

THE AMERICANISATION OF THE FRENCH WAR ON TERROR

By
Céline Pieren

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
International Relations

Supervisor: Professor Hannes Černý

Word count: 17'229

Budapest, Hungary
2016

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the main attributes of the French discourse on terrorism as well as the undertaken measures after the attacks in November 2015. Once established, these findings will be compared to the case of the post-9/11 discourse and measures in the US. Relying on the theoretical frameworks of securitisation and the state of exception, this research aims at answering the following questions: what are the similarities and differences between the French and the US case; can we conclude that a successful securitisation process had taken place on France has it priory has in the US; and finally do we observe a state of exception and the creation of *homo sacer* in France? For this purpose, the research looks in a first step at official statements by the President and his government. In a second step, it examines to what extent the Parliament, the media and the population accepted the discourse and the introduced measures. This thesis permits to identify important similarities between the two cases under analysis, and to conclude that a securitisation process introducing a state of exception has taken place.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor Professor Hannes Černý for his guidance, encouragement and expert advice. I would also sincerely thank Robin Bellers for his time and helpful suggestions throughout my year at CEU.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my family, in particular to Rosely, and to my dearest IR friends for their unwavering support and their confidence in my abilities.

Table of contents

INTRODUCTION	1
Research question.....	2
Methodology	2
CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND	7
1.1 Securitisation.....	7
1.2 State of exception.....	13
CHAPTER TWO: THE US CASE.....	16
2.1 The events.....	16
2.2 The US discourse	17
2.3 The measures	22
CHAPTER THREE: THE FRENCH CASE	25
3.1 The context.....	25
3.2 The discourse	27
3.3 Formal support.....	39
3.4 Popular support.....	45
BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: THE US AND FRENCH CASES IN PERSPECTIVE.....	55
Appendices.....	61
1. Analysed materials for state's discourse	61
2. Analysed materials for formal support	65
3. Analysed materials for public support (media).....	66
4. First front pages after November attacks	70
Bibliography.....	71

Table of figures

Figure 1 Newspapers under analysis.....	6
---	---

INTRODUCTION

13 November 2015 marks a turning point in the history of terrorism in Europe but also in the French terrorism discourse. In fact, a semiotic shift can be observed between the speeches after the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the November attacks. Now the terrorist issue is clearly presented as the main threat to France's security and should be therefore addressed with extraordinary means according to official speeches. This shift resembles in many aspects what occurred in the US after 9/11, as some French media highlighted.¹

Such a semiotic shift is usually associated with the securitisation framework, formulated by the Copenhagen School. This describes the process in which a securitising actor (here mainly the state) presents an issue as an existential threat and thus a security matter. Once this threat description is accepted by the audience, the state is justified to use extraordinary means to address the threat. Securitisation introduces then a state of exception, the concept developed by Giorgio Agamben. While these measures might appear as legitimate in the short term, they might also represent a danger for democratic institutions in the longer term, as underlined by many scholars. It is here not to say that terrorism is not a threat at all or that it does not cause violence and death. Rather, the claim is that there is “discursive, political, and cultural process by which ‘real world’ experiences of violence are given social meaning through the negotiated application of different kinds of political and intellectual labels”.² Based on this observation, many scholars have called for a new approach to terrorism studies taking this constructed dimension into account.

¹ William Audureau, “Après les attentats, les similitudes entre les discours de Hollande et de Bush en 2001,” *Le Monde.fr*, November 17, 2015, sec. Société, accessed April 22, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/17/bush-en-2001-hollande-en-2015-les-discours-de-deux-presidents-face-aux-attentats_4812188_4809495.html

² Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (London: Routledge, 2009), 222–23.

Research question

This thesis argues that French political discourse has known a significant shift after the attacks of November 2015, comparable to what occurred in the US after 9/11. It proposes to examine the mechanisms and the motivations behind this shift on the basis of both theories of securitisation and state of exception. Given this theoretical framework, we formulate the following hypotheses: 1) a securitisation process has taken place, and b) the new semiotics of French political discourse is aimed at the legitimization of extraordinary measures as part of a state of exception. The analysis can offer a new and very recent application of well-known frameworks and can draw attention to a controversial ongoing process that has already triggered some concerns among important players like the EU.

Methodology

First of all, I will present the US case of securitising terrorism. The context of the securitisation and the main literature's findings on this case will be reviewed. For this purpose, I will mainly use secondary sources, based on scholars' many contributions on the topic. Because of the parallel with the post 9/11 US discourse, France seems a logical choice as a Western democratic State being a victim of repeated and high-profile terrorist attacks motivated by Islamist radicalism and resulting in a semiotic shift in the terrorism discourse.

As mentioned earlier, securitisation rests on a so-called speech act pronounced by State actors. It is then quite naturally that the present analysis will primarily focus on the discourse of the state. In order to offer a comprehensive analysis of the discourse, a critical discourse analysis would be desirable. However, this would demand the inclusion of a massive amount of texts,

images, speeches from many layers of society. Since this thesis does not allow for such a broad scope, I will thus mainly rely on content analysis. This method is particularly apt for studies looking at the contextual meaning of a text and is appreciable for its research design flexibility.³ The method looks at meanings, intentions, consequences and context.⁴ The method can be described as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns”.⁵

In this thesis, a so-called directed content analysis will be conducted. This method is ideal for the expansion of an existing framework or a new application of previous research findings.⁶ In that process, categories of words identified by earlier studies are coded and applied to a new case. Constructions that do not belong to predetermined categories are then analysed in more details. This analysis will permit a refinement or a rejection of the theory or previous findings.⁷ The strength of this method lies in its potential to provide evidence for the (in)validity of a theory and to permit for its extension.⁸ An analysis of the concepts also allows for “an understanding of the meaning of communication and to identify critical processes”.⁹

On the other hand, an acknowledged shortcoming of this method is that by relying on former studies, the researcher may be biased.¹⁰ Moreover, the reliance on theory can downgrade the researcher’s attention to contextual factors. This paper will thus pay a particular attention in presenting the particularities of the French case in comparison to the US case. Once done,

³ Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah E. Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis,” *Qualitative Health Research* 15, no. 9 (November 2005): 1278.

⁴ Downe-Wamboldt 1992 cited in: Satu Elo and Helvi Kyngäs, “The Qualitative Content Analysis Process,” *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 62, no. 1 (April 1, 2008): 108.

⁵ Hsieh and Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis,” 1278.

⁶ Ibid., 1281.

⁷ Ibid., 1283.

⁸ Ibid., 1282-3.

⁹ Elo and Kyngäs, “The Qualitative Content Analysis Process,” 108.

¹⁰ Hsieh and Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis,” 1283.

following a top-down approach, the analysis will then follow the steps of the securitisation process: after the speech act, I will look at the acceptance of the rhetoric and the measures by the audience. In order to do this, I will rely essentially on primary sources. All translations from French to English are those of the author.

The Speech Act

I will look at the speeches and interventions of the actors at the top of the state. The majority of the materials analysed will be issued by the President François Hollande, Prime Minister Manuel Valls, Minister of Interior Bernard Cazeneuve, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Development Laurent Fabius and Jean-Marc Ayrault, Minister of Defence Jean-Yves le Drian, and the Minister of Finance Michel Sapin. The texts will be accessed online on the websites of the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry.¹¹ A search will be executed to identify allocutions containing the word “terrorism”. This obviously provides an unmanageable scope of results, and already shows that the issue has been largely thematised, including in discussions about *a priori* unrelated matters. These latter will be thus excluded as well as the Parliament’s questions to the government, that are usually rather technical. The selected materials will be then analysed and semantic fields and rhetoric will be identified and manually coded.¹² Thus, the main lines of the discourse will be drawn. On this base, the acceptance by the audience will be measured. This will be achieved by exploring their contestation and opposition.

¹¹ Respectively www.elysee.fr and www.diplomatie.gouv.fr

¹² An exhaustive list of the analysed materials is provided in annexes.

The acceptance by the audience

As established by the literature, securitisation demands both formal and public support. The former will be assessed by analysing the debates and votes on topics highly related to terrorism, especially on the measures adopted, in both chambers of Parliament.¹³ The deviating discourses and positions will be identified and the results of the votes presented. Public support will be assessed by looking at the media on the one hand, and at public opinion polls on the other hand. Regarding the media, I selected four daily and weekly newspapers based on their political stance and their readership, in order to obtain a sufficiently representative sample.¹⁴ Since the scope of this thesis does not allow for a wider approach, I will include only national press and exclude regional newspapers. This selection can be justified by the presumption that the message from the state and the measures affect the whole territory and that thus differences among regions on this particular issue are expected to be marginal.

The articles during the week following the attacks and following the discussions of the various measures in the Parliament will be analysed. Interviews, press communiqué and articles dedicated to pure reporting will be left aside, since the aim of the analysis is to determine the position and (non-)acceptance of the medium. Therefore, editorials and titles will receive the prime attention. As an indicative basis, the four front pages immediately following the attacks will be presented and analysed to put forward the existing differences of perception between the selected newspapers. However, for the sake of feasibility within the scope of this thesis, I will focus

¹³ For the National Assembly see <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/debats/>; for the Senate see <http://www.senat.fr/seances/seances.html>; and for the Constitutional Council <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2015/sommaire-2015.142956.html>

¹⁴ Readership under, L'Alliance pour les Chiffres de la Presse et des Médias, "Presse Quotidienne Nationale – La Presse Payante – Diffusion – Chiffres – ACPM," accessed May 11, 2016. <http://www.acpm.fr/Chiffres/Diffusion/La-Presse-Payante/Presse-Quotidienne-Nationale>

exclusively on words rather than images. Finally, I will look at popular support with the help of various polls conducted by the *Institut Français d'Opinion Public* (IFOP) and IPSOS on the attacks and the measures¹⁵.

Figure 1 Newspapers under analysis

Newspaper	Issue	Political Stance	Readership (global ranking after market share)
L'Humanité	Daily	Communist left	36'931 (8)
Le Monde	Daily	(centre-)Left	257'897 (2)
Le Figaro	Daily	Right	311'326 (1)
Valeurs Actuelles	Weekly	Far-right	116'117 (94)

¹⁵ For Ifop, see www.ifop.fr and for IPSOS, www.ipsos.fr

CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The processes observed in France are neither new nor unknown. In fact, similar processes have been described and theorised by many scholars. Among the theories developed, the securitisation framework and the theory of the state of exception seem particularly adapted to our case. This chapter aims at introducing these theories in order to reflect on their abilities to describe what is at stake in France.

1.1 *Securitisation*

The securitisation framework has been developed by the Copenhagen school (CS) in its attempt to expand the understanding of ‘security’. While traditional theorists limited it to the survival of the state, CS scholars see it as a deliberate political choice.¹⁶ They consider that security is self-referential and constructed through discourse.¹⁷ In fact, a securitising actor, in our case state actors, presents to the audience an issue as a security matter, here terrorism. Once accepted by the audience as such, the state is enabled to use extraordinary measures to address the security threat. The threat is thus neither objective nor totally subjective, but rather an inter-subjective process, where both parties negotiate its meaning. A successful securitisation combines in that way consent and coercion through discursive manipulations. The result of the enunciation of security is then a new socio-political order where ordinary politics is suspended, and in which securitisation can then

¹⁶ Ole Waever, Chapter 3 “Securitisation and Desecuritisation” in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

¹⁷ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1997).

possibly become institutionalised.¹⁸ In this case, the audience perceives a non-existent return to normal politics since the issue is no longer actively securitised by the state actors. This is actually due to the fact that the emergency of the issue is accepted and internalised by the audience and no longer demands justification.¹⁹ The institutionalisation of the threat represents a particular danger for a democratic society in that it normalises exceptionality.

The framework of securitisation elaborates on the works by Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and John Austin and the assumption that discourse is performative and creates a social reality. As Derrida wrote, “there is nothing outside of the text”.²⁰ Thus, meanings are not fixed, they are created and modified through discursive constructions. Therefore, discourse can serve political motives and is thus often ideological. Indeed, the assumptions behind a discourse as well as the narratives and practices aim at legitimising and consolidating existing power structures and hegemonic practices.²¹

A successful securitisation demands four key facilitating conditions.²² First, the internal, linguistic-grammatical condition. Thus the formulation of security must follow existing discursive procedures: the higher the resonance of the security speech act with the existing security discourse, the higher the probability that the audience will accept the new threat identification.²³ Donnie Lipschutz defines discourses of security and speech as “the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within states, of

¹⁸ For more about institutionalized threats, see Didier Bigo; Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 171–201.

¹⁹ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.

²⁰ Debated translation from French ‘Il n’y a rien en dehors du texte’ in : Jacques Derrida, *De La Grammatologie* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967).

²¹ Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, 78.

²² Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.

²³ Juha A. Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 65–99.

conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them".²⁴ Therefore, every society has different codes that are evolving with time and are self-referential.

Then, there are external or socio-contextual conditions. In fact, the context is essential for securitisation because it attributes significance and power to the actors and their discourses.²⁵ The success of securitisation will thus depends on the power position of the securitising actor. Security is a specific field, wherein some are enabled to determine what a threat is but where no one can determine it alone.²⁶ The state is then not necessarily the exclusive securitising actor, but rather one among those who have sufficient social capital.²⁷ In our case, opposition parties, media, interest groups and external expert can as well participate in that process. However, since the security enunciator and the audience are asymmetrically informed, the audience depends on the discourse by officials or experts to evaluate the situation.

The success of securitisation will also depend on the nature of the threat. In fact, it must have some features that are usually perceived as threatening, like for example involving weapons.²⁸ Moreover, the securitising actor needs both formal (institutional) and moral (public) support. The higher the congruence between the two support dimensions, the higher the probability of a successful securitisation. There, knowledge, trust and power position are intertwined in the process of coercion.²⁹ A combination of emotional intensity

²⁴ Lipschutz, *On Security*, 5.

²⁵ Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 357–83.

²⁶ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.

²⁷ Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization."

²⁸ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*, 33.

²⁹ Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization."

and logical rigor is necessary for securitisation to succeed and make possible the introduction of extraordinary measures.

The new framework developed by the CS gave rise to many publications, debates and critiques. Regarding the facilitating conditions, externalists have pointed to the necessity of a favourable event and context to successfully securitise an issue. In our case, the wave of attacks in France throughout 2015 might in fact well increase the likeliness for a successful securitisation. Balzacq notes that besides his power position, the securitising actor must also have the ability to “identify with the audience’s feelings, needs and interests”.³⁰ On the side of the security enunciator, Vuori considers that three sequences of speech act must be present.³¹ First, the claim that there is an existential threat that will persist. Second, the warning of the consequences in case of inaction. Finally, the securitising actor insists, makes recommendations and suggestions to eradicate the threat.

On the side of the audience, Paul Roe distinguishes between the two stages of acceptance.³² First, the acceptance of the threat identification. Second, the acceptance of the extraordinary measures, the mobilisation. While the CS does not demand the second step for a successful securitisation, I assume in this thesis that it is necessary. As demonstrated by Roe in the context of the UK intervention in Iraq, the stage of identification is fundamental for securitisation, but the success of security policy is highly contingent upon the stage of mobilization. The CS’s claim that a successful securitisation can take place without the actual mobilisation of emergency measures is problematic on

³⁰ Ibid., 184.

³¹ Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,” 75.

³² Paul Roe, “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 6 (December 1, 2008): 615–35.

several counts: 1) it places significant emphasis on the speech act of the securitising actor, focusing on what is being said, rather than on what is being done 2) there is no clear delineation of how the analyst determines whether or not a securitising move has been accepted by an audience in the first place.³³

In fact, the main critiques of the securitisation framework and the derived limitations are indeed the CS' overemphasis on the language and its disregard of other forms of communication.³⁴ First, while the CS focused on the speech act, many scholars appeal to also considering the security enunciation as a discursive technique that generates or reinforces the public's acceptance of the threat identification. Moreover, gestures, practices and images are likely to be as influential as language. However, in this thesis, the focus will be set on language, as explained earlier.

The second main critique is that the securitisation framework ignores the mechanisms within the state organs that participate in the creation of the meaning of security. Therefore, the state remains a black box and an entity acting as one. The so-called Paris School and in particular Didier Bigo have addressed this issue. The securitising agent is no longer simply the state but rather networks of 'professional managers of unease'.³⁵ Security is the result of institutional competition and political struggle where the hegemonic political discourse in a Gramscian sense is confirmed and supported by the professional managers of unease. The result of securitisation is then the attribution of social ills to a specific category of individuals. In this process, boundaries are constructed between the insiders

³³ Monika Barthwal-Datta, "Securitising Threats without the State: A Case Study of Misgovernance as a Security Threat in Bangladesh," *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (April 2009): 277–300.

³⁴ Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 563–87.

