Moving Labor Power and Historical Forms of Migration: The Internationalist Socialist Worker, the Social Benefit Tourist and the Economic Migrant

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Statement

I hereby state that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. The thesis contains no material previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the historic formation of migratory categories is central to understanding the antagonistic relation between migration and capitalism. I substantiate this argument across three sections. I coin the concept of *moving labor power*, which is theoretically conceived in a manner that enables it to explore the moments that take place between the turning of body power into labor power (social reproduction) and the transformation of labor power into labor (production). The first section explores the agreements signed between Bulgaria and Vietnam in the period between 1973 and 1989 negotiating the exchange of labor between the two countries. The migratory category under scrutiny in this section is the internationalist socialist worker (ISW). The section proposes that state socialism framed moving labor power as a complementary and non-antagonistic relation between production and reproduction. I argue that the transition from state socialism to liberal democracy in Bulgaria brought about a situation where the relation between moving labor power, reproduction and production engendered a clear contradiction. Section two deals with the social benefit tourist (SBT): a category whose discursive formation aims at disciplining workers into laboring (production), forgoing any expectations of social welfare provision (social reproduction). SBT is free to move. Capital accumulation and freedom of movement connect in such a way that labor power depends on freed movement in order to be able to reproduce itself. In this configuration, we witness the creation of a specific type of moving labor power that must travel wide and far in order to ensure the maintenance of its body power. Section three delves into the ideological formation of the differentiation between true refugees and economic migrants. I argue that this differentiation belongs to economic liberalism, which disembeds the "economic" from the "political" by detaching coercion from processes of production, distribution and allocation, and which makes "the economy" appear free from violence. The section traces the effects of this ideological presupposition through an analysis of border crossing and detention centers. I show how these effects slow down and tame the movement of labor power into labor markets. The arguments in this dissertation are anchored in the premise that we need to exceed the legal frameworks of migration that are readily available to us and interrogate the very spaces (historical, ideological, and socio-political) of their making in order to understand the relation between capitalism and migration.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AoM	Autonomy of Migration
AVRP	Assisted Voluntary Return Programs
BCP	Bulgarian Communist Party
BHC	Bulgarian Helsinki Committee
BSP	Bulgarian Socialist Party
CAS	Central Archive Sofia
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSU	German Christian Social Union
CTU	Central Trade Union
DGB	German Trade Union Confederation
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
FAU	Free Workers' Union
FKS	German Financial Control of Illegal Employment
ILO	International Labor Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISA	Ideological State Apparatus
IWW	Industrial Workers of the World
MoI	Ministry of Interior
PRB	People's Republic of Bulgaria
REM	Regulation of the Economic Mechanism
RSA	Repressive State Apparatus
SAR	State Agency for Refugees
SAV	State Archive Vidin
SBT	Social Benefit Tourist
SHTAF	Special Home for Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners
SIA	Syria-Iraq-Afghanistan
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
UDF	Union of the Democratic Forces
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees

INTRODUCTION: FORMS OF MOVEMENT

A "refugee crisis" struck Europe in 2015. While thousands were trying to make their way into the continent, many of them drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. Others attempted to enter through Turkey into Bulgaria and then into Serbia in order to join organized transportation towards Austria and Germany. Crossing Bulgaria was a challenge however. Going to Dimitrovgrad in November of 2015, a small town on the Bulgarian-Serbian border, it became clear that the danger peculiar to the European Dublin Regulation, i.e. being fingerprinted, which in turn translates into deportation back to the first EU country of entry, was the most acute. While standing in line to hop on the bus from Dimitrovgrad to Belgrade, and from there to the Austrian border, a group of Afghans all confirmed that nobody wants to go through Bulgaria as "they force fingerprint you." "If they catch you, you will be held captive in detention." From there the conversation went into a mode of "rumor checking": "Does Germany deport to Bulgaria?" "We've heard Sweden does not," "My brother was caught in Bulgaria. Will he be returned to Turkey?"

In Dimitrovgrad, the yard of the local police department was turned into a semi reception camp. The Red Cross, UNHCR and a volunteers' team had all brought tents in order to take care of the newcomers either by providing hot tea, new shoes and clothes, or by simply participating in the spectacle of it all. The access of outsiders to the space was not easy. When I tried to enter the yard of the department, which meant that I simply had to jump over a rickety wooden fence, a police officer stopped me and explained in Serbian that I needed a permit. He accompanied me to the main building and left me waiting outside. As I was patiently waiting I saw a group of young men standing in line quietly. As it turned out, once people arrive they had to immediately form a line in order to be registered with the police department so as to be issued a document that allowed them to travel within Serbia for three days. The document saved them from entering a condition of illegality. One of the volunteers, a man in his late twenties explained to me that "Dimitrovgrad is heaven." He was part of the newly emerged "international volunteers," a self-given identification, who went from one Balkan country to another in order to help refugees. "[In Croatia for example], part of our work was to calm people down and make them stay still until the next bus comes. I think this is an important part of what we do. And I think that it is better that volunteers do that because volunteers have more respect in some sense. We also prevent people from pushing and

stepping on each other." "Are you saying that you do the job of the police?" "Yes, we assist them."

The scene and conversations from above, took place while the whole world was watching the almost surgical precision in the organization of the movement of refugees across Europe that took place in the late months of 2015. There is another form of movement that takes place across the European Union but that had remained invisible. This one is the precise opposite of what refugees endure. It is free. No border checks, no visas, no border dogs, fingerprints, and the Red Cross. The subjects of this freed movement are the EU's pauperized; often referred to as social benefit tourists.

In November 2013, a group of Bulgarians in Berlin lifted a banner in front of the Mayor's office. "We want housing and work," the banner read. The group, now known as the Eisfabrik, consisted of around thirty Bulgarian travelling laborers who were kicked out of a squatted building a few weeks prior to their protest. They had squatted an old abandoned factory back in 2011. Bringing water from the nearby river, sleeping in well built wooden barracks or tents spread throughout the floors of the building. The factory was their home. From time to time skinheads would visit the squatters but fights would rarely take place; everybody was going after their daily lives. Although they tried to keep the place low-key, newcomers from Bulgaria would come along until they found a place of their own. Finding a small job here and there was not a problem, salaries were not being paid regularly, however.

