

MIGRATION AS A SECURITY THREAT TO RUSSIA

CASE STUDY: CENTRAL ASIAN IMMIGRATION

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Abstract

The era of globalization has led to the highest number of migrants in the history of human existence and Russia has become one of the biggest migrant receiving countries in the world. Because of this, large inflows of immigrants created a high degree of anxiety within Russian society. Central Asian (CA) immigrants, particularly from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are perceived as a security threat to Russian communal identity. Therefore, this study examines the influx of CA immigrants to Russia, identifies the role of state officials, media and public in framing the debate and its impact on migration policies. The study employs Copenhagen School's securitization and societal security concept together with its critics to provide a holistic approach of the securitization of immigration to Russia. The findings of the study show that securitization is conducted not only through speech acts, but also through media images defended by Williams, which have strong implication on the acceptance of the issue by the referent object. Immigration security dilemma together with societal security concept provides a comprehensive approach in explaining the unwelcoming attitude of host societies toward immigrants. The analysis of speech acts and media images shows that the securitizing agents use the words "we" and "they", to strengthen Russian communal identity, and frame migrant identity as an existential threat. Finally, public support for securitization of immigration show that the securitizing agents have been successful in framing migrants as potential security threat and there is a growing tendency toward further securitization of the issue.

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List of Abbreviations

CA-Central Asia

CIS-Common Wealth of Independent States

EEU-Eurasian Economic Union

FMS-Federal Migration Service

ICSR- International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence

IOM-International Organization for Migration

ISIS-Islamic State

LDPR-Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

MIA-Ministry of Internal Affairs

RF-Russian Federation

SC-Security Council

SU-Soviet Union

Introduction

International migration is a phenomenon of globalization that has become increasingly important for governments, the general population, and relations between countries. In 2000, only 171 million people lived outside their home countries. By 2015, more than 244 million people lived abroad, leading to a 41 percent increase over 5 years.¹ To demonstrate, during the period between 1991 and 2013, Russia has transformed from one of the most restrictive states in the world to one of the biggest migrant receiving country.²

For Russia, international migration is a major factor for sustaining its economy through the inflow of cheap labor from the countries of The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), particularly Central Asia (CA). Likewise, this increase in immigration has become a significant factor for the Russian Federation (RF) in overcoming its ongoing demographic crisis. According to 2014 projections, Russia's current population of 142 million could drop to 100 million by the year 2050.³ Such a large-scale demographic loss can pose a series of threat to the political, economic and social security of the country. However, the large inflow of immigration from CA became a source of debate and has caused a high degree of anxiety within Russian society. Central Asian immigrants are increasingly perceived as a security threat to Russian communal identity.

Earlier studies on immigration from CA to Russia focused on the social, political and economic aspects of immigration. Yet, during the last decades, given the resurgence of nationalist elements in Russia, the focus of immigration has been framed from the point of view of anti-hostility. By the end of Cold War, international migration became one of the key

¹“International Migration 2015,” United Nations, accessed January 10, 2016.

²“Russia has World's 2nd Largest Number of Immigrants-UN Study,” Sputnik International September 12, 2013.

³Fuhrman, Johann. 2012. “Demographic Crisis: Russia's Migration Debates.” Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung International Report :93-112.

aspects of security agendas of many states particularly in Western Europe, the former Yugoslavia⁴ and Russia. Within Russia, academic work on immigration that looks at the security aspect of immigration, framed the main debates within narrower areas as nationalism, xenophobia⁵, demographic crisis, immigration policy⁶ and labor migration. Jens Siegert argues that, the current rising nationalist sentiment and negative perception of immigration in the world is caused by modern regimes and opposition within countries. To demonstrate, political leaders in Russia constantly invoke the strong dominance of ethnic Russian cultural identity and Russian traditions, which has definitely influenced the perception of ethnic Russians toward immigrants.⁷Caress Schenk claims that “institutional and societal xenophobia create mutually reinforcing demand for anti-immigrant policies in Russia... which does not reflect the demographic need of the Russian state”⁸. Using this logic, Marlene Laruelle blamed the rising xenophobia on the “badly collaborated migration policies” developed by the Federal Migration Service.⁹On the other hand, Orietta Perni claims that migration can affect the composition of the host society and therefore it encourages the state to develop new migration policies. Even, if in the short term, migration cannot change the host country’s ethnic composition, it can create a potential situation of worry, insecurity or even danger.¹⁰

Based on the existing literature available on immigration and security debate in Russia, it can be summarized that the previous studies focused on more narrow aspects as nationalism,

⁴Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De. Wilde. “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

⁵Marlene, Laruelle. 2013. “Anti-Migrant Riots in Russia: The Mobilizing Potential of Xenophobia,” Russian Analytical Digest 141: 2-4.

⁶Schenk Caress. 2010. “Open Border, Closed Minds Russia’s Changing Migration Policies: Liberalization or Xenophobia” *Demokratizatsiya* 18 : 101-121.

⁷Siegert, Jens. 2013. “Natives and Native Foreigners-the Difficult Task of Coexistence in Russia,” Russian Analytical Digest, 141: 5-7.

⁸Schenk Caress. 2010. “Open Border, Closed Minds Russia’s Changing Migration Policies: Liberalization or Xenophobia” 102

⁹Marlene, Laruelle. 2013. “Anti-Migrant Riots in Russia: The Mobilizing Potential of Xenophobia,”

¹⁰Perni Orietta. 2001. “Migration Flows, Societal Security and EU’s Integration Process, The Spanish Case” International Conference Europe Security in the 21 century, November (5-9).

xenophobia, demographic crisis, and migration policies. However, little attention and time has been devoted to analyzing actors and agents in framing the migration-security debate in Russia.

Hence, the study will try to answer the question: “How does the Russian State construct migrants as a security threat?” The aim of the study is to examine the influx of Central Asian migrants to Russian Federation, identifying the role of state officials, media and public in framing the migration security debate and its impact on the development of migration policies. This study seeks to examine the process by which Central Asian immigration becomes a security threat to the Russia State by employing the key tenets of Copenhagen School- securitization and societal security concept together with its critics. It will examine the process of securitization of Central Asian immigration to Russia, with a precise focus on the content of securitizing move in the speech acts, media articles and public perception over the last decade. Hence, I believe this study can provide a new approach to examining the issue and a valid contribution to the existing literature in the Central Asian Immigration to Russia debate.

The implication of securitization and societal security concepts developed by the scholars of the Copenhagen school is traditionally applied to the European countries and United States. However, taking into account movement of population and migration issues in different parts of the world, these concepts can be applied to other countries including Russia. According to Copenhagen Scholars, in international relations:

“An issue becomes a security issue when it is presented as posing an existential threat to an object and the threat needs to be dealt with immediately and with extraordinary measures”.¹¹ Because migrants are posing an immediate security threat to the national identity, mistreatment of immigrants becomes inevitable.¹²

¹¹Diskaya, Ali. 2013. "Towards a Critical Securitization Theory: The Copenhagen and Aberystwyth Schools of Security Studies." E-International Relations. Accessed January 23, 2016.

¹²Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De. Wilde. “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.121.

In addition, Copenhagen Schools' scholars define securitization as a process in which state actors frame the subject in a matter of security, an extreme version of politicization that allows undertaking extraordinary means in the name of security. The aim of the securitizing actors is to present the issue as such, that the message reaches its target audience despite the fact that not always the rhetoric and reality are compatible.¹³ However, by employing solely the concepts developed by the Copenhagen scholars in our case study one cannot provide full understanding of the issue. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the issue by expanding the concept, by focusing not solely on speech acts but also images. Williams claims:

“Contemporary political communication is increasingly embedded with televisual images. Therefore, the process of securitization take on forms, dynamics, and institution linkages that cannot be fully assessed by focusing on the speech –act alone”.¹⁴

Based on the definition provided by William, it can be concluded that media images have a strong implication in the process of securitization.

Furthermore, the societal concept of the Copenhagen school is criticized for its broad definition and subjectivity. Therefore, the study examines the societal security and immigration security dilemma to explain the public support for extreme hostility towards immigration. According to Alexseev, hostility is “speculative and preemptive”, which means that the host society becomes hostile toward migrants prior to the large inflow of immigration and prior to recognizing the existential threat.¹⁵ Hence, this study contributes to the existing research in two ways. Firstly, the study takes into account the critics of the secularization framework of Copenhagen Scholars to derive more holistic conclusions and observations about the unwelcoming environment to immigrants by the host country. Secondly, it contributes to the

¹³Ibid, 25

¹⁴Michael C. Williams. 2003. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 47: 511-531.

¹⁵Mikhail A. Alexseev. 2011. “Societal Security. The Security Dilemma, and Extreme Anti Migrants Hostility in Russia.” *Peace Research* 48: 509-523.

existing research not so much about the content, but about the framing of the perception through speech acts and media that may drive anti –immigrant hostility in the society.

In order to assess the plausibility of the Copenhagen School’s securitization and societal security concepts jointly with the two critics provided above, this study will employ the concepts into the case of Central Asian migration to Russia. According to the Migration Policy Center report, immigrants to Russia come from one hundred different countries, however approximately eighty percent of immigrants come from the CIS, especially from Central Asia¹⁶. When analyzing Central Asia immigration to Russia, the study refers only to three countries: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are excluded from this category due to varying reasons. After the collapse of Soviet Union, Turkmenistan, authorities pursued “restrictive government control over the labor emigration model”, which has resulted in less immigration to Russia in comparison to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In 1994, Turkmen authorities decided to close all its transportation ties with Russia, including buses, railroad and by sea, which made it almost impossible for Turkmen to travel abroad. The bulk of the Turkmen migrants that live in Russia today settled in Russia before the dissolution of Soviet Union.¹⁷ Kazakhstan as well is excluded from the category due to its different economic conditions, state relationship, and geographical location. Labor migration from northern areas of Kazakhstan are driven by geographic proximity and transport accessibility. In addition, Kazakhstan is one of the founding member state of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) with the aim of creating common economic space.¹⁸ Migrants from Kazakhstan fall into different categories, as the main flow of migrant workers travel to

¹⁶Ryazansev, Sergey. 2014. “Russia and Kazakhstan in Eurasian Migration system: Development Trends, Socio-Economic Consequences of Migration and Approaches to Regulation,” in *Regional Migration Report: Russia and Central Asia*, ed. Bartolomeo D. Anna et al. European University Institute, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Center.

