb enclaves. In 2003, the ICG[482] reported that enclaves were financed with around €125 million from Serbia's budget. Those funds provided Serb elites with administrative structures and resources of their own. Accepting reintegration within

[476] See: http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=13172.
[477] See: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2007&mm=09&dd=12&nav_id=43697.
[478] Council of Inclusive Governance, p. 2, see: http://www.cigonline.net/images/Report_Elections_And_Dialogue_2010.pdf.
[479] *Ibid*
[480] Author's Interview with SLS leader and parliamentarian, Slobodan Petrović: Prishtina, September 26th 2008. The interview was conducted in Serbian and translated to English.
[481] ICG: 2005, Report 161,, ICG: 2009, Report 200, ICG: 2012, Report 218
[482] ICG 2004b, p.10

Kosovo structures would have implied losing these capacities and the chances to consolidate them further.[483]

Parallel structures were pervasive in Kosovo, and each of them is linked to the public administration in Serbia. For example, there is in Gracanica a liaison office of the Serbian Administrative Court based in Nis[484]; a Serbian civil registry was functioning in downtown Prishtina until 2014; and the Commercial Court of Prishtina is located in Kraljevo (Serbia)[485]. Schools run by Serbia still operate in areas of Prishtina, Prizren, Peje/Pec, Gjilan, and northern municipalities including University in Mitrovica North to mention some of the almost 50 facilities reported by OSCE.[486]

The consequences were numerous; among the practical concerns was the validation in Kosovo of education certificates issued in those schools, and vis a vis Serbia. In 2015, Kosovo Government adopted a regulation for validation of diplomas of University of Mirovica North in interim bases, to ensure reintegration of Kosovo Serbs based on the Brussels Agreements.[487] The situation continues and a settlement is expected to take place in the agreement to be reached in Brussels. Health care is also provided by facilities paid and run by Serbia. Some of those, however, do not satisfy the needs of all Kosovo Serbs, who travel to other facilities in northern enclaves of Mitrovica, or to Gracanica in the south.[488] Up to 2007 those travels required setting up UN convoys.[489]

[483]ICG: 2005, Report 161, Towards Final Status. Also, ICG: 2009, Report 200. Also, ICG: 2012, Setting Kosovo Free.
[484] OSCE: 2006-2007, Parallel Structures.p.17
[485] *Ibid*, p.20
[486] I*bid*., p. 33-34.
[487] http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/RREGULLORE_(QRK)_-_NR__21-2015_PER_PROCEDURAT_DHE_KRITERET_PER_LESHIMIN_E_CERTIFIKATAVE_SHTETASVE_TE_REPUBLIKES_SE_KOSOVES_TE_CILET_KANE_MARR.pdf
[488] OSCE: 2006-2007, op. cit., p. 50.
[489] Ibid.

The parallel structures served various purposes: 1) they kept Serbian influence within the Kosovo territory; 2) they provided a secure alternative to Kosovo Serbs; 3) they helped consolidating their enclaves as they provided their leaders with much needed resources. Those resources coming from Serbia were not a minor thing, but rather the tools that allowed that leadership to survive in a context of open hostility from their Albanian counterparts. Thus, as predicted by theory, ethnic kin support was a necessary factor for the survival and consolidation of the enclaves.

The ICG reported in 2003 that while a Serb municipal vice-mayor earns a salary of €300 from the Kosovo Budget, the head of a parallel municipality earned €800 from the Serbian one.[490] This has been the main problem up to the date of this writing: those on Serbia's payroll earn much more than those within Kosovo institutions, be they doctors, teachers, judges, and even police officers. There are also Serbs who receive a double salary. The situation is similar both in the south or the north of the Ibar River. It has been a successful strategy that allowed Kosovo Serbs to consolidate a political voice within Kosovo, which in turn eventually led them to have legally constituted municipalities in 2008.

The international community never addressed the issue of parallel structures seriously until the Brussels Dialogue did it in 2011. The OSCE kept running lengthy and detailed reports on how those structures were operating in Kosovo,[491] but no single actor or negotiation before the Brussels Dialogue could dismantle them. For example, back in November 2002 the UNMIK announced the official closure of all parallel structures in North Mitrovica.[492] The closure of those very same structures is

[490] ICG: 2003, p. 5.
[491] See OSCE reports on Parallel structures: 2002-2003, 2006-2007, and 2008-2009.
[492] ICG: 2003, p. 5.

going to be decided by the third week of January 2016 in Brussels, almost 14 years after their announcement!

Seeing that any efforts to reintegrate the Kosovo Serb minority were failing, and that the Kosovo Albanian majority was pushing for consolidating its own status, the SC appointed Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy of the Secretary General. His mission was to broker the negotiations over the final status of Kosovo, to reach a satisfactory solution for the Kosovo Serb minority, and to assure their protection across Kosovo.[493] The negotiations started in Vienna early in 2006 and lasted until November 2007, resulting in the Ahtisaari Plan[494]. It consolidated the Kosovo Albanian power by stating that alternative options were no longer viable: neither Kosovo returning to Serbia, nor the continuation of the international administration.

The plan provided for the supervision of the Independence for a couple of years with the capacity to annul decisions that violate the plan.[495] The Independence was supported by the International Civilian Office (ICO) and had an International Civilian Representative (ICR) and an EU Special Representation (EUSR), adding later in December 2009 the EULEX structure to deal with Rule of Law.

The Ahtisaari Plan provided for the protection and promotion of the rights of communities and their religious and cultural heritage through the creation of 'New Municipalities', the 'Enhanced Municipal Competences' and the "rights to receive certain assistance from Serbia, within certain clear parameters set by the Plan"[496].

[493] Letter from Secretary General addressed to the President of Security Council, UN Doc, 31 October of 2005. S/2005/708 and S/2005/709 of 10 November 2005.

[494] See the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal, or "Ahtisaari Plan", at http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf.Also, the Report of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General on Kosovo's future status: http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf.

[495] The International Steering Group, formed by 25 countries that recognized the Kosovo Independence would have the responsibility to appoint (in consultation with the EU and endorsed by the UN) and oversee the ICR.

[496] See: Resolution S/2007/168.

It also called for the creation of six new Kosovo Serb administered municipalities: Mitrovica North, Gracanica, Ranilug, Partesh, Klokott/Vrbovac, and Novo Brdo. This effort granted the Serb enclaved scenarios with a legal and strong control of their own affairs, reflected in the 'enhanced municipal competences' that the Law of Self-Government provided for the fields of health, education, cultural affairs, and police, as well as the possibility of inter-municipal cooperation. The Law on Education guarantees education in the Serbian language, including the right to use textbooks and curricula developed by the Ministry of Education of Serbia.

Despite these extensive powers, Kosovo Serbs, and Serbia in particular[497] rejected the Plan because it challenged the control that Serbia had over Kosovo. The Albanian majority, however, embraced it with happiness because it meant a big step forward in the final consolidation of its power.

Rejecting any solution within the Kosovo government institutions meant for Serbia and the Kosovo Serb elites not to give in to the consolidation plans of the Albanian majority. At the same time, this rejection allowed the Serb elites to keep demanding benefits within their enclaves, and for Serbia to keep alive the political project of recovering Kosovo.

As predicted by the theory of post-war reintegration, the country remained divided between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs due to respective majorization dynamics that aimed at consolidating their respective power. Mobilized co-ethnics were key to pushing Serbs away from Kosovo and deterring their participation in Kosovo institutions run by the UNMIK. By supporting parallel structures and by

[497] Southeast European Times: 2007, "Serbian parliament convenes, rejects Ahtisaari Plan", 15 February, accessed on May 14th 2008. See: http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2007/02/15/feature-02.

demanding partition, Serbia deterred the Serb-Albanian relations[498], and thus the possibilities for the reintegration of Kosovo Serbs.

The international community exposed its ineffectiveness to disrupt Serbs and Albanians' majorization patterns, to curtail their respective ethnic kin support, and to build a reintegration solution relying on existing but weak tide riders among both groups. Instead, the internationals kept swinging between fearing the KLA and Serbia in equal parts.

A different position within the international community in Kosovo helped change the process in another direction. With strong international backing, on February 17 2008, Kosovo Albanians managed to consolidate their power in a Parliamentarian Session, when parliamentarians unanimously declared the Independence of Kosovo. However, only 109 out of 120 members were present, due to the foreseeable absence of Serb MPs.

V.2.2 2009-2015 The dual reality: a path toward reintegration

This period differs considerably with the previous one in two aspects. First, it does start to record some movement towards reintegration, even when we still cannot properly say that the enclaved scenario has totally evolved into a reintegrated one. The process has started, but despite that the tendency has been sustained over 6 years there are still many issues to resolve.

Second, majorization practices still survive, despite the concomitant advance of reintegration. To observe the outlook of the movement from an enclaved scenario to a reintegrated one, we need to look at what happened with the enclaves and the

[498] ICG: 2003, *op. cit.*

proposal of converting them into legal municipalities, and the participation of Serbs in the elections and the Kosovo Government structures.

From enclaves to municipalities

Despite the fact that neither Kosovo Serbs nor Serbia supported the Ahtisaari Plan, the declaration of Kosovo Independence came accompanied by most of the measures envisaged in the Plan. In extended sessions the Kosovo Parliament approved the 42 laws of the so-called "Ahtisaari Package" without further discussion and with a simple "yes and no" vote. Those laws were the bus Kosovo Albanians took on the way to independence.

The laws, mostly crafted by a crowd of international experts, were never opened to parliamentary debate. Most of them were devoted to the transfer of functions from the central government to municipalities, and addressed various issues related to minorities in Kosovo, in particular the Serbs.[499]

The laws made important concessions to favor minorities[500] and created new municipalities, consolidating the enclaves[501]. The laws foresaw "enhanced competences" for municipalities, granting Serb minority a high degree of control over the territories where they constitute the majority, especially in the areas of education[502], cultural affairs, and police, and also provided for inter-municipal cooperation. [503] Another law established Special Protective Zones with the objective of protecting the cultural heritage of Kosovo Serbs and the surroundings of their

[499] KIPRED: 2009, p. 5.
[500] In my MA Thesis I discuss a detailed description of the "Ahtisaari laws" enacted to favor minorities and reintegration in Kosovo. I offer here a summary of what I learned then. See: Peral, Natalia A.: "*Civic Nation Building as a tool for conflict transformation: an analysis of the Ahtisaari Plan and the Independence Process in Kosovo*", June 2009, Sabanci University.
[501] Law NR. 03/L-41.
[502] A Special Law was designed also for this issue, Law NR.03/L-068.
[503] Law NR. 03/L-40.

enclaves.[504] Their municipalities were to be granted the possibility to receive financial assistance from Serbia, provided that it was transparent and circulated through the Ministry of Finance of Kosovo.[505]

The reintegration of Serbs in Kosovo structures took the path that these laws indicated. The Albanian elites and the international community in Kosovo were strongly committed to this end: for Albanians this was the price they had to pay for Independence, and for the international community this was the only path to peace.

The process started with the creation of four of the six Kosovo Serb minority municipalities before the elections of November 15th, 2009: Gracanica, Ranilug, Klokot, and Novo Brdo.[506] However, the international community was a bit dubious about how to manage the process, to the extent that they left Mitrovica North and Partesh for a later stage.[507]

Between 2008 and 2010 the ICO took the leading role in the implementation of the new municipalities, mostly because Kosovo Serbs trusted the international community more than the Kosovo Government[508]. The ICO provided compensations in resources and skills to the municipalities, recruited and trained Kosovo Serbs, and organized the Municipalities Preparation Team (MPT)[509]. For Serbs this represented an opportunity for more jobs with salaries that were three times higher than the average salary in the Kosovo civil service.[510]

Although in the beginning the Kosovo Government was reluctant to offer so much control to Serb areas and did not want to reward non-cooperative Serbs,[511] it

[504] Law NR. 03/L-39.
[505] Law NR. 03/L-40 and Special Law on Municipalities Financing, NR. 03/L-49.
[506] KIPRED: July 2010, p. 7,
[507] KIPRED: 2009,. *op.cit* p. 4-5
[508] ICG: 2012,.*op.cit* p. 11
[509] ICG: 2012, *op.cit.*p. 11.
[510] S/2009/300, p.8-9, see: http://www.unmikonline.org/SGReports/S-2009-300.pdf.
[511] ICG: 2012, *op.cit.* p. 14.

developed an intensive work of infrastructure in several of their municipalities, like Gracanica, Ranilug and Novo Brdo. The Office of Communication Affairs of the Prime Minister was instrumental in persuading the Serbs from Ranilug to participate in the elections.[512] The Government also built a hospital in Gracanica and apartments in Strepce.[513] The strong links between the Albanian elites and SLSs' leaders based in Gračanica and Štrpce might explain the higher deployment of resources in those municipalities[514]; after all, the SLS had been the tide rider of the reintegration process since 2007, when it moved into a government coalition with the PDK.

Part of the reintegration process in those Kosovo Serb municipalities was to organize the messy logistics that existed due to multiple resources and providers coming from Serbia, the Kosovo Government, and international donors. One such issue was the management of electric energy services. The Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK) sough to enforce payment through disconnecting entire villages; this conflictive situation was resolved with collective agreements established between the KEK and the leadership of those villages with the support of the international community.[515]

In March and April of 2010, the Kosovo Government advanced in dismantling illegal[516] Serbian mobile operators in Serb municipalities of the South. Their inhabitants understandably protested, as they remained without mobile service coverage. The Kosovo Government responded by instructing mobile operators to

[512] KIPRED: 2009, *op.cit.*p. 7-8.
[513] *Ibid.*
[514] ICG: 2012, *op.cit.* p. 13.
[515] S/2009/300, p.6-7, see: http://www.unmikonline.org/SGReports/S-2009-300.pdf.
[516] Illegal in this term means illegal according to Kosovo Law because those operators never passed the proper controls established in Kosovo.

distribute free SIM cards in those areas and offer reduced prices for calls to Serbia.[517] All in all, Serbs ended up adapting to the new conditions.