³⁵ Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 1 suppl (February 1, 2002): 73.

and the outsiders. In this thesis, the debate within the legislative body will of course be analysed but a deeper insight into the administration and the practices of the “professional of unease” is beyond its scope.

A third limitation of the securitisation framework is that it does not extensively provide for the motives behind this practice. In contrast, David Campbell considered that the threat identification plays an important role in identity-building.³⁶ The discourse creates an illusionary boundary between the inside and the outside and “mobilise national energies”.³⁷ This relates to Hegel’s concept of non-self-identity and the process in which an individual or a society identities itself in opposition to the other. In the Cold War case analysed by Campbell, the US and the Soviet Union are interdependent in their process of building or reinforcing national identities. Who we are is constructed in opposition to who we fear. This idea strongly relies to Carl Schmitt and his concept of exclusion and enmity, which the securitisation framework seems to implicitly include.³⁸ Security is then existential to national identity and national cohesion and constitutes a valid motive for securitisation, including in our case. Vuori offers a broader spectrum of motives for securitisation.³⁹ She distinguishes four further goals besides the introduction of extraordinary measures: raising an issue on the agenda, deterring, legitimating past acts, and controlling. Securitisation can thus pursue other aims than the introduction of drastic extraordinary politics. In our case, besides of course the use of extraordinary means, deterring and legitimating appear as likely goals.

³⁶ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Revised edition (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 1998).

³⁷ Ibid., 165.

³⁸ McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security.”

³⁹ Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,” 76.

A fourth main critique of the securitization framework precisely concerns the definition of those “extraordinary politics”. In fact, the delimitation between ordinary and extraordinary can appear as blurred in the securitisation framework. Indeed, normal politics are defined as political issues belonging to the regular agenda. Security issues on the other hand belong to special politics, this means “nondemocratic decision-making due to necessities of survival”.⁴⁰ Therefore, some dichotomies are identifiable: the routine is opposed to the urgent, transparency to secrecy, democratic to elitist. Jef Huysmans tried to improve the concept, again with the help of Schmitt’s work. He defines then “extraordinariness” as ‘serious distortions in the restraining effects that the rule of law and democratic representation gave on the arbitrary exercise of power’.⁴¹ This leads us directly to the Schmittian concept of the state of exception.

1.2 *State of exception*

Giorgio Agamben describes the state of exception as ‘one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones’.⁴² Schmitt said that in emergencies, the very essence of democracies are abandoned.⁴³ Liberal states create then a legal vacuum to allow for extreme measures. Agamben describes this space, wherein the state is no longer accountable for the rule of law as anomie.⁴⁴ This state of exception rests on the subjective judgement of necessity since “*necessitas legem non habet*”.⁴⁵ This

⁴⁰ Buzan, Waeber, and Wilde, *Security*, 29.

⁴¹ Jef Huysmans, ‘Minding Exceptions: The Politics of Insecurity and Liberal Democracy’, *Contemporary Political Theory* 3, no. 3 (December 2004): 321–41.

⁴² Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, 1 edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

⁴³ Alex J. Bellamy et al., eds., *Security and the War on Terror*, New Ed edition (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007), 75.

⁴⁴ As explained in *Ibid.*, 77.

⁴⁵ *State of Exception*, 1.

subjective assessment is the task of the sovereign. More importantly, the sovereign is defined by this function: he is who declares the state of exception.⁴⁶ Thus, the taking of extraordinary measures is a consolidation of power. Schmitt confirms that sovereignty is revealed in the state of exception.⁴⁷

Building on Schmitt, Agamben defines the state of exception as a suspension of the law in order to maintain the law.⁴⁸ This goes back to securitisation, where the securitising actor intensifies the need for addressing the threat by saying that if not addressed, everything will be destroyed. Thus, the state of emergency is the most extreme case in which the norm and its realisation stand the furthest to each other.⁴⁹ In our case, the existential need for the defending of freedoms demands for the restrictions of these same freedoms. Moreover, the state of exception creates a category of *homo sacer*.⁵⁰ The individuals of this category are thus deprived of legal status and their existence is reduced to the so-called bare life. Their life can be then interrupted without punishment. This is aimed at reducing the discrepancy between the norm and the life. Schmitt distinguished between enemy, who is a concrete existential threat, and foe who is a criminalised threat.⁵¹ While the enemy must be defeated, the foe must be destroyed. In our case, the intention of prosecuting the terrorists but more importantly to deprive them of French citizenship hints at this mechanism.

⁴⁶ Carl Schmitt, *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität*, 9th ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009 (1922)) cited in: *State of Exception*, 1.

⁴⁷ As explained in Rens Van Munster, "The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule," *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law* 17, no. 2 (June 2004): 141–53.

⁴⁸ *State of Exception*, 40.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁵⁰ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998).

⁵¹ As explained in Munster, "The War on Terrorism."

These processes were also observable in the post-9/11 United States. According to Agamben, the military order of President Bush in November 2001 and the establishment of Guantanamo Bay constitute states of exception.⁵² They in fact erase the legal status of some individuals, the so-called “unlawful combatants”. Rens van Munster confirms this by claiming that the ‘War on Terror’ is a permanent state of exception.⁵³ Building on Hobbes and his Leviathan, Agamben considers that the “absolute capacity of the subjects' bodies to be killed forms the new political body of the West”.⁵⁴ The measures of security contribute to a de-politicisation that is in the longer run irreconcilable with democracy.⁵⁵

For all these reasons, similar processes must be identified and the attention of the audience must be drawn on these practices, in order to guarantee the rule of law.

⁵² *State of Exception*, 3.

⁵³ Munster, “The War on Terrorism,” 141.

⁵⁴ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 125.

⁵⁵ Agamben, ‘On Security and Terror.’ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* September 20, 2001 cited in : Munster, “The War on Terrorism.”

CHAPTER TWO: THE US CASE

An illustrative modern example of the practices of securitisation and the introduction of a state of exception is the reaction of the United States following the attacks known as 9/11.⁵⁶ Many scholars have highlighted the processes behind the introduced measures and denounced the dangers of it. The following chapter offers a selected overview of these contributions. This will prepare the ground for the subsequent comparison with the French case. However, it must be kept in mind that some initial fundamental differences exist between the US and France, which demands caution in comparing the two. This is especially relevant for the party system (two-party in the US and multiparty system in France), and the historic-demographic composition of society. In fact, the colonial past of France, especially in Maghreb, results in a different stance towards the Muslim community as in the US. These differences will be highlighted later in the conclusion.

2.1 *The events*

On September 11 2001, the world witnessed in horror the images of the planes crashing into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York. Some minutes later, the Pentagon, centre of the US military, was targeted too while another hijacked plane crashed in Shanksville. The attacks generally known as 9/11 attacks and later attributed to

⁵⁶ Some scholars like Richard Jackson denounce the label of 9/11 itself, arguing that this designation is a discursive construction containing a set of twisted assumptions and emotions. However, for the sake of simplicity, the events will be referred to as such.

al-Qaeda left 2'977 dead and more than 6'000 people injured and constitutes the deadliest terrorist attack in history.⁵⁷ The attacks are not only exceptional in terms of casualties and impact, but also in terms of reaction. Domestically, the Patriot Act was adopted in October 2001 and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established in 2002.⁵⁸ Surveillance and security controls were increased and the powers of the National Security Agency (NSA) were also expanded. All these measures thus obviously restricted citizens' liberties and privacy, which has been problematised by many observers and scholars.

Moreover, the budgets of the military, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the NSA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were dramatically increased, leading to a more policed society.⁵⁹ Internationally, George W. Bush and his administration announced the beginning of the "War on Terror" (WoT).⁶⁰ Congress passed an authorisation for the use of military force against terrorists only three days after the attacks. This allowed for the US interventions in Afghanistan in October 2001 under the explicit name of "Operation Enduring Freedom", and later in Iraq in 2003. Here again these interventions and their legitimacy provoked many reactions among observers.

2.2 *The US discourse*

Michael Parenti notes that for many months following the events, the media kept reporting about 9/11 and its aftermath. More importantly, any form of dissonance was

⁵⁷ 'Global Terrorism Database', accessed April 24, 2016, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>

⁵⁸ Department of Justice, "What Is the USA Patriot Web," January 2, 2010, accessed April 25, 2016, <https://web.archive.org/web/20100102035036/http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm>

⁵⁹ Michael Parenti, *The Terrorism Trap: September 11 and Beyond* (San Francisco: City Lights Publishers, 2002).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

considered as an unpatriotic act as clearly stated in Bush's words "either you are with us or against us".⁶¹ Furthermore, the government exercised a tight control over communication on the matter, as illustrated by the buying of the rights for all pictures on Afghanistan from the satellite company Space Imaging Inc.⁶² Richard Jackson considers that these discourses and strategies have been successful and that almost all layers of US society were using the establishment's language.⁶³ David Altheide claims that the discourse on terrorism was indeed no longer referring to the attacks or any specific event, but rather to a general worldview.⁶⁴ Everyday practices reflected the terrorist threat. According to him, the main interpretation of the post-9/11 discourse is that the world has changed and that everything requires a new meaning.⁶⁵ Magnus Hörnqvist considers that the message behind the discourse is that law is no longer enough to guarantee security, and thus legitimises state actions.⁶⁶ Actually in this process, discourse and action reinforce each other. Discourse becomes an exercise of power. Besides the legitimising function, Jackson notes that the discourse on the war on terrorism was aimed *inter alia* at marginalising dissent and reinforcing national unity.⁶⁷ On this base, Barry Buzan highlights the WoT as a *prima facie* case of successful securitisation.⁶⁸

⁶¹ Ibid., 41.

⁶² Ibid., 51.

⁶³ Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).

⁶⁴ David L. Altheide, "Consuming Terrorism," *Symbolic Interaction* 27, no. 3 (2004): 289–308.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 304.

⁶⁶ Magnus Hörnqvist, 'The Birth of Public Order Policy', *Race & Class* 46, no. 1 (1 July 2004): 30–52, cited in : David L. Altheide, "Terrorism and the Politics of Fear," *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies* 6, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 416.

⁶⁷ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*.

⁶⁸ Barry Buzan, "Will the 'global War on Terrorism' Be the New Cold War?" *International Affairs* 82, no. 6 (November 1, 2006): 1101–18.

The first identified specificity of the US discourse on 9/11 and terrorism is the war rhetoric. Jackson considers that this was aimed at broadening the set of possible measures for military interventions.⁶⁹ According to Paul Williams, the labelling was unnatural or even problematic in many ways.⁷⁰ First, war is usually waged against a precise enemy, while here the enemy is vaguely called “terrorism”. Second, by labelling the struggle a war, it confers a political status on terrorist groups. Third, the term itself was inaccurate since not all terrorism was to be fought but rather the groups or states threatening Western interests. Fourth, the successes against terrorism were presented in military terms and no longer as a success of law enforcement. And finally, it permitted the government to take measures that are not acceptable under peace. Second, the US administration’s rhetoric aimed at creating distinct categories: irrational terrorists versus heroic regular armed forces and innocent people, evil versus good, barbarianism versus civilisation.⁷¹ In fact, the terrorists are labelled as savages, mad, barbarous, devious, traitor, evil, unfaithful, inhuman, faceless and hateful.⁷² On the other side, Americans are generous, brave, freedom-loving, tolerant, peaceful, strong, honourable and innocent.⁷³

Third, the discourse underlined the unprecedented scope of the threat and the exceptional nature of the events. This discourse emphasises that everyone can be a victim and must be protected.⁷⁴ Moreover, it reinforces the US’ “collective identity of victim”.⁷⁵ In parallel, the scope of the threat is constantly accentuated and recalled. It is presented as

⁶⁹ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, cited in: Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, *Critical Terrorism Studies*, 115.

⁷⁰ Bellamy et al., *Security and the War on Terror*, 12.

⁷¹ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*.

⁷² Ibid., 62-76.

⁷³ Ibid., 76-88.

⁷⁴ Altheide, “Terrorism and the Politics of Fear”, 418.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 423.

unprecedented, serious, global, without borders and threatening the core of ‘what we are’.⁷⁶ The discourse further aimed at excluding any alternative since “no rational person can doubt” the seriousness of the threat.⁷⁷ However, the level of threat has been debated by both experts and scholars.⁷⁸

Fourth, the discourse claimed that America was targeted because of its virtues, rather than its failures. America is said to stand for freedom and terrorists are presented as freedom-haters.⁷⁹ Moreover, America is presented as peaceful while terrorists aim at provoking chaos and hatred.⁸⁰ However, in al-Qaeda’s rhetoric, on the other hand, the attacks are nothing more than the logical consequence of US foreign policy.⁸¹ Fifth, the rhetoric aimed at presenting the war led by the US as a good war.⁸² This is achieved through seven discursive constructions: the cause is just, the war is well constituted, the war is fairly conducted, the war is winnable, the war is a last resort, and war is the consequence of US divine and historic responsibility.⁸³ The image of the “good war” is well known by the American audience and goes back to World War II. Thus the war is defensive rather than expansionist and would not cause a greater harm than the threat is causing.

This is symptomatic of a broader de-historisation. In fact, the war on terrorism is constantly removed from its actual time framework and bound to historical struggles. This is achieved with the help of four popular meta-narratives: World War II, the Cold War, the

⁷⁶ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 95–112.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 103.

⁷⁸ See among others Barry Buzan in ‘Will the “global War on Terrorism” Be the New Cold War?’.

⁷⁹ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 54.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 55.

⁸¹ Ibid., 56.

⁸² Ibid., 121.

⁸³ Ibid., 124–49.

struggle between civilisation and barbarianism, and globalisation.⁸⁴ In fact at many times, Bush and his administration used the term of the “Axis of Evil” referring to the Axis powers in World War II to describe Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Furthermore, the ideological struggle between the “country of freedom” and the freedom haters deliberately recalls the ideological struggle of the Cold War. Both have in common that they are perceived as “zero-sum, global-scale, generational struggles against anti-liberal ideological extremists who want to rule the world”.⁸⁵ The civilisation narrative is also usual in US rhetoric and goes back to its fundamental myth of White Christians civilising Indian savages.⁸⁶ Finally, globalisation is equalled to freedom and to America as the leader of the free capitalist world. Through the attacks against the US, the global economic wealth and openness are attacked.⁸⁷

As Jackson noted, the problematic aspects of this discourse are manifold.⁸⁸ First, it is tautological in that it systematically refers to earlier constructions. This contributes to creating a coherent discourse and rendering the constructed reality more powerful in the mind of the audience. Second, it is opaque by avoiding a clear definition of the terms and their moral boundaries. For example, the concept of good and evil remains voluntarily blurred and even the concept of terrorists is unspecified. Third, the language is highly gendered. In fact, men are presented as heroes leading the war against wrongful, inhuman barbarians while women are depicted as poor victims, who need to be protected. Fourth, it has a strong ideological dimension. Linked to the metanarratives mentioned earlier,

⁸⁴ Ibid., 40.

⁸⁵ Buzan, “Will the ‘global War on Terrorism’ Be the New Cold War?,” 1101.

⁸⁶ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 48.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 51–53.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 156–58.

mapping the war as an ideological struggle aims at making any dissent unjustifiable. And finally, it contains many silences, most notably about civilian casualties and other ‘collateral damages’ abroad, and thus avoids any debate on the morality of US actions.

2.3 *The measures*

All these aspects participate in creating an environment of fear that in turn favours the implementation of drastic measures. Jackson identifies six political functions of fear: the maintenance of social contract, the enforcement of collective identity, the delegitimising of dissent, the increased funding for some institutions, the distraction of the public from other issues, and calls for retaliation.⁸⁹ Michael Parenti considers that the counterterrorism measures are rather aimed at raising the “nation’s siege psychology” and proving that the state is keeping things under control.⁹⁰ Moreover, the imbalance between the initial aggression and the reaction carries the message that one American life is worth many non-American lives.⁹¹ Rens van Munster argues that overall the US moved from defence to prevention, and thus insecurity rather than security became the value to maximise through security policy-making.⁹² Thus, the duty to ensure protection, and preserve safety and trust has been replaced by a “permanent feelings of fear, anxiety and unease”.⁹³

⁸⁹ Ibid., 113.

⁹⁰ Parenti, *The Terrorism Trap*, 21.

⁹¹ Ibid., 23.

⁹² Munster, “The War on Terrorism,” 147.

⁹³ Ibid.

Domestically, the US state introduced many legal modifications. Munster considers that these measures were equal to a permanent state of exception.⁹⁴ The most crucial of them are the adoption of the Patriot Act and the establishment of Guantanamo Bay. These two measures also contribute to the creation of *homo sacer*. In fact, terrorists have been labelled as ‘unlawful combatants’, so that their fate is no longer a matter of law enforcement.⁹⁵ Following Agamben, Guantanamo Bay is then the suspension of the rule of law.⁹⁶ This distinction is reinforced by bureaucratic procedures based on risk management and calculating who is a threat and who is not.⁹⁷ As Munster underlines, this means that freedoms are constantly restricted.

