A Perlocutionary Account of Metaphors

by

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I, the undersigned [Gergő Somodi], candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at the Central European University Department of Philosophy, declare herewith that the present dissertation is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of work of others, and no part the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

Budapest, 12 November 2015

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Signature

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It has been a long journey which comes to an end now. It took me seven years to finally settle, for myself, at least, on the questions that I was interested in at the beginning. During these seven years, I'd discussed the problems surrounding metaphors with so many people, I am sure I won't be able to list them all here. I am particularly grateful to Katalin Farkas, my supervisor, for the helpful discussions and for her patience. I learned a ton from Zsófia Zvolenszky; I cannot be thankful enough for all the discussions and her efforts in putting together the 2010 Summer University on *Meaning, Context, Intention* at the Central European University. Many thanks to Ernest Leopre, Matthew Stone, Wayne Davis, Ray Buchanan, Elisabeth Camp, Adam Sennett for their comments and for all the discussions there. In 2009, I had the possibility to visit the Logos Group in Barcelona for few months, I gained a lot from the intellectual climate of the group and especially from discussions with Josep Macià, Genoveva Martí and Manuel García-Carpintero. Thanks are also due to Marga Reimer who was amongst the first to encourage me to develop a perlocutionary theory of metaphors and to contact Micheal Harnish with whom I had fruitful exchanges about speech act theory. I would like to thank Hanoch Ben-Yami for inspiring conversations on the topic. As a member of the Erasmus Collegium, I had the opportunity to participate in many workshops, conferences and reading groups organized by the Collegium which definitely helped me in putting this work together. Many thanks to Urša Mavrič for reading and correcting major parts of my dissertation.

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Abstract

Much has been said about metaphors in philosophy of language, but few such thought provoking and controversial papers had been written on how they "work their wonders" than Donald Davidson's *What Metaphors Mean* (1978). In the last four decades many linguist, philosopher and cognitive scientist, working on an account of how we communicate by means of metaphors, started with pointing out what Davidson got wrong or right. His view that metaphor carries no special meaning or content different form the literal meaning of the expressions it is comprised of, that it is simply a tool to draw our attention to similarities, served as the starting point for many to articulate their own theory (cf. Bergmann, 1982; Rorty and Hesse, 1987; Moran, 1989; Hills, 1997; Stern, 2000; Camp, 2003; Guttenplan, 2005; Reimer and Camp, 2006; Camp, 2008; Stern, 2008; Reimer, 2008; Lepore and Stone, 2010). This thesis is no different.

I think what Davidson essentially got right is emphasizing the causal effects of metaphors, i.e., that metaphors nudge us into noting similarities, to take on a new perspective on the mentioned things. He also thought—to anticipate, this will be where I disagree—that this is the ulterior aim of metaphor and the metaphorical speaker. Consequently, according to Davidson, there is no special meaning the speaker aims to convey, given that this effect can be achieved by the literal meaning of the uttered sentence, or its comprehension thereof. This is not to deny that the metaphor has a point

or that it inspires a lot of thoughts.

In his *Communication and Convention*, Davidson (1984, 273) links what he calls ulterior purposes of utterances to John L. Austin's notion of perlocution (Austin, 1962); acts people perform by uttering sentences. Such an act for instance is, making the audience to undertake certain actions by asking them to do so, or to surprise them by what one is saying. Given this much, Davidson (1978) can be described as developing a perlocutionary theory of metaphor (cf. Lepore and Stone, 2010).

My aim is to show that a perlocutionary theory does not have to follow Davidson's arguments and conclusions, just roughly outlined above. After a careful examiniation of the notion of metaphorical meaning, the perspectival effect of metaphors, and the notion of perlocution and perlocutionary effects, I will argue, first, that metaphors's effect of making us see something in a new light is indeed a perlocutionary effect. I call this the **Perlocution Claim**. Second, I will also point out that achieving perlocutionary effects are not necessarily the ulterior purposes of the speakers. In most cases, they are just one among the many intended effects a speaker can have in uttering something. Consequently, Davidson's claims about the casual effects of metaphors will not support his conclusion that there is no metaphorical meaning beyond the perspectival effect of metaphors, in as much as there are examples where eliciting the metaphorical effect is not the final aim of the speaker. Examples are not hard to find, and they support the existence of metaphorical meaning contrary to Davidson.

Nevertheless, recent theories of metaphorical meaning do not fit well with the Perlocution Claim. Partly, because they reject the claim as belonging to Davidsonian non-cognitivsm (cf. Stern, 2000), a label introduced to designate theories denying the existence of metaphorical meaning. Additionally, because they also consider perlocutionary effects to be final, non-linguistic, aims of utterances.

The proposed theory of metaphor endorsing the Perlocution Claim relies on the

distinction between different possible realizations of perlocutionary effects. It incorporates a non-cognitivist theory for some examples of metaphors while at the same time, using the same theoretical framework, it provides an account of how metaphorical utterances have a special meaning on certain occasions. As a theory of metaphorical meaning, it is close to that developed by Elisabeth Camp (2003; 2008; 2014) on which if there is a metaphorical meaning, it is an inexplicit meaning which the hearer has to recover by way of cultivating the perspective offered in the metaphor.

Table of Contents

Copyright **ii**

Acknowledgments **iii**

Abstract **iv**

1 Introduction **2**

1.1 Overview 6

1.2 Locating Metaphorical Meaning 8

1.2.1 Types of Meaning 9

1.2.2 Types of Metaphorical Meaning 27

2 The Effect of Metaphors **48**

2.1 *"Seeing as is not seeing that"* 50

2.1.1 Metaphor and Aspect Seeing 52

2.2 Seeing that through Seeing-as 55

2.3 The Metaphorical Mode of Presentation 63

2.4 Sense Modulation and Framing 70

3 The Notion of Perlocution and the Perlocution Claim **76**

3.1 The Notion of Perlocution 77
3.1.1 Preliminaries: Acts and Effects 77
3.1.2 Further Features of Perlocutionary Effects 84
3.2 On the Perlocutionary Nature of Metaphor's Framing Effect 88
3.3 Perlocutionary Effects and the Total Significance of Utterances 92
3.4 Challenges to Standard Views 96

4 Defending the Perlocution Claim **100**
4.1 Common Ground, Speaker Meaning and Metaphors 101
4.1.1 Lepore and Stone (2010) on Speaker Meaning 106
4.1.2 Lepore and Stone (2010) Style Non-cognitivism 108
4.2 Lepore and Stone against the Perlocutionary Theory of Metaphors . . . 109
4.3 Defending the Perlocution Claim 110

5 Developing a Perlocutionary Account **115**
5.1 Metaphorical Speech Acts 116
5.2 A Perlocutionary Account 120
5.2.1 Perlocution, Accommodation, Direct Content 123
5.2.2 Character, Dimension vs. Perlocutionary Effect 125
5.3 Conclusion 129

6 Summary **131**

Bibliography **136**

Chapter 1

Introduction

Upon hearing the question

> ...who wrote the phrase: "No man is an island." Was it – – a) John Donne, b) John F. Kennedy, or c) Jon Bon Jovi.

watching the *Who wants to be a Millionaire*, Will, one of the narrators and main characters of the movie *About a boy* is thinking

> Well that's an easy one. Definitely the most crap Bon Jovi Lyric ever. The way I see it, *every man is an island*. But the great thing is, there's never been a better time in history to be an island. Even fifty years ago, for instance, they did not have daytime TV. – – Or videos, or CD's, or home espresso makers or glossy magazines with questionnaires about how cool you were and pictorials of scantily – clad models from Brazil. The thing was, *every man was an island*, but you didn't have to be a crap island. With the right supplies, and the right outlook, *you could be a sun-drenched tropical resort*, the kind caressed by warm breezes, the kind with a permissive, carefree atmosphere, the kind visited by cute Swedish tourists on holiday. Sure, *I was an island*, but I was a pretty cool island. *I was Maui.* (About a boy, shooting script, 2002, Italics added.)

This monologue of Will is a pretty good example of how metaphors, some highlighted in the above quote, form a part of our everyday life, our thinking, way of talking and describing things.

When the term 'metaphor' first appeared in Isocrates's Evagoras somewhere around 370 B.C.; one of the most influential and long lasting theoretical approaches to this figure of speech seems to be already in place. Isocrates wrote,

> ...For to the poets is granted the use of many embellishments of language, since they can represent the gods as associating with men, conversing with and aiding in battle whomsoever they please, and they can treat of these subjects not only in conventional expressions, but in words now exotic, now newly coined, and now in *figures of speech* ($\mu\varepsilon\tau\alpha\phi o\rho\alpha$), neglecting none, but using every kind with which to embroider their poesy. Orators, on the contrary, are not permitted the use of such devices; they must use with precision only words in current use and only such ideas as bear upon the actual facts. (Isocrates,*Evagoras*, 1980, Sec.8-10, Italics added)

That is, metaphor was regarded as an "ornamental word, [...] added to ordinary discourse for the purpose of persuasion" only, having nothing, or very little to do with "precision" and "plain facts" (Berggren, 1959, 17).

This interpretation of the phenomenon was formed within the field of Rhetoric, particularly by the Sicilian school and Gorgias. Metaphor was analyzed and distinguished from ordinary discourse with regards to the effect it had, or could have, in persuasive speech. As a stylistic device it was to be used to fire up the audience's imagination and emotions to achieve persuasion. To see the rationale behind this view, just reflect for a moment on how Will is employing his metaphor *"you could be a sun-drenched tropical resort"* to boost your imagination in convincing you that we live in an era when people can, and maybe should, really be independent from each other and live well.

Interestingly enough, this "Doctrine of Ornament", a phrase coined by Douglas Berggren (1959, 16) for this view of metaphors, found its place in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle—and the tradition henceforth to follow—, despite all their aversions towards rhetoricians of their age. However, metaphor was described, particularly by

Aristotle,[1] as a stylistic device in relation to his general ideas about the meaning of words. Of course, that is not the only description Aristotle gave of metaphors,[2] and it would be anachronistic to ascribe any explicit theory of metaphors to him.

Still, the *Doctrine of Ornament* gained its first shape in Aristotle's works. Given that this doctrine and its 20th century reformulations are, at least partly, the topic of this dissertation, it is worth roughly outlining it before formulating the main questions that I will be after answering in the upcoming chapters.

Aristotle defined metaphors as words that are being used in place of 'proper' or 'perspicuous' words. Berggren quotes Aristotle's Rhetoric 3.2.,

> of names and verbs it is the proper ones that make style perspicuous; all others which have been spoken of in Poetics [strange words, metaphors, ornamental words, words lengthened, curtailed or altered in form] elevate and make it ornate. (1959, 20)

As he points out, the term 'proper' might have two different readings here. First, it might refer to the ordinary meaning of words, i.e., what people ordinarily mean by them. Second, it might have some allusion to Aristotle's Organon. 'Proper' words, then, would not be "determined by contemporary usage, but by the 'essence' of the thing referred to; this essence being established by Aristotle's method of citing the wider genus, along with the differentia." (Berggren, 1959, 22)

Whichever meaning we ascribe to the term 'proper', there is a consequence of defining metaphor as a name given to a thing to which it does not belong. Namely, that metaphor has no sense, for only 'proper' words convey information about the world, given that they grab the 'essence' of the thing they belong to, they are the 'bearers' of

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[1] Plato was not so much concerned with particular figures of speech as he was generally with the sophistic philosophy.

[2] Berggren reconstructs what he calls the *Doctrine of Analogy* as well (1959, 58-90.)

truth and falsity. Essences and truth are confused if words are used in one another's place. Therefore, metaphors are, or seem to be, useless in conveying information and attaining truth. They are at best misleading, pointing to an essence which is not the proper one in the given situation. Their function is but to elevate style and ornate ordinary discourse, to affect the audience in order to persuade them.[3]

It is harder to see why this would be so, if 'proper' means the ordinary meanings people associate with certain words. One could argue that it is possible to introduce a new meaning to a word to the everyday practice using a metaphor. This is not possible if there is no sense what so ever in the first use of the metaphor. However, such an argument would equate metaphor with introducing a new term into the language. But introducing a new word or meaning into the vocabulary is not the only occasion when words are used in each other's place. Recall again the *"sun-drenched tropical resort"* metaphor.

This *Doctrine of Ornament* has been so influential that it still was a live view in the middle of the 20th century. Berggren (1959) writes

> [g]one presumably are the Aristotelian "essences," and greatly improved is Aristotle's simpler genus-species method of definition [...] under the "non-cognitive" or "senseless" functions of language, the ancient Sicilian and Aristotelian "stylistic devices" still find their accustomed place:
>
> Pictorial (Imaginative)
> Emotional (Affective)
> Volitional-motivational (Directive). (58)

Much has been changed since Berggren wrote these lines. Most philosophers and linguists agree that metaphors have cognitive significance and are meaningful, convey information about the world, even if they maintain that they also have a non-cognitive, primarily pictorial function as well.

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[3] Again, that this is not the only approach that can be ascribed to Aristotle.

In my dissertation, I would like to focus on this pictorial function of metaphor. I believe that, in pursuit of ascribing a special, cognitive significance or meaning to metaphors, this pictorial function or dimension has been either overlooked or not properly analyzed by contemporary theorists. I claim that on the proper analysis of metaphors' effect, it is a perlocutionary effect.

Let me leave the claim without any further clarification at this point. I would like to only emphasize now that in arguing for the perlocutionary nature of metaphors' effect, I do not mean to defend the "Doctrine of Ornament" in what follows. I don't think metaphor is merely an ornament, nor that it is simply a replaceable stylistic device. Instead, I am interested in the question: *What theory of metaphorical meaning follows form a proper, perlocutionary analysis of the pictorial dimension of metaphors?* Particularly, theorist often forget that it is the speaker, and not only the metaphorically used sentence in itself, who makes, or intends to make her audience entertain a picture or to look at something from a different perspective. This pictorial dimension of metaphorical speech should be treated as an *effect* brought about partly by the speaker; it is a result of her linguistic *act* which accomodates the audience's grasp of what has been communicated.

1.1 Overview

Given that my primary focus is on theories of metaphorical meaning in respect with how they analyze the imagistic, pictorial dimension of metaphor, I will be discussing the possible meaning of 'meaning' in this **First Chapter**. I present the notion of linguistic meaning as opposed to explicitly and implicitly communicated content with an eye on current views on metaphorical meaning.

Simply put, you can use the sentence

(1) I am here now.

to explicitly express different contents depending on where you are, and when, whilst the linguistic meaning of (1) stays the same irrespective of these circumstances. You can even imply uttering this sentence that you have time for something you and your audience agreed to do previously. How exactly expressing all these works in communication, and how metaphor fits into this mechanism, will be covered by discussing current semantic and pragmatic views offered to provide an explanation.

In **Chapter Two**, I will present in detail the different ways philosopher aim to capture the pictorial dimension or perspectival effect of metaphors. Intuitively, it might seem straightforward that metaphors have to do something with pictures or vivid imagination, especially when one is confronted with poetic examples, such as W. H. Auden's

(2) "The hourglass whispers to the Lion's paw."

But what exactly is involved in the claim that metaphors make us see something in a new light, or that they offer a perspective, is harder to grasp and formulate in an explanation of metaphorical meaning.

I claim that metaphor's pictorial dimension is a perlocutionary effect. In **Chapter Three**, I will introduce and motivate this claim by discussing, first, the notion of perlocution and perlocutionary effect, and, second, by showing how metaphor's effect fits into this category. I will end this chapter with discussing some of the challanges the truth of the perlocution claim poses for theories of metaphorical meaning discussed in Chapter One.

In **Chapter Four**, I will defend my Perlocution Claim against a recent objection put forward by Ernest Lepore and Mathew Stone (2010). Based on a thorough discussion of what it is for a speaker to mean something, Lepore and Stone (2010) denies that it is worthwhile to describe what happens in metaphorical speech in terms of speaker meaning. Metaphors, on their view, is a distinct mode of speech, and as such, it groups better with phenomena such as trash talking and joking. They also argue that the notion

of perlocution is not apt to describe metaphor. I argue that this claim of theirs rests on a restricted conception of perlocution and perlocutionary effects.

I will develop the perlocutionary theory in detail in **Chapter Five**. The proposed perlocutionary account agrees with the non-cognitivist that there is a causal mechanism at work with metaphors, that metaphors cause us to notice resemblances between things, to accept a new perspective or to conjure up an imagery. The theory also agrees with the Gricean view that there is, or might be, something meant by the speaker of a metaphorical utterance. Particularly, it is in harmony with the Elisabeth Camp's view who claims that the hearer has to recover the content of the metaphorical speech act by way of cultivating the perspective offered (2008; 2013; 2014). The perspective induced is what equips the context with the information required to evaluate the speech act itself. It is still a perlocutionary effect though. It serves as means to make the utterance understood.

1.2 Locating Metaphorical Meaning

Are metaphorical utterances really devoid of any sense as the early analytic philosophers Berggren (1959) referred to thought? Those who claim they are not must locate metaphorical meaning among the elements, or parts, which comprise the total significance of a linguistic utterance. In a nutshell, the meaning of a linguistic utterance is not exhausted by the meaning that the elements uttered have in a given language. The utterer might very well mean the opposite or might just need her audience to infer the things he additionally means from a preliminary interpretation of what has been said. Furthermore, even the interpretation of what has been said can differ from the identified linguistic meaning of the elements uttered. Clearly, reading out loud the sentence, "The Dog is hungry" and using the same sentence about the dog in the yard say different

things, even on a naive, one might say folk linguistic, understanding of the term 'say' I employed above. How exactly linguistic meaning, saying, and meaning something more are analyzed will be covered in more detail in this section. As we shall see, in the second part of this chapter, there are as many types of theories of metaphors as parts of an utterance to which some type of meaning can be ascribed.

Let me, therefore, go into the details of how the total significance of utterances has been analyzed by philosophers and linguists in the late 20th-, early 21st century. After that, in the second half of this introductory chapter, I will also present the main proposals as to where to locate metaphorical meaning among the elements of the total significance of an utterance around which the linguistic and philosophical discussion revolves. To anticipate, my aim is not to provide a unique analysis of the total significance of utterances. I would like to present the state of the art by drawing the map of the main notions of meaning which also figure in the debate on how one should analyze metaphorical meaning. When discussing the various proposals for providing an account of how metaphors work, in section 1.2.2., I will not try to present all the arguments one could have in support of either views. Primarily, because my aim is not to evaluate the arguments one can have for one or the other, and to choose the most viable account of metaphors this way. My aim instead is highlight some problems for all the current views presented by providing a perlocutionary analysis of the effect of metaphors in Chapter 2 and 3.

1.2.1 Types of Meaning

The discussion in the late 20th century philosophy of language about the notion of meaning has been framed by the essays of Herman Paul Grice (1989). In fact, the phrase "the total significance of an utterance" originates from his work (Grice, 1989, 42). Without defining what Grice meant by this phrase at this point, I would like to use it as a cover term for a vast range of phenomena theorist following Grice emphasized as being

part of a significant utterance. I will proceed by discussing some examples and I will focus on linguistic utterances.

Consider the following conversation, originating from Grice (1989):

Ann: Where can I get antifreeze?

Bob: There's a station at the corner.[4]

We can safely say that these linguistic marks or noises belong to the English language; they would be recognized as such by speakers of that language. They have a certain linguistic meaning in English. That meaning is known and is accessible to all competent speaker of the language. One can say that, speakers of English know the linguistic meaning of these sentences in virtue of their competence in English language.

Every language, just as the competence in every language, can be analyzed into two distinct, but still entwined parts; (knowledge of the) lexical elements and words, on the one hand and, on the other, (knowledge of the) rules by means of which these elements can be combined in order to express more complicated things, i.e., syntax. I do not mean here a strict distinction between rules and elements that have meaning. (cf. Somodi, 2009) This knowledge is often referred to as *semantic* knowledge, semantics being understood as "conventional rules of meaning for expressions and their modes of combination" (cf. Korta and Perry, 2015).

Imagine now, that the conversation above takes place once in London, UK, and once in Austin, Texas, US. Although the linguistic meaning stays the same in both conversations; speakers depict different things by the use of their sentences. Consequently, *what is said* by them will also differ. In one case, Ann inquires if she can buy some antifreeze around someplace in London, the capital of the United Kingdom; in

[4] (Cf. Davis, 2007, 5)

the other, she does the same in Austin, Texas. Bob's answer is about different corners and gas station's respectively. The conditions under which Bob's utterance is true in these different scenarios are quite different. That is, the utterances have different truth-evaluable contents. Some other type of utterances, for instance requests, promises, or Ann's question etc., are evaluated differently, not based on their truth or falsity. This content has been referred to as *propositional content* in the literature.

So far I have differentiated two types of meaning which are closely connected to each other. On the one hand, we can talk about the *linguistic meaning* of an utterance, and, on the other hand, we can talk about the particular propositional content of an utterance. The former is the same from utterance to utterance, that is, Ann's utterance in London has the same linguistic meaning as Ann's utterance in Texas. It is the propositional content that differs depending on such variables as who Ann and Bob are, where and when they met, i.e. on the *context* of the utterance which is comprised, on a classic view, of the participants, the time and place of the utterance.

Propositional content of an utterance can be, *prima facie*, different from the linguistic meaning.[5] The latter standing, most of the time, in need of some contextual input for the speaker to convey a message. With regards to Ann and Bob's conversation, I only highlighted so far the time and place of the utterance and the persons involved in the conversation as parts of the context. The context, however, can involve much more than the speaker, the time and the place of the utterance. There is also a lot of background information which influence what content the speaker conveys. If I tell my wife

(1) The prime minister visited the University.

she will know that I am referring to the Central European University without me being

[5]For a dissenting view, consult Cappelen and Lepore (2000)

fully explicit about this. I also expect her to know this in uttering (1), and that influenced the wording of my sentence. If I cannot expect my audience to know which University I am attending to, I would need to make it fully explicit in my utterances about the events that happened there, otherwise I wouldn't be giving relevantly enough information to them. Consequently, the classic view on context needs to be adjusted with an element of what can be expected as common knowledge based on conversations and events preceding a particular utterance. This background information can be described as a set of mutual beliefs, beliefs that are expected to be believed by the participants in a conversational situation (cf. Bach and Harnish, 1979; Stalnaker, 1999; Fricker, 2012).

We have seen by now a couple of examples where the linguistic meaning of an utterance requires a contextual input to get the speaker's message through. One can differentiate between two main approaches in explaining how speaker–hearers arrive at the content of the linguistic utterance on a given occasion. On the one hand, there are those who claim that contextual input is something that is dependent on, and governed purely, by the linguistic meaning of the utterance. These views can be labeled *semantic views*. A paradigmatic example of the linguistic meaning governing the contextual input to an utterance is the pronoun *'I'*. That *'I'* always picks out the speaker, whoever that might be, is due to a rule which is part of the meaning of *'I'* and which determines what the actual content of this expression will be on a given occasion of its utterance. Consequently,

(2) I ate already.

expresses different contents if uttered by you, or by me.

However, uttering (2) the speaker might express that (2*) she has eaten apple already, or that (2**) she has had a breakfast, or that (2***) she has eaten on the day of the conversation, but certainly she does not mean that she consumed some food sometime in

her life up to the point when this utterance occurs. Even though it is possible for the speaker to mean just that, it would be a very unusual message by uttering (2).

Semantic views claim that such additions to the linguistic meaning are governed by the linguistic meaning of the utterance itself. There is a rule, or a set of rules, in the construction of (2), in its underlying grammar, in the way it is put together that governs what content from the above mentioned possibilities (2) acquires on the occasion of its utterance.

Others hold that contents (2*)-(2***) are expected to be added to the linguistic meaning by the speaker–hearers' general knowledge about the context; their general cognitive resources with little, if any, guidance from the linguistic meaning or rules.[6] These views are labeled as *pragmatic views*.

There is a huge literature of this debate between the two possible options on explaining how linguistic utterances acquire their propositional content, worthy in itself of being a topic of a dissertation. For my purposes in this chapter, i.e., to present in a nutshell the possible meaning of 'meaning' when talking about a metaphorical one, the this rough outline is enough for now. I will dive more into the details as I proceed in my presentation of the meaningful parts of an utterance and also when I will be discussing views of metaphorical meaning that locate it on the level of propositional content of an utterance.

Also, I will refrain to go more into the details of the semantic/pragmatic difference. I will use the labels as just introduced; treating semantic theories of content those which ascribe the leading role to the linguistic meaning of an expression in arriving at the expressed contents, and as pragmatic the views which refer to different processes, about

[6] For instance Derirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber (2002), Robyn Carston (2002) are arguing for such a view. See also Francois Recanati (2002a) and just to mention a few pieces of articles on the topic.

which I will provide more details later in this section..

At this point, let me discuss the connection between the propositional content of an utterance and what has been said by the speaker, which I implicitly equated in the discussion so far. This equation is rooted in Grice's formulation of *what is said* by an utterance. For Girce (1989), saying something was closely related to, yet still different from, what he refers to as the "conventional meaning" of words or expressions, what I discussed under the label *linguistic meaning* so far. He writes

> I intend what someone has said to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has uttered. Suppose someone to have uttered the sentence *He is in the grip of vice.* Given a knowledge of the English language, but no knowledge of the circumstances of the utterance, one would know something about what the speaker had said, on the assumption that he was speaking standard English, and speaking literally. [...] But for a full identification of what the speaker had said, one would need to know (a) the identity of *x*, (b) the time of utterance, and (c) the meaning, on the particular occasion of utterance, of the phrase *in the grip of vice*. (Grice, 1989, 25)

Basically, the only adjustment Grice considered, in these lines at least, on the lingustic meaning to arrive at an occasion specific propositional content, or *what is said* according to Grice, was disambiguation and fixing the values of indexical and referring expressions. On the basis of examples like (2) above, many philosopher and linguist suggested that there are more than these semantically governed contributions to the propositional content of the utterance.

The distinction between what is said and the linguistic, or conventional, meaning, however, does not exhaust the total significance of an utterance for Grice and his followers and critics, because, as it has been noted, many times we mean more or something else than what we say by our utterances.

