The Radical Right in Policy Space: A Comparative Analysis of Radical Right Parties in Eastern and Western Europe

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees, in any other institutions. The dissertation contains no materials previously written and/or published by any other person, except where appropriate acknowledgement is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

David Pupovac
August31, 2015

Abstract

The analyses presented in the dissertation address the functioning of the European radical right in the policy space by comparatively analyzing Eastern and Western European radical right parties. The dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the ideology of the European radical right and the function ideology plays in the radical right's performance in elections. The research addresses three central problems: the definition and the ideological transformation of the radical right; ideological differences between Eastern and Western European radical right parties; and the effect of ideological shifts and interactions of competitors in the policy space on the variation of radical right's vote shares. In addition to the central research questions, the dissertation addresses the problem of conceptualization and dimensionality of the policy space and contributes to the literature on measuring ideological positions of parties using hand-coded manifesto data. The analyses provide evidence for these principal conclusions.

Firstly, social and political changes forced radical right parties to adapt and to alter some aspects of their ideologies. I argue that authoritarianism, typically associated with the traditional radical right, is neither a sufficient nor a necessary characteristic of the contemporary radical right. I claim that definitional characteristics of radical right parties are to be found in extreme positions considering the "Other", and this location in the policy space is the quality which distinguishes radical right parties from other party families. To account for these hypotheses, I test contesting definitions of the radical right and provide evidence for the transformation of the radical right's ideology and the moderation considering the authoritarian policy dimension. Nevertheless, I also demonstrate that, despite these ideological changes, modern radical right parties still share with historical fascist and Nazi parties the same type of extremism with respect to the exclusion on the basis of in-group/out-group distinction.

Secondly, although the modern understanding of the radical right rests on an assumed ideological distinctiveness of Eastern (post-communist) and Western European radical right parties, I challenge this assumption and argue that the perceived distinction is a byproduct of different political and historical circumstances characteristic for Eastern and Western European states. In assessing the validity of the ideological difference, I consider both particular issues and the position of parties in the multidimensional policy space. The analysis presents evidence against the assumed ideological differentiation between Eastern and Western European radical right parties and, thus, contests the foundation of the modern understanding of the radical right.

Thirdly, I argue that ideological shifts and the location of parties in the policy space have a significant explanatory power in accounting for the variation of vote shares of radical right parties. I demonstrate that, in the presence of relevant social, economic and institutional indicators, the ideological division of party systems with respect to exclusionary and authoritarian issues has a consistent and substantial effect in explaining the variation of radical right vote shares. Consequently, I provide evidence that, while electoral success of the radical right may be aided by socio-economic, cultural and institutional contexts, the lack of a national consensus considering the issues such as national identity, traditionalism or civic liberties contributes to the growth of radical right vote shares.

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Chapter 1 –Introduction: Research Questions, Design of Analysis and Methodology

1.1. The perils of the radical right and the academic literature

The radical right embodies a profound threat to European democracies. These parties challenge the multicultural understanding of European societies (van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000), question the legitimacy of the EU project (Mudde, 2007) and dispute the representative character of the political establishment (Abedi, 2004). Consequently, the electoral success of the radical right is met with considerable concerns across Europe.

As the rise of the radical right parties happens in waves (Beyme, 1988), with a slight delay, so does the interest in the subject (Mudde, 2000). The initial proliferation of the literature can be traced all the way back to the 1940s and the 1950s and it is closely related to the reflections on the interwar period and the rise of fascism and Nazism (e.g. Reich, 1983; Adorno, Fraenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Arendt, 1975). However, with unsuccessful waves of the radical right resurgence in the post-World War II period (Beyme, 1988) and the prolonged preservation of a remarkable degree of social and political stability in liberal democracies (Betz, 1993, p. 413) the topic of the radical right gradually lost importance. As Roger Eatwell puts it: “At the turn of 80s extreme right parties seemed destined to political oblivion” (Eatwell, 2000, p. 407). Consequentially, up to the early 1980s the number of publications on the radical right was small. Nevertheless, around the mid-1980s everything changed. The shift in the political climate, the rise of new social movements, the emergence of new political issues and the promotion of new social actors created major changes in party systems of West European states. It was expected that these conflicts would benefit the left. Instead, in the 1990s West European party systems came increasingly under pressure from the radical right (Betz, 1993; Betz, 1999). On the other hand, in post-communist Europe radical right parties were already successful in the first (founding) multiparty elections (Mudde, 2000). In the subsequent elections, this trend

remained persistent across the region, although the vote share of respective radical right parties varied substantially. Consequently, the topic of the radical right became prominent in the literature.

The last wave of the radical right brought about a different type of parties. The modern radical right parties are not (officially) opposed to the liberal democracy; they are media savvy and have professional electoral campaigns; they target selected minorities, but reject any relation with fascism or Nazism. Furthermore, during the last wave the radical right accomplished an unprecedented electoral success in the post-World War II period, reaching new highs in the 21st century (see Figure 1.1). Thus, in the 2014 European elections for the first time in history radical right parties were successful in outperforming mainstream parties in three major European democracies: the United Kingdom, France and Denmark.

Figure 1.1
Average vote shares of radical right parties in national elections 1990-2012



Note: Figure illustrates the annual electoral support of the radical right parties across Europe expressed as the vote share of radical right parties obtained in the last national election.
Source: data collected by the author using electoral commissions' websites and the European Election Database

Consequentially, the need to understand the radical right and, in particular, to understand the origin of its ideology and the factors facilitating its electoral success, has never been more important. The analyses presented in this dissertation seek to bring together

the major points of the growing literature on the contemporary radical right, and to challenge and test some of the fundamental hypotheses in a comparative fashion.

1.2. The contribution of the dissertation

The specific research questions addressed in the dissertation originate from two general research topics. The first topic studies the role of ideology and ideological change in understanding the radical right. The second topic studies the extent to which radical right parties in Eastern and Western Europe are comparable and can be analyzed using a shared theoretical framework. In the following sections I will firstly address the significance of the aforementioned topics and, subsequently, focus on the specific research questions.

1.2.1. The radical right in the policy space of Eastern and Western Europe

Despite the lively and vigorous debate on the radical right, social scientists have not been able to reach a consensus regarding many underlying phenomena and in many regards the statement that: "…we now know far more about extreme right parties, yet seem to agree on far less", appears to stand the test of time (Mudde, 2000, p. 6). The ideology of the radical right and the effect of the ideological positions of rival parties on the radical right are particularly problematic topics in this regard. Due to numerous factors, including the variation over time (the repositioning of parties in the policy space), the problems associated with the operationalization of policy shifts or the narrow scope conditions, the functioning and significance of ideology vis-à-vis the radical right remain elusive. By contrast, the debate on the positioning of the radical right and its interaction with other parties in the policy space has a strong presence in the radical right literature (e.g. Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Mudde, 2000a; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997).For example, the conceptualization of the radical right is a frequently addressed issue(Betz, 1993; Kitschelt, 2007; Mudde, 2007), the ideological innovation is commonly

employed in differentiating between the contemporary radical right parties and their earlier incarnations (Ignazi, 2003; Golder, 2003), while the shifts in the policy space are repeatedly employed in explaining the radical right's electoral success (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2007). Nonetheless, despite the importance of the topic in understanding the radical right, there is a lack of systematic empirical accounts on the subject. Furthermore, few empirical analyses present in the literature tend to focus on small subsets of radical right parties and they are dominated by qualitative analyses.

The principal task of the dissertation is to account for several critical aspects of the radical right's functioning in the policy space, by using a rigorous and transparent quantitative methodology. Although throughout the dissertation I address the impact of additional factors relevant for the particular research questions, the ideology of the radical right and the interaction of parties in the policy space are the main topics addressed in the dissertation.[1]

Quite a few disputes with regard to the role of the ideology can be traced back to the hypothesized difference between post-communist (Eastern) and Western European radical right parties and the tendency of authors to focus only on one of the regions. Namely, despite the process of the EU integration, the increased economic and political cooperation, and the interdependence of countries, an analyst dealing with the radical right typically focuses either on the Western European or on the post-communist radical right and, thus, limits the validity of findings to a certain geographical area or historical period. Notable exceptions in this regard are edited volumes (e.g. Mammone, Godin, & Jenkins, 2013; Wodak, Mral, & KhosraviNik, 2013; Ferguson, Cheles, & Vaughan, 1995); however, these analyses do not share a common theoretical or methodological foundation. On the other hand, there is a strong prevalence of monographs dealing with the Western European radical right in a

[1] Throughout the dissertation I will use terms such as "ideology", "placement in policy space", "positioning in issue space" and the related variants of these terms as interchangeable. Nonetheless, it is likely that some authors may choose to make a distinction between these terms.

comparative fashion (e.g. Carter, 2005; Givens, 2005; Hainsworth, 2008; Ignazi, 2003; Mudde, 2000a; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997); while studies dealing exclusively with the Eastern European radical right are infrequent and mainly restricted to edited publications and case studies (e.g. Ramet, 1999; Mudde, 2005; Pankowski, 2010; Stojarová, 2013).

However, despite the accepted practice in the literature, there are strong arguments for a pan-European perspective in the analysis of the radical right. Radical right parties are successful throughout Europe (see Figure 1.1) and European states share similar political, historical and economic conditions. The effects of most of the hypothesized causal relations are likely to be applicable across Europe, while quite a few hypotheses are actually more effectively analyzed in a pan-European perspective. In particular, the effects of ideology, such as the effect of the position of competitors in the policy space, are expected to have the same consequences regardless of the assumed regional differences.[2] Finally, the phenomenon of the radical right extends beyond Eastern or Western European borders (Norris, 2005) and should be understood as a component of the universal phenomenon of the far-right politics characterized by similar systems of beliefs and supported by attitudinally comparable electorates.[3]

The analyses presented in the dissertation take a pan-European perspective. The hypothesized causal mechanisms are always tested in a comparative perspective, using both

[2] Rather than arguing against the division of radical right studies, I seek to underline the beneficial aspects of a joint analysis of Eastern and Western Europe. Naturally, there are reasonable arguments in favor of separating the research on Eastern and Western Europe. Narrow scope limits can be beneficial for the understanding of interregional differences and their effects on the radical right (e.g. why in some Scandinavian countries radical right parties are more successful in elections). An additional justification for the separation of research on Eastern and Western European radical right studies can be found in the hypothesized causal mechanisms and the relevant contextual factors. For instance, Bustikova's and Kitschelt's hypothesis which stipulates that the legacies of certain types of communism can be associated with the increased radical right support is, obviously, only applicable to Eastern Europe (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009). Similar is the case (although to a smaller degree) with the levels of immigration and the electoral support of radical right parties in Western Europe (van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000; Art, 2011).

[3] In this regard, the New Zealand First, the National Renewal (Chile), Pauline Hanson's One Nation (Australia), the Reform Party (Canada) and, to some extent, Tea Party (the USA) are examples of the radical right beyond European borders (see for example, Norris, 2005). On the other hand, in Asia, phenomena related to value systems of the radical right can be identified in disputes over Yasukuni Shrine; the presence of racism, xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes in Japan; the notions of the Greater Korea; the disputes over islands in the East China Sea; or the prosecution of Rohingya in Myanmar (Burma).

subsamples of post-communist and Western Europe. Consequently, the dissertation systematically builds on both the strengths of regional approach and the strengths of pan-European standpoint, thus increasing the robustness of findings.

1.2.2. The research questions

The dissertation addresses three research questions crucial for the understanding of the functioning of European radical right parties in the policy space. The research questions deal with the following topics: the definition of the radical right; the classification in post-communist and Western European radical right classes, and the effect of ideology on the variation of vote shares of radical right parties. In the following paragraphs I will discuss the main problems related to each of the research questions and list the principal findings of the analyses presented in the dissertation.

1.2.2.1. How to define the radical right?

The definition of the radical right is the starting point of all radical right studies. Nevertheless, despite the importance of the topic, there is little agreement on the proper definition of the radical right. Furthermore, while the literature is focused on developing the concept of the radical right and its theoretical underpinnings, the authors are continually failing to couple theoretical discussions with clearly falsifiable hypotheses and empirical tests.

The main challenge in the definition of the radical right is the changing nature of the radical right ideology. The modern radical right parties are significantly different in comparison to the far-right parties from the interwar period and from the immediate post-war period. Namely, in the last two decades some radical right parties adopted liberal position with regard to issues such as women rights, LGBT rights, or the separation of church and state. On average, in comparison to the historical far-right parties, the contemporary radical

right parties are more moderate and even likely to embrace some issues from the post-materialist agenda. Furthermore, modern radical right parties carefully craft their messaging and avoid certain issues so that they would not alienate the voters who do not hold extreme political views. These aspects of the contemporary radical right render the traditional definitions of the radical right misleading. Consequently, there is a need to develop a new approach to the definition of the radical right and pair it with comprehensive empirical evidence.

The approach to the definition of the radical right proposed in the dissertation builds on the general theoretical framework, which postulates two distinct conceptual structures: the exclusionary dimension which reflects the parties' positions considering "the Other" (i.e. the dimension includes positions on assimilation, nationalism, policies with respect to ethnic minorities, etc.); and the authoritarian dimension which reflects the parties' positions with regard to the hierarchical order of society (i.e. the dimension includes positions on law and justice policies or positions considering individual rights, etc.). I argue that the nature of the social and political changes in modern European societies is such that it aids in the transformation of the radical right ideology in the direction of moderation of authoritarian stances. Instead, the definitional crux of the radical right is placed on the exclusionary dimension. I argue that radical right parties are distinctive from other party families by occupying extreme positions with regard to exclusionary issues, and it is assumed that this characteristic is shared by all radical right parties regardless of the temporal and cross-sectional variation of radical right ideologies.

From the empirical standpoint, the problem of the definition is understood as the problem of the identification of the radical right party family and its differentiation vis-à-vis other party families. I present evidence which demonstrates that on the basis of authoritarian issues, radical right parities cannot be distinguished from conservative and Christian-

democratic parties, while the classifications based on exclusionary issues successfully group radical right parties in an exhaustive and robust cluster. Consequently, in contrast to the literature, I show that authoritarianism is *neither a sufficient nor a necessary* characteristic for the identification of the radical right and that the essential ideological characteristics of the radical right are to be found in the relation of the party family to "the Other".

1.2.2.2. Is there an ideological difference between the Eastern and the Western European radical right?

The differentiation between the Eastern and the Western European radical right is a working hypothesis of almost all modern studies of the radical right. Considering the strong differentiation in the literature, one would expect significant differences between the respective groups of parties. However, the grounds for this differentiation are not self-evident. While the rationale for separating research on Eastern and Western radical finds some support in regional differences (e.g. historical legacies, economic development, and political culture), the distinction is expected to find the strongest justification in the ideological profile of the parities.[4] However, there is no consensus on the magnitude of these dissimilarities (Minkenberg, 2009, p. 447), and some authors, depending of framework of analysis, assumed both significant ideological differences between the post-communist and the Western European radical right and the lack of such diversity (e.g. Mudde 2005; Mudde 2007).

Due to the lack of comparative studies, the appropriateness of this distinction is not systematically tested. Consequently, the ideological differentiation between the Eastern and Western European radical right is a problem in itself which requires thorough scrutiny. The

[4] However, the effect of regional differences is also questionable as intra-regional dissimilarities seem to be as significant. For instance, political and cultural differences between Spain, Portugal and Greece, on one hand, and Scandinavian counties, on the other, seem to be comparable to differences between post-communist and Western European countries. However, in contrast to the East-West divide, there is a tendency to jointly analyze the respective radical right parties.

analysis presented here seeks to fill in this lacuna and test to what degree the ideological profiles of radical right parties in Eastern and Western Europe are actually different.

The validity of classification in Eastern and Western European radical right groups is tested using multiple data sets and methods. The analysis addresses both the difference considering particular issues and the overall difference as manifested in the position of the classes of parties in a multidimensional policy space.

The results show limited evidence for ideological differentiation in Eastern and Western European radical right classes. This is particularly evident with regard to the exclusionary and authoritarian dimensions. Considering the exclusionary dimension, the distinction finds the strongest evidence with regard to the issue of nationalism; however, contrary to the position adopted in the literature, the issue of immigration offers very weak evidence for the stipulated ideological difference. Furthermore, none of the authoritarian issues provides sufficient evidence for the justification of the ideological distinction. Finally, although there is strong evidence for the differentiation of the radical right on the basis of issues loading on the economic dimension, these issues are not salient in the radical right ideology.

Overall, these results provide weak support to the notion of the European radical right accepted in the scientific community. While there is some indication for ideological differentiation considering a limited number of issues, the similarities between the Eastern and Western European radical right significantly outweigh the differences. Contrary to the accepted position, the radical right parties in the West seem as extreme as parties in the East, and ideological differences imposed on the parties seem to be either the function of idiosyncratic conditions of states or researchers' bias.

1.2.2.3. Which factors influence vote share variation of the radical right?

One of the most important topics in the research on the radical right is the electoral support of these parties. In this regard, a distinction can be made between the studies interested in the motivational and social background of voters and the studies interested in the radical right's vote share variation across space and time. While the individual level studies dominate the discipline (e.g. Arzheimer & Carter, 2010; Arzheimer, 2012; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000), the varying success of radical right parties at the polls is the most puzzling aspect of the phenomenon. Namely, the volatility of the radical right's electoral support seems excessive, and vote shares differ across countries and time periods without any obvious pattern. However, despite the importance of the topic, comprehensive and rigorous analyses of this volatility are uncommon.[5]

A particularly interesting aspect of this problem is in the relation of parties' ideologies and the vote share variation of the radical right. This relation is one of the central components of the political opportunity model, which in its best-known form (i.e. Kitschelt & McGann, 1997) relates the vote share of the radical right to the changes in the position of mainstream parties in the policy space. Following the publication of Kitschelt's analysis, researchers proposed alternative hypotheses relating the placement of the radical right and its competitors in the policy space with voting for the radical right (e.g. Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002). However, despite the attractiveness of these hypotheses only few studies test the effects of positioning in the policy space on radical right's vote shares.[6]

[5] This line of research is dominated by Western European studies (e.g. Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Swank & Betz, 2003; Golder, 2003). In the case of Eastern Europe, the lack of research is more pronounced due to both lack of the literature and comparatively smaller number of free and fair elections available for analysis (Pirro, 2014).

[6] While there are studies testing the effect of position in policy space on individual vote choices (Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002), only Carter (2003) tests its effect on radical right vote shares. Jackman & Volpert (1996), Swank & Betz (2003) and Golder (2003) ignore the effect of positioning in policy space.

In order to address the effect of ideological shifts on the electoral support of the radical right, I propose a parsimonious model which explains the radical right's vote share variation using three factors: the party system's ideological division (polarization) considering exclusionary-authoritarian issues, the size of targeted minority population and the electoral support of the main mainstream rightist party. This baseline model is contrasted to the models based on addition of alternative sets of contextual factors expected to influence the vote share variation of the radical right. The additional factors include: institutional arrangements (e.g. electoral systems, state structures); socio-economic conditions (e.g. unemployment rates, welfare systems); demographic contexts (e.g. immigration and asylum seeker rates); and socio-political factors (e.g. political culture, value orientations of citizens). The empirical testing of these hypotheses is facilitated by a pooled cross-sectional time series data set compiled by the author utilizing various primary sources of data.

The analysis provides evidence which relates the electoral gains of the radical right with ideological division considering exclusionary-authoritarian issues. Therefore, radical right parties across Europe seem to prosper in societies where issues such as identity, minorities or culture provoke deep disagreements and conflicts between the parties. In other words, the electoral success of the radical right finds explanation in the factors related to party systems, rather than institutional arrangements, economic crisis or other contextual factors.

1.3. The properties of the research design

Although some of the propositions are expected to travel beyond the set of cases addressed in the dissertation, the aforementioned analyses are developed with the specific parties, geographical area and time frame in mind. In the following sections I will describe the main properties of the research design.

1.3.1. Terminology and case selection

While the term "radical right" is frequently used in the literature (Norris, 2005; Arzheimer & Carter, 2010; Minkenberg, 2009), there is no agreement in the discipline considering the proper terminology.[7] Various terms are often used interchangeably with the term "radical right" such as: extreme right, ultra-right, far-right, right-wing, ultra-nationalist, racist, xenophobic, anti-immigrant, neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, etc. The term "extreme right" is probably the most frequently used in political science to refer to the family of parties analyzed here (e.g. Carter, 2005; Hainsworth, 2008; Ignazi, 2003). In addition, since the early 1990s there was a tendency to label this group of parties as "populist". Authors coined terms such as "populist radical right" (Mudde, 2007) or simply "populist right" (Betz, 2013), which contributed further to the confusion with regard to the terminology. However, while the term "radical right" is not the label most frequently used to denote the party family in question, it has several distinct advantages in comparison to the alternatives.

Firstly, the term "radical right" has a long history and its origin can be traced to the mid-1950s and the early 1960s, to the works of the authors such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset. They used the term predominantly to refer to phenomena such as McCarthyism and John Birch Society (Bell, 2002). Thus, the term establishes the relation to a larger literature and places the discussion within in the framework of a wider intellectual tradition.

Secondly, following the notion of the radical right adopted by the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution, one may distinguish between two types of parties, the "extreme right" and the "radical right", where although the later raises a question about the fundamental tenets of liberal democratic order, it does not necessarily ask for the displacement of the current political system (Hainsworth, 2008, p. 9). A similar classification

[7] In this section I am predominantly discussing terminology. The definition of the radical right is discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.

is employed by Norris (2005); she makes a distinction between extreme right parties which are willing to use violence in the attempt to achieve their goals and radical right parties that are not inclined to these means. Therefore, the term facilitates the distinction between the forms of far-right politics within and outside democratic system.

An additional advantage of the term "radical' is in its neutral value. For instance, while some parties use "radical" to label themselves (e.g. Serbian Radical Party, Italian Radicals, Radical Left (Denmark)) few, if any, choose to label themselves "extreme".[8]

It is also important to underline that the understanding of the radical right in this analysis is juxtaposed to the prevailing understanding of this party family in terms of "populist right". While I do not argue that some, or even most, of the parties belonging to the radical right party family are populist, it is important to distinguish the radical right party family from populist and particularly populist right-wing parties.[9] Furthermore, the contemporary emphasis on populism of the radical right obscures the ideological core of the party family and, thus, hinders a proper definition.

On the basis of these insights, by the generic term "extreme right" I refer to banned parties and organizations (e.g. Centre Party '86, Obraz), organizations or groupuscules willing to use violence or terror in the attempt to achieve their goals (e.g. National Socialist Underground, Combat 18), openly racist groups and groups which promote hate speech (e.g. stormfront.org, vanguardnewsnetwork.com), subcultural movements (e.g. Blood & Honor, skinheads), and other similar associations. In contrast, by "radical right" I solely refer to *parties active in accordance with the basic tenets of the liberal democracy* and, therefore,

[8] This is particularly important given the "normalization" of the presence of the radical right in European party systems. Extremism implied in the term "extreme right", assumes that these parties are outside democratic system, which is de facto not true.

[9] For instance, a party such as the Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland was a populist right-wing party, but it is not a radical right party (Pankowski, 2010). Furthermore, it is particularly important to distinguish between radical right and populist parties, which are in the press, but often also in the academic literature, placed in the same category. Populist parties, such as the recently created Five Star Movement (Italy), the People's Party – Dan Diaconescu (Romania), or the Alternative for Germany, are sometimes grouped with radical right parties, but they are not a part of the radical right family.

free to compete in the electoral market. Therefore, in accordance with most of the literature, I consider the respect for democratic values and procedures a necessary condition for the classification of parties in the radical right category (Ignazi, 2003; Minkenberg, 2003; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005; Pelinka, 2013). Finally, the term "far-right" is used to refer to both the extreme right and the radical right.

1.3.2. Units of analysis

The lowest level of analysis employed in this study is the party level. This level of analysis is used in addressing the differences between the radical right party family and other party families (Chapter 4); testing the hypothesized differences between the Eastern and the Western European radical right (Chapter 5); and the validity analysis of scales extracted on the basis of a hand-coded manifestos data set (Chapter 3).

In the analysis of radical right vote shares the unit of analysis is an election in a country (Chapter 6). As the focus of the analysis is the proportion of votes obtained by the radical right, in cases where there is only one significant radical right party, effectively, election level and party level are identical. However, given the interest in the state level conditions which facilitate voting for the radical right, in countries where more than one relevant radical right party is active (e.g. Italy, Austria, Greece), the dependent variable reflects the proportion of votes obtained by all radical right parties which participated in the election.

1.3.3. Scope conditions

The selection of cases is based on independent variables. Consequently, the sample encompasses countries with an extremely strong representation of the radical right (such as Romania, Serbia, Austria) as well as states where radical right parties have had a negligible electoral success (such as Estonia, Spain, Portugal). In the following subsections I will list the main scope conditions.

1.3.3.1. Geographical conditions

The countries of Europe cover a relatively continuous territory, which serves as the precondition of other scope conditions. By Eastern Europe I assume a continues geographical area composed of, in terms of the United Nations Statistics Division, parts of Central and South Eastern Europe (Balkans) and the whole of Eastern Europe. Therefore, by Eastern Europe I assume an area ranging from the Czech Republic on the west to Ukraine on the east, and Albania on the south to Russia and Baltic States on the north. By Western Europe I assume an area predominantly composed of, in terms of the United Nations Statistics Division, Western Europe and Northern Europe (excluding the Baltic states). It is not as continuous geographical area as Eastern Europe, since it also comprises parts of Southern Europe, in particular Greece and Cyprus. In total 40 countries are included in the sample, which, on the basis of their geographical proximity, are expected to have close economic, political and cultural relations.

1.3.3.2. Political and historical conditions

The areas of Eastern and Western Europe share a significant number of intra-regional and inter-regional political and historical similarities. Before World War I, most of the states of Eastern Europe were under undemocratic multi-ethnic empires governed by Hohenzollern, Habsburg, Ottoman and Romanov dynasties. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, the interwar period and the independence of the states were mostly marked by authoritarian regimes. The states have exerted mutual influence: most of the national movements from the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century were interrelated, while the events of the communist era usually had a spillover effect. Finally, following the founding post-communist elections the countries of Eastern Europe went through a series of simultaneous

transformative processes (e.g. adoption of market economy, democratization, shift to post-industrialization, etc.).

In contrast, in the period before World War I most of the countries of Western Europe were already independent, while the interwar period was in many regards the continuation of the prewar period of industrialization, economic development and progress in terms of strengthening of democratic institutions and individual rights. The period after World War II, brought about rapid democratization and liberalization of the political process, decolonization, European integration and economic growth.

The juxtaposition of Eastern and Western Europe primarily builds on legacies of the communist period. However, the creation of the EU placed Eastern and Western Europe on a converging trajectory. By 2013 ten Eastern European countries joined the EU, while the additional three Eastern European states are the EU candidate countries.

1.3.3.3. Time span

The comparative analyses presented here seek to analyze radical right parties under conditions of liberal democratic systems and free elections. By definition, this limits the time frame of the analysis to the period after the fall of communism. Although most of the founding elections in post-communist Europe happened during the early 1990s, given that the fall of the Berlin Wall is often taken as the symbolic fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of communism in Eastern Europe, the year 1989 is selected as the start date of the analysis.

1.3.3.4. Excluded cases

Several cases are excluded from the analysis. Belarus is excluded on the grounds of lack of free and fair elections. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia the

period between 1991 and 1995 are not included in the analysis.[10] Namely, due to the wars, during this period the nationalist rhetoric was excessive across the party systems, reducing the ideological differences between the radical right and other party families.[11] Finally, Turkey is excluded on the grounds of failing to meet two scope conditions: firstly, during the 1990s military still strongly exerted influence on political outcomes in Turkey, thus hindering the democratic process; secondly, politically Turkey fits neither the profile of Western nor post-communist (Eastern) Europe.

1.4. Data and methodology

The empirical analyses in the dissertation utilize quantitative methods. Each analysis normally employs several different statistical techniques. The importance of methodology is reflected in the structure of the chapters; each chapter includes a section which describes the selected methods, data and indicators used in the specific analysis.

The choice of quantitative methods is motivated by several reasons. Firstly, excluding the analysis of the demand side (voters), the studies of the radical right are characterized by theoretical deliberations, descriptive analysis and the lack of rigorous testing. In words of Mudde: "Despite the plethora of publications that have appeared over the past twenty-five years, the field is still full of 'received wisdom' that (so far) has not been tested scientifically." (Mudde, 2007, p. 295). Quantitative methods are particularly suitable for hypothesis testing as they are universal in nature, applicable across disciplines and scientific problems, while properties and assumptions of each statistical technique are typically well-

[10] The Serbia parliamentary election of 1997 is in-between the ends of wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the beginning of Serbian war with NATO. Consequently, this election is included in the analysis.

[11] The parties in the Balkans are difficult cases and in many regards the region is still, to a certain degree, exceptional. Due to a prolonged effect of the conflicts and contested impartiality of the current settlements, parties still adopt heighten nationalist rhetoric. In this regard, particularly problematic cases are parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina - parties such as the Serbian Democratic Party, the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Community are sometimes considered the radical right. Similarly, in Macedonia the ruling VMRO-DPMNE is sometimes considered the radical right, while in Croatia the mainstream right Croatian Democratic Community is also sometimes considered the radical right (e.g. Mudde, 2007).

known. Finally, the multidimensional character of the policy space and the number of cases addressed in each analysis exceed the power of qualitative approaches to the abovementioned problems.[12]

The analyses in the dissertation are developed with a particular care of robustness and reliability of findings. The main hurdle facing the analyses is the sample size. On the level of radical right parties, sample size ranges from N=17 to N=47. On the election level, the maximum number of cases is N=219. Consequently, each analysis typically utilizes multiple data sets and multiple methods. This approach minimizes the effect a set of cases or a method may have on the findings, and results in a higher level of robustness.

1.4.1. Expert surveys: limits and advantages

As the main topic of the dissertation is the placement of parties in the policy space, the majority of analyses are based on data sets measuring the position of parties on issue dimensions. In this respect, expert surveys take a prominent place in the analyses.

Namely, expert surveys are frequently used by political scientists interested in measuring positions of political parties on various issues (Castles, 1984; Huber & Inglehart, 1995; Ray, 1999). However, this method of data collection has some negative characteristics. Firstly, experts' opinions may reflect the prevailing standpoint of the discipline with respect to the ideology of parties, which may not be indicative of the actual positions of the parties (Ennser, 2012). Namely, expert surveys are likely to produce an overly systematic assessment of the policy space in that they summarize accumulated knowledge and may be skewed to exhibiting an overly coherent and homogeneous perception of the policy space (Ennser, 2012; Volkens, 2007). In addition, experts are likely to base their judgments on the varying

[12] It is important to note that quantitative methods are not employed on the samples of populations but rather on the populations themselves. In this respect, strictly speaking, the significance testing and p-values are meaningless. However, I am following the common practice in econometrics and political science where significance tests are reported and interpreted (see for example Jackman &Volpert, 1996; Golder, 2003, Swank & Betz, 2003).

criteria of parties and party systems (Budge, 2001; Huber & Inglehart, 1995). In this respect, there is an ambiguity about the precise understanding of parties as collective actors and experts may evaluate different segments of the parties' organizations (activists, leaders, or voters), while some authors claim that expert judgments may be influenced by past coalitions and alliances (Volkens, 2007; Huber & Inglehart, 1995; Laver & Schofield, 1990). Furthermore, the meanings of the indicators, especially abstract dimensions such as the left-right, may vary across cultures and time (Huber & Inglehart, 1995, p. 75). In addition, expert surveys obscure the distinction between programmatic promises and resulting actions as well as between party rhetoric and actual voting behavior in legislatures (Whitefield, Vachudova, Steenbergen, & Rohrschneider, 2007). Finally, there is no consensus on the period for which expert survey estimates are valid (Volkens, 2007). Namely, the expert surveys seem highly reliable across time and there seems to be little dynamic variation (McDonald & Mendes, 2001; Huber & Inglehart, 1995).

However, according to Kitschelt, the advantage of these data sets is in that they are based on multiple sources, and not only one type of information. Namely, experts base their judgments on academic analyses, leaflets and programs of parties, voter alignments, media coverage of parties, parties' campaigns and their behavior in legislative arena, rallies and plethora of other sources. In this respect Kitschelt emphasizes that: "such synthetic judgments may have greater external validity, although the measurement reliability is obviously limited because of the lack of unambiguously observable facts and figures" (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997, pp. 63-64). Consequently, the use of this type of data is very frequent in the literature on the radical right (e.g. Carter, 2005; Bustikova, 2009; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Norris, 2005; Pirro, 2014).

1.4.2. Hand-coded manifestos data set: how to estimate positions of parties in the policy space?

The methodology of parties' policy positions estimation is a particularly important topic in the dissertation. Namely, given the central role of ideology in the substantive research questions, the approach to the measurement of parties' positions in the policy space is likely to affect the findings. In the period between 1989 and 2013 approximately one hundred radical right parties participated in national elections in Europe, while the number of parties which were likely to affect the electoral fortunes of the radical right is far larger. The sheer number of parties and elections analyzed here makes it impossible for a single author to collect the data on all the cases of interests. The only data set in existence compiling the necessary statistics is the Comparative Manifestos Project.

Nevertheless, the extraction of the policy dimensions from the Comparative Manifestos Project became a discipline in itself (see for example Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987; Budge & Laver, 1992; Kim & Fording, 1998; Gabel & Huber, 2000; Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006; Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov& Laver, 2011; Dinas & Gemenis, 2010). Since the inception of the project, there is a bourgeoning discussion on numerous aspects of the Comparative Manifestos Project, which resulted in various methods of policy dimensions estimation. However, there is still no agreement considering the most optimal methodology. Given the controversies related to the policy position estimation, it is crucial to address this topic in a systematic manner and identify the most valid policy scale estimation procedure.

I present an alternative theoretical approach to the interpretation of hand-coded manifesto scores, and propose an alternative methodology. The core of the proposition is in claim that any text-based estimation of the policy position (e.g. estimation of the position of a party with regard a specific issue) should incorporate the overall estimate of party's position across time.[13] The correction addresses several negative aspects of hand-coded manifesto data including lack of references to particular issues and inflated estimates of the change in

[13] Namely, the importance of this debate goes beyond the Comparative Manifestos Project data set. The insights from these discussions are applicable to any analysis of text based on word (quasi-sentences) counts, including any hand-coded analyses of text or the fast developing field of computer based analysis of text.

position. As this methodological proposition is compatible with estimation procedures proposed in the literature, in order to produce the most optimal scale extraction method, I isolate each step in estimation procedures presented in the literature and assess its impact on validity scores. In empirical terms, the main result of this analysis is an alternative approach to estimation of policy scales characterized by validity scores which, in a statistically significant manner, outperform the estimates presented in the literature. In theoretical terms, the main contribution is in advancing interpretation on hand-coded manifesto data by underlining the beneficial aspects of the introduction of overall (time invariant) estimate of party's position in estimating party's position at particular point in time.

1.4.3. Data sets used in the analysis

All analyses presented in the dissertation are based on multiple data sets. Furthermore, the data set employed in the analysis of the variation of radical right's vote shares is created by compiling several sources of information. The following databases are used in the analyses:

Party Policies in Modern Democracies (Benoit & Laver, 2007)[14]
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006 (Hooghe, et al., 2008)[15]
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 (Bakker, et al., 2012)[16]
Minorities at Risk (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009)[17]
Eurostat – Population, immigration and asylum statistics (February 2014 version)[18]
Pew Research Center – Muslim Population in World[19]
Virtual Jew Library - Jewish Population in World[20]
Council of Europe - estimates of Roma Population in Europe[21]
The World Bank –World Development Indicators (June 2014 version)[22]
The World Bank – Database of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefet, & Walsh, 2001)
International Migrant Stock -United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs[23]

[14] The data is available from http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/ppmd/ .
[15] The data is available from http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/data_pp.php .
[16] The data is available from http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/data_pp.php .
[17] The data is available from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ .
[18] The data is available from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/
[19] The data retrieved on February 28th 2014 from http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-population/?sort=Country
[20] The data retrieved on March 1st 2014 from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/jewpop.html .
[21] The data retrieved on April 30th 2014 from http://web.archive.org/web/20091006045453/http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/Documentation/strategies/statistiques_en.asp .
[22] The data is available from http://data.worldbank.org/frontpage .

National Election Results[24]
European Election Database-Norwegian Social Science Data Services[25]
Quality of Government (December 2013 version)[26]
European Social Survey (February 2013 version) (Jowell & The Central Co-ordinating Team, 2007)
The Comparative Manifestos Project (December 2012 version) (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tanenbaum, 2001; Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & Macdonald, 2006)[27]
The United Nations Statistics Division - National Accounts Main Aggregates Database (December 2013 version)[28]

1.5. The outline of the dissertation

The dissertation is divided in two sections. The first part addresses the fundamental aspects of the analysis, including concept formation and measurement. In this respect, Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of the analysis. The main purpose of the chapter is to set the core concepts used throughout dissertation. Particular emphasis is placed on the definition of the radical right and the dimensionality of electoral competition in the policy space, as well as the tension between these two conceptualizations. The empirical contribution of the chapter is in the evaluation of the contesting hypotheses considering the policy space and the analysis of the relations of parties' positions across ideological dimensions.

Chapter 3 turns to the analysis of the policy dimension extraction methods on the basis of the Comparative Manifestos Project. The objective of this chapter is to operationalize the concepts developed in the general theoretical framework. The chapter demonstrates that the policy position estimation methods proposed in the literature are characterized by inconsistency and excessive variability. Consequently, an alternative theoretical approach to the interpretation of manifestos is proposed and its empirical consequences are tested while controlling for the effects of the other methodological aspects of estimation. As the proposed

[23] The data is available from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimatestotal.shtml
[24] The data are collected during August 2013 by the author via national electoral commissions' websites.
[25] The data retrieved during August 2013 from http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/ .
[26] The data is available at http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/ .
[27] The data is available from https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/ .
[28] The data is available from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm .

modifications of estimation methods are producing superior validations results, scales extracted on the basis of this methodology are used in the following analyses.

In the second part of the dissertation I turn to substantive questions considering the radical right. Chapter 4 focuses on the proposed definition of the radical right and the contesting conceptualizations of the party family as presented in Chapter 2. The chapter addresses the instable nature of the radical right ideology and demonstrates the capability of the proposed definition of the radical right to stand the test of ideological transformations of the party family.

Chapter 5 turns to the distinction between Eastern and Western European radical right parties and evaluates to what degree the division on post-communist and Western European radical right studies can be justified on the basis of differences in ideology. The chapter presents evidence based on a variety of data sets and methods which challenge the assumed ideological distinctiveness of Eastern and Western European radical right parties.

Chapter 6 addresses the vote share variation of radical right parties by contrasting the explanatory power of factors originating from the interaction of parties in the policy space to the explanatory power of other contextual factors present in the literature. Consequently, the chapter systematically evaluates the effects of factors expected to influence the variation of the vote shares of radical right parties, including socio-economic, political and cultural sets of contexts, and demonstrates a positive relation between the fragmentation of party systems and the radical right's electoral success.

Finally, Chapter 7 relates the substantive findings to the political outcomes and developments which surpass the topics of the research questions addressed in the dissertation. Furthermore, on the basis of the previous analyses the chapter presents a number of policy recommendations designed to tackle the growing presence of the radical right in European party systems.

Chapter 2 –Theoretical Framework: Definition of the Radical Right and Dimensionality of the Policy Space

2.1. Introduction

Despite of more than two decades of extensive research, the literature on the ideology of the radical right and its interaction with other parties in the policy space displays the features of the earliest stages of development: it revolves around a set of concepts which are often uncritically and unsystematically used; the appropriateness of definitions and assumptions is seldom tested; and, finally, theoretical propositions are developed on the basis of limited scope conditions. In spite of these limitations, these conceptions and narratives are very influential – they determine research agendas, shape public discourse, and guide public policy. Therefore, there is a need to transform the intuitions and the notions on the ideology of the radical right and the structure of the policy space into an explicit and falsifiable theoretical framework and test the adequacy of the assumptions and the propositions.

2.1.1. The problem

Definition of the radical right is a starting point of any radical right analysis. In general, definitions of the radical right seek to identify essential characteristics of the party family and, typically, these features are recognized in the ideological profiles of parties. However, the ideology of the radical right varies with time. Positioned on the periphery of the ideological variety, under the constant risk of electoral failure and being pushed to the political margin, often under the threat of banning, radical right parties adopt new while reframing old issues, contest the elections using innovative campaign machinery, change their constituencies or create new electoral coalitions. Consequently, identifying characteristics shared by all radical right parties across Europe and defining the party family is still a challenge for researchers.

However, the problem of the definition of the radical right exceeds the issue of party family identification in that it is directly related to the dimensionality and the conceptualization of the policy space relevant for the electoral competition of radical right parties. Namely, while the definitional characteristics of the radical right may encompass only a small set of features (e.g. xenophobia, anti-immigrant positions), they are likely to be components of more general dimensions of party competition (e.g. nationalism). Thus, while a radical right party may compete on a narrow policy platform (e.g. immigration), its electoral fortunes are likely to depend on the positioning of competitors considering a large variety of issues.

The main problem addressed in the analysis is the potential distinction between *the definitional dimension* of the radical right and *the policy dimensions relevant for its electoral competition*. This is a multifaceted question which, in addition to the theoretical perplexities, assumes particular empirical implications. In this respect, the specific issues, which determine parties' positions on a general dimension, are usually expected to be connected via correlational structure. Furthermore, policy dimensions are often variously conceptualized and operationalized, and the authors tend to differ in the selection of constitutive components. Thus, it is questionable to what extent hypothesized relations between the concepts and the issues correspond to the relations observed in empirics. In addition, the structure of the electoral competition in the policy space, that is, the number and the relation of the relevant policy dimensions, is disputed. Therefore, the problem of the definitional and the competing dimensions of the radical right and the problem of their relations are not negligible and they ask for further clarification.

2.1.2. The plan of the analysis

Given the above described tension between the definitional dimension of the radical right and the dimensionality of the electoral contest in the policy space, the task addressed in

this chapter is twofold. Firstly, there is an imperative to address the definition of the radical right and, secondly, it is necessary to assess the relation of the defining dimension of the radical right to the policy dimensions relevant for its electoral competition. The structure of the argument is mirrored in the arrangement of the chapter.

The first section is initiated by addressing the main concepts used in defining the radical right where particular attention is devoted to the core ideological features proposed in the literature on the definition of the party family. On the grounds of this discussion, the section identifies the main principles of defining the radical right and *postulates* the definition of the radical right adopted in the dissertation.

The following section shifts the focus from the definition of the radical right to the dimensionality of the policy space and the structure of electoral competition. The section is initiated by discussing some of the most common concepts and policy dimensions employed in the literature and problematizing their relation to the proposed definition of the radical right. On the basis of this deliberation, I present a set of hypotheses considering the structure of the policy space and the significance of particular policy dimensions for radical right parties.

The subsequent section combines these two a priori discussions by introducing the empirical aspect of the analysis. The hypothesizes on the dimensionality of the policy space and the relations between the policy dimensions are tested using three datasets and a number of statistical techniques, while the crux of the empirical analysis is in structural equation models tested using two data sets. The final section concludes and explains the relation of the chapter to the reminder of the dissertation.

2.2. Conceptualizing the radical right

In this analysis the problem of the definition of the radical right is primarily perceived as the problem of classification of parties into party families. To define the radical right is

understood as setting the limits of the party family in opposition to the other party families. Thus, in this analysis the main function of the definition is *to enable the empirical identification of the radical right party family on the basis of a set of measurable characteristics*. Likewise, the problem of different types of radical right parties within the radical right party family is understood according to the identical formal principles. However, the discussion of the issues which differentiate between the types of radical right parties emphasizes the ideological aspects of the radical right that are not shared by all family members, and which are for that reason secondary in the radical right ideology. Having these principles in mind, in the following section I underline the most prominent approaches to the definition and the classification of the radical right simultaneously and review the *core concepts* and *policy dimensions* related to this party family.

2.2.1. The literature on defining and classifying the radical right

The research on the radical right produced a rich spectrum of approaches to the definition of radical right parties. The first type of literature is based on the theories developed in the context of the surge of radical right parties in Western Europe during the 1980s and the 1990s, and the succes of Tatcherism and Reganism (e.g. Kitschelt & McGann, 1997, Betz 1994). The main differentiating feature of this approach is in the accent on the economy. The authors primarly emphisized the economy in order to distinguish a group of radical right parties within the broader family of the radical right. Nevertheless, the denoted group comprises the best known and electoraly most potent parties. An example of this approach is provided by Betz, who distinguishes between two core traits of the radical right: 1) rejection of the principles of individual equality and individual liberty, accompanied by acceptance of an authoritarian rule based on ascribed characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, or religion; 2) acceptance of violence (Betz, 1994, p. 3). However, he employs the position on economic issues to distinguish between groups of radical right parties, and makes a

distinction between national populist parties and neo-liberal populist parties (Betz, 1993a, p. 674).

If one adopts the presumption that radical right parties, particularly the most successful ones, assume predominantly neoliberal positions with regard to the economy, and also acknowledges the extreme rightist positions of the radical right with respect to exclusionary and authoritarian issues, there is an opportunity to define the radical right using a more abstract conceptualization. The basis of this approach is in the assumption that the radical right party family is positioned on the far-right side of the policy space in general. Accordingly, several authors proposed to define the radical right using its position on the left-right dimension (e.g. Ignazi, 1992; Ignazi, 2003; Norris, 2005).

However, the post 1990s studies went back to the conceptualizations in line with the traditional understanding of the radical right, emphasizing issue dimensions such as nationalism, ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, but neglecting positions on economic issues in their definitions and classifications. For example, Mudde starts development of his definition with the concept of nationalism, and then accentuates three distinctive ideological features of the populist radical right: nativist nationalism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2007). On the other hand, initiating the analysis from the term "right-wing extremism", Carter arrives at a two-dimensional definition of the radical right. The extremist component assumes the rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state, while the right-wing component entails the rejection of the principle of the fundamental human equality.[29] In the classification of radical right parties she uses three dimensions: the importance of issue of immigration, the nature of parties' racist attitudes (if parties subscribe to classical biological racism, new racism – culturism, or

[29] The manifestations of the former definitional segment are anti-pluralism, a call for a stronger state, emphasis on law and order; the manifestations of the later definitional segment are nationalism, ethnocentrism, racism, and exclusionism. (Carter, 2005, p. 17).

no racism); and parties' attitudes towards democracy, parliamentarism and pluralism (Carter, 2005, pp. 28-34).[30]

The concepts and notions developed in the literature on fascism and Nazism have a strong influence on the modern understanding of the radical right. For instance, Griffin's definition of fascism as a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism (Griffin, 1991) is often echoed in the literature dealing with the current incarnations of the radical right (e.g. Fennema, 1997; Hainsworth, 2008). However, most authors underline the difference between the historical fascism and Nazism and the contemporary radical right (Betz, 1993; Eatwell, 2000; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Minkenberg, 2002; Mudde, 2007; Hainsworth, 2008) and, consequently, these concepts are mainly present in distinguishing between radical right parties. For instance, Ignazi uses three dimensions to differentiate radical right family from other party families and classify radical right parties: placement at the far-right side of the policy space; negative attitude toward the political system; and fascist features in party ideology (Ignazi, 1992). On the basis of these dimensions he arrives at two types of radical right parties – new and old extreme right.[31]

As with Ignazi's approach, issue dimensions based on legacies (e.g. fascism, communism, religion, etc.) are commonly used in the classification of East European radical right parties. Some taxonomies are in line with the conceptualizations developed in the analyses of the Western Europe radical right. For instance, Minkenberg makes a distinction between fascist-authoritarian, racist-ethnocentric and religious-fundamentalist radical right parties (Minkenberg, 2002, p. 347). However, in categorizations authors mostly prefer focusing on, what Mudde calls, post-communist criteria of types (Mudde, 2000, p. 7). In this regard, Mudde proposes to distinguish between radical right parties that are rooted in the

[30] Cater identifies five empirical types of radical right parties: neo-Nazi parties, neo-fascist parties, authoritarian xenophobic parties, neo-liberal xenophobic parties, and neo-liberal populist parties (Carter, 2005, p. 50).
[31] Given that the last dimension has a pivotal role in distinguishing between the classes of radical right parties, in later works he reduces classification on two dimensions: the presence or absence of a fascist legacy and the acceptance or refusal of the political system (Ignazi, 2003).

political culture and ideas of the period before communism, communist radical right parties which display a combination of nationalism and nostalgia for the communist past, and post-communist radical right parties that are newly established and focus on the current issues (Mudde, 2000). In a similar vein, Shafir makes a distinction between the parties of radical return and the parties of radical continuity (Shafir, 2000). Pursuing a similar line of reasoning, Bustikova claims that Eastern European radical right parties can be classified on the basis of three dimensions: nationalism, cultural conservatism and anti-communism (Bustikova, 2009, p. 229).

The most important novelty in the modern radical right studies is the emphasis on the concept of populism. Indeed, quite often authors use the term "populist" in naming the whole party family or at least the most significant and visible subgroup of the radical right (De Lange & Guerra, 2009; Minkenberg, 2009; Shekhovtsov, 2013; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Betz & Johnson, 2004; Zaslov, 2009; Mudde, 2007; Fennema, 2005). According to Betz core elements of populism are pronounced faith in the common sense of the ordinary people, the belief that simple solutions exist for the most complex problems of the modern world, and the belief that the common people, despite possessing moral superiority and innate wisdom, have been denied the opportunity to make themselves heard (Betz, 1994, p. 4). Considering the last point, Zaslov emphasizes that the core of the populist radical right ideology is in the claim to represent the "pure people" against the "corrupt elites" (Zaslov, 2009, p. 310). Populism is important in both classification of parties within the radical right family and understanding its electoral performance. For instance, Golder used the distinction between neo-fascist (authoritarian and elitist) and populist parties in his analysis of the variation of radical right vote shares (Golder, 2003, p. 443). On the other hand, populism is often considered to be the main factor in the electoral success of the radical right (Mudde, 2007; Betz, 1994; Pelinka, 2013).

Lastly, it should be noted that taxonomy is rarely purpose in itself. Namely, classes are often defined assuming a particular research question in mind. For instance, Williams introduces a typology based on calculated decision-making as reflected in the changes of platform strategies of radical right-wing parties. Hence, the timing of the adoption of new strategies is used to differentiate between parties, and the parties are classified according to their role in the reinvention process. Consequently, he distinguishes between the parties that preserved fascist legacies, the entrepreneurs that aggressively sought strategies to position themselves to take advantage of the openings in 1980s, and the bandwagoners, which later adopted entrepreneurs' reinvented politics and styles (Williams, 2006, pp. 57-58).

2.2.2. Approaching the definition of the radical right

The brief discussion above raises several dilemmas considering the definition of the radical right. Firstly, there is a question about the importance of ideology in defining the radical right. Secondly, there is a problem of populism and its role in the definition of the radical right. Thirdly, there is a problem of concept formation and the number of policy dimensions used in the definition. In the following sections I address these issues in more details.

2.2.2.1. Ideology as an instrument of definition and classification

While the authors predominantly emphasize the ideological characteristics of parties in defining and classifying the radical right, sometimes other criteria are employed, particularly in distinguishing between radical right parties, such as: legacies, historical origins of parties, organizational structures, political contexts or political strategy. Therefore, it is questionable how valuable is ideology in identifying the radical right.

Mair's and Mudde's analysis of the types of classifications of parties into families offers a broader framework for addressing this problem (Mair & Mudde, 1998). Mair and

Mudde identify four approaches to party classifications: the use of transnational federations, the use of the names of parties, the sociological approach, and the focus on policy and ideology. The transnational federations approach is problematic since not all parties belong to international federations (Mair & Mudde, 1998, pp. 216-217). This is particularly problematic for radical right parties given that their transnational federations are both short-lived and small in terms of the number of members (e.g. Union for Europe of the Nations; European National Front; Alliance of European National Movements; Europe of Freedom and Democracy). In a similar manner, given that not all parties adhere to a common party name, relying on parties' names does not suffice (Mair & Mudde, 1998, pp. 221-222).[32] Finally, the sociological approach is inadequate in that electoral coalitions forged by the radical right are questionable in themselves and not a consistent and stable phenomenon across space and time.[33]

In this regard, ideology seems to be the only viable approach to the classification of parties in party families. Moreover, while in the earlier account of Mair and Mudde (1998) the ideology based taxonomies were opposed to the other types of classifications, in the later account of Mudde (2007) ideology is situated in the foundations of all party family classifications. In this regard, the other types of classification may be perceived only as the proxy indicators of ideology. Therefore, it seems reasonable to search for the definitional crux of the radical right by focusing on ideology.

2.2.2.2. The exclusion of populism

[32] Although some labels are traveling across borders (e.g. National Front, Progress Party, Freedom Party, etc.) these are rather exceptions. Furthermore, in a later account on party families Mudde introduces a third method of party family classification –use of self-identification, that is, the self-definition of parties. Nevertheless, this method is not particularly useful either, given that, due to the negative connotations and consequences of the label (including the banning of parties), radical right parties rarely refer to themselves using the tag "radical right" or related labels (Mudde, 2007, p. 35).

[33] Furthermore, according to Mair and Mudde, although the sociological (origins) approach is highly praised for its ability to explain the origin of political parties and party families, it is criticized for not sufficiently explaining the shifting party ideologies (Mair & Mudde, 1998, p. 15).

Although populism figures prominently in the modern analyses of the radical right, I propose to ignore this feature in the definition of the radical right. This is not to say that populism has no explanatory power in understanding the radical right or that the concept is irrelevant (see for example Silva & Littvay, 2014). However, there are several aspects of the concept which make it redundant in the analysis presented here.

Firstly, as underlined above, the concept of populism is usually introduced in order to delineate a certain group of radical right parties. For instance, Mudde's introduction of the term "populist radical right" was motivated by the attempt to exclude some of the parties which are commonly understood as the radical right, such as the National Democratic Party (Germany) (Mudde, 2007, pp. 49-51). However, the goal of this analysis is to incorporate all types of radical right parties in Europe. Secondly, there is an ambiguity considering the meaning of the concept of populism. In words of Betz: "Generally populism can be defined as a structure of argumentation, a political style and strategy and an ideology." (Betz, 1994, p. 4). In a similar vein Rydgren argues that populism may refer to a political ideology, political style and cultural populism (Rydgren, 2004, p. 201). Consequently, the concept of populism may assume different meanings, including the understanding of populism as an ideology, and its use in the definition of the radical right without further limitations is likely to cause a conceptual confusion. Furthermore, even if populism is understood as an ideology it suffers from additional ambiguities. According to Betz the core elements of populist ideology are a strong producer ethic; strong repudiation of the existing socioeconomic and sociopolitical system as serving the special interest of the few; and a pronounced claim to genuine democracy and egalitarianism (Betz, 1994, p. 4). However, these elements are not exclusively characteristic for populism and, thus, they are not sufficient for delineating a type of ideology. In this respect, the term populism is more appropriately used as a reference to

certain political strategies.[34] Finally, despite the trend to characterize or even label radical right parties as populist, some authors have distanced themselves from this practice as it actually legitimizes this form of politics (Mammone, Godin, & Jenkins, 2013, p. 4). Namely, as Jamin notes, populism does not embody the same kind of threat to liberal values as the radical right (Jamin, 2013, p. 38).[35] Thus, for all of the aforementioned reasons, populism is not considered in the discussion of the definition of the radical right.

2.2.2.3. Conceptual structure and minimal common denominator strategy

While ideologies such as socialism, liberalism and communism have a long history, the concept of right-wing radicalism is relatively new (Mudde, 1995, pp. 204-205).[36] Consequently, the debate on various conceptual tenets of far right politics is continually growing, and this is the case with regard to both the discussion on the contemporary radical right (Betz, 1994; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2007) and the debate on the historical fascism and Nazism (Griffin, 1991; Arendt, 1975; Reich, 1983; Umland, 2009). The consequence of this approach is a shop list type of approach to defining the radical right and its subgroups.[37] By contrast, only a small number of authors attempted to define the radical right by reference to a minimal number of ideological features.[38]

[34] Namely, the authors who emphasize populism in their understanding of the radical right almost invariably take it as a political style or a structure of argumentation (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Givens, 2005; Hainsworth, 2008; Carter, 2005).