The Eisfabrik lived like this until one day a techno party took place in the factory. As the group was sleeping, masses of ravers started invading the place, playing loud music and tossing empty bottles around. The Bulgarians tried to talk them into leaving with no result. Eventually, a fight broke out. "We were tired, we wanted to sleep, all of us work hard," reasoned one of them. The police intervened and soon enough an eviction notice was glued to the factory's entrance. The Bulgarians did not resist the eviction itself. Occupations, however, followed: the offices of main political parties (Die Linke and SPD), the largest trade union DGB's office, and finally the Mayor's office were occupied within a few days. While waiting on the promised solution to their housing problem, the Eisfabrik group started sleeping rough on the streets, sometimes helped with accommodation in hotels by social services, another time using the homeless shelters, and yet other times sleeping at a camping site that was self-organized by homeless people. Their struggle finished as many others. Unable to secure

shelter, the laborers left Berlin. Some went back home, others travelled to another European country, and a small portion went to a construction site in Frankfurt that was seeking for workers.

On February 3, 2015, the Bulgarian National Library in Sofia held an exhibition organized by the related to the center-right Christian Democratic Union of Germany, Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Named "The Iron Curtain," the exhibition was a part of the larger commemorating events taking place throughout the country under the name "25 Years Free Bulgaria." The events were organized under the patronage of Bulgaria's President Rossen Plevneliev and Sofia Platform. The latter is a comparatively young organization, only launched in 2011. Its membership however, comprises strategic figures in Bulgarian politics tightly linked to the right wing parties of the country, European structures and foundations. As one entered the National Library on the day of Sofia Platform's exhibition, she was forced to walk a trail of Communist shaming. After passing the library's security and entering the main hall, one's attention was immediately attracted by the large, almost billboard-like posters that hung symmetrical to the walls. German shepherd dogs, barbed-wires, prisoners and the faces of crude border militia stared at the visitors from the placards. Right beneath the posters and behind glass showcases, stories of border murders, anathematized discourses of brave border guards, exposure of Communist border infrastructures and border newspapers invited visitors to take a close look at the "cruel and inhumane" operations of Communist Fortress Bulgaria.

The exhibition aimed at "rationalizing" the "near communist past" as it related to issues of movement and evoked images of hierarchical divisions as they pertained to the institutionalizing of the communist border. "25 Years Free Bulgaria" pointed at incomplete statistics of border-related deaths that took place between 1945 and 1990, treating state socialism as if stuck in a static temporality. During the opening event, in a speech delivered by the Bulgarian President, Plevneliev articulated the evils of the border past in two directions: firstly as separating the country from the "free world" and secondly, as an obstacle before those who tried to cross onto that same world. These, according to the President, were the true "confirmation of the inhumane nature of the totalitarian regime." Both Konrad Adenauer's representative and a Bulgarian patriot who took the stage after the President's note, translated the "illiberal" nature of the borders of the past as oriented not solely towards its outside enemy but also towards its own – those who attempted to escape the Iron Curtain.

"Those who died in their attempt to reach the free world are not homeland traitors… they have contributed to the liberation of the homeland… They travelled in order to participate in the common liberation movements of the enslaved European nations." Enslavement, homeland, and liberation are all common tropes when Communism is concerned. In this last treat of thought, we see an overlap, an attempt to synchronize the movement as a political expression ("liberation of the homeland") and a movement in its physical dimensions. These two elements became compatible.

State socialism is often depicted as if it was movement-free; both on the way out and on the way in. And yet, thousands were traversing the socialist world via state programs for labor exchange. Slavery and "inhumane treatment" are representations often attached to the workers who came to the Eastern Bloc during state socialism (Schwenkel 2014). Yet, there are at least three analytical incompatibilities with the above mentioned representations. Firstly, because of frequent reliance on methodological individualism that cannot sustain such claims, secondly because empirical evidence suggests quite different subject positions of the workers, and last but not least because of misuse of slavery as a possible mode of production in the relation between socialist countries. Liberal commentators conflate these matters and via such narratives the socialist foreign workers gain these intertwined "illiberal" attributes; if they had been slaves, then they must have also been immobilized, and vice versa.

The work to come will explore these three categories: the internationalist socialist worker, the social benefit tourist, and the economic migrant. The aim of the thesis is to read through them not as categories that belong solely to the field of migration, but to reveal their relation to modes of reproduction of labor power. My aim is to perform a historical reading of political and economic processes and conditions that make movement imperative for social reproduction. This allows me to de-essentialize the figure of the migrant through a reading of historical formations of migratory categories. When we position these formations in the temporal gap that exists between migration and labor apparatuses, i.e. the moment between one's crossing of a border and the commodification of her labor, we can explore the antagonistic relationship between migration and capitalism.

The internationalist socialist worker was a form of migration that was peculiar to state socialism and that sprung as a relation between the early and late 1970s. I take the case of the labor contracts signed between People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB) and the Socialist

Republic of Vietnam (SRV), which brought more than twenty thousand Vietnamese women and men to labor in different industries in Bulgaria ranging from agriculture, to chemical production, and construction. Vietnam was not the only country to send laborers to Bulgaria. Cuba, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Nigeria, to name a few, were all involved in the "building of really existing socialism;" a moral and material economy that was often invoked as means of political influence over the foreign workers. These foreign workers travelled in an organized manner, every five years a new contingent would replace the previous one. The negotiations regarding the work of the internationalist socialist workers was a relation between the sending and the receiving state.

Bulgaria was not the only socialist country to import labor from Vietnam. Many other countries in the Eastern Bloc had signed similar contracts with SRV. Yet, Bulgaria is of particular interest as economists and sociologists close to the Bulgarian Communist Party were one of the first to engage with the theoretical question of labor movement in socialist-type of economies. These theoretical reflections were bound to generate an understanding of the relation of the foreign worker to the host state, to the sending state, to the processes of production and reproduction, and the ethics of work. This thesis focuses on a particular exercise in political thinking that emerged in the conditions of intensification of the economy, i.e. when pro-market liberalization reforms were under way in Bulgaria. The chapters concerned with the internationalist socialist worker are positioned in a way so as to explore the struggles that took place between different reformist wings within the Communist Party. I insert the foreign worker in the midst of these struggles and trace the changing forms of the contracts vis-à-vis the changing politico-economic conditions. There are three periods under examination: the 1970s, the 1980s, and the very beginning of the 1990s. These periods do not merely follow a chronological timeline but explicate different rationales constructing the moral and material place of foreign workers in late socialist Bulgaria.

