

**A Call to Arms:
Tradition, Nationalism, and Paramilitary Violence
in Northern Ireland and Kosovo During the Twentieth Century**

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Abstract

This thesis examines the rise of nationalism and the formation of paramilitary groups in Kosovo and Northern Ireland throughout the twentieth century. Using a comparative approach, this work examines issues of tradition, paramilitarism and conflict through the lens of ethnosymbolism and argues that paramilitary groups such as the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Provisional Irish Republican Army serve as a continuation of a violent struggle which has existed for almost the whole entirety of the twentieth century and still continues to this day. This work seeks to examine how issues such as social inequality and oppressive political regimes resulted in an outbreak of violence and wide spread support for armed resistance. Group dynamics of paramilitary units are examined including a discussion concerning ideology, splits in formation, and recruitment. Ultimately, this work argues that paramilitary groups were all part of a larger modern movement which looked to the past for tradition and to the future for the hope of an independent nation.

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List of Abbreviations

AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (<i>Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës</i>)
EU	European Union
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GMK	Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IRA	Irish Republican Army
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo (<i>Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës</i>)
LKÇK	National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (<i>Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës</i>)
LPK	People's Movement of Kosovo (<i>Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës</i>)
LPRK	Popular League for the Republic of Kosovo
LRSHJ	Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia
MNLK	Movement for the National Liberation of Kosovo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NICRM	Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
PKMLSHJ	Communist Party Marxist-Leninist of Yugoslavia
PMK	People's Movement of Kosovo (English name for LPK)
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
UÇK	Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Albanian name for KLA)
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo

Author's Note

The spelling of certain regions, cities, groups, etc. can be a controversial topic when concerning the history of Serbia, Kosovo and Kosovar Albanians. Many cities and regions have changed their names from Serbian to Albanian following Kosovo's declaration as independent republic in 2008. In the tradition of Tim Judah and due to the fact that this paper is being written in English, I refer to the country (Kosovo) by its English name of Kosovo rather than by its Albanian name, *Kosova*. Any other irregularities in spelling occur as a result of remaining true to the text from which it is being cited and is not a result of personal bias.

INTRODUCTION

In the introduction to the *Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army* it states that, “No nation has a greater tradition of guerrilla warfare than Ireland”¹, no nation perhaps, except for that of the Albanians. It has been stated that along with the Irish, the Albanians, “nurture a culture of violence well-tailored to guerrilla i.e. hit-and-run warfare.”² This propensity towards paramilitary violence is a trait which is strongly interwoven throughout the histories of both Irish and Albanian nationalists alike and has caused a great deal of trouble for the states which have chosen to engage in conflicts with these forces. The term paramilitarism, or more specifically ‘paramilitary violence’ refers to “military or quasi-military organizations and practices that either expanded or replaced the activities of conventional military formations.”³

Paramilitary forces provided a unique and distinct threat due to the fact that,

Paramilitary forces...were...a potential threat to political stability, especially as they were not centrally controlled and were usually loyal first and foremost to their immediate leader. In the absence of functioning state authorities, or in opposition to authorities that were regarded as illegitimate, paramilitary formations in both countries defined themselves as legitimate forces. Believing in their responsibility to establish order and in their future designation as corps of national armies, members of these irregular armies regarded themselves as pre-military rather than paramilitary forces.⁴

In the twentieth century paramilitary forces followed this described pattern and emerged in Kosovo and Northern Ireland when the state and national armies did not support nationalist interests or posed a threat to certain populations such as the Kosovar Albanians and Irish Republicans and Catholics.

¹ *Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army: Notes on Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 1.

² Pavlos-Ioannis Koktsidis and Caspar ten Dam, "A success story? Analysing Albanian ethno-nationalist extremism in the Balkans." *East European Quarterly* 42, no. ii (2008): 161-190. *Index Islamicus*, p. 161.

³ Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, "Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War: An Introduction", in *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War*, eds. Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 1.

⁴ Julia Eichenberg, "Soldiers to Civilians, Civilians to Soldiers: Poland and Ireland after the First World War", in *War in Peace*, p. 199.

Northern Ireland and Kosovo present a unique opportunity for comparison due to their similar struggles with conflict and nationalism that have occurred throughout the twentieth century. Though seemingly different at first glance, Kosovo and Ireland share a great deal of similarities. For example,

Northern Ireland and Kosovo are bi-national small places, where violent conflict is the product of historically rooted antagonisms derived from territorial partitions and repartitions, and systemic political and socio-economic discrimination by privileged hegemonic groups against unprivileged subordinate groups. In both cases politics hinges on a challenge or questioning not only of the legitimacy of government policy, but also of the legitimate authority of the state itself.⁵

These two are similar not only because of the nature of their conflicts but on a territorial level as well. Throughout their individual histories both Kosovo and Northern Ireland have been viewed as contested territories which are viewed as being integral parts of larger states “Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, Northern Ireland as an integral part of the UK.”⁶ In both cases, improved standards of living and socio-economic modernization following the Second World War led to a number of demographic changes which altered the balance of power which meant that regimes could no longer rule without the use of either mass expulsion or mass repression of peaceful resistance movements and nationalist groups.⁷

Along with their similarities, a key number of differences also exist between these two groups. One of the main differences which existed was that Kosovo and Northern Ireland held a reverse order of subordination and hegemony. In Kosovo, Orthodox Serbs who acted as the minority ethnonational group penalised Muslim/Catholic Albanians who were the majority ethnonational group. In Northern Ireland, the situation was the exact opposite with the majority ethnonational group (Protestant British ‘Unionists’) penalising a minority ethnonational group

⁵James Hughes, “Paying for Peace: Comparing the EU’s Role in the Conflicts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo”, *Ethnopolitics* 8, no. 3/4 (September 2009): 287-306. p. 288.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

(Catholic Irish ‘Nationalists’). The outcomes of the conflict were also extremely different for the two cases with the Troubles in Northern Ireland being brought to a stalemate through the Belfast Agreement in 1998, while the Kosovo War was brought to an abrupt end following the NATO air campaign in 1999 and the enactment of the United Nation’s Ahtisaari Plan which declared independence for Kosovo in 2007. These similarities between Kosovo and Northern Ireland along with their differences help to define two uniquely complex conflicts and will be a central topic for exploration throughout this thesis.

Historiography and Interpretative Framework

The historiography of paramilitary groups can often be difficult to trace due to the contemporary nature of the subject. Paramilitaries themselves have been in existence for a number of centuries, playing a significant albeit discreet role as local militias, guerrilla movements, or auxiliary forces in major conflicts such as the Napoleonic Wars and the Spanish Civil War. However, despite this extensive history, the term ‘paramilitary’ did not emerge until the 1930’s “when it designated the emergence of armed political formations organized on military lines in fascist states...”⁸; the term was later modified in the 1950’s to describe these political formations and their role in the wars of decolonization and in postcolonial conflicts. In the current age, the term paramilitary has again been amended to incorporate new concepts and has been subject to scrutiny and further inquiry in a number of contemporary works.⁹

Arguably, some of the more notable and inclusive writings on paramilitary violence in the twentieth century can be found in the collective work, *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe After the Great War* (2012). This recent compilation, published only several years ago

⁸ Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, “Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War: An Introduction”, in *War in Peace*, p. 2.

⁹ Ibid.

in 2012, is edited by historians Robert Gerwarth and John Horne and is composed of a collection of essays written by historians which focus on the topic of paramilitary formations and violence that developed between the years 1917 to 1923. Although the work has a strong Euro-centric focus, it manages to look outside of the scope of Western Europe alone and provides useful commentary on paramilitarism in regions such as Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

A number of contemporary works focus solely on broad national histories often referred to as ‘macro’ histories of the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo and discuss the development and long term effects of war and violence on these countries. Journalist, Tim Judah is one of the more prominent and better known authors whose works such as *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (2000) and *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know* (2008) discusses the history of nationalism in Kosovo from a journalistic perspective and utilizes a *longue durée* historical methodology to discuss Kosovo’s development over the course of several centuries. Miranda Vickers’s, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* also provides a broad overview of the region’s complex history. Many of the works which focus on war and violence in Northern Ireland are much more narrow in scope and usually only discuss the state of affairs in the North following partition in the twentieth century. Eunan O’Halpin’s book *Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies since 1922* (2000) and Peter Hart’s *The IRA at War, 1916-1923* are both prime examples of a text which discusses only a narrow scope of history and inquiry.

Primary sources being utilised for the construction of this thesis include a variety of witness statements, paramilitary issued documents and statements, and government and academic reports on events of violence. Primary source material concerning the Kosovo Liberation Army, particular in the concern of witness statements and statements made by members of the paramilitary are understandably difficult to come across. The International

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Court Records online offers a number of primary source documents such as witness-related materials, briefs, indictments, and various legal documents from the Balkan Wars in the 1990's. The Conflict Archive on the Internet also offers a wide range of primary source documents in English which discuss conflict in Northern Ireland from 1969 to the current day.

Much of the theoretical background will focus on a variation of the theory of modernism which is known as ethnosymbolism. Ethnosymbolism is the ideal approach for this thesis due to its unique approach towards the idea of nation and ethnicity. This theory asserts that,

1. nationalism, the ideology and movement is both recent and novel;
2. nations, too, are recent and novel;
3. both are the products of 'modernisation', the global movement of societies to the state of modernity.¹⁰

Ethnosymbolism, a contemporary theory developed by historian Anthony D. Smith stresses the "need to understand the 'inner world' of ethnicity and nationalism through an analysis of symbolic elements and subjective dimensions."¹¹ Ethnosymbolism and its followers "consider the cultural elements of symbol, myth, memory, value, ritual and tradition to be crucial to an analysis of ethnicity, nations, and nationalisms."¹² Ethnosymbolism ultimately argues that these elements help to ensure a sense of cohesion and common consciousness during periods of crisis or rapid change and that they help to differentiate a community from other analogous communities in both the view of its own members and outsiders.¹³ This theory is discussed in greater detail in a number of Smith's works including *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986) and

¹⁰ Anthony D. Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A cultural approach*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 7.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 21.

¹² Ibid, p. 25.

¹³ Ibid.

Ethnosymbolism and Nationalism: A cultural approach (2009) and will help provide the framework for my argument and be supported by a variety of other texts and documents.