Another positive trend for reintegration in the South is visible among returnee families. The adoption of a strategy for communities and return (2014-2018), and the subsequent trainings for municipal officers in municipalities such as Novobërdë/Novo Brdo, Partesh/Parteš and Shtërpcë/Štrpce, made it much easier for returnee families to reintegrate into such communities.[518]

Table V.1: New Kosovo Serb municipalities in the South[519]

New Municipality	Population	Ethnic Balance
Gracanica	18,392	Serb Majority (85,7%), Albanian and Roma minorities.
Klokot	5,145	Serb Majority (72%), Albanian and Roma minorities.
Partesh	N/A	N/A
Ranilug	5,150	Serb Majority (99%), Albanian minority.
Novo Brdo	9,670	Serb Majority (73%), Albanian and Roma minorities

The ICG argues that seeking family return was a pragmatic approach of local Serbs willing to stay safe where they lived. However, we can notice that the abovementioned events confirm the predictions of my post-war reintegration theory. The first step towards reintegration was made by Kosovo Serb local elites who sought political survival in the conditions of the Declaration of Independence and started to cooperate with the Kosovo Government institutions. After all, the international community was working intensively in helping to disrupt the structures that Kosovo

[517] ICG: 2012, *op.cit.*p. 13, footnote 115.
[518] http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-kosovo-progress-report_en.pdf
[519] Adapted from Burema, Lars: 2013, Chapter 6, *Decentralization in Kosovo: Defusing Ethnic Tension or Furthering Ethnic Isolation?* in Decentralization and Local Development in South East Europe, edited by Barllett, Malekovic, Monanstiriotis, and Malekovic. The information has been updated using OSCE data of 2015.

Serbs used to maintain their enclaves, and the support base of Serbia that was essential to that end.

The fact is that Serb enclaves had no capacities to sustain themselves[520]: they relied on spoils of war collected through Serbia and the spoils of peace of an international community eager to establish a multiethnic society. The commitment to the Kosovo Independence changed Kosovo Serbs' possibilities to renew those capacities. These conditions would be even clearer to them when Serbia started to recalculate the direction of her diplomatic agenda in the pursuit of having access to the EU.

The transition period from an enclaved scenario to a reintegrated one might seem chaotic to a reader unfamiliar with the parallel structures of Serbia in Kosovo, and with Serbian political games in the territory. As of this writing, Kosovo Serb elites in all of their majority municipalities are at the same time heads or assembly members of structures under the Kosovo Government, and of those financed by Serbia. In some cases they have a division of labor in which those within Kosovo Government structures perform all the local government functions, and those financed by Serbia manage schools and hospitals.[521]

The situation responds to two factors: on one hand, it speaks of the incapacity of the international community to find a mechanism to disrupt Serbian support to the enclaves in Kosovo for the last 15 years, without which those enclaves would not be able to sustain themselves. On the other hand, it speaks of the incapacity of the Kosovo Government –and in retrospect, of the international community- to absorb economically those that might be laid off in the event of a dismantlement of Serbian structures.

[520] ICG: 2012, *op.cit.* p. 13-14.
[521] *Ibid.* p. 16.

This is a simple pragmatic problem that has generated the most unbelievable stories of conviviality in Kosovo. To give just one example, the current Klokot elected mayor, Serbian Srecko Spasic, is the former mayor of the Viti municipality, which is an Albanian majority one.[522] Serbian support to the enclaves has gone as far as appointing in the parallel structures the very same mayor that was legally elected within the Kosovo structures of government; such is the case of the Strepce Mayor, and of other Kosovo Serb municipalities.[523]

Even for tide riders convinced of the reintegration process, such as Mr. Nikolic (the Strepce Mayor, head of two parallel administrations for the same municipality until he changed the lock on the door), the local elites' decision by itself is not sufficient to guarantee a move towards reintegration.

This is so because the situation responds to a more basic problem, namely, the Serbian resources that enforce the capacities of elites that engage in majorization, even when such majorization is each day more limited to specific municipal offices or structures. In an interview with the ICG, Gracanica officials explained the conditions that generally apply in municipalities: "we control everything here; they [the Serbia-funded authorities] have no real power". The parallel municipality "employs, in one way or another, up to 1,000 people (...) our municipality as a whole would not be able to deal with a crisis of such a high number of people losing their jobs".[524]

As predicted by the theory, the possibilities of ethnic reintegration go all the way down to disrupting resources that are nowadays provided by Kosovo Serbs' ethnic kin (Serbia), while increasing the resources from the Kosovo Government directed to those who decided to ride the tide of reintegration. It might not be easy for

[522] BIRN: March 19, 2015, p. 21,.
[523] *Ibid.*
[524] ICG: 2012, *op. cit.* p. 16.

Kosovo to transfer such resources, because its general economic situation is not healthy, having most of its youth unemployed. Moreover, since the Ahtisaari Laws are implemented the Serb municipalities enjoy more benefits that any average Albanian majority municipality, which are also starved for resources. Thus, the reintegration process is still lacking the disruption of the support base of the enclaved scenario.

Still, this is a path that the international community appears to be committed to since the EU tied the Serbian EU accession plans to her role in Kosovo, establishing for the first time in the history of the EU Chapter 35 as a pre-requisite for accession. I will explain more on this on the next sections because the developments of this EU leverage over Serbia is more related to the negotiation over the reintegration of the north, which will necessarily have a spillover effect across southern municipalities as well.

Partaking in elections and government positions

The election of 2009 registered a peak in the turnout of Kosovo Serbs, with a participation of 20%[525] in the southern municipalities as a sign that they were slowly starting to participate in Kosovo Government structures.[526] This turnout took mostly everyone by surprise; particularly the international community that feared a low turnout and had started to develop informative meetings in the enclaves.[527] The positive trend of the Kosovo Serbs' turnout was maintained in the elections of 2010,

[525] KIPRED: 2009, *op.cit* refers to 10,000 Kosovar Serb voters of a total of eligible 80,000, yet, in general, turnout calculations are made over a total number of possible voters of 55,000.
[526] Partesh had a separate election in June 2010, with more than 65% turnout.
[527] KIPRED: 2009, *op. cit*. p. 5.

when it increased to 40%,[528] being the highest turnout ever in Kosovo history, and doubling their own turnout for the municipal elections of 2009[529].

The municipal elections of 2013 rendered a general turnout in Kosovo of 46.31% in the first round and of 40.02% in the second round.[530] In the Kosovo Serb municipalities the turnout was notably higher, with rates of 54.94% in Gracanica, 58.40% in Novo Brdo, 58.75% in Ranilug, 64.56 in Partesh, and 61.25% in Klokot[531].

The general elections for the Kosovo Assembly were held on June 8, 2014, due to an early dissolution of the Parliament on May 7. The general turnout throughout Kosovo was 43.46%.[532] This time the turnout in the Kosovo Serb municipalities was not excessively higher: 42.92% in Gracanica, 46.45% in Novo Brdo, 46.54% in Ranilug, 49.41% in Partesh and 51.56% in Klokot, according to the same source[533].

The Kosovar Serb Independent Liberal Party (SLS) was a partner of the PDK in the government, and it continues to integrate the "Coalition for a New Kosovo" as the most important partner among the Serb community. In 2010 the SLS won 2% of the general vote, which guaranteed their access to 9 of the 10 reserved seats in the parliament. The SLS participation in the Kosovo Government was further enhanced

[528] B92: 2012. Turnout is unclear in Serb areas, 12th December, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=12&dd=12&nav_id=71473 and Setimes (2012) Kosovo elections causes new rift among Serbs, 15th December, http://setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/12/15/feature-02

[529] OSCE: 2010, United States Mission to OSCE December 16th, see: http://www.osce.org/pc/92997?download=true

[530] Kipred: 2014, p. 19, 25.See: http://kipred.org/repository/docs/Local_Elections_of_2013_in_Kosovo-__General_Overview_and_Recommendations_on_Electoral_Reform__869258.pdf. Also, CEC: 2013a (in Albanian), see: http://www.kqz-ks.org/Uploads/Documents/Statistikat%20e%20pergjthshme_zeanjmbkjs.pdf.

[531] CEC: 2013b (in Albanian), see: http://www.kqz-ks.org/Uploads/Documents/Statistikat%20sipas%20komunave_xxqyokgpnn.pdf.

[532]Balkan Insight: 8 Jun, 2014. See: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-elections-2014. Also: CEC: 2014a, p. 2, see: http://www.kqz-ks.org/Uploads/Documents/Statistikat%20ne%20nivel%20vendi%20-%2020140701_04072014_kyhinsniph.pdf.

[533] CEC: 2014b. See: http://www.kqz-ks.org/Uploads/Documents/20140701%20Statistics%20-%20Municipality%20Level_mgqzsssnuk.pdf.

when it obtained three ministries (Local Self-Government Ministry, Communities and Return Ministry, and Labor and Social Welfare Ministry).

By 2010, the SLS was the main Kosovo Serb party even in the enclaves, being a majority in Gracanica, Strepce, Klokot and later in Ranilug. In Novo Brdo there was a municipal coalition between the Albanian LDK and two Serb political parties; the Serb turnout, despite being higher than in previous elections, was insufficient for their lists to win. [534] Although the Serb and Albanian coalition for the national government was initiated in 2007, at local levels such arrangements were not replicated within the Serb enclaves.

Table V.2: Kosovo Serb Turnout 1999-2015[535]

	Municipal elections (2000)	Parliament Elections (2001)	Municipal elections (2002)	Municipal Elections -2004	Parliament Elections (November 2007)	Municipal Elections (Novembe r 2009)	Parliament Elections (December 2010)	Municipal Elections (November 2013-	Parliament Elections (December 2014)
Kosovo Serbs South	No participation	46% turnout	No participation	No Particpation	1% turnout	20% turnout	Around 40% turnout	55%	45%
Kosovo Serbs in the North	No participation	No participation	No participation	No Participation	No Participation	Lower than 1%	No Participation	25%	25%

The increase of political participation and cooperation with the Kosovo Government structures did not mean that it ran smoothly. As expected in the theoretical predictions, when the reintegration process advances, majorization voices still continue to exist and react to this process. The dual cacophony is provided by the tensions between the elites that decide to ride the tide of reintegration and the elites that still seek to maintain a majorization pattern as a process through which to consolidate available resources and political legitimacy. It is the period when old

[534] Burema, Lars: op. cit.
[535] Updated version of same table in Jenne & Peral: 2013.

elites still see benefits of seeking majorization, and they are right to estimate so. Kosovo Serb elites' capacities are to be found in the resources provided by the public administration of the enclaves, provided by Serbia in some cases, and by the Kosovo Government structures in the case of the tide riders.

Serbia left the Kosovo local elections to the Ministry of Kosovo e Metohija, which lacked a unified position regarding this issue. Minister Bogdanovic was more conciliatory and argued that there would not be negative consequences for Kosovo Serbs who participate in elections; while Mr. Ivanovic, his secretary, kept threatening them and claiming that they might lose support.[536] The Serb Radical Party (SRS) in Serbia demanded penalties for Kosovo Serbs who are paid by the Serbian Government and participated in these elections.[537] The Serb Orthodox Church in Serbia joined the arguments against participation, while the one in Kosovo supported elections.[538]

Even more interestingly, while radical Serbs in the north, like Marko Jaksic and Milan Ivanovic, campaigned against participation with intensive threats, the 'used to be' radicals of the south participated in creating their own lists or joining Kosovo Serb parties.[539] Intimidation also took place in Novo Brdo and Strepce,[540] but Gracanica witnessed the Kosovo Serb leadership being divided between supporting the elections or violently opposing participation.

Assembly members in Gracanica thought that these elections would cancel their autonomy in the enclaves.[541] Rada Trajkovic had expressed earlier in August that participation was tied to conditions on the ground, arguing that "[conditions are] that

[536] KIPRED: 2009, *op. cit.* p. 5-6,
[537] B92: 2009a. See: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2009&mm=10&dd=30&nav_id=62695.
[538] KIPRED: 2009, *op. cit.* p. 6,
[539] *Ibid.*
[540] I*bid.*
[541] B92: 2009a, cited.

we receive territories, and that we receive the already transferred authorities to a team of people who were appointed to be the ones to implement decentralization".[542] She meant that finally Kosovo Serbs would control their own affairs in their own territory. In other words, these elections were nothing more than the final confirmation of the enclaves and the existence of Serbs in Kosovo.

She adds in the same interview: "Belgrade [opposed elections because] is trying to fight for the return of sovereignty over Kosovo, but the sovereignty will be worthless if there are no Serbs there".[543] Regardless of how logical this position might sound even to protect the interests of the Kosovo Serb majorization on the ground, the SNC expelled Rada Trajkovic and followers due to their lobby for participation in the municipal elections.[544]

All in all, every single Kosovo Serb was trying to figure out the best political survival strategy within the enclave, whether that meant keeping the majorization pattern with the support of Serbia, or reintegration within an arrangement with the Kosovo Government. The dualism of this period, so far, responds to hesitations in failing to estimate for how long they needed to rely on Serbia, and from when they would need to find a deal with the Kosovo Government. Most Kosovo Serb leaders of the South are largely oriented to the second option. This is even clearer when we understand the mushrooming of Serb lists since the 2009 elections, which were the first ever to be organized by the Kosovo Government after Independence.

Despite the game of different positive and negative reactions among the Kosovo Serb leadership to their electoral participation, the facts are that parties supported directly by Serbia, as the United Serbian List (JSL), and the Serb

[542] B92: 2009b, October 30, see: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2009&mm=08&dd=11&nav_id=61092.
[543] B92: 2009, op. cit.
[544] Ibid.

Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija (SDSKIM) also joined the SLS and competed in the elections. They won different seats in municipal assemblies, although neither gained parliamentarian representation.[545] The dual reality of Kosovo Serbs in the south also shows in the political participation of a list like SLS, which has been riding the tide of reintegration since 2007; and the participation of the JSL supported by Serbia. This reality reflects the process of a reintegration that is not yet complete. We might need to wait until the elections of 2017 to see whether this reintegration trend continues.

How far has the international community gone in disrupting Serbian support to the enclaved scenario in the south?

Truth to be told, the slow withdrawal of Serbia from the south is more related to Serbia's change of political priorities than to an active role of internationals in deterring her. As predicted by the theory, when an enclaved scenario loses the resources that sustain them, the option to ride the tide of reintegration seems to be a good strategy of political survival. It is therefore more likely to see old faces adapting to a new reality than new faces dealing with the heritage of the old one.

The economic crisis burdened Serbia with the maintenance of parallel structures throughout Kosovo. In such conditions, keeping the the cash flow mostly to northern Kosovo, fitting Serbian partition goals, seems to be a rational option.[546] These new political priorities led Serbia to withdraw from the south, but at the same time aimed at keeping a political hand over the ethnic elites in the south.

[545] The Kosovo Turk minority holds 3 seats in the assembly, integrating the G6+ coalition group, represented by the KDTP that also holds the Ministry of Public Administration. Two Askali and one Roma are members of the parliament. None of those minorities could ever have been present in the parliament without the quota (or "reserved seats") provided by the Ahtisaari Plan, given that none of those minorities went beyond the 3% threshold. See: http://www.kqz-ks.org/SKQZ-WEB/al/zgjedhjetekosoves/materiale/rezultatet2010/1.%20Rezultatet%20e%20pergjithshme.pdf.

