Closing Society through Securitization: Hungary's Populist-Illiberal response during the European Migrant Crisis of 2015

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Abstract:

Since 2014, European Union member and non-member states have faced a large-scale influx of refugees/migrants from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, resulting in a European-wide crisis. Hungary, a member of the European Union since 2004, has been particularly challenged by the EU’s philosophy of multicultural inclusivity. Over the last few years, Hungary has become one of the leading Eurosceptic member-states, challenging the EU structure in relation to migration policy. Under the Fidesz administration, Hungary has proudly led the political discussion in constructing barriers to preventing migrants and refugees from entering Fortress Europe. Hungarian history is filled with narratives of a desire to escape the past; however, instead of turning towards understanding, Budapest has sought a discursive path mired in Eurosceptic rhetoric and securitization rhetoric, which has caused great tension and disharmony within the EU. Utilizing the qualitative method of Critical Discourse Analysis’s Historical-Discourse Approach combined with the Constructivist lens, with regards to societal and political Securitization theory to highlight the impact of 2015 Migration Crisis and the October 2016 Referendum in relation to Hungary’s “securitization” of the political sector in regards to migration policy and it’s impact of Hungary’s tedious relationship with Brussels. Furthermore will reveal the ongoing trend of the Fidesz government’s numerus attempts to securitize and “close” the social sector. In using critical discourse analysis, this will allow for a study of official discourse from political speeches and semi-official media statements. It will also look at the unofficial everyday discourses (i.e. political posters) that are expected to reveal how Hungary has masked it “power consolidation” agenda via securitization of the Migration in 2015 and the follow up even of the October Referendum in 2016. Through securitization discourse it will show the (i) politicizing of the Migrant Crisis for political interests, (ii) the process of securitizing and it’s extent in both the social and political sector in Hungary, (iii) the stigmatization of migrants through the legal criminalization of migration.

The results of the study have revealed that Hungary during the Migration Crisis had a clear securitization of Migration and of the political sector given that all the theoretical criterion NT only had been fulfilled in both periods of the study but “overlapped” into the societal sector. However, it in in the social sector where the Hungary failed on both occasions to completely securitize, due to a “small” but effective opposition movement, against Fidesz’s attempt to obtain a single ethnic national identity, of “white-Christians” who is adamantly opposed to EU multiculturalism. Today Hungary still remains politically securitized in a sense that one party dominates and has near-full control over both social and legal institutions, which has left the societal sector vulnerable given the “overlap” between both sectors, especially in relation to NGOs and Civil Society in Hungary; as seen by Lex-CEU and the Civil Organizations Law. Both pieces of legislation posed by the Fidesz government would make it impossible for NGOs or academic institution to operate, thus completing societal securitization and creating a “closed society.”

Keywords: Migration Crisis 2015, October Referendum, Quota, Securitization, Open Society, Nationalism
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Since 2014, EU member and non-member states have faced a large-scale influx of individuals from Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, resulting in an ongoing Migrant crisis. Hungary, a member of the European Union, has been particularly challenged by the competing narratives regarding multicultural inclusivity, since their accession into the European Union in 2004. Simultaneously, Hungary has become one of the leading Eurosceptic member states challenging the EU structure in relation to Migration and Asylum Policy. Under Victor Orbán’s administration Hungary has “proudly” led the political discussion in constructing barriers to preventing migrants and “Refugees from entering “Fortress Europe.” Hungarian history is filled with narratives of a desire to escape the past; however, instead of turning towards understanding, Orbán’s government has sought a discursive path that is filled with Eurosceptic and securitization rhetoric which has caused great tension and ‘disunion’ within the EU.

Utilizing the qualitative methods of Critical Discourse Analysis this thesis will highlight the embedded nationalist rhetoric behind Orbán’s speeches and how Hungary’s securitization of Immigration and Migration policy during the crisis has led to frayed relations with Brussels. This Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) will focus on two distinct periods of dialectics (i) the erection of the wall on the Hungarian-Serbian border (September- November 2015) and (ii) the post-Crisis rhetoric in relation to the October “Quota Referendum” in 2016 (October 2016).

There have been several studies conducted on the Migration Crisis of 2015 itself, but few have focuses on the “dialectic aspects” of the Crisis through the lens of Securitization Theory

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1 In reference to EU Directive 2011/51
and how Nationalism plays a large role in the political narrative of the Crisis itself; especially in the Hungarian context. This study will not only contextualize the Hungarian case as the initial challengers to the legal aspects of migration norms, but to highlight how Hungarian politicians have capitalized on Migrant suffering to promote Eurosceptic/nationalist agendas; while retaining certain EU status privileges and legal framework. Furthermore, this thesis will also pinpoint the policy gaps in Dublin III and the reveal how Hungary has “masked” their blatant disregard EU law and human rights abuses, under the guise of “Euroscepticism.” However, to prove this conjecture, one must ask the following research questions: What role has the 2015 Migration Crisis in the securitization of Hungary? And to what extent has this securitization taken place and its justification? Furthermore, how has the securitization and national discourse affected Hungary’s relationship with Brussels?

Chapter 2: Literature Review & Theoretical Framework

To answer these questions, one must review all the literature on this contentious topic. The topic is contentious given the complex nature of the local, national, and supra-national elements of the context and all the intertwining relationships between actors. To not conflate or to overwhelm the reader with the numerous statistical and political information on this specific topic of the 2015 Migration Crisis, this study will specifically focus on the Hungarian context and the future of “open society” in Hungary. The main goal of this chapter is also to highlight the gaps in the literature, in spite of the “interdisciplinary” approaches or nature of the literature pertaining to this topic. Therefore, this chapter is designed and organized to help categorize the most relevant literature pertaining to the thematic theoretical, conceptual, and literature that will provide the socio-political context necessary to understand and answer the specific research question. This chapter will be broken down in three key sub-sections of literature: Thematic (i.e. Hungary specific studies), Interdisciplinary, Conceptual to illustrate specifics of the Hungarian
context within the “macro” European political structure. For Hungary’s reaction to the Migration Crisis of 2015 was “highly” politicized both on the international and domestic level, as Hungarian Journalist Gabriella Valaczky’s article in one of Hungary’s top social magazines illustrate.

**Thematic Literature: The Hungarian Context**

Valaczky’s article appeared in *Ora 168 Magazine*, where she tried to explain the rationale behind the “Everyday Xenophobia of Migrants.” In her article, she describes how the FIDESZ government’s poster campaign has “professionally feed into prejudices” that all migrants are “dangerous and criminal” for they only seek to be violent” and that Brussels will force Hungary to accept these criminals. However, Valaczky rejects this notion and asserts that this is the typical nationalist behavior that is tied to deep rooted prejudice in Hungary; which can be explained by Group Focused Enmity Theory. In the Hungarian case, the stranger is not just the Migrant but Brussels. FIDESZ has successfully used the crisis to construct the “internal enemy” (i.e. the migrants) and the “external enemy” which of course would be Brussels, due to the “imposed quota directives.” It is this mentality that is genuinely disturbing to Hungarians for this pattern of “scapegoating” has been seen before in the past with Jews and Roma; and has done nothing to improve daily life in Hungary.

Despite this fact most people in Hungary believe it only validates the academic studies that state that Hungarians have a “tradition of xenophobia” and FIDESZ has only capitalized on these phenomena and have been able to remain in power by promoting this narrative of “nationalism and victimhood.” While Valaczky is wise in her rejection and analysis of the political situation other scholars do not have such a bleak outlook on the situation, for FIDESZ may have the political

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
power, but they have not been able to convince the entire Hungarian public, as Dr. Szalai illustrates.

Dr. Szalai of has taken a different view from Valaczky. In his study on the “Securitizing Migration” in Contemporary Hungary, he asserts that FIDESZ may have been able to manipulate the media, and assert control over the borders, but they have not manipulated Hungarian civil society. Szalai utilizes Balzacq’s “Securitization of Political Agency” theory to explain the current tensions that exist in Hungarian society since the Migrant Crisis. Balzacq’s theory asserts that Securitization can be defined as “rhetorical structure” in how speech is presented with the promotion of an imminent threat; which FIDESZ has masterfully used in the case of Hungary. Hungary is one of “core” transit states along the Balkan Route, which has encountered large waves of migration. But, what makes this migration different is the “type” of migrants that have come through (Image1).

Hungary has dealt with migrants before, but they were mostly non-African or Middle Eastern migrants. Given his fact it not a shock that many Hungarians had bought into the government media propaganda about the migrants becoming a security threat. According to Balzacq’s theory, Securitization occurs when three branches, the government, judiciary, and media work together to create a myth that perpetuates an environment of fear, which will justify their grasp of power. The most important branch is the media, for it is the media that acts as the agent of this myth and if this branch does not cooperate with the other two branches the myth fails to affect the consciousness of the people via public discourse. Each of these branches reinforce the


other, for the media is the tool of the securitization by distributing the myth whilst the judicial and the government branch act as the policy makers that politically reinforce the myth. The only issues is that the success of the myth is heavily dependent on the level of mobilization through grassroots movements - this is where the FIDESZ has partially failed in the Hungarian case.

Now while FIDESZ has the complete control of media and political power it does not have control over civil society. It is true that FIDESZ has been able to create the “myth” through the media and has been able to erect a fence between Hungary and Serbia to keep migrants out. However, the fence has only acted as an “instrument” as well as a” symbol” of securitization. Another element that FIDESZ has successfully manipulated is that of the public discourse, where they have been able to combine the overlapping axes of cultural (islamophobia) and economic (loss of jobs) fear that have culminated in the large pushback against EU multiculturalism; and in the post 9/11 context this means focusing on the fear of Islamic terrorism. What is most uniquely clever about this discourse is that it also highlights the issue over national identity and how Hungary has always been at its base a Eurosceptic.7 For Hungary is willing to have the economic benefits of the EU but has done everything to highlight the failure of multiculturalism in Europe, especially after the Charlie Hebo attacks; which acted as justification for many to not allow Muslims into Europe.8 This sentiment is based on the rational that certain migrants have no intention integrate and the EU has failed in forcing them to integrate; which makes them more prone to terrorists because they reject European culture. Unfortunately, such events help cement the latent ethno-nationalism espoused by FIDESZ and plays into their demonization of Islamic migrants.

7 Péter Balázs, Director, CEU Centre for European Neighbourhood Studies, “From ‘Crisis’ to Challenges of Integration: The Current State of the Balkan Migration Route.”
8 Szalai and G.Hobl, “Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary.”
Not only have migrants been security threats or “future terrorists” but FIDESZ has also added another layer of demonization through securitization by reminding the public that migrants are “criminals” for crossing certain borders “illegally”. Therefore, according to the government, it is essential for security to cut off any government benefits to said criminals, for by their actions, they have challenged the sovereignty of the state. Given such behavior, it is not only necessary within the government’s perspective, but its Hungary’s responsibility to keep out migrants for the EU’s domestic security. In Szalai’s point of view, this has been the more convincing arguments from FIDESZ, since majority of Europe is concerned about her borders and the economic ramifications of a large influx of migrants, given the recent state of the EU’s economy. It this specific argument that lead to the blurring of lines between the economic Migrant versus the “Refugee or Asylum seeker” who has the legal right to migrate and seek protection; which has only intensified after the recent terror attacks. Thus, making it next to impossible for actual Refugees to access the resources they need to survive.910

Kallius, Montescu and Rajaram’s Ethnography: Imobilizing mobility- Border Ethnography, Illiberal Democracy & the Politics of the Refugee Crisis in Hungary piece provides readers an insight as to what happened “on the ground” during the height of the Migration Crisis in the summer of 2015 in Hungary. This study displayed that coalitions were created out “necessity” since the Hungarian government “deliberately” or “intentionally” neglected Refugee needs. Instead, the government securitized the political, but not the societal sector during the Crisis. The Securitization process was very visible due to how the police treated Refugees alongside the volunteer and activist groups who provided humanitarian aid and transit information

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9 Péter Balázs, Director, CEU Centre for European Neighbourhood Studies, “From ‘Crisis’ to Challenges of Integration: The Current State of the Balkan Migration Route.”
10 Szalai and G. Hobl, “Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary.”
to Refugees. This tension resulted in several protests at both Keleti Pályaudvar and at the border. To which, played into the hands of the Hungarian government who were determined “demonize” migrants as a “threat” as Dr. Gabor and Messing’s media study of: Media Coverage of the “Migrant Crisis” in the Austrian and Hungarian Media study reveals.

Majority of scholars have covered the socio-political angle of the Migrant Crisis and looking at the relationship between all the “obvious” actors involved: political leaders, EU Commissions, relevant EU institutions and the Refugees themselves. However there are very few academic sources that take into account the “passive” actors that have played a crucial role in how the public “frames and perceives” the Migrant Crisis, the media. As Buzan and Ellians have highlighted the media and Far-Right populists have “symbiotic” relationship. The media gets higher ratings with the outrageousness of Far-Right actor’s comments and actions and the Far-Right parties get the media coverage alongside filling their “resource gap” in order to gain coverage for elections.