[35] Furthermore, the interest in radical right parties came about as the consequence of their success in the electoral arena. Consequently, the parties in the focus of the modern radical right studies are the electorally most successful parties. However, considering the ideological profile of radical right parties, it is quite likely that the electoral success is not possible without populism. In this regard, populism may be a necessary characteristic of any electorally meaningful radical right party.

[36] The very concept of the radical right became prevalent only in the post-World War II period (Hainsworth, 2008, p. 9). On the other hand, these parties do not adhere to a single foundational doctrine, philosophical or intellectual tradition, and, as mentioned above, predominantly they are not members of party associations (both European and international) (Zaslov, 2009, p. 309).

[37] For instance, Mudde found 58 different characteristics used in the definition of the radical right in the academic literature (Mudde, 1995).

[38] For instance, Husbands uses racial exclusionism (Husbands, 1981), while Eatwell's definitions of the radical right primarily revolve around the concept of nationalism (Eatwell, 2000). Furthermore, based on Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), Kitschelt introduces the grid/group conceptualization of the radical right (Kitschelt, 2007).

Following Mahoney's discussion on concept formation (2004), I argue for a minimal denominator approach to the definition of the radical right.[39] The choice of the minimal denominator strategy is primarily determined by the assumption that there are core believes, world views and values which constitute the foundation of the radical rightist ideology and which allow for the identification of the party family. In particular, it is assumed that these fundamental characteristics can be captured by a small number of abstract concepts which constitute the minimal common denominator of all parties (Betz, 1999; Mudde, 2007). Thus, following Sartori's distinction between concept's intension and its extension (Sartori, 1970), it is expected that in order to incorporate all empirical cases of a group of parties, one necessary has to define the group as generally as possible, that is, with an abstract conceptualization which subsumes a large number of attributes. Ideally, the conceptualization should be sufficiently abstract to exhaust the category of the party group which is being defined, and sufficiently specific to exclude the parties from the other groups. Thus, in line with Sartori's notion of "the ladder of abstraction" (Sartori, 1970), I assume a hierarchical structure of concepts, where, ideally, each concept subsumes a set of less abstract and empirically less extensive concepts. Eventually, the hierarchical arrangement of concepts is expected to account for the whole policy space.

2.2.3. The definition of the radical right

On the basis of the above mentioned principles (i.e. the definition based on ideology, the exclusion of populism, the minimal denominator approach to concept formation), in the

[39] Mahoney made a distinction between three types of concept formation. The family resemblance strategy assumes that no single attribute is shared by members of a category, though the members resemble to each other on at least some attributes. The radial categories strategy can take two forms: either a category is anchored in a central example that serves as a best case or a prototype; or category may be centered in ideal type where real cases are analyzed to idealized central example that serves as a best or a perfect instance of the type in question. The mini-max strategy consists of two definitional segments: the minimal definition incorporates only those attributes that are shared by all cases of the category, while ideal-typical definition views a category in light of all major attributes associated with the category (Mahoney, 2004, pp. 94-95).

following sections I address the defining policy dimension of the radical right and, subsequently, propose the definition of the radical right.

2.2.3.1. The defining policy dimension of the radical right

The discussion on defying the radical right demonstrated that nationalism figures prominently in the definitions of this party family (Givens, 2005; Griffin, 1991; Mudde, 2007; Minkenberg, 2002) and, in general, it can be argued that the concept of nationalism captures some of the core aspects of the background concept (Adcock & Collier, 2001) of the radical right. Nevertheless, there is certainly some mismatch between nationalism and the concept of the radical right. In this respect, some authors emphasized that the radical right ideology is based on the rejection of the principle of human equality considering a wider set of characteristics, including nation, race, or ethnicity (e.g. Betz, 1994; Carter, 2005). Therefore, there is a need to define the radical right in more abstract terms using a more general conceptualization which would subsume concepts such as nationalism, racism or ethnocentrism.

Clues to this conceptualization can be found throughout the literature on the contemporary radical right. According to Eatwell, the goal of the radical right is a *homogenous* society and, therefore, these parties stress conversion, expulsion or worse of "*the Other*" and the defense of a traditional conception of community (Eatwell, 2000, p. 413). In a similar vein Minkenberg claims that the right-wing radicalism is a myth of a *homogenous* nation, a romantic and populist ultranationalism directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism (Minkenberg, 2002, p. 337). Kitschelt emphasize the same point while discussing the group dimension in his two-dimensional definition of the radical right. According to him, radical rightists erect boundaries between the in-group and the out-group based on residence in a national territory (or claimed territory) and/or biological descent

(race, ethnicity), which in turn serve as the basis of friend/foe distinction (Kitschelt, 2007). Krejčí's historical analysis traces the core of far-right politics in an exclusionary drive starting with the expulsion of Jews from Spain in the 16th century, across ethno-linguistic drive between 1848 and 1948, to the nationalist policies of communist regimes (Krejčí, 1995). In his discussion on the modern radical right Husbands states: "What unites all of these parties is their particular commitment to some sort of ethnic exclusionism – a hostility to foreigners, immigrants, Third World asylum-seekers, and similar outgroups – as well as aggressive nationalism or localism." (Husbands, 1992). Finally, Ramet sums these points in the following words: "The Other lies at the heart of radical right politics, and for the radical right, which understands the world in terms of struggle, in terms of 'us' versus 'them', the Other is translated into 'the Enemy'" (Ramet, 1999, p. 1). Therefore, above all the radical rightism is an *exclusionary* ideology which revolves around relations and concepts such as: *homogenous versus heterogeneous, universalism versus particularism, friend versus foe, group, other, and outsider* (Betz, 2001; Ramet, 1999; Eatwell, 2000; Kitschelt, 2007).

Hence, I propose to identify the defining dimension of the radical right in the varying positions of parties considering "the Other". The operationalization of the dimension is based on the position of parties considering issues such as: immigration, race, religion, ethnicity, nation, etc. The crucial aspect of this proposition is the assumed correlation structure of the policy positions. Namely, it is assumed that if a party adopts an extreme position on one of the issues, it is also more likely to have an extreme position on any other issue related to the dimension. Whether the position of the party on the dimension is predominantly expressed by nation-, race-, or ethnicity-based ideology is a matter of historical contingency, political strategy or idiosyncratic national context.[40] Nonetheless, the dimension is understood as a

[40] However, this is not to say that the adopted notion of in-group/out-group is irrelevant. To the contrary, depending on the definition of "the Other" parties may be classified as, for example, ethnic-nationalist, anti-Semitic, Islamophobic or anti-immigrant. In other words, the variation in types of exclusionary ideological

fusion of these exclusionary ideological varieties and their ideological opposites. Thus, it constitutes a latent ideological factor which determines the positions of parties over each particular issue. Hereafter I will refer to this ideological component as *the exclusionary dimension.*

2.2.3.2. The proposed definition of the radical right

The adoption of the above described position enables the definition of the radical right with the reference to a single abstract dimension. As concepts may display features of both sets and dimensions, I argue for the use of the dimensional aspect of concepts and the definition of the party family based on its placement in the policy space. Namely, an oversimplified understanding of a concept as a set assumes that it can be operationalized as a binary variable where a case can be either in the set or out of the set (Ragin, 1989; Ragin, 2000). On the other hand, the understanding of concepts as dimensions presumes the operationalization through a continuous or ordinal variable and allows for a varying degree of group membership.[41]

I argue that, in order to define the radical right as parsimonious as possible, the position on the exclusionary dimension should be adopted as the feature which differentiates radical right parties from the other parties. This argument states that if at any given time a snapshot is taken of the positions of all political parties in Europe on the exclusionary dimension, radical right parties will form a distinct cluster. If such snapshots are regularly taken over the period specified with the scope conditions, radical right clusters will be similarly positioned in the

standpoints enables differentiation between parties within the radical right party family. Therefore, these distinctions can serve as the basis of the taxonomy within the radical right.

[41] Concepts employed in the classifications can be understood in both ways. For example, the dimension in the foundation of the concept of nationalism presumes a variety of positions ranging from the extreme nationalism to the position of its conceptual counterpart – cosmopolitism. Thus, understood in this manner, the basis of the concept of nationalism is a bipolar dimension. However, the typical use of the term "nationalism" in the classification of parties assumes a set: parties are either nationalistic or not nationalistic. Furthermore, the nationalism may also assume a truncated scale (uni-polar dimension), where party can be placed on the positions ranging from moderate nationalist to extreme nationalist, but excluding the whole area of positions approaching predominantly cosmopolitan positions.

policy space and, thus, distinctive from the clusters of other party families. Accordingly, the position of parties on the exclusionary dimension is considered to be *a necessary and a sufficient* feature in defining the radical right and identifying radical right parties. Consequently, assuming the willingness to (at least officially) respect the democratic rules and procedures, the following postulate may be stated: *the radical right party family is the group of parties which occupies the utmost rightist position on the exclusionary dimension*.

The advantages of this approach are manifold. Firstly, it allows a parsimonious definition of the radical right. Secondly, it establishes a clear relation to empirics and appropriate methods, and lends itself to falsification. Finally, it is not dependent on particular issues or thresholds in identifying the radical right, but allows for changes in the radical right ideology, while providing a constant theoretical foundation.[42]

2.3. Conceptualizing the policy space

The postulation of the defining dimension of the radical right raises the problem of the dimensionality of the policy space and the structure of the electoral market. Namely, while the definition of the radical right is expected to capture the most important aspect of its electoral competition, the electoral performance of the parties is likely to be affected by the overall configuration of party systems and the dimensionality of the policy space.

The dimensionality of the policy space is a frequently addressed problem in political science (e.g. De Vries & Marks, 2012; Benoit & Laver, 2012). Namely, although theoretically electoral competition can be perceived as a contest in a policy space consisting of an infinite number of issue dimensions, it is common and justified to reduce the number of

[42] This approach to definition and classification has additional advantages. As the radical right is defined only by its position of the exclusionary dimension, it offers a very parsimonious conceptual framework. Namely, it uses the concept of position which is logically assumed and, therefore, inseparable from the concept of dimension. Important aspect of this thesis is that the concept of the radical right is relational in the sense that radical right is crucially determined by the policy positions and values adopted by electorate, intellectuals and, the most importantly, other parties. Furthermore, the definition on the basis of positions in the policy space enables the assessment of the degree of membership in particular party group.

ideological dimensions for analytical purposes (Bakker, Jolly, & Polk, 2012, p. 222). In this respect, it is important to notice that the discussion on the relevant policy dimensions mirrors the concepts employed in the literature on the definition of the radical right. Thus, the reduction to one-dimensional policy space (Downs, 1957; Pooley & Rosenthal, 1997) corresponds to the definition of the radical right based on the left-right dimension (e.g. Norris, 2005; Ignazi, 2003). The reduction of the policy space to the socialist vs. capitalist (economic left-right) and the libertarian vs. authoritarian (socio-cultural left-right) dimensions (Kitschelt, 1994; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, & Edwards, 2006; De Lange S. L., 2007) corresponds to the definition of the radical right based on the positions of parties with respect to the issues such as nationalism, ethnocentrism and authoritarianism (e.g. Mudde, 2007; Carter, 2005). Finally, some authors proposed the reduction of the policy space to three or more policy dimensions (e.g. Bakker, Jolly, & Polk, 2012), thus potentially allowing for the conceptualizations of electoral competition in line with the idiosyncrtic nature of the proposed defintion of the radical right. Consequently, the definition of the radical right based on the exclusionary dimension, problematizes the relation of the defining dimension of the radical right to the dimensionality of the policy space and the overall structure of electoral competition.

2.3.1. The dimensionality of the policy space

In contrast to the left-right dimension, which can be understood as the most abstract conceptualization of the policy space (i.e. ideological super-issue) (De Vries & Marks, 2012), the exclusionary dimension corresponds only to a subset of political issues. Therefore, the exclusionary dimension is expected to account only for a fraction of the positioning on the left-right dimension while the residual variation is expected to be explained by other facets of party competition in the policy space. Hence, the isolation of the exclusionary dimension raises the problem of identifying the remaining ideological components.

In this respect, Kitschelt's work provides a useful guide. In his opinion political systems involve delineation of who is citizen, choice of collective decision modes, and rules of allocating scarce resources (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997, pp. 19-24). As mentioned above, Kitschelt introduces the notion of who is citizen under the label of "group dimension". According to him, the radical right erects boundaries between the in-group and the out-group on the basis of place of residence and/or biological descent (Kitschelt, 2007, p. 1179). Evidently, this policy dimension corresponds to the above described defining dimension of the radical right: *the exclusionary dimension*. On the other hand, the choice of collective decision modes is introduced under the label of "grid dimension". Grid is understood as the density of obligatory rules of conduct that prevail in a group and it reflects: "the balance between compliance with a higher group authority versus members' rights to choose their own lifestyles, express individual preferences, and make them heard in the formation of collective decisions" (Kitschelt, 2007, p. 1178). In this analysis this ideological component is labeled "*authoritarian dimension*". Finally, the allocation of scarce resources refers to the position of parties considering dilemma of redistribution versus spontaneous market allocation or, in more general terms, considering dilemma of capitalist politics versus socialist politics (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997, pp. 5-15). In this analysis this ideological component is labeled "*economic dimension*".

This conceptualization raises several important questions with respect to the electoral competition of the radical right. Firstly, there is a question how the authoritarian and the economic ideological components are related to the exclusionary dimension. Effectively, this question asks if the structure of the policy space and the party competition require addressing positions considering the issues beyond the definitional dimension in analyzing the electoral performance of the radical right. Secondly, as presented in Figure 2.1, together with the specific issues which determine the position of parties on each particular dimension, the

dimensions are expected to create a hierarchical structure which accounts for most of the positioning in the policy space. Therefore, there is a question to what extent the proposed conceptual structure captures the electoral competition in the policy space.

Figure 2.1
Conceptual hierarchy



Note: The figure presents assumed hierarchical relation between policy/issue dimensions as suggested by Kitschelt (1992, 2007). The arrows signify the decreasing level of generalization at each nod.

Finally, there is a question how important is each policy dimension for radical right parties. This question seeks to assess if radical right parties are predominantly competing on a selected set of issues while choosing to ignore the others. In the following sections I will address the problematic nature of these issues in more detail.

2.3.2. The authoritarian dimension

Authoritarianism may be understood as an ideology of strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely, and which promotes law and order policies and punitive conventional moralism (Mudde, 2007, p. 23). While authoritarianism is one of the concepts most frequently related to the radical right ideology (e.g. Lipset S. M., 1981; Betz, 1994; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Mudde, 2007; Carter, 2005; Arendt, 1986), some authors consider authoritarianism to be *sufficient* for identifying a party as a member of

the radical right party family.[43] However, as the authoritarian dimension assumes a set of meanings distinct from the notions associated to the exclusionary dimension, the relation between these concepts is theoretically problematic.

The concept of authoritarianism can be understood in analogy with two sets of literature. The first type of literature originated during the 1960s and the 1970s and revolves around the classification of regime types. In this tradition authoritarianism refers to certain forms of conduct and mentalities rather than a specific set of values and world views (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Consequently, it is taken as a separate concept, equally applicable to both leftist and rightist regimes, and as such attributed to the various forms of rule – e.g. bureaucratic authoritarianism (O'Donnell, 1973), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2001), or electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006). If this notion of authoritarianism is transmitted to the analysis of the ideological characteristics of parties, the concept takes a form of an independent feature, weakly related or unrelated to any other ideological component of the policy space, including the exclusionary dimension.

In contrast to the notion of authoritarianism in the regime typologies, the ideological feature of authoritarianism can be understood in analogy with the notion of authoritarianism in the socio-psychological literature. In this literature authoritarianism is taken as a set of behavioral dispositions and a personality structure which is closely related to certain worldviews (Adorno, Fraenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). In this paradigm, authoritarianism serves as the psychological basis of a variety of exclusionary positions, where these sets of traits and beliefs are bounded together not by a logical relation, but rather by underlying psychological dynamics (Todosijević, 1999). If this paradigm is adopted as a model for understanding the structure of the policy space, positions on authoritarian and exclusionary issues are expected to be strongly associated.

[43] For instance, Borz claims that radical right parties are the ones which exhibits at least one of the features on the following dimensions (nationalism, ethnocentrism, racism, xenophobia) and hierarchical dimension (authoritarianism, anti-democracy) (Borz, 2012, p. 174).

Following the interpretation of the authoritarian dimension corresponding to the first analogy, one may point to the social and political changes which allow for a particular mixture of exclusionary and authoritarian positions in the ideologies of the modern European parties. In Western Europe, all-encompassing welfare state and growing prosperity gave prominence to a set of postmaterialist issues such as gender equality or climate changes and environmental pollution (Inglehart, 1977). On the other hand, these political transformations, accompanied by the transition to post-industrial society, growing importance of service sector, secularization and increased mobility of capital and workforce, were followed by individualization, consumerism, and search for alternative life styles and individual self-realization (Enyedi, 2008). These changes resulted in a decreased appeal of calls for authoritarian policies, while still allowing the mobilization on the basis of the fear of "the Other". With respect to the radical right, it is likely that these changes forced parties to either moderate their position considering authoritarian issues or to neglect these issues in their campaigns. In this regard, some modern radical right parties may be expected to take more moderate positions or put less importance (salience) on authoritarian issues, while still adopting and emphasizing extreme positions considering exclusionary issues, thus rendering authoritarianism *neither sufficient nor necessary* for identifying the radical right (for the discussion of this proposition and empirical analysis see Chapter 4).[44] On the other hand, if the notion of authoritarianism as an independent ideological characteristic is applied across all party families, one may expect parties that are inclusive, but also authoritarian. This understanding of ideology is in line with some aspects of horseshoe theory (attributed to Faye (1996)) in that it predicts the convergence of the radical left and the radical right considering certain ideological features. In this respect, *extreme* leftist parties and, particularly,

[44] A similar position is adopted by Kitschelt. According to him: "While the historically older radical right emphasized 'gridness', an authoritarian political regime, hermetic social conformity, and strict national boundary drawing, often with racist overtones, many strands of the more recent radical right accept a certain pluralism of rules, as long as 'groupness', cultural homogeneity within national boundaries, is reinforced." (Kitschelt, 2007, p. 1179)

communist parties are viewed as allegedly specific vehicles of this combination of ideological features.[45]

In contrast, following the interpretation of the authoritarian dimension corresponding to the second analogy, one might claim that there is a certain economy in ideological conceptual structures which necessarily relates authoritarianism to exclusionism across all parties in party systems. Namely, if ideology is assumed to be, to a certain extent, a coherent set of believes, although conceptually and logically distinct, authoritarianism and exclusionism can be expected to be closely related.[46] According to Ramet organized intolerance takes the form of a war against society; it assumes coercive homogenization and strict law and order policies necessary to impose hierarchical order and unity on the society (Ramet, 1999). Thus, extreme positions on the exclusionary dimension assume calls for harmonious and homogeneous society in which differences are rejected and suppressed. In other words, authoritarianism originates from the necessity to subject the individualism and pluralism in the society. As the analysis of parties' placement in the policy space shifts from the radical right to other party families, with the more moderate positions on the exclusionary dimension one would expect the more moderate positions on the authoritarian dimension. Thus, on the opposite side of the continuum one would expect cosmopolitan and socially libertarian parties, characterized by far-left positions with regard to both exclusionary and authoritarian issues.

[45] Furthermore, it is important to allow for a possibility of parties with a pronounced authoritarian agenda and indistinct or vague exclusionary program. This would present a particular form of the far-right politics, not presently characteristic for European countries and not considered the radical right. One may considered these parties to be ultra-conservative. A similar position is adopted by Mudde who argues that nativism is not a core ideological feature of neoconservatives, although they do tend to be strong defenders of national state interests (Mudde, 2007, p. 28). While some aspects of this ideological profile are very noticeable when it comes to conservative parties, they can also be noticed with respect to religious parties. Furthermore, this profile is likely to be characteristic of far right parties coming from traditional immigrant, multiethnic and multiracial states such as the USA, Australia or Canada and states characterized by civic nationalism.

[46] This is obvious in issues which equally fit both conceptual determinations. For instance, religion is one of the signifiers of in-group. Thus, it is conceptually related to the exclusionary dimension. On the other hand, religion also stands for traditionally ordered, hierarchical society, thus conceptually corresponding to notions related to authoritarianism. In that regard, some concepts are equally reflective of both dimensions.

Obviously, both interpretations of the authoritarian dimension offer compelling arguments. However, the choice between these two paradigms is empirical. Naturally, if the level of authoritarianism in ideology covaries with the position on the exclusionary dimension, there is ground to claim that the dimensions are actually components of a single overarching dimension. This proposition can be stated in the form of the following hypothesis:

H1: Parties' positions on the exclusionary dimension and the authoritarian dimension are manifestations of a latent ideological component of the electoral competition in the policy space.

2.3.3. The economic dimension

The authoritarian and the exclusionary dimension exhaust the aspect of the policy space which is commonly referred to as the cultural, libertarian-authoritarian or cosmopolitan-particularist component of electoral competition (De Lange S. L., 2007; van der Brug, 2001; Kitschelt, 1992).In general, it is assumed that the residual portion of the policy space is predominantly comprised of positions considering the economy, where, similarly to the exclusionary and authoritarian dimensions, the specific issues are expected to constitute a separate ideological construct characterized by a common correlational structure. Moreover, the political conflicts over the economy, such as differences with respect to redistribution, protectionism or market regulation, are assumed to be fundamental in the formation of party systems characteristic for much of the 20th century (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). In this respect, in American political studies a simple one-dimensional economic ideological space is the default in addressing the behavior of political parties (Bakker, Jolly, & Polk, 2012, p. 222). In contrast, in recent years, the debate on the dimensionality of the political competition in Europe has intensified (De Vries & Marks, 2012, p. 186). Namely, with the advent of globalization and the changes in voters' value orientations, the researchers predominantly

adopted position that the contestation over the role of the state in the economy is accompanied by a new cultural divide pitting nationalists and cultural conservatives against cosmopolitans and cultural libertarians (De Vries & Marks, 2012; Kriesi, et al., 2008; Inglehart, 1997; Kitschelt, 1994). This transformation raises several issues relevant for the understanding of the radical right's electoral competition.

With respect to the radical right, the most pertinent question asks about the structure of the policy space. More specifically, it asks about the relation of parties' positions on the exclusionary and authoritarian ideological components to the positions with respect to the economy. Namely, if the variation on the economic dimension is related to the variation on the exclusionary and authoritarian dimensions, the structure of electoral competition will be adequately captured by a single left-right dimension and further conceptual differentiation in the analysis of the radical right's electoral performance may be redundant. In addition, a close association of the positions on the economy to the positions on exclusionary and authoritarian issues lends credibility to the conceptualizations of the radical right which emphasize the neoliberal character of the party family (e.g. Betz, 1993a; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997).

In contrast, the studies of dimensionality of European party systems typically assume orthogonality of policy dimensions (De Lange S. L., 2007; van der Brug, 2001; Kitschelt, 1992). In this respect, the placements of parties on the economic dimension are not expected to be in a close relation to the placements on the exclusionary or authoritarian dimensions. However, the adoption of this position is likely to have important implications in understanding of the radical right. In particular, the differentiation of the economic dimension implies, to certain extent, a compartmentalization of electoral competition, thus allowing for radical right parties to contest elections using narrow political platforms. Additionally, the independence of the economic ideological component allows for the dimension to serve as

the basis of the classification within the group of radical right parties (see more in Carter, 2005; Golder, 2003). This proposition can be stated in the form of the following hypothesis:

H2: Across party systems the positions of parties on the exclusionary and authoritarian dimensions and the positions on the economic dimension are not associated.

The subsequent problem emerges from the issue of the sufficiency of the proposed conceptual structure in addressing the party competition in the policy space in general. Namely, coupled with exclusionary and authoritarian issues, the economic dimension is expected to *comprise most of the relevant issues contested in the modern politics* (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; De Lange S. L., 2007; Kriesi, et al., 2008). Thus, from the ideological point of view, excluding alternative forms of voter–party attachments such as clientelism (Kitschelt, 2007a), the positions with respect to the relevant issues are expected to almost fully explain the electoral competition of the parties. Consequently, if the left-right dimension is perceived as the most abstract conceptualization of the policy space, exclusionary, authoritarian and economic issues are expected to account for most of the variation in the dimension. This problem refers to the issues frequently omitted or considered to be less relevant in addressing the dimensionality of the policy space. In this respect, from a strictly theoretical viewpoint, environmental issues as well as distinction between pro urban and pro rural policies may not be considered a part of any of the abovementioned dimensions. However, the assessment of the adequacy of the proposed conceptual framework exceeds the pure theoretical deliberation and requires empirical justification. In this regard, the aforementioned assumptions can be articulated in the form of the following proposition:

H3: The exclusionary, authoritarian and economic dimensions explain most of the electoral competition of parties in the policy space.

Additionally, the economic, authoritarian and exclusionary dimensions are not expected to have the same power in explaining the electoral competition in the policy space. Namely,

the position traditionally adopted in the literature assumes the prevalence of economic issues over all other origins of party competition (Lipset, 1981; Fiorina, 1981; Tucker, 2006; Downs, 1957). However, with the dissolution of traditional cleavages postulated by Lipset & Rokkan (1967) and the transformation of the ideological basis of the electoral competition (Inglehart, 1997), increasing number of authors questioned the primacy of the economic dimension over all other sources of party competition (e.g. De Vries & Marks, 2012; Kriesi, et al., 2008).

The power of the economic dimension in explaining the electoral competition of parties will have important consequences with respect to the analysis of the electoral performance of the radical right. Namely, assuming that the ideology of the radical right predominantly revolves around exclusionary and authoritarian issues, the prevalence of the economy in electoral competition will not favor the radical right. Consequently, the literature on the radical right is inclined to emphasize the importance of exclusionary and authoritarian issues in the party competition (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; De Lange S. L., 2007; Mudde, 2007). In this respect, a working assumption of most radical right studies is that the explanatory powers of the exclusionary and authoritarian dimensions parallel that of the economic dimension. Nevertheless, to what degree the exclusionary and authoritarian issues impact the structure of the party competition is an empirical question. In this respect, this proposition can be stated in the form of the following hypothesis:

H4: The exclusionary, authoritarian and economic dimensions have a similar strength in explaining the electoral competition in the policy space.

However, regardless of the importance of the economic dimension in understanding electoral competition in general, the role of the economy in the electoral performance of the radical right is predominantly dependent on the salience of economic issues in radical right

ideologies. Nonetheless, the question of the significance of the economy in the ideology of the radical right is a contested issue in the literature.

According to von Beyme (1988) in the period between the late 1950s and the early 1980s the radical right in Western Europe developed a new ideological platform which was characterized by neoliberal stances with respect to the economy. This position prompted some authors (e.g. Kitschelt & McGann, 1997) to relate the electoral success of the radical right to its stance on the economy. In contrast to this position, the more recent studies discount the importance of the economy in the radical right ideology (Carter, 2005; Givens, 2005). For instance, according to Mudde radical right parties are neither leftist no rightist in economic terms, and the economy is secondary and instrumental in the ideology of the radical right (Mudde, 2007, pp. 119-132).

The hypothesized insignificance of economic issues in the radical right ideology may have significant consequences on the comprehension of its electoral competition. Namely, while the electoral fortunes of other parties may be determined by their positions and interactions on the economic dimension, the radical right may prove to be unaffected by this type of repositioning. Furthermore, the irrelevance of economic issues questions the definitions and classifications of the radical right based on economic issues. This proposition can be stated in the form of the following hypothesis:

H5: In the radical right subset of parties, the salience scores of exclusionary and authoritarian issues are higher in comparison to the salience scores of economic indicators.

2.4. Data and methodology

2.4.1. Data sets and variables

The aforementioned hypotheses are tested using three expert surveys: the Party Policy in Modern Democracies (Benoit & Laver, 2005), the Chapel Hill 2006 (Hooghe, et al., 2008), and the Chapel Hill 2010 (Bakker, et al., 2012) (hereafter PPMD, CH-06 and CH-10). Expert

surveys collect the judgments of country experts considering the placement of parties on a set of issue dimensions. The data sets comprise mean scores of experts considering each party. The use of three expert surveys, composed of different items, comprising different parties and states, and collected at different time points, increases the reliability, robustness and replicability of findings (for detailed information on expert surveys see Appendix – Expert Surveys).

For a dimension to travel across parties it must comprise a set of issues. However PPMD data set does not incorporate a sufficient number of items necessary for the creation of composite indicators. Therefore, to operationalize this dimension the second best option is to use indicators which are assumed to load on the exclusionary or the authoritarian dimension and which, in this setting, can be understood as proxy measures. For West European countries the employed proxy indicator is the position of parties on the issue of the integration of immigrants in society. On the other hand, for Eastern Europe, I use positioning of parties on cosmopolitan vs. national consciousness, culture and history. Finally, proxy indicator for authoritarianism is "social" – the position of party on liberal policies on matters such as abortion, euthanasia and homosexuality. This indicator does not capture the aspect of the authoritarian dimension considering obligatory rules and ordered society, but captures the aspect of the limited choice of life styles and the restriction of personal preferences. Two variables in PPMD expert survey run across all of the cases in the data set: economics (position with regard taxes and spending) and social (position with regard liberal policies). However, indicators of nationalism, immigration, deregulation and privatization only run across subsamples of countries. In order to incorporate all relevant cases, nationalism and immigration are combined into a single variable. In the same manner, deregulation and privatization are combined into a single variable and interpreted as a very crude proxy of the position on economic policies (see Table 2.1 for the list of indicators).

The advantage of CH-06 and CH-10 data sets is in that they comprises several items that are supposed to load on the exclusionary, authoritarian and economic dimensions and which can be used across all parties in the survey.

Table 2.1
Variables and datasets used in the analysis

Data set	PPMD	CH-06	CH-10
Authoritarian dimension	social (position with regard abortion, euthanasia and homosexuality)	libertarian-postmaterialist vs. traditional-authoritarian	libertarian-postmaterialist vs. traditional-authoritarian
		civil liberties vs. law & order	civil liberties vs. law & order
		social lifestyle	social lifestyle
Exclusionary dimension	immigration	immigration	immigration
	nationalism	multiculturalism vs. assimilation	multiculturalism vs. assimilation
		ethnic minorities	ethnic minorities
		cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	
Economic dimension	deregulation	deregulation	deregulation
	privatization	redistribution from rich to poor	redistribution from rich to poor
	economics (position with regard taxes and spending)	public service vs. reducing taxes	public service vs. reducing taxes
Parties	***N=320***	***N=188***	***N=239***
Radical right parties	***N=29***	***N=18***	***N=27***
States	***N=40***	***N=24***	***N=28***
Period	***2003-2004***	***2006***	***2010***

Four items are assumed to load on the exclusionary dimension: indicator of position of parties on immigration policy; indicator of position of parties on dimension of multiculturalism versus assimilation; indicator of position of parties on rights of ethnic minorities; and indicator of position of parties on the dimension of cosmopolitism versus nationalism. In addition, three items are expected to load on the authoritarian dimension: indicator of position of parties on the dimension of expanded personal freedom (abortion, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation) versus traditionalism (value order, tradition, government moral patronage); indicator of position of parties on law and order policies and civil liberties; and indicator of position of parties on liberal policies and lifestyle. Finally, considering the economic dimension three variables are included in the analysis: position of parties considering improvement of public services versus reducing taxes; position of parties considering deregulation of markets; and position of parties considering redistribution from

rich to poor. Finally, all three data sets include an indicator of parties' position on general left-right continuum.[47]

2.4.2. Methods

The core of empirical analysis is in the simultaneous testing of hypotheses using structural equation modeling. Figure 2.2 displays graphical representation of the juxtaposed models. The overall structure of the electoral competition in the policy space is approximated by the left-right dimensions. The model on the left implies that *two latent factors,* the positions on the combined exclusionary-authoritarian dimension and the economic dimension, are separately driving the positions on the specific exclusionary, authoritarian and economic issues, while jointly these two dimensions determine the positions of parties on the left-right dimension. The model on the right suggests that *three latent factors*, the positions on the exclusionary, authoritarian and economic dimensions, are driving the positions on the particular issues, while together these three ideological components determine the positions of parties on the left-right dimension. Therefore, the performance of these models is compared in order to address the hypothesis on the distinct exclusionary and authoritarian dimensions (*H1*), while the results based on the best performing models address the majority of remaining hypotheses (*H2*-*H4*).The identification of the model is achieved by fixing the variance of latent constructs to one.[48]

[47] The variables that might have a confounding effect are not included in the testing. While the indicators of relation to international organizations (EU, UN) or particular states are indicative of exclusionary positions, they also may reflect other political concerns (i.e. economic issues, historical experiences). Consequently, these indicators are not included in the analysis. As the position on religion is equally indicative of authoritarian and exclusionary positions, it is also not included in the analysis.

[48] Kline suggested two possible ways of securing identification of the model. Fixing marker variables or fixing variance of the factors. Both methods of scaling factors generally result in the same overall fit of the model (Kline, 2011, p. 128)

Figure 2.2
Graphical representation of the contrasted structural models



Note: The diagrams present all estimated statistics using reticular action model (RAM) (Kline, 2011). Observed variables are represented with rectangles/squares; latent variables are represented with circles/ellipses; the effects of one variable on another are represented with a line with a single arrowhead; covariances/correlations of independent variables are represented with a curved line with two arrowheads; variances are represented with two-headed curved arrows that exit and reenter the same variable.

Due to the requirements of structural equation modeling (Kline, 2011) and the number of available indicators, this model is tested only on CH-06 and CH-10 data sets. In addition to aiding in the increased robustness of the findings, the use of two data sets in structural equation modeling provides a type of invariance test.[49] Additional evidence is provided using PPMD data set, however, due to the number of available indicators, the analysis is conducted using only the basic statistical techniques.

Finally, the hypotheses related to the importance of the economic issues in the ideology of the radical right are tested by a simple comparison of salience scores on the issues related to the respective dimensions.

2.5. Results

2.5.1. The exclusionary-authoritarian dimension versus the exclusionary dimension and the authoritarian dimension

Firstly, I focus on the relation of parties' positions on the exclusionary and authoritarian dimensions. Starting with the analysis based on PPMD data set, Figure 2.3 presents the results of the regression of two exclusionary issues (immigration and nationalism) on an authoritarian issue (social) in Western and Eastern Europe, respectively. The Figure demonstrates that the indicator social is strongly associated with indicators of nationalism and immigration, and that the effect of authoritarian issues on exclusionary issues is almost identical in both Eastern and Western Europe.

The analysis of the correlation coefficients disaggregated across states reveals a similar pattern on the country level. With one exception, all states have a strong and positive relation between the authoritarian and exclusionary issues, while only a handful of coefficients are

[49] In addition to the difference in number and identity of parties, the difference is also in the indicators used in analysis. Namely, the indicator of cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism is not present in CH-10.

statistically insignificant. Consequently, the preliminary analysis based on PPMD provides evidence against the distinction between the authoritarian and the exclusionary dimension (see detailed results in Appendix-Chapter 2).

Figure 2.3
Regression of authoritarian on exclusionaryissues – Western and Eastern Europe (PPMD data set)



Note: The graph on the left presents fitted regression line for the Western European parties, while the graph on the right presents the fitted regression line for Eastern European parties. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence interval.

These findings are confirmed in the structural equation models based on CH-06 and CH-10 data sets. The models in which three latent constructs are expected to determine the positions on the particular exclusionary, authoritarian and economic issues have a fairly good fit to the data; nevertheless, the associations between the exclusionary and the authoritarian latent construct approach r≈0.90, which is above the critical threshold recommended in the literature (Kline, 2011).[50] Consequently, these models are discarded in favor of the models in which the positions on observed indicators are determined only by the exclusionary-authoritarian and the economic latent constructs. These models have a good fit to data (see Table 2.2) and an exceptional explanatory power in addressing the positions of parties in the policy space (see Figure 2.5).

[50] To certain extent the structural equation models reflect the theoretical ambiguities considering the relation of the exclusionary dimension and the authoritarian dimension. Namely, likelihood ratio chi-square tests indicate that, in comparison to the simpler models, the more complex modes are performing statistically significantly better and this result finds confirmation in comparison of BIC values (see Appendix-Chapter 2). However, in cases of both CH-06 and CH-10 the exclusionary and authoritarian latent factors are highly correlated, to the extent that is hard to understand them as empirically distinguishable constructs (see Appendix-Chapter 2). Consequently, the simpler models are perceived as describing the relations in the data in a more adequate manner.

Considering both datasets, the latent exclusionary-authoritarian dimension accounts, on average, for approximately 80 percent of variance in each individual exclusionary and authoritarian issue employed in the analysis (see detailed results in Appendix-Chapter 2).

In addition, in line with the analysis conducted on PPMD data set, the exclusionary dimension is regressed on the authoritarian dimension and the regression lines are plotted for each country in the survey (see Figure 2.4). The analysis reveals the same pattern already observed in analyzing correlations between indicators nationalism and social, and indicators immigration and social in PPMD data set. The regression lines are bundled together and for all party systems the exclusionary ideological positions are positively associated with the positions on the authoritarian dimension.[51]

Figure 2.4
The relation of the exclusionary and authoritarian dimensions across European states (the Chapel Hill data sets)



Note: The graphs present fitted regression lines for each state. The authoritarian and exclusionary dimensions are constructed using principal component analysis on the relevant set of variables.

Therefore, it can be concluded that analyses on the basis of CH-06 and CH-10 data sets, as well as analyses based on PPMD data set, provide strong evidence in favor of *H1*. In other

[51] The weaker relations between the dimensions, as presented in Figure 2.4, are observed with respect to Poland (CH-06) and Latvia (CH-10).

words, the analyses demonstrate that the authoritarian dimension and the exclusionary dimension are components of a single ideological construct – the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension.

2.5.2. The explanatory power of the policy dimensions

The next step in the analysis is to compare and asses the power of the exclusionary-authoritarian and the economic dimension in explaining the variation of parties' positions on the left-right dimension.

Considering PPMD dataset, the applicability of the two-dimensional model is assessed by a set of regression analyses. In each analysis dependent variable is parties' left-right placement, while independent variables are the indicators expected to load on the exclusionary-authoritarian and economic dimensions (see Table 2.1). Regressing only two untransformed variables (economics and social) on the left-right scale explains 73 percent of variance in the left-right dimension. The introduction of additional two composite variables in the regression equation modestly increases the value of R-square (R^2=0.77). However, in both analyses variable "economics" has the strongest effect in explaining the positions on the left-right dimension. To get some sense of the explanatory power of variables loading on the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension, the left-right dimension is regressed on two relevant variables (exclusionary and social) and this model accounts for 44 percent of variance in the dependent variable. In the following step I factor analyze the four aforementioned variables using principal axes factoring with varimax rotation. Two factors are extracted which account for 68 percent of variance in the variables. These factors correspond to the expected formation of the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension and the economic dimension. Furthermore, the factor scores were saved using regression scoring and the left-right dimension is regressed on the factors. The general image is in accord with the results presented above. The model explains 74 percent of variance in the left-

right dimension, while the second factor (the economic dimension) has somewhat stronger impact on the change in the dependent variable (see detailed results of each analysis in Appendix-Chapter 2).

Figure 2.5
Results of structural equation models (CH-06/CH-10)



Note: The figure presents standardized coefficients. All coefficients significant at p<.001
** The indicator is present only in CH-06 data set.*

Table 2.2
Fit indexes for structural equation models

	CH-06	**CH-10**
RMSEA index	0.103, 90% CI: (0.082-0.124)	0.110, 90% CI: (0.088-0.131)
Tucker-Lewis NNFI	0.964	0.967
Bentler CFI	0.974	0.978
SRMR	0.042	0.028
AIC	170.269	165.886
BIC	-87.952	-48.408

The analyses based on more comprehensive and systematic structural equation models developed for CH-06 and CH-10 data set provide an additional confirmation of these findings. The exclusionary-authoritarian dimension and the economic dimension explain 84 percent and 87 percent of variance in the CH-06 and CH-10 indicators of the position on the left-right dimension, respectively.

On the other hand, the explanatory powers of the economic and exclusionary- authoritarian dimensions are comparable. While the economic dimension is consistently outperforming the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension in explaining the variation in the left-right dimension, the difference in the explanatory power is not substantial. While a standard unit increase in the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension is associated with 0.49 and 0.48 units increase in the left-right dimension, a standard unit increase in the economic dimension is associated with 0.57 and 0.59 units increase in the left-right dimension in CH-06 and CH-10 data sets, respectively (see Figure 2.5).

Therefore, these finding provide strong evidence for *H3* and *H4*. The analyses demonstrate that the positions on the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension and the economic dimension explain the positioning of parties on the left-right dimension and, consequently, almost completely account for the placements of parties in the policy space. Furthermore, the analyses provide evidence for a distinctive and strong effect of the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension in explaining the positions of parties on the left-right dimension. Consequently, there is a strong support for the claim that the competing dimension of the radical right is crucial in understanding electoral competition across states and party systems.

2.5.3. The radical right and the economic dimension

Considering the correlational structure linking the economic and exclusionary-authoritarian dimensions, the analysis based on PPMD data set finds a positive and, on average, moderate relation. In other words, the more rightist positions on the economic dimension are accompanied by the more rightist positions considering the exclusionary-authoritarian ideological component. In Western Europe the correlation between the indicator economics, on one hand, and the indicators social and immigration, on the other are r=0.324 and r=0.699, respectively. However, in Eastern Europe, the correlation of economics with nationalism is statistically insignificant and close to zero. Furthermore, on the basis of the aforementioned indicators two principal components are extracted, and the correlation between the factors representing the exclusionary-authoritarian and economic dimensions across all European states is r=0.289. Furthermore, according to the structural equation models there is also a positive relation between the economic dimension and the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension. The latent constructs estimated using CH-06 and CH-10 data sets are positively associated (r=0.485 and r=0.503, respectively). Consequently, there is no ground in claiming full independence considering the position on economic and exclusionary-authoritarian issues (*H2*). However, to some extent, economic issues are crosscutting the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension, and thus, they may serve as the foundation of the classification of radical right parties.

Finally, to account for the importance of the economic dimension in radical right's ideology, the salience indicators of all above analyzed issues are inspected. Table 2.3 sums the results of PPMD, CH-06 and CH-10 expert surveys. All items loading on the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension have higher mean salience scores than the ones which are loading on the economic dimension. Thus, these results can be interpreted as strong evidence in support of the

proposition of the secondary importance of the economic dimension in the ideology of the radical right (*H5*).

Table 2.3
Importance of exclusionary-authoritarian and economic issues in the radical right ideology

CH-06/CH-10		PPMD	
EXCLUSIONARY-AUTHORITARIAN DIMENSION			
salience indicator	**mean score**	**salience indicator**	**mean score**
civil liberties vs. law & order	7.17/7.54	nationalism	18.46
social lifestyle	7.30/6.61	social	13.65
immigration	8.37/8.50	immigration	18.59
multiculturalism vs. assimilation	8.08/8.09		
ethnic minorities	8.15/8.14		
cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	8.65		
ECONOMIC DIMENSION			
salience indicator	**mean score**	**salience indicator**	**mean score**
public service vs. reducing taxes	5.08/4.83	public spending vs. taxes	10.75
deregulation	4.55/4.41	deregulation	13.26
redistribution from rich to poor	5.07/4.89	decentralization	11.60

Note: The differences in scores between PPMD and CH-06/CH-10 are due to scaling All differences between radical right mean scores, and the mean scores of remaining parties are statistically significant at p<..001.

2.6. Discussion of findings and the relation to the subsequent analyses

The theoretical approach to the concept of the radical right presented in this chapter arrived at an innovative definition of the radical right party family. In contrast to the definitions suggested in the literature, the proposed definition departs from dependence on complex conceptualizations and specific policy positions by focusing on the position of the radical right on an abstract policy dimension. By doing so, the proposed definition offers a parsimonious alternative to the definitions proposed in the literature which succeeds in capturing the fundamental intuitions considering the ideology of the radical right. More importantly, the definition based on the position of the radical right in the policy space defined by the exclusionary dimension facilitates the identification of the radical right, while still allowing for policy shifts in the radical right ideology. Consequently, the definition is likely to stand the test of time and to enable the identification of radical right parties both in the past and in the future.

However, the empirical analyses of the relation of the defining dimension of the radical right and the other ideological components of the policy space demonstrated that, currently, the electoral competition relevant for the radical right exceeds the positioning on the exclusionary dimension. Namely, there is evidence that, in the context of the contemporary Eastern and Western European democracies, the positions on authoritarian issues are closely related to the positions on exclusionary issues, and that the respective dimensions are components of a more comprehensive ideological construct –the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension. In other words, by and large, the positions of a party on in/out of group issues are closely related to party's notions considering the density of obligatory rules and hierarchical order in the society. Therefore, while radical right parties may choose to compete by emphasizing exclusionary issues, their electoral fortunes are likely to depend on the positions of its competitors considering a wider array of issues.

Furthermore, there is strong evidence for appropriateness of the two-dimensional model of party competition. The analysis demonstrated that the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension and the economic dimension explain the positioning of parties on the left-right dimension. Most importantly, it demonstrated that each dimension has a distinct and strong effect in explaining the placement on the left-right dimension, which underlines the importance of the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension in understanding politics beyond the radical right. On the other hand, despite the overall importance of the economic dimension in understanding the ideology of parties, there is evidence that for radical right parties economic issues are of lesser importance. Consequently, it is likely that electoral fortunes of the radical right will not be affected by the positions of its competitors considering economic issues.

These findings give a lot of credibility to the traditional conceptualizations of the policy space which models party competition via the economic (socialist vs. capitalist) dimension and the exclusionary-authoritarian (libertarian vs. authoritarian, cultural) dimension. However, the evidence departs from the conventional reasoning in two regards. Firstly, as the explanatory power of the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension rivals that of the economic dimension, there is an implicit justification of why radical right parties managed to gain a foothold in party systems across Europe. Namely, the potential for mobilization on the basis of exclusionary or authoritarian issues is present across states regardless of the presence of radical right parties in party systems. Secondly, in contrast to the common position in the literature, there is evidence that positions on the economic and exclusionary-authoritarian dimensions are not fully independent. In this regard, there is some potential for radical right parties to occupy extreme rightist positions on economic issues. However, economic issues are not important in the radical right ideology, which questions the definitions and classifications of the radical right based on this dimension.

The subsequent chapter (Chapter 3) connects the above described conceptualization of the policy space to a pooled cross-sectional time series data set based on hand-coded manifestos of parties. The validity analysis of parties' positions estimation methods will serve as the basis of extracting the exclusionary-authoritarian and economic dimensions across multiple countries and periods. Therefore, this research facilitates other analyses, including the classification of radical right parties and the analysis of the variation of electoral successes of the radical right. The following chapter (Chapter 4) will turn to the hypotheses related to the definition of the radical right presented in this discussion. Above all, it will address the hypothesis that the position on the exclusionary dimension is a sufficient and a necessary feature for identifying the radical right

and that, therefore, it constitutes the defining characteristic of the radical right. Likewise, it will also address the hypothesized change in the ideology of the radical right and the insufficiency of the authoritarian dimension in identifying radical right parties.

Chapter 3 – Operationalization of Policy Dimensions Using a Hand-Coded Manifestos Data Set

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 The relation to the previous analysis

The discussion on the definition of the radical right and the structure of the policy space identified two core ideological components: the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension and the economic dimension. In the previous chapter these dimensions were tested and operationalized via three cross-sectional data sets. In the following analysis I am relating these dimensions to a pooled cross-section time series data set. This link is important for two reasons. Firstly, it facilitates the classification of parties within the radical right party family (Chapter 5). Namely, classifications based on quantitative methods ask for a larger pool of cases, while a typical cross-sectional survey collects data only on few radical right parties. Secondly, it facilitates the analysis of the relation of the electoral fortunes of radical right parties and the ideological shifts of parties across time (Chapter 6).

3.1.2 The problem

Studying the changes of parties' policy preferences over time faces major obstacles. In the early 1980s expert surveys were introduced as means of estimation of parties' positions. However, expert surveys are neither collected in regular intervals nor collected in a standardized form with a fix set of variables or cases. Political scientist also suggested extracting policy positions from public opinion polls and the method is often used to validate position estimates based on the other sources of information (e.g. Gabel & Hubert, 2000; Netjes & Binnema, 2007). In addition to the imperfections similar to expert surveys (e.g. the limited number of relevant variables, the irregular periods of collection, the limited spatial and temporal coverage, etc.), there is a problem of the validity of voters' perceptions in estimating the actual positions of

parties. Finally, the computer-assisted content analysis of election programs has made a significant progress in the last two decades (Volkens, 2007). Although this method is promising, currently these techniques cannot deliver valid estimates for policy dimensions other than a single left-right dimension (see for example Medzihorsky, Littvay, & Jenne, 2014).

At the moment the Comparative Manifestos Project (formerly the Manifesto Research Group, hereafter CMP) is the only data set which allows for a more comprehensive longitudinal analysis of parties' positions (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tanenbaum, 2001; Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & Macdonald, 2006). The exceptional nature of this data set and its importance for the discipline is evident in the decades-long debate considering the estimation of policy positions using CMP (e.g. Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987; Budge & Laver, 1992; Kim & Fording, 1998; Gabel & Huber, 2000; Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006; Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov, & Laver, 2011).[52] However, the discussion did not produce definite answers with regard to the most optimal estimation methodology, and new propositions are frequently presented.

In this respect, Table 3.1 presents the correlation coefficients of expert surveys' indicators of parties' positions on the left-right dimension and the CMP left-right scales produced using some of the most prominent methodologies suggested in the literature.[53] The results demonstrate that the choice of the method employed in the scale extraction procedure has a strong effect on the validity of scales. Thus, the scale extraction methodology will have an exceptional influence on the substantive findings of any analysis. Consequently, the main problem of the analysis

[52] Manifesto Project Database website (https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/) lists more than seventy articles published in peer reviewed journals as directly related to CMP data set, while the number of articles using CMP data set is actually much higher.

[53] Six methodological propositions are analyzed: Laver & Budge (1992), Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, (1987), Klingemann (1995), Gabel & Huber (2000) Kim & Fording (2002) and Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov, & Laver (2011). For the simplicity, in the text the methods will be referred to using the names of the authors (i.e. Laver & Budge, Budge et al., Klingemann, Gabel & Huber, Kim & Fording, and Lowe, et al.).

presented in this chapter is how to design the most valid policy preference scale extraction procedure.

Table 3.1
Correlations coefficients of expert surveys' left-right indicators and left-right scales extracted using CMP

	Replicated left –right scales extracted using CMP					
Expert surveys indicators	**Laver & Budge (rile scale)**	**Gabel & Huber***	**Klingemann**	**Budge et al.**	**Lowe et al.**	**Kim & Fording**
CH-06 left-right indicator	0.621	0.075	0.346	0.305	0.649	0.654
N	133	133	133	100	133	133
PPMD left-right indicator	0.602	0.116	0.321	0.306	0.608	0.618
N	189	189	191	173	189	189

*Note: *=average based on statistically insignificant correlation coefficients*

3.1.3 The contribution and the plan of the analysis

In addressing the problem of the validity of policy scales, I build on insights provided in the literature as well as on an original theoretical proposition. Considering the previous literature, the analysis focuses on the best performing estimation methods and identifies the procedures which consistently increase the validity of extracted scales. Considering the theoretical aspect of the analysis, I present an alternative interpretive framework which departs from the traditional approach by rejecting the notion according to which the counts of sentences in manifestos are understood as indicative of the general policy positions of parties at the time manifestos were publicized.

In addition to the new theoretical insight, the analysis presented here is novel in several aspects. The previous validity analyses were mainly focused on the left-right dimension (e.g. Benoit & Laver, 2007; Dinas & Gemenis, 2010). Here I am concerned with the application of the methods across various policy dimensions and research purposes. Consequently, the validity analysis of each proposition is conducted simultaneously on three positional scales: the left-right dimension, the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension and the economic dimension. Next, as the original CMP coding schema was devised with Western European states in mind, the validity

analyses present in the literature are based exclusively on this set of countries. However, the analysis presented here includes all European post-communist states and the relevant policy categories. Finally, the propositions presented in the analysis are applicable to any method which seeks to estimate parties' positions at different time points using text analysis via statement counts, and thus contributes to the greater field of text analysis.[54]

The chapter proceeds in the following manner. The first part is initiated with a concise description of the properties of CMP data set. However, the main contribution of the section is in the analysis of the opposing notions of party competition and, particularly, in the proposition of an alternative theoretical framework of interpreting manifesto scores and the accompanying methodological amendment. The second part discusses the methodology of the estimation procedures proposed in the literature and presents several methodological suggestions expected to improve scale validity. The subsequent section brings these two discussions together by presenting the results of validity analysis of all methodological propositions. Finally, in the last section I discuss the main findings of the analysis.

3.2 The theory of party competition and manifestos

At present, CMP compiles data on party platforms of 960 parties in 654 elections, where the earliest record refers to an election in 1920.[55] The data set is based on the content analysis of election programs, where the programs are taken as the indicators of parties' policy emphases and policy positions at certain points in time. The manifestos are hand-coded, where the coding unit in a given program is the "*quasi-sentence*", defined as an argument. An argument is the

[54] The developments in computer based text analysis and the increasing amount of digitalized manifestos and other relevant texts allow for the collection of alternative pooled time series cross-sectional data sets. The insights presented in this analysis are applicable to any data collected over time using text analysis.

[55] The data set is continually updated and the number of parties and elections is continually increasing. Consequently, these descriptive statistics are tentative.

verbal expression of one political idea or issue and, consequently, a sentence may encompass several quasi sentences.

The data set is divided in 7 general types (domains) of coding categories (per101-per706). In addition to 57 items that run across Eastern and Western Europe there is a supplementary set of variables which is devised to capture party competition only in East European states. The variables reflect the amount of quasi sentences belonging to a certain category expressed as the percentages of the total number of quasi sentences in a manifesto. These variables (with exception of one) take ether positive or negative sign. If a coding category is represented with both positive and negative sign variables, the particular issue (policy) is assumed to be positional. On the other hand, if the coding category is represented only by one variable (hence, signaling only positive or negative reference to the issue), the issue is assumed to be a valence issue.

The data collection, the design of coding schema as well as the distinction between positional and valence issues are the consequences of a specific notion of party competition adopted by the CMP research team. Therefore, it is necessary to address the theoretical background of CMP and asses to what degree it facilities the extraction of policy scales.

3.2.1 Selective emphasis vs. direct confrontation

The research team of CMP based its data collection procedure on the *salience theory* of party competition (Budge, 2001). In contrast, authors concerned with the extraction of policy preference scales usually adopt the notion of the policy space in line with the *confrontational (positional) theory* of party competition (see for example Benoit & Laver, 2007).While both theories assume that the relation of a party and a certain issue can be understood in terms of the categories of position and salience, the theories assign different meaning and significance to

these concepts. In terms of the positional notion of party competition, parties constituting a party system are competing by assuming confronting positions with regard to each issue in order to locate themselves in positions that maximize their vote share. On the other hand, according to the salience theory, in words of Budge:

> "…parties do not in fact directly oppose each other on an issue by issue basis. They rarely take specific policy stands at all or mention any other party or its issue-positions. Instead their programmes assume there is only one tenable position on each issue and devote their energy to emphasizing the policy areas on which their credibility on that position is strong enough to pick up votes." (Budge, 2001, p. 75).

