

BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE -
INVESTIGATING EU NORM DIFFUSION TECHNIQUES
IN JORDAN AND MOROCCO

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I, the undersigned Mira Alexander hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where proper acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

This is a true copy of the thesis, including final revisions.

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. Alexander", is written over a light gray rectangular background.

Abstract

The EU's foreign policy approach changed significantly from the 1990s onward. The EU streamlined its programs to promote democracy and good governance into a single policy framework in 2007, the so-called European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). It aims at building a ring of stable, liberal, and democratic neighbors. However, critics often label the ENP as unsuccessful. In simply exporting its internal integration mechanisms used in enlargement policy, the EU is neglecting the fact that the trump card of accession is unavailable for neighborhood countries. Hence, the EU's bargaining position is mainly dependent on its norm resonance. However, a crucial element for successful socialization is an initial norm resonance between the third country and the socializer. This turns into a vicious cycle, where successful democracy promotion is dependent on norm resonance. However, to create this norm resonance, a certain degree of already existing norm resonance is required. To break this vicious cycle, this paper addresses the question of norm diffusion using the cases of Jordan and Morocco. The research question "How did the EU create norm resonance in Jordan and Morocco between 2007 and 2010 to increase the success of the ENP in these countries?" is answered by assessing the ENP tools, *funding*, and *enhanced relations* in the policy areas of social policy and institution building according to Jeffrey Checkel's framework for socialization. Comparing the fulfillment of Checkel's preconditions for internalization against progress made in the respective policy area will reveal an indication of whether funding and enhanced relations can foster the norm diffusion.

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List of Abbreviations

CEDAW	UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIUDAD	Cooperation in Urban Development and Dialogue
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighborhood Policy Instrument
EU	European Union
MEDA	Mesures D'Accompagnement
MED-PACT	Local Authorities Partnership Program in the Mediterranean
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIP	National Indicative Program

1. Introduction

The EU's predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community, was initially formed on the functionalist idea of integrating sectors crucial to warfare. This was to prevent European powers from engaging in another war against each other. However, after 1989, policy makers abandoned this inward looking "policy of exclusion" and replaced it with a "policy of inclusion" (Smith, 1996). With the end of the Cold War, the EU entered an era of optimism and confidence, in which it strived to disseminate the values that had won over communism. This more active EU foreign policy approach led to the development of enlargement policy, which reached its peak in 2004 with the accession of ten new member states, of which eight were from the post-Soviet sphere. While enlargement is considered "the EU's most successful foreign policy in the decades leading up to [...] 2004", especially in terms of norm diffusion, it also exemplifies the policy's geographical limits (Fouéré, 2016).

Discussions arose around the Union's capacities to absorb more members, as well as the compatibility of norms between the EU and aspiring members in the East and the South. These discussions soon halted any further enlargement. Nevertheless, the EU still considered its governance model worth spreading and did not want to dismiss its normative mission to bring democracy, human rights, and good governance to its wider region. Hence, the ENP was developed in 2007 (Smith, 2011; Pace, 2007). Borrowing tools and mechanisms from the previously successful enlargement policy, the ENP's aim was to build a ring of stable, liberal, and democratic states in the EU's Eastern and Southern neighborhood. However, it soon became apparent that without the trump card of EU accession available to nations outside of Europe, the EU has much less leverage to impose reforms on third countries (Mocanu, 2007). Furthermore, academics have pointed out the ambiguity of the EU's behavior towards its neighbors. On the one hand, the EU claims that its main objective is the establishment of democracies, liberal markets, and good governance for the sake of local populations in neighboring countries. On the other hand, it is evident that a major concern of the EU is its own security. Hence, policies are more so directed towards creating stable, and not democratic, neighbors (Cremona, 2008). This inconsistent behavior, in combination with a lack of meaningful incentives, makes the ENP's effectiveness questionable.

The EU's Southern neighborhood exemplifies this problem well. EU involvement in North Africa did not start with the launch of the ENP. Already after the end of the Cold War, the EU's Southern Member States feared that more resources would be devoted to EU enlargement, i.e. its Eastern neighbors, at the expense of the EU's Southern partners. As a result of this concern, EU foreign ministers and their Mediterranean counterparts held a conference in 1995 (Pace, 2007). The so-called Barcelona Declaration was the final product of this conference and it established the EMP with the goal to develop a "secure, stable and peaceful Euro-Mediterranean space" (ibid., p.659). Considering this long-term EU involvement in the region, as well as the Arab Spring in 2011 and its aftermath, one starts to wonder how much the EU really contributes to democratizing processes in these countries.

The EU addressed the ambiguity of its language with the latest revision of the ENP in 2015 by adopting a more functionalist and sector-specific approach (Schumacher, 2017). While these redefined goals are more pragmatic and possibly easier to achieve, the issue of a lack of incentives is still unresolved. As the tools used in the ENP are built upon the assumption of political conditionality due to the promise of EU membership, they are highly inadequate in the realm of ENP and make the success of the policy more dependent on domestic aspects of the partner countries (Noutcheva, 2015). The European Commission (2014) identified these as "the ability and commitment of governments to reform and to deepen relations with the EU, as well as on the capacity to explain and gain popular support and adherence to this agenda." This ability and capacity varies from country to country and is mainly dependent on the EU's norm resonance in the third country (Stoddard, 2015).

For the purpose of this thesis *norm resonance* is interpreted as internalization, defined by Jeffrey Checkel (2005). According to Checkel (2005), internalization is the outcome of a successful process of socialization, i.e. an actor's shift from a logic of consequence to a logic of appropriateness. However, if the main goal of the ENP is to spread EU norms to its neighborhood and the main condition for this to be successful is a certain degree of norm resonance, one of two possible outcomes will occur. Either the EU would only be involved in countries that already agree with their norms, which would mean that all EU neighborhood projects are successful because of the fulfilled condition of norm resonance, or there must be mechanisms the EU is using to create norm resonance in countries that are not in accord with EU

norms prior to EU involvement in the country. Looking at the various ENP Progress Reports and considering the outcomes of the Arab Spring, it becomes clear that not all ENP projects are successful. Therefore, to break this vicious cycle, where norm resonance is needed to create norm resonance, this thesis addresses the following research question: How does the EU create norm resonance in Jordan and Morocco between 2007 and 2010 to increase the success of the European Neighborhood Policy in these countries?

This topic has not been sufficiently addressed in existing literature, even though its investigation would benefit academics as well as policy makers in the domain of EU foreign policy. On the one hand, it advances the theoretical understanding of socialization theory. On the other hand, having a clearer picture on what supports successful norm diffusion, makes EU foreign policy more efficient and goal oriented. Furthermore, it can be used to complement the new more functionalist approach of the ENP in countries that wish to increase cooperation with the EU. The cases of Jordan and Morocco, traditionally considered good students and important partners to the EU, are two similar and most probable cases, allowing for exploratory research to be conducted. These results can later on contribute to research on the broader question of EU norm diffusion.

To answer the research question two ENP policy areas, social policy and institution building, are analyzed with regards to three aspects: first, the amount of funding directed towards this policy area; second, enhanced relations between the EU and the third country, where regional projects are used as a proxy for enhanced relations; third, progress made in the policy area, to indicate norm resonance. *Funding* and *enhanced relations* are two out of four tools generally used to further ENP goals. The other two mechanisms are technical and administrative support, and investments of the EIB (Wesselinck & Boschma, 2017). However, as these two are mostly concerned with technical assistance where little norm diffusion is to be expected, only the former two are of importance for the analysis in this thesis. The analysis is conducted via a document analysis of ENP Progress Reports, the NIP, and an analysis of the regional projects according to Checkel's mechanisms of socialization.