¹⁷ Ibid, 10.

¹⁸“Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan agree on custom union,” *Turkish Weekly* December 5, 2009.

the Urals and South Siberia and are mostly Russian by ethnicity and are not employed in the construction sector as are most migrants from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.¹⁹

Having defined the existing literature, the significance of the issue and contributions of the study, the roadmap to the rest of the study is the following. The first chapter will provide conceptual tools that will be employed throughout the study. In the beginning, the study will describe how the definition of security changed after the Cold War and formation of the Copenhagen School. Afterwards, the study provides different definitions of securitization and societal security to build the theoretical framework. The study also considers the critics of these concepts. The second chapter will provide a general background on the immigration pattern. The first section examines the evolution of immigration during Tsarist Russia and later during the creation of the Soviet Union (SU). The second section focuses on the evolution of migration policies of the Russian Federation as a response to the marked increase in immigration. The third chapter will focus on the speeches of state officials, media and public surveys. When analyzing the empirical part, special attention is devoted to the content of the securitizing moves in terms of speech, media articles and the images of immigrants in the public space. The final chapter will be devoted to concluding remarks on the research.

The Methodology of the study comprises a qualitative research of labor migration and how it is constructed as a threat to the Russian State. The study examines the issue by employing the Copenhagen School of securitization and societal security concept together with critics. It includes textual analysis of academic articles, careful study of historiography and statistics of general migration trends from CA to Russia, and state migration policies. Afterwards, the study analyzes state officials' speeches, media highlights related to Central Asian immigration and evaluates the public support of securitization of Central Asian

¹⁹ Ryazansev, Sergey, "Russia and Kazakhstan in Eurasian Migration system: Development Trends, Socio-Economic Consequences of Migration and Approaches to Regulation," 26.

immigrants through an opinion poll produced by Yuri Levada Analytical Center and statistical data on immigration.

Chapter 1 - Theoretical aspects of security migration debate

In this chapter, I will provide conceptual tools that will be employed throughout the study. In the beginning, the study will describe how the definition of security has evolved after the Cold War and formation of the Copenhagen School. Afterwards, the study provides different definitions of securitization and societal security to build the theoretical framework. The study also considers the critics of the concepts.

1.1 Security

Security and overall security studies within the last several decades have encountered many debates. The transformation in the world system as well as emergence of new actors and new strategic environments have not left the concept of security consistent. Within the traditional security approach, security is studied in relation to the military aspect, where war is a direct threat to the survival and security of the state, its territorial integrity and political autonomy. As Stephan Walt states, “security is the study of the threat, use and control of military force”.²⁰

However, the end of the Cold War has encouraged security scholars to expand and deepen the definition of security beyond the military aspect. The existing traditional security approach was not able to explain the events that happened after the Cold War. For example, Europe was in the process of integration and the construction of the European Identity. It led to fear that the new identity could prevail over the national identity.²¹ On the other hand, the collapse of Yugoslavia led to a challenging relationship between the state security and the

²⁰Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De. Wilde. “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, 3

²¹Ibid, 2

societal security. The disintegration of the Soviet Union also created challenges in building national identity in the host societies.²²

1.2 Copenhagen School of Security Studies

As highlighted above, the end of Cold War showed that the traditional approach to security was inadequate and that there was a high demand for a broader, deeper and more multi-sectorial approach to security. In response “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” was developed by scholars of Copenhagen Peace Research Institute represented by the writings of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde and other scholars, who together formed the Copenhagen School. The idea was to provide a framework for analyzing the new emerging issues such as immigration, ethnic conflict, demographic issue, terrorism, environment, which went beyond the conventional security approach.²³ The scholars of the Copenhagen School argue that, in the international relations, an issue becomes a security issue when it is presented as posing an existential threat to an object. There are three conceptual tools that have been developed by the school: a) sectors; b) regional security complexes; and c) securitization theory. Securitization is the most widely used concept in the security studies.²⁴

Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, in analyzing the security threat divided it into five sectors of security: political (sovereignty and ideology of state), military (state survival and territorial integrity), societal (threat to group identity) economic (limited access to resources, state bankruptcy) and environment (global ecosystem).²⁵ The logic of each security sector is determined by securitizing actors and referent object²⁶.

²²Buzan, Barry. “People, states, and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era.” London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991.

²³Buzan, Wæver, and De. Wilde. “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” 24.

²⁴ Ibid, 25.

²⁵Barry, “People, states, and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era.”22-23.

²⁶Buzan, Wæver, and De. Wilde. “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” 25.

1.2.1 Securitization

According to the Copenhagen School's scholars, securitization is a process in which state actors frame the subject in a matter of security; an extreme version of politicization, that allows the undertaking of extraordinary means in the name of security. As mentioned above, the aim of the securitizing actors is to present the issue as a security threat and then the issue is accepted as a threat by the audience, that it is defined as a security threat.²⁷

Buzan claims that "security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the games and frames the issues either as a special kind of politics or as above politics"²⁸. However, this does not mean that securitization always is fostered by state; instead, the societal agents as public opinion can also securitize migration in order to defend its national identity²⁹ or communal identity.³⁰

Similarly, Sheehan claims that: "Securitization is about constructing a shared understanding of what are to be considered security issues."³¹ If in traditional security approach, to securitize an issue meant that the state is allowed to use force to take coercive measures to address a problem, the modern approach to securitization argues that the issue can be constructed as an existential threat, accepted by an audience, and after it is politicized.³² Weaver claims that an issue becomes an international security matter, when it can be argued that the issue is absolute priority and it poses immense threat. In this case, the state in order to deal with the issue employs extraordinary means.³³

²⁷ Ibid, 25-26

²⁸ Ibid, 23

²⁹ Perni Orietta. 2001. "Migration Flows, Societal Security and EU's Integration Process, The Spanish Case."

³⁰ Swarts Jonathan and Karakatsanis M. Neovi. "The Securitization of Migration: Greece in the 1990s" *Journal of Balkan and near Eastern Studies* 14 (2012)33-51.

³¹ Saleh Alam, 2010. "Broadening the concept of Security: Identity and Societal Security," *Geopolitics Quarterly* 6: 228-241.

³² Ibid, 228-230.

³³ Buzan, Wæver, and De. Wilde. "Security: A New Framework for Analysis."

According to the Copenhagen School scholars, speech-act approach to security distinguishes three types of units involved in the security analysis:

1. Referent object : object that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival
2. Securitizing actors : actors who securitize issues by declaring something a referent object-existential threatened
3. Functional actors: actors who affect the dynamic of a sector.³⁴

In the analysis, Buzan and other scholars of Copenhagen School refer to the referent object, as an actor who has a power to influence the decision in the field of security. The securitizing actors through speech acts can securitize an issue as an existential threat. However, looking precisely at the content of the speech act is not enough. Michael Williams argues that considering the cotemporary political communion, televisual images have strong implications during the securitization of the migration. Current security policies are constructed not solely by “linguistic legitimization” but also by relations between images and rhetoric.³⁵ Further, below, I will explain more in detail about society as a referent object of securitization.

1.2.2 Societal outlook

As mentioned in the beginning, national security was the key concept in the area of security affairs and security studies before the end of the Cold War. The focus of security had been state centric and mostly dealing with political and military aspects but gradually the notion of security started to expand. The state on one hand has a characteristic of having a fixed territory, and formal administrative body, but society on the other hand is about identity, and the ways in which communities define themselves. Therefore, when the communities feel that their

³⁴Ibid, 36.

³⁵Michael C. Williams. 2003. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” 51211

identity is threatened, it results in societal insecurities.³⁶ Giddens defined society as “a cluster of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity”.³⁷ Similar to Giddens, Waever states that “society is about identity and self-conception of collectivities and individual identifying themselves as member of that collectivity”³⁸. In terms of contextual meaning, both definition have similar meaning.

Security is defined as the absence of threat. Consequently, an issue is scrutinized within the societal security agenda, when a threat to collective identity is perceived. Hence, migration is seen as an alien identity and a mass migration could pose a threat or so called perceived threat to the established distinct identity within a state.³⁹ Therefore, the focus of societal security is the maintenance of its communal identity- comprised of elements as language, customs, religion, culture and nationality from existential threats.

Despite the broad definition of societal security and its implication, Buzan, Waever and De Wilde claim that societal security can be used in viewing the following issues:

- a) Migration -the influx of a migrant population in the host society can lead to identity changes and shifting the composition of the host society.
- b) Horizontal competition-even, if the host society identity is strong, the fear of being overridden by the cultural and linguistic influence of migrants remains present.
- c) Vertical competition-in the case of integration projects, migrants can become so integrated with the host society that they no longer feel that they are immigrants.⁴⁰

Waever argues that communal survival threat may refer not solely to the societal identity but that it is a combination of societal identity and state sovereignty. According to Waever “If a state loses sovereignty, it has not survived as a state; if a society loses its

³⁶McSweeney, Bill. 1999. *Security, Identity and Interests: A sociology of International Relations* New York: Cambridge University Press.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Buzan, Wæver, and De. Wilde. “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” 21.

³⁹Ibid, 21.