The proponents of the salience theory do not claim that parties cannot be described in positional terms, but rather that "they are positional in nature but only one-positional so far as most issue areas are concerned" (Budge, 2001). The major consequence of this understanding of party competition is the emphasis on the concept of valence issues. Following Stokes (1963), the proponents of the silence theory claim that there are two types of issues: positional and valence. As mentioned above, positional issues are the ones where parties take up the "pro" and "con" positions, while valence issues are the ones where only one position is possible. According to the proponents of the silence theory, valence issues are dominant in party competition and, consequently, parties are not differentiated by opposing positions, but by varying emphases on a shared position (Budge, 2001).

In contrasts to the notion of strictly opposed paradigms, I argue that the confrontational and salience theories of party competition are not mutually exclusive.[56] The main assumption of this proposition is that the difference between these theoretical frameworks is due to their focus on the *different aspects of party competition*. In this regard, the salience theory is interpreted as predominantly centered on the party competition in terms of electoral campaign and communication strategy. Namely, as a manifesto is a part of party's communication with voters, the party will avoid certain issues and emphasize others primarily to attract certain segments of the electorate without alienating other potential supporters. Consequently, the party will emphasize issues which favor its ideological profile and credibility or increase its chances in winning additional votes, while it will avoid issues on which the positions of the party are unpopular or the credibility of the party is low. In this regard, the salience theory is focused *only on specific issues* which constitute parties' messaging, rather than on the *general ideological profile* of the party.

On the other hand, party competition in the positional paradigm is understood in accordance with the idea of the *overall ideology* being the basis of political contest and the main product in the electoral market. Thus, in the tradition of the spatial notion of party competition (e.g. Downs, 1957), ideology is understood as a shortcut to parties' policy positions considering particular issues. The voters have a general idea of parties' ideologies and, while a party may choose not to address certain policies at a specific election, its position on most of the relevant issues can be assumed on the basis of its ideological profile. Therefore, while the confrontational theory allows for parties to emphasize or ignore particular issues, the parties are still expected to

[56] In this regard, some authors emphasize that parties' behavior may be interpreted in both ways. For instance, van der Brug claims that it is evident that parties are directly confronting on the same issues as well as selectively emphasizing certain issues (van de Brug, 2001, p. 118).

adopt opposing positions considering the majority of relevant issues, and in this regard, most issues, if not all, are positional.[57]

Consequently, as the salience theory and the confrontational theory address different aspects of party competition, they are not mutually exclusive and the main problem is in bridging the gap between these notions of party competition. In this respect, as manifestos are means of parties' communications, in the crucial aspects they will correspond to the expectations of the salience theory. However, as parties are expected to ignore issues that favor competitors, the positions of parties over these particular issues cannot be compared and the concept of a policy scale is meaningless. Consequently, given that the salience theory of party competition is not allowing for the comparison of ideological positions of parties, it is necessary to employ an extraction procedure which interprets manifesto scores in line with the confrontational theory. In this respect, I argue that scale estimation procedures based on manifesto scores must incorporate the *general ideological positions* of parties considering either a certain issue or considering the positions on one of the general policy dimensions (e.g. the economic dimension or the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension). Therefore, the general ideological positions of parties are understood as the link that bridges the gap between the salience theory and the confrontational theory of party competition.[58]

[57] Accordingly, Lowe et al. (2011) also underline that valence issues may be understood as positional. For instance, the position on environment is considered to be a valence issue, and parties are not expected to take antienvironment position. However, as Lowe et al. point out: "Many parties do in fact take progrowth stances that contain thinly veiled antienvironmental messages" (Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov, & Laver, 2011, p. 137).

[58] It is also important to underline that original CMP variables predominantly indicate the positions of parties rather than the salience of issues. I have examined correlations between variables coming from CMP's Domain 4 (Economy) and Domain 6 (Fabric of society) and the indicators of position and salience in the Chapel Hill 2006 and the Party Policy in Modern Democracies expert surveys (Hooghe, et al., 2008, Benoit & Laver, 2005). CMP variables were examined in transformed (logged) and untransformed form (more about the reasons for transformation below). In both instances, the correlation coefficients for the association of CMP variables and the indicators of position in expert surveys are approximately two times larger in comparison to the correlation coefficients for the association of CMP variables and the indicators of salience. In that regard, it can be stated that CMP data set primarily reflects the positions of parties.

3.2.2 The methodological proposition

In order to test the aforementioned proposition, I use the addition of parties' respective averages across elections to their original scores as a method of incorporating the overall ideological positions of the parties in the extraction of policy scales. Methodologically, this proposition in line with the strand of the literature which suggests the use of smoothing in the estimation of parties' policy positions (e.g. Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006). The mean is intended as an estimate of the general position of a party across several elections. In essence, it should be understood as a numerical expression of party's ideology or an approximation of its party family. Given the relatively short period addressed here (the post 1989 elections), this position is taken as a constant – in other words, parties are assumed to be fixed in their core political positions.[59] However, across a longer timeframe, a more accurate estimation would require addressing the potential change of party family. Naturally, the idea of the general ideological position may be variously conceptualized and the variety of theoretically justified operationalizations is limitless. Nonetheless, for the purpose of this analysis average sufficiently accurately reflects the idea of the general positions of parties, without introducing computationally and interpretatively complex procedures which may influence other aspects of scale extraction methodology.[60]

In addition to linking the confrontational and the salience notions of party competition, the proposition is in accordance with the theory of the disproportional emphasis of policy shifts in manifestos. In this respect, Pelizzo argues that parties stress certain issues in their election

[59] One may object that in this type of approach the positions of parties are assessed using both past and future positions. However, here the mean is only intended as an estimate of party's general ideological position, which is assumed to be fixed.

[60] In general, the method proposed here is relatively unrefined and there are other, more sophisticated, methodological solutions. For instance, an alternative approach to estimating the ideological positions of parties considering an issue may be based on an estimate of the general ideological position as expressed in a single manifesto, rather than several manifestos across time. Furthermore, across time, one may use moving average to estimate the general positions of parties. However, the primary goal of this analysis is not to propose the most optimal extraction methodology, but to present general idea and demonstrate its benefits. In addition, the simplicity of the method enables assessment of each step of the extraction in an isolated environment.

programs to signal positional movement to the electorate (Pelizzo, 2003, pp. 83-86).Similarly, according to Franzmann and Keiser, parties overemphasize specific issues to signal positional changes and, thus, the saliency scores should be understood as signals which communicate modifications of parties' positions rather than their true positions (Franzmann& Kaiser, 2006, pp. 164-165).[61] In line with these expectations, the addition of mean diminishes the shifts in policy positions and constrains the movements of parties in the policy space with respect to their overall ideological position.

The effect of this procedure is demonstrated in Figure 3.1. The graphs show positional scores of two hypothetical parties in six elections (e_1-e_6) in a policy space ranging from -1 to 1, where the space may refer to a specific issue (coding category) or an abstract policy dimension (e.g. the economic dimension). The positive scores indicate the prevalence of rightist while the negative scores indicate the prevalence of leftist sentences. For the purpose of the argument, let's assume that the scores reflect the positions of parties considering the rights of ethnic minorities (e.g. rights of immigrants or Roma). The graph on the left displays unaltered manifesto scores. The first party is a moderately rightist (signified with the higher scores) and its manifesto scores are characterized with a higher degree of variability (party 1). On the other hand, the second party (party 2) is consistently communicating the same, strongly leftist, policy position, except at one election (e_3). Although it seems obvious that these parties are ideologically different, at e_3 the parties are ideologically indistinguishable – in CMP setting this illustrates the situation in which both parties ignored minority rights and, consequently, manifestos do not include any

[61] Furthermore, as it is safe to assume that parties are predominantly changing their position in order to win elections or at least to win additional votes, it seems natural that parties will emphasize the policies expected to increase their vote share. Moreover, as parties are ideologically constrained by their past positions and cannot move freely in the policy space, it seems reasonable to assume that in order to alter voters' perception of its position, the party has to put more emphasis on the change in its communication, although the actual change in the position might seem disproportionally small in comparison to the place the message occupies in its communication.

reference to the issue. For instance, this may be a consequence of the entrance of a radical right party in the electoral arena, which competes on the issue of ethnic minorities. On the other hand, at e_5 party 1 shifted strongly to the left – in CMP setting this reflects the situation where a manifesto of a rightist party has the prevalence of sentences arguing for minority rights. For example, this may be the case where, due to the changed pattern of electoral competition, a manifesto of a rightist party lists specific policy propositions considering the enhancement of minority rights, but constrains the references to the limits of minority rights to few general statements. However, according to the unaltered scores, at this election the party moved to the camp of leftist parties. Thus, if unaltered manifesto scores are used, parties seem to move in the policy space without ideological constrains.

Figure 3.1
Comparison of altered and unaltered policy dimension scales



Note: the figure illustrates the difference between the dimensions based on unaltered hand-coded manifesto scores and the dimensions based on scores altered by inclusion of the general ideological position of the parties

In contrast, the graph on the right (Figure 3.1) presents the same scores after the addition of parties' respective means.[62] After the transformation parties do not converge at e_3, but rather approach each other. In addition, both parties preserve their ideological profiles, while

[62] The scores are divided by two in order to correspond to the limits of policy space.

maintaining the changes in position. Thus, despite the strong change of the position to the left at e_5, party 1 does not become leftist, but rather approaches the centrist position.

Consequently, this proposition has several important characteristics. Firstly, it allows for the estimation of parties positions even if a particular manifesto does not include references to the specific issues. It is important to underline that this type of variability can be caused by both actual changes in policy emphasis and factors such as coding errors, the omissions of the authors of manifestos or chance variation. Thus, in addition to addressing the common ground of the salience theory and the confrontational theory, the proposition addresses some of the problems frequently associated with the manifesto scores (see more in Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov, & Laver, 2011). Furthermore, the addition of parties' average scores to their original scores reflects the idea of constrained movement of parties in the policy space and diminishes the effect of the change in the number of sentences in manifestos. Finally, as party's average position is based on a set of manifestos, the method evades the paradigm inherent to other methods in which the position of the party is estimated only on the basis of a single manifesto.

In order to assess the empirical justification of this theory, the proposition is analyzed against the other scale extraction methods. In the following paragraphs I will turn to the most important aspects of scale extraction methods proposed in the literature, as well as the methodology of scale validation.

3.3 Data and methodology

3.3.1 The methods of creation of composite variables

The starting point in the extraction of scales is the selection of a statistical technique used in the transformation of relative number of quasi-sentences in to the composite variables representative of particular issue dimensions. In the preliminary analysis I have analyzed six

extraction methods: Laver and Budge (1997), Budge et al. (1987), Klingemann (1995), Gabel & Huber (2000), Kim and Fording (1998; 2002) and Lowe et al. (2011).[63] In the creation of composite variables the authors tend to use either factor analytic methods (e.g. principal component analysis or principal axis factoring) or the variants of the subtraction of sums of left-side and right-side sentences.[64] In this respect, I found that principal component analysis (Gabel & Huber method) and the subtraction of the sum of percentages of left-side variables from the sum of percentages of right-side variables (Laver & Budge method) produce the highest and the most consistent validity scores. The subtraction of sums of left and right sentences proposed by Laver and Budge (1992) is highly flexible as it is able to take the variables with high frequency of no category references (see below for more details), but it may be susceptible to the problem of the balance of the number of employed indicators.[65] In contrast, principal component analysis (hereafter PCA) is not susceptible to the problem of the number of employed indicators, but it is not flexible. The following analysis will be centered on the combination of these two methods of

[63] The replicated methods were selected having mind the complete literature on scale extraction. Namely, the research on scale extraction methods can be divided in two types. The first type of research seeks to provide valid policy scales across parties and states in order to facilitate a small to mid-size *N* comparative analysis (e.g. Budge and Laver, 1992; Gabel and Huber, 2000). On the other hand, the second line of research is motivated by problematic cases which fail face validity tests (e.g. Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006; Dinas & Gemenis, 2010; Pelizzo, 2003). This line of research is typically concentrated on a single state and suggested extraction methodologies often ask for addressing each party involved in analysis. However, this meticulous approach to the scale extraction renders these methodological suggestions impractical for the extraction of scales across a large number of states and multiple elections. Given that the unique contribution of CMP is in providing a comprehensive pooled time series cross-sectional data set, the methods suggested by researchers coming from this line of research will not be analyzed here.

[64] Factor analytic methods are used by Gabel & Huber and Budge et al., where the first is based on principal component analysis, while the second is based on principal axis factoring. On the other hand, the subtraction of sum of left side sentences percentages from right-side sentences percentages is used by Laver & Budge, while Kim & Fording divide the subtraction of left side sentences percentages from right-side sentences by the addition of percentages of left-side sentences to right-side sentences ((R-L)/(R+L)). Lowe et al. method is based on both Laver & Budge and Kim & Fording as $logR - logL = log\frac{R}{L}$. Finally, Klingemann uses both principal component analysis and subtraction in his extraction methodology.

[65] The balance of the number of left and right side variables is a neglected aspect of the scale extraction procedure of this type. Namely, assuming that a party has a uniform number of references over all categories, the number of variables contributing to left or right side of ideological positioning will likely tip the scale in the direction of the larger number of variables.

the creation of composite variables with other methodological propositions, and the comparison of their validity scores.

3.3.2 The selection of sets of variables

The selection of the sets of variables used in scale extraction is guided by both theoretical and empirical (inductive) principles. The theoretical criterion is the most important in the variable selection and, in this regard, the variables expected to contribute to the positioning of parties on the respective policy dimension are the ones that are to be selected. With respect to the inductive reasoning, the positions on issues loading on the same dimension are expected to be related (Budge & Laver, 1992). In that regard, the correlation structure connecting policy dimensions is the substantive issue in the variable selection (Gabel & Huber, 2000; Elff, 2008). Furthermore, the lack of references to certain coding categories (signified by zero value in CMP) may be particularly important in the variable selection. Namely, variables with a higher share of no-references have lower correlation coefficients and, in general, provide less information on parties' ideological positions.[66] Consequently, they may have a negative effect in the implementation of certain methods, such as PCA.

On the basis of these criteria, I define three sets of variables. The first set comprises variables with a solid theoretical foundation, high correlation coefficients and the low frequency of zeros – I will refer to this set as the *basic set of variables*. The second set is the expanded version of the first, which in addition comprises less theoretically and empirically justified variables – I will refer to this set as the *extended set of variables*. The extended and basic sets are

[66] In addition to justifications based on the salience theory, the lack of references may be explained by multiple causes. First, the number of coding categories is large, and it is not likely that parties will address all issues in a manifesto. Second, some of the coding categories refer to the policies that are not central for party competition in some of the countries. Third, some of the coding categories refer to policies that are not relevant for party competition at certain periods (such as corporatism or set of post-communist categories). Fourth, party might have a position on other policy category, which is closely related to the category with no reference.

only based on the variables running across all of Europe. To assess if the set of variables devised to capture the party competition only in East European states increases the validity of extracted scales, a selection of these of "East European variables" is added to the extended set of variables thus creating the third set of variables used in the analysis.

Therefore, three sets of variables are defined: the basic set, the extended set and the extended set with the addition of East European variables. These sets were specified for the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension, the economic dimension and the left-right dimension. Thus, in total nine sets of variables are used in the validity analysis of the proposed methods (see Appendix - Chapter 3 for the list of variables).

3.3.3 The methods of transformations of variables

The transformation of CMP variables is a rarely addressed issue. However, the transformations are likely to have an effect on the validity of scales. Firstly, it should be underlined that CMP is distributed with transformed values. Namely, the original CMP scores are the counts of quasi-sentences, while the data in the CMP data set are standardized by taking the total number of (quasi-) sentences in the respective documents as a base.

However, further transformations are possible and, potentially, desirable. Given that some variables in CMP are positional in nature (e.g. national way life -positive (per601) and national way life - negative (per602)) it seems natural to collapse these pairs via subtraction into single positional variables. These composite variables have several advantages: they have a lower frequency of no-references; they approximate normal distribution; and they reduce the number of variables in analysis.

Furthermore, Lowe et al. have suggested that logit odds scales will more accurately reflect the position of parties (Lowe et al., 2011). In their opinion, the addition of each sentence in a

manifesto has a decreasing marginal effect and, consequently, they take the natural logarithm of the sum of the counts of left-side and right-side quasi-sentences. However, Lowe et al. method is not flexible and, to facilitate the comparisons of various methods considering logarithmic transformation, I apply the transformation to each variable.[67] Given the frequency of no-references (zero values), I test the performance of variables altered by addition of 1 before logarithmic transformation. The main effect of this procedure is that upon logarithmic transformation, categories which are not referred to in manifestos revert to zeros.[68]

The positional and logarithmic transformations are compatible and can be combined. Therefore, with respect to the transformations, three methodological options are tested in the subsequent analysis: untransformed variables, variables with positional and logarithmic transformation, and logarithmically transformed variables.

3.3.4 Scales and validity analysis

Table 3.2 systematizes the main types of scales extracted on the basis of the abovementioned methodological alternatives. The table does not exhaust all methodological alternatives tested, but rather illustrates the general research strategy. All scales are estimated using Laver & Budge and Gabel & Hubert methods of creation of composite variables in combination with a particular set of variables and a particular transformation, while the control

[67] Therefore, while Lowe et al. (2011) suggest the application of logarithmic transformation on the sum of both left and right-side variables, here logarithmic transformation is applied to each category (variable) separately. In other words it is assumed that the diminishing effect is equally applicable to specific policy categories (e.g. each additional sentence dedicated to national way of life (per 601) is less important in determining the policy position of a party considering this policy category). This method enables assessment of the effect of logarithmic transformation across various sets of variables.

[68] This type of transformation is also frequently used (e.g. Jackman & Volpert, 1996, p. 514). The advantage of this transformation is that, if the final estimate of party position is based on the deduction of sums of left- and right-side categories, these scores do not contribute to the positioning of the party. Empirically, this type of transformation takes the middle ground between the methods suggested by Budge and Laver (1992) and Lowe et al. (2011). For example, the correlation coefficient between exclusionary-authoritarian dimensions calculated using Budge and Laver (1992) and Lowe et al. (2011) methodologies is r=0.83. However, if scores are transformed as suggested here, the correlation coefficients of such a scale and scales extracted on the basis of Budge and Laver (1992) and Lowe et al. (2011) methodologies are r=0.89 and r=0.86, respectively.

scales are estimated on the basis of methods of Kim & Fording and Lowe et al. and the relevant sets of variables. Furthermore, given that, due to the frequency of no-references, it is likely that the introduction of Eastern European variables will have a negative effect in the application of Gabel & Hubert method (PCA), I tests if components extracted using subsamples of Eastern and Western Europe and the respective sets of variables produce more valid results.[69] Finally, to test the proposition on the interpretation of manifesto data presented in the theoretical section, the validity analysis of the scales based on the addition of the mean to the original score is conducted for each of the scales.[70]

Table 3.2
Main types of scales extracted for the exclusionary-authoritarian, economic and left-right dimensions

			MAIN EXTRACTION METHODS			CONTROL SCALES	
			Laver and Budge	Gabel and Hubert	Gabel and Hubert with Eastern and Western European components	Kim and Fording	Lowe et al.
SET S OF VARIABLES	Basic	Untransformed	x	x	x	x	x
		Transformed: positional and logarithmic		x			
		Transformed: logarithmic	x	x	x		
	Extended	Untransformed	x	x	x	x	x
		Transformed: positional and logarithmic		x			
		Transformed: logarithmic	x	x	x		
	Extended set with addition of EE variables	Untransformed	x	x	x	x	x
		Transformed: positional and logarithmic		x			
		Transformed: Logarithmic	x	x	x		

[69] Given that East European categories do not have any scores for West European countries, the application of Gabel and Huber methodology (an application of principal component analysis) on the combined set of extended and East European variables produces very poor results. As an alternative, a principal component was extracted for West European countries on the basis of the extended set of variables, while the second principal component was extracted for Eastern European countries on the basis of both the extended set and the East European set of variables. Subsequently, the scales are joined into a single dimension

[70] It is also assumed that the balance of the number of left and right side variables might have an effect on the validity scores of policy dimensions estimated on the basis of Laver & Budge method. For this reason, I test if the division of the sums of the left and right-side categories with the respective number of categories used in the estimation will have an effect on validity scores. However, the effect of this procedure is only tested on a selection of scales.

The validation of extracted scales is based on expert surveys. This type of data is routinely used in validity analysis (Budge & Pennings, 2007; Benoit & Laver, 2007; Dinas & Gemenis, 2010). One of the reasons is that many authors start from the assumption that the expert judgments measure the "true" policy positions (Volkens, 2007, p. 109). However, here I adopt the position of Budge et al. who claim that there are only differing representations of policy dimensions with different kinds of bias built into them through their procedures and assumptions (1987, p. 33). However, the theoretical background of data collection, that is, the reliance on the confrontational theory of party competition, makes expert surveys particularly useful in assessing the validity of CMP scale extraction methodologies. Nonetheless, there is no claim of objectivity of expert surveys.[71]

The analysis is centered on assessing the validity of each scale in a cross-sectional setting using two expert surveys: the Party Policy in Modern Democracies (Benoit & Laver, 2005) and the Chapel Hill 2006 (Hooghe, et al., 2008) (hereafter PPMD and CH-06). However, it is also expected that a higher cross-sectional validity will result in a higher validity in terms of longitudinal scores. Due to small sample size this is assessed only in the last instance using in addition the Chapel Hill 2010 expert survey (Bakker, et al., 2012) (hereafter CH-10). (For further information on expert surveys see Appendix – Expert Surveys). The expert surveys and CMP data set are joined by matching the time of expert evaluation with the closest election. As CMP is

[71] Naturally, the association between CMP and expert survey indicators will depend on additional factors. The stochastic processes behind creations of manifestos and the process of coding, on one hand, and the formation of expert opinion and its collection, on the other, are plagued with incomparable sources of error which often in practice cannot be controlled for (for a detailed account on CMP see Benoit, Laver, & Mikhaylov, 2009). Furthermore, while expert surveys are criticized for their ambiguity over parties as collective actors, the time period for which estimates are valid, and the distinction between programmatic promises and resulting actions (Volkens, 2007, p. 117), CMP relies on election programs which are official documents agreed upon by the party as a whole and published at a precise point in time. Furthermore, following Bartolini and Mair (1990), Dinas and Gemenis (2010) argue that in situation where ideological differences between parties are clear, party manifestos might not prove to be reliable indicators of their positions, since ideologically clearly differentiated parties might have a freedom to present a distorted policy image.

a collection of manifestos of parties and coalitions which are based on Sartori's criterion of relevance (Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987, p. 31), there is a mismatch between the data sets. In the joined data set CH-06 indicators measure the positions of 133 parties, while PPMD indicators measure the positions of 196 parties.

The validity of each scale is tested using policy positions considering the relevant issues in expert surveys. It is expected that the increased validity will be manifested in higher correlation coefficients for any of the relevant issues and, ultimately, in a higher average of correlation coefficients across variables and expert surveys. Consequently, the tables below (Tables 3.3 to 3.7) will refer to average correlation across variables and average correlation across data sets. This strategy is not employed only in the case of the left-right dimension as each expert survey includes a variable intended to measure policy positions in terms of the general left-right scale. Finally, in addition to the values of validity scores, the consistency of scores across variables, data sets and extracted scales is used as a criterion in assessing the validity of each methodical proposition.

In the following section I will separately address empirical justification of each methodological alternative and, finally, present a validity analysis of a scales based on the resulting principles of scale extraction.

3.4 Results

3.4.1 The general ideological positions of parties

The addition of mean to the original score has the strongest and the most consistent effect on the improvement of the validity scores. This procedure increases the validity scores regardless of the estimation method, the estimated dimension or the set of variables used in the scale

extraction. Table 3.3 presents average correlation coefficients across expert surveys only for the four replicated left-right scales.

Table 3.3
Merger of original scales and their means

	Left –right dimension			
	Laver & Budge (rile scale)	**Gabel & Huber**	**Lowe et al.**	**Kim & Fording**
Replicated scale	0.612	0.096	0.628	0.636
Scale and mean - joined by summation	0.675	0.150	0.683	0.692
Scale and mean - joined by PCA	0.679	0.154	0.686	0.694

Note: the figures in the table are averages of correlation coefficients of replicated left right scales and the left-right indicators in expert surveys (PPMD and CH-06)

Even in the case of low validity scores (the original Gabel & Hubert method), the joining of the mean and the original scale improves the strength of association. This is the case with any of the extracted scales and both merging procedures (summation or PCA). However, when it comes to the merging of the extracted scale with parties' means, there is only small difference in performance in favor of PCA (see Table 3.3).

Consequently, there is strong evidence for the interpretation of hand-coded manifestos data which argues for the introduction of the core ideological orientations of parties in estimating the policy scales.

3.4.2 Creation of composite variables

The validity scores for the methods of the creation of composite variables do not indicate an unequivocally optimal solution. The control scales based on Lowe et al. and Kim and Fording are, overall, only slightly underperforming in comparison to the use of PCA (Gabel & Huber) and the subtraction of sums (Laver & Budge), and the benefit of the later becomes obvious only in the combination with other techniques.[72] Furthermore, the validity scores are dependent on the

[72] However, it should be kept in mind that Lowe et al. and Kim and Fording methods also include transformations of variables as well as other methodological procedures, which may explain why these methods are performing well.

type of estimated dimension. In this regard methods, of Lowe et al. and Kim and Fording are underperforming in extraction of the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension. Similarly, if original coding schema is used, PCA is the best performing method in estimating the economic dimension, while the subtraction of sums is the best performing method in estimation of the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension (see Table 3.4a-3.4b). However, with the inclusion of East European countries, PCA performs poorly. Separate PCAs for Eastern and Western Europe improve overall validity of the method, but the method still underperforms (for detailed results see Appendix - Chapter 3). In this respect, choice between PCA and the subtraction of sums is dependent on the scope conditions of the research.

Table 3.4a
Comparisons of estimation methods –exclusionary authoritarian dimension

Extended set of variables				
	Gabel & Huber	**Laver and Budge**	**Lowe et al.**	**Kim and Fording**
Average correlation (across variables)	0.591	0.619	0.552	0.562
Average correlation (across data sets)	0.563	0.592	0.535	0.538
Extended set with addition of Eastern European set of variables				
	Gabel & Huber with separate PCA for East and West	**Laver and Budge**	**Lowe et al.**	**Kim and Fording**
Average correlation (across variables)	0.560	0.616	0.523	0.556
Average correlation (across data sets)	0.524	0.576	0.507	0.533

Table 3.4b
Comparisons of estimation methods –economic dimension

Extended set of variables				
	Gabel & Huber	**Laver and Budge**	**Lowe et al.**	**Kim and Fording**
Average correlation (across variables)	-0.748	0.688	0.721	0.698
Average correlation (across data sets)	-0.749	0.689	0.721	0.699
Extended set with addition of Eastern European set of variables				
	Gabel & Huber with separate PCA for East and West	**Laver and Budge**	**Lowe et al.**	**Kim and Fording**
Average correlation (across variables)	0.543	0.637	0.657	0.629
Average correlation (across data sets)	0.547	0.639	0.658	0.630

Notes: tables present scales created by merger of mean and original scale using summation.

In addition, it was hypothesized that the balance of the number of left and right-side variables used in the extraction may have the effect on validity of Laver & Budge method. When this disbalance is accounted for, there is some improvement in validity, but the improvement is not substantial.

3.4.3 Sets of variables

The selection of variables has a very strong effect on the validity of extracted scales and the choice between the basic set, the extended set and the extended set with the addition of the Eastern European variables is likely to determine the choice of method for the creation of composite variables. The most obvious effect of set variables is observed with regard to Gabel & Huber method (compare Tables 3.1 and 3.4a-3.4b).[73] Overall, there is strong evidence that the maximization of the selection of variables has a positive effect on the validity of extracted scales and the validity scores of scales based on the extended set of variables are almost invariably outperforming the scales based on the basic set. However, it should be emphasized that, the correlation coefficients for the exclusionary-authoritarian scales are on average lower in comparison to the scores produced by the economic scales regardless of the employed variable set.[74]

On the other hand, the inclusion of the Eastern European set of variables may have a very detrimental effect on validity scores, particularly if an inappropriate method of creation of composite variables is used. To have a better grasp of the effect of inclusion of the East

[73]While the application of the method on the original set of variables (i.e. the atheoretical application of principal component analysis on all 57 categories) produces very poor results, use of this method over the extended set of variables (the theoretically selected set of variables) produces the best validity scores (see Table 3.7).

[74]This is consequence of at least two causes. Firstly, it is possible that parties might be less willing to express their exclusionary-authoritarian positions, particularly if they occupy more extreme rightist positions. Secondly, it is possible that CMP coding schema is not adequate to capture positioning on the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension.

European variables, the validity analysis was conducted on subsamples of Eastern and Western Europe. Tables 3.5a and 3.5b present the validity scores of the exclusionary-authoritarian and economic dimensions only for Eastern European parties.

Table 3.5a
Comparison of estimation methods – Eastern European subsample

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension								
	Extended set of variables with addition of Eastern European variables				Extended set of variables			
	Laver & Budge	Gabel & Huber (separate PCA)	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.	Laver & Budge	Gabel & Huber	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.
Average correlation (across variables)	0.510	0.393	0.367	0.305	0.478	0.431	0.350	0.280
Average correlation (across data sets)	0.452	0.352	0.324	0.277	0.414	0.367	0.284	0.246

Table 3.5b
Comparison of estimation methods – Eastern European subsample

Economic dimension								
	Extended set of variables with addition of Eastern European variables				Extended set of variables			
	Laver & Budge	Gabel & Huber - (separate PCA)	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.	Laver & Budge	Gabel & Huber	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.
Average correlation (across variables)	0.575	0.309	0.499	0.532	0.560	-0.635	0.521	0.542
Average correlation (across data sets)	0.585	0.345	0.523	0.555	0.569	-0.658	0.534	0.558

It can be noticed that in general the scores for Eastern Europe are not as high as the scores for entire Europe (compare Tables 3.4a-3.4b and 3.5a-3.5b). In that regard, it seems that CMP coding schema simply does not capture the party competition in Eastern Europe as precisely as it does considering Western Europe.[75] Furthermore, focusing on each of the dimensions, it seems that validity scores are dependent on methods. With regard to the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension, the inclusion of Eastern European variables improves validity scores for most of the methods (i.e. Laver & Budge, Kim & Fording and Lowe et al.). However, considering the economic dimension the results are more ambiguous. In this instance there is a slight

[75] Partly this may be the consequence of the available expert surveys; namely, the expert surveys are collected during 2004 and 2006, while the set of Eastern European variables is mostly addressing the immediate post-communist issues.

improvement of validity scores with regard Laver & Budge method, while there is a small deterioration in implementation of Kim & Fording and Lowe et al. methods (for detailed results see Appendix - Chapter 3).

3.4.4 Transformations of variables

The transformation of variables by subtracting the opposing pairs of positional indicators is expected to have the most obvious effect in the extraction of the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension. The primacy of the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension is principally the consequence of the available pairs of variables. However, there is no evidence that this type of transformation has a positive effect on the validity of extracted scales.

If the logarithmic transformation of counts suggested by Lowe et al. (2011) is held constant while varying other methodological aspects of scale extraction, there is some evidence that this transformation has a positive impact on scale validity. As mentioned before, on average, Lowe et al. (2011) methodology performs only slightly worse than the best performing methods. However, the contribution of this transformation to the scale validity is not pronounced (see Tables 3.4a and 3.4b).

Finally, logarithmic transformation of each variable (i.e. $\ln(x+1)$) has a pronounced and a positive effect on scale validity. Although its effect is dwarfed by the effects of addition of parties' averages and variable selection, the effect of this transformation is fairly robust and consistent regardless of the set of used variables or the method of creation of composite variables. Thus, although some authors raised arguments against this type of transformations (e.g. Budge and McDonald, 2012), there is evidence that it has beneficial effects on the validity of the estimated scales. In this regard, the best results are produced using logarithmically transformed variables (see Table 3.6a and 3.6b).

Table 3.6a
The best performing combinations of estimation methods, transformations, and variable sets

Basic and extended sets of variables					
Implemented methodological steps	**Left-right dimension**	**Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension**		**Economic dimension**	
	Average correlation (across variables and data sets)	**Average correlation (across variables)**	**Average correlation (across data sets)**	**Average correlation (across variables)**	**Average correlation (across data sets)**
extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PCA, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	-0.753	0.631	0.639	-0.734	-0.735
basic set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	0.710	0.623	0.603	0.612	0.612
extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	0.722	0.619	0.592	0.688	0.689

Table 3.6b
The best performing combinations of estimation methods, transformations, and variable sets

Extended set with addition of East European set of variables					
Implemented methodological steps	**Left-right dimension**	**Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension**		**Economic dimension**	
	Average correlation (across variables and data sets)	**Average correlation (across variables)**	**Average correlation (across data sets)**	**Average correlation (across variables and data sets)**	**Average correlation (across variables)**
logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	0.722	0.640	0.624	0.743	0.743
no transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	0.699	0.625	0.600	0.695	0.696
no transformation, extraction based on PCA, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	0.517	0.526	0.494	0.468	0.469

3.4.5 The proposed dimension extraction procedure

On the basis of these results it is possible to propose an optimal scale extraction methodology suitable for the problems addressed in the dissertation. Given the goal of the comparative analysis of Eastern and Western European parties, in this instance the primary concern is the inclusion of the Eastern European set of indicators. The proposed procedure consists of eight steps. The steps are as follows:

1. On the basis of theoretical grounds, select the variables expected to contribute to the positioning of parties on a particular dimension (e.g. the economic dimension). Maximize

the selection by choosing all relevant variables, including the ones relevant only for particular political systems.

2. Transform each variable (x) by adding 1 and, subsequently, by taking natural logarithm (i.e. ln(x+1)).
3. On the basis of a priori reasoning, divide the variables into the groups corresponding either to the left side or the right side of the political spectrum.
4. Add variables corresponding to each respective side.
5. Divide each sum by the respective number of variables used in addition (e.g. if six variables have been used to create the sum of left-side variables, divide the sum with six).
6. Subtract the sum of left-side variables from the sum of right side variables (or vice versa depending on the desired direction of the scale).
7. Calculate the average score of each party across all elections.
8. Add the average of each party to the original subtracted sums of left-side and right-side categories.

The tables below presents the validity scores of the scales based on these rules. Table 3.7 presents validity scores for each extracted dimension. In comparison to the scales presented above (see Tables 3.6a to 3.6b) this scale has the highest validity scores, although some methods (based on similar extraction principles) are approaching these results.

Table 3.7
Validity scores of the proposed policy position estimation procedure

Left-right dimension	**Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension**		**Economic dimension**	
Average correlation (across variables and data sets)	Average correlation (across variables)	Average correlation (across data sets)	Average correlation (across variables)	Average correlation (across data sets)
0.724	0.643	0.626	0.745	0.746

However, the improvement in validity is most visible in comparison of the performance of the suggested extraction methodology and the methodologies suggested in the literature. Table 3.8a compares the proposed left-right scale and the scales advanced in the literature. The proposed scale strongly outperforms any of the methods proposed in the literature and the difference is statistically significant. Moreover, Table 3.8b presents the strength of association between differences in positions on the left-right dimension between two elections calculated on the basis of expert surveys and CMP. Although the correlation coefficients are not as strong as the ones observed considering validation based on cross-sectional data, the proposed methodology still outperforms the methods proposed in the literature.

Table 3.8a
Validation of the proposed left-right dimension – cross-sectional perspective

	Proposed left-right dimension			**Replicated left –right dimension**					
Left-right indicators in expert surveys		95% bootstrapped confidence interval		Laver & Budge (rile scale)	Gabel & Huber	Klingemann	Budge et al.	Lowe et al.	Kim & Fording
		Lower	Upper						
CH-06	0.743	0.653	0.820	0.621	0.075	0.346	0.305	0.649	0.654
N	133			133	133	133	100	133	133
PPMD	0.713	0.628	0.780	0.602	0.116	0.321	0.306	0.608	0.618
N	189			189	189	191	173	189	189

Table 3.8b
Validation of the proposed left-right dimension – longitudinal perspective[76]

	Proposed left-right dimension	**Replicated left –right dimensions**					
Left-right indicator in expert surveys		Laver & Budge (rile scale)	Gabel & Huber	Klingemann	Budge et al.	Lowe et al.	Kim & Fording
CH10-CH-06	0.204	0.124	0.131	0.068	-0.325	0.123	0.135
N	88	89	89	89	46	89	89

Note: the decrease in value of N is due to mismatch between CH-06 and CH-10

[76] The unusual scores of Budge et al. methods are attributed to the extractions problems inherent to this method. See more details in Appendix-Chapter 3.

3.5 Summary of findings and the relation to the subsequent analyses

The analysis presented here arrives at the following conclusions. First, the selection of the adequate methodology of scale extraction is dependent on the scope of research. The analysis shows that both PCA and the subtraction of sums may be acceptable choices depending on the purpose of research and the selected indicators. Under conditions of a theoretically founded set of variables selected from the *original list of coding categories*, Gabel & Huber (PCA) is the most promising method. This suggestion is in contrast to the literature on the estimation of party positions from CMP, which predominantly ignores the use of principal component analysis, but it is in line with most of the statistical literature which recommends principal component analysis in creation of composite variables (Kim & Mueller, 1978). In contrast, if research requires the incorporation of the East European set of indicators, one should use the subtraction of sums (Laver & Budge method).

The validity of extracted scales is aided by the inclusion of a maximal set of available and theoretically justifiable indicators. However, as underlined above, although every additional piece of information is valuable, one should pay attention to the distribution of values and, particularly, to the frequency of no-references as they are likely to have a negative effect on certain methods of creation of composite indicators.

Considering transformations, there is some empirical evidence which supports the theory of Lowe et al. (2011), which hypothesizes that each additional quasi-sentence has a diminishing effect in determining the positions of parties. Nevertheless, while the methodology proposed by Lowe et al. (2011) provides empirically sound policy dimensions, I present evidence which demonstrates that logarithmic transformation of each indicator employed in the extraction of dimensions produces superior results.

Most importantly, the analysis provides theoretical foundation for linking the salience theory to the confrontational theory of party competition. The results present strong empirical evidence that the incorporation of parties' general ideological positions captures an important characteristic of the confrontational notion of party competition. Namely, the concept of general ideological positions addresses the problem of selective emphasis by relating transient positions of parties to the more stable aspects of parties' value systems. In this respect, it facilitates comparison of parties' policy positions considering the issues which, due to adopted communication or campaign strategy, may be ignored. Furthermore, the inclusion of parties' general ideological positions diminishes policy shifts of parties and reflects the notion of the ideologically constrained policy shifts. Finally, in comparison to all analyzed methodological alternatives, the proposed methodological modification has the most pronounced and the most consistent effect irrespective of the extraction method, the policy dimension or the set of utilized indicators.

This analysis makes possible further research with regard to the radical right. Firstly, the suggestions presented here inform the analysis on the classification of the radical right. The developed methodology enables analysis of a larger number of radical right parties and the implementation of cluster analytic methods in addressing the problem of the classification of parties within the radical right party family (Chapter 5). Secondly, the scales presented above are used in the operationalization of multiple factors needed for the pooled time series cross-sectional analysis of the electoral performance of radical right parties (Chapter 6). As the use of the CMP data set in the most optimal avenue for facilitating this research, the validity analysis presented here offers strong assurance considering the reliability of findings on the electoral performance of radical right parties.

PART 2: THE RADICAL RIGHT IN POLICY SPACE

Chapter 4 – Ideological Modernization of the Radical Right: An Analysis of the Position of the Party Family in the Policy Space

4.1. Introduction

4.1.1. Relation to the previous analyses

The previous analyses described and tested the basic assumptions considering the policy space (Chapter 2) and validated the operationalization of the policy dimensions by means of a pooled cross-sectional time series data set based on hand-coded manifestos (Chapter 3). In the following analysis, I address the position of the radical right party family in the policy space and its relations to the other party families. Above all, the analysis relates the definition of the radical right proposed in Chapter 2 to the empirics, and tests to what extent the proposed definition is likely to capture the temporal and the spatial variety of radical right ideologies.

4.1.2. The problem

For decades, the definition of the radical right is the focal point of "the war of words" (Arzheimer, 2012; Mudde, 1996). Chiefly, this debate is a consequence of the attempts to emphasize, problematize and understand various ideological aspects inherent to far-right parties, including both the contemporary radical right and historical Nazi and fascist parties. However, to a large degree it is also a consequence of ideological transformations of the radical right. Namely, radical right parties are continuously reinventing their ideological profiles (Beyme, 1988; Davies & Lynch, 2002), while the changes became particularly rapid and noticeable with the beginning of the 1980s and the rise of the radical right in the electoral arena (Williams M. H., 2006; Betz, 1993; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). Viewed through these lenses, the contemporary radical right shares a limited number of characteristics with its pre- and post-World War II predecessors (Golder, 2003; Ignazi, 2003); moreover, as certain worldviews were not proscribed in the past (e.g. anti-Semitism, racism, authoritarianism, etc.), many of today's parties may even

seem moderate. On the other hand, the failure to create permanent international alliances and the efforts of some radical right parties to disassociate themselves from certain party family members indicate the lack of an ideological unity. Consequently, there is a problem of how to define the radical right in such a manner so that the concept may travel across space and time.

However, in contrast to the definitional perplexities, there is a consensus considering the list of the actual members of the radical right party family. Naturally, there are some disagreements over the parties close to the boarder of the conservative/Christian democratic and the radical right party families (e.g. the UK Independence Party or the Swiss People's Party).Nevertheless, overall, the list of European radical right parties seems to be agreed upon. Consequently, the main problem addressed in this chapter is the identification of the most optimal approach to bridging the gap between *the conceptualization of the radical right* and *the particular empirical cases of the contemporary radical right*.

4.1.3. The contribution and the plan of the analysis

This analysis identifies an exhaustive and homogenous class of radical right parties based on the objective criteria of the classification of parties, and the essential ideological characteristics of the party family expected to travel across space and time. The main contribution of this analysis is in presenting a simple, but intuitive, understanding of the radical right and coupling it with evidence based on appropriate but seldom used methodology. Considering the theoretical aspect of the analysis, I argue that due to the ideological transformation of the parties only the definition based on exclusionary issues (i.e. racism, immigration, nationalism, etc.) captures the set of parties usually considered the radical right. This proposition is contrasted to two alternative hypotheses. The first asks about the potential of the definition of the radical right based on its position on the left-right dimension, while the

second addresses the definition of the radical right based solely on the authoritarian component of the policy space. These inquiries seek to evaluate to what extent some of the traditional notions and definitions of the radical right are applicable to the contemporary radical right. Considering methodological aspect of the analysis, I introduce the use of cluster analytic methods in identifying party families as an appropriate approach to problems related to the positions of party groups in the policy space. The most optimal classifications are selected by means of a validation procedure, while the results are verified using three clustering methods. In addition, although the emphasis is on the positional aspect of the radical right ideology, the analysis also addresses the salience of the relevant ideological characteristics, while the robustness of the findings is assessed using multiple data sets.

The chapter proceeds in the following arrangement. The first section starts with a description of the changes in the radical right ideology during the post-World War II era. Subsequently, I discuss the theoretical background of each assumption and introduce three hypotheses tested in the empirical section of the analysis. The second section specifies the general approach to cluster analysis and discusses data, theoretical expectations and the validation of results. The third section presents the generated classifications and the results of supplementary analyses. Finally, the last section concludes and discusses the findings.

4.2. Definitions of the radical right and the policy space

The ideology of the radical right changes with time. The family as a whole is perpetually altering its ideological profile by adopting new issues, reframing old ones, and selectively emphasizing particular policies. This is the consequence of many factors including the parties' attempts to attract new voters, the imitation of new and successful radical right parties abroad, and the efforts to become legitimate challengers of mainstream parties.

In an often-cited study, von Beyme (1988) described three phases in the development of radical right parties in the post-World War II period. According to von Beyme, the first phase started with the end of the war and lasted until the mid-1950s. The radical right comprised of surviving or revived fascist and Nazi parties from the inter-war period. Consequently, the ideology of the radical right was characterized by extreme positions considering both exclusionary and authoritarian issues. The electorally strongest representative of this phase was the Italian Social Movement, but for the most part the radical right consisted of isolated and political insignificant parties.[77] The second phase of ideological development came about predominantly as a reaction to economic developments in Western Europe (Widfeldt, 2010). The catalyst of the second phase was the short-lived Poujadist movement which managed to make a breakthrough in the 1956 French parliamentary election. However, the phase actually gained momentum in the early 1970s in Nordic countries.[78] Its main characteristic was the adoption of the rightist positions with regard to a large set of economic issues, but it was predominantly embodied in anti-tax protest.[79] In addition to the emphasis on the economy, the parties had weak links to the inter-war fascism or Nazism. In that regard, this development can be perceived as a form of ideological moderation. According to von Beyme, the third phase started in the 1980s with the electoral and political breakthrough of the National Front (France). The main ideological innovation in this phase was the adoption of immigration as the key issue (Betz,

[77] In the first phase, important representatives of the radical right were Oswald Mosley's Union Movement and Spanish Falange; with addition of some extreme right parties, such as the Socialist Reich Party, they complemented the list of best-known far-right parties of the time. The more recent representatives of this phase of ideological development include the Center Party and CP '86 (the Netherlands) the National Front (the UK), the National Democratic Party (Germany) and to certain extent the Swedish Democrats.

[78] Namely, the main representatives of the phase were the Progress Party (Demark), Anders Lange's Party/Progress Party (Norway) and the Rural Party (Finland).

[79] The main purpose of creation of Pierre Poujade's UDCA was the organization of ant-tax protest. Mogens Glistrup, leader of the Danish Progress Party, who actively advocated against tax rates, was eventually convicted for tax evasion in 1983. The original name of the Norwegian Progress Party was Anders Lange's Party for Strongly Reduced Taxes, Fees and Public Intervention. The only exception in the second phase was the Rural Party (Finland) which was mostly concerned with protection of its agricultural constituency (Widfeldt, 2010).

1993; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). Furthermore, due to the electoral success, radical right parties became a major political concern and came under increased public scrutiny.[80] In response, the radical right reached for further ideological refinement by narrowing the exclusionary aspect of ideology to the issue of Islam (Carter, 2005; Krzyzanowsk, 2013; Betz, 2013; Betz & Meret, 2009), additionally relaxing some of the authoritarian and populist aspects of the ideology (Rooduijn, de Lange, &van der Brug, 2014), and distancing themselves from selected members of the radical right family (Mudde, 2014).[81]

On the other hand, in Eastern Europe the radical right went through more intricate and erratic changes. The initial position of the radical right in Eastern Europe featured chauvinism, revisionism and anti-communism and, in general, it was characterized by the ideology that was extremely authoritarian and exclusionary (Bustikova, 2009; Mudde, 2000; Minkenberg, 2002). In particular, the changes brought about with the fall of communism created fertile ground for ultra-nationalism, which resulted in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the war in the Balkans and the conflicts in the Soviet successor states. Although anti-communism and secessionist tendencies eventually lost momentum, throughout the post-communist period radical right parties based their ideology on the issue of ethnic minorities (Bustikova, 2014; Pirro, 2014a).[82] Furthermore, even though in comparison to the West the radical right in the East is perceived as more extreme (Mudde, 2005), if not in ideological terms, a level of moderation is certainly obvious in the

[80] The most prominent cases of public outcry are probably the European Union diplomatic sanctions imposed on Austria in 2000 due the creation of coalition government which included the Freedom Party of Austria (Pelinka, 2009) and the French presidential elections of 2002 (Norris, 2005).

[81] This stage of development of the radical right ideology may be considered a separate, fourth phase of the radical right transformation. To a large degree, it signaled abandoning of biological racism inherent to the "traditional" types of far-right parties for cultural racism. In this phase, the electoral success of radical right became common, while the number of radical right parties participated in the government or they supported minority governments.

[82] In this respect, Roma are the most frequent target of the Eastern European radical right. The most prominent party in this regard is Jobbik (Hungary), however, a similar type of far right politics is present in Czech Republic (the Workers Party, the Republicans of Miroslav Sadek), Slovakia (the Slovak National Party), Bulgaria (Ataka) and Romania (the Greater Romania Party). On the other hand, the radical right in the region is typically concerned with historical "enemies of the nation" in the form of minorities with the neighboring kin state.

media presentations and political campaigns.[83] Namely, similar to the parties in the West, radical right parties in the East seek to present themselves as rightful participants in political process by combining carefully crafted media presentations with a targeted exclusionary message. However, a typical radical right party in Eastern Europe did not have a sustained electoral success or organizational capacity, which would allow it to develop in the way parties such as the National Front (France) or the Freedom Party of Austria developed (Betz, 2001; Betz, 2013a). On the other hand, in the countries where the radical right had a prolonged participation in parliament, such as the cases of the Balkans and some Baltic states, certain radical right parties moved closer to the center sometimes substantially relaxing both the exclusionary and authoritarian aspects of ideology.

To what degree definitions of the radical right can withstand the changes of its ideology is both a theoretical and empirical problem. In the following sections, I will discuss arguments that relate the main policy dimensions (see Chapter 2) to the definitions of the radical right and the changes in the radical right ideology.

4.2.1. The definition of the radical right and the left-right dimension

In order to define the radical right as parsimonious as possible one has to focus on a single abstract policy dimension. In this regard, the left-right dimension is the most abstract conceptualization of the policy space and according to Hix: "[it] is a remarkable invention, in that it enables politics to be simplified into either a dichotomy or a single continuum" (Hix, 1999, p. 73). In this approach to the definition, radical right parties differ from other parties by occupying the extreme rightist positions on the left-right dimension. For instance, Norris (2005)

[83] The moderation of the East European radical right is the most visible in renouncing of violence as a legitimate political means in national and international matters. In this regard, to certain extent, transformation of Eastern European parties can be described as a shift from the positions characteristic for the extreme right to the positions characteristic for the radical right.

identifies radical right parties using the mean score of the combined left-right and immigration scales. Ignazi employs a more purist approach. According to him, one of the key features of radical right parties is that they must be located at the right end of the left-right continuum, with no party located more to the right (Ignazi, 1992; Ignazi, 2003).

However, the problem of defining the radical right using the left-right dimension is inseparable from the problem of the position of the radical right considering economic issues. Namely, the previous analyses (Chapter 2) demonstrated that the exclusionary-authoritarian and economic dimensions have a significant explanatory power in determining positions of parties on the left-right dimension. The definition based on the left-right dimension requires for the rightist positions on exclusionary-authoritarian issues to coincide with the rightist positions on the economy. This expectation is in agreement with the standpoint prevalent in the early 1990s (e.g. Betz, 1993), when radical right parties were perceived as advocates of the predominantly neoliberal economic policies. In this respect, the definition based on the left-right dimension requires for von Beyme's second phase of ideological development of the radical right to be instrumental in the profile of the contemporary parties. Thus, one may point to the prototypical radical right parties of von Beyme's second phase, such as Norwegian and Danish Progress Parties, which maintain the predominantly rightist positions on the economy (Rydgren, 2004a; Norris, 2005). Furthermore, some of the new parties, such as Dutch Party for Freedom and the List Pim Fortuyn, can be considered proponents of this ideological type (van Kessel, 2011). While it seems that in Eastern Europe the case of a rightist economic profile of the radical right has a weaker foundation, there are several exceptions. For instance, For Fatherland and Freedom (Latvia) adopted the neoliberal program (Zake, 2002), while in Poland the radical right parties were often in coalitions with the pro-market Union of Real Politics (Pankowski, 2010).

In contrast, some authors are inclined to the proposition that the economic liberalism was never a prominent feature in the profile of the West European radical right (e.g. Carter, 2005; Givens, 2005). In this regard, Mudde claims that many key representatives of the radical right family do not hold neoliberal views and that economic program is a secondary feature in ideologies of radical right parties (Mudde, 2007, p. 119). On the other hand, with respect to Eastern Europe, Ishiyama noticed an electoral demand for a mixture of nationalist-authoritarian policies and the policies of economic redistribution and protectionism (Ishiyama, 2009). Thus, this "red-brown" demand makes it implausible for the East European radical right to compete on a neoliberal platform and it is expected that the parties will adopt predominantly leftist economic positions.

Consequently, if rightist positions on the economic dimension do not coincide with the rightist positions considering exclusionary and authoritarian issues, radical right parties will not be placed at the far-right end of the left-right dimension. Therefore, in line with the notion of party families forming distinct ideological clusters in the policy space, the first hypothesis reads:

H1: The radical right party family is indistinguishable from other party families on the grounds of its placement in the policy space defined by the left-right dimension.

4.2.2. The definition of the radical right and the authoritarian component of the policy space

The previous analysis (Chapter 2) demonstrated that despite the conceptual distinction between authoritarian and exclusionary issues, there is a strong positive association between the exclusionary and authoritarian aspects of ideology across all party families. In line with these findings, most authors consider authoritarianism to be a *necessary* and sometimes even a

sufficient feature for a party to be classified as the radical right (Mudde, 2007; Kitschelt, 2007; Carter, 2005; Borz, 2012).

However, already during von Beyme's second phase radical right parties adopted less extreme positions considering some ideological aspects. The most obvious change concerns the rejection of Nazism and fascism in both ideological and symbolic terms (Williams M. H., 2006, p. 56). However, in the last two decades, in order not to alienate or scare off voters with an overtly authoritarian message, quite a few radical right parties additionally relaxed their policies considering certain issues and even adopted some of the policies from the post-materialist agenda (Betz, 1999). In this respect, modern radical right parties are likely to discard the notions of strictly ordered society and hierarchical models of decision-making inherent to the interwar far-right parties and movements, and tolerate some freedoms considering individual life styles and choices. Furthermore, radical right parties are likely to understate and relax the positions considering polices coming from atavistic, traditional or religious worldviews, such as restrictive positions considering women rights, totalitarian notions of state or militarism.

These changes are particularly evident with regard to the societies in which progressive liberal values took deeper roots (thus, predominantly Western European states) and especially noticeable in cases of newly formed parties which do not face internal (partisan) and external (voter) pressures related to the authoritarian ideological traditions. Thus, radical right parties such as the Flemish Block, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Northern League (Italy), and the Norwegian Progress Party have embraced freedom of expression, separation of church and state, and the equality of men and women (Mudde, 2007). In addition to accepting the equality of men and women, women take a more prominent role in the leadership of radical right parties (Meret,

2015).[84] Furthermore, parties such as the Party for Freedom (the Netherlands) and the List Pim Fortuyn adopted liberal positions over LGBT issues (Akkerman, 2015; van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003).[85]

While the moderation of the Western European radical right is fairly pronounced, there is some evidence of the ideological transformation of the Eastern European radical right with respect to the authoritarian component of the policy space, although the changes seem to be tentative and halfhearted. The most visible change is the rejection of aggressive and violent ultra-nationalist rhetoric characteristic for the early 1990s. However, some of the changes are comparable to the ones in Western Europe. Nominally, the equality of men and women is the generally accepted position, and women frequently play a prominent role in Eastern European radical right parties.[86] On the other hand, some of the long-lasting radical right parties significantly toned down authoritarian aspects of their ideology. For instance, For Fatherland and Freedom started from far-right positions in 1993 but, upon the merger with the Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK), became more moderate and, consequently, it is often considered to be a borderline case (Muižnieks, 2005; Auers & Kasekamp, 2013).[87] Another

[84] Pia Kjærsgaard was one founders and, up to 2012, the leader of the Danish People's Party; Marine Le Pen took over the leadership of the National Front from her father Jean-Marie Le Pen; Alessandra Mussolini was the leader of the Social Action before the party merged with the People of Freedom; Siv Jensen is the leader of Norwegian Progress Party.

[85] Homophobia is characteristic of many radical right parties, but not all. Mudde underlined that two Dutch parties of the 1990s, the Centre Democrats and Centre Party '86, did not take an overtly homophobic position (Mudde, 2007, p. 67). However, while in Eastern Europe LGBT issues seems to be uniformly rejected, in the West LGBT issues seem to be a point of compromise for some radical right parties. For instance, despite homophobic references of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the National Front did not participate in anti-gay marriage campaign in France in 2013 (Diffley, 2013). Similarly, Betz notes that a survey from August 2012 found almost half of the National Front supporters coming out in favor of gay marriage (Betz, 2013a)

[86] Krisztina Morvai, although not formally a member, figures prominently on behalf of Jobbik; Ruža Tomašić is the founder the Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević, and before leaving she was the only representative of the party in the European Parliament; Nataša Jovanović and Vjerica Radeta were very prominent MPs of the Serbian Radical Party.

