Nothing Else Matters? The Role of Ethnic Voter-Party Linkage in Voting:

Experimental Evidence from Montenegro

By

Nemanja Stankov

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Gabor Toka

Budapest, Hungary

2016

Abstract

This study analyses the voting behavior patterns in an ethnically divided post-communist society. More precisely, I argue that the long lasting rule of Democratic Party of Socialists and a small rate of electoral volatility in Montenegro, is a consequence of ethnic, cleavage, based voting. To test this assumption I apply a two-stage experimental design to a sample of 240 Montenegrin students. In the first stage respondents are treated with cues on candidate's ethnicity. The results indicate that there is a clear ethnic link and effect of that link on vote choice in the case of Montenegrins, while the results are inconclusive in the case of Serbs. Furthermore, in the second stage, respondents are provided with misbehavior information about the same candidate, namely corruption information. I hypothesize that corruption information about the candidate will increase the volatility rate for the out-group candidate. No evidence was found to support that claim. On the contrary, Montenegrins tend to punish their in-group candidate more when corruption charges are raised against him. This study complements the scholarly literature on ethnic cleavage voting, voting in Montenegro and an emerging literature on identity shifts in Montenegro.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank the Department for giving me the opportunity to spend an amazing two years in Budapest. To learn and to grow, both as a scientist and as a person. Furthermore, I extend my gratitude to International Visegrad Fund for awarding me with the scholarship during my studies in Budapest. This thesis would not be possible without their support.

I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Gabor Toka. His guidance and expertise shaped the final outline of this thesis. Without his unconditional support this project would not be as half as good as it is now. Furthermore, I am grateful for the patience in reading similar, history filled, drafts over and over again.

My thanks go to my dear friend Olivera Komar, who planted the seed of scientific inquiry into my brain. Thank you for the help in the fieldwork, for all the chats, tips and pointers but most of all thank you for being my friend. I would also like to thank: Slaven Živković, Srdan Škuletić, Milena Gvozenović, Iva, Nikola, Ćiki, for making me feel like I never left home; Miloš and Zsofi for all the support and help during these two years (Zsofi, the grammar in my papers extends its gratitude on its own); My quiet, yet so awesome friend Maddona, who always has my back; to Marsela, "nuestra amiga para toda la vida" for an amazing year of stories, friendship and fun; to Arthur, for all the poker nights we gambled away; to Katerina, for being from Bulgaria (that's not all to it, you are a good friend as well); to Ivan Vuković, for believing in me and helping me to get here. Finally, to my best friend and flat mate (although after two years I cannot stand the sight of you anymore), Nemanja Batrićević, for all the struggles we shared and all Friday nights with which we chased the struggles away.

I am lucky to have the support and understanding of my family. Thank you for believing in me, to my father, Rade, for showing me how to go through life; to my sister, Valentina, for taking the role of the kid in the family; to my mother, for helping me become the man that I am today.

To you, Hajdana, who are all that there is and all that will ever be, I dedicate this thesis to you.

Contents

Table of Figures

1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War prompted a new wave of democratization in Europe. While this democratization wave inspired a body of literature in comparative politics dealing with differences and similarities between old and new democracies in institutional settings, constitutions, democratic values, electoral and party systems (see Crafword and Lijphart, 1995; Lijphart, 2001; Tavits, 2005, 2008; Zielinsky, 2002), literature on ethnic voting in new democracies is scarce (see Birch 1995). This is especially true when we consider the analysis of voting behavior in the countries of former Yugoslavia. More specifically, little attention has been devoted to voting behavior patterns in the smallest of the former Yugoslav countries – Montenegro.

It is the principal aim of this paper to complement the scarce literature on voting behavior in Montenegro. It is interesting that Montenegro did not inspire more scholarly attention, considering the fact that it is the only post-communist country that did not change its government since the introduction of pluralism. Namely, The League of Communist of Montenegro transformed into the Democratic Party of Socialists in the early 1990s, and has never lost parliamentary elections since.

As a starting point for explaining voting behavior in Montenegro, I will use cleavage theory established by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The "fourth wave" of democratization renewed interest in this theory with a focus on the influence of cleavage politics on the establishment and durability of party systems (see Tavits, 2005; Birnir, 2007, Tucker, 2002). In the review of all articles published on the topic of electoral dynamics in post – communist Europe in the period from 1991 to 2000, Tucker (2002), concludes that in principle authors agree on the

existence and influence of societal cleavages on voting patterns and electoral results. Where scholarship differs is identification of particular cleavages that matter. The authors mostly focus on societal cleavages based on class, urban rural splits and generational effect (Kopstein & Richter 1992; Clem & Craumer 1995c, 1997; Wyman et al. 1995; Szelenyi et al. 1997; Moser 1999b, in Tucker, 2002).

Furthermore, presumably because of the undemocratic character of the Western Balkan states and a prolonged period of war and ethnic conflict in the 1990s, these countries were largely excluded from comparative analyses of post-communist countries (see Tavits, 2005; McAllister and White, 2007; Whitefield, 2002; Evans and Whitefield, 2000). Tucker (2002) adds that case selection is influenced mainly by the sphere of interest of Western democracies resulting in Russia, Poland, Baltic countries and new and potential NATO member states being analyzed more frequently.

Particularly interesting for the topic of this paper is that only one article surveyed by Tucker (2002) focuses specifically on the influence of ethnic cleavage on voting patterns and electoral results (see Birch, 1995). From this perspective the case of Montenegro offers a possibility to better understand how ethnic cleavages are shaping voting behavior. This paper will argue that ethnic voter/party linkage is a sufficient predictor of individual vote choice in Montenegro.

Ethnic cleavage became a salient political issue during the 1990s but is still shaping the face of Montenegrin politics. The process of state building, which culminated with the 2006 referendum for independence, established ethnic cleavage as the dominant political conflict in the society. Furthermore, nation building process reshaped ethnic identities and embedded them with new meaning (Džankić, 2014). In a particular case, we cannot look at ethnic division

in Montenegro as a matter of primordial identities and differences, but of constructed social and political identities. This paper complements this emerging line of research on identity shifts in Montenegro by creating a classification of Montenegrin and Serbian political identities that are consisted out of ethnicity and complemented with religious affiliation and language preference.

The principal aim of this study is not to establish the existence of ethnic cleavages nor is it to offer a full scale analysis of identity shifts. Rather, this paper relies on previous research in these areas, and focuses on the cleavage politics as explanation for voting behavior and, in addition, of small rate of electoral volatility in the case of Montenegro. One of the aims of the research is to examine whether explanation for low electoral volatility can be found in strong ethnic party/voter linkage and to analyze its strength under the conditions of candidate's misbehavior (see Peters and Welch, 1980; Redlawsk and McCann, 2005). In other words, when confronted with information about candidates' corruption, how do voters weigh candidate's ethnicity and misbehavior in deciding the vote?

For this exploration I will use an experimental design that largely follows Dunning and Harrison (2010) study of ethnic politics in Mali, with an additional stage where information is provided about corrupt behavior. The first stage of the experiment aims at establishing the ethnic linkage between voters and candidates and to evaluate the effect of that link on candidate's approval rates. Second stage of the experiment introduces corruption information against the candidate and aims at testing the stability of ethnic linkage and voting preference under the assumption of misbehavior, (in this particular case corruption).

Studying the Montenegrin case is interesting for several reasons. First, Montenegro is a democracy in the making that can provide further insight into the party system development and cleavage-based voting in a recently formed post-communist country. Furthermore, Wolfinger (1965) argued that ethnic based voting is strongest in the early years of residence. A few remarks should be made here. In his analysis, Wolfinger (1965) studied early residence of social groups that have moved in already long existing countries. Although this is not the case in Montenegro, this concept is still applicable. The fact that Montenegro become independent in 2006 (after 88 years), when all social groups started redefining their identity, contributes to the argument that all social groups can in a way be considered as early residents.

It appears there is no experimental data on this issue for Montenegro, this analysis can be used as a starting point of future analyses of the Montenegrin case. Nevertheless, it appears that this is a clear case of a strong correlation between vote choice and demographic characteristics, namely ethnicity. For illustrative purposes, data from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems shows that 90.5% of ethnic Montenegrins voted for one of the Montenegrin parties[1] in 2012 parliamentary election. Also, 84% of Serbs casted a ballot for one of the Serbian parties[2]. Judging by this numbers it is safe to assume that there is a significant amount of ethnic voting happening in Montenegro. It is important to note that I am not looking here at minority parties. As Montenegrins comprise 44.9% of the population, and Serbs 28.72% (Census, 2011), the first can hardly be characterized as a clear majority, while the other hardly be characterized as minority population in Montenegro. Instead of minority ethnic voting, what is puzzling is how the two biggest ethnic groups are maintaining group cohesion and voting for in-group parties.

Second, in her analysis on the stability of party systems in East Europe, Tavits (2005) examines the level of electoral volatility and party system stability. One of the main arguments is that

---

[1] Parties that explicitly supported the independence excluding minority Bosniak, Croatian and Albanian parties.
[2] Parties that opposed the independence.

high level of electoral volatility and low party system stability is a consequence of a weak cleavage structure which ensured the emergence of economic voting pattern (Tavits, 2005). If Tavits' reasoning is correct then Montenegrin voting behavior should be unresponsive to stimuli such as differences in perceived competence in economic management or corruption among politicians. Furthermore, the case of Montenegro is interesting as it represent an outlier case with a strong cleavage structure, very low electoral volatility and a relatively stable party system.

More specifically for the case of low electoral volatility, the ruling coalition has a stable support which ranged from 51.9% in 2008 elections to 45.6% in 2012 elections (Table 1). In absolute terms, in all election presented in Table 1, the ruling coalition DPS-SDP acquired between 164.000 and 168.000 votes. Furthermore, the volatility is a consequence of different minority parties being part of the pre-election coalition with DPS-SDP in 2006, 2009 and 2012 parliamentary elections. As for the opposition parties the percentage shift are slightly bigger but still indicate small rate of electoral volatility.

Table 1: Electoral result for main political parties in Montenegro in the last three election cycles

Election Year			
2006	2009	2012	Political Party/Coalition
	% of vote		
48.62	51.94	45.59	DPS-SDP[3]
13.13	6.03	22.82	PZP
14.68	9.22		NOVA
14.07	16.84	11.06	SNP
/	/	8.24	PCG

Note: DF spans PZP and NOVA rows in 2012 column.

Source: State Electoral Commission

[3] Democratic Party of Socialist (DPS) and Social-Democratic Party (SDP) runned as a pre-election coalition in all three electoral cycles. Movement for Change (PZP) formed and runned for the first time in 2006. Movement for Change (PZP) and New Serbian Democracy (NOVA) formed new coalition party Democratic Front (DF) just before the 2012 elections. Socialist People's Party (SNP) ran in a pre-election coalition in 2006, while in other two election cycles runned separately. Positive Montenegro (PCG) formed before 2012 parliamentary elections.

This claim of small volatility is confirmed by calculating the Pedersen Index of Volatility (Pedersen, 1979) which, for the volatility between 2009 and 2012 elections, amounts to 13.9. In comparison, the Pedersen index, for the last two election cycles in 2012 and 2014, in Serbia is 29. Furthermore, in the analysis of electoral volatility in post-communist countries Powell and Tucker (2009), calculated the Pedersen Index of Volatility for 21 countries. The Pedersen index for Montenegro was calculated for three elections in the period from 2000 to 2006 and amounted to the average of 28[4], which placed it as the second lowest country in terms of volatility, only above Hungary.

As to the second point of small volatility more detailed analysis follows. In individual terms, 88.8% of voters who choose the ruling coalition DPS-SDP in 2009 parliamentary elections did so in the 2012 elections as well. As for the opposition parties 55.4% of those who choose SNP in 2009 were 2012 voters as well. The biggest opposition party, in the last election cycle in Montenegro, DF acquired 60% of its votes from the voters who supported the two constituent parties in the 2008 elections- PZP and NOVA. The remaining 40% came from other opposition parties (36% from SNP voters) which roughly coincides with the 7% support increase compared to 2008 elections when PZP and NOVA ran separately. From 2009 elections, DF was able to retain 88.6% of NOVA voters and 55% of PZP voters. .All of the results stated above indicate that ruling coalition has a stable support and low levels of volatility. On the other hand, there is a level of volatility in opposition party voters but even those who change the vote choice between the election cycles are voting for another opposition party, not the ruling coalition.

---

[4] The index was computed with reference to Type A and Type B volatility. In other words, whether the volatility is the consequence of voters chosing different party in electoral cycles (B), or a consequence of new parties entering the electoral competition (A). In the Montenegrin case, only 4 out of 28 points on the Pedersen Index are attributed to voters changing their vote choice between elections, and 24 to new parties enetering the competition("party system instability").

Furthermore, volatility seems to affect parties that weakened their ethnic alignment with the electorate – SNP and PZP. For a long time, political program of SNP was clearly pro-Serbian and unionistic. Prior the 2012 elections, the focus of their party platform shifted to economic and social policy. As for the PZP, the party remained neutral during the referenda process and always advocated political program based on civic values.

The third reason for conducting this study is that studying ethnic cleavage voting can help us understand why Montenegro has a multi-party system with a predominant party (Komar, 2013) that never lost national elections since the introduction of pluralism in 1991. The results presented earlier, combined with string ethnic voting, offer an explanation why Montenegro has a long lasting rule of the DPS-SDP coalition.

Lastly, prior to this study only Komar (2013) analyzed the patterns of voting behavior in Montenegro in her PhD thesis. Her study was an exploratory research in which she combined and applied a large number of well-established voting behavior theories without specifically focusing on either of them. My study is the first attempt at looking at ethic cleavage as a main factor in explaining voting behavior in Montenegro.

The overall results indicate that there is a strong ethnic linkage between Montenegrins and Montenegrin political candidates. Montenegrins candidates have smaller chance of being voted by a Serbian national. On the other hand, this experiment failed to show the same relationship between Serbs and their in-group political representatives. Furthermore, when confronted with misbehavior information Montenegrins are more likely to punish their in-group candidate more severely. In other words, Montenegrins hold their in-group candidate to a higher moral and political standards.

This study contributes to the scarce literature on voting behavior in Montenegro, by causally testing the ethnic linkage as voting predictor. Furthermore, the study complements the literature

on voting in post-communist countries as well as the literature on ethnic cleavage based voting. Lastly, a small contribution is added to the emerging literature on identity shifts in Montenegro.

The paper is structured as follows. First, the following chapter introduces the case history and traces back the origins of ethnic cleavage to the beginning of the 20th century. Second, the theory chapter uses the historical interpretation to embed the case of Montenegro into cleavage theory, expressive voting and offers as short summary of the literature on corruption. Third, the methodology chapter gives detailed account of the experimental design, procedures, stimuli and hypotheses. Fourth, data and measurements describes data collection procedure, sample characteristics, initial group comparisons and dependent variables. Fifth, results sections presents the findings of the experiment in and across groups. Sixth, the limitations chapter evaluates the shortcomings of the methodological setup and analysis used. Seventh, the last chapter discuss implications of the research and concludes.