In the 1990s, movement became the locus of class struggles. Simultaneously to blacklisting the citizens of eighty countries as "potentially dangerous," Vietnamese among them, Bulgaria signed a "contract of friendship" with the Federal Republic of Germany. With the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc, Eastern Europe came to resemble a chessboard. Thousands of foreign workers were forced out of Bulgaria, Bulgarian workers abroad were forced to return home. The previous assemblage of friends turned into an assemblage of foes. The notion of freedom of movement, that is to be able to leave a state for another without the

burden of visas and border controls, gained popularity and became a political claim to possible reproduction on part of the Bulgarian working class. At the time industrial production was halted, unemployment skyrocketed and Bulgarian labor was being thrown out of the country into a consolidating new Europe, where free movement was a horizon to be achieved. With Bulgaria's accession in EU's structures in 2007, the horizon became a new reality for Bulgarian workers, locked between impossible reproduction at home and a mode of existence that presupposes more or less permanent travelling abroad.

A new migratory category was invented in 2013, that of the social benefit tourist. This new category, designed by politicians such as David Cameron and Angela Merkel, indicates the turn that Europe took towards austerity. At first aimed at Bulgarians and Romanians, the social benefit tourism discourse is an enterprise of disciplining mobile EU workers into working without expectations towards the welfare state. This discourse is, as of today, slowly making its way into infra-legal structures within the EU. Bulgarian pauperized workers in Germany work without contracts, depend on subcontractors to find jobs, often do not receive wages, sleep rough on the streets, and fall into never ending nomadism. The apparatus that is being created around social benefit tourism – police controls of "illegal" EU workers, municipalities' tight control of homeless people's right to shelters, severe checks into one's ability to claim social benefits, and policing of address registrations – reinforces a particular appearance of the pauperized. The image arrests a supposed laziness, economic idleness, theft and abuse of social welfare. When we look closer, however, we see a complex reality. That same apparatus is in fact the producer of the representations from above and reinforces the images of thievery.

The reader is probably by now reminded of a similar discourse that frames another category that belongs to migration apparatuses – that of the bogus asylum-seeker. Contrary to the social benefit tourist, the asylum seeker has to jump border fences, she is detained in immigration prisons, and viciously pushed away from EU territories. The term "bogus," when attached to a refugee or an asylum-seeker has acquired a Bourdieuian sense of doxa. Yet, it is worth mentioning that the unspoken meaning lies in the construction of refugees as fraudulent economic migrants. The bogus asylum-seeker is mostly used as a concept in the U.K. Its coining, however, developed historically in the 1990s with the restructuring of the German asylum system, where recategorization of migration definitions took place via the concept of "safe country." The latter concept transformed the status of the Eastern Bloc from a territory

drawn in political persecution to a safe place on its way to build liberal democracies. The effect was reclassification of asylum-seekers into economic migrants. The ones subjects of political persecution turned into subjects of economic misfortunes. The 1990s, thus, entangled class struggles with legal recategorization within European asylum systems.

The collusion of the economic migrant drives political projects in the EU to this day. Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán relies on the notion in order to build the facade of his "illiberal democracy," seemingly in opposition to European values. The economic migrant has acquired political meaning that spreads beyond the innovations within border and migratory apparatuses. The border fence between Serbia and Hungary was after all built by soldiers and its construction relied on workfare programs that compel unemployed into ill-secured working conditions. In this way, the created fear around the economic migrant was reinforced by an economic model, which had turned welfare into forced workfare. Further, the dubious deal between Turkey and the EU signed in 2015 with the purpose of stopping economic migration towards the union in exchange for six billion euros and accelerated visa liberalization for Turkish citizens had raised questions in regards to Europe's commitment to human rights and democratic principles. The European Commission, for its part, harnesses the notion of the "economic migrant" so as to fortify the borders of the continent and filter the latter from the genuine refugees. These recent developments are part of the ongoing reclassification of migratory categories, where we witness deepening of structures that set aside deserving refugees and non-deserving economic migrants. The filtering of the economic from the political has been mostly outsourced to the external borders of the Union. Bulgaria is one such border, where vigilante groups of hunters of fraudulent refugees and border police work conjointly in order to prevent the arrival of economic migrants. Bulgaria was the first country from the so-called Balkan Route to erect a fence along its borders with the sole purpose to stop the invasion of people seen as economic migrants into the EU. Despite these efforts, my research shows that border crossers tend to make their way into the territory after which they are detained in the so-called Special Homes for the Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners and eventually transferred to reception centers. There, they await a court decision whether or not they can remain in the country as holders of humanitarian or refugee status.

Discourses, EU policies and scientific studies encourage us to think that the above mentioned cases belong to different sets of rules and apparatuses of control. This is indeed what we see when we first approach them. In the case of the internationalist socialist worker, we deal with

inter-state contracts for the exchange of labor; in the second case we delve into the workings of freed movement within the EU context; and the third context is representative of the Common European Asylum System whose purpose is tight control over the external borders. When we invoke the rhythms of these movements, again, we are faced with a difference. Whereas the Vietnamese workers were sent and received in bulk in order to fill in labor shortages for the Bulgarian economy, the socialist benefit tourist roams fast and wide in order to find the next possible job. And yet, the asylum-seeker is captivated by a string of oppressive mechanisms that slow down and tame her movement further into the European Union. There is one particular thread I have chosen to follow, which places these cases into a relation, that of them representing movements of labor power. In other words, if the apparatuses molding the very physicality and rhythms of the movement is what separates the cases, the potentiality to look at them as moving labor power is what brings them together. I argue that there is a mutual reinforcement of the seemingly different apparatuses, which is entangled in the relationship between migration and labor regimes.

With the notion of labor power I would like to draw the attention of the reader to the idea that those who travel and whom we often think as 'migrants', can in fact be viewed as potential labor. The way the "migrant" makes sense before economic and political structures, I believe, and contrary to what Thomas Nail has proposed with his notion of the "figure of the migrant" (2015, to be discussed below), is a relation peculiar to the development and the history of liberal philosophy and capitalist relations of production. This is so precisely because of the possibility instantiated with these developments for one to sell her bodily and intellectual capacities as a commodity. The migration apparatuses in place, i.e. borders, international labor contracts, immigration prisons, the freed movement within the EU, migration agencies, are always – I will argue – in relation to labor markets, explicitly, or not. When we approach the relation between migration and labor markets in transnational movements, we can see that there is a temporal gap between one's reaching of a labor market and the migration apparatus that apprehends the movement. I situate my thesis in this temporal gap that is set aside for the relation between production and social reproduction. In this temporal gap we can see the increased dependence on movement for both the reproduction of labor power and the striving of capital.