Internationally, the Bush administration took four steps.⁹⁸ First, it increased military presence in the Persian Gulf fifteenfold. This was accompanied by the interventions in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, as a direct consequence of the successful mapping of the struggle against terrorism as a war. Second, it supported counterterrorism measures in many countries. Third, it intensified military relations with pro-US Muslim countries and finally, became more neutral in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Overall, many of these measures are problematic both in moral and in legal terms, which even reinforces the need for a supportive discourse. As Agamben himself acknowledged, “A state which has security as its sole task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to become itself terroristic.”⁹⁹ In sum, the following elements have been identified by the literature regarding the discourse.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 142.

⁹⁵ Bellamy et al., *Security and the War on Terror*, 76.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 78.

⁹⁷ Munster, “The War on Terrorism,” 147.

⁹⁸ Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” *International Security* 31, no. 2 (October 1, 2006): 71.

⁹⁹ Agamben, “On Security and Terror”.

First, the rhetoric of a “new” world with an unprecedented, serious, global and identity-threatening threat following exceptional events that stroke America because of its virtues. Second, the rhetoric of a last-resort war, and especially of a good war that is fair and legitimated by US divine and historic responsibility, that is broadly (globally) supported, that is winnable. Third, the creation of two distinct categories that reinforces national unity. Fourth, the language serves the de-historisation of the struggle. Fifth, the discourse is aimed at marginalising dissent. Finally, the discourse is tautological, opaque, gendered, and contains many silences. The measures have on their side as consequences a restriction of freedoms, the creation of *homo sacer* and the interventions abroad. These features must be kept in mind during the forthcoming analysis of the French discourse.

CHAPTER THREE: THE FRENCH CASE

3.1 *The context*

The year of 2015 has been particularly violent in terms of terrorism in France.¹⁰⁰ While some attacks had already been conducted in previous years, especially the so-called Toulouse and Montauban shootings targeting soldiers and Jewish citizens in 2012, nothing reached the scope of the attacks during 2015. It all started on the 7th of January, when two brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi entered the offices of the satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* killing 12 people. The perpetrators had pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula. Two days later, customers of a kosher supermarket were taken hostages by Amedy Koulibaly, who had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and in Syria (ISIS).¹⁰¹ Four civilians were killed. These both attacks are now known as *Ile-de-France* attacks. In June, a man was beheaded by his employee who left a black flag of the Islamic State on the site of the attacks. While the exact nature of this act has been disputed, the perpetrator Yassin Sahli was charged with terrorism.

Another questioned case of terrorism happened in August, where a man opened fire in a train between Amsterdam and Paris but was rapidly stopped by other passengers before he could kill anyone. In September 2015, Hollande decided to military intervene against ISIS in Syria in addition to the Iraq intervention, while afore he had always strongly opposed

¹⁰⁰ lefigaro.fr, “Attentats Terroristes En France: 2015, «annus Horribilis»,” *Le Figaro*, November 16, 2015, accessed May 5, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/11/16/01016-20151116ARTFIG00008-attentats-terroristes-en-france-2015-annus-horribilis.php>

¹⁰¹ The name itself of ISIS is highly debated. While initially named ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’ or ISIL, the organization officially adopted the shortened appellation ‘Islamic State’ or IS. However, in an attempt at denying the state nature of the organisation, governments and scholars mainly use the acronyms ISIL, ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) or Daesh, derived from its Arabic name.

this option.¹⁰² Some saw in this turn the consequence of the migration crisis in Europe, or the increasing number of cases linking France to ISIS. However, others perceived it as a deliberate attempt at boosting his popular support. In fact, surveys show that his popularity has kept deteriorating since his election in May 2012 apart from a sudden rise after the attacks of *Ile-de-France*.¹⁰³ The need for support has been increased by the growing pressure in view of the presidential elections in 2017 and the regional elections in December 2015. According to many observers, President Hollande was in disgrace as many did not want him as candidate to 2017 presidential elections.¹⁰⁴ According to specialists and ISIS itself, this intervention directly triggered the following attacks.¹⁰⁵

They occurred on the 13th of November when three simultaneous attacks left 129 people dead and at least 300 injured.¹⁰⁶ ISIS claimed responsibility for what represents the gravest attack on French territory since World War II. Three individuals committed suicide bombings around the *Stade de France* during a football game between France and Germany where President Hollande was present, killing one person. Simultaneously, two perpetrators in a car targeted various terraces in Paris, leaving 39 people dead. Finally, three assailants entered the concert hall *Le Bataclan* and took the audience hostage. When the police launched an assault to free the hostages, two of them detonated their suicide vest.

¹⁰² David Revault d'Allonnes, "Hollande ou la guerre décomplexée," *Le Monde.fr*, November 2, 2015, sec. Politique, accessed May 5, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/11/02/hollande-ou-la-guerre-decomplexee_4801420_823448.html

¹⁰³ IFOP, "Les Indices de Popularité," Survey (Paris, December 2015).

¹⁰⁴ Arièle Bonte, "Une Majorité de Français Ne Souhaite Pas Voir François Hollande Candidat En 2017," *RTL.fr*, September 6, 2015, accessed May 22, 2016. <http://www.rtl.fr/actu/politique/presidentielle-2017-une-majorite-de-francais-ne-souhaite-pas-que-francois-hollande-soit-candidat-7779625404>

¹⁰⁵ Dabiq, 'Decisiveness or Decision', Issue 12, November 2015 (1437 Safar), 28.

¹⁰⁶ Le Monde. "What you need to know about Paris attacks and the situation in France," *Le Monde.fr*, November 14, 2015, sec. Société, accessed May 22, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/14/what-you-need-to-know-about-paris-attacks-and-the-situation-in-france_4810074_4809495.html

The siege left 89 people dead. The unprecedented scope of the attacks not only generated a strong condemnation and a wave of support all over the globe, it also deeply reshaped French attitude against terrorism, both in terms of language and actions. The following section will focus on the former.

3.2 *The discourse*

In order to evaluate the change operated in French rhetoric on terrorism, it is important to firstly look at the practices before the November attacks. For instance during the attacks in Toulouse and Montauban in the late months of the 2012 Presidential campaign, the main message of then-President Nicolas Sarkozy was the need to maintain national unity.¹⁰⁷ One year later, now-President Hollande considered during commemorations that these attacks had touched the French Republic in its heart.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, he stated that democracy will always be stronger than fanaticism and that the fight against terrorism must be global. Terrorism, he said, is a coward brutality that always targets the weakest and the innocent. He concluded by claiming that France will never be stopped, divided nor separated.

The attacks in the headquarters of *Charlie Hebdo* and in the kosher supermarket did not fundamentally alter the official language on terrorism. The victims were presented

¹⁰⁷ “Tueries de Toulouse et Montauban: l’UMP Attaque Hollande et Le Pen, Le PS Dénonce Un «dérapage»,” *Slate.fr*, March 21, 2012, accessed May 5, 2016. <http://www.slate.fr/france/51985/toulouse-montauban-tueries-hollande-le-pen-ump>

¹⁰⁸ Présidence de la République, “Hommage Aux Victimes de Toulouse et Montauban,” *Www.elysee.fr*, accessed May 5, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/hommage-aux-victimes-de-toulouse-et-montauban/>

as heroes who died for the idea they had of France, namely freedom.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, the President considered that through these attacks the French republic as a whole had been affected because France stands for culture and democracy, and an ideal of justice and peace. The acts were also still presented as crimes and their perpetrators as "the authors of this infamy" and assassins. Furthermore, the means taken were rather usual for counterterrorist measures: investigations by the justice department and the implementation of the "Plan Vigipirate" aimed at securing high-risk public spaces. In his speech following the attacks, the President appealed to national unity between communities, as he and Sarkozy have done during previous years. He concluded saying that "freedom will always be stronger than barbarism", recalling thus his earlier speeches.

In general, the discourse in 2015 prior to November attacks focussed on describing terrorism as barbarian and on highlighting the particular position of France in the world as the *patrie* of freedoms. Moreover, while terrorism is said to threaten "all powers", the President publicly regretted that despite France's warnings, Europe and the World were too passive in Syria and in the fight against terrorism. Simultaneously, a strong focus was put on the need for national and international unity in the struggle. However, terrorism as an issue remained quite discrete in official speeches besides the regular expressions of support to nations that had experienced a recent attack.

However, immediately after the attacks of November, a new tone was set. François Hollande began his speech to the population with these four ominous words: "France is at

¹⁰⁹ Présidence de la République, "Allocution À La Suite de L'attentat Au Siège de Charlie Hebdo," *Www.elysee.fr*, accessed May 22, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-a-la-suite-de-l-attentat-au-siege-de-charlie-hebdo/>

war".¹¹⁰ Moreover, the terrorist issue became omnipresent in speeches and declarations even in discussions on non-related matters. Thus, terrorism has been invoked in almost all bilateral meetings from South America to India, as well as in summits on climate, health safety and entrepreneurship. Moreover, the various speakers have constantly referred to each other in order to support their claim and create a coherent and encompassing language. The new language is characterised by an accentuation of existing rhetoric identified earlier and the appearance of new semantic fields.

First, the causes of the attacks have been extensively developed. Premier Valls stated it clearly from the beginning: "let us not deceive ourselves: terrorism hit France, not for what France has done in Iraq, in Syria or in Sahel, but for what France is", contradicting thus the terrorists' claim.¹¹¹ Hollande elaborated by claiming that the perpetrators were willing to affect "the very idea of France, its values, its youth, its vitality, its culture, its art of living."¹¹² Valls added to the list the French ideal of tolerance and respect, national cohesion and *laïcité* and Bernard Cazeneuve the principle of emancipation.¹¹³ Furthermore, terrorists are said to have attacked the French way of life because they hate these values as well as joy, sharing, and culture.¹¹⁴ In addition, the nature of the targets (concert hall, terraces, football stadium) indicated according to the President that France's diversity and youth were particularly aimed at.

Second, saying that France has been attacked for its values gave the opportunity to recall the unequalled virtues of the country. France is thus presented as the "country of

¹¹⁰ Hollande, 14/11/2015; for full reference see Annex 1.

¹¹¹ Valls, 19/11/2015.

¹¹² Hollande, 17/11/2015.

¹¹³ Valls, 16/03/2016 and Cazeneuve, 03/05/2016.

¹¹⁴ Hollande, 07/01/2016; Cazeneuve, 17/03/2016; and Delattre, 20/11/2015.

freedoms, democracy, culture, and [that is] the first country to proclaim that all humans are born free and equal and that the free flow of ideas, opinions is one of the most precious human rights".¹¹⁵ France is presented as unique because of its particular position in the world as the universal defender of values and freedom. According to the President, this is the reason why France is "as loved as rarely a country has been loved before".¹¹⁶ Therefore, by attacking France, terrorists were actually targeting the whole world.¹¹⁷ Moreover, "France is always a light for humanity; when it is hit, it is the world that finds itself for a while in the darkness".¹¹⁸

Third, in parallel to praising France's virtues, the discourse aimed at outlining the despicable nature and goals of the aggressors. For that purpose, the existing rhetoric of barbarianism and cowardice has been repeated and intensified.¹¹⁹ Terrorists are depicted as inhuman and cynical assassins committing vile, ignoble and shameful abominations and pursuing oppression and slaughter every single day in their "blind violence".¹²⁰ They dared attacking an unarmed crowd and innocents, whose only crime was to be alive.¹²¹ Moreover, this "terrible scourge" is said to "exploit fears to better exclude and part", their goal being that France denies itself and its values.¹²² According to the President, they further aim at "erasing everything; the youth, culture, life, at the same time history and memory".¹²³ Therefore, President Hollande has insisted that the combat is not a civilisational struggle

¹¹⁵ Hollande, 19/11/2015.

¹¹⁶ Hollande, 26/01/2016.

¹¹⁷ Hollande, 24/11/2015.

¹¹⁸ Hollande, 16/11/2015.

¹¹⁹ Hollande, 14/11/2015, 16/11/2015, 17/11/2015, 18/11/2015, 17/12/2015, 07/01/2016, 21/01/2016, 10/03/2016; Valls, 19/11/2015, 25/11/2015, 09/01/2016, Ayrault, 22/03/2016; Fabius, 25/11/2015; Cazeneuve, 16/02/2016; Sapin, 17/11/2015; Désir, 25/11/2015; and Ripert, 19/11/2015.

¹²⁰ Hollande, 14/11/2015, 16/11/2015, 18/11/2015; and Désir, 25/11/2015.

¹²¹ Hollande, 16/11/2015.

¹²² Hollande, 16/01/2016, 10/03/2016; and Hollande, 17/12/2015.

¹²³ Hollande, 17/11/2015.

because "these assassins represent none".¹²⁴ Valls reinforced this view by saying that it is a struggle opposing "the strength of democracy to the horror of fanaticism".¹²⁵ He insisted: "it is a struggle for democracy, not a struggle opposing the West against the East".¹²⁶

Fifth, while the representations of the aggressors and the victims barely change from pre-November attacks, the nature and scope of the threat have evolved. Valls clearly stated in his address to the Parliament: "the threat is here: unprecedented, global, and sustained".¹²⁷ Unprecedented because the level of the threat has allegedly never been as high.¹²⁸ The scope of the threat is in fact intensely underlined by the President and the members of the government. Terrorism has become the "main challenge" and is France's only enemy.¹²⁹ This yet unexperienced level has been explained by the government with the particularities of ISIS as a highly organised group with a territorial base, financial resources and military capacities.¹³⁰ According to the President, terrorists are now "skilled fighters, used to extreme violence, determined to kill, even at the expense of their own lives, and whose action is coordinated from abroad". While Hollande has been insisting on their use of heavy weapons, Valls even invoked the risk of chemical and bacteriological weapons.¹³¹ A further specificity is highlighted by Defence Minister who described ISIS as a "hybrid enemy with two heads", referring to the dual threat of an army in Syria and

¹²⁴ Hollande, 16/11/2015.

¹²⁵ Hollande, 13/01/2016.

¹²⁶ Valls, 22/03/2016.

¹²⁷ Valls, 05/02/2016.

¹²⁸ Hollande, 04/01/2016, 05/01/2016, 14/01/2016, 21/01/2016, 30/03/2016; Valls, 23/12/2015, 16/03/2016, 22/03/2016; Cazeneuve, 12/01/2016, 16/02/2016, 17/03/2016, 23/03/2016, 03/05/2016; Le Drian, 22/03/2016 ; and Conseil des Ministres, 03/02/2016.

¹²⁹ Hollande, 07/01/2016, then Hollande 25/01/2016, 28/01/2016 and Ayrault, 05/04/2016.

¹³⁰ Hollande, 16/11/2015 and Cazeneuve, 01/03/2016.

¹³¹ Valls, 19/11/2015.

Iraq and of a terrorist organisation within France itself.¹³² In fact, as President Hollande recalled "we know it and it is cruel to say it: it were French who [...] killed other French".

Global because as mentioned earlier the targeting of France was rather a symbolic choice but was aimed at the whole world.¹³³ At many occasions, Hollande and the government have clearly stated it: "the threat is global".¹³⁴ Moreover, Hollande has recalled that terrorism has struck everywhere and he has paid careful attention to be present for other victim states. The president stated that ISIS was "not the enemy of France but the enemy of Europe".¹³⁵ Later he went further stating that Islamist terrorism had declared war to France, to Europe, to the whole World.¹³⁶ Thus the eradicating of ISIS is the responsibility of the whole international community because the "whole humanity is targeted".¹³⁷ Therefore it is necessary to "fight terrorism everywhere it ransacks, slaughters, rapes, plunders, and kills, without distinction."¹³⁸ Then, the threat is said to be lasting. Premier Valls insisted on the fact that the world had entered a new era on November 13: "we have entered [...] a new era characterised by the sustained presence of hyper-terrorism".¹³⁹ Moreover, the President and his government warned the parliamentarians as well as the population that the fight against ISIS will be a long struggle.¹⁴⁰

The fourth feature of the discourse is also the most drastic change: the attacks committed in November are no longer presented as crimes like those perpetrated earlier,

¹³² Le Drian, 24/11/2015.

¹³³ Fabius, 25/11/2015.

¹³⁴ Hollande, 19/11/2015, 22/03/2016; Valls, 20/11/2015, 13/02/2016, 22/03/2016 ; and Sapin, 17/11/2015.

¹³⁵ Hollande, 16/11/2015.