⁴⁰Ibid,22.

identity, it has not survives as itself”. Hence, it is essential to recognize, that in terms of migration both state and identity matter in relations to communal survival.⁴¹ Benedict Anderson, in his book “Imagined Communities” explains how the state and communal identity are constructed. He explains that when the group identity “self” is distinguished from “other”, this distinction can lead to conflict with “other”. Similarly Paul Roe argues that the securitizing actors- use the terms “us” and “them” in their speeches and in media to present the issue as threat to communal identity.⁴² For Anderson, nations are political projects of identity creation, and achieving coherent collective identity.⁴³ From the extreme nationalist perspective, the existence of foreign nationals prompted by migration is perceived as a threat to reproduction of the pure national identity. Therefore continued flow of migrants can alter national composition of the dominant population.⁴⁴

The threat to identity is perceived as socially constructed. If a society see that their “we” is under risk, it responds with voicing collectively this as a threat to the survival of communal identity.⁴⁵ Along the same logic, Theiler states:

To securitize is to identify an alleged threat to the survival of the community and to the shared identity it sustains, its presumed origins and perpetrators, as well as a strategy to ward off that threat and thereby render society security again. Given that these are perceived to be existential threat to something whose survival is sought as an end in itself and is afforded absolute priority, effective securitization often leads to defensive measures that go beyond the limits of what qualifies as politically or morally accepted conduct in normal circumstances.⁴⁶

Based on the definitions provided above, which carry similar message, it can be summarized that when the society perceives threat, it automatically generates a response

⁴¹Waeber, Ole. 2015. “Securitization and Desecuritization” in *On Security*, ed Ronnie D. Lipschutz New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 405.

⁴² Perni Orietta, “Migration Flows, Societal Security and EU’s Integration Process, The Spanish Case,” 7.

⁴³Roe, Paul. 1999. “The Interstate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflicts as a “Tragedy” *Journal of Peace Research* 36: 183.

⁴⁴Saleh Alam, 2010. “Broadening the concept of Security: Identity and Societal Security,” *Geopolitics Quarterly* 6. 234.

⁴⁵Waeber, Ole. 2015. “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 43.

⁴⁶Waeber, Ole., and Lemaitre, Pierre. 1993. “Identity Migration and the new Security Agenda in Europe.” Palgrave Macmillan, 42.

⁴⁷Theiler, Tobias. 2003. “Societal Security and Social Psychology,” *Review of International Studies* 9, Cambridge University Press, 249-268.

mechanism. Firstly, it can attempt on its own to react through communal activities as a demonstration or development of special groups-“nationalists” or the extreme cases through the ideology of fascism. Secondly, it can try to bring the issue to the political sector.⁴⁷ In response, the state can take extraordinary actions in the cases of emergency or can address the immigration issue through restrictive policies toward migration, the establishment of quota systems or media speeches.

As explained in the beginning, the societal security concept is not without limitation. Firstly, the concept is criticized for being broad and subjective. For example, Paul Roe argues that the problem with the concept lies in defining the identity, whether, identity is an object of a process, or whether identity is something constant and solid or whether it is something fluid and changing. Moreover, when analyzing the societal dimension it is challenging to define the securitizing actors. Traditionally, the state officials use reference to state and sovereignty in their speeches, to show their commitment to the state. On the contrary, opposition leaders use the concepts of nation and identity to reach power in their speeches, because it is easier to argue about the nation being in danger than the state itself. Also by using the nationalist argument, it is easier to influence mass society and put emphasis on the incapability of the existing regime to defend the national interest of population.⁴⁸ Similarly, McSweeney claims that societal security defines society as having a single identity, and this can lead to the rise of intolerant identities, that eventually can motivate interethnic conflict.⁴⁹

Therefore, the study considers immigration security dilemmas to explain the public support for extreme hostility toward immigration. This theory is considered in the study because it is applicable for studying anti-immigration hostility in Europe, the United States of

⁴⁷ Perni Orietta, “Migration Flows, Societal Security and EU’s Integration Process, The Spanish Case.”

⁴⁸ Roe, Paul. 1999. “The Interstate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflicts as a “Tragedy” *Journal of Peace Research* 36: 183.

⁴⁹ Saleh Alam, 2010. “Broadening the concept of Security: Identity and Societal Security,” *Geopolitics Quarterly* 6. 236.

America and Russia. According to Alexseev, hostility is “speculative and preemptive”, which means that the natives become already hostile toward migrants prior to the large inflow of immigration and prior to recognizing existential threat.⁵⁰ Moreover, hostile attitude toward immigrants can fuel the public to pressure the state to undertake restrictive policies. Within the immigration security dilemma, migration makes the host society uncertain of the ability of the state to ensure the security and the interest of the host society in relation to migration. Consequently, the uncertainty of societal perception make it believe that is it more practical to overrate the reality of the threat fostered by migration and equip oneself toward the worst scenario.⁵¹ As a result, the anti-migrants groups start their campaign against migration flow prior to the reification of the threat.⁵²

In this chapter, I outlined theoretical framework from which the empirical analysis will flow. In order to answer the research question and achieve the aim of the study, the chapter provided the main conceptual tools and its limitations. These concepts were chosen in order to understand the linkage between framing security issue and the way the public response, in determining the difference between the rhetoric and the reality of the threat posed by Central Asian immigration to Russia. The following chapter will outline the migration trends before the creation of the SU, during the SU and after the collapse of SU and the evolution of migration policies in Russia.

⁵⁰Mikhail A. Alexseev. 2011. “Societal Security. The Security Dilemma, and Extreme Anti Migrants Hostility in Russia.” *Peace Research* 48, 509.

⁵¹*Ibid*, 512.

⁵²*Ibid*, 520.

Chapter 2 – Labor Migration from Central Asia to Russia: General Trends

Now that I have developed the theoretical framework and introduced the main concepts, the theses will proceed with migration trends of Russia to provide a general picture of migration from CA to the country. It is an interesting case to study in terms of migration because such a dynamic inflow of immigration is a relative new phenomenon for the contemporary Russian State. The second section examines the migration policies as response to the large inflow of immigration. Based on the evolution of migration policies, the study is divided into periods to outline the securitizing moves. The analysis of migration policies focuses on the period of the beginning of presidency of Vladimir Putin.

When analyzing current migration trends, it is necessary to look at the historical pattern, scale and characteristic of migration to Russia. Major migration trends in contemporary Russia are the outcome of population movement during the Tsarist (1547-1917) and Soviet (1917-1991) periods, which have created favorable conditions for post-Soviet Migration.⁵³ Therefore, I have divided this chapter into sub sections: migration trends until the disintegration of SU, and migration trends afterwards. Further, in the paper, when analyzing Central Asian immigration to Russia, I refer only to immigrants from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Labor migration for these three CA countries plays a significant role and comprises the biggest flow. Mainly it is due to fierce dependency on remittances sent by labor migrants to their families and its contributions to the overall GDP in these countries. For example, according to World Bank data in 2013, remittances comprised 49.5 % of GDP in Tajikistan and 31 % of GDP in The Kyrgyz Republic and 11% of GDP in Uzbekistan. The

⁵³Nozhenko, Maria. 2010. "Focus Migration: Russian Federation," Hamburg Institute of International Economics. July, 20: 1-10.

labor migrants from these countries perceive Russia as opportunity for employment and raising their standard of living.⁵⁴

Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are excluded from the study due to different economic conditions and political approaches towards immigration. As mentioned above, Turkmenistan pursued a “restrictive government control over labor emigration” model, which has resulted in less immigration to Russia in comparison with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.⁵⁵ Kazakhstan is also excluded from the list due to its different economic conditions, state relationship, and geographical location.⁵⁶

2.1 Migration trends until the dissolution of Soviet Union

The period from the 17th -19th century is recognized for the territorial expansionism of the Russian Empire. It started in the early 17th century with the movement of Russian population to Siberia and the Far East. By 1678, Russians became the dominant ethnic group in this region. In the Beginning of the 18th century, Russian territory expanded further west with the acquisition of Belarus, the Baltics, part of Poland and parts of Ottoman Empire. In the 19th century, the Northern Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia and Central Asia became part of the Russian Empire. The results of this territorial expansion has led to the penetration of Russian speaking populations into new geographic areas including territories of Central Asia.⁵⁷

During the Soviet period, migration is characterized as internal migration. There were two factors that defined the type of migration. Firstly, state control of people's

⁵⁴ “Personal Remittances, received (% of GDP),” The World Bank. Accessed January 10, 2016.

⁵⁵ Ryazansev, Sergey. “Russia and Kazakhstan in Eurasian Migration system: Development Trends, Socio-Economic Consequences of Migration and Approaches to Regulation,” 30.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 26.

⁵⁷ Ivakhnyuk, Irina. 2009. “The Russian Migration Policy and its Impact on Human Development: The Historical Perspective,” United Nations Development Program Human Development Reports (2009).

movement through residence permits (*propiska*),⁵⁸ and involuntary large-scale population movement. The idea of state controlling the population movement through residence permits was driven by experience of failing to manage large-scale migration over a large territory. The second factor is the result of industrialization. The idea of the Soviet authorities behind large-scale involuntary population movement was to industrialize the large territory of the SU. Another factor of involuntary migration was the compulsory resettlement policy of the Soviet totalitarian regime. The victims of these policies were mainly suspects of collaboration during the war with Nazi Germany, who were later involuntarily moved in groups to Siberia and CA. These policies were aimed at diversification of population composition throughout the Soviet Empire. For example, ethnic Russians comprised 2.5 % of population in Armenia and about 38% in Kazakhstan before the collapse of Soviet Union.⁵⁹ However, international migration during the soviet era were very limited. Soviet authorities practiced very restrictive policies, which made international migration almost impossible for its citizens.

This section outlined the main migration trends to Russia until the dissolution of SU. By outlining the historical pattern of migration to Russia, it can be summarized that migration during the period from 17-19th century is characterized as one of territorial expansion of the Russian Empire. However, migration during the soviet period is characterized as internal migration. During this period, migration was strictly state controlled and international migration, as a phenomenon, barely existed. The above historical outline was provided to show that immigration to Russia, particularly from CA is not a new trend for contemporary Russia and immigration to Russia in general has been very common.