[87] Despite being in the government during 1995-2004, 2006-2010 and after 2014, I consider the party to be the radical right. In addition to support for Nazi Waffen Latvian Legion and Russophobia, this is position is also

example of moderation is the Croatian Party of Rights, which under the leadership of Tonči Tadić tried to present itself as a moderate conservative party (Stojarová, 2013).[88] Finally, similarly to some Western European parties, certain Eastern European radical right parties actively address some post-materialist issues, such as protection of environment, animal welfare or renewable energy (Olsen, 1999; Turner-Graham, 2013).[89]

Given that in comparison to their predecessors, the modern radical right parties are, on average, more likely to adopt moderate positions considering authoritarian issues, the traditional understanding of the radical right ideology may no longer capture *differentia specifica* of the party family. In this regard, in opposition to the conventional understanding of the radical right, one may argue that authoritarianism is *neither necessary nor sufficient* in the definition and identification of the radical right. Consequently, the following hypothesis states:

H2: The radical right party family is indistinguishable from other party families on the grounds of its placement in the policy space defined by authoritarian issues.

4.2.3. The definition of the radical right and the exclusionary component of the policy space

Complementary to the above stated hypotheses, I argue that the radical right party family should be defined using its position with regard to the exclusionary component of the policy

justified by the merger of the party with the fairly extreme All for Latvia!, which resulted in creation of a new party, the National Alliance (Auers & Kasekamp, 2013).

[88] The most important example of the transformation is the Serbian Radical Party. However, the transformation surpassed adoption of more moderate positions, but rather it was an outright change of political family. As early as in 2008 there were clear signs that party is moving to the center when it supported the Stabilization and Association Pact with the EU. This eventually brought about the split of the party in 2009, where the leadership and the majority of membership of the party formed the pro-EU moderately rightist Serbian Progressive Party (Spoerri, 2010). Subsequently, the Serbian Radical Party was not successful in passing electoral threshold, while the Serbian Progressive Party won 2012 and 2014 parliamentary elections.

[89] Examples of such parties are Dveri (Serbia) and the Croatian Party of Rights, which actively advocated for protection of environment and, particularly, oppose the introduction of genetically modified organisms. However, it must be underlined that, to some extent, these positions are also driven by anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories considering the influence and the role of agrochemical and agricultural company Monsanto. On the other hand, the program of Jobbik addresses issues such as animal welfare and illegal waste dumping.

space. Thus, extreme positions considering exclusionary issues are *necessary and sufficient* in defining the radical right. The main assumption of this proposition is that, notwithstanding the changes of the radical right ideology, the extreme positions considering exclusionary issues persist as a constant feature of the radical right ideology. Namely, similar to other ideological facets, the exclusionary aspect of the radical right ideology changed with time. In Western Europe, starting with the end of World War II, the radical right discarded biological racism in favor of anti-immigrant positions, and subsequently moved to Islamophobia, cultural racism and Euroscepticism (Betz, 2001; Carter, 2005). Likewise, in Eastern Europe, the radical right parties were initially on ultra-nationalist positions, focused predominantly on irredentism and threats from neighboring states, while in the later stages, the parties became more concerned with ethnic minorities, Roma and, particularly, with the EU. However, unlike with the authoritarian ideological component, where it is expected that radical right parties on average assume less extreme positions and assign less importance to the issues, throughout the changes extreme positions considering the exclusionary ideological component remained constant and the issues continually dominated the radical right agenda.

Therefore, the core of the radical right family is situated in its relation to the "Other". In this regard, the inflated notion of own group, and, in particular, fear, mistrust or hatred of individuals belonging to the out-group (immigrants, ethnic minorities, racial distinct groups, etc.) are the main characteristics of radical right parties across both space and time. In other words, *all radical right parties* are taking extreme positions over the exclusionary dimension regardless of the change in the ideological characteristics inherent to the particular period. Thus, it is expected that when these parties are mapped against other party families in the policy space consisting exclusively of exclusionary issues, radical right parties will create an ideologically distinct

cluster. Therefore, assuming the lack of antidemocratic activities and participation in democratic process, the last hypothesis reads:

H3: The radical right party family is distinguishable from other party families on the grounds of its placement in the policy space defined by exclusionary issues.

4.3. Data and methodology

4.3.1. Specification of the methods

The abovementioned hypotheses ask for a particular methodological approach. A typical approach to the analysis of groups involves assessing the impact of independent variables on the *known* group membership. However, as the hypotheses require that particular groups of parties are distinguishable on the basis of their position in the policy space, it is necessary to disregard known (or assumed) class membership structures (i.e. membership of parties in party families). Usually, in political science these problems are solved using a qualitative approach (e.g. Carter, 2005; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Minkenberg, 2003). As such, they are susceptible to criticisms due to the lack of transparent procedure and potential arbitrariness. In order to minimize the involvement of researcher in determining class membership, I account for the hypothesized taxonomies using a quantitative method – cluster analysis (for an example of a similar methodological approach see Ennser, 2012).

The implementation of cluster analysis in party research faces two difficulties. Firstly, a typical party level data set includes information considering a small or mid-sized sample. Under these conditions, negative properties of methods are likely to be exaggerated, particularly in the presence of unusual cases or outliers. Secondly, the statistical literature does not provide unequivocal answers considering the selection of an optimal number of classes and model fit.[90]

[90] This problem is particularly noticeable in relation to the more primitive methods of classification (i.e. hierarchical clustering, k-means clustering, fuzzy clustering) (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). Nonetheless, the difficulty is also present in advanced classification methods, such as latent class analysis. Namely, the difference between two nested

To tackle these problems a multi-method procedure is designed and uniformly applied across all classification problems in the dissertation. Thus, all taxonomies are selected using three clustering methods (HCA-hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis, k-means and LCA-latent class analysis) and a validation procedure.

The selection of the cluster analytic methods and their specification is guided by an attempt to increase the chances of producing similar cluster solutions. In this regard, in certain application of LCA, log-likelihood function resembles the criteria employed in k-means (Vermunt & Magidson, 2002). On the other hand, as the measure of similarity between cases in k-means procedure is Euclidean distance, this similarity measure is also selected for the application of agglomerative HCA. Considering the HCA method of assignment of cases to clusters, the selected method is UPGM (unweighted pair-group method) which, in comparison to extremes of single and complete linkage methods, represents a midpoint (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984, p. 40). However, as it is the only method based on a more general statistical reasoning, LCA is given primacy over other two methods.[91] In this regard, HCA and k-means are primarily used to control for possible aberrations caused by small sample sizes and to provide the assessment of robustness.

latent class models is assessed with a likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic (G-squared). However, the difference G-squared test is not appropriate for comparing models with different number of latent classes as these models are not nested in the traditional sense of the word. For these reasons, authors typically assess model fit and the number of classes using Bayesian or Akaike Information Criterions.

[91] LCA resembles structural equation modeling, in that latent variables are created from indicator variables, however, unlike structural equation modeling, latent variables are assumed to be categorical (McCutcheon, 1987; Goodman, 2002). Namely, in LCA cases are assumed to belong to a set of *k* latent classes, with the number of classes and their sizes not known a priori (Vermunt & Magidson, 2002, p. 89). LCA works on the principal of maximizing the likelihood of the observed data. It is assumed that the data is generated by a mixture of underlying probability distributions. The likelihood for data consisting of n observations assuming a Gaussian mixture model with G multivariate mixture components is: $\prod_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{k=1}^{G}\boldsymbol{\tau_k}\boldsymbol{\phi}(\boldsymbol{x_i};\boldsymbol{\mu_k},\boldsymbol{\Sigma_k})$ where G is the numbers of mixture components (clusters). Geometric features (shape, volume, orientation) of the clusters are determined by the covariances $\boldsymbol{\Sigma_k} = \boldsymbol{\lambda_k}\boldsymbol{D_k}\boldsymbol{A_k}\boldsymbol{D_k}^{\top}$, which also may be parameterized to impose constraints across components (Fraley & Raftery, 2007).

Save for LCA, none of the methods has an inherent type of fit statistics. Thus, in order to determine which classification has the best fit to data, it is necessary to use validation indexes. However, as none of validation indices provides a definitive guide to the number of clusters, a set of various validity measures is employed. I am employing two general types of validation: internal and stability.[92] Without going into the detailed explanation of each validity score, I will list the main indices used here.[93] For internal validation I am using connectivity, Dunn index, and silhouette width (Brock, Pihur, Datta, & Datta, 2008). In addition, I am using average distance between clusters, average distance within clusters, and within sum of squared errors (Hennig, 2002). For stability validation I am using average proportion of non-overlap, average distance, average distance between means and figure of merit (Brock, Pihur, Datta, & Datta, 2008). In addition to these indices, BIC is used to assess the validity of classifications produced by LCA (Fraley & Raftery, 2007).

All three clustering methods are executed in a uniform manner. Each method is used to generate partitions ranging from two to ten clusters. In the use of LCA all partitions are generated across all possible parameterizations. Consequently, 108 classifications are produced for each test. Each classification is validated using 10 validation scores. Based on the validation procedure the best performing classifications are selected and reviewed in detail.

The best performing classifications are expected to reflect the theoretical expectations considering the adequacy of concepts used in the definition of the radical right. Firstly, it is expected that the use of cluster analysis will create a homogenous and exhaustive radical right clusters. This assumes that the *crisp aspect of clustering* will mirror the group of parties usually

[92]According to Brock et al.: "Internal validation measures take only the dataset and the clustering partition as input and use intrinsic information in the data to assess the quality of the clustering. The stability measures are a special version of internal measures. They evaluate the consistency of a clustering result by comparing it with the clusters obtained after each column is removed, one at a time."(2008, pp. 2-3).

[93] For more details see Halkidi, Batistakis, & Vazirgiannis (2002a, 2002b) and Brock, Pihur, Datta, & Datta, (2008).

considered the radical right. Second, it is expected that the classification methodology will provide estimates that address ambiguities related to borderline cases.[94] Thus, the *fuzzy aspect of the clustering* methodology (in particular, LCA probability of class membership) is expected to reflect the uncertainties considering the disputed cases.

4.3.2. Data sets and variables

The cluster analytic approach to testing the hypotheses is facilitated by the use of the Chapel Hill expert survey from 2006 (hereafter CH-06) (Hooghe, et al., 2008). The features that make this data set particularly suitable for cluster analysis are policy scales estimated across all party systems and a large set of issue dimensions. Four items load on the exclusionary dimension: the indictor of positions of parties on immigration policy; the indictor of positions of parties on the dimension of multiculturalism; the indictor of positions of parties on rights of ethnic minorities; and the indictor of positions of parties on the continuum of cosmopolitism versus nationalism. In addition, three items load on the authoritarian dimension: the indictor of positions of parties on the dimension of expanded personal freedom (abortion, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation) versus traditionalism (value order, tradition, government's moral patronage); the indictor of positions of parties on law and order policies; the indictor of positions of parties on liberal policies.[95] The placement of the parties in either

[94] For instance, while there is no doubt with regard populist character of the UK Independence Party and its pronounced Euroscepticism(Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts, 2012), the party was careful to distance itself from typical radical right parties such as the National Front (France) or the Party for Freedom (the Netherlands), and often it is not categorized as the radical right. On the other hand, now defunct, the National Alliance (Italy) was a successor openly fascist Italian Social Movement, created right after World War II by supporters of Benito Mussolini. However, under leadership of Gianfranco Fini, the party went through a phase of moderation, and it is questionable to what degree it can be considered a radical right party. Furthermore, it is questionable to what degree parties which gained prominence during the second wave of the new radical right, specifically Norwegian economically libertarian Progress Party and the True Fins, can be considered members of the family.

[95] I have excluded two indicators from the analysis. The first is the indicator of position on religion, which, while being very important, can be categorized as both an exclusionary and an authoritarian issue and, thus, does not facilitate the testing of the hypotheses presented here. Secondly, while the position on the EU is important in understanding radical right, it is typically not considered a core issue of the radical right, and on those grounds, it is

exclusionary or authoritarian issue space is expected to be determined by the party family. Figure 4.1 displays the graphical representation of the respective cluster analytic models estimated using CH-06.

Figure 4.1
Graphical representation of exclusionary and authoritarian models estimated in analysis



Note: The figure illustrates two cluster analytic models of party family identification estimated using CH-06 data set.

Two expert surveys are used for supplementary analyses: the Party Policy in Modern Democracies (Benoit & Laver, 2007) (hereafter PPMD) and the Chapel Hill expert survey from 2010 (Bakker, et al., 2012) (hereafterCH-10).While the use of these data sets allows for the analysis of position and salience across the first decade of the 21st century, the specific limitations make them unsuitable for cluster analysis. Considering PPMD, most of the issue dimensions are limited to a subset of cases. Considering CH-10, due to the lack of the indicator of nationalism vs. cosmopolitism, the data set is a poor choice for a proper assessment of the validity of the central hypothesis (for further information on expert surveys see Appendix – Expert Surveys).

The position of the radical right parties on the left-right dimension is directly operationalized. Namely, in PPMD, CH-06 and CH-10 surveys experts were asked to place

excluded from the analysis. Namely, while many radical right parties are Eurosceptic, Euroscepticism is not sufficient to categorize a party as the radical right. Similar is the case with religion. See Chapter 5 with regard to the analysis of the relationship of the radical right and these indicators.

parties on the left-right scale. As in this case we are dealing with a one-dimensional policy space, where the potential misclassification is evident, cluster analysis is not necessary.

Finally, it is important to underline that in the following analysis I am using a list of parties categorized as the radical right. While in the analysis I consider the radical right family to have unknown membership, identified only by the ideological characteristics of parties, it is necessary to use the list of "usual suspects" to enable the comparison of produced clusters to the membership in the radical right party family.[96]

4.4. Results

4.4.1. The left-right dimension

Given that the general left-right dimension is a synthesis of policy positions, it is reasonable to assume that the effect of the far-right positions on the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension will be balanced out by the moderate positions on the economic dimension. This mechanism is expected to have the effect on both *the level of expert scores considering particular parties* and *the level of mean scores of experts across parties*.

Considering the first perspective, the mixture of leftist economic positions and rightist exclusionary-authoritarian positions is likely to cause a disagreement among the experts considering the actual positions of particular radical right parties on the left-right dimension.[97] In this regard, for the majority of radical right parties the observed standard deviations of expert scores are small. The few exceptions are exclusively radical right parties of the post-communist Europe, where the standard deviations of expert scores for the Greater Romania Party and the

[96] The list is compiled using numerous sources including: Hainsworth (2008), Mudde (2007), Mudde (2005), Carter (2005), and Williams (2006). For testing purposes, the list does not include the UK Independence Party. However, based on the evidence presented in this analysis the UK Independence Party is included in the radical right party family in the subsequent analysis.

[97] This is a special case where there is a cause to doubt the validity of the means of expert scores. However, in general, the means of expert scores are taken as accurately reflecting the positions of the parties.

Slovak National Party are disproportionately large according to the results in all three data sets. Similar to the Bulgarian National Union Attack (outlier in terms of standard deviation in CH-06 and CH-10), these are the parties that blend exclusionist positions with a set of leftist economic positions (Frusetta & Glont, 2009; Anastasakis, 2002; Mudde, 2000; Mudde, 2005).

Considering the second perspective, it is likely that the parties with leftist economic views will not be positioned on the far-right side of the left-right dimension. Figure 4.2 presents the distribution of *mean scores of experts* considering the positions of radical right parties in all three surveys. The graphs demonstrate that European radical right parties are occupying predominantly rightist positions; however, many parties are not located on the extreme right positions of the left-right continuum, while some are actually placed in the center of the policy space. Therefore, it seems that, although the conceptualization of the radical right on the basis of the left-right dimension reflects an important aspect of the ideology of the radical right, it does not precisely differentiate between the radical right party family and other party families. Therefore, there is strong evidence for*H1*.

Figure 4.2
Distribution of scores of European radical right parties over the left-right dimension



Note: The figures present the mean scores of experts with respect to each party. The difference in scores between CH-06/CH-10 and PPMD are due to scaling.

4.4.2. The authoritarian component of the policy space

Considering taxonomies based on the authoritarian component of the policy space, the validation of the classifications produced by HCA points to divisions in three, five and ten clusters, while the validation of the classes produced by k-means indicates the validity of divisions in two and nine clusters. The validity scores of LCA clustering indicate that the most optimal solutions occurred at classifications in five and eight clusters based on EEE (equal volume, shape and orientation of clusters) parameterization (for detailed discussion on validation and results see Appendix-Chapter 4).

The review of the most optimal HCA solutions (see Table 4.1) demonstrates that classifications based on authoritarian issues are not suitable for the identification of the radical right. Radical right parties are prevalently grouped in a single cluster that remains stable throughout all classifications. However, the clusters incorporate only 75 percent of radical right parties in the sample. In addition, these are not homogenous clusters, but incorporate seven conservative and Christian-democratic parties.[98] While some of these parties used hard nationalist and anti-immigration rhetoric or they formed coalitions with radical right parties (e.g. Law and Justice) they are seldom considered the radical right.

Table 4.1
Confusion matrix for HCA and k-means classifications based on authoritarian issues

	HCA Classification in 10 groups		HCA Classification in 3 groups		K-means Classification in 9 groups		K-means Classification in 3 groups	
Cluster ID	Radical right	Other	Radical right	Other	Radical right	Other	Radical right	Other
1	0	38	0	54	0	26	0	56
2	0	14	4	97	2	16	17	31
3	0	6	13	7	0	13	0	71
4	0	1			2	12		
5	2	30			0	22		
6	2	20			0	26		
7	13	7			0	24		
8	0	40			13	6		
9	0	1			0	13		
10	0	1						

Note: shaded cells indicate dominantly radical right cluster; classifications produced using CH-06 data set

[98] The conservative and Christian-democratic parties clustered with radical right parties are: the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (Germany), the People's Party (Spain), the Democratic and Social Center/People's Party (Portugal), the Law and Justice Party (Poland); Slovakian Christian Democratic Movement , the New Slovenia - Christian People's Party (Slovenia); and the Order and Justice (Lithuania).

K-means produces almost identical results. While the classifications in a small number of clusters do not produce a distinctively radical right cluster, the division in nine groups creates a cluster consisting of thirteen radical right parties and six conservative and Christian-democratic parties. Excluding the People's Party (Spain), the parties grouped in this cluster are identical to the group of parties created using HCA (see Table 4.1). In the same manner, k-means fails to incorporate a set of radical right parties in the radical right cluster. Specifically, the Danish People's Party, the Party for Freedom (the Netherlands), the True Finns, and For Fatherland and Freedom (Latvia) are misclassified.

The analysis of classifications provided by LCA confirms the findings based on the HCA and k-means. Although classifications are successful in creating clusters comprising the majority of radical right parties, the radical right parties are mixed with predominantly conservative and Christian democratic parties (see Table 4.2).[99]

Table 4.2
Confusion matrix for LCA classifications (EEE parameterization) based on authoritarian issues

	LCA Classification in 5 groups		LCA Classification in 8 groups	
Cluster ID	Radical right	Other	Radical right	Other
1	0	42	0	1
2	0	48	0	40
3	4	45	0	13
4	13	9	2	15
5	0	14	2	26
6			13	12
7			0	30
8			0	21

Note: shaded cells indicate dominantly radical right cluster; classifications produced using CH-06 data set

Finally, in order to address the inclusion of parties in the "radical right cluster", Figure 4.3 displays LCA class membership probabilities associated with both radical right parties and parties coming from other party families. It is noticeable that radical right parties have probabilities of membership similar to other parties, and that in some cases class membership probabilities of radical right parties are even lower in comparison to the parties coming from the

[99] In addition to conservative and Christian democratic the parties mentioned above, the list includes the Christian Union (the Netherlands), the Union of Christian and Center Democrats (Italy), and the Democratic and Social Center/People's Party (Portugal).

other party families (see Figure 4.3). This is particularly noticeable with regard to the LCA classification in eight groups, where radical right parties are classified with a larger number of parties coming from other families.

Figure 4.3
Probability of class membership in the radical right cluster –the authoritarian component of the policy space



Note: sizes of circles correspond to the values of class membership probabilities.

Therefore, classifications fail in creating both exhaustive and homogenous radical right clusters. Furthermore, probabilities of cluster membership in the radical right cluster demonstrate that if the definition of the radical right is based solely on authoritarian issues, the radical right parties are indistinguishable from conservative and Christian democratic parties. On the other hand, it is quite problematic that the Danish People's Party, the Party for Freedom (the Netherlands), the True Finns and For Fatherland and Freedom (Latvia) are repetitively misclassified. The Danish Peoples Party was part of the wave of Western European parties that adopted neoliberal economic ideological tenets and strong anti-immigrant rhetoric.[100] Most of

[100] The party emerged as a splinter from the Danish Progress Party, but soon became more successful and took a more moderate position considering economic issues. However, it never reached the vote share of the Progressive

the last decade the party spent supporting minority governments of conservatives and liberals, and adopted more liberal policies over some authoritarian issues. However, the party is considered a typical representative of the new radical right. On the other hand, the Dutch Party of Freedom is at the forefront of Islamophobic rhetoric in Western Europe and, in many regards, it is the extension of ideological brand initiated by Pim Fortuyn. The True Finns and For Fatherland and Freedom are less clear-cut cases. The True Finns is sometimes considered a borderline case, but the party emerged from the bankrupt Rural Party that was the part of the second wave of the radical right. Finally, For Fatherland and Freedom oscillated from the strong objection to the naturalization of Russian speaking population and the support for the role of the Latvian Legion in World War II, to some moderation in the early 2000s, but it subsequently merged with the far-right All for Latvia in 2011,which effectively took over the party (Auers & Kasekamp, 2013). Therefore, the findings confirm the hypothesis of inadequacy of authoritarian issues in the definition of the radical right and the differentiation of the radical right from other party families (*H2*).

4.4.3. The exclusionary component of the policy space

Considering taxonomies based on exclusionary issues validation scores of both HCA and k-means classes indicate the optimal solutions with respect to classifications in two, three and ten clusters. On the other hand, in addition to the divisions in minimal number of clusters, the most valid solution produced by LCA are EEE classifications (equal volume, shape and orientation) in seven and five clusters and VEV classification (variable orientation and shape, equal volume) into three classes (for detailed discussion on validation and results see Appendix-Chapter 4).

Party in national elections, although in 2014 election for European Parliament the party took more than 26 percent of the votes.

The classifications based on HCA give strong evidence for *H3*. The cluster of radical right parties is formed already at division in two clusters and remains stable during further divisions. The cluster includes all radical parties in the list, with the addition of the UK Independence Party, and the New Flemish Alliance.

In contrast to HCA, k-means clustering fails to produce a homogenous cluster of radical right parties via classification in small number of classes (two and three clusters). However, with the division into ten clusters k-means arrives at a solution similar to HCA. In particular, ten-cluster solution creates a class of radical right parties that includes both the UK Independence Party and the New Flemish Alliance. However, in contrast to the classification based on HCA, radical right cluster based on k-means excludes the True Fins (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3
Confusion matrix for HCA and k-means classifications based on exclusionary issues

	K-means Classification in 10 groups		HCA Classification in 3 groups	
Cluster ID	Radical right	Other	Radical right	Other
1	0	16	0	46
2	16	2	0	110
3	1	23	17	2
4	0	32		
5	0	24		
6	0	6		
7	0	22		
8	0	19		
9	0	7		
10	0	7		

Note: shaded cells indicate dominantly radical right cluster; classifications produced using CH-06 data set

Regardless of parameterization, LCA classifications in two clusters produce almost identical results: all radical right parties are grouped in a cluster comprising 40 parties. In addition to radical right parties, the cluster incorporates a large set of regionalist parties and some conservative or Christian-democratic parties (e.g. the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union and the Law and Justice Party).[101] However, the divisions exceeding the minimal number of classes are

[101] The list of ethnic and regionalist parties includes parties such as: the Party of Wales; the Scottish National Party; the Basque Nationalist Party; the Basque Solidarity; the Galician Nationalist Bloc; the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania; We Ourselves; the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. This finding underlines some important similarities between regionalist/ethnic parties and the radical right. In an additional analysis based on both exclusionary and authoritarian issues, which is not presented here, these parties form a distinct regional/ethnic party cluster characterized by high average probability. The specific mixture of positions (i.e. combination of very liberal

similar to the ones produced by HCA and k-means. The classification in three clusters based on VEV parameterization groups the UK Independence Party, the Law and Justice Party (Poland) and the New Flemish Alliance in the radical right cluster, but excludes the True Fins. On the other hand, the classification in four clusters based on EEE parameterization includes the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (Estonia) and the New Era Party (Latvia) in the radical right cluster.[102] The classification in seven clusters includes the UK Independence Party and the New Flemish Alliance in the group of radical right parties, but in contrast to all other classifications, excludes the National Alliance (Italy) and the True Finns.[103] Therefore, excluding division into minimal number of classes, all classifications produce reasonably exhaustive and homogenous radical right clusters, and consequently it is justified to claim that LCA taxonomies supports *H3* (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4
Confusion matrix for LCA classifications based on exclusionary issues

	LCA parameterizations and classifications					
	VEV Classification in 3 groups		EEE Classification in 4 groups		EEE Classification in 7 groups	
Cluster ID	Radical right	Other	Radical right	Other	Radical right	Other
1	1	127	0	39	0	35
2	0	28	0	61	0	15
3	16	3	0	54	0	38
4			17	4	0	35
5					15	2
6					2	23
7					0	10

Note: shaded cells indicate dominantly radical right cluster; classifications produced using CH-06 data set

positions with regard minority issues, but centrist or even somewhat rightist position with regard authoritarian issues results in a high level of confidence with regard to the accuracy of classification of these parties in a separate party family. However, undoubtedly, this party family shares a lot of characteristics with the radical right.

[102] The membership of the New Era Party in the radical right cluster is problematic and can be considered a misclassification. Namely, although the party is considered populist and somewhat nationalist (Pabriks & Stokenberga, 2006), it was never considered the radical right. On the other hand, the Pro Patria Union was created in 1995 by merger with the radical right Estonian National Independence Party. Both parties were infamous for their radical statements considering minority issues during the early 1990s, but later they moderated their policy stances (Poleshchuk, 2005, p. 56).

[103] The National Alliances is particularly interesting case in this regard, as its membership in the radical right family is disputed. The party is the successor of the fascist Italian Social Movement, but went through a phase of moderation and denunciation of fascism and subsequently merged with Silvio Berlusconi's People of Freedom in 2009.

Finally, Figure 4.4 presents the probabilities of class membership in the radical right cluster for classifications in four and seven classes based on EEE parameterization. The classification in four clusters underlines the uncertainty of membership in radical right family of the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL), the National Alliance (AN), the True Finns, the Law and Justice Party (PiS), the New Flemish Alliance (NVA) and the Danish People's Party (DF). The smaller and a more strict radical right cluster produced by division in seven clusters, underlines comparatively lower probability of membership in the radical right family of the New Flemish Alliance (NVA) and Italian Northern League (LN). However, contrary to the initial assumptions, there is a strong indication that the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is a member of the radical right family.

Therefore, the classifications based on exclusionary issues produce quite homogenous radical right clusters comprising almost all “usual suspects”. The precision of the classifications is particularly obvious if compared to the classification based on authoritarian issues (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2 vs. Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Moreover, the classifications reflect intuitions considering the parties closely associated to the radical right. In particular, the New Flemish Alliance, which seeks secession of Flanders from Belgium (Deschouwer, 2013) and the extreme nationalist Law and Justice Party (Poland) (Pankowski, 2010) are sometimes categorized as the radical right. In addition, the classifications address to the problematic cases of the radical right, such as the True Finns, the National Alliance or the UK Independence Party. Consequently, there is strong evidence that radical right parties should be defined on the grounds of their position in the exclusionary policy space (*H3*).

Figure 4.4
Probability of class membership in the radical right cluster – the exclusionary component of the policy space



Note: sizes of circles correspond to the values of class membership probabilities.

4.4.4. Supplementary analysis – position and salience across time

In order to expand the analysis to a wider time span and a larger selection of radical right parties, I analyze the position of the radical right across all three expert surveys. A more general representation of the positions of radical right parties is obtained by plotting the parties in the policy space defined by the exclusionary and authoritarian ideological components. Figure 4.5 demonstrates that most parties are occupying the extreme rightist positions on the exclusionary dimension, while their placement in the policy space is less restricted considering authoritarian issues. On the other hand, there are very small, positive, but *statistically insignificant* associations between positions on authoritarian dimension and exclusionary dimension considering PPMD and CH-06 data sets. On the other hand, with regard to CH-10 there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between dimensions (r=0.544). However, this association is still lower in comparison to the associations observed considering all parties in CH-06 and CH-10 data sets (r≈0.90) (see Chapter 2). Therefore, there is evidence that within the

radical right party family positions on the exclusionary and authoritarian ideological components are independent.

In addition to providing evidence considering the central hypothesis of the chapter, the Figure also confirms the findings considering specific borderline cases. Most obviously, on all three plots Italian National Alliance (AN) is occupying a "moderate" position on the exclusionary ideological component, while it takes a relatively extreme position considering authoritarian issues. In this regard, considering the first decade of the 21st century, it is justifiable to claim that the National Alliance is a case of ultra-conservative party rather than a radical right party. To a lesser degree, the ambiguity with regard to the party family is also present considering True Finns (PS). Furthermore, in Eastern Europe, the parties such as the For Fatherland and Freedom – National Alliance (TB/LNNK-NA) and to lesser extent Slovenian National Party (SNSsl), and in Western Europe, parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the Danish Peoples Party (DF) and the Norwegian Progress Party (FrPno), are typical examples of moderately authoritarian, but extremely exclusionary parties. On the other hand, as expected, the Dutch radical right parties, List Pim Fortuyn and the Party for Freedom, are at forefront of the radical right ideological innovation (see Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5
Position of radical right parties in the exclusionary-authoritarian policy space



Note: For the CH-06 and CH-10 data sets, the available exclusionary and authoritarian issues are combined in the respective policy dimensions by extracting a single component via principal component analysis. For PPMD the exclusionary composite indicator is created by joining the indicators of position on nationalism for Eastern Europe and on immigration for Western Europe, while the indicator "social" represents the authoritarian dimension.

Finally, I compare the mean positions of radical right parties on exclusionary issues to the mean positions on authoritarian issues across all three expert surveys. As expected, scores on authoritarian issues are, on average, lower than the ones characteristic for exclusionary issues across all three data sets. The lowest scores are observed considering position on social lifestyle, however, the scores on civil liberties vs. law and order are close to the lowest scorers considering exclusionary issues (see Table 4.5).

However, while the difference between averages of radical right parties on exclusionary and authoritarian positional indicators is not very pronounced, there is an evident difference considering salience indicators. Namely, across all three expert surveys the scores on the salience indicators for authoritarian issues are noticeably lower in comparison to the salience scores for exclusionary issues. In this regard, while there is evidence that a substantial number of radical right parties still maintains authoritarian ideological positions, for most of the parties these issues are not at the top of the agenda. Consequently, overall, there is strong evidence for an innovative character of the ideological profile of modern radical right parties in which authoritarian issues play less significant role, but which preserves extreme positions considering exclusionary issues.

Table 4.5
Mean position/salience scores of radical right parties

	Positional indicators			Salience indicators		
	CH-06	**CH-10**	**PPMD**	**CH-06**	**CH-10**	**PPMD**
Authoritarian issues						
social lifestyle/social	8.57	8.28	16.31	7.30	6.61	13.45
gal/tan or new politics position	8.70	8.66				
civil liberties vs. law & order	8.82	8.73		7.17	7.54	
Exclusionary issues						
immigration	8.71	8.99	18.67	8.37	8.50	18.44
cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	9.52		18.86	8.65		17.57
ethnic minorities	8.98	8.89		8.15	8.14	
multiculturalism vs. assimilation	9.16	9.19		8.08	8.09	

4.5. Discussion of findings and the relation to the subsequent analyses

Considering methodological aspect of the research, the analysis provides evidence for effectiveness of seldom-used cluster analytic methods in addressing the problems of party classifications. In particular, the analysis provides evidence for robustness and suitability of LCA in political party research. The accuracy of classifications based on LCA is validated by comparisons with classifications obtained by HCA and k-means, and the results produced by all three methods are very similar. On the other hand, the cluster membership probabilities obtained by LCA reflect the debates related to membership of particular parties in the radical right party family. In this regard, LCA allows for direct assessment of problematic cases and facilitates empirical driven decisions considering party family membership. Overall, these findings demonstrate the superiority of the proposed methodology in comparison to the methods commonly used in the literature.

However, most importantly, the analysis presents evidence of the changing nature of the radical right ideology. The findings demonstrate that some of the characteristics commonly associated with the traditional radical right are no longer useful in defining and identifying the radical right of the 21st century. In particular, results show that the notion of defining the radical right using the left-right dimension is confounding and inadequate. Therefore, if the neoliberal position was a dominant characteristic of radical right parties up to the early 1990s, there is no evidence that it is a distinctive feature of contemporary radical right parties.

Most importantly, the analysis demonstrated that authoritarianism is no longer a distinctive characteristic of the radical right party family. While most of the radical right parties are still highly authoritarian, the increasing number of the parties is taking a more liberal position considering authoritarian issues. This transformation in ideology is unprecedented in the history

of radical right parties and it presents the ideological innovation characteristic only for the contemporary radical right.

By contrast, the analysis showed that the essence of the radical right is where it always was – in the position of the party family considering "the Other". Thus, the core of the radical right is in the exclusionary aspects of its ideology and the analysis demonstrated that the definition of the radical right based on exclusionary issues enables a precise identification of radical right parties. However, this ideological aspect is also the most discomforting facet of the party family as it relates the contemporary radical right with the destruction and hatred that marked much of the 20th century.

These changes present a challenge for democratic societies. With prolonged participation of radical right parties in democratic process, further transformations of the radical right ideology should be expected. In the future, radical right parties are likely to focus on the specific exclusionary aspects of their ideology (e.g. Islamophobia or anti-Romanism). Furthermore, the radical right is likely to relax some aspects of its ideology and adopt social and economic positions traditionally held by left-libertarian and post-materialist parties. Finally, they are likely to use politically correct language and act as normal participants of political life. However, with the unprecedented electoral success of radical right parties, their growing acceptance and the increased participation in the government, there are fears that both public and elites may underestimate the peril brought about by the rise of the radical right. This danger is in the extreme position of the radical right considering the exclusionary component of the policy space – a characteristic shared by all radical right parties across time.

In the following chapter I will further advance the discussion on the position of the radical right in the policy space by addressing the classification of parties within the radical right party

family. By implementing the methodology develop in this analysis, I will assess to what degree the hypothesized difference between the Eastern and the Western European radical right can be established on the basis of the ideological characteristics of the parties.

Chapter 5 – Are there Eastern and Western European Radical Right Parties? A Comparative Analysis of Party Ideology

5.1. Introduction

Despite the process of the EU integration, the increased interdependence and cooperation, as well as the economic and political convergence of states, the past two decades of research on the radical right were characterized by a strict division into Eastern (post-communist) and Western European studies (e.g. Carter, 2005; Givens, 2005; Hainsworth, 2008; Mudde, 2005; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Pankowski, 2010; Stojarová, 2013). Due to contextual differences, frequent ideological changes accompanied by infighting and failure to create permanent international organizations, the dominant understanding is one of distinct party groups rather than a single radical right party family. However, the prolific literature on the radical right has devoted surprisingly little attention to the comparative analysis of Eastern and Western European radical right parties. Consequently, the distinction rests on untested assumptions and a comprehensive empirical analysis of the differences between Eastern and Western European parties is yet to be undertaken.

5.1.1. The problem

Comparison of radical right parties can take various forms. One may compare the organization of parties, their formation and sociopolitical origins, the attitudinal profiles of electorate, or the social, historical and economic contexts in which they operate (Minkenberg, 2009; Pirro, 2014; Mair & Mudde, 1998). Nevertheless, as the main product in the electoral market and the chief factor in distinguishing between party families, an exceptionally important aspect of the radical right considering East vs. West differentiation is the ideological profile of

the parties. With respect to this aspect of far-right politics, the few comparative analyses in the literature do not provide clear-cut answers (Minkenberg, 2009).

Employing the unique socio-economic and political contexts characteristic for post-communist states, the dominant strand of literature draws a strict demarcation line between the East and the West. For instance, Bornschier claims that advanced industrial countries create contexts in which the *raison d'être* of the Western European radical right is so distinctive, that it renders this group of parties to a separate party family (Bornschier, 2010, p. 34). Pirro offers a more elaborate argument. While acknowledging that radical right parties across Europe share characteristics of nativism, authoritarianism and populism, he accentuates the distinctive regional conditions which make the post-communist radical right a *sui generis* phenomenon, characterized by a distinct ideological profile (Pirro, 2014a, pp. 601-604).

However, despite contextual differences, several authors emphasized ideological similarities between radical right parties (e.g. Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005). In this respect, one can stress a number of features shared by radical right parties in Europe. In particular, across decades, ideologies of radical right parties developed using common philosophical and intellectual traditions, the parties often shaped their policy platforms using the models of the counterparts abroad, and they frequently formed international networks and organizations. On the other hand, the common EU framework and globalization present radical right parties with a uniform set of mobilizing opportunities, such as economic shocks or waves of refugees and immigrants, thus aiding in the development of a common ideological profile.

Therefore, while the differences in regional conditions, and especially historical legacies, seem evident, it is questionable to what degree these distinctions are reflected in the ideological profiles of radical right parties. Namely, the contextual differences may obscure the latent

ideological strand common to both the Eastern and the Western European radical right. Thus, while ideologically parties may not be significantly different, due to the contextual diversity, they may appear so. Furthermore, it is important to note that while contextual factors may not have an effect on the ideological positions of the parties, they may have an effect on the varying emphasis considering particular issues. In this respect, radical right parties across Europe may assign different importance to certain issues without actually differing in the policy positions. Finally, while different historical experiences may foster different ideological profiles of parties, the convergence of social, economic and political conditions of Eastern and Western Europe in the last two decades increases the likelihood of the convergence of radical right parties in terms of both position on and salience of relevant issues.

Therefore, the ideological distinction between the Eastern and the Western European radical right is not self-evident, but rather it is a problem that asks for further clarification. The analyses presented in this chapter seek to address this lacuna by assessing to what extent the distinction between the Eastern and the Western European radical right can be justified using exclusively the ideological characteristics of radical right parties.

5.1.2. The contribution and the plan of the analysis

The following analysis seeks to challenge the hypothesized ideological distinction between the Eastern and the Western European radical right by presenting comprehensive and multifaceted evidence that questions the current state of art. In doing so, the analysis utilizes two distinct but complementary lines of research. The first research strategy is focused on the positions of parties in a multidimensional policy space and the potential clustering of parties in separate Eastern and Western European radical right party families. The second research strategy

extends this inquiry by focusing on the salience and the positions of parties with regard to specific issues.

Furthermore, in contrast to predominantly qualitative approach to the problem of party classification (e.g. Carter, 2005, Kitschelt & McGann, 1997), the chapter utilizes a quantitative approach to the analysis of the East vs. West distinction and, in this regard, it is a continuation of the research presented in Chapter 4. The analysis is performed on four datasets, thus offering extensive cross-validation of results, while, in terms of methodology, the analysis employs multi-method approach based on three types of cluster analysis and a set of independent t-tests.

The chapter proceeds in the following manner. In the first section I relate the historical and political contexts to the main hypothesis on ideological differentiation between radical right parties and, subsequently, expand the theoretical framework to hypotheses considering the specific issues. In the following section I discuss the methodology and datasets used in the analysis. The next section presents results of statistical tests, while the final section concludes and presents some suggestions for further analysis.

5.2. The theory on contextual differences and the radical right

Following the literature on the outcomes of post-communist transitions (Janos, 1993; Darden & Grzymala-Busse, 2006; Jowitt, 1992; Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009), it is common to relate conditions relevant for the differentiation of radical right parties to three historical periods: pre-communist, communist, and post-communist (Mudde, 2000; Pirro, 2014a). Although there is some variation between the states, in comparison to Western Europe, in the pre-World War II period Eastern Europe was characterized by authoritarian regimes, nation-building efforts, and lower levels of development, and it is assumed that these legacies generated distinctive

narratives, worldviews and resentments propitious for a particular type of far-right politics.[104] On the other hand, notwithstanding the well documented differences in communist legacies (Pop-Eleches, 2007; Jowitt, 1992; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Tóka, 1999), Eastern European states went through several analogous cultural, social and economic transformations under communist regimes which are likely to uniformly affect the radical right in the region.[105] In this respect, the inclination to wealth redistribution and the attempts in restoration of institutions and traditions proscribed by communist regimes are frequently mentioned characteristics of the Eastern European radical right (Pirro, 2014a; Minkenberg, 2002). Finally, in Eastern Europe the end of the Cold War was followed by the transitional period in terms of the transformation from authoritarian regimes to liberal democracies, the adoption of the capitalist market economy, and a shift from industrialization to post-industrialization (Minkenberg, 2002), thus presenting the radical right with a particular set of issues and problems not inherent to its Western counterpart. Overall, these historical, political and socio-economic conditions are expected to generate distinctive ideological standpoints of Eastern and Western European radical right parties. These expectations can be ranked according to the degree of the anticipated ideological differentiation in the following manner.

Firstly, in the most general terms, a strict differentiation between party groups would assume that the ideological profiles are the function of different correlational structures inherent

[104] For instance, the notions of victimhood and injustice are often adopted in the discourse of the radical right in Eastern Europe (Macdonald, 2002). Furthermore, as throughout this period Eastern European countries were characterized by low levels of industrialization and urbanization, underdeveloped infrastructure, and low literacy rates (Darden & Grzymala-Busse, 2006), but at the same time governed by foreign regimes, radical right parties often adopt the notion of external hindrance to the national progress.

[105] The regimes attempted to overcome the massive economic differences between Eastern and Western Europe through an aggressive development, including the expansion of the infrastructure, electrification and urbanization, but at the same time they neglected agricultural and service sectors (Jowitt, 1992).By doing so communist regimes generated conditions in which certain social groups were likely to be mobilized by the radical right ideology in the post-communist period. Culturally, the most significant result of communism was the imposition of the ideology on all types of cultural products and secularization, which are also likely to result in specific ideological profiles of radical right parties in the East (see discussion below).

to the policy positions of the Eastern and the Western European radical right with respect to *a large selection of issues*. Therefore, in terms of a higher-order multidimensional policy space, the differences are expected to result in clusters of distinctly positioned parties, thus generating separate Eastern and Western European radical right *party families*. Hence, the most comprehensive proposition of the analysis can be expressed in the form of the following hypothesis:

H1: Radical right parties in Eastern and Western Europe occupy different positions in a multidimensional policy space.

In contrast,weaker arguments would focus only on differentiation with respect to*particular issues*. Firstly, the differences between the radical right parties may not amount to a comprehensive ideological distinction characteristic for party families, but rather the parties may be expected to merely take different *positions* considering certain issues. Secondly, an even weaker argument would not assert the ideological differentiation with respect to the positions of the parties, but only with respect to the *salience* of issues.

In order to address these propositions, in the following paragraphs I present the most prominent arguments suggested in the literature with respect to the effect of historical, political and socio-economic contexts on the ideology of the parties. In line with the general theoretical framework (see Chapter 2), the hypotheses are organized according to the reference to one of the following families of issues: exclusionary issues, authoritarian issues and economic issues.

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5.2.1. Hypotheses - exclusionary issues

One of the main assumptions on the East-West differentiation is that East European radical right parties are more extreme. In the words of Mudde: “if compared to their ‘brethren’ in Western Europe, they look somewhat pathetic: (far) more extremist, but (far) less successful.”

(Mudde, 2005, p. 165). The exclusionary aspects of the ideology and especiallynationalism are particularlyimportant in this regard (Enyedi, 2006, p. 232). Namely, with some exceptions, before World War I, most of the territories of today's Eastern European states were parts of large multi-ethnic empires (i.e. Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman and Russian). In this regard, the quest for self-determination marked most of the political and cultural practice throughout the 19th century. Therefore, the modern manifestation of independence of most of East European states is a relatively recent phenomenon, with the earliest indications of sovereignty dating back to the first half of the 19th century.[106] On the other hand, the national communist period often coupled the fusion of nationalist, anti-Semitic and communist doctrines (Chen, 2003; Pankowski, 2010; Krejčí, 1995) with the actual limitation of sovereignty (most vividly exemplified in the Soviet interventions of 1956 and 1968). Finally, the post-communist period brought about frequent territorial changes, starting with the dissolutions of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia to the most recent secession of Crimea and its annexation by the Russian Federation. Consequently, it is likely that due to the fragile nature of East European states and the lack of experience with democracy, the nationalist sentiments will run higher across party systems, and escalate in the ideologies of radical right parties. In this regard it is expected that the East European radical right will take more nationalistic position and combine it with the requests for border revisionism and the deep distrust of neighboring states. By contrast, in the period before the Great War most of Western European countries were already independent, while the consequences of World War II and denazification delegitimized all extremely exclusionary positions. Furthermore, excluding Germany, throughout the post-war period state borders of Western European states remained stable. Thus, although the ultra-nationalism is

[106] This is particularly true with regard some of the Western Balkans and the USSR successor states. Naturally, this proposition excludes medieval incarnations of the states, but rather focuses on the modern form of statehood, which bases sovereignty of self-determination of the people.

expected to be characteristic of all radical right parties (Griffin, 1991; Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2007), the radical right in the West is expected to take a somewhat more moderate position considering the issue, while territorial disputes are not expected to be as prevalent. Consequently, the following hypotheses can be stated:

H2a: In comparison to their Western counterparts, radical right parties in Eastern Europe are taking more extreme positions considering the issue of nationalism.

H2b: In comparison to West European radical right parties, the issue of nationalism features more prominently in the ideologies of radical right parties in Eastern Europe.

The notion of "the enemy" is another potential difference between the Eastern and the Western European radical right. Analogous to the assumption on nationalism, it is expected that in the East the enemy is recognized in neighboring states with (often fictional) territorial pretensions or in the former occupier, most frequently in the form of successor states of the former empires such as Germany, Russia, Turkey or Hungary (Mudde, 2007, pp. 74-86). While this is also characteristic for radical right parties of Western Europe (particularly considering the fears from Russia, Germany and Turkey), the specific aspect of the Eastern European radical right is the relation to the ethnic minorities with neighboring kin states. This antagonism can be traced to the initial formation of national states and the border disputes of the 19th century. On the other hand, although World War II has significantly changed the composition of the population and to some degree incapacitated and delegitimized mobilization on the basis of group membership across Europe,[107] the nationalistic propensities of communist regimes perpetuated the ethnocentric tendencies and, in this regard, generated the background for the

[107] In addition to the significant loss of population due to the war, approximately 10 to12 millions Germans were expelled from Eastern Europe (Noskova, 2000), while most of the Jewish population, previously predominantly situated in Eastern Europe (particularly in Russia, Poland, Romania and Hungary), was exterminated in the Holocaust or later migrated (Panayi, 1998).

radical right mobilization in the post-communist period. Finally, the dissolution of some post-communist states and ensuing civil wars contributed to the climate of suspicion and resentment in Eastern Europe.

An important aspect of the identity of "the Other" is in what Mudde (2007) calls "special enemies". In this respect there is a consensus that Eastern European radical right parties are characterized by strong anti-Roma and anti-Semitic views (Shekhovtsov A., 2013; Pankowski, 2010; Mudde, 2007; Karácsony & Róna, 2011). Thus, although discriminatory practices have been observed in Western European states with a larger Roma population, as the European population of Roma is predominantly concentrated in east-central and south-eastern Europe, numerous examples of Roma discrimination, such as race-motivated violence, segregation of Roma communities by means of makeshift walls or vigilante policing of Roma are mainly associated with Eastern Europe (Feischmidt & Szombati, 2012; Mirga, 2009). On the other hand, the post-World War I period in Eastern Europe was characterized by a strong presence of anti-Semitism, particularly in the public discourse of countries with considerableJewish populations (e.g. Poland), and this tendency persisted in the early stages of the post-communist period (Andreescu, 2005; Pankowski, 2010 ; Kĭaulakis, 2005; Muižnieks, 2005).[108] With the turn of the century, the leaders such as Gábor Vona of Jobbik, Roman Giertych of the League of Polish Families or Oleh Tyahnybok of the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" succeeded in creating electorally successful anti-Semitic parties (Shekhovtsov A., 2013; Pankowski, 2010; De Lange & Guerra, 2009).[109] Nonetheless, while Western European radical right parties are by no means

[108] For instance, in Hungary István Csurka, the founder of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, published in 1992 an essay "A Few Thoughts…," in which he had used the term "Hungarian Lebensraum" and which was condemned for its anti-Semitic and nationalist messages (Bernáth, Miklósi, & Mudde, 2005, p. 76). Furthermore, during the 1990s Maciej Giertych of the National Party and Boleslaw Tejkowski of the Polish National Community-Polish National Party were prosecuted for anti-Semitism and incitement (Pankowski, 2010).

[109] In terms of both its electoral success and anti-Semitic rhetoric, Hungarian Jobbik is probably the most prominent radical right party in this group of parties. For instance, in 2012 Jobbik's MP, Márton Gyöngyösi, asked for drawing

free from anti-Semitism, they seem to be less open to anti-Semitic rhetoric.[110] In this regard, Western European radical right parties are more likely to adopt the new anti-Semitism, which is exclusively focused on the Arab–Israeli conflict (Camus, 2013; Wistrich, 2003), or to use coded anti-Semitic messages (Mudde, 2007, p. 80).[111] Having in mind the positions on all aforementioned ethnic minorities, the following general hypotheses can be asserted:

H3a: In comparison to their Western counterparts, radical right parties in Eastern Europe are taking more restrictive positions considering the issue of rights of ethnic minorities.

H3b: In comparison to West European radical right parties, the issue of rights of ethnic minorities features more prominently in the ideologies of radical right parties in Eastern Europe.

While Eastern European radical right parties are perceived as espousing anti-Roma and anti-Semitic positions, Western European radical right parties are predominantly described as Islamophobic (Betz, 2013; Kallis, 2013; van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003). However, except for France, where anti-Muslim sentiments can be traced back to the Algerian war of independence (Camus, 2013), in most West European countries Islamophobia is the function of the changed immigration patterns and, to some extent, the post-9/11 climate (Krejčí, 1995; Mudde, 2007). And indeed, with the beginning of 1990s the primary concern of Western European radical right parties was immigration in general (including refugees and asylum seekers), which led some authors to label these parties anti-immigrant (e.g. van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000; van

up of a lists of Jews in Parliament and the government as they present the national security risk (Dunai, 2012), while in 2013 the party protested the World Jewish Congress in Budapest (Freeman, 2013).

[110] For instance, in 1987 Le Pen made a famous statement claiming that that the gas chambers were only a detail in history (Camus, 2013, p. 128).

[111] In Western Europe a strong consensus exists that the Holocaust is the epitome of evil and, as the electoral success of radical right parties in the West depends on being perceived as normal parties (van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005), the radical right is not likely to compete on an anti-Semitic platform. In addition, the space for radical right parties to express their position is additionally limited by the possibility of *cordon sanitaire* or banning. For the case of *cordon sanitaire* against the Freedom Party of Austria, see (Pelinka, 2009).

Spanje, 2010).[112] Namely, after World War II, the countries of Western Europe underwent through several waves of immigration, starting with the immigration from former colonies, through the admission of guest workers during 1960s, to the waves of refugees during 1990s (Krejčí, 1995). Consequently, in the subsequent period radical right parties in the West increasingly focused on issues of immigration and asylum. However, the anti-immigrant positions are hardly exclusively a Western European feature and in this regard, examples of Slovenia in the early 1990s (Jalušič, 2002) and Ataka's recent mobilization against Syrian refugees in Bulgaria (Higgins, 2013) are the cases in point.[113] Nonetheless, although studies show a growing disquiet about immigrants and refugees in various post-communist countries (Mudde, 2007, p. 71), lower levels of immigration in Eastern Europe are commonly invoked while discussing the lack of importance of the issue in this region (Kitschelt, 2007). These propositions can be stated in the form of the following hypotheses:

H4a: In comparison to their Eastern counterparts, radical right parties in Western Europe are taking more restrictive positions considering the issues of immigration and assimilation of immigrant and asylum seekers.

H4b: In comparison to East European radical right parties, the issues of immigration and assimilation of immigrant and asylum seekers features more prominently in the ideologies of radical right parties in Western Europe.

[112] The case of Heinz-Christian Strache, leader of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), is particularly indicative of the changing nature of the radical right ideology and shift from immigration to Islamophobia. While during Jörg Haider era, FPO was focused on immigration in general, Strache attempts to approach some immigrant communities. In particular, he made efforts to attract Serbian immigrant population in Austria by wearing Serbian religious symbols, openly opposing Kosovo's independence from Serbia, and even attending concerts of Svetlana Ceca Ražnatović, the widow of the late war crimes suspect, Željko Ražnatović Arkan.

[113] Additional similarities can be pointed out. For instance, the recent protests over immigration and attacks on immigrants in the Russian Federation (Bidder, 2013) share features with some events in the Western Europe, such as the attacks on immigrants in Germany following the riots of Rostock-Lichtenhagen (Bade & Anderson, 1994, p. 95)or the burning of refugee shelter in Nauen, Germany in August of 2015. Furthermore, although the circumstances of migration were very different, the Russian speaking population in the Baltic countries (particularly Latvia and Estonia) can be seen as an immigrant population. If one is willing to adopt this viewpoint, this case of the radical right mobilization against immigrants in many regards surpasses the one observed in Western Europe.

Finally, although the ideologies of the radical right in the West are not necessarily in contradiction with the general pro-European stance (Bar-On, 2013; Williams B., 2013; Mudde, 2007), with the beginning of the 1990s most of radical right parties in Western Europe adopted anti-EU position. The Euroscepticism became particularly prominent in the period following the crisis of 2008 and slow economic recovery of the eurozone, and escalated in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament.[114] By contrast, after decades of Soviet domination, radical right parties in Eastern Europe emerged within the framework of the "return to Europe" (Minkenberg, 2009, p. 450). Excluding a small number of parties, radical right parties in the East perceive themselves a part of European history and civilization.[115] Although, similarly to Western European radical right, parties such as the League of Polish Families (De Lange & Guerra, 2009), the Hungarian Life and Justice Party (Mudde, 2007), or the Serbian Radical Party (Bakić, 2009) oppose the EU, Mudde emphasizes: "… in most cases the parties would do their best not to be perceived as fundamentally anti-European, given the pro-European conviction of the majority of the population. They would imply that their opposition was temporary and could be changed depending upon the economic and political development of the EU and their home country." (Mudde, 2007, p. 160). Consequently, as in Eastern Europe there is a general consensus on levels of both elite and society that the accession to the EU is a desirable goal, the East European radical right is not expected to adopt excessive Eurosceptic positions or for this issue to be particularly salient. Therefore, the following hypotheses can be stated:

H5a: In comparison to their Eastern counterparts, radical right parties in Western Europe are taking more adverse positions considering issues related to the EU.

[114] Namely, in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament the radical right parities competing on Eurosceptic platform managed to obtain an unprecedented number of MEPs in countries such as Denmark, Austria, United Kingdom and France.

[115] For instance, Jobbik subscribes to neo-Turanism and advocates alliance with Uralo-Altaic peoples (Akçalı & Korkut, 2012).

H5b: In comparison to East European radical right parties, issues related to the EU feature more prominently in the ideologies of radical right parties in Western Europe.