Due to the comparative nature of the subject, this thesis will also make use of what historian Jürgen Kocka referred to as asymmetrical historical comparison. In his work on the study of comparative histories, Kocka has stated that “Frequently, historical comparisons are asymmetrical in the sense that they investigate one case carefully while liming themselves to a mere sketch of the other case(s) which serve(s) as comparative reference point(s).¹⁴ In his work, Kocka has discussed many of the benefits of comparative historical approach and how useful it can be as a research method despite some of its initial setbacks. “Heuristically, the comparative approach allows one to identify questions and problems that one might miss, neglect or not invent otherwise.”¹⁵ Because a completely equal comparison between two cases is all but impossible to form, asymmetrical comparison aids in the research process by helping to clarify a single case by contrasting it with another. A number of methodological constraints do exist with the comparative approach, three of which are outlined by Kocka and include:

1. The more cases a comparative study includes, the more dependent it becomes on secondary literature, and the more difficult it becomes to get near to the sources and read them in their original language...
2. The comparative approach presupposes that the units of comparison can be separated from each other...In other words, the comparison breaks continuities, cuts entanglements, and interrupts the flow of narration.
3. One cannot compare totalities, in the sense of fully developed individualities. Rather, one compares in certain respects...comparison implies selection, abstraction, and de-contextualization to some degree.

Overall, despite the initial constraints, the comparative historical approach provides a number of advantages in helping to aid in my comparison of paramilitarism in Kosovo and Northern Ireland.

¹⁴ Jürgen Kocka, “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg.” *History and Theory*, (1999): 40-50, p. 40.

¹⁵ Jürgen Kocka, “Comparison and Beyond”, *History and Theory* (2003): 39-44, p. 40.

Using this comparative historical perspective, this thesis will seek to examine the roots of nationalism and paramilitary violence in Kosovo and Northern Ireland during the twentieth century and make note of a number of key similarities and differences which exist between the paramilitary groups which formed around these two territories. The scope of the study will examine the continuation of paramilitary formations in Kosovo and Northern Ireland which spans throughout the entirety of the twentieth century. For Kosovo this begins around 1912 with the first kaçak rebellions to 1993 when the Kosovo Liberation Army first formed. As for Northern Ireland, the scope of this study will examine the Easter Rising in 1916 and discuss how this led to the development and formation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army from 1969 to 1972.

The conflicts being examined by no means constitute the entirety of paramilitary violence which broke out in Kosovo and Northern Ireland prior to the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. I have simply narrowed the scope to focus on these major events in order to provide both a clear and concise comparison of paramilitarism in two separate regions. A majority of examinations of paramilitary groups tend to focus on a wide variety of topics including the formation, tactics, and structure of the individual groups, this thesis will take on a much narrower focus. This thesis will focus strictly on the origins and the early formations of both the KLA and PIRA and conclude just prior to their actual mobilisation. Although this focus allows for a close examination of these groups and their nationalist background, it is in many ways limiting due to the fact that it does not look at the actual involvement of these groups in their respective conflicts (The KLA in the Kosovo War [1998-1999] and the PIRA during the Troubles [1969-1998]).

There are a number of theoretical constraints which come with the examination of this topic, the most problematic being the clandestine nature of paramilitary groups and terrorist organizations. The groups and formations being discussed often have very little primary source information concerning their activities released to the public. When information concerning their activities is released it is often turned in their favour if it has been published directly by the paramilitary group or turned viciously against them if it is released by the government or ruling body which is trying to control or bring an end to their actions. Lorenzo Bosi describes some of the problems involved in the study of political violence when he states, “Most literature on political violence and terrorism has features of questionable scientific merit. By and large it relies on poor research methods, shows a dependence on secondary and even tertiary accounts, and exhibits a general failure to undertake primary research.”¹⁶ A number of interviews are available from individuals who participated in paramilitary groups during the conflicts or acted as witnesses to the violence. However, irresponsibly conducted interviews and failed oral history projects such as the Belfast Project at Boston College have had massive implications on research work in the field and resulted in the loss of access to a number of primary source materials including personal candid interviews with members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army which will now remain unreleased to researchers.¹⁷

The ultimate goal of this thesis is to analyse the importance of tradition in the formation of paramilitary groups through the lens of ethnosymbolism and asymmetrical comparison and

¹⁶ Lorenzo Bosi, “Explaining the emergence process of the civil rights protest in Northern Ireland (1945-1968): Insights from a relational social movement approach.” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 21, no 2-3 (June 2008), p. 352.

¹⁷ For more on the details concerning the Belfast Project at Boston College see, Jon Marcus, “Oral history: where next after the Belfast Project?” *Times Higher Education*, 5 June, 2014, accessed 10 August, 2016. <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/oral-history-where-next-after-the-belfast-project/2013679.article>.

argues that although many of these nationalist movements took place over a large span of time, each event is essentially part of a larger continuation of violence. This thesis highlights both the similarities and difference which occurred in the formation of paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland and Kosovo and discusses the necessity of tradition in paramilitary formations and shows how even when a movement or a rebellion fails or loses momentum it never truly ceases to exist because of its inclusion into local and national mythologies. Overall, this thesis seeks to compare the outbreak of paramilitary violence which occurred throughout Northern Ireland and Kosovo and show how two different regions were both transformed by conflict and violence in the twentieth century.

1. ORIGINS OF PARAMILITARISM:

In order to obtain legitimacy and support, many paramilitary groups and nationalist movements resorted to publicly supporting and circulating various forms of ethno-nationalist discourse which “include[d] the reification of the myth of an ancient past and of a continuing independence struggle, highlighting heroism, sacrifice, victimhood, and trauma.”¹⁸ Kosovar Albanians often stressed their ancient Illyrian origins and the national hero Skanderbeg who fought valiantly against Ottoman rule in the 15th century¹⁹ in order to highlight their mythic past. Irish Republicans also participated in this reification of the mythic past, portraying historic battles and mythical figures such as Cú Chulainn, a hero meant to embody the belief in resilience against invaders, in many of the political murals found throughout Northern Ireland.²⁰

“Through reification, these myths have played an important unifying role and provided Kosovar Albanians [and Irish Republicans] with a defense mechanism when faced with repeated externally induced realignments and reconfigurations of their political identities.”²¹ These myths not only provide a defense mechanism however, they also help to provide a sense of legitimization for the nation. Anthony D. Smith discusses in his book *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986) how the desire for modernization coupled with a nostalgia for the past is “one of the paradoxes of contemporary society”.²² He writes that it is ultimately a requirement for all societies to legitimate their innovations (which can include the formation of paramilitary groups)

¹⁸ Valur Ingimundarson, “The Politics of Memory and the Reconstruction of Albanian National Identity in Postwar Kosovo”, *History and Memory* no. 1 (2007): 95-123, p. 95.

¹⁹ “Skanderbeg”, *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, accessed 7 June, 2016. <http://www.britannica.com/biography/Skanderbeg>.

²⁰ “Symbols Used in Northern Ireland-Symbols Used by Both Traditions”, *Conflict Archive on the Internet*, accessed 7 June, 2016. <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/symbols/crosstrad.htm#cuchulainn>.

²¹ Ingimundarson, “The Politics of Memory and the Reconstruction of Albanian National Identity in Postwar Kosovo”, p. 98-99.

²² Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986), p. 176.

and this task can be fulfilled through remembrance and nostalgia for either a real or an imagined past.²³

This chapter discusses the roots of paramilitary violence in the twentieth century and highlights the defining events which occurred prior to and during the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. These events include the kaçak rebellion in Albania and Serbia (1919-1924), the Easter Rising in Dublin (1916), the riots at the University of Pristina, Kosovo (1981) and the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland (1969-1972). Though the events in this chapter which are discussed are certainly more modern than mythic, they are meant to show how early rebellions which took place in the twentieth century became part of a mythology which served as a rallying cry and a source of tradition for paramilitary groups to centre themselves around in later years. This chapter argues that these events of paramilitary violence, although they may have been initially unsuccessful and failed to generate widespread national or international support or recognition, must be seen as part of a larger continuation of events which helped to inspire the formation of movements that developed in later generations. For these groups, their legacies were ultimately not determined according to their successes or their failures in rebellion but whether or not they were able to carry out tradition despite the outcome.

1.1 Paramilitary Tradition in the Early Twentieth Century

For the Albanians, early resistance took the form of armed groups of rebels—known as kaçaks—who were active throughout Kosovo and Northern Albania during much of the early twentieth century and served as the main source of resistance to Serbian rule and expansion. Relations between the Serbs and Albanians became particularly tense during the Balkan Wars

²³ Ibid.

and the First World War when Serbian soldiers carried out a violent campaign which sought to increase Serbian control in the newly annexed territory of Kosovo. Following the end of the Great War, tensions between Serbians and Albanians only increased as a Yugoslav state was declared and authorities in Belgrade began to establish a policy of colonization which greatly favoured veterans of the Serbian Army and sought to promote a national (Serbian) spirit throughout the region of Kosovo.²⁴ During this time, regions such as Kosovo and Macedonia were ultimately, viewed in pre-war terms by the Serbian elite as being “integral parts of the Serbian national body in which the process of integration had not been completed, and in which they faced violent conflict with rival programmes of national integration/assimilation.”²⁵ Kosovo Albanians collectively opposed this colonization and their submergence into a Yugoslav state as outlined by the Versailles Treaty and responded by inciting an armed rebellion against their Serbian occupiers in the years following the conclusion of the First World War.²⁶

The resistance movement which later came to be known simply as the kaçak rebellion, was fought by armed groups of guerrilla soldiers (kaçaks) who took part in hit and run based attacks against the forces of the Yugoslav occupation.²⁷ These guerrilla fighters differed from traditional soldiers due to the fact that,

In regular warfare the tactical objective is to destroy the enemy in battle by concentrating superior numbers at a decisive time and place. The guerrilla strikes not one large blow but many little ones; he hits suddenly, gnaws at the enemy's strength, achieves surprise, disengages himself, withdraws, disperses and hits again.²⁸

²⁴ John Paul Newman, “The Origins, Attributes, and Legacies of Paramilitary Violence in the Balkans”, in *War in Peace*, p. 154.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ James Pettifer, *The Kosova Liberation Army, Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 1948-2001* (London: Hurst & Company, 2012), p. 19.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ *Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army*, p. 6.