The following section of the study will provide an outline of immigration flows after the collapse of SU. It will try to draw linkages between immigration flows and the state

⁵⁸Ibid, 5.

⁵⁹Nozhenko, Maria. 2010. "Focus Migration: Russian Federation,"2.

response in the form of the revision of immigration policies. The aim of the section is to show the state's role in framing migration policies by securitizing immigration.

2.2 Migration and migration policies after the dissolution of Soviet Union

After the dissolution of the SU, the Central Asian countries were among the Soviet successor states facing the most severe economic and political situations. None of the Central Asian countries were prepared for the severing of Soviet ties. For example, Tajikistan after the collapse of SU went through a tough civil war and had severe economic problems. Kyrgyzstan, small mountainous country suffered from economic instability due to limited natural resources and tight linkages to the Soviet Economy. Uzbekistan in comparison to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had much better economic conditions due to cotton production in the beginning, but later it also experience tough economic problems. As a result, many people from the Central Asian countries traveled to Russia in search of better life.⁶⁰

At the same time, with the collapse of the SU, 25 million ethnic Russians were left beyond the borders of the RF, which served as a main cause for mass migration in the beginning of the Russian State's existence.⁶¹ Consequently, Russia transformed from one of the most closed countries in terms of international migration to one of the largest migrant receiving country in the world. Significant numbers of migrants came to Russia from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - particularly CA.⁶² This aspect makes the case of migration from CIS to Russia unique in relation to other immigration flows as in the case

⁶⁰ Pomfret, Richard. 2003. "Central Asia since 1991: The Experience of the New Independent States." OECD Development Center. 222

⁶¹Nozhenko, Maria. 2010. "Focus Migration: Russian Federation,"3.

⁶² "Russia has World's 2nd Largest Number of Immigrants-UN Study," Sputnik International September 12, 2013.

of USA,⁶³ Turkish immigration to Germany,⁶⁴ Muslim migration to France or the case of Greece in the 1990s.⁶⁵ Among the key determinant of Russian attraction for CA migrants is economic instability in their host countries, common historical heritage with the Russian state, and relative liberalized policies for the CIS countries.⁶⁶

Migration flows and migrant composition to Russia since the disintegration of SU have changes over the years.⁶⁷ The first period encompasses the time-line from 1991-1995. This is the early years of the collapse of the SU, which set the basis for Russia's current migration policy. In 1992, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) was created as a response to the mass inflow of immigrants from CIS.⁶⁸ According to Ilkhamov, the main drive for immigration was repatriation of ethnic Russians due to the beginning of ethnic conflict and fear of discrimination by the titular nations in the newly independent states. At the same time, in the newly independent states, the authorities continued to centralize power in their hands and pursued a strategy of domestic nationalism and reemphasizing the national identity, which encouraged ethnic Russians to migrate to Russia.⁶⁹ Despite granting citizenship to everyone after independence, the inclination and favor toward the titular nation was visible among the Central Asian countries. For example, authorities put great importance on language or used it as a precondition for obtaining or retaining government jobs. This prompted a segment of migrants to flow to Russia.⁷⁰

⁶³Zong Jie and Batalova Jeanne. 2016. "Mexican Immigrants in the United States," Migration Policy Institute, (April 1, 2016).

⁶⁴Oezcan Veysel. 2004. "Germany Immigration in Transition" <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/germany-immigration-transition> (April 1, 2016).

⁶⁵Swartz Jonathan and Karakatsanis M. Neovi .2012. "The Securitization of Migration: Greece in the 1990s" *Journal of Balkan and near Eastern Studies* 14 (2012): 33-51.

⁶⁶Nozhenko, Maria. "Focus Migration: Russian Federation," 5.

⁶⁷Korobkov V. Andrei. 2007. "Migration trends in Central Eurasia: Politics versus economics," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 40:173.

⁶⁸Nozhenko, Maria. "Focus Migration: Russian Federation," 5.

⁶⁹Ilkhamov, Alisher. "Geographic Mobility of Uzbeks: The emergence of cross national communities vs, nation-state Control" (paper prepared for NBR Conference "Generational change and leadership succession in Uzbekistan", Washington DC, (March 2, 2006).

⁷⁰Ibid.

The second period is characterized by socioeconomic factors encouraging immigration from CA. The period from 1996-1999 and 2000-2005 is outlined as one of movement toward the securitization of migration policies. During the late 1990s, the state authorities turned their attention toward the irregular labor migration from CIS countries. The total amount of illegal immigrants reached from three to four million. In order to cope with illegal immigration, the state adopted a “Concept of the State Migration Policy of Russian Federation”. However, this attempt failed due to the large size of the shadow economy and informal labor market.⁷¹

During the early 2000s, Putin started to redefine Migration Policies. In 2002, the FMS was re-established and became part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). With these changes, migration was framed in the context of security in line with a rise in the negative public perception of immigration. At the same time, in 2002 the law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens on the Territory of the Russian Federation” was adopted.⁷² It was anticipated as a tool for transparent controlling of migrants. In addition, the new law canceled automatic granting of Russian citizenship to all interested citizens of SU and introduced a quota system to all foreign citizen from non-CIS countries. It created bureaucratic obstacles for the immigrants to obtain work permits, registration, and more challenges for labor migrants from Central Asia to migrate to Russia legally. In addition to the new law, in 2004 Article 322.1 “Organization of illegal migration” was added to the Criminal Code of Russian Federation. The state goal was to decrease illegal migration through increasing penalties for violation of immigration laws.⁷³ The Period from 2005-2007 is characterized as a radical shift toward liberalization of Migration policy by the state authority. In response to declining and aging population in Russia, the state authorities started to acknowledge the importance of immigrants

⁷¹Ivakhnyuk, Irina. 2009. “The Russian Migration Policy and its Impact on Human Development: The Historical Perspective,” 35, 38.

⁷²Federal Law No 62 FZ of May 31, 2002 “On Russian Citizenship,” Accessed March 16, 2016

⁷³Nozhenko, Maria. 2010. “Focus Migration: Russian Federation,” 5.

for economic and demographic development. Amendments to the law “On the Legal Status of Foreign citizens on the Territory of Russian Federation” was adopted which simplified procedures of attaining work permit and residence registration for migrants from CIS countries. In addition, an experimental immigration amnesty was attempted, which aimed to legalize around one million immigrants in the eight Russian regions including, Moscow, Irkutsk Region and Krasnodar Region.⁷⁴ Furthermore, in 2006 law “on Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation” was adopted, and aimed at improving the mechanism of registration and liberalizing procedures for obtaining residence registration.⁷⁵ As a result, more than 1.2 million work permits were issued for immigrants from CIS countries, which is three times the number of issued work permits in 2005.⁷⁶ Only ten CIS countries, which signed visa free agreement, shared the privilege of the liberalized state policies. In addition to the new law, in 2006 the state authorities approved “The National Program for Supporting Voluntary Migration of the Compatriot Residing Abroad to the Russian Federation” which was aimed at improving economic and demographic development of Russian State and encouraging Russian ethnic groups to return from the CIS countries. However, the program failed to achieve its objective as only 682 compatriots decided to move to Russia in comparison to the target of 23,000.⁷⁷ It is important to highlight that the liberalized policies and the new initiative for attracting compatriots were targeted toward ethnic Russians and not all immigrants.

The relative liberal migration policies of RF started to move in the direction of securitization after 2006. It started with the resolution of the government, which established in

⁷⁴ Taratuta Yuliya, “Russia Declares Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants” *Kommersant*. September 11, 2005.

⁷⁵ “Amendments aimed at the improvement of the mechanism of migration registration of foreign citizens and stateless persons” *Maxima Legal : Law reviews*, March 21, 2011.

⁷⁶ Ivakhnyuk, Irina .2009. “The Russian Migration Policy and its Impact on Human Development: The Historical Perspective,” 4.

⁷⁷ Vishnevsky Anatoly, and Babylev Sergei. 2009. “Russian: Facing Demographic Challenges,” *The National Human Development*.

2007 “admissible share of foreign workers employed by enterprise entities on the territory of Russian Federation”. According to this resolution, foreign citizens are not allowed to work in the retail market, selling alcoholic beverages, pharmaceutical goods.⁷⁸ This resolution had a significant impact on the Chinese immigrants who were mainly employed in the above-mentioned markets, but still had an impact on Central Asian migrants. In addition, the situation worsened with the first signs of the economic crisis and increase of the unemployment rate in Russia in 2008. Obviously, immigrants became the target of the Russian nationalists. In the media appeared publications, which framed migrants as job stealers and criminals.⁷⁹

With this the revision of the migration policies in Russia did not stop. The key document that shaped the migration pattern to the RF after the securitizing moves toward even more restrictive policies after 2012 is the “Concept of State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation through to 2025” approved by President of RF, Vladimir Putin. The first period of implementation of the concept (2012-2015) is aimed at developing and adopting corresponding regulations to meet the objectives like certifying and developing language programs, legal support centers for migrants.⁸⁰ These state initiative are aimed toward active recruitment and integration of permanent immigrants particularly compatriots, which should eventually lead to demographic and socioeconomic development.⁸¹ At the same time this Law, brings a lot of discomfort to migrants because, it strengthen the role of FMS, makes the process of obtaining work permits more bureaucratic and makes hiring immigrants for employers unattractive.⁸²

⁷⁸“Order of the Government of the Russian Federation from November 15, 2006 of No68” CIS Legislation.

⁷⁹“The impact of the Economic crisis on Migration trends and migration policy in Russian federation and the Eastern Europe and Central Asia,” IOM (Moscow, 2009): 28

⁸⁰ “Concept of State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation through to 2025,” President of Russia, June 13, 2012.

