Nationalism in the Civil Movements of Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement

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Abstract

Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement, both breaking out in 2014, were publicly proclaimed as civil movements. They shared many similarities: both began with the government's decision to sign or not sign a trade agreement with the historically significant *other* country—Russia and China, both were student-led, both were violently oppressed by the government, and both led to the change of regimes directly immediately after Euromaidan and later in the national election after Sunflower Movement. Despite the civic elements of the two movements, this study argues that they were nationalistic movements in the guise of civic movements and aims to understand through the case of the two movements, what nationalistic sentiments could inform about social movements.

Given their internal similarities in the movements and external similarities of history, domestic politics and geopolitical locations, the current study applies the framework proposed by Goodman[1] to examine nationalism in three aspects: ideologies, institutions, and interests. The study draws from the background of nationalism of the two countries to discuss the pattern that Euromaidan and the Sunflower Movement both demonstrated and contributes to the literature of the role of nationalism in social movements.

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[1] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."

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Chapter1. Introduction and Literature Review

2014 was a restless year around the globe. There were a series of outbreaks and

lasting protests ranging from East Asia: e.g. South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan; the

Middle East: Egypt; Europe: Ireland, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Bosnia; Africa: Ghana,

Tunisia; North America: the United States, just to name some examples. It seems to

witness an era for appeals for not only equality, anti austerity measures imposed by

the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also more fundamentally democracy in

the form of anti-corruption or anti-undemocratic practices. Commonly considered

civil movements, Euromaidan in Ukraine and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan

both broke out after the government took actions to sign/not sign trade deals with

China and the EU and protested against the governments' inability to represent their

people. Taking place before the Sunflower Movement, Ukraine people even made a

video showing their support for the Sunflower Movement, in which similarities of the

two movements were mentioned:[2]

> Greetings to all Taiwanese people from Ukraine
> We support your struggle for democracy
> We admire your courage and patriotism
> Protests in Taiwan and protests in Ukraine are not the same,
> but we still have much in common.

Other than both being civil movements, the mobilization of the national identity as

Ukrainians and Taiwanese in the two movements is clearly seen. They especially

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[2] Anastasiia Bezchastna, *Ukraine Supports Taiwan in 20 Languages*.

make intriguing cases as the identity of being Ukrainian and Taiwanese is in fact

highly contested in the identity politics of Ukraine and Taiwan. The two movements

present as puzzles to the current study as the emphasis on being Ukrainian and

Taiwanese, on top on being citizens and students, risk the movements' prospect of

success given the divided nature of national identities in the two countries.

The Euromaidan Movement of Ukraine broke out in 2014 due to dissatisfactions

of government corruptions and the government's pro-Russia trade policies. President

Viktor Yanukovych initially expressed the intention to sign a trade agreement with the

European Union, but refused to do so ultimately. Along with other countries seeking

to negotiate trade agreements with the EU, Ukraine had been under the pressure by

Vladimir Putin with their geopolitical significance to form the Eurasian Union,

especially after Putin's re-election in 2012. The signing of Association agreement with

the European Union (EU) was officially suspended after the government attended the

Vilnius Summit of November 28-29, 2013, and a surprise deal was made between

Yanukovych and Putin on Russia's purchase of $15 billion bonds and the discounted

price of gas at 33% of the original price.[3] The news that President Yanukovych

reversed the pro-western policy and would not sign the Association agreement until

financial problems were first resolved by the agreements with Russia triggered

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[3] Diuk, "Euromaidan."

large-scale protests followed by violent police crackdowns that fueled the escalation

of the protests and eventually led to the ousting of President Yanukovych and the

formation of a pro-EU interim government. Soon after, Crimea was annexed in the

name of protecting Russian nationals by Russia's military seizure of Ukrainian

military bases and infrastructure and support for a Crimea referendum to join the

Russian Federation in February 2014.[4] The Sunflower Movement in Taiwan was a

protest against the legislature's unlawful passing of the Cross-Straits Services and

Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with China. Student protesters seized the legislature for a

period of more than 30 days that gained wide-spread support from the public,

culminating in a massive protest march of about 50,000 people in March 2014.

Supporters ordered sunflowers into the legislature to increase the morale of the

protesters, and the flowers became a symbol of the movement which it was named

after. The outcome of the movement put the passing of CSSTA on hold, and the draft

version of Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act was proposed and sitting on the

floor of the legislature to be passed.

　　Studies on Euromaidan and the Sunflower Movement examine topics under

either the study of social movements or nationalism, but little attempt has been made

to investigate the role of nationalism with a linkage to social movement theories.

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[4] Ibid.

Scholarship on Euromaidan discusses media's role in resource mobilization (e.g.

Onuch[5]) and the role of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the

mobilization process[6], Utopian ideas in both (Euro)maidan and anti-(Euro)maidan

movements (e.g. Minakov[7]), European values and how well (Euro)maidan

participants correspond with European values (e.g. Shestakovskii[8]), historical

approaches to Ukraine as a post-Soviet state versus (Euro)maidan as a turning point of

Ukraine history (e.g. Zayarnyuk[9]), and the protesters' identity as agents to progress

history (e.g. Baysha[10]), what the (Euro)maidan protesters demanded (e.g. Zelinska[11]).

Although Kulyk[12] investigated nationalist sentiments since Euromaidan, his focus

was mainly on only nationalist sentiments that evolved after the movement and gave

little contextualization to the role of the nationalist sentiments in social movement

theories. Kuzto[13] discussed competing nationalism in (Euro)maidan; however his

analysis was not dependent on the discourse of the movement itself but the series of

events that happened before, during, and after the movement. Kuzto's[14] study thus

distinguishes itself from the current study that examines the discourse of nationalism

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[5] Onuch, "EuroMaidan Protests in Ukraine."
[6] Onuch, "Facebook Helped Me Do It'."
[7] Minakov, "Utopian Images of the West and Russia Among Supporters and Opponents of the Euromaidan."
[8] Shestakovskii, "Radicalized Europeans?"
[9] ZAYARNYUK, "A Revolution's History, A Historians' War."
[10] Baysha, "Ukrainian Euromaidan."
[11] Zelinska, "Who Were the Protestors and What Did They Want?"
[12] Kulyk, "Ukrainian Nationalism since the Outbreak of Euromaidan."
[13] Kuzio, *Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Nationalism*.
[14] Ibid.

and attempts to understand the role of nationalist identities in social movement theories.

In comparison to Euromaidan, much fewer studies have been done on the Sunflower Movement. The studies mainly examine the movement in the context of social movement theories alone, such as on political opportunity structure (e.g. Ho[15]), the discourse in media of different political stances (e.g. Brindle[16]), and the resistance of Chinese influence in Sunflower Movement in Taiwan and Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong (e.g. Kaeding[17]). While the issue of competing national identities may have surfaced in the above research, in the knowledge of the current research, no research has conducted an analysis of nationalistic sentiments in Sunflower Movement itself. Also, no study seems to have been done looking at Sunflower Movement from a nationalistic perspective and examining the role of nationalism in the broader scholarship of social movements.

The two movements are ideal cases for the examination of nationalism in social movement studies. Not only did the two movements erupting in 2014 have similar purpose and form—both to stop or to start the signing of trade agreements, both were peaceful student protests that were suppressed by the governments, and both trumped

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[15] Ho, "Occupy Congress in Taiwan."

[16] Brindle, "A Corpus Analysis of Discursive Constructions of the Sunflower Student Movement in the English-Language Taiwanese Press."

[17] Kaeding, "Resisting Chinese Influence."

one of the two competing national identities (open for different interpretations)—but also the two countries share several similar characteristics. Both Ukraine and Taiwan are democratic countries that began their first democratic elections in the 90s; and both are in the proximity of the historical *other* states who exerted pressure on the government not to sign the trade agreement (European Association Agreement for Ukraine) and with whom the agreement was to be signed by the national government (Cross-Straits Services and Trade Agreement for Taiwan). Given how the appeal as a Ukrainian and Taiwanese triggered immediate association of national identities and the parallel historical development of the *other* state in Ukraine and Taiwan's proximity, a comparison of the two cases are ideal cases to enlighten social movements theories about the role of national identities.

1.1 Research Questions

The current study adopts the constructive approach to nationalism as discursive constructions, and examines the nationalistic sentiments of Euromaidan and the Sunflower Movement using videos released on the official websites. Through the examination of the framing of identity in Euromaidan and the Sunflower Movement and the demands made by the protesters the study seeks to answer the following questions. Specifically, the current study aims to situate national identities in the

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framework of social movement studies proposed by Goodman[18] to investigate how

nationalism may inform social movement studies.

(1) How were nationalistic sentiments constructed in Euromaidan and Sunflower

Movements?

(2) What was the role of national identities in the two social movements and what

do their national identities help with the understanding of social movement

studies?

1.2 Methodology

To address the research questions outlined above about the framing of identities

and demands made to reflect nationalism, video data collected from the official

websites at https://euromaidanpr.wordpress.com/english-videos/ and

http://4am.tw/videos/ from the two movements will be analyzed. The reason to use

videos for analysis is three-fold. Firstly, both Euromaidan and Sunflower Movements

are known to use digital tools to their advantage. With the social networking websites

allowing "tweeting," "retweeting," on Twitter and "sharing" on Facebook, lots of

information official or nonofficial was circulated, making the selection of information

source subject to bias. The selection of videos on the English official websites, thus

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[18] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."

provides a more coherent discourse that the central leadership of the movements

views to be consistent with the purpose and goal of the movements. Secondly, as the

videos are chosen for the English official websites, they tend to have English subtitles

or English narratives included in the video. Through the narratives provided, either

through the plot of the video itself or the narratives and sometimes the combination of

both, it is possible to find common elements of the framing of identities and demands

by the protesters. Finally, as this study examines two cases, it is best to analyze

similar data types for patterns to be observed, if any. While there has been research

examining the resolutions proposed by (Euro)maidan protest participants from

different districts[19] and Facebook pages of select Euromaidan leaders,[20] there is no

publicly available data of resolutions for Sunflower Movement. With different

strategies of movement organization, Sunflower Movement also seems to have

adopted a more centralized instead of diffused organization strategy that involved

different use of social networking websites for resource mobilization. Sunflower

Movement Facebook page received 60,000 "likes" and more focused posts on the

protest against the Cross-Straits Services and Trade Agreement, whereas the

Facebook page of Euromaidan is devoted to not only the protest, but also issues and

events surrounding Ukraine (as of the access date, there were close to 60,000 likes).

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[19] Zelinska, "Who Were the Protestors and What Did They Want?"
[20] Kulyk, "Ukrainian Nationalism since the Outbreak of Euromaidan."