After a brief introduction of the ENP, the relevant theories of external governance and socialization, as well as the methodology used in this paper, the main section focuses on the most probable case study of Jordan and Morocco. First, the data is briefly described. Second, the

policy area of social policy is analyzed according to funding, projects, and progress made in Morocco and Jordan, and conclusions are drawn from a comparison of these three elements. Third, the same procedure is used to analyze the policy area of institution building. Lastly, overall conclusions are drawn and, if possible, policy recommendations for the future of the ENP given.

2. Literature Review

The ENP celebrates its ten-year anniversary this year. While it is this policy that is under investigation in this thesis, it is crucial to look deeper into the structures of the relationship between the EU and its Southern neighbors to understand the underlying logics and path-dependencies.

The first official regional approach of the EU towards its Mediterranean neighbors was initiated in 1995 with the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements that were signed as part of the Barcelona Process. These agreements established the EMP whose aim was to promote a “long-term relationship based on reciprocity, partnership and co-development” (Cremona, 2008, p.270). While the EMP is a multilateral agreement, the ENP has more of a bilateral nature, based on individual Action Plans and differentiation (Pace, 2007). Nevertheless, both policies address similar issues, which is why the ENP is considered a complimentary policy rather than a replacement of the EMP (Cremona, 2008). The ENP’s aim was to rationalize and streamline the many existing policies and programs that already dealt with the EU’s neighboring countries (Wesselink & Boschma, 2017).

Due to its encompassing nature, the ENP operates on various levels using multiple mechanisms. A main tool of the EU’s enlargement policy has been political conditionality. However, this could only be successful because the EU could offer membership (Pace, 2007). As this incentive is missing in the ENP it is using four different mechanisms to incentivize compliance to EU requests. These mechanisms are: (1) the funding of implementation of legislation and development of institutions, (2) technical support, (3) enhanced relations, and (4) investments of the EIB (Wesselink & Boschma, 2017). These mechanisms go through three levels of implementation, namely the interregional, regional, and bilateral level. In an effort to streamline not just policies but also funding, the EU initiated the ENPI in 2007 to properly integrate funding of all neighborhood related programs (ibid.). The EU allocated a total amount of twelve billion Euro to the ENPI for the period of 2007-2013. This has even been increased in the consecutive budgetary period (2014-2020) to over 15 billion Euro (ibid.). While most of the ENPI funds are earmarked for bilateral programs, they have been complemented by a series of thematic programs dealing with stability and peace, as well as democracy and human rights among other key issues (ibid.).

The ENP has been criticized, revised, and amended multiple times during its short existence. The latest revision took place in 2015, and there are probably many more to come. The main criticism has been that the ENP is not reaching its goals. To come to this conclusion, one must look more closely at EU evaluation techniques within the realm of the ENP. Up until 2015 the EU used so-called Progress Reports to measure progress in ENP countries (Schumacher, 2017). One of the main methodologies of the ENP is differentiation. This means that each ENP country has its own individual Action Plan and Progress Reports (Barbé & Johansson-Nogués, 2008). Hence, there are no overall objectives and benchmarks but in cooperation with the third country, country-specific goals are agreed upon and these are used as benchmarks to measure success and failure. Del Sarto and Schumacher (2011) criticized that the “arbitrary and useless selection of pseudo-benchmarks [...] undermine the effectiveness of the leverage model of democratization policies” (p.932). Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis, success of the ENP has to be defined, to link EU practices in norm diffusion to increased success of the policy itself. Therefore, even though critics have pointed out the arbitrarily applied benchmarks in ENP Progress Reports, these Progress Reports serve as the main tool to identify success of the ENP in this thesis, as the goal is not to establish a binary of success/failure but to see whether progress can be detected.

The question remains, however, how the EU can ensure success of the ENP. As mentioned earlier, the ENP’s tools and techniques are widely considered inadequate for the policy area, as they are based on conditionality, which worked well in the case of enlargement, but not for neighborhood relations (Noutcheva, 2015). Hence, the underlying logic of the ENP should be analyzed more thoroughly.

The EU’s foreign policy approach is inherently different to that of a traditional nation state. Therefore, scholars use the theory of external governance to explain the EU’s actions. Lavenex (2004) defines this as “[taking] place when parts of the *acquis communautaire* are extended to non-member states” (p.683). As opposed to more traditional foreign policy theories, external governance focuses on norm diffusion and policy transfer through legalization and socialization (Levenx & Schimmelfennig, 2009). This is further supported by Stoddard’s (2015) argument that the ENP’s success depends mainly on EU norm resonance in the third country. Hence, it is worth looking more specifically at the concepts of norm diffusion and resonance. The following section guides the reader through the theoretical framework used in this thesis.

3. Theoretical Framework

Checkel (2005) defines *norm diffusion* as a process of socialization in his framework of socialization theory. It is crucial to highlight that the success of this process is not required to define the process of norm diffusion itself (Schimmelfennig, 2000). If this process is successful, we can speak of norm resonance, i.e. internalization. This indicates the “adoption of social beliefs and practices into the actor’s own repertoire of cognitions and behavior” (ibid., p.112), or a shift in the actor’s behavior from a logic of consequence to a logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 2005). When a logic of consequence guides an actor’s behavior, he or she carefully analyzes all possible options and chooses the one in which the outcome most benefits the actor’s self-interest (March & Simon, 1993). On the contrary, if a logic of appropriateness guides an actor’s behavior, “rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate” (March & Olsen, 2004, p.3). Checkel (2005) further differentiates between Type I and Type II internalization. Whereas Type I internalization indicates that a shift in logics has begun because there is a certain degree of “automaticity” in the actor’s behavior, Type II internalization indicates that the actor has actively and reflectively internalized the new logic of appropriateness. These results can be achieved by different mechanisms: (1) strategic calculation, (2) role playing, and (3) normative suasion (ibid.).

Strategic calculation is rooted in instrumental rationality and can only work when political conditionality is present, as it uses incentives and rewards to trigger certain behavior from the actor that is to be socialized. This by itself cannot lead to internalization as it is based on rational cost-benefit calculations and does not transform the actor’s belief system (ibid.). Role playing is different to strategic calculation as it is based on the assumption of bounded rationality. This means that actors are bound by cognitive and structural limitations, such as time and information, and therefore aim to achieve a satisfactory instead of an optimal solution (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). Here, a shift in logics can be achieved if contact between actors is intense, occurs in small groups, and is sustained for a significant, and long duration (Checkel, 2005). This shift in logics, however, falls short of Type II internalization as actors still play a role. Nevertheless, there is a certain “automaticity” of behavior which allows for role playing to lead to Type I internalization (ibid.). Normative suasion can accomplish the most substantial form of internalization, i.e. Type II. It has its roots in Habermasian social theory and social psychology and is hence based on

communicative rationality (ibid.). In this scenario, interests and preferences are open for redefinition, given that one actor succeeds in persuading the other actor with convincing arguments. If successful, the actor will “actively and reflectively internalize the new understandings of appropriateness” (p.812). Conditions that are beneficial to the success of normative suasion are: (1) if socialization occurs in a new and little-politicized policy field, (2) if the actor to be socialized has few already deeply rooted beliefs in this area, and (3) the socializer has authority and behaves according to its own principles without lecturing or demanding (ibid.).