2. The Emergence of Ethnic Cleavage in Montenegro: Case History

To understand the origins of voting behavior in contemporary Montenegrin society, we must first trace back its origins in the short but turbulent Montenegrin political history. It is important to note that the historical events I am about to describe and their competing interpretations were used as political arguments during post-communist period, and produced the main line of division on the question of Montenegrin sovereignty in the referendum in 2006.

In the modern era, Montenegro was finally acknowledged as a sovereign and independent state at the Berlin Congress in 1878. The period of independence lasted for almost 30 years, at the end of which Montenegro was forcefully annexed and incorporated by Serbia into the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes (SHS Kingdom) in 1918 (Vuković, 2016). The course of events that took place in the unification assembly, called the Great People's Assembly, represent the first and probably the strongest source of a strong and persistent cleavage along ethnic lines in Montenegro.

What were the reasons behind these political controversies? Morrison (2009) points out that what makes the situation more unusual are the cultural similarities between Montenegrins and Serbs. Both nations share Orthodox religion, very similar myths and symbols, while the language differences are very minor (Morrison, 2009). Nevertheless, Montenegrins are still interpreting the annexation as a historical grievance.

Furthermore, the idea of the first Yugoslav state was present for several years and the majority of the population supported the creation of the joint Yugoslav state. Vuković (2016) rightfully argues that the support for the joint state was based on a belief that the unification process will respect Montenegrin sovereignty and be based on the principles of equality. Even Montenegrin

King Nikola I Petrović, whose political views often changed, supported the unification within a loose federal state with federal units that will preserve autonomy (Pavlović, 2009).

Instead of following the principles outlined above, the unification was conducted in a completely different manner. Šuković (2011), nicely summarizes the historical events that occurred. In November 1918, while King Nikola I and Montenegrin government were still in exile, the Serbian military organized a Great People's Assembly (hereinafter Assembly) in Podgorica[5] . The Assembly was established in the small town of Berane ten days prior to the Assembly meeting in Podgorica. The founding of the Assembly was done in violation of applicable constitutional and legal provisions of Montenegro. Neither of the actors had the legal authority to do so, nor was it done in through the procedures of legal political institutions in Royal Capital Cetinje.

In the Act establishing the Assembly, rules of procedure on the elections of peoples representatives on the Assembly were laid out. With the support of Serbian military, the election for the Assembly were held in a rush without the majority of the people knowing about them. In addition, in a significant part of Montenegro they were not organized at all. As the Assembly was established, on the first days, the *"representatives"[6]* voted on the rules of procedure that will be used for the decision making process. On the second day, the Chairman Savo Cerović introduced the draft of the resolution on the agenda without"representatives" knowledge. It was read only once without the distribution of the printed copies to the "representatives".

Furthermore, the Chairman denied discussion both on the specificities and in general about the content of the draft claiming that the applause heard after the reading was proof enough that

---

[5] Additional argument agains the legality and legitimacy of the Great People's Assembly is the fact that it was not organized in Royal Capitol Cetinje, which served as a center of Montenegrin state for more than two centuries.
[6] [Italic, N.S].

discussion was unnecessary. There is evidence to be found in the transcript of the meeting that significant demand for debate and opposition to claiming the applause as evidence that the draft has been accepted as resolution, and consequently passed, but no proper voting ever took place. Despite all that occurred, all 160 representatives signed the Resolution (Šuković, 2011).

As the rules of procedure were completely ignored it resulted in Serbian military proclaiming unconditional unification of Montenegro to Serbia and the nullification of the Montenegrin state. The main decisions of the Assembly were the nullification of the Montenegrin state and church (Morrison, 2009) and prohibition on return to the country to King Nikola I who remained exile in Paris until his death in 1921. As Rastoder (2003) points out, the whole process was both illegitimate and illegal (cited in Bieber, 2003).

As it became increasingly obvious that equal status will not be granted to Montenegrins, a military resistance was organized and took place on Christmas Eve 1918 (Rastoder, 2003, in Bieber, 2003). The military fractions called "komite" were definitely defeated in 1919 and the remaining force scattered throughout the country later on joining the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the opposing political groups were formally organized into the proponents of unconditional unification called "The Whites", and the proponents of the unification on equal footing called "The Greens" (Rastoder, 2003 in Džankić, 2013). This line of cleavage remained frozen during the Communist era but resurfaced and is still used for politicization of ethnic identity in contemporary Montenegro (Vuković, 2016).

In Montenegrin society two historical narratives on the 1918 unification are present. On the one hand, in contemporary Montenegrin society Montenegrins view unification as illegal and illegitimate, as well as the result of the Serbian aggressor politics. On the other hand, Serbs view the 1918 unification as a free expression of the people's will as Montenegrins are colloquially called "southern Serbs". These narratives organized along the historical

confrontation between The Greens and The Whites helped establish the identities associated with pro-independence or unionist block (Morrison, 2009). In other words, the confronted discourses are just one, but key, dimension of what shapes the political identities of Montenegrins and Serbs in the 21st century. In this paper I argue that these identities have shaped the voting behavior prior to the referendum and continue to do so since.

The Montenegrin state was re-established after WWII not as an independent state, but as one of the federal units of Yugoslavia. This was a significant improvement over the position Montenegro had in the SHS Kingdom. At that point even highly positioned people within the Central Committee of the Communist Party argued that Montenegro deserved the status of a separate republic but not of a separate nation (Đilas, 1947 in Džankić, 2013). Relatively good position of the Montenegrin state lasted until the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia when Montenegro decided to stay in a joint state with Serbia.

The reasoning behind this decision to, at first, stay at a joint state with Serbia is most probably the consequence of the communist legacy in Montenegro. Namely, following the great military sacrifice in World War II, Montenegrins managed to colonize the political institutions of the new communist Yugoslav state, where they remained overrepresented right up to the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Lampe, 2006). Not only that the Montenegrins managed to secure the position in the Party and political institutions, they further managed to materialize the influence in a way that Montenegro received disproportionally large share of funds from the federal budget for inner socio-economic development (Vuković, 2014). As Roberts correctly pointed out, the time Montenegro spent under communist rule was "the best in Montenegro's entire history" (2007:393). Furthermore, the main reasoning in the decision to stay in a join

state with Serbia could be found in the hope "… for the continuation of a system that they rightly believed had worked greatly to their advantage"[7] (Roberts, 2007: 426).

It was precisely in the first several years of the new Yugoslavia that the ethnic cleavage remerged, which is still shaping the face of Montenegrin politics today. Vuković (2016) argued that the pressure of the Milosevic's regime created an opening for the re-emergence of the unsettled Montenegrin question that seemed to be resolved for good in the communist era[8]. The ethnic clashes remerged again in the relations between official Podgorica and official Belgrade, where the argument of Montenegrin nation being a historical fabrication and nothing more than southern Serbia resurfaced (Morrison, 2003 in Vuković, 2016). The clashes between the two federal units alongside with the rising ethnic and religious conflicts in the region created a path for the emergence of numerous political subjects claiming to represent different ethnic entities.[9]

Džankić (2013) points out that precisely this mobilization along ethnic lines made possible the creation of Montenegrin and Serb identity[10]. Džankić (2013) acknowledges the prior existence of religious and linguistic differences but in her opinion these divides were not that influential per se, as they just created additional layers of Montenegrin or Serbian identity and contributed to the dominance of structural (ethno-cultural) cleavages. For the delimitation of Montenegrin and Serbian political identities, the single most important event, according to Džankić (2013), was the break in the ruling party in 1997 when two fractions re-emerged. One fostering the values associated with Montenegrin identity pushing for independence, other nurturing strong

---

[7] This quote refers directly to political elites of The Legue of Communist of Montenegro, but should not be exclusive of the entire Montenegrin population.
[8] Note that this issue was present prior to the clases of 1997-1998. LSCG (Liberal Union of Montenegro) advocated the seccision of Montenegro, but only after the DPS monopolized the issue it became higly politicaly salient in domestic politics and in the relationship with Serbia.
[9] After the deterrence from Milošević's nationalist politics, the political clashes between Podgorica and Belgrade culminated on the 14th of January 1998 when in mass demonstrations in Podgorica, police and military confronted. At that point, the Montenegrin government controlled the police while the military was controlled by the regime in Belgrade.
[10] Note that in the beginning of the 90s identity differences between Serbs and Montenegrins were almost indistinguishable, where both groups were just a part of the Christian Orthodox majority in Montenegro.

relations with the Milosevic's regime in Belgrade and "preserving" the Serbian identity (Vuković, 2016). Precisely following these lines of division, ethnic identities first shaped the vote choice as an expression of the support for the regime in Belgrade, later on as a support for the independence. I argue that in the contemporary society, these identities still shape the vote choice by putting an emphasis on ethnic, voter-party linkage.

Furthermore, the clash in the party fractions described above, came from the negative economic consequences of the Milošević's regime, but was later embedded and strengthened using the ethnic dimension. As Vuković and Milačić (2016) point out, at that time the main point of disagremment was how to redefine the relationship with Belgrade as it had very negative political and economic cosequences for Montenegro. One block of the party lead by Predrag Bulatović, at that time president of the party and of the state, was openly suporting the regime in Belgrade, while the other block, lead by Milo Đukanović vice president of the party and Prime Minister, openly widraw support and started advocating closer partnership with Western democracies (Vuković & Milačić, 2016). The clash between these two opposing political programs would reach its peak in the Montenegrin referendum for independence in 2006.

From 1997 to 2002 the independent block grew in strength and general support that eventually resulted in the signing of the document between the governments of Serbia and Montenegro known as Belgrade Agreement (Darmanović, 2007). The main provisions of the Charter referred to the creation of a more loose joint state with a separated foreign policy.

From that moment on, Montenegro and Serbia started appearing in the international community as practically two independent states (Đurović, 2006). Two states separately negotiated the accession to the World Trading Organization and filled separate accession applications for EU (Đurović, 2006). Regarding the independence issue, the most important provision

("temporality clause") stated the right of the Montenegrin people to organize a referendum for independence three years after the signing of the Agreement (Darmanović, 2007).

Due to the much politicized issue of independence, and bearing in mind the recent history of the Balkans, the EU took part in the negotiation and organization process of the referendum through special emissary Miroslav Lajčak and Františep Lipka (Darmanović, 2007). The later took part in the referendum as the chair of the electoral commission (Darmanović, 2007). In order to avoid further complication of the strained relations of the two countries, a majority of 55% who voted in the referendum was needed for Montenegro to become an independent state. On May 21st 2006, Montenegrin voters went to the polling stations and with a razor thin 55.5% majority decided to become an independent state. Needless to say that ethnic affiliation played a decisive role in how people voted at the referendum, with Montenegrins accompanied by minorities voted for while Serbs voted against Montenegrin independence.

In her analysis of the cleavage structure in Montenegro, Džankić (2013) argues that four distinct critical junctures paved the way for the dominant cleavage conflict. The last critical juncture was the 2006 referendum that adjoined both structural and functional cleavages[11] in Montenegro. Although functional (socio-economic) cleavages had gained in importance after the fall of Milošević in 2000, electoral results from the parliamentary elections in 2001 had indicated the dominance of structural cleavages between the two camps. Functional cleavages, just for a brief period of time, changed the dynamics of the competition in 1997 and 2006 (Džankić, 2013). In other words, excluding a brief period of time in 1997 and 2006, parties' mobilization strategy revolved around constructed ethnic identities of Montenegrins and Serbs.

---

[11] By the term functional cleavages Džankić (2013) reffers to political (class, optimal, socio-economic) split in Montenegrin society regarding the relationship whit Milošević's regime in Belgrade. After the 1997 split in the ruling party (DPS) to DPS (Democratic Party of Socialists) and SNP (Socialist Peoples Party), DPS opposed Milošević while newly formed SNP supported the regime in Belgrade. On the other hand, structural (socio cultural) cleavages are primarily societal splits along the lines of ethnicity, religion and language.

In the political struggle over the statehood issue the clear division among the people became obvious only after the political actors triggered the structural (ethno-cultural) cleavages. In other words, the clash between Serbia and Montenegro initially started because of the unfavorable economic position but was redefined and strengthened as an ethnic "conflict". Furthermore, the divide over the statehood issue ultimately lead to the reconstruction and reinvention of the national identities, where Montenegrins aligned with the pro-independence block while Serbs aligned with the unionist block (Džankić, 2013).

As mentioned earlier, Serbian and Montenegrin identities were almost indistinguishable in the beginning of the 1990s. In other words, what means to be Montenegrin or Serbian is not so much a matter of primordial ethnic origins or distinctions, but of clear social construction of ethnic and in the end political identities. This phenomenon can be clearly illustrated by looking at the census results from 1991 and 2003, where we can observe a severe shift in self-report of ethnicity. Namely, in the 1991 census, 61.86% of the population declared themselves as Montenegrins and only 9.34% identified as Serbs. In the next, 2003 census, 43.16% declared as Montenegrins and 31.99% as Serbs. These shifts clearly demonstrate that during these years there was a significant redefining of what it means to be a Serb and a Montenegrin. Furthermore, what it means to be a Serb and a Montenegrin became a political issue, and as I argue in this paper, the defining cleavage that shapes electoral behavior.

Although the statehood issue was resolved in 2006, the ethnic cleavage is still present nine years later. In particular, the referendum resolved the statehood issue, but the conflict was preserved in the Montenegrin/Serb societal split (Bieber, 2010; Darmanović, 2007; in Moch'tak, 2015). There are several reasons why ethnicity remains an important factor.

First, the Serbian minority still has problems accepting the decision made ten years ago. This opinion is supported by Serbian parties that have not made a clear statement whether they

accept the new political reality and with a small number of radical Serbian parties that still publicly support the initiative for a new unification.

These parties relate to the historical interpretation of the 2006 referendum as a great Montenegrin betrayal of the Serbian people but are not limited to just mythological interpretations. Rather, issues such as clientilism, nepotism that favor Montenegrin population and even discriminatory practices against portion of the Serbian population in Montenegro play a role.

Furthermore, recently these parties started using the term "private state" to mark the level of political and economic development of Montenegro. In other words, referendum results enabled the current Prime Minister Đukanović to gain absolute control over state institutions and to exercise full control over all political and economic processes in the country. Some argue, that this outcome would have been avoided if such a geographically small country have stayed in a joint state with Serbia.

On the other hand, Montenegrin part of the cleavage is reinforced by at least two dimensions. First, as previously mentioned is the historical grievance against the Serbs. The other is closely related. Namely, popular discourse is the fear of rejoining the union with Serbia if Serbian national party is ever to seize power in Montenegro. This argument can be easily characterized as an expectation of future grievance, which ultimately reinforces in-group homogeneity of Montenegrins and strengthens out-group hostility towards Serbs.