Using Critical Discourse Analysis the authors have found that while the underlying message from the media was in favor of the government action the Austrian media did not cover “government actions” against/towards the migrants as ‘heavily handedly’ as the Hungarian media had done which (i) displayed more images of the Hungarian government’s actions towards the Refugees alongside their reactions (only when violent), (ii) Hungarian media did not portray volunteer in an ‘empathetic; light as the Austrian media had done, and (iii) the Hungarian media focused more on the “human aspect” of the story not the ‘government’s responsibility in causing

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13 Gap in terms of financial support and organizational support (see Ellinas)
the current situation.\textsuperscript{14} The Austrian media made it clear who was to blame for the crisis alongside which EU policies were ‘impossible’ to implement. Each of these small patterns in media coverage indicate the type of narrative each media outlet or governments were trying to espouse during the crisis. The only time that both media country’s media sources differed was in September when the focus in Austria focused on resettlement of Refugees versus Hungary which continued to contribute to “moral panic” by covering all stories related the “massive waves” of migrants and their criminality of illegally crossing borders, and claiming that this event was not just a crisis but an “epidemic.”\textsuperscript{15}

In the specific case of Hungary Domík Heji asserts that Hungary’s actions during the crisis were not only hypocritical, but were based off fear based on the historical past of Hungary. Heji’s piece highlights the cultural-political dimensions of the Refugee Crisis in the Hungarian context. The author claims that the main reason for Hungary’s opposition is due to the internal divisions within the country which during the crisis have become externalized, especially the need for cultural homogeneity in Hungary.\textsuperscript{16} Heji asserts that Orbán’s use of Huntington’s \textit{Clash of Civilizations} with Islam has acted as a “moral” justification of Hungary’s rejection of migrants. Religious and cultural homogeneity has been a crucial state building element in Hungarian history which is why Orbán has invoked such rhetoric, to create the moral panic and to revitalize the Hungarian collective memory about the 16\textsuperscript{th} century Ottoman invasions of Europe.\textsuperscript{17} Which most Europeans of the region share a common fear, but the irony is that Hungary herself was in similar situation like those of Syria, Afghanistan, and other conflict regions in recent history. What Orbán

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
has neglected to mention in his “national narrative discourse” in the media was his own recent history, the events of 1956.

Orbán’s Islamophobic rhetoric has struck a chord not just with Hungarians but many other “ethnically homogenous states” in the region like Slovakia and Poland; who have filed legal suit against the EU Commission over the Refugee quotas. Under normal circumstances this rhetoric would not have settled well in Europe; however, several member state leaders have supported if not applauded Orbán’s positions for “He said what we all were thinking.” Which has made Hungary as a “spoiler” to the Europeanization-Integration process, thus placing the two actors on a crash course; which has culminated in the 2016 Referendum on the EU’s Migration policies. The Referendum was a draw for both sides, for the only 12.5% participated and over 18% of those ballots were spoiled, which displays there are deep divisions within Hungary on this issue, but there is an overall Eurosceptic attitude in Hungary. Heji asserts that the real concern with Hungarians is more about the EU’s lack of coherent policy and how they have not implemented it fully or ad hoc. One would think that such recent history would and could not be forgotten so easily. Yet it seems, that such history is only used when convenient, as Korkut illustrates.

Korkut focuses on one issue that has been hinted at in several pieces of literature in relation to the Migrant Crisis of 2015, especially in relation to Hungary. This being how Hungary perceives foreigners in comparison to Turkey. The comparison was made on the basis that both countries are “geopolitical transit zones.” In both cases the author highlights the history of each state in relation to immigration policies and reveals that Hungary and Turkey have a similar distain or aversion of “foreignness or foreigners” in spite of low immigration rates to these given states.

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18 Ibid.
Korkut explains this trend by asserting that it is “political parties” that frame the policies and the narratives, which helps promote and socially embed the aversion to “foreigners or foreignness” in both countries.20

Dr. Liz Fekete in Hungary: Power, Punishment and the ‘Christian Ideal’ assert that the issue of national identity and the solidification of a specific ethnic identity is not a new strategy or phenomena in Hungary. She asserts that FIDESZ has always had the “identity agenda” since its inception.21 National sovereignty and identity is what FIDESZ and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán “cling” to ensure their political legitimacy and power. Dr. Fekete argues that each of these nationalist strategies or action come down to the personal agenda of one charismatic person, Viktor Orbán himself and his religious views on the “Christian Ideal.” The programs instituted under his rule from the Public Works sector to the vouchers have all been tied to a deeply seated corrupt administration which has gained the popularity of the religious right, including the anti-Semitic party of Jobbik.22 Orbán’s balancing act between his party and Jobbik since 2010 has resulted in much of the erosion of free media in Hungary and to the detriment of an “open society.”

Dr. Fekete argues that what Orbán means by “traditional values” is really Orbán’s own political agenda which is moral-political mix of the anti-Semitism of the inter-war period Hungary under Horthy in what Bálint Nagy calls a “Post-Communist Mafia State.”23,24 It is under this irredentist system in which Migrants and Refugees have been demonized and abused during the 2015 Migrant Crisis only because of one man’s ideological belief of what Hungary

20 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
should be a “Christian-white illiberal democracy” outside the EU sphere and her norms, which has been Orbán’s game all along; as seen by the treatment of the “poor, Roma and Jewish” minorities in his country since his election. Very little had changed by 2015 and it is no surprise to many Hungarian as to why their government had erected fences. Orbán sees Hungary only for White-Christians and refuses to adhere to a “politically correct society.”

**The Interdisciplinary Approach: International Relations (IR), Sociology(SOC), and Social Psychology (SP)**

The chaos of the Migration Crisis of 2015 was so poorly managed and politicized that it had stirred enough “discontent” among EU member states that the crisis itself has been discussed and analyzed from several different “entry points” and disciplines. One of the main entry points within the group of literature is that of International Relations and of Security Studies. Since 2001, numerous governments have changed their perspectives on the role of security. According to Barry Buzan, Securitization is most pervasive in the “political sector” and the “societal sector”. Buzan defines the Securitization of the political sector as a government’s goal to obtain or reify sovereignty through state ideology. Furthermore, he asserts that sovereignty can be threatened by existential threats that question legitimacy or governing authority - including supranational actors. Such actors, like Brussels, have gained an expanded role of a “supra-state”.

In the case of the EU, this can include member states that could undo the “integration process.”

Securitization theory emerges from the field of International Relations, which has traditionally focused on “Security/Strategical Studies.” However, Buzan claims that this is a “too narrow” of a field and that securitization can occur in other forms and other areas, outside the “military perspective in relation to the issue of “security complexes.” Security complexes has been defined as: “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked, that their

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national security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”

Moving from the “Classical Security Complex Theories (CSCT),” Buzan asserts that the “security complexes” can also apply not just to states or regional actors but to units within a state, such as governments, firms, cooperation’s etc. (Buzan 13-16). For, these internal actors can also display similar behaviors/traits and security complexes as states do. When looking at security complexes within states one must look at the structure and Buzan asserts that there are four keys “broad structures” that can indicate or form a security complex such as: maintenance of the status quo, internal transformation, external transformation and overlay. In CSCT, this would mean the changing or state borders, but in this case the new security paradigm relates to societal and institutional changes. These specific factors Buzan labels as “facilitating conditions” which highlight the cause-effect relationship of securitization and what issue is being securitized. Now these factors can be on the local or state level. After all, by Buzan’s definition Securitization (ST) is nothing more than hyper-politicizing a specific topic; it is the process of securitization that highlights the contentious issues within societies, due to the fact that specific issues become securitized.

In order to understand ST one must look at the phases of securitization and its process within a specific sector to find the true “security threat” which Buzan labels as the “existential threat.” The question remains is who defines and what defines as an existential threat? This can be best answered by which sector the securitization process emerges and how the actors within the sector frame the “security threat.” There are two key complexes that Buzan highlights that have become securitized in recent history is that of societal sector and the political sector. In the societal sector

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26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.
ST is always tied to the issue of “identity” or national security on an issue that the state has either failed to solve or presents a threat the “community” and its culture. The most common issues that are or have been securitized is that of: Migration, Horizontal competition (internal minorities), and vertical competition (i.e. secessionist claims or external threats). The biggest flaw in defining securitizing is that of definitions within this sector are normally vague and “socially constructed” by the actors themselves or their perceptions of the threat. Another weakness in securitizing the social sector is the possible reactions taken by the people which can manifests itself in two ways: the community can carry out the acts itself or the government/state can carry it out, which is normally an overflow from the securitization of another sector (i.e. economic, military, or political).

As in the societal sector, ST can occur within the political sector. In the political sector securitization normally implies that the main goal of a government or state is to maintain “organizational” or “social orders.” In political terms the issues of “legitimacy” and “sovereignty” are the root issues. ST occurs when there an “existential threat” emerges or specific “a referent object is a largescale collective identity that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions is “pervasive” or “heretical.” Therefore, societies have a burden establishing political boundaries that differentiate existential threats, thus causing the dominant ideology or nationalist agenda that places the collective identity as a threat to the state. Such threats are constructed through political rhetoric and speeches. To properly identify and understand securitization, Buzan lists several definitional aspects of securitization and their relevance:

- **Securitization** - as a process where a state actor transforms an issue into an existential threat to a referent object, where the securitized threat becomes the justification and legitimization for the mobilization of emergency measures (breaking rules) by the state or
Securitization becomes an “extreme version of politicization of specific referent object that is constructed to pose an “existential threat” to a state’s survival. A successful securitized threat receives disproportionate amounts of attention and resources compared to non-securitized/civilian issues. The process is only deemed successful if the society or people support the securitization of all four criterion: establishing an existential threat, emergency action, and the effects of these actions on internal relations of the community and “breaking democratic rules. The process can also be institutionalized or ad hoc applied\textsuperscript{28}.

- **Referent objects** - an object (or ideal) that is being threatened and needs to be protected
- **Existential threat** - an object (or ideal) that has been identified as potentially harmful
- **Securitizing actor** - actors who securitize issues by declaring something-a referent object-existentially threatened
- **Functional Actor** - actors who affect dynamics of a sector without being the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security.
- **Politicization** - receives disproportionate amounts of attention and resources compared to civilian or non-political issues; the issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme superiority
- **An Audience** - the target of the securitization act that needs to be persuaded and accept the issue as a security threat.
- **Societal security** - society is about community identity; societal security is about large, self-sustaining identity groups
- **Securitizing Move** - A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to referent object does not by itself create securitization; but the issue is

One of the main concepts of Securitization is that of the securitizing move\textsuperscript{29}” which is what “referent object” is framed as the “existential threat.” An actor’s effectiveness is based off the specific discourse of securitization. For securitization is not just reliant on specific actors, it is dependent upon the society accepting the security discourses, because ST is a “self-referential

\textsuperscript{28} Ibtd.
\textsuperscript{29} In language Theory it as also called a “speech act”
process” for there needs to be a substantial existential threat present. This is what makes studying ST interesting for it overlaps in sectors easily and has specific no indicators for it can be studied directly by assessing the “existential threat” itself and the success of the process. Buzan does highlight three components (steps) that can indicate a successful securitization process: establishing an existential threat, emergency action, and the effects of these actions on internal relations of the community and “breaking democratic rules.”

The main challenge identifying securitization especially when justify these threats to sovereignty and to nationhood, especially liberal democracies where there is rule of law; this appears to have been the biggest challenge for EU member states, such as Hungary since the 2015 Migration Crisis. Several academics and researchers have covered the subject, but merely through the lens of “macro” European Public Policy issues not the specific issues that are unique to Hungry. However, a few legal academics have pointed out that Hungary’s governmental actions during the crisis hint a ‘larger’ regional policy problem as Carrera’s policy brief explains.

In December 2015, European Policy Analyst Dr. Carrera and his team of researchers assessed the EU Migration Policy Initiatives and Directives as taken in the immediate aftermath of the 2015-2016 Migration Crisis. Carrera’s main criticism in his policy paper focuses around the “social embeddedness” of the Dublin III system of “burden sharing” which in reality is “pushing back” migrants to be dealt with on the EEA countries (i.e. Serbia, Macedonia, Albania) alongside the “transit countries” that are within the EU (i.e. Italy, Greece, Croatia and Hungary).

While the EU President Junker maybe inclined to promote the and welfare of Migrants many member states have grumbled at the “fiscal” burden of providing temporary aide in accordance with EU Directive

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2013/33 in conjunction with ‘Reception policies’ according to the 1952 Refugee Convention and Dublin III. One of the few improvements was that of the “collective” coast guard service, to prevent further drownings in the Mediterranean. However, this initiative failed due to the lack of the institutional capacity from EU “hot spots.” Furthermore, some EU member states like Hungary have proven unwilling to legally adhere to EU law or comply to the “bare minimum” of EU Dublin Regulations and Human Rights Law that are related to European Common Asylum System (CEAS); which has only increased in EU states like Czech Republic and Slovakia in the wake of the 13 November Paris attacks.

Dr. Greenhill’s piece approached this issue in a dualist manner using IR theory and public policy analysis. She assessed the unilateral agreements that exposed the internal issues of EU Migration Policy and how certain member states have “deviated” from EU norms and integration. Some claim that is based off the homogeneity of the country or its historical roots, but Greenhill asserts that these “suspected causes” are only ‘surface issues.’ Dr. Greenhill’s main argument is that the Migration Crisis was chaotic on a number levels not just because of the vagueness of Dublin III protocol, but because of ‘national actors’ that would politically gain from “weaponizing migration” and cites her previous work on “Coercive Engineered Migration (CEM)” in which leaders deliberately create or manipulate “cross border population movements” in order to induce or receive political or economic concession from “target countries.” These actors act as agent provocateurs that do not directly cause the migration, but accommodate or exploit the emergency humanitarian conditions. Such actors can also offer to alleviate humanitarian

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32 Italy and Greece
33 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
emergencies if they receive a mutual benefit; if not they seek to *punish* the target states. This is what IR theorists call ‘coercion by punishment’ where the specific actors use migration to agitate the domestic peace of target states to achieve their goals.

Internal politics and how the EU “burden sharing systems” which has provoked a great deal of dissent among member states. One of the biggest hurdles for Tusk was getting member states especially Hungary and the Visegrad countries to implement Dublin III regulation in relation to EU Common Asylum System (CAS) and the Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC). Hungary has refused to implement this during the Crisis and has used EU’s 638 billion Euros to build “illegal fences” across their borders between Croatia (another EU member state) and Serbia. Dr. Greenhill asserts it was the EU’s lack of action that emboldened other EU member states to question the directive, on the legal basis that the directive violates national sovereignty. Furthermore, Dr. Greenhill also mentions the major conflation of Refugees, Muslims and terrorism.36 It is the political discourse of Hungarian President Viktor Orbán’s “invading armies” rhetoric that has mobilized the Far Right within the EU; which caused more internal discord among member states and Brussels. For with their rhetoric it was clear that such political actors do not see Refugees as humans but as Islamic terrorists and the EU elite have done little to “delink” the two.37 The question remains why is Hungary and Europe in general prone to such hatred of Muslims or outsiders?