Let me get back now to the conversation between Ann and Bob quoted at the beginning of this section. Uttering,

(3) There's a station at the corner.

Bob was not only saying that there is a station at the corner of whichever city the conversation took place. He was also answering the question of Ann, who wanted to know where she can buy some antifreeze. Drawing Ann's attention to the fact that there is a station at the corner, Bob was also communicating, therefore, that Ann might purchase some antifreeze there. Had he not meant that as well, there wouldn't have been much point in his utterance.

The content, or proposition, that Ann can purchase antifreeze at the corner was *indirectly, implicitly* communicated to Ann. Bob said one thing, but *meant* something more as well. This indirect content or the act of expressing this indirect content was called by Grice *'conversational implicature'* (Grice, 1989; Neale, 1992). It is something Ann was expected to infer given that Bob was answering in the first place and based on what he was saying. She could have reasoned as follows: "Bob wouldn't have said 'There is a station at the corner', had he not believed, and wanted me to believe as well, that I can buy there some antifreeze. So, he must have also *meant*, that I can buy some antifreeze at the corner."

Grice distinguished between two types of propositions an utterance expresses. One is *what has been said* by the speaker, in our example, the content that there is a station at the corner nearby the place of the talk exchange. The second is the implicated content, one the speaker also meant assuming he was cooperating, namely, that Ann can get antifreeze at that station. The former is, on Girce's view, closely connected to the linguistic meaning of the utterance, while the latter is arrived at by using our general understanding of, and expectations about, human behavior.

Grice made explicit several principles and maxims that govern such reasoning as exemplified above. By means of which principles, it can be explained how one can arrive from what the speaker said to what has been also communicated in conversations. The now famous "Cooperative principle", which is the basis of all the other maxims and rules,

says that "make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Grice, 1989, 26)." I will discuss the maxims related to this principle when I go into the details of the Gricean theory of metaphor later.

This distinction Grice made between what has been said by the speaker and what was merely additionally implied or implicated by her became a basic distinction everyone agrees with to some extent. I already mentioned that many philosophers and linguists argued that not only semantic processes, such as those of disambiguation and reference fixing also mentioned by Grice, figure in determining the propositional content one says in uttering something. Going into all the differences in the possible ways of drawing the distinction would take me far from my general purpose of introducing the layers of the total significance of an utterance in this Chapter. I will discuss some general features of both the category of what is said and what is implicated, discussed by Grice primarily, which are central to the philosophical debates.

Grice distinguished two types of conversational implicatures, one being the generalized implicature, the other the particularized conversational implicature, such as the example we discussed above in relation to Ann and Bob's conversation. He also distinguished both types of conversational implicatures from conventional ones. Although I am not aware of any theory which would have proposed to analyze metaphorical meaning as either generalized conversational- or conventional implicature, it is worth giving examples to shed light on what part they have in the total significance of an utterance.

Grice intended the *conventional implicature* as being such that it is determined by the conventional meaning of the sentence, and not by way of inference as it was the case with the indirect content in Ann and Bob's conversation above. When one says

(4) Greg is Hungarian, and, therefore, he is a pessimist

her sentence implicates that it follows from Greg being a Hungarian that he is a pessimist.

However, it is not part of what was said by the utterance according to Grice. One criterion he introduced for supporting this claim is based on the relation on the truth or falsity of sentence (4) and what it implicates. If it is false that Greg's pessimism follows from him being a Hungarian, it still can be true, Grice holds, that Greg is Hungarian and that he is a pessimist.[7].

This is one key difference Grice intended to introduce between the content of what is said and the content of implicatures. The truth or falsity of the latter does not influence the truth or falsity of the former, their truth conditions are independent and hence are their contents, on his view.

An important difference between the conventional and conversational implicature will be that when the audience is asked how they arrived at the implicata, they will refer to the particular meaning or wording of the sentence whenever they are asked about a conventional implicature. Whereas in the case of conversational implicatures, they might make explicit a reasoning similar to that which I attributed to Ann above (Grice, 1989, 25). In other words, conventional implicatures are related to the meaning of words and can be identified with minimal, or without any, reference to the context.

Moreover, it is possible to "cancel" particularized conversational implicatures. Bob could have continued after his initial utterance of (3) with (3*)

(3) There's a station at the corner.

(3*) I am not sure if they sell antifreeze, but it's definitely a place to ask.

Thereby canceling the implicature the utterance of (3) in itself could give raise to. However, it does not seem possible to cancel the conventional implicature of (4) without contradiction.

[7]For further discussion and challenges to Grice's approach on the phenomenon consult Davis (2014)

Generalized conversational implicatures are akin to conventional implicatures to an extent that even Grice himself found it difficult the draw the distinction as the following lines clearly indicate: "it is all too easy to treat a generalized conversational implicature as if it were a conventional implicature (1989, 37)." However, generalized conversational implicatures are not tied to the linguistic meaning of the sentence.

Consider the utterance of the sentence

(5) Jerry is meeting a woman this evening.

Normally, the audience would understand that the speaker was talking about a woman other than Jerry's wife or girlfriend. This implicature, however, is not tied to the meaning, or to the particular construction, of the sentence. The speaker, uttering (5), says one thing and means something more, unlike in the case of (4). Still, on Grice's view, there is a type of convention that helps the audience to figure out the indirect meaning. It is not simply calculated from the context based on the general knowledge of the principles governing the conversation. Additionally, it is possible to cancel the implicature in (5), even though it might strike one as odd in some cases.

So far I presented in a nutshell how Grice divided the total significance of an utterance into three distinct general parts. There is the conventional or *linguistic meaning*, on the basis of which *what has been said* by the speaker is identified in a given context. Then, either based on principles governing human interactions, or still on the basis of some convention, hearers are expected to infer implicatures of the utterance made in a given context, conventional-, generalized- or particularized conversational implicatures, respectively. Grice aimed to capture the difference between what has been said and implicatures, partly, by pointing to the independence of truth conditions of the contents expressed, and to the fact that implicatures are inferred, or must be "capable of being worked out" based on what has been said in a given context. Recall at this point Ann's inference to implicature of Bob's utterance.

This division, however, relies on Grice's particular characterization of what is said, and his inferential model of communication, according to which the only contextual input to linguistic meaning required to arrive at the content expressed, or what has been said, is disambiguation and fixing the values for arguments of indexical and referring expressions. This does not happen by way of inference, as opposed to the process of identification of implicatures. As I mentioned briefly, this notion of the proposition expressed by a linguistic utterance has been challenged. Behind the challenge there is a different way of constructing the inferential model of communication developed by Relevance Theory.

For Grice, communication was a special type of intentional action aiming at influencing mental, emotional and behavioral states of others. Bob's answer to Ann influenced Ann's mental and emotional states for she came to know that there is a station at the conrner and to believe that she can get antifreeze there, which could have made her happy and feeling relieved. All these effects could have been possibly intented by Bob. Understanding communication from this perspective helped Grice to distinguish, for any given human communicative situation, between facts that arise from the nature of human interaction—one might call these pragmatic facts, part of which are the implicatures—and facts that are linked to the agent's competence in a given language, i.e., semantic facts (Neale, 1992). Recall that knowledge of the meaning of the elements of a given utterance and the rules in accordance with which they were combined does not always equal to knowing what information has been communicated by that utterance. To identify the latter, one relies on her general cognitive capacity and understanding of human interactions. Part of this, more or less tacit, understanding are the Cooperative Principle and the maxims I have already covered.

Around the 1980s, cognitive scientist and psychologists (Cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995) proposed a new way for understanding what it is exactly that governs our understanding of each others behavior, and all input that strikes our cognitive faculty.

They claimed that "[h]uman cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance" which they called the *Cognitive Principle of Relevance*. Relevance is, basically, about the effectiveness of gathering information and the cognitive effort that is required for that. At any moment, there are a multitude of stimuli affecting the cognitive and nervous system of humans. Relevant from these will be those, which against a background of available assumption and information will yield a positive cognitive effect. That is, at any given state of the human cognitive system, it is geared towards those inputs (smells, visual stimuli, etc.) which will result in changing the system in a positive direction.

Walking around in a foreign city, looking for entertainment opportunities, some type of noises and visual signs will be more relevant than others. These inputs will be treated as a piece of evidence, which will be weighted against a set of background information. Meeting a group of loud student-looking people at a corner, one might infer that there is some type of facility where they spent time together which might fit the purpose of walking around looking for entertainment. A clear visual sign of a pub at the same corner will strengthen that conclusion further. The less effort required for achieving the biggest cognitive effect, the more relevant an input to the human cognition is.

Now, every processing of a stimuli is governed by the principle of relevance. However, communicative stimuli are such that they convey the presumption of their own relevance (Communicative Principle of Relevance). Humans are, Relevance Theory claims, good in predicting and identifying which possible relevant input another human is attending to, or which stimuli is the most relevant for another human, and predict and infer his behavior based on this information. In linguistic communication, it is the aim of the speaker to produce an input which will be relevant for the hearer and the hearer is expected to take the linguistic utterance as highly relevant. This is the sense in which the communicative input presumes its own relevance. The purpose of communicators is, most of the time,

that the communicative situation succeeds in fulfilling its mutual, or mutally recognized, purpose. Given this much, participants in a conversation need to produce stimuli that is easy to process and has the biggest contribution with regards to the purpose of the talk exchange they are engaged in.

Relevance Theory still treats communication as a form of intentional action, but as such they look at it through the lens of the cognitive principle of relevance, particularly, the communicative principle. The theory differentiates between two models of communication which were developed in the history of investigating languages and communication in general. The first is the *code model*, according to which the information conveyed is encoded into some type of code by the sender, and the receiver only needs to decode that when perceiving the input. Obviously, with an eye on all the examples we covered so far, human communication does not work like that; we convey more than we encode, sometimes even in our simplest talk exchanges. The second model of communication is labeled as the *inferential model*, a version of which was developed also by Grice, for instance.

Relevance theory also applies and develops an inferential approach to communication. However, what governs the inference for the relevance theorist is quite different than the Gricean mechanism. The Gricean "Cooperative Principle" will not be in place. Ann, hearing Bob's response about the station at the corner will treat the utterance as an evidence to infer that there is a station at the corner and also as evidence to further infer that she can buy antifreeze there, adding this is granted by the Communicative Principle of Relevance. Much of this happens "on-line" without much reflection on what happens by the hearer.

Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (2008) writes,

> All human intentional communication works in the way outlined above: the communicator produces a piece of evidence of her meaning – the ostensive stimulus – and the addressee infers her meaning from this piece of evidence and the context. Linguistic utterances are just one type of ostensive stimulus. Verbal communication is always context-sensitive and inferential. (87)

The inferential process starts when a linguistic stimuli has been identified and its linguistic meaning decoded. The inference goes to various interpretations of the encoded meaning from which some will be more relevant than others. These interpretations are not built on each other, as they are on Grice's view, rather they are "on-line" constructed, as I mentioned. Relevance Theory still treats the content that Ann can get antifreeze at the station on the corner as an implicature; yet they argue that the Gricean notion of *what is said* is not theoretically useful as it was defined by Grice. Sperber and Wilson (2002) propose to call *explicatures* or *explicit content* those interpretations of an utterance which are partly decoded from the linguistic meaning and partly inferred. They define implicatures those contents which are wholly inferred on occasion of the utterance. It is important to note that both explicatures and implicatures are treated as being propositional.

Before I go into the details of what other differences are between explicatures and implicatures, let me introduce two processes which figure in the speaker–hearers inferences to both. These processes are linked to the identification of the linguistically encoded concepts, basically the linguistic meaning, and the modification as required by the standards of cognitive relevance.

Consider a case in which I utter

(6) This beef is raw.

when it is clear for us that the meat in question does not lack any preparation, it just hasn't been baked enough, for my taste, at least. Relevance theory claims that I am not expressing a false proposition here and thereby implicating another, as a Gricean might argue, but I explicitly express the proposition that the beef is half baked, and I will be taken to have said that. Or, to put it differently, my utterance encoded the concept RAW, which my hearer adjusted, expected by me, into the ad hoc concept of RAW* which includes half

baked beef as well. This process is referred to as broadening, category extension, or loose use. Further examples are,

(7) Holland is flat.

(8) I have a terrible cold. I need Kleenex.(Wilson and Sperber, 2002, 223)

Where 'flat' is adjusted to mean a terrain without mountains which strictly speaking is not flat, and 'Kleenex' is adjusted to mean any handkerchiefs.

There are other utterances, however, which require a different type of adjustment, the narrowing of the content. Consider the utterance of

(9) I think I have a temperature.

Where the speaker is clearly not just talking about any degree of temperature, but about being in the state of fever, and expects the hearer to narrow down the encoded meaning to arrive at this content. In what follows, I will refer to all pragmatic processes the object of which is the encoded meaning of a linguistic utterance in a context as *modulation*, borrowing the term from Francois Recanati. That being said, I also want to note here that not every pragmatic view of explicit content would agree with the inferential model as it was outlined by Relevance Theory discussed here (Cf. Recanati, 2002b). But the main elements, explicit content, implicit content, linguistic meaning will appear in all criticism and modification of the original framework.

Moreover, there are some general features which are accepted widely. One of them is the deniability of implicitly communicated contents. Something taken to be implicitly communicated by a linguistic utterance in a context can be denied by the speaker more or less faithfully and honestly. For instance, Bob can deny that he wanted to create the impression in Ann that she can buy antifreeze at the station on the corner. He can

refrain, when challenged by Ann claiming that he only wanted Ann to ask where she can buy antifreeze, but was not claiming that she definitely can buy some at the station. Ann was responsible, partly, to come to this latter conclusion, perhaps by taking into consideration information that was not mutually available for Bob and for her. Or at least this is something Bob can pretend to be the case. The possibility of deniability is a feature makes implicit communication preferable sometimes over explicit expression of contents. (Cf. Fricker 2012)

The explicit content, however, can only be denied if the speaker denies that he wanted to say anything at all. Bob cannot deny that he said that there is a station at the corner except in the case of claiming that he was not answering the question of Ann at all. For instance, he might claim he was talking to someone else about some other corner what Ann has overheard and took as a reply to her answer.

To sum up, we have seen that the total significance of an utterance can be divided into three main parts. First there is the linguistic meaning of the uttered noises that belong to a certain language. Second, closely related to this there is the propositional content which is expressed directly and explicitly by the utterance. Following Fricker (2012), I will take this to be the content the speaker cannot deny expressing without denying the fact that he was engaging in a communicative act at all. That is, a content for the putting forward of which the speaker can be held accountable and responsible for justifying if challenged. There is no responsibility on the hearer to understand the utterance as having this content. Third, there are implicatures, or inexplicitly, indirectly communicated contents. I intend here the indirect content to cover implicatures in both a Gricean and a relevance theoretic sense. These are contents which, in contrast to explicit contents offer certain deniablility for the speaker, hence he is less, if at all can be held accountable for the hearers understanding the utterance as contributing this inexplicit content to the talk exchange.

I do not want to suggest here, that every single utterance always has these aspects. It

might very well be, that the speaker means just what he says, i.e., that he expresses directly and explicitly the proposition that is determined by the meaning of words he uttered and by either a semantic process of filling values for arguments or by pragmatic processes of adjusting the encoded meaning for the occasion. It seems that none of the three parts discussed above is a necessary part of a meaningful utterance. In our linguistic activities, however, some of them, at least, are surely present.

Let me add at this point a note on speaker meaning, as I have been using various phrases, such as, the speaker conveys, aims to convey, means something, without much clarification. One reason for that is that I wanted to avoid getting into the recent debate on what speaker meaning in fact is at this point of my dissertation.

There is a lot of discussion lately on how one should characterize what it is for a speaker to mean something (Lepore and Stone, 2010; Alston, 2000; Davis, 2007; Green, 2007). The center of this debate is Grice's proposal to understand the total significance of an utterance as something the speaker means in the characterization of which Grice is referring to agents' psychology. Speaker meaning is characterized by the speaker's intention and its recognition by the audience. In case of a declarative sentence or utterance, the speaker means that *p* by uttering utterance *u*, on Grice's view, if and only if, she intends her audience to believe that *p*, intends her audience recognize that the she has such an intention and intends this recognition to be a part of the reason for the audience to form the belief *p* (Grice, 1989, Neale, 1992). To explain these latter two conditions, an often cited example is the case of Herod showing John the Baptist's head to Salome with the intention of inducing the belief in her that John the Baptist is dead. Even though Salome recognizes, or might recognize, this intention of Herod, it has no role, or referring to it is redundant, in inducing the belief that John the Baptist is dead. Consequently, Herod is not meaning that John the Baptist is dead, so Grice (1989) claims. Grice wanted implicatures to be captured by this definition too, i.e. he proposed implicatures to be speaker meant. Characterizing



Figure 1.1:

speaker meaning with this sort of reflexive intention, i.e., an intention which has to be recognized and its recognition has to be a reason for eliciting he effect intended, received much critical discussion and the various divergent accounts of what it is for a speaker to mean something worth a dissertation of its own. No characterization would cast doubt on the various parts of the significance of an utterance I presented so far. Everyone agrees that sometimes we communicate indirectly, we convey more than what we say, and sometimes we communicate the opposite of what our words mean. Disagreement is about whether a particular phenomenon can be described as indirectly meant, not about whether there is such a thing as indirectly meant content. I will get to the details of what speaker meaning is on various conceptions when it will be relevant in discussion of the various theories of metaphorical meaning.

These are all the forms, dimensions or senses of the term 'meaning', illustrated on Figure 1.1, which I will investigate with regards to the question whether metaphors have a meaning.

For the sake of articulating my own view of how metaphorical speech is to be explained, I will contrast it with theories which were formulated within the theoretical framework roughly outlined in this introduction. Let me now go more into the details of each possible views starting with the semantic theories. To anticipate, I am not evaluating the arguments for each possible views in what follows, I am trying to pinpoint the motivation behind them and their general claims. I will raise new challenges to each possible view based on the scrutinized analysis of the notion of perlocution.

1.2.2 Types of Metaphorical Meaning

Metaphorical character

Semantic theories of metaphors had been widely rejected for many years after the topic of metaphor received analytic philosphers' attention in the 1950s. However, with the development of semantics in the late twentieth century as well, particularly with the raise of David Kaplan's (1989) view on indexicals and demonstratives, new possibilities emerged to formulate a semantic explanation of how we use and understand metaphors.

In what follows, I will only focus on these developments. Particularly, I will discuss Michiel Leezenberg (1995) semantic view and Josef Stern's (2000; 2008; 2011) view, who independently from each other, developed a theory of metaphor inspired by Kaplan's works.[8]

Among the reasons many theorist rejected semantic explanations of metaphors were

[8] Those interested in an overview of alternative semantic views should consult Leezenberg 1995 (63-85), and Stern 2008 (264-268).

that metaphors are highly context dependent. Saying of Juliet, form Shakespeare drama, that she is the Sun, and saying the same thing of Achilles of Homer, are quite different things. Treating metaphors as semantic would yield, then, a proliferation of meanings, raising the number of meanings one word can have close to infinity, an undesirable consequence.

Furthermore, semantic theories were blamed for not being able to explain how can the literal meaning of an expression remain active in its metaphorical setting. Whatever is expressed or achieved by saying of the above fictional characters that they are "the Sun", it is dependent on the ordinary meaning of the word "the Sun" and, as Donald Davidson (1978) pointed it out, every adequate theory of metaphors must be able to explain this dependence of a metaphorical expression on the literal meaning of the words it is comprised of. As Stern points out, it is not just the meaning of the individual words that matter but also their combinations. Whether one utters (10) or (11) in a certain context,

(10) Man is a wolf

(11) Wolf is a man,

she expresses quite different metaphorical contents, even though the expressions used are the same, but in different order (see also Stern, 2000, 48-55, 2011, 284).

These two considerations alone can give us an insight why a pragmatic theory, that is, a theory providing explanation for metaphors by referring to pragmatic processes of utterance interpretation was preferred by many authors against the semantic explanation. The context dependence of metaphorical utterances might be better and more economically explained in the pragmatic framework. Also the metaphorical/literal dependence as an adequacy criterion can be met way easier.

David Kaplan's work become crucial in changing the way people were thinking about semantic explanations exactly because his analysis of indexicals and demonstratives

challenged the assumption that context dependent expressions and utterances are best explained with a pragmatic theory. Indexicals like the pronoun 'I' are also highly context sensitive expressions. When uttering

(12) I am hungry;

we express different things; the truth conditions of our utterances will be quite different. I already mentioned that it is because the linguistic meaning of *'I'* can be analyzed as kind of a rule that is known by competent speakers of English; a rule saying that the pronoun depicts the utterer of the sentence. Kaplan called such a rule the "character" of the expression *'I'*.

This character does not vary throughout different *contexts*. In the context of me uttering (12), this character will yield a proposition in the evaluation of which it is crucial that it is about me. If you utter the same sentence, you will be part of the truth evaluable *content*.

Right now, writing these lines, I am not hungry, I just ate. So, the content I would express uttering (12) would be false. However, it is perfectly possible; were circumstances different, say, had I not eaten, that uttering (12) I am expressing my actual hunger, so the extension of my utterance then, in that circumstance would be different.

To grasp the gist of the Kaplanian framework quickly, *character* and *context* yields a truth evaluable *content* or *intension*, which might have different truth values, or *extension* in different *circumstances of evaluation*. The character is indexed to the context, it has empty places to be filled out with values from it. A context is composed of the speaker, the place, the time of the utterance and a possible world. Circumstances of evaluations can be regarded as possible worlds. Contexts, thereby, can be regarded as a subset of circumstances of evaluation.[9]

[9] "The difference between context of utterance and circumstance of evaluation, which is crucial to Kaplan's theory, is a distinction not in ontological status as much as in role or function. In terms of possible-worlds semantics, both may be seen as worlds or situations: the set of possible contexts of utterance is then

Now, it is not only indexicals and demonstratives, but virtually almost all expression types in a language can be analyzed in terms of character, context, content, and circumstance of evaluation. It has to be noted though, that expressions such as *'lion', 'wood', 'bank'* exhibit a far less dependece on a context to establish their content. Establishing what characters are manifested in an utterance yields a form of pre-semantic context dependence. When I hear the sound pattern *'I'*, I will have to decide whether what I heard was the singular first person singular pronoun, or 'eye', or an affirmative 'ai' (Stern, 2000, 62; 2011, 286); that is, I will have to establish what characters are to be ascribed to the sound patterns of an utterance. A similar story can be told about hearing the sound pattern *'bank'*; the hearer has to decide whether she ascribes the character of river bank or that of the financial institute in a given context, and only after that can she establish what content the speaker expressed in the context.

On the current semantic views, it is exactly at this point where we identify a metaphor, and then we interpret it. But, the interpretation will not be different in type than that of the interpretation of the singular first person pronoun once realized that it is what has been uttered. In both cases, the recognized character will pick up values from the context.

However, the way we described the context will need some adjustments, and it is this modification of the notion of context in regards with which semantic theories diverge. Leezenberg (1995) refers to Renate Bartsch's work (Bartsch, 1987), who claimed that, in order to accommodate property expressions into the Kaplanian framework, we need to introduce a *thematic dimension* to the context next to the deictic dimensions of speaker, time and place of the utterance.

The thematic dimension specifies the theme of discourse, or what the discourse is

---

a proper subset of the set of possible circumstances of evaluation, namely those situations where the spaeker is at the place and time of the utterance." Leezenberg (1995, 132-133)

about. This dimension supplies the respect in which adjectives like *good, ugly, bad* apply.[10] That is, property expressions' character, which can be regarded as a *'pre-property'*, is a function from thematic dimensions to properties (Leezenberg, 1995, 142).

Thematic dimensions are sets of properties; however, they are not a closed set. They allow for indefinite further differentiation (Leezenberg, 1995, 141). Also, one might differentiate three types of thematic dimensions. There is an *internal* dimension that comes with expressions by default, particularly with those that are "dimensionally strongly determined", such as the expression 'brave'. Strongly determined adjectives express the same property across all contexts (145). There is an *external* dimension coming in the form of "*predicate-limiting* adverbials", e.g., "John's paper is *stylistically* good", and a *contextual dimension*, which is composed of information from preceding discourse and/or from the extralinguistic context of utterance.

Given all this, Leezenberg's (1995) proposal goes as follows:

> the basic idea is simply that a metaphorical interpretation arises from the application of a property expression in a new thematic dimension d_n. In metaphorical interpretation, the internal dimension of an expression is overruled. To take a simple example
>
> 33) This is a swine
>
> In isolation from a context, (33) does not yet express any specific propositional content. The same sentence type may receive different literal and metaphorical interpretations, depending on both the referent of *this* and on the thematic dimension. By the very same (or at least a very similar) mechanism, contextual features determine both that *this* is interpreted as referring to, say, the extremely

[10] According to Leezenberg, thematic indeterminacy is a rarely noticed form of context-dependence, even though it is semantically important, for applying dimensional difference to the same expression might yield a fallacious argument. Leezenberg (1995) writes:

> Aristotle was already aware of this: in Chapter XX of the Sophistical Refutations (177b14), he argued that it is possible for a good man to be a bad cobbler, but this does not imply that, as a cobbler he is both good and bad: … not being skilful at cobbling, is not the same kind of property as being good as a man, which is a moral property. (140)

> filthy person at whom the speaker is pointing, and that *swine* is interpreted in a thematic dimension other then the default dimension d_i of biological taxa. (145)

Consequently, on this view, metaphorical content is a directly expressed propositional content which is determined by the character of the metaphorically used expression together with the thematic dimension of the context. This propositional content then can be evaluated against various circumstances of evaluations, yielding different extensions.