Second, after the referendum the state has undergone efforts to rebuild Montenegrin national identity. In the immediate years before and after the referenda these efforts were focused on the issues of state symbols such as the national flag and national anthem. In 2004, the Parliament of Montenegro passed the Law on national symbols defining new coat of arms and flag. Furthermore, the text of the new national anthem "O svijetla majska zoro" (Oh, the bright

dawn of May) was contested (Džankić, 2013). Significant opposition from the Serbian part was put in place to the installment of the symbols that are associated with the Montenegrin state from 1878-1918. The breaking up with the history "shared" with Serbia during the 90's and even during the communist era went further from dissociating Montenegro from Serbian in terms of national symbols, it even went to the point that even the "republic" was erased from the state name in the constitution and regarded as an unwanted Yugoslav legacy.

In the recent years, the ethnic cleavage has been deepened with the establishment of the Montenegrin language. The process lasted for several years including the creation of two new letters, grammar of the Montenegrin language and the introduction of Montenegrin language into primary and secondary schools. Once again, the whole process was highly politicized and culminated in a month-long negotiations about the name of the language in schools and constitutional change in this regard.

Serbian parties managed to force the Montenegrin majority into making concessions more or less blackmailing them with the withdrawal of support for constitutional change in the part of Judiciary proposed by the EU as a part of the accession process. As a specific request in the EU accession process, Montenegro was asked to change the Constitution to make Judiciary less dependent from other branches of power. Among other changes, this implied change in the way members of the Judiciary and Prosecutorial Council were elected. In order to make Constitutional change a two third majority of all MPs is needed which ruling coalition did not have at that time. Opposition parties struck a deal offering support for the changes in the Judiciary part if ruling coalition supports constitutional changes in language section. In the end, the language in schools was called "Mother tongue", with an optional clause for each student to choose the name of the language (Montenegrin, Serbian, Croat or Bosnian language). In the constitutional sense, the Montenegrin language was made an official language, while Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Albanian language were made languages in official use.

One other dimension that deepened the ethnic cleavage is the issue of the religious affiliation to Montenegrin or Serbian Orthodox Church. The 1918 annexation was the end of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church but several initiatives were present during the interwar years to reestablish it as a formal religious institution. Currently, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church exists as a religious organization without formal recognition from other Orthodox churches. This matter is highly delicate as the Serbian Orthodox Church is seen as a main actor through which Serbia can still influence political life in Montenegro. Resolving this issue is likely to round off the process of building the Montenegrin national identity. So far the state has not made any concrete actions in supporting or opposing the reestablishment of this religious institution. Džankić (2013) argues that the ruling party restrain from clear affiliation with one or the other Orthodox Church has led to religious cleavage becoming a separate layer of identity: both Montenegrin and Serbian. Based on the reasons outlined above, I argue that ethnic cleavage and consequently ethnic voting did not disappear but was actually reinforced after the referendum.

As discussed prior in this paper, depending on the context, ethnic identity can comprise multiple dimensions such as religion, language, race and cast, which can provide a basis for different interaction and different conflicts between ethnic identities. In addition, political conflict can be entrenched alongside these multiple dimensions and not just alongside one (Chandra, 2005; Laitin, 1986; Posner, 2004a, 2005; cited in Dunning and Harrison, 2010).

Taking into consideration what has been said so far, in the Montenegrin context, a case could be made that ethnicity, crosscut by religion and language creates at least two specific political identities.[12] Complementing to Montenegrin ethnicity, it could be argued that religious

---

[12] The reason why I argue religious and linguistic cleavages complement ethnic cleavage is contained in the nature of the former. Namely religious cleavages are organized not along the lines of different religions but different Churches of Orthodox Christianity. Furthermore, differences between the Montenegrin and Serbian language are minor.

affiliation to the Montenegrin Orthodox Church and the Montenegrin language create a specific identity which I label as political Montenegrin. Due to a highly politicized opinions on the mater, it is highly unlikely that an individual will incorporate only two out of these three dimensions but in such a case I will also label that identity as political Montenegrin. Any other combination will produce an identity labeled political Serbs (Table 2).[13]

Table 2: Political Identity Classification[14]

Religious Affiliation→	Montenegrin Orthodox Church		Serbian Orthodox Church	
Language→	Montenegrin	Serbian	Montenegrin	Serbian
Ethnicity↓				
Montenegrin	Pol. Montenegrin	Pol. Montenegrin	Pol. Montenegrin	Pol. Serb
Serbian	Pol. Montenegrin	Pol. Serb	Political Serb	Pol. Serb

All of the issues regarding the reinvention and reestablishment of national symbols, language and church had been characterized as a clear attack on Serbian minority with the intention of diminishing Serbian culture, specificities and importance for Montenegrin society. Through the dimensions of religion and language I have incorporated them into the concept of political identity in Montenegro. Together, they represent the principle line of division between Montenegrin and Serbs, and consequently the driving factor behind the vote choice.

What are the implications of these political clashes on voting behavior? On the one hand, Mocht'ak (2015) argues that ethnicity plays an important role as a mobilization factor against the ruling DPS. On the other hand, this does not imply that ethnicity is very important in the

---

[13] Although there is no hard evidence to support the classification of nationalities in this table I believe there is little evidence to support the claim that is incorrect.
[14] The necessity of making such a classification comes from a sampling issue faced by some researches, which conducted research on University of Montenegro (Batrićević, 2015,). Namely, researchers are faced with a problem of samples over reporting Montenegrin ethnicity and underreporting Serbian ethnicity.

electoral contest. It is the goal of this paper to provide evidence on this unexplored matter. Although and argument could be made that this party-voter link cannot be as strong as in the early years after the 2006 referendum, the very low level of electoral volatility indicates that there is a strong stabilizing factor in the vote choice. I argue that this stabilizing factor could be an ethnic cleavage complemented with religious and language cleavages, labeled in this paper as political identity, or what Džankić (2013) called the structural (ethno-cultural) cleavage.

3. Theoretical consideration

In the previous chapter I have described the historical events that shaped and reinforced the division along ethnic lines in Montenegro. The following chapter will embed the political context into a theoretical framework to enable the explanation of voting behavior.

How do voters decide? More specifically are there any social characteristics that can help us understand voting behavior and party linkage? According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), party system polarization is based on social group polarization in which only few hierarchically ordered cleavages matter. Moreover, on their analysis, social conflicts based on religion, class and ethnicity are reflected through party systems and are expressed through voting behavior. Evidence can be found that ethnic issue represents a particularly persistent social cleavage that significantly influences voting preferences (see Hahn and Almy, 1971; Parenti, 1967). Contrary to this view, Lijphart (1980) argues that, surprisingly, religious and linguistic cleavages are effective predictors in vote choice. What his study also shows is that in countries such as Canada and Belgium religious cleavage was taking over the ethnic-linguistic differences that have dominated the 1970s.

On the one hand, more recent research provides evidence that traditional social cleavages have become a weaker predictor of electoral choice. Dalton (1996) argues that this is especially true for advanced industrial democracies. The reasoning behind the argument is that due to the change in electoral competition and party politics, traditional cleavages have become less relevant cues and information shortcuts in advanced industrial societies (Dalton, 1996). On the other hand, this claim has been challenged in a series of published articles (see, Tucker, 2002; Brooks et al. 2004). Specifically, Brooks et al. (2004) combined evidence from six postwar democracies and tested the influence of class, religion and gender on vote choice in a comparative perspective. Their overall findings are quite mixed, but significant evidence is

presented to reject the claim that social cleavages are losing importance. In fact, countries like Australia, USA and Austria in the late 1990s show a growing impact of cleavage structure on voting behavior (Brooks et al. 2004).

All of the studies mentioned above examine cleavage structures, albeit with a different scope. However, there is scarce literature on cleavage structures in post-communist societies and specifically in Montenegro. Tucker (2002) surveys 101 article, published in 16 leading journals on the topic of electoral politics and voting behavior in post-communist countries from 1991 to 2000. While previous research provides evidence on the importance of cleavage structures in post-communist societies little attention has been devoted to the study of former Yugoslavia or specifically to Montenegro. Exception to this rule is recent study by Komar (2013). In her research on voting patterns in Montenegro, Komar (2013) concluded that sociodemographic relations are significant predictors of voting behavior in Montenegro, accompanied by national identity as the basic program difference between political parties. Furthermore, ethnicity and religion are two main identity issues, which positioned themselves as dominant social cleavages.

Is ethnic cleavage really so influential in voting behavior? Do voters choose their preferences based on ethnic or some other political preferences? Posner (2005) offers a valid explanation as to why ethnic cleavage is salient for group classification. Ultimately, ethnic identities are formed around group characteristics that are not susceptible to change. In some cases, such as the color of skin, they are impossible to change, while in others, such as religion and language, they are difficult to change (Posner, 2005). Furthermore, as democracy strongly encourages the expression of identity, nurtured and strengthened during the authoritarian regime, ethnicity emerges as an organizing principle in the political arena of the new democracies (Birnir, 2007). Birnir (2007) continues that ethnic identification is probably the only developed source of political identification in new democracies. Therefore, it is the only politically salient cleavage

capable of significant political mobilization (Crawford, 1996, cited in Birnir, 2007). This undeveloped political space renders information cues of old democracies useless, where an environment of low political information is present. Thus, in such an environment only *stable ethnic-information shortcut provides* sufficient information for political choices (Birnir, 2007)."In short ethnic voters have more information about the ethnic party than non-ethnic voters have about any of the parties that appeal to them" (Birnir, 2007).

If Montenegrin voters are indeed influenced by cleavage structures in vote choice, then they are not basing their vote choice on the principles of the instrumental rationality. Instead their choice is closer to the principles of expressive behavior[15]. It is essential to first introduce a broad distinction between voting based on instrumental rationality and expressive voting. Furthermore, it is important to mention the claim raised by the Hamlin and Jennings (2011), namely that there are no pure cases of either instrumental rationality or expressive voting but voters respond to different kind of incentives, benefits and give them the appropriate weight.

The basic idea of expressive vote is that voting and voting in a particular way "may express some aspect of voters belief, values ideology or identity…and is valuable to the individual in its own right and provides sufficient motivation to vote" (Hamlin and Jennings, 2010). Where these approaches differ was nicely summarized by Hamlin and Jennings (2011) in the following:

1. Voting is expressive if it derives from the underlying symbolic meaning of voting
2. Expressive behavior should be understood relative to an audience (the individual can be his/her own audience)
3. Both expressive and instrumental choices may be „true", even when they are in conflict. Neither one should be viewed as more essential than the other.

---

[15] Note that instrumental rationality can be associated with etchnic voting patterns especially if we consider small minority groups in a diverse society. However, in cases where parties of majority ethnic groups base their program differences on ethnicity without any difference in economic policy proposed, I am inclined to assume that voting patterns are closer to the expressive bahivior model. Montenegro represents such a case (Komar, 2013).

Regarding the expressive choice itself, Hillman (2011) argues that there are two dimensions of expressive behavior. First dimension is the general decision to cast the vote and second is the decision for whom to vote for specifically. More importantly expressive logic of the low-cost voting decision enables voters to choose the layer of identity they want to express even if expressing that identity is contrary to their self-interest (Hillman, 2011). From this perspective in the Montenegrin case I will argue that the choice of voting for a specific party may come from reaffirming a specific identity of an individual. Perhaps the most present layer of expressive voting as symbolic is the meaning of the vote for a national (ethnic) party. In a sense it is a symbolic statement that differentiates "us" from "them".

Furthermore, the voter can express his choice aiming to confirm his social identity (confirming association with other members of the group, or he can vote as to identify with a specific party or candidate (Hamlin and Jennings, 2011; also see Nelson, 1994; Schuessler, 2001)). Specifically, Komar (2013) argues that if we reduce social identity to national ethnic identity, evidence can be found to support the claim that in Montenegro vote choice is an expression of social identity. Furthermore, Komar (2010) also argues that party programs are organized alongside these salient cleavages. This claim is particularly important if we bear in mind that "what is available to be expressed depends on the options before the voter" (Brennan, 2008). In other words, for voters to be able to behave expressively and confirm their social (ethnic) identity via vote choice to a corresponding party system with parties organized alongside salient cleavage issues much be in place. In this study I will regard the expressed ethnic identity based on the political identity classification made in the history chapter.

I have argued and demonstrated that the low electoral volatility may be the consequence of the ethnic voter-party linkage. But how strong is that linkage? Part of the answer will come from the data about the actual correlation between vote choice and ethnicity in Montenegro. But there is another and probably more relevant way of looking at the issue: Do voters care about

other important information such as candidate reputation, ideological position or personal characteristics? How does this information interact with the ethnic linkage?

The basic assumption is that if voters are familiar with the dishonesty and corruption affiliated with the candidate running for office they would not vote for him/her (Peters and Welch, 1980). Furthermore, if we are analyze an "incumbent" case, we expect the incumbent to be punished ("electoral retribution") at the following election (Peters and Welch, 1980). In spite of the general expectations, Peters and Welch (1980) argue that "this belief…contrasts with the striking examples of members of Congress and others being reelected by overwhelming majorities even after indictments or convictions for gross violations of the public trust". In an analysis of Brazilian local elections, evidence was found that voters do hold the mayors accountable for misconduct, but not so strongly that this would discourage misbehavior (Pereira et al. 2008).

Peters and Welch (1980) suggest possible explanations for the individual decision to support the corrupt candidate[16]. Two explanations are particularly interesting in the light of the argument made about ethnic voter/party affiliation in Montenegro. First, in some cases voters are ignorant about the accusation made against a certain candidate (Bryce, 1959; Levin, 1960; cited in Peters and Welch, 1980). Second, voters actually weigh the corruption accusation with other factors such as party linkage (Rundquist et al. 1977). "If, on the other hand, a voter likes a particular candidates political party or stand on important issue, the voter may discount any corruption charges leveled against the candidate and vote for him (or her) anyway "(Peters and Welch, 1980). Can this "trading" argument be applied in the Montenegrin context? If I expose

---

[16] One additional factor that should be taken into consideration is the different dimensions of corruption and their interpretation by the public (Redlawsk and McCann, 2005). What is characterized as corrupt behavior by one citizen does not resolute with all the others in the political community (Redlawsk and McCann, 2005). Undertaking an effort to define corruption is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will take into consideration the distinction made between different dimensions of corruption and refer the analysis and findings in this paper only to the dimension that affiliates corruption with breaking the law.

voters in Montenegro to evidence of the candidates dishonesty, unethical and criminal conduct will it affect their vote choice? How stable is the ethnic voter/party affiliation and do they actually weigh the misconduct allegation with other factors?