[546] KIPRED: 2009, p. 7, op. cit.

The possibilities of reintegration were more linked to the way in which Serbia started to behave in the south than to any strategy of the international community to outsmart the majorization patterns within the Kosovo Serb enclaves. For instance, the crisis over the electricity bills was resolved when Serbia demanded her ethnic kin to pay to the KEK, despite the fact that these keep rejecting payment[547]; and the electoral participation was admitted after Serbia decided to support Kosovo Serb lists for different elections.

V.3 Northern Kosovo Serb municipalities

Most of the post-war period of the northern municipalities in Kosovo features the extensive economic and political support that Kosovo Serbs received from Serbia to maintain the enclaved scenario, set up right after the war. Meanwhile, the Albanian majority consolidated their ruling across Kosovo and tried to do so in northern Kosovo as well, albeit unsuccessfully. The international community succeeded in installing the reintegration agenda among Kosovo Albanians but failed to do so among Kosovo Serbs. The maintenance of the enclaved scenario started to be challenged on April 19 2013, when Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement in Brussels. The Dialogue for the Normalization addresses substantial issues that could change the reality on the ground and move northern municipalities toward a reintegrated scenario. It seeks the participation of Serbs in the Kosovo Government structures and the dismantlement of enclave structures that are still financed by Serbia.

[547] S/2009/300, p. 6-7. See: http://www.unmikonline.org/SGReports/S-2009-300.pdf.

Thus, we have two different processes: one between 1999 and 2012 which maintained enclaves in northern municipalities, and another, from 2013 to this day, when the first steps to reintegration took place.

Figure V.3 Post-war Outcomes in Northern Municipalities



V.3.1 1999-2012 Maintaining Kosovo Serb enclaves: a stronghold of Serbia as their ethnic kin

This section departs from the concentration of Kosovo Serbs in enclaves in the northern municipalities of North Mitrovica, Leposavic, Zvecan and Zubin Potok. To describe how these enclaves were maintained I will observe Serb and Albanian elites and their co-ethnics from September 2000 onwards, when the emergency phase ended and ethnic murder dropped to a few cases per week.[548]

Since the French KFOR divided Mitrovica, northern municipalities have maintained an enclaved scenario, relying largely on Serbian support in terms of financial and political resources. The most diverse aspects of community life

[548] King and Mason: 2006, p. 68.

remained under Serbia payroll: civil servants, schools, health care, security and courts.[549]

As the UNMIK Police was clashing with the local population, the international community allowed "Bridge watchers" and forces from the MUP (the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs) fill the vacuum, although the former was no longer financed by Serbia from 2003 on.[550] Life in the north reflects the standards of Serbia proper: newspapers, shops, prices in Dinars, even security service is provided by Serbia.[551] Personnel, weapons and money easily entered Kosovo because internationals could not take proper control of the borders and the roads.[552] The administration of Justice remained based on Serbian laws, Kosovo courts did not have jurisdiction *de jure* or *de facto* over the enclaves, and the UNMIK did not address this issue either.[553] The four municipalities kept operating as realities on their own, especially after Serbia payed for the asphalt on the road linking them, connected the water system, and telephone networks separated from the south.[554]

The ICG reports mutual obstructionism and actions by Kosovo Serbs and Albanians to intimidate each other.[555]

Violence continued in both directions in 2000; mobilized Albanian co-ethnics even attacked the only train connecting the northern municipalities with Kosovo Poljie,

[549] OSCE: 2003, *op,.cit*
[550] *Ibid:* p. 12.
[551] ICG: 2000, p. 9.
[552] ICG: 2000, p. 13.
[553] Reka 2003, p. 292.
[554] King and Mason: 2006, p. 208.
[555] ICG: 2000, Kosovo's Linchpin: overcoming division in Mitrovica, 31 May 2000, p. 1-2. Mobilized Albanians planted a grenade in a Serb café and attacked a UNHCR bus carrying Serbs from Mitrovica with a rocket-propelled grenade, killing three and wounding several others. Meanwhile, Serbs went on killing non-Serbs between 2nd and 20th of February. The violence pushed 1,700 Kosovo Albanians, Turks, and Muslim Slavs away from the north. This period ended with an international operation that enclosed Mitrovica searching for weapons, after mobilized Albanians wounded French KFOR members who were there protecting Serbs.

blowing the train up or derailing it.[556]

As predicted by my theory, each group resorted to violence to exclude the other from respective areas of influence, developing a majorization pattern that gives their elites full control of the power they gained or preserved after the war. Kosovo Albanians refused to advance minority rights because Kosovo Serbs opposed independence and kept strong links with Serbia,[557] while Kosovo Serbs still believe that Kosovo will return to Serbia.[558]

Advancing reintegration in the north has failed consistently. By October 2000 the UNMIK scheduled municipal assembly elections. The international community feared non-participation in northern enclaves and proposed, as an alternative to elections, a mutual recognition in Mitrovica among Serbs and Albanians with a veto capacity over proceedings. However, Albanians rejected the proposal, imposing the majority that was ruling from Prishtina.[559]

In another attempt, with the aim of persuading Serbs of participating in the Kosovo Government structures and in the October 2002 elections in particular, SRSG Michael Steiner proposed a decentralization strategy with a Seven Point Plan for Mitrovica, which later extended to all Serb enclaves.[560] According to the ICG, as Serbs did not participate in the local elections, the plan did not go through, while Albanians opposed it fearing partitioning.[561]

Serbs of the north created the Union of Serb Municipalities as a reaction led by Marko Jaksic (from the DSS party[562]) and Milan Ivanovic. They reiterated their

[556] New York Times: 2000. See: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/27/world/kosovo-polje-journal-aboard-the-serb-train-bitterness-and-hope-too.html.
[557] ICG: 2003, p.21.
[558] Ibid
[559] King and Mason 2006 p. 71-72.
[560] ICG: 2003, p. 18,
[561] ICG: 2003, p. 19.
[562] ICG: 2000, p. 4.

support to the parallel structures, proposing a sort of two-entity arrangement for Kosovo,[563] showing that maintaining the enclave was related to a further power consolidation of Kosovo Serbs.

Not all Kosovo Serb leaders were that open and direct with such plans. Some of them, like SNC leader Oliver Ivanovic, figured out a pragmatic way to maintain the enclave while deriving spoils of peace from the international community. He created his power base using his English language skills to be part of negotiations with internationals regarding the north, and Mitrovica in particular. But he also relied on Serbian money to finance public services and salaries; and on his ties with Vojislav Kostunica[564] to keep circulating resources to co-ethnics. He is assumed to have a sort of double face because he held control over the "Bridge Watchers".[565] This case is a clear example of how internationals have failed to condition the resources provided to various leaders, who diverted such resources to keep up their patronage networks.

By then, warlords (Mr. Thaci and Mr. Haradinaj) lost the elections against the LDK, and violence erupted again in Mitrovica in February 2001. Meanwhile, in Prishtina the UNMIK was doing no effort to depoliticize the education system and left it to Albanians to use it as a patronage network.[566] The UNMIK did specific resource allocations to minorities and promised to penalize elites for infringing minority rights by holding their municipal budget back; however those provisions were not always enforced.[567]

A Kosovo Albanian government was established in the south of Mitrovica. It was led by a KLA mayor, Bajram Rexepi, who opposed its division and assumed a

[563] ICG: 2003, p. 20.
[564] ICG: 2000, p. 3-4.
[565] Ibid., p. 4.
[566] King and Mason: 2006, p. 85.
[567] ICG 2003, p. 22.

conciliatory position[568] that would provide more gains to extend Albanian control over the area than ignoring the enclave reality.

The UNMIK tried to attract some Kosovo Serb participation by opening an administrative office in the north side. However, the office was incapable of out-powering the control that Bridge Watchers had over the region.[569] They used violence consistently against Albanians and UNMIK police officers[570], while their leader, Oliver Ivanovic, occupied positions in the Serbian government at that time, and in subsequent years up to this day.[571] He opposed the return of Kosovo Albanians to the north, while complaining that internationals have not made sufficient efforts for the return of Kosovo Serbs.[572] These refused to register, manipulating the return numbers to alter the demographics on the north to assure they could change the ethnic balance of Mitrovica.[573] Otherwise, Kosovo Serbs had to be relocated to their pre-war homes.

Frustrations in Kosovo regarding the lack of international resolution on the final status sparked an outrage of violence in March 2004 also in the north, an episode already commented. Division grew when the riots were not effectively addressed by internationals.[574] Overall, Kosovo Serb minorities saw partition as a more attainable option.[575] While Kosovo Albanian extremists learnt that they could challenge the security setup of the international community, the Serb minorities lost trust in the protection that the latter could provide.[576]

Kosovo Albanian and Serbs elites maintained Kosovo divided through a majorization pattern that succeeded in excluding each other from different areas of

[568] ICG: 2000, p. 6.
[569] King and Mason: 2006, p.168-169.
[570] ICG: 2002, p3-4
[571] ICG: 2000, p.2.
[572] Ibid p. 5-6.
[573] Ibid p. 6.
[574] See: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/kosovo0704.pdf.
[575] King and Mason: 2006, p. 202.
[576] HRW: 2004, see: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/kosovo0704.pdf.

influence, allocating resources within their respective networks of patronage and with attempts to manipulate the demographics. With the support of Serbia Kosovo Serbs kept proposing plans that would help maintain the enclaves further.

One of those was the "Plan for the Cantonization of Kosovo" presented by Prime Minister Kostunica after the riots, demanding the autonomy of all Kosovo Serb enclaves mirroring the Srpska Republic in Bosnia.[577] Already in 2003, Mr. Djindjic presented a decentralization plan with provisions for a partition in the north, after Deputy Prime Minister Covic had brought up the partition of Kosovo in a UNSC meeting in April 2002.[578]

However, none of those plans succeeded, not only because Kosovo Albanians categorically opposed them, but also because the international community deterred such plans in a couple of occasions. First, Senator J. Biden conditioned USA assistance to the unification of Mitrovica[579], and then in 2005 the Contact Group removed partition from the agenda for good.[580]

The international community was disrupting Kosovo Albanians and Serbs' majorization patterns by denying partition and making a multiethnic Kosovo a non-negotiable reality. But reintegration was still far away because the international community failed to address the mobilized Albanian co-ethnics that rioted against Serbs in 2004, and the Serbian back up to the power base of Kosovo Serbs within the enclaves.

After 2004, the international community understood that moving towards reintegration required much more than pacific relations between Albanian and Serb

[577] Ramet, 2006 p. 550.
[578] Reka, 2003, p. 336.
[579] Ibid.
[580] See art. 6 Contact Group Guiding principles, available at: http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/kosovo_Contact%20Group%20-%20Ten%20Guiding%20principles%20for%20Ahtisaari.pdf.

elites. Particularly when in April 29th 2004 the Serbian parliament approved[581] the "Belgrade Plan", proposing the creation of an autonomous Serb region within Kosovo containing five districts where Serbs were in a majority before 1999. Thus, the Serb enclaves in the south of the Ibar River would remain outside this region.

Although partition plans did not advance among the international community, Serbia later persuaded UN Envoy Kai Eide to allow the resettlement of Kosovo Serbs anywhere they chose, and not necessarily in their localities of origin.[582] This permitted the manipulation of Serbs towards any of the enclaves where they were concentrated, aided by further actions to exclude Kosovo Albanians from the north. With the financial help of Serbia, Albanian houses were bought up even above market prices, and when Albanians would not agree to sell different sorts of intimidations were made to assure they move.[583]

The international community decided to open the status talks after Mr. Kai Eide recommended so,[584] but the talks lacked a specific policy to tackle the Serbian influence within the enclaves. It did, however, highlight that Serbia had to be included in those talks, that UNMIK had to seek the transference of its role to the OSCE and the EU, and that the international community had to make an active use of sanctions to push the process forward. This report was the key instrument to reach the Vienna Talks in 2006 that eventually brought to life the Ahtisaari Plan, which was consistently opposed by Kosovo Serbs in the north, who stayed away from different electoral runs.

[581] The plan was released before in Blic Newspaper on the 8th of April of 2004. The news is no longer available online yet I have a save copy.
[582] King and Mason: 2006, p. 207.
[583] Ibid p. 208.
[584] S/2004/932 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20S2004%20932.pdf and S/2005/635 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20S2005%20635.pdf

Northern municipalities did express their concerns during the Vienna talks, although not at the table because their position was represented by Serbia.[585] Mr. Jaksic declared that they wanted to create the municipality of Mitrovica north to eventually join the other three municipalities in a common Kosovo Serb front; on the other hand, Kosovo Albanians opposed it because they wanted to restore the ethnic balance of Mitrovica[586], in line with impeding partition. Nevertheless, Kosovo Serbs opposed the Ahtisaari Plan, and sparked violent demonstrations when Kosovo Albanians declared the Independence.[587] However, these events lasted only a few days and have not been repeated again.

In fact, things started to change considerably in Kosovo when Serbia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU for visa liberalization in April 29th, 2008. The agreement did not include Kosovo as part of Serbia. The message for the south was clear, but also for the north. However, to continue holding the grip of the north, Serbia ran local elections in northern municipalities in May 2008 and formed the "Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija", to act as a new parallel structure.[588]

By June the assembly met in its first session: Kosovo Serbs gathered in the Mitrovica parliament with 45 delegates of 26 municipalities to reaffirm Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, and to reject the Kosovo Independence and the Constitution[589] approved that month. Although this was a move of Kosovo Serbs to consolidate

[585] Weller: 2008.
[586] http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2006&mm=05&dd=04&nav_id=34734
[587] KIPRED: 2012, ", p. 6.
[588] OSCE Report: 2008.op.cit
[589] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kosovo-serbs-set-up-rival-assembly-856904.html

power within their enclaves, the EULEX[590] established border control in northern Kosovo and succeeded in assuming police, customs, and judicial roles.[591]

In October 2008 Serbia tried to stop the Independence process by requesting the UN General Assembly a resolution regarding whether Kosovo's unilateral Declaration of Independence was in line with international law. Some scholars suggested that with this move Serbia pursued a face-saving strategy[592]; while others argued that it was a strategy oriented to buy time and eventually keep Kosovo in a Status limbo for a bit longer.[593] Either way, Serbian actions helped continuing the enclaved scenario for Kosovo Serbs.