¹³⁶ Hollande, 30/03/2016.

¹³⁷ Ripert, 19/11/2015.

¹³⁸ Hollande, 16/01/2016.

¹³⁹ Valls, 13/02/2016, see also 20/11/2015, 28/01/2016, and 05/02/2016.

¹⁴⁰ Hollande, 16/11/2015, 18/11/2015, 30/03/2016; Valls, 05/02/2016, 13/02/2016, 22/03/2016; and Fabius, 29/01/2016.

but as acts of war. Hollande started using the concept of “war terrorism” (*terrorisme de guerre*).¹⁴¹ The distinction regularly appeared between the “terrorist attacks” of January and the “acts of war” of November.¹⁴² The war rhetoric has been and still is particularly present and appears in the majority of interventions.¹⁴³ Moreover, ISIS is referred to as a “terrorist army” to reinforce the war dialectic.¹⁴⁴ On this basis, only one possible answer is logically offered to the audience: waging war.¹⁴⁵ Immediately after November attacks, the President claimed: “what happened yesterday [...] is an act of war and in the face of war, the country must take appropriated decisions”.¹⁴⁶

The defining features of this war has been also extensively described. First, the war is presented as being inevitable. Given the circumstances, France is said to have no other options but to conduct a last-resort war. Thus, war is rather a duty than a choice. Valls explained “we had a responsibility, we had a duty: to militarily intervene in Syria”.¹⁴⁷ Hollande further claimed “my first duty is to protect you. Protecting you means intervening at the root of the evil, in Syria and Iraq”.¹⁴⁸ Hollande has moreover referred to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen to explain that resistance to oppression is a fundamental right and that therefore France must make use of it.¹⁴⁹ In addition, the presented role of France in the world aims at reinforcing this sense of duty. France must be

¹⁴¹ Hollande, 16/11/2015.

¹⁴² Hollande, 31/12/2015 and 13/01/2016.

¹⁴³ Hollande, 14/11/2015, 16/11/2015, 18/11/2015, 19/11/2015, 31/12/2015, 07/01/2016, 13/01/2016, 05/02/2016, 30/03/2016; Valls, 09/01/2016, 13/02/2016, 22/03/2016 ; Le Drian, 15/11/2015; and Delattre, 20/11/2015.

¹⁴³ Valls, 25/11/2015.

¹⁴⁴ Hollande, 14/11/2015, 16/11/2015, 21/01/2016; Valls, 25/11/2015; Fabius, 25/11/2015; and Le Drian 15/11/2015.

¹⁴⁵ Hollande, 16/11/2015, 17/11/2015, 18/11/2015, 19/11/2015, and 07/01/2016.

¹⁴⁶ Hollande, 14/11/2015.

¹⁴⁷ Valls, 25/11/2015; and Fabius, 25/11/2015.

¹⁴⁸ Hollande, 31/12/2015.

¹⁴⁹ Hollande, 16/11/2015.

worthy the love it has received and meet the expectations of the world as a defender of freedom.¹⁵⁰ Valls went further “the role of France is to use force until the annihilation of those who declared war against us”.¹⁵¹

Second, the cause is presented as just. Valls affirmed that France will “hit justly because it acts in the name of freedom and security”.¹⁵² Hollande added that “[France’s] cause is civilisation and humanity”. Consequently, the president has declared that French soldiers are in fact the humanity’s soldiers who permit the world to be free and the societies subjected to barbarism to recover their dignity and freedom.¹⁵³ In Hollande’s words, they fight for the triumph of this “ideal of liberty and dignity that France shares with all the peoples of the world”.¹⁵⁴ Third, the war is said to be winnable. From the beginning, Hollande has reassured the population that the enemy is not elusive nor out of reach.¹⁵⁵ Determined, Hollande as well as Valls have declared “we will win”.¹⁵⁶ Many times since the beginning of the military intervention, the various official speakers have affirmed that ISIS is in decline.¹⁵⁷

All these feature of the conducted war are reinforced by many implicit references to France’s historical struggles and especially, World War II.¹⁵⁸ France is said to have a “historical responsibility” to fight and will surely succeed.¹⁵⁹ History has allegedly

¹⁵⁰ Hollande, 23/01/2016.

¹⁵¹ Valls, 28/01/2016.

¹⁵² Valls, 25/11/2015; and Fabius, 25/11/2015.

¹⁵³ Hollande, 05/12/2015.

¹⁵⁴ Hollande, 17/12/2015.

¹⁵⁵ Hollande, 16/11/2015.

¹⁵⁶ Hollande, 22/03/2016; Valls, 20/11/2015, 25/11/2015 ; Cazeneuve, 12/01/2016, 16/02/2016; Désir, 27/01/2016; and Ripert, 19/11/2015.

¹⁵⁷ Hollande, 30/11/2015, 21/12/2015, 07/01/2016, 21/01/2016, 30/03/2016; Valls, 25/11/2015; Fabius, 25/11/2015; and Le Drian, 15/03/2016.

¹⁵⁸ Hollande, 17/11/2015, 07/01/2016; Valls, 19/11/2015, 20/11/2015; and Ripert, 19/11/2015.

¹⁵⁹ Hollande, 24/11/2015 and 03/03/2016.

demonstrated that the French people are valiant and will triumph over barbarism, implicitly referring to Nazism.¹⁶⁰ In fact, France has “overcome many other hardships and [...] those who have sought to defy it have always been the losers in history”.¹⁶¹ Indirect references to the occupation and liberation of Paris, and to Charles de Gaulle are present. The places where speeches were held also related to this era at some points, like the place of revolts against occupying Nazi Germany or of the greatest battles of WWI. .

Beyond defining the nature of the struggle and the belligerent sides, the language has also a further aim, namely at delegitimising alternatives and oppositions. The Council of ministers thus stated that the imminent and high terrorist threat is unquestionable.¹⁶² The rhetoric of emergency has also been expanded to other fields. Thus, Hollande describes the high unemployment rate as a “socio-economic state of emergency.”¹⁶³ Delegitimizing attempts have been particularly present in the interventions of Premier Valls in the Parliament’s chambers during the discussions on adopted measures. From the beginning he has warned that no explanations for the attacks should be searched for because “explaining means to some extent justifying”.¹⁶⁴ Facing disagreement, he claimed “what is the message you are sending to the people?” Later he warned “let us not fight the wrong battle [...] and ensure that we do not build useless oppositions”.¹⁶⁵

These attempts are reinforced by many calls to unity “out of respect for the French people”. These calls have been reinforced by an outlined need to meet people’s expectations. The government and Valls claimed that “what the people demand is to do

¹⁶⁰ Hollande, 14/11/2015 and 16/11/2015.

¹⁶¹ Hollande, 16/11/2015.

¹⁶² Conseil des Ministres, 03/02/2016.

¹⁶³ Hollande, 04/01/2016.

¹⁶⁴ Valls, 09/01/2016.

¹⁶⁵ Valls, 16/03/2016.

whatever it takes to protect them and [...] seamless unity”.¹⁶⁶ He continued: “our fellow citizens would not understand that divisions overcome the higher interest of our nation”.¹⁶⁷ Valls further questioned “are you sure you want to put into question a decision that has managed to gather the two main political families?” and accused the Parliamentarians of not looking for an agreement.¹⁶⁸ Interior Minister Cazeneuve added that the non-cooperation of some political groups was “irresponsible” and that the level of threat demanded the overcoming of cleavages.¹⁶⁹ He further considered that the “fight against terrorism deserves better than untruths and the unfair contesting of our Ministers”.¹⁷⁰

Hollande also extensively appealed to unity from the people, but also implicitly from political instances, arguing that division is among the goals of the terrorists and that “our strength, our weapon is our unity”.¹⁷¹ Addressing Parliamentarians, he recalled that they are “the representatives of a free people that is invincible when it is assembled and united” and that it is their “republican duty” to preserve unity.¹⁷² He appealed the Parliament to take its responsibilities and “go beyond partisan cleavages”.¹⁷³ Another way the discourse fulfils this function is by claiming that all actors have the duty to say the truth and to then expose what is this “truth”. Thus Valls claimed “The duty of truth is to repeat that the level of threat has never been so high, and that we are facing a war.”¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁶ Hollande, 05/01/2016; Valls, 05/02/2016, 16/03/2016, 22/03/2016; and Désir, 27/01/2016, then Valls, 20/11/2015.

¹⁶⁷ Valls, 23/12/2015 and 22/03/2016.

¹⁶⁸ Valls, 16/03/2016.

¹⁶⁹ Cazeneuve, 23/03/2016.

¹⁷⁰ Cazeneuve, 12/01/2016.

¹⁷¹ Hollande, 16/11/2015, 18/11/2015, 31/12/2015; and Désir 27/01/2016, then Hollande 17/12/2015.

¹⁷² Hollande, 16/11/2015.

¹⁷³ Hollande, 31/12/2015.

¹⁷⁴ Valls, 23/12/2015.

The government also directly addressed the doubts of the Parliament through the discourse. Regarding the state of emergency, Valls reassured the Chambers claiming that this measure is an answer to the popular demand. Moreover, he stated that it is “the answer of a strong France that never bows and never will; it is the rapid answer of a democracy against barbarism; the efficient answer of a free country, of a democracy against the ideology of chaos”.¹⁷⁵ To further increase the acceptance of the measures by the members of the parliament and the population, the speakers regularly underlined the exceptional nature of the situation and thus, of the measures.¹⁷⁶ Valls summed this up clearly “the constitutional revision is an exceptional moment that takes place in an exceptional context”.¹⁷⁷

In parallel, the commitment to republican values, and especially freedom, is constantly reasserted to sustain the Chambers’ and population’s support.¹⁷⁸ “The Republic is our shield” and “the best answer is the Republic, its principles, its values, its duties”.¹⁷⁹ “France will lead this war with the weapon of law” because France will never deny itself.¹⁸⁰ Indeed, “France must not lose itself to win the war; France will answer to hatred with fraternity, to terror with the strength of law, to fanaticism with hope that life itself represents, France will answer by being itself.”¹⁸¹ State Secretary Désir considered that it would be a terrible mistake to put the fight against terrorism and human rights in opposition

¹⁷⁵ Valls, 19/11/2015.

¹⁷⁶ Hollande, 16/11/2015, 19/11/2015, 05/01/2016, 07/01/2016, and 05/02/2016.

¹⁷⁷ Valls, 05/02/2016.

¹⁷⁸ Hollande, 16/11/2015, 17/11/2015, 19/11/2015, 17/12/2015, 04/01/2016, 05/01/2016, 07/01/2016, 13/01/2016, 16/01/2016, 05/02/2016, 10/03/2016, 17/04/2016; Valls, 19/11/2015, 20/11/2015, 05/02/2016, 16/03/2016; and Désir, 27/01/2016.

¹⁷⁹ Hollande, 05/01/2016 and 13/01/2016.

¹⁸⁰ Hollande, 19/11/2015.

¹⁸¹ Hollande, 19/11/2015.

since terrorists precisely target these rights.¹⁸² Valls and Le Drian used this commitment to freedom to legitimise the measures by asserting that “security is first among freedoms” and it is a “fundamental principle for the organisation of [a] democratic society”.¹⁸³

Therefore, at many times, they repeated that the state of emergency will be extended but no longer than necessary.¹⁸⁴ “The state of emergency in a democracy that wants to defend itself but also to defend its freedoms is not intended to last” and the “exception shall not become the rule”.¹⁸⁵ He introduced here the necessity to anchor the state of emergency in the Constitution.¹⁸⁶ According to Valls, this anchoring is the “very essential definition of the rule of law”.¹⁸⁷

A further message delivered by the discourse is the leading role of France in the fight against terrorism. Thus, Hollande said that France will “take its responsibility because it is its role, its destiny; to do what others cannot”.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, France was among the first nations to fight ISIS and is now at the outpost of the war.¹⁸⁹ Accordingly, the leaders regret the lack of engagement of other actors, especially the EU.¹⁹⁰ Valls even stated in March that “Europe is at war”, abandoning thus the traditional “France is at war”.¹⁹¹ Former Foreign minister Fabius appealed to Europe to take its historical responsibilities serious.¹⁹² However, he underlined the necessity of a “world front” that would recognise ISIS as the

¹⁸² Désir, 27/01/2016.

¹⁸³ Valls 19/11/2015 and 20/11/2015.

¹⁸⁴ Hollande 04/01/2016

¹⁸⁵ Hollande 07/01/2016 and 13/01/2016.

¹⁸⁶ Hollande 07/01/2016.

¹⁸⁷ Valls, 05/02/2016.

¹⁸⁸ Hollande, 21/01/2016.

¹⁸⁹ Hollande, 21/01/2016 and Valls, 25/11/2015.

¹⁹⁰ Hollande 07/01/2016.

¹⁹¹ Valls 22/03/2016.

¹⁹² Fabius, 25/11/2015.

number one enemy.¹⁹³ Delattre added while addressing the UNSC that the United Nations have “humanity in common” and that it is their responsibilities to defend it.¹⁹⁴ Finance Minister has demanded that every nation sets aside its differences and unites efforts in the fight.¹⁹⁵ The international community is said to be “divided and incoherent” while France was already supporting ISIS’ enemies and called for a big and unique coalition.¹⁹⁶ Hollande considered that it is his responsibility that “the whole international community acts and coordinates its efforts”.¹⁹⁷

In sum, today’s French discourse is characterised by a strong rhetoric of a just, long-lasting but winnable war, provoked by the despicable nature of the aggressors who represent an unprecedented and global threat to French values. The struggle is also linked to other historical just struggles like for instance against the Nazis. The measures taken are said to be the adapted answer to the exceptional nature of the attacks and to the people’s expectations and in total respect of Republican values. Thus, political oppositions are not legitimate and the people as well as the politicians must show unwavering unity. This unity must be transposed to the international level, where France will lead a global coalition against ISIS in respect for its particular status and its historical responsibility.

3.3 *Formal support*

As mentioned earlier, the securitisation needs both formal and public support. First, the two Chambers of the Parliament have to accept the discourse and validate the measures

¹⁹³ Fabius, 25/11/2015.

¹⁹⁴ Delattre, 20/11/2015.

¹⁹⁵ Sapin, 17/12/2015.

¹⁹⁶ Hollande, 16/11/2015; and Fabius, 07/01/2016.

¹⁹⁷ Hollande, 25/11/2015.

proposed by the President and his government. The Senate is the upper house gathering representatives of territorial entities, where discussions are smoother than in the lower house, the National Assembly, where partisanship is exacerbated. In fact, it is not rare to see parties blocking the majority's propositions on the basis of pure political calculations. This has been true since Hollande's election, where former President Sarkozy's party *Les Républicains* (LR) have been almost systematically opposing Socialists' (PS) projects.

In the hours following the attacks, the President introduced the state of emergency which allows for the introduction of curfews, the dissolution of associations, house arrests, prohibition of public gatherings, the collecting of private weapons, and legally simplified home searches.¹⁹⁸ The debates in the Parliament regarding the state of emergency showed little resistance. Indeed, the extension of the State of emergency was adopted one week after the attacks in an accelerated procedure by both Chambers. In the Senate, after a powerful speech by the Prime Minister, the LR President of the law commission saluted the commitment of the Socialist government in the protection of the French people against barbarism.¹⁹⁹ He further repeated that the state of emergency does not in any way mean the suspension of the rule of law but the necessary measure to save it, and appealed to unanimously accept its extension. Both allocutions were concluded by massive applause from all political groups with the exception of the Communist group.²⁰⁰ In fact, a Communist representative highlighted the concern of her group that the proposed measures

¹⁹⁸ Legifrance, "Décret N° 2015-1475 Du 14 Novembre 2015 Portant Application de La Loi N° 55-385 Du 3 Avril 1955 | Legifrance," accessed May 22, 2016. <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2015/11/14/INTD1527633D/jo#JORFARTI000031473407>

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ The Senate includes six political groups (listed in decreasing order of representation): Les Républicains (LR-right), Groupe Socialiste et Républicain (SOC-left), Union des Démocrates et Indépendants (UDI-centre), Groupe Communiste, Républicain et Citoyen (CRC-far left); Groupe du Rassemblement Démocratique et Social Européen (RDSE-left), Groupe Ecologiste (left). Six members are not belonging to any of the groups.

resembled “limits and abuses to democracy”.²⁰¹ Moreover, the Green Party expressed similar concerns but concluded that given the unprecedented barbarian nature of the enemy, the group will support it.²⁰² The draft law was finally adopted, as demanded, unanimously.