Other scholars addressed the issue of norm diffusion differently. Krasner (1999) and Goldstein et al. (2000) are representatives of the notion that norms are simply outcomes of power battles and are chosen by the strongest actors for their rational utility. However, the entire puzzle of this thesis is built on the assumption that the EU cannot simply impose its norms on other actors, which is why this strand of theory is disregarded. Other authors, such as Sandholtz (2008) and O’Mahoney (2014), do agree that norms are socially constructed by the interaction of actors. However, both conceptualized models in which actors reshape norms through disputes, which are solved using convincing arguments and precedents. While O’Mahoney further specifies how norms are changed when they are either ambiguous, inconsistent, or inadequate, both models do not focus on the mechanisms used for persuasion. Furthermore, persuasion in this case is a purely rational undertaking based on arguments and precedents without emotions involved. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) developed the cascade model, consisting of three stages: norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization. This model mainly explains how domestic norms spread to other countries and become international norms. However, they do not go into detail about the mechanisms of why countries choose to adopt other countries’ norms. Similarly, Risse and Sikkink (1999) developed a spiral model of norm diffusion. This model focuses on the process of how international norms become domestic norms. Through the model’s stages the interplay between foreign and domestic actors in the domestic arena is emphasized (ibid.). While this model seems fitting to analyze the case of the EU in its neighborhood, its focus on transnational advocacy groups as key agents on the international sphere reduces its suitability as the EU possesses different tools and powers.

The previously outlined approaches to analyze *norm diffusion* are insufficient to analyze an actor, such as the EU, and its tools to spread norms in a *sui generis* setting like the ENP. The

models either disregard the aspect of social construction of norms, neglect the mechanisms used for persuasion, or focus on transnational non-state actors, which are difficult to equate with the EU. Checkel's framework of norm diffusion is hence the most fitting. It does not specify the socializer's characteristics; hence it can easily be applied to the EU. Furthermore, it looks specifically at conditions under which diffusion mechanisms can be successful, and therefore lead to internalization.

To use Checkel's framework in the analysis of this paper, it has to be further operationalized. Therefore, the next section focuses on this thesis' methodology, it gives an in-depth account of the variables and their operationalization, and justifies sampling methods and case selection.

4. Methodology

The analysis of EU norm diffusion mechanisms is conducted by studying two policy areas in two countries within the timeframe of 2007 to 2010 through a qualitative case study analysis. The following section focuses on the study's methodology and research design. First, it outlines the variables and their operationalization. Second, it discusses the sampling methods. Lastly, it introduces the case studies.

4.1 Variables and Operationalization

In line with the research question, the aim of this thesis is to analyze how the EU creates norm resonance. Hence, the dependent variable is *norm resonance* itself. This concept is defined as successful socialization, i.e. internalization, and as outlined previously, can be further broken down into Type I and Type II (Checkel, 2005). While Type II internalization is described by Checkel as a more comprehensive form of internalization, for this thesis, they are taken as two different qualities of socialization that are not in a successive relationship. The two independent variables are *funding* and *enhanced relations* as ENP tools to create norm resonance. As laid out before, the ENP mainly uses four mechanisms. However, it is to be expected that two of the four, i.e. technical support and investments of the EIB, mainly trigger strategic calculation on parts of the third country, as they are heavily based on incentives and rewards (cf. *ibid.*). While on first sight *funding* may seem like an incentive-based mechanism too, it is important to note that the funds are directed towards changes in the government structure that are inherently ideological. Therefore, this paper focuses on *funding* and *enhanced relations* to detect socialization processes.

The dependent variable, *norm resonance*, is operationalized into two aspects. First, compliance in the area in question is taken into account. Positive feedback in the EU Progress Reports within the analyzed timespan indicates *compliance*. The overall progress made in the four years is summarized and classified as either negative, none, limited, some, or substantial progress. Since the reports focus on governmental policies and not public opinion, internalization within the government is considered *norm resonance*. Second, the conditions set out by Checkel for socialization are part of the operationalization as well to give a stronger indication that compliant behavior is caused by socialization and not rational, incentive-based behavior. For Type I

internalization, these conditions are: (a) contact in small groups, and (b) intense, long, and sustained contact; for Type II internalization, they include: (a) a novel and uncertain environment, (b) few, prior ingrained beliefs, (c) the socializer has authority, (d) the socializer acts out of principle, and (e) contact takes place in less-politicized settings (ibid.). Hence, if through the analysis, it is detected that increased compliance has occurred in combination with a majority of these preconditions being fulfilled in the set-up of the projects, it will be taken as a strong indicator that socialization has taken place.

As this thesis aims to analyze whether ENP mechanisms can create norm resonance, both independent variables are ENP mechanisms, i.e. *funding* and *enhanced relations*. *Funding* is operationalized as the money budgeted for bilateral projects under the NIP for the timeframe of 2007-2010. *Enhanced relations* are represented by additional regional projects Morocco and Jordan participate in within the given policy area. The architecture of these projects is then analyzed according to Checkel's framework to establish whether preconditions for internalization are fulfilled.

Considering the mechanisms, it is hypothesized that *funding* will, if at all, lead to Type I internalization, as this type is triggered by role playing, which implies bounded rationality. Hence, through interaction in small groups as well as funding, a shift of logics has begun (Checkel, 2005). *Enhanced relations*, on the other hand, could lead to Type II internalization, as increased contact will lead more easily to an actively and reflectively internalized new logic of appropriateness (ibid.). However, norm diffusion is very difficult to achieve. Therefore, it is crucial to understand that even if some conditions may be beneficial to successful socialization, the maintenance of a logic of consequence is always possible.

4.2 Sampling

As the research method above is described as qualitative, data collection thus involves mainly qualitative sources, with the only exception of the EU budget. All documents are analyzed according to the variables outlined in the previous section.

Data to establish whether the neighboring states are complying with EU values and norms is gathered through EU Progress Reports, that can be found on the European External Action Service's website. Each countries' NIP is used to identify the funds directed to both policy areas,

and the EU Neighbours South portal and EuropeAid publication (2010) “Our Neighbours: Panorama of Regional Programmes and Projects in the Mediterranean Countries” is consulted to detect the regional projects and their characteristics.

The following table summarizes the variables, their operationalization, and sampling.

Variables	Operationalization	Sampling
Norm Resonance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Compliance (i.e. negative, none, limited, some, or substantial progress) - Majority of preconditions met for either type of internalization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU Progress Reports 2007-2010
Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Amount of funding 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Indicative Program 2007 - 2010
Enhanced Relations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Involvement in regional projects - Architecture of these projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project Websites

Table 1: Variables, Operationalization, and Sampling

4.3 Case Selection

The base assumption of this thesis is that the trump card of accession to the EU is not available as an incentive for compliance in the ENP. It is crucial that the cases used in this study guarantee this assumption. As the Eastern border of Europe is often debated, it cannot be precluded that accession is used as an incentive with the EU’s Eastern neighbors. Hence, only cases from the EU’s Southern neighborhood are worth considering for this thesis. Due to North Africa’s geographical location, demarcated from Europe by the Mediterranean Sea, it will always remain a neighbor and never be considered a possible member. Therefore, Morocco and Jordan have been selected as case studies.

Experts traditionally considered, both, Morocco and Jordan to be good students of the ENP (Lannon, 2010). Furthermore, both countries are important partners to the EU. Morocco’s ties to France guide its close relationship to the Union (Bendiek, 2008), and Jordan is crucial to the EU due to its geographical position on the Arabic peninsula and stabilizing effect on the region (EEAS, 2016). Moreover, both countries have a similar population composition, Arabs and

Sunni Muslims, and are Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchies (CIA, 2016). While it is never possible to draw generalizable conclusions from a limited number of cases, the two cases selected are a good indicator for what could foster EU norm diffusion processes in a favorable environment. Hence, they serve as two similar and most probable cases that allow for exploratory research, which can subsequently contribute to further research on EU norm diffusion.