This temporal gap, coupled with an approach to movements via the notion of labor power are important for the contribution this thesis seeks to establish. I turn to them in order to address

what I think of as categorical fetishism. That is, I would like to disturb methods that engage with the questions of migration and that have as their departing point a particular migratory category, without unsettling its seeming historical stability and without taking into account the relation and mutual reinforcement of differentiated migratory categories. I, instead, access the field through the notion of labor power and its transformation into labor that can be traced within the labor-migration nexus. The making of body-power into moving labor-power allows us to interrogate regimes of commodification and their relation to wider societal processes. When we zoom onto this temporality, that is, again, preserved for the relation between movement and the making of labor, we learn about the crafting of migratory categories, which in turn destabilizes their presumed natural state of being. That is, we can approach the craft behind the formation of migratory categories in the crossing points between ideological apparatuses, material relations, and history.

My contribution lies also in the defetishization of the migrant. To defetishize the migrant is to explore political and economic structures that make it into a phenomenon that preoccupies our historical present. The category of the migrant, then, acquires methodological significance. Only by zooming onto the conditions that establish one as a migrant, can we thus gain a historical understanding of its making and avoid categorical fetishism. To defetishize these categories, I have chosen to walk through political theories that seek to establish the epistemological (and sometimes ontological) place of movement within larger social organizations and to understand what theoretical presuppositions they entail. How is the migrant articulated in academic studies, and what other relations these theories reflect is important for the method here. I analyze these categories through a relational approach in order to explore their historical structuring.

CHAPTER ONE THE METHODOLOGY BEHIND MOVING LABOR POWER

1.1. What is Moving Labor Power?

Speaking of the body's relation to production apparatuses, Michel Foucault (2015) asserts that the former is,[1]

> [not] merely the locus of desire [for the satisfaction of one needs], but is now the source of labor-power, which must become productive force. It is precisely at this point of the transformation of physical strength into labor-power and its integration into a system of production, which will make it productive force. (P. 187)

Foucault's argument follows a line, where we can detect a double-bind process. On the one hand, there is a transformation from body-power to labor-power, and on the other hand, there is a presence of a transformative force that turns labor-power into productive power. The notion of *moving labor power* should be read in a related sense. It refers to the very physical motion realized by its subject and the ways this motion is apprehended in the migration-labor nexus. I treat physical movement as a body power, as a faculty constitutive of labor power, i.e., the capacity of the body to move could potentially be subjected to economic supply and demand. To this end, there is a specificity to the social relations that are produced and attached to a subject by the proxy of her moving as labor power. This means that physical movement can never be detached from social processes and relations. The social forces that compel someone to move; the objective socio-economic and political conditions that make movement imperative for one in order to reproduce is the moment prior to *moving labor power.*[2] In that very moment we can identify Foucault's first part of the double-bind process. When a physical strength, or a bodily capacity, is acted upon so as to become labor-power. *Moving labor power* is a relation that grasps the second part of the process and describes the character of apparatuses that capture and mold movement in the intersection between

[1] Foucault goes on to discuss the subversive tactics employed by workers in relation to production processes turning their bodily capacities against these same apparatuses. He terms these *illegalism* and asserts that the latter "consists in refusing to apply this body...to the apparatus of production (2015:187)." I discuss "illegalism" further in the chapter.

[2] This is the original formation of movement as means of reproduction. The basic assumption is that at some point, the people who have undertaken the journey to Europe, have lost access to means of subsistence they have previously had. Simply put, at some point the producer's self-reproduction has as its necessary condition a relation of movement.

migration and labor regimes. Here, in this second moment, labor power develops as potential, which presupposes the emergence of struggles over the form of commodification labor power would eventually endure. When we scrutinize migration apparatuses as a locus for the unfolding of this struggle, we can see that certain forms of commodification are more possible than others.

My thesis comprises three main historical forms of moving labor power, the categories of which are: the internationalist socialist worker, the social benefit tourist, and the migrants who move via the European asylum route. Whereas the last two forms are peculiar to our own present, the former is not. It is long gone. By discussing moving labor power in the framework of "really existing socialism," I bring new light to the knowledge of socialist regimes and also to specific configurations that emerged with the withering away of these same regimes. By exploring these forms vis-à-vis each other and the ways in which they operationalize legal, ideological and political devices that valorize the very capacity to move, I initiate a discussion that brings us closer to an understanding of what was at stake in 1989 in regards to the movement of labor power in Europe. Of course, I do not claim that state socialism exhibited liberal democratic characteristics. Just on the contrary, the rationales that initiated the relation of moving labor power were asymmetrical to their counterpart in the West, the guestworker. Socialist political theorists working in the sphere of migration, approached moving labor power as means towards full integration of the socialist bloc, where division of labor would be spread accordingly to the production in a particular country. Moreover, socialist economic theorists foresaw moving of labor power as a relation of reproduction that was to sustain the workers and their sending state, where calculations were made in a way so as to prevent economic and social losses for both sending and receiving socialist countries. And again, due to political changes within the socialist world, although we cannot easily conceptualize a relation of commodification of labor power during that period, we can trace the development of a similar relation vis-à-vis the movement of internationalist socialist workers starting in the early 1970s and progressing towards commodification in the 1980s.

I do not conceive of the categories under examination in this thesis as given, naturalized points of arrival but try to disentangle them and to see them as final products that sum up historical developments. And yet, these developments are not conceived here as "time past" but are analyzed in a way so as to extrapolate their actuality in the present.

In this sense, my work differs from other works in the field of migration studies that have chosen to preoccupy themselves with either one of the categories available to us via legislative frameworks. I take these categories and contrast them in order to denaturalize them, to think of them in relation and not as mere autonomous and independent instances. These processes are, in addition, informed by ideological presuppositions that generate concrete forms of moving labor power, i.e. different levels of permeability to labor markets, establishing a complex and multilayered relation to the state and social security and operationalizing movements accordingly to concrete political forms of racialization and differential inclusion. In other words, the ways labor power moves across borders is ideologically and materially conditioned. In our present, economic and political liberalism have had great implications for this conditioning.