5.2.2. Hypotheses - authoritarian issues

With respect to the position on the EU, Minkenberg emphasizes that the radical right in Eastern Europe have developed under circumstances of simultaneous processes of "return to Europe" and "return to past" (Minkenberg, 2009, p. 450). The "return to past" refers to the adoption of pre-World War II ideologies, but also to the return of traditional value systems and worldviews. In this regard, the relation to fascism appears to be very important. Namely, whereas in Western Europe the radical right reframed its discourse (and ideology) in such a way to diminish fascist legacies (Ignazi, 2003, p. 23), the parties in Eastern Europe seem to resemble the inter-war radical right (Mudde, 2000; Kopeček, 2004; Pankowski, 2010).[116] Although it must be underlined that Eastern European radical right parties are not expected to explicitly adopt and promote fascist or Nazi policies, they are likely to uphold the fascist legacies, minimize the effects of occupation or idolize collaborators.[117] These features are likely to result in the

[116] However, one must emphasize that the distancing from fascism and Nazism is a relatively recent phenomenon with regard to the Western European radical right, which can be traced back earliest to the late 1970s and the early 1980s (Pelinka, 2009; Ferguson, Cheles, & Vaughan, 1995). A typical example in this regard is the Italian Social Movement, which altered its ideology in the early 1990s and reinvented itself in the form of the National Alliance (Ignazi, 2003).

[117] The examples include parties such as the Slovak National Party, the Croatian Party of Rights, and the Polish National Community-Polish National Party, while there are many more examples with respect to extra-parliamentary far-right. This is likely a consequence of multiple causes. The lack of freedom of speech during communist period limited the free discussion on the nature of fascism and Nazism, particularly with regard to the native types of far-right politics and Nazi collaborators (Anastasakis, 2001, p. 18). Consequently, with the fall of communism, radical right parties were able to question the legitimacy of the official (communist) narrative and to formulate revisionist historical accounts. In addition, the ideological vacuum resulting from the collapse of communist regimes forced all parties in Eastern Europe to seek roots in pre-communist period (Minkenberg, 2009). Furthermore, in several cases the first modern incarnations of independent national states were created under fascist regimes (e.g. Slovakia under Jozef Tiso or Croatia under Ante Pavelić's Ustaše regime), while in several countries the aspiration for self-determination during World War II was knitted together with Nazi collaboration (e.g. Stepan Bandera's Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Waffen-SS Latvian and Estonian Legions). Therefore, despite major atrocities committed by some of these regimes and formations (e.g. extermination of Serbs, Roma and Jews by Ustaše regime, deportation of Jews under Tiso's regime, or mass murder of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia carried out by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), the radical right parties are willing to legitimize them through a

demands for a strictly ordered society, the hierarchical structure of decision making and, overall, increased authoritarian tendencies, thus contributing to the notion of comparatively more extreme East European radical right parties. By contrast, in Western Europe parties openly espousing aspects of fascist legacies are either proscribed or represented only on the fringes of party systems (e.g. the National Democratic Party of Germany, the British National Party and Center Party '86 (the Netherlands) (Mudde, 2000; Ignazi, 2003)). Consequently, the radical right in the West is not expected to adopt extremely authoritarian positions.

Furthermore, the radical right parties in Eastern Europe are, on average, perceived as more likely to subscribe to traditional moralism and atavistic values systems, sometimes going back as far as perceived "golden age" of the medieval national state (Mudde, 2000). In contrast, at the time of the fall of the Iron Curtain, the cleavages and political alliances characteristic for much of the period of the late 19th and most of the 20th century have been dissolved, and new actors, such as green parties, have entered political arena, creating distinctive contexts of electoral competition for the Western European radical right (Inglehart, 1997). The entrance of postmaterialist parties in West European party systems has affected both the values systems of the general public and the ideological principles of parties. This development is likely to initiate adoption of certain points of postmaterialist agenda in the ideology of some radical right parties (such as environmental issues) and cause the reduction in some authoritarian demands. This seems particularly evident in the case of parties such as Dutch List Pim Fortuyn or the Party for Freedom, which adopt libertarian positions with regard to social life style issues (Akkerman, 2005; van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003). These propositions can be expressed in the form of the following hypotheses:

broader framework of the fight for independence. In addition, some authoritarian practices of communist regimes (such as ethno-linguistic and anti-Semitic policies in Soviet Union, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria (Krejčí, 1995; Pankowski, 2010 ; Frusetta & Glont, 2009)) found a natural continuation in radical right parties.

H6a: In comparison to their Western counterparts, radical right parties in Eastern Europe are taking more restrictive positions considering the issue of social lifestyle and overall adopt more traditionalist positions.

H6b: In comparison to West European radical right parties, the issues of social lifestyle and traditionalism feature more prominently in the ideologies of radical right parties in Eastern Europe.

However, although overall radical right parties in Eastern Europe are expected to be more authoritarian, radical right parties in Western Europe are expected to advocate more sever law and order policies. This expectation is closely connected to the prevalence of the issue of immigration in the ideology of the Western European radical right. Due to socio-economic position, ghettoization and the lack of integration, immigrants are easy targets of criminalization in the radical right discourse. On the other hand, radical right parties in the West are likely to respond to demands of a substantial group of citizens in fear of immigrants (van der Brug & Fennema, 2007, p. 482). A similar pattern is expected in Eastern European cases where Roma are the primary target group (Karácsony & Róna, 2011). However, although the adversary treatment of Roma is likely to be a pronounced characteristic of some East European radical right parties, the issue of Roma in Eastern Europe is not as prevalent so that it would affect overall discourse on law and order policy.[118] On the contrary, West European radical right parties do not shy away of organizing their political campaigns over the issue of law and order

[118] Namely, the adversary position on Roma is particularly characteristic for countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, in some countries characterized by a large population of Roma, the radical right is not mobilized on the basis of this issue. In this regard, the case of the Serbian Radical Right Party is particularly, indicative, as party used to draw a significant portion of its electorate from Romani minority. On the other, hand in most of East European countries the adversary standpoint on Roma is not a prominent characteristic of the radical right.

(for instance Flemish Block in 1997; see more in Mudde, 2000a). Consequently, the following hypotheses can be proposed:

H7a: In comparison to their Eastern counterparts, radical right parties in Western Europe adopt harsher positions considering law and order issues.

H7b: In comparison to East European radical right parties, law and order issues feature more prominently in the ideologies of radical right parties in Western Europe.

Furthermore, after decades of forced secularization, the Church and religion are likely to play a stronger role in the ideology of radical right parties in Eastern Europe. Especially considering the Orthodox denominations, where churches are autonomous and constitute a part of national identity, religion is expected to play a stronger role (Mudde, 2007, p. 85). In this regard, one might point to the parties such as the League of Polish Families and Dveri which developed in synergy with the Polish Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church (Wiesinger, 2008; Pankowski, 2010 ; De Lange & Guerra, 2009). Furthermore, quite a few parties (including Jobbik in Hungary, Ataka in Bulgaria, the Slovak National Party and the Croatian Party of Rights) espouse strong Christian identity (Mudde, 2007; Pirro, 2014a). On the other hand, the relation between religion and the radical right in the West is more ambiguous. Although with the increasing emphasis on Islam radical right parties, such as the Flemish Interest/Block (Belgium), the Northern League (Italy) or the Freedom Party of Austria, started emphasizing Christian roots of the European culture (Mudde, 2007, p. 85), there seems to be a consensus that radical right parties in the West do not find support in churchgoers and that secularization decreased the chances of the advent of fundamentalist Christian parties (Camus, 2013a; Arzheimer & Carter, 2010). Therefore, in comparison to relatively secular radical right parties in the West, radical right parties in the East are expected to espouse religious principles

and to emphasize the role of religion in political and social life. Consequently, the following hypotheses read:

H8a: In comparison to their Western counterparts, radical right parties in Eastern Europe are more likely to support a stronger role of religion in political life.

H8b: In comparison to West European radical right parties, the role of religion in political life features more prominently in the ideologies of radical right parties in Eastern Europe.

5.2.3. Hypotheses - economic issues

Finally, in Western Europe the period after the Second World War was characterized by strong economic growth and, up to the economic crisis of the 1970s, almost full employment (Jackman & Volpert, 1996). For the most part, in this period the economy did not play a major role in the ideology of the radical right. However, with the advent of neoliberal politics in the form of governments of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the radical right apparently found a new electoral platform. The adoption of neoliberalism was often perceived as a new phase in the development of the Western European radical right (von Beyme, 1988), as well as the main explanatory factor of radical right's electoral success in the region (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). With the beginning of the 1990s quite a few parties exhibited these characteristics, including Scandinavian Progress Parties, the National Front (France), and the Freedom Party of Austria (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). Although with the turn of the century the importance of neoliberalism in the ideology of the Western European radical right was questioned (Kitschelt, 2007; Mudde, 2007; Arzheimer, 2008), in comparison to the East, the parties in the West still seem to adopt more economically liberal positions. Namely, the radical right parties in post-communist countries came about as a reaction to the political and economic transformation processes and the revival of the culturally founded nationalistic tendencies

(Anastasakis, 2002; Minkenberg, 2002; De Lange & Guerra, 2009; Bustikova, 2009). The process of transition exposed citizens to major structural changes, which had negative consequences on more vulnerable sections of society (the elderly, workers with inferior and nontransferable skills, employees of large industrial complexes, etc.). Although transition produced some positive economic outcomes, in many regards Eastern Europe is still lagging behind Western Europe.[119] These conditions have led to the amalgamation of social-protectionist stances, with highly exclusionary ideological positions (Ishiyama, 2009). In this regard, Markowski asserted that: "there is no single party that resembles the New Radical Right of the West" (Markowski, 2002, p. 28).[120] Consequently, considering this set of propositions, the following general hypotheses can be stated:

H9a: In comparison to their Eastern counterparts, radical right parties in Western Europe are taking more rightist positions considering the general left-right economic dimension as well as more rightist positions considering particular economic issues.

H9b: In comparison to East European radical right parties, economic issues figure more prominently in the ideology of the radical right parties in Western Europe.

In the following paragraphs I will turn to datasets and methods utilized in addressing the aforementioned hypotheses.

5.3. Data and methodology

5.3.1. Variables

[119] For instance, despite privatization, the state sector is still larger in comparison to the Western Europe, averaging between 25-30 percent, while the share of service sector is still not at Western European level (Enyedi, 2008; Pop-Eleches, 2014). On the other hand, higher levels of corruption and clientelism are characteristic for Eastern Europe (Wallacea & Latchevab, 2006; Sajo, 1998).

[120] However, this is only partly true; For Fatherland and Freedom (Latvia) adopted neoliberal program (Zake, 2002), while in Poland radical right parties were often in coalitions with the neoliberal Union of Real Politics (Pankowski, 2010)

The abovementioned hypotheses refer to the ideology of European radical right parties in the post-communist period. Considering the number of parties and time span assumed by the scope conditions, an adequate approach to the hypotheses testing requires multiple sources of information. The analysis is based on two types of data designed to account for the policy position of parties: expert surveys and hand-coded manifestos. Expert surveys include three data sets: Party Policy in Modern Democracies (Benoit & Laver, 2005), Chapel Hill 2006, and Chappell Hill 2010 (Bakker, et al., 2012; Hooghe, et al., 2008) (hereafter PPMD, CH-06, CH-10). The data set based on hand-coded manifestos is the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tanenbaum, 2001; Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & Macdonald, 2006) (hereafter CMP). As data sets provide different coverage in terms of radical right parties, states and national elections (see Table 5.1) they facilitate different methodological options (for the list of parties see Appendix-Chapter 5).

Table 5.1
Datasets –descriptive statistics

Dataset	States *N*	Radical right parties *N*	Radical right parties *N* (West/East)	Period
CH-06	15	18	12/6	2006
CH-10	20	27	19/8	2010
PPMD	20	29	17/12	2003-2004
CMP	28	44	19/25	1989-2013

Expert surveys differ in the type and the variety of indicators. Two variables of interest in PPMD run across most of the cases in the data set: economics (i.e. position and salience considering taxes and spending) and social (i.e. position and salience considering liberal policies) (see Table 5.2). Additional variables of the interest are position on and salience of nationalism, immigration and religion; however, these variables cover only subsamples of countries. On the other hand, in CH-06 and CH-10 data sets variables are running across all of the states, where the only difference is that CH-10 does not account for the position and salience considering nationalism (for further information on expert surveys see Appendix – Expert Surveys).

In contrast, variables in the CMP take ether positive or negative sign. If a coding category is represented by both positive and negative sign variables, the particular issue (policy) is assumed to be positional. In this analysis only the pairs of positional variables are used and three pairs are expected to load on the exclusionary dimension, while one pair is expected to load on the authoritarian dimension. The CMP variables used in the analysis are transformed by taking logarithm of each indicator and, subsequently, by summing up the pairs of the positional indicators (see Chapter 3). Having in mind the generality of hypotheses related to the economy, I use the economic dimension created of all relevant issues (see Chapter 3). As the primary interest of the analysis is the overall ideology of the parties, the mean values of party scores across elections between 1989 and 2013 are used in the analysis. Table 5.2 presents the data sets and variables in a summary manner.

Table 5.2
Indicators used in the analysis

Datasets	Exclusionary dimension	Authoritarian dimension	Economic dimension
CH-06 **CH-10**	Position: immigration Salience: immigration Position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] Salience: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] Position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism Salience: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism Position: rights of ethnic minorities Salience: rights of ethnic minorities Overall the EU position Salience of the EU Position: benefits of the EU membership Position: powers of the EP Position: internal EU market	Position: civil liberties vs. law & order Salience: civil liberties vs. law & order Position: social lifestyle Salience: social lifestyle Position: religious principles in politics Salience: religious principles in politics Position: libertarian-postmaterialist vs. traditional-authoritarian politics	Economic left/right position Position: public service vs. reducing taxes Salience: public service vs. reducing taxes Position: deregulation Salience: deregulation Position: redistribution from rich to poor Salience: redistribution from rich to poor
PPMD	Position: nationalism (cosmopolitism vs. nationalism) Salience: nationalism Position: immigration Salience: immigration Position: joining the EU Salience: joining the EU	Position: social Salience: social Position religion Salience: religion	Position: economics (spending vs. taxes) Salience: economics Position: left right general
CMP	National way of life + National way of life – Multiculturalism + Multiculturalism - European union + European union -	Traditional moral + Traditional moral –	Economic dimension

5.3.2. Methods

The most demanding hypothesis states that the ideological differences between the Eastern and the Western European radical right result in the groups of parties distinctly positioned in a multidimensional policy space and, thus, generate separate radical right party families (*H1*). In other words, instead of assessing to what degree each issue contributes to the (known) regional difference, the hypothesis requires for the distinction between Eastern and Western European parties to be disregarded. Consequently, I assess to what degree the position of radical right parties in the policy space facilitates grouping of parties in (unknown) Western and Eastern European party classes. As in this approach the latent party types (i.e. Western and Eastern European radical right) are expected to be derived from the position of the parties over issue dimensions, the approach demands methods coming from the cluster analytic family (e.g. fuzzy set clustering, k-means, latent class/profile analysis).

The cluster analysis is facilitated by means of the hand-coded manifestos data set. The disadvantage of this data set is in a relatively narrow selection of authoritarian and exclusionary issues (see Table 5.2), while the advantage is in the inclusion of a large set of radical right parties, which allows for the implementation of cluster analysis (see Table 5.1). The stability of the resulting classifications is evaluated using three cluster analytic methods: agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA), k-means, and latent cluster analysis (LCA). Due to the beneficial aspects of LCA, this method is the primary reference in the presentation of results while the robustness of the results is controlled using HCA and k-means cluster analysis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; McCutcheon, 1987; Vermunt & Magidson, 2002; Fraley & Raftery, 2007).

As none of the methods, save for LCA, has an inherent type of fit statistics, in order to determine which classification has the best fit to data it is necessary to use validation indexes.

Consequently, each method (HCA, k-means and LCA) is used to generate all classifications ranging from two to ten clusters and the best performing classifications are selected using validation indexes and, subsequently, compared to the assumed clustering structure.[121]

Additionally, the robustness of the hypothesized distinction between Eastern and Western European radical right parties is assessed by means of a sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity analysis is facilitated by specifying two models. The baseline model comprises a subclass of variables expected to have the greatest weight in distinguishing between Eastern and Western European radical. Therefore, the model includes indicators of position on national way of life (nationalism – *H2a*), position on multiculturalism (relation to minorities – *H3a*), and position on economic issues (*H9a*). The sensitivity of produced classes is tested by the extension of the baseline model with the indicators of position on the EU (*H5a*) and traditional moral (*H6a*). The strong evidence for the central hypothesis on West vs. East distinction (*H1*) requires replication of the findings across both models. The graphic illustration of the models is presented in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1
Estimated latent class models



Notes: the boxes with solid outline indicate variables included in the baseline models; boxes with dashed outline indicate variables added in sensitivity analysis

[121]A detail account considering the approach to cluster analytic methods is presented in Chapter 4.

This analysis is extended and refined by evaluating the weaker arguments which address the *position* of each hypothesized party group considering specific issues (*H2a-H9a*) as well as the *importance* of each issue in the ideology of the radical right (*H2b-H9b*). This line of inquiry is based on expert surveys. The advantage of this approach is in possibility to account for a large number of characteristics and ability to assess the validity of potential differences across both position and salience indicators (see Table 5.2). However, due to small sample sizes, in this analysis the regional difference (i.e. West vs. East) is imposed on the data. Effectively, in this analysis I assume that the difference between the East and the West is real, and assess to what extent each issue contributes to the regional distinction. In contrast to the use of cluster analysis, the adequate methods for this line of inquiry include techniques such as independent t-test, ANOVA/MANOVA or logistic/multinomial regression. Nevertheless, due to the requirement of larger sample sizes in the application of more complex statistical techniques, the analysis is conducted using a set of independent sample t-tests rather than preferred multivariate analysis.

5.4. Results

5.4.1. Positions of party groups in multidimensional policy space – results of cluster analyses

The selected classifications based on the baseline model predominantly support *H1*. The best validation scores for HCA clustering are generated for classifications in three, seven, eight and ten clusters. The validation of clustering based on k-means indicates optimal solution with regard to the classifications in three, four and eight clusters. Finally, the clustering based on LCA points to classification via EII (equal volume) and classifications via EEI (equal volume, equal shape, and coordinate axis orientation) in two, three and four classes (for validity scores and detailed discussion on validation see Appendix – Chapter 5).

While HCA classification in three clusters still groups Eastern and Western European radical right parties together, both divisions in seven and ten groups produce distinctively Eastern and Western European radical right clusters. In particular, concerning the division in seven classes there is a fairly homogenous Eastern European cluster which does not include only four Eastern European parties; on the other hand, while there is a homogenous Western European cluster, it does not include nine Western European parties (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3
Confusion matrix for baseline model - classifications based on HCA

	HCA division into 10 clusters		**HCA division into 7 clusters**		**HCA division in 3 clusters**	
Cluster ID	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right
1	3	1	3	1	3	2
2	7	0	10	0	16	21
3	4	18	5	21	0	2
4	3	0	1	0		
5	1	0	0	1		
6	1	0	0	1		
7	0	3	0	1		
8	0	1				
9	0	1				
10	0	1				

Note: shaded cells indicate dominantly Western and Eastern European radical right clusters; classifications produced using CMP data set

The review of the selected classifications based on k-means cluster analysis reveals results similar to ones obtained by HCA. Already at division in three clusters there are distinctively East and West European clusters. As expected, by increasing the number of classes the homogeneity of Eastern and Western European clusters becomes more pronounced, albeit at the expense of the comprehensiveness. Thus, divisions in eight classes creates Eastern European cluster which comprises three Western European parties, but excludes majority of Eastern European radical right parties, while at the same time Western European radical right clusters are divided in several clusters (see Table 5.4).

Table 5.4
Confusion matrix for baseline model - classifications based on k-means

	K-means division into 8 clusters		K-means division into 4 clusters		K-means division in 3 clusters	
Cluster ID	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right
1	6	1	12	3	4	19
2	0	1	3	2	11	4
3	0	1	4	18	4	2
4	5	3	0	2		
5	1	6				
6	3	1				
7	1	1				
8	3	11				

Note: shaded cells indicate dominantly Western and Eastern European radical right clusters; classifications produced using CMP data set

Finally, I will focus on the results obtained by means of LCA. Classifications based on EEI parameterization are producing characteristically Eastern and Western European radical right clusters already at division in two clusters (see Table 5.5) and the selected classifications are very similar to the classifications obtained on the basis of HCA and k-means cluster analysis (see Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5), which verifies the robustness of the findings.

Table 5.5
Confusion matrix for baseline model - classifications based on LCA

	EII division in 3 clusters		EEI division in 2 clusters		EEI division in 4 clusters	
Cluster ID	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right
1	3	2	8	21	4	2
2	12	4	11	4	11	3
3	0	2			0	2
4	4	17			4	18

Note: shaded cells indicate dominantly Western and Eastern European radical right clusters; classifications produced using CMP data set

However, although these classifications are based on variables which favor the division in Western and Eastern classes of parties, the results are still underlining significant similarities between radical right parties. In this regard, particular cases of Western European radical parties stand out. In LCA classification in two clusters parties such as the True Finns (fin:TF), the Swedish Democrats (swe:SD), the Swiss Democrats (swi:SD), the National Front (France, fra:FN), the Danish People's Party (den:DF), the United Kingdom Independence Party (uk:UKIP), and the Party for Freedom (the Netherlands, net:PVV) are grouped with the Eastern

European radical right (see Figure 5.2). However, the categorization of some of the parties most representative of Western European radical right with Eastern European parties is problematic.

Figure 5.2
LCA classification in two clusters based on EEI parameterization



This is similar with regard to some of Eastern European, less well-known parties, such as the Bosnian Radical Party of Republika Srpska (bos:RS), the United Albanian Right (alb:UAR) or the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (pol:ROP), which are grouped with West European parties. In classification in four clusters, some of the abovementioned Western European parties are categorized in separate classes (e.g. the Party for Freedom, the Swedish Democrats, and the Danish People's Party); nonetheless, parties such as the National Front, the Swiss Democrats, the United Kingdom Independence Party and the True Finns remain grouped with Eastern European radical right parties. The conditional probabilities of class membership of these parties in the Eastern European cluster give strong evidence for the accuracy of

classification with regard to the National Front (for classification in two clusters, p=0.966; for classification in four clusters, p=0.873), Swiss Democrats (for classification in two clusters, p=0.999; for classification in four clusters, p=0.857) and somewhat weaker evidence for the United Kingdom Independence Party (uk: UKIP) (for classification in two clusters, p=0.951; for classification in four clusters, p=0.797) and the True Finns (for classification in two clusters, p=0.886; for classification in four clusters, p=0.847).

However, despite the problematic cases noted above, in general terms, the findings are in line with the expectations. The table 5.6 displays clusters means. The parties grouped in the East European cluster are on average more nationalist and more restrictive with regard to the rights of ethnic minorities, while parties grouped in the West European cluster are taking more rightist positions on the economy. Consequently, overall, the classifications produced on the basis of the baseline model are successful in reconstructing the hypothesized difference between Eastern and Western European radical right parties, although the classes are characterized by a substantial number of misclassified cases.

Table 5.6
Cluster means - LCA classification in two clusters based on EEI parameterization

	West European cluster	East European cluster
Nationalism	0,927	2,241
Multiculturalism	-0,172	0,595
Economy	0,432	-0,041

However, with the transition to the higher-order multidimensional policy space in the sensitivity analysis, the fragility of classifications in Western and Eastern European classes becomes evident. None of the HCA clustering solutions reflects the assumed difference between Eastern and Western Europe. Through all classifications Western and Eastern European radical right parties are grouped together and the dominant cluster, created of parties coming from both

regions, is never dissolved. Somewhat better results are obtained using k-means; however, none of the k-means classifications captures the division between the Eastern and the Western European radical right. Finally, the results based on LCA are similar to the results produced using HCA and k-means – upon examination of the most valid classifications there is no sufficient evidence to claim that any of the classifications replicate the division into the Western and the Eastern European radical right (for validity scores and confusion matrices see Appendix – Chapter 5). Consequently, it can be stated that sensitivity analysis does not support the differentiation of Eastern and Western European radical right parties. Overall, there is weak evidence for the claim that ideological dissimilarities between radical right parties amount to the difference inherent to party families (*H1*).

5.4.2. Position, salience and specific issues – results of independent t-tests

5.4.2.1. Exclusionary issues

In this section I extend the analysis by addressing specific issues. Considering exclusionary issues, the regional difference finds the strongest evidence with regard to issues of immigration and assimilation of asylum seekers. Considering the *salience* of issue of immigration as well as the *salience* of issues of integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation) there are statistically significant differences between the East and the West, where Western European radical right parties are putting more emphasis on the issues (*H4b*). Nevertheless, with regard to the *position* over these issues the picture is less clear (*H4a*). Although in both cases Western European radical right parties are somewhat more extreme, in CH-06 there is no statistically significant difference with regard to the position on immigration, while in CH-10 there is no statistically significant difference with regard to the position on assimilation of immigrants and asylum seekers. This ambiguity is underlined by means of indicators of position and salience of the issue of ethnic minorities (*H3a* and *H3b*). According to

CH-06 and CH-10, both Western and Eastern European radical right parties take extreme rightist positions over minority issues, and put it high on their agenda and, consequently, there is no statistically significant difference between the regions (for all results see Appendix-Chapter 5).

Only one expert survey (CH-06) allows for assessing the regional difference with regard to nationalism (*H2a* and *H2b*). In this respect, there is a statistically significant difference in the position of Eastern and Western European radical right parties, where radical right parties in the East are more nationalistic. The score on nationalism of radical right parties in the East is μ=9.75, which indicates that all parties have the extreme scores considering this item (maximum = 10). The score for the West is μ=9.39 which is also extreme, trumped only by Western European position with regard to asylum seekers (μ=9.5). In PPMD the position over nationalism is estimated only for Eastern European parties, while the opposite is the case with regard to immigration. Interestingly, according to PPMD scores, in comparison to the position of Eastern European radical right parties on nationalism, the radical right parties in the West are taking more extreme position with respect to immigration. In this regard, while the data provides evidence for regional difference on the basis of issues of immigration and nationalism, there seems to be a week case for the claim that radical right parties in the East are more extreme in comparison to their Western counterparts.

Finally, with regard to the standpoint considering the EU (*H5a* and *H5b*), in total twelve indicators across all three expert surveys were used in the analysis. However, statistically significant difference is observed only with respect to the salience of the EU in CH-10 and the EU is more salient for radical right parties in the East. On average, radical right parties in both the East and the West are opposed to the EU and the issue is salient for the parties. However, in comparison to exclusionary issues discussed above, radical right parties are notably more

moderate considering the position on and the salience of issues related to the EU. Therefore, in general, there is only weak evidence considering the difference between radical right parties in the East and the West over the issues concerning the EU.

5.4.2.2. Authoritarian issues

Considering authoritarian issues, the strongest evidence is found with respect to policies on civil liberties vs. law and order. Radical right parties are not statistically different when it comes to the *position* on law and order, although in both CH-06 and CH-10 Western European radical right parties are assuming somewhat more rightist positions (*H7a*). However, there is a difference in the *salience* of the issue of law and order vs. civil liberties (*H7b*). In this regard, Western European radical right parties are assigning more importance to law and order issues and the difference is statistically significant in both CH-06 and CH-10.

On the other hand, when it comes to the *position* on social lifestyle (issues such homosexuality, abortion, or euthanasia) there is no statistical significant difference between radical right parties (*H6a* and *H6b*). Although, it is noticeable that the scores of parties such as the List Pim Fortuyn (the Netherlands), the Party for Freedom (the Netherlands), the Danish Peoples Party and Norwegian Progress Party are less extreme in comparison to other radical right parties, this type of party is not sufficiently represented in the pool of the Western European radical right to significantly alter the average scores. This is also the case with regard to the *salience* of social lifestyle issues. Thus, the evidence based on PPMD, CH-06 and CH-10 does not support the hypothetical difference between radical right parties in Western and Eastern European considering social lifestyle issues. Accordingly, the same results are observed with regard to libertarian/postmaterialist vs. traditionalist/authoritarian continuum – on the basis of CH-06 and CH-10 there is no statistically significant difference between the parties.

Finally, religion was expected to be more important in ideologies of Eastern European radical parties (*H8a* and *H8b*). However, with regard to both position and salience, radical right parties in Eastern and Western Europe are adopting relatively moderate stances and there is no statistically significant difference between the regions.

5.4.2.3. Economic issues

Considering economic policies it was hypothesized that radical right parties in the West are taking more rightist positions on all analyzed issues, where the position on each specific issue (e.g. taxes or deregulation) is expected to be a consequence of the general position of the parties on the economy (*H9a* and *H9b*). With respect to the general economic left-right dimension, there is solid evidence for the aforementioned hypothesis. In both CH-06 and CH-10 there is statistically significant difference between the groups of radical right parties and Western parties are occupying more rightist positions. However, on average, these positions can be only described as moderately rightist, while the positions of their Eastern counterparts can be described as moderately leftist. In addition, the Western European radical right is taking a more rightist position over each specific issue and assigns more importance to them. There are statistically significant differences with regard to the position on taxes vs. spending on public services (CH-10 and PPMD), the salience of the issues of taxes and spending (PPMD), the position on deregulation (CH-10), and the position on redistribution from rich to poor (CH-10). The only exception in this regard is the redistribution from rich to poor which is more salient in Eastern Europe, but this difference is not statistically significant either in CH-06 or in CH-10. In this regard, it is safe to say that there is a strong evidence for the claim that radical right parties in the West are adopting moreneoliberal positionsconsidering economic issues.

5.5. Concluding remarks and the relation to the subsequent analyses

Overall, the evidence provided by this analysis gives more weight to the arguments that assert similarity of radical right parties rather than to the arguments that support a strict ideological differentiation between the East and the West. As Table 5.7 demonstrates, analyses based on both expert surveys and hand-coded manifestos strongly reject a strict ideological difference between Western and Eastern European radical right parties. In particular, the classification in clusters of Eastern and Western European radical right parties is possible only if the selection of ideological characteristics is kept at the minimum and, to certain extent, trivialized. However, as demonstrated in the sensitivity analysis, when other relevant indicators are introduced, the distinction between Eastern and Western European radical parties disappears. Consequently, there is no evidence for independent Eastern and Western European radical right families (*H1*).

Considering a weaker argument asserting the difference with respect to the *position* on specific issues (*H2a-H9a*), the analysis identifies differences with regard to a strikingly small selection of issues. Concerning exclusionary issues, there is solid evidence that parties in the East are more nationalistic. Thus, increased nationalism may explain characteristically Eastern European phenomena such as the requests for border revisionism or the resentment of minorities with the neighboring kin state. However, with respect to the position on immigrants and asylum seekers there is only weak and inconsistent evidence for ideological differentiation. By contrast, the most consistent results are related to the economy and in this respect radical right parties in the East are more inclined to redistributive and protectionist policies. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the economy is not salient in the ideology of the radical right, which questions differentiation based on this set of issues (see Chapter 2).

Table 5.7
Summary of ideological differences between radical right parties

	Position	Salience
Nationalism	++	-
Immigration and asylum	+	++
Position on ethnic minorities	-	-
Euroscepticism	-	-
Civil liberties vs. law and order	-	++
Social lifestyle	-	-
Economy	++	-

Note: (++) = strong evidence ;(+) = some evidence; (-) = no evidence.

Finally, considering the *salience* of specific issues (*H2b-H9b*), the findings with regard to immigration and asylum seekers lend a strong support to the hypothesis of the increased importance of these issues in Western Europe (see Table 5.7). Furthermore, while radical right parties are similarly positioned with respect to all authoritarian issues, there is strong evidence in favor of the salience of law and order policies in the Western European radical right ideology.

Consequently, considering the set of exclusionary and authoritarian issues, the findings are more supportive of the distinction based on the varying importance of issues rather than of the distinction based on ideological positioning. However, the difference in salience can be interpreted merely as an adjustment of the shared ideological profile to the specific national contexts, rather than the ideological difference per se.

Thus, if the ideology is used as the main foundation of the distinction between the groups of radical right parties, there is only limited evidence for distinguishing between the Eastern and the Western European radical right. In this respect, the boundary between the two groups of parties, at least partly, seems to be the reflection of other state or party level characteristics, such as political systems, cultural differences or historical legacies. For instance, political culture and the public discourse of the radical right may explain the East vs. West differentiation. Quite a few authors have expressed doubts about the relation of the public discourse of the radical right in Western Europe and their actual ideological position (Camus, 2013; Fennema, 1997). It is

assumed that radical right parties in the West are fearful of being labeled extreme due to predicaments of banning, isolation and loss of votes. On the other hand, radical right parties in the East seem to be free to express their true positions with little regard to possible consequences.[122] Additional cause of the differentiation between the East and the West may be in party systems. The lack of electorally successful left-libertarian and green parties in Eastern Europe renders these party systems, on average, more rightist in comparison to their Western counterpart, which in turn may affect the perception of the radical right parties.Therefore, the research on differentiation between the Eastern and the Western European radical right is likely to find a foundation in historical, political, cultural or economic circumstances in which parties operate.However, in the terms of ideological differences, radical right parties in Eastern and Western Europe are simply not that different.

The analysis in the next section seeks to extend the discussion on the radical right by addressing how the positions of competitors in the policy space affect the electoral fortunes of radical right parties. Given that this chapter demonstrated that the ideological positions of Eastern and Western European radical right parties are not as significantly different as it is commonly assumed, the following analysis seeks to address if the electoral performance of radical right parties across Europe is determined by similar causes.

[122] As Pankowski has put it with regard to the activity of Maciej Giertych in the European Parliament, there is a difference in "cultural sensitivities" – what is accepted in political discourse in Eastern Europe is simply not acceptable to the European political mainstream (Pankowski, 2010, p. 131). On the other hand, it is also possible that Eastern European judicial systems are not willing or capable to address hate speech or related offences of major political actors, thus creating conditions in which political discourse can be extreme.

Chapter 6 – Ideologically Polarized Party Systems and the Electoral Support of the Radical Right: An Analysis of the Effects of Contextual Factors on the Vote Share Variation

6.1 Introduction

The unprecedented electoral success of radical right parties is the main reason for the raised concerns over far-right politics in the past two decades. Consequently, the phenomenon of voting for the radical right is probably the most frequently addressed topic in the radical right studies. Nevertheless, despite the bourgeoning literature on the electoral performance of the radical right, some of the fundamental questions are left unanswered. In this regard, the variation of the radical right's vote shares is one of the most significant problems.

6.1.1 The problem

The studies of the electoral support of radical right parties are driven by two competing, but compatible lines of research. The first line of research seeks to identify supporters of radical right parties by determining their social, economic and demographic characteristics and strives to uncover the attitudinal and ideological characteristics of the electorate. Overall, these inquires aspire to understand the demand side of the radical right's electoral support – the voters.

The second line of research is predominantly concerned with the varying electoral success of radical right parties. The main problems in this line of research are: why in some countries radical right parties had a relatively continuous success while in others they utterly failed; and which factors are determining the variation of radical right parties' vote shares across successive elections. In contrast to the previous approach, these studies shift the focus from voters to the elections and the contextual factors of the states.

However, while there are still a lot doubts considering many features of radical rightist's electoral support (see more in Hooghe & Reeskens, 2007; Kitschelt, 2007), the sociological and

attitudinal profiles of the voters seem to be the least problematic aspects. The voters of radical right parties typically have a low level of formal education; they tend to be manual workers, small business owners, unemployed, housewives and retirees; radical right supporters are either very young or rather old, and they are dominantly male (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Kitschelt, 2007). In this regard, writing about individual level studies in the Western Europe, Arzheimer notices:

> "A whole host of national and a smaller number of comparative studies have replicated these findings time and again. However, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the more intriguing twin question of why the extreme right's support is so *unstable* within many countries over time, and why these parties are so *weak* in many West European countries." (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 259).

Figure 6.1 demonstrates the erratic nature of the variation of radical right's vote shares in Europe. In the period between 1990 and 2012 most of European states have endured an electoral breakthrough of the radical right at some point in time. However, the timing of the breakthrough, the persistence and the magnitude of the radical right's electoral success is exceptionally variable. For instance, some countries have a fairly consistent pattern of electorally strong radical right parties (e.g. Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and Serbia). By contrast, countries such as Germany, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and most of smaller and island nations (e.g. Iceland, Malta, and Luxembourg) did not experience a significant radical right breakthrough.

Figure 6.1
Vote shares of European radical right parties



Note: data collected by the author using electoral commissions' websites and the European Election Database

On the other hand, in certain countries across most of the period the radical right was steadily increasing its vote share (e.g. Norway, Denmark, and Belgium), while in the others its vote shares were declining (e.g. Baltic states). Furthermore, in most of the countries the electoral fortunes of the radical right do not display any obvious pattern (e.g. Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria), while in many cases vote share variation was characterized by rather sharp increases and decreases (e.g. Netherlands, Russia, and Hungary).

In response to these electoral outcomes, the comparatively small literature on radical right's vote shares advanced an excessive number of explanations of the variation of the radical right's electoral support (e.g. Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Swank & Betz, 2003; Koopmans & Muis, 2009; Minkenberg, 2003; Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Knigge, 1998; Golder, 2003). On the other hand, there is a notable absence of the literature on the electoral support of radical right parties in Eastern Europe and, to even larger extent, there is a lack of comparative analyses of the factors contributing to the variation of the radical right vote shares in Eastern and in Western Europe. In general, the overwhelming number of often mutually dismissive hypotheses paired with the lack of comparative studies is indicative of the absence of a consensus in the scientific community considering the variable electoral success of the radical right. The main ambition of the analysis presented in this chapter is to fill in this lacuna by proposing an alternative theoretical framework and by systematically addressing rival hypotheses considering the contexts which determine the variation of the radical right vote shares in Europe.

6.1.2 The contribution and the plan of the analysis

The propositions advanced in this analysis diverge from the literature in several regards. The unique features of the approach are in its strong emphasis on party system characteristics, particularly on the interaction of parties in the policy space, and in its rejection of commonly

invoked factors such as economic or institutional contexts. An additional innovative feature of the analysis is in its common approach to all European radical right parties. Thus, while recognizing the variety of specific regional contexts, I claim that regardless of regional differences, the electoral performance of radical right parties in Eastern and Western Europe can be explained by a similar causal mechanism.

The chapter consists of four main sections. In the first section I propose a theory of the variation of the radical right vote shares. In the next section I briefly discuss estimation, data and indicators employed in the analysis, and, subsequently, present results of the empirical tests of the basic (baseline) model. Following the evaluation of the model, the subsequent section concisely describes the most important counterarguments advanced in the literature. The next section juxtaposes the proposed model to the rival arguments and presents the results of statistical tests. Finally, the last section discusses results and concludes.

6.2 The argument

Three contextual factors are expected to determine the variation of radical right vote shares in Europe: *(1) the ideological diversity of party systems with respect to the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension, (2) the overall electoral success of the main mainstream rightist parties* and *(3) the sizes of targeted ethnic minorities*. The proposed model, and particularly the emphasis on party system characteristics, is based on the intuition that fixed or slow changing factors (e.g. socio-economic and institutional contexts, political culture or the variation in the demand side) are not likely to explain the excessive cross-sectional and temporal variability of the radical right vote shares. By the same token, this model disregards theories based on the effects of exogenous factors, which are expected to have a similar impact across all affected states, and assigns most of the explanatory power to the internal characteristics of the states.

Starting with the only factor that falls outside the category of party system characteristics, as the radical right predominantly builds on the exclusionary-authoritarian ideological appeal, it is assumed that the presence of ethnic minorities in a state is likely to create a prolific environment for radical right parties. The emphasis on ethnic minorities primarily comes from the group conflict theory paradigm (e.g. Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Sherif & Sherif, 1953).[123] Given its long tradition in the academic literature, the effect of the size of minority population as well as the effect of its identity has been thoroughly studied in the radical right literature (e.g. Arzheimer, 2008; Knigge, 1998; van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000). In this regard, the size of *frequently targeted ethnic minorities* (Roma, Muslims, ethnic minorities with neighboring kin state, immigrants, etc.) is particularly important. Typically, studies postulate a linear relation between the population, or the proportion, of targeted minorities and the support for the radical right (e.g. Swank & Betz, 2003). However, following Kitschelt and Bustikova (2009), I assert that the radical right is likely to benefit from the conditions in which the population of targeted minorities is sufficiently large for the minorities to be visible or, more importantly, to be able to present credible and legitimate political demands to the government but, at the same time, sufficiently small so that the opposition to minority demands is not likely to create major political consequences.[124] Consequently, it is assumed that the population of the

[123] Group conflict theories come in many forms. For instance, Arzheimer makes a distinction between three types of group conflict theories (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 260). The first is the classical theory of scapegoating. In this type of approach minorities provide convenient targets for the aggression of the members of the majority who are frustrated by their lack of status or other resources. On the other hand, theories of realistic group conflict claim that xenophobia is the result of a conflict between immigrants and natives over scarce resources such as jobs or welfare benefits. Finally, theories of ethnic competition, status politics, subtle, modern or symbolic racism, and social identity cover a middle ground. Needless to say, all theories assume that the presence of minorities is a necessary factor in explaining the mobilization on the far-right side of the policy space.

[124] Kitschelt and Bustikova write: "Ethno-cultural antagonisms are stoked successfully by radical rightist parties when there is a plausible minority scapegoat and when that scapegoat does not have the capacity to inflict major damage on the titular majority and its political organizations, either because it is too weak in numbers, and/or controls too few economic assets and/or is not needed by one or all of the relevant parties of the largest ethnic group to build a winning governing coalition."(Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009, p. 468).

targeted minorities is relevant insofar as it falls between this upper and lower limit. This proposition can be stated in the form of the following hypothesis:

H1: Highly ethnically homogenous and highly ethnically heterogeneous societies do not provide contexts favorable for the increase of vote shares received by the radical right.

The credibility and electoral strength of the mainstream right (i.e. conservative or Christian-democratic parties) is also a commonly mentioned factor in the literature. It is expected that radical right parties will be negatively affected by the presence of overall electorally successful mainstream rightist parties (Swank & Betz, 2003, p. 228). The relation follows from the assumption that the mainstream right and the radical right share the electorate characterized by similar attitudinal and value orientations. Consequently, the failure of the main mainstream rightist party to mobilize its electoral base opens the window of opportunity for the ideologically proximate competitors, including the radical right. Similarly, the division of the electorate across several moderately rightist parties, particularly if combined with a high volatility, is likely to have a beneficial effect on the radical right's electoral performance. Therefore, on average, it is expected that the countries characterized by a high and consistent electoral support for a single mainstream rightist party do not provide conditions favorable for the electoral breakthrough of the radical right or for its consolidation in electoral arena. This proposition can be stated in the form of the following hypothesis:

H2: The consistently strong electoral support for the main mainstream rightist party creates an unfavorable context for the increase in the radical right vote shares.

Finally, the most distinctive contribution of this analysis to the literature is in arguing for the significance of ideological diversity considering the exclusionary-authoritarian issues in understanding the electoral success of the radical right. The fundamental assumption of the

argument is that in order to understand the radical right's electoral performance one must focus on the competing dimension of the radical right – the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). As across Europe exclusionary-authoritarian issues (i.e. immigration, ethnic minorities, law and order, etc.) are in the core of the radical right's ideology and focal points of its political campaigns, it is expected that the positions of the rival parties on this dimension have a strong effect on the electoral performance of the radical right.

The emphasis on the positions of parties in the policy space is one the characteristics of the political opportunity structures paradigm (e.g. Tarrow, 1994; Kitschelt, 1986). Namely, in one of its most influential forms, the proponents of this approach claim that the convergence of parties in the policy space creates an opportunity for radical right parties to mobilize electorate whose ideological viewpoints are not represented in the party system (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Carter, 2005). In opposition to this argument I follow Ignazi (1992), who claimed that *polarization* is the main cause of the radical right's electoral success. Thus, I argue that the party systems characterized by a consensus, or small disagreement, of all electorally relevant parties (excluding the radical right) considering exclusionary-authoritarian issues are less susceptible to the radical right's breakthrough or its consolidation.[125] In line with the notion of political opportunity structures it is assumed that the emergence and the solidification of radical right parties in the electoral arena is dependent on openness of party systems and, in this regard, on openness to new and, especially, to extreme, ideologies (Arzheimer & Carter, 2003, p. 23). Party systems characterized by strong ideological conflicts over exclusionary-authoritarian issues are expected to be more receptive of extreme ideologies. Fragmented party systems create an

[125] It is important to underline that this proposition does not specify on which position in the policy space parties should converge in order to prevent the electoral success of the radical right. Naturally, due to the tendency of parties to maximize their electoral potential by addressing the grievances and demands of ideologically distinct portions of the electorate, one would expect the convergence over a moderate position in the policy space.

environment in which extreme positions are a part of normal politics. Under these conditions, voters are likely to be more sympathetic to a new contender that competes on an extreme rightist platform. On the other hand, the continuing conflict, coupled with the presence of the radical right in the party system, is expected to validate extremes and pit one side of the political spectrum against the other. In line with this argument, one may claim that the increased ideological fragmentation also reflects the increased salience of the exclusionary-authoritarian issues (Bustikova, 2014), which paired with issue ownership and credibility of the radical right considering this set of issues (Mudde, 2007), is also likely to benefit its vote shares. A similar mechanism is expected in the case of reactive repositioning in the policy space. Therefore, considering the effects of mainstream right-wing parties' imitation of the policies and the rhetoric of the radical right in an effort to limit electoral losses or win additional votes (see for example Mudde, 2007, p. 241), the shift of the mainstream right towards the extreme positions is perceived as legitimizing the policies of the radical right, and thus, on average, benefiting its electoral performance (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). On the other hand, Arzheimer (2009) claims that the public will often follow the views of the elites if there is a consensus amongst them, thus excluding the radical right as a legitimate electoral option. Furthermore, in the presence of an agreement over the acceptable range of positions, due to extreme positions, radical right parties are likely to be subjected to *cordon sanitaire*, which diminishes their coalition potential and, thus, encourages the strategic reasoning in electoral decisions. This proposition can be stated in the form of the following hypothesis:

H3: Party systems characterized by proximity of all electorally relevant parties (excluding the radical right) considering the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension do not provide contexts favorable for the increase of the radical right vote shares.

These three causes are expected to explain most of variation in the radical right's vote shares. In the following sections I will turn to the empirical evaluation of this model.

6.3 Evaluation of the baseline mode

6.3.1 The baseline model -estimation, variables, data

The dependent variable in the model is vote shares received by all radical right parties in national elections (for the list of parties see Appendix Chapter-6).[126] As the dependent variable is limited (approximately 20 percent of cases are left censored), ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the linear model is likely to violate some assumptions of the method, such as zero mean for the OLS errors (Swank & Betz, 2003, p. 229). Consequently, I employ the tobit maximum likelihood estimation procedure. The main methodological concerns in modeling this type of data are autocorrelation and unit heterogeneity, while due to small *T*, cross-sectional dependence is not an issue. The presence of the first-order serial correlation is a justified concern in modeling vote shares of radical right parties (Swank & Betz, 2003, p. 229), so it is reasonable to include the lagged dependent variable in the model. Considering unit heterogeneity, authors tend to employ fixed effects models (Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Golder, 2003). However, due to several reasons, including the presence of a constant in model and the domination of number of states (*N*) over number of elections (*T*), this is not a viable option for this type of data.[127] Alternatively one may use random effects model (Baltagi, 2005). However, due to the presence

[126] As the effects of the state level contexts are expected to affect all radical right parties in the same manner, the cumulative votes share is selected rather than the vote share of the single major radical right party. Furthermore, few countries have more than one successful radical right party (e.g. Italy, Austria). Overall, in one third of national elections more than one radical right party participated in the competition, where the maximum is six radical right parties in an election.

[127] As this is a panel data set, it is inappropriate for fixed effects modeling. Approximately 70 percent of variance in the dependent variable is due to cross-sectional variation. Rather than explaining this variance, fixed effects absorb it. Furthermore, with large *N* there is increased inefficiency, so that particular unit effects are overestimated. If the effect is driven by both cross-sectional and time-serial variation, estimation by means of fixed effects will attenuate the coefficient for *X*, where attenuation is dependent on the ratio of time-serial to cross-sectional variation. Finally, if *X* is a constant fixed effects wipe out the explanatory power of the variable.

of serial correlation and the necessity to include the lagged dependent variable, a random effect model is not viable modeling option.[128] Finally, due to small sample size, particularly considering the subsamples of Eastern and Western Europe, multilevel modeling is not feasible. Consequently, in order to address the likely problem of heteroskedasticity, I use the robust variance estimate that adjusts for within-cluster correlation (Huber/White/sandwich estimate of variance (Wooldridge, 2002)).

On the basis of the theoretical framework presented above, I propose the following empirical model:

$$VOTE\ SHARE = \alpha + \beta_1(VOTE\ SHARE_{e-1}) + \beta_2(IDEOLOGICAL\ DIVISION) + \beta_3\ (RIGHTIST\ SUPPORT) + \beta_4\ (MINORITY\ SIZE) + \varepsilon$$

where the subscript *e* denotes time of national election, α is the equation intercept, *VOTE* $SHARE_{e-1}$ through *MINORITY SIZE* are the explanatory variables, $\beta 1$- $\beta 4$ are tobit parameter estimates and ε is the error term. I operationalize polarization of party systems *(IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION)* using the positions of parties on exclusionary-authoritarian dimension estimated by means of the Comparative Manifestos Project (see Chapter 3). The lack of a consensus is measured as the magnitude of a standard deviation of the positions of all parties, excluding radical right, at each election.[129] The electoral support for mainstream rightist parties (*RIGHTIST SUPPORT*) is intended as the indicator of the overall strength of mainstream rightist parties considering the analyzed period. It is operationalized as the weighted average of the average vote share received by the largest mainstream party across all elections in the analysis and its actual

[128] Namely, the problem with the estimation by means of random effects is that the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the random effect in the error term (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).

[129] The standard deviation is intended to measure the polarization of party systems over exclusionary and authoritarian issues, without reflecting the vote shares received by each respective party and, thus, capturing the polarization of the electorate. As electoral manifestos are published before the elections, there is a necessary succession of events needed to establish causality in temporal terms.

score at the election.[130] Finally, the population of minority *(MINORITY SIZE)* is operationalized as a dummy variable indicating if the size of the targeted minority in the country is between 4 percent and 15 percent of total population.[131]

The model presented above also serves as the baseline model against which alternative hypotheses are assessed. The model is evaluated on data that covers period between 1989 and 2012, and encompasses 192 national elections (see further description of the data below).

6.3.2 Results – the baseline model

Considering the baseline model, there is solid evidence that the ideological division of party systems has a positive effect on the variation of vote shares of the radical right (see Table 6.1). An increase of one standard deviation in ideological conflict increases the proportion of votes received by radical right by approximately 1 percent. The relation is stable across both Eastern and Western subsample and the strength of the relation is similar, although the effect is somewhat stronger in Eastern Europe. A similarly consistent relationship is present considering the size of minority and vote shares of radical right parties. In both Eastern and Western Europe the presence of targeted minorities in size between 4 percent and 15 percent is positively related to vote shares of the radical right and it increases electoral support of radical right parties by approximately 4 percent, where the effect is smaller in Western Europe.

[130] The operationalization of the electoral strength of mainstream rightist parties support may take various forms, where each has its own advantages and shortcomings. For instance, using moving average will account for variation of mainstream rightist overall vote shares, but it will produce a substantial number of missing values. On the other hand, using contemporaneous vote shares of mainstream rightist parties does not capture overall strength of the mainstream right. Furthermore, as the radical right and mainstream right are most likely competing over the same electorate, the use of this indicator may be perceived as demonstrating a trivial point. In this regard, following Swank and Betz, it seems more plausible to use the indicator of electoral success of mainstream right across a longer period of time. Merger of average vote share received in all elections with the actual score at the election via weighted average is intended to capture both overall strength of mainstream right and volatility of its vote.

[131] The 4 percent limit is selected assuming that mobilization of the minorities becomes more notable as the population of the minorities approaches typical electoral threshold. Furthermore, it is assumed that at this threshold minorities become visible, particularly if they are concentrated in certain region or urban center. The upper limit is set on the basis of the comparative analysis of the population of minorities in countries. In approximately 25 percent of elections the proportion of minorities exceeds 15 percent of total population.

Table 6.1
Baseline model

	Europe			Western Europe			Eastern Europe		
	Standardized coefficients	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	Unstandardized coefficients	
	beta	β	Robust SE	beta	β	Robust SE	beta	β	Robust SE
VOTE SHARE$_{e-1}$	0. 691	0.691***	0.076	0.825	0.825***	0.068	0. 512	0.512***	0.079
IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION	0.906	9.001*	4.737	0.958	10.053**	4.818	1.246	11.891*	6.200
RIGHTIST SUPPORT	-1,705	-0.221***	0.072	-2.193	-0.276***	0.076	-0.822	-0.112	0.122
MINORITY SIZE	3.730	3.730***	1.130	2.190	2.190*	1.242	5.049	5.049**	1.974
constant	0.157	4.226		0.068	5.847		0.871	0.786	
sigma	5.753			4.901			6.184		
Nagelkerke R^2	0.598			0.718			0.477		
N	192			108			84		
censored	36			24			12		
countries	38			20			18		

Note: standardized coefficients obtained by standardizing IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION and RIGHTIST SUPPORT
**** =p> 0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p>0.1*

Finally, there is a difference in the effect of the overall electoral success of mainstream right on the vote shares of the radical right. In Western Europe, as well as in Europe in general, the relationship is in the expected direction and a percent increase in the electoral success of mainstream rightist parties decreases the electoral support for radical right parties by approximately 0.2 percent. However, the relation is weaker and statistically insignificant in Eastern European subsample. Furthermore, the explanatory power of lagged dependent variable is weaker with respect to Eastern Europe, indicating that the electoral support of the radical right in this region is a less predictable phenomenon. In this regard it must be underlined that the model is not performing uniformly across subsamples. The model fits the Western European subsample significantly better, explaining over 70 percent of variation in the received votes. On the other hand, in Eastern Europe the model accounts for roughly 48 percent of variation.

6.4 Counterarguments

In opposition to the proposed model one may refer to one of the numerous causal mechanisms proposed in the literature. In the following sections the explanatory power of the

alternative theoretical approaches is evaluated vis-à-vis the proposed model. All hypothesized causal mechanisms are subsumed under the general concept of contextual factors. As the number of theories assumes similar causal mechanisms, the use of the concept of contextual factors allows for a merger of several theoretical paradigms under a common theoretical framework.[132] More importantly, as Jackman and Volpert underline (1996, p. 508), contexts can be understood as circumstances especially propitious for political crusades of the form favored by the radical right, while actual supporters of the radical right may not belong to the group directly affected by the context in question. In a similar manner, while the country level indicators may refer to individuals (thus being susceptible to ecological fallacy), here they are primarily understood as referring to county's contexts. Consequently, in the following subsections I present theories in two groups: theories pertaining to the contexts originating from the macro level factors (state level), and theories pertaining to the contexts originating from the micro level factors (voter level).

6.4.1 Macro level contexts

6.4.1.1 Socio-cultural contexts

As mentioned above, given that the appeal of the radical right predominantly depends on the identity politics (i.e. exclusionary issues), the socio-cultural contexts and, particularly, the composition of the population is often studied factor. Given that these contexts are often either temporally constant or slow changing, usually they are linked to the deep structural and social transformations through mechanisms such as scapegoating.

[132] Arzheimer made a similar suggestion (Arzheimer, 2012). Due to unclear delimitation and intersections between various theories, he opted to discard the concept of political opportunity structures in favor of the concept of contextual factors. In his opinion, the notion of political opportunity structures in the study of the radical right should, in a strict sense, include institutional factors such as political decentralization and electoral thresholds, while in a wider sense, the concept should include positions of other parties, media coverage and discursive opportunity structures. The concept of contextual factors allows for the introduction of all these factors under common theoretical framework.