Meanwhile, together with the Kosovo Government, the ICO made one more attempt at reintegration with the "Strategy for the North", oriented to build rule of law, decentralization, constitute the municipality of north Mitrovica and assist governance in Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic.[594] But this strategy also failed due to Serbian hindrance in the north.

In May 2010, Serbia run municipal elections again in the north, and again the international community observed without further action.[595] In 2012, the Kosovo Government opened an office in the northern Bošnjak Mahala neighborhood -mostly inhabited by Kosovo Albanians-, to address daily issues of the local population without politicizing them, and so far it has worked without many problems.[596]

[590] EULEX is the EU institution in Kosovo tasked –by the UN Security Council- with an assistant mission to observe the rule of law and provide police officers, prosecutors and judges.
[591] S/2009/300, Annex I.
[592] Author's interview with Ivan Vejvoda: April 2013, Washington DC.
[593] ICG: 2010.
[594] KIPRED: 2012, p. 9.
[595] Ibid: p. 10.
[596] Author's interview with Adriana Hodzic, head of the office.in Mitrovica.

On July 22nd 2010, the ICJ ruled against Serbia[597], and on September 9th 2010, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution acknowledging the ICJ decision and welcoming the EU mediation in the process called "The Technical Dialogue"[598]. Between March 8th 2011 and February 24th 2012, such dialogue advanced pending technical issues to resolve daily problems of Serbs and Albanians. The dialogue addressed the civil registry, cadastral documents, mutual recognition of diplomas, the recognition of Kosovo custom stamps, Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), cooperation and equal participation in regional forums, freedom of movement, and integrated border management.

The issues of telecommunications and energy that were previously agreed to be discussed remained unresolved and were later addressed by a political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbian Prime Ministers Mr. Hashim Thaci and Mr. Ivica Dacic.

Because this first Technical Dialogue was not aimed at addressing the political agenda, it did not discuss any aspect related to the enclaves, nor did it attempt to bring reintegration to the table. Such topics were to be discussed later in the "Dialogue of Normalization of Relations" (19th October 2012, to 19th April 2013), entirely devoted to sorting out the reintegration of Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo structures and the final dismantlement of Serbian support to such structures. However, the technical aspects had undoubtedly political implications, and so we learnt on July 19th when Serbia cancelled its participation in Brussels, where it was supposed to agree on lifting its ban on Kosovo goods.

[597] International Court of Justice, "Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo", *Advisory Opinion*, July 22, 2010, p. 43.

[598] A/RES/64/298 *Request for an advisory opinion of the of the International Court of Justice on whether the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo is in accordance with international law*, September 9th 2010, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/298, accessed April 6th, 2013.

KIPRED argues that the Serbian decision of walking out of this meeting was related to a previous encounter between Mr. Tadic and Lady Ashton in May 2011, when Serbia arrested Ratko Mladic and they met to discuss EU accession issues. In that meeting Mr. Tadic asked for partitioning the north, and in connection with that point, he later cancelled the Serbian participation in the Technical Dialogue where the topic of customs was about to be discussed.[599] Because Ashton did not proceed with Tadic's demand, Serbia learnt that it could not exchange cooperation with the ICTY for EU accession, so it had to switch its strategy and devote efforts to collecting gains through the Dialogue.[600]

Serbia had its domestic and foreign policy agenda, but Kosovo had its own as well, and the north was key for both of them to access it. On July 20th the Kosovo Government established reciprocity with Serbia and Bosnia banning their custom stamp products. Kosovo saw the opportunity to show internationals and Kosovo Serbs in the north that it had decided to exercise full sovereignty in the north. Later on, the special force "ROSU" was sent to the north to control border crossings 1 and 31, arguing that EULEX failed to enforce the ban.

Once more, the north witnessed violence, unrest and barricades.[601] Thus, on July 26th Prishtina, Belgrade and the KFOR reached an agreement to handle the control of the area to the NATO. On July 28th the EULEX terminated its duty at the border crossing, which it had held since Independence Day; KFOR took over, classifying the zone as a restrictive military area. Nevertheless, March 2012 brings EULEX back to the scene as guarantor of the IBM Agreement at the border crossing points between Kosovo and Serbia.

[599] Ibid: p. 11.
[600] Ibid.
[601] Kosovo Serbs built barricades with trucks along the Ibar River and border crossings, and one policeman was killed. B92: 2011, Checkpoint Jarinje in northern Kosovo set on fire , 27th July 2011, see: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=07&dd=27&nav_id=75648 ,

The developments observed during this period fit the predictions of my theory. We see that the Albanian majorization activities in the north promptly ceased when realizing that moving towards reintegration was a more feasible strategy to consolidate power over Kosovo. They considered the enclaves in the north more seriously when the possibility of partitioning was more compellingly on the table, or when Serbian support to the enclaves could push Kosovo far away from even a reintegrated option, as it happened with the Custom incident. In that context, Kosovo Albanians agreed to discuss plans to remove such possibility, and understood that reintegration was the path to go. On the other side, Kosovo Serbs' majorization pattern to maintain the enclave was never disrupted during this period.

Although the international community tried to achieve that with diverse decentralization plans, none ever challenged the support base on which Kosovo Serbs rest. As my theory predicts, enclaves can only sustain over time if they rely on an alternative source to obtain extra support on resources. Serbia was that source; first, for various domestic reasons, and later for pure foreign policy goals, as we could see when it entered the Brussels Dialogue. For Serbia, Kosovo Serbs in the north are her key to accessing the EU as well as all the resources that come with that for her already depreciated economy. As for the Kosovo Serbs, maintaining themselves in the enclaves is also the way of preserving their political survival within the Kosovo scene in the north.

V.3.2 2013-2015 The dual reality in the North: a path towards reintegration

The main challenge of any reintegration process in conditions of enclaved scenarios is to achieve minority participation within majority structures. Kosovo

Albanians chose reintegration over a majorization pattern oriented to consolidating their exclusive power when they accepted the Ahtisaari Laws as a mechanism to sustain their Independence process while respecting minorities through a bill of rights crafted for this purpose. However, Serb minorities in the north still opted for maintaining the enclave. This is not surprising if we know that 85% of their personal income is linked to public-sector salaries; with 75% of these provided by Serbia and only 25% by the Kosovo Government.[602] Theory predicts that reintegration requires disrupting the mechanisms through which Serbia sustained Kosovo Serbs enclaves.

Understood in those terms, a move to reintegration has been observed in the northern municipalities since the signature of the normalization agreement between Kosovo and Serbia in Brussels as a first step. This is a very short time spam to draw substantive conclusions, particularly after more than 13 years of an enclaved scenario in the north. However, we can still explain the reasons of this movement and draw some conclusions, while comparing it with the previous period as well as with the developments in southern Kosovo.

Table V.3. Kosovo Serb Municipalities in the North

Municipality	Population	Ethnic Balance
Mitrovica North	29,460	Serb Majority (76%) Albanian, Bosnjak, Gorani, Turk, Roma and Askali minorities
Leposavic	18,600	Serb Majority (96.5%), Albanian, Bosnjak and Roma minorities
Zubin Potok	15,200	Serb Majority (91%), Albanian minority.
Zvecan	16,650	Serb Majority (96.09%), Albanian, Bosnjak, Roma and Gorani minorities.

[602] Ejdus, Malazogu and Nic: 2003, p. 8.

From parallel structures to reintegration of the north

On April 19th 2013 in a negotiation brokered by the EU, Kosovo and Serbia reached a landmark agreement that established the basic principles for the reintegration of Serb municipalities in the north within the Kosovo Government structures.[603] The agreement focused on the reintegration of former members of Civil Protection Corps (CPC) and the Judiciary system with an appellate court in Prishtina and another in Mitrovica to deal exclusively with Kosovo Serbs issues.[604] It established the reintegration of the police[605] and remaining Serbian security forces (MUP) within the northern municipalities.[606] A regional commander for four northern municipalities is placed in Mitrovica and operates under Kosovo Police chain of command. All these items rest in sub-agreements that plan the steps and conditions of their implementation. Such sub-agreements[607] establish two different steps: one entails the reintegration of former members of parallel structures within the Kosovo government; the other entails subsequent steps dismantle existing Serbian operative structures in those municipalities. This means stopping any operation from those structures, discontinuing salaries coming from Serbia, and the abolishment of respective Serbian laws. The agreement also established the creation of an "association of municipalities" to work as a collective representative of Kosovo

[603] Agreement 19th April 2013, see: http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/FIRST_AGREEMENT_OF_PRINCIPLES_GOVERNING_THE_NORMALIZATION_OF_RELATIONS,_APRIL_19,_2013_BRUSSELS_en.pdf.

[604] Ibid: art. 10.

[605] Ibid: art. 7.

[606] Ibid

[607] Sometimes they are also called "conclusions", "action plans" or "implementation plan".

Serbs' interests vis a vis the central government.[608] On August 25th 2015 further details of implementation were negotiated.[609]

In short, the agreement sets the base for northern municipalities to move from enclave conditions supported by Serbia to conditions of an average Kosovo municipality with additional benefits, like a guaranteed and protected communication line between those municipalities and the central government through the 'association'.

Earlier in that year the Agreement on Custom Revenue[610] established the collection of taxes at at the northern border gates of Jarinje and Bernjak and transfer of part of collected taxes into a Development Fund[611] established for the socio-economic welfare of the local population.[612] The agreement also established the registration within Kosovo government structures of the companies and undertakings working in north. This last aspect is highly relevant in the current context, where the rule of law is weak and criminal activities are frequently carried out with the connivance of local political elites, sometimes in cooperation between Albanian and Serbian elites.[613]

Police reintegration has been the first and most successful of all processes in 2014. In the judicial sector, the reintegration of serb judges and prosecutors is at the final stage, however the salaries of judges have not yet been discontinued by Serbia,

[608] Ibid: arts. 1-6.
[609] Implementation Agreement on Association of Municipalities, 24th August 2015, see: http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/150825_02_Association-Community-of-Serb-Majority-Municipalities-in-Kosovo-General-principles-Main-elements_en.pdf.
[610] Agreement on Customs Revenue, 17th January 2013. See: http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Agreement_on_Customs_revenue_collection_of_17_January_2013.pdf.
[611] Ibid: arts. 7 and 9.
[612] Notice that the agreement foresees that one Kosovo Serb leader of the northern municipalities, one official of the Kosovo Government and one representative of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in Kosovo jointly manage the Fund.
[613] KIPRED: 2012, p. 8.

and the respective laws have not been abolished.[614] The reintegration of former members of Civil Protection has been completed early in January 2016, although salaries from Serbia have not yet been discontinued.[615] Moreover, as of today, the reintegration in the areas of health care, education and other issues of municipality management still function within Serbian structures and payroll. The collection of national and municipal taxes has not been discussed within the negotiation process yet.[616] The development fund in functioning , it has collected 8 million Euro so far; to this date the Board has allocated 1.5 million Euro to Mitrovica North[617], and lately 2.5 million additional Euro for the four northern municipalities.[618]

The agreement of normalization is also bringing an end to the barricade in the Bridge of Ibar River that was a symbol of divide between north and south since the end of war. Agreements reached on 25th August 2015 calls for the barricade to be removed by the end of June 2016, in kind of smooth removal through revitalization of the bridge by the European Union.

At the same time, this progress led to spontaneous demands for reintegration. For example, twenty four custom officers have been recently reintegrated by the Kosovo Government after a six-month process of recruitment. Those officers had resignation from their posts in 2008, instructed by Serbia after the Kosovo Independence Declaration, Witnessing the advance of the Dialogue in Brussels and its effects on northern Kosovo, they approached Kosovo Chief negotiator, Minister Mrs.

[614] State of Play in the Implementation of Brussels Agreement: briefing of 25th November 2015, p. 9. See: http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/KOSOVO_BRIEF_REPORT_ON_BRUSSELS_AGREEMENTS_STATE_OF_PLAY_251115.pdf.

[615] See: http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/?page=2,9,5504 and (Forthcoming) State of play in the Implementation of Brussels Agreements, Kosovo Government.

[616] Information updates from the forthcoming State of play Implementation of Brussels Agreements, Kosovo Government.

[617] See: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/press_corner/all_news/news/2015/20150918_en.htm.

[618] See: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/press_corner/all_news/news/2015/20151216_en.htm.

Tahiri, in one of the Civil Society Roundtables where she normally interacts with the local population to explain the benefits of the reintegration process. In this meeting these officers asked to be returned to their posts explaining they were pushed by Serbia to resign. In response to this request, Mrs. Tahiri organized a commission with Kosovo Government officials, the EU office of Kosovo, the Director of Customs and the Norwegian Embassy, which funds the roundtables, and proceeded to reintegrate these officers.[619]

Seeing this successful story, another group of officers of Kosovo Tax Administration that had resigned for the same political reasons also approached Mrs. Tahiri with a list of people that wished to be reinstated in their positions. Their reintegration is about to start in January 2016.[620]

Moving enclaved communities to reintegration demands the construction of minority participation within majority structures, yet the process does not exhaust itself in the major steps of voting, or ceasing to use services provided by the enclave structures. It also involves micro steps to reach there. For example, preparing for local elections and establishing the new municipality of North Mitrovica required increased interactions with Kosovo officials to address the various steps of that process. Mayors of northern municipalities came to dialogue with Kosovo government officers for the first time in 2014. First they did so at the premises of the EU and with the presence of EU and US Embassy personnel; then they met within the Ministry of Local Government at the office of the Permanent Secretary, also with EU personnel. Later,

[619] The story was provided by Mrs. Edita Tahiri, Kosovo Minister of Dialogue and Chief Negotiator in an interview in Vienna, November 2015.
[620] Ibid.

they reached a dynamic by which Mayors would frequent offices of different ministries and interact with Kosovo government officials to resolve daily problems.[621]

The Association of Municipalities

A sizable political crisis is taking place around the association of municipalities, of which not much is known about because its statute was not drafted or approved yet by Kosovo. With eggs and tear gas the opposition to the Kosovo Government railed against the association of municipalities, arguing that it brings up the partition of Kosovo, despite the very content of the agreement. [622] Nevertheless, the opposition is collecting political gains while challenging one of the agreed instruments of reintegration that consolidates the Kosovo Independence. After all, the Kosovo Government has clearly conditioned the establishment of the Association with full removal of Serbia's parallel structures.[623]

The association is a step to reintegration, as long as mechanisms that maintained enclaved communities no longer exist, and structures of minority participation are not run under Serbian law and money. Yet, there is still a long process to sustain in Brussels and within Kosovo to make it work.