It is important to note that the strength of voter party linkage can behave differently under different circumstances. In this paper I am looking at just one dimension that can test the strength of the relationship: corruption. The conclusion about the ethnic linkage must take this fact into account. In other words, if corruption information results in weakening the voter/party linkage that that does not indicate weak ethnic linkage. Rather, this paper will answer how one-shot treatment with corruption information interacts with the established relationship. Furthermore, some have found corruption and generally misconduct information to affect voting preferences temporarily after the exposure (Mitchell, 2013). When time is included as a factor, the effect of misconduct information diminishes as voters return to their initial opinions (Mitchell, 2013). Therefore, claiming that corruption information is effective in severing the ethnic linkage can be misleading, as I do not take time passage into account.

In the next section I propose a two stage experimental setup through which I aim at answering both the questions of the effect of ethnic cleavage on vote choice and the stability of the vote under the assumption of corruption.

4. Methodology

To the best of my knowledge, prior data sets and papers do not focus specifically on the effect of ethnic cleavage as the explanation of vote choice in Montenegro[17]. In order to research this particular issue, I propose a two-stage experiment with a sample of Montenegrin students. I choose this particular sample for two reasons. First, students are an age cohort that was strongly influenced by national schemata as the referendum occurred during the period of formative years for their personal values (see Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008 and; Kasser et al. 2002,). Especially after the referendum there has been as strong movement for rebuilding Montenegrin national identity, through the creation of the Montenegrin language and Montenegrin Orthodox Church. The student population has been strongly affected by this development, as they were in the center of educational reform that introduced Montenegrin language into schools. However, the reform also allowed students to choose the name of the language they will learn at schools (Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian or Mother tongue).

The process of choosing the name of the language was highly politicized and can be regarded as a way of expressing political identity. The name of the language was contained in official transcripts and documents. Due to the politicized process, it made private information on political and ethnic affiliation of individuals somewhat public. Following this argument, the student population, should have a clear idea on their ethnic and political identity, and will serve the aim of this research well. In addition, it is also a group that I have easy access to, so the feasibility of my study was not compromised due to the small number of respondents.

Second, experimental design offers the possibility to control for the other factors and is ideal for theory testing as it can guarantee that the hypothesized difference between groups is due to

---

[17] In her PhD dissertation Komar (2013) does an exploratory research of voting behavior in Montenegro, where ethnic predictors are used as part of the indicators testing a wide aray of voting behaviour theories.

the treatment effect, and not some other intervening variable. Thus, I will apply experimental design by which a clear causal mechanism can be established between the independent and the dependent variables.

The experiment designed for this purpose is divided into two distinct stages and tested on three distinct groups with an internal division into Montenegrins and Serbs. The short outline of the experiment is presented in Table 3. Further explanation of the design is provided below.

Table 3: Experimental Design: Treatment and Control Conditions

	Experimental Condition		
	Control Group	Treatment Group 1 Montenegrin Candidate	Treatment Group 2 Serbian Candidate
First Stage	**Political Speech**	**Political Speech**	**Political Speech**
	Pol. Montenegrin Pol. Serb	Pol. Montenegrin Pol. Serb	Pol. Montenegrin Pol. Serb
Second Stage	**Newspaper Article**	**Newspaper Article**	**Newspaper Article**
	Pol. Montenegrin Pol. Serb	Pol. Montenegrin Pol. Serb	Pol. Montenegrin Pol. Serb

In the first stage, students participating in the experiment are randomly assigned to one of the three groups. Each of the three groups consists out of students that declare themselves as Montenegrins and the group of students that declare themselves as Serbs.[18] I use a similar stimulus as the one that has been used by Dunning and Harrison (2010) in their research of ethnic voting in Mali. The authors have used videos of independent political candidates as treatment, in which all groups have been shown the same video with the manipulation of the politician's last name, which conveys the information about ethical identity. In Montenegro the last name is not a sufficient cue for conveying the ethnicity of the candidate, and therefore the

---

[18] Several other nationalities are represented trough political parties in Montenegrin party system. It is my belief that ethnic cleavage between these two biggest groups is the most influential one and that including others will unnecessary complicate the research design. Furthermore, other ethnicities can be view as ethnic minorities and the political affiliation to their ethnic parties can be considered to represent ethnic politics more as opposed to cleavage politics.

treatment will require some further information about the candidate's ethnic affiliation. Instead of a video,[19] each group in my experiment is treated with, 400 to 450 words, political speech[20] on an economic issue from a social democratic perspective. The same speech is used in all three groups as treatment with minor differences that convey the ethnicity of the author. One of the groups was treated with the political speech of a candidate who clearly distinguished himself as Montenegrin, used Montenegrin language and Latin alphabet, and lives in a town dominantly populated by Montenegrins. In this particular treatment group I test two initial hypotheses.

H1a: There will be a difference in the approval rate of the Montenegrin candidate between Montenegrins and Serbs.

H1b: Montenegrin candidate will have higher approval rate among Montenegrins than among Serbs.

Second group was treated with the same political speech but the candidate clearly distinguished himself as a Serb, used Cyrillic alphabet and lives in a town populated mostly by Serbs. As in the first case, in the second treatment group, I formulate two initial hypotheses.

H2a: There will be a difference in the approval rate of the Serbian candidate between Montenegrins and Serbs.

H2b: Serbian candidate will have higher approval rate among Serbs than among Montenegrins.

---

[19] Considering the budget of this research and my very basic skills in video editing it is my belief that a newspaper article is a better solution for treatment than a video of candidates.

[20] The text should be long enough to ensure that the general economic idea is identifiable but not so long that the respondents lose their interest in reading. Computer based test can help with that issue since it is possible to control for the time respondents spent reading the text.

Third experimental group serves as a control group. They were treated with the same speech without information that conveys ethnic affiliations of the author. Since the control group does not have ethnic information cues I formulate the following hypothesis.

H3: There will be no difference in the approval rate of the candidate between Montenegrins and Serbs.

This design allows for making comparisons both between the experimental groups and within the groups.[21]

Due to the specific variables that can influence voting preferences I have used computer-based design with randomization effect. Dynamic Process Tracing Environment offers a platform for computer based experimental design and provides necessary interface for experimental setup and data collection. In the setup, I control for several intervening variables. First, for the political speech I chose economic issue because, I presume, the impact of ethnicity in this field should be minimal compared to other politically salient issues in Montenegro. I also presume that political preferences influence voters' preferences on economic issues. Since that is the case some sort of control should be introduced. To control for the economic preferences in the pretest I have used left-right scale of economic preferences.[22]

One possible problem that arises is the difference in group sizes in the experiment. Researchers at the Faculty of Political Science in Podgorica experienced a disproportionally larger response rate among the Montenegrins as compared to the Serbs. Specifically for that reason, in the case history chapter, I presented the theoretical classification of political Montenegrins and political

---

[22] Left - Right scale from Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems will be used. I decided to use more questions rather than just the standard question "On a scale from 1 to 10 where do you position yourself in terms of left-right where 1 represents left and 10 represents right". It should provide more precise measurement of the real ideological stance of the respondents and help me understand the preexisting views that respondents can have on the (treatment) political speech from a social democratic perspective.

Serbs. The logic of the classification was used to recode the indicator questions for ethnicity, language and religion into a single political identity variable. Second, to control for the already established voting preferences no party affiliation of author of the speech is mentioned. This ensures that all differences encountered can be assigned to the ethnicity of the author and not of respondent's opinion of author's political party.

After the treatment, two manipulation checks followed. First, the platform offers process tracing and records the time respondents spent on the stimulus item. This data serves as an initial check whether the respondents actually read the treatment or not. Second, I applied several questions for the manipulation check. These questions test whether the treatment conveyed the ethnicity of the author to the respondent by asking: "What do you think is the authors nationality?". In addition to the manipulation check, a posttest measured the level of agreement with the solution mentioned in the speech. Furthermore, it also measured how prepared are the respondents to vote for the specific candidate and their assessment of how successful this candidate would be. This stage of the experiment is mainly taken from the Dunning and Harrison (2010). Moreover, I employ some tools from an article about gender bias in Scandinavia, where Matland (1994) used post treatment measures that fit the aim of this research nicely.

In the second stage of the experiment I aim at testing how strong is the ethnic tie between voter and candidate, as well as, how strong is the vote based on ethnic linkage under the assumption of corrupt behavior. When confronted with additional information about the candidate's morality and illegal activity, does the approval rate decrease? For that purpose I introduced an additional treatment in each of the groups. In the first group I introduced a newspaper article about the alleged vote buying during the last parliamentary elections. An off the record source from the police has leaked the information to the press about the investigation into corruption, along with the name of the perpetrator. The newspaper article states that the author of the

political speech in the first stage of the experiment was involved in a pyramid scheme of vote buying. In this sense pyramid scheme means that lower party members did not act independently but were instructed and funded by higher-level party members. The article is a changed version of an actual article from a major newspaper in Montenegro ("Vijesti").

The reasons for choosing a supposed newspaper article as treatment is based on the findings of Chang et al. (2010). In their article, Chang et al. (2010) analyze the malfeasance of Italian public officials during eleven consecutive legislations. They find that judicial investigation did not discourage the candidates from running for office nor did it affect their support rate. Furthermore, what they observe is the change in the level of political accountability in the early 1990s. They attribute the change to the role of free media and argue that political accountability can only be obtained through the joint influence of judiciary and media (Chang et al. 2010). For that particular reason the newspaper article is about the judicial investigation on the vote-buying scheme. In that way I was able to connect the theorized role of the judiciary and media for political accountability and I choose the particular issue of vote buying to make the article more realistic. Indeed, vote buying is often identified as a big electoral problem and violation, both moral and legal, and it is being perceived by a large portion of the public as a wide spread practice in Montenegro. For the first treatment group I formulate two initial hypotheses.

H4a: There will be no difference in the candidate's approval rate within Montenegrins compared to the measurement after the first treatment (small volatility).

H4b: Compared with the measurement after the first treatment candidates approval rate will be lower within the Serbs (large volatility).

In the second treatment group I use the same newspaper article with the change of the candidates name so that it matches the name used in the first stage of the experiment. Here, I formulate two initial hypotheses.

H5a: There will be no difference in the candidate's approval rate within Serbs compared to the measurement after the first treatment (small volatility).

H5b: Compared with the measurement after the first treatment candidates approval rate will be lower within the Montenegrins (large volatility).

In the control group I introduce the same treatment without ethnic cues. As respondents in this group are assumed not to have ethnic linkage with the candidate I formulate the following hypotheses.

H6: Approval rate of the candidate will drop significantly for both ethnic groups (large volatility).

 After the second stimulus, I again include a two-stage manipulation check. I record the time respondents spent on the stimulus item followed by questions. One of the question ask: whether the respondents believe in the allegations in the newspaper article? Another question also asks: whether they changed their opinion of the candidate for better or for worse? In addition to the manipulation check questions, I repeat several of the questions asked after the first treatment to conduct a formal testing of the hypotheses.

The description of the response variables for hypothesis testing can be found in the next chapter. As a cover story for the experiment I used the annual conference on political communication for political parties' youth organized by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. The respondents were told that political parties' youth received training in political communication and as a test of the application of the training received, they are instructed to write and deliver a speech on a certain topic. The presented aim of the research is to evaluate the quality of those speeches. The respondents were debriefed in April, on a short presentation of the study aim and the initial results obtained.

5. Data and Measurement

In order to test the proposed hypotheses, the data used in this paper was collected in two waves. First wave, from 28th of September until 24th of October and second wave from 15th to 19th of January on the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Montenegro. The sample consists of 241 respondents allocated to three experimental groups. Each respondent had equal probability of being assigned to two treatments or a control group. Group size varied from 78 respondents in the control group to 84 and 79 in Montenegrin and Serbian candidate treatment groups. Out of initial 293 respondents 52 were excluded for not reading stimulus items carefully enough (spent less than 30 seconds on the stimulus item). The reasoning behind the exclusion is twofold. First, stimulus items were around one A4 page in length and no matter how proficient of a reader the respondents were, it is not reasonable to expect that reading of the stimulus item would take less than 30 seconds. Second, and more important, the strongest and most important information cues about ethnicity and corruption are located at the end of the stimulus items. In order for stimulus items to be effective, respondents should read the entire texts. On average respondents spent 133 seconds (sd= 75) on stimulus item 1, while they spent 90 seconds (sd=52s) on stimulus item2. Distribution of the attention to stimuli is in the following histograms (1).

35

Histogram 1: Attention to stimuli items 1 and 2

As for the basic demographic variables the sample consists out of students 18 to 26 years of age. Furthermore, it over reports women (W (185), M (56)). By far the most important demographic variables for the purpose of this research are ethnicity, religiousness and language. As anticipated in the previous chapters the sample is biased and over represents members of Montenegrin ethnicity. In the sample 187 respondents reported being ethnic Montenegrins, while only 34 respondents reported being Serbs. At this point because of the small sample size of Serbs, which is further divided into 3 experimental groups, group comparison would not be possible. For this particular reason I created the political identity variable out of ethnicity, religiousness and language according to the theoretical explanation discussed earlier in this paper. This increased the sample size of Serbs from 34 to 82. The actual distribution of political identities among experimental groups is presented in the following histogram (2).

Histogram 2: Political Identity Distribution across Samples

One of the biggest advantages of experimental political science is that the portion of the variation in the data comes from the decisions made by the researcher and his intervention in the data-generating process (GDP). In order for this to be true, several assumptions must be meet. The most important assumption concerns the randomization effect in experimental design through which we hope to obtain very similar control and test groups. To control for the randomization effect and group similarity I conducted several analyses.

First, the political speech that conveys ethnic information is a statement of economic policy, thus potential difference in approval rate of the candidate can be a consequence of group differences in economic preference. To control for differences/similarities six questions on economic preferences were included in the pretest questionnaire[23]. To get a single measurement

---

[23] In the next question you will have a chance to read confronted opinions on some important contemporary issues. Using a scale from 1 to 10 please indicate how much do you agree with one or the other opinion. For more information check question 10 in the appendix.

of economic preference I summed up the responses and divided them by 6 to create Index of Economic Preferences[24]. Basic descriptive statistics is presented in the following table.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Index of Economic Preference

Variable	n	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Skew	Kurtosis
Index of Economic Preference	240	5.61	1.36	5.5	1.33	9.5	0.02	0.14

Table 4 demonstrates the responses are normally distributed having a mean value of 5.61. Higher values on the scale indicate more leftist view on the economic issues. Since the stimulus item was written from a center-left perspective judging from this distribution, on average respondents should like the candidate. Furthermore, I conducted an ANOVA test to test for group differences. The f statistics indicate that the model p values are not within the range of statistical significance, so I do not reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the groups. In other words, randomization was successful in making the groups on average very similar (Table 5).

Table 5: One Way ANOVA: Index of Economic Preference by Experimental Groups

	Index of Economic Preference				
	DF	Sum SQ	Mean SQ	F test	P value
Experimental Groups	2	4.05	2.02	1.09	0.34
Residuals	237	440.12	1.85		

Second, in the pretest I included a general measurement of left-right political preferences measured on a scale from 1 to 10. Basic descriptive statistics reveal a normal distribution with a mean of 4.85 and a standard deviation of 1.65. Compared with the results of the Index of

---

[24] Reliability analysis revealed that the indicators used to measure economic preference are measuring the same concept with Cronbach alpha value of 0.76.