⁸¹ “The deomographic-economic Framework of Migration,” Migration Policy Center , June 2013

⁸²Stepin Andrei, “Immigration, Legislation, Federal Migration Service, Russia” *RIA Novosti*, August 19, 2013

This section on migration and migration policies after the collapse of Soviet Union, outlines the development of migration policies in Russia and how these policies were changing as a response to migration inflows. It is important to note that, that during the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the Federal Migration Services and migration legislation were revised continuously. The first period is characterized as creation of FMS as a response to the mass immigration after the collapse of SU. The state at this time lacked efficient mechanism to control migration flow. The second period is the continuation of state measures to the inflow of illegal immigration. The third period is characterized with its controversial state policies. From one side, the state liberalized state migration policies to attract immigration from CIS country. On the other side, it liberalized policies for compatriots and restricted for ethnic immigrants from CIS countries. During the fourth period, the state tried again to attract immigration through “National Program for Supporting Voluntary Migration” due to the demographic crisis that Russia was facing. Again, these policies were targeted at compatriots. The final period of immigration is considered as moving forward to restrictive migratory policies and further securitization of the issue.

The purpose of chapter two, section one was to outline the historical pattern of immigration to Russia and draw linkage with Central Asian immigration. The second section of the chapter focuses on the process of securitization of migration through Migration policies in Russia. The above analysis shows that the migration policies have moved toward securitization in the last decade and special attention is given to the role of ethnic Russians living in the near abroad.

Chapter 3 – Copenhagen school in practice: Empirical analysis

This chapter will analyze the process of securitization of migration in Russia through the lenses of securitization and societal security concepts as presented by the Copenhagen School scholars. In the beginning of the chapter, the study tries to provide historical evidence of securitization of migration during the soviet period to provide more holistic view of the issue.

The chapter will encompass analysis of state official speeches, media analysis and the public polls on the issue, focusing on the last decade. The chapter is divided into three-sub section, each focusing on particular securitizing actors in framing the debate. The first section focused on the speeches of the state officials and opposition leaders. The second section focuses on the role of media, precisely stories in creating the image of immigrants. The final section outlines the public response to the securitizing agents as state officials and media.

The overall Russian labor migration pattern does not differ greatly from the migration to the European countries from Eastern European states and North Africa. Labor migration to Germany, characterized as “Gastarbaiter” or “Polish plumber”⁸³ to the UK have clear intersecting points. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, immigrants from CA pursued similar approach. Ideally, the multi-ethnic SU and later Russia, shall pursue legacy of historically established multi-cultural state, which encourages a wide, extend of ethnic assimilation. This should be a key determinant for safeguarding against any racial prejudices.⁸⁴ However, the ambiguity of the titular nationality and receptive attitude toward

⁸³Asthana Anushka, “The Polish plumber who fixed the vote” The Guardian, May, 2005

⁸⁴Tolz, Vera. 1998. “Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation building in Post-Communist Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies50: 1002.

migrants can be traced to the existence of the SU and its national policies. The problem with the Soviet legacy derives from the ideology itself, which was built based on the ethnocentric principles. The ideology itself is not ambiguous because it was constructed as a shared identity of Soviet people (*Sovetskii narod*). Particularly, Brezhnev often in his speeches and policies emphasized on “russification” targeted to enact Russian language and culture on its non-Russian people and assimilate them into the Russian nation.⁸⁵ Moreover, despite the subsistence of 15 other autonomous republics and regions, Soviet State always put the Russian identity and Russian culture as a superior identity.⁸⁶

Furthermore, during the Soviet legacy, the religious identities of the member states were prohibited. The importance of the titular language and culture was set as a second priority after the Russian. It was the core of the Soviet ethnocentric nationalism. However, the situation has changed radically after the collapse of the USSR. As Ilkhomov states:

“...the fall of the USSR, this system of checks and balances in the sphere of national policies was completely destroyed, while the principle of internationalism was abandoned. As a result, nationalism was unleashed to become the dominant political force and the principle source of legitimacy for post-Soviet ruling regimes. Claims such as “Russia for the Russians” or “Kyrgyzstan for the Kyrgyz” resounded not only in kitchen debates, but also in public politics and the press.”⁸⁷

During the Soviet period, such issues did not exist because the status of Russian identity was not under question. The Russian population shared the privilege of Russian being the language of the “lingua franca” which was used in the media, politics and academia.⁸⁸ However, with the dissolution of the SU, the question of immigration as a potential threat to state security, potential danger to the Russian identity came into front.

⁸⁵O’Connor, Kevin. 2008. *Intellectuals and Apparatchiks: Russian Nationalism and the Gorbachev Revolution*. NY: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher.

⁸⁶IlkhamovAlisher, “Central Asian Migrants in Russia: A Heated Debate” Fair Observer. March 19, 2014.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Ibid.

Hence, in the following section, I will try to demonstrate the tools through which the securitizing moves were undertaken during the last decade. Particularly, during the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the securitization of immigration became more vivid and the issue is highly discusses at the state level. In addition, during the presidency of Vladimir Putin and afterword, the migration legislation was amended and new laws were adopted several times as outlined above. Therefore, it is interesting to focus on this particular time frame in order to answer the research question.

3.1 Speech Acts

In this section, I will explain the securitizing moves of state officials, which is aimed at investigating the process of securitization of CA immigration to Russia. To answer the research question of the study, it will employ the securitization and societal security concepts developed in the theoretical chapter. The speeches for state officials, namely president of RF, Vladimir Putin, mayor of Moscow- Sergei Sobyenin, leader of Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) Zhirinovskiy, and former Leader of party “Rodina” Dmitry Rogozin are chosen to examine the issue. Particularly the speeches of the above-mentioned officials were chosen due to their political activity and political view, their role in the society and in framing the general debate over migration in Russia. The aim is to show securitization of migration by state official and their effect on central Asian immigration and migration legislation.

We have to keep in mind the key concepts of the Copenhagen School that we developed in the theoretical part. According to the Copenhagen Schools scholars, securitization is a process in which state actors frame the subject in a matter of security; an extreme version of politicization, that allows to undertake extraordinary measures in the name of

security.⁸⁹ Following the logic, it can be said that, the securitizing actors frame the issue as an existential threat in order to gain approval of the audience and after it is politicized.

For example, the government officials did not leave the event in Kondopoga, a town in the Republic of Karelia unnoticed, where two ethnic Russians were killed and several others were badly injured by Chechens and one Azeri in a restaurant fight. One month later, on October 5, 2006 at that time prime minister of Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin ordered to ban foreign workers in the urban market places. Putin called for immediate ethnic cleaning of markets. In his speech, he ordered:

“To bring order to the most ethnically polluted places of our country - in the markets. We have to take additional measures to improve the wholesale and retail market to protect the interest of our Russian producers and indigenous population in Russia.”⁹⁰

It is a clear example of securitizing moves by state officials, instigating to undertake emergency as well as extraordinary measures. Secondly, Putin highlights the role of ethnic Russians, which prevails over non-ethnic Russians. Furthermore, Putin uses the word “ethnic cleaning” often used by nationalist and opposition leaders to stress the nationalist views and bring a clear division of Russian and non-Russians –usually referred to Central Asians and immigrants from Caucasus. Further securitization was proceeded in 2007, when the government approved a resolution establishing admissible share of foreign workers in the enterprise entities and absolute ban in the retail market.⁹¹ It is also interesting that only one year before the incident, the government made amendment to the law on “Legal Status of Foreign citizens on the Territory of Russian Federation” aimed at simplification of work procedures for immigrants from CIS countries. Such government reaction is explained by biased attitude toward immigration and by common fear of the “other”. Consequently, Putin called for measures to

⁸⁹Buzan, Wæver, and De. Wilde. “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” 25.

⁹⁰ Original Title “Putin velel nachat etnicheskuu chistku gosudarstvennogo masshtaba s rinkov,” News ru.com, October 5, 2006, accessed May 2, 2016 <http://m.newsru.com/russia/05oct2006/rynok.html>

⁹¹ “Order of the Government of the Russian Federation from November 15, 2006 of No68” CIS Legislation. Accessed April 5, 2016 <http://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=14947>

deal with the threat resulting in further securitizing moves and restrictive policies. Moreover, Putin during his presidential campaign in 2012 stated:

“Without doubt Russia needs new flow of labor force, but it needs smart and hardworking labor force which will move to Russia for a long term, and will feel Russia as his/her Motherland, but not to come as a seasonal worker and travel back. However, our current policies are not favorable for our compatriots due to all the bureaucratic procedures. We have to simplify these procedures for our compatriots, native Russian speakers and carries of Russian culture.”⁹²

In this speech, president Putin makes two points. Firstly, Russia needs immigrants and secondly Russia needs not all immigrants, but particularly compatriots. He uses the words “our compatriots”, “native Russian speakers” that share the “same culture” to highlight the elements of communal identity. It verifies the argument of Buzan, that migrants possess an alien identity and mass migration could pose a threat to the established distinct identity within state. Therefore, if immigrants share similar identity, they do not pose any threat. In addition, it is important to draw lines between the date when the speech was made and the set of events that were happening in Russia. Putin was running for his 2nd term presidential election, and like many other state officials to win the voice of the Russian population, he stressed on the issue of immigration to Russia and the potential threat posed by the illegal immigration. He emphasizes his care about ethnic Russians that live outside Russia, the role of Motherland and Russian culture and language to win the heart and voice of Russian population.