One of the few academics has asked such questions about the crisis. One such academic is Dr. Antal Örkény, a Hungarian Sociologist who conducted a study called the *Social Representation of Strangers and Attitudes towards Immigrants in Europe*. While this study was conducted in 2008, prior to the Migrant crisis it provides a forecast as to why the European

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36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
Community had the reaction it did. In his study, Örkény asks, does the protection of the borders of the EU, through proportionate acceptance, and the sharing of resources provide insight to the comprehensive humanitarian aid of Refugees? If so, why is there such discord between Member States? In his study, Dr. Örkény refers to Alfred Schultz’s story of the Stranger and how Europe has treated strangers in conjunction with the Theory of Group Focused Enmity Syndrome (GFES); which is defined as:

"Stronger groups devaluing and discriminating weaker groups is a common phenomenon in society, which derives from the system-level ideology of cultural differences. The declared aim of this attitude is to maintain the subordinate and superior relationships between the different groups." 38

According to Örkény, it was not a question of borders but a question on how successful European integration has been and how it relates to the issue of xenophobia and national identification in Europe. The two elements are intertwined and have revealed the deep seated prejudices of the European Community, in relation to how they see the stranger. In his study, Örkény utilizes Group Focused Enmity Theory to analyze certain EU member-states, their levels of xenophobia, and how it relates to prejudice. However, operationalizing xenophobia is rather difficult given the cultural nuances that it manifests in specific cases, so the study utilizes the following definitions of xenophobia:

- *It can be the typical characteristics of the personality, as fear of something different, fear of strangeness or of other groups.*
- *It may be sociologically determined, such as protecting one’s status, dissatisfaction, motif of interest or sticking to the advantages of the welfare system (welfare chauvinism).*
- *Finally, it may be a culturally determined ideological phenomenon, such as verification of the system, maintaining inequality and social dominance, authoritarianism, social and cultural dominance, social distance, rejection of the weak and political alienation.* 39

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39 Ibid.
Using these definitions, the study measured several dimensions of rejecting groups and focused on group attitudes towards: immigrants, Muslims, blacks, Jews, homosexuals, homeless and disabled people. This data could show how the feelings of antisemitism, homophobia and racism compared to xenophobia in different countries such as: France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Germany, Italy, UK, Hungary, and Poland. However, this review for the sake of argument will focus on the Hungarian results of the study. The first part of the study showed that all the countries the phenomenon of group focused enmity is typical.\textsuperscript{40} There is no exception, although, the extent of rejection varies partly depending on the groups and the country. There was the expected result of xenophobia, since the process of immigration is related to related to economic, employment, social and cultural tensions, and conflicts, all which has affected Europe for years.\textsuperscript{41} The results display that prejudice is less dependent on the GFES but involves the rejection of immigrants, therefore, this correlates to xenophobia being a deeply embedded collective norm in Hungary. Such results also show a correlation to the issue of national identity and xenophobia, and in the Hungarian case displays that social domination is large factor in understanding the widespread xenophobic attitudes (especially among the elderly in Hungary). Having such results can also explain why multiculturalism has been slow to take root in Hungary and in recent years has manifested itself in homeland nationalism.\textsuperscript{42} However, Hungary is not alone in its ties to ethnic or homeland nationalism this has become an overall trend in recent years as Dr. Örkény and Dr. György Csepeli assess in their study of \textit{The Patterns of Islamophobia in Europe}.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
Their study reveals that Islamophobia is not a new phenomenon is mostly connected to the fear of Islamic culture(s). So there is large differentiation between anti-Muslim vs. anti-Islamic tendencies, for most Europeans are anti-Islam but not anti-Muslim, for the fear of Islamic norms. The one European state that espouses this the most is Hungary, for in Hungary the memory of the former Ottoman Empire is entrenched into collective national memory. The Hungarian government has portrayed itself as the “defenders of Europe” against Muslim “droves” that will upset the entire balance of Europe in every aspect: politically, socially, demographically, and economically. Unfortunately, this mentality is not only found in Hungary but in the other neighboring Visegrád states of Poland, Slovakia, and Czech Republic. Furthermore, in each of these states, the fear of Islamic terrorism is always a subject of public discourse. But the question remains within the literature: What can explain Europe’s and Hungary’s behavior toward Migrants and Refugees during the Crisis and its impact on society?

It is from the ‘Hungarian specific’ to the Interdisciplinary literature that presents a “specific underlying phenomena,” which has consistently been occurring; which is a trend toward an “intolerant” or “closed society.” One of the key conceptual elements to be discussed and assessed is that of “open vs closed societies.” The first major author that created the “academic discourse” of open and closed societies is that of Karl Popper.

**Conceptual Literature: Open vs. Closed Societies, Far Right-Populism and EU Governance**

Karl Popper is one of the essential theoretical thinkers of civil society within a liberal democracy. Popper criticized *historicism* and defended open societies in liberal democracies. A “closed society”, as defined by Popper, is caste-based, intolerant, communitarian and totalitarian.

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44 Alex Etl, “Constructing Identity through the Hungarian Migration Discourse” (Central European University, 2016).
45 Antal Örkény and György Csepeli, “The Patterns of Islamophobia in Europe.”
For Popper, the “open society” is a world where “individuals are confronted with personal decisions” as opposed to a "magical or tribal or collectivist society"; the people and government of this society are transparent, tolerant, emphasizes individuality, responsive and reject use of force to achieve political goals. Popper’s discussion of open and closed societies has continued to spawn academic interest in social norms and how specific ideologies affect the formation and hierarchy of society; especially in recent years with the rise in Populism in Europe.

One of the main texts in the current discussion about Far-Right Wing populism is Wodack’s text that is compilation or anthology of academic articles discussing the rise of the Far-Right s, and the tactics used to gain electoral votes. Populism has become popular because ‘populists’ have been able to morph the resentment towards globalization and economic disparity into a political form. However, Populists have become increasingly ethno-centric, which is where the genius of simplification has taken place, for it has taken abstract concepts and created a “conceivable” enemy which has been placed upon migrant’s foreigners, and in some cases as in Hungary, Europeanization. Pelinka cites how Populism was used by the American Revolutionaries, Russian Bolsheviks, the Nazis, and the Italian fascists. What separates unites the populists is their methods in which and how they mobilize, they can “discard” their historical past, bits that re-emerge in a way that is more appealing by utilizing “deeper pasts” such as the Ottoman invasions or national historical figures such as Joan of Arc.

Another key text in understanding the goals of the Far Right is that of Mudde’s work on the definitions and classifications of far-wing parties; which can vary from left to right. According to Mudde there are four key lines of political cleavage that separate parties into

47 Ibid.
There are nine key ‘spiritual families’ in Europe which consist of the following: liberal and radical parties, conservative parties, socialist and social democratic parties, Christian democratic parties, communist social parties, agrarian parties, regional and ethnic parties, right wing extremist’s parties and now the ecological movements. Each party is defined and categorized by their ideology and the voter’s perception of the party. Other scholars such as Schumann have added a fifth element to the list which is that of “strong state” which can either manifest itself in an “anti-democracy” stance or a strong state that embodies nationalist rhetoric.

The only way to ensure that use of the term “extreme right” would be that of the test Mudde complied. A party must meet these propositions:

1. The extreme right party consists of a distinct group of parties that share a common ideological core
2. The common ideological core includes Far-Right extremist’s beliefs (as listed above)
3. Within this group subgroup is defined as extreme right party based on ideological extremity.

The current challenge in studying the Far Right and Populism today is that Populists have been able to adapt to their surroundings and it is difficult to clearly “define” and “categorize” Far Right Populism for each group of Populists have been able to “manipulate” all the necessary political tools to achieve power. However, the role of the media has always been crucial for politicians in elections but more so for the Far-Right. Elias highlights the media’s key role in Far-Right in relation to being the element in political life that helps the Far-Right mobilize as agents of “legitimization.” Far-Right parties via their media coverage of the Far-Right members themselves as well as specific media stories. In recent years, there has been an increase

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ellinas, Antionis, *The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe*.
in how media has allowed Far-Right agenda to influence their work in relation to which stories are covered, especially stories that help create or cement national identities in an “ethicized” lens\textsuperscript{52}. These stories “blur the lines” between citizenship and national identity thus causing an “identity crisis” for the populace.

Another key aspect that media has had a major role in aiding the Far-Right is giving “space for ethnocrats” to espouse and permeate their beliefs to the public. Massive media attention has filled the resource void in financial/organization limits that small Far-Right parties rarely have. Has given Far-Right parties an easy win come election day due to the amount of coverage they get from the media for free. Such exposure of controversial statements and actions has given Far-Right parties a presence amongst the populace. It is this presence that has made Far Right parties noticeable and has become fully fledged European political parties that have been on the rise since 2008. It is with the rise of Far Right and their ability to adapt and become integrated into European political society that has many European elite concerned about the “success” of the European project. Another major issue of contention in recent years with Populism is that of “social project” of European socio-political integration and the creation of a cosmopolitan society. It is this rejection of “cosmopolitanism” and the ‘skepticism’ about the EU integration project within all sectors, especially in the social sphere which European Union theorists call “Cultural Euroscepticism.”

According to Cecile Leconte, “Cultural Euroscepticism” is important, since it is the main term that encompasses the opposition to the European project, which the European Union represents.\textsuperscript{53} These aspects addressing national concerns are varied, from utilitarian and political Euroscepticism to value-based and cultural Euroscepticism, which are more pertinent for the

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
topic of this thesis. Values-based and cultural Euroscepticism are the criticism and opposition to the European project and the EU based on the arguments that the EU values and/or culture is contrary to the values and/or culture of the nation. Both Euroscepticisms differ in their arguments: value-based Euroscepticism argues that the EU is intervening in local issues which are related to social and cultural norms; cultural Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is the opposition to the idea of “Europe” wither because it is believed to have never existed, or to be a homogenous, monolithic bloc which has completely different values from the nation-state. Wiener and Diez assert that the rise of populism is due to the perceived pressure of “Cultural Euroscepticism” especially in EU states who have historically ethnic homogenous populations. Wiener and Diez’s compilation of texts focus on several theories of European integration and its applications. The European Union promoted “Europeaness which has spread to be widely accepted across the Western European EU members. However, this “Europeaness” is perceived differently in each of those countries, despite having an effect of decreasing xenophobia, among other factors. However, this only explains the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries, which several authors hypothesize that “slowness” to accept EU socio-political norms have more to do with national self-interests. In the current context, the Hungarian rhetoric of protecting Europe from the migrants is a form of the acceptance of “Europeaness,” but of a different form from what the EU promotes and advocates for.

In recent years, the European Union has faced several structural and theoretical challenges in relation to policies and the adherence of Member states applying them. These challenges have been politicized in the media and throughout the EU, ranging from migration, to

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54 Ibid.
55 Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, European Integration Theory (Oxford University Press, 2009).
economic policy and foreign policy. Why do certain states abide by EU rules whilst other member states do not? Schimmelfennig and Dirk claim that it is about regional issues which lead to ‘Differentiated Integration’ which means that certain states adhere to the vertical aspects of EU integration (i.e. market economy) but not the horizontal (i.e. Social and Migration issues). According to the authors this phenomenon has occurred because of the EU’s failure in “deepening” EU institutions within member states and “widening” the scope of these policies to other member state level agencies within Member states to ensure the supervision, as well as compliance with EU regulations. This has been a trend since the 1990’s with the Europeanization projects by Brussels to push more “democratic and open societies.” However, it is the role of politicization of these certain projects that have inhibited the “deepening” of these measures, especially in Eurosceptic member states that displays the “internal differentiation” within the EU.

With the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the world saw a surge in “regionalism” and the development of IGOs created for regional securities (i.e. military and economic). However, over time these regional institutions had become more than regional but geo-political one such organization is the EU. During the 1990s the EU had embarked on a socio-political project to create a stringer union by utilizing Intergovermentalism to enhance the security and unity of the EU. Under this premise, it was the supranational state actors that created and pushed EU initiatives and agendas. However, over time this had become less and less after the 2004 Enlargement Process, adding former Communist states into the EU fold; in which the EU had

57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
attempted to state build through EU institutions to supersede national or regional agendas. Each of these numerous concepts listed from the “open society” and the creation of European cosmopolitan society to its challenges with Far-Right Populism in the “guise” of Euroscepticism which has posed to be a challenge across sectors. Such complex challenges are difficult to defeat and to detect the signs especially when these conceptual elements are wrapped into narrow but specific context, as seen by the Migrant Crisis of 2015.

Theoretical Lens:
The events of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary and the October Referendum in 2016 have sparked national discussion among member states about the effectiveness of Dublin III and the direction of the European Union itself in relation to internal harmony with member states. To properly assess these “micro” and “macro” levels of political-security discourse this thesis will utilize the theoretical lenses of Securitization Theory, as it pertains to Hungary during these two distinct periods. The theoretical lenses of Securitization Theory will help provide the logical rational for the numerous types of discourses that emerged during the crisis; which in turn will help answer the following research questions: (i) What role has the 2015 Migration Crisis in the securitization of Hungary? (ii) And to what extent has securitization taken place and its justification? (iii) Furthermore, how has the securitization and national discourse affected Hungary’s relationship with Brussels? Each of these research questions will not only help examine the process of Securitization and how it occurs in “democracies” but how it can be used to as a “tool” to consolidate power and the national consciousness.