1.2. Methodological Liberalism: Liberal Philisophy and the Praxis of Movement

With the term methodological liberalism I place under scrutiny both the philosophical theories that engage the question of what is movement and the effects of these theories on the practices found within migration apparatuses in our European contemporaneity. I want to draw attention to epistemological and methodological problems that stem from the uncritical use of categories and dichotomies in migration studies (such as 'political'/'economic' immigrant; social benefit tourists, etc.), and what is kept out of sight from the development of the relation between state, capital and moving labor power when scholars do not situate these categories historically and relationally.

There is a historical specificity to the ways political and economic liberalism conceptualizes the movement of populations and this specificity has to be read in the (now) globalized relation of producing a commodity specific to capitalism, that of labor power. Migratory categories cannot be divorced from the particular ideological presuppositions that do re/create them. Often such categories are used against each other in the introduction of austerity measures and, recently, an attempt was made to introduce re-entry bans within the European Union (Apostolova 2014). In this sense, migratory categories must be read as a relation that is part of larger processes of marginalization and racialization (see Rajaram's [2015] notion of common marginalizations for detailed discussion on this relation). The proliferation of migratory categories hierarchizes subjects dubbed 'migrants,' in the meantime establishing

possibilities for infinite fragmentation of labor (or what Mezzadra and Neilson [2013] call "the multiplication of labor").[3] The conditions for this fragmentation must be sought after in the intersection between migration and labor regimes, where differentiated movements (e.g. asylum system and freed movement) create differentiated legal categories, which in turn provide for differentiated access to labor markets, forms of commodification and possibilities for reproduction, and not least lead to (im)possibilities of seeking commonalities in class struggles.

The ethos manufactured around economic and political liberalism in relation to movement provides me with an epistemological glance over the historical specificity of this fragmentation. I first turn to discussing some of the liberal theories that engage movement as an object of inquiry in order to trace their implications for the way migration apparatuses are being structured. I then proceed to analyze how movement can be read as a necessity for the reproduction of labor power. The chapter finishes with a comment on the methodology used for the writing of the thesis and a map of the work presented here.

Hagar Kotef (2015:3) demonstrates that the classic, or early political liberalism from the 17th and 18th century had as one of its core elements, within its wider apparatus of notions such as will, equality, and reason, a conception of freedom that abstracted the liberal subject as being capable to move, to use freely her capacity of locomotion. The author engages with the texts of Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Hobhouse, among others, to develop a genealogy of liberal political thought concerned with the place of movement, of locomotion, in the development of the liberal tradition.

She explores the texts of Thomas Hobbes to show that his theorization of movement was not only a matter of metaphorical usage, as some have claimed, but also a "material form through which other questions are negotiated (questions of freedom, citizenship, location, right) and that thereby becomes a technology of rule" (2015:73). The author explains that,

> … forming the idea that the citizen – to some extent a newly emerging political entity at the time – is a function of particular patterns of movement. I claim that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, free movement was a quintessential element in the corpus of work that would become the foundation of liberal thought (2015:64)

[3] As proposed by the authors, the notion of multiplication of labor grasps the mutation of relations that develop between borders, political processes and labor forces. It is concerned with the composition of living labor, e.g. heterogenization of workforces and the intensification of labor processes.

Thomas Hobbes, claims Kotef (2015:66), was in a way a political theorist of movement. He "identified freedom as but 'the absence of… *external impediments of motion'"* (Kotef 2012). Basically, to operationalize freedom, movement appeared as a technology of power that was capable to ease the manifestation of this freedom, to make it possible.

John Locke in the *Treaties* (written in 1689), for his part, claims Kotef, apprehended freedom as the opposite to boundless movement; freedom was expressed counter to movement and dependent "upon some confinement of the individual" (Uday Mehta 1992, cited in Kotef 2015:77). What was peculiar to Locke was that his approach to movement concerned space and not the body (Kotef 2015:79). His preoccupation with the necessity to border movement was an effect of a particular abstraction of property as possibly private. Locke, thus, conceptualized freedom vis-à-vis private property and the necessary fences protecting that same property.[4]

After all, John Locke understood "private property [to accrue] from the admixture of labor and land" (Wolfe 2016:3). That which is the mixture between one's labor and nature, is a product that belongs to the laborer who created it, it creates ownership. But whose labor and whose ownership? In the chapter on property, Locke treats the labor of the serf as an instrument to the ownership of the civilized man,

> When there is some land that has the status of common … taking any part of what is common and removing it from the state nature leaves it in creates ownership… Thus when my horse bites off some grass, my servant cuts turf, or I dig up ore… the grass or turf or ore becomes my property…(Locke 2003: 112).

The labor of the serf (as that of the horse), thus, belongs to the master; it aquires a tool-like qualities that enclose property to be used by the master. The master has the right to fence off this labor so as to free himself from the restrains of the *common.* Where the serf is fenced off, the civilized man's freedom is approximated by his right to move around and enclose parcels of nature that become private ownership. Here, we can trace a conception of movement that is freeing for some (the civilized man) and yet settling for others (the serf). In fact, the latter becomes a condition for the former, and vice versa. A dialectic that most certainly persist in our own contemporaneity.

[4] See also Brown (2010) for a similar argument regarding Locke's philosophy.

Yet, the point for Locke was not to stop movement, but to subject it to regulation, to safe and secure it. In the *Essay Concerning Toleration* (written 1690), the philosopher explicitly attaches movement to freedom: "So far as man has a power to think, or not to think; to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man *free"* (Locke, cited in Kotef 2015:78).

Certainly, as Kotef shows, this does not mean that subjects were not racialized, gendered, and classed, nevertheless, the 'liberal subject' was abstracted and imagined as a moving body and existing in motion.[5] In a nutshell, Kotef shows that early liberalism turned its political gaze to humans' corporeal dimensions, namely that of her capacity to move. But the power to think, or to move, is an operation for Locke. "Motion is to the body; not its essence, but one of its operations," he asserts (1997:123). And operation is a form of reflection, which comes about from any reaction to passion, "such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought" (Locke 1998:119). By analogy, the operation of the body to move, arises from dis/satisfaction (i.e. passion), and not from the essence of men. Men need to operationalize (to reflect) in order for movement to become a proxy to freedom. Yet, it is only the civilized men who are capable of the latter. In turn, movement becomes a liberal ethos of liberation to be sustained differentially. "Movement functions as *a pivot of materialization of the liberal body"* (Kotef 2015:4, italization of the author), she concludes. What signified such preoccupation?