Contextual framing of Central Asia migration as an issue for Russia has also changed over time. If in 2006-2010, Central Asian immigrants image were associated with job stealers, robbers and alien identity in the media, in the sake of recent events, immigrants are perceived as direct security threat, connected with terrorism and extremist. During the Security Council (SC) meeting on March 31, 2016, President of RF, Vladimir Putin stated:

⁹² Original title “Putin protiv migrantov,” December 16, 2012 .
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvqPMYk_BsA

“Russia needs to strengthen protection of sites of state borders on the directions constituting danger to penetration of migrants. It is necessary to strengthen protection of sites of state border on the directions constituting the increased danger. All possible windows and "openings" should be blocked!”⁹³

In this speech, the President directly, alarms the state officials and secondly the Russian population that they should be precautious about the coming threat. The state authorities should pay special attention to the migrants and particularly illegal migrants coming from CA. With such strong and direct command, the issue of migration is framed as special kind of politics or above politics. According to immigration security theory that we developed in the theoretical framework, after these speeches, the native become already hostile toward migrants prior to recognizing the existential threat.⁹⁴

Migration to Russia is vastly from CIS countries and it is not a new phenomenon as explained in the previous chapter. Large inflow of immigration has been happening since the early years of creation of Russian State. At the same time, recent statistics show that the number of immigrant from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan has decreased in the last two years by more than 10 %. It has been resulted due to restricting the migration policies and deterioration of economic situation in Russia.⁹⁵ However, the state officials continue to portray immigrants as potential danger despite the decrease in the number of immigrants. Furthermore, Putin in his speech at the SC called for:

“Deep analysis of the migrant Crisis in Europe and drawing necessary conclusions and called to take necessary actions about existing and potential threats. Primary, it concerns our borders, partners of Eurasian Economic Union, CSTO, and CIS.”⁹⁶

⁹³“The president has held the meeting of the Security Council devoted to questions of improvement of migration policy,” 1- Live, March 31, 2016, accessed April 5, 2016 https://www.1tv.ru/news/2016/03/31/299497-prezident_provel_zasedanie_sovbeza_posvyaschennoe_voprosam_sovershenstvovaniya_migratsionnoy_politiki

⁹⁴Mikhail A. Alexseev. 2011. “Societal Security. The Security Dilemma, and Extreme Anti Migrants Hostility in Russia.” 47.

⁹⁵ “Number of Immigrants from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan decreased by 1 million” Sadoi Tojikiston. November 12, 2015, accessed May 1, 2016 <http://sadoitojikon.com/tajnews/5912-chislo-migrantov-iz-uzbekistana-tadzhikistana-i-kyrgyzstana-v-rossii-snizilos-na-1-mln-grafiki.html>

⁹⁶ Kucera Joshua, “State Department Downplays ISIS Threat In Central Asia,” Eurasianet.org. June 12, 2015, accessed May 1, 2016 <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73836>

From this speech, it can be summarized, that Putin calls for more strict measures to deal with the existential threat. The Copenhagen concept of securitization argues that the issue can be constructed as an existential threat, accepted by an audience and after it is politicized. In this case, President Putin through his speeches is politicizing the issue to get approval of the society. In addition, when examining the more recent speeches of Putin and other state officials, it can be observed that there is a clear shift of framing the immigration security debate in Russia. For example, in the recent years, anti-migrant speeches are defended by the so-called penetration of the Central Asian communities by the Islamic State Fighters, which why Putin calls for strict border control. These propagandas are backed with an assumption, that militants disguised as labor migrants come to Russia in order to deteriorate the Russian security situation. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Daniel N. Rosenblum, from the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, argues that there are over 4000 Central Asians fighting in Syria and most of them are recruited from Russia.⁹⁷ At the same time, International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence's (ICSR) results show that there are around 1400 active militants from CA fighting in Syria and Iraq as of January 2015.⁹⁸ The number of immigrants that join the radical groups is very low in comparison the number of immigrants from CA going to Russia for work.⁹⁹ The state official speeches about the migration crisis and the real situation in Russia, confirm the concept of securitization. Precisely, the state official through their anti-migrants speeches construct issue as an existential threat. In practice, the radicalization of migrants in Russia has never been high, and there is little evidence that the current tendency regarding Islamic State (ISIS) is much different.

⁹⁷Umida, Hashimova. 2015. "Reports of Radicalization of Central Asian Migrants in Russia Appear Overblown," The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 12: 161.

⁹⁸Tucker Noah, "Central Asian Involvement in the Conflict in Syria and Iraq: Drivers and responses," May 4, 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CVE_CentralAsiansSyriaIraq.pdf

⁹⁹Umida, Hashimova. 2015

Sergei Sobyenin, mayor of Moscow in an interview to the newspaper “Moskovskie Novosti” in May 2012 said:

“Moscow is a Russian city and it should remain that way. It is not Chinese, Tajik or Uzbek. People who speak Russian badly and who have a different culture are better off living in their own country.”

Through using such language, we can trace the logic developed in the theoretical framework. According to Buzan, when a threat to collective identity is perceived, the issue can be examined within the societal agenda. In the above speech, Sobyenin like Buzan stresses on absence of similar language and shared culture between migrants and ethnic Russians. Consequently, when the referent object, society accept the threat, the issue become a security issue. In addition, Sobyenin, in the same interview blames migrant for high crime rates. However, the data provided by the MIA showed that foreign nationals committed only two percent of crimes in Moscow. Following this logic, if all foreign nationals comprise only two percent of crime rate, Central Asian immigrants make even a smaller share of the total. Therefore, the argument that immigrants pose security threat by committing crime is invalid.¹⁰⁰

Moreover, Sobyenin stresses the world as “other culture”, refers to immigrants “they” or “their” in his speeches to incite societal insecurity. According to Mc Sweeney, societal insecurity can lead to rise of intolerant identities that eventually can motivate interethnic conflict. Russia have not reached that point of societal insecurity, which is mentioned by Mc Sweeney. However, the fact that such hostile speeches can exacerbate already existing nationalist sentiments and nationalist groups have empirical grounding. Moreover, as Theiler argues, when society perceives a threat, it automatically generated mechanism of response. Firstly, it can react through communal activities as demonstration. Secondly, it can bring the issue to the political sector. In response, the state can take extraordinary actions as restrictive

¹⁰⁰ Murat Sadykov, “Central Asia: Labor Migrants Caught in Russian Politicians Crosshairs,” Eurasianet.org, June 18, 2013, accessed May 1, 2016 <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67135>

policies, establishment of quota system or media speeches. In our case, mayor of Moscow uses media to influence mass audience. His speech also comes in line with his mayor campaign in 2012 and parallel to adoption of “Concept of State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation through 2025”. The outcome of this concept, Russia again peruses relative restrictive immigration policies, which significantly affects immigrants from CA.

One of the most popular Russian news portal “Izvestia” published an article with the title “Zhirinovsky wants to clear Russia from labor migrants”. Vice speaker of the State Duma and leader of Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky said:

“Russia needs to restrict its migration policy. We need to fully get rid of immigrants as we have enough labor force.”¹⁰¹

From above statement, it can be concluded that Zhirinovsky has an extreme warning and hostile position toward immigrants. Later, during his speech at State Duma on February 4, 2016 Zhirinovsky said the following:

“Until we do not recall the key problem, we cannot put diagnosis. We have to define “why did hatred between people started?” There is no problem between Russians, bashkirs, tatars. Mostly the problem is between south Caucasus and Central Asia. Today we have 15 million immigrants from Central Asia and South Caucasus. They have a ready Muslim army, which itself will arrange boom. In Moscow, we have 4-4 million of them: young, strong, aggressive, armed-ready army for a revolution. Therefore, the state authorities should listen to experts and think about our security. There is only one radical solution: force all the migrants out. We do not need migrants in Russia.”¹⁰²

According to this statement, several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, Zhirinovsky stresses on the cultural difference of the host society and immigrants, thus he refers to collective identity as a referent object, and its survival being in danger. Secondly, Zhirinovsky through his official speeches, wants to attain more public support and he has been very successful in doing this

¹⁰¹ Original title “Zhirinovsky khochit ochistit Rossiu ot trudovikh migrantov,” Izvestia. May 7, 2010, accessed March 15, 2016 <http://izvestia.ru/news/470899#ixzz47IoWTsu3>

¹⁰² Original title “ Zhiritnovsky v Gosdume,” February 4, 2016, accessed March 27, 2016 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aTqXhaGpjFM>

because, LDPR has been actively part of the official politics for more than 20 years despite its neo-Nazi activists and slogans¹⁰³.

Alike LDPR, Rodina -political party is also known for its nationalistic and xenophobic expressions used in its pre-election campaign. As noted above, opposition leaders use nationalistic expressions to influence the society by emphasizing on potential threat. To demonstrate the former Leader of party “Rodina” Dmitry Rogozin harshly criticized the decision of FMS to amnesty about one million illegal immigrants from the CIS. In his speech, he claims that:

"Mass attraction of cheap labor from regions with alien culture, historical traditions instigates unsolvable problems. Events, similar to those that occur in France now expect also Moscow if Moscow will not take necessary strategic actions in its policies. Instead, amnestied immigrants will continue to occupy the jobs of Russians, their income will not increase to the point that they will stop carrying drugs, rob, kill, rape, etc."¹⁰⁴

In the above speech, Dmitry Rogozin alarms the state to take securitizing moves. He implies to Russian collective identity being at risk. As Waever claims, threat to society security depends on the degree to which migrants absorb and adapt to the social capacities. If migrant are hostile toward societal elements that constitute the societal identity, the threat to societal security is high and therefore there are higher chances that state undertakes extraordinary measures to protect the communal identity. Here Rogozin emphasizes that immigrants have alien culture, tradition equating them with “other”. Like other state officials, he blames immigrants for robbery, killing and rape, which do not have imperial grounding as explained above.

In this section, I have analyzed how securitizing actors in the face of state official, who can push toward securitizing moves, by framing migrants as potential threat in their

¹⁰³Shekhovstov, Antos and Umland, Andreas. 2011. “Neo-Fascist Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his extremely rightwing LDPR in Russia’s Upcoming parliamentary Elections,” *Foreign Policy Journal*, (November 7).