Economic Preference I can see that on average respondents are politically more center-left on both scales. Basic descriptive statistics can be found in the in the following table (6).

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics: Positioning on a Left-Right Political Scale

Variable	n	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Skew	Kurtosis
Left-Right Political Scale	241	4.84	1.65	5	1	10	0.2	0.39

To test the effect of randomization, I conducted an ANOVA test of left right positioning by experimental groups. The f statistics indicates that on the average the scores on left-right positioning are not statistically different among groups, therefore I failed to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the groups. The results of ANOVA are in Table 7 .

Table 7: One Way ANOVA: Positioning on a Left-Right Political Scale by Experimental Groups

	Left-Right Political Scale				
	DF	Sum SQ	Mean SQ	F test	P value
Experimental Groups	2	2.27	1.36	0.49	0.6
Residuals	238	649.96	2.73		

Third, the pretest included questions on the level of trust in political institutions[25]. Comparing the level of trust for every single institution would consume unnecessary space and time, so first I conducted factor analysis to identify underlying factors from the data. Based on the accounted variance and how meaningful the components were I was able to reduce the number from 10 observed to 3 latent variables covering 52% of the total variance. First component identifies those who trust in domestic political institutions such as the president, parliament, government and political parties. Factor loadings are also positive for trust in all other

---

[25] Included institutions: Government, Parliament, President, Political Parties, Judiciary, Police, NGO, Church and other religious institutions, EU, NATO.

institutions but are not substantively big. This component accounts for 25% of the total variance in the data. Second component clearly makes a distinction between the respondents and identifies those who have high level of trust in international political institutions such as EU and NATO, while they have low level of trust in the state institutions and the Church. This factor accounts for additional 15% of the total variance. Final factor identifies those who have high levels of trust in institutions preserving law and order (judiciary and police). The results of the factor analysis are presented in the following table (8).

Table 8: Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Levels of Institutional Trust

	Factors		
	Domestic Political Institutions	International Political Institutions	Law and Order
Variables:			
Government	0.89	0.14	0.21
Parliament	0.75	0.15	0.27
President	0.67	0.18	0.16
Political Parties	0.42	0.1	0.37
Judiciary	0.3	0.15	0.71
Police	0.36		0.54
NGOs		0.2	0.25
Church and other religious	0.24	-0.13	0.27
EU	0.125	0.99	
NATO	0.277	0.57	0.19
Proportion of Variance	0.25	0.15	0.12
Cumulative Variance	0.239	0.387	0.511

I isolated these three factors and created new regression score variables out of them. Next, I used these three variables to make comparison between the groups. In all three cases f statistics showed the p value to be out of the range of statistical significance; therefore I failed to reject the null hypotheses of no difference between the groups. The distribution of factor scores of

institutional trust for all three groups is statistically indistinguishable. The results of ANOVA are presented in the following table (9).

Table 9: One Way ANOVA - Principal Components by Experimental Groups

	DF	Sum SQ	Mean SQ	F test	P value
Domestic Political Institutions					
Experimental Groups	2	2.38	1.19	0.84	0.43
Residuals	236	334.38	1.41		
International Political Institutions					
Experimental Groups	2	1.68	0.84	0.98	0.37
Residuals	236	201.1	0.86		
Law and Order					
Experimental Groups	2	0.09	0.05	0.05	0.95
Residuals	236	236.25	1		

From the formal testing conducted in this chapter I can conclude that there are no differences between the groups on economic positioning, general left-right political positioning and institutional trust. In this particular case the randomization procedure produced similar groups.

Moving on to the measurement level used for dependent variables, to measure the level of approval (propensity of casting a vote) - the main dependent variable – I asked, "If there was an election held tomorrow, how likely is that you would vote for the list that the author of the speech represents?" The answers were recorded on a scale from 1 to 5 where 5 represented higher probability.[26]

---

[26] Alternative solution was to ask a question "If there were elections held tomorrow, would you vote for the author of the speech you just read?" I opted for the option described in the main text for two reasons. First, the alternative would require a binary answer of Yes or No while the treatment is not sufficiently strong to produce that kind of clear-cut decision. Second, the options for formal statistical testing would be limited to methods applied to categorical data.

The questionnaire included several other response variables taken from the Dunning and Harrison (2010) experiment[27]. These variables refer to the measurement of different dimensions of approval ranging from the candidate likability, competence, and intelligence to his overall ability to do a good job if elected. These variables are be used to test for the difference between the groups. Specific response variables and their level of measurement are presented in.

Table 10.

Table 10: Response Variables for the first treatment

Variable	Range
Likelihood of casting a vote for the candidate	1-5[28]
General evaluation of the speech	1-7
Candidate: Likable	1-5
Candidate: Competent	1-5
Candidate: Intelligent	1-5
Candidate: Trustworthy	1-5
Candidate would: Do a good job	1-7
Candidate would: Coup bad with the problems	1-7
Candidate would: Fight for his ideals	1-7
I agree with the candidates political program	1-7
I was impressed	1-7
Candidate has good reason to stand for elections	1-7

After the second treatment I used three main response variables for both within and between group hypotheses testing.[29] Since the article claimed that the candidate was involved in illegal vote buying I asked again the following questions: In your opinion how trustworthy is this candidate?; How competent is the candidate to achieve his political goals?; and the main

---

[27] This facilitates a more nuanced statement of the respondents regarding what they think about the candidate. The treatment was supplemented with information about the candidate's competence and personal achievements. It is my belief, and the results of Dunning and Harrison (2010) provides evidence to support the claim, that these measurements are valid operationalization for the specific issue.

[28] Higher numbers indicate higher level of affiliation and approval.

[29] I decided not to include all of the response variables used after the first treatment for several reasons. First, repeating all questions would unnecessarily burden the respondents and jeopardize the quality of the responses. Second, allegations in the second treatment refer to some not all of the dimensions examined after the first treatment. For example, whether the candidate did participate in the illegal vote buying should affect the perception of candidate's intelligence of the level of agreement with his political program.

response variable "If there was an election held tomorrow, how likely is that you would vote for the list that the author of the speech represents?". For all these questions, I used the same level of measurement as in the first stage of the experiment.

6. Results

6.1. Test Group 1: Montenegrin candidate political speech

6.1.1. Effect of Ethnicity on Vote Choice

Following the methodology used in this paper I now turn to hypothesis testing. Prior to conducting formal tests, I first checked the results of the manipulation check in Montenegrin candidate treatment group. The results are the following: 77 out of 84 respondents stated the political candidates is Montenegrin, one stated that he is Serbian, Bosniak or of other ethnicity, while four respondents were not sure on the candidate's ethnicity. Based on these results, I can conclude with certainty that the stimulus item conveyed the ethnicity of the candidate. To formally test my hypothesis I used two versions of t test: two sample t test and paired sample t test. In this chapter, I test the hypothesis proposed for the treatment group that read political speech of the Montenegrin candidate.

The null hypothesis for **H1a** states that there will be no difference in the approval rate of Montenegrin candidate between Montenegrins and Serbs. **H1b** is a directional hypothesis stating that approval rate (voting intention) will be lower among Serbs compared to Montenegrins. To test these hypotheses I used two sample T test. In the first stages of hypothesis testing formal test revealed that I can reject the null hypothesis of no difference and that indeed approval rate differs in the hypothesized direction. On average Montenegrins are more likely to vote for Montenegrin candidate when compared to Serbs (Table 11). The mean value among the Serbs is 2.76 (with a bigger variation) while the mean value among Montenegrins is 3.2.

Chart 1: Likelihood of Casting a Vote by Political Identity

Table 11: Likelihood of Casting a Vote by Political Identity

Likelihood of Casting a Vote for The Montenegrin Candidate

	Mean	CI Upper limit[30]	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	2.76	0.02	0.85	2.16	42.79	0.03*
Montenegrins	3.2					

To establish whether the difference in the likelihood of vote is essentially the result of hypothesised voter/candidate ethnic linkage I continued testing the supplement dependent variables. Additional differences that go in favour of the above presented result can be found in the favouring of the candidate, his pleasantness, the quality of his speech and trustworthiness. Montenegrins are more willing to favor this particular candidate (m =4,38) compared to Serbs (m=3,73). Differences also emerge in evaluating how pleasant the candidate is where on average Montenegrins score 3.72 while Serbs score 3.3 (Table 12).

---

[30] All tables are presenting 95% confidence intervals.

45

Chart 2: How likely are you to favor this candidate oppose to others? How pleasant a person the

candidate is?: By Political Identity

Table 12: Welch Two Sample T Test: Favor the Candidate and Candidate is a Pleasant Person by

Political Identity

Favor this candidate

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.73	1,34	-0,05	1,85	67,17	0,06*
Montenegrins	4.38					

Candidate is a pleasant persons

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.33	0,67	0,12	2,86	59,11	0.005**
Montenegrins	3.72					

In addition, t test reveals differences in how Serbs and Montenegrins rate the quality of the

speech they just read (Table 13). On average Serbs rate the speech with 4.5 while Montenegrins

do so with 5. [31]

---

[31] To test the hypothesis in this paper I used two-tailed T test with 95% confidence interval despite the fact that I am testing directional hypotheses. For this reason I believe results that fall between conventional 0.05 and 0.1 threshold can still be viewed as a positive finding as in the cases of differences in favoring the candidate, rating the quality of the speech and trustworthiness.

Table 13: Welch Two Sample T Test: Quality of Speech by Political Identity

Quality of speech

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	4,5	1.08	-0.08	1,714	61,78	0.09*
Montenegrins	5					

Candidate is and trustworthy person

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3	0.52	-0.01	1.856	59.889	0.06*
Montenegrins	3.25					

However, considering other dependant variables, such as competence and intelligence, differences between the groups are not statistically significant (Table 14). What I conclude from the results is that despite the fact that both groups view the candidate as equally competent, and intelligent differences emerges in their propensity to vote for his party list. Furthermore, additional tests revealed that there are no differences between political Montenegrin and political Serbs in their views on economic policy, prior to the stimuli the groups were almost identical. All of this implies that there is something else the respondents take into consideration when deciding to cast the vote. Since the only additional information I convey through the stimulus item is ethnicity of the candidate I can claim that this makes the

difference in their vote choice. I reject the **H1a** and **H1b** null hypothesis and conclude that the candidate's ethnicity does have an effect when the candidate is Montenegrin. Namely, Montenegrins are more likely that Serbs to vote for a Montenegrin candidate.

Table 14: Welch Two Sample T Test: Intelligence, Competence and Trustworthiness by Political Identity

Candidate is and intelligent person						
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	2.76	0.39	-0.05	1.51	72.74	0.13
Montenegrins	2.93					
Candidate is and competent person						
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.33	0.69	-0.15	1.26	70.29	0.2
Montenegrins	3.6					
Index of Economic Preferences						
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	5.56	0.53	-0.71	-0.29	61.52	0.77
Montenegrins	5.47					

6.1.2. Effect of Ethnicity on Vote Stability

In the second stage of the experiment I introduced information on candidate's misbehavior and my question is how ethnic voter/candidate linkage effects vote choice. The stimulus check showed that on average respondent believed the allegations are likely to be both true and untrue (m=3.17) with no significant differences between Montenegrins and Serbs (mdiff=0.25, t=0.22).

In the previous chapter I have established the ethnic voter/candidate linkage in Montenegrin test group I now move to see how strong that ethnic affiliation is. More specifically in this chapter I will test two hypotheses:

H4a: There will be no difference in the candidate's approval rate within Montenegrins compared to the measurement after the first treatment (small volatility).

H4b: Compared with the measurement after the first treatment candidates approval rate will be lower within the Serbs (large volatility).

For this purpose I use paired sample T test. In the first stage of hypothesis testing I first checked whether there was an overall difference in the likelihood of casting a vote for the candidate prior to the introduction of second stimuli and after. The analysis showed the on average respondents were less likely to vote for the same candidate with the mean difference of 0.53 (Table 15). The difference was highly statistically significant at the level of $p<0.001$. Overall, corruption information would prompt respondents to reconsider their vote choice and to eventually vote for another candidate (volatility).

Furthermore, the question is whether these differences comes from both the political Montenegrins and the political Serbs, or is the result of one group decreasing the approval rate. Paired sample T test showed that there was a statistically significant decrease of approval rate in both groups. Opposite to my theory Montenegrins decreased the approval rate in average by 0.65 while Serbs decreased the approval rate by 0.46. Based on these results I cannot reject the null **H4a** hypothesis of difference between the approval rate before and after the corruption information among Montenegrins. Indeed they show less tolerance towards the candidate. In other words, Montenegrins are holding the in-group candidate to a higher standard. Furthermore, I cannot reject the null **H4b** hypothesis of approval rate not being lower between the Serbs. On the contrary, the decrease in the approval rate among the Serbs is statistically significant compared to the measurement after the first treatment but is substantively smaller compared to the decrease among the Montenegrins. The results and visualization of paired sample t test follows (Table 15).

Table 15: Paired Sample T Test: Likelihood of Casting a Vote

Likelihood of Casting a Vote: Overall

Mean Difference	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
0.53	0,73	0,33	5,38	83	0.000***

Likelihood of Casting a Vote: Serbs

Mean Difference	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
0.46	0,78	0,14	2,97	29	0.005**

Likelihood of Casting a Vote: Montenegrins

Mean Difference	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
0.65	0,91	0,38	4,92	47	0.000**

Chart 4: Paired Sample T test: Likelihood of Casting a Vote by Political Identity

Furthermore, not only that Montenegrins are holding Montenegrin candidate to a higher standard, but corruption information drops the likelihood of voting for Montenegrins from 3.2 to 2.6, for Serbians from 2.76 to 2.33 making them statistically indistinguishable. The results indicate that after the introduction of corruption information neither Montenegrins nor Serbs are willing to vote for this particular candidate.

Considering other variables included after the second stimuli the result are in line with the findings in the previous paragraphs. As for the candidate competence overall there is a drop in the opinion of respondent about candidates competence on average by 0.64 (significant at

p<0.001). In the Serbian subsample candidate's competence drops on average by 0.36(significant at p<0.1), while in the Montenegrin subsample it drops by 0.81(significant at p<0.000).

As for the trustworthiness, overall on average respondents view the candidate as less trustworthy by 0.58(significant at p<0.000). Within the groups, Serbs view the candidate as less trustworthy on average by 0.5(significant at p<0.000) while Montenegrins view the candidate as less trustworthy by 0.6 (significant at p<0.000).