The kaçak movement consisted namely of Albanian immigrants from the region of Kosovo and was revered by the Albanians as a national-liberation movement and condemned by the Serbians as being an organisation of outlaws. The kaçak movement served essentially as both of these things, with one group of outlaws taking part in guerrilla warfare fought up in the hills against settlers and local officials while a separate group of regular outlaws who were avoiding military service and taxation, committed raids and looted remote areas which were poorly protected.²⁹ These Albanian guerrilla fighters had initially emerged from a tradition of banditry known as hajduk, which had existed as far back as the seventeenth century during the height of the Ottoman Empire.³⁰ The bandit tradition had developed into armed rebel groups with the goal of taking revenge against the Serbian colonists who were exploiting the poor uplands as they were constructing new towns and also for political retribution, “offering the Albanian poor a chance to try and settle scores against their new masters.”³¹

During the rebellion, the Committee for the National Defense of Kosovo—also known as the Kosovo Committee—located in Shkodër (Northern Albania) helped to provide much of the support for the kaçaks who were dispersed throughout Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro.³² The resistance movement was also aided by the state of Italy, whose troops had occupied Albania for much of the First World War and held a number of territorial interests and claims throughout the region.³³ The rebellion in the central Drenica region of Kosovo, led by Azem

²⁹ Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (London: C Hurst & Co., 1998), p. 99.

³⁰ Pettifer, *The Kosova Liberation Army*, p. 19.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Tim Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), e-book, pp. 74-75.

³³ John R. Lampe, *Balkans into Southeastern Europe, 1914-2014: A Century of War and Transition*, Second Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 51.

Bejta and his wife Shota, served as the main point of resistance and became increasingly popular amassing around 10,000 active fighters by early 1919.³⁴

The movement gained mass popularity when Bejta encouraged Albanians to take part in various acts of civil disobedience including refusing to serve in the army or pay any state-imposed taxes. Serbian sources noted the collective response from Albanians stating, “The kaçaks were springing up like toadstools. Whenever somebody gets a court or administrative summons, he joins the kaçaks; and also when he is drafted.”³⁵ However, despite their large numbers and mass following, the kaçaks were unable to stage a successful rebellion. By the time the rebellion had finally come to an end, it was estimated that, “more than 12,000 Albanians had been killed, about 22,000 of them had been imprisoned, and roughly 6,000 houses had been burned.”³⁶ On 15 July of 1924, Bejta was captured and on 24 December of that same year, Ahmed Zogu came to power as premier of Albania and entered into a private agreement with leaders in Belgrade where he promised to eliminate the kaçak threat. The kaçak rebellion finally dwindled out following the fall of Bejta when “one of the more liberal governments in Belgrade issued a sweeping amnesty decree that included more serious crimes.”³⁷

Ultimately, the kaçak rebellion had occurred with the hope that those who resided in Kosovo could resist Serbian colonisation and carry on with an essentially archaic mode of production and economic life.³⁸ The kaçaks viewed the bandit tradition as being a central part of their revolutionary heritage and fought with “the knowledge that however futile and

³⁴ Klejda Mulaj, “Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31, no. 12 (December 2008): 1103-1119, p. 1105.

³⁵ Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 303. Quote can be found in Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, p. 100.

³⁶ Mulaj, “Resisting an Oppressive Regime”, p. 1105

³⁷ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, pp. 101-102.

³⁸ Pettifer, *The Kosova Liberation Army*, pp. 19-20.

unproductive their revolt, it was ‘good’ because it fell into the tradition of their predecessors.”³⁹

This tradition of violent resistance against foreign invaders and anti-Serbian sentiment was something that would be carried on into later generations and form a historical narrative which would help fuel Albanian nationalism in the late twentieth century.

Similar to Albania, paramilitarism in Ireland also found its roots in the early twentieth century. Many scholars have argued that the occurrence of the First World War helped to “popularize a more radical form of Irish political identity among the island’s three million or so nationalists”⁴⁰ and helped to set the stage for rebellion. In the year 1916, England’s armed forces had been away at war for nearly two years and it was at this point that nationalists in Ireland saw that, “In England’s difficulty [was] Ireland’s opportunity.”⁴¹ This so-called opportunity that the Irish paramilitary groups saw was the chance to stage a rebellion which would take place throughout Ireland and would attempt to free the Irish Republicans from the yoke of British imperial rule. Staging a rebellion during the Great War was seen as most opportune because with “a liberal regime in Dublin Castle, and an Irish Party equally distracted by war, [it] left the Irish Republican Brotherhood free to produce the Rising, and the R.I.C. (Royal Irish Constabulary) and Dublin Metropolitan police incapable of preventing it.”⁴²

Political tensions between Great Britain and Ireland can be traced back well before the outbreak of the First World War to the Act of the Union which was voted into effect in the year 1801 by British Parliament. The Act of the Union, also referred to as the Irish Act of Union was meant to establish legislative unity between the United Kingdom and Ireland where “the authors of the act not only looked forward to the nineteenth century, they also sought to address some of

³⁹ Ibid, p. 20.

⁴⁰ Alvin Jackson, “The Two Irelands”, in *War in Peace*, p. 63.

⁴¹ Richard F. Welch, “The IRA’s Guerrilla Wars. *Military History* 20, no. 1 (April 2003): 58-64, p. 59.

⁴² Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. at War: 1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 14.

the central political controversies of the 1780's and 90's."⁴³ One of the main controversies being the 1798 rebellion, a failed attempt by Irish nationalists to overthrow British rule in Ireland. The Act of the Union was originally supported by a number of Irish Catholics since they believed that there would be a chance for Irish Catholic emancipation to come into existence. However, the Act of the Union only weakened Irish representation in parliament by forcing through the abolition of the Irish parliament and transferring all Irish representation over to parliament at Westminster, leaving Irish political interests completely under-represented. The introduction and enactment of the Third Home Rule Bill in 1914 sought to remedy the existing political tensions by calling for legislative independence in Ireland. However, the success of Home Rule was short-lived when the start of World War I led to the indefinite suspension of the bill being enacted until all hostilities came to an end.⁴⁴

The suspension of the Home Rule Bill infuriated many Irish nationalists and separatists and they quickly began to draw together a plan to forge an independent state. Similar to the kaçak rebellion in Albania and Kosovo, leaders of the rebellion in Ireland would make use of foreign involvement to support their cause. "Irish militant separatists had used the occasion of Britain's foreign entanglements to seek support among Britain's enemies, and to exploit relative British weakness through conspiracy or armed insurgency." Irish nationalists reached out to Germany, Britain's greatest enemy during the war, and sought military aid in planning their insurrection.⁴⁵ Sir Roger Casement, a British diplomat turned Irish nationalist, made the journey to Germany on behalf of the Irish rebels to develop relations with the state of Germany and gain their support. Casement first travelled to Germany in 1914 and after nearly two years of planning

⁴³ Alvin Jackson, "The Irish Act of Union", *History Today* 51, no. 1 (January 2001): 19-25, p. 21.

⁴⁴ Senia Peseta, *Modern Ireland: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, e-book, pp. 47-49.

⁴⁵ Jackson, "The Two Irelands", in *War in Peace*, p. 65.

and negotiating, the German government finally agreed in February of 1916 that they would ship 25,000 captured Russian rifles and one million rounds to Ireland prior to the start of the planned rebellion.⁴⁶

The insurrection began on the morning of Easter Monday of 1916 when around 219 members of the Irish Citizen Army and 1,300 Irish Volunteers took to the streets of Dublin and within hours had seized a number of key government buildings throughout the city including the General Post Office.⁴⁷ By noon that same day, Patrick H. Pearse, a poet and impassioned nationalist emerged from the GPO and read aloud the words of the Proclamation of the Irish Republic which had been drafted by himself and a number of other nationalists. It reads:

IRISHMEN AND IRISHWOMEN: in the name of God and of the dead generation from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom...In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty; six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State.⁴⁸

Irish nationalists had believed that an independent Irish Republic was finally in their line of sight. Unfortunately, it would only be a matter of days before the entire rebellion would be decimated. The German ship carrying the arms meant for the Irish rebels had been captured by the Royal Navy before the Easter Rising had even begun and Roger Casement was also taken into custody that same day just as he landed on the Kerry coast.⁴⁹ Martial law was declared throughout Dublin city and county on 25 April and British troops began shelling buildings occupied by rebels on 26 April. On 29 April, 1916 Pearse and the rebels surrendered on behalf of

⁴⁶ "Sir Roger Casement and the German connection," *BBC.co.uk*, last modified 24 September 2014, accessed 8 August, 2016. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterirising/insurrection/in02.shtml>.

⁴⁷ Darren Kelly and Derek Molyneux, "An Easter timeline: Monday, April 24th, 1916", *The Irish Times*, April 24, 2015, accessed May 1, 2016, <http://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/an-easter-rising-timeline-monday-april-24th-1916-1.2187749>.

⁴⁸ "Poblacht Na H Eireann. The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic to the People of Ireland", *Proclamation 1916*, <http://the1916proclamation.ie/>.

⁴⁹ "Sir Roger Casement and the German connection," *BBC.co.uk*.

the provisional government. By the time the rebellion had come to an end, 450 people had been killed, 3,000 wounded, and nearly 2,000 insurgents were captured with nearly 400 of those captured being sent to Britain for internment.⁵⁰

Despite the disastrous outcome from the 1916 Easter Rising the fight was not over yet for the Irish paramilitary groups. In a witness statement by Sean Prendergast, a member of Fianna Eireann who participated in the Rising, the witness discusses his surprise after being released from prison to discover the profound effect that the rebellion had on the Irish people despite the nationalist loss. Prendergast writes,

Many people who had hated us, had come to admire us, to lionise us...The people too had learned To sing *our* songs – songs of praise “for the gallant men of Easter Week” and the “Felons of Our Land.” *Our* songs, *their* songs, *Ireland’s* songs. It was truly inapplicable and hardly understandable this strange spontaneous swing over to our side. But there it was, true and unashamed, and undoubtedly Irish. This sudden conversion engendered in us a feeling that all was not lost after all...there was satisfaction in the thought that a “new spirit” had come into Ireland, a new spirit with great potentialities, hope and promise.⁵¹

This new spirit of nationalism which Prendergast describes persisted throughout much of the twentieth century in Ireland during both the Irish War of Independence and the Irish Civil War and is further discussed later in the thesis, during the discussion concerning the early formation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

The main failure of each of the individual rebellions in Kosovo and Ireland was that they ultimately failed to gain significant international attention or cause any major threat to the government structure at the time in which they occurred. In the case of both rebellions, violent nationalism and acts of terrorism carried out by the Irish and Albanians were considered threats

⁵⁰ Ronan Fanning, *Fatal Path: British Government and Irish Revolution 1910-1923* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 2013), p. 140.