Buzan clearly defines its deviation from “traditional security studies” by using Social Constructivism as a lens instead of the traditional International Realist perspectives; which only focuses on states and military units via “security complexes.” Buzan asserts that the phenomena that occur in the International Realist perspectives can manifest themselves within states and
apply to several sectors. Given this deviation the one limitation of applying this theory to the specific case of Hungary and the Migration Crisis of 2016 and the Referendum would be that of only focusing on the “Social” and “Political” sectors, thus excluding the economic and environmental sectors.\(^6\) Furthermore, Buzan warns about the definitional “wideness” and possibility of sectorial overlap of the political sector, for security has always been political and that all threats have been historically defined as political. Therefore, for this specific study we will use the definitions that Buzan has designed for the Securitization of process.

Chapter 3: Methodology

In order to properly conduct the study, one must choose an appropriate method to measure the extent of the Securitization process in Hungary during the two-specific periods mentioned. Based off the heavily contextual nature of this study, the chosen method will be that of CDA’s Discursive Historical Approach (DHA).\(^6\) According to Flick, one of most diverse and unique methods in social sciences is that of Discourse Analysis, for it allows the researcher to use sociolinguistics to explain or highlight a specific event or the narratives formed around an event. There several forms or sub sects of discourse analysis that have been formulated over the years ranging from: Conversational Discourse Analysis, Discursive Psychology (as developed by Edwards and Potter) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).\(^6\) CDA is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse that views language as a form of social practice. Scholars working in the tradition of CDA generally argue that (non-linguistic) social practice and

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\(^6\) Flick, U., *An Introduction to Qualitative Research.*
linguistic practice constitute one another and focus on how societal power relations are established or reinforced through language. In addition to linguistic theory, this specific approach draws from social theory and contributions from Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. Ideology has been called the basis of the social representations of groups, and, in psychological versions of CDA developed by and Ruth Wodak, there is assumed to be a socio-cognitive connection between social structures and discourse structures. CDA helps a researcher discover how sociolinguistics is used to describe or illustrate a certain event in society.\(^{63}\)

There are two subtypes of CDA there is the historical-discourse approach that looks at historical or political texts and tries to integrate as much historical background and primary sources in order in which the discursive ‘events’ are embedded. The main goal of CDA as a method aims to de-naturalize the role discourses play in the (re)production of non-inclusive and non-egalitarian structures and challenges the social conditions that are socially embedded. It is discourses stand in a mutual relationship with other semiotic structures and institutions. It is under this umbrella of study that DHA falls under for it seeks to understand or reveal the historical elements of the discourse and it has been used to create the (re)production of non-inclusive and non-egalitarian structures. According to Wodak, DHA is “distinctive” both at the level of research interest and methodical orientation for it specifically targets the issues of: identity construction and in unjustified discrimination and focuses on the historical dimensions of discourse formation. Given this focuses DHA is epistemologically tied to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, and toward Habermas's language philosophy. In order to properly differentiate “discourse” from the “text” Wodak asserts to use Lemke’s definitional approach

\(^{63}\) Wodak, R, I – 33.
where ‘texts’ are raw linguistic products via ‘discourse’ is the bundling of simultaneously
language acts that frame the “context” which has four distinct layers:

1. Immediate language
2. Intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres, and
discourses
3. The extra-linguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames, via
‘context’
4. The broader socio-political and historical contexts which the discursive practices
are embedded in related to ‘macro theories’

*Which is the best CDA Method? DHA or SCA?*

The Socio-cognitive approach of CDA according to Wodak is designed to measure the
relationships between three concepts of: logic, philosophy, and linguistics. Like DHA, SCA
looks at discourse, but from a specific critical point of view. It is this specific point of view
which makes this sub-method of CDA most interesting, for the three elements are targeted
towards assessing or “triangulating” cognition, society, and their discourses; for it are these three
elements that highlight specific themes. Such themes can consist of: domination, power abuse,
problems in society and inequity. SCA is deliberately designed to asses each of these factors as
based in the psychosocial context, and how linguistic elements create or maintain social-power
structures. According to Teun A van Dijk, the linguistic power in the psychosocial realm is
maintained through ideology and dominance via political discourse.64 While the SCA method
may immediately seem to be a fitting method to use for this study, but the main flaw of SCA is
heavily reliant upon “knowledge-ideology relationship” and the interpretive paradigm of the
researchers. As objects of inquiry, macro phenomena like ideology are arguably more
‘contextual’ or ‘subjective’ in an interpretative paradigm; which constrains the type of data that
can be used for study. It is this “subjective process of hermeneutic interpretation” which renders

the SCA method inappropriate for this study, for the goal is to answer how discourse is used, not to look at the grammatical or social ideology behind the discourse.65

Application & Limitations: CDA-DHA

Unlike SCA, DHA is the best fit for this study, because unlike SCA DHA is flexible in terms of the type of data that can be used or collected. Wodak’s study of the Far Right in Austria utilized CDA’s DHA, which revealed the social embeddedness of Austrian history and its ties to the formation of Austrian identity. This study seeks to do the same, but will be applied to the Hungarian context of the Migration Crisis of 2015 and it’s follow up Referendum on Refugee Quotas in 2016 through the theoretical lens of securitization. Now in order to accurately answer each of these theoretical questions in relation to Securitization as it relates to the Migration Crisis and Hungarian October Referendum of 2016, one must look at the “discourses” and the historical context of which it has occurred in to understand the specific dialectic context that pertains to these socio-political events. Each aspect of the securitization theory can be expressed or measured via the qualitative “method umbrella” of CDA specifically using the DHA. Fairclough asserts that social life is an “inherently” open system of practices in which are partially discursive, but they are discursively represented.

Discourse is constituted by the difference between what cone could say correctly at one period (under the rules of grammar and logic) and what is actually said” and thus “the discursive field at the specific moment, the law is this difference.66”

Furthermore, the DHA to CDA allows researchers to dive deep into complex socio-political contexts to reveal how discourse acts as a form of not only verbal expression, but as way of expressing one’s identity. The premise for using this specific approach is understand how and why the discourses of the Migration Crisis of 2015 has shaped Hungary, in conjunction with how these changes have impacted Budapest’s relationship with Brussels. By using the specific

66 Flick, U., An Introduction to Qualitative Research; Wodak, R, 1 – 33.
method of CDA’s DHA this will allow this study to analyze not only political speeches but the common discourse; which is highly contextual given the multi-layered historical and political identity of Hungary.

Based off the heavy contextual nature of this study, the chosen method as previously stated will be that of CDA’s DHA. Now like any other methodical approach CDA’s DHA has specific limitations which can consist of: “thick descriptions” that could be biased from the researcher, the selection of material could be selective, and of course the “lack of explicit techniques” or ‘a craft’ when analysing the data. Therefore, in order to prevent these specific critiques the study shall be based upon specific parameters in relation to how the data is collected, the type of data collected, and what techniques will be used in analysing data. One of the key strengths of CDA-DHA is that the data can be collected via fieldwork and can consist of not just ‘formal discourses’ such as political speeches, but the everyday discourse; which can include: blogs, posters, newspapers and letters to the editors etc. In this study, all types of “semi-formal or informal discourses” will be analysed, to prevent “selection bias”. One of the biggest challenges or limitations of this study was trying to find accurate data that was specifically related to the research questions. Like any other methodical approach CDA’s DHA has specific limitations which can consist of: “thick descriptions” that could be biased from the researcher, the selection of material could be selective, and of course the “lack of explicit techniques” or ‘a craft’ when analysing the data. Therefore, to prevent these specific critiques the study shall be based upon specific parameters in relation to how the data is collected, the type of data collected, and what techniques will be used in analysing data. Both events of the Migration Crisis of 2015 and the October Referendum of 2016 made several international and local headlines. In order to

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67 social resonance within the wider society of the discourse analysed

overcome this “challenge” this study narrowed down the types of political speeches, op-eds, and blogger sites by looking at the specific content and eliminating “secondary” sources in favour of the primary sources, in order to have an accurate data on heavily contextual topic; which highlighted another key limitation, a balanced sample size. However, the biggest “ethical challenge” was to decide to include Orbán’s TV Radio Interviews with Kossuth Radio’s “180 Minutes” as political speeches. Given, the fact that this Radio Station is government owned and only features Orbán and his “monologues” that act as interviews, these transcripts will be defined or considered as “political speeches.”

Many of the sources accessible were from the Hungarian government, but the researcher found a local translator who translated Hungarian documents and posters. However, there were few semi-formal and informal magazines or blogs that were translated into English for publication, hence the “smaller sample size. Furthermore, each of the sources has been collected directly from their point of origin if it be political speech, op-ed or an online blogger site. To have a balance sample size the study’s total sample is that of (\(N_t=35\)) and out of this total sample there are political speeches (\(N_t=14\)), Semi-formal discourse (\(N_t=12\)) which include blogs and political posters (\(N_t=10\)). Each of these samples will be broken down into their designated period in the Analysis section. The Political speeches were retrieved from the website of the Prime Minster from the two designated periods of study; which were all in English alongside the Blog sites. However, the other two data sets (i.e. posters and Ora 16 article) were translated by our local Hungarian translator, Mr. Kalotay who had volunteered as a translator for the study.

Given the heavily contextual atmosphere and content of the research data, the researcher used a specific methodology of analysis when analyzing data. In her study and text provides a specific method on what to look for when applying the DHA method to a combined group of formal and
semi-formal discourse data: Referential Nomination, Predication, Argumentation, Perspective Framing or Discourse Representation, and Intensification Mitigation.

Chapter 4: Hungarian Reversal: Regime Changes from 2010-2015

Since 1989, Hungary has struggled to recover from the Inter-War period legacies and the Communist regime. However, transition to Democracy and neo-liberal economy has left its “economic shock” impact upon Hungary and her political system. Such divides continued to separate the demos from the politicians, mostly due to ‘corruption’ and ‘weak rule of law’ for the political elite continued to weaken Hungary’s socio-political position within the EU. It was in 2008 that Hungary had reached breaking point with her Socialists government, who may have successfully achieved EU Accession for Hungary, but had failed to win public opinion over extreme institutional corruption. Leading to the rise of the Socialists partner, Fidesz (MPSZ) lead by Viktor Orbán had slowly began to “distance” itself from the Socialists with a more ‘Conservative line’ which won them the 2010 elections.

2010: Return of FIDESZ

After winning the 2009 Parliamentary elections Fidesz gained the “super majority” not only re-organized and reframed their party lines (From MPSZ to MPP), but the entire political and institutional systems in Hungary. The growing influence and power of Fidesz has caused concern to many international organizations especially, Human Rights Organization and the Venice Commission. Over 200 reforms were pushed within two years and the Constitution

69 Construction of in-groups and out-groups-Examples: membership categorization or depersonalizing metaphors
70 Labelling social actors more less negatively than others, either in appreciative or depreciative light
71 justification of a positive or negative attributions-Example: Topoi used to justify political inclusions or exclusions, discrimination, or preferential treatment
72 expressing involvement Positioning speaker’s point of view-Example: reporting, description, narration, or quotation of (discriminatory) events and utterances
73 Modifying the epistemic status of a position-Example: intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of (discriminatory) utterances
74 Bálint Nagy, Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary.
75 53% of the vote and given 68% of the Parliamentary seats
amended over five times. By 2014, the Constitution and government institution were completely in the hands of Fidesz supporters or cronies, which were rewarded for their loyalty.76 Furthermore, in 2010-2011 Orbán and his Fidesz regime managed to use the new legal framework to “close the doors” on free media and journalism by targeting opponent media stations.

Complicating for Hearts & Minds: Rise of Jobbik

Jobbik is an “Anti-Semitic or Neo-Nazi” and “nationalist-irredentist” party who wants to return Hungary to the Horthy Inter-War period. The evidence for these claims can be seen in the party’s “culturally Eurosceptic” rhetoric and party rallies against majority of minority groups: Roma, Jews, and the poor. According to Kovács and Nagy, Fidesz saw the new party as a threat and allied with Jobbik, but over time it was clear that Fidesz had begun to “steal away” or “absorb” some of Jobbik’s social policies. Such social policies can be seen in the rise of Anti-Semitism in Hungary, the religious emphasis of the Calvinist-Catholic in national identity and the social welfare legislation.77 Each of these elements have reduced Hungary’s prestige and economic standing in the EU, but Orbán has since attempted wipe out any form of criticism of his regime; thus, earning Hungary the nickname of “Orbánistan.”78 But it was in 2015 with the Migration Crisis, that had brought all the “internal political dynamics” of the Hungarian far-right to light with the actions of both the Fidesz government’s Immigration policies and that of the Jobbik paramilitaries79 “aggression” towards Refugees and Asylum seekers on Hungary’s southern borders.80

76 Ibid.
77 Bálint Nagy, Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary; Peter Wilikin, Hungary’s Crisis of Democracy: The Road to Serfdom; Edith Oltay, Fidesz and the Reinvention of the Hungarian Center-Right.
78 Bálint Nagy, Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary.
79 Magyarországt Mozgalom
Chapter 5: Hungarian National Sovereignty vs. Dublin III

Dublin III Overview:

The core principles of Dublin III are as follows: Every asylum seeker should gain access to the procedures; there must be a member state (MS) to determine the case. Therefore, only one procedure should be conducted within the Union and that is a decision by any MS be taken in the name of others (i.e. no parallel or subsequent application should take place). Secondly, the principle of “allocation of responsibility” should not create burden sharing and if the system fails, it is the family’s failure to deny access to EU territory. Furthermore, all MS as according to accession agreement are in harmony with the 1952 Refugee Convention laws in relation to (i) definition of refugee (ii) refugees have access to legal remedies and (iii) physical protection during the remedy process.  

In order to properly execute such principles the EU Council & Court had set up a specific “reserve” in order to properly finance such policies for each MS.

As of 2011, the Brussels as allotted the EU Refugee fund with 628 million Euros designated to the following areas: Reception conditions and asylum procedures, integration of persons whose stay in the MS capacity development, resettlement from third countries into a MS, transfer of refugees and beneficiaries from one MS to another MS, emergency measures to help MS’s in the event of a sudden mass influx of refugees or displaced persons. On paper, the Dublin III protocol appears clear but as the 2015 Migration has displayed there were severe issues with three key areas: Reception conditions, asylum procedures and integration procedures, especially along the border of the Balkan Route.