The conclusion of Josef Stern's account is the same (Stern, 2000, 2007, 2008, 2011), however, he does not rely on Bartsch and Leezenberg stlye extended conception of the context. Instead he is introducing the notion of a distinct metaphorical character, which is "a rule or directive to map a parameter of the context into the content of the metaphor in that context." (Stern, 2009, 270)

For Stern, this rule is represented as an operator, *'Mthat'*, in analogy with Kaplan's *'Dthat'* operator for demonstratives. A demonstrative is an indexical that requires a demonstration to determine its referent. The paradigmatic example is the expression 'this' or 'that' like in Leezenberg's example above. The operator *'Dthat'* when prefixed to an expression turns that expression into a demonstrative, by making the expression itself into a character which picks up its content from the context. For instance, the utterance of (13) can be reformulated into (14)

(13) *That* is better than *that*.

(14) *Dthat*(book to my left) is better than *Dthat*(the book to my right)

Where *Dthat()* captures the demonstration required for the expressions *'that'* to contirbute a particular content in the given context. The same way *Dthat* can be used to capture, Kaplan holds, the demonstration in any definite description or demonstratively used expression. The purpose of Kaplan's theory and the role this operator plays in

resolving problems surrounding direct reference are not crucial for my present purposes.[11]

Suffice it to say that, in analogy to *'Dthat'* capturing the demonstative use of expressions, the operator *'Mthat'* transforms the term or phrase to which it is prefixed into a context sensitive expression according to the following rule:

> For every context c and for every expression ϕ, an occurrence of 'Mthat [ϕ]' in a sentence S (. . . Mthat [ϕ]. . .) in c (directly) expresses a set of properties P presupposed to be m-associated with ϕ in c such that the proposition $\langle$ ... P... $\rangle$ is either true or false in the circumstance of c. (Stern, 2000, 115)

The notion of presupposition and *m*-association goes back to Robert Stalnaker (Stalnaker, 1973) and Max Black's work (1954). The former being "a set of propositions to which a speaker, in making an utterance, commits himself in that, in their absence his utterance would be inappropriate or (as with metaphor) uninterpretable as it is."(Stern, 2008, 273). The notion of *m*-association depicts a set of commonplaces associated with an expression *e*. These commonplaces, according to Black's observation, are more important in the metaphorical interpretation than the definition or the features that are actually true of *e*.

So, for Stern, the metaphorical interpretation is triggered by the recognition of the *Mthat* operator being at work; which then, instead of the regular character of the expression to which it is attached, turns the character into a function picking out properties form the set of associated commonplaces the literal vehicle has.

Again, according to Stern, the recognition of the *Mthat* operator fits into the kind of disambiguation involved in assigning a type to a sound pattern. He writes,

> if I hear the sound pattern '...i...,' I must assign it to the type '...eye ...,' '...I...' or '...aye...' If it is 'aye,' I must in turn disambiguate the two senses of the word type

[11] For a detailed discussion consult (Braun, 2015)

> (that yield two expressions where an expression is a word + meaning): the familiar sense of 'yes' or the affirmative vote or the archaic sense of 'forever or always.' And if the type is the first-person indexical 'I' in turn I must go on to step (v) and assign it a contextually fixed semantic value. (Stern, 2011, 286)

Similarly, once the metaphorical character is assigned through the process of disambiguation as described here, it picks out a contextually fixed semantic value. It won't be as linguistically constrained as it is in the case of the indexical 'I', but very close to the linguistic character of demonstratives, such as *this* or *that*.

Consider the case of uttering:

(15) Achilles is the Sun

(16) Juliet is the Sun

The operator *Mthat* can take the expression 'the Sun' as a value for its argument in both cases.

(15*) Achilles is *Mthat(* the Sun*)*

(16*) Juliet is *Mthat(* the Sun*)*

The Sun metaphor will take different properties from the culturally associated set of commonplaces relative to whether we read it in the Iliad or in Shakespeare's play, once it has been identified that the character is *Mthat(* the Sun*)* for the expression in the utterance. (Cf. Stern 2000; 2006)

One appeal in both Stern's and in Leezenberg's account is that they rely primarily on independently motivated semantic notions of context, character, thematic dimension etc.[12] Utilizing these notions, they can avoid the problems I mentioned at the beginning of this

[12] For more details on the differences between Stern and Leezenberg consult (Leezenberg, 1995, 155-162)

section, namely, the proliferation of meanings for each expression and the need to provide an explanation for the metaphorical-literal dependence. At the same time, providing a robust explanation of how metaphors work in our everyday talk exchanges. On both views, the metaphorical content is a directly expressed propositional content the determination of which is governed by linguistic rules.

Other than that, I wouldn't like to go into the details of their arguments that support the existence of metaphorical character, for my strategy in the upcoming chapters will be to raise general difficulties for treating metaphor as semantic phenomena based on a new analysis of the pictorial dimension of metaphors. Let me now turn to the pragmatic views.

The Gricean Theory

There is an interesting consequence of explaining metaphors work in the semantic fashion outlined above. Namely, that our natural way of describing the metaphorical speaker as

(17) he did not *meant* what he *said*

(18) he wasn't speaking literally

seems inappropriate. If the metaphorical meaning or content is directly expressed, such a talk is out of place. But it feels overly natural to describe the metaphorical speaker by using either (17) or (18).

Based on this natural way of describing metaphorical speech, there needs to be a difference, and there need to be some kind of indirectness, or non-explicitness in conveying content through metaphorical speech. We must have an explanation of why it is natural to describe metaphorical speech in terms of indirectness illustrated in (17) (Cf. Camp, 2006).

I distinguish three types of Gricean approaches to metaphorical speech. The first being the original version of the theory put forward by Grice in his *Logic of Conversation*

(1989). It's not a full blown theory though. The two other types of Gricean theories can be differentiated regarding their approach to the phenomenon of metaphor. That is, based on whether they modify the general Gricean conceptual framework about communication and—as a consequence—develop an account of figurative speech akin to that of the original (cf. Searle, 1979; Bach and Harnish, 1979, etc.), or they start with their own analysis of metaphor and reformulate the theory preserving the main insights of it (Camp, 2003, 2006). I will focus on the original version of the theory, and Elisabeth Camp's theory. To justify this move, suffice it to say that it is Camp's theory and the original version are in the center of current debates (Wearing, 2006; Stern, 2007; Lepore and Stone, 2010; Stern, 2006).

The well known *Logic and Conversation* of Grice (1989) is based on the observation that much of the things we communicate to each other in talk exchanges can be explained as being dependent on our mutual tacit knowledge of the principles and maxims that govern human behavior generally, and communication in particular. That is, we don't just utilize our linguistic competence when we interpret each other.

The Cooperative Principle, is the governing principle for conversations , according to Grice, which requires the contribution to a talk exchange to be in harmony with its general direction and purpose, as I have already discussed earlier by looking at Ann and Bob's conversation.

In addition to this principle, Grice (1989) distinguishes four maxims or sub-maxims. These are; the maxim of *Quality*, that is, one should not say what he believes to be false or, for which he lacks enough evidence. The maxim of *Quantity* requires the speaker to give only appropriate amount of information, not more, not less. The maxim of *Manner*, according to which one should be brief, organized, shall avoid ambiguity and obscurity. The maxim of *Relation* requires the whole contribution to be appropriate (27-8).

Now, *particularized conversational implicature* arises when one observes the Cooperative Principle, but does not comply[13] to some of the sub-maxims. The most famous example is the letter of recommendation for a job applicant sent by a professor with not enough or not proper information about the candidate. In that case, the professor clearly observed the Cooperative Principle, however, he was floating, that is "blatantly failing to fulfill", the maxim of quantity by not giving sufficiently enough information about the candidate. Thereby, he was implicating that the candidate is not good enough for the job.

A similar story is told about irony and metaphors although the relevant maxim is that of the Quality. Grice wrote

> It is perfectly obvious to A and his audience that what A said or has made as if to say, strictly speaking, is something he does not believe, and the audience knows that A knows that it is obvious to the audience. So, unless A's utterance is entirely pointless, A must be trying to get across some other proposition than the one he purports to be putting forward. This must be some obviously related proposition [...] Examples like *You are the cream in my coffee* characteristically involve categorical falsity, so the contradictory of what the speaker made as if to say will, strictly speaking, be a truism; so it cannot be *that* that the speaker trying to get across. The most likely supposition is that the speaker is attributing to his audience some feature or features in respect of which the audience resembles (more or less fancifully) the mentioned substance. (1989, 34)

These conversational implicatures have certain general features. They might be indeterminate, they are not part of the meaning of the expression to which they attach, and their truth is not required for what has been said to be true, and, most importantly, they are deniable.

It is exactly at this point where direct expression views object to the Gricean analysis. If the metaphorical meaning was a conversational implicature such that it is deniable, it

[13] There are several different ways to not to comply with the maxims which I will not discuss in detail here.

would be hard to explain that we are able to express our agreement or disagreement with a metaphorical content, very much along the same lines we express our agreement with literal statements. Consider the following conversation of a group of people trying to decide who shall be the next departmental chair:

> A: How about Bill?
>
> B: Bill is a bulldozer.
>
> A: That's true. But isn't that a good thing in this case? We want someone who will stand up to the administration and get things for our department.
>
> C: I disagree that he is a bulldozer; that exterior hides someone who's basically insecure. But either way, Bill wouldn't make a good chair. (Bezuidenhout, 2001, 156-7)

Now, compare this with the below talk exchange concerning a candidate's ability to perform well in a philosophy job;

> D: How about Mr. X?
>
> E: "Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular."
>
> F:* I disagree that he is not apt for the requirement of this role.

So it seems that B's meaning "got lodged to his words" (Cf. Hills, 1997) in ways that E's meaning will never get lodged to her words. Bezuidenhout (2001) even goes further and claims that without there being a directly asserted content in B's utterance it would be hard to understand both A and B's response to it.

Camp (2008) agrees with this claim to some extent. Discussing Romeo's metaphor

(19) Juliet is the Sun

She writes that Romeo, by his metaphor, put himself "down on record as committed to some content, and thereby" made himself "responsible for justifying its truth if challenged" (Camp, 2008, 10). That is, he asserted something about Juliet as opposed to putting her

and the Sun just next to each other in order to give a hint to some similarities. Indeed, there is no such commitment for many of the conversational implicatures. Furthermore, usually when the speaker denies an indirectly communicated content, he retreats to what he said, the explicit proposition he contributed to the talk exchange. Consider the ironical utterance of

(20) That just shows that they know very well what they are doing.

The speaker of (20) can be taken to be meaning the exact opposite. Yet, when challenged, he can claim that all he meant was, indeed, that they know very well what they are doing. The utterer of (19), however, has nothing to go back to as being communicated in the conversation he was engaged in. It is possible for the speaker to deny a particular metaphorical content, yet if he does not offer an alternative interpretation for his utterance, his denial of the implicature will either make the original utterance incomprehensible as it stands or will count as denying that the speaker wanted to communicate at all (Cf. Bezuidenhout, 2001, Camp, 2013). All this suggests that the metaphorical content is not an implicated content, instead it is a directly expressed content.

Moreover, Camp also points out that metaphors have propositional contents which serve to affect speech acts other than assertions.

> [S]uppose a friend were to exhort [Walt] Whitman to social engagement by saying 'Oh Walt, be a spider and cast out your thread! Linger not alone on the precipice!' Then he would not just be trying to *cause* Whitman to think about himself and his social interactions from *a certain perspective.* Rather, he would be recommending that Whitman undertake certain actions, ones which might be difficult to specify in literal terms, but which have genuine conditions of satisfaction nonetheless. (Camp, 2008, 12-3; italics added [G. S.])

However, all this does not render it implausible to talk about metaphor in terms of indirectness. For we do much of our everyday speech acts indirectly, while we can still

report them in a direct manner. Camp (2006) borrows an example form Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (1997) to support this point.

> Suppose a professor is asked whether Alice passed her exam, and responds by saying:
>
> [21] I didn't fail any students.
>
> Then [21'] would be a natural report of the professor's utterance:
>
> [21'] The professor said that Alice passed her exam.
>
> But everyone agrees that the content attributed in [21'] should count as a mere implicature of [21]. (Camp, 2006, 285)[14]

That is, based on reports on what has been said, exemplified by (21'), one cannot conclusively argue for the expression of a direct propositional content. Camp(2006,2008) formulates more arguments against treating the metaphorical meaning as a direct content; I am not going to the details of these here for my present purpose is just to indicate what conceptions of metaphorical meaning are available. Interestingly though, Camp does not conclude that the metaphorical content would be an implicature. Still it's not a directly conveyed propositional content either, in as much as it depends on a felt difference between what the speaker said and what he meant. Camp (2014) proposes to conceive the metaphorical meaning as an indirect though primary content which shares some features of implicatures while passing some test that are used to distinguish explicit content from the implicit ones.

Furthermore, Camp claims that, what was meant by the speaker in the case of metaphors is usually worked out by the audience accepting the invitation of the speaker to cultivate a certain perspective about the things mentioned in the metaphor. She writes,

[14] For more examples to the same effect consult Camp (2006, 293-299)

> Speakers intend for their hearers to recover their metaphorical content, I claim, by way of cultivating a state of 'seeing-as'; an utterance counts as metaphorical just in case the speaker intends that her hearer recover her communicative content this way. (Camp, 2003, Sec. 1.4)

In concluding, we can safely say that Camp (2003, 2006, 2008, 2013) introduces a new form of indirectly—that is, inexplictly— conveyed propositional content to that which we have already discussed in the first part of this chapter. This new propositional content is indirect but one that does not share all the features of implicatures and can be regarded as a primary content. She is doing so, partly, on the basis of showing that the criteria the direct expression views provide for establishing that the metaphorical content is a direct propositional content cannot be used conclusively (Camp, 2006) to show just that.[15] Based on those criteria many paradigmatic example of implicatures could be treated as part of what has been said by an utterance. Let me turn now to the pragmatic direct expression views in more detail.

Communicative Relevance and Metaphors

The direct expression views, as I mentioned, come in two forms. One is the semantic view which I have already discussed; the other is a pragmatic one, to which now I turn. There are many authors developing a pragmatic direct expression view, and here I do not want to go into the details and all the important nuanced differences one could establish between them. Basically, all such views deny the indirectness of metaphorical meaning and also break down the distinction between the metaphorical and the literal as traditionally conceived.

The background of all such theories is the relevance theoretic approach to utterance interpretation. To recap briefly, an utterance is treated in the relevance theoretic framework

[15] Camp's (2014) argument for this account of metaphorical meaning based on her view on perspectives employed in metaphors will be the topic of the next chapter

as and evidence of meaning from which the speaker is to infer the explicature, or direct content and also to relevant implicatures as well, given the contextual background available. Implicatures and explicatures are identified at the same time, although there might be differences how the inference actually works (Cf. Recanati 2002). Part of this inference of communicated content is a process called *ad hoc concept construction*, by means of which a linguistically encoded concept is either narrowed down, or loosened up to include things the encoded concept with its strict linguistic meaning does not apply to. Again, there are many version of this theory. The main idea is that metaphorical meaning can be treated on the level of explicatures and that the metaphorical use of language is continuous with the non-metaphorical one in that with regards to utterance interpretation it is the same processes which are at work, ad hoc concept construction and pragmatic inferences, but taking different degrees, in both cases.

Here is an illustrating example form Carston (2010); she claims that the utterance of:

(22) The water is boiling.

> could be intended and understood in any of the following ways: *strictly literally*, communicating that the water is BOILING, so at or above boiling point; as an *approximation*, communicating that it is close enough to BOILING for the differences to be inconsequential for current purposes (e.g. for making a cup of coffee); *hyperbolically*, so not BOILING but closer to it than expected or desired (e.g. too hot to wash one's hands in comfortably); or *metaphorically*, suggesting, for instance, that the water, although not necessarily anywhere near boiling point, is moving agitatedly, bubbling, emitting vapour, and so on. In each case, a different concept is communicated, all of them derived from the literal encoded concept, and on the non-literal interpretations the concept's denotation is broader to varying degrees than that of the lexical concept.(303-4)

Carston (2010), however, acknowledges that this might not provide the full explanation of how metaphors work. She brings up several examples to show that something more is required to have a full account of metaphors. Consider the following (Carston 2010, 309)

[23] Depression, in Karla's experience, was a dull, inert thing–a toad that squatted wetly on your head until it finally gathered the energy to slither off. The unhappiness she had been living with for the last ten days was a quite different creature. It was frantic and aggressive. It had fists and fangs and hobnailed boots. It didn't sit, it assailed. It hurt her.

Carston (2010) points out that it seems implausible that the hearer went through all the different concept constructions required for understanding (20). That is that the hearer went through constructing TOAD*, SQUAT-ON-YOUR-HEAD*,CREATURE*, FISTS*, FRANTIC*, FANGS*, HOB-NAILEDBOOTS*. Consequently she argues for a different process being present for these and similar examples. The linguistic meaning evokes a certain imagery which is then further developed in the recovery of the content of the utterance. This process takes place when the concept construction guided by relevance is too costly, or takes too much effort.

It is interesting, however, that even though Carston (2010) suggests that this imagery developing pragmatic process triggered by the literal meaning of the utterance in a context results in implicatures, and, as opposed to this, the modulation process yields explicit contents, these two routes might interact in some cases. Furthermore, that the second way of processing is always there for the hearers to search for further implicatures. Carston (2010) writes

> The first (ad hoc concept) route delivers an explicitly communicated (speaker-meant) propositional content, while imagery is often just an incidental effect; on the second route, speaker-meant propositional content is implicated (often weakly), while the literal meaning and the imagery it evokes play a more dominant role than on the first route. However, what all cases of metaphor have in common is that the second processing route is always available - literal meaning is always there to be searched further for relevant implications about the topic and, similarly, the imagery evoked is available for further 'looking' and 'noticing'. (320)

This is particularly interesting because she endorses the idea that the evocation of imagery through language use is a perlocutionary effect in Austin's (1962) sense, which she exemplifies with mental responses such as being amused, comforted, hurt, etc. (Carston

2010, 318). These effects, emphashizes Carston, even when they are intentionally produced, the intention to produce them will not be a reason for the hearer to be amused, etc.; hence they are not communicated. Carston (2010) writes

> This is interesting because it would follow that, in some cases, the most powerful and memorable effects of a metaphor do not fall within [...] communicated content at all and so, strictly speaking, lie outside the domain of a pragmatic theory.

And then she adds

> However, as well as being attended to for its own sake, imagery may function as a source of thoughts about the metaphor topic that *do* fall within the author's overtly intended meaning and the author may intend or, at least, expect the imagery to be so used.

At this point, it is unclear to me why Carston (2010) does not draw to conclusion that the evocation of imagery cannot be a prelocutionary effect. No effect of an utterance can be both intention irrelevant and be produced in a way that the recognition of the intention to produce it provides a reason for the effect to be realized. How is it possible for the imagery to be intention irrelevant yet still function as "source" of communicated thoughts? If it is not the imagery but the thoughts provoked by the imagery which are communicated, how can that exactly be if the imagery itself is not? I will address these questions in more details once I discussed the notion of perlocution in Chapter 3 and the effect of metaphors in Chapter 2.

"The Dark Side"

William P. Lycan (2000) called that part of the literature on metaphor "The Dark side" in whose work one can find a denial of any special meaning or metaphorical cognitive significance whatsoever to metaphors. They are also referred as the non-cognitivist, or causal theories. As I mentioned in the introduction, this view goes back to Aristotle, but it was the view of the positivist and neo-positivist movements of the early 20th century as

well. Donald Davidson (1978) and Richard Rorty (1987) also endorsed it. Quite recently Ernest Lepore and Matthew Stone (2010) proposed a new version of this view.

Primarily, the focus of the non-cognitivist views of the late 20th century is to identify how metaphors work. In explaining how metaphors function, according to the non-cognitivist, it is of very little help to say that they convey a metaphorical meaning. No matter whether that meaning is direct or indirect, such an explanation is like, as Davidson (1978) puts, explaining why a drug puts you to sleep by referring to its "dormative power." The effect metaphors have on us, is more important. To use Carston's (2010) argument from above, it is precisely because the effect of metaphors "do not fall within" the category of communicated content, either because it is a perlocutionary effect (Davidson, 1978), or because it groups better with other phenomena, such as jokes or trash talking (Lepore and Stone, 2010) or bird songs (Rorty and Hesse, 1987).

Consequently, non-cognitivists do not deny that there is a point in a metaphor, nor that it can lead to special insights. They deny that those insights will be the meaning of the metaphor in any of the earlier discussed senses. For Davidson, what is important about a metaphor is that it causes the audience to notice things, to see something from a new perspective which is merely prompted by the literal meaning of the expressions used in the metaphorical utterance. This perspective, and what we notice, on Davidson's view, is not a meaning, it is just not the same type of phenomena. The particular arguments are not important for my present purposes, for an excellent summary on them consult Reimer (2001) and Camp (2013).[16] This type of causal theory of metaphors was taken to the extreme by Richard Rorty (Rorty and Hesse, 1987).

Lepore and Stone (2010) criticize the Davidsonian view, but at the same time they

[16] Camp distinguishes two versions of a Davidsonian theory of metaphors. The one outlined here is the most referred radical version. It is possible to reconstruct a view from Davidson's work which is very close to the Gricean view, for more details consult Camp (2013)

agree with the approach to metaphors. In their view, metaphor has no meaning, because the speaker's intention in using the metaphor is not to contribute a particular information to the talk exchange she participates in; rather she wants to get the audience to create an imagery and explore its consequences. It will be a joint venture of both the hearer and the speaker, and must be recognized as such by both participants. For Lepore and Stone (2010) metaphor is closer to jokes and puns. The point of a joke, or what is funny in it, is not something meant by the speaker in any of the above detailed senses of meaning. It is just something that falls out of the scope of the conceptual framework developed to capture the meaningful parts of our conversations. I will provide more details of Lepore and Stone's (2010) view in Chapter Four.

On the face of it, a perlocutionary account of metaphors would align with the non-cognitivist view. Recall at this point Carston's (2010) reasoning who wrote that, in as much as perlocutionary effects are intention irrelevant, they fall out of the scope of the study of communication. Consequently, if metaphors main feature is to elicit a perlocutionary effect, metaphors are not part of the study of communication. Carston (2010) did not provide a full analysis of what perlocutions are, she just mentioned a couple of examples and the feature that the effects exemplified are intention irrelevant, i.e., the recognition of the intention to produce a certain effect is not a reason for the appearance of the effect in a given situation. Also, while she endorses the perlocutionary status of metaphor's effect, she still holds that there are communicated contents of metaphorical utterances depending on that perlocutionary effect without much explanation of how is that possible. My aim in this dissertation is to show exactly that based on a scrutinized analysis of the notion of perlocution.

Before turning to the effect of metaphors and its nature in the next chapter, let me anticipate a rough sketch of the theory I would like to propose once that analysis is provided. First, I think that the non-cognitivist analysis of metaphor have certain appeal.

The inspiration of the theory I aim to develop originates from Davidson's original proposal. However, the non-cognitivist conclusion that metaphorical speech falls out of the scope of regular talk exchanges and groups instead with trash talking and joking, and so on, I find far fetched. Just as in the case of Carston's (2010) reasoning, there is a limited interpretation of what role perlocutionary effects can play in our talk exchanges behind the genuine non-cognitivist views.

I am in agreement with Camp's claim that metaphorical speech is correctly described as saying one thing and meaning something else. I only dissent with her analysis of metaphorical speech, particularly with the claim that it should and can be analyzed in terms of illocutions, i.e., that metaphors always serve to undertake speech acts with propositional contents. I don't think this claim is, or can be, universally true.

The perlocutionary theory I will propose is a hybrid theory which can accommodate both a non-cognitivist analysis of metaphor while, at the same time, show how is it possible to use metaphors in speech acts with more or less definite propositional contents. It is crucial for such a theory to reevaluate the place and role perlocutionary effects play in our everyday talk exchanges.

I already mentioned too many times the notion of illocution and perlocution without any explicit definition for my reader to be curious about what exactly I mean by them. This will be the topic of the third chapter. In what follows, first I will present how metaphors pictorial effect is described by some prominent proponents of the various kind of theories I discussed here. Then, I will discuss the notion of perlocution and illocution and I will show that, on all the descriptions provided, the claim that perspectival effect of metaphors is a perlocutionary effect is true. After that, I will defend the claim against objections that can be found in the literature which will be followed by a summary of theses endorsed by this perlocutionary theory.

Chapter 2

The Effect of Metaphors

The phrase, "verbal imagery", ...seems to be a metaphor for metaphor itself.

Richard Moran

In the previous chapter, I provided an outline of the various options one can have if she ascribes meaning to metaphors. I went through and presented the various readings of the term 'meaning', and grouped the current theories of metaphors based on the type of meaning they identify as special meaning for this figure of speech. I also discussed the view according to which there is no meaning to metaphors whatsoever beyond the literal meaning of the uttered sentence. In closing, I introduced my claim that these theories don't provide a proper analysis of metaphor's imagistic effect and that they fail to recognize its perlocutionary nature. In this chapter, therefore, I will go through how the various theories analyze this effect of metaphor, before introducing in more detail what I will call the *Perlocution Claim*.

Ever since the publication of Max Black's seminal paper on metaphor (Black, 1954) a lively discussion has been devoted to this particular effect of metaphors, the description of which varies from author to author. Some call it 'picturing', 'imagistic' or 'framing'

effect (Guttenplan, 2005; Moran, 1989; Stern, 2008). Others talk about metaphors in terms of 'aspect seeing', 'brainstorming', 'imaginative play', etc. (Camp, 2008; Hills, 2008; Reimer, 2008; Walton, 2005). Despite the—sometimes merely verbal—differences in the descriptions of the effect, most contemporary theories endorse it as an important aspect of metaphorical speech, or even claim that the picturing effect is part of the cognitive import, if not the total significance or meaning, of this trope.

In this chapter, I will present different characterizations of the effect and I will also discuss the role this effect plays in the divergent explanations of the phenomenon of metaphors. I will only pick a few emblematic authors from each type of theory I presented in the previous chapter and discuss their analysis of the imagistic dimension of metaphors. Particularly, I will present Davidson's view for the non-cogintivist part. Then I will go into the details of the pragmatic theories' conception. After that, I will present how Josef Stern analyzes the pictorial effect in his semantic theory. Lastly, I touch upon how the pragmatic direct expression views and Robyn Carston (2010) incorporate this effect into their account of metaphors, before I recap the features of the perspectival effect.