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As stated on the About Page of the official Facebook page of Euromaidan

Euromaidan Press: "*Euromaidan Press* is a public initiative that, in line with the spirit

of Maidan, provides reliable and accurate information on developments in Ukraine" in

comparison with what is stated on the Sunflower Movement official page *Sunflower*

Movement 太陽花學運 "The Sunflower Movement (aka Occupy Parliament) is an

ongoing student and civil protest in Taiwan, aiming to raise public political

awareness." Announcements and the direction of the movement thus, were much

more easily identified from the Sunflower Movement Facebook Page than the

Euromaidan Facebook page, and the tracking of prominent figures of Sunflower

Movement's Facebook pages may not be as fruitful as Kulyk's[21] research.

The data for analysis using the videos released from the official websites will be

the transcribed scripts of videos, and lyrics in the case of songs. The narratives shown

as texts in the videos will also be transcribed, labeled and included in the scripts. The

total number of videos released on the official websites is 17 and 19 for Euromaidan

and Sunflower Movement respectively. However, during the time of access (mid

2016), 3/17 and 2/19 videos had broken links and will thus be excluded from the

analysis. The videos will be numbered in the order of presentation on the websites,

including the ones with broken links. To investigate identities and demands by the

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[21] Ibid.

protesters, the coding scheme adopts Tilly and Tarrow's[22] categorization of claims

They categorize components of claims into identity, standing, and program in

Contentious Politics. Identity reveals who the participants are and how they relate to

the addressed. Standing is how participants understand what their rights are in

demanding change, and program refers to the participants' demand for the target to

act in accordance with their proposed way. Following this conceptual framework, a

qualitative analysis of the videos will be conducted by identifying the presence of the

three components in the claims of the videos and contextualizing the identities

constructed through the claims. After the analysis of national identities for the two

movements, a final discussion in Chapter 5 will discuss what the national identities

adopted tell us about social movements with the framework positioning nationalism in

social movement studies that Goodman proposed.[23]

1.3 Overview of Chapters

In order to discuss the results of the analyses of nationalism in the two

movements, a literature review on relevant scholarship and theories will be included.

Chapter 2 will review the role of identity in civic and social movements, outline major

approaches to the scholarly debates of nationalism, and introduce the theoretic

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[22] Tilly and Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*.
[23] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."

framework combining nationalism and social movements. Chapter 3 and 4 dedicated

for Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement respectively will first provide the

background of competing national identities before analyzing the nationalistic

sentiments in the two movements. Finally chapter 5 will compare nationalism

identified in the two movements and situate them in the larger context of nationalism

and social movement studies proposed by Goodman.[24]

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[24] Ibid.

Chapter2. Bridging Social Movement and Nationalism Theories

2.1 Democracy and Social Movements

Social movements function as an important force in the participation of public affairs. In discussing democracy and social movements, Della Porta[25] pointed out that studies speculated democracy as representative democracy that can be viewed as majoritorian rule, and social movements serve the function of keeping the governments accountable but also providing different concepts of democracy to the representative one that makes decisions favoring the majority and suppressing the minority. That is, social movements are a way to increase participation and transparency of decision-making through the concept of consensus. The idea of consensus promotes diversity and the awareness of different points of view, thereby focusing on "…what unites" (p.3).

While the constitution grants the citizens of a country the equal rights, the different "nations" inside a country with further divided identities they adopt other than a citizen of a country, such as those based on ethnicity or class, can be attributed to as the cause of inequality, unequal treatments, neglects by the society and government. Civil movements can be organized by the suppressed "minority" against the government-represented "majority." However, in cases where the governments are

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[25] della Porta, "Democracy and Social Movements."

subsequently overthrown and replaced through elections, it can be said that the

"minority" becomes the "majority," and the ousted governments go from the

representative "majority" to the "minority" whose decision-making is viewed as only

representative of a restricted group of people and whose ruling is no longer

considered legitimate or representative of the "majority." Intended or unintended, in

the consensus building of "what unites" for the claim-making of civil movements,

movements may converge identities and change public opinions whether or not they

aim to bring about political or policy change. That is, in the process of the movements,

the question of "who we are" and "what we represent" invoke the questions of

identity and inevitably emerge in the process of the organization of democratic

movements.

2.2 Collective Identity, Nationalism and Social Movements

In the form of social movements, identity necessarily resided in not only the

initiators, but participants and observers. Collective identity has been studied by

social movement scholars in an attempt to fill in the gaps of dominant social

movement theories of resource mobilization and political process models.[26] The

intricacies of how the structure and the agents interact that encourage individuals to

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[26] Polletta and Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements."

participate in social movements and the opening of structure, availability of resources

and ways of organization all play a role in the outbreak of social movements and the

outcome. Polletta and Jasper[27] pointed out that four types of questions are answered

for social movements in turning to collective identities: 1.) why actors gather for

collective actions and the context for their grievances, 2.) what the motivating force is

other than material incentives for people to participate in movements without

free-riding, 3.) the role identity plays in the selection of movement strategies, and 4.)

the effects of social movements on culture. In examining the identity adopted and

framed in the movements, the relationship of the actors involved, i.e. states,

governments, and individuals can be dismantled. However, while there is recognition

of identity as an important variable in the study of social and political theories, little

attention has been paid to studying identity,[28] even more so in the case of national

identities. According to Goodman,[29] social movement research examining

nationalism is usually peripheral but not central to social movement studies. Although

Polletta and Jasper's[30] work highlights the importance of the role of identity, they

clearly distinguished their research from nationalistic identities and pointed readers to

references of national movements against international organizations.

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[27] Ibid.

[28] Della Porta, Diani, and Muro, "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Social Movements."

[29] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."

[30] Polletta and Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements."

In an attempt to connect studies of identity politics and social movements, Della

Porta, Diani, and Muro[31]'s examination of studies related to identity in social

movements found that there has been no consistent theory of why and when social

movements mobilize identity through cleavages along the line of nations and ethnic

groups. Social scientists studying social movements seem to only study ethnicity and

nationalism as a variable of mobilization and concentrate on relational conflicts and

elements of violence or rebellion.[32] While the current study recognizes the

complexities of social movements and does not attempt to argue that national

identities alone can account for the occurrences or outcome of social movements, an

examination of national identities in social movements could, as Polletta and Jasper[33]

pointed out, provide answers to why actors gather for collective actions, the context

for their grievances, what the motivating force is other than material incentives, and

the effects on culture. Examining social movements using nationalist sentiments as

collective identity, the current study will discuss nationalism in a broader framework

proposed by Goodman[34], who in his attempt to connect social movement and

nationalism theories, pointed out the nature of social movements as a political process

and proposed examining nationalistic sentiments in three typical aspects of social

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[31] Ibid.
[32] Della Porta, Diani, and Muro, "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Social Movements."
[33] Polletta and Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements."
[34] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."

movements, i.e. ideologies, institutions, interests. His conceptualization of

nationalism in social movement studies relating to each aspect will be explained in the

beginning of each section discussing the two movements' effects on the three aspects

in chapter 5. For the discussion of ideologies, the current study will loosely borrow

the answers Polletta and Jasper[35] highlighted collective identities can provide as the

guideline to analyze the role of national identities as ideologies in social movements.

2.3 Nationalism

In order to understand nationalistic identities in social movements, it is important

to define the approach of nationalism I adopt in the current study taken from

nationalism research. Many definitions of nationalism have been construed, but

broadly speaking, nationalism is a political penchant of recognizing a people as a

nation, based on ethnicity, citizenship, and ideological systems.[36] There are ways of

categorizing nationalism research. The first distinguishes between two groups of

understanding of nationalism into whether the definition of a nation is the old,

naturally given or a fabricated output of modernity (p.635).[37] The first group, taking

the existence of ethnicity as given, consists of primordialism and instrumentalism.

Primordial scholars believe that individuals have a clear conception of the *selves* and

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[35] Polletta and Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements."
[36] Verkhovskii and Pain, "Civilizational Nationalism."
[37] Ishiyama and Breuning, *21st Century Political Science*.

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both ethnicity and nations are the sources of powerful cultural connections. They

believe that humans have single fixed identities, meaning that they only belong to one

ethnic group of nation which remains fixed over time. Primordialism is widely held to

be true for not only experts and lay men.[38] In examining social phenomena, identity

is considered to be singular and constant, and diversity is often speculated to be the

cause of problems. The opposing view of primordialism is instrumentalism which

views ethnicity and nationhood as instruments for political entrepreneurs to utilize for

maximization of benefits and power. These two "organic theories" are often adopted

in the study of ethnic identity rather than nationalism but they form an integral part of

nationalism studies since ethnicity is frequently considered the "natural" distinctions

of *selves* and *others*. The second group of theories, viewing the definition of a nation

as a modern invention, comprises perennialism and modernism. Perennialist scholars

claim that "ethnicities are not natural givens but historical, social and cultural

phenomena and that modern nations are updated versions of ethnic communities

(p.635).[39] Modernist scholars on the other hand, view nationalism as a pure invention

of the modern industrial identity. That is, the idea of a nation reflects different stages

of history and is contingent on modern conditions.

    A different way of looking at nationalism, also born out of the debate on the role

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[38] Della Porta, Diani, and Muro, "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Social Movements."
[39] Ishiyama and Breuning, *21st Century Political Science*.

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of ethnic identity, is between essentialism and constructivism.[40] Essentialist scholars

such as Anthony D. Smith upheld that nations have ethnic cores that are not imaged.

On the other hand, the group of constructive scholars believes that national identities

are the product of wholly modern inventions that exist only after modernization and

industrialization. Ernest Gellner's claim that the state creates a new history and then

proclaims a nation based on ancient roots and Benedict Anderson's "imagined nations"

are among such conceptualizations of nations as identities constructed by modern

nation states.

With the transition of the international order from colonialism to pluaralism,

nationalism and national identity have been given definitions and re-definitions by

both the people and the nation-states. While the formation of a nation is quite often to

some degree dependent on ethnicity and the problemtized nature of diversity has been

pointed out by primordialistic scholars, the modern states rarely have a homogeneous

ethnicity, or in some cases even if the majority of the population is of the same

ethnicity, different historical backgrounds that bring about different social processes

have led to different national identifications. Nationalism unexplainable by ethnicity

brings out the conceptualization of nationalism based on different ideological systems.