Reception Conditions:

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Under Dublin III the main goal of the reception directive is to “ensure asylum seekers a dignified standard of living and comparable living conditions in all Member States during the refugee status determination procedure.” However, there some exemptions in which Dublin III does not legally accommodate which is secondary movements (i.e. asylum shopping) influenced by the variety of conditions for their reception. Therefore, the Dublin Protocol is only mandatory in the cases of those who fall under the 1951 Convention on Refugees and subsidiary protection is optional as dictated by the MS. Furthermore, MS are obliged to provide refugees with information when crossing in Schengen zone and to provide accurate documentation papers (e.g. permit of temporary stay) within three days of refugee arrival. Secondly MS’s are prohibited to detain refugees for over than a period of three days. In conjunction to this, MS’s must provide “asylum centers” for temporary shelter and provide refugees free movement. It is after this point that MS’s may be allowed to provide medical screenings, and access to employment (if not they have one year to comply). What must also be noted it is that MS’s must maintain “family unity” for refugees and “minors” must be enrolled in language schools after a period of three months stay. Furthermore “unaccompanied minors” must be given council immediately and must place in special centers that have the capability of family tracing of parents or siblings.

Dublin also obliges MS to provide living and legal accommodations to refugees during their waiting time for their asylum application. This means that MS must provide adequate: shelter, health care (mandatory for victims of violence or torture) and access to legal counsel and UNHCR representative or fellow recognized NGOs. However, each of these provisions

83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 This is also applicable to pregnant women, the elderly and disabled persons
86 § 17
87 Ibid
88 European Comission, “Country Responsible for Asylum Application (Dublin).”
are based on the condition that the refugee applicant has: not applied for asylum in other MS, abandons the determined place of residence w/out permit, does not report as prescribed or does not appear for interview, failed to register at the border (via EURODAC) file an asylum status claim or has falsified their financial status.\textsuperscript{90, 91}

**Asylum Procedures:**

There are several steps to this process and the first would be that of register at the border to obtain “permit of stay” to access the temporary living accommodations, then to file an asylum claim with a legal representative with the MS’s Immigration Office.\textsuperscript{92} However, if an asylum seeker does receive word of their status within three months from the MS’s immigration office the MS loses the right to “transfer” the refugee to another MS. If the MS rejects a request a refuge has the right to challenge this decision within the two-month period after the decision was received, but if a refugee leaves during either of these processes, the MS of their “point of entry” must take them back within six months. This one of the most debated provisions of Dublin III and has brought to the ECJ several times most notably in the *Petrosian* (2009), that acted as the legal precedent for “taking back procedures (i.e. taking action)” and the *M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece* in 2011. It was this case that established the legal limits of what MS’s can do in relation to non-refoulment, the legalities of expulsion, refugee detetion standards and the limited applications of those standards.\textsuperscript{93, 94}

**September 2015: The Crisis hits Hungary**

\textsuperscript{89} EURODAC: Database system that tracks all asylum applications and refugee data to prevent “double applications.” It also acts as a databank for MS’s to track refugee personal data-one file is good up to 10 years
\textsuperscript{90} §16 -4
\textsuperscript{91} European Commission, “Country Responsible for Asylum Application (Dublin).”
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
The summer of 2015 was very chaotic especially for Hungary which was one of the main “transit countries” along the Balkan route. During the crisis, it was a fact that Hungary was the main entry point for refugees to enter the EU zone, but the problem was that Hungary “overburdened” in many ways bit internally and externally. About the theoretical literature, when a candidate state becomes a member it is usual to have temporary setback in terms of “capacity ability or building.” But in the case of Hungary since 2006 with the continued election of the Eurosceptic party, FIDSZ adhering to EU law was not their style, especially if the refugees were Muslim. Since 2006, EU money has tended to “disappear” in Hungary, and by 2015, Hungary did not have the financial or institutional capacity to handle the mass number of migrants that entered. Some border crossing like the camp at Röszke or Bicske did initially attempt to comply with Dublin III protocol by giving temporary permits to refugees. However, these permits were then rendered useless when migrants decided they did not want to stay in Hungary for several reasons: (i) those who did register properly were subject to strict laws (ii) refugees constantly faced verbal and physical threats by police and para-militaries upon entering and (iii) the Islamophobic-xenophobic rhetoric espoused by Prime Minister Orbán during the early stages of the crisis. This only exacerbated the “practical challenges” for those who worked on the border and tried to implement Dublin III procedures via EURODAC, for at one point hundreds of refugees refused to give their fingerprint; which resulted in more violence at the hands of Hungarian border police. Orbán consistently promoted this “victimization” narrative of how Hungary “stood alone against another Ottoman invasion” and how Brussels was imposing “unfair policies.” Such rhetoric invoked bad memories across Europe, and other Visegrad countries had begun to indirect support Hungary’s position.
By this time, Orbán’s empty rhetoric became a surface-reality, and other Eurosceptic states in the region shared the same position as seen by Slovakia’s legal challenge of the refugee quotas. As of August, of 2015, the situation in Hungary had only continued to deteriorate, for Hungary as a gesture erected a large security fence across the Hungarian-Serbian border for “Europe’s protection.” The problem was that this fence was five miles over actual Hungarian territory into Serbia (EEA member) and Croatia. It was this fence that caused extreme tensions on the national level in the EU, not only between Budapest and Brussels, but Belgrade also.

Current Regime Policy & Hungary’s Counter-Arguments
These tensions between Budapest, Brussels and Belgrade have only become tenser, especially considering Brexit. Hungary has continued in the rejection of Dublin III and International conventions, as of February 2017 Hungary is building a second large security fence on her borders.95 In addition to this, Hungary has passed several new national laws in relation to immigration that make implementing Dublin III impossible such as the string of “open camp closures” and the “package of amendments” on Hungarian Asylum Law that was passed through Parliament in February 2016.96 There are five key acts: The Act of Asylum, Act on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third-Country Nationals, the Act on the State Border, the Act of Minor Offenses, and the Act on Child Protection and Management. Each of these acts focus on the issues of collective push-back against migrants ranging from: non-

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return/refoulment, illegal and arbitrary detention, poor conditions, refusal to allow registration of migrants and illegality of “transit zones.” The legal changes consist of the following changes:

- All third country nationals found in Hungary will be “escorted” to the “transit zone” on the border without being permitted to submit asylum applications (Art 6)
- State may issue “state of emergency” or crisis at any time due to ‘mass migration is extended’ (6) which are vaguely defined as to what constitutes ‘emergency’; which was extended by 7 months after 7th of September 2017
- Applications for asylum can only be filed within the “transit zone” (Art 7) and if asylum seeker stay longer than 28 day it is an immediate detention; which can include minors or unaccompanied children (Art.4, 7,9)
- If asylum request is rejected, there is a 72-hour window to seek legal remedy and contest ruling (Art 6)
- Personal interviews can be conducted in the transit zones or carried out remotely via telecommunication devices (Art 6)
- Asylum seekers are responsible for the cost of their “detention/asylum seeking service processes” (Art 3)

Each of these new requirements dictated by the government is in clear violation of all Dublin III Protocols in relation to their country nationals, refoulment, reception procedures, and asylum-seeking procedures via legal remedy. Firstly, the transit zone is not only physically illegal in relation to the border lines, but forcing asylum seekers to reside his small area is “illegal and arbitrary detention.” Second, this collective pushing back and refusal to accept Dublin transfers places asylum seekers at risk of refoulment into an “unsafe state” via Serbia. Thirdly, asylum seekers have the right to apply “in good faith” and to have access to legal counsel for their process. In the case of Hungary in the transit zones neither of these rights has been provided! Legal remedy has also been next to none given the 72-hour window given the numerous numbers of cases within transit zones; alongside “intentional neglect” by Hungary’s Office of

97 General violation OF: ECHR Art. 3& 5, violation of Charter Arts. 4,6,18 & 19 alongside Article 3 (2) & 17 (2) of Dublin III Protocol
Immigration by limiting hours and staff. On top of this violation, the human dignity of asylum seekers has been 
*decimated* to its core via: poor living conditions for asylum seekers), no access to information about their status, no access to translations services, or access to the mandated healthcare for vulnerable populations.

**Chapter 6: Results-Competing Narratives on National vs. International**

*The Data:*

During this study, there were dozens of political speeches, interviews, posters, and blogs postings that referred to the two events to be analyzed. Therefore, to properly categorize and organize the data each piece of the overall sample will be broken down into two main groups/categories Period 1: Migrant Crisis 2015 and Period 2: October Referendum of 2016. Each data item will be placed within the data group it refers to. Now both major categories consist of an “almost” balanced amount of each type of sub-data via speeches, posters, and blogs. So, to assess these sub-data groups each type will be assessed according to the type of data within their major data group. The statistical breakdown of data is as follows:

- **Period 1: Migrant Crisis (N_m=21)**
  - Political Speeches: N=10
  - Blogs: N=8
  - Posters: N=4
- **Period 2: October Referendum of 2016 (N_0=15)**
  - Political Speeches: N=4
  - Blogs: N=4
  - Posters: N=6

Each data piece above will be given a specific labeled in the analysis section based on either the time or piece title to prevent confusion between data sets (Image 2). For in each piece of data the researcher looked for the five-key methodological CDA-DHA indicators: referential nomination, predication, argumentation, intensification mitigation and perspective framing. Each data set within the sample size was ‘littered’ with colorful jargon and rich with discursive strategists to illustrate or argue a specific point about specific groups and political agendas. Now
the data was split in half when had come to “provocation speech” and the discursive “reaction” to specific comment. There was a very vivid divided to be found in the literature as whole, for there were two clear sides of an argument throughout the data, which shifted very little regarding both the “micro” and “macro” narrative debates that do exist. The first major “micro narrative debate” emerges in Period 1 where majority of the debates focused on the political arguments and narrative framing of the European Refugee Crisis in Hungary in 2015.

**Period 1: Migration Crisis of 2015**

The data from this period was very politically charged and intense with a “rich” pool of discursive data. Firstly, all the data categories displayed a clear division between the “Pro-Refugee” or “Anti-Refugee” groups. However, one must be careful in the description for the Anti-Refugee group in practice never even used the “words” Refugee due to their political meaning and implications. In the Anti-Refugee camp, there was a clear message which had a “blatantly obvious” political agenda or motive of “othering” or “demonizing” migrants and incoming Refugees. Almost every methodological discursive tool was utilized in trying to create an environment of “tension” or “fear” which was found predominantly on the Anti-Refugee camp’s data set during this specific period. In order to asses these “trends” in an unbiased manner and accurately, we shall look at each data category within this frame individually. The sub-data group would be that of the political speeches from the period of September of 2015 to mid-November of 2015 (N=10) along with posters (N=4) and blogs (N=8).

**Political Speeches:**

It was during this period which was the height of the Refugee Crisis in Hungary when over 10,000 Refugee and migrants crossed over into Hungary southern border from Serbia in route to Germany, Austria, or Sweden. Orbán had spoken about “migrants” prior to September but it was this month that proved to be contentious for Hungary. According to Orbán, in his first
three speeches in early September (3-7) one finds that he clearly defines the national narrative that “Hungary is being invaded” by millions of “economic migrants.” Orbán has clearly defined the in-out group which are those in the EU versus “migrants” or “economic migrants” NOT Refugees. Furthermore, Orbán accuses the EU of their “lack of immigration policy” and then asserts that to ‘survive’ one had to protect its “external borders” and its “Christian cultural identity.” These statements are loaded with referential nomination, predication, intensification mitigation and perspective framing. For, according to Orbán the EU is being threatened by “economic migrants” that threaten the stability of European society and frames as well as predicates the EU as the “indolent-distant supra-structure government” that is neglectful. It is these specific elements that are continue narrative through all the political speeches by the Prime Minister, alongside his blatant Anti-Muslim sentiments. The first occurrence of his “anti-Muslim” rhetoric was from his September 5th and 7th speeches on Hungarian radio. Not only does he uphold the “protection of external borders” from “economic migrants” but he is very clear in who he deems as the “threats” to Europe.

Orbán referentially nominates that the two key threats to Europe are “Muslims” and “economic migrants” as to which he seems to assume are all Muslim or from Muslim sending states; which he clearly lists: Pakistan, Mali, Nigeria, and Bangladesh. Particularly in his September 5th and September 7th Interviews which are loaded with nationalist-xenophobic utterances. Both these interviews were very verbose and intense filled with perspective framing, argumentation, and intensification. Orbán describes a narrative cleverly framed and emotionally volatile, for his use of words such as “overrun” or “invasion” of “Muslims” invoke the political memory of the series of bloody Ottoman invasions of Europe back in the 15th and 16th centuries, thus invoking fear and paints the Refugees and migrants as such. Furthermore, he refuses to
acknowledge that these civilians crossing into Europe are ‘Refugees’ but “illegal” migrants crossing borders. But Orbán does not stop there, he continues.

Another key element that ties all the methodological elements together is the aspect of “security.” Orbán makes it very clear that migrants threaten not only the border security but the political and cultural security of Europe. Orbán asserts that there will always be an “endless supply of economic migrants” coming to Europe and that Hungary has no institutional capacity to register or provide for them as dictated in EU Temporary Protection Directives. Nor, does Hungary want to accommodate these migrants for majority are Muslim and have proven to be hostile, aggressive, and uncooperative on many occasions. To support this accusation Orbán cites the “parallel societies” within Germany and France where Muslims refuse to integrate or adopt “European or Christian norms” which is not only a ‘security threat’ in terms of violence but a ‘cultural threat’ to national identity.