In the National Assembly, the Socialist rapporteur of the legal commission referred himself to Agamben and the danger of the generalisation of a state of exception and condemned what the US has done in 2001 by placing jurisdiction to special organs.²⁰³ He claimed that France will in no way do something similar to these extreme cases and will not fall into the “trap” set by its aggressors. The representatives of the various political groups expressed their support, highlighting the unprecedented scope of the threat and the need for unity, and constantly making use of the rhetoric of barbarianism.²⁰⁴ The only discordant voice came here again from three representatives of the Green Party considering that the measure is a security overbid and that it threatens freedoms. At the end, the draft law was approved by 551 out of 557 votes.

Almost the same scenario took place in February 2016, where a further extension was again submitted to the Chambers’ approval. This time, the Minister of Interior Cazeneuve presented the draft law. During his intervention in the senate, he claimed that the exception to common law is part of the French Republican history and that every democratic country has the duty to provide for a state of emergency.²⁰⁵ He specifically

²⁰¹ Senat, Compte-Rendu intégral, 20 Novembre 2015, 11139.

²⁰² Ibid, 11142.

²⁰³ Assemblée Nationale, Compte Rendu intégral de la séance du jeudi 19 novembre 2015. Then-rapporteur Jean-Jacques Urvoas will later become Minister of Justice in January 2016.

²⁰⁴ The National Assembly is composed of six political groups (listed in decreasing order of representation): Groupe Socialiste, Républicain et Citoyen (SRC-left); Les Républicains (LR-right); Union des Démocrates et Indépendants (UDI-centre); Groupe Radical, Républicain, Démocrate et Progressiste (RRDP-centre-left); Groupe Ecologiste (left); and Gauche Démocrate et Républicaine (GDR-far left). Thirteen members are not belonging to any of the group.

²⁰⁵ Sénat, Compte Rendu intégral de la séance du mardi 9 février 2016, 2505.

addressed the claims that the measures could be a threat to democracy and rejected it by underlying the level of the threat.²⁰⁶ This time, the speech was applauded ‘only’ unanimously by the *Républicains* and Socialists and by some of the RDSE and UDI. As in November, the Communist group spoke of ‘disastrous consequences’ and put forward the concerns that human rights associations and personalities had expressed about the abuses of the state of emergency.²⁰⁷ They further claimed that “the state of emergency is a state of exception”.²⁰⁸ The Green Party denounced on their side a brain-washing of the population that pretends that nation’s security essentially depends on the extension of the State of emergency.²⁰⁹ However, the law was again clearly adopted by 316 out of 344 votes.²¹⁰

In the National Assembly, representatives of the Green Party who were already opposed to the extension in November 2015 reiterated their concerns denouncing “penal populism” and stating that the “state of exception [had] become the rule” and warned of the establishment of a “security state”.²¹¹ Furthermore, the GDR expressed their disagreement highlighting the concerns of human rights associations and questioning the efficacy of the state of emergency. The Green Party also expressed its disagreement. However, the extension was adopted by 212 out of 243 votes.²¹²

The intervention in Syria that was launched in September 2015 was not subject to Parliament’s approval since the President is also according to the Constitution the head of armed forces. However, the interventions of more than four months must be validated by

²⁰⁶ Ibid, 2506-8.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, 2510-1.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, 2511.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 2513.

²¹⁰ Ibid, 2524.

²¹¹ Assemblée Nationale, Compte Rendu intégral de la séance du mardi 16 février 2015.

²¹² Ibid.

the Parliament. On the 25th of November, both Chambers gave their approval. In the Senate, the ecologists and the communists expressed some concerns, based on the fiasco of the Libya intervention of 2008 and regretted a tendency to go to war without long-term solutions.²¹³ The latter abstained from voting while all the other groups, including the Green Party decided to support the law, and it was finally adopted unanimously.²¹⁴ In the National Assembly, all groups expressed their support, invoking many times the unprecedented level of the threat, with the exception of the far-left GDR who decided to abstain.²¹⁵ The law was adopted with 515 out of 519 votes.

The new constitutional law called “Protection of the Nation” was aimed at anchoring the state of emergency in the constitution and initially foresaw the deprivation of nationality for bi-nationals involved in terrorism. The Chambers failed to find an agreement on the law and both made various modifications. In fact, in the Senate many voices and especially the communists denounced the inefficacy, risk of a permanent state of exception, stigmatisations and the maintaining of a climate of fear.²¹⁶ The Green Party also criticised the use of the war terminology and considered that the fight against terrorism had nothing to do in the Constitution.²¹⁷ The RDSE group was deeply divided about the question but the majority was not in favour.²¹⁸ The LR group insisted on the fact that France is at war and saluted the symbolic function of the deprivation of citizenship.²¹⁹ In the National assembly, many parties avoided to give a clear intention. While the need for

²¹³ Sénat, Compte Rendu intégral de la séance du mercredi 25 novembre 2015, 11630 and 11638.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 11643.

²¹⁵ Assemblée Nationale, Compte Rendu intégral de la séance du mercredi 25 novembre 2015.

²¹⁶ Sénat, Compte Rendu intégral de la séance du mercredi 16 mars 2016, 4184.

²¹⁷ Ibid, 4194.

²¹⁸ Ibid, 4196.

²¹⁹ Ibid, 4198.

constitutionalising the state of emergency was widely accepted by the main political groups (Socialists, LR, UDI and RDSE), the deprivation of citizenship has been more widely debated. The vote was characterised by the lack of unity within the political groups, especially among the Socialists. On this basis, President Hollande renounced to the constitutional revision on the 30th of March.

A new law aimed at fighting organised crime, terrorism and its financing has been subject to the Parliament in March. It provides for increased powers for judges and prosecutors, legally facilitated identity controls, stricter controls on French citizens coming back from warzones and an intensification of the fight against the financing of terrorist organisations.^{.220} It was presented the Justice Minister Urvoas to the chambers. Here again the Communist group and the Green Party opposed the draft, arguing that it would restrict fundamental freedoms.²²¹ The Senate however accepted the law with 299 out of 328 votes.²²² In the National Assembly, *Les Républicains* considered that the law did not go far enough but decided to support the law in a “movement of solidarity”. The GDR strongly opposed it, and after having highly criticised it, the RRDP finally decided to support the draft. It was adopted by 474 out of 506 votes.

In general, all measures beside the deprivation of citizenship and thus the constitutional revision, have been strongly supported by a wide political spectrum. Solely the far-left political groups CRC and the Green Party have raised concerns but their low representation in the Chambers did not prevent the adoption. Interestingly, the two main

²²⁰ Gouvernement.fr, “Projet de Loi Renforçant La Lutte Contre Le Crime Organisé et Le Terrorisme,” *Gouvernement.fr*, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.gouvernement.fr/argumentaire/projet-de-loi-renforçant-la-lutte-contre-le-crime-organise-et-le-terrorisme-3750>

²²¹ Sénat, Compte Rendu intégral de la séance du mardi 29 mars 2016, 4834-5.

²²² Sénat, Compte Rendu intégral de la séance du mardi 5 avril 2016, 5117.

political parties PS and LR have shown unprecedented conformity. The language used by the government also seemed to have been widely accepted and reproduced with the exception again of the two far-left political groups.

3.4 *Popular support*

Media

The reception by the media has been to some extent more contrasted and followed the partisan cleavages. Following the lines of the communists and the ecologists in the Parliament, the far-left newspaper *L'Humanité* showed from the beginning some scepticism towards the language and measures of the government. The appeals on the front page following the events illustrates the medium's view: solidarity, no to stigmatisations, responses must follow the rule of law, and military interventions must be conducted only under the auspices of the UN. Already three days after the attacks, the newspapers denounced the "martial language" of the President and a Patriot Act *à la Française*.²²³ Moreover, the journalists have wondered if the measures meant a normalisation of the state of emergency and an "unprecedented restriction of freedoms". In the following days, the newspaper underlined the vagueness around the project of the constitutional revision and questioned its efficacy.²²⁴ It furthermore denounced the mass number of searches, claiming

²²³ *L'Humanité*, "A Versailles, Le Discours Martial de François Hollande," *L'Humanité*, November 16, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/versailles-le-discours-martial-de-francois-hollande-589824>

²²⁴ Sébastien Crépel, "La Poudre Aux Yeux de La Révision Constitutionnelle," *L'Humanité*, November 18, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/la-poudre-aux-yeux-de-la-revision-constitutionnelle-589987>

that many of them had nothing to do with terrorism and denouncing many police blunders especially the house arrest of ecologist militants during the COP21.²²⁵

The editorial following the attacks warned against the manipulation of feelings as a propaganda weapon aimed at establishing a war atmosphere and serving partisan interests.²²⁶ According to this article, the rhetoric used and the normalisation of the state of emergency would represent a victory for ISIS and the newspaper regretted that the war rhetoric will perpetuate the circle of violence.²²⁷ The newspaper also relayed at many occasions the concerns of various associations fighting for the freedom of expression and defending human rights, and denounced a possible “democratic hibernation”.²²⁸ They furthermore criticised the “dramatization” of the threat by the Prime minister and considered that this threat was used to legitimise everything²²⁹. They constantly appealed to a rejection of a permanent state of exception.²³⁰ While the opposition was still present at

²²⁵ Mehdi Fikri, “Perquisitions Tous Azimuts, Sur Tout Le Territoire,” *L’Humanité*, November 19, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/perquisitions-tous-azimuts-sur-tout-le-territoire-590223>; Mehdi Fikri, “En État D’urgence, La Police Tape À Tout-Va,” *L’Humanité*, November 25, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/en-etat-durgence-la-police-tape-tout-va-590801>; *L’Humanité*, “État D’urgence: Le Pays Des Droits de L’homme Ne Les Respectera plus,” *L’Humanité*, November 30, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/etat-durgence-le-pays-des-droits-de-lhomme-ne-les-respectera-plus-591171>; and Clotilde Mathieu et Adrien Rouchaleou “Sécurité et Libertés Publiques, L’équilibre Incertain,” *L’Humanité*, November 27, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/securite-et-libertes-publiques-lequilibre-incertain-591034>

²²⁶ *L’Humanité*, “Penser Contre La Menace,” November 19, 2015, *L’Humanité*, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/penser-contre-la-menace-590219>

²²⁷ *L’Humanité*, “La République, Avec Le Peuple,” November 20, 2015, *L’Humanité*, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/la-republique-avec-le-peuple-590297>

²²⁸ Sébastien Crépel, “Les Défenseurs Des Libertés S’inquiètent D’une Loi Aux Motifs Trop Vagues Pour Être Honnête,” *L’Humanité*, November 20, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/les-defenseurs-des-libertes-sinquietent-dune-loi-aux-motifs-trop-vagues-pour-etre-honnete-590326>, and Jérôme Skalski “Un Recul Des Libertés Au Nom de La Défense de La Démocratie?” *L’Humanité*, November 20, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/un-recul-des-libertes-au-nom-de-la-defense-de-la-democratie-590269>

²²⁹ Lionel Venturini, “L’urgence, Le Prétexte Servant À Tout Au Sommet de l’État,” *L’Humanité*, November 23, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/lurgence-le-pretexte-servant-tout-au-sommet-de-letat-590497>

²³⁰ Benjamin König, “Face À La Barbarie, L’exigence Démocratique,” *L’Humanité*, November 27, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/face-la-barbarie-lexigence-democratique-591078>

the time of the second extension on the 16th of February, the alarming articles are fewer, one of them even relativizing that the extension does not mean no rights for citizens.²³¹

In contrast, the constitutional law has been all along strictly criticised by *L'Humanité*. The anchoring of the state of emergency was considered as “incompatible with the rule of law”.²³² After its abandoning, they regretted that the debate had terrible consequences for the credibility of the power and has “damaged the Republic”.²³³ In fact, the journalists considered that the power had “played with emotions rather than truth” and that the Socialist President had become too close to and instrumentalised by the right and far-right parties.²³⁴ Regarding the new law for the fight against terrorism, the newspaper considered that it was purely a relay of the state of emergency aimed at normalising its measures.²³⁵ Surprisingly, the military intervention in Syria provoked less condemnations and even less interest on the side of the newspaper. As mentioned earlier, the newspaper followed the position of the far-left parties in the Chambers, denouncing a restriction of liberties, the belligerent rhetoric of the government and a normalisation of the state of exception.

²³¹ Daniel Roucous, “Etat D’urgence, Trois Mois de plus Mais Pas sans Droit Pour Les Citoyens,” *L'Humanité*, February 22, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/etat-durgence-trois-mois-de-plus-mais-pas-sans-droit-pour-les-citoyens-599904>

²³² Laurent Mouloud et Aurélien Souheyre “Constitutionnalisation de L’état D’urgence: Renoncez, Monsieur Hollande!” *L'Humanité*, March 22, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/constitutionnalisation-de-letat-durgence-renoncez-monsieur-hollande-602642>

²³³ Gérald Rossi et Lionel Venturini, “Déchéance et Congrès, François Hollande Fait Marche Arrière,” *L'Humanité*, March 31, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/decheance-et-congres-francois-hollande-fait-marche-arriere-603479>

²³⁴ Lionel Venturini, “Hollande Referme À Regret La Révision Constitutionnelle,” *L'Humanité*, April 1, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/hollande-referme-regret-la-revision-constitutionnelle-603539>, and Aurélien Souheyre, “François Hollande Dans Les Mains de La Droite,” *L'Humanité*, February 16, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/francois-hollande-dans-les-mains-de-la-droite-599138>

²³⁵ Marie Barbier, “Les Sénateurs S’apprêtent À Durcir La Réforme Pénale, Véritable « Relais » de L’état D’urgence,” *L'Humanité*, March 31, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/les-senateurs-sappretent-durcir-la-reforme-penale-veritable-relais-de-letat-durgence-603481>

On its side, *Le Monde* titled “terror in Paris” and showed a victim being rescued on the ground in front of a terrace. The editorial in the corner states: “France is at war” and praises the mobilisation of the French people and the international solidarity. While at first stance, some aspects of the discourse seemed to have been adopted, the leftist newspaper also demonstrated some critical stances from the beginning. They published a lot of interviews with critical personalities, who denounced the potential abuses and the manipulation of emotions and discourse.²³⁶ The state of emergency has been particularly criticised, and especially the abusive house arrests. Its journalists regularly appealed to vigilance.²³⁷

Furthermore, like *L’Humanité*, it regretted the dramatization of the language. Also like *L’Humanité*, the state of emergency was extensively denounced at its first extension but substantively less at the second extension in February 2016. The critique was stronger towards the debate around the constitutional reform and the deprivation of nationality that the newspaper described as a “major political disaster” and a “presidential fiasco”.²³⁸ In contrast, the new law for the fight against terrorism has received little attention and almost no condemnation while the extension of the military intervention in Syria received no attention at all. While initially quite critical despite its usual sympathy for the left, the newspaper has smoothened its stance towards the establishment over time.

²³⁶ Among others Frederic Gros, philosopher; Gilbert Achcar, Professor; Pierre Rosanvallon, Professor; François Saint-Bonnet, Professor and many human rights associations.

²³⁷ Vanessa Codaccioni, “Ce que nous dit l’histoire du recours à l’exception,” *Le Monde.fr*, November 26, 2015, sec. Idées, accessed May 21, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/11/26/ce-que-nous-dit-l-histoire-du-recours-a-l-exception_4818349_3232.html

²³⁸ *Le Monde*, “Déchéance : un désastre politique majeur,” *Le Monde.fr*, March 31, 2016, sec. Idées, accessed May 21, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/03/31/decheance-un-desastre-politique-majeur_4893152_3232.html

Le Figaro- that is usually highly critical towards Hollande's government- was surprisingly positive in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. The front page following the events states "war in the heart of Paris", supporting the war rhetoric, and showed corpses on terraces surrounded by distressed rescuers on its front page. Under the picture, the text relied the words of Obama claiming that the whole humanity and universal values have been targeted, in line with official statements. The right-leaning newspaper went further when it saluted the hardening of the president's position and actions.²³⁹ Moreover, while it also mentioned the abuses of the measures, especially house arrests, it insisted rather on their efficacy.²⁴⁰ The state of emergency did not provoke a real debate in the columns of the newspaper and only a few articles refer to it. The second extension received even less attention, the newspaper focussing on migration and a potential "Brexit". The two or three articles on the topic only summarised the vote and the results of the first three months of the state of emergency. However, this praise did not last long, and the partisan logic took over. *Le Figaro* criticised the Socialist government for recycling conservative discourse for political purposes, and that thus the *Republicains* have no space left between the left and the *Front National*.²⁴¹

This critique accentuated with the debate around the constitutional revision and the deprivation of citizenship. On the one hand, the newspaper was highly critical towards the President's renouncing. According to its journalists, this decision marked the "end of the

²³⁹ lefigaro.fr, "Attentats de Paris : La Justice Une Nouvelle Fois Oubliée ?", *Le Figaro*, November 23, 2015, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2015/11/23/31001-20151123ARTFIG00296-attentats-de-paris-la-justice-une-nouvelle-fois-oubliee.php>

²⁴⁰ lefigaro.fr, "Des Perquisitions Contestées Mais Efficaces Selon Les Policiers," *Le Figaro*, November 26, 2015, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/11/26/01016-20151126ARTFIG00199-des-perquisitions-contestees-mais-efficaces-selon-les-policiers.php>

²⁴¹ lefigaro.fr, "Comment Hollande a Piégé Les Républicains," *Le Figaro*, November 25, 2015, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2015/11/25/31001-20151125ARTFIG00325-comment-hollande-a-piege-les-republicains.php>

quinquennium” and they considered that his whole term was “for nothing”.²⁴² On the other hand, *Le Figaro* regularly outlined the internal disputes within the Socialist party. It considered that the President and his party have lost themselves in the tactic while handling the attacks’ aftermath. The intervention in Syria did not receive any critique except maybe sustained attention given to Sarkozy and other *Républicains*’ claim that the government did not weigh enough the consequences of an engagement. Otherwise, the articles on the topic remained purely descriptive. The same has been true concerning the new law on the fight against terrorism. Here again, besides reporting, only one interview by the LR President of the legal commission of the Senate- who is a strong supporter of the law- was published. In sum, while quite supportive in the first weeks, the newspaper became increasingly critical of the government over time.