To anticipate, I will not try to stick consistently to a single name for this effect of metaphors, as you might have already noticed. That would make this chapter a very unpleasant read. Nothing hinges here on how exactly the effect of metaphors is called, 'imagistic', 'pictorial', 'poetic', 'framing', 'perspectival' or what you have. Some emphasize the imagistic aspect, e.g., Carston (2010), others talk more in terms of perspectives, e.g. (Camp, 2014, 2008). I doubt that any informative distinction between the two camp can be drawn, partly because the description of this very effect itself is metaphorical. For instance, Camp (2008) makes the claim that metaphor comprehension does not literally involve seeing Juliet in any way at all, but that what happens in thought is a similar to what happens in perception when someone sees a gestalt figure. On the

other hand, on Carston's view, it is not simply that metaphors evoke images instead of concepts, but they evoke images so that further inferences can be drawn to arrive at implicatures. These further inferences cannot come but from "seeing" the contextually relevant situation through that image, which again will lead us to something like a Gestalt experience in thought. In other words, most of the claims divergent views make about how metaphors' effect is playing a role in how we communicate with metaphors can be rephrased into each others terminology without endangering the major claims of those theories on metaphorical meaning. But I've run too far forward.

I will refrain, though, from using the term 'poetic', because the phrase 'poetic effects' actually can include many other things than an imagistic or perspectival effect. Also, I will avoid using the phrase 'pictorial' because that might suggest a very close connection between pictures and metaphors; which, as we shall see, might be misleading. In the literature on metaphor, there is no agreement either on what terminology to use. The various authors speak, sometimes very loosely, about aspect seeing, perspective shifts, picturing etc. I will touch upon, as I proceed in this chapter, what all these descriptions aim to designate.

2.1 *"Seeing as is not seeing that"*

Undoubtedly, one of the most discussed views on the perspectival effect of metaphors in the late 20th century was Donald Davidson's, who, as I have mentioned in the previous chapter, put a radical emphasis on this distinctive feature of metaphor. It is rather emblematic how he (Davidson, 1978) characterizes the effect of metaphors:

> metaphor *makes us attend to some likeness*, often a novel or surprising likeness, between two or more things (34)
>
> Metaphor and simile are merely two among endless devices that serve to *alert us to aspects of the world* by inviting us to make comparisons. (40)

> No doubt metaphors often *make us notice aspects* of things we did not notice before; no doubt they *bring surprising analogies and similarities to our attention*; they do provide a kind of lens or lattice, as Black says, through which we view the relevant phenomena. The issue does not lie here but in the question of *how the metaphor is related to what it makes us see.* (45, italics added)

One could see this last question of Davidson as, basically, giving the theme of the discourse on metaphors for many years after the appearance of *What Metaphors Mean.* According to Davidson, the 'induction of a perspective' is just something that differs from the 'conveyance of meaning' of ordinary expressions. He borrows an analogy from aspect seeing to elaborate further on what he has in mind,

> What we notice or see is not, in general, propositional in character. [...]if I show you Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit, and I say, "It's a duck," then with luck you see it as a duck; if I say, "It's a rabbit," you see it as a rabbit. But no proposition expresses what I have led you to see. [...] Seeing as is not seeing that. Metaphor makes us see one thing as another by making some literal statement that inspires or prompts the insight. Since in most cases what the metaphor prompts or inspires is not entirely, or even at all, recognition of some truth or fact, the attempt to give literal expression to the content of the metaphor is simply misguided. (47)

So, for Davidson, this 'seeing-as' effect is not compatible with metaphors conveying a distinct meaning over and beyond the linguistic meaning of the expression uttered.[1]

Almost everyone was countering Davidson's claim that the relation of the metaphorical utterance, and what it makes us see, cannot be that of the relation of 'meaning' to an utterance of a sentence. The objections come from different directions; almost as many as the layers of 'meaning' I discussed in the previous chapter. Strangely enough, many theorist thought, at the same time, that Davidson *'put his finger'* on this effect of metaphors correctly, and his insight of relating metaphor's effect to aspect seeing and images is a correct one (Stern, 2000; Moran, 1989; Camp, 2003). Taking into consideration the below examples will shed some light on why this part of Davidson's view is compelling,

[1] For a detailed reconstruction of Davidson's arguments for his non-cognitivist conclusion consult Reimer (2001).

a) Depression, in Karla's experience, was a dull, inert thing–a toad that squatted wetly on your head until it finally gathered the energy to slither off. The unhappiness she had been living with for the last ten days was a quite different creature. It was frantic and aggressive. It had fists and fangs and hobnailed boots. It didn't sit, it assailed. It hurt her. (Carston, 2010, 309)

b) Virginia Woolf said that a highbrow is "a man or women of thoroughbred intelligence who rides his mind at a gallop across the country in pursuit of an idea." (Davidson, 1978, 38)

c) The fog comes
on little cat feet.

It sits looking
over harbor and city
on silent haunches
and then moves on.
(Carl Sandburg, 'Fog')

Clearly, there is something, or a lot, we notice or "see" which is different from simply understanding a content, say, that there was a fog in the city, considering example c) above, or that Karla was overwhelmed by depression considering example a). Before I go into the details of Davidson's opposition in explaining how this additional aspect is related to a notion of metaphorical meaning, let me go further in investigating the sense in which seeing an aspect, or inducing a new perspective on something can be relevant to metaphors.

2.1.1 Metaphor and Aspect Seeing

If you take the following metaphor from the popular song *Seven Nation Army* of the rock band *White Stripes*

And I'm bleeding, and I'm bleeding, and I'm bleeding,
Right before the lord,
All the words are gonna bleed from me,
And I will think no more.

it appears natural to say that uttering, or singing, these words Jack White made us see him as bleeding words, that he made us notice that he is, or will be, suffering through uttering the last of his words in his confession, and he will have nothing more to say, remaining dead silent. All these would definitely be missing, had he just uttered, or sung, that

> I will say just a couple more words
> and I will think no more

I don't want to imply here, though, that the meaning or the content of the Jack White's metaphor is that he will say just a few more words.

Despite the attractiveness of talking in terms of visual experience, particularly of aspect seeing, it is still hard to get a firm grip on what actually happened. For, literally, we cannot see Jack White as being in the state of bleeding words. Words are just not the proper objects of bleeding. It is hard to tell what such a veridical experience would be like. As G. Neville Kemp (1991) pointed out,

> [...] aspect-seeing concerns the interpretation and organization of visual stimulation, based on correlations already learned; it takes place only when something available to visual inspection duplicates, to the requisite degree, the visual stimulation one would receive if one were actually seeing an object of such and such a kind. Hence both things must be the sorts of things that can have visual aspects; more generally, one can perceive one thing as another only if both are capable of being perceived within the same sense modality. (86)

Words when uttered are waves in the air which reach the eardrums of the hearer and make them oscillate. Although it is possible to read off the words from someone's mouth without hearing anything; uttered words belong to the auditory sensory modality. Whereas 'bleeding' is primarily, though not exclusively, associated with visual experiences. This is not to say that you cannot conjure up an image of someone bleeding words, but that would be a different claim. Also, taken a bit out of context, 'bleeding words' can be used to talk about writing, in which case maybe talking about the phenomenon of 'seeing-as' might be appropriate.

It must also be apparent by now that the thesis that metaphorical expressions make us see one thing as another is a metaphor, or metaphorical, in itself (cf. Moran, 1989; Kemp, 1991; Camp, 2003; Stern, 2000). Given this much, any explanation of metaphor referring to this effect should be careful how much explanatory work is done by the effect. The best one can do is to use aspect-seeing, or Gestalt-psychology as an analogy to shed some light on what is happening when we understand a metaphor. But one needs to be careful in doing so because it might happen that we are just giving another name to the same phenomenon, i.e. metaphor.

As a result, one might also resort then to the claim that the effect of metaphors is to invite us to make comparisons. The problem with this description of the effect might be that we don't always have all the things available that we need to compare. The same type of examples that give rise to doubts about the involvement of aspect-seeing in metaphor comprehension can also be used to challenge the idea of comparisons prompted by metaphors. Even though we can easily compare the utterance of words to bleeding, it's much harder to see what would be the relevant comparison for metaphors such as the "mind's eye", "the rubies and pearls of a loving eye" (cf. Tirrell, 1991).

Despite all these difficulties, many people accepted that aspect seeing, even if in a metaphorical sense, has something to do with metaphors, particularly with metaphorical comprehension. They elaborate on the idea according to which when we understand a metaphor something happens which is a lot like what happens when we see the duck-rabbit gestalt figure as a duck and then/or as a rabbit. Let us go now into the details of the analogies they provide.

2.2 Seeing that through Seeing-as

Davidson (1978) argued that metaphors, belonging "exclusively to the domain of use", require a pragmatic explanation. That is, in our linguistic competence, syntactic or semantic, there is nothing, except the literal meaning of the words uttered, to which we could refer in our explanation of why exactly a certain perspective with its content was evoked. To capture the similarities, to take on the lens, so to say, we have to also look at the contextual information available at the time of the metaphorical utterance.

Many philosophers have agreed with the claim that metaphors require a pragmatic explanation, e.g., Marie Bergmann (1982), Richard Moran (1989) and Elisabeth Camp (2003, 2008, 2014), just to name a few. Many of them also agreed with the claim that the words in the metaphorically used sentence do not have any other special meaning than their literal meaning. But, based on H. P. Grice's (1989) works on pragmatics, they pointed out that the linguistic meaning of the words in a sentence is not the only type of meaning there is when we explain human communication. Pragmatic theories claim that metaphorical meaning falls under the category of indirect or implicated meaning. What metaphor makes us see can be related to this indirect meaning in different ways, as we shall see in what follows.

The exact arguments against non-cognitivism of any of the above mentioned authors are not important for my purposes in this chapter[2]. All I would like to discuss in what follows is the afterlife of the Davidsonian view on metaphor's effect. Almost all of Davidson's opponents in this pragmatic camp accept—without much modification—the description of the effect of metaphors as provided by Davidson; and that they import it, with some change with regards to the role they ascribe to it, into their own account.

[2]For a detailed discussion see Camp and Reimer (2006)

Let's see first the Gricean pragmatic views. Marie Bergmann (1982), one of the first proponents of such a view, writes

> A metaphor has *organizing power* if it influences our orientation toward a subject matter.(243)

and then she clarifies what she means by 'organizing power' here:

> A metaphor may highlight certain aspects of a subject while obscuring others. Here, I think, is the heuristic value in thinking of the understanding of certain metaphors as being akin to "seeing-as": metaphors sometimes give us a new orientation toward a familiar subject matter, making us revise, ignore, or even forget, beliefs that went along with the old orientation. (Bergmann, 1982, 243-244)

Now, Bergmann (1982) does not put strong theoretical emphasis on the perspectival aspect of metaphors as does Davidson himself, and, as we shall soon see, some other critics of him. For her, metaphor can either be assertoric or non-assertoric, to this latter category, she refers to as 'insightful use'. A metaphorical utterance, depending on the purpose of the speaker, can be used, among many other things, just to realize its 'organizing power' and thereby to shed a new light on its subject.

When a metaphor is assertoric, it has a propositional content. According to Bergmann, however, this propositional content is not the content which could be determined on the basis of the linguistic meaning and the context of the utterance, i.e. it is not an explicit content of the uttered sentence. Still, it is something the speaker has meant.

Take, for example, the most common metaphor in the philosophical literature, i.e.

> *Richard is a lion.*

When figuring out the metaphorically asserted content, we don't necessarily think about lions as a biological species. Instead, we choose from properties that we culturally associate with lions, such as bravery, nobility, goodness and what you have. Most of our linguistic expressions have such "salient characteristics" associated with them, according

to Bergmann, and the salience of such characteristics, actually, varies from context to context. They can vary from person to person, but there are culturally bound beliefs in salient characteristics (cf. Black, 1954, 1979).

For Bergmann (1982), then, the content of a metaphor or

> ...the proposition that we take to be asserted is a direct function of salient characteristics associated with (at least) part of the expression. And as what is salient varies, so do the propositions that a sentence, taken as a metaphor, may successfully be used to assert. (238)

Now, my only concern with contrasting the assertoric use of a metaphor and the insightful use, the latter being distinguished by metaphor's 'organizing power', is that Bergmann fails to exclude this "power" of metaphor's from those factors that can influence salience of certain characteristics in a given context. As we have seen, metaphor comprehension, in being akin to 'seeing-as', might involve restructuring our beliefs. And those beliefs are, or might be, part of the context towards which the proposition as a function is directed to pick out the salient characteristics. If Bergmann wants to maintain that it is only for certain type of metaphors where the heuristic of 'seeing-as' can work, she must somehow exclude the organizing power from the set of factors that can modify salience in a given context.

Let me illustrate the point here with an example borrowed from Bergmann. She writes,

> One salient characteristic associated with 'encyclopedia' is a property of being a source of information. Thus I can use 'Marie is an encyclopedia' to attribute that property to Marie, to assert that Marie knows lots of things.

How exactly we get to that asserted content from attributing the property of being a reliable source of information is far from clear. But, more importantly, this metaphor is just as much about Mary as about encyclopedias. Using the term 'encyclopedia' metaphorically of Marie, the speaker is actually highlighting certain aspects of her and influences our orientation towards her by its "organizing power." I don't think that

attributing any properties stereotypically associated with encyclopedias to Mary can be independent of this "organizing power." But then the Davidsonian might be spot on in pointing out that it is the "organizing power" and not the meaning which does the explanatory work in accounting for how metaphors "work their wonders."

Richard Moran (1989), another proponent of the pragmatic view along Gricean lines, formulates a similar difficulty for everyone who incorporates what he calls "the framing effect" into their theory. He writes

> To call someone a tail-wagging lapdog of privilege is not simply to make an assertion of his enthusiastic submissiveness. Even a pat metaphor deserves better than this, and such an analysis is not essentially improved by tacking on an open-ended list of further dog-predicates that may possibly be part of the metaphor's meaning. Hence it becomes attractive at this point to insist that the comprehension of the metaphor involves seeing this person as a lapdog, and in some detail, experiencing his dogginess. This is what a successful metaphor pulls off, and this image-making quality is what lies behind both the force and the unparaphrasability of poetic metaphor. (Moran, 1989, 90)

Moran investigates further the relation between metaphors and pictures, metaphors and the perspective they induce. He distinguishes between two senses of the pictorial dimension of metaphors. The first is an experiential sense. According to this, we do indeed see the things as they are presented by metaphors. Moran (1989) writes:

> It is almost as if the imagistic "seeing" of metaphor comprehension really involved one's seeing things that way, that is, believing them to be that way, which would give us no way to distinguish between understanding a metaphorical assertion and believing it. (91)

We have seen already the difficulties coming from this view of the perspectival effect of metaphors. On the second reading of metaphor's pictorial dimension, a metaphorical expression evokes an image before the "mind's eye." This second reading, however, gets rejected by Moran, who points out that there is much more to metaphors then simply providing a picture. He highlights two problems with this second view. The first is that there might be items which are hard to picture, for example, the "mind's eye" itself.

Secondly, according to Moran, a metaphor is "semantically articulate" in a way that a mental image is not. This is because an image, in Moran's view, cannot tell us, what is being imagined as what. Finally, the endlessness of paraphrase discards this version of image theory as well. There cannot really be a picture that could depict all the things that an interpretation of a metaphor can contain.

So Moran, very much like Davidson, takes metaphors to be connected to aspect seeing, in which 'seeing' can be regarded as an actual experiential state, even if not the ordinary visual experience. He, then, distinguishes between two possible options regarding this connection. First, one might, as does Davidson, take this "framing effect" to be definitional of metaphors. The rationale behind this view is that it is hard to depict metaphors which fail to bring this effect about. Those expressions and sentences would be considered either as absurd or false statements or treated as a simple triviality. Think about the famous example,

No man is an island.

On the face of it, without the framing effect being brought off, this statement is a simple truism. Once the effect is realized, it can be considered a metaphor. Moran writes,

> For if no ideas have been linked together, if nothing has been seen in terms of something else, then we just have a statement inexplicable in its gross falsity or in its banal irrelevant truth. So there are no unsuccessful metaphors, but what they succeed at is not the assertion or communication of anything (for example, a statement of resemblance). Their success is at the level of effects, what they get us to associate, or notice, or attend to. (Moran, 1989, 96)

There is one drawback, however, of this Davidson-style view. If all expressions which fail to bring about this effect are excluded from the set of metaphors, then dead metaphors—such as the mouth of the river, neck of a bottle—cannot be accounted for. Dead metaphors are expression which once possibly were expression that had their framing effect, but they were used to depict and express the same meaning over time.

The question arises then how did the so called dead metaphors acquire the meaning they have as dead metaphors if that meaning was not present when they still had their "organizing power" in place?

Consequently, there is a view on which the framing effect is not definitional of metaphors, or at least, cannot be regarded as such given the need for explanation of the "life cycle of metaphors." Moran seems undecided as to which view to accept. In his 1989 paper, he sets out the rationale for both while leaning towards those theories that define metaphor by its framing effect. But, he is not presenting it as a necessary thesis to accept.

In his view, though, someone who does not define metaphor with the realization of the framing effect, but holds at the same time that it is part of the cognitive import of metaphor, has to provide an explanation of how the content of metaphor is conveyed independently. Those who define metaphor with the "framing effect" and also think that the metaphorical content is mediated by it, a view which has a certain *prima facie* appeal, have to tackle a different challenge. For according to Moran one cannot endorse both the thesis about the definitional role of the framing effect and the thesis that this very effect provides, or helps to provide, the content of a metaphorical assertion.

As an argument for this claim, Moran provides an analysis of the success condition for assertion of a content and the success condition of the "framing effect." In his view, these conditions are not compatible. This is because, he claims, the framing or the image provoked, once the "provocation" is successful, is irresistible; an image "that is not chosen or willed", as he puts it. To put it differently, once we understand an utterance as a metaphor the framing effect was successfully brought about. If there is a communicated content mediated by, or embedded in, this effect, the hearer would be forced to believe that content once she understood the utterance as a metaphor. There would be then "a forced assent" to what the metaphor asserts. But in communication understanding, and belief in what

has been understood, must be distinguished.

I think Moran is too quick here in drawing his conclusion, but I am not going into the details of my objections here, for they are not crucial for my purpose with this chapter. I will be investigating the relation between any type of effects of utterances and their communicated content in the upcoming chapters.

The Davidsonian solution of Moran's puzzle is to deny that there is communicative content beyond the literal meaning that brought the framing effect forth. However, Moran does not accept Davidson's solution, and proposes his own by scrutinizing further the analogy between metaphors, pictures and *prapetitio.*

So far what we have seen is that first, in Bergmann's account, the "organizing power" of a metaphor is something that accompanies, or might accompany the assertoric use of a metaphor. The framing effect is regarded as a side effect, even though Bergmann also emphasizes the importance of the seeing-as heuristic in understanding metaphors. Second, on Moran's view, the framing effect becomes central in how metaphors have, or communicate their content. Moran, however, sees a possible inconsistency in a theory that defines metaphor both in terms of speaker meaning, and in terms of successful framing. This is an inadequacy that was solved by Davidson by giving up on any content conveyed by a metaphor other than the literal meaning of the uttered words.

Elisabeth Camp (2008) set out a theory that tries to make the thesis on framing effect, and the thesis of metaphorical assertion consistent. Her theory relies also on the characterization of the effect of metaphors as it was provided by Davidson. She reformulates the "framing effect" Moran talks about more in terms of aspect seeing. She writes,

> many people have suggested that the poetic power of ... metaphors consists in their ability to make us see one thing as something else, thereby providing us with a novel perspective on it. Of course, we don't literally see Juliet, or life, in any way at all ... the idea is that in these cases, something happens in thought that's a lot like what

> happens in perception when we shift from seeing the famous Gestalt figure as a duck to seeing it as a rabbit. (Camp, 2008, 2)

We have already seen that on Moran's view, and to some extent on Bergmann's theory as well, this special state of 'seeing as' is regarded as what delivers the metaphorical content. But they don't really have a very detailed theory on how that content is determined. On Camp's theory, the speaker intends the recognition of this shift of perspective to be what helps the hearers identify the content of the metaphorical utterance.

The theory she develops is very much similar to that of Bergmann (1982). However, she provides a detailed analysis of how, what Bergmann called, "salient characteristics" work in our everyday conversations independent of metaphors. Then she also develops her account of "aspectual thought" which will figure in how metaphors gain their meaning by way of providing a holistic organizational restructuring of the characterizations we rely on in our talk exchanges. The speaker wants the hearer to recover his content by way of cultivating a certain perspective, an aspectual thought about the subject matter of the conversation. The very details of her notion of aspectual thought are not important for my present purposes (cf. Camp, 2014).

Camp also thinks, just like Moran, that an adequate theory of metaphor has to accommodate the fact that metaphor's effect plays such a role in the understanding of metaphorical utterances. She writes,

> At a minimum, ... an adequate theory of metaphor needs to acknowledge that metaphorical utterances both undertake speech acts with assessable contents and induce perspectives for thinking about one thing as something else. (Camp, 2008, 21).

Her proposal (Camp, 2014) is that we should treat the perspectives as being presupposed by the metaphor, given that it functions as a prerequisite for understanding an utterance as a metaphor in the first place. The audience is expected to have and recognize all the relevant characterizations as background information for the metaphor

to be understandable at all. The irresistibility of the metaphorical framing effect Moran talks about is, partly, due to this role of the perspective according to Camp (2014).

So much for the pragmatic views and how they incorporate the idea that metaphor comprehension involves aspect-seeing.

To sum up, although theorists accept the rationale behind the Davidsonian view that the perspectival effect of metaphor is important in understanding metaphorical utterances, they all reject the conclusion that this effect is incompatible with metaphorical assertion and the communication of a metaphorical content. An idea which is of crucial importance for the non-cognitivist theories to support their main thesis, i.e., that there is no special, figurative meaning to metaphors. Let me now turn to the semantic views.

2.3 The Metaphorical Mode of Presentation

Recall that, as discussed in the first chapter, we can distinguish between a directly expressed proposition and an indirectly expressed proposition as being two different layers of the meaning or significance of an utterance. We can also distinguish, accordingly, amongst theories of metaphor talking about the special metaphorical content in terms of directly or indirectly communicated propositional content.

So far, I only presented the pragmatic, indirect views' take on what is the perspectival effect of metaphors. I also mentioned briefly their claims on how this effect should be incorporated into an account of metaphor. According to these pragmatic views, Davidson is right about the effect in as much as it exists and might even appear to be in conflict with the claim that metaphors have a content that the speaker is aiming to get through to his or her audience. Still, the conflict can and should be resolved. On the currently formulated version of the account, it is the framing effect itself which helps the communication of the metaphorical content (Camp, 2008, 2014)

Taking something pictorial to be part of the cognitive significance of metaphors is not peculiar to philosophers developing a pragmatic or indirect expression theory. It's just that it is their characterization of the effect which is closest to the Davidsonian formulation. It's much harder to see how, if at all, direct expression views, incorporate the framing effect into their account. To anticipate, many of the direct expression views deny that there is anything special about the effect of metaphors that is worth emphasizing compared to literal speech. Or, if they don't deny the existence of such special effects, they don't ascribe, at least not directly, any special role to it in the understanding of metaphors. They do not link the framing effect to the metaphorical content the way Camp (2003) and Moran (1989) did.

Recall also that direct expression views come in two forms. According to what might be called the pragmatic direct expression view, the understanding of a directly communicated content is governed by general cognitive principles, not by linguistic ones (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Carston 2002). As opposed to this, there are those who think that it is our semantic competence that drives our understanding of the directly expressed propositions (Stern, 2000; Leezenberg, 1995; see also Chapter One). Let me continue with a short recap of the latter views.

On Josef Stern's view, it is part of our linguistic competence that we understand metaphors. We have a skill to identify or to recognize metaphors and once that happens, we know immediately what to do. This is, of course, a form of a tacit knowledge. If we hear 'Richard is a gorilla' we immediately will pick some property form the associated presuppositions our culture dictates about gorillas and that is matching Richard as well. Moreover, we will take the speaker to assert just that property about Richard. For instance, we will take the speaker to say that Richard is a brute, or something along these lines. We might then evaluate the proposition thereby expressed as either true or false. Stern represents this linguistic skill of ours with the 'Mthat' operator, or the metaphorical

character (see also Chapter One).

So far, there has been no talk about the pictorial nature of metaphors in arriving at the content they communicate. Notice how similar this account is to what Bergmann also provided. Of course it is an oversimplification, but the disagreement between Bergmann and Stern is really on the mechanisms that govern the identification of the property which is being asserted in the metaphor. For Bergmann it's a pragmatic mechanism similar to how we recover implicatures from a conversation. For Stern, it is a semantic machinery similar to the semantic machinery at work behind indexicals and demonstratives as David Kaplan (1989) proposed.

Interestingly enough, Stern seems to accept the Davidsonian characterization of the framing effect. He (Stern, 2000) writes

> [a]lthough I shall argue against Davidson's conclusion that metaphors do not express metaphorically specific propositional contents, I do think that he puts his finger on a pictorial dimension that distinguishes the character of a metaphor from that of nonmetaphorical expressions.(286)

And he keeps this agreement later as well.

> Suppose Romeo actually announced, as he does in the context depicted in Shakespeare's play, that
>
> (1) Juliet is the sun.
>
> Although he is surely making us attend to a likeness between Juliet and the sun, and possibly inviting us to view her in a certain light, Romeo is also saying something true or false of Juliet... (Stern, 2008, 262)

He even agrees with Moran, and with Davidson, that having such effects marks that a metaphor is a live one. But, according to Stern, it is not the only mark by means of which we can decide whether a metaphor is alive or dead (cf. Stern, 2007, 3-4).