To support this point, he cites his ‘own version’ of the Keleti Pályaudvar train incident to support his point. He masterfully manipulates the underlying prejudice and fears of people while skewing it to his agenda of a “Hungary for Hungarians.” According to Orbán migrants are “make too many demands” and are “aggressive” for during the Crisis thousands of migrants refused to be fingerprinted and have attacked police, thus forcing Hungary to declare an “emergency” and forcing officials to implement harsher restrictions in conjunction with building more fences. Moreover, when Refugees did enter Budapest many were attacked by police or harassed and left with nowhere to stay overnight while waiting for the trains and when one managed to get to the station there was no information as to where or what they needed to board trains. This is where there was an intentional escalation of events Hungarian police refused to let Refugees onto the trains, even if they had valid tickets for those trains into Germany.
Here is where Orbán begins to shift blame and partial focus in mid-September of 2015 into late October, to his real agenda of using the Refugee Crisis to reject Brussels. This is framed in two ways, the first being that the Migration Crisis was due to Brussels’s “failed policies” that not only included migration, but multiculturalism. Here the most fascinatingly rich data emerges about Orbán’s true agenda; which is the elimination of the ‘open society’ with multiculturalism and civil organizations. In his mind, Hungary is Christian and should stay as such, and economic migrants threaten this status quo and Hungary’s national ethnic homogeneity. He does not assert this claim directly but alludes to it via his attack on Greece’s failure for border protection and Brussels forcing Hungary to “resettle Refugees” via quota through Europe to “burden share.” Insights as to the logical connection of all these elements can be found in Orbán’s speeches from September 13-26 where he boasts of Hungary’s success during the crisis and how other member states should follow Hungary’s example.

In his broadcasted interview with Bild Zeitung on September 13, Orbán reaffirmed that there is no “Refugee Crisis” but a “Migrant” Crisis in Europe and those who are to blame for this Crisis would be Germany, Greece, and the Refugees themselves. Orbán asserted that it was “Christian duty” to ensure that the EU solves the actual problem causing migrants to leave their homes so that they can return to them. This was the “Christian duty” to return them back to their old lives not to give “new European lives” and that Hungary has no capacity to provide such lives and stated, “those who are rich be weary for you will be poor too” if they allow migrants in. In his September 14 Radio interview Orbán states that “Brussels is illegally enforcing laws against the EU Charter for member states via the quota and that Europe is at risk of Islamazation” by accepting migrants.
In his speech on September 17 Orbán basks pride about the construction of fences on the Serbian border and announces that another one is to be built on the Hungarian-Croatian border to prevent illegal border crossings. Furthermore, any damage done to the fences warrant 10 years in prison and heavy fines for migrants and that “transit zones” will be built to assess asylum claims; which were “detention centers.” In these ‘transit centers’, no information was given or translated for migrants and there was no decent accommodation and any services were provided by NGOs. But, on the European level, similar actions in Austria and Croatia were being taken, by establishing more border check points and enforcing Dublin III fingerprinting. These actions, Orbán called “hypocritical” for Hungary was demonized and called heartless earlier for doing similar measure but now everyone else followed. In his mind Hungary was a victim of bad PR from Brussels during the apex of the Crisis earlier in the month and his favorite conspiracy theory of the Soros Foundation. In his mind, these measures were justified for not only did Hungary halt the flow if migrants, by building the fences but enforced EU law; alongside their “security” interests. It is in late September that Orbán shifts the focus from external issues to internal issues in Hungary and the EU. According to Orbán’s, as spelled out in his speeches on September 17 and 26, the quota proposed by Brussels is illegal and a way to enforce Hungary to adhere to the European project of “multiculturalism” supported internally by Gygory Soros and his Foundations. Hungarians must stand up to Brussels by holding a “national referendum” on the matter of the quota and continue to support the police and military in Hungary to defend their external borders from “human traffickers” and “terrorism.” It is here that Orbán start to link migration with a specific security threat, terrorism while masking his anti-Muslim sentiments with a “humanitarian face” by mentioning his abhorrence for human trifling. Orbán then proposes that Brussels should “pushback migrants” to Serbia or Turkey for they are the first
point of entry to the Schengen Zone as EEA countries, and that both states are “safe countries.”
Neither of these states is “safe for migrants” as UNCHR had dictated in early September of 2015.

**Posters**

Given the politically tense environment of the Refugee Crisis in Hungary there were dozens of different types of posters from different parties. Unlike the last sub-data set this group sub-data both parties participated in a poster campaign. To which the funds were of course unevenly distributed. According to Dr. Gabor & Messing and Lydia Gall from Human Rights Watch Hungary, asserts that Budapest/FIDESZ spent 4.3 million € on the Anti-Migrant in mid-September of 2015. 3.2 million Euros was spent on “questionnaires” about migration and another 1.1 million € for 1,000 posters during these specific periods of time. In contrast the opposition party, mainly a comedic party in the past in this period became the sole source of opposition to FIDESZ, the Two-Headed Dog party. The Two-Headed Dog Party consisted of 7,000 people who donated 140,000€ for a counter-poster campaign for 900 posters with witty sarcastic remarks to FIDESZ. Both party’s posters were very vivid in color and “truly” displayed the great divide between the Pro-Refugee Groups and the Anti-Migrant Group. Majority of the “opposition” posters were designed as a “response” or retort to the FIDESZ remarks; which had several factual errors. In order, to have a balanced sample of both parties each group was had 2 posters that were included in the data sample.

We shall first assess the FIDESZ/Anti-Migrant posters, since these specific posters instigated the opposition’s posters. Both samples of the Anti-Migrant posters resulted in being distinct “mirror image” of Orbán’s political rhetoric. One poster had a dark blue background with the National Hungarian Emblem with the message “Ha Magyarországra Jössz Tisszteleben kell Tartanod A Törvényeinket! Nemzeti Konzultáció-a bevándorlásról és a terrorizmusról”. This
means “If you come to Hungary you have respect our laws-National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism” (Image 3). The second poster had the same layout but with this message “Ha Magyarországra Jössz Tiszteletben kell Tartanod a Kulúránkat!” which translated means “If you come to Hungary you must respect our culture! (Image 4)” Both posters had a clear message that any Migrant Muslim or other had to try and be more “Hungarian than Hungarians” to be accepted or deemed worthy to stay. Another possible assessment/conjecture that can be made was these posters clearly targeted Muslims in a sense that “Hungarian Culture” was to be respected along with the laws. The Two-Headed Dog Party’s posters however, had a different message.

The opposition’s posters in comparisons with the Government’s posters were filled with wit and sarcasm aimed to dispel the “untruths” written on Government posters and pamphlets trying to undermine the Government’s efforts to in “delinking” migrants to terrorism, by humor. One such poster was very candid about who to blame for the chaos and Nationalist rhetoric coming from Budapest the poster stated in English “Sorry about our Prime Minster, he is trying to distract us from seeing all the money stolen” surrounded by blue with an old blind rhino in the corner with the Hungarian flag on him rear in the far-right corner. Then on the left corner was the Two-Headed Dog logo of a white-red dog who form resembled a “Jack Russel Terrier (Image 5).” This poster was clearly made for a different audience instead of the migrants themselves it was aimed at the Hungarian Public to state the “reality” of the whole Crisis.

Another more “subtle” poster used by the opposition during the Crisis was a “ground posters.” These ground posters were painted ground in bright colors that were designated “safe zones” or spots where migrants could come to obtain information or basic supplies such as: water, food, shampoo, bread, or medical needs from volunteers (Image 6). As previously stated, many NGOs
and volunteer groups participated in aiding the migrants through Budapest and Hungary to get to Austria or Germany. While Orbán’s speeches paint such groups as a “nuisance” or aiding “undesirables” the blogs collected in this study display otherwise.

**Blogs**

One major blog source that was available to the researcher in English was that of the Budapest Beacon which retained almost daily accounts and details about the Crisis and what exactly was going on “the ground.” It was made very clear by the words used and the focus of the message that the bloggers in question are in clear opposition to the Hungarian Government’s narrative. The first post was on September 2nd and the header was titled “EP President Accuses Hungary of Politicizing the Refugee Crisis.” Using this last phrase hints at where the author stands alongside its accusatory tone when referencing Viktor Orbán and his actions such as:

“Irrational features and National Egoism” to describe his government’s actions. The second blog post reiterates Orbán’s speech about “another upcoming national consultation-No doubt the government will spend hundreds of millions of Hungarians what to think prior to spending their money for the consultation itself.”

The blogger continues his criticism and states that Orbán may blame Germany for the Crisis but it is he to blame for misusing EU funds that were meant for such “emergencies.” Thus, referring to the Refugee Fund established by the EU. Furthermore, debunks Orbán’s accusation that migrants are a “public health” risk due to diseases, in which the author cites the statement by the World Health Organization that “the two are correlated or caused by the other—there is no systematic correlation. “Another blog that was written on the 7th of September when over 17,000 asylum seekers landed in Germany and caused the Bavarian Interior Minister to complain that “Germany cannot handle the Burden alone.” In the photos show how on migrants almost froze to death on the border town of Röszke trying to cross the Hungarian border or waiting for busses to take them to registration centers. The blog had several photos with Hungarian police hovering over “thinly clothed” migrants in freezing weather alongside “riot police” who were heavily
armed. These images hint at how the Hungarian government is using the military to “defend”
their external borders. In conjunction with the quote:

_Hungarian government police have been distributing disturbing pamphlets south of the border
warning Asylum seekers that crossing the Hungarian Government is a crime, punishable by
imprisonment._”

Another blog post had similar reports describing the “escalation” of the Crisis on
September 8th where Hungarian police began to beat and tear gas asylum seekers for crossing
borders and refusing to be fingerprinted. 11 of these Asylum seekers were arrested and detained.
The author states that the Hungarian Government is violating the 1952 Convention of Refugees
and asks the government to treat Refugees humanly. These groups petitioned the Hungarian
Government to help the Refugees with supplies and information and to end their “inaction.” But
as the blogger states, this “inaction was action” for Orbán.”

By September 11, 2015 the Crisis became worse with tensions between Hungarian police
and migrants increasing. Unfortunately, the Hungarian government and their officials stuck to
Orbán’s story, that Hungary had no capacity to handle the Crisis alone a needed EU help. The
blogger however dispelled myths espoused by government media via Minister János Lázár.
János Lázár stated on national TV that over “176,000 migrants have crossed over into Hungary”
and that Western Media has not made it easy for Hungary by “deliberately skewed and deceptive
reporting.” The author then states that Hungary will place further legal barrier on September 15
with a militarized southern border and a deceleration of a “state of emergency” and that new
“transit zones” will be established on the border to deal with the massive number of Asylum
Seekers. János Lázár also made several statements reiterating Orbán’s line that “migrants have
no legal entitlements to protection” and that “Serbia is a safe their-country” but with the EU’s
immigration policy has allowed “terrorists to enter Hungary.” Here is where this specific blog
ends with an op-ed comment to Lázár’s statement that “Actually, they’ve been running the place

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for the past five years.” The next two blogs from September 13 to the 28 go into detail about how Orbán’s government intends to keep out migrants.

The blogs from this period clearly use the referential nomination, predication, argumentation against the Hungarian government, for it seems the blogs are not interested in framing a narrative, but trying to “sift through” Hungarian national media by government channels to find the facts. For in these specific blogs there are dozens of references to how Hungary “politicked” migrants for national pride, and acted inhumanly towards migrants for fear of Muslims. One such blog as to how the Hungarian government set up “transit zones” where only ten Asylum Seekers entered per day and are detained until their claims have been reviewed by the “nefarious” Szged Court. It is this court that does not give Asylum seekers any information or translate proceedings. Majority of which denies Asylum claims forcing migrants either back to Serbia or detained in the transit zone. Another blog that was written the day after the previous one is a retort back to Orbán’s Christian-nationalist rhetoric quoting an opposition leader from the Hungarian Democratic Coalition (DK) who bitterly admonishes the Catholic Church in Hungary for not doing anything to help the migrants and hiding behind the government line stating

“Where is Jesus Christ now in the hearts and mind of the Country? I guess the barbed-wire fence at the border that the govt. is setting up in Southern Hungary is the crown that Jesus had on when he was crucified. This is not a way to those who knock on our doors for aide with children.”

This blog’s clear target was the Catholic Church who sided with Orbán’s view that “Hungary was at risk with a large wave of Muslim migrants coming and that the EU was the real threat” Archbishop stated. However, the blog did not give a precise name, but had a cynical but truthful retort, “This is not a retort you should expect from followers of Jesus Christ. The Ottoman Empire ruled Hungry for 150 years and it did not turn Hungary Muslim. What are we
afraid of? Saint Stephen set an example and we have forgotten that example.” The last two blogs from this period, September 23 and 28 both highlight how Hungary was not only upsetting Brussels but also, their “neighbors” with their razor fences. In conjunction with militarization of the border and “draconian” laws Asylum Seekers continued to come into Hungary through its southern borders with Serbia and Croatia. It was these events in the bloggers view that caused Orbán to initiate the “sweeping police powers” to the military who could not conduct operations as policemen.98

Period 2: October Referendum 2016

The second period of our study revolves around the long awaited “Quota Referendum” on the relocation of Refugees and Migrants. While Orbán may have “officially announced” that Hungary would have a “National Consultation” on Brussels quota in February of 2016, but he alluded this early on in his speeches as seen in the previous period; which is why the second period is necessary to asses in conjunction with the Migration Crisis period to accurately answer the research questions. In this section, we will look at Orbán’s speeches (N=4), Posters (N=6) and Blogs (N=4) from the October Referendum period (October of 2016).