Finally, the far-right newspaper *Valeurs Actuelles* also followed political lines and has been highly critical of the government all along. The front page following the events is the most dramatic: “War to the Barbarians”, clearly supporting the proposed formulation. Under the title, the newspaper offers its solutions: hunting down the Islamists, stopping immigration, changing French foreign politics, and rearming the country. The text appeals thus to a more powerful state with racist undertones. In the following weeks, the main critique was that the Socialist government failed to take measures in time to avoid the attacks. The newspaper argued that the state of emergency should have been introduced earlier and accused the government to debate about the “war” instead of pointing of the

²⁴² lefigaro.fr, “Ainsi S’achève Le Quinquennat,” *Le Figaro*, March 30, 2016, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2016/03/30/01002-20160330ARTFIG00311-ainsi-s-acheve-le-quinquennat.php>; and lefigaro.fr, “François Hollande : Un Quinquennat Pour Rien,” *Le Figaro*, March 30, 2016, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2016/03/30/31001-20160330ARTFIG00270-francois-hollande-un-quinquennat-pour-rien.php>

“internal enemy”.²⁴³ More importantly, they hold the Socialist government responsible for the November attacks, even saying that Foreign Minister Fabius with his “diabolic mistakes” has “hundreds of corpses on his conscience”.²⁴⁴ According to the newspaper, their constant rejection of a law in the type of a Patriot Act that could restrict freedoms to protect the population is the direct cause for the drama. The government is accused of denying the threat and accusing of racism those who rightfully warned.²⁴⁵ Indeed, the rhetoric of war, the constant dehumanization of ISIS’ soldiers and the demand for adapted measures were highly present in the newspaper already in January after *Ile-de-France* attacks. However, they incoherently also criticised the state of emergency when it finally entered into force for its inefficacy in preventing further attacks and claim that its introduction is rather aimed at obscuring the President’s failures.²⁴⁶ The level of the threat is also regularly outlined and all measures are presented as inefficient.

The constitutional revision was considered as restricting freedoms and the debate around the deprivation of citizenship as “a lot of fuss about nothing”.²⁴⁷ In fact, the journalists logically expressed their strong support for the deprivation of nationality.²⁴⁸ Finally, the debate around the law against terrorism is almost non-existent in this

²⁴³ François d'Orcival, “État D’urgence Politique,” *Valeurs Actuelles*, December 3, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/etat-durgence-politique-57596>

²⁴⁴ Yves de Kerdrel, “Le ‘J’accuse’ de ‘Valeurs Actuelles’,” *Valeurs Actuelles*, November 27, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/le-jaccuse-de-valeurs-actuelles-57426>; and Yves de Kerdrel, “Les Erreurs Diaboliques de Fabius,” *Valeurs Actuelles*, November 19, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/les-erreurs-diaboliques-de-fabius-57278>

²⁴⁵ Geoffroy Lejeune, “Aveuglement : Ils N’ont Rien Voulu Voir,” *Valeurs Actuelles*, November 19, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/ils-nont-rien-voulu-voir-57285>

²⁴⁶ Yves de Kerdrel, “L’État D’urgence Cache Des Tas D’urgences,” *Valeurs Actuelles*, December 10, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/letat-durgence-cache-des-tas-durgences-57767>

²⁴⁷ Jean-Marc Fedida, “Le Coup D’état D’urgence Permanent,” *Valeurs Actuelles*, April 4, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/il-est-vital-dinstituer-des-recours-effectifs-60589>; and Valeurs Actuelles, “François Hollande Renonce À La Réforme Constitutionnelle,” *Valeurs Actuelles*, March 30, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/societe/francois-hollande-renonce-a-la-reforme-constitutionnelle-60512>

²⁴⁸ Valeurs Actuelles, “L’État D’urgence Cache Des Tas D’urgences.”

newspaper but it considered like the right and far-right parties that the measures are insufficient. In sum, the far-right party has been particularly hostile towards the establishment, holding it responsible for the attacks. Moreover, many far-right traditional shortcuts have been expressed, for instance between terrorism and migration.

While the state of emergency has initially generated many critiques among the majority of the media under analysis, the extension of the military intervention has barely aroused any concern. The new law on the fight against terrorism has been criticised for being liberticidal by *L'Humanité*, and for not going far enough by *Valeurs Actuelles* but remained quite ignored by the two mainstream newspapers. Finally, the very controversial constitutional revision aimed at anchoring the state of emergency in the constitution and the deprivation of citizenship has received broader attention. While the leftist media were mainly opposed to it, the rightist ones welcome it. However, all of them agreed on saying that the President's renouncing it was a serious political disaster.

Popular support

Immediately after the attacks, 98% of the surveyed population considered that the terrorist threat was high, the highest percentage ever observed.²⁴⁹ 59% also subscribed to the idea that France is at war since the attacks. The support for this rhetoric followed the partisan lines: the most sceptical are the supporters of the far-left *Front de Gauche* (FdG) at only 39%. The partisans of the biggest political parties mainly supported this idea (PS at 57% and LR at 67%). The *Front National* (FN) supporters were unsurprisingly the most

²⁴⁹ IFOP, "Les Réactions Des Français Aux Attentats Du 13 Novembre," Survey (Paris, November 2015).

convinced ones that France is at war (71%). According to another study, they were even 75% to support the war rhetoric in November 2015, and still 62% in April 2016 (FdG 53%, PS 55%, LR 72%, FN 75%).²⁵⁰ As in a consequence, 84% of the surveyed population claimed to be ready to sacrifice some freedoms to increase their security.²⁵¹ Here again, the FdG supporters are the most sceptical but the majority is in favour (65%). The PS, LR and FN supporters are all sensibly favourable (respectively 87%, 91% and 86%).

Thus, immediately after the attacks (between the 18th and 20th of November), 95% of the interviewed population were in favour of a deprivation of citizenship, 94% for a personnel increase in security forces, 94% for the re-introduction of border controls, 92% for house arrests, 91% for the extension of the state of emergency and 86% for the creation of a national guard, composed of reservists.²⁵² For each of the measures, the surveyed people close to the FN expressed the highest enthusiasm and the supporters of the FdG the highest scepticism. Overall the two rightist parties are clearly more in favour than the two leftist. The support for airstrikes in Syria also increased following the attacks. From 76% in September and October 2015, it jumped to 85% in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Here again, the far-left is the less supportive but still displays a high approval rate (75%). The supporters of the two main political groups are extremely supportive (PS at 95% and LR at 91%). The FN partisans also agree (86%). This rate represents the highest support for military interventions ever observed by the research centre since 1992. As a comparison, the interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2014 received respectively 55% and 53-69%. The support for a revision of the criminal law regarding

²⁵⁰ IPSOS, "Fractures Françaises 2016," Survey (Paris, April 2016).

²⁵¹ IFOP, "Les Réactions Des Français Aux Attentats Du 13 Novembre."

²⁵² IFOP, "L'approbation Des Mesures Annoncées Par F. Hollande Après Les Attentats," Survey (Paris, November 2015).

terrorism is widely spread since 91% of the surveyed population considered that the existing law is not severe enough in April 2016.²⁵³ Here again the results follow the partisan logic. Thus, the supporters of the LR and FN are the most in favour (respectively 96% and 98%). The left agrees at 80% and the far-left at 74%.

The trust in institutions in the fight against terrorism was also affected by the events and its immediate aftermath.²⁵⁴ Thus, while 46% trusted the President in his government in February, 50 % trusted them in November 2015, but the number already went back to 49% in January 2016. Here, partisans of LR and FN displayed the lowest rate of trust. The evolution of the popularity of the French president also seems to confirm the overall support for the measures.²⁵⁵ While at 20% in October, it jumped to 27% in November and December. The rate had already seen a similar development after the January attacks moving from 17% in December 2014 to 29% in January 2015. The increase is less clear for Manuel Valls' popularity, which increased from 36% in October to 39% in November 2015.

The support for the measures is overall strong among the public. However, the support decreases as we move from the far-right to the far-left. While the supporters of the FdG confirm the sceptical position of the far-left groups in the Parliament and of the far-left newspaper *L'Humanité*, the far-right supporters are more supportive than the far-right medium *Valeurs Actuelles*.

²⁵³ IFOP, "Les Français et La Législation Antiterroriste," Survey (Paris, April 2016).

²⁵⁴ IFOP, "Les Français et La Menace Terroriste Un an Après Charlie," Survey (Paris, January 2016).

²⁵⁵ IFOP, "Les Indices de Popularité."

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: THE US AND FRENCH CASES IN PERSPECTIVE

As mentioned earlier, France and the United States obviously feature profound differences that we have to keep in mind when drawing comparisons. However, it is reasonable to say that they share many similarities that might in fact hint at similar processes.

First, both discourses highlighted the exceptional nature of the attacks, and that their cause rooted in the national virtues. These events have marked the beginning of a new world or a new era with an unprecedented threat. In both cases, the threat is serious, global, and threatens the very identity of the nations.

Second, both have switched to a logic of war. This transition might serve both internal and external purposes. As we have seen in both cases, this contributes to convincing the population of the seriousness of the threat and the need to take extraordinary measures that would not be accepted in peace times. On the external side, it permits to legitimate military interventions abroad towards international partners and organisations. In fact, at the time of this thesis, the US is still militarily active against jihadist groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and at the Horn of Africa while France is active in Iraq, Syria, in the Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) and in the Central African Republic.²⁵⁶

While both discourses aimed at constructing a war situation, some differences appear in the components of it. Both agree on defining their respective struggles as just because the on the one hand, the terrorists provoked retaliation, and on the second hand,

²⁵⁶ Ministère de la Défense, “Opérations,” accessed May 23, 2016, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations>

they act in the name of freedom and democracy. In both cases, the war is presented as winnable because democracy will always defeat barbarism. They also agree on the fact that this struggle is globally supported and the homeland has a leading status in the global war. François Hollande himself insisted on the Americano-French leadership in the fight during his visit to President Obama eleven days after the attacks.²⁵⁷ He also underlined the historical responsibility of both countries. However, a major difference between the US and French discourse is obviously the links with religion. While Bush's administration claimed that America has a divine duty to export democracy, the French never refers to religion. This is not a surprise given the strong attachment to *laïcité* of the French society. Moreover, this would have clearly excluded the important Muslim population of France, which would have been particularly counterproductive given the many calls to national unity.²⁵⁸

Third, they have extensively portrayed the perpetrators as inhuman barbarians. In fact, while some terms vary, the overall image is highly similar. A difference lies however in the representations of the victims and in the moral distance between the two categories. In fact, while the US discourse had tendency to underline the innocent nature of the victim, this rhetoric is less omnipresent in France. Moreover, we have seen that the US discourse was highly gendered and created an image of ultra-manly American heroes combating the barbarians. Although French soldiers are once labelled as the soldiers of humanity, there is no such deification as in the US case. More importantly, as hinted earlier, the French discourse never aimed at stigmatising Muslims or migration. This is probably due to the

²⁵⁷ Hollande, 24/11/2015.

²⁵⁸ In 2010, the estimated Muslim population in France reached 7.5%, while in the US it was estimated at 0.8%. See Pew-Templeton, "Global Religious Futures Project," accessed May 23, 2016, <http://globalreligiousfutures.org/>

very different structure of the both societies. In fact, the presence of a large community of Muslims in France goes back to colonial past and the majority of them are entirely considered as French.

Fourth, both have used a de-historisation of the events. In the case of the US, the literature had identified four meta-narratives, namely WWII, the Cold War, the civilising mission against the natives, and the globalisation. In the French case, the references to WWII are predominant, and the cases are in that matter quite similar. In contrast, the Cold War and the globalisation rhetoric are non-existent. The question of the civilisation narrative is less obvious. On the one hand, the French rhetoric insisted on the status of France as defender and symbol of freedom, democracy, *laïcité* (in opposition to fanaticism), and culture. On the other hand, it would be problematic to pretend that today's political elites praise French colonial experience as the struggle between civilisation and barbarism.

Fifth, both discourses aimed at delegitimising dissent. In fact, both administration aimed at limiting opposition through discursive practices, making critique unpatriotic. However, at first sight, the French political sphere and media seems more critical. This might be partly explained by the difference in party systems. Indeed, the US political spectrum is dominated by the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. In France, although the power is always in the hands of either the Socialist Party or *Les Républicains*, various political sensitivities are present in the public debate. In the French case, it is arguable that since the two main political groups cooperated, the difference to the US is of minor importance.

Sixth, the US as well as the French discourse were tautological. In fact, as noted in both cases, speeches and interventions refer to each other to create an encompassing discourse. We have seen that in the case of the Bush administration, the discourse was described as opaque and containing many silences. If some may argue that the French discourse is similar in this aspect, the analysis presented here indicated that the French rhetoric was however less obscure. As mentioned earlier, it cautiously avoided any amalgamation of terrorists and the Muslim population, thus it insisted on claiming that the threat is terrorism, jihadi Islamism or Islamist terrorism.²⁵⁹ Furthermore, the outcomes of the internal measures and the airstrikes are regularly presented. Moreover, while the US strike a broad set of targets, France has so far targeted exclusively military facilities.

Finally, the main differences between the two cases surely concern the adopted measures. In many ways, the French instruments were less drastic than the US measures. In fact, the legal modifications adopted by the French parliamentarians remain far from the Patriot Act, as criticised by the far-right. Moreover, as hinted earlier, the military intervention of France is lighter since it consists uniquely of airstrikes on military targets. Finally, and importantly, the French reaction to the attacks did not result in the creation of anything close to Guantanamo Bay. Rather, France's efforts were put in the creation of de-radicalisation centres. Although the first of them is expected to start operating only in September and thus the practices of such institutions are still unknown, it is unlikely that these will evolve to practices similar to what has been observed in Guantanamo Bay.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁹ Hollande, 05/01/2016 and Valls, 28/01/2016.

²⁶⁰ lefigaro.fr, "Le Premier Centre de Déradicalisation Accueillera Des «candidats» Dès Septembre," *Le Figaro*, May 9, 2016, accessed May 22, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/05/09/01016-20160509ARTFIG00269-le-premier-centre-de-deradicalisation-accueillera-des-candidats-des-septembre.php>

A potential exception to the French softer solutions is the state of emergency and its many extensions. This state of exception represents serious threats to individual liberties and perpetuates a climate of fear that could reveal in the longer run dangerous for French society. Moreover, the apparently decreasing interest and condemnation by the political opposition and the media raises concern. However, with the rejection of its anchoring in the constitution and simultaneously to the deprivation of citizenship, the French elite managed to (partially) avoid an institutionalisation of the regime of exception, and importantly the creation of *homo sacer*.

Despite these positive notes, the situation remains worrisome, and the elements presented in this thesis hint at a successful securitisation of terrorism resulting in the almost uncontested introduction of drastic measures and a state of exception. Indeed, a further extension request for the state of emergency has been submitted since the writing of this thesis, legitimised by the government by the European Football Championship and the Tour de France taking place in France in June and July. It had been again massively accepted by the Senate and the National assembly on the 19th of May (309 out of 339 in the Senate and 46 out of 66 votes in the National Assembly).²⁶¹ Although the vote results have been somewhat less obvious than the previous ones, the opposition remains surprisingly low especially among the media. The extension of the state of emergency appears now almost as an administrative formality. Now neither the President nor the Prime Minister take the trouble of addressing the Parliament on this matter. While the threat

²⁶¹ Sénat, Compte Rendu intégral de la séance du mardi 10 mai 2016; and Assemblée Nationale, Compte Rendu intégral de la séance du jeudi 19 mai 2016.

remains in fact serious, especially given these important events on French soil, one cannot help but suspect a banalisation of this measure.