In the studies of the radical right the temporal and the cross-sectional variation in the percentage of ethnic minority populations is often utilized in the analysis of support of the radical right. However, the reliability of findings may depend on level of analysis and the analyzed minority group (Kitschelt, 2007, p. 1198). Immigration rate is the most frequently used indicator in studying the Western European radical right (e.g. Swank & Betz, 2003; Golder, 2003; Knigge, 1998; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002). Alternatively, Swank and Betz suggested using the number of asylum seekers (2003), while Lubbers et al. emphasize the importance of immigration coming from non-EU countries (2002). In Eastern Europe, due to low immigration rates, authors are more inclined to assess the impact of the ethnic composition of the state (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009). On the other hand, in both Eastern and Western Europe hypotheses based on cultural racism suggest controlling for the proportion (or population) of culturally distinctive minorities (e.g. Roma or Muslims).[133]

6.4.1.2 Economic contexts

In addition to the variation in the population composition, most of the authors are concerned with the effect of economic conditions. With regard to both Eastern and Western Europe, these arguments relate to the Weimar hypothesis in that the economic difficulties are expected to lead to the increased electoral support for the radical right (Ishiyama, 2009, p. 486). In Western Europe the oil shock of the early 1970s brought end to the full employment period, while post-industrialization led to the growth of service sector, the growth of "post-Fordist" workforce working in smaller and more dispersed production units, as well as trade and capital mobility (Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Betz, 1994; Ignazi, 1992). According to Betz and Swank,

[133] In this section I am focused only on the population composition. However, in a wider sense, socio-cultural factors may include the average level of attained education or the distribution of the population across economic sectors. However, these factors are categorized within other theoretical families.

these changes created the situation in which winners were highly skilled professionals, technical personnel and managers, while losers were lower-skilled workers and the traditional middle class (Swank & Betz, 2003, p. 221). While it affected a similar segment of the population, in Eastern Europe the process was more pervasive in that it involved the transition to the liberal democracy and the market capitalism, along with elements of change from industrialism to post-industrialism, and sometimes accompanied by simultaneous nation and state building (Minkenberg, 2002, p. 355).

In this framework unemployment rate is the most frequently used indicator (e.g. Golder, 2003; Knigge, 1998; Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Arzheimer, 2009). Alternatively, authors account for economic change using GDP per capita, inflation, foreign direct investment or economic growth (e.g. Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Knigge, 1998; Swank & Betz, 2003; Arzheimer, 2012). Furthermore, Swank and Betz (2003) suggest controlling for percentage of wage and salary workers in manufacturing, while an additional avenue of research points to the effect of macroeconomic shocks (Jackman & Volpert, 1996).

6.4.1.3 Institutional contexts

In addition to socio-cultural and economic contexts, the effect of electoral system is probably one of the most frequently examined, but also one of the most contentious factors. As radical right parties are typically confined to the political fringe, like other minor parties seeking to break into office, they are expected to perform better in political systems which facilitate more egalitarian conditions of party competition (Norris, 2005, p. 83).[134] However, authors tend to

[134] The effect assumed here is above all the psychological one (Duverger, 1969; Riker, 1987). Namely, the adverse rules of transformation of votes to seats "squeeze" out the parties with a lower vote share, and ultimately render the votes cast for those parties wasted (Jackman & Volpert, 1996). In an attempt to avoid wasting their votes, voters substitute their first order electoral preferences with the second order preferences. Consequently, under these conditions, small parties, such as the majority of radical right parties, are less likely to perform successfully in elections.

operationalize the effects of electoral systems in various ways. While the distinction between proportional and majoritarian systems is particularly important (Minkenberg, 2003; Norris, 2005; Givens, 2005), in line with Norris' (2005) suggestion, the authors tend to focus on capturing the effect of disproportionality. For instance, Betz and Swank used an ordinal indicator of proportionality (2003), while Jackman and Volpert used effective electoral threshold and effective number of parties to gauge this effect (Jackman & Volpert, 1996).

Furthermore, considering institutional contexts, Arzheimer underlined that the state's structure and the basic arrangement of the state's institutions have a potential to impact voting for the radical right (Arzheimer & Carter, 2003; Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer, 2012). In particular, he hypothesized that the effect of decentralization or federalism may foster the development of right-wing extremist parties because voters are often more willing to support new and/or radical parties in the so-called "second order" elections. Namely, smaller stakes and typically lower turnout rates may provide the parties with opportunities for recruiting members, gaining political experience, legitimating policies and thus gaining a foothold in the electoral arena.[135]

6.4.1.4 Political contexts

6.4.1.4.1 Government and governmental policies

Polices adopted by governments in response to economic contexts are expected either to improve or diminish the chances of the radical right. In this regard, Swank and Betz assess the effects of trade openness, total taxation as share of GDP and the size of networks of social protection (size of social welfare, universal coverage, benefits equality, and generosity of social wage) (Swank & Betz, 2003), while Knigge introduces inflation in her model (Knigge, 1998).

[135] By the same token, second order elections may provide citizens with an opportunity to express their political frustration with the mainstream parties without overly disturbing the political process on the national level (Arzheimer & Carter, 2003).

Additionally, several researchers underlined that a climate of political scandals and corruption may create conditions favorable for the radical right (Betz, 1994; Caiani & Della Porta, 2011). Namely, a high level of corruption and political scandals are likely to increase political distrust and dissatisfaction, and create an opportunity for new political actors, especially anti-elitist radical right parties (Pirro, 2014). In a similar manner, Bustikova has presented evidence for the relation of quality of government and the support for the radical right (Bustikova, 2009).

Furthermore, the composition of governmental coalitions is likely to have an independent effect on the electoral performance of the radical right (Arzheimer & Carter, 2003). Several authors have examined the impact of the radical right's participation in government on policy and agenda setting (Minkenberg, 2001; van Spanje, 2010; Heinisch, 2003). However, while there is some evidence that participation in government may hurt the prospects of the radical right in successive elections its effect hasn't been studied (see examples of the Austrian Freedom Party, the List Pim Fortuyn, the League of Polish Families, and the Slovak National Party).

6.4.1.4.2 Party system characteristics

Although the positions of parties in the policy space offer a promising research avenue, empirical research into the electoral effects of relation between mainstream parties and radical right parties is still in its infancy (Mudde, 2007, p. 243). Probably the most prominent model developed in this tradition is Kitschelt's (1997). According to him, when the main moderate conservative and social-democratic parties move too close to each other in two-dimensional policy space, they open a window of opportunity for a radical right party. A modification of Kitschelt's model is proposed by van der Brug et al. (2005), who suggest that radical right parties are more successful when the largest mainstream right-wing competitor occupies a moderate

centrist position on the socio-cultural dimension. Similarly, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) using party statements on internationalism, multiculturalism, national way of life, and law and order, tested the effect of two indicators: the ideological position of the major mainstream rightist party and the ideological distance between the two major mainstream parties. On the other hand, Lubbers et al. (2002) suggested focusing on the issue of immigration. Similarly to Arzheimer, but using immigration restriction scale, they calculate the space between the most restrictive party in a country not belonging to the radical right party family and the respective radical right party (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002, p. 359). Furthermore, they also assess the effect of the overall immigration restriction climate in party systems (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002, p. 360).

In addition to the effect of the interaction of parties in the policy space, it is expected that the success of radical right parties is determined by the electoral success of the extreme left or ecological parties. During the 1970s and the 1980s many social scientists argued that Western European societies were moving towards "post-material" societies characterized by diminishing concerns with traditional class and economic interests (Eatwell, 2003, p. 52). According to Inglehart, the salience of post-materialist issues in modern politics created new cleavages. In his opinion, the new cleavage pits the conservative and xenophobic forces against the change oriented movements and parties (Inglehart, 1997, p. 331).[136] In that regard, the indicator of the presence in parliament or the indicator of vote shares of post-materialist parties (e.g. ecological parties) are crucial in testing this hypothesis. For instance, Swank and Betz include vote share of new-left or left-libertarian parties at previous election in their model (Swank & Betz, 2003).

[136] In particular, the post-material emphasis on sexual and other freedoms threatens traditional values adopted by more rightist oriented voters. On the other hand, the new post-material agenda is seen as irrelevant for many voters (Evans, 2004, p. 57). Combined, these factors are assumed to be the main causes of the rising radical right vote.

Furthermore, the instability of voters' attachments to political parties is likely to favor the entrance of new contenders in electoral arena. In this regard, volatility is also expected to be positively related to the radical right's vote shares.

6.4.1.5 Political legacies and religion

Furthermore, the research on social movements often stresses the importance of cultural factors. According to Minkenberg, political culture can be understood as a measure of ideological schisms and cultural differentiation or as an influence of particular political traditions on the respective conflict cultures and their formal and informal rules (Minkenberg, 2003, p. 157). In particular, Minkenberg underlined that dominant religious traditions, with their connections to nation-building or national identity, create an opportunity for the radical right-wing mobilization (Minkenberg, 2003).

Furthermore, it appears that both with regard to Western and Eastern Europe, fascist interwar legacies provide the opportunity for the contemporary radical right to appropriate symbols that reside in an idealized national past (Williams M. H., 2006; Ignazi, 2003; Golder, 2003; Mudde, 2000). However, in Eastern Europe, in addition to the pre-communist legacies, the communist legacies are also expected to have an effect on vote shares of the radical right. For instance, based on the distinction of forms of real-socialist regimes, Kitschelt and Bustikova hypothesized that the legacy of patrimonial communism, which was characterized by low levels of interelite contestation, popular interest articulation and rational-bureaucratic professionalization as well as by hierarchical chains of personal dependence between leaders and followers, is particularly suitable for the rise of the radical right (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009).

6.4.2 Micro level contexts

6.4.2.1 The sociological approach to voting

The sociological (socio-structural or socio-economic) model is the most prevalent individual level approach in understanding voting for the radical right. Sociological hypotheses refer to predominantly demographic characteristics of the population (Arzheimer, 2012; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Norris, 2005).As these indicators are usually treated as control variables, it is hard to think about the model as a separate theoretical account. In this regard, education provides the most plausible theoretical approach to the radical right. For instance Enyedi asserts: "Lack of education amplifies concerns about immigration, increases support for law and order policies and for programs based on traditional morality, and triggers support for authoritarian conservative or radical right-wing parties" (Enyedi, 2008, p. 292). Education is expected to a have similar effect across Europe. As in Eastern Europe the transformation process created anxieties in many ways analogous to those associated with the modernization in postindustrial societies of Western Europe (Betz, 1993; Inglehart, 1997), voters with inferior skills are expected to be more likely to vote for the radical right parties.[137]

6.4.2.2 The instrumental approach to voting

Within the framework of instrumental voting models the vote for radical right parties is primarily the function of voters' ideological profiles and their attempt to influence policy outcomes. This theoretical framework is foundational for at least two types of voting models: the single issue model and the programmatic voting model.

The first model assumes that the vote for the radical right is driven by a single issue which accounts for most of the party's support. With regard to Western Europe there is evidence that anti-immigrant attitudes have a strong explanatory power in understanding the radical right's

[137] Namely, many authors have noticed that widespread discontent, which has accompanied the transformation of state-control economies to market economies in the post-1989 period, is associated with the membership in the group of the radical right electorate (Minkenberg, 2002; Linz & Stepan, 1996).

electoral support (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000; Arzheimer, 2008). In general, immigration is used as an omnibus issue through which other socioeconomic concerns of the day can be funneled (Williams 2006, 54). Although the thesis has weaker support in Eastern Europe, there is evidence that support for some parties is based on a single issue, typically anti-minority attitude (Róna, 2011 ; Andreescu, 2005).

Contrary to the single issue hypothesis, the programmatic voting assumes voter-party linkage based on an all-encompassing ideological relation between parties and voters. In this approach, voters are attached to a party on the basis of its overall program. A common way to conceptualize this idea is in the framework of spatial (proximity, policy) models. In its basic form, the explanation of voting behavior is grounded in a spatial representation of the party competition, where the vote is understood as a consequence of the proximity of a voter and a party in one-dimensional ideological space (Downs, 1957). Typically in the voting behavior literature the individual's self-placement on the left-right dimension is taken as an indicator of programmatic voting (Arzheimer, 2009; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007). Thus, countries with the right-oriented electorate are expected to generate contexts favorable for the electoral success of the radical right.

6.4.2.3 The expressive approach to voting

The theoretical framework of the expressive voting assumes that voting for the radical right is the expression of one’s party identification or dissatisfaction with party politics, rather than a deliberate attempt to influence policy. One of the most evoked theories in this tradition is the

social disintegration model.[138] The model has a long history, and can be traced back to the mid-1940s (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 260). One of more prominent accounts within this tradition was developed by Arendt (1975). According to her, the support for totalitarian systems can be explained by the atomization of citizens, caused by economic deterioration (Nazi Germany) or produced by political system (the Soviet Union). A somewhat modified version of these motifs can be found in the work of Putnam and his notion of declining social capital (Putnam, 1995). In general, it is expected that social atomization leads to loss of a sense of belonging, feelings of insecurity and inefficacy and, consequently, feelings of anxiety and anger. The theory argues that, in order to reduce feelings of frustration, insecurity, and detachment, that result from isolation and the loss of community, voters are ready to embrace new ideologies and, in particular, the ideologies that satisfy the desire for a community.[139] Consequently, most of the indicators utilized in this paradigm are designed to capture the diminished role of structures such as family, local community, professional organizations, and traditional civil society organizations.

On the other hand, in the early accounts on the radical right in Western Europe, the protest vote hypothesis featured prominently (Norris, 2005; Arzheimer, 2008; Eatwell, 2003). The notion of protest vote is closely related to the notions of dealignment and disenchantment with politics (Arzheimer, 2008, p. 175; van der Brug & Fennema, 2007, pp. 478-479). The process of dealignment assumes the breakdown of the linkage between voters and parties based on traditional social structures (Evans, 2004, pp. 56-60). The protest vote is the reaction to the

[138] In this analysis, the term social disintegration is used as a general label referring to several related theoretical accounts, in particular social isolation thesis and degrading social capital thesis.

[139] These 'quasi-communities' can be understood as either real social movements (the radical right or extremist organizations) or those that are only metaphysical or metaphorical in character, such as ethnic community. According to psychological research, these "communities" increases a sense of self-esteem, efficacy and sense of belonging (Arzheimer, 2009; Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Eatwell, 2003).

perception of an unsatisfactory performance of political parties and political system in general. Therefore, the prime motive behind a protest vote is to show discontent with the political elite. It is primarily a vote against political status quo and, in that regard, can be considered an antithesis to the ideological voting. Consequently, the level of support for the political system is one of the main indicators of the protest vote model (Mudde & Holsteyn, 2000). Additional indicators typically used to assess the effect of protest vote are of political cynicism, trust in political institutions, or satisfaction with government.

6.5 Evaluation of counterarguments

6.5.1 Counterarguments - estimation, variables and data

The assessment of these causal mechanisms is derived by juxtaposing the aforementioned sets of factors to the baseline model. In this regard, as presented above, the estimation is based on the tobit estimator and Huber/White cluster corrected standard errors, where autocorrelation is addressed by means of lagged dependent variable (i.e. lagged cumulative vote share of radical right parties). The evaluation is based on extending the baseline model by successively introducing indicators coming from each set of contextual factors. In this regard, the empirical expectation is that the findings based solely on the baseline model will be replicated regardless of contextual factors introduced in the model.

The hypotheses proposed in the literature are operationalized using the following *primary sets of indicators* (see Table 6.2). The effects of socio-cultural factors are operationalized using the proportion of "special enemies" (Jews, Roma and Muslims) as well as the proportion of immigrants and asylum seekers. Considering the effects of institutional factors, the effect of electoral systems is operationalized using the dummy indicator for proportional representation; the effect of state structure is operationalized using the dummy indicator for presence of

autonomous regions. Economic contexts are operationalized using the dummy indicator of the financial crisis of 2008 and the unemployment rate at the time of election. Considering the contexts originating from governmental policies, health expenditure expressed as the percent of GDP is used as a proxy of social protection and welfare; the indicator of quality of government is used as the proxy of governments' performance; finally, the effect of the cooperation between mainstream parties and radical right is gauged using the dummy variable indicating the radical right's participation in the government or radical right's support of a minority government. The effect of political legacies is operationalized using indicators for Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim cultural traditions; a separate indicator accounts for the presence of strong interwar fascist organizations and movements, or autochthone fascist regimes; lastly following Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009) a dummy variable accounts for the presence of the patrimonial communist legacy. Considering the group of contexts originating from micro-level factors, the overall ideological position of the electorate is indicated by the aggregate left-right attitude scale; the indicator of political trust is designed as a composite variable representing overall trust in political parties and politicians; and a composite indicator accounts for aggregate attitudes towards immigration. Finally, considering the set of party system variables, the vote share of left-liberal parties is operationalized as the vote share of the utmost leftist party in terms of the left-right dimension; the effect of ideological position of the mainstream right is gauged using the position of the mainstream rightist party on exclusionary-authoritarian dimension; the multiculturalism restriction climate is operationalized following Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers(2002); the ideological convergence between mainstream parties is operationalized using distance between the mainstream leftist and the mainstream rightist parties on the left-right dimension; and finally the salience of exclusionary-authoritarian issues is operationalized

following Arzheimer (2012). Particular attention is paid to the other theoretically justified operationalizations. Consequently, hypotheses coming from each theoretical family are tested using alternative indicators (see Table 6.2 for the full set of indicators).[140]

Data set used in the analysis was compiled by the author. The complete data set consists of 212 elections in both Eastern (post-communist) and Western Europe which helps to overcome problems related to selection bias that might affect small-*N* studies. However, as the data set was compiled using multiple sources of information (see Chapter 1), the degree of matching varies. Consequently, due to missing data, approximately 180 elections are analyzed, with the maximum of 192 elections.[141] In this regard, while hypotheses pertain to all European radical right parties, the results are predominantly based on EU member states.

6.5.2 Results – counterarguments

6.5.2.1 Socio-cultural contexts

The groups most frequently targeted in the radical right discourse and pivotal in the traditional and modern radical right ideologies are Jews, Roma and Muslims (Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007). However, the actual and the relative size of Jewish population in states have no relation to the vote share of the radical right.

[140] These results are also verified using the logarithmically transformed dependent variable. The transformation of the dependent variable is proposed by Jackman & Volpert (1996). As tobit specification is heavily reliant on the normality and homoskedasticity assumptions (Baltagi, 2011, p. 359) it is safe to estimate a model with the transformed dependent variable. Independent variables were also transformed where appropriate. Furthermore, the lagged independent variables are introduced in the model instead of the contemporaneous scores. The results are not significantly different, but the transformation introduces additional missing values.

[141] Approximately a half of missing cases was lost due to the introduction of lagged dependent variable for Eastern European states. Furthermore, in this data set the missingnesss is typically a characteristic for post-communist, non-EU states (Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Russia), where the data on more recent elections is less likely to be missing. Typical approach to missing data, such as multiple imputation, builds on the assumption that cases are missing at random (Schafer & Graham, 2002). However, the probability of missingness in this case is not likely to depend on the observed data, but on missing data. Schafer & Graham argue that under conditions of missing not at random, one may model missingnesss using likelihood or Bayesian procedures assuming a very large sample, which is not the case with this data set (Schafer & Graham 2002, p. 153-154). Finally, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina most mainstream parties can be described as mainstream rightist, all five elections available in CMP for Bosnia and Herzegovina were excluded from the analysis. An election in Montenegro and Macedonia was excluded because only a single party is addressed in CMP.

Table 6.2
Sets of variables used in the analysis[142]

	Primary set of variables	Alternative set of variables	
Socio-cultural context	Targeted minority 4 percent-15 percent Jew proportion/population Roma proportion/population Muslim proportion/population (excluding Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania) Immigration proportion/population	Targeted minority -proportion Asylum proportion/population Muslim proportion/population	Ethnic fractionalization Linguistic fractionalization Religious fractionalization
Economic conditions	Financial crisis 2007/2008 Unemployment Foreign Direct Investments, Net Inflows (percent of GDP) Exports (percent of GDP)/Imports (percent of GDP)	GDP, (Constant International USD) GDP per capita, PPP (Constant International USD) GNI per Capita, PPP (Current USD) GDP per Capita Growth (percent) Long-Term Unemployment (percent)	Inflation (percent of GDP) Tax Revenue (percent of GDP) Employment in agriculture (percent of total employment) Employment in industry (percent of total employment)
Institutional contexts	Proportional representation Autonomous regions	Electoral effective number of parties Vote Threshold Federal structure	Mean district magnitude Gallagher index - disproportionality of an electoral outcome
Government and governmental policies	Public health expenditure (percent of government expenditure) Quality of government Radical right participating in government or providing support to a minority government	Health expenditure per capita Transparency International - Corruption Perceptions Index Rule of Law Regulatory Quality	Public Health Expenditure (percent of GDP Voice and Accountability
Legacies	Catholic/ Islamic/ Orthodox vs. Protestant cultural tradition Fascist legacy	Patrimonial vs. bureaucratic communism	
Attitudinal and demographic features	Left right attitudes Political trust (composite variable) Attitudes towards immigration (composite variable)	Authoritarianism-law and order (composite variable) Religiosity (composite variable) Personal satisfaction (composite variable) Attitudes towards homosexuality	Trust in political institutions (composite variable) Education
Parties and party systems	Ideological diversity on exclusionary-authoritarian dimension - standard deviation Volatility Vote share of left liberal party (defined by position on left-right dimension) Multiculturalism restriction climate Salience of exclusionary-authoritarian issues Salience of issue of multiculturalism Position of mainstream right on exclusionary-authoritarian dimension Position of the most extreme non radical right party on exclusionary-authoritarian dimension Distance between mainstream parties on left-right dimension	Ideological diversity on left-right dimension - standard deviation Vote share of left liberal party (defined by position on exclusionary-authoritarian dimension) Position of the most extreme non radical right party on left-right dimension Distance between mainstream parties on exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	Position of the most extreme non radical right party on economic dimension Distance between mainstream parties on economic dimension

[142] "Primary set of variables" refers to hypotheses and indictors most frequently employed in literature. The results of the test considering these indicators will be presented in the analytical part of the chapter. "Alternative set of variables" refers to the variables which were tested in order to account for the alternative operationalization of the hypotheses. These tests are not presented in the analytical part, but they are referred to in the discussion of the results.

These findings are constant across Eastern and Western European subsets, and Europe as a whole. Similar, the relative and absolute size of Roma population is not related to the vote share of the radical right across Europe, or across Eastern and Western European subsamples. Finally, there is no relation between the absolute or the relative size of Muslim population and electoral support of the radical right (see Table 6.3).

Turning to the number of immigrants and asylum seekers, there is no evidence relating these social changes to the vote share of the radical right.[143] If anything, there is some limited evidence that immigration rate and number of asylum a seekers are negatively related to the support for radical right parties in Western Europe. However, overall, the average rates of immigrants or asylum seekers do not explain the varying electoral success of radical right parties. Similarly, when it comes to the dynamic aspects of immigration or asylum, there is no evidence that the variation of the relative or the absolute rate of immigrants and asylum seekers across time contributes to the success of radical right parties in Eastern, Western or Europe as a whole. Furthermore, the proportion of immigrants is not related vote shares of the radical right (see Table 6.3).

Finally, shifting the emphasis from the size of particular ethnic minorities to the cumulative size of minorities regardless of their identity, there is no evidence that the relative size of minorities has the expected relation to the vote shares of radical right parties. Furthermore, there is no relation between the homogeneity of a nation, measured via ethnic, religious or linguistic fractionalization, and the electoral success of the radical right.

[143] It is necessary to underline that considering the rate of immigrants and asylum seekers there is a substantial number of missing values, particularly considering Eastern Europe. In this regard, these findings are predominantly indicative of Western European states.

6.5.2.2 Economic contexts

Considering the economic contextual factors, unemployment is considered to be one the most important elements in explaining the radical right's electoral support. Two indicators are used to account for the potential effect of unemployment: yearly unemployment statistics and long term unemployment statistics. While being statistically insignificant, both indicators are negatively related to vote shares of radical right parties across all thee subsamples. On the other hand, the expectations of the Weimar hypothesis find the appropriate conditions in the financial crisis of 2008. However, particularly considering Eastern Europe, there is no evidence that the economic crisis had any effect on the increase of vote shares of the radical right (see Table 6.4).[144] Regardless of the selected operationalization, the effects of the economic downturn and economic performance have no significant relation to the electoral gains of the radical right: tax revenue, GDP per capita growth, and inflation are not related to the vote share of the radical right. Furthermore, the effects of GDP per capita and GNI per capita are neither significant nor in expected direction.[145]

Additionally, the relative sizes of the economic sectors are expected to have a strong relation to the electoral support of the radical right. However, neither the size of agricultural nor the size of industrial sector is related to the increase of vote percentages of the radical right.

[144] Radical right parties in Western Europe did increase their vote share after 2007/2008, but the trend of increase can be traced back to 2002/03, while in Eastern Europe radical right parties, on average, lost some electoral support following the economic crisis.

[145] These two indicators have a statistically significant relation in univariate regression models, but not in the expected direction. Similarly, the effect of total GDP and GNI are consistent and have a positive relation to vote shares of radical right parties, but it is assumed that these relations are driven by the size of population. Namely, national GDP and GNI are closely related to population of the states – using some of the available GDP and GNI indicators, the correlation coefficients with population size range from 0.648 to 0.795.

Table 6.3
Effects of socio-cultural contexts

	Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe		Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe	
	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE
VOTE SHARE$_{e-1}$	0.681***	0.082	0.813***	0.063	0.494***	0.091	0.701***	0.078	0.832***	0.067	0.515***	0.094
IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION	8.605*	5.042	6.790	5.691	11.678*	6.430	8.935*	4.759	11.990**	4.712	11.706*	6.488
RIGHTIST SUPPORT	-0.202**	0.084	-0.314***	0.108	-0.084	0.205	-0.220***	0.073	-0.282***	0.081	-0.097	0.122
MINORITY SIZE	3.620***	1.305	2.445*	1.450	4.008	3.642	3.712***	1.126	2.659*	1.364	-5.367**	2.263
JEW POPULATION (IN 1000)	-0.004*	0.002	-0.013	0.006	-0.035	0.036						
ROMA POPULATION (IN 10,000)	-0.002	0.009	0.032	0.026	0.012	0.021						
MUSLIM POPULATION (IN 10,000)	0.001	0.001	0.014	0.008	0.005	0.004						
IMMIGRATION PROPORTION							-0.066	0.102	-0.145	0.120	0.066	0.152
constant	4.139		7.188		0.250		4.685		6.659		-0.239	
Nagelkerke R^2	0.570		0.715		0.475		0.600		0.724		0.481	
sigma	5.782		4.858		6.305		5.798		4.915		6.271	
N	176		99		77		189		108		81	
censored	25		15		10		36		24		12	
countries	33		17		16		37		20		17	

*Note:*** =p> 0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p>0.1*

Table 6.4
Effects of economic contexts

	Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe		Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe	
	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE
VOTE SHARE$_{e-1}$	0.682***	0.070	0.818***	0.075	0.518***	0.077	0.708***	0.070	0.749***	0.081	0.593***	0.120
IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION	10.464**	4.694	10.839**	5.082	14.318**	6.363	8.190*	4.459	9.898**	4.289	12.112*	5.799
RIGHTIST SUPPORT	-0.222***	0.071	-0.286***	0.080	-0.102	0.120	-0.232***	0.075	-0.387***	0.089	-0.043	0.097
MINORITY SIZE	3.642***	1.125	2.423*	1.312	4.934**	1.946	3.490***	1.004	2.841**	1.397	3.779***	1.198
FINACIAL CRISIS 2007/2008	0.781	1.308	2.558	1.690	-1.130	1.951						
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE	-0.120	0.094	-0.032	0.178	-0.170	0.118						
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS (percent OF GDP)							-0.061**	0.028	-0.096***	0.033	-0.008	0.350
FDI, NET INFLOWS (percent OF GDP)							-0.144*	0.076	-0.140**	0.060	-0.262	0.153
constant	4.974		5.672		2.121		8.087		13.772		0.025	
Nagelkerke R^2	0.603		0.728		0.489		0.646		0.749		0.531	
sigma	5.710		4.832		6.133		5.263		4.829		5.270	
N	191		107		84		174		100		74	
censored	36		24		12		32		20		12	
countries	38		20		18		37		20		17	

*Note:*** =p> 0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p>0.1*

Finally, the effect of the dependence of the national economy on the international trade and capital was assessed using indicators of foreign direct investment inflows and the combined indicator of imports and exports expressed as percent of GDP. However, while the coefficients are in expected direction and statistically significant for Western Europe and Europe as whole (see Table 6.4), these effects are not present when three cases, where average imports and exports of goods and services exceed 100 percent of GDP, are excluded from the sample.[146]

6.5.2.3 Institutional contexts: electoral rules and state structure

The rules of transforming votes to seats, the structure of the parliament and the laws regulating parties and elections are the basis of the institutional approach to the radical right. Nevertheless, researchers frequently find no evidence for the stipulated hypotheses (e.g. Mudde, 2007; van der Brug & Fennema, 2007). The research presented here confirms these findings. Starting with the disproportionality of an electoral outcomes measured by Gallagher index, there is no evidence that disproportionality has an effect on voting for the radical right.[147] In the same vein, vote threshold is not related to the vote share variation of radical right parties. Furthermore, following Jackman and Volpert, the influence of effective number parties was assessed; however, the effect was not observed.[148] Furthermore, several measures of average district magnitude were used in the analysis. However, these analyses do not produce evidence for the stipulated relation. In contrast, the distinction between plurality and proportional representation proves to be important in explaining the vote variation of radical right parties; the relation is a

[146] In effect this means excluding three elections in Luxembourg. Naturally, the sensitivity of the results questions the genuineness of the relation.
[147] See Arzheimer and Carter(2006) for similar findings.
[148] The effective number of parties actually has a statistically significant effect on vote shares, but not in the presence of the indicators coming from the baseline model.

statistically significant on the levels of European and Eastern European sets of cases (see table 6.5).

Furthermore, state structure is not related to the vote shares of the radical right. Indeed, the presence of a federal constitutional structure has no explanatory power in accounting for voting for the radical right considering Eastern, Western and Europe in general, while the presence of autonomous regions has an effect in expected direction considering Western Europe but which is not statistically significant (see Table 6.5).

6.5.2.4 Government and governmental polices

Abuse of public office for private gains is considered to be one of the main causes of the protest voting. Nevertheless, there is no relation between voting for the radical right and the variation of corruption perception (as measured by Transparency International) across time as well as mean values of corruption perception across states.[149]

A similar relation with the protest vote is often assumed with regard to the quality of government. However, the indicator of quality of government (a composite variable created from corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality) has no relation to the electoral success of the radical right. Furthermore, there is no relation of rule of law and voice and accountability to vote shares of the radical right across Eastern, Western and Europe as a whole.[150]

[149] Unfortunately, the Transparency International corruption perception index only covers a portion of cases, so these findings need to be interpreted with some caution.
[150] Similarly to Transparency International data, these three indicators do not include all cases in the analysis. As mentioned above, missingness is particularly present with regard to the Eastern European cases.

Table 6.5
Effects of institutional contexts – electoral systems and state structure

	Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe		Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe	
	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE
VOTE SHARE$_{e-1}$	0.685***	0.079	0.821***	0.065	0.493***	0.084	0.742***	0.082	0.813***	0.076	0.516***	0.095
IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION	9.764**	4.855	10.591**	5.013	12.035*	6.282	8.123*	4.388	8.487*	5.018	8.302	5.896
RIGHTIST SUPPORT	-0.215***	0.072	-0.270***	0.077	-0.117	0.121	-0.197***	0.069	-0.317***	0.089	-0.025	0.107
MINORITY SIZE	4.091***	1.231	2.485*	1.416	5.305**	2.066	3.520***	1.012	2.849**	1.488	3.511**	1.459
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION	2.725**	1.307	1.208	1.208	8.096**	3.869						
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS							0.929	1.057	2.174	1.406	-2.050	2.386
constant	1.200		4.347		-6.978		3.170		6.185		-0.285	
Nagelkerke R^2	0.604		0.719		0.500		0.597		0.729		0.369	
sigma	5.765		4.885		6.251		5.373		4.930		5.301	
N	188		108		80		182		107		73	
censored	36		24		12		38		24		12	
countries	37		20		17		36		20		16	

*Note:*** =p> 0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p>0.1*

Table 6.6
Effects of government and governmental policies

	Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe		Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe	
	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE
VOTE SHARE$_{e-1}$	0.760***	0.066	0.820***	0.077	0.581***	0.081	0.704***	0.081	0.844***	0.077	0.524***	0.079
IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION	5.2475	4.022	9.908**	4.794	4.383	4.266	9.191**	4.266	9.827**	4.940	12.134**	5.292
RIGHTIST SUPPORT	-0.165***	0.058	-0.293***	0.108	-0.024	0.096	-0.217***	0.096	-0.268***	0.075	-0.104	0.117
MINORITY SIZE	3.077***	0.994	2.266*	1.267	3.903***	1.407	3.730***	1.407	2.120*	1.080	5.315***	1.992
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT	3.554	2.283	-1.477	5.596	3.858	3.713						
RADICAL RIGHT IN GOVERNMENT							-1.798	1.819	-1.570	2.583	-3.340	2.562
PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE							0.246	0.203	0.139	0.262	0.396	0.359
constant	0.491		5.589		-2.559		0.795		3.663		-4.1717	
Nagelkerke R^2	0.646		0.719		0.553		0.604		0.721		0.492	
sigma	5.132		5.017		4.861		5.690		4.862		6.087	
N	173		108		66		192		109		84	
censored	33		25		9		36		24		12	
countries	36		20		16		38		20		18	

*Note:*** =p> 0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p>0.1*

Likewise, it was assumed that the participation of radical right parties in the government or minority support for the government is likely to have beneficial effects on the increase of vote shares of the radical right. Nonetheless, the support of a minority government and participation in the government are not related to the electoral success of the radical right. Across all three samples the coefficients are negative, indicating that maybe the radical right may be electorally successful only if it is in opposition (see Table 6.6).

Furthermore, there is no relation between the strength of social protection and the vote share of radical right parties.[151] The indicator of public health expenditure, in terms of its share of government expenditure, has no relation to the electoral success of radical right parties (see Table 6.6). Similarly, the proportion of public health expenditure in GDP and health expenditure per capita have no relation to vote shares of radical right parties across all the three samples.

6.5.2.5 Political culture and legacies

The most populous religion of a state is commonly assumed to determine the state's political culture (Minkenberg, 2003). Four dominant religious denominations are considered in the analysis: Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant (including Anglican) and Islamic. Overall, there is no evidence that vote shares of the radical right are affected by the dominant religious tradition. In Eastern Europe there is evidence that countries with a Muslim majority are less likely to have a successful radical right party, but these findings are driven only by the case of Albania (see Table 6.7).

[151] In addition to proportion of public health expenditure in GDP and health expenditure per capita (PPP), I accounted for the effect of total health expenditure on voting for radical right. The total health expenditure has a strong, positive and consistent relation to vote shares of the radical right in Western Europe. Nonetheless, in addition to the unexpected direction of the relation, the size of total health expenditure is reflective of both state of economy and the population size, so one may question to what extent it is actually reflective of the strength of welfare state in comparative perspective.

Similarly inconsistent results are found considering fascist legacies. The presence of interwar fascist legacies or autochthon fascist regimes in Western Europe increases vote share of radical right parties by 7 percent, but the effect is not observed in Eastern Europe (see Table 6.7). Considering Kitschelt's hypothesis that states with the patrimonial communist legacies are more prone to have a successful radical right party (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009), the effect was most likely present in the early stages of post-communist transition.

6.5.2.6 Attitudinal and demographic characteristics of the electorate[152]

Considering the single issue thesis, there is no evidence that the variation of attitudes towards immigration over time is related to vote shares of the radical right. The same is the case considering the cross-sectional variation of attitudes towards immigrants and their relation to vote share of the radical right in Eastern, Western and Europe as a whole (see Table 6.7). The composite variable created from indicators of church attendance and frequency of praying shows no relation of the commitment to a religion and the electoral success of the radical right. Furthermore, both coefficients for distribution of religiosity and attitudes towards immigration are not in the expected direction. With regard to the authoritarian dimension and the respective indicators, the findings are similar. The variation of attitudes towards gays and lesbians has no relation to the electoral support of the radical right. Considering law and order policies, there is no evidence that, on average, the prevalence of harsher attitudes with regard to the punitive policies is related to the vote share of the radical right.

[152] This aspect is the weakest point of the analysis. Namely, this analysis has to be based on individual level data which is aggregated on country level at the nearest election. However, there is no data set which is collected, using uniform methodology, at regular intervals across all, or at least a substantial subset of, cases. All the analyses presented here are based on the European Social Survey. The results presented in Table 6.7 are based on country means, which in turn are based on 75 election level scores. The results are least representative for Eastern Europe, where the data covers only 4 countries. Turning to the model presented in Table 6.7, although the difference considering other coefficients is modest, the constant seem to be overestimated which questions the validity of the whole model. Nonetheless, all reported findings were also confirmed using univariate tobit regressions.

Considering the overall ideological position of the electorate on the left-right dimension and therefore, the programmatic model of voting, there is a statistically significant relation, but in unanticipated direction (see Table 6.7). Nevertheless, this finding is only present on European level.

On the other hand, the decreasing confidence in political process is frequently invoked in protest vote models. However, the composite indicator of trust in political parties and trust in politicians has no relation to vote shares of radical right parties (see Table 6.7). Contrary to the hypothesized relation of the social disintegration and the support for the radical right, there is no evidence that interpersonal trust is related to the variation of the radical right vote shares in Eastern, Western and Europe in general.

Finally, there is no evidence that the difference in the education level of the population is related to the electoral success of the radical right.

6.5.2.7 Party and party system characteristics

The emphasis on characteristics of parties and party systems is a prominent feature of many approaches to understanding the radical right. Starting with the absence of party identification and the instability of party system, as reflected in electoral volatility (Pedersen, 1979), there is no evidence for association of this factor and the vote share of radical right parties. This finding is consistent across all considered samples (see Table 6.8b).

Table 6.7
Effects of political legacies and attitudinal characteristics of voters

	Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe		Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe	
	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE
VOTE SHARE$_{e-1}$	0.673***	0.063	0.617***	0.092	0.523***	0.094	0.716***	0.060	0.727***	0.101	0.357***	0.098
IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION	9.746**	4.229	17.361***	5.215	10.946*	6.567	6.630	4.280	10.570**	4.339	9.322**	4.506
RIGHTIST SUPPORT	-0.257***	0.075	-0.535***	0.108	-0.127	0.176	-0.220***	0.081	-0.418**	0.196	0.129	0.149
MINORITY SIZE	5.012***	1.202	4.227**	1.773	6.017*	3.122	2.524**	0.965	0.944	1.202	0.341	1.339
CATHOLIC LEGACIES	-0.934	1.219	-1.714	1.198	-0.488	2.117						
MUSLIM LEGACIES	3.242*	1.693	omitted		-0.845	2.800						
ORTHODOX LEGACIES	-2.137	1.496	3.189*	1.781	-2.116	2.709						
FASCIST LEGACIES	3.101***	1.180	7.028***	2.217	0.187	1.716						
LEFT_RIGHT POSITION ($_{country\ means}$)							-3.440**	1.613	-3.529	2.421	-3.256	2.365
POLITICAL TRUST $_{(country\ means)}$							0.677	0.528	0.491	1.208	-0.690	1.631
IMMIGRATINON ATTITUDES $_{(country\ means)}$							-1.260	0.874	-2.665	1.639	-2.991	2.573
constant	3.952		9.674		1.980		26.903		40.936		29.657	
Nagelkerke R^2	0.625		0.777		0.484		0.637		0.732		0.380	
sigma	5.646		4.530		6.195		4.875		4.802		3.881	
N	192		108		82		160		106		54	
censored	36		24		12		26		22		4	
countries	38		20		18		29		19		10	

*Note:*** =p> 0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p≥0.1*

On the other hand, the hypothesis that the rise of radical right parties is a response to the electoral successes of post-materialist parties finds weak evidence in the data. The vote share of the most leftist parties in terms of both the left-right dimension and the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension is not positively related to vote shares of the radical right.[153] Actually, considering the electoral success of the most leftist parties in terms of the left-right dimension, there is a statistically significant negative relation with vote shares of radical right parties – nonetheless, this relation does not hold on the subsamples of Eastern and Western Europe (see Table 6.8b).

Furthermore, the features of party systems in terms of the ideological positioning of parties are often referred to in explaining the electoral support of the radical right. Starting with the hypothesis considering the overall importance of exclusionary-authoritarian issues in the national political discourse (e.g. Arzheimer, 2012; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006), the salience of the respective issues is addressed using two indicators: the indicator of salience of the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension and the indicator of salience of issues related to multiculturalism. However, there is no statistically significant relation between the vote shares of radical right parties and the indicators of salience (see Table 6.8a).

Considering the hypotheses related to the position of the nearest competitor in the policy space, two primary indicators are used in the analysis: the position of the leading mainstream rightist party on the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension and the position of the competitor ideologically closest to the radical right on the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension.[154]

[153] In addition to the contemporaneous relation of electoral scores of post-materialist and radical right parties, the hypothesis was analyzed using lagged electoral scores of the post-materialist parties and overall (mean) electoral scores of post-materialist parties.

[154] Furthermore, the effect of positioning on the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension of the nearest competitor in terms of the left-right and economic dimensions was assessed. These analyses also produce no evidence for the relation of the indicator to vote shares of radical right parties. The results do not differ from the ones presented above.

Table 6.8a
Effects of parties and party systems

	Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe		Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe	
	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE
VOTE SHARE$_{e-1}$	0.500***	.0724	0.819***	0.066	0.500***	0.078	0.693***	0.077	0.805***	0.065	0.513***	0.075
IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION	10.688**	4.995	9.068	5.976	14,407**	7.120	7.997**	4.501	5.374	5.522	11.954**	5.684
RIGHTIST SUPPORT	-0.196***	0.071	-0.221**	0.098	-0.098	0.111	-0.237**	0.079	-0.357***	0.085	-0.111	0.124
MINORITY SIZE	3.870***	1.100	2.436*	1.245	4.922**	1.909	3.839***	1.106	2.253**	1.226	5.060***	1.871
SALIENCE OF EXCLUSIONARY-AUTHORITARIAN ISSUES	0.007	0.010	0.014	0.012	-0.016	0.011						
POSTION OF MOST ESTREME NON-RADICAL RIGHT PARTY	-3.126	2.231	-2.178	2.334	-2.098	4.203						
POSITION OF MAINSTREAM RIGHT PARTY ON EXCLUSIONARY-AUTHORITARIAN ISSUES							-0.911	2.694	5.860*	3.083	-0.194	3.167
SALIENCE - MULTICULTURALISM							-0.081	0.176	-0.196	0.170	0.000	0.285
constant	3.379		3.168		3.453		4.482		7.741		0.825	
Nagelkerke R^2	0.602		0.723		0.496		0.602		0.737		0.477	
sigma	5.726		4.891		6.025		5.739		4.741		6.183	
N	192		108		84		191		107		84	
censored	36		24		12		36		24		12	
countries	38		20		18		38		20		18	

*Note:*** =p> 0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p>0.1*

Table 6.8b
Effects of parties and party systems

	Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe		Europe		Western Europe		Eastern Europe	
	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE	β	Robust SE
VOTE SHARE$_{e-1}$	0.681***	0.069	0.825***	0.060	0.519***	0.072	0.684***	0.074	0.779***	0.081	0.512***	0.077
IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION	9.169*	4.797	10.238**	4.877	9.347*	5.458	9.257**	4.423	9.767*	5.070	12.033*	6.275
RIGHTIST SUPPORT	-0.214***	0.069	-0.270***	0.076	-0.155	0.137	-0.247***	0.073	-0.336***	0.070	-0.123	0.114
MINORITY SIZE	3.902***	1.081	2.314*	1.182	5.219***	1.834	4.004***	1.202	2.516**	1.252	5.260**	2.109
MULTICLUTURISM RESTRICTION CLIMATE	0.828	1.387	-0.228	1.819	1.612	2.020						
VOTE SHARE OF MOST EXTREME LEFTIST PARTY (IN TERMS OF LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION)	-0.098**	0.040	-0.015	0.040	-0.114	0.083						
VOLATILITY							0.011	0.029	0.079	0.072	-0.015	0.033
DISTANCE OF MAINSTREAM PARTIES ON LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION							0.349	0.189	0.560**	0.220	0.047	0.202
constant	5.693		5.684		4.410		3.604		4.544		1.512	
Nagelkerke R^2	0.609		0.718		0.497		0.604		0.737		0.478	
sigma	5.693		4.907		6.085		5.713		4.777		6.184	
N	191		108		83		191		107		84	
censored	36		24		12		35		23		12	
countries	38		20		18		38		20		18	

*Note:*** =p> 0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p>0.1*

Nevertheless, excluding the effect of the position of the mainstream right in Western Europe, these indicators do not have a statistically significant relation to the votes received by the radical right across all samples used in the analysis (see Table 6.8a).

Furthermore, considering the issue of multiculturalism, it was assessed to what degree the more restrictive positions of parties in a party system hinder electoral performance of the radical right (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002); however, there is no statistically significant relation between these phenomena (see Table 6.8b).

Finally, turning to the hypothesis that the convergence of the mainstream leftist and rightist parties is related to the radical right's performance in elections (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Carter, 2005), there is no evidence that radical right parties benefit from the ideological proximity of the main competitors. Actually, in Western Europe there is a statistically significant relation between the divergence of the mainstream parties on the left-right dimension and the increase in vote shares of radical right parties, but these findings cannot be replicated using other samples (see Table 6.8b). The convergence hypothesis was also tested using economic and exclusionary-authoritarian dimensions; however, these tests confirm the initial findings.

6.6 Discussion

The analyses provided in this chapter underline several important points. While a substantial percent of variation in both Eastern and Western Europe can be explained using the identical causal mechanism, it seems obvious that our ability to understand the Western European radical right is deeper than the ability to understand its Eastern counterpart. Throughout testing all models were more successful in explaining the variation of voting in Western Europe. While this is partly due to the limitations in both theoretical and empirical terms, it is obvious that the electoral performance of the radical right in Eastern Europe is a less

predictable phenomenon. Namely, in line with the unpredictability of Eastern European party systems (Bértoa, 2013), the electoral success of radical right parties in the East is not as determined by their previous performance in the election (see Tables 6.1 through 6.8).

The most significant difference in the performance of the models across subsamples is the insignificance of the electoral success of mainstream rightist parties in explaining the variation of radical right's vote shares in Eastern Europe. In addition, via tests of rival hypothesis I found that proportional representation is positively related to the vote shares of the radical right in Eastern Europe, while fascist legacies and state structure are significant and in expected direction considering Western European subsample.[155] However, the explanatory power of these factors is limited.

Notwithstanding differences, it is even more important to emphasize the similarities between radical right parties in Europe. Across all samples ideological division and the presence of minorities are statistically significant and in expected direction. Consequently, an important implication of the analysis is the similarity of the factors determining the electoral success of the radical right in Eastern and Western Europe. Therefore, further effort in the radical right studies should focus on developing more sensitivity for the Easter European radical right and its context by extending the scope of research from the EU members to the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia, providing alternative hypotheses, and employing systematic data collection procedures and analysis.

Nevertheless, the main finding of this analysis is a limited explanatory power of all factors other than the ones originating from the qualities of party systems and socio-cultural characteristics. The effect of ideological divisions in party systems (polarization) is fairly strong

[155] However, considering the number of factors employed in the analysis there is a possibly that certain effects are significant due to chance, which underlines the similarities between the Eastern and the Western European radical right.

and consistent across all subsamples. On the other hand, the presence of ethnic minorities that are sufficiently large for minorities to be visible and, potentially, politically active, but also sufficiently small and powerless so that they are unable to generate a substantial political conflict, seems to be a necessary condition for a successful electoral performance of most radical right parties. The overwhelming majority of factors is statically insignificant in the presence of these indicators, let alone consistent across subsamples. Consequently, the analysis finds no evidence which would indicate that in the last two decades electoral performance of the radical right in Europe has benefited by varying economic or social circumstances, or other major structural changes. This finding challenges a whole family of hypotheses which pinpoints the cause of the radical right's electoral success in an external impetus and phenomena such as the shift to the post-industrial economy, post-communist transformation, or economic shocks. In addition to the direct tests of the effects of the proposed contexts, this thesis finds confirmation in the analysis of voter's attitudinal and ideological orientations and their relation to the vote share of the radical right. On the other hand, even the endogenous national contexts, such as political legacies or institutional arrangements, seem to have limited explanatory powers.

Consequently, the resulting explanation is the one that focuses on party strategies, political cues, ideology and electoral competition. While this proposition paints a bleak picture of politics by relating interparty conflict, inadequate party strategies and weakness of the mainstream right to electoral success of the radical right, it also indicates that the success of the radical right may not be long-lasting. Namely, while confronting the economic downturn or the changing demographic makeup of a nation may entail all-encompassing reforms, deep structural transformations and years of adjustment, the reposition of political parties in the policy space is comparatively undemanding. Therefore, the proper response to the electoral success of the

radical right is in the modification of exclusionary-authoritarians policies of its rivals. A consensus over acceptable range of positions on the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension and the rejection of the extremely positioned parties are likely to be the policies which will negatively affect the electoral fortunes of the radical right. While this primarily assumes the ideological transformation of parties, the public pressure and, in particular, the active participation of the civil society may turn to be necessary factors in creating the right conditions. Especially considering a long term strategy of tackling the radical right, reaching a consensus considering the exclusionary-authoritarian issues will require a broader coalition of moderate forces and a comprehensive effort in educating and informing the public.

Chapter 7 –Conclusion: Future Developments and Policy Responses

7.1. Introduction

The following discussion seeks to relate the findings presented in the empirical analyses to the general expectations considering the development of the radical right in the future as well as to practical social and political responses to the increased presence of radical right parties in European party systems.

The analyses presented in the dissertation provide strong evidence for a unified theoretical framework in approaching the problem of the European radical right. Namely, radical right parties across Europe share a common ideological profile and their electoral fortunes are determined by a similar causal mechanism. On the other hand, radical right parties are embedded in party systems which are increasingly growing similar, while the increased mobility of capital and workforce, the EU accession and the interdependence of states, accompanied by an amplified electoral volatility and low partisan affiliation, create a common context. In this respect, it can be assumed that the presence of radical right parties in party systems will have a similar effect on societies across Europe and, consequently, the following discussion refers to all European states and the respective radical right parties.

In subsequent subsections, I will firstly present a concise account of the main findings. On the basis of this summary, I will propose several hypotheses considering the further development of the radical right and its impact on political and social climate. Finally, having these expectations in mind, I will present a set of policy recommendations addressing the rise of the radical right and its effect on European societies.

7.2. Summary of findings

7.2.1. Policy space

Considering the ideological positioning of parties and the dimensionality of policy space, the analyses provide evidence that the radical right's electoral breakthrough and success in elections are facilitated by the structure of party competition. In particular, there are strong indications that the party competition in the policy space provides the radical right with opportunities to mobilize the electorate. Namely, the positioning of parties in the policy space is equally determined by the exclusionary-authoritarian and the economic ideological component and these two issue dimensions account for most of the variation in the positioning of parties in terms of the left-right dimension. Thus, despite the changes in terms of ideological profiles of the parties and value orientations of the electorate, identity, cultural issues, ethnic minority rights, traditionalism, debates over the hierarchical order of society and the vertical notion of morality, as well as other relevant issues constitute one of the main axes of political competition. In this respect, across party systems, configurations of party competition create opportunities for the radical right mobilization. Furthermore, the analyses provide evidence considering the importance of the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension for radical right parties. Namely, in the radical right ideology exclusionary-authoritarian issues are significantly more salient in comparison to economic issues. Thus, while the structure of party competition favors the parties competing on the exclusionary-authoritarian ideological component, the importance of exclusionary-authoritarian issues in the radical right ideology places these parties in a favorable position to assert the ownership and the competence considering the relevant issues.

In addition, I presented evidence in support of a strong explanatory power of parties' policy positions in accounting for the vote variation of the radical right. In this respect, while the electoral success of radical right parties cannot be explained by differences in demand side or by evoking economic and social characteristics of the states, the vote share of the radical right

seems to be determined by the position of the radical right's contenders in the policy space. Namely, under the condition of a strong polarization considering exclusionary-authoritarian issues, radical right parties are more likely to electorally profit. Thus, while a consensus amongst political elites dismisses the radical right as a legitimate electoral option, ideologically divided party systems create an environment in which extreme positions are a part of normal politics.[156] Therefore, as divisions over issues such as ethnicity, immigration or minorities are taking hold of political debate, radical right parties are more likely to be perceived as an acceptable alternative to the mainstream parties and, consequently, more likely to attract moderate or center-rightist voters. Hence, in ideological terms, the potential to attract the voters seems to be less a characteristic of radical right parties, but more a characteristic of the political systems in which radical right parties operate.

7.2.2. The radical right in the policy space

This study offers several important insights with respect to the ideological profiles of radical right parties. Firstly, analyses demonstrate that despite the changes in the radical right rhetoric, the sophisticated election campaigns and the professional marketing, the essence its ideology remains constant. Namely, the perceived threat from "the Other" is in the core of the radical right ideology. This finding justifies the fears often related to the electoral success of the radical right. Specifically, radical right parties still embody the same type of social pathology characteristic for the interwar period, which escalated in World War II atrocities. Consequently, despite political, social and economic changes in past decades, the problem of the far-right politics endures in its traditional form.

[156] This explanation also addresses the weak performance of radical right parties in Western Europe before 1980s. Namely, despite the waves of immigration, the issues of identity were not as strongly politicized as they were in the post 1980s period. For instance, see Kriesi & Frey (2008, p. 161) for the case of the Netherlands.

Upon emphasizing this point, it is very important to notice that the analyses also refuted some of the commonly held assumptions with respect to the radical right. Namely, despite the persistent core of the radical right ideology, the contemporary radical right is very different from its predecessors. In particular, the analyses demonstrated that authoritarianism is increasingly less suitable for the identification of radical right parties. While the decreased strictness in authoritarian demands is the most obvious aspect of the change, this transformation is followed by further ideological modifications. Radical right parties are likely to modernize their platforms by addressing some of the post-materialist issues, such as LGBT issues, climate change or the pollution of the environment. Although anti-Semitism is still present, and particularly evident in case of some Eastern European parties, it does not take a major role in the ideology and most parties do not compete on an openly anti-Semitic platform. The majority of radical right parties abandoned biological racism in favor of cultural racism and Islamophobia. Furthermore, radical right parties, particularly the most successful ones, are sure to avoid any reference to fascism and Nazism, especially considering its most obvious manifestations in terms of iconography or glorification of certain historical figures. Moreover, although nationalism, requests for border revisions and fears of ethnic minorities are persistent (and quite explicit in Eastern Europe), radical right parties do not adopt calls for addressing the (perceived) border disputes by violent means and do not ask for the forced purification of nation from "foreign" elements. In general, radical right parties are more likely to address the issues of "the Other" indirectly, through the means of welfare chauvinism, culturalism or by emphasizing law and order issues, rather than reaching for the notions of blood and soil. On the other hand, the radical right is increasingly drawing upon the most convenient conception of "the Other" and, therefore, their key topics may change over time and vary by context.

Finally, the division of the literature on Eastern and Western European radical right studies finds little support in ideological profiles of radical right parties. While the empirical testing is successful in confirming the distinction on the basis of nationalism (i.e. Eastern European parties are more nationalistic), other positional aspects of the radical right ideology, most notably positions with respect to immigration and asylum seekers, are not different in a statistically significant manner. Furthermore, the classification in Eastern and Western European radical right party clusters can be reconstructed only if the number of relevant issue dimensions is kept at minimum; in a higher level multidimensional policy space, post-communist and Western European radical right parties are indistinguishable. Nevertheless, it is important to note that there is some evidence with respect to the salience of the issue of immigration and the issue of law and order, which indicates certain variety considering the electoral competition of radical right parties in the East and the West. However, the most consistent evidence considering the East-West divide is found with regard to economic issues which, as mentioned above, do not figure prominently in the ideology of the radical right.