Political Speeches

In the previous period, Orbán’s political speeches were filled with numerous predications, argumentation, and referential nominations, which mostly consisted of intensification of specific groups: Economic Migrants (in reality refugees), Brussels, Germany, and the Soros Organizations. Each of these actors played a role in Orbán’s political narrative framing of Hungary’s martyrdom from the EU’s negligence via “lack of” Immigration policies; which places Hungarian-Christian national identity at risk with the large of number of incoming Muslims Migrants. This national narrative was the main line of the government for several

98 Checking documents, body searches, inspecting cloths and vehicles and to make arrests when necessary and allowing them to use force
months even after the Crisis, however by February of the next year the “Crisis” in Hungary had abated, and there was a “political vacuum” left in the media space for Orbán. This gap had been filled with the Anti-EU and Anti-Brussels rhetoric- to blame the ‘distant supra-structure’ for all of Hungary’s problems during the Crisis and to reject Brussels ‘multicultural agenda’ via sponsoring a ‘National Consultation/Referendum’ on the issue of “relocation quotas” for Refugee and migrants. It was during this second period that the “real political agenda” came to light-Hungary for Hungarians or Fortress Europe! This is the key narrative that was continued through 2016 by Orbán in several of forms as we shall see later with the posters. But it was his speeches after the “failed October Referendum” that display his real political motives.

There are four key speeches that clearly display the connection of the Referendum to the Refuge Crisis rhetoric. Orbán had longed discussed and bragged about Hungary being able to decide for herself in relation to Refugee/Migration policy and assumed that majority of Hungarians agreed with him that Brussels “Migrant quota” was illegal and forcing Hungary to accept Muslim terrorists into Hungary. However, Orbán’s assumption was wrong, only 44 percent of people came to vote and over 55 percent of those votes were “spoiled” or deemed invalid. The Hungarian people had spoked and Orbán’s plan had backfired politically, and only displayed that Hungarians were not so easily “duped” by nationalist propaganda. In spite of this, Orbán still continued his political rhetoric against Brussels and European Multi-Culturalism, as seen in his speeches.

The first speech would be that of the “Referendum Results” on October 3rd where Orbán pronounced the following “We have achieved and excellent result today, for we have over 3 million and 204 votes which is 15 percent more than the EU Accession vote…. the Hungarian people have considered the proposal today and have rejected it. The Hungarian people have
decided that we Hungarians, alone decide on whom we wish to live together with.” Orbán then continues to tell the public that Brussels must respect the vote and Hungarian national sovereignty for 92 percent of the population rejects their plans of a quota. Now while the first part may be truthful that the October Referendum had more of a voter turnout than the EU Accession, however, the reality is that there was no clear “voice” from the Hungarian people that they rejected Brussels plans. Secondly, Orbán’s ‘fabrication’ of facts in stating that Hungarians have rejected Brussels plans. This is the way assumed or wanted the Referendum to go, for it would a powerful political-legitimization tool for Orbán against Brussels and domestically by being granted the “political right” to legally amend the Hungarian Constitution on his terms. In spite of the actual results, Orbán continued to play his charade of success when addressing the International Press on October 5. He event stated that “98 percent of all ballots voted against compulsory resettled of migrants” and asserted that this sent a clear message to Brussels that Hungarians will decide alone, what is in their best interest “the people have spoken.” However, the problem was the people did speak and were deeply divided on the issue of migration, only a few, linked the migration crisis to a rise in terrorism and risking Hungarian identity, but most of, many of others saw through the rhetoric as a political ploy of “keeping out” non-White Christians from Hungary through demagoguery. In his speech Orbán announced that “to make unified stand of national sovereignty. Parliament must adhere to the people and amend Article 14-pargraph 2, prohibiting collective compulsory relocation.” But, the irony is while the Referendum was failure, Orbán’s point was clearly made to Brussels and there were some serious amendments made to the Dublin III.

Another speech that was quite revealing was that of the speech Orbán gave to the press after the EU Summit meeting almost a week after the Referendum, on October 21. His main
message was that “EU has made some serious decisions on migration policy, but was unable to
come to a consensus, but President Junker made it clear that the quota proposal will not be
withdrawn. Therefore, EU and other V4 states are at an impasse.” So, it seems that Orbán’s falsification of results was not accepted or believed by Brussels and sent the exact opposite message to EU officials. However, Orbán refused to recognize this in this speech for he later attributed the “change or discussion of change in migration policy” to the ‘success ‘of the Hungarian Referendum. But, here was the main trend, Orbán then contradicted himself when he discussed the issue of European “solidarity” for then he stated, “Hungary’s honor was insulted at the summit for not being in solidarity with the EU, and has been repeatedly slandered by not taking in migrants.” To which Orbán then stated the following “Hungary was and IS in solidarity with the EU by protecting its external borders.”

At the end of the speech Orbán asserted that he has tried to work with EU leaders by suggesting or drafting several proposals which have all been rejected, and that “How can one have solidarity with the EU if one’s honor is continually attacked?” Now this last statement speaks volumes for once again Orbán is “playing the victim or national martyr role” he so loves and continues. The last speech from this period given by Orbán was on October 23 with a TV interview with Nue Passe, where he once again blamed the EU, for ‘shaming’ Hungary by not taking in migrants, to which he asserted was false. That Hungary had taken some migrants, it just not all of them because Hungary has had a ‘different experience’ with Muslims in the past” therefore invoking the political memory of the Ottomans. However, in reality there were no facts to back this claim, so Orbán continued to do what he does best, blame others and complain. He asserted that “Hungarians like Germans like rules, and Hungary adhered to those rules whereas Greece did not. For they did not protect their external borders.” Thus, returning to
blaming Greece and Germany, along with his Islamophobic views by ending the interview with the statement “Islam and Christianity cannot mix for they have differing traditions and are incompatible with each other.” Such a sentiment may have been made by word of mouth after the Referendum, but such sentiments from Orbán and FIDESZ were well known prior to this interview, for the government posters in the second period made it very clear. Just as the oppositions posters made their distrust known about the ‘real agenda’ of the Referendum.

**Posters**

The October Referendum may have been one of the most intense of poster campaigns both the Government and the opposition, the Two-Headed Dog Party launched several posters in retort “back and forth” between each other with claims and slogans. However, it was once again a repeat of period one in terms of finances for the Hungarian Government spent a grand total of 3.6 billion Euros (11.3 billion HUF) on the entire October Referendum campaign (5.9 billion HUF for posters and 875 million on letter pamphlets). However, these numbers were gathered by ‘outside sources” for the Hungarian government asserted that they had only spent 3.9 billion HUF; which ended up becoming a fallacy. The opposition on the other hand, asserts that the government spent 7.6 billion €. There has yet to be an investigation to the exact amount spent by the Hungarian government. Regardless of costs the Referendum Posters, were very clear about their agenda with the slogans. One poster slogan stated the following “Tudta? A párizsi merényletet bevándorlók követték el” which translated means “Did you know the Paris attacks were committed by Immigrants (Image 7)?” Other government posters had similar slogans such as “Ne Kockáztassunk! Szavazzunk Nemmel! Október 2.” which translated means “Let us not risk our future, vote No on October 2nd” which was posed behind a Hungarian flag background (Image 8).” Another government poster’s message made clear who the enemies were with the slogan “Üzenjünk Brüsszelnek, hogy Ők is megérsteék!” that means “Lets send a message to
Brussels so they understand (Image 9).” The last government poster was also very telling about what the goals of the October Referendum meant with the slogan “Az Emberek Döntöttek: Az Országot Meg Kell Védeni,” which means “The People have decided, the nation has to be defended (Image 10).”

Now while the governments posters were focused on promoting the Referendum the opposition’s posters of course had a comedically reply back “Tudta? Szíriában Háború van” which means “Did you know there is a war in Syria?” surrounded by the Two headed dog logos at the bottom with a phrase in a red box “Hülye Kérdésre hülye Választ! Szavazz Érvénytelenül” meaning “A stupid answer for a stupid question (Image 11).” Another popular poster designed by the opposition was even more comedically and sarcastic with the slogan “Üzenjünk Budapestnek, Hogy ők is megértsék!” meaning “Lets send a message to Budapest so they understand” next to two circles with a red “X” overtop the red box with the same quote as the other poster “Hülye Kérdésre hülye Választ! Szavazz Érvénytelenül” meaning “A stupid answer for a stupid question (Image 12).” Both posters proved to be effective for according for of 43% of voters 55% of the votes were spoiled, thus invalidating the Referendum; which bloggers ensured that international media took notice.

**Blogs**

It was within the blogs one did not know much about Hungary or the ‘local politics” f the Referendum would be able to read and understand. The language was clear and had a clear message “Referendum failed and tells what Orbán’s real agenda is- Hungary for Hungarians” or that “FIDESZ forces mandate.” The next set of sub-set of data three blogs) were written on the same day of October 4th, 2016, that had the same message but from three different angles: financial spending, who was to blame, and what others said. The first one spoke of how much the

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99 All Translations done by Marton Kalotay
Hungarian government spent on their posters and the “Pro-Referendum” campaign, in which was “public money.” According to the blogger FIDESZ spent “Net total of 5.9 billion HUF on information campaigns and TV advertisements and 7.49 billion HUF on posters alongside the 875 million HUF for pamphlets.” To which in the end costed FIDESZ 13.1 billion HUF (31.4 million USD) of public money from Brussels for other projects, mainly the EU Refugee Fund. This data was posed next to a photo a railway in Budapest littered with FIDESZ posters w/the header “FIDESZ government outspent opposition 10:1 in Sunday’s Referendum. It was this blog that painted the realities in Hungary of how money was spent in 2016 and where exactly the money was coming from, the so called “enemy” Brussels. However, this message was not so well received in Hungary on October 2, and as always in politics there was someone to blame for a political failure.

The next blog written on October 4th asserted that the “fall person” for Orbán would be that of the Propaganda Minister, Antal Rogán. For it was the Propaganda Minister who organized the poster campaign and how it was distributed. But, the blog implicates that this minster withheld the Referendum results from Orbán s that he had more of a “positive message” to send out to the media for the “greeter good of Hungary.” Rogán prior to the campaign warned FIDESZ amount spending too much on posters and media, in case it would go wrong; which it did. According to Fidesz media the posters were blame for “the same primitive message next to each other caused them to blend together.” It is here the blog ends by reiterating the previous blog about finances and where all this money came from and accuses FIDESZ of being a “money laundering factor.” The last blog on this day focused on mainly on what other parties in Hungary said and who was at the political advantage. According to the blogger, the Referendum was not about migration but a “battle for local power and the minds of Hungarians.” For it was during the
campaign that FIDESZ was competing with rising political opposition, which was the first time in several years that several leftist groups allied together to stand against FIDESZ and their Jobbik allies. This alliance was made from the Social Democrats the Two-Headed Dog party, the Socialists, and several NGOs. The referendum proved that there could be opposition in Hungary and FIDESZ had political competition for the 2018 elections. The blogger also warns readers to keep an “eye on local politics, soon.” For since FIDESZ was robbed of their means to grasp more local influence via the Reform, a means to change the Constitution again in their favor. However, despite the local vices FIDESZ still pushed for a “victory” and has made several amendments to “migrant movement” in Hungary scheduled for late December of 2016 and in the next year. It is these sentiments that are echoed by the last blog from this period.

The last sub-data piece was written on October 18, when Orbán was addressed the international media by stating that the referendum was a “success in a sense that there was unity that stepped over political boundaries; which placed Hungary’s independence in danger.” Which was his main premise to override the ‘will of the people’ in rejecting his political agenda by forcing a change in the Fundamental Laws of Hungary thus quoting Orbán’s statement of “there are many enemies within, for those who dream of Europe being a melting pot into one mas endanger or will remove Hungarian traditions, cultures, language and laws.” It is here the blogger asserts that Orbán’s statements have a “macro” goal to create an “illiberal-authoritarian state” within the EU. For the author quotes Orbán’s statement of “98% of Hungarians wish to remain in the European Empire, but Hungary will not allow Brussels to erode Hungary’s national idea, which has always been the way of an empires experiments.”

**Analysis of the Data:**

One angle that provides an answer to these questions posed by the overall discourse would be that of securitization theory, given the tone and content in both period discourse. For
what the discourses of these two periods have shown on the micro-national level in Hungary that there was a “hyper-politicization” of refugees and were presented as an “existential security” thus becoming the “referent object” of a state actor’s rhetoric (Image 13).

**Period 1: Migrant Crisis**

The “Refugee/Migrant Crisis” may have been a “macro” problem for the EU, but it Hungary who seemed to manipulate the situation to their national advantage by making the mass wave of refugees coming to Europe a “national issue” or discussion about specific issues; which over time evolved from an economic-social threat to a security threat. The intensification or demonization of Refugees to Migrants became the referent object that was a ‘security threat’ to the nation, but also the European Union as well. But the challenge, is pin-pointing when did the issue of Refugee or Migration exactly become securitized in Hungary and which sectors has it affected in Hungary and then to the EU in general?

Based on the data the answer would be that the securitizing actor, was Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán who began the securitization process in late August-early September, with the first wave before the erection of the wall and the September 15 measures. For Migration in Hungary was already a “hot topic” for prior to the actual crisis. Orbán had already established Refugees as a threat with his refusal in his speeches back in March of 2015 with UNCHR and the IOM’s warning about a flow of Refugees coming through the Balkan Route. Secondly Orbán early on refused to acknowledge “Refugees” but labeled them as “economic migrants” who only seeking a ‘German or Austrian life’ and were not “genuine refugees.” Thus, granting him the legal “wiggle room” to not adhere EU law or to the 1952 Convention on Refugees. It was this “speech act’ that began the process, for three main elements of the securitization criterion had been already fulfilled that of” securitizing actor, securitizing move, the creation of an existential threat, and the referent object -Economic migrants. Initially, the securitization process may not
have been so obvious, but if one looks at the local level environment such phenomena in Hungary is uncommon, given the national political context.

Now the political sector in Hungary was already on the verge of being securitized due to the domination of one party in a “mafia state” structure (i.e. manipulating referendums, Courts, and Constitution), that was within the EU; which what makes this study unique for Orbán in the past has politicized and securitized specific topics before (i.e. Roma issue) to win elections. However, these two periods are unique for they were part of a bigger trend on both the Hungarian national level and EU level. Now in relation to the process of securitization there is always a social element to it that ties within the political realm, and in Hungary’s case the literature and discourses reveal that was a pre-existing “homogenous complex” in Hungary in relation to political interactions between Orbán-FIDESZ actors and the Hungarian Public; which gave provided Orbán the power and environment need to securitize migration and the Refugee quota issue as “existential” and National identity or “social security” threat to Hungary.