It is interesting to know that Serbia committed 500 million Euro for the north[624], when the total profit from trade with Kosovo is estimated to be 391 million Euro, as we learnt during the 2011 crisis.[625] The north is currently an economic burden for Serbia with a 22% of unemployment. The border is also a black hole of

[621] Author's interview with Besnik Osmani, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Local Governments of Kosovo: Prishtina, 2nd October 2014.
[622] See: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/opposition-teargases-kosovo-parliament-10-08-2015, http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-kosovo-serbs-20151218-story.html and http://en.trend.az/world/other/2478564.html.
[623] Author's interview with Mrs. Tahiri, Minister of Dialogue: Nov. 2015. The agreement in principle is reached in Brussels that in parallel with the Association statute drafting process, a tri-partite working group will work on the plan for removal of parallel structures.
[624] Malazogu et. al.: op. cit.
[625] The Economist: 2011. See: http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/07/serbia-and-kosovo. KIPRED: 2012, p. 8.

criminality, lack of rule of law, and a black market that neither Serbia nor Kosovo were have been able to tackle. The smuggling of goods is estimated to be ten times higher than the needs of the north.[626] Eulex EULEX once found out that 90% of animals quarantined after illegally entering Kosovo came from Serbia.[627] The big question is what the role of Serbia is going to be? Is the international community going to disrupt Serbian support to maintain the enclaves and advance with the implementation of what was agreed on paper? Until the question is answered, we cannot foresee the chances of reintegration, particularly because the border proximity between northern municipalities and Serbia helps sustaining the enclaves.

The North opens up to elections

An equally important step for reintegration was the agreement to participate in the local elections run by the Kosovo Government in 2013.[628] The elections of 2013 and 2014 reflected the advance of reintegration policies beyond the negotiation table. Serbs in northern municipalities participated in Kosovo elections for the first time since 1999. Moreover, the elections speeded up the creation of North Mitrovica, the last remaining municipality foreseen by the Ahtisaari Plan.

In the local elections of 2013, Serbian officials called for participation, arguing that it was a way to keep Serbia within Kosovo territory, and to facilitate the return of the displaced population. [629] Prime Minister Ivica Dacic went as far as saying that voting is the only way for Kosovo Serbs to obtain internationally verified, legal and legitimate municipalities.[630] Nevertheless, this did not mean that Serbia distanced

[628] 19th April Agreement, op.cit art. 11. It was later agreed that this was extensive to the participation of northern municipalities in all elections of Kosovo.

[629] See: http://inserbia.info/today/2013/09/voting-of-internally-displaced-serbs-cancels-the-results-of-ethnic-cleansing-in-kosovo-vulin/.

[630] See: http://inserbia.info/today/2013/09/boycott-of-kosovo-election-would-harm-interests-of-serbs-in-the-area-dacic/.

itself from the process; it rather emphasized the policy implemented in the north. It maintained duality by promoting the reintegration agreed in Brussels to obtain gains from the EU; while at the same time holding the grip of Kosovo Serbs in the north, backing the entire Srpska list that won nine of the ten Kosovo Serb municipalities in 2013[631] and nine Kosovo parliament seats in 2014.[632]

Political participation for local Kosovo Serbs also implied the double game of entering within Kosovo government structures as long as Serbia remained strong in the area: this is not the spirit of the agreement, but it is so interpreted by local Serbs. Leposavic mayor, Mr. Jablanovic, called for participation in elections while at the same time emphasized that "our state is in Belgrade, we have been given assurances that Serbia will not abandon us, and I am certain that it will not".[633] Later on, when the opposition to the Kosovo Government demanded to review the Brussels Agreement, Mr. Jablanovic argued that it was "unacceptable", while at the same time expressed the need to consult Serbia –besides other actors- regarding the political conditions in Kosovo.[634] He was later appointed as the Minister of Communities and Return of the Kosovo Government, but he had to resign after calling Kosovo Albanians "savages" for protesting against Serb pilgrims in Gjakova/Djakovica.[635]

In general, Kosovo Serb leaders were forced to take a different position than the one they played in the past. Serbia moved from boycotting to promoting political reintegration only after the creation of the Srpska list, even in the 2014 elections when the SLS joined the grand Serb coalition that obtained nine members in the parliament

631 See: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-kosovo-progress-report_en.pdf, and: http://www.ecmikosovo.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Information-Bulletin-Minority-Party-Elections-ENG.pdf.
632 Konrad Adenauer Stifftung, 2014. Parliament Elections Kosovo 2014.
633 See: http://inserbia.info/today/2014/05/jablanovic-important-for-serbs-to-vote-in-kosovo-elections/.
634 See: http://www.balkaneu.com/serb-lista-brussels-agreement-reviewed/.
635 See: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-serb-minister-resigns-after-a-month-of-protests.

and three ministers.[636] Apart from them, Nenad Rasic created the Labor and Welfare Party, and currently the Kosovo Serb parliament group is divided between five members who respond to the Srpska list and four more inclined to the former SLS. Many former SLS leaders, once tide riders in the Kosovo elections, were left with no other alternative than joining the Serbian backed Srpska list.

Regardless of the increase in minority participation in the north, the process was not easy. Elections in North Mitrovica had to be cancelled and repeated two weeks later due to open intimidation of candidates and voters in front of polling stations.[637] At the same time, a self-proclaimed "Temporary Assembly of Kosovo and Metohija" called for boycott with Serbian nationalist arguments and spreading fears that people would be fired if they vote and later abide by Kosovo law.[638]

Once again, Serbia was decisive in political decision making in the north. The reintegration process advanced by the Brussels agreement was reflected differently on the ground. Some of the very same Kosovo Serbs who were elected, resigned later on in order to not pledge the Kosovo oath[639]; and others elected legitimately under Kosovo law were later nominated by Serbia as mayors of the Serbian parallel structures.[640] Despite participation, Kosovo Serbs had previously rejected the

[636] See: http://www.kqz-ks.org/Uploads/Documents/Rezultatet%20sipas%20Subjeketeve%20-%2020140526%20Party%20Results%20-%20Kosovo%20Level_jywcwsfyts.pdf.
[637] Malazogu, Ejdus, Mic Zornaczuk: 2014, *Integration or Isolation?*, p. 2. A joint effort of Central European Policy Institute, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Democracy for Development, the Polish Institute of International Affairs.
[638] BPRG: 2013, p. 3.
[639] See: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2014&mm=01&dd=13&nav_id=88950.
[640] In fact, all of four mayors of the north double in their role. The agreement aimed at establishing a legal functioning of those municipal bodies in accordance with Kosovo, they do so, but they do Serbia as well.

proposed reintegration[641]; while others, like the Mayor of Zvecan, complained that Serbia took decisions without consulting them.[642]

Thus, the reintegration process in its transitional phase is swirling around how and who should engage Kosovo Serbs. Meetings with Kosovo officials are fairly regular, although very low profile and indirectly supervised by the international community.[643] In fact, in February 2014 they met highest Kosovo officials to start operationalizing the work of municipalities within the Kosovo law.[644] Nevertheless, they still rely on Serbia to maintain the salaries of their patronage networks.

The challenge for the reintegration process is to disrupt the majorization pattern that kept the enclaves ongoing, but at the same time working for alternative dynamics with the existing actors. Otherwise the reintegration process might fail; the double role of Serb mayors, or a vacuum in transferring to Kosovo the structures financed by Serbia might spark more majorization in the form of more radical voices going back to obstructing participation in Kosovo structures.

The international community and reintegration in Kosovo

The agreements converted the EU in the sole guarantor of their implementation, so the advance of future steps will depend entirely on the EU capacity to follow this process through. However, the technical dialogue had the US involved at the side of the negotiation table, a role that it later relinquished for the times of the normalization dialogue to avoid Russia demanding similar privileges. The technical dialogue featured a couple of hours' long videoconference with Mr. Thomas

[641] Balkan Insight: 2012, "Northern Serbs Vote 'No' to Kosovo", 16 Feb. See: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/99-74-kosovo-serbs-say-no-to-pristina.
[642] Radio Free Europe's Interview with Klokot's Mayor Sasa Mirkovic: April 5th 2013. See: http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/srbi-na-kosovu-podeljeni-oko-dijaloga-pristine-i-beograda/24948979.html.
[643] Author's interview with Besnik Osmani, permanent secretary for municipalities in Kosovo: September 3, 2014.
[644] See: http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/?page=2,9,3999.

Countryman, US Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs with responsibility for the Balkans with both parties, previous to each negotiation round. Currently the EU office in Kosovo and Serbia and the US Embassies are deeply involved in following the developments and helping overcome stalemates. Lately, the Germany is increasing its involvement. It rests on the EU to broker and guarantee the agreements, although the US government envoy meets Prime Ministers in Brussels during the period of negotiation meetings.[645]

However, key to the success of those agreements and EU leverage was imposing conditions on Serbia and Kosovo through the EU accession process. The EU is also involved in helping the implementation process: for example, it circulated 26.5 million euros[646] for IBM, Civil Registry and Cadastral Agreement.

Since the dialogue started in 2011, the EU issues progress reports on implementation of agreements by both parties as part of the EU annual progress reports on aspirant countries. The progress of Kosovo and Serbia in implementation of agreements has been an important factor for the decision of the European Commission to recommended EU member states that accession talks be opened with Serbia, and with Kosovo on a Stabilization and Association Agreement.[647] A few months later Germany opposed the opening the accession talks for Serbia, scheduled for the EU

[645] The agreements that foresaw the reintegration of Kosovo Serb enclaves in the north came into being after regular negotiation meetings taking place in Brussels at a technical level, and only remaining issues are discussed at the political level between Prime Ministers. Several working groups meet regularly to negotiate and implement various technical issues, after which drafts are elevated to Prime Ministers for approval or for addressing specific political points. The process advances due to the brokerage of the EU that helps in bridging the parties and exercising leverage.

[646] From this total amount, 21 million was allocated for construction of IBM buildings for 6 border crossings throughout the Kosovo-Serbia border (10.5 million to each state), 1.5 million for Serbia to scan the civil registry books to be returned to Kosovo (taken by Serbia during the war), 3 million for Serbia to scan cadastral documents to be returned to Kosovo, and 1 million for Kosovo to establish the technical agency for verification and comparison of the returned documents with Kosovo cadastral data base. (Data collected from the Ministry of Dialogue of Kosovo, updated in December 2015).

[647] See reports the following reports: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/ks_recommendation_2013_en.pdf;http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/sr_recommendation_2013_en.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/sr_spring_report_2013_en.pdf.

Parliament meeting of June 27th 2013, and postponed it until January 2014 only under the condition that Serbia implements all the Agreements so far reached.[648] This explains why Serbia switched its policy towards the north of Kosovo, at least in publicly promoting the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the elections, as well as the Association of Serb municipalities in August.

Serbia had already faced similar pressures by Germany after stalling the technical dialogue negotiations in 2011 and refusing to return to the negotiation table to discuss the Custom Agreement with Kosovo. When Angela Merkel visited Belgrade on August 23rd 2011, she made it clear that Serbia was conditioned to return to the Dialogue and implement agreements with Kosovo.[649]

The EU showed how committed it was regarding the Agreements reached and the reintegration of northern municipalities by delaying for almost two years the process of opening negotiations with Serbia, plus designing one special chapter addressing Serbian failure to fulfill the agreements.[650] On December 14th 2015, Serbia was granted the opening of the negotiations with the EU over two specific Chapters, one that deals with corruption (Chapter 32) and another that establishes the fulfillment of the Agreements with Kosovo as a conditionality to access the EU (Chapter 35).[651]

Chapter 35[652] is unique as the conditionality imposed by the EU to disrupt Serbian support to the northern municipalities' enclaves. It is the weakening of this support during this period that explains the initiated path to reintegration in line with theory expectations.

[648] See: http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/germany-opens-eu-door-serbia-acc-news-528971.
[649] Merkel said: "If Serbia wants to achieve candidate status, it should resume the dialogue and achieve results in that dialogue, enable EULEX to work in all regions of Kosovo, and abolish parallel structures and not create new ones". BBC: 2011. See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-14631297.
[650] See: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/enlargement/opening-chapters-historic-step-serbia-320597.
[651] See: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia/index_en.htm.
[652] See: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/AD-12-2015-INIT/en/pdf.

As for Kosovo, on October 27th 2015, it signed the SAA establishing its first contractual relationship with the EU, officially starting the first step to European integration[653]. The priorities in the foreign policy agenda of Serbia and Kosovo are both oriented towards the Euro-Atlantic integration. Both have been awarded benefits within this path for the successful implementation of these agreements, which confirms my theory expectations that actors' moves towards reintegration are more of a political action with specific domestic and diplomatic benefits.

V.4 Comparing South and Northern Kosovo Serb enclaves

In this section I compare the cases of Kosovo Serb enclaves in the southern and northern municipalities to assess the explanatory power of the theory of post-war reintegration vis a vis partitionist theories: in specific I discuss the predictions provided by John J. Mearsheimer.

While lamenting the violation of human rights that partition supposes, Mearsheimer painted an obscure future for Kosovo unless it takes place. The author predicted that due to the existence of a security dilemma between Serbs and Albanians, Kosovo was doomed to three options: 1) Serbs could resume ethnic cleansing against Kosovo Albanians; 2) Albanians could do the same to Serbs; or 3) They could sustain endless ethnic conflict.[654] The cases above described proved Mearsheimer wrong, and because reintegration is not expected in societies with massive war atrocities, it also shows the limits of partition explanations. Let's explore this further.

[653] See: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/10/248938.htm.
[654] Mearsheirmer: Partitioning Kosovo, p. 137.

Southern Serb enclaves were the first to make steps to reintegration: we can observe political participation since 2007, and the process of building new municipalities under Kosovo law was finished by 2010, unlike the northern municipalities which started doing so in 2013 and 2014 respectively.

In both cases the movement to reintegration took place when the capacities of Kosovo Serb elites had been weakened. The Serbian decision of entering the EU Accession process leaving Kosovo outside the package counts as a signal to southern Kosovo Serbs that their resources in the future will be dropping. As the international community was specifically allocating resources to reintegration, it seemed more viable for the Kosovo Serb political survival to follow it over maintaining the enclave.

This suggests that moving from an enclaved scenario to a reintegrated one is not possible without challenging the capacities (resources and legitimacy) of Kosovo Serb elites to sustain the enclave. Disrupting the Serbian financial support base was the turning point towards reintegration in both cases, because that support was vital for the Kosovo Serb elites. Thus, reintegration is possible because what enters on its way has less to do with ethnic fears than with the elites' capacity to sustain themselves in given political conditions. Moving towards reintegration is an accessible task if third parties intervene to disrupt the capacities on which ethnic elites rely upon to enforce a majorization pattern to access political gains.