The analysis of EU interaction with Morocco and Jordan focuses mostly on interactions between the EU and the respective third country government. While it is not formulated as bluntly, the EU will always prefer a stable and undemocratic neighborhood to an unstable and democratic one. Therefore, it will mostly support existing governments and not non-state actors that could challenge the regime (Börzel & Lebanidze, 2015). Hence, when looking for norm resonance, the focus lies on governmental policies and not public opinion, as stated previously. The Arab Spring has caused the EU much trouble in this respect. Additionally, it also led to domestic changes that cannot be attributed to the EU's efforts of democracy promotion. Thus, the timeframe of analysis is limited to the first complete budgetary period of the ENPI (2007-2010). This has the benefit of controlling for the events of the Arab Spring, as well as allowing for complete data with regards to budgetary expenses and evaluation reports of programs.

The policy areas, social policy and institution building, were selected because of an asymmetry in *funding* and *enhanced relations*. This asymmetry benefits the analysis as it allows for a better distinction between the two ENP tools. After having previously outlined the research design, theory, and framework, the subsequent section focuses on the analysis of the two policy areas.

5. Analysis

The data collection for the following analysis occurred through a qualitative content analysis of a total of twelve documents. For each country, the respective Action Plan, the NIP for the timespan of analysis, and the annual Progress Reports within the same period were analyzed. The results of all four Progress Reports per country were summarized to give an overview of the complete progress within the period in question. Then, the relevant sectors within social policy and institution building were classified into the five categories of progress laid out in the previous section.

Furthermore, a list of all EU projects (EuropeAid, 2010) the countries have participated in during the four years in question was consulted. These projects are used as a proxy for enhanced relations. The table below shows the number of projects in each policy area the two countries participated in.

Policy Area	# of Projects: Morocco	# of Projects: Jordan
Economy	9	9
Social Policy	6	6
Government & Human Rights	4	5
Culture	4	4
Environment	3	3
Energy	2	2

Table 2: Enhanced Relations (Data from: EuropeAid, 2010)

For the analysis to benefit from an asymmetry in funding and enhanced relations, the number of projects was contrasted with funding from the NIP. The table below displays the amount of funding the EU directed to different policy areas between 2007 and 2010 through the ENPI. As a result, the two policy areas analyzed in the next section are social policy and institution building, because they portray the starkest asymmetry.

Morocco		Jordan	
Policy Area	Amount of Funding (in million Euro)	Policy Area	Amount of Funding (in million Euro)
Economy	240	Economy	78
Institutional Reform	40	Institutional Reform	107
Government & Human Rights	28	Government & Human Rights	17
Environment	50	Sustainable Development	63
Social Policy	296	-	-

Table 3: Funding (Data: European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument, 2007a; 2007b)

5.1 Social Policy

The standard definition of social policy includes the government's policies towards welfare and social protection. Examples for common areas of involvement are health, housing, education, poverty, and family (Spicker, n.d.). However, when analyzing EU documents, certain inconsistencies appear in respect to what is considered social policy. Hence, in this analysis five areas are evaluated that fit into the general definition of social policy and are part of the NIP priority areas and annual Progress Reports: civil society, women's rights, worker's rights and social dialogue, research, education, and vocational training, as well as unemployment and poverty.

In social policy, Morocco receives much funding (i.e. 296 million Euro), and is involved in relatively many projects at six (European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument, 2007a; EuropeAid, 2010). Jordan by contrast only receives very little funding, as social policy is not a priority area under the NIP 2007-2010. However, some parts of social policy receive funding under other items, such as women's rights and civil society and support for education and unemployment policies. Whereas the former receives only a portion of the 17 million Euro dedicated to the priority area of political reform and good governance, the latter receives a total of 48 million Euro via the sustainability of development priority area (European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument, 2007b). Nevertheless, Jordan is involved in as many projects in this policy area as Morocco (EuropeAid, 2010). After having looked at the design of the projects to identify whether some, if any, preconditions for Type I or Type II internalization are fulfilled,

funding and enhanced relations are contrasted to the possible progress made in the issue areas mentioned above.

There are two projects in the area of education. Both the Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window and the Tempus project have a budgetary timeframe of one year, but in reality, have existed for 30 and 27 years respectively (Erasmus+, 2017; EACEA, 2013). The Erasmus Mundus project aims to promote cooperation between the EU and ENP countries (EU Neighbours South, n.d.a). It does so by facilitating student and staff mobility through partnerships and stipends. Furthermore, it enhances the role of higher education policy, international recognition of studies and qualifications as well as the international cooperation capacity of third countries (ibid.). The structure of this program shows the opportunity for long and sustained contact due to its duration. However, as it focuses on the exchange of individuals, the direct impact on policy change is most likely relatively little, as it is not the same small group of people that continues to meet and discuss issues in this policy area. Therefore, role playing on part of the third country within this setting is not very likely. With regards to Type II internalization, some preconditions are fulfilled, as higher education is a relatively little-politicized policy area, and the EU as a socializer can be said to act out of principle because it has little strategic or political gain from these kinds of programs in the short term. However, a crucial element is the cumulative effect these exchanges can have. If a large number of third country nationals take part in an exchange it is a great basis for norm diffusion, as it is on the lowest and least politicized level possible. Nevertheless, this would only happen after a long time and if the program is used extensively.

While Tempus is also based around exchange and cooperation, its aims are focused more on the structural level in comparison to the Erasmus Mundus project. It supports the modernization of higher education in the neighborhood countries through structural reforms and organizes joint projects between higher education institutions (EuropeAid, 2010). Due to these joint projects, there is a better opportunity for long, intense, and sustained contact in small groups. Hence, role playing and Type I internalization are not precluded. However, as the policy sector of higher education is still little politicized, and the possibility of few prior beliefs and an uncertain environment is high, Type II internalization is also imaginable.

The one project on gender equality, “Enhancing Equality between Men and Women in the Euromed Region”, has a four-year duration. However, it is succeeded by similar projects (EU

Neighbours South, n.d.b). The project focuses on analysis, advocacy, media involvement, and capacity building. Besides these measures, it also facilitates networking to promote exchanges of experience and knowledge (EuropeAid, 2010). However, it does not become clear how often these encounters happen. Since most of these measures do not involve any sort of small group contact, chances for norm diffusion are relatively small.

Lastly, there are three projects on civil society promotion. The MED-PACT program runs for four years; however, it is preceded and followed by other programs with similar objectives (EU Neighbours South, n.d.c) MED-PACT consists of nine projects linking 30 Mediterranean and 25 EU cities to represent their inhabitants, stimulate dialogue among them and other local actors, and together develop strategies for sustainable urban development (EuropeAid, 2010, p.54). This project fulfills very well the preconditions for internalization. On the one hand, it sets the stage for long and sustained contact in small groups on the local level. On the other hand, the contact also occurs in a little-politicized policy area. Due to this, the EU could be seen as an authoritative socializer. All in all, both types of internalization are possible through the MED-PACT program.

The second program, CIUDAD, works in urban development as well and has a similar methodology to MED-PACT. CIUDAD mostly identifies and formulates projects with the aim of creating sustainable partnerships between the EU and Mediterranean local authorities (EU NeighboursSouth, n.d.d). The overall goal is to increase coordination between local and regional actors, and build capacities on the local level. CIUDAD runs for four years, which may be too little of a timeframe to build long-term sustainable partnerships (ibid.). Nevertheless, it is once again a little-politicized policy area and the focus lies on small group contacts which are supposed to be long lasting. In sum, both types of internalization are possible in the case of CIUDAD.

Tresmed, the third project on civil society promotion, has a long timeframe of initially six years, with the possibility of extension (Consejo Económico y Social de España, n.d.). Tresmed organizes study visits to 17 EU capitals to foster exchange, discussion, and learning. It is built as a forum of participation for economic and social actors, and furthermore organizes two regional seminars on education and awareness raising for the importance of education (ibid.).