There are a few conclusion that could be drawn out of this analysis. First, I was unable to confirm the strength of the hypothesized differences that will occur in the Montenegrin and Serbian subsample after the introduction of corruption information. Indeed my results show a different trend occurring. Ethnic linkage in this particular groups has led to the drop in support for the candidate when corruption information was learned. Second, results are consistent for all variables measured after the second stimuli. Namely, Montenegrins are less likely to vote for the candidate, view him as less competent and trustworthy compared to measures after the first stimuli, implying that higher decrease among the Montenegrins did not occur by chance. Quite opposite, precisely because of the ethnic linkage Montenegrins apply higher moral and political standards to the Montenegrin candidate.

Furthermore, the results point out that ethnicity on its own is not such a stabilizing factor of vote choice. In other words, there is something else that is keeping the Montenegrin vote for Montenegrin parties stable. These results confirm what was argued in the opening chapter. Namely, ethnicity is not a primordial identity but a socially constructed category. Ethnic affiliation on its own does not influence the stability of the vote choice significantly. Rather, only when ethnic linkage serves as a cue of a larger political alignment, then it serves as a stabilizing factor for Montenegrin parties. In other words, when ethnic affiliation conveys

information on the policy stances towards national symbols, church, language, independence and foreign policy goals, namely EU and NATO membership accompanied by less dependence on Russian capital, it matters.

6.2.   Test Group 2: Serbian candidate political speech

6.2.1.   Effect of Ethnicity on Vote Choice

Prior to applying the formal test to hypotheses for the second test group I first looked at the distribution of answers on stimulus check question. The stimulus was not as effective as in the first test group, 50 out of 79 respondents correctly identified the author of the speech as Serbian. This resulted in some problems in the hypothesis testing. More on the issues will follow at the end of the chapter.

In the first stage of hypothesis testing I check whether there are group's differences in the voting intention for Serbian candidate and test the null hypothesis of no difference. The results of the test showed no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no difference. Actually in this testing stage all tests including variables such as competence, trustworthiness, quality of speech, pleasantness, intelligence and favor this candidate among others showed no difference in the group means. What is intriguing is that the mean differences mostly go contrary to what my theory suggests. For example, although the differences are not statistically significant, Montenegrins favor the Serbian candidate more, and rate his speech better than the Serbs do (Table 16). This observation is important ant in the light of the explanation that will shortly follow about what happened in the data.

Table 16: Two Sample T Test: Dimensions of Candidate Approval by Political Identities

Likelihood of Casting a Vote

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	2.68	0.33	-0.51	-0.42	70.97	0.67
Montenegrins	2.6					

Favor this Candidate

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.41	0.89	-0.30	0.99	63.74	0.32
Montenegrins	3.71					

Candidate is an intelligent person

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	2.62	0.33	-0.2	0.5	70.52	0.6
Montenegrins	2.68					

Candidate is a competent person

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.55	0.18	-0.75	-1.2	64.34	0.23
Montenegrins	3.26					

Candidate is a trustworthy person

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.06	0.18	-0.54	-0.98	54.9	0.32
Montenegrins	2.88					

Pleasant person

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.58	0.16	-0.31	-0.62	60.23	0.53
Montenegrins	3.51					

Quality of speech

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	4.2	0.89	-0.35	0.86	63.24	0.39
Montenegrins	4.51					

At this point I should examine three possible explanations for this occurrence: theoretical fallacy, political identity explanation and inadequate stimulus item.

First, the results might not confirm my theory because the theory altogether is wrong. Instead of claiming that voters decide based on ethnic affiliations in this particular case perhaps what drives Serbians into voting is both the question of candidate's ethnicity and right wing nationalist rhetoric. Almost all political candidates in Montenegro that identify themselves as

Serbs have right wing political platforms in which they particularly stress closer ties with Serbia, Russian Federation and express strong opposition towards the NATO membership. Majority of population in Montenegro still believes that if a Serbian party were to come to power it would automatically mean the cancelation of Montenegro as an independent state and return to a union with Serbia. It is possible, that for Serbians, ethnicity functions as a cue for radical political attitudes and clear opposition to official governmental policy.

Second, stimulus item failed to convey the ethnicity of the candidate and thus failed to make specific ethnic voter/candidate linkage. In the stimulus item the candidate repeats several times that he is Serbian and that he is talking to his fellow Serbians living in Montenegro. Only 50 out of 79 respondents properly identified the candidate as of Serbian ethnicity. This result indicates that there is a significant portion of the respondents that in lack of nationalistic rhetoric fails to identify self-proclaimed Serb as a Serb.

Third, the theoretical construct of political identity of Montenegrins and Serbs does not capture the essence of ethnic cleavage very well. Religious and linguistic dimensions are just a part of political identity but are not a crucial one. Ethnicity remains the only relevant indicator of political identity. Although theoretical construct of political identity of Montenegrins and Serbs it showed its practical value in the hypothesis testing of the first test group, the most plausible argument in favor of explanation comes from the data itself. After the initial analysis I used ethnicity as a group factor in testing. This reduced the actual sample size to 76 respondents but with actual degrees of freedom of 8 in t test (8 Serbs and 66 Montenegrins). Since there is a very small sample size no difference was found between the groups, but compared to the analysis on the basis of political identity the direction of the relationship changed. Contrary to the results of the complete sample in average Serbs gave better scores in competence, intelligence, trustworthiness, quality of speech, pleasantness and were more likely to vote for the Serbian candidate than Montenegrins.

Based on what has been said so far, I draw the following conclusion. Stimulus item failed to convey the ethnicity of the candidate to all respondents but following the data it is not the main reason why groups do not behave statistically different. Rather, it seems that ethnicity is much more important than religion and language in creating the political identity of Serbs. To properly test this explanation much bigger sample size is required that accounts for more ethnic Serbs.

Furthermore, even stronger than the results of the Montenegrin treatment group, these results indicate that for Serbians ethnic identity is a matter of political choice/social construct. Simple (primordial) ethnic linkage was not enough to produce higher voting chances for the Serbian candidate by the Serbs. Deprived of all political meanings, ethnic identity is but a common feature among very diverse group of people. The results point towards a more politicized meaning of the ethnic identities in order for them to produce a strong party/voter linkage. In other words, radicalization of discourse, Serbian Orthodox Church, Serbian language, nurture of the strong ties with Serbia and Russia with the opposition to NATO membership are probably the dimension that fuel the ethnic linkage among the Serbs.

6.2.2.   Effect of Ethnicity on Vote Stability

At this point the hypothesis testing after the second treatment might seem meaningless as I failed to establish a clear ethnic voter/candidate linkage after the first stimulus. Nevertheless, it is important to test all of the proposed hypotheses in order to be able to draw general conclusion.

As in the previous test group, I first checked the distribution of responses on stimulus check item. Mean value for this treatment group was 3.42 meaning that respondents in this group on average believed the allegations against the candidate were true. Furthermore there was no

significant difference between Montenegrins and Serbs in this regard (mdiff=0.17, p=0.41). In addition, respondents in this group were more likely to believe the allegations against the candidate were true when compared to Montenegrin candidate treatment group.

In this chapter I test the following hypotheses:

H5a: There will be no difference in the candidate's approval rate within Serbs compared to the measurement after the first treatment.

H5b: Compared with the measurement after the first treatment candidates approval rate will be lower within the Montenegrins.

First, I tested whether there was an overall difference in the voting intention after the introduction of corruption information. The test show a statistically significant mean of the differences of 0.69(p<0.000), meaning that the voting intention dropped, on average, 0.69 compared to the measurement after the first stimuli. Furthermore, I continued with testing the null hypothesis of difference among the Serbs in approval rate of the candidate before and after the corruption information. The test demonstrates that the mean of the differences was 0.58 statistically significant at 0.000. Therefore, I fail to reject **H5a** null hypothesis of no difference between the approval rates among Serbs.

In addition to the difference in the voting intention after the introduction of corruption information, I test the null hypothesis of approval rate not being lower among Montenegrin. The test provides highly significant results (p<0.000) with the mean of the differences being 0.66. Therefore I reject the **H5b** null of no difference in approval rate among Montenegrins.

In addition to the above stated, in comparison of Serbian and Montenegrin respondents no significant difference were found, although the results were in the hypothesized direction. On average, Serbians have a smaller drop in approval rate of the Serbian candidate. Overall, I

cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the groups. Furthermore, compared to the results in the first treatment group, the results indicate Serbians do not hold their ethnic candidates to a higher standard as Montenegrins do.

This particular occurrence can be explained in two ways based on the context of Montenegrin political system. First, and more plausible, as minority group Serbs have stronger inter group cohesion in which their primary goal is to preserve the unity of the group. In other words, they are more inclined to disregard misbehavior information of their group representative in order to preserve the fragile position in the political system. On the other hand, Montenegrins have a secure political position in the system making them more sensitive to misbehavior information, especially to within group misbehavior.

Second, it can be argued that voting in Montenegro is under the influence of *the image of invincibility* (Komar, Živković, 2016), which results in voters voting but not choosing their political representatives. In other words, long lasting rule of DPS created a context in which voters believe the winner of the elections is predetermined and which may result in a new form of dissent – *people giving up on democracy* (Komar, Živković, 2016). In such a context, where Serbian parties never entered public office on state level, it is possible that portion of the electorate believe entering public office cannot be achieved with normal democratic means, making misbehavior more tolerated.

Chart 5: Paired Sample T Test: Likelihood of Casting a Vote by Political Identity

Table 17: Paired Sample T Test: Likelihood of Casting a Vote by Political Identity

Likelihood of Casting a Vote: Serbs

Mean Difference	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
0.58	0.91	0.25	3.62	28	0.000***

Likelihood of Casting a Vote: Montenegrins

Mean Difference	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
0.66	0.93	0.4	5.08	44	0.000***

As for the other two measures repeated after the second stimuli yielded somewhat different results. Overall I see a drop in trustworthiness and competence on average by 0.69 and 0.67 with both differences being highly significant (p=0.000***). As for the group comparison the results differ from the voting pattern described in the previous paragraph although the difference between the groups is neither substantively nor statistically significant. On average Serbs have a higher drop in trustworthiness (mdiff=0.79, p=0.000***) and competence (mdiff=0.68, p=0.002**) compared to Montenegrins (mdiff=0.6, p=0.000***) and (mdiff=0.6, p=0.000***).

6.3. Control Group: Neutral candidate political speech

6.3.1. Vote choice

In the control group participants were not treated with cues on the candidate ethnicity, which should result in similar ratings of the candidate among Serbs and Montenegrins. Along those lines the **H3** hypothesis was formulated stating that candidate's approval rate will be the same among Montenegrins and Serbs. As in the previous cases I used several variables to access the potential difference in the approval rate. First in line was the question on the likelihood of casting a vote. Contrary to the assumption made, on average, Montenegrins (3.17) had a greater chance of casting a vote for this particular candidate when compared to Serbs (2.69). Similar results, in substantive terms, are found in how much the respondents favor the candidate, think he is trustworthy person and think of his speech as a high quality one. On average Montenegrins score more on each of these variables with statistically significant difference. As for the other variables used in this analysis the results failed to reach statistical significance. Nevertheless, the direction of the relationship does not change. On average, Montenegrins give better scores on the candidate's intelligence, competence and pleasantness (Table 18). Based on the result of the analysis I cannot reject the null hypothesis of difference in approval rate among Montenegrins and Serbs.

Table 18: Two Sample T Test: Dimensions of Candidate Approval by Political Identities

Likelihood of Casting a Vote

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	2.69					
Montenegrins	3.17	0.91	0.05	2.28	30.94	0.02**

Favor this Candidate

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.31					
Montenegrins	4.15	1.66	0.01	2.05	42.75	0.04**

Candidate is an intelligent person

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	2.78					
Montenegrins	2.91	0.45	-0.2	0.8	35.58	0.42

Candidate is a competent person

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.55					
Montenegrins	3.66	0.58	-0.34	0.53	37.177	0.59

Candidate is a trustworthy person

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	2.9					
Montenegrins	3.28	0.73	0.02	2.19	38.64	0.03**

Pleasant person

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.5					
Montenegrins	3.66	0.55	-0.22	0.87	31.52	0.38

Quality of speech

	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	4.43					
Montenegrins	5.04	1.19	0.02	2.1	53.96	0.04**

The results of the control group are bit intriguing. Based on the theoretical assumptions made earlier in this paper if no ethnic cue was provided Serbians and Montenegrins should not differ, on average, in the approval rate of the candidate. However, the results of my experiment show the opposite. The behavior of participants in the control group is very similar to the respondents in the treatment group with the Montenegrin candidate political speech. In other words, Montenegrins rate both candidates better compared to Serbs and overall the scores in both groups are very similar. For example, when asked how likely is it that they will cast a vote for

this particular candidate, on average, Montenegrins score 3.17 in control group and 3.2 in treatment group. As for the Serbs, on average they score 2.69 in the control group and 2.76 in treatment group.

This particular finding can be explained with the results of the manipulation check introduced after the treatment. Namely, 56 out of 77 respondents in the control group stated they think the author of the speech is of Montenegrin ethnicity, 19 respondents were not sure, while only 2 stated he is of Serbian ethnicity. Although no ethnic cue was introduced in the control group, not surprisingly, the default option for a political candidate in Montenegro is a Montenegrin. Ethnic group formed their opinion based on the default option. Taking that into consideration it is not surprising that the results of the analysis in the control group are so similar to the treatment group with the Montenegrin candidate.

Even though the results of the control group points towards the existence of ethnic party/voter linkage, the results raise limitations of a different nature. Namely, the experimental design failed to introduce a proper control condition which would isolate any reference to the ethnicity of the candidate. The stimulus item used in the control group made no reference to ethnicity, in group cohesion, nor did it have personal information on the candidate's name and place of life. As this vague *person* was still characterized as a Montenegrin, at this point, I see no better way of designing the control condition. Furthermore, if the control condition candidate would bee of different ethnicity (Bosniak, Albanian, Croat etc.) that would raise all sorts of confounders that would include not just ethnic voting but minority representation, minority policy and would exclude the possibility that members of other ethnic groups would even consider voting for a minority option.

6.3.2. Vote stability

In the previous chapter I have established that respondents in the control group behave very similar to the respondents in the Montenegrin candidate treatment group. As for the second stage of the experiment, the results are relatively the same. The manipulation check revealed respondents believed the allegations against the candidate were true (m=3.31).

The formal testing of the **H6** hypothesis of no difference in the approval rate drop between the groups reveled that there is a difference between Serbs and Montenegrins. Namely, on average, the likelihood of voting for the Serbs reduced by 0.43 opposed to the Montenegrins where it reduced by 0.68. Both results are highly statistically significant (Table 19).

Table 19: Paired Sample T Test: Likelihood of Casting a Vote by Political Identity

Likelihood of Casting a Vote: Overall					
Mean Difference	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
0.58	0.8	0.37	5.5	77	0.000***
Likelihood of Casting a Vote: Serbs					
Mean Difference	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
0.43	0.86	0.005	2.1	22	0.04**
Likelihood of Casting a Vote: Montenegrins					
Mean Difference	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
0.68	0.98	0.36	4.75	44	0.000***

As for the remaining two variables the results show the same pattern. Montenegrins are more likely to punish the candidate more, after leaning the misconduct information. In the case of how competent the candidate is, on average, the score dropped by 0.86 among Montenegrins and 0.63 among the Serbs. As for the trustworthiness, the score dropped by 0.36 among the Serbs and 0.75 among Montenegrins.