National identity is both the "ethnic history and identity of the community, religion,

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[40] Ibid.

and belief system" and "dominant ideology and conscious manipulation, including

commemoration, ideology, and symbolism" (Smith 1991, 2009, as quoted in

Korostelina[41]). Nationalistic sentiments have also been subject to social construction

with new priorities and boundaries depending on the political, economic, and

religious goals of leaders and elites (Kelman 2001 as cited in Korostelina[42]). As

Brubacker[43] pointed out, national identities categorizing the whole of a nation,

cultivates solidarity, mutual responsibility and civic commitment at the national level.

Although ideologies are, as Kelman pointed out, up for manipulation, they are

not always purely instruments of the elites'. The different social forces at work

creating different ideologies or sub-sects of ideologies building on ethnicity, history,

political, economic and religious can come from not only the top—the elites—but

also the bottom as people take up a certain identities to define the *selves* in the social

spheres they reside and to use as guidelines based on which they act. Either direction,

the discourse challenges or reifies, changes or deepens national identities. National

identity changing with time and discourse, remains to be relevant for the modern

world.

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[41] Korostelina, "Mapping National Identity Narratives in Ukraine."
[42] Ibid.
[43] Brubaker, "In the Name of the Nation."

2.4 Theoretical Framework

As the review of identity and social movement and nationalism studies above demonstrates, in order to situate nationalist sentiments in social movement theories, the current study adopts the constructive approach as proposed by nationalism scholars like Gellner and Anderson. Through its understanding of national identities, the study will position the findings of national identities under the study of collective identities and Goodman's[44] framework combining nationalism and social movements. That is, the current study view national identities as identity claims constructed through language and aims to understand the power of national identity claims in social movements.

In order to analyze the identity claims, Tilly and Tarrow's[45] categorization of social movement claims: identity, standing, and program, is used to systematically dissect the language construction of national identities in the social movements. Following the investigation of the identity discourse for Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement, a discussion of the power of national identities in social movements will be presented in the final chapter (Chapter 5) using Goodman's[46] framework of examining the effects of nationalism in the context of ideologies, institutions, interests. The discussion of effects of ideologies on social movements will be loosely based on

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[44] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."
[45] Tilly and Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*.
[46] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."

Polleta and Jasper's[47] arguments of what collective identity can contribute to social

movement research, namely why actors gather for collective actions, the context for

their grievances, what the motivating force is other than material incentives, and the

effects on culture.

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[47] Polletta and Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements."

Chapter3. Euromaidan

3.1 History and National Identities in Ukraine

The name of Ukraine comes from the word "borderland;" historically, Ukraine

was in between of the Russian Empire and the democratic European countries,

between communist and capitalist social orders, and between the Soviet Union and its

European satellites.[48] The capital of modern day Ukraine, Kiev, was once the center

of the Rus' civilization (9th-13th century) and is considered the cradle of the culture of

modern day Russia, Ukraine and Belarus[49] In the 16th-17th century, Kiev became part

of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until the Partitions of Poland led Galicia in

modern-day western Ukraine to be ruled by the Austrian Empire and the other parts

by the Russian Empire. After the Russian Empire was overthrown, a short-lived

Ukrainian People's Republic was formed (1917-1921), during which Ukraine

underwent a civil war with the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin for the establishment of

the Soviet regime, which modern Ukrainian historians often consider to be a

movement of independence. The Soviet Ukrainians finally controlled much of

Ukraine and signed the treaty of Riga along with Russian republic with the second

Polish Republic. Ukrainian People's Republic is the inception of 20th century

Ukrainian nationalism, which was later considered a threat to the Soviet State by

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[48] Yekelchyk, *Ukraine*.

[49] Jenkins, *Crisis In Crimea*.

Joseph Stalin that directly or indirectly led to the Holodomor famine of Ukraine. The

famine, now considered a genocide, killed an estimated 2.5-7.5 million ethnic

Ukrainians.

At the end of World War II, Stalin took Western Ukraine from Poland, and

Crimea was transferred to the Ukrainian republic in the 1950s but maintains a strong

connection with Russia. In fact, not until western Ukraine came under the rule of

Soviet Union, western Ukraine had mostly "western" influence, being exposed to the

renaissance and western civilizations. The history of Ukraine thus can be considered

as a division with the western part governed by Vienna and Warsaw as part of the

Austrian empire or Poland and the east being governed by Russia.[50] Under Soviet

rule, its historiography adopted a Russian empire scheme in which the patrimony

empire Kiev Rus, was constantly instrumentalized in portraying "Russians,

Belarussians and Ukrainians as united by fraternal feelings of solidarity stemming

from a shared umbilical cord" (p. 673).[51] The burgeoning Ukrainian national

movement led by the Ukrainian People's Republic of 1917-1921 was criticized as

"…hostile to the Bolshevik-led national and economic emancipation of Ukraine

peasants and workers" , and the right-wing Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

and the military wing of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Western Ukraine were

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[50] Diuk, "Euromaidan."
[51] Wolczuk, "History, Europe and the national Idea''."

"…condemned as Nazi collaborators" (p.673)[52]. The Soviet framework of the

supra-ethnic national identity of the "Soviet people" diluted and interrupted the

formation of a Ukrainian identity.

Nationalism in Ukraine underwent several transformations at different periods of

time. At the collapse of the Soviet Union, both civic nationalists and ethnic lists

embraced the nationalism for Ukraine statehood. According to Kuzio[53], All

nationalists except for the radical nationalists, including civic Rukh and civic

sovereign communists joined the movement to support independence during

1989-1991 and thus their nationalistic sentiments fell under the "civic and inclusive"

kind. The radical nationalists, on the other hand, had an "ethnic and exclusive"

nationalistic orientation despite their support for a Ukrainian state. Although the goal

of independence was fulfilled with the combination of nationalism, and it appeared to

be of much less utility since the *self* was now clearly defined against *others* in form,

the quest for a national identity remains relevant as the national idea is viewed as

important by the elites in consolidating Ukraine statehood and unity.

However, the obvious regional divide (east vs. west) into the claims of

pro-Russian and pro-European identity, unaccountable for by only ethnicity, dates

back to the shared destiny of Ukraine and Poland and Russia. In studying the national

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Kuzio, *Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Nationalism*.

divides of the east and west, Riabcbuk[54] pointed out the stratified nature of the

differences of national identity in Ukraine not just in terms of ethnicity but also

linguistics and politics. According to Riabcbuk[55], Donbas and Galicia, the

easternmost and westernmost parts of Ukraine represent two different worlds indeed,

but the area in between of them consists of variations that make telling one Ukraine

from the other difficult. Ethnically and linguistically speaking, Ukrainians comprise

the majorities in all regions except for Crimea, but Donbas and Crimea have more

Russian speakers than Ukrainian speakers according to the census in 2001.[56] A trend

of more Soviet influence is consistently observed, not only in ethnic and linguistic

terms but also in political divides. Starting in 1991, Galicia showed a strong

anti-communist preference in elections and by 2002-2004, support for

non-Soviet/anti-communist parties and politicians spread to other parts of western and

central Ukraine where the historical border of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

resided till the 18th century. This fault-line of the east and west is important as it

divides the western world, civilization, and republicanism from "the 'Oriental' world

of the Moscow stardom and Ottoman Empire (Soltys, 2005 as cited in Riabchuk[57]). At

the same time, the two orientations of identities—

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[54] Riabchuk, "'Two Ukraines' Reconsidered."
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.

non-Soviet/anti-communism/pro-European versus post-Soviet/pro-Russian create the

impression of identities and discursively manipulated by politicians to accomplish

their own agendas, and post-soviet elites have no intention of creating an Ukrainian

identity.[58]

The balance between the west and east identities that holds Ukraine as a state

was undermined by scandalous president Leonid Kuchma in 2002-2004 when he

terminated his allegedly 'balancing' practices and went all out for the most powerful

Donbas clan, with Victor Yanukovych being chosen as the prime minister and

successor for presidency.[59] The rhetoric by the pro-Russian incumbent featured

Galicia as fascists, Nazi collaborators, and American stooges, whereas the opponents

lashed back accusing the Donbas clan as Donbas mafia associated with 'Moscow

puppets'.[60] This divide continues to be demonstrated in not only national and local

elections, but also most recently in Euromaidan. Nationalism in Euromaidan will be

discussed in the context of the history of Ukraine.

3.2 Euromaidan Video Analysis

In the 14 of the accessible videos of Euromaidan, 7 had the identity claims made

by the protesters as being "Ukrainians," 3 self-identified as foreigners such as

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[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

Belarusian, Polish, or German, 1 speak to protesters in the tone of God and called the protesters "human beings," and 1 identified as pro-human rights (group) that was investigating the mass killing by the Ukrainian government during the time of the movement. The emphasis of being Ukrainian often goes hand in hand with keeping Ukraine united and independent, on top of civil appeals to stand up for the rights. The civil identity as Ukrainian justifies the standing claim that they have the rights to participate in public affairs. All except for 3 made program claims addressed to the international community to impose economic sanctions against Russia for their annexation of Crimea. All the other ones have program claims addressed directly to Ukrainians about the importance to unite and to persist and 1 makes a response to those that criticize the movement as instigating extreme nationalism. The themes that surface from the analysis of the discourse of identity construction are the meaning of being a Ukrainian against the *others*, and the emphasis of the definition of Ukraine's nationhood. In Ukraine's quest for a Ukrainian identity since independence, the evolving Ukrainian identity will be analyzed using the above two themes.

3.3 The National Identity Question in Euromaidan

Euromaidan broke out soon after Yanukovych announced he would not sign the association agreement with the EU, although the government's violent response had

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led the movement to adopt the framing of a civic movement. Shulman[61] points out

that competing national identities are at loggerheads politically and economically.

Russian nationalists look to integrate economically with Russia and the

Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) to achieve their nationalist goals of "unity

through ties with the homeland, identity through the boundary erosion and cultural

diffusion and autonomy through economic diversification," while the Ukrainian

nationalists promote economic integration with the European Union to achieve

"autonomy through the economic diversification and independence, identity through

the boundary erosion and strengthening and identity through cultural diffusion and

protectionism." Western Ukraine parties and organizations such as Rukh, the

Ukrainian Republican Party, Democratic Party of Ukraine and Congress of Ukrainian

Nationalist promote nationalist slogans such as "Away from Moscow!" or "Return to

Europe." On the contrary Russian nationalist parties and organizations popular in

Crimea and eastern Ukraine such as Russian Movement of Crimean, Civic Congress,

Communist Party, Socialist Party and International Movement of the Donbas push for

the breakdown of barriers to the commerce, investment and travel with Russia since

the breakaway with the Soviet Union. Russian nationalistic sentiments, however, have

not received as much widespread support as the Ukrainian nationalist ones with the

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[61] Shulman, "Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration."