The fact that Kosovo Serbs in the northern municipalities kept enclaves for longer is not linked to different levels of war atrocities but rather to the border proximity with Serbia, which allowed them to rely on higher capacities than those in the south. Border proximity made it easier for Serbia to expand its structures within the north; although southern structures were kept, the border made the northern

enclaves more sustainable. Resources flow easily and uncontrolled, not only from Serbia but also from criminal activities.

The various Serbian calls for partitioning, even after the Ahtisaari plan was a reality for Serbs in the south, kept Serbs elites in the north believing that they would eventually be traded for their kin in the south, who would remain within Kosovo structures. These extra capacities allowed Serbs in the north to continue obstructing minority participation of their kin within Kosovo Government structures, circulating resources to their co-ethnics, relying on structures financed by Serbia, and concentrating dispersed Serbs in certain areas, aided by Mr. Eide's removal of the requirement to return to pre-war homes.

Yes, ethnic violence unfolded on several occasions in the north, but ethnic hatreds cannot account for it, because it ceased when the international community disrupted the majorization pattern of Kosovo Albanians with Ahtisaari Plan, and when the Brussels Agreement curtailed the role of Serbia in the north. Tying the hands of Serbia with the agreement reduced the capacities of their kin in the north and pushed for a change in their attitude regarding Kosovo Albanians.

If Mearsheimer and Partition scholars were right in their assumptions, then Kosovo Serbs would never have engaged with Albanian officials of the Kosovo government to prepare teams to work within the municipalities. Such cooperation is unthinkable for Mearsheimer.

In general, Kosovo Serbs in the south and north of Ibar River were looking at the Serbian movements to evaluate political decisions regarding their own enclaves. The different pace of the reintegration process in the north is related to the Serbian political decision of backing partition to derive foreign policy benefits, rather than to protect co-ethnics.

We still need to see whether the path to reintegration will be completed, as Serbia is still today halfway through her EU commitments. However, we did observe that addressing the Kosovo government, Serbia and Kosovo Serbs with a negotiated deal enforced by the EU served to start the reintegration process. Still there is room for multiple options because we cannot know whether Serbia will continue to respect the EU conditionality.

Nevertheless, expectations of my theory have been met so far . In both cases, capacities of ethnic elites were weakened, their support base was disrupted and the possibilities for maintaining the enclave are nowadays curtailed. As predicted, enclaves cannot be sustained over time without those capacities. It is also not enough to challenge the capacities of minority elites to sustain the enclaves, but also those of majority elites to advance over minorities through a majorization pattern.

The Kosovo Albanian elite was also challenged when internationals imposed the conditions of the Ahtisaari Plan, and they had to recognize municipalities with a Serb majority and enhanced legal competences. Moreover, although the opposition is currently expressing arguments in line with a majorization pattern, they seem to challenge the current government rather than the status of Kosovo Serbs: every Kosovo Albanian knows that Independence is conditioned upon the respect of Kosovo Serb rights.

V. 5. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the explanatory power of my theory of post-war reintegration is maintained in contexts other than those of Bosnia.

In both the north and south cases the theory predictions hold that weakening elites' capacities to run a majorization pattern that maintains the enclaves is necessary for moving towards reintegration. When those capacities are consistently provided by their ethnic kin support, the international community has to challenge that support. As both cases have the same Kosovo Serb minority and the same kin state as support, this comparison helped to show the specific impact of border proximity on the capacities that kin-states can channel to the enclaves. The comparison also shows the relevance of kin-states in post-war outcomes, particularly in sustaining enclaved communities, but they are also highlighted as relevant actors to engage at the negotiation table in search of reintegration.

This work also shows that unless the international community succeeds in addressing the role of kin-states in sustaining the enclaves, a dual reality might take place and the reintegration process might not move from the transitioning period. We can see how the Serbian meddling by naming parallel mayors in municipalities in the south and the north leaves a dual reality on the ground, in which Kosovo Serb elites on the reintegration path survive together with those try to maintain enclave conditions. The EU might need to address this specific issue particularly in the north, when border proximity and the lack of the rule of law might increase criminality hazards.

Understanding that enclaves need to be maintained over time with capacities that in general cannot be generated within the enclave, helps policymakers think of avenues of policy to promote post-war reintegration. The international community failed consistently for almost 13 years to understand that insofar as those capacities are provided by Serbia, reintegration does not stand a chance in Kosovo. Spoils of peace were circulated towards the enclaves, increasing the resources of elites to

maintain those enclaves. Thus, increasing resources from the donor community to the enclaves does not help them to move to reintegration. The key is to condition those resources to elite cooperation towards reintegration, as we could see in the southern enclaves.

Last, post-war reintegration is a possible reality in enclaved communities, as long as the international community engaged in peacebuilding processes understands the dynamics that maintain those enclaves and challenge them. Thus, conviviality after war is not only a desirable option, but also a possible one.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

"I have come across people (...) who have written history without taking part in public affairs,
and politicians who have concerned themselves with producing events without thinking about them.
I have observed that the first are always inclined to find general causes, whereas the second, living in the midst of disconnected daily facts, are prone to imagine that everything is attributable to particular incidents,
and that the wires they pull are the same as those that move the world.
It is to be presumed that both are equally deceived." -- Alexis de Tocqueville

VI.1 Conclusions

This thesis departed from the empirical puzzle of various post-war outcomes along the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina and inquired why some societies remain divided while others reintegrated after the war. So, what have we learnt?

Local elites have incentives to keep societies divided, and they rely on the support of their ethnic kin (inside and outside the country) to do so. Nonetheless, this does not to have to be a permanent condition of those societies, because timely third party intervention challenging those dynamics have proven to be successful in reintegrating societies divided by war, if they tackle the operational capacities those elites have to keep societies apart through a majorization pattern. Thus, we confirm that reintegration is a desirable outcome, but also –and more importantly- a possible one.

We have also learnt that post-war outcomes do not imply only a binary option between segregation and reintegration. There are four different possibilities that can reflect how societies interact in post-war settings. Namely, they reintegrate (implying

the return and participation of minorities); they become homogenous (minorities are absent); they assimilate (minorities do not restore their demographics, but they still participate in community life); or minorities live in an enclave (their demographics is restored or untouched, but they do not participate in community life run by majority groups). Local elites maintain homogenous and enclaved societies, and their ethnic kin supports them. Insofar as elites rely on that support, separation among ethnic groups becomes sustainable over time.

We know now that an enclave and a homogenous community represent different challenges for reintegration. In homogenous societies it is necessary that third parties intervene in a timely manner to disrupt the conditions that maintain such outcome. Timing is key for the return of minorities to their pre-war homes; otherwise, they tend to resettle somewhere else.

Failure to intervene on a timely manner in homogenous communities result in assimilated outcomes because majority elites tend to agree on expanding participation spaces for minorities, as such participation is less of a challenge than minority return, which can alter their favorable demographic. Although this condition has not been observed in our cases, we did observe that in Bugojno an assimilated outcome has emerged since 2004, out of restricted economic opportunities that prevented reintegration to sustain over time. In this last case, the Croat minorities were forced to find a life somewhere else, even after the community reached reintegration between 1999 and 2003.

With the Bugojno case we have learnt that conditions that lead to post-war reintegration differ from those conditions that allow its sustainability. The test run in the Jajce case shows how such sustainability is strongly linked to the economic

opportunities provided in a given territory. The touristic prospect of Jajce has helped the reintegration in this community to hold over time.

While studying Jajce, I found out that minority elites in enclaved communities need an extra influx of resources from their ethnic kin. This is so because enclaves are controlled by minority elites that provide services to their constituency in parallel to those run by majority elites with higher capacities to control a territory. Thus, majority elites have more capacities to maintain homogenous scenarios by themselves than minority elites have to maintain enclaves. This is also an important distinction for policy making because the majorization pattern developed by majority elites might be more difficult to disrupt than the majorization pattern that maintains enclaves.

These findings are highly important in a world that currently has almost 60 million conflict-induced refugees and displaced people[655]. Many of those conflicts will eventually come to an end, and there will be a need for strategies to handle the resettlement of those populations back home, but more importantly, to address the expected political dynamics that keep societies apart. Post-war refugee management will be required in places like Syria, Iraq and Congo, so lessons from previous conflicts are all more than necessary.

At the end of wars in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia the international community believed that it had to opt between partitioning those territories, or making arrangements in their institutional design that could facilitate the reintegration of those societies. I showed that there is much more to do before thinking about dividing territories, and that extra efforts are warranted to engage at sub-national level besides developing an institutional design that could enforce cooperation among formerly conflicting parties.

[655] UNHCR 2015: *op. cit*.

This work demonstrates that ethnic reintegration is a successful tool that demands active and responsible engagement of third parties in a timely manner, challenging elites on their exclusivity over resources, their legitimacy to engage in violent actions and the support they rely upon, that is: their ethnic kin.

Despite the theoretical angle of this thesis, I developed this work having in mind the policy audience and particularly those engaged in the difficult task of building peace. Thus, I start this chapter by referring to my theoretical contributions and continue with the implications of this thesis for the policy sector.

VI.2 Theoretical Contribution

This thesis offers three main theoretical contributions: 1) it offers a new dependent variable, 2) it refines existing concepts, and 3) it builds arguments against partitionist theories.

VI.2.1 A new dependent variable

In my thesis I brought new theoretical contributions for future researchers in the field of post-conflict studies. I offer a new dependent variable, "post-war outcomes", which allows us to study to what extent the social fabric has been restored after war, and all the possible variations within this context. Such variations are: reintegrated, homogenous, assimilated, and enclaved outcomes.

The reality of what we often refer to as "peace", as soon as an agreement between previously conflicting parties has been reached, is a post-war setting that assumes a wide range of variation in the outcomes it generates, but it also involves specific tasks and actors. State-building is set in place to rebuild governing structures,

reconstruction efforts to deal with infrastructure, and an ethnic reintegration process to rebuild the social fabric damaged by the massive displacement of population due to conflict.

Post-war outcomes, *post-conflict societies*, *post-war environments* or *war-torn countries* are concepts equally used to refer to the destroyed infrastructure, state-fragility and precarious (or non-existent) societal relations. Moreover, peace-builders and scholars assume that post-war environments are in general more positive entities than the war itself. We tend to forget that the signature of a peace agreement does not translate immediately to the local realities of people in post-conflict and divided societies, and when it does, it is not likely to be done evenly across a given country. Furthermore, while we can easily observe (and measure) how much of the destroyed buildings have been rebuilt in each municipality, or how many institutions have been slowly reestablished, we lack concepts that could speak about the different realities of the reconstruction of the social fabric.

A persistent feature in all the interviews I conducted in the municipalities of Bugojno and Jajce (in BH) was the reference to the survival of war-like dynamics during the years after the DAP was signed. All interviewees referred to the difficulties of being an "ethnic minority" in a post-war setting, and to the ethnic-cleansing-like practices they suffered by local elites eager to consolidate their war gains.

Although these practices at one point ceased and minorities could return to both Jajce and Bugojno, the literature did not have a conceptual language to show these variations. It seems inexplicable that after the mushrooming of ethnic conflicts during the 1990s, all of which involved the abuse of civilians as a tool to wage wars, there was not a measure that could inform us about the reconstruction of the societal

fabric, and at the same time could travel across space and time. This thesis offered such measure with the dependent variable of "Post-War Outcomes".

I showed previously that Jenne's model relies on a binary distinction between reintegrated scenarios and non-reintegrated ones, but adding nuances to her model can help us capture the varieties of non-reintegrated scenarios that might exist across time and space. For instance, before 1999 minorities of Jajce and Bugojno were both non-reintegrated in their respective municipalities. However, the post-war scenario in both localities looked extremely different. While in Jajce the Bošnjak minority could derive health care and education services from their own parallel administration in Vinac, the Croat minority in Bugojno was at the mercy of a hospital run exclusively by Bošnjaks, and facing an education program implemented by the very same majority that was impeding their return home. These "non-reintegrated" realities were very different, and required a conceptual framework to address each of them.

This theory is built for cases that observed civil wars with an identity component, which displaced large numbers of population due to conflict, and experienced ethnic cleansing or genocide-like practices. Thus, it applies to post-conflict contexts like Afghanistan, Rwanda, Congo, Burundi and possibly Iraq, and Syria once the war ends.

VI.2.2 Refining Concepts and Theoretical Arguments

In order to explain the variation of post-war scenarios, I draw on Jenne's ethnic spoils logic and refine this concept as a "majorization pattern". Such redefinition allows me to do three things: 1) to distinguish the specific logic that applies to minority elites from the logic applied by majority elites. For instance, the majorization pattern implemented by minority elites in an enclaved community will

be oriented to obstruct minority participation in majority structures, while at the same time aiming at increasing minority return to increase the demographic base of the enclave. But in a homogenous community, majority elites' majorization pattern obstructs both minority return and minority participation. 2) The majorization pattern also adds one more mechanism, which is the manipulation of displaced co-ethnics to shore up their demographics, which in turn contributes to power consolidation. 3) The majorization pattern integrates a distinction between spoils of war and spoils of peace; the first are described by Jenne as the resources that are conquered through war or obtained due to the control of a specific territory, while the second refers to resources that are drawn by the international community or donors in general to the peacebuilding and reconstruction process.

This distinction is necessary to add one more political dynamic to those described by Jenne's logic of ethnic spoils. This dimension is the game in which local elites engage with third parties to drive resources in their own benefit. In practical terms, this implies that third parties can condition the resources they provide, and they can also condition the way local elites use those resources within the scenario they play.

Because the resources provided by third parties vary per each outcome, such distinction is all more necessary. For example, dispersed minorities might have less access to the spoils of peace and war than concentrated minorities. Dispersed minorities do not have any government structure to distribute resources, while concentrated minorities do have a structure within their enclave. As spoils of war more easily circulate to existing structures, the capacities of minority elites in an enclaved society are higher than those in a homogenous one. This also helps us to guide policy making decisions while supporting minority elites in post-war outcomes.

Furthermore, this thesis brings a distinction between reintegration and sustainable reintegration as two different entities that face different conditions, adding to the concept of ethnic reintegration provided by Jenne and Moore.[656] Reintegrated societies observe high levels of minority participation with high levels of minority return, and so does a sustainable reintegration. But, while reintegration describes the outcome of the engagement of the international community in either a homogenous or an enclaved society, sustainable reintegration describes the conditions required to preserve such outcome over time.