Additionally, it supports the Mediterranean Economic and Social Council and lobbies for the set-up of such Councils in the individual countries. Lastly, it aims at fostering the exchange of

experiences of institutionalized dialogue between the North and the South (ibid.). This project very well fulfills the preconditions for internalization as it is set up for long-term, intense, and sustained contact in small groups. Furthermore, the study visits to EU capitals support the perception of the EU's authority. The only aspect that might be disadvantageous to norm diffusion, is the focus on institutionalized dialogue that could be seen as too politically driven in countries with a different civil society philosophy than the liberal open society vision predominant in Europe.

A summary of the project analysis can be found in the following table.

	Erasmus Mundus	Tempus	Enhancing Equality between Men and Women in the Euro-Mediterranean Region	MED-PACT	CIUDAD	Tresmed
Type I	Not likely	Potentially	Not likely	Potentially	Potentially	Potentially
Type II	Potentially	Potentially	Not likely	Potentially	Potentially	Potentially

Table 4: Project Analysis - Social Policy

5.1.1 Morocco's Progress

When looking at the Progress Reports of Morocco, some progress has been made in the realm of civil society. In 2007 the government launched a national strategy to facilitate the formation of NGOs and a step-by-step increase of inclusion into the democratic process of civil society actors can be recorded (European Commission, 2008a). Furthermore, there is some progress with regard to freedom of association, e.g. since 2008 criminal records of members of associations do not have to be submitted to the government anymore (European Commission, 2009a).

Nevertheless, groups touching on sensitive issues such as the conflict in Western Sahara still encounter major difficulties receiving government approval (European Commission, 2010a).

Another sector of some progress is the area of education, research, and vocational training. There are many participants in EU projects such as the 6th and 7th Framework Programs. Furthermore, the EU has awarded around 86 Erasmus mobility stipends during the time in question, and 16 Tempus projects, 12 Erasmus Mundus student, and 14 researchers received EU grants (European Commission, 2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011a). Morocco continuously proceeded to align towards the Bologna process and the ECTS system during the four years, without any crucial

results being documented, despite Morocco's participation in the 12th Political Forum on the Bologna Process (*ibid.*). The Moroccan government modernized and decentralized the education sector (European Commission, 2008*a*). Nevertheless, it remains faced with substantial problems of illiteracy, school drop-outs, and a lack of human and financial capital for the sector (*ibid.*). To address issues such as the high illiteracy rate and the low school enrollment rate, the government proposed legislation in 2010 to create an agency for alphabetization, and an Emergency Plan was established focusing on school access in rural areas, especially for girls, and disabled children. While there has been some progress in these regards, problems remain (European Commission, 2011*a*). An EU-Mediterranean University in Fès was created in 2008, and a Jean Monnet Module on EU-Mediterranean relations which is now taught in Casablanca (European Commission, 2009*a*, 2011*a*). Furthermore, a twinning program to integrate the Moroccan research system into the European Research Space began in 2011 (European Commission, 2011*a*). With regards to vocational training, the respective ministry drafted a plan to improve training through an apprenticeship system with the aim to better match skills with jobs (European Commission, 2009*a*). However, it failed to set-up the body in charge of this issue until 2010. Overall, the Progress Reports depicts a mixed picture with regards to progress in this sector. Hence, the sector is categorized as only having achieved some progress.

In all other areas, only limited progress is disclosed by the analysis of the Progress Reports. The efforts with regards to women's rights remain modest. Morocco introduced gender sensitive budgeting in 2009 and an Equality Agenda in 2010 (European Commission, 2010*a*, 2011*a*). Furthermore, women are now allowed to pass on their nationality to their children, and the government lifted prior reservations towards CEDAW in 2008 (European Commission, 2008*a*, 2009*a*). Nevertheless, Morocco failed to introduce corresponding measures to implement CEDAW, did not pass a law against domestic violence by 2010, even though it was in preparation since 2006, and the application of the new Family Code remained difficult throughout the entire timeframe due to uninformed judges and the lack of other capacities (European Commission, 2008*a*, 2009*a*, 2010*a*, 2011*a*).

A similar pattern of formal initiatives, but with a lack of implementation, is seen in the area of worker's rights and social dialogue. Even though the government initiated a national Economic and Social Council in 2010, civil society has criticized it for its composition and role (European

Commission, 2010a). There is continued dialogue on various issues, e.g. strike legislation and voluntary return, however the government produced no results in the timeframe in question (European Commission, 2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011a).

Lastly in the area of poverty and unemployment, progress has remained limited even though it has been one of the priority areas of the Moroccan government. In the investigated timeframe, the unemployment rate increased, the Human Development Index declined, and the poverty rate remained unchanged at around nine percent (ibid.). Morocco remains burdened with large social and regional inequalities and a fragmented labor market as well as development policy (ibid.). Nevertheless, some progress can be recorded. The alphabetization rate increased, school enrollment conditions improved and led to higher enrollment, child and infant mortality rates decreased, and there is a higher registered number of births in well-equipped hospitals (European Commission, 2011a).

In conclusion, education, research, and vocational training receive a relatively high amount of funding and are supported by two projects that may be able to fulfill preconditions for internalization. This policy area also shows the most progress in relation to the other areas. Enhancing gender equality, by contrast does not receive much funding, and the project to enhance relations between the EU and Morocco does not provide the framework to fulfill preconditions of internalization. Accordingly, progress in this area is only limited. Lastly, with regards to civil society and social dialogue, only limited funding is applied but three projects, all dealing with exchange and capacity building, support development in these areas with some success. Overall, while all of this is only an indication, a certain pattern appears which seems to support the hypothesis that projects fulfilling the preconditions of internalization are crucial for socialization. If these projects are further strengthened by funding, even more progress is registered in the corresponding sectors. For the purpose of clarification, these results are summarized in the table below.

Sectors	Funding	Enhanced Relations	Progress
Civil Society	Medium	Type I: High	Some
		Type II: High	
Women's Rights	Medium	Type I: Low	Limited
		Type II: Low	
Worker's Rights & Social Dialogue	Medium	None	Limited
Research, Education & Vocational Training	High	Type I: Medium	Some
		Type II: High	
Poverty & Unemployment	High	None	Limited

Table 5: Results Morocco - Social Policy

5.1.2 Jordan's Progress

In the case of Jordan, the only policy area recording some progress is research, education, and vocational training. In 2008 the EU and Jordan signed an Agreement on Research and Technology and established a Joint Committee for its oversight that resumed its work in 2009 (European Commission, 2009b, 2010b). The Education Reform for Knowledge Economy project continued its operation throughout the entire research timeframe with the exception of one year, when it had to be suspended due to a lack of funds (European Commission, 2010b, 2011b). There is strong cooperation between the EU and Jordan in the fields of vocational training, e.g. they set up a Technical Vocational Education and Training fund in 2008; however, there have been several problems with it since, and progress slowed down in 2010 (European Commission, 2009b, 2011b). Jordan received technical help from the EU for its Accreditation and Quality Assurance program but still suffers from inconsistencies and fragmentation (European Commission, 2011b). The Jordanian government passed two new laws on Higher Education and there is some participation in exchange programs, i.e. the EU granted three Erasmus Mundus endowments, 84 mobility, as well as nine Tempus scholarships. Furthermore, Jordan participated with seven researchers in the 7th Framework Program (European Commission, 2008b, 2009b, 2010b, 2011b). Even though the EU recorded high individual impact, it laments the low overall impact (European Commission, 2010b).