¹⁰⁴ Original title “Podina protiv amnistii migrant” “Rustrana, October 11, 2007 accessed March 27, 2016 <http://xn--80aa2bkafhg.xn--p1ai/article.php?nid=14497>

speech acts. In the study, I highlighted the role of these political agents in the society and the time when the securitizing move were undertaken and tried to draw correlations with the migration policies. Consequently, it can be concluded that lack of a positive vision by state officials and continues restrictive immigration policy have led to framing the negative image of immigrants. Furthermore, the study provides statistical evidences and verifies that the securitizing moves undertaken by state officials, overrate the reality of threat posed by immigrants.

The following section will focus on the role of media stories in creating the image of immigrants and shaping public perception for securitizing the issue.

3.2 Media Evaluation

Media is an accepted influential securitizing agent because it can influence society's attitude toward this or that problem. Hence, media has a great responsibility in the creation of perceptions about immigration. If the Copenhagen Scholars focus on the speech as a key form of communicative action in security practices, in the contemporary communication, newspaper, televisual images have increased impact. According to Michael Williams televisual images are strongly connected to the political communication today. Hence, securitization is not only conducted by speech acts, but also by televisual images which have strong implication on the acceptance of the issue in the society.¹⁰⁵

Considering the era in which we live, media has a big power in shaping public perception. It has a strong implication when analyzing Central Asian immigration attitude to Russia. Often, in media image of immigrants are associates with criminals, lawbreakers and aggressive in Russia. Typically such media mentioning's are portrayed more often on

¹⁰⁵Michael C. Williams. 2003. "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," 512.

newspapers as “Zavtra” “Russkaya Pravda”, “Nazionalnaya Gazeta”, “Za Russkoe Delo” as well as nationalist websites and internet blogs in Russia. According to the head of Moscow-based Sova Center, which monitors the xenophobic and right wing groups, nationalist groups often recruiting volunteers through newspapers like “Zavtra”.¹⁰⁶ In these cases, securitization is done through Russian nationalist parties and movements and media serves as securitizing agent in attracting supporters and reaching bigger audience. The motives of such movements are explained by preserving of their societal security and societal identity.

The biggest highlights in the media of Central Asian immigrants during one year media monitoring are the news relates to “The death of Tajik baby Umarali” and “ Beheading of a Russian girl by Uzbek nanny”. At first glance, these two stories have contrasting messages, but throughout the analysis you will understand how media, a securitizing agent is used to frame the migration debate in the society for further securitization. These stories are chosen, because they were the most discussed media mentioning during the one-year media evaluation and best portray the current mood of state officials and public toward Central Asian immigrants.

The killing of the baby Umarali has been reported in the most popular Russian news portal as “Argumenty I Fauty”¹⁰⁷, “NTV news”¹⁰⁸, “Echo Moskvi”¹⁰⁹, “Novaya Gazeta”¹¹⁰ and Russian television. The tragedy occurred on October 13, 2015, when the Saint Petersburg’s

¹⁰⁶ Balmforth Tom, “Russia's Nationalist Fringe Takes Center Stage In Eastern Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, June 17, 2014, accessed March 21, 2016 <http://www.rferl.org/content/russias-nationalist-fringe-take-center-stage-in-eastern-ukraine/25425155.html>

¹⁰⁷ Original title “Ya slishala krik vnuka. 5 mesyachnii Umarali pogib iz-za prosrochennoi visi,” Argumenty I Fakti October 26, 2015 accessed March 12, 2016 http://www.aif.ru/society/people/ya_slyshala_krik_vnuka_5-mesyachnyy_umarali_pogib_iz-za_prosrochennoy_vizy

¹⁰⁸ Original title “Smert malish-migranta v Peterburge: na tele malchika bili obnaruzheni gematomi,” NTV, October 30, 2015, accessed March 15, 2016 <http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1558371/>

¹⁰⁹ Original title “V gibeli rebyonka iz Tadjikistana est vina I sotrudnikov polisii, schitaut v prezidentskom sovete po pravam cheloveka,” Echo Moskvi, October 31, 2015, accessed February 12, 2016 <http://echo.msk.ru/news/1650030-echo.html>

¹¹⁰ Original title “Otkuda takaya nenovist?-Ne ponimaut roditeli pogibshgo v Sankt Peterburge mladensa” Novaya Gazeta, October 23, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015 <http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/70442.html>

police, the Russian's second largest city detained the baby's mother Zarina Yunusova and his uncle Daler Nazarov. They were suspected for violation of migration laws. This is not a special case, because many migrants from CA are targeted in a regular sweeps by migration authorities. The child was taken by force from his mother and was taken to pediatric center for parentless children while the adults were placed in cells. The same day, the child died because of unclear causes. After several weeks despite clamor and demand for thorough investigation, criminal case was opened, but by that time the mother of the child was already deported to Tajikistan.¹¹¹ In an interview to "Novaya Gazeta", the grandmother of the dead child said that this city has taken away her second child. In 2004, her 12-year-old child went out to get bread and was injured in chest by a stranger. After the death of the both, the state official did not open a case for investigation and until today, and the murder of the boy is unpunished.¹¹²

According to Sova Analytical Center, in 2014, 26 people died and 133 were injured as a result of racist and neo-Nazi violence. In 2015, about 11 people were killed and approximately 82 people were injured by the same group. Migrant from CA, particularly Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Kyrgyz constitute the largest group of victims. To demonstrate, in 2014, 14 people out of 26 people killed and 28 out of 133 injured came from CA¹¹³. From the evidence provided, it can be said that immigrants from CA who are less protected become target for harassment and violent attacks.

From the first story, it can be summarized that immigrants, when mentioned in the newspapers and media are often associated with "illegal" and "law breaker". The statistics

¹¹¹ "Tajikistan: Toddler's Death Exposes Vulnerability of Migrants in Russia," Eurasia net, November 19, 2015, accessed March 6, 2016 <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76171>

¹¹² Original title "Otkuda takaya nenovist?-Ne ponimaut roditeli pogibshgo v Sankt Peterburge mladensa" Novaya Gazeta, October 23, 2015

¹¹³ Yudina Natalia and Alperovich Vera, "The Ultra-Right Movement under Pressure: Xenophobia and Radical Nationalism in Russia, and Efforts to Counteract Them in 2015," SOVA-Center for Information and Analysis, April 8, 2016, accessed March 12, 2016 <http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2016/04/d34247/>

provides above showed inverse, because in reality immigrants become target of harassment and violent attacks by the host society. Also, there is growing tendency in the public and in the regulating organ, that mistreatment of immigrants is acceptable, and there are very little chances that someone will be punished for it.

The second top story related to Central Asian immigration to Russia, is framed around beheading of Russian girl by Uzbek nanny, Gulchekhra Bobokulova. According to “MK Ru” news portal, Ms Bobokulova early morning of February 29, 2016 beheaded the three year old Russian girl. Afterwards, she put the apartment on fire and moved toward Oktyabrskoye Polye metro station. When police stopped her, she took out of the plastic bag the head of little girl and started to wave with it, claiming terrorist slogans¹¹⁴. In her defense at the court, the women explained that it was God’s will and she does not regret for her act. This is very rare story when immigrants commits similar action. After medical investigation, it was revealed that the convict suffered from mental schizophrenia, which have prompted her toward such unhuman crime. It has been confirmed by the Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov in an interview saying “it is obvious that we are definitely talking about a woman who is mentally unsound”.¹¹⁵ It is interesting because, this case has not been much stressed by the state authorizes, which was predicted to be widely stressed in the national television and by state authorities. One of the explanation can be due to the focus of Russian foreign policy on topics like Ukraine, Syria and Turkey. From the case above, it can be said that state can use media to securitize the issue that is more appealing to its national interest, despite the potential threat. However, despite the states attempt to

¹¹⁴ Original title “ Khroniki nyani-ubiisi: Bobkulova otrezala golovu devochke, vernuvshis iz Uzbekistana” *MKRU*, February 29, 2016, accessed March 12, 2016 <http://www.mk.ru/incident/2016/02/29/khroniki-nyaniubiyey-bobokulova-otrezala-golovu-devochke-vernuvshis-iz-uzbekistana.html>

¹¹⁵ “Kremlin: Nanny who says beheaded Russian child to avenge Syria strikes 'mentally unsound,’” *Reuters*, March 3, 2016, accessed March 12, 2016 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-murder-child-kremlin-idUSKCN0W50ZR?mod=related&channelName=worldNews>

forget the story, the case has definitely stirred the anti –Muslim, anti-migrant and anti ISIS sentiments in the Russian society. It has increases degree of hatred and suspicion toward central Asian immigrants. According to Vladimir Mukomel, the situation of immigration will get worse after this incident. As Mr. Mukomel said:

“There could be organized attack on migrants; this might also be reflected in the attitude of ordinary Russians toward the migrants they meet in their everyday life; in markets, shops, in the stress or anywhere else. It is very likely that the migrants will feel some tension. In media and socials networks, migrants are addressed “they”, the migrants, are different from “us” and they do such things.”¹¹⁶

Mukomel, also stresses that the securitizing agents like state officials and media often address host society “us” to strengthen the Russian collective identity and present migrants “they” as a societal threat, aiming for further securitizing moves to receive public support for further securitization. These case, have provided extra confidence for state officials, nationalist movements to continue their anti-migrant and xenophobic sentiments. For example, Russian parliament asked for increasing the control of Central Asian migrants to Russia due to so-called infiltration of these societies by ISIS and their religious belief. Their request is explained by the assumption that fighters masked as labor migrants come to Russia in order to destabilize the situation in the country and their number is very high.