⁵¹ “Witness Statement Reference #:755, Witness: Sean Prendergast, Member Fianna Eireann, 1911, Officer IV, Dublin 1914-1916; Captain IRA, Dublin, 1921”, *Bureau of Military History 1913-1921*. Section 2 pp. 213-214, accessed May 31, 2016.
<http://www.bureauofmilitaryhistory.ie/reels/bmh/BMH.WS0755%20section%202.pdf#page=12>.

by ruling governments, but not very major ones. Serbian forces often responded disproportionately to threats throughout the region⁵² and when the Prime Minister of England, H.H. Asquith heard about the start of the Easter Rebellion in Ireland he merely remarked, “well that’s something” and went to bed.⁵³ Both of the rebellions were regarded as a public nuisance more than anything and were quickly and vigorously suppressed within a relatively short period of time.

Overall, the kaçak rebellion and the Easter served as a continuation of former rebellions and conflict and provided nationalists with an outlet for past antagonism against the ruling colonial elite. Both Irish rebels and Albanian kaçaks used the opportunities presented to them following the outbreak of the First World War and attempted to exploit the animosity which existed between wartime enemies by seeking aid from states such as Italy and Germany during their individual rebellions. However, although these conflicts took place either during or shortly after the Great War it should be noted that, “The First World War...did not create the conditions for paramilitary violence...However, it did alter and expand the dimensions of pre-existing conflicts.”⁵⁴ Irish and Albanian nationalists had simply been continuing down a path of rebellion and nation building which had been set forth prior to the war but had yet to be truly fulfilled.

1.2 Civil Unrest as a Precursor to Conflict

A new age of nationalist discontent emerged for Kosovo and Northern Ireland in the latter half of the twentieth century. A number of social and political reforms had been introduced in both countries by the 1960’s in order to try and bring about a tentative peace and a new era of

⁵²Ibid, p. 148.

⁵³ Fanning, *Fatal Path*, p. 140.

⁵⁴ Newman, “The Origins, Attributes, and Legacies of Paramilitary Violence in the Balkans”, in *War in Peace*, p. 151. This quote is referencing to the outbreak of paramilitary violence primarily in the Balkans. However, it can easily be applied to the situation which occurred in Ireland as seen in the discussion of the Easter Rising using the opportunity presented by the First World War and having the rebellion serve as an extension of past conflict.

modernization and production. However, the Kosovar Albanians and Irish Catholics and Republicans were still unsatisfied with the state of affairs and began to take part in protest movements so they could publicly voice their discontent. These movements differed greatly to the rebellions which took place during the early twentieth century due to the fact that they began to shift from being centred around purely anti-imperial and anti-colonial views and started to encompass the demand for radical social and political change throughout both Northern Ireland and Kosovo. These protests which initially began as peaceful responses to social inequality quickly broke out in violence and civil unrest when more radical separatist groups saw their opportunity and stepped in to gain a monopoly over the movements and helped to act as the tipping point toward violent resistance.

For Kosovar Albanians, political unrest had been brewing throughout much of the late 70's and early 1980's following the decline of the so called "golden age" and culminated in a series of violent riots in 1981 which threatened to put an end to what little domestic stability remained in the region.⁵⁵ The 1970's in Kosovo were marked by considerable improvements in the standard of living along with a number of positive social, economic, and educational reforms which greatly benefitted Kosovar Albanians. The University of Pristina was opened in 1969 allowing Kosovar Albanians access to Albanian language classes at nearly every level; a number institutes for Albanian culture and literature were opened; and the national "key" system helped to assure Albanian representation in areas such as civil service and in provincial and federal governments.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know*, p. 89-91.

⁵⁶ Julie A. Mertus, *Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), p. 17.

Politics in Kosovo also underwent a major transformation during this time. In 1963 Kosovo had been declared as an ‘autonomous province’ and under the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (*Ustav Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije*), “Republics and Autonomous Provinces became almost fully equal and... autonomous provinces gained full autonomy over their parliaments, budgets and judicial systems, and the governments of the provinces were able to veto any policy of the Republic of Serbia.”⁵⁷ Ideas concerning nationality and ethnicity underwent a great number of changes during this time, many of which were extremely positive and liberating for individuals residing in Kosovo. These new provisions were written under the General Provisions of The Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province Kosovo of 1974 (*Ustav SAP Kosova Iz 1974, Godine*) and included such rights as,

Article 4

The nations and nationalities in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo shall be equal in their rights and duties.

To ensure the equality of the nations and nationalities, their right to the free development and expression of national specificities, language, culture, history and other attributes shall be guaranteed.

Article 187

Citizens shall be guaranteed the freedom to express their affiliation with a nation or nationality, the freedom to express their national culture and the freedom to use their language and alphabet.

No citizen shall be obliged to state which nation or nationality he belongs nor to opt for any one nation or nationality.

Citizens shall be guaranteed the freedom to express their affiliation with an ethnic group, the freedom to develop their culture and the freedom to use their language and alphabet.

Propagating or practicing national inequality and any incitement of national, racial or religious hatred and intolerance shall be unconstitutional and punishable.⁵⁸

⁵⁷Keiichi Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime: The Genesis and Expansion of the UÇK in Kosovo”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 62, No. 7 (September 2010): 1135-1152. p. 1137.

⁵⁸ *The Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo of 1974*, Article 4 and Article 187 found in *Kosovo: Law and Politics, Kosovo in Normative Acts Before and After 1974* (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 1998), pp. 40-43. Both articles were translated into English from their original Serbian. Original text reads as follows:

Član 4: U SAP Kosovu narodi i narodnosti su ravnopravni i imaju ista prava i dužnosti. Radi ostvarivanja ravnopravnosti naroda i narodnosti zajemčeno je pravo njihovog slobodnog razvitka i izražavanja nacionalnih osobenosti, jezika, kulture, istorije i drugih obeležja.

Član 187: Građaninu je zajemčena sloboda izražavanja pripadnosti narodu, odnosno narodnosti, sloboda izražavanja nacionalne kulture i sloboda upotrebe svog jezika i pisma. Građanin nije dužan da se izjašnjava kome

These reforms helped to pacify many of the Albanians in Kosovo and also helped to maintain their loyalty to the communist regime.⁵⁹ However, the communist regime in Yugoslavia quickly came under threat following the death of Josip Broz Tito, the revolutionary President of Yugoslavia in 1980 and conditions in Yugoslavia began to deteriorate at a rapid rate. Yugoslavs were left shocked and with no clear leadership, states began to function simply by exercising the powers that had been granted to them under the constitution.⁶⁰

In the midst of all of the reforms, the years from 1971 to 1981 were characterized not only by improvements in standard of living for many Albanians but also by “a growing confidence among local Albanian leaders, who felt uneasy under Serbian ‘paternalism,’ as well as an increasing number of mass protests, demonstration, and riots that rejected it unconditionally.”⁶¹ Despite all the reforms and concessions that were granted to the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, it quickly became apparent that these changes would not be enough to settle the score between the Serbians and the Albanians. Unemployment in Kosovo was rampant and the prospects of finding employment for even some of the better educated Kosovar Albanians was bleak.⁶² Poor economic performance in Kosovo led to an increase of Serbs migrating to other parts of Yugoslavia and rates of unemployment reaching as high as 29.1% across the entire

narodu odnosno kojoj narodnosti pripada, ni da se opredeljuje za pripadnost jednom od naroda odnosno jednoj od narodnosti. Građaninu je zajemčena sloboda izražavanja pripadnosti etničkoj grupi, sloboda razvoja svoje kulture i upotrebe svoga jezika i pisma. Protivustavno i kažnjivo je svako raspirivanje nacionalne, rasne ili verske mržnje i netrpeljivosti.

⁵⁹ Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime, p. 1137.

⁶⁰ Tim Judah, “Yugoslavia: 1918-2003, The South Slavs,” *BBC History*, 17 February, 2011, accessed May 21, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/yugoslavia_01.shtml#four.

⁶¹ Sami Repishti, “Human Rights and the Albanian Nationality in Yugoslavia,” in *Human Rights in Yugoslavia*, eds. Oskar Gruenwald and Karen Rosenblum-Cale (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1986), p. 255. This quote is found in Julie A. Mertus, *Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), p. 18.

⁶² Ger Duijzings and Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, *War Within a War: Historical and Cultural-Anthropological Background Report*, 31 May 2004, Exhibit 2D00109. accessed July 29, 2016, United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Court Records Online, p. 14.

population, a rate which was two and a half times higher than the official rates in the rest of Yugoslavia.⁶³ It was found that “between 1970 and 1982, the percentage of unemployed Kosovo Albanians rose from 76% to 77.6%, while Kosovo Serbs fell from 17.6% to 15.1%.⁶⁴

The Yugoslav state quickly began to unravel under these conditions and in March and April 1981, Kosovo became the site of a number of student-led demonstrations. The demonstrations had no political motive at first but rather served as an outpour of anger over poor living conditions in the dormitories at the University of Prishtina and the canteen failing to provide many of the students with meals. Within a matter of days, protestors began to radically change their tone and demands transformed to include better conditions for Albanians in Kosovo and the establishment of an independent Kosovo Republic.⁶⁵

In an official report issued by Radio Free Europe on 28 April 1981 it provides a detailed description of the events which occurred between March 11-26 and April 1-2. The report reads as follows:

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| March 11-26 | A series of armed clashes between Yugoslav police and Albanian students at Pristina University took place, ostensibly sparked by student complaints over dormitory food and living conditions, and the insufficiency of their allowances in the face of Europe’s highest rate of inflation (ca 40%). On March 26 a strike broke out in nearby Podujevo involving many workers as a result of which 35 people were injured and 21 arrested... |
| April 1-2 | In various localities a series of apparently organized demonstrations with Albanian nationalist overtones began, and violence soon erupted. Although the Yugoslav authorities at first denied reports of deaths, (3) the gravity of the situation became evident as a number of strict measures were taken: a state of emergency (the first since World War II) was proclaimed in the area; a...curfew was declared...gatherings of more than 5 persons were banned; and Kosovo was placed off limits to foreign journalists. Pristina was surrounded by a cordon of |

⁶³ Momcilo Pavlovic, “Kosovo Under Autonomy, 1974-1990”, found in *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative*, eds. Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2009), p. 54.