Ukrainian majorities in Ukraine. The corresponding pro-western orientation reflects

Ukrainian concerns and efforts to maintain the autonomy and identity of the majority

of the Ukrainian nation. In the pursuit of weakening ties with Russian and stronger

ties with the EU, the Ukrainian nationalists aim to decrease economic dependence and

diversify Ukraine's economy given the long-time dependence on Russia, especially on

fossil fuels to downgrade the leverage for Russian nationalists with Ukraine

economy's dependence on Russia.

The framing of Euromaidan as a civic movement is abundant. This is the

broadest definition of being Ukrainians as reflected in video#13 "We want to be free

from the dictatorship. We want to be free from the politicians who work only for

themselves, who are ready to shoot, to beat, to injure people just for saving their

money, just for saving their houses, just [for] saving their power" (0:23).[62] The civic

demands, however, evolved from the demand for the government to sign the

association agreement with the EU, to the punishment of brutality and eventually the

resignation of Yanukovych as he was held accountable by the protesters for the violent

and undemocratic actions. Such change of progression of demands also led to the

dropping of "Euro" from Euromaidan, emphasizing the civic nature of the

movement.[63]

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[62] Whisper Roar, *I Am a Ukrainian*.
[63] Kulyk, "Ukrainian Nationalism since the Outbreak of Euromaidan."

Portraying themselves as citizens of Ukraine, however, conveys a nationalistic connotation, as it treats the citizens of Ukraine as one family against the unspecified *other(s)*.[64] The protesters identify themselves as Ukrainian citizens that hope for a better future for the country, against the impediment brought about by the unnamed inside/outside. In video#8, all the protesters sang the Ode of Joy. The caption in the beginning of the video went "Ukrainians …cherish the hopes for the change and improvement in their country" (0:13).[65] Video#11 claimed the identity of not only all men in Ukraine as in "Thousands of men from all over Ukraine leave their families and jobs to protect the Maidan…They are people from different walks of life" (0:13).[66] Considering themselves as representative of the majority of Ukrainians, the protesters emphasized that it's not just people from western Ukraine or those with special interests from different job fields that were against the government's decision not to sign the European association agreement.

Further evidence distinguishing between the identities as a Ukrainian that is pro-European and civil, in contrast with post-soviet and barbaric singled out the outside *other* of Russia the Ukrainians protest against. The construction of such identity as the national identity general Ukrainians embrace, one that sits at the opposite end of the post-soviet identity typical adopted in eastern and southern

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[64] Ibid.
[65] Zoya Shu, *Euromaidan*.
[66] Voices of Ukraine, *Maidan Self-Defense in Action*.

Ukraine is most directly seen in video#13: "We are civilized people but our government are [sic] barbarians. It's not [the] Soviet Union" (0:51),[67] a statement reflecting the mindset of the western world and pro-European national identity (in the pursuit of closer ties with the EU) as civilized whereas the oriental world of the Soviet Union as backwards. Coupled with the narratives of Ukrainians seeking a better future for their country, the protesters considered looking to Europe but not Russia to be the best for their country's future. Other than the direct reference to the Soviet Union as barbarian, the inclusion of statements from people from Donbas—the easternmost part of Ukraine whose residents likely with a post-Soviet identity—also created the association of the Soviet legacy with corruption and inequality. A reporter reporting on the self-defense team of Euromaidan in Kiev highlighted the grievances of Roman, a self-defense fighter from Donbas in video#11 "Yet, Roman (person name) tells us he didn't come to Kyiv to fight. He says he got fed up by the corruption and injustice in his Donbas homeland." In video#2 people from Kharkiv, the second largest city of Ukraine located in northeastern Ukraine that used to be the capital of the Russian empire, showed their support for Euromaidan and explicitly called out Russia's aggression that threatened Ukrainian: "While we support our newborn democracy, Russia has shown disrespect for a number of international agreements, defied its

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[67] Whisper Roar, *I Am a Ukrainian*.

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obligations to protect Ukrainian territorial integrity and dishonorably [annexed]

Crimea which is a part of Ukraine."

Direct countering of the Ukrainian identity not based on ethnicity, which Russian

nationalism discourse adopts, tracing the shared blood of Russian and Ukrainian

people to Kiev Rus to prevent Ukraine from moving westwards, was also found in

video#2. In the video, the Kharkhiv residents made championed Ukrainian statehood

against Russian invasion: "There are many Russian people in Kharkiv. Russian by

language, origin and culture. However, Russian ethnicity is not t all the same as being

a national of Russia" (1:13).[68] Such argument from Russia and counterargument from

Ukraine, exemplifies the conflicts of ideas of what constitutes nationhood. The

identity of Russia as the *other* by the "Ukrainians" in (Euro)maidan falls under the

ideation of nationhood as a modern invention that is no longer merely primordial, and

that Russia does not have rights over the territory of Ukraine because of the ethnicity

and language spoken by the inhabitants. There also seems to be an underlying

emphasis that those that used to be part of the Soviet Union, Georgians, Latvians,

Belarusians, etc. who came to (Euro)maidan to support the movement because of the

support for democracy as a universal value. Achieving the framing of the pursuit of

democratic values as a universal struggle, the inclusion of post-soviet nationals has an

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[68] Viktoriya Bulavina, *Kharkiv Citizens' Appeal to the International Community*.

undertone of the struggle against the aggression imposed by the fraternal state of Russia. For example, there are quite a few videos that include views of foreign nationals, video#7: "It doesn't matter which nationality you have. There are lots of people from different nationalities-Latvian, Belarusian, Armenian, Polish, Lithuanian and lots of others. People stand here for the idea-everybody understands what is happening now"(0:34)[69] and video#9 is a film shot by participants residing in Ukraine that are not Ukraine nationals, including two Belarusians, a Pole, and a German: "My name is Yanosh and I came here from Belarus to support my friends to the capital of Ukraine Kyiv." In video#9 "Things are going on in Ukraine are very important for Belarus, and people there see a clear example of dictator regime and opportunity to stand against it and so it might happen now in Belarus too [sic]."

The government's violent crackdown of the protests also led to prevalent condemnation of the government as the inside *other*. Yanukovych's government responsible for the trigger of the protest and the cruelty against Ukraine people, corresponded to the image of their party as the proxy of Russia that not only adopted a pro-Russia policy but also exerted pressure and imposed violence on the Ukraine people not to form closer alliance with the west: video#12 and #14 emphasized government brutality against the Ukrainian people: "These are Ukrainian people and

[69] Euromaidan PR, *Euromaidan - Jewish Girl Volunteered for Euromaidan in Kiev Ukraine*.

what is government and authorities doing? they [treat] them as criminals," (0:24) [70]

and "We were born and raised in Ukraine. We played in the very square which is now

burning, and our parents are amongst those who have stood against tyranny for the

last 2 months—facing freezing cold, bullets, and insults." Further evidence can be

seen from the conceptualization of metaphorical slavery of the Yanukovych

government of Ukrainian people in the hands of Russia: video#1, a song titled *We are*

Ukrainians by Georgian singers "I am Ukrainian. No matter who we are. I am

Ukrainian. No matter where we are" (0:44),[71] began with the grievance of Ukrainians:

"People dying 'cause they can't be slaves" (0:00).[72] Video#12 echoed the desire to be

free, from dictatorship the government was moving towards: "This is not about Euro

union. This is all about truth. This is all about just, this is all about you know we just

want to be equal. We want o be free" (0:16).[73] Through the discourse of the

government's dictatorship and violence, the identity of the government was

juxtaposed with the *outside others* by the protesters.

Being a post-Soviet state, the question of national identity requires

conscious efforts of nation-building by the elites. With the historical remnants of the

divided identities as being part of Europe or the Soviet Union and the changes of

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[70] Alexander Kulabuhov, *Euromaidan#2   What Is Wrong in Ukraine?*
[71] Serega Spielberg, *GEORGIAN STARS SUPPORT UKRAINE -We Are Ukrainians (Official Music Video)*.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Alexander Kulabuhov, *Euromaidan#2   What Is Wrong in Ukraine?*

different governments with different ideologies, the nation-building project seemed to be subject to instrumentability to the elites for their parties or clans to secure their interests. While Euromaidan emphasized their pro-European identity, they accused the government of corruption instead of being partial to the pro-Russian nation group. The pro-European identity promoted is obviously nationalistic in a neutral sense (in contrast with Russian media discourse of fascism). However, the accusations made against the *others* was presented in the frame of universal values such as democracy and good governance. Despite such civic appeals, the identities were advanced through the contrast with, in the protesters' words, the backwardness of the Soviet Union. Through inclusion of foreign national supporters from post-Soviet states that stated that Ukraine should set up an example, the framing of the identity of Euromaidan was constructed in the context of the competing national identities with universal grievances. This hybrid nationalism, both civic and national, born out of the movement, may provide insights to social movement studies I will later discuss alongside the Sunflower Movement.

Chapter4. Sunflower Movement

4.1 History and National Identities in Taiwan

Before the Age of Discovery in the 16th century, Taiwan had been populated by

the Dutch and Spanish, and it was not until the end of Ming dynasty of China that

Taiwan started to come into the picture of China. After the Qing dynasty took over the

Ming dynasty, however, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in the 1895 Sino-Japan War under

the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Taiwan was under Japanese rule until the defeat of Japan

in World War II, and Japan relinquished its claim over Taiwan in the treaty of San

Francisco. As the nationalist party of China, the Kuomingtang (KMT) and the

communist party were in a civil war and both claimed to be the legitimate government

of China. Both Chinas were uninvited to the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco,

rendering an ambiguity of the status of Taiwan. In 1949, the KMT retreated to Taiwan

and used Taiwan as the base for their comeback to re-claim the territory of mainland

China. To establish legitimacy, political and social control, the construction of a

Chinese identity, was top on the agenda by the KMT government, and the Chinese

identity of people under KMT rule was fostered through almost 4 decades of KMT

authoritarian rule.[74]

When the KMT first retreated to Taiwan, the famous 228 (February 28) incident

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[74] Chen, "Reconstructed Nationalism in Taiwan."

resistance in Taiwan became the symbolic historic event of KMT brutality and the treatment of people of Taiwan as second-class citizens. The 228 incident, in which a local Taiwanese woman was violently treated and killed for the sale of tobacco on February 28th 1949 triggered the enactment of the martial law in the same year that marked the official beginning of the KMT's authoritarian rule. While several other resistance movements took place after the 228 incident and the cleavage between the "mainlanders" and the "locals" continued, in 1987, President Chiang Ching-Kuo abolished the martial law. President Lee Teng-Hui, after President Chiang, an iconic figure given his "local" Taiwanese background, introduced a series of opening up that led up to the first presidential election in 1996. Political parties born after the political liberalization, including the KMT itself, soon took up the anxiety of the national identity as an important political resource, especially when the anxiety of the power shift from the minority mainlanders to the majority Taiwanese with President Lee Teng-Hui elected as the first democratically elected president of Taiwan. The claimed national identities as pro-China headed by the KMT and pro-Taiwan headed by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) continue dominating Taiwanese domestic politics till today.