There is limited progress in the areas of women's rights, and worker's rights and social dialogue. While the Jordanian government still did not ratify the International Labor Organization

Convention on freedom of association, it established a national Economic and Social Council in 2007 and a tripartite committee on social dialogue commenced its work in 2010 (European Commission, 2008*b*, 2009*b*, 2010*b*, 2011*b*). Furthermore, a conference on the rule of law and social tension took place in January 2010 (European Commission, 2011 *b*).

With regards to women's rights some progress was made as women can now apply for a passport by themselves, the age of marriage for girls was increased, there is a quota for women in municipal elections, and a High-Level Gender Forum took place in January 2007 (European Commission, 2008*b*). Furthermore, the government created a Gender Unit in the Ministry of Labor in 2008 and dropped reservations to CEDAW in 2009 (European Commission, 2009*b*, 2010*b*). Nevertheless, female participation rate in the labor force dropped to 15% in 2009 and 2010, and women are still not allowed to pass on their nationality to their children (European Commission, 2011*b*). Lastly, the government established a Complaint Bureau for victims of domestic violence in 2009 but its resources are not sufficient to operate effectively (European Commission, 2010*b*).

With regards to civil society almost no progress was made. While there was some progress with regards to freedom of assembly, freedom of association remains a challenge, especially since several International Labor Organization conventions are still not signed (European Commission, 2008*b*, 2009*b*, 2010*b*, 2011*b*). Furthermore, the government drafted a new law on NGOs, however, entirely without their involvement (European Commission, 2008*b*). Poverty and unemployment is another concerning area with little to no progress. Unemployment continues to rise, and especially youth unemployment is a major concern due to the mismatch between skills and jobs which creates a key demographic challenge (*ibid.*). An unemployment fund, which the EU had called for, was not created until 2010, and poverty remains a major problem (European Commission, 2008*b*, 2009*b*, 2010*b*, 2011*b*). While the government continued to implement the Poverty Reduction Strategy it developed in 2008 and created a corresponding coordination commission in 2009, it could not report much immediate success, and by 2010 eleven new poverty pockets developed (*ibid.*). The only success was the set-up of the first statistical office sharing data on poverty in 2010 (European Commission, 2011*b*).

While the case of Morocco has shown a pattern of association between projects fulfilling preconditions of internalization, and progress, the picture is not as clear in Jordan. The only

policy area showing some progress is research, education, and vocational training. This area also received the most funding, in relative terms, and included two projects that could potentially foster internalization. However, the policy area with the most projects, civil society, which even received some funding, though very little, displays little to no progress. A summary of the results is displayed in the table below. Sectors inconsistent to Checkel's theory are highlighted in a different shade. While the results in the case of Jordan are not very conclusive, it becomes apparent that progress can also be reached in the absence of enhanced relations, such as the case of worker's rights, and to some extent women's rights. Very importantly, however, it shows that *enhanced relations* and *funding* do not guarantee progress.

Sectors	Funding	Enhanced Relations	Progress
Civil Society	Low	Type I: High	Limited
		Type II: High	
Women's Rights	Low	Type I: Low	Limited
		Type II: Low	
Worker's Rights & Social Dialogue	None	None	Limited
Research, Education & Vocational Training	Medium	Type I: Medium	Some
		Type II: High	
Poverty & Unemployment	Medium	None	None

Table 6: Results Jordan - Social Policy

5.1.3 Summary of Results

In sum, the pattern appearing in Morocco which indicates a correlation between projects that fulfill the preconditions of internalization, funding, and progress is not supported by the results of the analysis of Jordan. While the pattern detected in Morocco is reproduced for the policy area with the most progress recorded in Jordan as well, it becomes clear that funding and projects are no guarantee for progress, as the lack of progress in the realm of civil society shows. This points towards other factors of norm diffusion that are not considered in this thesis. Hence, Checkel's theory of socialization seems to oversimplify the processes and preconditions of internalization. While this does not mean, it should be entirely rejected, it points towards the need for greater refinement of the theory and inclusion of more factors in the analysis. The following section

analyzes the policy area of institution building, to see whether this claim can be extended, or is only applicable to social policy.

5.2 Institution Building

The term *institution building* is not very well defined in academia. Since this paper is concerned with EU policy, it uses the definition from the European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations unit in the European Commission (2016), which states that institution building “[reinforces] institutional and administrative capacity [and strengthens] democratic institutions, public administration and organization [...]”. Therefore, the areas of electoral processes, judicial reform, public sector reform, and public finances and tax reform are considered. Additionally, each case has one specific category, which is decentralization in the case of Morocco and parliamentary cooperation in the case of Jordan, that is absent in the respective other country. These sectors were chosen because, on the one hand, they fit into the general definition of institution building. On the other hand, they are included in the priority areas of the NIP, and evaluated in the annual Progress Reports.

In the case of institution building, funding is opposite to the case of social policy (cf. Table 3). Here, Jordan receives relatively much funding in contrast to Morocco. The EU directs a total of 107 million Euro solely to institution building. This includes public finance and public administration reform, and support to the implementation of the Action Plan. This support encompasses the monitoring of reforms, performance, good governance, and transparency (European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument, 2007*b*). Additionally, Jordan also receives some funding in support of judicial reform and parliamentary cooperation via the political reform and good governance priority in the NIP, which amounts to a total of 17 million Euro for the entire priority area (ibid.). Morocco on the contrary, only obtains 40 million Euro for institutional support which includes support for public administration reform and the implementation of the Action Plan (European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument, 2007*a*). Furthermore, Morocco receives an additional 20 million Euro via the governance and Human Rights priority that is earmarked for the support of judicial reform (ibid.). *Enhanced relations* in institution building are not very pronounced as both countries only participate in one program, which is the Euro-Med Justice program, enhancing cooperation in the judicial sphere (EuropeAid, 2010; cf. Table 2). As in the section on social policy, the project is analyzed to

identify whether preconditions for internalization are fulfilled. Afterwards, *funding* and *enhanced relations* are contrasted to the progress made in the sectors mentioned above.

The Euro-Med Justice program only lasts for three years, from 2008-2011. However, it is a program like Erasmus or Tempus that is continuously renewed (Euro-Med Justic, n.d.). Hence, even though the initial timeframe is not very long, the renewals ensure long and sustained contact. The main aim of the project is to foster cooperation in the area of justice by strengthening the institutional and administrative capacity of the judicial sector in the third country (EU Neighbours South, n.d.e). This is done through the set-up of four working groups on the topics of access to justice and legal aid, justice and new technologies, resolution of cross-border family conflicts, and criminal and prison law. These working groups meet 24 times throughout the duration of the program and draft a report and handbook on the topics of the working groups (ibid.). Furthermore, the project also organizes three study visits to the EU for judges, magistrates, prosecutors, and other members of the judiciary, two Training Center visits, the drafting of two research reports and the creation of a website to allow for widespread access. Moreover, the EU and its partners organize three regional conferences to discuss the progress of the project with its participants (ibid.). In this project, the long, sustained, and intense contact in small groups is given. However, the subject matter is not a novel environment and is often very much politicized, as the policy area of justice lies at the heart of the government. Therefore, only preconditions for Type I internalization are likely.

	Euro-Med Justice
Type I	Potentially
Type II	Not likely

Table 7: Project Analysis - Institution Building

5.2.1 Morocco's Progress

Morocco made most progress in public finances and tax reform. Additionally, it also recorded substantial progress in electoral processes. While the Progress Reports did not mention public sector reform at all, it recorded some progress with regards to decentralization and only limited progress in judicial reform.

Both the national and the communal elections, in 2007 and 2009 respectively, went relatively well. Amendments to the electoral law in 2009 led to new communal divisions, increased the number of women elected, strengthened local government, improved local budgetary procedures,

and led to less national scrutiny over local finances (European Commission, 2010a). Furthermore, the elections in 2007 were the first that allowed international observers. Nevertheless, there is still no judicial framework for such observers (European Commission, 2008a).