¹¹⁷As explained above, the number of Central Asian immigrants fighting in Syria is not significant in contract to the actual propaganda framed around this issue. As noted by Umida Hashimova :

“The relative levels of radicalization within these societies had never been significantly high, and there is little evidence that the recent trend regarding Islamic State is much different.”¹¹⁸

Based on the example provided, it can be conclude that media has a great responsibility in shaping the perceptions about immigration. Particularly dramatic stories in the news are stored

¹¹⁶ IWPR Central Asia, “Central Asian Immigrants Face Prejudice in Russia,”Global Voices-Europe and Central Asia, March 12, 2016, accessed March 20, 2016 <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/central-asian-migrants-face-prejudice-russia>”

¹¹⁷Umida, Hashimova, “Reports of Radicalization of Central Asian Migrants in Russia Appear Overblown.” 161

¹¹⁸Ibid.

in the mind of public creating a biased negative image of immigration. Also, it proves the plausibility of societal security concept that the securitizing agents use word like “us” and “them” to present migrants identity as alien and threat to communal identity, directed toward further securitization of the issue.

The following section will outline the public attitude toward immigrants based on opinion polls and statistics.

3.3 Public Perception

In this section, I will try to explain whether the securitizing moves taken by state officials have real implication on the mass audience, which in our case is the mass Russian society. The study will examine the attitude of Russian society toward immigration based on the opinion poll produced by Yuri Levada Center together with more recent statistics. The opinion poll was conducted between June 1996 and June 2013 and is helpful in tracing the changes in societies perception of immigration. The mood and perception has not changed much in the last couple years as demonstrated in the speech act analysis and statistics from the last two years. The size of the opinion poll is relative large (1500-1600) which make the results more accurate and valid. Hence, I believe that the chosen opinion poll is appropriate for the analysis.

The aim of this section is to show that the speech acts, media highlights, have actually affected the perception of society and their attitude toward immigrants. In addition, the empirical data intends to provide evidence of acceptance of securitizing moves undertaken by the securitizing agents as state officials and media.

According to Figure 1, 37 % of the population think that, the number of immigrants in Russia should be significantly decreased and another 21% think that number of immigrants

should be decreasing slightly .¹¹⁹ Therefore, it can be said that more than half of the population in Russia supports the securitization of immigration. As outlined in the theoretical framework, the key reasons of negative attitudes toward immigrants is due to anxiety of host society that migrants may alter national composition of the dominant society. When the society feels that their “we” is under risk, it responds collectively as a threat to survival of community identity. From the opinion poll provided it can be summarized that the securitizing actors have been successful in securitization of the issue and reached the referent object.




Figure 1

Source: Opinion polls by Levada Center conducted June 1996–October 2012, N= 1516. Published on November 28, 2012.

Moreover, when answering the question “To what extent the public agrees with the statement: Immigrants are taking jobs from Russians?” less than 50 percent of the respondent in 1996, voted between completely agree and somewhat agree. Similar question was asked in October 2012 and its results showed that 65% of the population voiced completely agree and

¹¹⁹ “Opinion Poll: National Politics and Relations toward Immigrants” Yuri Levada Analytical Center, Poll conducted between June 1996–October 2012, N = 1516, November 28, 2012 accessed April 2, 2016 <http://www.levada.ru/2012/11/28/natsionalnaya-politika-i-otnoshenie-k-migrantam/>

somewhat agree. It shows that public support for securitization of the issue has increasing by more than 10 % in the last 16 years.¹²⁰




Figure 2

Source: Opinion polls by Levada Center conducted June 1996-October 2012, N=1516. Published on 28 November 2012.

It is clear from the chart below, that Russians believe that Immigrants work is not useful for the country and the society. According to this survey, only 5 % of Russia population believes that immigrants work is useful. It is clear that the state official's speeches, nationalist movements and media images have affected the society's perception.

¹²⁰“Opinion Poll: National Politics and Relations toward Immigrants” Yurii Levada Analytical Center, Poll conducted between June 1996–October 2012, N = 1516, November 28, 2012 accessed April 2, 2016 <http://www.levada.ru/2012/11/28/natsionalnaya-politika-i-otnoshenie-k-migrantam/>

Is the work of immigrants useful for country and society



Figure 3

Source: Opinion polls by Levada Center conducted on 20-24 June 2013, N=1601. Published on 3 July 2013.

However, according to the FMS, only in 6 months of 2015, migrants contributed 10.5 billion rubles to the federal budget through issuing 1 million working patents. The estimation of contributions to the federal budget from 2010 until today equals to 45 billion rubles. In 2014, only in Moscow, immigrants contributed 7 billion rubles to the State Budget through purchasing working patents. ¹²¹Two years later, similar study was conducted in Moscow, where the biggest portion of immigrant work. About, 40 % of “moscovites” stated that immigrant are taking their jobs and employers prefer to hire immigrants. However, when asked how often they faced this discrimination in real life, only 7 % of respondent said that employers give preference to immigrants. It is interesting that out of 40 % responded 17-26 percent said that they are ready to work as a low skilled worker. It is controversial, because 1/3 of the respondent were high skilled specialist. It is clear that these high skilled professionals in practice will never work as a janitor or as a plumber for 20,000-25,000 rubles. ¹²²

According to the Figure 4, more than half of Russian population supports the idea of introducing strict visa regulations for countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus and

¹²¹Florinskaya Yuliya, “Myths about immigrants “Do immigrants disturb Russians?”Independent View of Leading Specialist Institute for social analysis and forecasting ,RANEPa, July 20, 2016accessed March 20, 2016<http://www.rbc.ru/opinions/society/20/07/2015/55aceba79a79475ea32fa1e2>

¹²²Ibid

only 2 % of the population disagree with below statement. As it has been outlined in the theoretical framework, the host communities do not wait to become hostile until the number of immigration significantly increase and can alter the ethnic composition, or when migrants actually take away jobs from natives. Instead, as Alexseev claims, the public support for anti-migration policies starts before identity becomes a clear threat. The data from above chart prove the concept.




Figure 4

Source: Opinion polls by Levada Center conducted on 20-24 June 2013, N=1601. Published on July 2013

Based on the Figure 4, respondents when answering an ultra-nationalist slogan “Russia for Russians” surprisingly more than half of respondents agreed with this expression. It is clear from the diagram that the percentage of population favoring the idea of Russia for Russians have increased since 1994. It gained biggest support in 2009, and 2011. In 2009, public perceptions were framed around the economic crisis in Russia. Migrants were blamed for increase in unemployment among the ethnic Russians and often named “job stealers”. This mood, remains until today, considering current stagnation of Russian economy. Another indicator, of increase hostility is due to support of nationalist movements and nationalist slogans by state officials. To demonstrate, the percentage of people against this fascist slogan “Russia for Russians” has decreased from 30%-20percentage. Hence, the speech acts and

media mentioning of the nationalist sentiments has definitely influenced the public opinion and securitization of the issue.




Figure 5

Source: Opinion polls by Levada Center conducted August 1994-2012 , N -1600. One 3 periods were selected to show the growth of public support. Published on 11 July 2013.

The above analysis shows that the public supports for securitization of migration issue has increases in the last decades. Support for nationalist views among the society has increased, and the division of the notion of “we” and “they” became stronger. Supporting Alexseev argument, in Russia, the society becomes hostile toward immigrants already prior to clear threat of identity. Also, the examination of opinion poll show that there is growing support among the public to introduce visa regime for Central Asian immigration because of the image of immigrants in Russia as “illegal”, “job stealer”, and “radical”. However, the result of statistical examination say that such a strong feeling of worry is highly exacerbated.

Conclusion

The analysis outlined in the study show that the Copenhagen School's securitization and societal security concepts are plausible analytical tools in explaining the Central Asian Immigration to Russia debate. However, thorough examination of migration security literature I can suggest that by employing solely the concepts developed by Copenhagen scholars is not enough to understand or explain the full capacity of the immigration as threat to Russia. Therefore, the study contributes to the existing literature by taking into account the critics of the concepts to derive more holistic conclusions and observations about the securitization of Central Asian Immigration to Russia. The findings of the study show that securitization of CA immigration is conducted not only through speech acts, but also through media images. According to Williams', modern political communication is strongly entrenched in the televisual images, and therefore securitization conducted using speech acts and media images together have strong implication on the acceptance of the issue by the referent object. Likewise, the study employs societal security and immigration security dilemma defended by Alexseev to provide comprehensive approach in explaining the unwelcoming attitude of host society toward immigrants.

The historical examination of migration inflow after the collapse of the Soviet Union showed that migration inflow was strongly shaped by development of migration policies in Russia. The result of analysis of migration policies concluded that there is a strong inclination towards securitization of immigration in the last decade. Particularly after Vladimir Putin became the president of RF, migration policies and legislations were revised and amended several times, leading to more restrictive environment for migrants.

The analysis of securitizing actors in the face of state officials and leaders of nationalist parties show that there is a strong tendency towards securitizing move, by framing migrants as potential threat to the communal identity. The securitizing agents present migration as societal threat by using nationalist slogans and emphasizing on the difference between “us” and “them” to present migration as potential threat to the societal identity. Lack of positive vision of state officials have resulted in more restrictive policies for immigrants from Central Asia.

The study also proves that media has strong implication in framing the immigration debate. The result of the media evaluation and public response concludes that immigrants’ images are often associates with “illegal”, “job stealer”, “criminal”, and are ultimately mistreated. In the recent year, the image of immigrants has been framed as “radical” with the rise of ISIS and potential involvement of Central Asian Immigration in Syria and Iraq. Yet, examination of statistical data presented by the MIA of RF and examination of ICSR report show that these arguments have little empirical grounding.

Finally, public support for securitization of immigration shows that the securitizing agents have been successful in framing migrants as potential security threat to the host society through speeches and media coverage. Statistical data provided in the opinion poll, proved the validity of the securitization of the issue. However, it is important to emphasize that there are might be other reasons, which cause the sense of worry among the public in Russia. These other causes should be studies in the future to understand what other incentives are there for the public to worry. In addition, in the light of all changes in Russia’s economy and sanctions, there is clear demand for further careful analysis of media and its effect on public attitudes toward immigrants. From the theoretical perspective, the idea of securitization of migration is not well discussed and with the familiarization of migration as a security threat, the issues of

immigrants will be categorized, and ultimately dealt with which could be area for future research.

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