The political liberation in 1987 is also symbolic as bans on cross-strait contacts were lifted and those that retreated from China in 1949 were finally able to visit

families back in China. However, according to Chen,[75] the contacts soon proved to

only strengthen the awareness of the differences between the Taiwanese. Other than

the emerging competing identities, it is important to point out that during the KMT

rule between 1949-1987, the identity of Chinese and anti-communist-party sentiments

were fostered. Such was propagated by the KMT in the hope that one day, the

mainland would be taken back in its hands. Extending beyond the Chinese identity, an

underlying assumption that the nation will one day be one, was planted in public

discourse and education. That is, the unity of the nation is something that is to happen,

for the generation growing up during the time. However, the emphasis on unity was

more difficult to be taken up than that on identity and autonomy given the complete

separation of the two sides of the straits politically, economically and culturally,

literally in all aspects. Fortunately for Taiwan to survive, the separation prompted the

KMT to develop Taiwan economically. With foreign aids and a centralized

government determined to increase economic growth, infrastructure was built to pave

way for development.

Taiwanese autonomy from China is obvious till today, as Taiwan is an economic

body by itself that is known as one of the four Asian tigers and adopts full-fledged

democracy that is completely different from China's. After the political liberalization,

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[75] Ibid.

the two largest parties experienced the third peaceful party transfer as of 2016 (since

1996). With China's economy fast growing and its rising nationalism, Taiwan has

been considered to be the only lost territory that has not been reclaimed and China

maintains its claim to militarily take over Taiwan if independence were to be claimed.

As the competing national identities are obvious in domestic politics, international

relations scholars such as Richard Bush dedicate themselves to the research of

cross-strait relations often treat the national identities as an important indicator

guiding political and economic policies. The clash point across the straits roots deep

in the polarized national identities that the two major political parties take up. The

identity claim of the KMT is that of a Chinese identity that emphasizes the historical,

cultural, and ethnic roots traceable back to China, whereas the major opposition party,

the DPP's identity claim is that of a (local) Taiwanese that has been suppressed during

the long undemocratic KMT rule between 1949-1987. In his book *The Future of*

China-Taiwan Relation he categorized political identification with the blue (the KMT)

and the green (the DPP) into Deep Blue, Light Blue, Deep Green, and Light Green

and commented that only the Deep Green population (25% according to Bush)

exhibited ethnic nationalism that does not accept the Chinese identity.[76] The profile

of the Deep Green population is often those who view the KMT as intruders to

[76] Bush, *Uncharted Strait*.

Taiwan as this group of people usually has ancestors that resided in Taiwan during or much further before Japanese rule and strongly identifies with Taiwanese independence; the Dark Blue population, is often those who or whose family retreated to Taiwan with the KMT that strongly identify as Chinese. The analysis of the discursive national identities of the Sunflower Movement will be discussed in the context of Taiwanese history and political party identifications given their inseparable interactions.

4.2 Sunflower Movement Video Analysis

Being civil movements, all 17 of the accessible videos of Sunflower Movement claimed the identity as either citizens or students. The self-identification as citizens/students naturally engenders the standing claim that they (the protesters) are entitled to public affairs. Out of the 17 videos, all except for 4 made program claims addressed to the government about Cross-Straits Services and Trade Agreement. Out of the 4 with program claims not addressing the government, 2 invoked the support of the international community, and 2 addressed the parents of the protesters not to worry about their safety. A closer look at the discourse of the identity claims either by the selves or others (international media) not only referred to themselves as "students" and "citizens," but 6 out of 17 also juxtaposed themselves with the to-be-blamed-for ruling party, the Kuomingtang (KMT). Two specifically strongly identify themselves

as "Taiwanese." Also, all the standing claims resort to civil rights, but 5 out of 17 specifically mention the economic consequences and the prospect of happiness in the standing claims. The major themes concerning national identities of Sunflower Movement are identified to be based on political party divisions and the orientations of the economic policies the parties adopt.

4.3 Political Parties and National Identity in Sunflower Movement

The two major political parties, the Kuomingtang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), represent the identity claims of people in Taiwan on two ends of a spectrum, and national identity has been the subject for mobilization in Taiwan politics.[77] Before 1986, KMT was the only legal political party and the so-called white terror, where freedom was highly restricted and anyone threatening the party-state was prosecuted, permeated the society. Several people repressed and persecuted by the KMT regime became important leaders of the DPP, and because of their conflicting ideologies, incessant clashes between the two parties frequently take place. Indeed, the struggles to embrace different ideals have laid the ground for two mainstreams of identity claims in modern day Taiwan: the pro-China unification KMT and the pro-Taiwan-independence DPP. Other than political factors, history has led

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[77] Ibid.

people to believe that "longtime residents in Taiwan had become less "Chinese," and

especially because of the martial law imposed in 1949, the KMT created popular

alienation and led the "local Taiwanese" to emphasize the "'sadness' of their lot"

(p.24), which many of the DDP founding members experienced due to political

prosecution. After the democratization in the 1990s, with the freedom of speech to

express views on national identity and national identity being used as a source of

political mobilization, more and more people consider themselves Taiwanese rather

than Chinese nor both Taiwanese and Chinese even though the majority of people in

Taiwan are ethnically Chinese.[78]

The identity claims in the videos of the Sunflower Movement contain identities

constructed around the political parties, specifically the ruling party, the KMT. They

made references to the brutality the party imposed on Taiwanese people during the

authoritarian era between 1949-1987, calling out the KMT as the perpetrator of

brutality and the violation of freedom and highlighting the sharp contrast of what the

two political parties' ideologies embody: the authoritarian KMT and the democracy

pioneering DDP. The construction of the identity as citizens and the young

generations to be reminded of the suppression of the KMT 20 years ago (#1) and the

suffering of the people from the brutality of the incumbent KMT government (#8)

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[78] Ibid.

portrayed the KMT as the government *of* the people not *for* the people as it was in the

martial law era and immediately triggers the opposing ideology of national identity

embraced by the DPP, whose founding members fought for rights of freedom, were

relentlessly repressed during the martial law era, and embrace a local "Taiwanese"

identity. Video #1 presented on the official website of Sunflower Movement identifies

the narrator as the children of parents, and it mainly addresses parents in the video.

The entirety of the video explicates the brutality during the martial law era, also

known as the *white terror*, under the Kuomingtang(KMT). It asks the parents to "tell

them (the children) about how things have changed during these 20 years" (0:23),[79]

and lists the deprived rights and freedom under the KMT's authoritarian rule,

including songs that were banned, the lack of elections, political massacres, people

burning themselves for freedom of speech, and legal police brutality towards

protesters. Video #8 also described the crackdown of the student strike as taking

people "back to the martial law period" (0:06).[80] The analogy of the violence by the

KMT government to the martial law era quickly generates in people's mind the

traumatic experiences of families that suffered from the *white terror*, the sad lot,

which more often than not, turned the families and friends into DPP supporters that

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[79] 洪馬克, *30 年前你們守護我們 現在換我們守護台灣（中英日三國語言字幕版） It's Our Turn to Protect Taiwan Now.*

[80] AppleDailyEnglish, *Taiwan Police's Brutal Crackdown on Peaceful Student Protesters Results in Bloodshed.*

hail the aspiration for freedom for which the leading figures of the party were

persecuted and finally brought about Taiwanese democracy.

In video #10, a clip of the questioning of a DPP congresswoman on the police

brutality in their dealing with students' occupation of the cabinet building, the

congresswoman quoted a *Times Magazine* article of the violent treatment of students

as evocative of "…the 228 incident in 1949." The 228 incident is in fact, a symbolic

incident of conflicts between the "local" and "outsider" identities distinguishing the

DDP and the KMT. After the incident broke out, the "locals" protested against

government violence but were ruthlessly suppressed by the KMT "mainlanders". The

incident became the source of political mobilization for national identity and with

different ruling parties alternating between the KMT and the DPP, debates over

whether February 28th should be a national holiday for commemoration constantly

surface. The importance of the symbolic role of the 228 incident in Taiwan's identity

politics, can be testified by the apology provided to the victims and families of the

228 incident by former president Lee Teng-hui for political gain and Lee's emphasis

of a "local" Taiwanese national identity to acclaim public pride of Taiwan and the

identity of Taiwanese in contrast with not only the PRC communists but also the

KMT mainlanders for his 1996 re-election.[81]

[81] Bush, *Uncharted Strait*.

Besides the analogies made of KMT brutality to the martial law era and the 228

incident, the identities of being "Chinese" and "Taiwanese" were also at the core of

the conflicting ideologies and the source of the controversy of how the KMT

government dealt with the Cross-Straits Services and Trade Agreement (CSSTA).

Although the young generation growing up in a democracy has become more

pragmatic than those growing up during KMT's authoritarian rule and recognizes that

loving Taiwan does not equal to hating China[82], in the context of protecting Taiwanese

people's interests, the DPP's more skeptical approach to China seems to be much

more reassuring. The end of video #9 where the host, in order to contextualize the

Sunflower Movement introduced the relationship between Taiwan and China, portrays

the KMT as the preferred party China would like to do business with since "The KMT

has always favored reunification with China" (4:02).[83] Video #15 illustrated the

background and the reality of Sunflower Movement, in which Steve Tsang, Professor

of Chinese Studies at Nottingham University, mentioned the KMT as the party

pushing through the legislation despite much reservation from the public and

somebody China would "do business with" (2:42)[84] in his commentary on the

situation. Video #19, a student news report from students majoring in journalism

interviewed a law student from National Taiwan University about the grievance of the

[82] Ibid.

[83] China Uncensored, *Taiwan's Sunflower Student Revolution | China Uncensored*.