In the above quotations, Stern does not link the framing effect to the metaphorical content. He just says it's there, but that is not the point. Stern regards this perspective

inducing feature of metaphor part of its cognitive significance, and he conceives it as being "extra–propositional." Something which is not truth-evaluable but, nevertheless, part of the total significance of the utterance. He conceives this *extra–propositional* part to be a metaphorical mode of presentation of the propositional content and, as such, he considers this to be the pictorial dimension of the metaphorical character.

The phrase 'mode of presentation' goes back to Frege's notion of sense. As is well known, Frege explained[3] the cognitive difference between the identity statements below

> The Morning star is the Evening Star.
>
> The Morning Star is the Morning Star.

by introducing a difference between referents and the different modes these referents are presented. This 'mode of presentation' of the referent "constitutes the qualitative perspective from which the speaker is epistemically related to the thing" (Stern, 2000, 272). And, thus, the two sentences above can differ in the speaker's or the hearer's epistemic relation to Venus. David Kaplan later reformulated the problem using only demonstratives, such as 'this' or 'that', and showed that Frege's solution wouldn't provide a full explanation with examples where only these demonstratives are used. Consider two astronomers looking at pictures taken of the sky both in the morning and in the evening. It is also easy to imagine that one of them says,

> That is *that.*

by first pointing at the Venus as photographed in the morning and then pointing to the picture taken in the evening. Kaplan proposed that we take the character of a complete demonstrative expression to be the mode of presentation of its content. On Kaplan's view,

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[3] (cf. Frege, 2010)

this mode of presentation is not itself part of the proposition expressed as it is according to Frege. It is part of the cognitive significance nevertheless, as something *extra-propositional* which helps determine the propositional content itself.

Analogously, Stern (2000) proposes that the

> metaphorical character also provides a mode of presentation of its content (in a context). That is, there is information or cognitive significance carried and individuated by the character of the expression interpreted metaphorically, or its corresponding metaphorical expression, above and beyond its propositional, truth-conditional content in a context, "character-istic" information that is never captured in a statement of the content alone. (273)

treating the perspectival effect a part of the character as a mode of presentation or a "way of thinking" about the content, Stern offers a more fine grained description of the framing effect than the pragmatic accounts before. However, he does not think that this "way of thinking" is always there and necessary for understanding metaphors. It is something additional; something which makes a metaphor creative or live.

Stern does not distance himself, at this point, directly from Davidson. However, taking the pictorial dimension of metaphor to be part of the metaphorical character is a radically different way of thinking about this very effect than the pragmatic conceptions discussed so far. For a pragmatic theory, the effect is brought about either by the realization that the uttered sentence is false or by the fact that it is otherwise contextually inappropriate. In this sense, the effect is post-propositional. There has to be a proposition which has been identified as not being communicated, and this identification is what serves as the triggering factor of the effect of metaphors. Camp (2014) offers a different conception by treating the framing effect as a form of presupposition. For Stern, the perspectival feature of metaphor is extra-propositional which might help determining the propositional content, and is part of the cognitive significance of the utterance.

The imagistic dimension of metaphorical characters differs in yet another respect from the pragmatic accounts discussed in the previous section. Namely, in the analogy

Stern provides for understanding how metaphors are inducing the perspective they do. He discusses how indexicals and their characters are containing perspectival information in them. Think about the singular pronouns, or indexicals such as 'today' and 'yesterday'. Speakers of English have to know their relation to each other to apply an indexical properly. They also have to know the mandatory conditions under which they can replace each other. Tomorrow, I can only refer to today as yesterday in my reports of what has happened on this day.

There are similar relations of metaphorical characters as well. Stern (2000) writes,

> Something similar is at work with metaphor, although there is nothing nearly as perspicuous as the perspective determined by the indexical system. Metaphor networks [roughly the culturally associated net of beliefs a lexical element is embeded into, S.G.] ...are not governed by routine, let alone mandatory, transformations of terms to accommodate changes of context. (279)

Recall the example of "Richard is a lion", and that, as I mentioned in connection with Marie Bergmann's view, it is mostly the culturally associated features of lions that matter in the identification of the alleged metaphorical content. Now, on Stern's view all these culturally associated assumptions about lions form a network, probably part of networks of other assumptions about other animals, snakes, monkeys, birds etc. and all these provide a perspectival input to the metaphorical character and serve it in fixing the value of the argument place it creates. That is "Richard is a lion" will be interpreted as "Richard is Mthat(a lion)" and taking 'brave' as a value for Mthat(a lion) will be a direct content the utterance is understood to communicate.

Using the above metaphor, the speaker is committed to certain element(s) of the schematic network much in the same vein I am committed to use yesterday in my reports tomorrow about today's happenings. This helps, according to Stern, to explain why we paraphrase metaphors with further metaphors sometimes, and it also sheds some light on why there is a feeling of inadequacy when we simply try to paraphrase the metaphor as

'Richard is brave', etc. The inadequacy is due to the fact that our words in the paraphrase do not invoke the same network, or same relations the original utterance was embedded in.

Referring to such metaphorical networks can also explain the organizing power or the framing effect of metaphor. It is in this network that the metaphorical seeing-as, a way of thinking about the subject of metaphor articulates. As Moran (1989) also pointed out, a simple enumeration of the properties included in a metaphor would not give us the full cognitive import of the expression; similarly, Stern writes,

> "the enumeration of contents would leave out the structure of and the relations between the metaphors in the scheme, the way in which the scheme packages those metaphorically expressed properties, including the weighting, ordering, and organizing that expresses the speakers' and interpreters' comparative evaluations of the properties."(282)

Interestingly enough, Stern (2000) emphasizes, and refers to Martin Davies' work (Davies, 1982) in doing so, that even literal speech can have a restructuring "power" of our presupposition networks. It is worth to quote him at length at this point for this example of his will be of utmost importance in my main argument for the perlocution claim in the next chapter.

> Suppose I have a quiet, polite neighbor—call him Philby—always responsible in paying his bills and doing his duties, who prizes his privacy and, though not unfriendly, keeps to himself and does not make it easy for his neighbors to get to know him well; a fairly innocuous neighbor who does not bother or disturb anyone else and who does little to attract attention. Then one day we learn that he has been arrested as a spy for The Enemy. Now *seeing* Philby *as* a spy, that is, *thinking* of him *as* a spy, puts all his familiar properties in a new light. We see his dutiful, responsible, polite behavior in light of an ulterior motive—designed to give us a certain impression. We understand differently than we did before why he was so guarded about his privacy and why it was so difficult to get to know him well. We reinterpret all his efforts at anonymity and innocuousness in terms of his newly discovered occupation. The novel piece of news that Philby is a spy is not just a single new belief we acquire (although it is also that); for it restructures and reorganizes all of our other (prior) beliefs about him and will also lead us to discover, or uncover, other beliefs we might not have noticed otherwise (say, about his passion for electronic gimmicks and high-frequency radios).(283)

Similarly, Davies argues, with metaphors: Seeing Juliet as the Sun restructures our complex of beliefs and attitudes about Juliet.

Now, it's not entirely clear how much similarity Stern allows here between the characteristic perspective carried by the metaphor and the new perspective offered by the plain literal statement. For the example he gave of a literal statement, which can also reorganize our prior beliefs and presuppositions about a subject, has this effect post-propositionally; that is, only on the grounds that we understood the statement "Philby is a spy" or "Philby has been arrested for spying" or some other variation. It definitely has nothing to do with the character of any expression in these sentences, and is not pre-semantically entertained. I will elaborate on this point in the next chapter. Before that, in the closing section of this chapter I will present yet another conception on the perspectival effect of metaphors.

2.4 Sense Modulation and Framing

So far we have seen three different conceptions about the imagistic effect of metaphors each of which try to counter the Davidsonian approach. First, according to Marie Bergmann (1982) it might be regarded as a side effect of metaphors, an important one though, but one that only accompanies, if at all, the speaker's meaning. Sometimes it can help as a heuristic to facilitate the understanding of the metaphor. Second, it is possible to conceive the imagistic or framing effect to be definitional of metaphors, while still arguing that there is a speaker meaning, an indirectly communicated propositional content, mediated by this effect (Camp, 2003). Third, others can conceive it, following Stern (2000), as a part of the "character-istic" information an expression has, an epistemic relation similar to the demonstrations, pointing, or what you have, which accompany indexicals.

Treating the framing effect, the entertainment of pictures etc., to be additional and

parallel to the communicated content is a feature of the pragmatic direct expression views as well. Just to recapitulate briefly the discussion in Chapter One, these direct expression views generally talk about various modifications of the linguistic meaning of an utterance. These modifications, to put it in a nutshell, are governed by our cognitive make-up to optimize the linguistic input to our cognitive faculty. I will refer to these modifications or transformations of linguistic meaning as *"modulation"*, borrowing the term from Francois Recanti (2004) intended to use it here as a cover term.

A common example to shed light on how modulation works goes as follows; after the dinner has been served in the restaurant, someone says,

> This meat is raw.

When it is clear to all parties that the food does not lack preparation. In this case, the hearer most probably will not take the speaker to say any falsehood, but will broaden the concept of RAW encoded in the expression 'raw', and the speaker will expect her to do so. A new, ad hoc concept of RAW* will be constructed which covers half prepared meat as well in this particular context. The half prepared meat wouldn't originally be attached to the category of raw food or objects.

Now, a paradigmatic pragmatic direct expression view would claim that a similar story can be told about metaphors. On such a view, what happens in comprehension when I say about Richard that he is a gorilla is not different in kind but differs in degree in the process of broadening or other processes required for utterance comprehension. The same type of modulation happens in both cases, it's just the adjustment required on the lexicalized original meaning of each word that is different. There are a lot of details on cognitive background research, and authors tend to disagree on how exactly this modulation on the meaning of the words happen. But I take it that most of them would agree to this rough characterization. For my purposes here, this much detail is enough.

The content of the metaphor, therefore, is given by this mechanism of adjusting the original meaning of a word, phrase or sentence. And, again, the exact mechanism of this adjustment is a matter of dispute. To the extent that the "framing effect", or seeing one thing as another, can be part of these mechanism, the direct expression views can agree with a Davidsonian characterization of the effect.

I am only aware of one proposal, that of Robyn Carston (2010), formulated within the relevance theoretic framework which proposes a different cognitive processing route in the understanding of metaphors. Its worth quoting her again at this point,

> The first (ad hoc concept) route delivers an explicitly communicated (speaker-meant) propositional content, while imagery is often just an incidental effect; on the second route, speaker-meant propositional content is implicated (often weakly), while the literal meaning and the imagery it evokes play a more dominant role than on the first route. However, what all cases of metaphor have in common is that the second processing route is always available - literal meaning is always there to be searched further for relevant implications about the topic and, similarly, the imagery evoked is available for further 'looking' and 'noticing'. (Carston, 2010, 320)

An example for the prominence of the first processing route can be the metaphorical utterance of

> My daughter is a princess.

where the speaker might intend to explicitly point out how spoiled her daughter is. There might be some perspectives involved, or certain images evoked by the utterance, but those are not there to serve as a basis of inferences to further communicated content. As opposed to this, the utterance

> Depression, in Karla's experience, was a dull, inert thing–a toad that squatted wetly on your head until it finally gathered the energy to slither off. The unhappiness she had been living with for the last ten days was a quite different creature. It was frantic and aggressive. It had fists and fangs and hobnailed boots. It didn't sit, it assailed. It hurt her. (Carston, 2010, 309)

relies more on the images evoked to capture what is communicated, mainly implicitly, by the speaker. It is important to note here that Carston (2010) does intend to propose two different theory for different type of examples of metaphors. It is the prominence of the different processing routes, that of imagistic framing and the other of modulation, which varies on a case by case basis, but both routes are present, in Carston's view, for every metaphor.

Carston (2010) even accepts that this imagery is evoked as a perlocutionary effect and also raises the difficulty that if that is the case metaphors imagistic effect falls outside the study of communication given that an intention to produce a perlocutionary effect cannot serve as a reason for the effect to be brought about. Nevertheless, implicated contents identified via the evoked images are still communicated on Carston's view, without there being much clarification on how that is possible given the emphasized intention irrelevance of perlocutionary effects.

It is also not clear, to what extent would pragmatic direct expression views accept a Carston-style proposal for there being two processing routes. After all, in cases where the image evoking processing route is more prominent, communication will be essentially implicit. Yet I think its safe to say that even a strict direct expression view would agree that imagery is an incidental, perhaps perlocutionary effect, next to sense modulation which delivers an explicitly communicated propositional content. I take it that, for most theorists the framing effect would be something additional to the metaphorical meaning and it would definitely not be regarded a part of the sense modulation.

In closing this chapter, let me summarize the various approaches to metaphor´s imagistic effect. First of all, it must be noted, that mostly we have descriptions which are metaphorical in themselves. At best, we have analogies of what happens when metaphors provide us with a perspective. Some, for instance Bergmann (1982), Moran (1989) and Camp (2003), use the analogy of aspect-seeing and Gestalt psychology. Others, such as

Stern, provide more fine grained analogies form perspectives involved in semantics, particularly the relation of indexicals, ('I', 'you', 'today', 'tomorrow1, etc.).

We have also seen that some pragmatic accounts, following Davidson, consider this effect to be post-propositional, in the sense that the literal content of the uttered sentence has to be recognized as either false or otherwise conversationally inappropriate. After that, first, the effect might be appearing independent of the communicated content in the search for the pragmatically meant content. As I have presented, according to Bergmann (1982), the hearer only has to find one salient characteristic which she can take the speaker to be asserting of the given subject. The effect of seeing the subject in a new light is something that merely accompanies, if at all, this process. Taking the perspectival effect to be incidental in this sense is held by the pragmatic direct expression views too. Second, according to Camp (2003; 2008; 2014) and, to some extent, Moran (1989) an Carston (2010), it is the cultivation of a perspective by means of which a speaker is expecting the hearer to identify the implicitly communicated content.

Stern's semantic account takes the perspectival effect to be analogous to the perspectives involved in the proper use of indexicals. As such, he treats the effect of metaphors as something extra-propositional, part of the mode of presentation involved in the character of metaphorically used expressions. Hopefully, by presenting these views in detail, I convinced my reader that, one way or another, all these views build on the Davidsonian insight that metaphors "make us attend to some likeness" they prompt an insight by making the audience see something from a new perspective. Their disagreement with him is in the role the effect plays in metaphor comprehension. For Davidson, at least on his radical view, this effect is the only interesting thing to refer to 'how metaphors work their wonders' and we don't need to posit any extra special meaning. For the views presented above, the explanation cannot stop at the effect.

Given all this, I will turn to discuss my take on the nature of this effect. In the next

chapter, first I will discuss the notion of perlocution in detail. Then I will provide my argument for the claim that metaphor's framing effect discussed here is a perlocutionary effect.

Chapter 3

The Notion of Perlocution and the Perlocution Claim

In this chapter, first, I will set the stage for my Perlocution Claim by providing an overview of how the notion of perlocution evolved since it has been introduced to the field of philosophy of language by John L. Austin in his famous lectures (1962). Second, I will also argue that the imagistic effect discussed in detail in the previous chapter falls within the category of perlocutionary effects. I will relate the discussion about perlocutionary effects to the various layers of the total significance of an utterance in the third section of this chapter. I will conclude with formulating difficulties for the current views on metaphor which follow from the truth of the perlocution claim. Providing all the details of a perlocutionary analysis will be the topic of the fifth chapter, after I defended the Perlocution Claim in chapter four.

3.1 The Notion of Perlocution

3.1.1 Preliminaries: Acts and Effects

Let me start with re-describing the example of Bob and Ann's discussion you might recall from the first chapter.

Ann: Where can I get antifreeze?

Bob: There's a station at the corner.

Ann here was *asking* a question from Bob to which he *answered* and thereby *made* Ann *to believe* that she can get antifreeze at the corner, or that it's better if she asks for antifreeze there. All these acts depicted by the italicized phrases were done by means of the linguistic utterances Ann and Bob used, in other words, they can all be described as linguistic acts.

Austin (1962) differentiated three ways to describe the things we do when we use language: locutionary acts, illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts. Roughly put, the locutionary act is the act of uttering a sentence with a certain "sense and reference"; that is, with a certain meaning. This "sense and reference" has later been referred to as the direct propositional content of an utterance in the literature. As I discussed in the first chapter, Bob's utterance can express different contents depending, for instance, on where the conversation is actually taking place whereas the linguistic meaning stays the same across these contexts.

According to Austin, both the illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts are uses of the meaning of the sentence uttered, i.e., the locution or the propositional content. Bob in the above conversation uses the sentence he utters to *answer* Ann's question and at the same time to make her believe that she can get gas at the station on the corner. In a nutshell, illocutionary acts are acts we do in uttering something, whereas perlocutionary acts are acts done by saying something. Let me emphasize here that these acts are, or can be, regarded

as different descriptions of the same event, the utterance of a linguistic string. Let's dive in to the details of all these different categories and characterizations.

It is customary in the literature to illustrate the difference between the illocutionary and perlocutionary uses of the locution by listing verbs corresponding to each type of act.

> ILLOCUTIONARY: *assert, report, announce, predict, admit, opine, ask, suggest, order, propose, congratulate, promise, etc.*
>
> PERLOCUTIONARY: *bringing the hearer to learn that, persuade, deceive, frighten, surprise, convince, get the hearer to do something, get the hearer to think about something, embarrass, etc.*[1]

These two classes of verbs, denoting different things we might do using language, behave differently if put to the first person, present tense, indicative, active form. Whereas uttering

1) I assert that *p*.

counts as performing the act of assertion, it is not the case that uttering

2) I persuade you that *p*.

counts as performing the act of persuading. In other words, perlocutionary acts do not and cannot have an explicit performative formula. This is the difference, I believe, that Austin intended to capture with the formulas '*in* saying *p*, the speaker did *x*' and 'by saying *p*, the speaker did *y*.' Putting the verbs denoting acts we do using language into the place of the variables *x* and *y*, however, cannot be used as a decisive test to distinguish the illocutionary from the perlocutionary, for some illocutionary acts cannot be made explicit either (cf. Vendler, 1976).

[1] For more examples consult Leech (1983, 203).

Notice also, first, that perlocutionary acts might be entirely *non-linguistic* and are *non-conventional*. I might frighten or surprise you—even make you believe something—by pointing a gun at you. In other words, there is no convention, or a set of commonly and mutually accepted rules the following of which would grant that an agent is indeed performing a certain act. There are no rules to follow which would grant the success of the act of surprising. As opposed to this, even though illocutionary acts can be performed by non-linguistic means, for them there is also a convention that often times needs to be followed so that the act can be successfully performed.

Second, the actual perlocutionary acts the speaker performs depend on the hearer's response, on the way hearers are affected by the utterance. Or in other words, perlocutionary acts are dependent on the effect that is brought about by the utterance. This feature, however, leads to the modification of Austin's initial idea of perlocutionary acts being the use of the locution or of the propositional content of an utterance. Before going into the details of this claim, it is worth looking at Austin's (1962) definition of perlocutionary acts, in order to see what types of effects are relevant for uttering something to be described as a perlocutionary act. He writes

> [t]here is yet a further sense ... in which to perform a locutionary act, and therein an illocutionary act, may also be to perform an act of another kind. Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention or purpose of producing them; and we may then say,[...] that the speaker has performed an act [...] We shall call the performance of an act of this kind the performance of a perlocutionary act or perlocution. (Austin, 1962, 101)

As can be read from this definition, the effects constitutive of perlocutionary acts (hereafter: *perlocutionary effects*) are, (1) effects on the audience's mental, intentional and/or emotional states; and (2) effects which obtain because the speaker performed a locutionary and thereby an illocutionary act, and her act has been understood as falling under either of these categories. That said, Austin equated 'saying something' with the

performance of a full blown locutionary act which is, as he puts it, "*eo ipso* to perform an illocutionary act" (98). It is also clear that Austin excluded purely physical effects, such as transmitting sound from the air through the eardrums to the ossicles inside the middle ears of the audience, from the set of relevant effects.[2]

Next to pure physical effects, Austin aimed at excluding two different types of consequences an utterance might have from the set of perlocutionary effects. First, there are those that follow an utterance because there is a convention that they should. Consider the case of naming a ship. If I name a ship uttering 'I christen this ship Alexander the Great', it is definitely a consequence of my utterance that the ship will be called by this name form the occasion of the christening onwards given that everything was set up correctly for the procedure. Moreover, it is certainly a response of my audience, an effect on their future actions, to call the ship 'Alexander the Great' after the naming event. Still, there is a difference between these kind of consequences and perlocutionary effects proper. Whereas there is a conventional procedure for naming a ship which grants the effect that the ship will be called by this or that name, there is no such procedure for, say, convincing or surprising an audience. Was there such a thing, it would make the work of politicians and clowns way too easy.

Second, Austin wishes to exclude the audience's understanding of the content and the force of the utterance form the set of perlocutionary effects. He writes,

> An effect must be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out. [...] Generally, the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and the force of the locution. So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake. (Austin, 1962, 115-6)

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[2] See also what he said about the 'by saying' formula:

> To use the 'by saying' formula as a test of an act being perlocutionary, we must first be sure... that 'saying' is being used... in the full sense of a locutionary act. (Austin 1962, 130-131)

Searle later reformulated this claim the following way

> unless [the hearer] recognizes that I am trying to tell him something and what I am trying to tell him, I do not fully succeed in telling it to him. In the case of illocutionary acts we succeed in doing what we are trying to do by getting our audience to recognize what we are trying to do. But the 'effect' on the hearer is not a belief or response, it consist simply in the hearer understanding the utterance of the speaker. It is this effect I have been calling the *illocutionary effect.*[3] (Searle, 1969, 47, italics added)

However, this formulation of the illocutionary "uptake" or effect—taken up by many authors such as Kent Bach and Michael Harnish (1979, 12-15), Jerrold M. Sadock (1974), Searle and Vanderveken (1985) etc.,—endangers the very distinction between illocution and perlocution. Sadock explicitly suggests that we conceive illocutionary acts as a special kind of perlocutionary acts "with characteristics that distinguish it from all other kinds of perlocutions" (Sadock, 1974, 152-3), partly because illocutionary acts are capable of failing to "secure uptake" in the same way as perlocutionary acts are capable of failing to reach their aim, but more on this later.

Defining illocutionary acts in terms of necessary effects an utterance has to take on its audience, I believe, is what made Austin think that it is "the distinction between illocutions and perlocutions which seems likeliest to give trouble" (Austin, 1962, 109). Interestingly, he himself warned against thinking about illocutions in terms of consequences. He intended to avoid the idea that the illocutionary act is the consequence of the locutionary act. That is, Austin insisted that we should not analyze illocutionary

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[3] Compare

> it could not be the case that in general intended effects of meant utterances were perlocutionary because many kinds of sentences used to perform illocutionary acts have no perlocutionary effects associated with their meaning. For example, there is no associated perlocutionary effect of greeting. When I say "Hello" and mean it, I do not necessarily intend to produce or elicit any state or action in my hearer other than the knowledge that he is being greeted. But that knowledge is simply his understanding what I said, it is not an additional response or effect. (Searle, 1969, 46)

acts—for instance, "he urged me to"—as follows: "he said certain words and in addition that he is saying them had or perhaps intended to have certain consequences (?an effect upon me.)" (Austin, 1962, 114). Given this much, it is hard to understand why he was so keen on excluding the "securing of uptake" from the set of perlocutionary effects.

William P. Alston (2000) interprets this discrepancy in Austin's work the following way:

> [Austin] wavers between saying that the illocutionary act cannot be "happily and successfully performed" without this "uptake" [i.e., the audience's understanding of the meaning and the force of the utterance], and suggesting that this is a necessary condition of the mere performance of the act. (24)

Alston continues by arguing against the latter suggestion,

> It is clear that the latter is not the case. Whether I told you that the dean is coming to dinner or asked you to bring me a towel does not hang on whether you heard or understood me. If you didn't, my communicative purpose has been frustrated. But it does not follow, that I didn't tell you or ask you. (*Ibid.*)

That is, for Alston, illocutionary acts are not dependent on the production of any effect; whereas perlocutionary acts are. If you are not persuaded by what I am telling you, I have not performed the act of persuading you, but I did tell you something, despite the fact that you have not heard or understood what I am saying, just as I did ask you a question, even though you refuse to reply. Clarifying the difference between linguistic acts and their dependence on the effects they produce on the audience this way allows Alston to classify the hearers' understanding as a perlocutionary effect; one that is special since it is required for the success of the communication, but one which is, nevertheless, a perlocutionary effect (cf. Alston, 2000, 174).

Given all the above considerations about the relevant consequences for perlocutionary acts, let me get back to the reason why the dependence of such effects on the audience response won't leave Austin's claim that a perlocutionary act is the use of the locution

intact. I believe, it was Ted Cohen (1973; 1975, 672) who first pointed it out, by means of examples, that 'saying something' might produce effects on the hearer's beliefs etc., without the hearer realizing what illocutionary act the speaker has performed. In other words that the locutionary act can be the direct cause of a perlocutionary effect. For instance, simply understanding the content of the utterance

3) There is a spider on your lap. *p.*

without any grasp of whether the utterance was a warning or a mere assertion.

Shortly after the publication of Cohen's articles, Stephen Davis (1979) and Bach and Harnish (1979) provided examples to show that perlocutionary effects might be brought about not only by the propositional content expressed, but by the meaning the uttered sentence has in the given language independent of its context of utterance. For instance, it is possible for the speaker to impress his audience by the choice of his words. Moreover, they also provided examples of perlocutionary effects which can be produced by the physical properties of utterances, such as the volume or the tone of the speaker's voice.

In other words, both Davis (1979) and Bach and Harnish (1979)—contrary to Austin (1962) and Searle (1969)—take the phrase 'saying something' in a loose sense, at least in regards to the notion of perlocution. They equate it with the utterance of certain noises. An often cited example of a perlocutionary effect brought about by the physical properties of an utterance is waking up someone by shouting 'Don't wake up!' (Bach and Harnish, 1979, 82). Such examples clearly show that a perlocutionary act is not necessarily the use of a locution.