By explicating the significance that movement holds to political liberalism, Kotef proposes a reading of ideological formation of the doctrine, where locomotion, and therefore its regulation, becomes the center of governance and a point of conflict for and within liberal ideological forms. As it will be seen, we do not necessarily have this same preoccupation in state socialism. Certainly, movement was to a varying degree suspended both inland and across-land in the state socialist republics and this had to do with a certain understanding of labor as necessary static and having to always be available to the necessities of production. Whereas liberal philosophy envisaged movement as necessarily free in order to meet the needs of capital, state socialism envisaged it necessarily controlled in order to meet the needs of social production and reproduction. Furthermore, as Momchil Christovobserved, the

[5] It is not necessarily that this movement is preserved for the body, it can be as well attached to the soul and mind (e.g. Mill [1989]).

difference between liberal and state socialist political thinking in regards to movement, can be detected in the ways the subjectivity of the those moving is being constructed.[6] Whereas liberal political philosophy constructs this subjectivity vis-à-vis abstractions such as will, autonomous choice and interest, and the individual, state socialism subjectifies movement as a structural necessity, where the individual has to fit in. One explanation given to the emergence of physical movement as a preoccupation of political liberalism and political economists (Procacci 1991) could be sought after in the reorganization of forms of property and the subsequent emergence of free labor (in the Marxist sense), and thus, the possibility to commodify labor power. [7] Torpey (1998) demonstrates that in the nineteenth century, the combination between the disintegration of feudal relations and the need of the industrial economy for labor *in statu nascendi* resulted in slacking of previously held movement restrictions. This historical transformations created the conditions for the emergence of "the new class of free, impoverished workers… who were bound to move" (Torpey 1998). And although bound to move, these workers eventually had to be fixed at industrial plants for the needs of production.

From the above, we can anticipate the idea that the ability to think of property as possibly private played an important role in the dialectic between freed and regularized movement. The former meant that one is freed to move in order to sell her own property, i.e. of labor power, to the owners of the means of production, and the latter anticipated a protection of private property that belongs to landowners, for example, and secured by state means. This conflict within liberal thought – who is the proper subject of unregulated movement – continues to preoccupy liberal theorists today in various traditions within liberalism, from the welfare liberals to libertarians (see Phillip Cole 2000 for an extensive discussion on these two traditions and concerns of migration) albeit mostly from an ethical standpoint. Libertarians are perhaps the most radical adherent to the first point of view. We see this line of argument developed by Ryan McMaken (2017) who sees immigration as the "natural outcome of the exercise of private property rights" as long as "the migrant can secure income through employment or some other voluntary means, then the immigrant will be free to relocate — thanks to the invitation of private owners and employers." That is, as long as migrants are free

[6] Personal communication July 25, 2017. I am thankful to Christov for his careful reading and critical comments on chapter one.

[7] Freed from the means of production and hence, freed to move. This freeing was central to the transition from feudalism to capitalism and also central to the development of labor markets. In the English case of this transition, we can see a correlation between the enclosure of land and migration (for detailed account see Snell [1987] and McNally [1993]).

to sell their labor power.

We are not far away from what John Torpey above identified as a historical development. The operationalization of physical movement for the purposes of social reproduction, which includes freeing and regulation of the subjects of that reproduction by both state and capital, then, has accompanied the emergence of political economy since its dawn. Yet, the forms of apprehending this "bound to objective conditions" movement have transformed tremendously. Freedom of movement as a legal form of this apprehension shortens the time gap between the potential for capital to gain labor power and the actuality of its exploitation. On one hand, freedom of movement provides an outlet the building pressure between the (departure) state (where there is an excess labor power) and hindered reproduction. On the other, it absorbs the interrupted relation between capital and labor power, where the wage given by the former supposedly guarantees the reproduction of the latter, creating the conditions for a relation between movement, capital and the state to merge together and produce a specific kind of laborer: one who is constantly on the move in order to reproduce herself. There is a certain dialectic if we are to look at the moving labor power between states, where the "excess" population of the departure state becomes the "surplus" population for the host state.

Freedom of movement and the regulation of movement continue to consume contemporary debates in liberal philosophy. Joseph Carens (1992) positions himself in the debate regarding immigration in the following way:

> Liberal egalitarianism entails a deep commitment to freedom of movement as both an important liberty in itself and a prerequisite for other freedoms. Thus the presumption is for free migration and anyone who would defend restrictions faces a heavy burden of proof. Nevertheless, restrictions may sometimes be justified because they will promote liberty and equality in the long run or because they are necessary to preserve a distinct culture or way of life. (P. 25)

Interestingly, and perhaps properly liberal in his treatment of movement, the author identifies movement as both the actual prerequisite, but also as the potential obstacle to liberty. Again, as in the classic texts of liberal thinkers, to move freely here, as well, is defined as a prerequisite to other freedoms. Carens also supports a view that bounds freedom of movement as a tool for uprooting poverty in the Third World (to be read as the hindered social reproduction at the place of departure). In his account, freedom of movement, in a nutshell, is given the quality to facilitate and ease the difficulties stemming from poverty and hindered reproduction. Even though the debate under examination is from the early 1990s, today we

can see how Carens' prescription has become a fulfilled prophecy. Freedom of movement entails certain reorganization in the relation between state, capital and (potential) labor that the reader can trace further in the thesis, but what I am interested to point to at this moment is the "opposite" side of the same coin, namely the "cons" argued against freedom of movement within the same liberal egalitarian framework.

Let us consider the second part of Carens statement. What is it hidden behind the notion of "distinct culture or way of life?" What is this distinct culture to be protected against? Further in the chapter Carens frames the question in the following way: what would be justifiable ban on entry if, for example, the way of life of Japanese people is threatened by significant number of potential immigrants? It is also of interest Carens' definition of what constitutes ethical exclusion, locked in the following statement,

> from some viewpoints every form of exclusion that draws distinctions based on race, ethnicity, or cultural heritage is morally objectionable. I think, however, that one cannot make such a blanket judgment. Difference does not always entail domination (1992:38).