Overall, these findings indicate that Eastern and Western European radical right parties are on converging ideological paths and, thus, predisposed to be affected by similar factors, prone to international cooperation and likely to have a comparable impact on the respective societies. Above all, these results lend a very limited justification for the uncoupling of research on Eastern and Western European radical right on the basis of ideological profile of the parties, and suggest that the current academic approach hinders a comprehensive understanding of the radical right.

7.3. What does the future holds?

7.3.1. Continued ideological transformation of the radical right

Radical right parties demonstrated the ability to opportunistically shift policy positions and adapt to the changing political and social climate, while espousing the language of liberal democracy in the process (Betz H.-G., 2001). While many of today's political parties find ideological transformation to be difficult, the radical right is one of the most flexible political families and can no longer be seen as consisting of uncompromising, single-issue parties. In this regard, the radical right parties are likely to maintain the trend that brought them the unprecedented electoral success in the post-World War II period. Thus, the radical right is likely to adopt an adaptable ideological framework, carefully targeting selected minority groups, while disguising intolerant ideologies in a more acceptable rhetoric and presenting themselves as champions of the liberal democracy. Considering the later point, in order to attract non-radicalized voters, particularly in the phase of party consolidation, radical right parties are expected to present themselves as legitimate participants of political life, unlikely to affect the everyday life or to challenge the basic tenets of democracy. In this respect, radical right parties, particularly the ones that are evidently electorally sustainable, should be expected to uphold this tendency in the future (Art, 2011).

The modernization of the ideology will be followed by innovative forms of electoral mobilization and new models of campaigning. In particular, the radical right pioneered a new style of communication by embracing new technologies. Most European radical right parties now operate well-designed websites, actively use social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook, and even seek to reach out to the public beyond national borders (Klausen, 2015; Berger & Strathearn, 2013; Berger & Morgan, 2015; Caiani & Parenti, 2013a).[157] On the other hand, they are increasingly promoting younger, charismatic, well-educated leaders in an effort to shake off their old reputations, rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the electorate and offer a

[157] With respect to the last point, some of the websites, such as that of Jobbik , have extensive English sections.

new, youthful image (Goodwin, Ramalingam, & Briggs, 2012). In this respect, particularly presuming sustained electoral success, radical right parties are expected to excel in modernization, further innovating means of political communication and seeking new avenues to mobilize voters and, thus, challenge the mainstream parties.

7.3.2. Sustained, but varying electoral success

While there is no disagreement considering the electoral success of the radical right in the last two decades, it is important not to exaggerate its achievements. Namely, while as a whole the radical right party family had an unparalleled electoral success, the story of individual radical right parties is one of volatility and uncertainty. In 2002, the Austrian Freedom Party won just over a half of its record 27 percent of votes received in the 1999 elections. While in 2000 the Greater Romania Party received almost 20 percent of votes, in 2008 the party fell below the electoral threshold necessary to obtain seats in the parliament. French National Front, often considered the prototypical radical right party, fell from its record 15.3 percent in 1997 to 4.3 percent of votes in 2007, only to rise again in 2012 to the vote share of 13.6 percent. One of the most electorally consistent radical right parties, the Slovak National Party, fell below electoral threshold in 2012. The results presented in this research demonstrated that the vote share variation of radical right is, to certain extent, beyond the control of radical right parties as it is dependent on the behavior and policy positions of their competitors and the characteristics of party system. Thus, while the performance in elections will be contingent on parties' own strategic abilities, organizational capacity and leadership, the electoral success of the radical right will also depend on state level contextual factors, beyond the radical right's power. Therefore, the presence of the radical right in national parliaments is by no means guaranteed.

Furthermore, the flexibility of the radical right party family is reflected in that new radical right contenders are regularly emerging and often prove to be electorally successful. The meteoric rise of Jobbik is a prominent example in this regard, but similar examples can be found in Eastern Europe with respect to All for Latvia! (before merger with For Fatherland and Freedom) and to certain extent the Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević.[158] In Western Europe, corresponding cases can be found in Dutch Party for Freedom and Pim Fortuyn's List, or some flash radical right parties, such as Swedish New Democracy. In this respect, the frequent emergence of new radical right parties characterized by varying electoral success should be expected in the future.

However, although the electoral support of the radical right is volatile, it seems safe to expect that in a short term radical right parties will uphold the trend of the increased electoral success. This seems to be particularly true considering Western Europe where the tendency is more pronounced and where judging by the latest elections to the European Parliament, the radical right parties should be expected to reach a new level of electoral success.[159]

On the other hand, considering the long term electoral prospects, it seems that radical right parties are most likely here to stay. As the parties are successful in (re)engaging and mobilizing young and working class population, the radical right is attracting electorate with a potential for a long-lasting party identification. Furthermore, the factors often associated with the rise of the radical right, such as immigration, waves of refugee and asylum seekers, increased disillusionment with mainstream parties or amplified vote share volatility, are likely to remain central political problems. Coupled with the increased sophistication of the radical right

[158] Namely, the Croatian Party of Rights Ante Starčević is a splinter of the Croatian Party of Rights, and the leaders obtained some prominence before creating a new party.
[159] However, to certain extent the EU elections proved to be poor predictors of the performance of the radical right in national elections. For instance, while the UK Independence Party managed to take the biggest share of votes in the 2014 EU election, it only managed to take a single seat in the 2015 national election.

campaigns, these factors are likely to facilitate prolonged presence of radical right parties in electoral arena or at least provide them with a broad impact on the electorate.

7.3.3. Impact on social and political life

While the electoral success of individual radical right parties is expected to be volatile, the radical right is likely to have a substantial influence with respect to a variety of social and political aspects. In particular, the presence of radical right parties is expected to impact policy formulation, introduce the radical right issues to the mainstream political agendas, and shift social attitudes.

Considering the last point, Rydgren (2003) argues that the presence of radical right parties is likely to increase racism and xenophobia in society by strengthening and articulating latent ethnic prejudices. Along the same line Andersen & Evans (2004) found a positive association between the electoral successes of radical right parties and ethnic intolerance across seven West European countries. Recent protest in Dresden by the Patriotic Europeans against Islamisation of the West (Pegida) (Elgot, 2014) demonstrated that the climate of intolerance may cross the borders and take hold in the countries where the radical right does not have a strong electoral presence.[160] In this respect, the presence of radical right parties across European party systems is expected to weaken social cohesion, undermine the social fabric of democracy and contribute to the rising social intolerance, discrimination and political discontent in the future. In particular, the radical right is expected to have a decisive impact on mainstreaming anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and anti-Roma attitudes and contribute to the overall increase in intolerance towards ethnic minorities.

[160] The anti-Islamic organizations prove to be particularly successful in spreading their message internationally. In this respect, the example of the English Defense League is particularly indicative as its emergence influenced creation of a number of similar organizations in Nordic countries (Meret, 2012; Jungar, 2012).

In addition to influencing values and attitudes of voters, the radical right parties are likely to have an impact by lending an air of legitimacy to extreme exclusionary and authoritarian policies and positions. While the most concerning aspect of the radical right is the potential promotion of violent extra-parliamentary extreme right movements and organizations, in many regards the relation between these phenomena is still questionable (Goodwin, Ramalingam, & Briggs, 2012). By contrast, there is solid evidence that the strong presence of the radical right in the electoral arena has an effect on the rival parties and the government. Although the change in policy positions across party systems may be caused by various factors, a number of studies demonstrated that radical right parties have an impact on positions of governments and mainstream parties with respect to immigration and asylum policies by playing a crucial role in the introduction of increasingly harsh regimes (Mudde, 2007; van Spanje, 2010). Furthermore, Schain et al. (2002) emphisize that the radical right may have an effect on a broader body of politics including policies such as housing, employment and education. Thus, if not directly, through the participation in the government, the radical right is expected to affect the policy through indirect influence on the positions of parties and governments.

Finally, the increased electoral success of the radical right has a potential to result in its stronger impact on the European level decision-making. However, it should be emphasized that this effect is likely to be more modest in comparison to the effect on national level. Namely, while radical right parties are very vocal in parliamentary sessions, voting results show that the radical right MEPs wield the influence proportionally weaker than that of other political groups (Faure, 2014). The causes for this phenomenon include a lack of vote cohesion, poor organization and disagreements between radical right parties (Morris, 2013; Faure, 2014). In this respect, although there is an increasing capacity to affect the EU politics, the influence of the

radical right on the EU policy, particularly through a direct impact via voting in the EU Parliament, is likely to remain limited in the future.

7.3.4. Continued fragmentation and cooperation of the radical right

The expectations considering the influence of the radical right on the EU level are particularly important in light of 2014 elections to the EU parliament, and overwhelming success of radical right parties in Western Europe.[161] Radical right parties were always inclined to international cooperation and the attempts in the creation of alliances can be traced to the immediate post-World War II period and the formation of the European Social Movement.[162] Nonetheless, all of the attempts in cooperation were short-lived, restricted to a small subset of parties and unsuccessful (Betz H.-G., 1999; Mudde, 2007). Throughout the dissertation I presented evidence considering the common ideological ground of European radical right parties. Paradoxically, in contrast to other party families, these commonalities are likely to negatively affect the international cooperation of radical right parties. The preoccupation with the exclusionary aspects of ideology, the constant fear of separatism and the distrust in the motives of the partners condemn all potential cooperation only to a small group of radical right parties (Betz H.-G., 1999, p. 308). More broad coalitions are likely to have the fate of the short-lived Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty group.[163] Therefore, despite the increased number of seats in the European Parliament, the votes of radical right parties are likely to remain fragmented.

[161] The success of radical right parties in 2104 European elections was almost exclusively a Western European phenomenon. Excluding the strong performance of Jobbik in Hungary, the radical right parties in the East had very poor electoral results.

[162] In addition to the EU Parliament groups, such as Europe of Freedom and Democracy or Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty, radical right parties organize in other forms. A more recent example is the Alliance of European National Movements formed on the initiative of Jobbik.

[163] The group dissolved after the arguments between the members of Alessandra Mussolini's Social Alternative and Vadim Tudor's Greater Romania Party over the issue of Romanians in Italy.

The fragmentation is likely to be enhanced by other factors. Throughout the dissertation I emphasized that the electoral success and the consolidation of the radical right are likely to depend on public's and elite's acceptance of the parties. Thus, radical right parties need to present their policies and worldviews as reasonable and acceptable. However, networking with other radical right parties is a risky enterprise as the blunders of any party in the network have the potential to negatively affect other members of the network (Goodwin, Ramalingam, & Briggs, 2012). Therefore, one would expect a radical right party to distance itself from the groups and parties perceived as more extreme. In this regard, the campaign for the 2014 EU election was the case in point. The campaign of the UK Independence Party was marked by strong distancing from the National Front (France) on the grounds of the alleged National Front's "prejudice and anti-Semitism"(Meredith, 2014). On the other hand, the National Front campaigned on the platform of future cooperation with Dutch Party for Freedom, but it was sure to rule out any cooperation with Ataka (Bulgaria), Jobbik (Hungary) and Golden Down (Greece) (Nielsen, 2014). Essentially, radical right parties did their best to present themselves as normal and legitimate competitors in the electoral market, unjustly prosecuted and discriminated against by political mainstream, elites and the media. However, effectively, this type of strategic choices restricts the potential of radical right parties in forming international alliances. Most recently, this resulted in continuing fragmentation of the radical right in the European Parliament. Thus, a group of parties led by the UK Independence Party joined the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (now rebranded as the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy), while the initiative of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders to create the European Alliance for Freedom initially failed in gathering sufficient number of MEPs to create an official group in the European Parliament.

However, despite the expectation of continued fragmentation, the radical right parties are also expected to actively work on the creation of international networks. Namely, the increased international cooperation allows for the parties to present themselves as members of a broad international movement, while facilitating the dissemination of operational know-how and funding (Goodwin, Ramalingam, & Briggs, 2012). Furthermore, radical right parties are benefiting from these international networks by inviting internationally well-known politicians and activists to their events.[164] Likewise, less successful radical right parties seek to copy organizational and communication models of their more successful counterparts in other countries which, in turn, often initiate transnational collaborations. With respect to the last point, the French Front National has been on the forefront of international cooperation, offering financial support and initiating collaborative projects (Rydgen, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Betz, 2013a), while, more recently, Jobbik took a similar role by spearheading the creation of the Alliance of European National Movements in 2009.

Therefore, having in mind the long history of the radical right's international networking as well as current tendencies, it can be expected that radical right parties will continue with active international cooperation. However, it is likely that these efforts will be accompanied by frequent disputes and divisions, and consequently the creation of a broad international radical right alliance is not foreseeable in the near future.

7.4. Policy responses to the rise of the radical right

7.4.1. The problem of identifying the danger of the rise of the radical right

As the radical right is getting increasingly distant from its fascist and Nazi predecessors, the danger of the radical right becomes more elusive and the parties are growing more acceptable

[164] For example, during the Swedish Democrats' 2010 election campaign, the party invited Robert Spencer, the American founder of Jihad Watch, and Alan Lake of the English Defense League to speak at the Swedish Democrats events (Goodwin, Ramalingam, & Briggs, 2012).

to the electorate. Namely, in comparison to far-right parties in the past, as well as their extreme and violent counterparts which operate outside of the political system, modern radical right parties embody a different type of threat to contemporary democracies. As Betz and Johnson put it: "What makes it so difficult to get a firm grip on the nature of the contemporary radical right is that it is both democratic and extreme." (Betz & Johnson, 2004, p. 312). Ideologically, the radical right is growing increasingly indistinguishable from conservative and Christian-democratic party families. On the other hand, radical right parties do not challenge the constitutional order of the states and they are less likely to employ violence, let alone to attempt to change the system by violent means. To the contrary, they are likely to distance themselves from any violent act, particularly terrorism, and emphasize their role in defense of principles of the liberal democracy, civil rights and the constitutional order (see for example Betz, 2013a and Akkerman, 2005).In this respect, it is difficult to address and articulate the problem of the radical right in modern societies.

Nevertheless, the most concerning aspect of the radical right is still in its relation to the violence. In this regard, it is important to note that, in comparison to other sources of violence or terrorism, the far-right organizations are not the most acute sources of concern. Although incidences related to the extreme right, such as assaults on ethnic minorities, hate speech and the desecration of religious institutions, are relatively frequent, large scale acts of terror perpetuated by organized groups are uncommon.[165] Actually, while organized underground groups have the capability and intention to carry out attacks, the most acute threat of the far-right violence comes from individuals, so called "lone wolves" (Europol, 2012). In this respect, Anders Behring

[165] The uncovering of the National Socialist Underground (*Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund*) terrorist group is one of rare cases of identifying a large-scale far-right terrorist organization in Europe.

Breivik's bombing of government buildings in Oslo and the mass murder of participants of the Norwegian Labor Party youth camp on island of Utøya in 2011are the most tragic examples.[166]

The relationship between illegal and violent extreme right movements, radicalized individuals and radical right parties is complex and ambiguous. For instance, Minkenberg believes that the presence of radical right political parties diverts support from violent movements and channels far-right demands into the democratic system (Minkenberg, 2003). On the other hand, it is likely that nonviolent groups may "set the scene" for the extreme right, while the ideological foundations of radical right parties can be used to justify the violence.[167] Furthermore, radical right parties are often embedded in a wider culture of violence and frequently recruit individuals that openly propagate antidemocratic and racist narratives (Goodwin, Ramalingam, & Briggs, 2012).[168]

Nonetheless, while the relation of the radical right and extremists outside political system is questionable, the impact of radical right parties on political and social climate is evident. As mentioned above, the radical right is introducing exclusionary policies in public sphere and shifts attitudes of the electorate by promoting nationalism, xenophobia and the intolerance of differences. Although parties are formally devoted to democratic values, the radical changes they seek are grounded in a critique of the liberal democracy. Consequently, although the radical right does not embody the same threat as it did only few decades ago, it still questions the fundamental consensus on which contemporary democratic systems are founded.

[166] However, this is not a sole example. For instance, David Copeland, a former British National Party member, conducted a 13-day bombing campaign in April 1999 killing three and injuring hundreds. Robert Cottage, a former British National Party candidate, was arrested in 2006 for stockpiling weapons. In 2011 in Italy, two Senegalese street vendors were murdered by a member of the extreme right group, Casa Pound.

[167] For instance, so-called "lone wolves" in most cases had long-standing involvement with organized extremist groups and sometimes participated in work of radical right parties (Ramalingam, 2012).

[168] In this respect, quite a few radical right parties face a tension between a need to moderate and the internal pressure of hard-core members to keep a distinct, extreme profile.

Having in mind uncertainties with respect to the perils of the radical right, the following policy propositions are intended to address the impact of the radical right parties on modern European societies.

7.4.2. Interplay between banning and *cordon sanitaire*

The repressive measures are the first type of policy proposition that come to mind, particularly considering the violent forms of the far-right. In this respect, the banning of the most extreme radical right parties, the proscription of public activities organized by particular groups, or the criminalization of the attempts in reconstruction of prohibited groups and parties are frequently advanced propositions. Furthermore, policies designed to limit dissemination of the propaganda, including the banning of publications, pictures or any material with racist or xenophobic content (both offline and online) may addresses the spreading of radical rightist ideologies. However, above all these policies must include the prohibition of public incitement of violence or hatred and materials that condone crimes against humanity or promote genocide. In addition, the police and the court system should treat racist and xenophobic motives of crimes as aggravating circumstances (Betz H.-G. , 1999).

While these policies are justified and necessary in the case of the most extreme forms of radical right politics, it is important to note that these measures may be circumvented, hard to implement and even have a negative effect. With respect to the banning, the evasion strategies include changing names of organizations, the formation of entirely new organizations or the creation of unregistered groups.[169] On the other hand, the case of the National Democratic Party of Germany demonstrates that the attempts in banning of a party can be hard and problematic.

[169] The most prominent example in this regard is the Flemish Block and its reformation in the form of the Flemish Interest (Erk, 2005)

Finally, repressive measures may empower counter-cultural profile of the radical right (van Spanje &de Vreese, 2015) while, despite the suppression, the parties are still likely to maintain their activities in an unofficial or even clandestine form.[170]

In this regard, banning seems to be a viable option only in a limited number of circumstances, while a more sustainable alternative is *cordon sanitaire*. *Cordon sanitaire* can be understood as an informal mode of banning or a form of containment policy aimed at the prevention of the propagation of unwanted ideologies. In principle, it assumes a commitment of mainstream parties to exclude radical right from coalition negotiations, but may include other forms of discrimination against the radical right. However, as demonstrated by the case of the Flemish Interest, this policy may not affect the electoral performance of the radical right. Nonetheless, it is effective in limiting the influence of the radical right and, particularly, in demonstrating that policies and values adopted by the radical right are beyond standards acceptable in modern democracies.

7.4.3. Controlling debate, reaching consensus and wining back the electorate

The dissertation presented evidence in favor of the relation between the polarization considering exclusionary-authoritarian issues and the increase in radical right vote shares. In this regard, the electoral success of the radical right is likely to be halted if the most disquieting exclusionary-authoritarian positions are delegitimized in political discourse, while the overall salience of exclusionary-authoritarian issues in the electoral competition is decreased. On the most elementary level, mainstream political actors need to contest common fabrications propagated by the radical right (such as the idea that ethnic minorities are to blame for a lack of jobs and housing) as well as to address popular conspiracy theories and myths. Furthermore,

[170] Particularly problematic in the online sphere, where parties and organizations may move to foreign-based hosts where legal action against them is not possible, and thus stay active in public sphere.

mainstream parties should seek to alleviate the tensions and fears commonly associated with ethnic minorities or immigrants (such as concerns about irredentism or uncertainties about the effect of immigration on benefits systems) and to defuse the anxieties of the populace.

It is important to emphasize that this proposition does not imply that mainstream parties should ignore the issues raised by the radical right. Namely, disregarding radical right parties may allow them to present themselves as the vanguard political force willing to raise the issues which concern the "ordinary people", but are neglected in the mainstream political discourse. Instead, it is particularly important for mainstream parties to address the issues with a potential for radical right mobilization before the radical right does and, above all, to seek an interparty consensus considering the most troubling exclusionary-authoritarian problems. This strategy will permit moderate parties to frame and set the tone of the political debate, without being forced into a reactive positioning, while allowing them to find the means of communicating exclusionary-authoritarian issues without stoking the flame of the radical right.

Furthermore, political leaders need to define new modes of addressing concerns of the electorate. In the era of increased dealignment, low political confidence and weak party identification, political leaders need to adopt new tactics for reaching new audiences, original communications strategies and innovative forms of mobilization. Thus, safeguarding voters from the contagion of radical right narratives should not be only about controlling debate, but rather it should be about bridging the gap between politicians and voters, and trying to win back the voters who have turned to the radical right due to dissatisfaction with policy and politicians.

7.4.4. Education, inclusion and the creation of strong civil society

However, the most important aspect of addressing the rise of the radical right is in preventive policies. In this respect, the principal tool is the intervention in education. These

polices include the development of school curricula on topics such as: racism, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; intercultural and inter-ethnic tolerance; or identity and democracy. Although the outcome of these policies is expected to be evident only in a long term, the results are likely to be more enduring than the effects of the previously mentioned policy propositions.

Beyond the formal education, it is a necessary to promote the inclusion of minorities considering educational attainment, opportunities, and political participation. Thus, in addition to state level inclusion initiatives, it is necessary develop grassroots integration initiatives, and seek to create stronger ties with local communities. For example, increasing the number of police officers with an immigrant or ethnic minority background can be a valuable way of building a resilient police force and a strong civil society (Ramalingam, 2012). In addition, studies of the relation between urban planning and discrimination show that ghettoization of immigrants, Roma or other ethnic groups reinforces typical prejudices and stereotypes of the public (see for example Keith, 2005).

Furthermore, it is very important to involve the citizens in responding to the rise of the radical right and extremist non-party actors. It is necessary to mobilize communities against the far-right, racism, and racist violence, while governments need to have confidence in the ability of communities to respond effectively (Ramalingam, 2012). In this respect there is a need facilitate development projects and initiatives that would increase the awareness of the position of targeted minorities (e.g. immigrants, asylum seekers, Roma) as well as empower minorities in addressing increasingly xenophobic climate.

7.4.5. Engaging the media

Finally, the media is playing a significant role in the rise of the radical right (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005; Ellinas, 2010; Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007). While few

radical right parties will attain media coverage which supports them, radical right parties are skillful in dealing with the media while their leaders proved to be particularly competent in public appearances. Furthermore, media may unintentionally shape political discourse by politicizing issues such immigration, criminality, or interethnic relations, thus legitimizing policy positions of the radical right. In addition there is a tendency to approach the radical right in a sensationalist manner, often exaggerating the strength or influence of the parties, and thus allowing them to occupy more than their fair share in reporting (Goodwin, Ramalingam, & Briggs, 2012). Although, given the need to maintain a free press, influencing the behavior of the media is ethically problematic, addressing the problem through trainings and journalist workshops is likely to have some impact on the relation of the radical right and the media.

7.5. Final remarks

The electoral success of the radical right in contemporary Europe is a complex phenomenon which requires a comprehensive response. No single actor or policy alone is likely to affect the rise of the radical right and, in this respect, the increased presence of radical right parties in electoral arena can only be addressed by a joint action of actors across society, including the mainstream parties, the non-governmental sector and the general public. Therefore, while each specific measure has a significant place in designing a comprehensive policy response, the main task is in the creation of a consensus across European societies and the formation of a united front against the radical right.

However, this undertaking may prove to be very difficult. At the time when the mainstream political actors are under threat from radical left parties (e.g. Podemos, SYRIZA) and while populist parties are taking a foothold in party systems (e.g. Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement, the Alternative for Germany), this task is becoming increasingly demanding, and

requires significant efforts and substantial coordination on behalf of all participants. Consequently, in the following years the radical right will present a major challenge to European political systems and it will test the durability and vigor of modern European democracies. In all likelihood, what lies ahead is a period of turmoil, deep political divisions and uncertainty.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX-EXPERT SURVEYS

Questionnaires

PPMD dataset

(corresponding salience indicators are on scale 1-20, where 1=not important at all and 20=extremely important)

Left-right
Please locate each party on a general left-right dimension, talking all aspects of party policy into account.

Economics (Spending v. Taxes)
Promotes raising of taxes to increase public spending (1)
Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes (20)

Economics (Privatization)
Promotes maximum state ownership of business and industry (1)
Opposes all state ownership of business and industry (20)

Deregulation
Favors high level of state regulation and control of the market (1)
Favors deregulation of the markets at every opportunity (20)

Nationalism
Strongly promotes a cosmopolitan rather than _____national consciousness, history, and culture. (1)
Strongly promotes a _____national rather than cosmopolitan consciousness, history, and culture. (20)

Immigration
Favors policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into_____ society. (1)
Favors policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their home country. (20)

Social
Favors liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia (1)
Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia (20)

Religion
Supports religious principles in politics. (1)
Supports secular principles in politics. (20)

EU: joining
Opposes joining the European Union. (1)
Favors joining the European Union. (20)

EU: Accountability
Promotes the direct accountability of the EU to citizens via institutions such as the European Parliament. (1)
Promotes the indirect accountability of the EU to citizens via institutions such as the European Parliament. (20)

EU: Authority
Favors increasing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy. (1)
Favors reducing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy. (20)

Chapel Hill 06 and Chapel Hill 10 datasets

(corresponding salience indicators are on scale 0-10, where 0=not important at all and 10 =extremely important)

General left-right position. 0-10
Please tick the box that best describes each party's overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

Economic left-right position. 0-10
Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state. 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

Position on new politics (galtan). 0-10
Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. 0 Libertarian/Postmaterialist, 10 Traditional/ Authoritarian

Position on improving public services vs. reducing taxes.0-10
Strongly favors improving public services - Strongly favors reducing taxes

Position on deregulation.0-10
Strongly opposes deregulation of markets - Strongly supports deregulation of markets

Position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.0-10
Strongly favors redistribution - Strongly opposes redistribution

Position on civil liberties vs. law and order.0-10
Strongly promotes civil liberties - Strongly supports tough measures to fight crime

Position on social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality). 0-10
Strongly supports liberal policies - Strongly opposes liberal policies

Position on immigration policy.0-10
Strongly opposes tough policy - Strongly favors tough policy

Position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation).0-10
Strongly favors multiculturalism - Strongly favors assimilation

Position on cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism.0-10
Strongly advocates cosmopolitanism - Strongly advocates nationalism

Position towards ethnic minorities.0-10
Strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities - Strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities

Position on the role of religious principles in politics. 0-10
Strongly opposes – strongly favors

Overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in 2006. 1-7
Strongly opposed – strongly in favor

Relative salience of European integration in the party's public stance in 2006. 1-4
No importance – great importance

Party leadership's stance on wheatear the country has benefited from EU membership. 1-3
Benefited-Not Benefited

Position of the party leadership in 2006 on the powers of the European Parliament. 1-7
Strongly opposes – strongly favors

Position of the party leadership in 2006 on EU internal market.1-7
Strongly opposes – strongly favors

APPENDIX–CHAPTER 2

Analyses of PPMD data set

Correlation coefficents of the exculsionary and authoritarian indicators across countries

Eastern Europe		**Western Europe**	
Albania	0.687**	Austria	0.941*
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.971*	Belgium	0.870*
Bulgaria	0.731*	United Kingdom	0.980*
Croatia	0.950*	Cyprus	0.448
Czeh Republic	0.567**	Denmark	0.687*
Estonia	0.514	Finland	0.872*
Hungary	0.942*	France	0.979*
Latvia	0.376	Germany	0.945*
Lithuania	0.747*	Island	0.929*
Macedonia	0.876*	Ireland	0.701
Moldova	0.031	Italy	0.878*
Poland	0.886*	Luxeburg	0.894*
Romania	0.921*	Malta	0.986
Russia	0.984*	Neitherlands	0.364
Serbia	0.618	North Ireland	0.825*
Slovakia	0.258	Norway	0.456
Slovenia	0.876*	Portugal	0.998*
Ukraine	- 0.552	Spain	0.989*
		Sweden	0.863*
		Switzerland	0.846*

*Note: *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01. The results are based on indicators of nationalism, immigration and social.*

Regression model based on social and economics (dependent – left-right dimension)

	Standardized coefficients	**Unstandardized coefficients**	
	beta	**β**	**SE**
economics (spending vs. taxes)	0.639	0.773***	0.039
social	0.407	0.392***	0.031
constant		-0.985*	0.456
R	0.855		
R^2	0.730		
Adjusted R^2	0.728		
F	391.218		
Sig.	0.000		

*Note: *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001*

Regression model based on all variables (dependent – left-right dimension)

	Standardized coefficients	Unstandardized coefficients	
	beta	β	SE
economics (spending vs. taxes)	0.555	0.672***	0.046
social	0.184	0.177***	0.041
economy	0.066	0.057	0.031
exclusionary	0.315	0.297***	0.041
constant		-1.401**	0.426
R	0.879		
R^2	0.772		
Adjusted R^2	0.769		
F	242.688		
Sig.	0.000		

*Note: *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001*

Regression model based on variables loading on exclusionary dimension (dependent – left-right dimension)

	Standardized coefficients	Unstandardized coefficients	
	beta	β	SE
social	0.405	0.388***	0.051
exclusionary	0.333	0.278***	0.044
constant		3.920***	0.474
R	0.671		
R^2	0.450		
Adjusted R^2	0.447		
F	137.825		
Sig.	0.000		

*Note: *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001*

Factor analysis of all variables (principal axis factoring)

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues		Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings	
	Total	% of Variance	Total	% of Variance
1	2.175	54.374	1.565	39.125
2	1.198	29.941	1.170	29.257
3	.394	9.838		
4	.234	5.848		

Rotated Factor Matrix		
	Factor	
	1	2
economics (spending vs. taxes)	0.277	0.760
social	0.816	0.144
exclusionary	0.906	0.146
economy	0.031	0.742



Regression model based on the extracted factors (dependent – left-right dimension)

	Standardized coefficients	Unstandardized coefficients	
	beta	β	SE
exclusionary-authoritarian factor	0.581	2.971***	0.152
economic factor	0.603	3.353***	0.165
constant		11.074***	0.140
R	0.864		
R^2	0.746		
Adjusted R^2	0.744		
F	423.304		
Sig.	0.000		

*Note: *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001*

Correlation coefficient of extracted economic and exclusionary-authoritarian factors

	Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	Economic dimension
Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	1	0.289**
Economic dimension	0.289**	1

*Note: **=p<0.01; N=307*

Analysis of CH-06/10 data sets – structural equation models

Comparison of baseline structural equation models

CH-06	Two factor models	Three factor models
AIC	428.4763	261.9709
AICc	387.8383	217.4209
BIC	160.5457	3.749708
CH-10		
AIC	488.7138	334.0712
AICc	449.399	290.1745
BIC	263.9905	119.7773

Baseline structural equation models - two factor models

				CH-06 data set				CH-10 data set			
	Indicator		Latent construct	Unstandardized coefficients	Standardized coefficients	S. E.	R^2	Unstandardized coefficients	Standardized coefficients	S. E	R^2
Determinants of position on exclusionary-authoritarian ,economic issues and left – right dimension	libertarian-postmaterialist vs. traditional-authoritarian	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	2.210***	0.903	0.138	0.815	2.312***	0.925	0.123	0.855
	civil liberties vs. law & order	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	2.097***	0.933	0.124	0.869	2.092***	0.945	0.107	0.892
	social lifestyle	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	2.169***	0.845	0.152	0.714	2.304***	0.873	0.135	0.761
	immigration	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	1.936***	0.928	0.116	0.861	2.171***	0.950	0.110	0.902
	multiculturalism vs. assimilation	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	2.095***	0.927	0.125	0.859	2.297***	0.948	0.117	0.899
	ethnic minorities	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	2.072***	0.850	0.144	0.722	2.186***	0.907	0.120	0.823
	cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	1.987***	0.894	0.127	0.798				
	public service vs. reducing taxes	←	economic dimension	2.152***	0.973	0.118	0.945	2.107***	0.968	0.103	0.936
	deregulation	←	economic dimension	2.096***	0.952	0.120	0.906	1.962***	0.939	0.102	0.881
	redistribution from rich to poor	←	economic dimension	2.086***	0.956	0.118	0.913	1.999***	0.984	0.095	0.968
	general left-right position	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	1.173***	0.525	0.096	0.852	1.188***	0.519	0.083	0.877
	general left-right position	←	economic dimension	1.258***	0.563	0.098		1.302***	0.569	0.086	
	economic dimension	↔	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	0.439***		0.061		0.482***		0.051	
Error variances	libertarian-postmaterialist vs. traditional-authoritarian	↔	libertarian/ postmaterialist vs. traditional/ authoritarian	1.102***	0.184	0.131		0.906***	0.145	0.097	
	civil liberties vs. law & order	↔	civil liberties vs. law & order	0.658***	0.130	0.085		0.529***	0.108	0.060	
	social lifestyle	↔	social lifestyle	1.883***	0.286	0.210		1.662***	0.239	0.165	
	immigration	↔	immigration	0.602***	0.138	0.076		0.509***	0.097	0.060	
	multiculturalism vs. assimilation	↔	multiculturalism vs. assimilation	0.715***	0.140	0.090		0.589***	0.100	0.069	
	ethnic minorities	↔	ethnic minorities	1.651***	0.278	0.185		1.024***	0.177	0.106	
	cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	↔	cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	0.995***	0.201	0.116			0.063		
	public service vs. reducing taxes	↔	public service vs. reducing taxes	0.265***	0.054	0.052		0.300***	0.119	0.042	
	deregulation	↔	deregulation	0.455***	0.094	0.064		0.518***	0.031	0.056	
	redistribution from rich to poor	↔	redistribution from rich to poor	0.414***	0.087	0.061		0.128***	0.123	0.030	
	general left-right position	↔	general left-right position	0.738***	0.148	0.085		0.643***	0.145	0.065	

*Note: *** p<.001*

Baseline structural equation models - three factor models

	Indicator		Latent construct	CH-06 data set				CH-10 data set			
				Unstandardized coefficients	Standardized coefficients	S. E.	R^2	Unstandardized coefficients	Standardized coefficients	S. E	R^2
Determinants of position on exclusionary-authoritarian ,economic issues and left –right dimension	libertarian-postmaterialist vs. traditional-authoritarian	←	authoritarian dimension	2.418***	0.988	0.129	0.976	2.482***	0.993	0.116	0.985
	civil liberties vs. law & order	←	authoritarian dimension	2.026***	0.901	0.127	0.812	1.984***	0.896	0.111	0.802
	social lifestyle	←	authoritarian dimension	2.415***	0.941	0.141	0.885	2.505***	0.949	0.127	0.900
	immigration	←	authoritarian dimension	1.957***	0.938	0.115	0.880	2.166***	0.948	0.110	0.897
	multiculturalism vs. assimilation	←	exclusionary dimension	2.163***	0.957	0.122	0.916	2.356***	0.973	0.114	0.946
	ethnic minorities	←	exclusionary dimension	2.088***	0.856	0.143	0.733	2.226***	0.924	0.119	0.853
	cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	←	exclusionary dimension	2.032***	0.914	0.125	0.835				
	public service vs. reducing taxes	←	economic dimension	2.149***	0.971	0.118	0.943	2.107***	0.968	0.103	0.936
	deregulation	←	economic dimension	2.099***	0.953	0.119	0.908	1.962***	0.939	0.102	0.881
	redistribution from rich to poor	←	economic dimension	2.087***	0.956	0.118	0.914	1.999***	0.984	0.095	0.969
	general left-right position	←	exclusionary dimension	0.665***	0.298	0.151		0.594***	0.259	0.147	0.879
	general left-right position	←	authoritarian dimension	0.539***	0.241	0.142	0.849	0.613***	0.268	0.137	
	general left-right position	←	economic dimension	1.278***	0.572	0.100		1.340***	0.585	0.088	
	economic dimension	↔	authoritarian dimension	0.356***		0.066		0.388***		0.056	
	economic dimension	↔	exclusionary dimension	0.453***		0.061		0.501***		0.050	
	exclusionary dimension	↔	authoritarian dimension	0.855***		0.022		0.895***		0.015	
Error variances	libertarian-postmaterialist vs. traditional-authoritarian	↔	libertarian/ postmaterialist vs. traditional/ authoritarian	0.138***	0.023	0.064		0.090***	0.014	0.049	
	civil liberties vs. law & order	↔	civil liberties vs. law & order	0.949***	0.188	0.110		0.968***	0.197	0.096	
	social lifestyle	↔	social lifestyle	0.753***	0.114	0.101		0.694***	0.100	0.081	
	immigration	↔	immigration	0.520***	0.120	0.073		0.534***	0.102	0.067	
	multiculturalism vs. assimilation	↔	multiculturalism vs. assimilation	0.426***	0.083	0.072		0.316***	0.054	0.058	
	ethnic minorities	↔	ethnic minorities	1.586***	0.267	0.181		0.849***	0.146	0.094	
	cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	↔	cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	0.814***	0.165	0.102					
	public service vs. reducing taxes	↔	public service vs. reducing taxes	0.279***	0.057	0.053		0.301***	0.064	0.041	
	deregulation	↔	deregulation	0.442***	0.091	0.063		0.518***	0.119	0.056	
	redistribution from rich to poor	↔	redistribution from rich to poor	0.410***	0.086	0.060		0.127***	0.031	0.030	
	general left-right position	↔	general left-right position	0.751***	0.151	0.085		0.633***	0.121	0.063	

*Note: *** p<.001*

Final structural equation models

				CH-06 dataset				CH-10 dataset			
	Indicator		**Latent construct**	**Unstandardized coefficients**	**Standardized coefficients**	**S. E.**	**R^2**	**Unstandardized coefficients**	**Standardized coefficients**	**S. E**	**R^2**
Determinants of position on exclusionary-authoritarian ,economic issues and left –right dimension	libertarian-postmaterialist vs. traditional-authoritarian	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	2.067***	0.845	0.145	0.713	2.259***	0.904	0.125	0.817
	civil liberties vs. law & order	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	1.195***	0.531	0.137	0.868	2.120***	0.957	0.106	0.916
	social lifestyle	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	1.983***	0.773	0.159	0.597	2.217***	0.840	0.138	0.706
	immigration	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	1.969***	0.944	0.114	0.891	2.176***	0.952	0.110	0.907
	multiculturalism vs. assimilation	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	2.152***	0.952	0.123	0.907	3.906***	1.613	0.362	0.981
	ethnic minorities	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	2.033***	0.914	0.125	0.836	2.191***	0.910	0.120	0.827
	cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	2.068***	0.848	0.144	0.719				
	public service vs. reducing taxes	←	economic dimension	2.156***	0.974	0.118	0.949	2.115***	0.972	0.103	0.944
	deregulation	←	economic dimension	2.215***	1.010	0.125	0.927	2.187***	1.045	0.111	0.919
	redistribution from rich to poor	←	economic dimension	2.077***	0.951	0.118	0.905	1.991***	0.980	0.095	0.961
	general left-right position	←	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	1.102***	0.493	0.097	0.844	1.101***	0.481	0.083	0.865
	general left-right position	←	economic dimension	1.277***	0.572	0.102		1.351***	0.590	0.090	
	economic dimension	↔	exclusionary-authoritarian dimension	0.485***	0.485	0.058		0.503***	0.503	0.049	
Error variances	libertarian-postmaterialist vs. traditional-authoritarian	↔	libertarian/ postmaterialist vs. traditional/ authoritarian	1.716***	0.287	0.194		1.146***	0.183	0.111	
	civil liberties vs. law & order	↔	civil liberties vs. law & order	0.666***	0.132	0.074		0.410***	0.084	0.059	
	social lifestyle	↔	social lifestyle	2.654***	0.403	0.289		2.052***	0.294	0.192	
	immigration	↔	immigration	0.473***	0.109	0.067		0.488***	0.093	0.053	
	multiculturalism vs. assimilation	↔	multiculturalism vs. assimilation	0.473***	0.093	0.072		0.114***	0.019	0.090	
	ethnic minorities	↔	ethnic minorities	0.810***	0.164	0.100		1.002***	0.173	0.097	
	cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	↔	cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	1.670***	0.281	0.188					
	public service vs. reducing taxes	↔	public service vs. reducing taxes	0.252***	0.051	0.048		0.266***	0.056	0.036	
	deregulation	↔	deregulation	0.352***	0.073	0.057		0.353***	0.081	0.044	
	redistribution from rich to poor	↔	redistribution from rich to poor	0.452***	0.095	0.061		0.161***	0.039	0.028	
	general left-right position	↔	general left-right position	0.779***	0.156	0.089		0.710***	0.135	0.069	
Additional parameters (CH-06/CH-10)[171]	lib-postmat vs. trad-author/ lib-postmat vs. trad-author	↔	social lifestyle/ social lifestyle	1.773***	0.282	0.219		1.229***	0.186	0.132	
	civil liberties vs. law & order/ deregulation	←	libertarian-postmaterialist vs. traditional-authoritarian/ multiculturalism vs. assimilation	0.403***	0.439	0.050		-0.185***	-0.214	0.021	
	deregulation/ multiculturalism vs. assimilation	←	social lifestyle/ civil liberties vs. law & order	-0.132***	-0.155	0.022		-0.733***	-0.670	0.144	

*Note: *** p<.001*

[171] The parameters are estimated upon the review of the modification indexes – CH-06/CH-10.

APPENDIX-CHAPTER 3

Selection of variables

The following tables present the Comparative Manifestos Project indicators used in the creation of the basic set, the extended set and the extended set with the addition of Eastern European variables for the economic dimension and the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension. The left-right dimension is conceptualized as a synthesis of the economic dimension and the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension.

Variables capturing position the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension

Basic set		Variables added for the extended set	
national way life; positive	per601	internationalism; positive	per107
national way life; negative	per602	internationalism; negative	per109
traditional moral; positive	per603	European union; positive	per108
traditional moral; negative	per604	European union; negative	per110
law and order; positive	per605	political corruption; negative	per304
multiculturism; positive	per607	political authority; positive	per305
multiculturism; negative	per608	social harmony; positive	per606
military; positive	per104		
military; negative	per105		

Variables capturing position on the economic dimension

Basic set		Variables added for the extended set	
free enterprise; positive	per401	economic planning; positive	per404
incentives; positive	per402	corporatism; positive	per405
market regulation; positive	per403	Keynesian demand; positive	per409
protectionism; positive	per406	controlled econ; positive	per412
protectionism; negative	per407	nationalization; positive	per413
econ orthodoxy; positive	per414	Marxist analysis; positive	per415
social justice; positive	per503	anti-growth econ; positive	per416
welfare; positive	per504		
welfare ; negative	per505		

Variables capturing position of Eastern European parties

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension		Economic dimension	
Russia; positive	per1011	privatization; positive	per4011
western states; positive	per1012	control economy; negative	per4012
Eastern Europe; positive	per1013	social ownership; positive	per4121
Baltic states; positive	per1014	mixed economy; positive	per4122
Nordic council; positive	per1015	publicly owned industry; positive	per4123
Yugoslavia; positive	per1016	socialist property; positive	per4124
Russia; negative	per1021	privatization; negative	per4132
Western states; negative	per1022	private-pub mix culture; positive	per5021
Eastern Europe; negative	per1023	private-pub mix social justice; positive	per5031
Baltic states; negative	per1024	private-pub mix welfare; positive	per5041
Nordic council; negative	per1025	private-pub mix education; positive	per5061
Yugoslavia; negative	per1026		
Russian army; negative	per1031		
independence; positive	per1032		
rights of nations; positive	per1033		
restrict citizenship; positive	per2022		
lax citizenship; positive	per2023		
multiculturalism Roma; positive	per6072		
multiculturalism Roma; negative	per6081		
minorities inland; positive	per7051		
minorities abroad; positive	per7052		

Budge, Robertson, & Hearl 1987 – extraction problems

There are several issues in replicating Budge et al. (1987) extraction method. Prior to any empirical testing, it seems that the main problem of the method stems from its focus on the country level. Namely, the failure to account for the positions of parties in one party system relative to the positions of the parties in other party systems is likely to cause distortions in the extracted scale. Thus, pooling state level scores is not likely to produce a dimension that reflects positions of parties in a comparative manner. Furthermore, multiple problems are manifested in the execution of the method and the attempt to follow the Budge et al. methodology to the letter was a failure. The recommended use of principal axis factoring with varimax rotation was not possible in most of the cases (Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987, p. 471). Namely, method was failing on various stages of extraction and occasionally the procedure was not even able to produce the first factor, let alone more complex solutions. This may be caused by multiple reasons. For instance, it should be kept in mind that the dataset used in this analysis is different from the one used by the authors. Namely, although the dataset is the product of the same research project, Budge et al. were concerned with 19 West European states in the post war period until 1989. The decreased number of cases combined with the lack of normally distributed variables, is the most likely reason for the low communalities, the failure of the extraction of shared variance or the failures to produce rotated solution using principal axis factoring. Since some of the problems can be addressed, the effect of principal axis factoring was assessed in the second stage of factor analysis. Nonetheless, to circumvent the initial problem, principal component analysis with varimax rotation was employed in the first stage of factor analysis. This procedure should not produce significantly different results in terms of the interpretation of factor scores and the nature of extracted factors (Kim & Mueller, 1978); nonetheless, it might have an effect when it comes to scaling. However, since the main goal of the first stage factor analysis is the summarization of the data (Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987, p. 32), the principal component analysis might turn be a more appropriate method.

Following the original procedure, two factors are retained for each domain, resulting in 14 factor scores for each state. The variables without variation on country level were not included in the analysis. In the second stage, principal axis factoring was used to extract the first component, which according to Budge et al (1987) represents the general left-right dimension. The procedure was not successful in five cases. For these cases principal component analysis was implemented and these results were pooled together with results obtained by principal axis factoring to create the final scale.

Lastly, viability of the method with regards to the extraction of the exclusionary-authoritarian and the economic dimension was tested. For the procedure of extraction of the exclusionary-authoritarian dimension, Domain 1 (External relations) and Domain 6 (Fabric of society) were selected. For the extraction of the economic dimension, Domain 4 (Economy) and Domain 5 (Welfare and Quality of life) were selected. Consequently, four factors were introduced in the second stage of each factor analysis. Nonetheless, use of principal axis factoring proved not to be feasible in this setting. Only 12 factors were retained for exclusionary-authoritarian dimension and 9 for the economic dimension. This verifies the general lack of viability when it comes to the performance of this method in extraction of specific dimensions.

Validity analysis of replicated extraction procedures

The following tables present the results of the validity analysis of methods suggested in the literature. The validity analysis is focused on combinations of the replicated methodologies of scale extraction and the sets of variables (i.e. basic set, the extended set and the extended set with addition of the East European variables).

Left-right dimension

Original and basic sets of variables

		Laver & Budge (rile)	Laver & Budge basic	Laver & Budge extended	Gabel &Huber original	Gabel &Huber basic	Gabel &Huber extended	Klingemann original	Klingemann (based on the best performing sets)
General left/right position (CH-06)	Pearson Correlation	.621	.686	.674	.075	.634	-.722	.346	.561
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.388	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	133	133	133	133	133	133	133	133
Left right general (PPMD)	Pearson Correlation	.602	.625	.636	.116	.601	-.691	.321	.537
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.112	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	189	189	189	189	189	189	191	191

		Budge, Robertson, & Hearl	Lowe et al. original scale	Lowe et al. extended	Kim & Fording	Kim Fording extended
General left/right position (CH-06)	Pearson Correlation	.305	.649	.696	.654	.716
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	100	133	133	133	133
Left right general (PPMD)	Pearson Correlation	.306	.608	.623	.618	.641
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	173	189	189	189	189

Extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables

All countries - Extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables

		Laver & Budge	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.	Gabel &Huber separate PCs for East and West
General left/right position (CH-06)	Pearson Correlation	.672	.690	.684	.572
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	133	133	133	133
Left right general (PPMD)	Pearson Correlation	.636	.640	.629	.456
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	189	189	189	191

West Europe – Comparison of the extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables and the extended set of variables

		Extended and Eastern European set				Extended set of variables			
		Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.	Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.
General left/right position (CH-06)	Pearson Correlation	.689	.773	.717	.711	.689	-.767	.718	.742
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
Left right general (PPMD)	Pearson Correlation	.704	.756	.720	.712	.704	-.785	.717	.729
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108

Eastern Europe - Comparison of the extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables and the extended set of variables

		Extended and Eastern European set				Extended set of variables			
		Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.	Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.
general left/right position (Q10)	Pearson Correlation	.600	.006	.593	.590	.612	-.589	.622	.627
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.965	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
LEFT RIGHT GENERAL	Pearson Correlation	.499	-.068	.480	.459	.495	-.514	.432	.475
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.539	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	81	83	81	81	81	81	81	81

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension

Original and basic sets of variables

			Laver & Budge (rile)	Laver & Budge basic	Laver & Budge extended	Gabel &Huber basic	Gabel &Huber extended	Gabel &Huber positional extended	Klingemann basic	Klingemann extended
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.528	.656	.682	.636	.641	.642	.632	.549
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133	133	133	133	133
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.434	.614	.605	.570	.569	.578	.586	.479
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.575	.664	.688	.674	.674	.661	.668	.612
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	129	129	129	129	129	129	129	129
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.527	.607	.651	.593	.601	.600	.623	.572
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.384	.573	.573	.551	.560	.570	.550	.566
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.498	.672	.687	.674	.680	.677	.600	.553
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.452	.606	.599	.565	.557	.557	.608	.492
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.463	.483	.465	.402	.394	.404	.427	.346
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	193	193	193	193	193	193	195	195
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.476	.560	.524	.543	.550	.557	.492	.410
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194	194	194	194	196	196

			Budge, Robertson, & Hearl	Lowe et al. social liberal	Lowe et al. basic	Lowe et al. extended	Kim & Fording basic	Kim & Fording extended
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.299	.535	.570	.558	.616	.611
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	100	133	133	133	133	133
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.200	.471	.530	.519	.571	.551
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.047	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	99	132	132	132	132	132
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.323	.533	.575	.587	.607	.634
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	96	129	129	129	129	129
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.277	.551	.536	.584	.563	.576
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	95	128	128	128	128	128
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.308	.410	.450	.473	.491	.508
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	99	132	132	132	132	132
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.310	.515	.566	.566	.615	.609
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	99	132	132	132	132	132
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.255	.448	.510	.503	.551	.541
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.010	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	100	133	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.136	.487	.411	.452	.438	.443
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.071	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	177	193	193	193	193	193
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.199	.530	.470	.504	.496	.498
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.008	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	178	194	194	194	194	194

Extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables

All countries - Extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables

			Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.683	.632	.605	.548
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.601	.518	.537	.504
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.691	.676	.630	.577
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	129	129	129	129
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.662	.611	.583	.582
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	128	128	128	128
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.586	.512	.509	.479
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.715	.643	.627	.577
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.596	.531	.529	.488
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.465	.390	.454	.441
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	193	195	193	193
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.545	.531	.532	.517
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	196	194	194

West Europe – Comparison of the extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables and the extended set of variables

			Extended and Eastern European set				Extended set of variables			
			Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.	Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.719	.709	.692	.659	.719	.683	.692	.674
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.600	.611	.540	.529	.600	.581	.540	.541
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.726	.756	.693	.671	.726	.726	.693	.687
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.684	.676	.596	.596	.684	.637	.596	.611
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.595	.559	.527	.518	.595	.567	.527	.516
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.747	.749	.669	.658	.747	.732	.669	.669
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.622	.623	.580	.548	.622	.587	.580	.562
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.551	.508	.555	.562	.551	.477	.555	.581
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.593	.679	.629	.650	.593	.666	.629	.668
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113

Eastern Europe - Comparison of the extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables and the extended set of variables

correlations eastern Europe only			Extended and Eastern European set				Extended set of variables			
			Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.	Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.558	.452	.315	.212	.544	.494	.323	.189
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.001	.027	.143	.000	.000	.024	.194
		N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.520	.362	.346	.307	.528	.406	.378	.312
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.011	.015	.032	.000	.004	.007	.029
		N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.570	.470	.394	.263	.542	.509	.399	.240
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.001	.006	.074	.000	.000	.005	.104
		N	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.615	.458	.570	.549	.578	.532	.560	.521
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.522	.424	.398	.333	.483	.487	.394	.311
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.002	.005	.019	.000	.000	.005	.030
		N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.658	.486	.541	.410	.581	.581	.493	.353
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.003	.000	.000	.000	.013
		N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.458	.333	.253	.223	.457	.373	.277	.225
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.019	.080	.123	.001	.008	.054	.121
		N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.259	.206	.175	.174	.230	.172	.123	.158
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.019	.061	.119	.121	.039	.124	.273	.158
		N	81	83	81	81	81	81	81	81
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.437	.350	.318	.278	.367	.331	.210	.212
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.001	.004	.012	.001	.003	.060	.058
		N	81	83	81	81	81	81	81	81

Economic dimension

Original and basic sets of variables

			Laver & Budge basic	Laver & Budge extended	Gabel &Huber basic	Gabel &Huber extended	Gabel &Huber positional extended	Klingemann basic	Klingemann extended
Chapel Hill (2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	.522	.612	.583	-.692	-.683	.591	.620
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133	133	133	133
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	.561	.627	.616	-.677	-.662	.606	.609
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133	133	133	133
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	.519	.605	.584	-.682	-.671	.571	.592
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133	133	133	133
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	.549	.634	.579	-.682	-.681	.573	.584
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	ECONOMICS (SPENDING VS TAXES	Pearson Correlation	.614	.667	.668	-.713	-.698	.621	.610
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194	194	194	196	196
	ECONOMIC (PRIVATIZATION)	Pearson Correlation	.405	.570	.454	-.676	-.681	.339	.401
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000
		N	83	83	83	83	83	85	85
	DEREGULATION	Pearson Correlation	.682	.707	.717	-.740	-.723	.771	.716
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	79	79	79	79	79	79	79

			Budge, Robertson, &Hearl	Lowe et al. free enterprise	Lowe et al. involvement in economy	Lowe et al. basic	Lowe et al. extended	Kim & Fording basic	Kim & Fording extended
Chapel Hill (2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	-.061	.622	.630	.616	.651	.598	.625
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.545	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	100	133	133	133	133	133	133
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	.027	.646	.666	.652	.674	.630	.644
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.791	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	100	133	133	133	133	133	133
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	.029	.610	.622	.630	.666	.599	.629
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.772	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	100	133	133	133	133	133	133
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	-.030	.639	.600	.608	.638	.585	.608
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.766	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	100	133	133	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	ECONOMICS (SPENDING VS TAXES	Pearson Correlation	.062	.507	.640	.650	.674	.642	.656
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.411	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	178	194	194	194	194	193	194
	ECONOMIC (PRIVATIZATION)	Pearson Correlation	.185	.502	.511	.486	.576	.487	.552
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.106	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	78	83	83	83	83	82	83
	DEREGULATION	Pearson Correlation	.096	.546	.698	.731	.733	.720	.716
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.414	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	74	79	79	79	79	79	79

Extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables

All countries - Extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables

			Kim & Fording	Lowe et al	Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West
Chapel Hill (2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	.619	.647	.621	.531
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	.636	.669	.631	.535
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	.619	.659	.612	.522
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	.603	.636	.639	.491
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	ECONOMICS (SPENDING VS TAXES	Pearson Correlation	.652	.673	.666	.588
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194	196
	ECONOMIC (PRIVATIZATION)	Pearson Correlation	.558	.585	.589	.387
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	83	83	83	85
	DEREGULATION	Pearson Correlation	.716	.733	.707	.753
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	79	79	79	79

West Europe – Comparison of the extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables and the extended set of variables

			Extended and Eastern European set				Extended set of variables			
	correlations west		Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.	Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.
Chapel Hill (2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	.622	.713	.665	.699	.622	-.711	.665	.699
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	.636	.716	.669	.696	.636	-.700	.669	.696
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	.620	.702	.665	.707	.620	-.702	.665	.707
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	.689	.755	.689	.709	.689	-.752	.689	.709
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
Benoit and Laver (2004)	ECONOMICS (SPENDING VS TAXES	Pearson Correlation	.721	.761	.735	.742	.721	-.743	.735	.742
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113
	ECONOMIC (PRIVATIZATION)	Pearson Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	-1.000	1.000	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
		N	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	DEREGULATION	Pearson Correlation	.707	.753	.716	.733	.707	-.740	.716	.733
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79

Eastern Europe - Comparison of the extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables and the extended set of variables

			Extended and Eastern European set				Extended set of variables			
	correlations east		Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.	Laver & Budge	Gabel &Huber with separate PCs for East and West	Kim & Fording	Lowe et al.
Chapel Hill (2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	.613	.301	.513	.535	.593	-.656	.537	.545
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.036	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	.595	.292	.531	.574	.583	-.615	.569	.598
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.042	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	.574	.284	.495	.528	.554	-.634	.534	.551
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.048	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	.532	.233	.423	.463	.520	-.570	.454	.482
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.108	.002	.001	.000	.000	.001	.000
		N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
Benoit and Laver (2004)	ECONOMICS (SPENDING VS TAXES	Pearson Correlation	.538	.347	.478	.505	.530	-.645	.479	.498
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	81	83	81	81	81	81	81	81
	ECONOMIC (PRIVATIZATION)	Pearson Correlation	.600	.400	.559	.589	.582	-.693	.555	.583
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	81	83	81	81	81	81	81	81
	DEREGULATION	Pearson Correlation	.[a]	.[a]	.[a]	.[a]	.[a]	.[a]	.[a]	.[a]
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
		N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Validity analysis of combinations of extraction procedures

The following tables present the results of the validity analysis of the combinations of the suggested methodological alternatives (i.e. addition of the mean, variable transformations, sets of variables, and methods of creation of composite variables).