⁶⁴ Ibid. It is interesting to note that this rate of unemployment almost directly reflected the fluctuating proportion of the population in Kosovo at the time with Albanians making up around 73.7% of the population while the Serbs made up around 18.4% in the early 1970’s. (p. 9 and p. 13)

⁶⁵ Mertus, *Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war*, pp. 29-30.

tanks, numerous checkpoints were set up, (4) and troops and police from other parts of Yugoslavia were brought in...⁶⁶

The protests quickly began to take on a political undertone when students began to suggest that the university administration was run by corrupt ‘parasites’ and that the Serbians were responsible for taking away all the wealth from the Kosovar Albanians. These statements caught the attention of activists from Marxist-Leninists groups who quickly stepped in to make their voices heard.⁶⁷ Separatist groups like the Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo (GMLK) and the Movement for the National Liberation of Kosovo (MNLK) had been trying to find a way to bring about social reform for years and address the poor living standards which had been growingly increasingly worse during the economic crisis of the 1980’s and the protests at the University of Pristina provided them with this chance. However, despite the involvement from the GMLK and MNLK the protests served as much more than just a podium for voicing Marxist ideals. Hydajet Hyseni, the Former Deputy Chair of the LDK⁶⁸ who acted as a protester during the student riots, remarked on the protests stating that there were other influences to be considered.⁶⁹ Hyseni stated,

What was happening in Poland at the time had an indirect influence as well. It gave us hope. It showed us that a movement was possible. In general, democracy in Eastern Europe had a pro-Western perspective. The opposition had an anti-Communist and social aspect in Poland. In contrast, in Kosovo the opposition had a national character. Instead of being anti-Communist, the Kosovo movement was anti-colonialist and nationalist.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ "The Kosovo Events in Perspective", 26 April 1981. HU OSA 300-8-3-11799; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.

⁶⁷ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 38-39.

⁶⁸ Armend R. Bekaj, *The KLA and the Kosovo War: From Intra-State Conflict to Independent Country* (Berlin: Berghof Conflict Research, 2010), p. 40.

⁶⁹ Judah, *Kosovo*, pp. 38-39.

⁷⁰ Julie A. Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1999), p. 76. *this quote is found in* Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, p. 39.

1981 in Kosovo ultimately marked a revival in revolt and a growing discontent which could not be settled through the policies of peaceful resistance which would follow in the next several years under the presidency of Ibrahim Rugova.

The 1960's in Northern Ireland brought about a great change in social reform and was contrasted with the movement towards potential conflict as it had in Kosovo during this time. In 1962, Terence Marne O'Neill became the fourth prime minister of Northern Ireland and shortly after his election began he had already adopted a number of strategies which were being employed throughout Great Britain in order to address the decline of industries such as new-town development and regional planning which he hoped would help to boost economic growth. A six-year plan was adopted in 1964 with a plan for the construction of economic infrastructure including new house-building programs, a second university and a newly developed public administration. This move towards economic modernisation initiated by O'Neill encouraged closer ties to the Irish Republic and gave many people hope that the strong sectarian divide which had existed in Northern Ireland between the Irish Catholics and Unionist Protestants could be amended through these economic and infrastructural improvements. Unfortunately, the population began to realize that O'Neill's plans were more "symbolic rather than substantive" and were forced to acknowledge that a troubled path lay ahead for the divided society of Northern Ireland.⁷¹

Several years after O'Neill's election, conflict had once again broken out in Northern Ireland. The Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland had emerged as a response to the sectarian divide which existed throughout the country where the Protestant majority took part in a widespread exclusion of Irish/Catholic citizens. "This exclusion manifested in the limitation of

⁷¹ *The Politics of Antagonism*, eds. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, pp. 163-164

political franchise, discrimination in housing and employment...and an array of repressive mechanisms targeting Irish Republicanism in particular and the Irish/Catholic minority in general.”⁷² In contrast to the protests in Kosovo, the civil rights marches in Northern Ireland did hold some political motives. The initial demands held by the Civil Rights Movement included universal franchise and equal access to housing. In Northern Ireland, elections would often be manipulated through the use of gerrymandering, which was the redrawing of electoral boundaries, in order to reduce the Catholic vote. Many of the Protestant Unionists believed that if the number of Catholic households were to increase in certain areas, it could undermine the sectarian politics which were at work throughout the country. Therefore, local councils which held a Unionist majority would often limit the building of new housing for Catholics and restrict access to housing that currently existed.⁷³

Inspired by the African-American Civil Rights Movement in America which was also occurring in the 1960's and the Northern Ireland tradition of marching, the Civil Rights Movement began to take shape and combine both old and new, regional and 'imported' repertoires of action. In August of 1968 the Civil Rights Movement took to the streets and began a series of public marches which despite their peaceful nature ignited the flame of revolt in Northern Ireland.⁷⁴ In a government issued *Cameron Report*, it describes the grievances of both the Protestant Unionists and Catholic Nationalists and how the marches on October 5th, 1968 marked the beginning of widespread ethnic conflict. The report states:

From the narrative of events, and the comments which we have made in the course of the narrative, it will be clear that the immediate causes of the outbreaks of violence which began on 5th October 1968, and their continuance thereafter, arose from a wide variety of sources. Some and not the least powerful, as we have

⁷² M. Byrne, "Politics Beyond Identity: Reconsidering the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland", *Identities-Global Studies in Culture and Power* 22, no. 4 (n.d.): 468-485, p. 472.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 473.

⁷⁴ Lorenzo Bosi, "Explaining the emergence process of the civil rights protest in Northern Ireland (1945-1968): Insights from a relational social movement approach." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 21, no 2-3 (June 2008), 242-271, p.260.

found, are deep-rooted in the continuing pressure, in particular among Catholic members of the community, of a sense of resentment and frustration at the failure of representations for the remedy of social, economic and political grievances. On the other hand, among Protestants, equally deep-rooted suspicions and fears of political and economic domination by a future Catholic majority in the population calculated to build-up a dangerous, and politically explosive, sectarian tension.⁷⁵

By 1969, marches and demonstrations continued and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) which was the predominant police force in Northern Ireland began to respond violently to protestors and locals of the city of Londonderry (known as Derry or Free Derry to the Catholic population).⁷⁶ On April 19, 1969 42-year-old Samuel Devenny was savagely beaten by members of the RUC at his home and died three months later from injuries he sustained during the attack.⁷⁷ Nearly thirty thousand people attended Devenny's funeral and just a week later Captain O'Neill resigned from his position.⁷⁸

Events took a turn for the worse later in 1969 when on August 12th Unionist/Loyalist groups known as Apprentice Boys staged a march through Derry--a predominantly Republican and Catholic area—which resulted in three days of rioting and clashes between nationalists and the Northern Ireland police. This event became known as the ‘Battle of the Bogside’ and led to the organization of a number of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations as the violence spread outwards to Belfast. The Unionist population of Belfast along with the Northern Ireland police feared a nationalist insurrection and foolishly staged a series of mob attacks on nationalist neighborhoods in Belfast as an effort to “reassert order in the region and to fight the perception that it was a community “under siege”.”⁷⁹ These attacks resulted in 7 deaths, 154 gunshot

⁷⁵ J. Henry Biggart, John Cameron, J. J. Campbell, “Cameron Report-Disturbances in Northern Ireland, Chapter 12: Causes of the Disorders”, *Conflict Archives on the Internet*, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmsocameron2.htm#chap12>, accessed April 31, 2016, ch. 12, section 126.

⁷⁶ Peter Taylor, *Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Fein* (New York: TV Books, 1998), pp. 57-58.

⁷⁷ Dick Grogan, “RUC officers may not face disciplinary action over Derry attack”, *The Irish Times*, October 5, 2001, accessed May 5, 2016. <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ruc-officers-may-not-face-disciplinary-action-over-derry-attack-1.330560>.

⁷⁸ Taylor, *Behind the Mask*, p. 58-59.

⁷⁹ Bosi, “Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army, p. 356.

wounds, and nearly 1,505 nationalist families were forced out of their homes due to intimidation or extensive fire damage. As a response to the violence, the British government deployed a number of British troops to Belfast to restore order among the wreckage of what had begun as peaceful resistance and had quickly dissolved into uncontrollable violence. It was at this point that decades long struggle known as ‘The Troubles’ began and the IRA spotted its chance to emerge from the shadows.⁸⁰

1.3 The Failures of Peaceful Resistance

The failures of peaceful resistance which occurred following the protest movements in Northern Ireland and Kosovo left a wide gap in the societal and ideological structure of Kosovar Albanians and Irish Republicans which was quickly filled by paramilitary groups and nationalist ideologies. Nationalist groups had been outraged by the failure of peaceful resistance due to the fact that it not only prolonged their suffering under repressive governments but also because it had robbed many nationalists and separatists of their desire to take part in the act of rebellion and armed conflict which they saw as an essential part of their national tradition. The peaceful resistance movements in Northern Ireland and Kosovo had originally been created with honourable intentions but unfortunately they had forgotten to consider the dangerous repercussions which would occur when these movements inevitably failed.

In Northern Ireland failed peaceful resistance which occurred during the Civil Rights Movement ultimately acted as an extremely powerful mobilising force for paramilitarism and nationalism and led to a massive increase in the number of recruits into the Provisional Irish Republican Army in 1969. It was found that this “mobilization was a result of a particular transformative event that triggered the belief that armed struggle was the only approach capable

⁸⁰ Ibid.

of bringing change to the socio-political situation of the time.”⁸¹ Prior to its devolution into violence the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was supported for a number of reasons including that it “(i) set exemplary standards for future co-existence between the two ethnic communities; (ii) would avoid injuries and death; and (iii) make the majority listen while denying it an easy excuse to crush or dismiss the campaign”⁸² However, the Civil Rights Movement had ultimately failed in Northern Ireland for the same reason that it had failed in Kosovo, it had presented an opportunity for socialist and left-wing groups to step in and take over the protest movement. During the protests in Northern Ireland,

...it can be said that the IRA successfully tried to exploit the clash between the radical democrats of NICRA and PD (People’s Democracy) on the one hand, and the protestant backlash on the other. It uses old republican nationalist tradition of violence against the state and had now reinforced it with a left-wing ideology which made cooperation and collaboration with the new forces of radical democracy and socialism that much easier.⁸³

It must be asked why in the face of such adversity, Kosovo which had previously held such strong traditional ties to armed resistance would suddenly take on a stance of passive resistance. The “President” of Kosovo Ibrahim Rugova who was elected in 1992⁸⁴ and his political platform, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) had adopted non-violent strategies instead of resorting to armed resistance against Serbia for a number of reasons. First and foremost, Rugova believed that there was very little chance of success if the Kosovar Albanians were to take part in armed resistance against the Serbs. In a statement in April of 1992, Rugova stated, “We would have no chance of successfully resisting the army. In fact, the Serbs only wait

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 347.

⁸² F. Wright, *Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis* (Dublin, 1987) cited in *The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland, 2nd Edition*, eds. Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry (London & Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1993), p. 168.

⁸³ Sabine Wichert, *Northern Ireland since 1945* (London: Longman Group UK Limited, 1991), p. 132.

