CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2016
| Author | Veres, Mate |
|---|---|
| Title | Sceptical argumentation and philosophical theology: Topics in Hellenistic philosophy |
| Summary | In Chapter 1, I consider the objection that Pyrrhonism cannot be a kind of philosophy in any garden-variety sense of the term, since suspension makes one unmotivated or unable to engage in truth-oriented inquiry. In response, I show that Sextus provides a narrative accounting for the original motivations of inquirers, as well as for the eventual split among dogmatists and Pyrrhoneans. On this account, suspension does not do away with the possibility of inquiry, rather keeps one removed from dogmatic commitments that would terminate inquiry. In Chapter 2, I examine the claim that Pyrrhoneans suspend about dogmatic theology, but engage in cultic practices of their societies without breach of their suspensive policy. I argue that the conformism advocated by Sextus is not dogmatic, and that possible hypocrisy is not his concern. Against the suggestion that ancient religion did not require beliefs subject to sceptical examination, I argue that this reading fails to provide a philosophically charitable account. In contrast, the general Pyrrhonean stance easily applies. In Chapter 3, I turn to the arguments against theology in PH III. I analyse the arguments about the conception, existence, and providential activity of gods. I raise the possibility that these constitute an extended argument against the conceivability of god, as far as dogmatic arguments go. I also discuss the peculiarity of providential arguments, in that they indicate discomfort about dogmatic positions unaffected by the inconceivability claim, leading Sextus to a dialectical appropriation of ordinary standards of impiety. In Chapter 4, I argue that the discussion of conceptual aetiology in M IX is compatible with the parallel discussion in PH III. While the arrangement of the material in M IX gives rise to worries about Sextus' editorial competence as well as about the fixity of his agenda, none of these worries proves substantial. I also argue that the contrast between 'more dogmatic' and 'more aporetic' parts of Sextan argumentation points to the different origin of materials incorporated into his position. In Chapter 5, I argue that the stance of Cotta in Cicero's De Natura Deorum resembles that of Sextus. While both Cicero and Cotta represent a Clitomachean variant of scepticism, the character Cicero retains his commitment to an assumption of divine providence, which explains his provisional judgement in favour of Stoic theology. In contrast, the dialogue at large expresses Cicero's wavering generated by conflicting commitments, and is thus more a piece of sceptical stagecraft than a meticulous presentation of philosophical options of the day. In Chapter 6, I argue that there is no principled way to decide the 'realist&# x27;-'idea list' debate concerning Epicurean theology. 'Realists' cannot offer an unproblematic account of the physical existence of gods, while 'idealists' endanger the criterial role of preconceptions. An innate disposition to conceive of god does not carry the day for 'idealists', though it highlights the ethical orientation of Epicurean theology. I suggest that Epicurus could have been genuinely uninterested in theological tenets not immediately relevant for the good life, and consider his theory of multiple explanation in this context. |
| Supervisor | Gábor Betegh |
| Department | Philosophy PhD |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2016/veres_mate.pdf |
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