In terms of public finances and tax reform much has happened in Morocco. The administration office for customs and taxes continued to modernize over the four years, and the number of registered businesses increased annually (European Commission, 2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011a). The ministry established an Authorized Economic Operator in July 2010 and the Combined Nomenclature entered into force in June 2011 (European Commission, 2011a). There is a continued effort of improving the management of budgetary resources, i.e. control of public finances. For example, in 2010 all departments received handbooks on the new management methods (*ibid.*). Furthermore, the computerization of public expenditure chains is used widely and improves the reliability of accounting and budgetary systems, and performance indicators are continuously introduced to better control public finances (*ibid.*). In 2009 the government established a legal obligation of businesses with a high turn-over in value to declare and pay their Value-Added Tax and company tax online through the office of the Inspector General of Finances (European Commission, 2010a). Furthermore, a general code on taxation entered into force in January 2007 and the preparation of a reform of the organic budget law inspired by EU practices commenced in 2009 (European Commission, 2008a, 2010a). Nevertheless, in those four years, there has been no progress on fiscal reform (European Commission, 2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011a).

Some progress was made in terms of decentralization. A Consultative Commission on Regionalization met for the first time in January 2010 and its initial mandate of six months has been extended to one year (European Commission, 2011a). Regionalization is a continued process, but the EU suggested that it would be more effective if it were integrated into a broader national framework (European Commission, 2009a). The policy areas of health and education have made significant progress in decentralizing (European Commission, 2008a). Furthermore, in the same year the government signed a law introducing fiscal reforms to give more financial authority to municipal councils. However, these councils still lack administrative capacity and the role of local politicians is not sufficiently clear defined (*ibid.*).

Lastly, there has been only limited progress in judicial reforms. They remain a major challenge throughout the entire timeframe, especially with regards to increasing the judiciary's independence (European Commission, 2011a). The Reform Strategy (2008-2012) consists of six principles, such as the consolidation of judicial independence and the moralization of the justice system, that have been developed through a consultative process with 100 organizations. For each principle, a corresponding working group exists; however, the exact content and extent of the reforms is still unclear (European Commission, 2009a). The Ministry of Justice received budget increases in 2009 and 2010 and completed the deployment of a computerized system for judicial administration in 2010 as part of a MEDA program (European Commission, 2011a). Another improvement is the creation of a judicial database in 2008 to increase access to judicial texts and other resources (European Commission, 2009a). Furthermore, the government signed a new Criminal Code in 2008, as well as two new laws to simplify judicial procedures in 2007 (European Commission, 2008a, 2009a). Cooperation between in the EU and Morocco in this field is positive. Morocco participated actively in the Euro-Med Justice Program and has adhered to important conventions under the The Hague Conference since 2010. Furthermore, Morocco cooperates with the European Council to train judges (European Commission, 2011a).

Overall, the pattern detected in social policy cannot be supported in the case of institution building. The sector that made the most progress, public finances and tax reform, was not involved in any enhanced relations and received only minor funding. In contrast, judicial reform received the same amount of funding but was involved in one project that favors Type I internalization, but made the least progress. These results are shown in the table below and inconsistencies to the theory are highlighted.

Sectors	Funding	Enhanced Relations	Progress
Electoral Progress	Low	None	Substantial
Judicial Reform	Low	Type I: Medium Type II: Low	Limited
Public Sector Reform	Medium	None	None
Public Finances & Tax Reform	Medium	None	Substantial
Decentralization	Low	None	Some

Table 8: Results Morocco - Institution Building

5.2.2 Jordan's Progress

Progress in institution building in Jordan went relatively well. One of the areas shows substantial progress and two sectors show limited or some progress respectively. The area with the most progress is, like Morocco, public finances and tax reform. Here the reform of the public finance management system recorded the most progress. These reforms include a medium-term expenditure framework, an improved medium-term fiscal framework, an efficiently implemented single treasury account, improved budget classifications, and the preparation for results-based budgeting (European Commission, 2008*b*). The income tax and sales tax departments were merged into one unit in 2008 and adopted all secondary legislation needed to implement the income tax law and general tax law in 2010 (European Commission, 2009*b*, 2011*b*). Furthermore, a temporary tax law which unifies budget categories and upgrades the efficiency of collection methods entered into force in January 2010. However, it has been a slow process throughout these four years, with no progress in 2007 and a rejection of the draft in 2008 (European Commission, 2008*b*, 2009*b*, 2010*b*).

The areas showing some progress in Jordan are parliamentary cooperation and judicial reform. With regards to parliamentary cooperation between Jordan and the EU, the cooperation increased in 2007 and 2008 with several visits from both sides in these years (European Commission, 2008*b*, 2009*b*). In the following two years, parliamentary cooperation was not mentioned, which leads to believe that not much has happened in this respect.

Judicial reform is progressing continuously with the Judicial Upgrading Strategy from 2007-2009 enhancing the organizational structure of the Ministry of Justice, the courts, and the Judicial Institute, including improving internal standard operational procedures, guidelines, and training staff for the proper implementation of these procedures (European Commission, 2009*b*). Furthermore, the government improved transparency and access through the set-up of an official website containing legislation and contact points (*ibid.*). However, there has been a lack of progress in the independence of the judiciary, which is still heavily dependent on the Ministry of Justice for funding and administration, the appointment of judges, and the existence of special courts outside of jurisdiction (*ibid.*). To address this issue, the government implemented a renewed Judicial Upgrading Strategy in 2010 (European Commission, 2011*b*). While Jordan actively participates in the Euro-Med Justice Program, it has not yet ratified the conventions

under the The Hague Conference and only in 2009 joined a working party on mediation under the Malta Process (European Commission, 2010*b*, 2011*b*).

Limited progress was made with regards to the electoral process and public sector reform. In 2009, the government signed a new Code of Conduct to improve transparency and accountability in the public sector. However, its implementation remains yet to be seen (European Commission, 2010*b*). Furthermore, an Ombudsman bureau is operational since February 2009, and the parliament appointed an Ombudsman in June of the same year. The bureau also joined the Mediterranean Association of Ombudsmen in December 2009 (*ibid.*). The electoral process has seen improvement in that the government signed a new temporary election law in November 2010. While it increased the number of seats in the lower house and occupied by women, it maintained the voting system which favors rural areas due to the uneven allocation of seats and disincentivizes the development of political parties. Furthermore, there is still no independent electoral body (European Commission, 2011*b*).

This part of the analysis shows that the most progress is made where most funding happened. Even though judicial reform was the only sector that was also involved in enhanced relations through a project that favored Type I internalization, not much progress is seen here. This may be due to the lack of monetary incentives or the politicized nature of the area. Interestingly, public sector reform has not progressed much, even though it received much funding. This could be explained by the fact that much focus and resources were directed towards public finance reform instead of public administration reform. The table below once again serves as a summary of the results, as well as a visualization of the largest inconsistencies between theory and analysis.

Sector	Funding	Enhances Relations	Progress
Electoral Progress	Medium	None	Limited
Judicial Reform	Medium	Type I: Medium Type II: Low	Some
Public Sector Reform	High	None	Limited
Public Finances & Tax Reform	High	None	Substantial
Parliamentary Cooperation	Medium	None	Some

Table 9: Results Jordan - Institution Building

5.2.3 Summary of Results

Overall, the pattern seen in the previous section is not repeated in institution building. Here, Morocco made most progress in public finances and tax reform, an area with no enhanced relations and relatively little funding. In contrast, judicial reform, a sector with the same amount of funding but with enhanced relations, made the least progress of all sectors. For Jordan, a similar picture appears, where funding led to the most progress, and a policy area with enhanced relations but little to no funding made almost no progress. Hence, no clear conclusion can be drawn, as what was hypothesized in the beginning could not be supported by the analysis. Nevertheless, this supports the previous claim that a straight-forward application of Checkel's theory of socialization is not enough to investigate norm resonance, and hence needs refinement.