The invocation of difference as not always related to domination links to another rationale that Carens points as a justifiable barring of entry in a nation state. In order to answer, Carens places two claims in opposition and relativizes them against each other: that of cultural preservation (as a right of Japanese people) and that of pursuit of economic opportunity (on part of potential immigrants). To resolve the riddle of what is morally more important, the author suggests the following resolution:

> Should [pursuing economic opportunity] trump the concern of the Japanese to preserve their culture? The answer might depend in part on the nature of the alternatives the potential immigrants face if Japan is closed. Recall that we have temporarily put to one side, by hypothesis, the problems of deep international inequalities and refugee-generating forms of oppression. Presumably, then, the potential immigrants have reasonable economic opportunities elsewhere, even if ones that are not quite as good. I do not see why an interest in marginally better economic opportunities should count more than an interest in preserving a culture. One obvious rejoinder is that restricting immigration limits individual freedom, while cultural changes that develop as a by-product of uncoordinated individual actions do not violate any legitimate claims of individuals… A richer concept of freedom will pay attention to the context of choice, to the extent to which background conditions make it possible for people to realize the most important goals and pursue their most important life projects (1992:38).

This statement sums up an approach to migration in liberal democracies both as a theoretical problematic and as a philosophy of praxis. This is best exemplified by the asylum system in place in the European Union that makes a crude distinction between economic migrants and political refugees. We see this differentiation in Carens as well. There is an unresolved tension in Carens' definition of migration as a possibility for reproduction, which also affects the way the "economic sphere" is imagined.[8] On the one hand, the function and the possibility to immigrate are given the latent quality of easing reproduction, yet, on the other hand, the right to enter belongs to a particular taxonomy based on an imagined "economic" sphere, where the urgency of reproduction is hierarchized depending on present alternatives.

Where "refugee-generating forms of oppression" do not belong to that taxonomy, it is possible for Carens to imagine the "economic world" in such terms. There is also a redefinition of freedom vis-à-vis movement. Whereas within classic liberal conceptions of choice and will belong to freedom proper, Carens changes the terms and argues that what is freedom (vis-à-vis) motion is "choice in context." This type of liberal narrative has been translated in concrete terms in the Common European Asylum System of today, which I term *moshenolov:* the filtering of the political from the economic, a fetishist preoccupation found in liberal democratic regimes of migration. I do discuss this distinction, its conceptual roots, and its effects in great detail in chapters seven and eight. Yet, here is the place to concretize the importance of these moral dilemmas when movement is approached from the point of view of liberal philosophy. They transcend morality as such and affect asylum systems as a basis for answering the question of who is the subject of legitimate violence and how is violence to be defined?

Phillip Cole (2000:44) points out that there is an unresolved contradiction within 'orthodox' liberalism and its approach to emigration and immigration. This contradiction, Cole continues, is best exemplified by the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights, where the freedom to leave a nation state is not complemented by the freedom to arrive at a nation state.

[8] Timothy Mitchell (1998) traces the historical and discursive development of the idea of "economy" and makes an appealing argument that the possibility to think the "economic sphere" as an autonomous domain in the post World War constellation functioned as a proxy to reimagining the nation-state and the postcolonial condition. If we insert one more relation in his argument, that of migration, we can see how the imagining of the economy via migration consolidates a certain idea of the nation-state, where subjects escaping the "economy" are not permitted and differentiated from the subjects that escape the "political" sphere. In this sense, we can trace an active imagination of the nation state, where the threat to its totality is most acute when the contamination arrives from a different, outside "economic sphere." I further develop this argument in chapter seven.

He terms this tension "the liberal asymmetry." We can, however, place the question again in terms of liberal definitions of violence and its legitimate escapee. The UN declaration hints that whereas people may retain choice in their claims to what is violence (and escape/emigrate from a territory), equally, it is up to migration apparatuses (be them national- or supranational-based as is the case with the Common European Asylum System) to question the legitimacy of such claims. This definition of legitimate violence affects the ways labor power travels transnationally. In the 1970s, for example, when the guestworker programs in Western Europe were put to a halt, many started using the alternative route of asylum in order to reach the post-guestworker countries. As Stephan Scheel (2011:Np) says, in the post-1973 constellation of powers, "existing asylum legislations remained the last legal loophole for many migrants to enter European countries." This makes the routes of moving labor power contingent, in the sense that there is a degree of overdetermination, of accumulation of contradictions with which liberalism and capitalism has had to grapple historically. Today as well, this remains the case, which has certain implications for the rhythm of migration of labor power. As Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) demonstrate, and as I further elaborate in chapter eight, this movement is tamed and slowed down by detention centers and illegal border crossings that are part of the *moshenolov.*

Kotef argues that movement upholds a plethora of meanings for liberalism: from its political dimensions in struggles, to political and social progress, to its very physicality. She see these meanings as operating together; mediating each other. In my thesis, I speak of movement as both that which strictly concerns the capacity of the body to move, and that which makes it possible to become moving labor power (which, as it will be seen, does not make it unrelated to social or politico-economic predicaments) and also of that which is in reference to the ideological apparatuses that attempt to restrict, free, and regulate in any way the former.

One needs to insert the capital relation, however, in order to fully grasp the above mechanisms. The relation between capital and labor power is not solely in the realm of moving and creating conditions for a floating labor power. There is always a moment of fixity that goes for both capital and labor power. Although the focus of my thesis is the labor power in motion and the space that is created between and betwixt labor and migration apparatuses for the reproduction of that labor power, the moment of fixity is worth mentioning even if only in transition. As Celine Cantat says, "Labor in motion becomes actual through fixing. At

all times there is a double dynamic of capital that both pushes in motion and fixes labor."[9] Going back to Foucault (2015), we can see that this fixation on fixing the hoarding proletariat to production apparatuses was a prevalent discourse in the works of the 19th century elite. All that "smacks of irregularity, of mobility in space" (Foucault 2015:188) had to be tamed and attached to production.[10]

The reader will be able to note this tension between fixity and motion in various aspects examined in the work below. The latter is best grasped in parts two and three of the thesis, where we can see how freedom of movement, as a historical form of moving labor power, has developed in a way so as to fix labor power in actual labor for short periods of time, in order to disperse it again in potential. And if dissipation was subjected to control and moralism in the 19th century, today state and capital unite and harbor it. This specific development is an effect of the advance of capitalism, where we witness an ever-growing dependence on subcontractors to secure employment and means of bodily reproduction such as shelters, food, and water. This erases the obviousness of the struggle between labor and capital and it instead relocates it between labor and subcontractors. As wages are often not being paid, labor then disperses, freed by freedom of movement, to seek new opportunities to sell her labor power. The asylum system in Bulgaria captivates labor power for periods of time, where the struggles organized by migrants we witness in detention centers are only seemingly oriented solely in opposition to migration apparatuses. When we look closer, these struggles develop in a way so as to claim faster procedures of repositioning between detention and reception camps, which will eventually better one's chance to escape towards labor markets further into Europe (Germany for the most part). Again, we have fixity, this time necessitated by the state, which will eventually spread labor power in motion, in potential.