This conceptual difference is as relevant as the pragmatic one, because it concerns the scope and nature of the third party intervention that will follow the attainment of ethnic reintegration. Although this thesis does not explore deeper the causes of reintegration sustainability, it does open this possibility for further research. For example, the international community has invested resources to rebuild community life and relocate displaced population in Gitukura (northern Burundi), and the UNDP alleges that such investment has helped with social cohesion.[657] Such investments could help comparing Gitukura with other communities in Burundi, in some of which conflict might reignite after the spark of violence in last April.[658]

This thesis also confirms the relevant role that third parties play in the process of reintegration, already pointed out by Jenne[659] and Moore;[660] and it helps clarifying the specific conditions under which third parties should intervene, highlighting the

[656] Jenne: 2010, op. cit.; Moore: 2013, op. cit.
[657] UNDP: *Rebuilding War-torn communities in Burundi.* From: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/ourstories/Rebuilding-war-torn-communities-in-Burundi.html.
[658] The Guardian: 2015, December 17. Retrieved January 14, 2016 from Burundi on 'very cusp' of civil conflict, warns UN human rights chief, see: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/dec/17/burundi-very-cusp-civil-war-warns-un-human-rights-chief-zeid-raad-al-hussein.
[659] Jenne: 2010, op. cit.
[660] Moore: 2013, op. cit.

consequences of non-targeted intervention. Furthermore, I add to the arguments of those scholars that the failure of reintegration takes three very different forms (rather than just non-reintegration): homogenous, assimilated or enclaved outcomes.

Moreover, I provide evidence of the possibility of reintegration reversibility: the Bugojno case showed that the lack of economic opportunities to sustain the reintegrated community can easily result in an assimilated outcome. This is a highly relevant point in the contexts of BH and Kosovo, where the members of some minorities can obtain alternative passports allowing EU access, or acquire higher levels of mobility that help them search for economic opportunities somewhere else.

The evidence I derive from the cases of Bosnia, and especially Kosovo, also shows the relevant role of Kin-States in post-war settings. By emphasizing the influence of Croatia and Serbia, respectively, either in supporting societal division, or in contributing to (or not hampering) reintegration processes, I contribute to the existing literature on kin-state roles.

VI.2.3 An Argument against Partition Theories

One main theoretical contribution of my theory of post-war reintegration is to have identified empirical observations that challenge existing partitionist accounts. This theory successfully explains how ethnic reintegration is possible in post-war contexts, but most importantly, it also provides reasons why it is a preferable policy solution than partitioning.

Proponents of partition arguments generally hold that group identities get hardened after the war, and that the fear of conviviality with other groups is so present among individuals that in order to provide for security for themselves, they resort to violence and expulsion to prevent being attacked by others. The analysis of the

Bugojno and Jajce cases first, and the Kosovo Serb comparison later in Chapter V, have demonstrated that such claims cannot be sustained. We saw that the obstructionist process was orchestrated by elites rather than spontaneously organized by the population. Obstruction was accompanied by the manipulation of co-ethnic IDPs from some other parts of Kosovo and Bosnia, and generally a specific top-down organizational capacity was deployed for moving those co-ethnics to Jajce or Bugojno.

The theory of post-war reintegration shows that elites were not truly concerned about protecting their communities but rather interested in the possibility of consolidating their post-war power while using ethnic boundaries as an instrument to this end. If the protection of population from other groups were a main concern for elites, why would they even engage in efforts to threaten their own co-ethnics in order to retrieve them from regions where those elites could not consolidate their power?

According to partition explanations, ethnic groups with a strong identity (and war is assumed to make identity stronger) will seek to provide security for themselves by expelling others. By the same reasoning, cooperation between members of different groups is therefore unlikely, even less regarding joint work in specific security tasks. However, this work has shown that the UN multiethnic police project seemed to have worked successfully in the Central Canton since its creation, and the merger of security forces neither brought further problems nor created reluctance to be loyal to the Central Canton command. Similarly, the first successful reintegration to be achieved in Kosovo was among Police and Civil Protection Corps recently.

Partition scholars assume that separation will take place, regardless of who implements it. Their concern is how it happens[661]. They claim that, in order to avoid

[661] Kaufman: 1998, p.123.

that ethnic cleansing-like practices such as obstructionism take place in post-war settings, we should plan a peaceful population transfer. The theory of post-war reintegration demonstrates that such separation only takes place because local elites have the resources and legitimacy to do so, but the enforcement of such separation stops when the incentive base is addressed by third parties. Thus, the premises of violence-prone ethnic identities and ethnic fears do not hold when elites' resources are challenged with a set of standards by which they could lose those resources and even be removed from office. This thesis provided several accounts of that sort.

Partition proponents also ignored the fact that a leadership alternative to hardliners does exist. My post-war reintegration theory calls them *tide riders* to highlight the fact that such leadership is willing to engage in the process of ethnic reintegration despite the threats and insecurity imposed on them by their co-ethnic hardliners.

Therefore, partition theories got something right: it is a matter of how we handle post-war societies. But not about 'how' we do partitioning in order to avoid a massive amount of bloodshed; instead, it is rather a matter of "how" we build ethnic reintegration in order to deter those actors that selfishly benefit from the promotion of fears and violence to achieve their political goals. Instead of investing brain power and resources to search 'how' to do the same task as ethnic elites but in a more organized and 'civilized' fashion (as partition theorists seem to propose), we have to invest those efforts in making reintegration possible. Moreover, the possibility of change is more natural to human beings than its opposite. Partition scholars seem to assume that human beings do not possess such capacity.

Believing that ethnic cleansing is a deeply rooted cultural behavior that the international community cannot avoid brings us to a hopeless situation, particularly

looking ahead to cases like Syria, Congo, Libya and Iraq. In a partition view, we are exposed to an increasing amount of separation and violence perpetrated by groups that entrench on the most varied identities for such purpose, and we cannot do anything about it.

Instead, if we begin to understand that ethnic cleansing is a political tool to promote and succeed in political goals, we can also understand that obstructionism and manipulation of IDPs and refugees in post-war scenarios is the continuation of such goals through other means and with other tools. Thus, the theory of post-war reintegration shows that we have to challenge the operational capacity that elites rely upon to implement such goals and the very specific tools they use to do so.

In addition, even when partition scholars can correctly explain why obstruction takes place, they cannot explain why ethnic reintegration was possible at one point of the Bugojno process and especially in Jajce, where it has become sustainable. For them, reintegration equals new opportunities for a security dilemma to re-emerge, and in turn, they expect that more violence will occur. Since the reintegration process took place in Bugojno, Jajce and the South of Kosovo, violence has not returned. The three cases have moved far away from any possibility of ethnic conflict. It is already eight years ago that Kosovo Serbs in the south began to cooperate and form coalitions with Kosovo Albanians within the Kosovo Government, an unthinkable situation for the proponents of partitioning.

VI.3 Policy Implications & Recommendations

Although this work bears a strong theoretical angle, it also aims at contributing to the policy audience. Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Congo,

Myanmar, Central African Republic, Iraq and Eritrea are the major sources of refugees nowadays (Figure VI. I). In a few more years those countries will need help in the process of resettling those refugees back home together with the current IDPs. This section provides implications from my theory of post-war reintegration to tackle situations of that sort. In the words of Antonio Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *"[w]e are witnessing a paradigm change, an unchecked slide into an era in which the scale of global forced displacement as well as the response required is now clearly dwarfing anything seen before.*" Thus, discussions like the one held in this thesis are more urgent than ever.

This work informs policy makers on 1) how to handle post-war reintegration, and 2) shows how post-war reintegration is one more conflict management strategy to consider. By doing so, this theory achieves the following: a) it establishes conditions along four types of post-war outcomes (reintegrated, homogenous, enclaved, assimilated), orienting respective policy planning; b) it orientates policy making for reintegration, providing guidelines for procedural aspects of the process regarding two key actors of the post-war scene: local elites and ethnic kin; c) it establishes the limits for third party intervention and the consequences of a non-responsible engagement in the reintegration process. Through this, the theory guides peacebuilders' rational calculations before engaging in a peacebuilding task, while calling for awareness on three relevant issues: timing, sustainability and local ownership. Peacebuilders' work depends on the possibilities of understanding what sort of post-war scenario their efforts –directly or indirectly- are helping to shape.

Figure VI.1. Major source countries of refugees by end of 2014 (UNHCR 2015)



VI.3.1 How the International Community should Handle Post-war Reintegration

This section provides recommendations to the international community regarding how to engage in post-war reintegration processes. It highlights aspects of the process that need to be considered before planning an intervention.

To each outcome its own policy!

This work distinguishes two possible post-war outcomes in which peace-builders might find themselves intervening in, and two other possibilities that might be created as consequences of the intervention process.

First, at war's end, the international community will face either homogenous or enclaved communities. Each calls for different priorities in policy-making. While homogenous societies demand prompt engagement in disrupting the majorization process developed by majority and minority elites, enclaved communities pose a minority participation challenge. In the latter case, timing is less of a concern than in

the former scenario because enclaves tend to concentrate minorities after the war. While a delay of intervention in homogenous societies risks the chances of reintegration, the work on enclaves to promote minority participation can be done with less urgency. However, engagement in enclaved communities demand policies not only oriented to majority and minority elites but also to the ethnic kin that supports them.

Second, third parties might help create an assimilated outcome, and by doing so curtail the chances for reintegration. Delaying on targeting minority return might force the relocation or the resettlement of those minorities somewhere else, jeopardizing their possibilities of return. Thus, an assimilated society might be created even under the watch and by the work of the international community.

People first!

Post-war reintegration calls for placing emphasis on the Protection of Populations as the main policy driver. In most interventions, peacebuilders try to work with existing elites because they fear a new emergence of conflict. However, interventions have to be planned with the awareness that refugees and IDPs are most of the time manipulated by their own co-ethnics eager to increase demographics in the particular societies they control. People are trapped in dynamics that treats them as a proxy through which elites secure their ruling or seek for power and territory consolidation long after the war's end. Such ethnic engineering is nothing but the continuation of war through other means, ethnic cleansing in specific. If people are not considered first, then the intervention itself might be meaningless insofar as war-like practices are reproduced in the post-war scenario under their watch.

If peacebuilders engage only with the aim to protect populations while trying not to exacerbate the existing dynamics (do not harm), their efforts might resonate

faster among the general population. Bosnia has shown that internationals have generally perpetuated the majorization pattern, thus violence, discrimination, and more conflicts in the long term are the obvious consequences. The IDMC Report of 2014 has clearly shown how ethno-politics is still entrenched within Bosnia politics, mostly because internationals have failed in placing people first in their policy making.

Act on time!

I have already mentioned how relevant it is for the success of reintegration that third parties engage in homogenous communities in a timely manner in order to avoid risking their chances, or help building an assimilated outcome. Delayed responses might result in further entrenchment of the very same situations that third parties aim at tackling, because -once again-, the intervention might be meaningless if assimilation is the result. Timing for guaranteeing minority return is a necessary condition. I estimated in this work that a prompt response to minority return means acting within the first five years of the post-war context.

Focus on alternative leadership!

This work has shown why elites have incentives to maintain societies divided and how they engage in various practices to that end. It also shows the existence of an alternative leadership that challenges such practices, the *tide riders.* However, the emerging of those tide riders of the reintegration process requires some sort of external support because otherwise their lives are at stake.

Breaking what Barnett and Zurcher called the "Peacebuilder's contract", meaning the exchange of negative peace for spoils of war provided by internationals, does require an alternative leadership. This work highlights how relevant it is for the

reintegration success that the international community supports elites that do not reproduce war-like practices.

Beware of the Kin-State factor!

This thesis made a theoretical contribution while describing how relevant the role of Kin-State is to maintaining societies divided with enclaves. Chapter 5 provides various accounts of the key role of Serbia in maintaining the enclaves in southern and northern Kosovo in various periods. Kin-States should be considered among the relevant conflict actors of any intervention because their meddling can hold back the general peace-building enterprise. There is a need to engage such actors in the negotiation table as a peace factor, internationals being the facilitator and enforcer of such role across the years.

EU conditionality might be one way of doing this, providing carrots of higher political order or switching diplomatic gains for the kin-state. Not addressing this factor turns into an incomplete implementation of third parties' capacities, weakening the actions taken and therefore altering the chances for reintegration.

Engage Responsibly!

If Bosnia has not achieved higher levels of reintegration it is not a problem related to ancient hatreds and irreconcilable ethnic differences. The problem rests in the solutions that were brought about for reintegration and in the way in which the international community has engaged there. As long as the international community engages in peacebuilding processes, there is a responsibility on their side to do it without exacerbating the post-conflict dynamics that bring their legacy from the war.

Solutions cannot be half way though. We learnt many years ago that Do No Harm[662] was a standard to live by when we talk about international engagement.

[662] Anderson: 2009.

However, it seems that this standard was not always properly taken into consideration. Internationals have done more harm than good by leaving untouched the operational capacities of ethnic elites in many areas of Bosnia. Such operational capacity left those elites with enough room to maneuver a clientelistic system along its patronage networks, mostly empowered by ethnic kin actors like neighboring kin- states.

Ethnic reintegration is doable. It does not make sense to engage in a territory to leave it with the same roots that engender violence and conflict; we have already learnt that from an extensive body of literature about conflict resolution.

Responsible engagement implies not contributing to exacerbating existing post-conflict patterns. It seems, however, that this aspect has been overlooked in the rush to provide relief to European countries willing to send back home the refugees held in their territories. It seems that the international community was more eager to solve their own overflow of refugees than to attain ethnic reintegration as a solution for post-war settings and peacebuilding processes.

At the end of the Bosnian war Germany had 350,000 refugees and was intensively pushing for their resettlement. The current refugee crisis might put Europe under similar conditions, although the learning process has increased as much as the fears towards this sort of experiences. Nevertheless, regardless of how this refugee crisis is managed at this moment, the engagement in post-war refugee management is not only unavoidable but also desirable if we are interested in not enhancing the very same roots of those conflicts. Whenever the moment for intervention comes, responsible engagement is in order.

Readers might wonder about the role of the local population is in this equation. Particularly readers acquainted with bottom-up practices of conflict

resolution and peace-building might inquire whether population is a *silent victim* or *a constrained actor*?

I have left this aspect to the end of this section for good reason. This dissertation does not address the individual preferences of the local population for reintegration. My assumptions regarding the population are the following: first, the post-war population always supports elites that identifies with their own group. This does not imply that they agree, do not contest, or disapprove of elites' actions; it only implies that the population understands its constraints, and it knows that the resources needed are to be channeled through group elites (regardless of whether they feel elites' actions to be repulsive).

For instance, the population in a homogenous post-war scenario is not blind to the fact that some of their neighbors have been pushed away or deprived from returning home, especially if they are re-located in premises belonging to someone else. Yet, to meet their needs and access to property, food, and job, they need to channel their demands through the existing elites and governing structures.