5.3 Assessment of Norm Diffusion Mechanisms

The prior analysis set out to look into the EU's norm diffusion mechanisms in its neighborhood. In order to do so, the analysis focused on three aspects in the policy areas of social policy and institution building. First, the amount of funding for each policy area was put into perspective to distinguish between much or little funding. Second, to account for enhanced relations, regional programs set-up by the EU for the specific policy area were analyzed according to Checkel's framework for socialization to see whether they fulfill preconditions for Type I or Type II internalization. Third, the progress in each policy area in the timeframe from 2007 to 2010 was analyzed. These results were then compared to see whether a pattern between funding, enhanced relations, and progress could be determined.

Previously, it was hypothesized that especially enhanced relations would lead to norm diffusion, as they foster internalization, if the projects fulfill the preconditions for it. Funding would most likely only lead to Type I internalization, if at all, as it can quickly result in strategic calculation, if monetary incentives are high enough and not accompanied by a setting favorable to internalization.

However, the results of the analysis show contradicting outcomes of the different policy areas and countries. The case of Morocco in social policy seems to prove the hypothesis, as most progress has been made in the sectors where funding meets fulfilled preconditions for internalization. However, the results of Jordan already contradict this pattern, as there was a lack

of progress in sectors with funding and fulfilled preconditions of internalization. Institution building further complicates the conclusion, because in Morocco progress is found in sectors without funding or enhanced relations, whereas there is no progress in sectors with the same amount of funding but with projects that fulfill the preconditions for internalization. A similar outcome occurred for Jordan in the case of institution building.

This inconsistency in results leads to the conclusion that the mechanisms of *funding* and *enhanced relations* cannot reliably diffuse EU norms in its neighborhood. Hence, the research question of how the EU created norm resonance in Jordan and Morocco between 2007 and 2010 cannot be answered sufficiently. Nevertheless, there are two main takeaways: first, the analysis' focus is too narrow to rule out other important factors and variables. Second, the analysis shows that there are different forms of rationality that can impact compliance. Hence, while this analysis cannot definitely detect norm diffusion practices, it indicates the need to refine Checkel's theory of socialization. This refinement should include more factors as this analysis showed that norm resonance cannot be investigated by a straight-forward application of the theory.

The lesson learned and policy recommendation from this analysis for the future of the ENP is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to a successful ENP in neighboring countries. Much is dependent on domestic circumstances and the architecture of the individual policy areas. Overall, it would be beneficial to focus on technical assistance and leave out the ambitious notion of democracy promotion, as norm diffusion in such politicized areas is difficult, if not impossible. Hence, the latest revision of the ENP in 2015 is laudable, as it abolishes the notion of democracy promotion almost completely and focuses on sector specific collaboration in areas such as economic, counter-terrorism, and security cooperation (Schumacher, 2017).

6. Conclusion

The EU's engagement in its immediate neighborhood has been long ongoing, and its ineffectiveness much criticized. However, if the EU continues to see itself as a soft regional power and normative actor who is diffusing its norms of democracy, rule of law, and good governance, to benefit populations around the world, its methods and their effectiveness have to be scrutinized.

The ENP's effectiveness was called into question due to its ambiguous behavior, claiming to spread democracy, yet acting out of self-motivation to secure a stable neighborhood, as well as offering few credible incentives. Hence, academia pointed out the need for existing norm resonance in the third country to ensure success. However, when consulting socialization theory a vicious cycle appears where ultimately norm resonance is needed to create norm resonance, among other factors. To ensure an effective and efficient policy and avoid tautology, there is an urgent need to look into the mechanisms used by the EU to diffuse its norms. A better understanding of whether and how these mechanisms work benefits not only policy analysts and decision-makers to improve EU foreign policy, but also researchers and academics in the field of socialization theory.

By conducting exploratory research with a most probable case study, this thesis aimed at analyzing ENP tools in a favorable environment to give indications for further research. Morocco and Jordan are both considered good students in the realm of the ENP, have comparable characteristics in terms of population and governmental structure, and are hence good cases to explore the effectiveness of EU norm diffusion tools. These tools, namely *funding* and *enhanced relations*, were analyzed according to Checkels' (2005) framework of socialization and compared against the progress made in the respective policy areas. The analysis showed that funding and enhanced relations do not consistently produce progress. Furthermore, progress may also occur in areas where no preconditions for internalization were fulfilled. Therefore, while norm resonance may be desired because it more likely leads to normative persuasion and hence Type II internalization, sometimes monetary incentives, if credible, already encourage progress. Hence, socialization theory cannot completely account for norm resonance and progress in the field of ENP, and therefore needs some refinement as socialization is more complex than what has been covered in the previous analysis.

Due to this finding it is crucial to reassess the exclusion of technical assistance and EIB loans from the analysis. The two mechanisms were excluded on the ground of theoretical considerations. However, as stated above, other forms of rationality or variables may have an impact on compliance and lead to a need to refine Checkel's theory to account for a more diverse setting of norm diffusion. As this takes away the basis for the exclusion of technical assistance and EIB loans, it may be worth to include them in future research.

While this thesis provided a thorough analysis, several shortcomings of the analysis should be acknowledged. First, since the language used in EU documents and categorizations made by EU officials varied in the different countries and years, considerable discretion was used when deciding on the categories of analysis. Furthermore, the clear distinction between categories was further complicated by a certain degree of spill-over and overlap between the different policy areas. Nevertheless, a large effort has been made to ensure the comparability of categories. Second, the entire analysis focuses on official EU documents. While other methods, such as in-depth interviews and long-term on-site investigation of decision-making processes, are more suitable for the analysis of socialization processes, a lack of time and resources did not allow for these methods to be used during this research project. Hence, appropriate proxies were created to nonetheless conduct a meaningful analysis. A suggestion for further research would be to take up the research question but collect data from interviews and meeting observations over a large timeframe. Lastly, the progress recorded in Morocco and Jordan was restricted to four years. However, it should be recognized that especially in terms of governmental reform, progress may take a long time to occur. For the purpose of a more narrow and concise analysis, this short timeframe was used. However, further research could widen this window of analysis and investigate a more long-term progress.

The lesson learned from this analysis, is that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to norm diffusion. If the EU wants to remain a credible actor in its neighborhood, it has to step away from over-encompassing programs, without a clear focus and too many simultaneous intentions. The latest change in the ENP is already a step in the right direction, as it focuses more on sectorial transactions and less on normative issues. Even though the ENP may seem less ambitious this way, it is more realistic and the years to come will show whether it will also be more successful. Nevertheless, the difficulty of credible incentives remains unresolved. Hence, further research

should be directed towards a more thorough investigation of ENP tools, to give more detailed policy recommendations on how to increase the ENP's effectiveness.

In a time where the European idea is contested more than ever, effective policies are crucial to prove the Union's ability to address today's challenges. As the European Commission's president Jean-Claude Juncker stated in 2016: "It is not about having more Europe but about having a better Europe [...]." While a better Europe is visibly needed in many internal aspects, it is also important to have a coherent and effective foreign policy approach. This approach must on the one hand portray a positive image of the EU to the world and enable the Union to form important alliances, and on the other hand stabilize its neighborhood and world politics through intelligent, fair, and effective policies. Therefore, the study and improvement of the ENP's tool and mechanisms remains a crucial task in the quest for a better Europe.

7. References

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