Nevertheless, following Mikhail Kissine's (2008; 2009) line of thought, I believe that it is useful to restrict, in the spirit of Austin's initial idea, the category of relevant consequential effects for perlocutionary acts to those that obtain because the audience perceives an utterance either as having certain syntactic and semantic features, and/or as

having a certain propositional content, and/or as being a certain illocutionary act, i.e., perceiving the illocutionary force with which the propositional content was issued (cf. Kissine 2008; 2009). The rationale is that these are what can be described as linguistic perlocutionary effect. To wake up someone any noise could have done a good job, that the noise has been made by uttering a sentence in English does not really figure in the effect.

Let me take stock of what I have said so far by means of examples of perlocutionary effects. Being impressed by someone's knowledge of the vocabulary of a given language might be an example of an effect brought about by perceiving that an utterance has certain semantic features. To achieve this effect, it does not really matter what one says, rather how one says it. However, to make someone alert by saying 'The bull is about to charge.' it might be important that there should be a bull in the vicinity to which the speaker can be taken to be referring, and about which she is taken to be saying that it is out to charge, i.e., that the utterance has a particular propositional content in a particular context. The audience might become alert without perceiving or realizing whether the speaker has issued a warning or simply has asserted that the bull is about to charge. For some consequential effects, however, it is important that they are brought about in virtue of the utterance having a certain illocutionary force, i.e., being recognized as an illocutionary act. For example, in making someone do something by an order or a request it is crucial that the utterance is understood and accepted as an order or a request. With the same utterance, many perlocutionary effects can be achieved, some of which can be identified as the point of the whole talk exchange, and some of which only accompany our linguistic acts.

3.1.2 Further Features of Perlocutionary Effects

To wrap up what has been discussed so far, one can say that every event that is causally related to the utterance, and comes about as a result of the audience perceiving the

utterance either as having certain syntactic and semantic features, and/or as having a certain propositional content, and/or as being a certain illocutionary act, can be regarded as a perlocutionary effect of the utterance (cf. Kissine, 2008; Davis, 1979).

Such causal effects might be produced either intentionally or unintentionally by the speaker. The intention to produce them can be recognized, or it might remain hidden from the audience. Whichever way it happens to be, it can be partly dependent on the speaker's aims. That is, the speaker sometimes might want his intention to produce a certain effect not to be recognized by the addressee. A typical example is impressing, in which case it might be better to hide that there is an intention to produce a certain effect on the speaker's side.[4] In such cases, the perlocutionary intention is covert. Often times, if the hearer recognizes such an intention of the speaker, the effect will not be brought about.

Similarly, the speaker might want his perlocutionary intention to be recognized. In such cases, the perlocutionary intention is overt. An overt perlocutionary intention might play a role in bringing about the intended perlocutionary effect. Such intentions can also be of the reflexive form Grice (1989) was talking about. That is, they can be intended to be recognized as intended to be recognized (cf. Bach and Harnish, 1979, 14, 81). An overt reflexive perlocutionary intention might play a role in bringing about the intended perlocutionary effect. For example, "the recognition of [the speaker's] intention to make [the hearer] mad (in stating that *P*) can itself contribute to making [the hearer] mad." (Bach and Harnish, 1979, 83)

Furthermore, most of the time illocutionary acts are associated with the overt intention to produce certain perlocutionary effects. By asserting *p*, the aim of the speaker might be to make the hearer believe or accept *p*. Similarly, requesting *p*, the speaker usually intends the hearer to perform a certain action described in *p*. It is reasonable to think about the

[4] For more examples consult Dominicy (2008).

intentions to produce these associated perlocutionary effects as being overt and reflexive.[5]

However, the recognition of a perlocutionary intention does not guarantee that the effect is brought about. In fact, as I have already mentioned, the recognition of the perlocutionary intention can itself block the realization of the intended effect. Recognizing the perlocutionary intention is incidental to the production of the perlocutionary effect also in the sense that, even

> in the special case where identification of the speakers' intention is necessary to the production of a perlocutionary effect—H might believe something or do something because and only because S wants him to—still there is a distinction between the hearer's recognizing that intention and its being fulfilled. The hearer might recognize what effect is intended without its being produced in him. (Bach and Harnish, 1979, 12)

Let us return to the distinction between the illocutionary effect—i.e., the hearer's understanding of the content and the force of the utterance—and perlocutionary effects. At this point, there is an important difference to note between the two. The intention to produce the illocutionary effect is not just overt and reflexive but also its fulfillment consists in its recognition. As Bach and Harnish (1979) explained, for an audience to understand that statement *P* was made in an utterance, they must take the utterance as intended to be a reason to think that the speaker believes that *P* and intends the audience also to believe that *P*. The audience does not actually have to believe that *P* or that the speaker believes that *P* to understand that the speaker stated that *P*. For that they only have to recognize that there is an intention to produce a certain effect that they are to identify "(and thereby have produced in [them]) partly by recognizing [the speaker's] intention to produce an identifiable effect." (Bach and Harnish, 1979, 15).

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[5] The point I would like to emphasize here is that there are perlocutionary effects which might be brought of partly by the audience recognition of the intention to produce them.

That said, there are perlocutionary effects that are produced intentionally but the recognition of the speaker's intention does not play a role in bringing them about. For instance, the speaker might intentionally surprise her audience by what she says, but it is hard to make sense of the claim that the audience recognition of the speaker's intention played any role in bringing about their state of being surprised by what the speaker said. At most, recognizing the speakers' intention in such cases helps the audience to establish whether what the speaker has done was intentional or not. The claim here is not that recognizing the speakers' intention in such cases is not important. There is a considerable difference as to whether what one said is surprising, or convincing or it is the speaker who actually surprises or convinces his addressee.

To sum up, perlocutionary effects might be produced in any of the ways represented on Figure 3.1. The relevant consequential effects of utterances are those which are brought about in the audience because they perceive the uttered noises as belonging to a



Figure 3.1: The ways perlocutionary effects might be brought about

certain language, and/or as having a certain propositional content, and/or as being a certain illocutionary act. Communicatively interesting are those effects, which are brought about intentionally, and by the utterance perceived as a full blown illocutionary act, since these provide the rationale for performing linguistic acts in the first place.

Note that my intention in giving the details of the various features of perlocutionary effects was not to provide necessary and sufficient conditions on deciding whether something is a perlocutionary effect or not. This, however, does not mean that we cannot decide on whether a certain phenomenon can be described as brought about by an utterance, i.e., as being a perlocutionray effect.

3.2 On the Perlocutionary Nature of Metaphor's Framing Effect

So far, I've discussed, in detail, what perlocutionary effects are. They are, mostly, intentionally brought about by the speaker, who is aiming at realizing them by building on the hearer's grasp of the utterance's syntactic and/or semantic features, propositional and/or illocutionary aspects. In order to show why metaphors' framing effect is perlocutionary, I would like to discuss here two examples in which literal speech has the effect of making the hearer see something in a new light. Or, as Josef Stern put it, to reorganize the way we think about something or someone. Consider, first, the case of Philby, the polite neighbor, who always paid his bills and avoided getting into, what one might consider, an inappropriately close relationship with those who lived close to him. One day another neighbor comes and tells us,

(1) *Have you heard that Philby has been arrested for being a spy?*

This question then, as Stern (2000) writes, puts all our beliefs and what we knew about Philby

> in a new light. We see his dutiful, responsible, polite behavior in light of an ulterior motive—designed to give us a certain impression. We understand differently than we did before why he was so guarded about his privacy and why it was so difficult to get to know him well. We reinterpret all his efforts at anonymity and innocuousness in terms of his newly discovered occupation. The novel piece of news that Philby is a spy is not just a single new belief we acquire (although it is also that); for it restructures and reorganizes all of our other (prior) beliefs about him and will also lead us to discover, or uncover, other beliefs we might not have noticed otherwise (say, about his passion for electronic gimmicks and high-frequency radios).(283)

Second, consider the example Martin Davies (1982) gave. He writes

> Suppose that Malcolm has been universally regarded as a pillar of probity and integrity; in short, as a good man. Suppose now that you are informed that Malcolm is a thief; he stole a large sum of money. Surely your view of Malcolm is radically reorganized. You do not merely add the property of being a thief to the properties you predicate of Malcolm and subtract such properties as may clash with this addition. [..][B]ehaviour once interpreted as the product of one attitude may know be interpreted quite differently. (Davies, 1982, 75)

I think it should be beyond doubt that these effects, this restructuring of our beliefs, elicited by means of a literal question in (1) or by an assertion about both Philby and Malcolm, is a perlocutionary effect of the respective utterances. They are brought about by the understanding of the utterance with its content and it is an effect on our thoughts and perhaps also on our feelings. Eliciting just this effect might have been intended by the speaker, but he might have had no intention at all to make us see either Malcom or Philby differently. If she intended us to make such a shift in our view, the recognition of her intention might have been a facilitator in our response. Still, it is perfectly possible that we realize the speaker's intention to make us think differently about Malcolm, we just resist seeing him as a bad guy.

Both Stern (2000) and Davies (1982) present this effect of a literal statement as being on a par with the effect of metaphors. The key question, now, is the following: What

difference does it make in the nature of this effect if we were told that, say, "Malcolm is a wolf?" Obviously, we will not update our network of beliefs about Malcolm, who is a human being, with the belief that he is, in fact, a wolf. I am not claiming here, though, that there is no context where it would be appropriate to do so. For instance, if we have read this sentence in a fiction about a fictional character called Malcolm, we might need to make such an update.

Nevertheless, in non-fictional contexts, we will look at Malcolm very differently, possibly taking him to be fierce, to be a person who is dangerous and aggressive and so on, much in the same vein, Bergmann (1982), Camp (2008, 2014) and Stern (2000; 2008) described. But this difference in how the original sentence or proposition with its content is treated will not result in a difference in the type or the nature of the effect itself. If they are analogous at all, both effects must be perlocutionary effects. In my view, all that changed has been, first, that the intention of the speaker to elicit this restructuring effect must be open, clear and recognized by the addressee in the case of metaphors. Yet again, this is not something that would discard the effect as being a perlocutionary one.

Recognizing the intention of the speaker to make us view Malcolm in a new light is crucial in interpreting the utterance "Malcom is a wolf." If this intention is covert, we will not take the speaker to be a rational agent or to be a competent speaker in the given language. Consider the case of children at an early age. Many times we hear them issuing sentences with some type of category mistakes, calling an airplane a bird, for instance. Still we don't ascribe them the intention to draw our attention to certain similarities between airplanes and birds. Most of the time, we will teach them the proper word to be used for the objects in question. Also, think about some schizophrenic patients calling people surrounding them spies, extraterrestrials, or what not. Although we might find their utterances apt, causing us to think about things differently, we won't treat their utterances as metaphors.

If we consider cases of metaphors which can be literally taken as true, the perlocutionary character of the framing effect should become even more obvious. Take the following classic examples,

(2) George W. Bush is a primate (Camp, 2008).

(3) Moscow is a cold city.

In each case, the sentences can be treated as conversationally appropriate and relevant contributions in a given context besides being obviously true, hence they are called "twice apt" metaphors (Camp, 2008; Hills, 1993). If the audience misses the speaker's intention to put the subject in a new light in these cases, they will miss the metaphor. What is even more interesting, the speaker might be unaware of consequential imagistic effects of utterances such as (2) and (3) and might be surprised at the audience´s response highlighting it. Furthermore, it is perfectly possible to recognize the speaker's intention, but still not being able to occupy the perspective offered on the subject.

My Perlocution Claim, given all this, goes as follows; if in the case of literal speech and twice true metaphors it is right to describe the effect of framing and "property restructuring" as a perlocutionary effect, so it is in the case of every metaphors. In my view, the effect is essentially the same, with particular differences that might be important, but which do not have a bearing on the status of the effect as perlocutionary.

Notice that my claim here is not that every utterance counts as a metaphor in as much as it is intentionally used to produce a perspective shift on a certain subject mentioned in it. That would render calling Malcolm a thief to be a metaphor in the above context, which is implausible. My claim, instead, is that metaphors' framing effect is perlocutionary in analogy with literal statements perspective shifting effects. In this, I agree with Davidson that metaphor is one among the tools to draw our attention to similarities. For such action, there is no convention how it should be performed and we have plenty of tools to achieve

it, linguistic and non-linguistic equally. How much the framing effect plays a role in our recognition of metaphors is a different question.

3.3 Perlocutionary Effects and the Total Significance of Utterances

In closing this chapter, I would like to relate the above discussion of perlocutionary effects to the different layers of the total significance of an utterance which was the topic of the first chapter. Also, I will present some difficulties that arise from my perlocution claim to the various views on the effect of metaphor I presented in the previous chapter.

To put it in a nutshell, the following layers have been differentiated in the total significance of an utterance in the introduction. First, there is what one might call the linguistic meaning. We can be aware of this meaning without any knowledge of the particular context, simply by being competent speakers of the given language in which the sentence has been formulated. Second, we can distinguish the linguistic meaning from the direct propositional content, which would be the composite of the linguistic meaning and the context in which the given sentence has been uttered. Recall the example of Ann and Bob's exchange, once taking place in the UK and once in the US and how the propositions they express change in these varying circumstances.

Third, there is or might be an indirectly expressed proposition which is – generally, according to Grice's formulation – determined, inferred, on the basis of the cooperative principle and what has been said. On relevance theoretic approaches, both direct and indirect, explicit and implicit contents are inferred.

As noted earlier, there is no commitment here on these parts being always necessarily there, one can say something without any further implications and so on. The point is that some of these layers are always present.

Perlocutionary effects are all consequences of an utterance which obtain due to the fact that the audience perceived the utterance's syntactic/semantic features and/or its propositional content, and/or its illocutionary force (Kissine, 2009). Based on this, *prima facie*, perlocutionary effects are different from the layers of meaning discussed because, by definition, perlocutionary effects are generated by either the linguistic meaning, the propositional, or communicated content. We have seen also that perlocutionary effects can be divided further into intentional or unintentional effects of what the speaker uttered. If intentional, the intention to produce them might be overt or covert, depending on the purpose of the speaker. For instance, one might want to impress his audience by the choice of words he used in a given sentence and he might want his intention to be recognized in doing so. Children, for instance, might do this when they want their parents to be proud of how much they learned. If overt, they can be reflexive, i.e, their recognition might be playing a role in their fulfillment, i.e., the realization of the intended effect.

As I mentioned earlier, the effects that come about as the result of the audience perceiving the illocutionary aspect of the utterance are the really important ones among the perlocutionary effects because they, generally, relate to the purpose of the speaker with his speech act in the relevant conversation. We might call the achievement of these, following Davidson, the "ulterior purpose" of the speaker. Davidson writes,

> A simple case: I shout "Thin ice" as you skate toward disaster. My ulterior motive is to warn you, the force of my utterance is assertory, and I intend you to take my words to mean that the ice towards which you are skating is thin. Even here, though, more intentions are present. I want to warn you, but I want to warn you in order to save you from a chilly plunge. I intend your grasp of the meaning and force of my utterance to be the means of your salvation. In this case, I have no reason to want you to be ignorant of any of my intentions, though it is not necessarily part of my intention that you should grasp all of my ulterior purposes. But here, as always, I use language with the intention that your grasp of my intended meaning and force should function to achieve my ulterior purpose. (Davidson, 2005, 171)

This ulterior purpose is also generally regarded as the perlocutionary point of the talk

exchange. Most utterances as illocutionary acts have a defaulted perlocutionary point. If I make a request, I do so with the intention to get what I asked for. If I make an assertion, I want my audience to take my word and come to believe, eventually to know, what I asserted; if I ask a question, I do so, generally, with the aim of getting an answer, and so on.

However, not all utterances are such that only the defaulted perlocutionary point is to be realized when they are issued. When Bob said to Ann that there is a station at the corner, his aim wasn't just to get Ann to believe that there is a station there, but also to come to believe that she can get antifreeze there. All these based on what he said and his alignment with the Gricean principle according to which he should make his conversational contribution such as is required by the purpose of the conversation in which it appears.

There is a debate in the literature on whether this additional content was something that Bob asserted, i.e., whether it was just a perlocutionary effect of his utterance or not. Such debates revolve around how much responsibility one takes for what was implicitly communicated by her utterance. For instance, Elisabeth Fricker (2012) proposes that

> [i]t is only what a speaker explicitly states that she incurs overt, full and undeniable responsibility for the truth of. Things she leaves it to her audience to figure them out, even if she fully expects and intends the audience to figure them out, and this is part of the perlocutionary point of her utterance, are not committed to by her—not at any rate, to the same full and undeniable extent.

As opposed to this, Camp (2014) argues that there are certain commitments the speaker is taking when conveying something indirectly, which render the speaker responsible for the truth of the implicit content and hence one can say that the speaker put the given content forward with some illocutionary force.

For now, I wouldn't like to go into the nuances of that debate as the sole point I want to make here is that some perlocutionary effects, especially those which can be

characterized as the "ulterior purpose" of an utterance and take the form of a thought or a belief to be entertained, can be regarded as implicitly communicated contents, or conversational implicatures. Again, this is not to claim that all conversational implicatures are perlocutionary effects. But some perlocutionary effects can definitely be characterized as such.

So far I have only discussed how certain perlocutionary effects, those which can be described as the ulterior purpose of the speaker, are or can be related to the implicitly communicated part of the significance of an utterance. Other than these, all the other types of perocutionary effects fall outside of the layers of the total significance discussed earlier for the following reasons. Linguistic meaning obviously cannot be treated as a perlocutionary effect because it is what it is by convention. Furthermore, it is what gives, or might give, rise to the perlocutionary effects itself, as is stipulated by the definition of perlocutionary effects, and not the other way around. This is also true of the direct propositional content itself. Although, in my view, it is theoretically possible that a perlocutionary effect, which was a result of perceiving the linguistic meaning of an utterance itself, contributes to the identification of the direct propositional content of that particular utterance by altering the context. In fact, to anticipate, I think that metaphor's framing effect is such a perlocutionary effect. I will further elaborate on this claim in the next chapter.

The claim that perocutionary effects fall outside of the layers of the total significance of an utterance I presented earlier is not the same as claiming that perlocutionary effects are not, or cannot be, part of the given context and that they are not important in a given talk exchange. Consider the utterance of

(4) Convinced of the truth of the perlocution claim you will be.

Now, you might find the phrasing of my sentence odd, and it might even remind you of

Master Yoda from the movie Star Wars when he was saying things like "Patience you must have, young padawan" to Luke Skywalker. That said, the perlocutionary effect in this case comes form the syntactic properties of the sentence.

Furthermore, the phrasing of my sentence might even irritate you, if you take me too seriously and think that I am pretending to be master Yoda, or it might just as well entertain you, and I might have intended all these, just as I might not have. I might just be someone who is not a native English speaker, which is actually true, and, by mistake, I reversed the word order in my sentence. Even in this case though, you might be made to think about the movie Star Wars, and if you think I am not aware that the way I was speaking can remind someone of Yoda, you can draw my attention to that. Whichever way it happens to be, it's hard to say that I conveyed all these contents to you, i.e., that all these thoughts and emotions prompted would be considered the content of my utterance at any level. That was only that I will convince you of the truth of the perlocution claim.

All these thoughts, emotions can become, however, part of the context, especially so if their appearance is explicit to both of us and we are both mutually aware of them. Say, if I realize I annoyed you by uttering (4), I might refrain by saying, "Sorry, this was a bad joke." In which sentence the indexical 'this' would refer to my sentence and the effects it had on you.

3.4 Challenges to Standard Views

In the coming chapters, I will give you more details on how exactly the perlocutionary effect of metaphorical framing works in my view. Now, I would like to close this section by some general problems which arise from the truth of the perlocution claim for the theories of metaphors discussed previously.

Let me start with the pragmatic views which identify metaphorical content as indirectly

communicated content. As I have shown, some perlocutionary effects can be regarded as indirect contents, so, *prima facie*, it should be possible to harmonize the perlocution claim, i.e, that metaphors' framing effect is a perlocutionary effect, with such an indirect pragmatic account of metaphors. However, such an amendment is not without difficulties.

If one treats the framing effect as perlocutionary, and the contents one acquires as a consequence of accepting the perspective offered in the metaphorical framing to be the content of an illocutionary act, a metaphorical assertion, say, will either have an inconsistent theory of metaphor, or an inconsistent theory of speech acts. What is illocutionary is not consequential.

The perlocution claim itself does not suggest though, that the content of the metaphor is determined by this effect itself. However, the fact that it can influence what properties and what beliefs are entertained and ascribed to the subject mentioned in the metaphor suggests that it indeed does.

This relates to the difficulty or the challenge for the direct expression views. The mechanism they identify as providing the content for the metaphor are not distinguished clearly from this metaphorical framing effect, except Robyn Carston's (2010) view. Indeed, it's built in either as an aspect of a semantic operator, as in the case of Stern, or, however tacitly, as part of a general cognitive mechanism in interpreting words and sentences such as loosening and narrowing the lexical meaning of a given utterance.

As for Stern's view, it is problematic, to say the least, to treat something that has all the characteristics of perlocutionary effects as part of the semantic competence of the speakers of a given language by treating it as a dimension of an operator which represents part of that skill and hence part of the linguistic competence. The perspectival effect and its realization, in my opinion, differs radically from the perspectives involved in knowing how to use indexical expressions such as 'today', 'yesterday' and 'tomorrow' (cf. Chapter 2). Stern (2000) also mentions that the way the perspective works in the case of metaphors is

less rule governed. I agree, it is less rule governed to the extent that the analogy itself looses its ground. To show that the perspectival effect is indeed a dimension of the metaphorical character, more needs to be said on why the metaphorical framing is a bad candidate to be a perlocutionary effect, possibly showing why it is not a perlocutionary effect when ordinary literary sentences or even twice apt metaphors induce a certain perspective on their subject.

The challenge to the pragmatic direct expression views is also connected to this point. Recall their claim is, roughly and generally, that metaphorical speech is continuous with literal speech in as much as the same cognitive mechanisms are involved in both processing a plain literal sentence, such as 'The room is silent', and the more metaphorical and figurative "The hourglass whispers to the Lion's paw". It's just that adjusting the meaning of 'whispers' and "lion's paw" in the latter example is required to a different degree, than it is required to adjust the meaning of 'silent' in the former example. As Camp (2008) pointed out, such an analysis will have trouble explaining the felt gap between what one says and means additionally in case of twice apt metaphors. If we treat the framing effect to be perlocutionary this difference can be explained.

Why posit then to separate mechanisms in describing how metaphors work, if a perlocutionary theory can explain both twice true and absurd metaphors equivalently? Besides, if those adjustments on the meaning of the metaphorically used lexical item require constructing in what sense the mentioned subject can count as something else, it is fair to say that for that, first, we need to be able to accept the perspective offered by the sentence itself.

As is it should be clear from all the above considerations, the perlcoution claim does not itself refute any theories of metaphorical meaning. If it is true, which, I hope my readers are convinced by now, it cannot be accommodated by most of the views on metaphorical meaning without rendering those theories inconsistent as they stand. This is the basis of my

claim that the most current theories of metaphor are misguided. They treat the metaphor' s framing effect as not perlocutionary, or completely treat as marginal, while it has all the characteristics of perlocutionary effects and seems to occupy a central place, sometimes only implicitly.

In this chapter I was aiming at four things. First, I wanted to get clear on what the notion of perlocutionary effect is. I described it, following Kissine (2008, 2009), as any event causally related to the utterance which obtains given that the audience perceives the utterance's syntactic/semantic, or propositional/illocutionary character. Second, I argued that in as much as the perspective induced by literal statements can be classified as such a causally related event to an utterance, we have firm grounds for the claim that the metaphorical framing effect is perlocutionary as well. This is what I call the Perlocution Claim. Third, I was showing that some such perlocutonary effects can be regarded as implicitly communicated content. After that I was indicating in closing the chapter why I think the current theories, discussed in detail in the first chapter are misguided and I also gave the details of some challenges the perlocution claim poses for these theories.

Chapter 4

Defending the Perlocution Claim

The argument for the perlocution claim was formulated based on an analogy already available in the literature between literal speech and metaphorical speech. Both Stern (2000) an Davies (1982) claimed that ordinary literal statements can have the perspectival effect that Davidson (1978) claims to be special for metaphors, or at least to do a unique work in metaphorical speech.

After thorough discussion of the notion of perlocution and perlocutionary effect in particular, I argued that the perspectival effect is perlocutionary effect in the case of literal statements, and analogously, we need to treat it as such in the case of metaphors. Before going into the details of how a theory endorsing the Perlocution Claim looks like, I would like to defend the general idea of the perlocutionary theory against a recent objection put forward by Ernest Lepore and Matthew Stone (2010).

In doing so, I will first present the challenge Lepore and Stone (2010) raised, who despite arguing for the non-cognitivist conclusion that metaphors have no special meaning, they reject the Perlocution Claim. In what follows, I will present the background of their positive proposal and also their argument against the perlocutionary theory. Particularly,

I will discuss in detail their analysis of speaker meaning. After that, second, I will defend the perlocution claim against their objections.

4.1 Common Ground, Speaker Meaning and Metaphors

Before I go into the details of Lepore and Stone's (2010) account of metaphors, and the challenge they raise for a perlocutionary theory, I would like to quickly recap the notion of the context and its role in how our utterances acquire their contents, however direct or indirect they might be.

The context is, according to what one might call a classic approach, composed of the place, time and the speaker-hearer of the conversation. All indexical expressions, such as the pronoun 'I' and 'you', 'now', and demonstratives, e.g, 'this' and 'that', require input from these aspects of the context of an utterance to acquire their content on a particular occasion.

Besides these factors, the contents of our utterances depend also on many more things that the participants mutually take for granted, believe, accept or know. Such things include presuppositions, extra linguistic interests, and other relevant information. You might recall, at this point, the example of me telling my wife that

(1) The prime minister visited the University

Uttering (1), I only contribute enough information to my wife in our exchange given that she knows which University I am attending, and that I can take it for granted that she knows this. What is mutually taken for granted can also include elements from the previous discourse as well, or knowledge about what has been said so far and some other facts about the talk exchange. As I have discussed it in Chapter One already, there is a disagreement on how much contribution is made by these factors to the direct content of an utterance, the details of which debate are not important for my present purposes.