⁸⁴ The elections which took place were clandestine and Ibrahim Rugova was elected as “President” of the parallel Kosovo state, a status which went unrecognised from 1992 to 1999. “Ibrahim Rugova”, United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Online, accessed 8 August, 2016, <http://www.icty.org/en/content/ibrahim-rugova>.

for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and to stay alive than be massacred.”⁸⁵ The majority of Albanians sided with Rugova and took up a stance of passive resistance in order to avoid being ethnically cleansed from Kosovo like the Bosnian Muslims had been in the previous war.⁸⁶

Though the fear of being trampled by Serbia played a predominant role in Rugova’s decision making policies there were also a number of other factors at work. A second factor, was that many Albanians believed that if they were to take part in violence it would only assert the stereotype held by many Serbians that Albanians were ‘primitive and uncivilized’.⁸⁷

The policy of non-violence resistance...connected the Albanian struggle with European democratic values and the notion of ‘civilisation’, in the face of ongoing oppression, injustice and humiliation by the Serbs. It allowed the Albanians to counter the ‘dishonest and slanderous’ Serb anti-Albanian propaganda and to prove ‘that the Albanians were not as the Serbs presented them and, still more importantly, that the Albanians were different and better than the Serbs’-it thus helped ‘to validate the self-worth of Kosovo Albanians at a time when they were being vilified’.⁸⁸

A final factor was that Albanian President Sali Berisha relied heavily on economic assistance from abroad which could be threatened if Albania took part in the violence and also did not want to jeopardise the security of Albania by initiating any sort of retaliatory acts by Serbia.⁸⁹

The peaceful resistance movement faced one of its biggest failures following the signing of the Dayton agreements that took place in November 1995 which brought an end to the war in Bosnia. Many Kosovar Albanians had believed that their demands would be addressed by the international community during the negotiations at Dayton. “They were horrified, then, that Dayton did not even touch on the question of Kosovo”⁹⁰ but rather focused on the territorial

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 1107, cited in Tim Judah, “Will there be a War in Kosovo?” *New York Review of Books* (14 May 1998).

⁸⁶ Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, p. 73.

⁸⁷ Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime”, pp. 1138-1139.

⁸⁸ Duijzings and Schwandner-Sievers, *War Within a War*, p. 63. Quoted material is found originally in Shkelzen Maliqi, *Kosovo: Separate Worlds: Reflections and Analyses* (Peja: Dukagjini, 1998), pp. 98-105.

⁸⁹ Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime”, pp. 1138-1139.

⁹⁰ Tim Judah, “The Growing Pains of the Kosovo Liberation Army” in *Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion*, eds. Kyril Drezov, Bulent Gokay, and Michael Waller, (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), pp. 21-22.

integrity of Serbia and Montenegro as part of the Republic of Yugoslavia. The failure at Dayton caused a great deal of outrage and led to a steep decline in support for Ibrahim Rugova and his policies of non-violent resistance. It was because of this that the LPK was finally able to step forward and show that now there no longer any real alternative to non-violence and that it was through paramilitary violence and this violence alone that the Kosovar Albanians could pave their way towards an independent Republic.⁹¹

In the end, repression of the student riots in Pristina in 1981 and the 1969-1972 civil rights marches in Northern Ireland did not bring an end to illicit organizations or activity, but rather radicalised their members and formations by pushing them underground. Prior to the peaceful resistance movements taking place, ruling governments in both Northern Ireland and Kosovo had taken a number of legal measures to avoid dissent. “From 1971 to 1981, public expression of political dissent was suppressed in all parts of Yugoslavia”⁹² and in 1967 in Northern Ireland the Special Powers Act was used to ban all Republican clubs.⁹³ These measures proved to be useless in the following years as protests took place and violence broke out among their respective populations. Government forces attempted to quell any voices of dissent through arrests and internment but instead ended up making heroes and martyrs of those who were detained or killed in the process.⁹⁴ This only strengthened the mythologies which drove the paramilitary groups into action and fuelled an inevitable outbreak of violence which could not be contained. Overall, it was due to the reaction of the ruling governments during the peaceful

⁹¹ Ibid, p. 22.

⁹² Mertus, *Kosovo: how myths started a war*, p. 20.

⁹³ Michael Farrell, *Northern Ireland: The Orange State*, Second Revised Edition (London: Pluto Press Ltd., 1980), p. 244.

⁹⁴ See Mertus, *Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war*, p. 20 and R. Craig Nation

resistance movements which helped to transform peaceful protest movements into active paramilitary units.

2. FORMATION OF THE KLA AND PIRA

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) were two paramilitary groups who both formed following a division in political and national ideologies among their respective national populations in the late twentieth century. The PIRA was active for a greater number of years than KLA and had experienced splits into different factions a number of times before. A poet and playwright by the name of Brendan Behan was quoted as saying, “Whenever three IRA men are gathered together, the first item on the agenda is the split.”⁹⁵ Though these splits among the groups initially hindered growth and advancement, they ultimately benefitted the groups by allowing them to create clear and distinct goals and remain true to their nationalist traditions. The aims of this chapter are to discuss how the split in ideologies led to the formation of the modern Kosovo Liberation Army and Provisional Irish Republican Army. Topics of focus include group division, ideological background of the paramilitary groups, and recruitment tactics of the individual paramilitaries.

2.1 Political Divisions and the Creation of the PIRA and KLA

The KLA was founded in 1993 when the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo—Lëvizja Popullore për Republikën e Kosovës or LPRK held a meeting in Drenica, Kosovo where local branch leaders sought to adopt a different name for the party and reconsider the ideology of the movement. The LPRK had long believed that armed resistance would be the best way to end Serbian oppression and lead to the formation of an independent Albanian state. However, due to the popular support for the president of Kosovo and leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës---LDK) Ibrahim Rugova, and his strict stance

⁹⁵ Peter Taylor, “Paramilitaries in the Troubles”, *BBC History*, February 2013, accessed April 10, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/topics/troubles_paramilitaries#p016kxh4.

of passive resistance along with frequent attacks by Serbian forces, plans for armed resistance were frequently interrupted.⁹⁶

Members of the LPRK had believed that a change in ideology was part of a necessary progression because many of the leaders of the party were considered to be communists or Marxists due to their previous associations with Yugoslav and Albanian communists. The LPRK had been created following the merging of several illegal organisations in 1982 following the failed demonstrations in 1981 which were discussed earlier in this thesis. These organisations were originally established and recruited members in countries throughout Western Europe by Kosovo Albanians who had been banned from work or studying and had gone abroad to seek refuge.⁹⁷ The separatist groups that eventually unified to form the LPRK in 1982 included the Group of Marxists-Leninists of Kosova (GMLK), the Movement for the National Liberation of Kosova (MNLK), The Communist Party Marxist-Leninist of Yugoslavia (PKMLSHJ) and the Movement for an Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia (LRSHJ). These groups all had strong ties to Marxist movements and ideologies and many believed that these ties could be damaging to the party's reputation and proposed that the Marxist ideology should be dropped. A split occurred in the group at this point when a fraction of LPRK members refused to abandon their communist ideologies and formed a new opposition party called the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo—Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës (LKÇK).

The remaining members of the LPRK who agreed that the Marxist ideology should be dropped went on to form the Popular Movement for Kosovo (Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës—LPK), which would later become the driving force behind the Kosovo Liberation Army.⁹⁸ This

⁹⁶ Klejda Mulaj. "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31, no. 12 (December 2008): 1103-1119, pp. 1107-1108.

⁹⁷ Kubo, "Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime", p. 1140.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

successor movement “advocated for a solution to the Kosovo question through active means and did not exclude the possibility of armed action.”⁹⁹ The LPK, which was based throughout Albania, Germany and Switzerland by 1985 began to train themselves on how to form a proper guerrilla insurgency by studying and evaluating the experiences in places such as Vietnam, the Basque region of Spain, and Ireland. Through careful study of these regions and the groups that carried out operations there, the LPK was able to learn how to acquire both arms and funding and begin the formation of a paramilitary force.¹⁰⁰

The split and formation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army that took place in 1969 was very similar to the political divide that had occurred in Kosovo which formed the KLA. In December 1969, the leadership of both the political and military branches of the Republican movement split due to a gap in both ideology and geography. The majority of southern Republicans, supported the popular intellectual idea that a pan-island national liberation front that would combine a political strategy embracing the abandonment of the policy of abstentionism with non-sectarian, defensive violence was what the nation needed in a defensive force. Members of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, met in January 1970 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Dublin in order to reach an agreement about what defensive stance the Republicans would take. Though the Southerners had held the majority at the Dublin meeting with their policy of a defensive national liberation, the minority of Northern Republicans split away from the majority to form the Provisional Irish Republican Army which called for an

⁹⁹ “Case No. IT-03-66-T, Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu Judgement”, 30 November 2005. Paragraph 41, p. 17. Accessed July 5, 2016, United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Court Records Online. The source of this quote can be found in Shukri Buja, T3731 ICTY Court Records.

¹⁰⁰ Henry H. Perritt Jr., *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), p. 7.

offensive stance that was uninvolved in constitutional politics and sought to wage a new war in Northern Ireland.¹⁰¹

The PIRA quickly proved to be much more traditionally nationalistic and militant than the predominantly inactive and Marxist ‘Official’ IRA faction, the remnant group which had been created during the split.¹⁰² At first, it seemed unlikely that the Provisionals would be able to maintain a successful campaign as the face of the Irish Republican movement. Following the split, the Official IRA had retained large quantities of money, facilities, and weapons—all of which were necessary to maintain the structure and integrity of the paramilitary formation. The Official IRA had also, through maintaining their Marxist background and ideology, taken all established lines of contact with the Eastern Bloc countries, leaving the PIRA with very little chance of gaining international support if they needed it. However, the PIRA surpassed the Official IRA in one key area which they had severely underestimated the importance of.

...the Provisionals had the priceless asset of credibility and legitimacy on the nationalist streets of Northern Ireland. In Ireland and America, that translated into growing command of republican opinion, which in turn ensured that the organization’s initial weakness of finance, propaganda, and weaponry were gradually overcome.¹⁰³

Shortly after formation in 1969, the PIRA had gained enough public support and loyal members to declare war against the British Army who were stationed throughout Northern Ireland and threatened that the only way the conflict would be resolved is if the British withdrew. Overall, the PIRA were able to establish themselves as the dominant Republican force in Northern Ireland due to their widespread popularity and their ability to portray themselves

¹⁰¹ Eunan O’Halpin. *Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies Since 1922*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 172-173.