[84] Truthloader, *Students Occupy Taiwan's Parliamentary Chamber - Truthloader*.

protesters: "KMT (ruling party in TW) kept the Agreement on Trade in Services between China and Taiwan as a secret [and] broke the regulations [sic] (0:15).[85] Not only is there distrust constructed on the KMT as the preferred government China likes to do business with, but the ideological national identity of the KMT, one as a "mainlander" that is pro-unification is also discursively hinted at as helping the *other*, China, in taking advantage of Taiwan. Video #13 showed Belgians' support for Sunflower Movement, with Taiwanese students studying in Belgian filming words of encouragement to express solidarity with the protesters in the legislature. A Belgian supporter mentioned "Also, we are in an age where the big power like China with Taiwan, Russia and Ukraine are over exerting their will upon smaller countries, so we are supporting the people of Taiwan." (1:43).[86] Although the words of encouragement came from a Belgian but not a Taiwanese, it can be assumed that much of the understanding of the movement came from the Taiwanese students gathering in Brussels for the filming of support.

The historical events of the martial law era and the 228 incident, which become the source of identity cleavage as a Chinese and Taiwanese and frequently used for mobilization for political gain by the two political parties, underlie the identities of the protesters, on top of their civil identity as citizens of Taiwan. Although Bush's

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[85] 歐小歐, 【*What News Fails to Say, We Say It!* 】*report 3 The Truth Of Sun Flower Student Movement Peace•Rational*.

[86] SunsetVictoria, *A Message from Belgium to Taiwan* 比利時聲援臺灣.

categorization and analysis of political identifications with the blue (the KMT) and

the green (the DPP) into Deep Blue, Light Blue, Deep Green, and Light Green

showed that only the Deep Green population (25% according to Bush) bases their

identity on ethnicity and culture that asserts that they are in no way part of China

whereas the rest of the population may be more open to the idea that Taiwan is

"geographically and culturally a part of the Chinese nation," nationalism constructed

in the videos against the pro-China-unification KMT seems to reflect the nationalistic

sentiment that goes beyond civil nationalism as observed by Bush.[87] In the political

mobilization of national identity, the bounds of the *selves* understood by the KMT and

the DPP, the Dark Blue and Green and Light Blue and Green overlaps to different

extents and the two extremes, i.e. the Dark Blue and Dark Green, include the least

members of *selves* and most members of *others*, the criteria of which builds on

ethnicity, culture, and ideologies. Nationalism observed in the video clips from

Sunflower Movement treated the KMT as the *other* not only because of the

government's brutality but more fundamentally the pro-China-unification ideology.

The construction can be considered to lean towards the ideological spectrum of the

green camp although civic elements were widely adopted for claim making and the

sensitive issue of independence or unification, one that both the KMT and the DPP

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[87] Bush, *Uncharted Strait*.

avoid publicly stating for fear of losing political support and angering either the

electoral or China, was buried in the construction of the protesters' identity. This

observation is indication that, other than civic nationalism that triggered people to

protest against the government's inability to govern *for* the people, the element of

nationalism based on national identity as a Chinese (mainlander) and Taiwanese

(local) is essential in accounting in part for, if not all, the identity of the protesters of

Sunflower Movement. Similar to Euromaidan, the hybrid nationalism of both civic

and national nationalism, were observed. Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement,

sharing similarities in several respects, will be discussed together in the following

chapter.

Chapter5. National Identities in Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement

The identity framing of being Ukrainian and Taiwanese in Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement both carried its broadest meaning of the *selves* as a member of the countries. However, in the discursive construction of identity, it was obvious that the *selves* were defined against the *others*, both domestically and internationally. Both governments of Ukraine and Taiwan were considered to be the *inside others* that acted against their people's will to sign or not sign trade agreements because of the historical outside *others* that triggered the protests of Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement. The similarity of the two cases and countries: both cases began with the issue of trade agreements that triggered proclaimed civic movements, both were student-led, both were suppressed, and both finally led to institution change; both countries were democratic that held their first elections in the 90s and both were in the immediate neighborhood of the historical *others*, are prime empirical cases to be applied to Goodman's[88] proposed framework, to better inform the role of nationalism in social movements.

Goodman's[89] proposal to connect nationalism with social movements as a political process and examine the effects on ideologies, institutions, and interests will thus be used as the framework of discussion in this section. Under the discussion of

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[88] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."
[89] Ibid.

ideologies, the questions Polletta and Jasper[90] posed for collective identity to inform

social movement research will be used loosely to structure the discussion of identities

in the two cases. Since the analysis of the discourse of national identities revealed

mostly about how the identity was constructed, the discussion of the effects on

institutions and interests will be based on secondary research on the two movements

and relevant literature of political parties or democratization where national identities

play a huge role.

5.1.1 Nationalist Identities, Social Movements and Effects on Ideologies

Goodman's[91] conceptualization of national ideologies on social movements

pointed out national identities, institutions, and interests form an inseparable

interaction. However, he pointed out that only through a conscious ideological

struggle do people form national identities, which are then politicized for claims of

even larger divisions. Ideologies are by definition unstable and contested. The

dominant ideology of the ruling class is necessarily partial to the interests of some

over others, and the experience of inequality resides in daily forms. Groups of

different ideologies thus challenge the priorities of the national agenda and the

boundaries of what constitutes a political question. What do the two cases of

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[90] Polletta and Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements."
[91] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."

Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement, adopting one ideology over the other (being

Ukrainian and Taiwanese) on the surface at least, tell us about the contention with the

others? Who were the *others*? What are the political questions at debate here between

the *selves* and the *others?*

The examination of discursively constructed identity of the movements situated

in the context of the major identities of Ukraine and Taiwan helps capture the essence

of the collective identity and provides answers to the role of identity in Euromaidan

and Sunflower. To answer why actors gather for collective actions and the context for

their grievances, Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement both broke out because of the

trade deals to be not signed or not signed with the outside *other*, namely, the EU and

China. The analysis of the identity of the movements contextualized their grievances

in studies of national identities. Contrary to the claims of the movements themselves

and the first impression they may leave, the identity was constructed more in

nationalistic and political terms instead of economic. Both movements discursively

portrayed the governments as the *inside other* that had closer and worrying

relationships with *outside other*. The identity of Euromaidan, on top of being citizens

of Ukraine, accused the Yanukovych government of enslaving and beating the

Ukraine people for their private gains. The identity of Sunflower Movement was

constructed by even more harshly criticizing the KMT than Euromaidan did for the

Yanukovych government, for incidents that date back to the time between 1949-1987.

The identity against the *outside other* not only extended from the dissatisfaction with

the *inside other*—the governments—but also through directly calling Russia and

China out. Euromaidan condemned Russian invasion of Crimea by their discourse of

what they deem as a nation-state: Russian ethnicity does not mean Russian nationality.

In the framework of the international order of modern states, Euromaidan appealed to

the international community to impose economic sanctions against Russia. Sunflower

Movement, while not being invaded by China, included discourse tidbits of expert

commentaries on their legitimate doubts against the trade agreement with China. One

video (#13) where a Belgian national showed his support for Sunflower Movement

also explicitly stated the conceptualization of the protest as a reaction to the bully by

bigger countries of small countries, through which the *outside other* was clearly

identified and the malicious intention of the *outside other* was being reiterated in the

discourse.

Euromaidan also described their pro-European identity as civil and the opposite

end of the national identity as post-Soviet as backwards, which provided a reason for

the adoption of the pro-European identity over the post-Soviet one. Sunflower

Movement's description of the KMT brutality in 1949-1987 in video#1, appealed to

parents to tell their children what it was like 30 years ago and urged the audience to

protect democracy, in contrast with the authoritarian regime the KMT represented not

only during the white terror era but also in the context of Sunflower Movement.

Authoritarianism was implied to be uncivilized, and the framing of the aspiration of

and preservation of democracy demonstrated the superiority of the pro-democracy and

pro-Taiwanese independence sentiment. Undoubtedly, the role of violence in both

movements may have been the catalyst that prompted mass participation. However,

violence alone did not enable the construction of identity established in the

movements. The long-existing national identity divides and the history of Ukraine and

Taiwan, were the fuel and foundation that made such construction of the identity of

the movements possible.

The motivating force other than material incentives, for people to participate in

movements in the two movements, have been constructed as responsibilities of

citizens, Ukrainians and Taiwanese alike, in holding the governments accountable.

Although the two movements broke out due to trade agreements with the *outside*

others, perhaps because of the power of using government violence in framing the

governments as the *inside others* that were willing to beat the *selves* and act against

the *selves'* interests in favor of the *outside others*, the identity of suppressed citizens

against the national governments became the driving force of movement participation.

Both movements included standing claims of identity as citizens that acted because

the government wouldn't listen. In Euromaidan video#7, the Jewish girl speaking on behalf of her fellow classmates studying Hebrew said "It's a pity that it takes so long and that our government doesn't want to hear us." In Sunflower Movement video#9 lamented the government's lack of response and actions towards citizens' demand to postpone the signing of the CSSTA "Apparently, the government wasn't listening to them for some reason." Such framing of identity was more likely to strike the chords of people's hearts that trigger the pathos of *our* shared suffering because what happened to you may very likely happen to me since we are all members of the national community.[92]

Also, as government violence was mobilized to create the victimized citizens fighting against brutal governments in both movements in creating the broadest citizen identity that were constructed against the violent *inside others* and hostile *outside others*, the movement strategies used by both movements emphasized the lack of organization by political parties specifically the major opposition parties and nationalist parties. They emphasized the movements as student-led and the participants as voluntarily joining the movements to create the sense of universal appeals to democracy and human rights. In video#14 of Euromaidan titled *The Price of Democracy*, scenes of violent beatings and resistance by the innocent citizens were

[92] Brubaker, "In the Name of the Nation."

presented without any narration, and in video#10 of Sunflower Movement, the congresswoman questioning the head of the cabinet on the violent clearing of student protesters described students as unarmed and peaceful, in sharp contrast with the riot police with batons and shields. Despite the universal appeals of democracy and the stark contrast of the power of the government and student protesters, much of the suffering in the construction of the identity of the movements was again centered around the government as the *inside others* acting in favor of the *outside others*. The use of violence by the government thus, not only triggered the *otherness* but also limited the movement tactics of students to remain non-violent and peaceful.

The two movements thus protested against the government as the *inside others*, with the political question beginning from the signing or not signing trade agreements with the *outside others*. The contention evolved from the specified *outside others* to the *inside others*, especially after the governments violently repressed the protesters, exacerbating the otherness of the national governments. Considering the national governments as the *inside others*, creates the identity of the rest of the population as the *selves*, who may undergo the sufferings imposed by the *inside others*, regardless of where the individuals situate on the spectrum of the national identities. While the framing of such civic identities against the *inside others* could be easily identified, the discourse analyses of the movement videos revealed that the governments's ideologies

rooted in national identities on the other end of the spectrum of the competing

national identities: a post-Soviet and pro-China-unification identity, were highlighted

and associated with negative historical, political, and economic sentiments.. Not being

blatantly "nationalistic" in the sense of the competing nationalism, the ideologies of

the two movements may have appealed to those whose national identity, other than

the civic one, lies somewhere more in the center. Through discourse, the *otherness* of

the governments adopting identities aligned with the historical *others*, was

strengthened and prompted those whose national identities were unclear to take sides

with the national identity of a Ukrainian and Taiwanese in both the national and civic

sense.