The context itself, as it has been pointed out by many authors, is not remaining intact from the utterances or the propositions put forward by the interlocutors. It must be clear from the fact that utterances already made can form a part of the context by virtue of the participants mutual awareness that they have been made. The context is in a constant change, and is being updated as the given conversation flows. Philosophers offered an analogy to model how context behaves in this regard. Following David Lewis (1979), they talk about a conversational scoreboard, or record, which is composed basically of all the things the interlocutors contribute to their conversational interaction, and the required background assumptions.

Firstly, when an utterance is made, the fact that it has been made is added to the conversational score. But for that, as Robert Stalnaker points out, the speech act has to be a "manifest event", which is an event mutually recognized by the participants as occurred. Not just speech acts can be regarded as manifest events. Here is an example Stalnaker (2002) gave:

> ...two Californians are sitting in a room together in the evening, and suddenly there is an unexpected power outage, and all the lights go out. Assuming that the two are initially mutually aware of each other, when the event happens it will immediately be common belief that it has happened. Furthermore, obvious consequences of the new information, conjoined with prior common beliefs, will also become common beliefs. (708)

Additionally, there will be further information added to the conversational score when an utterance is made. Such information includes, who the speaker is, what language he is speaking, how loud he uttered her linguistic remark and so on. These facts, and beliefs about these facts about the utterance then become part of the context itself. When I speak English, besides knowing that I am the speaker, you will probably become aware that I am not a native speaker. All these are what Stalnaker called "secondary effects." The conversational record is changed by them but they are not part of the content of the speech act itself.

That being said, the content of the utterance itself will also update the conversational record. This is especially true about the direct propositional content, but not fully true about indirectly communicated content. Whatever is on the conversational record has to be mutually recognized by the participants. When Bob said to Ann that there is a station at the corner, the content of his utterance, that there is a station at the corner, will be definitely added to the conversational record as being said by him. This is something Bob made explicit and committed himself to. Now, providing certain presuppositions about his cooperative behavior which Ann think is mutually recognized as well, and part of the record, Ann might infer that she can buy antifreeze at that station. But it might very well be that she is wrong about their mutual beliefs and Bob in fact expected her only to infer that she should ask if the station sells antifreeze or not; but not that she can definitely buy antifreeze there.

It is a fact that speakers can deny that they indirectly communicated something, suggested or hinted at a particular thing or certain things, that makes indirect communication an attractive choice in a lot of situations. The speaker might convey something which she can later on deny or cancel, sometimes honestly, often times not. What people do when they deny implications of what they said are mostly rejecting the presuppositions and, allegedly, mutual beliefs which led the audience to infer the alleged communicated content.[1] Consequently, implicatures will be added to what is mutually

[1] Cf. Camp, 2013,

> „*S* intends for *H* to take the fact that she uttered *U* in that context as evidence that she wanted him to take her to be communicating *Q*. Further, *S* intended *H* to arrive at *Q* by relying on a set of interpretive presuppositions, *I*, that are in fact mutually salient to *S* and *H* in that context. Finally, *H* appropriately recovers all of these intentions of *S*'s. The crucial feature exploited by speaker denial is that the presuppositions *I* which are required to calculate *Q* are context-specific and merely implicit. In actual fact, these presuppositions really do appear mutually obvious to both interlocutors. But when the speaker is challenged about what she meant, she pretends that they are not so obvious. In effect, *S* pretends to be in a slightly different conversational context, in which an alternative set of interpretive assumptions *I'* are

taken for granted to the extent that they are manifest to the participants of the conversation. I think that people are generally not very good at recognizing whether an implicature is mutually recognized, and taken for granted for future talk exchanges, or not.

So far, I covered two different ways an utterance can influence its context, in particular, the conversational record. On the one hand, 1) there are secondary effects, such as facts about the tone of voice, accent, volume, and so on. An utterance 2) influences its context by the mutually recognized content it contributes to the conversation. This content can be direct or indirect, but to be added to the record it has to be mutually recognized to appear in the conversation.

There is yet another way though in which an utterance can contribute information to its context which is different from all these. Sometimes it happens that I know that my audience is not aware of certain facts, and I might decide to make them aware by uttering a sentence which presupposes the relevant fact. This way I manage to get through a piece of information to the audience, but the information is not the content or meaning of the sentence I utter.

For instance, suppose that I am right after a career move within the company I work for, and my new boss schedules a meeting outside my working hours, expecting me and my colleagues to do some overtime. Discussing this meeting with one of my colleagues, I say

(2) I won't be able to make it that day as I will need to pick up my daughter from pre-school at that time.

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operative, differing from *I* in crucial but relatively intangible ways, such as the relative ranking of salience among objects and features in the situation under discussion, or the ranking of relative probability among various counterfactual possibilities." (9)

I know that my colleague does not yet know that I have a daughter, I just came to the team and we didn't have much opportunity to talk freely, and I decide to let him know that I have a daughter in this roundabout way. Instead of saying it directly, I utter a sentence which presupposes this very information, and expect my audience as well to update their set of beliefs they take for granted with this information. My colleague has various options in accepting my utterance. If he does not care too much, he will just record the information, if he does care, possibly we will continue with discussing when my daughter was born and so on so forth.

This phenomenon illustrated above is called in the literature *presupposition accommodation* and was introduced to the field of philosophy of language for discussion by David Lewis (1979) and taken up by many authors. Stalnaker (2002) presents it as an example of a speech act, in which the speaker is relying, for the evaluation of what is said in the speech act, on information rooting in the speech act event itself. I was uttering (2) knowing that there was no information expected tacitly to be mutually taken for granted between me and my colleague about my daughter. That is, I know that our context, at least the mutual beliefs and beliefs about our mutual beliefs were not aligned. The information that I have a daughter, on which the truth and falsity of my utterance in (2) depends, was contributed by my utterance of (2) to the set f recognized mutual beliefs. In fact, it was a choice of mine to accommodate the mutual beliefs by (2).

Stalnaker presents this phenomenon as a natural practice in our linguistic behavior. He writes,

> there is nothing abnormal about a speaker relying, for the interpretation or evaluation of what is said in a speech act on information that has its source in the speech act event itself. Suppose Alice says "She is the senior senator from California", pointing to a woman standing in the corner. A certain woman must be salient for her use of "she" to be appropriate and successful (where salience is presumably to be explained in terms of common belief), but it was Alice's speech act, and the accompanying gesture, that made her salient. (Stalnaker 2002, 711)

It's worth also quoting his definition of accommodation at this point,

> The phenomenon of accommodation, in general, is the process by which something becomes a common ground in virtue of one party recognizing that the other takes it to be common ground. (Stalneker 2002, 711)

Where common ground is understood as a set of beliefs speaker–hearers recognize they mutally believe and take for granted in a conversation. Now, there is a lot of debate over the phenomenon accomodation. Here, I just wanted to mention it as a way an utterance might influence its context. That much is beyond dispute by many. Whether it is a mechanism resting solely on pragmatic grounds, or it has to be explained in terms of semantic presuppositions are options one can have regarding the explanation of this phenomenon. The exact details are not important here of any of these explanations of presupposition accommodation (cf. von Fintel, 2008). So much on the relationship between the context, an utterance, and the common ground. Let me turn now to speaker meaning.

4.1.1 Lepore and Stone (2010) on Speaker Meaning

Lepore and Stone (2010), as I have mentioned it briefly previously, aims at reformulating the Gricean intention based notion of speaker meaning with a reference to the common ground or conversational score. They argue that the original Gricean characterization, which they summarize as follows,

> In order for a speaker *S* to (speaker) mean *p* with an utterance of *u* is for *S* to produce *u* with the intention to elicit the effect given by *p* in an audience by means of their recognizing that this is his intention.(165)

is not and cannot be sufficient. The reason is that it will be hard to characterize the relevant effects one might want to induce in certain situations. Lepore and Stone (2010) use the example of an oral exam to pinpoint some of the difficulties and motivate their reforulation

of the intention based view on speaker meaning. The student in such a situation is surely meaning what he says, but the professor must already have the information, the belief in *p*, i.e., the correct answer to a question. Consequently, the intention the produce the belief in *p* is of not much use in characterizing how the student means what he says. Given this much, Lepore and Stone (2010) asks

> But if [the speaker's] aim is for the examiner to credit her with the correct answer, isn't his response a function of the standards of the exam, not of his recognition of her intention to be judged correct? (167)

To avoid this difficulty, they propose to reformulate speaker meaning as being a special way of adding information to the common ground intentionally. This solution is not the only possible answer to the problem raised by examples like this of the oral exam. We have seen above that there are many ways information can be added to the common ground which, *prima facie*, are not candidates for speaker meaning. I surely don't mean that I made my utterance in English, when I utter a sentence in English. Just as I don't mean that I have a daughter uttering 2), I presuppose it in issuing that sentence. All these information have to go on record, if the speaker hears me or and perceives the linguistic meaning of my utterance.

To capture how information or content is speaker meant, Lepore and Stone (2010) refer to the notion of coordination discussed by Lewis (1969) and Thomason (1990). They provide the following example to shed light on their claim:

> in order that a speaker mean that it is raining with an utterance of "It is raining," roughly, she must intend to contribute that it is raining by coordination. This requires her audience and she to add that it is raining to the conversational record in order to satisfy their joint interest, including their interest in agreeing on the record […] we can summarize with [def]
>
> [def] For a speaker *S* to mean *p* with an utterance *u* is for *S* to utter *u* with the intention of coordinating with an audience to add *p* to their conversational record.(169)

Surely, this much is very controversial, yet here I am only concerned with the definition of speaker meaning to the extent it plays a role in theri argument against the effect of metaphors being perlocutionary.

4.1.2 Lepore and Stone (2010) Style Non-cognitivism

In case of metaphors, the speaker does not utter her uttereance with the intention to add a certain content to the conversational record, according to Lepore and Stone (2010). There is no intention to coordinate with the audience on a specific content to be added to the conversational record. Hence, no speaker meaning for metaphors. There is something else going on, metaphor being a special way of using language along with many others, such as trash talking or joking.

Consider the following conversation

> *Friends talk about Diet Pepsi*
>
> Vi : There is a problem with aspartame, but I can't remember what it is
> Joe : It affects your memory
> Vi : Hah! That's a good one (Lepore and Stone, 2010, 171)

Clearly, Joe was joking here and, in doing so—Lepore and Stone (2010) claim—he had no serious intention to add the content of his utterance to the conversational record. That is, he made no commitment as to whether aspartame affects memory or not. Instead, he was offering his utterance to develop the imagery that Vi is already "suffering from the ills of aspartame, but hasn't yet noticed the symptoms or their connection to the beverages she drinks" (Lepore and Stone, 2010, 171) and thereby he made fun of Vi.

Surely, in order to get the joke, Vi must recognize that this is the case and she

> must participate in exploring the consequences of this imagery to discover that it portrays her as suffering from the ills of aspartame, and so, to discover that this joke offers Joe a way of chiding her for worrying about it. Thus, the joke requires special

> cognitive effort from Vi, prompted in part by her recognition of its status as a joke. (Lepore and Stone, 2010, 172)

However, the imagery is not what Joe's utterance means. For it is simply that aspartame affects memory. In other words, Joe's utterance had only its literal meaning which Joe used to elicit a certain response in Vi. The same analysis can be given of metaphorical utterances according to Lepore and Stone (2010).[2] Uttering

> (3) Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra and then suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night, the ice weasels come.(Lepore and Stone, 2010, 165)

the speaker brings to mind the imagery that love is a snowmobile and intends the hearer to recognize that this is what she intended to do instead of adding a content of her utterance to the conversational record. Thereby, she aims at making the audience participate in a special cognitive effort—brought about partly by the addressee's recognition of the utterance's status as a metaphor—namely, to engage in the imaginative possibility that love is a snowmobile and what might follow from that, for instance "that love begins its trajectory with excitement, etc." So much about why there is no speaker meaning in the case of metaphors.

4.2 Lepore and Stone against the Perlocutionary Theory of Metaphors

Surprisingly, Lepore and Stone's (2010) objection to treating the effect of metaphors, the imagery they develop, as a perlocutionary effect stems from the same analogy they use to

[2] A similar point has been made by Ted Cohen (1978). The difference between Cohen's and Lepore and Stone's approach is that (1) Cohen was not concerned with the nature of speaker meaning, and that (2) he described the special effort required by both jokes and metaphors a bit differently, namely as being the achievement of intimacy.

discard the idea that there would be a distinct speaker meaning for metaphors.

The reason they think that perlocutionary effects provide a poor fit for describing metaphorical utterances is that, in the case of familiar perlocutionary effects, the addressee does not have to recognize the speaker's intention to produce a certain effect nor must she participate in any special cognitive effort. When a speaker's utterance surprises or intimidates the audience, it is because the content provokes certain thoughts and emotions in the audience. Against this, Lepore and Stone (2010) claims that we

> cannot appreciate the suggestions of [3]—e.g. that love begins its trajectory with excitement—merely by submitting the proposition that love is a snowmobile to our ordinary faculty of inference, critical thinking, and deliberation. Love is not a snowmobile! To suggest otherwise is absurd at face value. Reasoning normally from [3] would just rediscover the absurdity. We must recognize that [3] is a metaphor, and shape our psychological response accordingly. (Lepore and Stone, 2010, 170-171)

This is all one can find as argument against treating the effect of metaphors as perlocutionary. They summarize this point later discussing their relation to Davidson's view, which they reconstruct as a theory which models metaphor on perlocutionary effect such as intimidation. They write that such an

> account of the relationship between pragmatics and psychology in metaphor is unsatisfying, because it does not explain the audience's need to recognize the metaphor and participate in it's exploration. (Lepore and Stone, 2010,174)

Let me now turn to the problems with this argument against the perlocution claim.

4.3 Defending the Perlocution Claim

There are at least three problems with Lepore and Stone's (2010) reasoning against the effect of metaphors being perlocutionary. First, as we have seen in Chapter Three, not all perlocutionary effects are such that the recognition of the intention to produce them plays no role in bringing the effect in question about. Associated perlocutionary effects—e.g.,

making someone believe something by means of an assertion—are clear cases in which such recognition does play a role. Consequently, Lepore and Stone's (2010) argument is inconclusive, to say the least.

However, this is not the main problem I would like to emphasize in their reasoning. For, second, I think that the effect of metaphor does fit into the category of perlocutionary effects like intimidation and surprise. Consider again the case of "twice true" metaphors such as

4) The sun is warming today. (Cohen, 1976)

and "twice apt" (Hills, 1997) metaphors like

5) Jesus was a carpenter. (Camp, 2008)

Recall that "twice true" metaphors are so called because they are true—or might be true—on their "most literal" and on their metaphorical interpretation, as we discussed already when arguing for the perlocution claim in Chapter Three. Said of professor X on bright, sunshiny day, the utterer of (4) might claim, truly, that professor X is in a good mood. "Twice apt" metaphors are not just true on both possible interpretations, but those interpretations might also be relevant and conversationally appropriate. Elisabeth Camp (2008) notes about (5)

> On the one hand, someone might utter [5] metaphorically, as a way of communicating, roughly, that Jesus took the crooked timber of humanity and transformed it into something more useful and beautiful. On the other hand, we can also imagine a context in which the literal meaning is relevant: say, in a Bible study class about Jesus' life and work, in which it's important that Jesus was a humble tradesman who worked with his hands. (15)

The important point to emphasize here is that these interpretations of (5) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Contexts in which both interpretations are salient are perfectly intelligible.

In such cases, however, the speaker need not intend her utterance both literally and metaphorically. The hearer can conjure up an imaginative possibility on the basis of an utterance despite the fact that he knows that the speaker's intention was just to put the content of her utterance on the conversational record. Alternatively, suppose the addressee is not sure about the speaker's intention, and asks a clarificatory question whether he is right in interpreting what the speaker said in a metaphorical way. I think that it is possible for the speaker to realize that her utterance is "twice apt" on the given occasion only as a result of her reflection prompted by the addressee's uncertainty. She might even agree or consent to the metaphorical interpretation in that situation.

But not just the examples of "twice apt" and "twice true" metaphors show that a hearer can conjure up a particular imaginative possibility without there being an intention on the speaker's side for her to do so. Even absurd sentences might be the source of the effect. Here is one example. Rudolf Carnap in his paper titled *The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language* (1932) gave the following example of a meaningless sentence

(6) Caesar is a prime number.(17)

For Carnap, (6) is a meaningless pseudo-statement for not being verifiable. Moreover, it is also misleading since it has the regular subject predicate form, even though the subject and the predicate are incompatible. We cannot predicate of a person that he is a prime number, or so the story goes.

Now, compare Carnap's sentence with the introduction a famous Hungarian writer, Péter Esterházy, wrote to his lecture on the miraculous life of words showcased in the Hungarian National Television many years ago:

> Take set **A**. Let **A** be the set of prime numbers. A natural number is a prime number if it is divisible only by one and itself. [...] Set **B** is the set of all the Hungarian writers who have ever lived; so if someone is a writer and a Hungarian, s/he is in this set [...] We call a writer, ...well, essentially, what we call a prime number, something divisible only by one and itself (see also: weigh yourself with the universe!)...(translation is mine except for the Attila József quote at the end)

I do not think it is hard to recognize—even from this much—an allusion here to Carnap pseudo statement. If we take into consideration that Esterházy's lecture is mostly about the relation of thought, language, speech and poetry—the relation about which Carnap, at least in the above quoted paper, held a very interesting view, not ascribing a very important role to the latter two—the allusion becomes all straightforward.

Of course, Carnap's example for a pseudo-statement is not a metaphor. Still, I think that the allusion in Esterhazy's text would not be apt had there been no effect of conjuring up an imaginative possibility that a person belongs to the set of prime numbers initiated by Carnap's text. Facing absurdities similar to (6), psychological mechanisms might run their course, even if no intention to produce them with the arrived-at message occured at the time to the originator of the utterance.

All these considerations show that the content of an utterance alone is sufficient to trigger the metaphorical effect. That is, we can appreciate the metaphorical suggestions of a proposition merely by submitting it to our faculty of ordinary reasoning and critical thinking. Lepore and Stone's (2010) mistake is to conflate the question of how we recognize if someone speaks metaphorically with the question of how we interpret metaphors. But, as Josef Stern (2000) noted, quite rightly I think, "we can know what the metaphorical interpretation of an utterance *would* be even when we do not know whether it should be recognized as a metaphor on that occasion. (7)"

Given all this, I think Lepore and Stone (2010) are too fast in rejecting and contrasting their theory with the perlocutionary view they ascribe to Davidson. However, they might argue that their main claim, namely that there is no speaker meaning in metaphors, is safe with the Perlocution Claim, because speaker meaning requires adding a more or less specific content to the conversational record by coordination. And even though we might coordinate on perlocutionary effects, it cannot be information provided to the interaction through coordination which would render it speaker meaning. Lepore and Stone (2010)

writes,

> [y]ou may be working to convince me, and I may be working to be convinced. But this is a change in me, occasioned by the make-up of my psychology; it is not information contributed to our interaction through our coordination. (170)

As I mentioned in the beginning, I don't think that the Perlocution Claim necessarily leads to this kind of non-cognitivist account of metaphors; even though I think that such an account captures an important aspect of metaphorical speech. I will give my reasons in the next chapter, outlining how my perlocutionary account works. To anticipate, the notion of common ground and speaker meaning discussed in detail in the first two sections of this chapter, will also play a role in the perlocutonary account of metaphors I will propose.

Chapter 5

Developing a Perlocutionary Account

In Chapter four, I discussed the notion of common ground or conversational record and how Lepore and Stone (2010) utilize it in their non-cognitivist account of metaphors not just to ciritcize the Gricean notion of speaker meaning, but also to object to the perlocutionary analysis of the effect of metaphors. On their view, the speaker does not intend to coordinate on adding any content to the conversational record, but is aiming to elicit a different type of cognitive effort, to create an imagery and to explore its consequences. Hence, there is no speaker meaning for metaphorical utterances. Furthermore, according to them, the notion of perlocution is simply not apt to describe the speaker's intended effect. I challenged this latter claim of theirs by pointing out that the effect they ascribe to metaphors is indeed a perlocutionary effect, that is, their objection to the Davidsonian idea leaves the Perlocution Claim intact.

To put it in a nutshell, the argument for the Perlocution Claim in Chapter Three ran as follows. First, literal statements can have the effect of providing a new perspective on their subject, recall the examples provided by Stern (2000) and Davies (1982). Second, this effect is a perlouctionary effect of such statements; that is, it is an effect on the audience's

mental/emotional states brought off by them perceiving the utterance syntactic or semantic properties in both cases. Analogously, the framing effect should be a perlocutionary effect in the case of metaphorical statements too.

In this Chapter, I would like to turn to the question with which I started my inquiry: What theory of metaphors follows from the truth of the perlocution claim? First, I will consider an obvious candidate, non-cognitivism, and give my reasons why I think its not a viable option. Non-cognitivism about metaphors is not a necessary consequence of the perlocution claim. At the same time, I point out what insights should be preserved from the theory, and, third, I will propose a theory on which the Perlocution Claim can be harmonized with the claim that there is some sort of speaker meaning for metaphors, even on the refined notion Lepore and Stone (2010) provides. Finally, I will contrast the proposed view with the available alternatives to give more details about what type of metaphorical meaning there is on the perlocutionary account.

5.1 Metaphorical Speech Acts

Does a non-cognitivist theory necessarily follow from the Perlocution Claim? The affirmative answer has some *prima facie* appeal. In a Davidsonian fashion, one could argue that since we do not posit what we notice if the perspective is induced by a literal statement, as some kind of special meaning of the utterance, we shouldn't posit a special meaning for metaphors either. Not even an indirect one, in as much as the indirect meaning is considered to be something illocutionary. Consequently, for a Davidsonian, metaphor is just one tool to induce perspectives, make us conjure up an imagery, and thereby to realize certain things. The Perlocution Claim, so one might argue, clearly supports such a view.

Despite its appeal, such a view cannot be an adequate account of the phenomenon of

metaphor. I agree with philosophers objecting to Davidson that metaphors appear in our everyday talk exchanges way too frequently, in assertions and requests etc., for it to be a counter-intuitive claim that they have no meaning whatsoever other than the literal, or linguistic meaning of the uttered sentence. As Stern (2000) put it, metaphor's appearance in our communicative interactions needs to be explained and not simply explained away. It is my aim in this part to provide such an explanation with an eye on the Perlocution Claim.

To motivate the claim that there is a distinct meaning, distinct, that is, from the literal meaning of the uttered expressions, for metaphors; consider the following examples provided by Stern (2008) and Camp (2008). Both examples are speech acts other than assertion. Camp (2008) writes,

> [...], suppose a friend were to exhort [Walt] Whitman to social engagement by saying "Oh Walt, be a spider and cast out your thread! Linger not alone on the precipice!" Then he would not just be trying to cause Whitman to think about himself and his social interactions from a certain perspective. Rather, he would be recommending that Whitman undertake certain actions, ones which might be difficult to specify in literal terms, but which have genuine conditions of satisfaction nonetheless. (8)

Stern (2008) provides a similar example. He writes,

> [i]f I ask my son
>
> (9) Did a typhoon hit your room?
>
> not only am I not asking him whether (literally) a typhoon struck; I am also not asking for a yes-or-no answer to the question (expressed metaphorically) whether his room is or is not a mess; I am gently directing him to clean it up – or else. (270)

All these and similar examples show that it's not plausible to characterize metaphorical speech acts and utterances simply as doing nothing more that providing an imagery to explore its consequences or causing the audience to note similarities. Both the above non-explicit directive and the request contribute to the interaction of the speaker-hearer in a way that is plausible to describe as the speaker having meant something. That is, the hearer

is intended to engage in certain activities. Even if there is no information contributed to the exchange governed by the participants interest, there are more or less clear expectations as to what the hearer should do. Just as in the case of normal requests and directives. To emphasize again, metaphors' appearance in such conversations requires an explanation.

Given these examples, one could argue that they also show that the Perlocution Claim is false. Since non-cognitivism naturally follows from it and, apparently, non-cognitivism cannot be the proper account of metaphors, hence, by *modus tollens*, the Perlocution Claim is not the proper analysis of the effect of metaphors either. This is something towards which Carston (2010) is hinting when she emphasizes that evoked images do serve as grounds for inferences in search for communicated meanings, so in as much they can enter communication, they cannot be perlocutionary as that is something that falls out of the study of communication. Such an argument is, however, problematic for at least two reasons.

First, the above examples, on their own, do not show that it must always be the case that a metaphor is such that the speaker is doing something more than merely trying to make the hearer see something in a new light. In other words, the examples will not show that there is always, necessarily, a special non-literal meaning, that whenever a speaker is using a metaphor it will always be the case that she has a more or less definite content she aims to convey other than the imagery or the perspective offered on a subject.

In fact, it is not hard to find an example where the speaker's intention was no more than inducing a perspective and elaborate on it. After all, why couldn't creating imagery be the ulterior aim of the speaker? Recall at this point Will's chain of thought with which I started my introduction to the first chapter. Will was thinking,

> The way I see it, *every man is an island*. But the great thing is, there's never been a better time in history to be an island. Even fifty years ago, for instance, they did not have daytime TV. – – Or videos, or CD's, or home espresso makers or glossy magazines with questionnaires about how cool you were and pictorials of scantily –

> clad models from Brazil. The thing was, *every man was an island*, but you didn't have to be a crap island. With the right supplies, and the right outlook, *you could be a sun-drenched tropical resort*, the kind caressed by warm breezes, the kind with a permissive, carefree atmosphere, the kind visited by cute Swedish tourists on holiday. Sure, *I was an island*, but I was a pretty cool island. *I was Maui.*(About a boy shooting script, 2002)

Now, granted that we can imagine that Will was telling this to someone, and that it is plausible to say that Will made his point and committed himself to a more or less definite content he asserted when he said "every man was an island, but you didn't have to be a crap island." There is not much added to the point with saying, "you could be a sun-drenched tropical resort" and "I was Maui", other than the imagery and the perspective they induce and elaborate on. These metaphors are part of the amplification of the first and as such they solely aim at emphasizing the point already made by invoking new perspectives. Will's aim with these was nothing more.