As initially stated, these results are subject to regular changes given their recent nature but also rest on the analysis of a selection of materials. A deeper and more comprehensive research would be desirable in order to securely confirm the results presented here. However, the increasing expressions of concerns by international organizations seem to offer support for these results. The National Advisory Committee on Human Rights published an alarming statement on the abuses of the state of emergency.²⁶² On the international level, Amnesty International and the Council of Europe have also expressed their concerns about abuses and restrictions of individual freedoms.²⁶³ However, because of the shock provoked by the attacks, the contestation remains marginal and marginalised.²⁶⁴ For all these reasons, the French case must be kept under close watch by scholars and civil society in order to raise popular awareness and prevent potential abuses that could be legitimized by the ‘existential’ terrorist threat.

²⁶² Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, “Avis Sur Le Suivi de L’état D’urgence”, February 18, 2016, accessed May 25, 2016. <http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/avis-sur-le-suivi-de-letat-durgence>

²⁶³ Amnesty International France, “France : L’impact de L’état D’urgence|,” February 9, 2016, accessed May 22, 2016. <http://www.amnesty.fr/etat-urgence>; and Council of Europe, “Luttons Contre Le Terrorisme Dans Le Respect Du Droit,” *Commissioner for Human Rights*, February 3, 2016, accessed May 25, 2016. http://www.coe.int/tu/web/commissioner/view/-/asset_publisher/ugj3i6qSEkhZ/content/luttons-contre-le-terrorisme-dans-le-respect-du-droit

²⁶⁴ Libération, “La Vigilance Feutrée de Bruxelles Sur L’état D’urgence Français,” *Libération.fr*, January 24, 2016, accessed May 22, 2016. http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/01/24/la-vigilance-feutree-de-bruxelles-sur-l-etat-d-urgence-francais_1428671

Appendices

1. Analysed materials for state's discourse

Speaker	Date	Type of intervention	Main Topic
François Hollande <i>President</i>	2015-01-07	Declaration about <i>Charlie Hebdo</i> attacks	Terrorism and countermeasures
	2015-01-09	Declaration about <i>Ile-de-France</i> attacks	Terrorism and countermeasures
	2015-11-15	Declaration after Defence Council	Terrorism and countermeasures
	2015-11-16	Speech at the Parliament	Terrorism and countermeasures
	2015-11-17	Declaration at a summit (UNESCO)	UNESCO, culture and France
	2015-11-18	Speech at the gathering of Mayors	Terrorism and countermeasures
	2015-11-19	Allocution at the ceremony of Awards Chirac for Peace and Culture	Terrorism, conflicts, culture
	2015-11-24	Declaration at a summit (France-USA)	Terrorism and countermeasures, France-US collaboration
	2015-11-25	Declaration at a summit (France-Germany)	Terrorism and countermeasures, France-Germany and EU collaboration
	2015-11-26	Declaration at a summit (France-Russia)	Terrorism and countermeasures, France-Russia collaboration
	2015-11-27	Declaration at a summit (Commonwealth)	Climate
	2015-11-30	Declaration at a summit (COP21)	Climate
	2015-12-04	Declaration at a summit (COP21)	Climate
	2015-12-05	Speech on aircraft carrier	Military intervention in Syria
	2015-12-17	Declaration at the inauguration of a monument	Fraternisation, WWI
	2015-12-31	New Year's wishes to the Population	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016
	2016-01-04	New Year's wishes to the government	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016
	2016-01-05	New Year's wishes to the Constitutional Council	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016

	2016-01-05	New Year's wishes to religious authorities	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016
	2016-01-07	New Year's wishes to the Security forces	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016
	2016-01-13	New Year's wishes to State institutions	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016
	2016-01-14	New Year's wishes to the Army	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016
	2016-01-16	New Year's wishes to Correze Region	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016
	2016-01-18	New Year's wishes to Companies and Employers	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016
	2016-01-21	New Year's wishes to the Diplomatic Corps	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016
	2016-01-23	Declaration at opening of Museum	Culture
	2016-01-25	Declaration at a summit (France-India)	Bilateral relations
	2016-01-25	Press conference in India	Bilateral relations
	2016-01-26	Declaration to the French community in India	The role of France
	2016-01-28	Declaration at a summit (France-Iran)	Bilateral relations
	2016-02-05	Speech at the National School of Magistrates	Legal reforms, role and independence of judiciary.
	2016-03-03	Declaration at a summit (France-UK)	WWII commemoration, bilateral relations
	2016-03-08	Declaration at a summit (France-Italy)	Bilateral relations
	2016-03-10	Declaration at official visit (King and Queen of Netherlands)	Bilateral cooperation (security, values, EU ...)
	2016-03-22	Declaration after Brussels attacks	Terrorism and countermeasures
	2016-03-22	Declaration after Brussels attacks at the Belgian embassy	Terrorism and countermeasures
	2016-03-23	Declaration at a summit (health safety)	International health safety
	2016-03-30	Public Declaration	Renouncement to Constitutional revision
	2016-03-30	Public Declaration	Constitutional revision

	2016-03-31	Declaration at a summit (Nuclear Summit at Washington)	Nuclear security
	2016-04-01	Declaration at a summit (Nuclear Summit in Washington)	Nuclear security
	2016-04-17	Declaration at a summit (France-Egypt)	Fight against terrorism
Manuel Valls <i>Prime Minister</i>	2015-11-19	Speech to the National Assembly	Extension of the State of emergency
	2015-11-20	Speech to the Senate	Extension of the State of emergency
	2015-11-25	Speech to the National Assembly	Intervention in Syria
	2015-12-23	Speech to the government	Protection of the population
	2016-01-09	Speech to the Jewish Community in France	Jewish Community in France and fight against anti-Semitism
	2016-01-28	New Year's wishes to the Press	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016
	2016-02-05	Speech to the National Assembly	Constitutional revision
	2016-02-13	Speech at Security Forum in Munich	Security
	2016-03-16	Speech to the Senate	Constitutional revision
	2016-03-22	Question to the government by the National Assembly	Fight against terrorism
	2016-03-22	Question to the government by the Senate	Fight against terrorism
Bernard Cazeneuve <i>Minister of Interior</i>	2016-01-12	Question to the government by the National Assembly	Fight against terrorism
	2016-02-16	Question to the government by the National Assembly	Fight against terrorism
	2016-03-01	Intervention in the National Assembly	Discussion of the law against Organised Crime and Terrorism
	2016-03-17	Interview	Fight against terrorism
	2016-03-22	Question to the government by the Senate	Fight against terrorism
	2016-03-23	Audition in the Defence commission of the National Assembly	Fight against terrorism
	2016-05-03	Audition in the legal Commission of the Senate	Extension of the state of emergency
Laurent Fabius	2015-11-24	Interview	Foreign policy

<i>Minister of Foreign affairs and development (up to 11/02/2016)</i>	2015-11-25	Intervention in the Senate	Fight against terrorism
	2016-01-07	Interview	Foreign policy
	2016-01-29	New Year's wishes to Diplomatic corps	2015 Retrospective, thanks and actions in 2016
Jean-Marc Ayrault <i>Minister of Foreign affairs and development (11/02/2016 onwards)</i>	2016-03-22	Question to the government by the National Assembly	Fight against terrorism
	2016-04-05	Question to the government by the National Assembly	Fight against terrorism
Jean-Yves Le Drian <i>Minister of Defence</i>	2015-11-15	Interview	Paris attacks
	2015-11-24	Interview	Fight against terrorism
	2015-11-25	Question to the government by the National Assembly	Fight against terrorism
	2015-11-25	Interview	Fight against terrorism
	2016-03-16	Interview	Fight against terrorism
	2016-03-22	Question to the government by the National Assembly	Fight against terrorism
Michel Sapin <i>Minister of Finance</i>	2015-12-17	Intervention at the Security Council of the United Nations	Fight against terrorism (financing)
Harlem Désir <i>State Secretary for European Affairs</i>	2015-11-25	Interview	Fight against terrorism
	2016-01-27	Intervention at the Council of Europe	Fight against terrorism
François Delattre <i>Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations</i>	2015-11-20	Intervention at the Security Council of the United Nations	Fight against terrorism
Jean-Maurice Ripert <i>Ambassador of France to the Russian Federation</i>	2015-11-19	Interview	Fight against terrorism
Council of Ministers	2016-02-03	Communique	Extension of the state of emergency

2. *Analysed materials for formal support*

Institution	Date	Type	Topic
Senate	2015-11-20	Law adoption in accelerated procedure	Extension of the state of emergency
	2015-11-25	Law adoption	Extension of airstrikes in Syria
	2016-02-02	Law proposal and adoption	Fight against terrorism
	2016-02-09	Law adoption in accelerated procedure	Extension of the state of emergency
	2016-03-15	Presentation by the government and discussion	Conditions for military intervention on national territory for the protection of the population
	2016-03-16	Drafting of constitutional law	Protection of the Nation
	2016-03-17	Drafting of constitutional law	Protection of the Nation
	2016-03-22	Drafting and adoption of constitutional law	Protection of the Nation
	2016-03-29	Law discussion in accelerated procedure	Fight against organised crime and terrorism
	2016-03-30	Law discussion in accelerated procedure	Fight against organised crime and terrorism
	2016-03-31	Law discussion in accelerated procedure	Fight against organised crime and terrorism
	2016-04-05	Law discussion and draft adoption in accelerated procedure	Fight against organised crime and terrorism
National Assembly	2015-11-19	Discussion and adoption	Extension of the state of emergency
	2015-11-25	Presentation by the government and discussion	Extension of airstrikes in Syria
	2016-02-05	Presentation by the government and discussion	Protection of the nation
	2016-02-08	Discussion	Protection of the nation
	2016-02-09	Discussion	Protection of the nation
	2016-02-10	Discussion and adoption	Protection of the nation
	2016-02-16	Presentation by the government, discussion and adoption	Extension of the state of emergency
	2016-03-01	Presentation by the government and discussion	Fight against organised crime and terrorism
	2016-03-02	Discussion	Fight against organised crime and terrorism
	2016-03-03	Discussion	Fight against organised crime and terrorism
	2016-03-08	Discussion and adoption	Fight against organised crime and terrorism
	2016-03-16	Presentation by the government and discussion	Conditions for military intervention on national territory for the protection of the population

3. Analysed materials for public support (media)


Media	Date	Title	Topic
L'Humanité	2015-11-16	<i>A Versailles, le discours martial de François Hollande</i>	Hollande's speech and language.
	2015-11-18	<i>La poudre aux yeux de la révision constitutionnelle</i>	Constitutional revision
	2015-11-19	<i>Vers un état d'urgence durable</i>	State of emergency
	2015-11-19	<i>Penser contre la menace</i>	Discourse and measures
	2015-11-20	<i>Les défenseurs des libertés s'inquiètent d'une loi aux motifs trop vagues pour être honnête</i>	State of emergency
	2015-11-20	<i>La République, avec le peuple</i>	Discourse and measures
	2015-11-20	<i>« Un recul des libertés au nom de la défense de la démocratie ? »</i>	Discourse and measures
	2015-11-20	<i>Vigilance démocratique</i>	Discourse and measures
	2015-11-20	<i>Nos libertés contre la terreur</i>	Discourse and measures
	2015-11-23	<i>L'urgence, le prétexte servant à tout au sommet de l'État</i>	Discourse and measures
	2015-11-25	<i>En état d'urgence, la police tape à tout-va</i>	State of emergency
	2015-11-27	<i>Sécurité et libertés publiques, l'équilibre incertain</i>	Measures
	2015-11-27	<i>Face à la barbarie, l'exigence démocratique</i>	Measures
	2015-11-27	<i>« Un risque d'exercice du pouvoir de plus en plus autoritaire »</i>	State of emergency
	2015-11-27	<i>Les assignations à résidence inquiètent</i>	State of emergency
	2015-11-30	<i>L'état d'exception menace-t-il nos libertés publiques ?</i>	Discourse and measures
	2015-11-30	<i>État D'urgence. Le Pays Des Droits de L'homme Ne Les Respectera plus</i>	Measures
	2016-02-16	<i>François Hollande dans les mains de la droite</i>	Protection of the nation, deprivation of nationality
	2016-02-17	<i>Sortir de l'exception</i>	State of emergency
	2016-02-22	<i>Faut-il redouter la prolongation en cours de l'état d'urgence ?</i>	State of emergency
	2016-02-22	<i>Etat d'urgence, trois mois de plus mais pas sans droit pour les citoyens</i>	State of emergency

	2016-03-01	<i>L'exécutif confond atteinte aux libertés et lutte antiterroriste</i>	Law against organised crime, terrorism and its financing
	2016-03-11	<i>Une justice de classe et un État policier</i>	Law against organised crime, terrorism and its financing
	2016-03-22	<i>Constitutionnalisation de l'état d'urgence: renoncez, Monsieur Hollande!</i>	Protection of the nation; State of emergency
	2016-03-22	<i>Le Sénat ne cède pas à l'émotion sur la révision constitutionnelle</i>	Protection of the nation; State of emergency
	2016-03-23	<i>Entre émotion et récupération</i>	Discourse, measures and Brussels attacks
	2016-03-24	<i>Libres</i>	Discourse, measures and Brussels attacks
	2016-03-31	<i>Déchéance et Congrès, François Hollande fait marche arrière</i>	Abandoning of the "protection of the nation"
	2016-03-31	<i>Les sénateurs s'apprêtent à durcir la réforme pénale, véritable « relais » de l'état d'urgence</i>	Law against organised crime, terrorism and its financing
	2016-04-01	<i>Hollande referme à regret la révision constitutionnelle</i>	Abandoning of the "protection of the nation"
Le Monde	2015-11-19	<i>Etat d'urgence : « une marge de manœuvre bien trop large est offerte aux autorités »</i>	State of emergency
	2015-11-19	<i>Après les attentats du 13 novembre, le sentiment d'injustice des assignés à résidence</i>	State of emergency
	2015-11-19	<i>Pourquoi je voterai contre la prolongation à 3 mois d'un état d'urgence</i>	State of emergency
	2015-11-21	<i>Frédéric Gros : « Trop de sécuritaire tue la sécurité »</i>	State of emergency and discourse
	2015-11-23	<i>Perquisitions musclées, arrestations injustifiées : les abus de l'état d'urgence</i>	State of emergency
	2015-11-24	<i>Après les attentats, échapper au climat d'urgence</i>	State of emergency and discourse
	2015-11-25	<i>Etat d'urgence : « de graves violations des droits humains sont allègrement envisagées »</i>	State of emergency and discourse
	2015-11-26	<i>Ce que nous dit l'histoire du recours à l'exception</i>	State of emergency
	2015-11-26	<i>« Le risque dans notre société est celui de la naissance d'un désir d'autoritarisme »</i>	State of emergency and discourse
	2015-11-26	<i>Etat d'urgence : « Plus la latitude du pouvoir est grande, plus les citoyens doivent être vigilants »</i>	State of emergency and discourse

	2015-11-29	« Ne nous trompons pas de guerre »	War
	2016-02-19	<i>La Commission des droits de l'homme érille la mise en œuvre de l'état d'urgence</i>	State of emergency
	2016-03-31	<i>Déchéance: un désastre politique majeur</i>	Protection of the nation, deprivation of nationality
Le Figaro	2015-11-23	<i>Attentats de Paris: la justice une nouvelle fois oubliée ?</i>	Measures
	2015-11-25	<i>Comment Hollande a piégé Les Républicains</i>	Hollande's policies
	2015-11-26	<i>Des perquisitions contestées mais efficaces selon les policiers</i>	Measures
	2015-11-26	<i>Le député LR qui était contre la guerre</i>	Intervention in Syria
	2015-12-02	<i>Sarkozy: "On a sous-estimé la menace qui suivait notre intervention en Syrie"</i>	Intervention in Syria
	2016-02-16	<i>Quel est le bilan de l'état d'urgence trois mois après son instauration?</i>	State of emergency
	2016-02-17	<i>Feu vert pour la prolongation de l'état d'urgence à l'Assemblée</i>	State of emergency
	2016-03-29	<i>Philippe Bas: «Pas de pitié pour les terroristes!»</i>	Law against organised crime, terrorism and its financing
	2016-03-30	<i>Ainsi s'achève le quinquennat</i>	Protection of the nation, deprivation of nationality, Hollande's failures
	2016-03-30	<i>Hollande : de la déchéance de nationalité à la déchéance politique</i>	Hollande and his party's failures
	2016-03-31	<i>François Hollande : un quinquennat pour rien</i>	Protection of the nation, deprivation of nationality, Hollande's failures
	2016-03-31	<i>Manuel Valls somme sa majorité de se ressaisir</i>	Hollande and his party's failures
	2016-03-31	<i>L'affaiblissement conjugué du couple exécutif</i>	Hollande and his party's failures
Valeurs actuelles	2015-11-19	<i>Impitoyable, oui, impitoyable</i>	Paris attacks, radicalization and war
	2015-11-19	<i>Le grand aveu</i>	Paris attacks and government's failures
	2015-11-19	<i>Les erreurs diaboliques de Fabius</i>	Paris attacks and government's failures
	2015-11-19	<i>Aveuglement : Ils n'ont rien voulu voir</i>	Paris attacks and government's failures