Left-right dimension

Left-right dimension - Gabel & Huber and Laver & Budge, transformations and joining of mean and original score

		basic set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PC, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PCA, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA
general left/right position (Q10)	Pearson Correlation	.717	.717
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	133	133
left right general	Pearson Correlation	.661	.661
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	189	189

		basic set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition
general left/right position (q10)	Pearson Correlation	.744	.741
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	133	133
left right general	Pearson Correlation	.676	.704
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	189	189

Left-right dimension - Extended set of variables, joining with addition

		Gabel & Huber, joining of mean and original factor based on addition	Laver & Budge, joining of mean and original score based on addition	Lowe et al. joining of mean and original score based on addition	Kim & Fording, joining of mean and original score based on addition
general left/right position (Q10)	Pearson Correlation	-.770	.715	.731	.756
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	133	133	133	133
left right general	Pearson Correlation	-.738	.679	.663	.691
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	189	189	189	189

Left-right dimension - Extended set of variables, joining with PCA

		Gabel & Huber, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	Laver & Budge, joining of mean and original score based on PCA	Lowe et al, joining of mean and original score based on PCA	Kim & Fording, joining of mean and original score based on PCA
general left/right position (q10)	Pearson Correlation	-.772	.716	.732	.758
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	133	133	133	133
left right general	Pearson Correlation	-.739	.680	.665	.692
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	189	189	189	189

Left-right dimension - Original methods, joining with addition

		Gabel & Huber, joining of mean and original factor based on addition	Laver & Budge, joining of mean and original score based on addition	Lowe et al. joining of mean and original score based on addition	Kim & Fording, joining of mean and original score based on addition
general left/right position (q10)	Pearson Correlation	.152	.692	.714	.718
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.081	.000	.000	.000
	N	133	133	133	133
left right general	Pearson Correlation	.148	.658	.653	.665
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.043	.000	.000	.000
	N	189	189	189	189

Left-right dimension - Original methods, joining with PCA

		Gabel & Huber, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	Laver & Budge, joining of mean and original score based on PCA	Lowe et al, joining of mean and original score based on PCA	Kim & Fording, joining of mean and original score based on PCA
general left/right position (Q10)	Pearson Correlation	.158	.696	.717	.721
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.069	.000	.000	.000
	N	133	133	133	133
left right general	Pearson Correlation	.150	.661	.655	.667
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.039	.000	.000	.000
	N	189	189	189	189

Left-right dimension - Inclusion of the Eastern European variables

Left-right dimension - Gabel and Huber and Laver and Budge, transformations and joining of mean and original score

		extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	extended set of variables, no transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition (modified Laver and Budge)	extended set of variables, no transformation, joining of mean and original score based on PCA
general left/right position (Q10)	Pearson Correlation	.741	.716	.584
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	133	133	133
left right general	Pearson Correlation	.703	.682	.450
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	189	189	191

Left-right dimension - Comparison of the methods with the East European variables

		Kim and Fording	Lowe et al	Laver and Budge	Gabel and Huber, extraction based on separate Eastern and Western PCA
general left/right position (Q10)	Pearson Correlation	.690	.684	.672	.572
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	133	133	133	133
left right general	Pearson Correlation	.640	.629	.636	.456
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	189	189	189	191

Final scale – left-right dimension

Left-right dimension - Extended set

		extended set of variables, no transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation (+1), extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition
general left/right position (Q10)	Pearson Correlation	.716	.740
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	133	133
left right general	Pearson Correlation	.690	.706
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	189	189

Left-right dimension - Extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables

		no transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	logarithmic transformation (+1), extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition
general left/right position (q10)	Pearson Correlation	.723	.743
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	133	133
left right general	Pearson Correlation	.703	.713
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	189	189

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension -Gabel & Huber and Laver & Budge, transformations and joining of mean and original score

			basic set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PCA, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PCA, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	basic set of variables ,positional and logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PCA, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.721	.674	.711
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	132	133
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.682	.683	.697
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	129	132
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.700	.614	.673
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	129	128	129
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.632	.500	.603
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	128	132	128
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.508	.698	.510
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.710	.665	.670
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	133	132
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.681	.549	.687
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	193	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.566	.630	.599
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	193	194	193
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.645	.674	.636
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	132	194

			extended set of variables, positional and logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PCA, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	basic set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.690	.682	.685
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.679	.623	.622
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.645	.670	.671
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	129	129	129
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.574	.623	.631
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	128	128	128
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.496	.552	.562
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.653	.706	.712
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.660	.623	.601
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.564	.525	.517
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	193	193	193
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.606	.608	.571
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension - Extended set of variables, joining with addition

			Gabel & Huber, joining of mean and original factor based on addition	Laver & Budge, joining of mean and original score based on addition	Lowe et al. joining of mean and original score based on addition	Kim & Fording, joining of mean and original score based on addition
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.648	.685	.587	.616
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.571	.622	.573	.592
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.660	.671	.587	.615
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	129	129	129	129
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.602	.631	.577	.560
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	128	128	128	128
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.557	.562	.487	.496
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.706	.712	.620	.647
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.560	.601	.534	.551
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.431	.517	.480	.470
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	193	193	193	193
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.592	.571	.530	.519
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194	194

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension - Extended set of variables, joining with PCA

			Gabel & Huber, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	Laver & Budge, joining of mean and original score based on PCA	Lowe et al, joining of mean and original score based on PCA	Kim & Fording, joining of mean and original score based on PCA
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.647	.683	.588	.613
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.570	.621	.576	.593
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.658	.668	.584	.611
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	129	129	129	129
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.600	.628	.574	.556
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	128	128	128	128
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.556	.559	.487	.493
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.706	.712	.622	.648
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.559	.599	.535	.549
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.432	.519	.481	.470
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	193	193	193	193
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.593	.572	.530	.518
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194	194

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension - Inclusion of the Eastern European variables

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension -Gabel and Huber and Laver and Budge, transformations and joining of mean and original score

			extended set of variables, no transformation, joining of mean and original score based on PCA	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PCA, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	extended set of variables, no transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition (modified Laver and Budge)
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.625	.681	.432	.684
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.506	.653	.523	.616
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.656	.681	.439	.673
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	129	129	129	129
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.574	.612	.367	.640
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	128	128	128	128
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.380	.578	.353	.572
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.567	.733	.414	.736
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.553	.632	.503	.597
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.410	.550	.349	.518
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	195	193	193	193
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.463	.642	.349	.593
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	196	.681	194	194

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension - Comparison of the methods with the East European variables

			Kim and Fording	Lowe et al	Laver and Budge	Gabel and Huber, extraction based on separate Eastern and Western PCA
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.605	.548	.683	.632
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.537	.504	.601	.518
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.630	.577	.691	.676
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	129	129	129	129
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.583	.582	.662	.611
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	128	128	128	128
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.509	.479	.586	.512
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.627	.577	.715	.643
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	132	132	132	132
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.529	.488	.596	.531
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.454	.441	.465	.390
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	193	193	193	195
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.532	.517	.545	.531
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194	196

Final scale – exclusionary-authoritarian dimension

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension - Extended set

			extended set of variables, no transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation (+1), extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.675	.657
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	132
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.623	.663
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	132	129
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.662	.607
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	129	128
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.626	.556
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	128	132
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.559	.707
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	132	132
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.712	.626
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	132	133
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.597	.529
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	193
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.508	.602
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	193	194
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.580	.657
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	194	132

Exclusionary-authoritarian dimension - Extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables

			no transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	logarithmic transformation (+1), extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition
Chapel Hill (2006)	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)	Pearson Correlation	.673	.678
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	133
	position: social lifestyle (Q21)	Pearson Correlation	.610	.645
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	132	132
	position: immigration (Q25)	Pearson Correlation	.663	.670
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	129	129
	position: integration of immigrants & asylum seekers [multiculturalism vs. assimilation] (Q27)	Pearson Correlation	.636	.619
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	128	128
	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)	Pearson Correlation	.567	.571
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	132	132
	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)	Pearson Correlation	.738	.739
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	132	132
	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)	Pearson Correlation	.589	.619
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	social	Pearson Correlation	.507	.538
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	193	193
	exclusionary	Pearson Correlation	.599	.638
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	194	194

Economic dimension

Economic dimension - Gabel& Huber and Laver & Budge, transformations and joining of mean and original score

			basic set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PC, joining of mean and original factor based on PC	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PC, joining of mean and original factor based on PC	basic set of variables ,positional and logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PC, joining of mean and original factor based on PC
Chapel Hill (2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	.691	-.736	.708
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	.716	-.730	.723
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	.689	-.740	.713
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	.658	-.722	.677
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	economics (spending vs. taxes	Pearson Correlation	.743	-.739	.739
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194
	economic (privatization)	Pearson Correlation	.535	-.684	.593
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	83	83	83
	deregulation	Pearson Correlation	.800	-.791	.788
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	79	79	79

			extended set of variables, positional and logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PC, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	basic set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition
Chapel Hill (2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	-.736	.598	.673
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	-.730	.635	.690
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	-.742	.595	.670
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	-.725	.613	.682
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	economics (spending vs. taxes	Pearson Correlation	-.737	.670	.728
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194
	economic (privatization)	Pearson Correlation	-.688	.468	.629
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	83	83	83
	deregulation	Pearson Correlation	-.794	.708	.744
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		N	79	79	79

Economic dimension - Extended set of variables, joining with addition

			Gabel & Huber, joining of mean and original factor based on addition	Laver & Budge, joining of mean and original score based on addition	Lowe et al, joining of mean and original score based on addition	Kim & Fording, joining of mean and original score based on addition
Chapel Hill (2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	-.746	.673	.713	.691
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	-.739	.690	.744	.717
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	-.742	.670	.724	.692
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	-.724	.682	.700	.672
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	economics (spending vs. taxes	Pearson Correlation	-.772	.728	.738	.728
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194	194
	economic (privatization)	Pearson Correlation	-.729	.629	.645	.625
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	83	83	83	83
	deregulation	Pearson Correlation	-.784	.744	.787	.763
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	79	79	79	79

Economic dimension - Extended set of variables, joining with PCA

			Gabel and Huber, joining of mean and original factor based on PCA	Laver and Budge, joining of mean and original score based on PCA	Lowe et al, joining of mean and original score based on PCA	Kim and Fording, joining of mean and original score based on PCA
Chapel Hill(2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	-.748	.676	.715	.693
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	-.741	.693	.747	.720
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	-.743	.673	.726	.694
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	-.725	.684	.702	.675
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	economics (spending vs. taxes	Pearson Correlation	-.775	.731	.741	.732
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194	194
	economic (privatization)	Pearson Correlation	-.731	.632	.648	.629
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	83	83	83	83
	deregulation	Pearson Correlation	-.787	.746	.789	.766
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	79	79	79	79

Economic dimension- Inclusion of the Eastern European variables

Economic dimension - Gabel and Huber and Laver and Budge, transformations and joining of mean and original score

			extended set of variables, no transformation, joining of mean and original score based on PC	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation, extraction based on PC, joining of mean and original factor based on PC	extended set of variables, no transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition (modified Laver and Budge)
Chapel Hill(2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	.465	.742	.406	.683
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	.485	.742	.417	.696
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	.464	.754	.410	.678
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	.437	.728	.431	.692
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	economics (spending vs. taxes	Pearson Correlation	.535	.737	.392	.725
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	196	194	194	194
	economic (privatization)	Pearson Correlation	.141	.689	.286	.647
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.198	.000	.009	.000
		N	85	83	83	83
	deregulation	Pearson Correlation	.753	.809	.818	.744
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	79	79	79	79

Economic dimension- Comparison of the methods with the East European variables

			Kim and Fording	Lowe et al	Laver and Budge	Gabel and Huber, extraction based on separate Eastern and Western PCA (modified Gabel and Huber)
Chapel Hill (2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	.619	.647	.621	.531
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	.636	.669	.631	.535
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	.619	.659	.612	.522
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	.603	.636	.639	.491
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	133	133	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	economics (spending vs. taxes	Pearson Correlation	.652	.673	.666	.588
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	194	194	194	196
	economic (privatization)	Pearson Correlation	.558	.585	.589	.387
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	83	83	83	85
	deregulation	Pearson Correlation	.716	.733	.707	.753
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	79	79	79	79

Final scale – economic dimension

Economic dimension - Extended set

			extended set of variables, no transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	extended set of variables, logarithmic transformation (+1), extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition
Chapel Hill(2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	.701	.761
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	133
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	.722	.771
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	133
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	.702	.772
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	133
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	.692	.730
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	economics (spending vs. taxes	Pearson Correlation	.748	.779
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	194	194
	economic (privatization)	Pearson Correlation	.671	.706
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	83	83
	deregulation	Pearson Correlation	.763	.816
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	79	79

Economic dimension - Extended set with addition of the Eastern European variables

			no transformation, extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition	logarithmic transformation (+1), extraction based on subtraction, joining of mean and original score based on addition
Chapel Hill (2006)	economic left/right position (Q11)	Pearson Correlation	.697	.746
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	133
	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)	Pearson Correlation	.713	.750
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	133
	position: deregulation (Q15)	Pearson Correlation	.694	.755
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	133
	position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)	Pearson Correlation	.698	.727
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	133	133
Benoit and Laver (2004)	economics (spending vs. taxes	Pearson Correlation	.735	.748
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	194	194
	economic (privatization)	Pearson Correlation	.660	.689
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	83	83
	deregulation	Pearson Correlation	.759	.815
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
		N	79	79

APPENDIX–CHAPTER 4

Authoritarian policy space

Validation

With regard to classifications produced by means of HCA, connectivity and silhouette width indicate the validity of classification in two groups, while Dunn index points to the validity of classification in six groups. Stability validation scores point to classifications in three clusters (APN), five (ADM) and ten clusters (AD and FOM). On the other hand, within sum of squares, average distance within clusters, and average distance between clusters have sharp changes at divisions in three and five classes, indicating validity of these solutions (see validation scores below). Consequently, classifications in three, five and ten clusters are further analyzed.

The internal validation of the application of k-means on authoritarian variables points to divisions in two (connectivity and silhouette) and nine clusters (Dunn). Similar scores are noticeable with regard to stability validation: APN and ADM indicate the validity of division in two and three classes, respectively; while AD and FOM suggest a classification into nine clusters. Finally, within sum of squares, average distance within clusters, and average distance between clusters give very weak evidence for classification into three and four clusters. Therefore, classifications in two and nine clusters are analyzed in detail.

The validation scores of the application of LCA on the set of authoritarian variables produce mostly inconclusive results. Except for two stability scores (AD and FOM) which indicate validity of the division in ten classes, the remaining scores point to diverse classifications. Analysis of the BIC scores for each parameterization reveals predominance of minimal solutions and, with exclusion of EEE parameterization (equal volume, shape and orientation of clusters), there is a trend of decrease in BIC values with the increase in number of classes. On the other hand, according to BIC values, EEE parameterization proves to be the most successful with regard to all tested constellations of classes (excluding division in six groups). Turning to the scores of within sum of squares, average distance within clusters, and average distance between clusters of EEE parameterization, there is evidence to focus on classification in five and eight clusters (see validation scores below).

Validation Scores

HCA

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
HCA	Connectivity	10.92	13.52	16.45	29.37	30.84	38.06	46.11	59.56	61.79
	Dunn	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.10
	Silhouette	0.46	0.40	0.38	0.40	0.37	0.35	0.32	0.33	0.31

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	10.92	hierarchical	2
Dunn	0.10	hierarchical	6
Silhouette	0.46	hierarchical	2

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
HCA	APN	0.23	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.25	0.29
	AD	3.92	3.17	2.91	2.29	2.25	2.08	2.01	1.89	1.87
	ADM	1.97	1.50	1.20	0.76	0.86	0.86	0.82	0.77	0.81
	FOM	1.59	1.36	1.29	1.11	1.08	1.04	1.03	1.02	1.02

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.20	hierarchical	3
AD	1.87	hierarchical	10
ADM	0.76	hierarchical	5
FOM	1.02	hierarchical	10

Number of clusters									
Validity scores - HCA	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Within sum of squares	1340.60	808.59	786.65	450.33	438.89	358.29	329.02	266.54	260.55
Average distance between clusters	7.00	6.74	6.73	6.13	6.12	5.97	5.91	5.73	5.73
Average distance within clusters	3.58	2.89	2.87	2.11	2.09	1.95	1.88	1.65	1.64

K-means

Number of clusters									
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
K-means	Connectivity	13.35	28.00	30.93	39.81	48.57	50.02	66.72	62.91	72.42
	Dunn	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.10
	Silhouette	0.52	0.46	0.44	0.42	0.36	0.39	0.37	0.36	0.35

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	13.35	k-means	2
Dunn	0.10	k-means	9
Silhouette	0.52	k-means	2

Number of clusters									
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
K-means	APN	0.10	0.11	0.39	0.28	0.35	0.36	0.34	0.33	0.41
	AD	3.33	2.55	2.64	2.22	2.09	2.00	1.88	1.79	1.81
	ADM	0.64	0.50	1.41	0.85	0.98	0.98	0.92	0.82	1.04
	FOM	1.60	1.23	1.10	1.07	1.05	1.06	1.05	1.00	1.01

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.10	k-means	2
AD	1.79	k-means	9
ADM	0.50	k-means	3
FOM	1.00	k-means	9

Number of clusters									
Validity scores - K-means	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Within sum of squares	1080.07	613.70	439.21	359.81	309.49	264.11	237.70	215.83	196.91
Average distance between clusters	7.03	6.41	6.12	5.95	5.79	5.67	5.57	5.52	5.52
Average distance within clusters	3.12	2.40	2.06	1.90	1.77	1.61	1.52	1.44	1.41

LCA

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
LCA	Connectivity	40.50	79.80	55.74	35.65	79.06	71.07	107.73	90.29	85.45
	Dunn	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.06
	Silhouette	0.41	0.29	0.35	0.39	0.19	0.35	0.25	0.32	0.32

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	35.65	LCA	5
Dunn	0.07	LCA	4
Silhouette	0.41	LCA	2

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
LCA	APN	0.25	0.22	0.36	0.36	0.49	0.28	0.42	0.40	0.39
	AD	4.18	3.38	3.36	2.74	2.69	1.97	2.20	2.04	1.88
	ADM	2.27	1.18	2.10	1.50	1.59	0.88	1.24	1.17	1.08
	FOM	1.80	1.47	1.54	1.32	1.21	1.05	1.00	1.05	1.00

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.22	LCA	3
AD	1.88	LCA	10
ADM	0.88	LCA	7
FOM	1.00	LCA	10

Number of clusters									
Validity scores – LCA Parameterization - EEE	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Within sum of squares	1446.91	951.92	577.87	367.96	319.37	283.61	382.19	248.81	217.14
Average distance between clusters	6.70	6.13	6.05	5.98	5.78	5.71	5.62	5.56	5.54
Average distance within clusters	3.56	2.89	2.31	1.93	1.78	1.66	1.89	1.57	1.48



Validation

Considering HCA, two internal validation scores (connectivity and silhouette width) indicate the validity of classification in two groups, while Dunn index indicates the validity of classification in three groups. On the other hand, stability validation scores point to divisions in two clusters (APN), eight clusters (ADM) and ten clusters (AD and FOM). Within sum of squares and average distance within clusters and average distance between clusters indexes indicate the validity of division into four groups (see validation scores below). Consequently, classifications in two, three, four and ten clusters are further examined.

With regard to the validation of scores based on the application of k-means clustering on exclusionary variables, connectivity and silhouette suggest the validity of division into two clusters, while Dunn index points to classification into three clusters. On the other hand, there is a sharp distinction between stability validation scores, where APN and ADM indicate classification in two clusters, while AD and FOM suggest classification in ten clusters. Finally, the scores of within sum of squares, average distance within clusters, and average distance between clusters give weak evidence for the validity of classification in three clusters. Thus, classifications in two, three and ten clusters are further examined.

Turning to LCA results, internal validation scores favor division in three (connectivity and silhouette) and six clusters (Dunn). On the other hand, stability scores predominantly, indicate the validity of division in maximal number of clusters. In that regard, ADM, AD and FOM suggest classification into ten clusters, while APN scores indicate the validity of division in two classes. In contrast, BIC scores are exclusively indicating the validity of classification in minimal number of cluster. On the other hand results based on the parameterizations with coordinate axis orientation (EEI, VEI, EVI, and VVI) exhibit incremental changes in BIC values up to division in eight clusters. Given that predominance of minimal or maximal solutions is considered problematic, additional analysis is conducted excluding division in two classes. This analysis points to three solutions: EEE classification (equal volume, shape and orientation) in eight and five clusters and VEV classification (variable orientation and shape, equal volume) into three classes. Finally, within sum of squares, average distance within clusters, and average distance between clusters give weak evidence for the classification into three clusters based on VEV parameterization and classifications into four and seven clusters based on EEE parameterization see validation scores below). Consequently EEE classifications (equal volume, shape and orientation) in seven and five clusters and VEV classification (variable orientation and shape, equal volume) into three classes are further analyzed.

Validation scores

HCA

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
HCA	Connectivity	4.15	15.93	30.14	34.70	39.50	42.55	42.55	51.29	53.81
	Dunn	0.10	0.11	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
	Silhouette	0.47	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.33	0.32	0.31	0.31

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	4.15	hierarchical	2
Dunn	0.11	hierarchical	3
Silhouette	0.47	hierarchical	2

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
HCA	APN	0.13	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.28	0.29
	AD	4.56	3.47	3.03	2.92	2.70	2.65	2.57	2.44	2.38
	ADM	1.00	1.15	1.19	1.12	0.98	0.97	0.92	1.13	1.07
	FOM	1.80	1.34	1.28	1.24	1.17	1.16	1.13	1.09	1.07

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.13	hierarchical	2
AD	2.38	hierarchical	10
ADM	0.92	hierarchical	8
FOM	1.07	hierarchical	10

Number of clusters									
Validity scores - HCA	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Within sum of squares	2161.87	1067.83	723.12	652.31	568.58	556.79	547.12	451.49	444.06
Average distance between clusters	9.24	7.42	6.57	6.51	6.43	6.42	6.42	6.21	6.21
Average distance within clusters	4.58	3.34	2.67	2.57	2.43	2.41	2.41	2.15	2.14

K-means

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
K-means	Connectivity	21.78	31.62	41.05	43.35	44.70	57.45	59.35	73.99	76.51
	Dunn	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.08
	Silhouette	0.45	0.42	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.34	0.34	0.32	0.32

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	21.78	k-means	2
Dunn	0.10	k-means	3
Silhouette	0.45	k-means	2

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
K-means	APN	0.08	0.12	0.24	0.22	0.33	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.29
	AD	3.86	3.15	2.94	2.74	2.65	2.48	2.23	2.14	2.10
	ADM	0.49	0.68	1.06	0.84	1.17	1.03	0.85	0.81	0.85
	FOM	1.61	1.32	1.24	1.18	1.12	1.12	1.07	1.05	1.03

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.08	k-means	2
AD	2.10	k-means	10
ADM	0.49	k-means	2
FOM	1.03	k-means	10

Number of clusters									
Validity scores - K-means	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Within sum of squares	1533.00	901.59	700.94	579.08	490.65	418.36	374.54	345.59	323.34
Average distance between clusters	7.23	6.97	6.58	6.36	6.24	6.12	6.08	5.99	5.98
Average distance within clusters	3.73	2.93	2.64	2.41	2.18	1.99	1.88	1.82	1.79

LCA

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
LCA	Connectivity	39.12	32.18	75.91	70.66	85.34	63.13	119.46	74.90	78.35
	Dunn	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.03
	Silhouette	0.27	0.39	0.13	0.27	0.28	0.32	0.22	0.32	0.31

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	32.18	LCA	3
Dunn	0.08	LCA	6
Silhouette	0.39	LCA	3

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
LCA	APN	0.18	0.21	0.50	0.33	0.42	0.26	0.41	0.32	0.31
	AD	5.00	4.36	4.34	3.06	2.91	2.35	2.58	2.31	2.18
	ADM	1.42	2.53	2.59	1.28	1.48	0.87	1.25	0.95	0.85
	FOM	1.87	1.78	1.40	1.28	1.21	1.09	1.08	1.11	1.05

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.18	LCA	2
AD	2.18	LCA	10
ADM	0.85	LCA	10
FOM	1.05	LCA	10

Number of clusters and parameterization											
	EEV	VVV	VEV	VEV	VEV	EEE	EEE	EEE	EEE	EEE	EEE
Validity scores - LCA	2	2	2	3	4	3	4	5	6	7	8
Within sum of squares	2802.52	2669.60	2669.60	1775.52	1911.03	1049.29	826.07	827.02	516.36	459.57	545.10
Average distance between clusters	6.97	7.12	7.12	7.20	6.76	6.99	6.50	6.45	6.21	6.14	6.05
Average distance within clusters	4.67	4.54	4.54	4.20	4.15	3.20	2.83	2.81	2.28	2.12	2.26



APPENDIX-CHAPTER 5

Custer analysis

Results of baseline model

Validation – baseline model

Most of cluster validity scores for application of HCA on the baseline model point to classifications in two clusters. In other words, most of both stability and internal scores point to the minimal solutions (i.e. APN, ADM, connectivity and silhouette indexes), while only one index points to maximal solution (AD). To the contrary, Dunn index points to the three cluster solution, and there are only small differences in Dunn scores with regard to classifications in the range from three to six clusters. In addition, FOM index points to the division in eight clusters. Finally, the graphic examination of within sum of squares, average distance between clusters and average distance within clusters uncovers slight elbows at divisions in three and seven clusters. Consequently, classifications in three, seven, eight and ten clusters are further examined.

Internal validation scores for the application of k-means to the baseline model predominantly point to the divisions in a small number of classes (connectivity indicates validity of division in two classes, while Dunn and silhouette indicate validity of division in three clusters). On the other hand, stability scores are the following: APN indicates validity of division in two clusters, AD indicates validity of division in ten clusters; ADM indicates validity of division in two clusters; while FOM indicates validity of division in eight clusters. However, with regard to within sum of squares, average distance between clusters and average distance within clusters there is a strong indication of validity of division in four clusters. Consequently, clustering in three, four and eight clusters are further examined.

The internal validation scores for the application of LCA in estimation of the baseline model favor divisions in three clusters. On the other hand, APN and ADM validation scores give evidence for classifications in three and four clusters, while AD and FOM give support for divisions into maximal number of clusters. BIC criterion lends justification to the following parameterizations: VVI (varying volume, shape and identical orientation) classification into two clusters; EEI (equal volume, shape and orientation coordinate axis) classification into two clusters; and VEV (variable volume, equal shape and variable orientation) classification in two classes. In addition, it is noticeable that EII parameterization displays increasing values of BIC for classifications between two and four classes.

Three parameterizations (EII, VVI and EEI) are further validated using within sum of squares, average distance within clusters and average distance between clusters. The comparison of these values across the classifications narrows the selection to following classifications: classification in three and four classes via EII, and classifications in three and four classes via EEI. Therefore, in addition to the divisions in minimal number of clusters, these clustering solutions are examined in further analysis.

Validation scores – baseline model

HCA

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
HCA	Connectivity	4.90	11.53	12.65	15.28	16.54	29.70	32.52	39.06	41.10
	Dunn	0.31	0.37	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.30
	Silhouette	0.52	0.42	0.37	0.29	0.27	0.28	0.22	0.23	0.25

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	4.90	hierarchical	2
Dunn	0.37	hierarchical	3
Silhouette	0.52	hierarchical	2

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
HCA	APN	0.04	0.18	0.19	0.30	0.41	0.33	0.44	0.43	0.41
	AD	1.56	1.40	1.37	1.32	1.29	1.12	1.07	1.01	0.96
	ADM	0.14	0.40	0.41	0.48	0.55	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58
	FOM	0.76	0.76	0.75	0.75	0.76	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.04	hierarchical	2
AD	0.96	hierarchical	10
ADM	0.14	hierarchical	2
FOM	0.74	hierarchical	8

Number of clusters									
Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Within sum of squares	63.71	44.19	41.71	38.26	35.85	22.57	20.74	16.49	13.44
Average distance between clusters	3.41	2.73	2.73	2.65	2.64	2.18	2.15	2.09	2.06
Average distance within clusters	1.55	1.31	1.31	1.27	1.27	1.01	0.98	0.87	0.83

K-means

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
K-means	Connectivity	13.35	15.14	22.77	30.14	40.61	33.09	50.59	46.52	52.45
	Dunn	0.05	0.33	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.15	0.19	0.16	0.15
	Silhouette	0.28	0.41	0.34	0.29	0.27	0.29	0.26	0.25	0.25

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	13.35	k-means	2
Dunn	0.33	k-means	3
Silhouette	0.41	k-means	3

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
HCA	APN	0.04	0.18	0.19	0.30	0.41	0.33	0.44	0.43	0.41
	AD	1.56	1.40	1.37	1.32	1.29	1.12	1.07	1.01	0.96
	ADM	0.14	0.40	0.41	0.48	0.55	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58
	FOM	0.76	0.76	0.75	0.75	0.76	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.04	k-means	2
AD	0.96	k-means	10
ADM	0.14	k-means	2
FOM	0.74	k-means	8

Number of clusters									
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Within sum of squares	57.21	41.10	28.46	24.06	20.12	17.32	14.91	12.83	11.05
Average distance between clusters	2.03	2.09	2.12	2.03	1.94	1.92	1.92	1.89	1.87
Average distance within clusters	1.44	1.14	1.03	0.97	0.83	0.81	0.79	0.74	0.70

LCA

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
LCA	Connectivity	12.18	11.53	27.30	24.49	34.95	71.60	68.73	45.85	53.46
	Dunn	0.06	0.37	0.11	0.13	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.18	0.24
	Silhouette	0.29	0.42	0.33	0.32	0.26	0.07	0.11	0.26	0.27

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	11.5254	model	3
Dunn	0.368024	model	3
Silhouette	0.423375	model	3

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
LCA	APN	0.29	0.19	0.18	0.27	0.42	0.52	0.49	0.53	0.51
	AD	1.66	1.39	1.24	1.22	1.18	1.21	1.15	1.07	0.98
	ADM	0.71	0.39	0.51	0.60	0.65	0.74	0.70	0.70	0.67
	FOM	0.78	0.76	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.76	0.76	0.75

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.18	model	4
AD	0.98	model	10
ADM	0.39	model	3
FOM	0.75	model	10

Parameterization	EII				EEI				VVI			
Number of clusters	2	3	4	5	2	3	4	5	2	3	4	5
Within sum of squares	63.71	44.19	28.55	25.44	57.44	50.52	28.77	26.53	80.34	78.19	41.16	29.74
Average distance between clusters	3.41	2.73	2.10	2.11	2.05	1.99	2.11	2.07	2.01	1.95	2.06	1.97
Average distance within clusters	1.55	1.31	1.03	0.99	1.43	1.27	1.01	0.99	1.45	1.38	1.22	1.06



Results of sensitivity analysis

Validation - sensitivity analysis

The validation of HCA clustering in sensitivity analysis predominantly points out to minimal and maximal number of clusters. The best internal validation scores validate only divisions into two clusters, while stability scores in equally degree point to maximal and minimal divisions. However, with regard to within sum of squares, average distance between clusters and average distance within the clusters there is some indication that the division in six clusters might approximate division in Eastern and Western European radical right parties. Consequently, classifications in two, six and ten clusters are further examined (see tables below).

Considering the internal validity scores of k-means classifications, connectivity and silhouette scores point to the minimal number of classes, while Dunn index indicates the validity of the division in maximal groups. On the other hand, the stability scores point to various classifications. APN and ADM points to the division in two clusters, AD indicates the validity of division in ten clusters, while FOM points to the division in seven clusters. Concerning the scores of within sum of squares, averaged distance between clusters, and average distance within clusters, there seems to be a knee with regard the scores of average distance between clusters indicating the validity of the classification in six classes. Consequently, classifications in two, six and seven clusters are further examined (see tables below).

Finally, I review the validity scores of latent class analysis. Internal validation scores mostly indicate validity of the divisions into minimal number of clusters, while only Dunn index indicates validity of division in seven clusters. On the other hand, the review of the stability measures, point to multiple results (ADM and, APN indicates the validity of the division in two, FOM indicates the validity of the division in five and AD indicates the validity of the division in ten clusters). These results essentially cover the whole range of possible results. However, on the basis of the BIC criterion, only minimal three solutions can be selected: VII (variable shape, equal volume and orientation) classification into two clusters, EEI (equal shape, equal volume, orientation coordinate axis) classification into two and EII (equal shape, equal volume) classification into two clusters.

These three parameterizations are verified using within sum of squares, average distance within clusters and average distance between clusters. Nevertheless, these scores mirror BIC values, thus pointing to the EII parameterization as overall the best approach to parameterization. Consequently, classifications in two, five and seven clusters based on EII parameterization are further examined.

Validation scores - sensitivity analysis

HCA

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
HCA	Connectivity	2.93	13.36	19.08	19.63	27.18	27.97	31.66	33.90	34.40
	Dunn	0.49	0.29	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.33	0.34	0.34
	Silhouette	0.42	0.31	0.26	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.17

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	2.93	hierarchical	2
Dunn	0.49	hierarchical	2
Silhouette	0.42	hierarchical	2

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
HCA	APN	0.12	0.14	0.21	0.23	0.19	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19
	AD	2.28	2.22	1.97	1.93	1.82	1.75	1.57	1.44	1.39
	ADM	0.33	0.80	0.52	0.58	0.78	0.77	0.60	0.48	0.48
	FOM	0.80	0.80	0.76	0.77	0.76	0.76	0.74	0.73	0.72

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.12	hierarchical	2
AD	1.39	hierarchical	10
ADM	0.33	hierarchical	2
FOM	0.72	hierarchical	10

Number of clusters									
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Within sum of squares	132.92	100.61	87.31	81.81	58.93	55.17	47.48	43.78	41.53
Average distance between clusters	4.12	3.34	3.29	3.28	2.92	2.91	2.87	2.86	2.86
Average distance within clusters	2.33	2.04	1.93	1.92	1.63	1.62	1.51	1.49	1.49

K-means

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
K-means	Connectivity	12.18	23.34	30.03	34.72	37.33	45.67	46.46	48.92	52.55
	Dunn	0.16	0.19	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.30
	Silhouette	0.31	0.28	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.19

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	12.18	k-means	2
Dunn	0.30	k-means	10
Silhouette	0.31	k-means	2

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
K-means	APN	0.20	0.22	0.25	0.33	0.33	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.38
	AD	2.13	1.98	1.89	1.73	1.66	1.55	1.49	1.42	1.39
	ADM	0.61	0.61	0.65	0.71	0.70	0.73	0.72	0.68	0.74
	FOM	0.77	0.77	0.75	0.76	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.75

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.20	k-means	2
AD	1.39	k-means	10
ADM	0.61	k-means	2
FOM	0.74	k-means	7

Number of clusters									
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Within sum of squares	103.08	86.19	71.75	60.16	52.35	46.45	41.67	37.13	33.21
Average distance between clusters	3.01	2.84	2.85	2.69	2.62	2.62	2.61	2.58	2.54
Average distance within clusters	2.03	1.78	1.63	1.54	1.51	1.43	1.40	1.35	1.30

LCA

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
LCA	Connectivity	13.13	31.94	19.36	28.17	39.38	34.35	55.29	58.76	57.51
	Dunn	0.18	0.14	0.20	0.22	0.15	0.30	0.19	0.19	0.26
	Silhouette	0.31	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.19	0.23	0.16	0.18	0.20

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
Connectivity	13.13	model	2
Dunn	0.30	model	7
Silhouette	0.31	model	2

Number of clusters										
Method	Validity measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
LCA	APN	0.16	0.19	0.27	0.23	0.31	0.41	0.36	0.31	0.31
	AD	2.13	2.06	1.87	1.70	1.69	1.66	1.56	1.47	1.36
	ADM	0.43	0.66	0.61	0.51	0.73	0.84	0.80	0.78	0.71
	FOM	0.79	0.77	0.76	0.75	0.76	0.78	0.76	0.76	0.76

Optimal scores			
	Score	Method	Clusters
APN	0.16	model	2
AD	1.36	model	10
ADM	0.43	model	2
FOM	0.75	model	5

Parameterization	EII				EEI				VII			
Number of clusters	2	3	4	5	2	3	4	5	2	3	4	5
Within sum of squares	103.35	89.95	77.34	65.01	106.33	92.08	78.99	64.68	130.26	104.89	94.11	70.07
Average distance between clusters	3.07	2.96	3.01	2.93	3.07	2.96	2.66	2.90	2.70	2.79	2.57	2.64
Average distance within clusters	2.04	1.93	1.81	1.61	2.08	1.97	1.85	1.60	2.11	1.90	2.04	1.72



Confusion matrices for the classifications produced by sensitivity analysis

The following tables present the confusion matrices for the classifications selected using validation scores of the model utilized in the sensitivity analysis.

Confusion matrix - classification based on HCA

	HCA division into 10 clusters		HCA division into 6 clusters		HCA division in 2 clusters	
Cluster ID	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right
1	3	1	3	1	19	24
2	1	0	1	1	0	1
3	10	14	10	16		
4	3	5	4	5		
5	1	0	1	0		
6	1	0	0	1		
7	0	2				
8	0	1				
9	0	1				
10	0	1				

Note: shaded cells indicate dominantly Western and Eastern European radical right clusters; classifications produced using CMP data set

Confusion matrix - classification based on k-means

	K-means division into 7 clusters		K-means division into 6 clusters		K-means division in 2 clusters	
Cluster ID	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right
1	2	5	0	10	7	4
2	3	1	4	3	12	21
3	0	1	6	6		
4	7	7	6	3		
5	4	2	3	2		
6	3	1	0	1		
7	0	8				

Note: shaded cells indicate dominantly Western and Eastern European radical right clusters; classifications produced using CMP data set

Confusion matrix - classification based on LCA

	EII classification into 7 clusters		EII classification into 5 clusters		EII classification in 2 clusters	
Cluster ID	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right	West European radical right	East European radical right
1	3	1	3	2	7	3
2	1	1	11	15	12	22
3	10	14	5	4		
4	4	2	0	2		
5	0	1	0	2		
6	0	2				
7	1	4				

Note: shaded cells indicate dominantly Western and Eastern European radical right clusters; classifications produced using CMP data set

The following tables compare means of Eastern and Western European radical right parties and present the results of independent t-tests based on expert surveys.

PPMD

Economic

Region	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
Variable	Economics*		Economics salience*		Economic (privatization)		Privatization salience	
Means	10.161	13.356	9.590	12.096	10.436	NA	12.336	NA
Variable	Deregulation		Deregulation salience					
Means	NA	12.486	NA	13.041				

*Note: *= p<.05*

Exclusionary-authoritarian

Region	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
Variable	Nationalism (cosmopolitism vs. national)		Nationalism salience		Immigration		Immigration salience	
Means	17.987	NA	17.872	NA	NA	18.704	NA	18.475
Variable	Social		Social salience		Religion		Religion salience	
Means	16.574	16.426	13.002	13.756	7.838	NA	13.136	NA

*Note: *= p<.05*

EU

Region	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
Variable	Joining EU		Joining EU salience		EU accountability		EU accountability salience	
Means	9.284	6.236	13.056	12.901	NA	15.557	NA	11.913
Variable	EU authority		EU authority salience					
Means	NA	17.098	NA	14.344				

*Note: *= p<.05*

CH-06

Economic

Region	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
Variable	position: deregulation (Q15)*		salience: deregulation (Q16)		position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)		salience: redistribution from rich to poor (Q18)	
Means	3.755	5,629	4.230	4.710	3.785	5.417	5.453	4.881
Variable	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)		salience: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q14)		economic left/right position (Q11)*			
Means	3.971	6.099	4.530	5.315	3.928	6.435		

*Note: *= p<.05*

Exclusionary-authoritarian

Region	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
Variable	position: social lifestyle (Q21)		salience: social lifestyle (Q22)		position: religious principles in politics (Q23)		salience: religious principles in politics (Q24)	
Means	9.035	8.212	7.623	6.890	6.033	6.193	6.396	6.125
Variable	position: immigration (Q25)		salience: immigration (Q26)*		position: multiculturalism vs. assimilation (Q27)*		salience: multiculturalism vs. assimilation (Q28)*	
Means	8.461	8.908	7.025	9.121	8.533	9.490	6.600	8.940
Variable	position: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q31)*		salience: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (Q32)		position: ethnic minorities (Q37)		salience: ethnic minorities (Q38)	
Means	9.746	9.406	8.768	8.635	9.250	8.849	8.235	8.085
Variable	gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)		position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)		salience: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q20)*			
Means	8.768	8.611	8.630	8.807	6.055	7.670		

*Note: *= p<.05*

EU

Region	East	West	East	West	East	West
Variable	overall EU position (Q1)		salience of EU (Q2)		benefit from EU membership (Q4)	
Means	3.103	2.023	2.476	2.986	2.278	2.605
Variable	powers of EP (Q5)		internal market (Q6)			
Means	3.338	2,684	3.286	2.964		

*Note: *= p<.05*

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Economic

Region	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
Variable	position: deregulation (Q15)*		salience: deregulation (Q16)		position: redistribution from rich to poor (Q17)*		salience: redistribution from rich to poor (Q18)	
Means	3.128	5.712	3.628	4.743	3.924	5.671	5.386	4.691
Variable	position: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q13)*		salience: public service vs. reducing taxes (Q14)		economic left/right position (Q11)*			
Means	4.263	6.431	4.243	5.090	3.858	6.427		

*Note: *= p<.05*

Exclusionary-authoritarian

Region	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
Variable	position: social lifestyle (Q21)		salience: social lifestyle (Q22)		position: religious principles in politics (Q23)		salience: religious principles in politics (Q24)	
Means	8.712	8.103	6.842	6.512	6.719	5.807	6.359	5.233
Variable	position: immigration (Q25)*		salience: immigration (Q26)*		position: multiculturalism vs. assimilation (Q27)		salience: multiculturalism vs. assimilation (Q28)*	
Means	7.956	9.422	6.658	9.344	8.838	9.335	6.021	8.967
Variable	position: ethnic minorities (Q37)		salience: ethnic minorities (Q38)		gal/tan or new politics position (Q12)			
Means	8.988	8.853	8.988	8.853	8.555	8.899		
Variable	position: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q19)		salience: civil liberties vs. law & order (Q20)*					
Means	8.052	9.017	6.098	8.156				

*Note: *= p<.05*

EU

Region	East	West	East	West	East	West
Variable	overall EU position (Q1)		salience of EU (Q2)*		benefit from EU membership (Q4)	
Means	2.931	2.158	2.313	2.974	2.459	2.641
Variable	powers of EP (Q5)		internal market (Q6)			
Means	3.353	2.895	3.211	3.072		

*Note: *= p<.05*

Radical right parties – PPMD expert survey

Original name of the party	English translation of the name
Вмро – Българско Национално Движение	VMRO - Bulgarian National Movement
Hrvatski Blok	Croatian Block
Hrvatska Stranka Prava	Croatian Rights Party
Republikáni Miroslava Sládka	Republicans of Miroslav Sladek
Magyar Igazságés Élet Pártja	Hungarian Justice And Life Party
Tevzemei Un Brivibai/LNNK	Alliance Fatherland And Freedom-Lnnk
Liga Polskich Rodzin	League of Polish Families
Partidul Romania Mare	Great Romania Party
Либерально-Демократическая Партия России	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
Srpska Radikalna Stranka	Serb Radical Party (ser)
Slovenská Národná Strana	Slovak National Party
Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka	Slovenian National Party
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Freedom Party Of Austria
Vlaams Belang	Flemish Block
Front National	National Front (bel)
Dansk Folkeparti	Danish People's Party
Fremskridtspartiet	Progress Party (den)
Front National	National Front (fra)
Mouvement Pour La France	Movement for France
Deutsche Volksunion	German People’s Union
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands	National Democratic Party
Die Republikaner	Republicans
Alleanza Nazionale	National Alliance
Lega Nord	Northern League
Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore	Movement Tri-color flame
Lijst Pim Fortuyn	List Pim Fortuyn
Fremskrittspartiet	Progress Party (nor)
Schweizerische Volkspartei	Swiss Peoples Party
Eidgenšssische Demokratische Union	Federal Democratic Union

Radical right parties – 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey

Original name of the party	English translation of the name
Vlaams Belang	Flemish Interest
Dansk Folkeparti	Danish People's Party
Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos	Popular Orthodox Rally
Front National	National Front (fra)
Mouvement Pour la France	Movement for France
Alleanza Nazionale	National Alliance
Lega Nord	Northern League
Partijvoor de Vrijheid	Party for Freedom
United Kingdom Independence Party	United Kingdom Independence Party
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Freedom Party of Austria
Bündnis Zukunft Österreich	Alliance for the Future of Austria
Persussuomalaiset	True Finns
Nacionalno Obedinenie Ataka	National Union Attack
Tevzemei un Brivibai	For Fatherland and Freedom
Liga Polskich Rodzin	League of Polish Families
Partidul Romania Mare	Party of Great Romania
Slovenská Národná Strana	Slovak National Party
Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka	Slovenian National Party

Radical right parties – 2010 Chapel Hill expert survey

Original name of the party	English translation of the name
Vlaams Belang	Flemish Interest
Dansk Folkeparti	Danish People's Party
Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos	Popular Orthodox Rally
Front National	National Front (bel)
Front National	National Front (fra)
Mouvement Pour la France	Movement for France
AlleanzaNazionale	National Alliance
Lega Nord	Northern League
Partijvoor de Vrijheid	Party for Freedom
United Kingdom Independence Party	United Kingdom Independence Party
British National Party	British National Party
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Freedom Party of Austria
Bündnis Zukunft Österreich	Alliance for the Future of Austria
Persussuomalaiset	True Finns

Radical right parties – 2010 Chapel Hill expert survey (continued)

Original name of the party	English translation of the name
Nacionalno Obedinenie Ataka	National Union Attack
Tevzemei un Brivibai	National Alliance (former For Fatherland and Freedom)
Liga Polskich Rodzin	League of Polish Families
Partidul Romania Mare	Party of Great Romania
Slovenská Národná Strana	Slovak National Party
Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka	Slovenian National Party
Hrvatska Stranka Prava	Croatian Rights Party
Sverigedemokraterna	Swedish Democrats
Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	Jobbik
Fremskrittspartiet	Progress Party (Norway)
Schweizerische Volkspartei	Swiss Peoples Party
Eidgenšssische Demokratische Union	Federal Democratic Union
Lega dei Ticinesi	Ticino League

Radical right parties – CMP

Original name of the party	English translation of the name
Sverigedemokraterna	Swedish Democrats
Ny Demokrati	New democracy
Fremskrittspartiet	Progress Party (nor)
Dansk Folkeparti	Danish People's Party
Fremskridtspartiet	Progress Party (den)
Persussuomalaiset	True Finns
Vlaams Belang	Flemish Interest
Lijst Pim Fortuyn	List Pim Fortuyn
Partij voor de Vrijheid	Party for Freedom
Front National	National Front
Alleanza Nazionale	National Alliance
Lega Nord	Northern League
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Freedom Party of Austria
Bündnis Zukunft Österreich	Alliance for the Future of Austria
Schweizer Demokraten	Swiss Democrats

Radical right parties – CMP (continued)

Original name of the party	English translation of the name
Eidgenšssische Demokratische Union	Federal Democratic Union
Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz	Freedom Party
Partia Balli Kombetar	Party of National Front
Partia e Unitetit Kombëtare	Party of National Unity
Srpska Radikalna Stranka	Serb Radical Party (bos)
Nacionalno Obedinenie Ataka	National Union Attack
Hrvatska Stranka Prava	Croatian Rights Party
Republikáni Miroslava Sládka	Republicans of MiroslavSladek
Eesti Rahvusliku Soltumatuse Partei	National Independence Party
Eesti Kodanik	Citizen Coalition
Magyar Igazságés Élet Pártja	Hungarian Justice And Life Party
Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	Jobbik
Tevzemei un Brivibai	For Fatherland and Freedom
Zīgerista partija	Zigerista Party
Tevzemei un Brivibai	For Fatherland and Freedom
Srpska Radikalna Stranka	Serb Radical Party(mon)
Ruch Odbudowy Polski	Movement for the Reconstruction
Liga Polskich Rodzin	League of Polish Families
Partidul Unităţii Naţionale a Românilor	Party of Romanian National Unity
Partidul Romania Mare	Party of Great Romania
Alaintapentru Unitatea Romanilor	Unity Alliance
Bloc Zhirinovskogo	Zhirinovsky Bloc
Либерально-Демократическая Партия России	Liberal Democratic Party
Srpska Radikalna Stranka	Serb Radical Party (ser)
Slovenská Národná Strana	Slovak National Party
Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka	Slovenian National Party
Konhres Ukrayinskykh Natsionalistiv	Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists
Schweizerische Volkspartei	Swiss Peoples Party
United Kingdom Independence Party	United Kingdom Independence Party

APPENDIX-CHAPTER 6

Radical right parties included in the analysis

Country	Original name of the party	English translation of the name
Albania	Partia Balli Kombetar	Party of National Front
	Partia e Unitetit Kombëtare	Party of National Unity
Austria	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich	Alliance for the Future of Austria
	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Freedom Party of Austria
Belgium	Agir	Act
	Vlaams Belang	Flemish Interest
	Front National	National Front
Bulgaria	Българсканационално-Радикална Партия	Bulgarian National Radical Party
	Атака	Attack
Croatia	Hrvatski demokratski savez Slavonije i Baranje	Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja
	Hrvatska Stranka Prava 1861	Croatian Party of Rights 1861
	Hrvatska Stranka Prava Dr. Ante Starčević	Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević
	Hrvatska Stranka Prava	Croatian Rights Party
Czech republic	Republikáni Miroslava Sládka	Republicans of Miroslav Sladek
	Dělnická strana sociálnís pravedlnosti	Workers Party
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti	Danish People's Party
	Fremskridtspartiet	Progress Party
Estonia	Eesti Kodanik	Citizen Coalition
	EestiIseseisvusparte	Estonian Independence Party (Future Estonia)
	Eesti Rahvusliku Soltumatuse Partei	National Independence Party
Finland	Suomenmaaseudunpuolue/Persussuomalaiset	Rural Party/True Finns/Finns party
France	Mouvement Pour la France	Movement for France
	Front National	National Front
	Mouvement National Républicain	National Republican Movement
Germany	Deutsche Volksunion	German People's Union
	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands	National Democratic Party
	Die Republikaner	The Republicans

Radical right parties included in the analysis (continued)

Country	Original name of the party	English translation of the name
Greece	Πρώτη Γραμμή	Front Line
	Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος – Χρυσή Αυγή, Laïkós	Golden down
	Ελληνικό Μέτωπο	Hellenic Front
	Εθνική Πολιτική Ένωσις	National Political Union
	Κόμμα Ελληνισμού	Party of Hellenism
	Πολιτική Άνοιξη	Political Spring
Hungary	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	Jobbik
	Magyar Igazságés Élet Pártja	Hungarian Justice And Life Party
Italy	Movimento SocialeItaliano – Destra Nazionale	Italian Social Movement - National Right
	Alleanza Nazionale	National Alliance
	Fronte Nazionale	National Front (Italy)
	Forza Nuova	New Force
	Lega Nord	Northern League
	Alternativa Sociale Mussolini	Social Alternative
	Movimento Sociale – Fiamma Tricolore	Social Movement – Tricolour Flame
	Liga Veneta	Venetian League
Latvia	Tevzemei un Brivibai	For Fatherland and Freedom
Netherlands	Centrum Democraten	Center Democrats
	Lijst Pim Fortuyn	List Pim Fortuyn
	Partijvoor de Vrijheid	Party for Freedom
Norway	Fremskrittspartiet	Progress Party (nor)
Poland	Liga Polskich Rodzin	League of Polish Families
	Ruch Odbudowy Polski	Movement for the Reconstruction
	Stronnictwo Narodowe	Nationalist Party
	Partia X	Party X
Portugal	Partido Nacional Renovador	National Renovator Party
Romania	Miscarea Pentru Romania	Movement for Romania
	Partidul Noua Generaţie	New Generation Party
	Partidul Romania Mare	Party of Great Romania
	Partidul Unităţii Naţionale a Românilor	Party of Romanian National Unity
	Alaintapentru Unitatea Romanilor	Unity Alliance
Russia	Либерально-Демократическая Партия России	Liberal Democratic Party

Radical right parties included in the analysis (continued)

Country	Original name of the party	English translation of the name
Serbia	Покрет Двери	Dveri Movement
	Stranka Srpskog Jedinstva	Party of Serbian Unity
	Srpska Radikalna Stranka	Serbian Radical Party
	Srpski Pokret Obnove	Serbian Renewal Movement
Slovakia	Ľudovástrana Naše Slovensko	Peoples Party Our Slovakia
	Slovenská Národná Strana	Slovak National Party
	Pravá Slovenská Národná Strana	True Slovak National Party
Slovenia	Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka	Slovenian National Party
Spain	Falange Española Autentica	Authentic Spanish Falange
	Democracia Nacional	National Democracy
	Le Falange	Falange
	Falange Española De Las J.O.N.S.	Falange J.O.N.S.
	Espana 2000	Spain 2000
	Platform per Catalunya	Platform for Catalonia
Sweden	Ny Demokrati	New Democracy
	Sverigedemokraterna	Swedish Democrats
Switzerland	Eidgenšssische Demokratische Union	Federal Democratic Union
	Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz	Freedom Party
	Schweizer Demokraten	Swiss Democrats
	Schweizerische Volkspartei	Swiss Peoples Party
	Lega dei Ticinesi	Ticino League
Ukraine	Всеукраїнське Об'єднання «Свобода»	All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda"
	Конгрес Українських Націоналістів	Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists
United Kingdom	British National Party	British National Party
	United Kingdom Independence Party	United Kingdom Independence Party

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