A few remarks should be pointed out here. As can be seen from the results of this and the Montenegrin treatment group, the respondents behave very similar. One possible explanation

why is this the case was offered in the previous chapter. In addition to what has been said, the results of this group indicate that there really is an ethnic linkage between Montenegrins that shapes the vote choice, but it also strongly suggest that ethnicity is not a strong vote stabilizer under the assumption of misconduct information. On the contrary, ethnic linkage brings higher ethical and political standards in the case of Montenegrins.

6.4. Additional analysis

So far in the analysis chapter I have revived the result of the tests conducted in individual treatment and control groups. There is an additional way to approach the analysis and check the robustness of the results. Namely, in this chapter I will analyses the behavior of Montenegrins and Serbs across treatment and control groups. In other words, is there a difference in the approval rate of the in-group and out-group candidates? Here, I make the assumption of random distribution of Montenegrins and Serbs across experimental conditions.

First, I test whether there is a difference in the likelihood of casting a vote across experimental conditions for Montenegrin respondents (Table 20). For this purpose I first use One Way ANOVA followed by Tukey HSD posttest. The results show that there is a statistically significant difference in voting propensity depending on the experimental group. Further analysis revealed that Montenegrins are more likely to vote for the Montenegrin candidate (0.6) compared with the Serbian candidate. In addition, Montenegrins are more likely to vote for the control group candidate (0.57), in the previous chapters established as Montenegrin by default option, rather than the Serbian candidate. The results show no significant difference in the likelihood of casting a vote for the Montenegrin and control group candidate.

Table 20: One Way ANOVA: Likelihood of casting a vote for Montenegrin respondents across experimental conditions

	Sum of Squares	DF	F test	Significance
Experimental Condition	10.70	2	8.88	0.000***
Residuals	81.29	135		

Multiple Comparisons - Mean Difference				
	Difference	Upper CI	Lower CI	p value
Montenegrin - Serbian	0.6	0.98	0.22	0.000***
Control - Serbian	0.57	0.96	0.19	0.001**
Control - Montenegrin	-0.03	0.35	-0.41	0.98

Tukey HSD - Post Hoc Test

In addition to the results presented in the previous chapter, where I show Montenegrins rate the Montenegrin candidate more favorably than Serbs, these results witness the robustness of findings for the Montenegrins. In other words, the results of the experiment clearly show that there is a clear ethnic linkage and a consequence of that linkage for voting behavior for the Montenegrins.

As for the Serbians, the results show no difference in how they rate the candidate depending on the experimental condition they were assigned to. No significant difference arose in the likelihood of casting a vote for the Serbian, Montenegrin or control group candidate (Table 21). On the other hand, when only ethnic Serbs are used for the analysis the relationship changes the direction. Serbs are more likely to support their in-group candidate (0.51) opposed to the out group candidate. Because of a very small sample size the result does not reach statistical significance (34 ethnic Serbs allocated across three experimental conditions).

Table 21: One Way ANOVA: Likelihood of casting a vote for Serbian respondents across experimental conditions

	Sum of Squares	DF	F test	Significance
Experimental Condition	0.1	2	0.06	0.93
Residuals	64.44	79		

Multiple Comparisons - Mean Difference				
	Difference	Upper CI	Lower CI	p value
Montenegrin - Serbian	0.07	0.63	-0.48	0.94
Control - Serbian	0.005	0.6	-0.59	0.99
Control - Montenegrin	-0.07	0.52	-0.66	0.95

Tukey HSD - Post Hoc Test

7. Limitations of the study

Although this study is a significant contribution to the voting behavior literature on the case of Montenegro, a few remarks should be noted. The study suffers from issue of external validity and generalizability. The reasons for this are twofold.

First, sample used for the experiment is a student sample which can be assumed to be different from the general population. Furthermore, the sample itself over represents females and Montenegrins. The sample composition helped establish a clear ethnic linkage for Montenegrins but the results are more spurious for Serbs. When political identity classification is used, the results do not show ethnic linkage for the Serbs. However, when ethnicity alone is used the Serbian sample behaves as hypotheses. These results indicate that future research should obtain a sufficiently big sample of ethnic Serbs to properly test the ethnic linkage hypothesis.

Second, the treatment is suited for laboratory setup and can hardly be seen as such in a real life situation. Candidates are striped of party affiliation which is a significant cue in Montenegrin voting behavior. Furthermore, the study aimed at establishing the ethnic linkage between voters and candidates, while, on the other hand, Montenegro has a proportional representation electoral system with closed party lists. Although it does not fully reflect the vote choice in reality, it can be argued that in a small society, such as Montenegrin, vote choice is as much party based as it is candidate based.

As for the other limitations of the study, the experiment failed at creating a clear control condition striped of the candidate's ethnicity. However, it is plausible to argue that without ethnic cues introduced the control condition candidates is to be labeled with the default option and treated accordingly. Introducing a cue that clearly separates the control group from

Montenegrin or Serbian ethnicity would in Montenegrin context allude that the candidate is minority representative which would introduce all sorts of confounders.

8. Conclusion

In my thesis I have studied the ethnic voter/party linkage as a main explanatory potential for voting behavior in ethnically divided society. For this purpose, I used a long established cleavage theory and applied one of its understudied dimensions, ethnic cleavage, to an understudied context. More precisely, I argued that stability of DPS rule and relatively small electoral volatility can be explained using ethnic, cleavage, based voting. In essence, my main hypotheses assumed that ethnic cue in the experiment setup is sufficient enough to activate ethnic linkage in a way that two dominant ethnic groups in Montenegro would prefer in-group candidate. Furthermore, I tested the stability of that vote choice under the assumption of corruption information. In this stage of the research I hypothesized that ethnic linkage would account for smaller volatility rates. To answer these questions I used an experimental setup with two-stage design.

The results of the first stage of the research confirm the existence of ethnic voting, at least for the Montenegrins. In other words, Montenegrins respondents rated their inner group candidate more favorably and had higher likelihood of casting a vote for him. This findings withstood the robustness check as the data confirmed Montenegrin respondents rate their in-group candidate more favorably than the Serbian one, as well as that they rate more favorably the particular Montenegrin candidate more than the Serbs do.

On the other hand, the results failed to establish a clear ethnic voting pattern between the Serbs and their in-group candidate. There were no statistically significant differences between Serbs and Montenegrins in the approval rate of the Serbian candidate, nor did the Serbs rate more favorable their in-group candidate as opposed to the Montenegrin.

It is important to note that for these among and between group comparisons I created a concept of political identity in Montenegro. The dimensions included in this classification were

68

ethnicity, language and religious affiliation with two out of three forming a distinct political identity, as a political Serb or as a political Montenegrin.

When only ethnicity was used to define the Serbs, the pattern of ethnic voting emerged. However because of a very small sample size of Serbs, 34 respondents allocated to two treatments and a control group, the results failed to reach statistical significance. Nevertheless, these results point towards the ethnicity as a dominant dimension of political identity in Montenegro and imply that future research should incorporate a sufficiently big enough sample of ethnic Serbs in order to test the ethnic voting hypothesis.

In the second stage of the research, I tested the volatility hypothesis. Namely, whether the approval rate of the candidate reduces more for the out-group candidate. The results offered little evidence to support these assumption. On the contrary, the analysis revealed that Montenegrins hold their candidate to higher moral and political standards and that corruption information damages the candidate's position more among his in-group voters. As for the Serbs, no significant difference was found that would indicate smaller volatility rates for their in-group candidate.

Although the results of this experiment are somewhat inconclusive, they do point to the importance of studying voting behavior in divided societies. Future research on the topic of Montenegrin voting behavior should take into account the type and salience of identity layers. Furthermore, it would be interesting to access whether these identity layers have the potential to redirect voting behavior and eventually contribute to regime change.

Appendix

Pre-Treatment Questionnaire

1. Sex:
a. Female
b. Male

2. How old are you? _____

3. Are you in …
a. 1st year of undergraduate studies
b. 2nd year of undergraduate studies
c. 3rd year of undergraduate studies
d. 4th year of undergraduate studies
e. Master studies
f. PhD studies

4. Nationality:
a. Montenegrin
b. Serbian
c. Croat
d. Albanian
e. Bosniak
f. Other

5. Which religious denomination do you belong to?
a. Montenegrin Orthodox Church (CPC)
b. Serbian Orthodox Church (SPS)
c. Islam
d. Catholicism
e. Atheism
f. Agnosticism
g. Other
h. Refuse to answer

6. How many members are in your household? _____
7. What language do you speak?
   a) Montenegrin
   b) Serbian
   c) Croatian
   d) Bosnian
   e) Albanian
   f) Some other

8. What is, in average, the monthly amount of household income in your family?
   a. No household income
   b. Less than 50 EUR
   c. Between 51 – 100 EUR

d. Between 101 - 150 EUR
e. Between 151 - 200 EUR
f. Between 201 – 250 EUR
g. Between 251 – 300 EUR
h. Between 301 – 350 EUR
i. Between 351 – 400 EUR
j. Between 401 – 500 EUR
k. Between 501 - 600 EUR
l. Between 601 – 700 EUR
m. Between 701 – 800 EUR
n. Between 801 - 1000 EUR
o. Between 1001 – 1500 EUR
p. Over 1500 EUR

9. In politics, people often speak about political left and political right. Where do you see yourself with your political views?

Left   Right

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

10. In the next question you will have a chance to read confronted opinions on some important contemporary issues. Using a scale from 1 to 10 please indicate how much do you agree with one or the other opinion.

A.

| People should take more responsibilities on themselves and take care of themselves individually. | | State should take on more responsibility in providing each individual with what is necessary. |

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

B.

| Unemployed should accept any job offered otherwise their unemployment benefits should be revoked. | | Unemployed should have a right to reject every job that they themselves do not won't to work on. |

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

C.

| Competition is good. It encourages people to work more and develop new ideas. | | Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people. |

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

D.

| State should allow more freedom to companies. | | State should impose more control on companies. |

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

E.

| Income inequality should be cut down so everyone will have a roughly equal income. | | Difference in income should be widened as to bust individual contribution. |

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

F.

| Private property over companies should be strengthened. | | State ownership over companies should be strengthened. |

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11. Using a scale from 1 to 5, please rate the amount of trust you have in the following institutions? (1 being no trust at all and 5 being absolute trust)

Institution	No trust at all				Absolute trust
Government of Montenegro	1	2	3	4	5
Parliament of Montenegro	1	2	3	4	5
President of Montenegro	1	2	3	4	5
Political Parties	1	2	3	4	5
Judiciary	1	2	3	4	5
Police	1	2	3	4	5
NGO	1	2	3	4	5
Church and other religious organizations	1	2	3	4	5
EU	1	2	3	4	5
NATO	1	2	3	4	5

Stimuli: Political Speech (Neutral Group)

Dear Citizens,

Stimuli Montenegro: Dear Citizens of Cetinje,

Stimuli Serbia: Dear Citizens of Berane,

Among the great young people with whom I form the youth movement of my party, I have the privilege to speak to you tonight and show that young people in Montenegro have a vision for the future.

Stimuli Montenegro: I have the privilege to speak to you tonight and show that young **Montenegrins in Montenegro have a vision for the future.**

Stimuli Serbia: I have the privilege to speak to you tonight and show that young **Serbs in Montenegro have a vision for the future.**

We are sure that our youth can only help the development of Montenegro and our ideas come to understanding and support from older colleagues. Young people have the knowledge, skills and ability necessary in order for Montenegro to continue its European path and has become part of developed Europe.

Dear Citizens,

In addition to what I said earlier, I consider extremely important to show that we understand the problems that our country faces, and to realize how complex is to lead and develop one city, one country. So I'll try to present to you in the next minute snippets of programs that we have developed in our youth organization.

The focus of our policy in the future must be economic development of Montenegro. Without a stable and strong economy, our entire tax system is compromised, which means fundamental rights that this state guarantees are compromised: free education for your children, quality health and reliable social security. Montenegro is blessed with great natural resources and up to now it formed the basis of our economy. Tourism. We must reinforce our position as a safe destination for future investments, which will reflect positively on the overall development of the state.

However, for the overall of the quality of life it is necessary to connect the north and south, to work on a number of infrastructure projects, invest in the development of the north so that the people from the north migrate to the southern part because they want to, not because they have to. In order to secure the development we must be more aggressive towards attracting foreign capital. This implies free cash flow, low operating costs and investment environment supported by domestic and foreign banks.

It is noteworthy that the openness of capital markets and easier business conditions may in no way be at the expense of Montenegrin workers. We must draw the line and stay consistent in protection of economic rights of all citizens. Without a strong middle class Montenegro does not have a European future. The workers in my company can attest that in the last 2 years we continuously expand our business, we are investing in the improvement of working conditions and we are never late with the payment of wages and benefits. Principles that I use in my business company, we have incorporated into our political program, and our successful business testifies that we have the knowledge and experience to fulfill our promises and implement the reforms at the national level.

The time that I have available stand out so I have exposure to an end. I hope I have managed to get you closer to the dedication and effort expended and that my youth colleague invest every day to keep us waiting for better times.

For a better tomorrow[32].

Stimuli Montenegro: For a better tomorrow, Marko Jablan

Stimuli Serbia: For a better tomorrow, Rastko Bulatović

Post-Treatment Questionnaire Draft
Thank you for your participation in our study of political speeches. We would now like to know what you think of the speech you have just read. Your answers will remain confidential and your identity will not be revealed – please take time to answer all questions, and give your true opinion.

1. In your opinion, to what ethnic group the candidate belongs, (first name politician))?

   1. Montenegrins
   2. Serbs
   3. Bosniaks
   4. Albanians
   5. Croats
   6. Muslim
   7. Other

2. When you think about the merits of the candidate, do you pay attention to his nationality?
   1. Yes
   2. No

3. In general, are you more likely to vote for a candidate from the same ethnic group as you as opposed to a candidate who does not come from the same ethnic group?
   1. Yes
   2. No

4. On a scale of 1 to 7, overall how would you rate the quality of the speech (politician's name) you just read? (Circle the applicable option)
   (1 = very bad, 7 = excellent)
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
5. Does the speech (politician's name) makes you want to favour this candidate? (Circle the applicable option)
   (1 = no, not at all, 7 = yes, absolutely)
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
6. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (politicians name): (circle the mention of your choice)
   1. Very unpleasant
   2. Unpleasant
   3. Neither unpleasant nor friendly

---

[32] As an additional differences I used different versions of the words tomorrow, north etc. Versions associated with the Montenegrin language and new Montenegrin alphabet, or the versions associated with the Serbian „ekavski" dialekt. Furthermore, The Montenegrin stimuli was written in the Montenegrin alphabet, while Serbian stimuli was writen i cirilics(politicaly associated with Serbian language).