This work is not concerned with individual or group acts of resistance to such actions, but it does assume that the mere fact that the population uses those elites and their institutional structures to channel their demands legitimizes elites' operations (whether if they are aware of it or not).

Second, I assume that the population is not a passive victim in these processes, but rather an actively constrained actor. If the post-conflict dynamics were different, such constraints might be lifted and the population might not necessarily be forced to default in the support of local elites. Further research could explore the role of this actor under these constrained circumstances.

To conclude, third party intervention to achieve ethnic reintegration not only has to timely target the majorization pattern and ethnic kin that supports it, but it also has to be aware of the consequences of such intervention when is not done responsively.

VI.3.2 Post-War Reintegration as an alternative conflict management strategy

This work clearly shows that attempts to build ethnic reintegration are not only a desirable course of action but a very much needed one. Yet, we need to compare this tool to others that are regularly proposed as the solution of civil wars.

Some years ago, Dana Rohrabacher (Republican Congressman, USA) proposed Kosovo and Serbia to enter in a process of territorial exchange, whereby Kosovo would take the Serbian Presheva Valley (with an Albanian majority), and Serbia would absorb the Northern part of Kosovo (with a majority of Serbian population). Recommendations of this sort are short-sighted and do not serve to resolve conflicting conditions.

Political elites make decisions regarding their opportunities to sustain their political consolidation and survival within the scenario left by the war. As territories are rarely 100% homogeneous, it is logical to wonder in how many pieces those territories should be partitioned and how sustainable those partitions can be. Furthermore, proponents of managing post-war scenarios through partition indirectly reward and legitimize ethnic cleansing as a tool of war. Besides, we have to wonder how much different such a strategy is from the one carried out in war times. Partitioning as a conflict management tool equals committing "non-violent" ethnic cleansing in a 'legitimized' fashion.

The goals of the international community focus on getting rid of "ethnic cleansing" as a whole, not only of its worst consequences. Ethnic reintegration however, not only tackles the consequences of war, but also, and centrally, its roots.

Another policy discussion took place in Bosnia right after the war. The UNHCR was confronted with the question of whether it was about "bringing safety to people, or people to safety". Some had argued that this question is at the core of each UNHCR deployment. If we assume that after the war in Syria, we decide that safety conditions are never going to be ready for the return of refugees, and we decide to relocate 2 million Syrians somewhere else in the region, somewhere else in the world, or somewhere else inside Syria (imagining a "majority safe spot" exists).

In such a scenario, bringing people to safety would amount to the multiplication of enclaves –as those we have already seen in Iraq after the war in early 2000-, and an ample amount of resources to protect such enclaves. Moreover, we have seen that elites within the enclaves tend to reproduce such conditions, thus, the very same root of conflict survives within the post-war setting. We also discussed in Chapter 1 how homogenous/enclaved societies are more prone to conflict as well. The alternative to bringing people to safety would be to empty Syria of peaceful Syrians for good. I cannot even start to imagine how sustainable that policy option might be in a world that observes each day an increase in reactionary response to immigration and refugees.

Reintegration, however, is a more viable option. It amounts to focusing on policies that bring safety to people into their pre-war homes. It is difficult to see how this option can be possible in the existing conditions of Syria and Iraq; yet, eventually the war will finish and it will be more than necessary to work on the complete disruption of war-like practices surviving in the post-war context. Ethnic cleansing

reached a new level in Syria, and we are still not even close to be ready for the challenge of post-war reintegration or peacebuilding. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that without post-war conflict management the options are not touching the roots of the conflict, or fully engage in reintegration. A more peaceful world certainly demands the latter.

VI.4 Further Research

First, in this thesis I have tested the theory of post-war reintegration using a controlled comparison of two towns in the Central Canton of Bosnia. Also, I have further assessed its applicability to Kosovo and the reintegration process of its Serb minority. However, further research is in order to determine whether the theory of post-war reintegration carries explanatory power beyond the region of the former Yugoslavia. Testing this theory in other regions that have faced conflict-induced displacement will disclose whether predictions stand in different cultural contexts.

Second, this work has assumed "good will" on the side of third parties intervening in the ethnic reintegration process, and I have regarded missed opportunities of intervention as the results of variables that were not well considered or perceptions of the post-war environment that were not all that accurate. However, further research could explore the structure of interests and powers at play within the international community regarding ethnic reintegration as a conflict management tool and as a post-war refugee management device in specific. What are the conditions of those interests and powers for working against ethnic reintegration as a possible course of action? In line with this, is partitioning more functional to specific interests of the international community regarding specific territories? For instance, in the

eventuality of the end of the Syrian war, would it be more strategically desirable to invest efforts in partitioning the territories or in reintegrating them?

Further research should explore the variation in the leverage that ethnic kin actors have over local elites. For instance, it was always said within the Central Canton that the leadership of the main political parties would send moderates as representatives in different offices and deliberative structures[663] because the actual decision making process for the whole of Bosnia takes place in Sarajevo for the SDA and in Mostar for the HDZ. Thus, my work has only tested the existence of ethnic kin support, without entertaining further ideas on why local elites would disregard competing visions within their ethnic kin of how Bosnia should be. Exploring that leverage might inform us of the nuances of post-war political dynamics.

Although I assume that local elites and their ethnic kin support share the same power consolidation perspective, and under this assumption I sustain that elites will jointly search the maintenance of homogeneous or enclaved ocieties, further research could highlight competing alliances of local "tide riders" and leaderships within their ethnic kin. This research stops at showing that such alternative voices exist (i.e., tide riders) and they endure the risks that challenging the mainstream involve. Furthermore, this research has shown how many leaders confessed being trapped – unwillingly- in hardliner dynamics and therefore followed suit. However, cases like Branco Cavar in Jajce deserve further explanation. For instance, what are the exact conditions under which "tide riders" emerge?

Final Thoughts

[663] Pierce and Stubbs: 2000.

I believe that we cannot ignore that in academia we propose arguments to social and political problems that make an impact on the life of others, who become our object of study. Partition scholars make a moral and political choice, regardless of the fact that such a moral choice might have been unconsciously taken. So do scholars like Chandler[664], when they voice various critiques against third party intervention in post-war societies without recognizing one specific contribution.

It is maybe only at the end of writing this thesis that I got the courage to recognize my own moral and political choice. But I do it consciously. I have sought to remain objective concerning the data I gathered, and on the path that data has taken me to. However, I cannot remain silent regarding the normative priority I assign to reintegration. I do normatively believe that reintegration is the most desirable course of action we can pursue in policy making in post-war societies. I did develop a thesis through which I could test the extent of possibility of my normative standing. I was curious of its margins of possibility and its limits.

I was mobilized and inspired by the various political elites I have encountered since that day in 1997 when I started my first steps in the path of peacemaking, and by the various others leaders I have trained and intensively known while working on conflict management and human rights in Germany.

I have seen change, and thus I have seen that the possibility of bridging differences lies in the central core of human capacities. It was in those trainings that I battled intensively against scholars that were driving policy makers to the extreme of political options: the white and black painting of fears. It was on those very same days that a Kosovo Albanian participant who has seen a lot of suffering, sat quietly next to

[664] Chandler, D. 1999

a Serbian participant with an intense judging voice. They engaged in dialogue, they worked together, and they eventually solved problems together.

The same happened even within the Kosovo Government when the cross sectional teams were created: people were reluctant, certainly they did not want Serbia in Kosovo, and the idea of working for the reintegration of Kosovo Serbs sounded difficult for them to accept. Yet, several months later they recognized the effects of Dialogue in them, and they came to embrace, to appreciate and to envision the reintegration of Kosovo Serbs within Kosovo.

Academic work cannot be moral and politically irresponsible; at the same time, neither can it hide the values it sustains on grounds of academic objectivity. We are humans, we decide what to look at and we have our inner reasons to do so. That is academic honesty, exposing beforehand what our readers deserve to know.

I have decided that my work should be part of the premises that I believe in. I believe in the human capacity to change, in their capacity to overcome trauma, and reinventing themselves.

It is on those grounds that this thesis has started and finished.

Annex 1: Interviews in Bugogno

Croat Professor, Returnee, May 2011
Catholic Priest Zvinko, May 2011
Main Imam of Bugojno, Vehid Arnaut, May 2011
Ms.Ana Sapina, a teacher in Jajce of Croat origin living in Bugojno: May 2011
Mr. Pero Pejak, Bugojno Official for Return and Reconstruction, Bugojno: May 2011
Mahira, young Bosnjak, May 2011
Orthodox Priest Slavisa: June 2011, May 2012
N.U.P.P. representatives, Bugojno, May 2011
Architect Zvenko Antunovic, Croat leader, Bugojno, May 29th, 2011
Niki, Serb citizen: June 2011
Mr. Dzevad Mlaco Former Mayor of Bugojno (1995-1999), 29th June 2011
Primary School Director, Bugojno, May 2011
Mr. Nikica Spremo, 17th June 2011
Mr. Mario Pavlovic, Croat Returnee, 14th June 2011
Ms Lada Pavlovic, 15th June 2011
Mr. Ratko Kolovrat, Professor, 14th June 2011
Mr.Miloge Ninadovic, Serb Professor, 22nd June 2011
Mr. Mesud Secic, Math Professor, 6th June 2011,
Mr. Hajrudin Grebo, School Director, 6th June 2011,
Mr. Sead Pokvic, Electoral Committee, 18th June 2011
Serbia Professor of History, Slavko Zubic, 25th June 2011
Mr. Nicola Simic, a Serbian leader of the Cipuljc village, Bugojno, June 2011
Anonymous interviewee, Bugojno, June 2011
Croat returnees, Primary school teacher: Bugojno, June 2011.
Croat returnees, High school teacher: Bugojno, June 2011.
Croat returnee, Self-employed: June 2011.
Mr.Mariajnovic, OSCE regional office in Travnik, June 2011
Annonymous Serb returnee: June 2011.
Annonymous Croat returnee: June 2011.
Hospital Director Dr. Melika Mahmutbegovic, June 2011.
Mr.Nikica Oaxa, Serb, Returnee. June 2011.
Mr. Imali Tupara, 12th June 2011, politician
Secretaries at the Croat Cultural Center: June 2012
Ms.Aida Burko Female undergraduate student, 20th June 2011, May 2012.
Mr. Miroslav Zelic, politician 21st June 2012
Mr.Ugarak Mustafa, politician 22nd June 2012
Mrs.Fatma Sabic, NGO Director, 21st June 2012
Mr. Viskovic, politician, 21st June 2012'
Ms. Fatma Helez, 21st June 2012

Greta Kuna, the Central Canton Education Minister, Bugojno (1996-2010), November 2012
Mr. Nicola Simic, Serb leader and SDP politician: November 2012.
Priest Mirko, Bugojno November 2012
Croat leader A, Bugojno, November 2012
Croat leader B, Bugojno, November 2012

Annex 2: Interviews in Jajce

Mr.Mirko Ljubez, Croat Professor, Technical School Jajce: May 2012
Mariana, a Serb returnee: May 2012
Chief of Police, Jozo Budes: May 2012
Mr. Goran, a Red Cross Croat employee, May 2012.
Bošnjak returnee: May 2012.
Njhaz Duranovic, member of Municipal Assembly 2000-2004: May 2012
Mr. Emir Sahman. Bošnjaks' main representative at the parallel government in Vinac during 1995-1997 May 2012
Mr. Mustapha Kumar: May 2012
Director of Red Cross, 31st May 2012
Mrs. Rowan Youth Center, 30th May 2012
Mr. Dr.Vesna Miketa. June 2012,
Annonymous Bošnjak informant, June 2012
School "13 September" Director, June 2012
Annonymous Bosnjak Returnee, 14th June 2012
Director or Youth Center of Jajce: 1st June 2012
Mr. Nisvet Hrnjić, Mayor of Jajce 2008-2012: June 2012, Jajce.
Mr. Enver Sabic, Bosnjak leader June 2012
Mr. Amer Mrko, 2nd June 2012
Mr. Samir Kersten, 3rd June 2012
Ms. Azra Malzo, 3rd, June 2012
Director of AVNOJ Museum, 19th June 2012
Hospital Director of Jajce, June 2012
Mr. Passaga Hodzic, 6th June 2012
Myriam a returnee of Serb origin: June 2012.
Mr. Ivo Barisic, Health House Director: July 6th, 2012.
Mr. Samir Beharic, journalist, activist & photographer, July 2012
Annonymous Croat informant, former member of security forces, 7th July 2012
Mrs. Amela Kavasbasic, High School Professor (Bosnjak): 9th July 2012,
Mrs. Josipa Kulenovic, High School Professor (Croat): 7th July 2012
Director of the primary health care system in Jajce: July 2012.
Directors of Nikola Sop, July 2012
Annonymous, Secretary of HRVATSKA House, Bugojno: November 2012.
Mr.Branco Cavar, Jajce Mayor 2000-2004:, May, November 2012.
Mr. Njhaz Duranovic, member of Municipal Assembly 2000-2004: November 2012
Director of Technical School: 29 November of 2012.
Director, NGO Victoria 99: 29th November 2012
Mr Nicola Bilic, former Mayor of Jajce,1995-1998: November 2012
Mr. Director of Berta Kucera School: November 2012

Annex 3: Interviews in Kosovo

(Anonymous) former LDK member: January 23rd 2006.
Mr. Branislav Grbic, Kosovo Serb Parliamentarian: November 2007.
Mr. Slobodan Petrović SLS leader and parliamentarian: Prishtina, September 26th 2008. The interview was conducted in Serbian and translated to English
Ms. Jasmina Živkovic, Kosovo Serb Parliamentarian of Strpce 25th July 2013
Mrs. Adriana Hodzic, head of the Kosovo Government office in Mitrovica.
Mrs. Edita Tahiri, Kosovo Minister of Dialogue and Chief Negotiator: Vienna, August 2013, November 2015
Mr.Besnik Osmani, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Local Governments of Kosovo: Prishtina, 2nd October 2014.
Mr. Dalibor Jevtic, Minister of Communities and Return, 1st April 2013

Annex 4: Interviews in Washington DC

Ambassador Robert Beecroft, Head of the *OSCE* Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. From July 2001 to July 2004, 7th April 2013
Ambassador Robert Barry, Head of the *OSCE* Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina From January 1998 to June 2001, 9th April 2013
US State Department, Official of Serbian Desk, 12th April 2013
Ivan Vejvoda, Former Foreign Affairs Adviser of Zoran Djinjinc: 1st May 2013,

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