Authors are obviously aware that there are examples of metaphors with no speaker meaning. For instance, Stern (2008) writes,

> Any speech act we perform using language literally we can also perform with language used, or interpreted, metaphorically. Sometimes we make metaphors simply for their poetic power, their beauty, or their aesthetic pleasure. But we also employ metaphors, just like the literal, to elucidate abstract scientific and mathematical concepts and in folk explanations of human actions. And in everyday discourse interspersed with metaphors, we make assertions, ask questions, and issue commands and requests—just as we do with literal language. (262)

Similarly, Camp (2013) writes,

> what [a] Davidsonian view misses, is that metaphorical interpretation *typically, perhaps always,* also generates a speech act in which a proposition other than the uttered sentence's 'passing' meaning is presented with assertoric or other illocutionary force. (373)

The question then is, why typically and why not always is there a metaphorical meaning? Is it the case that some metaphors fit the Davidsonian model and some others don't? So,

essentially the non-cognitivist view is correct for some marginal examples, but not for some others? Are the theories of metaphorical assertion and meaning only supplement to the non-cognitivist view? Shouldn't there be, and shouldn't we prefer, one single account of metaphors?

Carston (2010) propses such a view by claiming that there are two distinct, althought present at the same time, cognitive processing routes in interpreting metaphorical utterances. Depending on the metaphor, these two routes, one being the image evoking route, the other being the ad hoc concept constructing route, have different prominence in different metaphorical utterances. Yet her view, even though encouraging a version of the Perlocution Claim, still inherits the tension of how the perlocutionary image evoking route can deliver something even weakly communicated. The perlocutionary theory I will propose below is intended to capture both uses of metaphors within its framework, similar to that of Carston's (2010), at the same time removing the tension between endorsing the Perlocution claim and a communicative account of metaphors.

5.2 A Perlocutionary Account

Let me recapitulate a few things about the notion of perlocution before I give my second reason why the examples of metaphor generating a speech act with a propositional content other than the one corresponding to the meaning of the uttered sentence do not contradict the Perlocution Claim, hence a perlocutionary account. A perlocutionary effect, following Kissine (2009; 2008), can be defined as a causal effect of an utterance which is brought about by the audience perceiving the utterance syntactic/semantic properties and/or propositional content and/or illocutionary force.

One can divide perlocutionary effects further based on their place in a conversation. Often times, perlocutionary effects can be described as being the ulterior purpose of the

speaker. Such is the case of prompting someone to take a certain action by means of a request or an order. Some other times, effects are not the final aims of the speaker. I might instruct someone to do something while I am mimicking the way of speaking of another person, and doing so for the sake of entertaining my audience, at the same time of giving the instruction. In such cases, eliciting the perlocutionary effect of entertainment was not my final aim. Still, it was one of my aims in the conversation.

It is not an inherent property of any perlocutionary effect whether or not it is, or can serve as, the ulterior aim of the speaker. I might entertain you by saying, "Patience you must have;" while at the same time communicating to you that you should be more patient, or not to hurry. Or, I can just tell you right away, "Don't hurry." In the former case, I might have had the intention to entertain you by the use of that particular word order and you might recognize my intention to do so. But it definitely was not my ulterior aim with my utterance.

This distinction between various realizations of perlocutionary effects is not reflected in the literature on metaphors. It shouldn't come as a surprise, given that the notion of perlocution is also rarely mentioned, if at all. Yet, only if the perlocutionary effects are solely conceived of as being the ulterior aims of the speaker is it possible to construct an argument on against a perlocutionary account based on examples of metaphorical speech acts. I think, though, that such an implicit reduction in the notion of perlocutionary effect is not warranted.

Consequently, on the perlocutionary account I propose one can differentiate between examples of metaphorical speech based on how the effect of metaphors, as a perlocutionary effect, is realized. Obviously, if the speaker's aim is solely to induce a perspective and make the audience to explore all its consequences, then there is no meaning that she aimed to convey with her utterance. And, as we have seen in the metaphors Will used in the amplification of his point on living independently, it is a real possibility.

If the speaker has another ulterior motive than eliciting this effect, then, I claim, that as a perlocutionary effect, the perspectival effect serves to accommodate the context with information in order to make it possible to interpret and evaluate the utterance itself. Much in the same vein we have seen in the case of presupposition accommodation and other examples provided by Stalnaker (2002) for speech acts which themselves affect the context in order for their own evaluation to become possible. I agree with Moran (1989) and Camp (2003; 2008; 2014), that what is special about the effect of metaphors is the role it plays in the interpretation of the utterance. What is additional in my view is the perlocutionary analysis of metaphors effect, and conceiving it as effect which affects the context by way of accomodation. This will be also the point where my view differs from Carston's (2010). On her view, the image evoking processing route is only activated if the processing cost of ad-hoc concept construction for the metaphorical input is too high. which suggest that the speakers intention with the utterance is not taken into consideration at all. On my view, my view, evoking the images will accomodate the context with information required for the interpretation of the utterance.

For the effect of metaphors to appear, it is enough that the hearer perceives the syntactic properties and the linguistic meaning of the uttered expression, particularly in the case of absurd metaphors. Regarding this, again, I am in agreement with Bergmann and Camp. Recognizing the syntactic and semantic properties will trigger all sorts of associations, commonplaces, weighing of different believes in a net of beliefs etc., which are, mostly, culturally bounded. Once the hearer realizes what commonplaces are taken to be part of the context, the common ground, by the speaker, and that the speaker also has a communicative intention, she will go on to recover as much as she can from the contributed content to their interaction.

In other words, metaphor contributes information, on my view, to the common ground, the background information required to evaluate an utterance, at least in the

sense of accommodation. That is, certain beliefs become common ground in virtue of one party (the audience) recognizing that the other is taking it to be a common ground. The participants will need to coordinate on what is added to the common ground in their joint venture governed by their interest present in the talk exchange where the metaphorical utterance occurs. Once that happens, they further have to coordinate on what other modifications need to be done on the conversational record depending on their joint interests.

Recall at this point the example of a child who is using an expression out of its context in his endevaour to acquire a language. For instance, he calls an airplane a bird, to give a trite example. I think the reason we will not understand the utterance as a metaphor is that we will not take the child as wanting us to take the complex perspective and the invoked associations to be part of the common ground to evaluate his utterance. We will just simply correct his use of the expressions.

Simply put, we use metaphors in order to express things we might lack words for, utilizing, mostly, but not exclusively, the linguistic meaning and the syntax of an expression together with the psychologically and culturally given associations they might be embedded in. In what follows, I will provide more details of this theory by illustrating how perlocutionary accommodation can work and contrasting my claims with the main thesis of theories presented in Chapter One.

5.2.1 Perlocution, Accommodation, Direct Content

Let me start with contrasting some examples of talk exchanges I already discussed. One of them aims to show that there is directly conveyed content in metaphor. The other that there is no such content for jokes. The first example is the conversation at a departmental meeting, discussing who should be the next head of the department.

A: How about Bill?

B: Bill is a bulldozer.

A: That's true. But isn't that a good thing in this case? We want someone who will stand up to the administration and get things for our department.

C: I disagree that he is a bulldozer; that exterior hides someone who's basically insecure. But either way, Bill wouldn't make a good chair. (Bezuidenhout, 2001, 156-7)

The second is the conversation about Diet Pepsi,

Vi : There is a problem with aspartame, but I can't remember what it is

Joe : It affects your memory

Vi : Hah! That's a good one (Lepore and Stone, 2010, 7)

Now, for Lepore and Stone (2010), just as we shouldn't posit any special speaker meaning for Joe's utterance, because the intention behind was to offer the imagery that Vi is already suffering from the ills of aspartame; we shouldn't posit any special speaker meaning for B's metaphor either, which is not to deny that it might have had a point.

However, I don't think the analogy is a good one and that it can be maintained regarding these examples. The talk exchange in which B is engaged requires a contribution according to the participants' joint interest, specifying who would be a good chair. B is not opting out, at least not taken to be opting out, from the conversation, which he could have done offering his metaphor to ridicule Bill. The metaphor was a response to a question and it put down on record certain properties of Bill which the participants considered relevant to the role of the head of a department and was taken as such by the participants as is shown by the flow of the conversation.

The bulldozer metaphor was not merely aimed at putting Bill into a different perspective. It wouldn't have reached its purpose if it only made the audience explore the consequences of an imagery. Not just any consequence of a created imagery would do for the utterance to be appropriate. Of course, it might be the speaker's intention to opt out of the conversation with the intention to make fun of Bill by the metaphor. All this

depends on what he wants the other participants to take him to believe and, by virtue of that, to induce a belief in the audience as well. This brings me back to the point that metaphor contributes information to the common ground at least in the sense of accommodation.

This does not mean that metaphorical meaning is a kind of accommodated content. The information provided to the common ground helps to determine the point the speaker wants to make, if there is any.

Additionally, this doesn't mean that the perlocutionary theory is in harmony with the direct expression view either. Recall that on that view, metaphorical meaning is a directly expressed propositional content, it is what has been said by the speaker. The key in understanding that content is sense modulation based on the cognitive mechanism of optimizing the relevance of inputs to cognition and understanding, wired into the make up of human beings. However, accommodating the contexts with certain beliefs in order to find out what the speaker is trying to communicate is not the same as modulating, narrowing or loosening the sense of any word or concept. If there is a speaker meaning, it might still be a primary meaning on the perlocutionary view, but I don't think it is of any use to conceive it as direct propositional content. Let me elaborate on this last point by contrasting the perlocutionary theory with the semantic views.

5.2.2 Character, Dimension vs. Perlocutionary Effect

I claimed earlier, that the effect of metaphors as a perlocutionary effect serves to affect the common ground, or the context of the utterance, with information necessary to evaluate the speech act itself. There are several examples discussed in the literature, from presupposition accomodation to how indexicals and demonstratives might acquire their content.

According to von Fintel, who is following Stalnaker (2002) regarding the speech acts

influencing the context of their own evaluation, there is nothing paradoxical about this phenomena. He wirtes,

> the first person singular pronoun 'I' needs to be interpreted with respect to the context—surely, nobody would deny this. But, clearly, what counts cannot possibly be the context prior to the utterance, since there is no speaker to serve as the denotation of 'I'. So, the relevant context is the context of the utterance, the context "as it is changed by the fact that the speech act was made." (von Fintel, 2008, 144)

My reader most probably noticed that in arguing for the perlocutionary effect of metaphors to be what is affecting the context so that the evaluation of the metaphorical utterance becomes possible, I use almost the same analogies that were used by semantic accounts. On their view, metaphor acquires its content similarly to expressions such as 'this' or 'that'. So, why couldn't they claim that once the effect of metaphors alters the context, it is still semantically governed how the expression acquires its content in a context. Either by being indexed to a thematic dimension which becomes apparent after the perlocutionary effect has been realized (Leezenberg, 1995), or by means of the metaphorical character *'Mthat'* in the abstract logical form of the utterance. (Stern, 2000; 2008; 2011).

Yet, I am skeptical about such a view for the following reasons. First, it is hard to see how such an account would allow for a metaphor to be used solely for the purpose of eliciting an imagery and explore its consequences. The problem is related to the fact that they treat metaphors' context dependence as a from of pre-semantic context dependence, that is, before any proposition has been identified.

Stern (2011), for instance, treats the identification of the metaphorical character at work analogous to the process of segmenting a sound pattern into words. To quote him again,

> if I hear the sound pattern '...ai...,' I must assign it to the type '...eye ...,' '...I...' or '...aye...' If it is 'aye,' I must in turn disambiguate the two senses of the word type (that yield two expressions where an expression is a word + meaning): the familiar sense of 'yes' or the affirmative vote or the archaic sense of 'forever or always.' [...]

> Given an utterance with the sound pattern (assuming the language of the speaker is English)
>
> 20. jul-le-ʻet iz the sen
>
> we must assign it to a type (as a word in a language with a meaning), and among the types—linguistic types, as I will argue in the next section—are metaphorical ones:
>
> (21a) Juliet is the sun.
>
> (21b) Juliet (Metaphorically speaking) ʻis the sun.ʼ
>
> (21c) Juliet is the son
>
> (21d) Juliet (Metaphorically speaking) ʻis the son.ʼ
>
> The metaphorical types, in contrast, to their literal vehicles are context-dependent and therefore have different semantic values (contents, e.g., properties) in different contexts. (Stern 2011, 286)

Stern proposes also an analysis of metaphor that is lexically and morphologically triggered.

I think, however, that the process of triggering a metaphorical interpretation cannot be assimilated to the process of segmenting sound patterns into meaningful parts, as Stern suggests. The latter does not necessarily require tacit considerations about the meaning of the uttered expressions or full competence in a given language. It is possible, for instance, when hearing an utterance in a foreign language to tell it was made in Russian, even reproduce all the words in the utterance with very little competence in Russian and having no knowledge of the meanings of the words. Native speakers of other Slavic languages can do that with some effort. Of course, there will be huge room for error, but still. It is hard to imagine that recognizing the need for a metaphorical interpretation wouldn't involve some considerations about the meaning of the given expression. Whether something requires a metaphorical interpretation or what meaning a sound pattern has cannot be assimilated to the same process, contrary to what Stern suggests. Similarly, what thematic dimension a word is indexed to, cannot be identified without recognizing that some thematic dimensions are inappropriate. When a sound

pattern is identified as a word with a given meaning, often times syntactical cues are enough. Simply by its place in the pattern one will know if the sound pattern '...i...' is 'I' or or 'eye' without any consideration of the meanings of either expression. It is not possible to select a metaphorical linguistic expression type without recognizing that the literal expression type with its meaning won't do.

Once we passed this pre-semantic level of interpretation, there is no room for the metaphorical operator to do its job. After such segmentation of the utterance into meaningful parts, it is the modified context—modified, that is by the perlocutionary effect brought about by the audience's grasp of the syntactic and semantic properties of the utterance—and the speaker-hearer coordination which settles what meaning the metaphorical expression has and not a disambiguated semantic function.

Furthermore, if the effect of metaphor is a dimension of the metaphorical character, which is, and has to be, recognized at a pre-semantic level— that is, before any proposition has been identified—, it is hard to see how is it possible for metaphors to elicit just this effect. This is a possibility even Stern allows for and accepts. We can use literal language to induce a new perspective and reorganization of beliefs, and as Stern said, any "speech act we perform using language literally we can also perform with language used, or interpreted, metaphorically. (Stern 2008, 262)"

Treating the pictorial dimension of metaphors as a perlocutionary effect explains this possibility more economically. In my view, once the meaningful parts of the utterance are established, the perlocutionary effect of metaphors is activated, and then depending on whether the speaker endorsed the effect and wants also that the audience endorse the same effect, that is, to adopt the associated commonplaces, net of beliefs, etc. as part of the common ground, they, depending also on their joint interest, might further coordinate on what they take to be the appropriate contribution to the talk exchange they are engaged in.

All this doesn't require a Gricean mechanism of recognizing that there is a false proposition that the speaker cannot be possibly taken to be communicating and therefore a search for an alternative, implicit communicated content. In this much, I agree with the semantic account that the metaphorical interpretation is lexically triggered in case of absurd metaphors. How much directness is in the communicated content of a metaphor depends on how much commitment is ascribed to the agreed contribution to the common ground, and how much is taken up by the speaker more or less explicitly (cf. Camp, 2014). As I mentioned in Chapter One, denial of the metaphorical content is often not possible without denying the act of communication itself.

To conclude, even though the semantic accounts use the same analogies of utterances which influence their contexts for their own evaluation to be possible, i.e., demonstratives and indexicals, I think they took the analogy too far and with the wrong emphasis. I agree with them, to some extent, that it is the lexical and syntactical properties of an expression which triggers the metaphorical interpretation, but I claim it is done by a perlocutionary effect and not by the metaphorical character or its dimensions.

5.3 Conclusion

The proposed perlocutionary view is very close to the pragmatic views developed by Marie Bergmann (1982), Richard Moran (1989), and particularly Elisabeth Camp (2003; 2008; 2014). It builds on Camp's claim that the speaker expects the audience to identify the intended message by way of cultivating the perspective offered in a metaphor. It strengthens and modifies the insights of these theories by providing a perlocutionary analysis of the effect of metaphors.

I claim that cultivating a perspective is a prelocutionary effect intended by the speaker. Sometimes it serves to enrich the context with relevant information by way of

accommodation on the hearer's part, so that the proper evaluation of the metaphorical speech act becomes possible, i.e., the utterance will not outright be labeled as false or otherwise absurd and the speaker as not acting rationally. Often times, as in the case of twice true metaphors, this effect of cultivating a perspective will play a different, but to some extent similar role. It will lead the audience to inferences about the point the speaker is trying to make. In these cases, the same mechanisms are at work.

My proposed account allow metaphors to be used solely to make the audience cultivate a certain perspective whilst Camp (2013; 2014) seems to suggest that there always must be a speech act with a propositional content, however indefinite that might be. In this regard, the proposed perlocutionary account is closer to that of Davidson (1978) and Lepore and Stone (2010) style non-cognitivsm. I consider it the merit of the proposed account that it unites the appeals of both these theories by presenting a detailed analysis of the notion of perlocution overlooked in the discussion of metaphors so far.

To sum up, the proposed perlocutionary account, with the perlocution claim being its central thesis, takes the insights from two theories, non-cognitivism and the Gricean view. It agrees with the non-cognitivist that there is a causal mechanism at work with metaphors, that metaphors cause us to notice resemblances between things, to accept a new perspective or to conjure up an imagery. The non-cognitivist fault, in my view, is that this causal effect might not be the ulterior purpose of the speaker. The perspective induced is what equips the context with the information required to evaluate the speech act itself. It is still a perlocutionary effect though. An effect induced by the audience perceiving the semantic properties and/or the propositional content or the illocutionary force of the utterance. It serves as a means to make the utterance understandable.

Chapter 6

Summary

There is a strange discrepancy in current theories of metaphorical meaning. On the one hand, they propose a theory of metaphorical meaning intended to capture and explain all instances of this figure of speech; yet they allow for non-cognitive uses of metaphors. Explicit discussion of the connection between the theory of metaphorical meaning and the possible non-meaningful use of metaphors is hard to find, and this holds for pragmatic as well as semantic views. It is hinted that the theory of metaphorcial meaning can be, one way or another, supplemented with the non-cognitivist insights.

The perlocutionary theory of metaphors I developed in this dissertation is free from such a tension. In fact, it builds on it. These two seemingly incompatible claims can be harmonized in a pragmatic theory if we treat the effect of metaphors—the seeing-as or perspectival effect—to be a perlocutionary effect and also realize that it is that component of a metaphorical speech act which affects the context, i.e., what is presumed prior to the utterance, in order for the speech act itself to be understandable after it has been made. Sometimes, the point of the metaphorical speech act is to elicit this perspectival effect. Some other times, the interaction in which it is realized requires more, and then there

might be an inexplicit though primary content the speaker puts down on record (cf. Camp, 2014)

To reach this conclusion, in the first chapter I presented different views on what metaphorical meaning is against the background of general views on utterance meaning, a notion the discussion of which has been vigorous since the appearance of the works of H. P. Grice (1989). Simply put, there is a distinction made in the literature between what certain expressions mean in a given language independent of their actual context of use, the knowledge of which meaning is part of the linguistic competence of speaker-hearers, and the content speakers express uttering phrases of their language.

The content a certain expression in context has is often determined by the linguistic meaning of the expression. The linguistic meaning of indexicals, for instance, is construed as a rule which always picks out a certain element from the context, which is composed of the time and place of the utterance and the mutual knowledge or belief about other state of affairs required to be present in the interaction.

There is a lot of debate whether it is only this type of process involved in the comprehension of the content of an utterance. Many people argued that, more often than not, our general cognitive mechanisms step in, and in fact, it is the modulation of the senses of expression by these mechanisms which helps us understand the content of an utterance. In such a view the utterance is grasped as an input, a stimuli, to our cognition.

Also, linguistic communication often results in indirect or not explicit messaging; the speaker meaning more, or something completely different than what could be reconstructed solely on the grounds of the linguistic meaning of the expression and the relevant contextual information. Such implicatures, a term introduced by Grice (1989) to capture the phenomena, form a relevant part of the total significance of an utterance.

After presenting in detail all the above roughly mentioned notions of meaning, I

presented various views taking metaphorical meaning falling under one of the categories. I presented the semantic view of Josef Stern (2000; 2011) and Michiel Leezenberg (1995), who both claim that we should model how metaphor works in analogy to indexicals and demonstratives inspired by David Kaplan's semantic analysis (Kaplan, 1959).

I presented also Grice's (1989) view, on which metaphorical meaning is a conversational implicature, and also the view developed by Elisabeth Camp which takes its inspiration from Grice's works in claiming that the speaker is meaning something else than he said, but recognizing that some features of the communicated metaphorical content are unique, and, therefore, it does not group well with paradigmatic types of implicatures.

I labeled, following the literature, direct expression views those accounts of metaphor which refer to general cognitive mechanisms and sense modulation in their account of metaphors and presented their main theses. On this account, metaphor comprehension is only different from general utterance comprehension in the degree of sense modulation required.

I closed my discussion of recent theories of metaphorical meaning with presenting the non-cognitivist views, which point to the special effect of metaphors, its ability to cause us notice unexpected similarities and to see something in a new light, and claim that instead of communicating a more or less definite content, eliciting this effect is the ultimate purpose of the speaker.

In Chapter Two, I scrutinized what this effect amounts to both on the non-cognitivist view and also on those views which endorse the insight of non-cognitivism, but at the same time argue that having this effect is compatible with metaphors' having a communicated content.

On the views inspired by Grice, there are two ways of incorporating this effect into

the analysis of metaphors. First, it is treated as something that appears alongside the conveyance of the metaphorical meaning. It is kind of a post-propositional effect, which appears once the direct content of the expression has been identified as conversationally inappropriate, which might come into play as a useful heuristic in interpreting metaphors (Bergmann, 1982).

Second, it is put into the center of the account as something by means of which the metaphorical content is to be recovered (Moran, 1989; Camp, 2003; 2008), but with little or no details on how this actually happens.

The semantic views, particularly that of Josef Stern (2000; 2011) provide a different analysis of this effect. Stern claims it is an extra-propositional part of the total significance of the utterance. A metaphorical mode of presentation which might help to determine the metaphorical content in a context and is definitely not something which is incompatible with it.

My purpose with a thorough discussion of how the effect is analyzed according to various views countering non-cognitivism about metaphors was to show its importance in theorizing about metaphorical meaning before turning to show that this effect is a perlocutionary effect.

In Chapter Three, I argue for this claim after a thorough discussion of the notion of perlocution, perlocutionary acts and perlocutionary effects as they were first discussed by Austin (1962). Perlocutionary effects, as defined by Kissine (2008; 2009) are effects which can be realized intentionally or unintentionally by the audience perception or comprehension of the syntactic/semantic properties, and/or propositional content and/or illocutionary force of the utterance. I also emphasized that perlocutionary effects are not necessarily the final aim of the speaker in uttering something.

To show that the effect of metaphors falls within this category, I used the analogy offered by Martin Davies (1982) and endorsed by Josef Stern (2000), who both claim

that some literal statements can have the same perspectival effect that metaphors have. Referring to this fact is a commonplace in the literature in arguing against the non-cognitivist view on metaphor. I argued that the perspectival effect in case of literal statements is a perlocutionary effect, and that we have no reason to treat it as something else in the case of metaphors either.

In Chapter Four, I defended a the Perlocution Claim agianst a recent objection put forward by Ernest Lepore and Matthew Stone (2010). They claim that there is no special meaning for metaphors other than the literal meaning of the sentence uttered. At the same time they object to analyzing what is additional in metaphors, the imagery elicited by them, in terms of perlocutionary effects.

Lepore and Stone (2010) argue that, in familiar cases of perlocutionary effects, it is the content alone that triggers certain thoughts and emotions and there is no need on the hearers' part to recognize the speaker's intention to elicit the particular effect. As opposed to this, they claim, we cannot appreciate the suggestions of a metaphor, the imagery and its consequences, simply by submitting the proposition put forward to our "ordinary faculty of inference and critical thinking." I provided examples that, in fact, we can. Hence their argument is not conclusive and leaves the Perlocution Claim intact.

Given all this, in Chapter Five, I returned to the original question of my dissertation: What theory follows from the truth of the Perlocution Claim? An obvious choice would be a non-cognitivist theory. Against this, I presented examples which point out that such an analysis cannot be correct. This choice, to echo Stern (2000), would count as simply explaining away some aspect of how metaphors work and wouldn't provide a proper explanation of the phenomena.

However, I also pointed out that one cannot rule out the possibility of a non-cognitive use of metaphors simply based on examples showing that there is something the speaker intends to convey by means of her metaphorical utterance. A full explanation of how

metaphors 'work their wonders' needs to accommodate both non-cognitive and cognitive uses of metaphors.

I argued that it is possible to formulate such an account based on the Perlocution Claim. To this effect, we only need to highlight the fact that there are different ways a perlocutionary effect can be realized. First, its achievement can be the ulterior purpose of the speaker. However, second, achieving a perlocutionary effect might just be one among the many intentions the speaker can have in uttering something. If the speaker's aim with a metaphor is simply to elicit the framing effect, there is no special meaning she wanted to convey. If the speaker has another ulterior motive, depending partly on the conversational situation she is engaged in, she intends this effect to accomodate the context with information which is required to make her contribution to the talk exchange she is engaged in understandable at all. The perspective induced will be taken to be part of the context by the audience realizing that the speaker is taking it to be part of the background knowledge.

On this account, if there is a special meaning of metaphors, it is an inexplicit, perhaps primary, pragmatic meaning along the lines Elisabeth Camp proposed recently (2013; 2014).

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