¹⁰² *The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland, 2nd Edition*, eds. McGarry and O’Leary, p. 23.

¹⁰³ O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p. 312.

publicly as being the ‘defenders’ of the nationalist and Catholic population against the security forces and loyalist and Unionist paramilitary groups.¹⁰⁴

2.2 Ideology and Objectives

Once the KLA and the PIRA had split away from the opposition they then had to create a clear and decisive set of goals for their groups and establish a strong following. The PIRA along with their political wing, Sinn Fein, drafted a constitution with several key aims. These aims were:

1. To guard and honour and uphold the sovereignty and unity of the Republic of Ireland.
2. To support the establishment of an Irish Socialist Republic based on the 1916 Proclamation.
3. To support the establishment of, and uphold, a lawful government in sole and absolute control of the Republic.¹⁰⁵

By examining objectives set out in the PIRA Constitution it can be seen that The Provisionals saw it as their duty to continue the legacy of those who had fought during the Easter Rebellion of 1916 and in the Irish War of Independence (1919-1921). The PIRA had set out a number of goals with the hopes of re-joining the twenty-six counties in the south with the six counties in Northern Ireland that had been split apart in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922. These goals could ultimately be seen as the PIRA’s long-term objectives while their proximal objective could be summed up simply in the statement ‘Brits out’, which demanded for a complete withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland.¹⁰⁶

The KLA differed from the PIRA in the sense that they had never published an official constitution, however, they did outline a number of goals and responsibilities in a document titled, *Kosovo Liberation Army Interim Regulations: On the Organisation of Internal Affairs in*

¹⁰⁴ *The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland, 2nd Edition*, eds. McGarry and O’Leary, p. 23.

¹⁰⁵ Taken from the PIRA Constitution, John Horgan and Max Taylor. “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (1997): 1-32. Accessed March 29, 2016. p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

the Army. In a section titled “Contents of the Military Oath” it outlines the military oath which was taken by all members of the KLA prior to joining the paramilitary force. The oath reads,

*As a member of the Kosovo Liberation Army, I swear that I will fight for the liberation of occupied territories of Albania and their unification, that I shall always be a loyal soldier, a worthy soldier of freedom, vigilant, brave and disciplined, ready at all times, even unto death to struggle to protect the sacred interests of the FATHERLAND. If I break this oath, may I be punished by the most severe martial law, and if I commit treason, may my blood be spent. I SWEAR!*¹⁰⁷

The LPK-leaders supported the KLA goal of Kosovar Albanian liberation, however, they had never truly considered the idea that Kosovo would become part of a ‘Greater Albania’ until much later in the distant future. The Central Staff of the Kosovo Liberation Army also issued a number of communiques which were circulated throughout the media and the public in order to gain support and outline their overall goals and ideology. In Communique No. 40 issued from Prishtina on 3 December 1997, the Central Staff addressed the Albanian people and stated,

We make it clear to the Albanian people that the UCK was born as a necessity of the times and its sole goal is the liberation of our territories. It has not introduced itself to the public indoors or as a roundtable, but by turning the barrel of a gun against the invader and traitors. Those in the failed pacifist movement must now realize that Kosova and other Albanian territories will not be liberated down the telephone or from an office, but only by a serious commitment in support of the armed struggle.¹⁰⁸

In this document, the KLA recognizes the failures of peaceful resistance as discussed earlier in the thesis and make it clear that their overarching goal includes the liberation of their homeland which can only be attained through armed struggle. It can be said concerning the ideology and objectives of the KLA reflected the main concerns for many Albanians which included self-

¹⁰⁷ “Kosovo Liberation Army Interim Regulations: On the Organisation of Internal Affairs in the Army”, p. 1. Prishtina, 1998, K052-9715-K052-9740-ET/Translation, accessed February 13, 2016, United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Court Records Online.

¹⁰⁸ “Kosovo Liberation Army Issues Communique on Armed Attacks”, Pristina, 05 Dec 1997, Exhibit P48, accessed July 13, 2016, United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Court Records Online. Document has been translated from original language in Albanian and was found in a collection of communiques. The document contains an initial summary from the original text which was Communique No. 40 issued by the Central Staff of the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1997 and made available through ICTY Court Records 19 November, 2004.

determination and independence above all.¹⁰⁹ Though the goal for the KLA was clear it often straying from the political path set out by the LPK and would never become a unified movement held together by a single command structure or ideology.¹¹⁰

The growth and popularity of the KLA in 1998 ultimately led to a chaotic restructuring of the group membership. Many armed groups claimed to be part of the KLA or fought under the name of the UÇK (Albanian name/abbreviation for the KLA) even if they were not actually members. Scholars have come to find at least six different factions which have claimed to be part of the KLA movement. These factions include:

1. The LPK
2. The LKÇK, which served temporarily as the propaganda mouthpiece for the KLA in 1998 with many members who fought alongside or later joined the group
3. Hashim Thaçi who along with student activists joined forces with the LPK and helped found the armed movement
4. Bujar Bukoshi, part of the LDK-led exile government who tried and failed to join forces with the LPRK
5. Adem Demaçi, a man with a great number of admirers in the KLA and served as KLA spokesman from 1998 to 1999 until he resigned in protest
6. The Jasharis, including legendary UÇK commander, Adem Jashari and his family who became famous symbols of martyrdom for the KLA after they were killed during a police raid on the family compound in 1998 sparking the start of the war in Kosovo.¹¹¹

Despite their differences in formation, the PIRA and the KLA both recognized the need for setting both long and short-term goals for their groups in order to attain their desired outcome of creating independent nations. The KLA had the advantage of setting a distinct goal, however, it was often unclear why certain outcomes were desired and how these goals would actually be

¹⁰⁹ Anna Di Lellio and Stephanie Schwander-Sievers, "The legendary commander: the construction of an Albanian master-narrative in post-war Kosovo." *Nations and Nationalism*, no. iii (2006): 513-529. *Index Islamicus*, accessed February 10, 2016, p. 515.

¹¹⁰ Pavlos-Ioannis Koktsidis and Caspar ten Dam. "A success story? Analysing Albanian ethno-nationalist extremism in the Balkans.", p. 165.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 166.

attained. One author states that with the KLA, “Irredentism seems to be the long-term goal. Yet the motivations, mind-sets and ideologies of the rebel movement’s founders, commanders, and rank-and-file have been complex, contrasting and contradictory.”¹¹²

Overall, tradition was central to the ideology of the KLA and the PIRA as can be seen as playing an integral role in the PIRA constitution and the KLA oath of allegiance and communiques. Their driving ideology could be found in their desire to form independent nations which could be both literally and symbolically re-joined with the states that they had once belonged to. Kosovo Albanians were defined and mobilised by their hope to one day become part of a Greater Albania while the Irish Republicans imagined a future where the Irish Republic would one day be reunited with the counties of Northern Ireland. Though these objectives were and still are out of reach for these paramilitary units they serve as influential motivators and a source of tradition for modern nationalists.

2.3 Building a Force and International Recognition and Legitimacy

In order for the PIRA and the KLA to reach their political and national aims, they would have to create a strong following and bring in a large membership to serve as fighters/supporters for the guerrilla forces. Both groups made use of a number of methods and appeals in order to recruit a wide variety of fighters from the general population. In order for a successful insurgency to take place it is necessary that a large portion of the population not only fosters hostility toward the regime or hope that other states will intervene, individuals must be willing to fight in order for an insurgency to take place.¹¹³ Kosovo was able to ignite an insurgency using a strategy which emphasized the strong bond that existed between members of the local

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, p. 36.

community and their interdependence on one another while also appealing to the international community. This was an extremely successful strategy for recruitment since Kosovo is seen as a place “where action against oppressors is deeply embedded in the culture” and “it also is a place where pessimism is embedded almost as strongly.”¹¹⁴

Recruitment in Northern Ireland for the PIRA was also helped along by deeply embedded cultural values concerning national independence and oppression. The PIRA like the KLA used the hearts and minds appeal and geared it to locals who were fed up with the oppressive British regime and made them believe that through armed struggle they could “reclaim a sense of dignity, honour, and pride for themselves and for their community.”¹¹⁵ Despite the fact that many of the younger recruits who joined in the late 1960’s and early 70’s had never lived through the Irish Revolutionary Period, they still felt a great deal of national pride and many of them were active in political movements prior to joining the PIRA.¹¹⁶ Overall, a study concerning early recruitment in the PIRA has found that the majority choice for joining the movement was not “a mere reproduction of an ideological alignment to the traditional Republican aim of achieving Irish reunification but as part of a recognition struggle at the individual and community levels.”¹¹⁷

The PIRA was extremely successful in recruiting new members during its early stages of formation particularly in following the failures of the Civil Rights Movement in 1969. It was found that for a number of members who joined the PIRA after 1969 and had been involved in activist movements, recruitment had followed an “abruptly acquired sense of obligation to

¹¹⁴ Ibid. pp. 36-37.

¹¹⁵ Bosi, “Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1969-1972.” *Social Science History*, 2012, pp. 350-351.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 351.

defend their own community and retaliate against the Northern Ireland establishment, the Loyalists and the British Army.”¹¹⁸

In contrast, the KLA often struggled to recruit members despite their powerful political message. Recruitment was particularly difficult for the KLA between 1991 and 1993, not due to a lack of young men who were ready to fight but because many feared that if they took part in early resistance movements they would attract violent Serbian reprisals.¹¹⁹ It was because of this that during its early years of existence, armed KLA units would often only consist of 3-5 people¹²⁰ while the PIRA had multiple brigade units with around 12 or more people serving in each brigade.¹²¹ In order to overcome initial recruitment and mobilization upsets, the KLA would often make use of violent images and manipulate them in order to create a provocative or agitation effect on the local population. By producing a constant slew of violent and disturbing images highlighting the atrocities of the Serbian regime against the Kosovar Albanians it helped to ignite a sense of national pride and a passionate desire for retribution.¹²² Another tactic which proved to be useful to the KLA included the idea of propaganda by deed. Propaganda by deed included mobilizing units of trained paramilitary soldiers from highly militant regions of Kosovo. This helped to establish a group of fighters who were serious and battle-hardened and would incite and inspire newer recruits of the KLA.¹²³

The KLA was eventually able to secure a number of recruits in the later years of its formation through what is referred to as the ‘wake-up call’ effect which followed the massacre of

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p. 347.

¹¹⁹ Pettifer, *The Kosova Liberation Army*, p. 74.

¹²⁰ Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army.", p. 1111.