5.2 Nationalist Identities, Social Movements and Effects on Institutions

In Goodman's[93] work connecting nationalism and social movement theories, he

eloquently pointed out the nature of the state's role in defining a national community

as a hegemonic conflict. Citing several modernist scholars such as Anderson and

Gellener, Goodman held that with state legitimacy becoming more populist, the

sovereign state is forced to be more pluralistic to create a unified concept of the

"nation." The outbreak of the two movements both directly or indirectly leading to

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[93] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."

institution change that came with regime change, exhibited the governments' failure

to create a unified national identity for the polar identities in the countries. However,

the two movements, although adopting a Ukrainian and Taiwanese identity, seemed

successful in creating an identity that found a middle ground for the competing

national identities in discourse while remaining nationalistic in nature as their

discourse revealed.

The most obvious effects on institutions in the two cases can be seen in the

change of governments when Yanukovych fled to Russia and an interim government

was formed which soon after signed the association agreement with the EU. The

Sunflower Movement happening in March 2014, propelled the independent candidate

Ko Wen-Je to run for Taipei mayor against the KMT candidate Lien Shen-Wen in

2015,[94] and likely influenced the landslide victory of the DPP in the 2016 presidential

election.

5.2.1 Ukraine

The identity of Euromaidan constructed against the Yanukovych government and

the portrayal of the pro-European identity as desirable to Ukrainians than the

post-Soviet one, finally led to the overthrow of the incumbent government headed by

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[94] "Beliefs More Important than Policies."

Yanukovych and the formation of the interim government. An impromptu presidential

election was held in May 2014, with Petro Poroshenko elected as the fifth president of

Ukraine.

It may appear that if Ukrainians are so clear about their national idea, their

political parties would evolve along the lines of national identities and propose

policies accordingly. However, the change in Ukraine's institutions is not

straightforward and at times appears inconsistent.[95] Although the discursive field of

public and political opinions and political engagement is much more unrestricted than

in Belarus and in Russia, the political parties are often used by rivals to lobby

particular interests and jeopardize the candidates of elections.[96] The election results,

while often showing a regional divide along the fault-line of the west and east, often

appear "inconsistent" as the elected parties for seats in the parliament and presidency,

fluctuate between the pro-European parties and pro-Russian parties. The definition of

what it means to be Ukrainians to the elites have thus been under constant debate with

the change of regimes.

The importance of a national identity has never been doubted since Ukraine's

independence. Not only do elites discursively construct national identities, but the

heritage of the Soviet history and further back, whether utilized by elite discourse or

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[95] White and Feklyunina, *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*.
[96] Ibid.

internalized through banal practices, complements a better picture of the

understanding of Ukraine national identity. The first president of Ukraine, Leonid

Makarovych Kravchuk, confirmed the need for a national idea that would unite

Ukraine but his conceptualization of the national idea was criticized by his

predecessor, Leonid Danylovych Kuchma, to be too ethnic-centric and lacked

consideration for economic issues, the issues which affect the street men and women

the most.[97] While Kravchuk placed the national component of the national identity

ahead of political, Kuchman adopted the political component ahead of national.

Kuchma led the quest of Ukrainian identity from a more ethnic-based one to a more

civic one, emphasizing that both the national and political/economic elements should

be incorporated into the new Ukrainian identity. However, in Kuchman's second term,

his attempt to consolidate the power of his party, again put the building of a unified

national identity at stake. Also, as identity is multi-dimensional and fluid with the

change of time, various factors are shown to affect Ukrainian citizens' identity. In a

poll (p.149) cited in Kuzio,[98] those under 30 years of age consider their identity as

related to their native land (not the former USSR nor Russia), those over 30 consider

language as the most important indicator, and those over 50 and 60 view national

traditions and religions as the most important indicators.

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[97] Kuzio, *Ukraine*.
[98] Ibid.

The fall of Viktor Yanukovych from Euromaidan took place after he fled Ukraine

to Russia. However, this was not his first fall; in fact, back in 2004 when he was

chosen by Kuchman as the predecessor after Kuchma started to pull of measures that

would help secure his power by clamping down political dissidents and holding a

referendum to weaken the power of the parliament. In the 2004 presidential election,

Yanukovych rigged the election against Viktor Yushchenko and sparked the Orange

Revolution. Before that the then president Kuchma himself was already steeped in

crisis as an accusation of him killing an opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze

triggered a protest on December 15th in Kyiv's Independence Square (Maidan) that

demanded a "Ukraine without Kuchma". Kuzio[99] pointed out that the scandal of

Kuchma created a framework of identity: the shared identity of sense of injustice and

atrocity committed by authorities to a powerless individual. Being the predecessor

chosen by Kuchma and with Yanukovych knowing that he was to lose to Yushchenko,

Yanukovych did everything he could to steal the presidency. The Orange Revolution

broke out in 2004 after Yanukovych announced his winning, which was outlandishly

won via foul means. The protest went on until the Supreme Court of Ukraine ordered

a re-vote for the president. This distrust in the government deepened and peaked as

the dissatisfaction against Kuchma and Yanukovych's attempt to increase their power

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[99] Kuzio, *Democratic Revolution in Ukraine*.

threatening the destiny of Ukraine as a democracy. However, several factors led to the

election of Yanukovych's winning of presidency in 2010. Yanukovych, however, was

again "impeached" in the form of social movement protest in Euromaidan in 2014.

The interim government formed after Yanukovych fled Ukraine was headed by

Oleksandr Turchynov until the election of president Petro Poroshenko in June 2014.

The interim government signed the association agreement with the EU in its short life

of February 2014 to June 2014. Also, the revival of Kuchma's a 2004 amendment of

Ukraine constitution to increase the power of the president and weaken the power of

the parliament, reinstated under the majority members of parliament from the Party of

Regions pending approval by president Yanukovych in 2014, also proved to be

unsuccessful with Yanukovych removed from office.

5.2.2 Taiwan

The KMT ruling since 1949 started the project of nation building. In the

globalized economy the world is moving towards, the KMT began political

liberalization and the open-up of interactions with China. The question of the degree

of economic integration with the historically constructed "hostile *other*" constantly

becomes clash points in political debates. Although between 1494 to 1987 if not later,

the KMT blatantly propagated hostility toward the communist China, those with the

pro-China-unification orientation of identification aligned with the KMT are in favor

of trade with the hostile *other*, the modern-day China. On the other hand, those with

the pro-independence orientation of identification aligned with the DPP remain

cautious about trade with China for fear that Taiwan would lose its autonomy.

Reasonable as the DPP's attitude may be, the DPP's economic policies have gradually

shifted towards the center and much less anti-China with China growing to be one of

the world's largest economies. Despite the young generations' increasing

self-identification as Taiwanese and not Chinese[100], when the issue of trade with

China appeared most critical during the financial crisis, the DPP lost in the

presidential campaign to the KMT. The shift of power back to the KMT in 2008

presidential election showed voters' preference to maintain the status quo with China

in the backdrop of the "radical" policies by the former DPP president that were

considered provocative to China and ran the risk of losing business opportunities.

While the fear of being economically integrated and even unified by China is

legitimate, scholars pointed out the myth of Taiwan's frequent economic engagement

with China as unaccountable by realism nor liberalism given its vulnerability.[101] Hard

numbers based on economic competitive advantage have driven the cooperation in the

direction of liberal markets, treating China as any other markets with the comparative

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[100] Liu, "Are We Family?"
[101] Chan, "Commerce between Rivals."

advantage of cheap labor. Many Taiwanese businessmen do business with and/or set up factories in China, and it is only natural for business to pursue its interests in the Chinese labor and domestic markets although how integrated the economy of Taiwan with China never ceases to spark political debates in the elections between the KMT and the DDP.

However, the Sunflower Movement may have pulled the break for the KMT government to curb its speed in economically integrating with China. The young generation of Taiwan wary of China's intention made claims that the passing of the authorization to conclude the agreement was undemocratic, which were confirmed by the following reports pointing out the marginal benefits Taiwan could reap. They emphasized the purpose of the movement not as anti-trade, but the anti-undemocratic practices of the passing of the agreement. That the government was moving too fast towards China without enough domestic support and with no solid statistics to back up the gain of the nation as a whole. along with government violence against the student protesters, finally led to the downfall of the KMT in the following elections.

The DPP, although having moved towards the center left for political support, has remained cautious about trade with China. While the DPP did not win the presidential election against the then KMT president, Ma Ying-Jiou, in 2012, the DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-Wen, not only continued the appeal of a Taiwanese

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identity which the young generations growing up in democracy generally identity

with, she also criticized the KMT government's unbalanced economic policies

benefiting only the elites. Not only was the Sunflower Movement, as publicly claimed

by the protesters, as attributable to the young generation's anger toward the lack of

checks and balances and the rapid speed the government had been moving toward

China, but also the distrust of the real economic benefits Taiwan can obtain through

the economic cooperation with China and who really benefited from such economic

cooperation.

After the outbreak of Sunflower Movement, the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-Wen

won a landslide victory in the 2016 presidential election. In one of her visions for

Taiwan, as a response to the Sunflower Movement taken up by the DPP, she made a

commitment to pass the enactment of Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act,

besides multilateral trade with other countries such as the intention to join the

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) led by the United States. In comparison, the KMT

candidate that lost to Tsai, Eric Chui, only proposed in his program that Taiwan has to

increase trade partnerships. Among the ones he specifically named, the TPP was one

but there the continuation of agreements with China under the Economic Cooperation

Framework Agreement, including the passing of the CSSTA, was highlighted.

Sunflower Movement and the following presidential election demonstrated how

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nationalism continues to play a role in domestic politics through the form of social

movements, through which protesters sought to maintain autonomy and unity as a

nation with the fear of over economic reliance, the desire to diversify, and the

promotion of the benefits of a nation above *others*.