Some can argue that the securitization process of the crisis only began with the erection of the 4meter high razor fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border or even on September 15, 2015 with the revision of laws limiting migration through Hungary. The problem with that logic would be that the reaction of the fence and the implementation of new legislation is only a “tool” of a securitizing actor; which was the case in Hungary. For the fence was designed to keep Refugees out or later to detain/prevent them from entering the Schengen Zone, alongside the new legislation that gave police “extended powers” to use “force” if Refugees refused to be entered the EURODAC system. It is the emergence and use of such “tools” that fulfill another criterion of the securitization process of “breaking rules” to accommodate the securitization process, as justification for security; which is exactly how Orbán painted the situation in Hungary to the EU
and EC. Breaking EU norms and rules to “asylum seekers” or “refugees” was valid because of security threats, especially in the name of “counter-terrorism.” However, some of the Hungarian population who resisted Orbán’s narrative and “emergency measures” by rebuking the national propaganda that “painted” refugees as security threat (Image 14). This was clearly seen during the Keleti incident and after when dozens of NGOs and volunteer workers came to help feed and give information to refugees and asylum seeker trying to get to Germany. Furthermore, bloggers ensured that the world knew the ‘truth’ behind the Keleti incident that the Hungarian government intentionally neglected to help migrants with proper papers, but used EU money to it.

Here is where the connection between the micro/national drama meets the macro drama, the EU’s reaction, and the local Hungarian reaction. Hungary had “militarized” it’s external borders which soon became the norm, when Croatia and Slovenia begun to build fences on their external borders; which triggered Austria, Denmark, and Sweden to start imposing stricter border controls. Such actions only caused the flow of asylum seekers ad refugees to find other routes other than the Balkan Route. What was most fascinating was how Orbán used the threat of “terrorism” before the November 13 attacks in Paris, as another tool to justify his “National Sovereignty-Security” Narrative via breaking EU rules, but at the same time dualistically painting the EU as ‘protector’ and a ‘threat’ especially after President Junker proposed the “mandatory” relocation of refugee quota (Image 15).

It was in the immediate aftermath, of this statement that Orbán shifted his focus from Economic Migrants and external border protection to linking the Paris attacks to migrants, and blaming Brussels for the Crisis itself. For in his mind, it was Brussels “lack of policy” on migration that encouraged ‘economic migrants’ to come to Europe while forcing EU Member states to accept these “illegal migrants” who did make it through during the Crisis. Such a
notion, for Member states to use their hard-earned resources to accommodate “illegal migrants” was unthinkable. Once again Hungary had to act in its own interest and did.

**Period 2: October Referendum**

It was during the second period of this study that the rational for Hungary’s heavy-handed actions and provocations towards the EU on migration policy became clear. Hungary was in no state to accept economic or illegal migrants from the crisis based on the fact of “limited capacity.” While this line presented by Orbán may be true, but not for the reasons one would think. Hungary had the state capacity to adhere to Dublin III and the proposed refugee quota had not attempted to securitize migration for political reasons. The money allotted to Hungary for the EU Refugee fund, as presented in the literature, was used to build the razor fence, and give new weapons to police at the border. However, this only accounted for small portion of EU funds; the question was where did the other portion go? That question was only answered after the October Referendum of 2016. In between the Crisis and the October Referendum Hungary had “tense relations” with the EU over their handling of the crisis and their ongoing securitization of migration and deepening securitization of the political sphere via refusing to adhere to the 1952 Convention of refugees for protection and EU Directives on Temporary Protecting, not to mention drafting legislation that criminalized migration (December-March 2016). However, relations with Brussels got even more tense as 2015 became 2016 when numerous IGOs and NGOs media stories began to reveal what had really happened in Hungary during the crisis, with reports of ongoing police brutality, illegal detentions, or abuse of migrants. As seen in the data from both the blogs and political speeches, Orbán’s security narrative argument became weaker and weaker. A new topic was needed to justify Hungary’s action to the international press, only this time the migrants were not the ‘direct’ focus, Hungary’s Christian Identity and Sovereignty was the focus. Orbán on many occasions made clear that “Christianity and Islam were
incompatible” and how Brussels had no legal right to force “Europeanism” or “a Multiculturalism agenda (i.e. societal security)” upon a member state through quotas; for “such experiences were projects of empires that failed.” Orbán made it clear that it was Hungary’s duty to “Stop Brussels” and retain the “1000 years tradition in Hungary” in other words “Hungary for Hungarians.” The dilemma was how could Orbán politically enforce this without endangering Hungarian-EU relations?

The answer was simple and a typical strategy, calling for a “National Consultation” on the matter to show Brussels that Hungary rejects their agenda. While the announcement of the October Referendum only became public on February 24, 2016, but he had hinted at it in late October-November of 2015, after the Paris attacks, claiming that Hungarians love the EU and had followed their rules by “protecting the EU’s external borders” unlike the Greeks, who were to blame for the Refuge Crisis, furthermore it was “shameful” that Hungary’s national honor was being insulted by international media by portraying Hungarians “heartless or cruel monsters” to Refugees during the crisis. The problem was, that it was a partial-reality for several Hungarians also helped refugees but very little of this got into the international media. Hungary’s image was in peril, and Orbán was determined to fix in the only way he knew how, denial and attack. As he had done in previous campaigns the Referendum would be a “national statement” to Brussels on Hungary’s position on “illegal” measures. As it turned out Hungary was not the only one peeved at the quota proposal, other V4 nations like Slovakia agreed and filed a law suit against the European Commission on the “Constitutional validity” of the quota. This set a stalemate between Hungary and the EU for months until the Referendum results came.

However, Orbán and FIDESZ did not remain idle, for several months the massive ad campaign was launched, reasserting that Hungary was the “victim” of EU policy which allowed
“terrorists” to enter to the EU and threaten Hungarian identity and culture. These posters were clear evidence of Orbán’s continued attempt to finalize his securitization of the political and social sector of Hungarian society. Szalasi stated may ‘successfully’ securitized the political sector in Hungary, but the societal sector remained intact from the securitization process, because of the presence of opposition acting as functional actors. But this time the tool in question was not a fence, it was the call for a “National Consultation’ which would allow Orbán to finish the process and ensure a securitized social sector alongside the political sector, where only his Nationalist-Christian agenda was present. This was made very clear by his speeches in both periods and by the national posters sponsored by the government. Alongside his personal speech acts against those NGOs who helped Refugees, placing them in league with Human traffickers and Brussel; especially Soros’s Foundations (Image 16). Such rhetoric continued in Hungary from late 2015-Ocotber 2016. Hungarians were bombarded by posters that painted the EU as the problem and a heavy police presence on the Hungarian-Serbian border continued, despite the reduced migration flow. Furthermore, more laws were passed making migration impossible in Hungary or for Migrants to be granted asylum by March of 2016. Even “open refugee” camps were liquidated forcing migrants into the “transit zones” to fend for themselves and wait for their claims to be heard with no government help. While asylum seekers languished in these transit zones, the Hungarian public were caught in between their national government and the EU; and faceless entity that has improved domestic life in Hungary.

Fortunately, in October of 2016 Orbán failed in his endeavors to securitize the social sector by using Brussels as the “referential object” and the EU’s supra-national enforcement of multiculturalism and open society upon Hungary’s national identity as an “existential threat.” Furthermore, there was no cohesive “audience” that accepted for such measures as seen by the
43 percent turnout rate for the Referendum and 55 percent of the ballots being spoiled. As the blogs had accurately put it, it was due to the Two-Headed Dog’s counter-Referendum campaign. Unlike Orbán’s campaign the Two-Headed Dog party focused on the facts and tries to convince the Hungarian people that Orbán was up to his “old tricks” by distracting people from the real problems mainly corruption and extortion of public money, not societal security, or national sovereignty. Now no once can conclusively say that all Hungarians disagree, but what can be said about this period was that the Referendum was failed, and Orbán was ‘robbed’ of his tool against Brussels. The problem was now, who was he going to blame for that failure? As the blogs had stated Orbán may have on the surface blamed his propaganda Minister, but he blamed the NGOs and Civil Organizations who helped in the counter-Referendum campaign; who in his mind were all tied to either the EU or George Soros.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Hungary during the Migration Crisis had a clear securitization of Migration and of the political sector given that all the theoretical criterion posed by Buzan had been fulfilled as displayed by the all the data from the first period. However, it in in the social sector where the Hungary failed on both occasions to completely securitize, due to “small” but effective opposition movements against Orbán’s attempt to obtain “complete” social security as defined by Buzan. However, Hungary remains politically securitized in a sense that one party dominates and has near-full control over both social and legal institutions; which leaves Hungary’s societal sector vulnerable given the “overlap” between both sectors, especially in relation to NGOs and Civil Society in Hungary; as illustrated by the Migration Crisis of 2015 and post-Migration Crisis discursive rhetoric. The data also hints at a more ‘deeper’ and ‘darker’ message that Securitization of the political sector was fulfilled in the name of Societal Security White-Christian ethno-nationalism, not illustrate just to defend the external borders of the EU, but
ensure that “Fortress Europe” remains majority Christian; and Hungary being the pivotal example of how European society priorities should be “Freedom, Christianity and Nation-not multiculturalism. To people like Orbán, multiculturalism is a “liberal agenda” that erodes at tradition, for it is tradition that maintains order. This rejection of multiculturalism also manifests itself in the Euroscepticism of the government. But the problem is, in Orbán’s case that such “order or creed” does not belong inside the EU. On numerous occasions Orbán has been cited by Schultz and others as the “autocrat” of Europe, which given his political speech and rhetoric is not too far from the truth; especially given his continued attempts to silence opposition through social securitization and use of referendum to amend the Hungarian Constitution repeatedly.

This has continued to strain Budapest-Brussels relations almost to a breaking point. In late May 2017, two years after the Crisis where Brussels threatened to “trigger” Article 7 of the EU Charter against Hungary, in response to Orbán’s latest “referent object” and “existential threat” to Hungarian identity George Soros’ Central European University along with her Civil Organizations. Learning from his previous failures to achieve societal securitization had found a way to wipe out any form of opposition by “ramming through” legislation, LEX-CEU through Parliament, in spite of mass opposition never seen since the 2010 Internet Law. Orbán has now targeted “academics” and one step away from shutting down civil society itself, which

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remains to be seen until June 12th of 2017. Unless the EU uses this legal tool Hungary continues to move towards becoming Karl Popper’s “Closed Society.”

Appendix

Image 1: Balkan Route for Refugees

Image 2: Data Collection
Image 3: Respect our Laws

Image 4: Respect Our Culture

Image 5: Sorry About our Prime Minister

Image 6: Safe Zones

Image 7: Did you Know?

Image 8: Let us not Risk our Future

Image 9: Send a Message to Brussels

Image 10: The People have Spoken
Image 11: Did you know there is a war in Syria?

Image 12: Let’s Send A Message to Budapest so they Understand

Image 13: Securitization-CDA:
### Image 14: Narrative Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian Government Sources: Speeches &amp; Posters</th>
<th>CommonDiscourse: Blogs &amp; Posters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Crisis:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protection of external borders &amp; security threat</td>
<td>• Christian duty to care for refugees and those in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Christian-European Identity &amp; Heritage</td>
<td>• Orban Politicizing Migration for domestic gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National Sovereignty</td>
<td>• Hungarian government and national egoism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic Migrants</td>
<td>• NGOs provided humanitarian aide when Hungarian government refused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Migrants are violent &amp; Aggressive and don’t obey rules or the police</td>
<td>• Migrants were attacked by Hungarian police &amp; paramilitaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hungary will make it’s own decisions</td>
<td>• Migrants were trapped in Keleti–government Refugees fleeing war Hungarian authorities are re-traumatizing them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• European Union has no right to enforce illegal acts-forced relocation of migrants</td>
<td>• Hungarian government sends ‘mixed messages’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Self-defense of homeland</td>
<td><strong>October Referendum:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Christian Duty to send refugees back to their “old life” not a “new one in Europe”</td>
<td>• Orban finally told what the referendum was about “keep Hungary a Hungarian Country”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October Referendum:</strong></td>
<td>• Fear of new “European cosmopolitan empire”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Migrants threaten National Christian Identity</td>
<td>• Failed Referendum only 43% participated and 55% of those votes were invalid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Paris proves more Migrants=more terrorism</td>
<td>• Hungary spend public &amp; EU money on anti-migrant campaign and lost (1.1 billion HUF) from pamphlets to posters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• More Migrants the more parallel societies will form as in France and Germany</td>
<td>• Invalid Referendum–Parliament has no obligation to change laws to their favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Brussels has no legal right to force Hungary to obey rules that are not in Hungarian Constitution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stop Brussels from violating Hungarian Nat. Sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Image 15: Orban’s Rhetoric Pattern/logic

- **External Border Protection**
- **Illegal Migration & Compliance w/ Article 26**
- **Refugee Law** doesn’t apply to economic migrants
- **Refugee vs. Economic Migrant**
  - Hungarian civil volunteers went “above & beyond”
  - “State of Emergency declared” blames Soros & NGOs to aide migrants
- **Protection from “aggressive migrants” & non-compliance**
- **Protection of European Culture & traditions-Christsians**
- **Christian duty to “return refugees” they should not take the risk**
- **Relocation Quota is illegal**
- **Liberals hide behind “mask of humanitarianism & Political Correctness**
- **Hungary is the “PR victim” for enforcing rules**

- **Migration=Terrorism**
- **Brussels vs. Budapest:** Migration Quota & Protection of Christian Identity
- **Referendum proves Hungarians favor National Sovereignty over EU-Brussels**
- **Soros, CEU, & Civil Society groups are a threat to National Identity**
Image 16: Micro-Macro Thesis
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