¹²¹ John Horgan and Max Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (1997): 1-32., accessed March 29, 2016, p. 7.

¹²² Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army.", p. 1111.

¹²³ Pettifer, *The Kosova Liberation Army*, p. 74.

Adem Jashari and his family in Prekaz and the onslaught of unfavourable media coverage aimed at President Ibrahim Rugova. Recruitment became exceedingly popular among young Kosovar Albanians and students located both in Pristina and abroad. This massive influx of recruits to the KLA occurred from late spring to summer of 1998. It was noted that the,

KLA attracted thousands of youth, mostly unemployed and generally frustrated. Every year some 20,000 Kosovars reached military age...many radicalised guest workers from Germany and Switzerland also joined the KLA. Intellectuals and political figures, however, kept their distance. In early July 1998, when the KLA was at its peak, some Western experts estimated the number of men at 40,000 to 50,000; KLA spokesman Jakup Krasniqi put the number at 20,000.¹²⁴

Overall, though the KLA and the PIRA differed in both strategy and levels of success concerning formation and recruitment of their individual armed groups, they also share a great number of similarities. Both groups were able overcome dramatic splits in ideology and found a way to use violence that had been committed against them as a driving force towards the creation of two independent nations. Ultimately, they were able to overcome large divides in political ideology in order to create cohesive groups bound together by a singular goal, ready to face off with their oppressive regimes.

While international intervention did not play an entirely decisive role in the rebellions of the early twentieth century in Kosovo and Northern Ireland, the issue of international aid and legitimacy was extremely significant in the conflicts of the late twentieth century and had a profound effect on the formation, growth, and repression of paramilitary movements. In a study which researched recruits in the Provisional Irish Republican Army from 1969-1972 it was found in the accounts of former volunteers that

Republican volunteers were fighting first and foremost to reclaim dignity, build honour, and instil a sense of pride in themselves and their community through armed activism. In these terms, the choice of joining the PIRA was justified not as a mere reproduction of an ideological alignment to

¹²⁴ Duijzings and Schwandner-Sievers, *War Within a War: Historical and Cultural-Anthropological Background Report*, pp. 109-110, Exhibit 2D00109. This quote is found in Detrez, *War Delayed: Kosovo*, p.9 citing *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 8 July 1998 and Kusovac 1998 b, p. 9 and 1998d, p. 23 (it is stated in the original footnote that full bibliographical reference is not available).

the traditional Republican aim of achieving Irish reunification but as part of a recognition struggle.¹²⁵

For the Irish Republicans, reunification of Ireland alone was not enough. They needed to gain recognition and legitimacy from both the nation and the international community in order to highlight their struggle and sacrifice. An initial truce was declared in 1975 following meetings between British and Irish republican representatives. However, the truce ended up being an outright disaster when the British failed to withdraw troops from Northern Ireland even though they had stated they would consider the possibility of withdrawal under the right conditions.¹²⁶ Once the Irish Republicans realised that the British government had no intention of removing their troops from Northern Ireland violence broke out once again and the Republicans were forced to seek international recognition by other means.

In 1976, the PIRA adopted a 'long war' strategy where they vowed to carry out an extensive campaign of violence against British troops and Unionist Forces until they withdrew. "The Provisionals' long war is almost invariably portrayed as a strategy aimed at securing victory through a sustained campaign that would eventually produce British withdrawal... It is also useful, however, to analyse it as a bargaining move aimed at pressuring the British government to re-engage in negotiations with the Provisionals."¹²⁷ While the KLA relied heavily on international aid and recognition in order to maintain the survival of their organisation, it is less clear what made the PIRA re-enter engagement with the British state in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Some scholars have suggested that the PIRA had effectively been defeated and therefore had no choice but to find a way to negotiate a peace agreement. Other scholars offer a

¹²⁵ Bosi, "Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army", p. 348.

¹²⁶ Robert W. White, "The 1975 British-Provisional IRA Truce in Perspective", *Eire-Ireland*, Vol. 45:3&4, Fall/Winter (2010): 211-244. P. 216.

¹²⁷ Niall O Dochartaigh, "The Longest Negotiation: British Policy, IRA Strategy and the Making of the Northern Ireland Peace Settlement", *Political Studies*, Vol. 63 (2015), 202-220, p. 204.

different and perhaps more likely explanation which describes the PIRA as being an organisation that was realistic, rational, and capable of adapting to changing conditions.¹²⁸ It was through the joint effort of the British government and Sinn Fein along with a number of other political parties throughout Northern Ireland that a peace agreement was finally reached on 10 April 1998 through the Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement). The Good Friday Agreement ultimately helped to give the Irish Republicans recognition in their struggle and allow them the basic human rights which they had sought after.¹²⁹

Following their formation, “the Kosovo Liberation Army realized that unless it was prepared to conduct protracted guerrilla warfare Serb forces would not be pushed out of Kosovo”.¹³⁰ Therefore, in order to overrun Serb forces and establish an independent Kosovo Republic, the KLA would need to gain the full support of the international community. Unfortunately, there existed a number of issues concerning international law which would hinder the KLA’s efforts to gain international support. The KLA’s ideology and indeed their entire purpose for fighting revolved around the idea of gaining independence and self-determination for Kosovo, a goal which directly violated one widely accepted tenet of international law. According to international law, “Outside the context of colonies, and possibly peoples under foreign domination, no entity within a state has a legal right of secession without the agreement of the constitutional organs of the state, including the majority consent of all the people.”¹³¹ It has also been pointed out by a number of legal scholars that the right of self-determination “has not been endowed by states in texts or practice with anything remotely like an internationally

¹²⁸ Ibid, p. 214.

¹²⁹ *The Belfast Agreement*, Gov.uk, 10 April 1998, accessed 10 August, 2016.
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement>.

¹³⁰ Ioannis Koktsidis and Ten Dam, *A Success Story? Analysing Albanian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Balkans*, p. 170.

¹³¹ Gary Dempsey, “Kosovo Crossfire,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 9, no. iii. (1998):94-108), *Index Islamicus*, p. 98.

validated right, accruing to every secession-minded people anywhere, to secede territorially.”¹³²

This meant, that in order to gain international support, the countries who would be aiding Kosovar Albanians would ultimately have to deny the fact that Kosovo was in violation of international law and allow the territory to secede from Serbia.

The Serb atrocities in Kosovo forced the initially hesitant international community to reconsider their position concerning involvement in Kosovo and their recognition of the KLA. Recognition and legitimacy for the KLA was ultimately achieved for Kosovo during the Rambouillet Agreement in 1999 just prior to the NATO air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which took place in June. However, for both the KLA and Kosovar Albanians this recognition came at a cost. Madeline Albright, the former US Secretary of State, made it her commitment to transform the KLA from a military to a civil force which led to the KLA having to sacrifice their ideology and identity in order to become a force which could be supported openly by the Western Powers.¹³³ In order for the KLA to achieve the independence which they had fought so diligently for, they would have to subscribe to the terms set out by the international governments and groups that were aiding them. The KLA used a specifically targeted message at the international community which asked for economic and military insurance against the return of Kosovo to Serbia. “This goal [was] based on the premise that the condition for independence [was that Kosovo would] subscribe to a Western/European supranational identity and was ultimately fulfilled following the establishment of the United

¹³² Thomas Franck, “Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession” in *Peoples and Minorities in International Law*, ed. E. Brolmann, R. Lefeber, and M. Zieck (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 16. Quoted in Gary Dempsey, “Kosovo Crossfire,” p. 98.

¹³³ Alpaslan Ozerdem, “‘Terrorist’ Group to a ‘Civil Defence’ Corps: The Transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army,” *International Peacekeeping*, 10:3 (2003), 79-101, p. 80.

Nations Mission in Kosovo at the end of the war and the official American declaration of Kosovo's independence in 2008.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ Ingimundarson, "The Politics of Memory and the Reconstruction of Albanian National Identity", p. 97.

Conclusion

Similar to many of the historic events which were discussed, this thesis does not have a clear cut or decisive ending. There are near countless ways in which nationalism, tradition and the question of why people choose to participate in violence can be addressed and this thesis acts as just a single one of these interpretations. For the nations of Northern Ireland and Kosovo paramilitary tradition and reflection on the past was a vital part of their existence. It was nationalism and the state that, according to Eric Hobsbawm which engendered nations, not the other way round; and to effect this, nationalists had to invent myths, traditions, suitable history and the like.¹³⁵ Early rebellions such as the Easter Rising and the kaçak rebellions had initially been perceived by many as ending in failure. However, for loyal members of the Albanian and Irish nations these rebellions may have lost momentum but they never truly came to an end. They provided paramilitary groups with a narrative which emphasized heroism and struggle and became part of a continuation and an extension of movements which occurred later in the future.

The efforts of many nationalists and activists to take part in a combination of peaceful resistance and armed resistance shows just how dynamic the concepts of tradition and nationalism can be. A single nationalist ideology can't be applied throughout the course of history as can be seen with the frequent splits in ideology which occurred between the KLA and the PIRA. Though the objectives of the paramilitaries such as the idea of creating an independent nation and retaining a tradition of armed resistance were often strictly defined and unmoving, much of their ideology was able to remain fluid throughout the years and adapt and change in order to better suit the era and environment in which they existed. Overall, these groups were

¹³⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism*, p. 5.

able to maintain such a long and dynamic legacy because of their contradicting abilities to provide their nation with a tradition and work towards modernisation.

The paramilitary formations which are discussed in this thesis represent an extremely dynamic grouping who for the most part were extremely self-aware of their limitations and their need to adapt to a changing political environment. They recognized that although they were fed by the desire to stay true to their tradition, they would also have to be willing to negotiate and transform their identity in order to gain the support of the nation and the international community. This was exemplified following the peace negotiations in Northern Ireland and Kosovo, when both the PIRA and KLA had come to terms with the fact that in order to achieve their group ideology they would essentially have to relinquish their identity as groups which were constantly involved in an armed or violent struggle.

The main problem which remains following this analysis begins with the question of how we can address paramilitary groups in the modern age. It is still difficult to find a completely clear definition for what paramilitarism truly is and in what ways it differs from or encompasses acts of terrorism. This thesis only addresses a few of the ways that the KLA and PIRA have been perceived and legitimized by foreign entities and attempts to highlight the delicate balance between acknowledgment and support. Overall, it brings to attention that researchers in the field of political violence, nationalism, and terrorism must look beyond the simple characteristics of paramilitary groups such as what weapons they were using and how they organized themselves and look further into how these groups have changed over time and how the international community has come to view them.

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