5.2.3 Concluding Remarks

The change of regimes of the two movements, while influenced by many other

factors that go back in history and domestic political contexts, arose from the

governments' obvious attempts to destabilize the equilibrium of the two competing

national identities through moving too closer to what the protesters identified as the

others. The two movements adopting the framing of civic movements, while

maintaining nationalistic in nature, utilized a much more inconspicuous framing of

their national identities against the competing identities, by structuring the identity of

the *others* along the line of civic rights the governments were violating. In the mean

time, they created associations of the governments' undemocratic and actions with the

outside others, attempting to detract those with a post-Soviet national identity and a

pro-China-unification identity from the *outside others* after experiencing the brutal

and unfair treatments of the *inside others*. The struggle of whether to distance from

the *outside others*, as a member of the nation-state, a citizen, being unfairly treated by

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the *inside others*, may have contributed to the relatively successful faming of the

identities as Ukrainians and Taiwanese.

5.3 Nationalist Identities, Social Movements and Effects on Interests

In Goodman's[102] proposed framework, the government as an institution

naturally serves the dominant interests rather than all of its citizens. However, state

elites depend on civil societies for the resources they generate and channel them into

structures and policies for the state's hegemonic unity. However, the above-mentioned

two interests are very different in form and meaning. The interests of the dominant

kind, may not only originate from the political capital gained through discourse and

personal networks, but also the wealth to support political activities. The latter kind

from civil societies, on the other hand, emphasizes more on ideologies for political

mobilization.

In a world-system operating based on neo-liberal economic principles, the

governments are often held accountable for economic performance. Thus, the

governments may easily prioritize increasing economic growth to maintain its

legitimacy, not only to gain political resources but at the same time support from

oligarchs and the general public. This however, puts the governments in a dilemma,

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[102] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."

especially with competing national identities that are often associated with social

classes, where the parties play the cards of the core and peripheral and manipulate

wedges that arise from the struggles. Different economic policies benefiting different

groups can also trigger nationalist movements.

In the context of Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement, however, the discourse

of the national identities revealed little on national group conflicts, nor class conflicts.

While this is not to say all nationalist movements do not involve conflicts of interests

based on groups or class, such phenomenon was not directly observed in the

construction of the identities of the two movements. Several reasons may account for

the lack of discourse on interests to divide the *selves* and *others* in both cases.

First of all, both movements proclaim themselves as civic movements. While

their nationalist nature was unraveled in their discourse, in protesting against the

governments as the *inside others* and including the rest of the population as the *selves*,

the framing around economic interests that do not consider citizens as a whole, risk

dividing the identities of the movements needed to gain support for mobilization. This

can be seen from the brief mentioning of the real benefits of the CSSTA for Taiwan as

a mere economic growth of GDP of 0.0034 %,[103] and barely any reference to

economic inequalities in Euromaidan. Not much further mentioning of divides of

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[103] "經部報告：服貿 僅讓經濟成長 0.034%."

interests was mentioned along groups based on class or ethnicity for the two movements.

Secondly, economic policies which necessarily create winners and losers are deeply intertwined in the domestic political contexts of countries, and as Goodman pointed out social movements as political process bring political struggles to the fore. The economic policies in the two cases, fell under the overarching theme of domestic politics. For the two movements, the regime change basically changed the direction of the economic policies and there was no need to further divide the identity through appeals of class or national groups.

Thirdly, the differences of the contexts of domestic politics and the economic policies in each country have their unique landscapes that promote or inhibit mobilizing grievances of interests in nationalistic movements. In some states, there may be more entrenched interests in specific groups or class that forms the oligarch specific political parties are affiliated with. They use the resources provided by the oligarchs, money and network, to consolidate their power and legitimacy while also maintaining mass consent. Such affiliation, coupled with economic inequality, may easily be manipulated by social movement entrepreneurs to create the framework and discourse of identity. However, in the case of Ukraine, if economic inequality exists between the elites and the mass, the framing of identity around the imbalanced

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benefits of the oligarchs and the mass may not be necessarily effective. This is because oligarchs play a significant role in political participation in Ukraine, both the pro-Russian and pro-European parties rely on oligarchs to different extent.[104] Therefore, not intending to overthrow the nation-state, appealing to the inequalities between the oligarchs and the mass would undermine both the government and the opposition parties. As for the case of Taiwan, the power transfer from the DPP to the KMT in 2008 due to the radical anti-China gestures by former president Chen Shui-Bien, exemplified the citizens' fear of the loss of economic opportunities with China. The will of the Taiwanese people to maintain the status quo with China for economic prosperity, especially with Taiwan being an export-oriented country, was a "national" appeal, a desire that both the oligarchs and the mass pursued. Therefore, although CSSTA was a trade agreement and despite the necessary winners and losers born out of trade agreements, not much specific claims of economic inequality was observed in the framing of the identity of the Sunflower Movement.

5.4 Conclusion

The discussions of the current chapter reflect on the role of nationalism in social movements using the case of Ukraine and Taiwan's Euromaidan and Sunflwoer

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[104] Pleines, "Oligarchs and Politics in Ukraine."

Movement under Goodman's framework of embedding national identities in the

political process of ideologies, institutions, and interests born out of social movements.

While the study used the similar cases of Euromaidan and the Sunflower Movement

to advance the thesis of the abundant information nationalism provides to the studies

of social movements, it must be acknowledged that larger scale studies comparing

more social movements with nationalistic sentiments must be conducted to further the

understanding of the role of nationalism in social movement studies.

What the current study reveals about nationalistic sentiments in social

movements, is based on the two similar cases of Euromaidan and the Sunflower

Movement that had both internal (movement) and external (domestic politics and

geopolitical locations) similarities. Starting from the micro-level analysis of identities

constructed in the two movements, the current study contributed to the understanding

of the power of national identities being used as collective identities in social

movements. Several interesting findings were found of nationalism in social

movements in the respects of ideologies, institutions, and interests under Goodman's

framework.[105]

Firstly, although the two movements were both proclaimed as civic, their

identities were constructed around the *others*, both the *inside others* (the governments)

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[105] Goodman, "Nationalism as a Social Movement."

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and the *outside others* (Russia and China). While for those embracing a pro-Russian

and pro-China identity in Ukraine and Taiwan, the signing or not signing of trade

agreements may not be a political problem, for those with the opposite ideologies, this

problem must be addressed. In addressing what they viewed as important on the

governments' agenda, governments' violent response may have contributed to the

escalation of the movement. Targeting the government as the *inside others*, the two

movements created a much broader identity as a citizen as the overarching theme of

the identities of the movements, with the flesh of the national ideas structured around

one end of the competing national identities—a pro-European Ukrainian identity and

a pro-Taiwan independence identity. This may have appealed to not only those clearly

embracing the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Taiwan independence identities, but also those

identifying themselves as citizens of Ukraine and Taiwan that are subject to

government brutality, thereby expanding the base of people participating in the

movements from movement activists to the everyman.

Secondly, the reasons behind the movement outcome of the change of regimes

were much better informed with the examination of nationalism in the two

movements. Understanding the ideologies of the movements in nationalistic terms

provides contextualization of politics and economy of the two countries. Goodman[106]

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[106] Ibid.

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pointed out that government institutions are more vulnerable trying to achieve

plurality. The actions of the governments in the two cases, showed that the

governments' failure in maintaining plurality, i.e. blatantly favoring one group over

the other, coupled with violence, may have weakened the governments' support from

the group they favor, if not detracted those that originally identified with the

governments' ideologies. This may be because the identity the movements constructed,

the national identity as a citizen, was close to people's hearts. Witnessing how the

governments reacted to different voices of the citizens, the fear that one day they

could be as unfairly treated, prompted a broader range of people with different

national identities to participate in and support the movements.

Thirdly, both Euromaidan and the Sunflower Movements appealing to the civic

and implied national identities as pro-European and pro-Taiwan-independence, did

not show signs of nationalism being an aggregate group for specific interests that

were deprived in the two cases. Nationalism provides us with the background of why

what began with trade agreements did not really center around the inequality of

distribution of wealth along nation groups or class lines. The current study posited

that citizens of both countries understood the necessary continuation of trade

relationships with the *others* in the globalized world and the grievances against the

oligarchs, the class likely to benefit from trade agreements, would not have been

effective for the two cases. For Ukraine, because the involvement of oligarchs in both

the ruling and opposition parties, dividing along the lines of groups or class equally

harms the government and the opposition party that they hope would rule in

Yanukovych's stead. For Taiwan as an exporting country, both the oligarchs and the

mass desire to trade with China for its comparative advantage and huge domestic

market, as the domestic elections testified. Focusing on the civic sentiment and the

national identity framing the democracy-aspiring youth wary of procedural checks

and balances of national policies, would likely have enabled the Sunflower Movement

to cater to a larger base of supporters, than mobilizing their identity around

inequalities.

The above findings of Euromaidan and Sunflower Movement under Goodman's

framework,[107] shed light on the power of examining national identities in social

movements. Nationalistic sentiments and competing identities provided much more

historic, political and economic backgrounds that explained how the government

came to be viewed as the *inside others* in the two movements that were violently

suppressed by the governments. The peculiarity of nationalist movements in the form

of civic movements also showed that nationalism should be further studied in the

context of social movements.

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[107] Ibid.

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Through the contextualization of the competing ideologies and what the

government embodied in the two movements, social movement scholars could make

sense of why grievances triggered by trade agreements were not expressed along lines

of inequality (under the discussion of interests), and why, in countries with two major

claims of national identities, social movements could break out because of the

partiality of one of the two national identities adopted by the government. The

nationalism and framing of the two cases also shed light on the conceptualization of

the identities the protesters adopted against the "other" end of their national identities,

which they project as that of their governments' and how the "other" identity came to

be viewed as negative through mirroring of the grievance of the *inside others* with the

outside others.

The political opportunities the two movements took advantage of, when

examined using the lens of nationalism, also garnered much richer background that

shaped why the incumbent regimes exposed openings for the grievances to expand for

mass mobilization, invoking past events related to the political parties and/or

historical incidents. Although both nationalistic movements must be understood in

their domestic historical, economic, and political backgrounds, given a certain similar

conditions, it was found that the two countries with two competing national identities

exhibited a preference to frame their identity in civic terms. They also both included

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the *inside* and *outside others*, paralleling their national governments to Russia and

China. The major opposition party of the two countries adopting the opposite end of

the national identity to the ruling party's both replaced the ruling party, and new

governments addressed the grievances of the protesters surrounding the trade

agreements. Although the grievances were triggered by trade agreements, economic

inequality was not mobilized for the support of the movements given the domestic

political landscape. It is posited that with countries of similar conditions with two

competing national identities and whose domestic politics embody either ends,

nationalist movements are likely to frame their identities following the same patterns

of the findings of the current study. Countries with different nationalism profiles,

where national groups are more diverse and where domestic politics do not center

around national identities, may demonstrate different patterns, and must be studied in

the context of social movement studies, for more patterns to be identified and

recognized.

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