4. Friendly
5. Very friendly

7. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (the first politician name)? (circle the mention of your choice)
1. Not at all clever
2. A little intelligence
3. Intelligent
4. Smart enough
5. very intelligent

8. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (the first politician name)? (circle the mention of your choice)
1. Not at all trustworthy
2. An untrustworthy
3. Trustworthy
4. Trustworthy enough
5. Very trustworthy

9. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (the first politician name)? (circle the mention of your choice)
1. Competent
2. Somewhat competent
3. Proficient
4. Competent Enough
5. Very competent

Based on the speech you have just read, do you agree with the following statements?
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)
(Circle the applicable option)
10. The candidate (1st politician's name), will be in granny to face the challenges of the mandate
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. I was impressed by the candidate (1st politician's name)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. I agree with the political ideas of (1 politician's name)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. The candidate (1st politician's name), has good reasons to stand for election
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. If elected, (first name politician) would do a good job
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. If elected, the candidate, (first name politician), defend others and would fight for his ideals
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

16. If there were an election held tomorrow, how likely is that you would vote for the list that the author of the speech represents?
1. Very unlikely
2. Unlikely
3. Neither unlikely nor likely
4. Likely
5. Very likely

75

Stimuli: Newspaper Article (Neutral Group)

Investigation on the purchase of ID cards

Basic State Prosecutor's Office began to investigate the allegations relating to the latest footage of alleged vote buying, which was published last week by the Network for Affirmation of NGO Sector (MANS).

From the non-government sector they comment that if an investigation should be exercised according to the rule of law principle this time will come to concrete results. From the audio recordings is evident that there is a (direct) agreement to acquire identity cards, so we believe that the next logical and legal step indictments, say at MANS.

On that occasion, the Prosecutor's Office stated that the investigation is still at an early stage and that removal of the details to the public would jeopardize the investigation. What we can say is that the decision to issue indictments will be made on the basis of evidence collected during the investigation process and not on the basis of media speculation, the Prosecution concludes.

Political parties Youth buying votes?

According to unofficial information, the police have conducted several investigations trough which evidence was collected against several persons. In the first place the police approached the analysis of telephone and online communication and took statements from persons suspected to have committed a criminal offense.

In addition to publicly known actors recordings released by MANS, police source whose identity is known to the editor, alleges that the buying of identity cards involved at least three youth member of the party concerned.

Stimuli Montenegro: In addition to publicly known actors recordings released by MANS, police source whose identity is known to the editor, alleges that the buying of identity cards involved at least three youth member of the party in question **of which the central figure is Marko Jablan from Cetinje.**

Stimuli Serbia: In addition to publicly known actors recordings released by MANS, police source whose identity is known to the editor, alleges that the buying of identity cards involved at least three youth member of the party in question **of which the central figure is Rastko Bulatović from Berane.**

We remind that in May 2014 the Executive Director of MANS Vanja Ćalović said at an extraordinary press conference that the audio recordings were made by employees of the MANS, adding that the reason of making them public is saving time for Prosecutor's Office not to investigate who made recordings but who buys ID cards.

2nd Stimuli Post-test Questionnaire

17. How likely is that the allegations from a newspaper article about the author, whose speech you read in the earlier stages of this research are true?
    a) Highly unlikely that they are true

76

b) Very unlikely that they are true
c) Nor likely nor unlikely
d) Very likely that they are true
e) Highly likely that they are true
f)

18. Has the article made you change your opinion on the candidate?
    a) Yes, I've changed my opinion for worse
    b) Yes, I've changed my opinion for better
    c) No I haven't changed my opinion

19. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (the first politician name)? (circle the mention of your choice)
    1. Not at all trustworthy
    2. An untrustworthy
    3. Trustworthy
    4. Trustworthy enough
    5. Very trustworthy

20. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (the first politician name)? (circle the mention of your choice)
    1. Competent
    2. Somewhat competent
    3. Proficient
    4. Competent Enough
    5. Very competent

21. If there were an election held tomorrow, how likely is that you would vote for the list that the author of the speech and the person from the article represents?
    1. Very unlikely
    2. Unlikely
    3. Neither unlikely nor likely
    4. Likely
    5. Very likely

Now we want to know more about yourself and your political views. These responses are only to better inform us on what the people who participated in the study and their political views. The information collected will be treated confidentially - thank you for answer all the questions.

22. Generally, to what extent are you interested in politics? (circle the appropriate option)
    (1 = no, not at all, 7 = yes, very much)
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

23. Are you a member of a political party? (circle the words that apply)
    1. Yes
    2. No

24. If so, which party are you a member of? _____

25. For whom did you vote in the Montenegrin parliamentary elections in 2012?

1. DPS / Demokratska partija socijalista

2. SDP / Socijaldemokarstka partija
3. DF/Demokratski front
4. SNP / Socijalistička narodna partija
5. POZITIVNA Crna Gora
6. GP/Građanski pokret
7. BS/ Bošnjačka stranka
8. DSCG / Demokratski savez u CG
9. DUA / Demokratska unija Albanaca
10. AA/ "Albanska alternativa"
11. HGI / Hrvatska građanska inicijativa
12. FORCA
13. LPCG / Liberalna partija CG
14. Did not vote
15. Didn't had the right to vote
16. Some other, which _____

Bibliography

Batrićević, Nemanja. „Emotional basis of political information processing in divided societies: Under distinct role of anxiety and enthusiasm". Master thesis, Central European University

Bieber, Florian, ed. (2003) *Montenegro in Transition. Problems of Statehood and Identity.* Nomos, Baden-Baden

Birch, Sarah. "Electoral behaviour in western Ukraine in national elections and referendums, 1989–91." *Europe-Asia Studies* 47.7 (1995): 1145-1176.

Bernhagen, Patrick, and Michael Marsh. "Voting and Protesting: Explaining Citizen Participation in Old and New European Democracies." *Democratization* 14, no. 1 (January 24, 2007): 44–72.

Bornschier, Simon. "Cleavage Politics in Old and New Democracies." *Living Reviews in Democracy* 1, no. 0 (May 10, 2009). http://democracy.livingreviews.org/index.php/lrd/article/view/lrd-2009-6.

Brooks, Clem, Paul Nieuwbeerta, and Jeff Manza. "Cleavage-Based Voting Behavior in Cross-National Perspective: Evidence from Six Postwar Democracies." *Social Science Research* 35, no. 1 (March 2006): 88–128.

Chang, Eric C.C., Golden, Miriam A., Hill, Seth J., "Legislative Malfeasance and Political Accountability", *World Politics*, Volume 62, Number 2, April 2010, pp. 177-200

Clem, Ralph S., and Peter R. Craumer. "A rayon-level analysis of the Russian election and constitutional plebiscite of December 1993." *Post-Soviet Geography* 36.8 (1995): 459-475.

----- "Urban-rural voting differences in Russian elections, 1995-1996: a rayon-level analysis." *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 38.7 (1997): 379-395.

Crawford, Beverly, and Arend Lijphart. "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms, and International Pressures." *Comparative Political Studies* 28, no. 2 (July 1, 1995): 171–99.

Dalton, Russell J. "Political cleavages, issues, and electoral change." *Comparing democracies* 2 (1996): 189-209.

Darmanović, Srđan, "Montenegro: A Miracle in the Balkans", *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 18, Number 2, April 2007, pp. 152-159.

Dunning, Thad, and Lauren Harrison. "Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali." *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 01 (February 2010): 21–39.

Djurović, Gordana, "Crna Gora: Od spoljnotrgovinske ka evropskoj integraciji", Ekonomski fakultet, Podgorica, 2006, Manuscript, Proffesor, Faculty of Economics, University of Montenegro

Džankić, Jelena, "Cutting the mists of the Black Mountain: Cleavages in Montenegro's Divide Over Statehood and Identity", Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 2013, Vol. 41, No. 3, 412–430

--------"Reconstructing the meaning of being "Montenegrin"." *Slavic Review* 73.2 (2014): 347-371.

Evans, Geoffrey, and Stephen Whitefield. *Explaining the formation of electoral cleavages in post-communist democracies*. na, 2000.

Hahn, Harlan, and Timothy Almy. "Ethnic Politics and Racial Issues: Voting in Los Angeles." *The Western Political Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (December 1, 1971): 719–30.

Hamlin, Alan, and Colin Jennings. "Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications." *British Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 03 (July 2011): 645–70.

Hillman, Arye L. "Expressive voting and identity: Evidence from a case study of a group of U.S. voters. A review of Norman Podhoretz, *Why are Jewish Liberals?* Doubleday, New York, 2009, p.337", *Public Choice*, Volume 148, Issue 1(July 2011): 249-257

Hooghe, Marc, and Britt Wilkenfeld. "The stability of political attitudes and behaviors across adolescence and early adulthood: A comparison of survey data on adolescents and young adults in eight countries." *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 37.2 (2008): 155-167.

Kasser, Tim, Richard Koestner, and Natasha Lekes. "Early family experiences and adult values: A 26-year, prospective longitudinal study." *Personality and social psychology bulletin* 28.6 (2002): 826-835.

Kristín Birnir, Jóhanna. "Divergence in Diversity? The Dissimilar Effects of Cleavages on Electoral Politics in New Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 602–19.

Komar, Olivera. 2013. "Birači u Crnoj Gori: Faktori izborne i partijske preferencije – Voters in Montenegro: Factors of electoral and party preference", PhD thesis, Čigoja, Beograd.

Komar, Olivera; Živković, Slaven (2016) "Democracy without alternations: case study of Montenegro", (forthcoming) East European Politic and Societies, SAGE

Kopstein, Jeffrey, and Karl-Otto Richter. "Communist social structure and post-communist elections: voting for reunification in East Germany." *Studies in Comparative Communism* 25.4 (1992): 363-380.

Lampe, R. John. 2006. *Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country*. Cambridhge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies." *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 1 (1991): 72–84.

-------------------- 1980. "Language, Religion, Class and Party Choice: Belgium, Canada, Switzerland and South Africa Compared." In *Electoral Participation: A Comparative Handbook*, edited by Richard Rose. London: Sage, pp. 283-328.

Lipset, Seymour, and Stein Rokkan. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, edited by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 1–64. New York: Free Press, 1967.

Matland, Richard E. "Putting Scandinavian Equality to the Test: An Experimental Evaluation of Gender Stereotyping of Political Candidates in a Sample of Norwegian Voters." *British Journal of Political Science* 24, no. 02 (April 1994): 273–92.

McAllister, Ian, and Stephen White. "Political parties and democratic consolidation in post-communist societies." *Party Politics* 13.2 (2007): 197-216.

Mitchell, Dona-Gene. "Here today, gone tomorrow? Assessing how timing and repetition of scandal information affects candidate evaluations." *Political Psychology* 35.5 (2014): 679-701.

Moch'tak, Michail, "Democratization and electoral violence in post-communism. A study of Montenegro", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 15:1, 97-117.

Morrison, Kennethh. 2009. *Montenegro: A Modern History*. London/New York: I.B. Tauris.

Moser, Robert G. "Independents and party formation: elite partisanship as an intervening variable in Russian politics." *Comparative Politics* (1999): 147-165.

Pavlović, Srdja. 2003. "Who are Montenegrins? Statehood, Identity and Civic Society", in *Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood*, edited by Bieber, Florian. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 83-106

Parenti, Michael. "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification." *American Political Science Review* 61, no. 03 (September 1967): 717–26.

Pedersen, Mogens N. "The dynamics of European party systems: Changing patterns of electoral volatility." *European Journal of Political Research* 7.1 (1979): 1-26.

Pereira, Carlos., Melo, Marcus Andre., Figueiredo, Carlos Mauricio., "The Corruption-Enchanting Role of Re-Election Incentives? Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazils Audit Reports", *Political Research Quarterly*, September 2008.

Peters, John G. and Welch Susan. "The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No.3 (Sep. 1980), pp.697-708

Posner, Daniel N. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Powell, Eleanor Neff, and Joshua Tucker. "New approaches to electoral volatility: evidence from postcommunist countries." *APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper*. 2009.

Rastoder, Šerbo. 2003. "A Short Review of the History of Montenegro", in: *Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood*, edited by Bieber, Florian. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 107-138.

Redlawsk, David P., McCann, James A. "Popular Interpretation of "Corruption" and their Partisan Consequences", *Political Behavior*, Vol.27, No.3, September 2005.

Roberts, Elizabeth. 2007. *Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro*. London: Hurts and Co.

Rundquist, Barry S., Gerald S. Strom, and John G. Peters. "Corrupt politicians and their electoral support: some experimental observations." *American Political Science Review* 71.03 (1977): 954-963.

Schuessler, Alexander A. (2001). *A logic of expressive choice*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c2000

Szelenyi, Ivan, Eva Fodor, and Eric Hanley. "Left Turn in Postcommunist Politics: Bringing Class Back In?." *East European Politics & Societies* 11.1 (1996): 190-224.

Tavits, Margit. "Party Systems in the Making: The Emergence and Success of New Parties in New Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 01 (January 2008): 113–33.
———. "The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe." *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 283–98.

Tucker, Joshua A. "The first decade of post-communist elections and voting: what have we studied, and how have we studied it?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 5.1 (2002): 271-304.

Vuković, Ivan. 2014. Party Outcomes in Hybrid Regimes in the Western Balkans and Beyond. *Doctoral Thesis* (available at: www.etd.ceu.hu/2014/vukovic_ivan.pdf).

--------2016. "Population Censuses in Montenegro – A Century of National Identity 'Repacking'", *Contemporary Southeast Europe* 3(1): 126-141

Vuković, Ivan and Milačić, Filip. 2016 "Minority Representation in Montenegro: Defying Balkan Standards"(Working Paper).

Whitefield, Stephen. "Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science.* 2002, Vol. 5 Issue 1, p181. 20p.

Wolfinger, Raymond E. "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting." *American Political Science Review* 59, no. 04 (December 1965): 896–908.

Wyman, Matthew, et al. "Public opinion, parties and voters in the December 1993 Russian elections." *Europe-Asia Studies* 47.4 (1995): 591-614.

Zielinski, Jakub. "Translating Social Cleavages into Party Systems: The Significance of New Democracies." *World Politics* 54, no. 02 (January 2002): 184–211.

Šuković, Mijat. "Podgorička skupština 1918. i odluka koju je donijela nijesu legitimne ni legalne, a brojni su i teški negativni učinci njihovi". 2011. *Pobjeda*, Podgorica

Web sources:

State Electoral Commission of Montenegro – DIK (http://www.dik.co.me/, date accessed 26.05.2016)
Statistical Bureau of Montenegro – MONSTAT (http://www.monstat.org/cg/,date accessed 18.05.2016)
Republic Electoral Commission of Serbia – RIK (http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/, date accessed 28.05.2016)