2015-11-27	<i>Le “J’accuse” de “Valeurs actuelles”</i>	Paris attacks
2015-12-03	<i>État d’urgence politique</i>	State of emergency and Hollande's failures
2015-12-10	<i>L’état d’urgence cache des tas d’urgences</i>	State of emergency and Hollande's failures
2015-12-31	<i>Oui, hautement symbolique...</i>	Protection of the nation, deprivation of nationality
2016-02-05	<i>La ligne Maginot de Valls</i>	Protection of the nation, deprivation of nationality
2016-02-23	<i>Une ancienne juge antiterroriste déplore "une vision minimaliste du spectre terrorisme"</i>	terrorism
2016-03-30	<i>François Hollande renonce à la réforme constitutionnelle</i>	Protection of the nation, deprivation of nationality, Hollande's failures
2016-04-04	<i>Le coup d’état d’urgence permanent</i>	Protection of the nation

4. First front pages after November attacks



Bibliography

- Abrahms, Max. "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." *International Security* 31, no. 2 (October 1, 2006): 42–78.
- Agamben, Giorgio. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. 1 edition. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- Agamben, Giorgio. *State of Exception*. 1 edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- Alliance pour les Chiffres de la Presse et des Médias. "Presse Quotidienne Nationale – La Presse Payante – Diffusion – Chiffres," accessed May 11, 2016. <http://www.acpm.fr/Chiffres/Diffusion/La-Presse-Payante/Presse-Quotidienne-Nationale>
- Altheide, David L. "Consuming Terrorism." *Symbolic Interaction* 27, no. 3 (2004): 289–308.
- Altheide, David L. "Terrorism and the Politics of Fear." *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies* 6, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 415–39.
- Amnesty International France. "France : L'impact de L'état D'urgence," February 9, 2016, accessed. <http://www.amnesty.fr/etat-urgence>
- Audureau, William. "Après les attentats, les similitudes entre les discours de Hollande et de Bush en 2001," *Le Monde.fr*, November 17, 2015, sec. Société, accessed April 22, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/17/bush-en-2001-hollande-en-2015-les-discours-de-deux-presidents-face-aux-attentats_4812188_4809495.html
- Balzacq, Thierry. "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context." *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 171–201.
- Barbier, Marie. "Les Sénateurs S'apprêtent À Durcir La Réforme Pénale, Véritable « Relais » de L'état D'urgence," *L'Humanité*, March 31, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/les-senateurs-sappretent-durcir-la-reforme-penale-veritable-relais-de-letat-durgence-603481>
- Barthwal-Datta, Monika. "Securitising Threats without the State: A Case Study of Misgovernance as a Security Threat in Bangladesh." *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (April 2009): 277–300.
- Bellamy, Alex J., Roland Bleiker, Sara E. Davies, and Richard Devetak. *Security and the War on Terror*. London: Routledge, 2007.
- Bigo, Didier. "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 1 suppl (February 1, 2002): 63–92.
- Bonte, Arièle. "Une Majorité de Français Ne Souhaite Pas Voir François Hollande Candidat En 2017." *RTL.fr*, September 6, 2015, accessed May 22, 2016. <http://www.rtl.fr/actu/politique/presidentielle-2017-une-majorite-de-francais-ne-souhaite-pas-que-francois-hollande-soit-candidat-7779625404>
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap De Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1997.
- Buzan, Barry. "Will the 'global War on Terrorism' Be the New Cold War?" *International Affairs* 82, no. 6 (November 1, 2006): 1101–18.

- Campbell, David. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Revised edition. Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 1998.
- Codaccioni, Vanessa. "Ce que nous dit l'histoire du recours à l'exception" *Le Monde.fr*, November 26, 2015, sec. Idées, accessed May 21, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/11/26/ce-que-nous-dit-l-histoire-du-recours-a-l-exception_4818349_3232.html
- Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme. "Avis Sur Le Suivi de L'état D'urgence," February 18, 2016, accessed May 25, 2016. <http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/avis-sur-le-suivi-de-letat-durgence>
- Council of Europe. "Luttes Contre Le Terrorisme Dans Le Respect Du Droit," Commissioner for Human Rights, February 3, 2016, accessed May 25, 2016. http://www.coe.int/ru/web/commissioner/view/-/asset_publisher/ugj3i6qSEkhZ/content/luttes-contre-le-terrorisme-dans-le-respect-du-droit
- Crépel, Sébastien. "La Poudre Aux Yeux de La Révision Constitutionnelle," *L'Humanité*, November 18, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/la-poudre-aux-yeux-de-la-revision-constitutionnelle-589987>
- Crépel, Sébastien. "Les Défenseurs Des Libertés S'inquiètent D'une Loi Aux Motifs Trop Vagues Pour Être Honnête," *L'Humanité*, November 20, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/les-defenseurs-des-libertes-sinquietent-dune-loi-aux-motifs-trop-vagues-pour-etre-honnete-590326>
- D'Orcival, François. "État D'urgence Politique," *Valeurs Actuelles*, December 3, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/etat-durgence-politique-57596>
- De Kerdrel, Yves. "L'état D'urgence Cache Des Tas D'urgences," *Valeurs Actuelles*, December 10, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/letat-durgence-cache-des-tas-durgences-57767>
- De Kerdrel, Yves. "Le 'J'accuse' de 'Valeurs Actuelles,'" *Valeurs Actuelles*, November 27, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/le-jaccuse-de-valeurs-actuelles-57426>
- De Kerdrel, Yves. "Les Erreurs Diaboliques de Fabius," *Valeurs Actuelles*, November 19, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/les-erreurs-diaboliques-de-fabius-57278>
- Department of Justice. "What Is the USA Patriot Web," January 2, 2010, accessed April 25, 2016. <https://web.archive.org/web/20100102035036/http://www.justice.gov/archive/il/highlights.htm>
- Derrida, Jacques. *De La Grammatologie*. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967.
- Elo, Satu, and Helvi Kyngäs. "The Qualitative Content Analysis Process." *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 62, no. 1 (April 1, 2008): 107–15.
- Fedida, Jean-Marc. "Le Coup D'état D'urgence Permanent," *Valeurs Actuelles*, April 4, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/il-est-vital-dinstituer-des-recours-effectifs-60589>

- Fikri, Mehdi. "En État D'urgence, La Police Tape À Tout-Va," *L'Humanité*, November 25, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/en-etat-durgence-la-police-tape-tout-va-590801>
- Fikri, Mehdi. "Perquisitions Tous Azimuts, Sur Tout Le Territoire," *L'Humanité*, November 19, 2015, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/perquisitions-tous-azimuts-sur-tout-le-territoire-590223>
- Global Terrorism Database. "Global Terrorism Database," accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>
- Gouvernement.fr. "Projet de Loi Renforçant La Lutte Contre Le Crime Organisé et Le Terrorisme." *Gouvernement.fr*, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.gouvernement.fr/argumentaire/projet-de-loi-renforcant-la-lutte-contre-le-crime-organise-et-le-terrorisme-3750>
- Hörnqvist, Magnus. "The Birth of Public Order Policy." *Race & Class* 46, no. 1 (July 1, 2004): 30–52.
- Hsieh, Hsiu-Fang, and Sarah E. Shannon. "Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis." *Qualitative Health Research* 15, no. 9 (November 2005): 1277–88.
- IFOP. "Les Réactions Des Français Aux Attentats Du 13 Novembre." Survey. Paris, November 2015.
- IFOP. "L'approbation Des Mesures Annoncées Par F. Hollande Après Les Attentats." Survey. Paris, November 2015.
- IFOP. "Les Français et La Législation Antiterroriste." Survey. Paris, April 2016.
- IFOP. "Les Français et La Menace Terroriste Un an Après Charlie." Survey. Paris, January 2016.
- IFOP. "Les Indices de Popularité." Survey. Paris, December 2015.
- IPSOS. "Fractures Francaises 2016." Survey. Paris, April 2016.
- Jackson, Richard, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning. *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Jackson, Richard. *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.
- König, Benjamin. "Face À La Barbarie, L'exigence Démocratique," *L'Humanité*, November 27, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/face-la-barbarie-lexigence-democratique-591078>
- L'Humanité. "A Versailles, Le Discours Martial de François Hollande," *L'Humanité*, November 16, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/versailles-le-discours-martial-de-francois-hollande-589824>
- L'Humanité. "État D'urgence. Le Pays Des Droits de L'homme Ne Les Respectera plus," *L'Humanité*, November 30, 2015, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/etat-durgence-le-pays-des-droits-de-lhomme-ne-les-respectera-plus-591171>
- L'Humanité. "La République, Avec Le Peuple," *L'Humanité*, November 20, 2015, accessed 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/la-republique-avec-le-peuple-590297>
- L'Humanité. "Penser Contre La Menace," *L'Humanité*, November 19, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/penser-contre-la-menace-590219>

- Le Monde. “Déchéance : un désastre politique majeur,” *Le Monde.fr*, March 31, 2016, sec. Idées, accessed May 21, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/03/31/decheance-un-desastre-politique-majeur_4893152_3232.html
- Le Monde. “What you need to know about Paris attacks and the situation in France.” *Le Monde.fr*, November 14, 2015, sec. Société, accessed May 22, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/14/what-you-need-to-know-about-paris-attacks-and-the-situation-in-france_4810074_4809495.html
- Lefigaro.fr. “Ainsi S’achève Le Quinquennat.” *Le Figaro*, March 30, 2016, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2016/03/30/01002-20160330ARTFIG00311-ainsi-s-acheve-le-quinquennat.php>
- Lefigaro.fr. “Attentats de Paris : La Justice Une Nouvelle Fois Oubliée ?” *Le Figaro*, November 23, 2015, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2015/11/23/31001-20151123ARTFIG00296-attentats-de-paris-la-justice-une-nouvelle-fois-oubliee.php>
- Lefigaro.fr. “Attentats Terroristes En France: 2015, «annus Horribilis».” *Le Figaro*, November 16, 2015, accessed May 5, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/11/16/01016-20151116ARTFIG00008-attentats-terroristes-en-france-2015-annus-horribilis.php>
- Lefigaro.fr. “Comment Hollande a Piégé Les Républicains.” *Le Figaro*, November 25, 2015, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2015/11/25/31001-20151125ARTFIG00325-comment-hollande-a-piege-les-republicains.php>
- Lefigaro.fr. “Des Perquisitions Contestées Mais Efficaces Selon Les Policiers.” *Le Figaro*, November 26, 2015, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/11/26/01016-20151126ARTFIG00199-des-perquisitions-contestees-mais-efficaces-selon-les-policiers.php>
- Lefigaro.fr. “François Hollande : Un Quinquennat Pour Rien.” *Le Figaro*, March 30, 2016, accessed May 21, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2016/03/30/31001-20160330ARTFIG00270-francois-hollande-un-quinquennat-pour-rien.php>
- Lefigaro.fr. “Le Premier Centre de Déradicalisation Accueillera Des «candidats» Dès Septembre.” *Le Figaro*, May 9, 2016, accessed May 22, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/05/09/01016-20160509ARTFIG00269-le-premier-centre-de-deradicalisation-accueillera-des-candidats-des-septembre.php>
- Legifrance. “Décret N° 2015-1475 Du 14 Novembre 2015 Portant Application de La Loi N° 55-385 Du 3 Avril 1955,” accessed May 22, 2016. <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2015/11/14/INTD1527633D/jo#JORFARTI000031473407>
- Lejeune, Geoffroy. “Aveuglement : Ils N’ont Rien Voulé Voir”, *Valeurs Actuelles*, November 19, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/ils-nont-rien-voulu-voir-57285>
- Libération. “La Vigilance Feutrée de Bruxelles Sur L’état D’urgence Français,” *Libération.fr*, January 24, 2016, accessed May 22, 2016. http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/01/24/la-vigilance-feutree-de-bruxelles-sur-l-etat-d-urgence-francais_1428671

- Lipschutz, Ronnie D., ed. *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
- Mathieu, Clotilde and Adrine Rouchaleou. "Sécurité et Libertés Publiques, L'équilibre Incertain," *L'Humanité*, November 27, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/securite-et-libertes-publiques-lequilibre-incertain-591034>
- McDonald, Matt. "Securitization and the Construction of Security." *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 563–87.
- Ministère de la Défense. "Opérations," accessed May 23, 2016. <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations>
- Mouloud, Laurent and Aurélien Soucheyre. "Constitutionnalisation de L'état D'urgence: Renoncez, Monsieur Hollande!" *L'Humanité*, March 22, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/constitutionnalisation-de-letat-durgence-renoncez-monsieur-hollande-602642>
- Munster, Rens Van. "The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule." *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law* 17, no. 2 (June 2004): 141–53.
- Parenti, Michael. *The Terrorism Trap: September 11 and Beyond*. San Francisco: City Lights Publishers, 2002.
- Pew-Templeton. "Global Religious Futures Project," accessed May 23, 2016. <http://globalreligiousfutures.org/>
- Présidence de la République. "Allocution À La Suite de L'attentat Au Siège de Charlie Hebdo." *www.elysee.fr*, accessed May 22, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-a-la-suite-de-l-attentat-au-siege-de-charlie-hebdo/>
- Présidence de la République. "Hommage Aux Victimes de Toulouse et Montauban," *www.elysee.fr*, accessed May 5, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/hommage-aux-victimes-de-toulouse-et-montauban/>
- Revault d'Allonnes, David. "Hollande ou la guerre décomplexée" *Le Monde.fr*, November 2, 2015, sec. Politique, accessed May 5, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/11/02/hollande-ou-la-guerre-decomplexee_4801420_823448.html
- Roe, Paul. "Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's Decision to Invade Iraq." *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 6 (December 1, 2008): 615–35.
- Rossi, Gérald and Lionel Venturini. "Déchéance et Congrès, François Hollande Fait Marche Arrière" *L'Humanité*, March 31, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/decheance-et-congres-francois-hollande-fait-marche-arriere-603479>
- Roucous, Daniel. "Etat D'urgence, Trois Mois de plus Mais Pas sans Droit Pour Les Citoyens," *L'Humanité*, February 22, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/etat-durgence-trois-mois-de-plus-mais-pas-sans-droit-pour-les-citoyens-599904>
- Schmitt, Carl. *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität*. 9th ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009 (1922).

- Skalski, Jérôme. "Un Recul Des Libertés Au Nom de La Défense de La Démocratie?" *L'Humanité*, November 20, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/un-recul-des-libertes-au-nom-de-la-defense-de-la-democratie-590269>
- Slate.fr. "Tueries de Toulouse et Montauban: l'UMP Attaque Hollande et Le Pen, Le PS Dénonce Un «dérapage»," *Slate.fr*, March 21, 2012, accessed May 5, 2016. <http://www.slate.fr/france/51985/toulouse-montauban-tueries-hollande-le-pen-ump>
- Souchevre, Aurélien. "François Hollande Dans Les Mains de La Droite," *L'Humanité*, February 16, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/francois-hollande-dans-les-mains-de-la-droite-599138>
- Stritzel, Holger. "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond." *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 357–83.
- Valeurs Actuelles. "François Hollande Renonce À La Réforme Constitutionnelle," *Valeurs Actuelles*, March 30, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/societe/francois-hollande-renonce-a-la-reforme-constitutionnelle-60512>
- Venturini, Lionel. "Hollande Referme À Regret La Révision Constitutionnelle," *L'Humanité*, April 1, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/hollande-referme-regret-la-revision-constitutionnelle-603539>
- Venturini, Lionel. "L'urgence, Le Prétexte Servant À Tout Au Sommet de l'État," *L'Humanité*, November 23, 2015, accessed May 20, 2016. <http://www.humanite.fr/lurgence-le-pretexte-servant-tout-au-sommet-de-letat-590497>
- Vuori, Juha A. "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders." *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 65–99. doi:10.1177/1354066107087767