I approach movement from the perspective of labor power in order to question, but also to bridge the gap introduced in the plethora of studies that are concerned with migration, broadly

[9] Personal communication, May 18, 2017. I am grateful to Cantat for her careful reading of chapter one, critical discussion, and posing of the right questions at the right time.

[10] Such irregularities are forms of what Foucault termed "illegalism of dissipation" and include: lateness, festivity, nomadism, debauchery (Foucault 2015:188). These "illegalisms" were subjected to control in the nineteenth century in effort to tame labor power. Foucault spends a great deal on the relation between "illegalism of dissipation" and the "illegalism of depredation" (e.g. the criminal). He argues that these two forms were subjected to different types of control mechanisms, turning the former into a soft and permanent illegalism, and the latter into a subject of "severe penalty." And yet, they acquired a relation of reciprocal reinforcement. The more one dissipates, the more likely she would be prompt to depredation. The more one tends towards depredation, the more likely she would fall into nomadism.

speaking. We often find crude separation in the field that represents engagements with either "forced" migration, or "labor" migration, or border regimes. I cut through these distinctions and situate myself in the temporal gap between labor power as a potential and labor as actuality, where migration apparatuses and labor regimes come together in order to produce specific type of exploitable class that depends on cross-border movement in order to reproduce.

1.3. Approaching Movement from the Point of View of Labor Power

Although there are various ways to approach the temporal gap that exists in the migration-labor nexus, my own approach is closest to Sandro Mezzadra's (2016). He says,

> …the very constitution of 'free' wage labor, which definitely characterizes specific histories of capitalism, is to be understood as the result of a struggle where mobility and its control are always at stake... Far from being reducible to the presumed 'norm' of a contractual exchange giving way to 'free' wage labor the commoditization of labor power can take multiple shapes. Practices, controls, limitations, and the regulation of mobility form a strategic field for the development of these processes, struggles and conflicts.

I situate my thesis in this strategic field identified by Mezzadra and look at the ways the holders of labor power, the migration apparatuses organized around the seizing of this labor power, the various state institutions and capital negotiate and struggle over the forms the reproduction and future commodification of moving labor power will take. That is, in the moments that follow immediately after body power is transformed into labor power, and labor power into labor. Further in the thesis I take three cases: that of the (emerging as a concept) moving labor power during state socialism, that of free movement in the EU, and that of moving labor power which moves via the European asylum route. I would like to point here that the outcomes of this temporal gap can be various in regards to the ways the "encounter" between capital and labor is shaped.[11]

To that end, in my thesis, movement refers to two things. Firstly, I look at movement as indispensable and inseparable physical capacity of the body's locomotion and therefore, as a faculty that is constitutive of labor power. That is the body power I spoke about in the

[11] Relying on Althusser's usage of Marx, Mezzadra (2016) thinks through migration as a conflictual field which makes possible the "encounter" between capital and labor.

beginning of this chapter. Secondly, for me movement is the moving from point A to point B or the transnational circulation of populations, where this physical capacity to move is geared towards specific modalities of social reproduction. In this sense, *moving labor power* absorbs both the physical and social dimensions of the body: to move physically and to (in order to) reproduce socially as (potential) labor. *Moving labor power* can take place in different forms, rhythms and speeds: I will look at three of these forms and their correspondent ideologies – moving in blocks (state socialism), taming one's movement (asylum systems) and accelerating it (freedom of movement). These forms represent different regimes of the motion of labor power and thus, different historical forms of that movement. But these forms of movement are tightly linked to another characteristic of labor power and that is its hidden potential to be turned into labor. In our contemporaneity, in a situation where the relations of capital have been globalized, in the majority of the cases those arriving at a place have to rely on nothing but their commodity of labor power in order to survive, i.e. they have no other way to survive unless they become subject in labor markets. In my thesis, I propose to look at the migratory categories as a form and effect: the effect of having to reproduce and sell your labor power by moving and the forms that capture the effect and turn it into concrete migration apparatuses geared towards specific modalities of commodification. I approach these apparatuses as sites, where labor power is being reproduced in very specific ways and shaped accordingly to the conflict between state, capital and labor.

For Marx (1974):

> The historical conditions of [capital's] existence are by no means given with the mere circulation of money and commodities. It can spring into life, only when the owner of the means of production and subsistence meets in the market with the free laborer selling his labor-power. And this one historical condition comprises a world's history. Capital, therefore, announces from its first appearance a new epoch in the process of social production. (P. 89)

Labor power is "the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in a human being, which he exercises whenever he produces a use value of any description" (1974:87). This, perhaps a bit essentialist take on labor power on part of Marx, is corrected by Foucault (2015), where he explicitly shows that in order for labor power to become such, there must be some mechanisms in place that turn body power into labor power.[12] Labor-power marks the

[12] I am grateful to Momchil Christov and Prem Rajaram for helping me see through this essentialism.

possibility for capital to thrive and reproduce as capital uses the faculties one finds in labor power (muscle, intellect, etc.). The first condition in this relation is that labor power appears as a commodity only in so far as it is offered for sale by her possessor and hence, equal rights become a precondition for the sale of labor power. The second condition is that the possessor of labor power sells no other commodity other than her own capacity to labor.

The notion of labor power attracts our attention towards the fact that laborers live outside their strictly working environment and that labor power is mortal. In this sense, its reproduction or maintenance of body power is of utmost importance for the striving of capital but also to the ways states connect or strive against capital**.** The real universality of capitalism, or, the intensive (reaching the individual directly) and extensive (i.e. reaching the entire world) character of globalization (Balibar 2002)[13] has 'globalized' these relations, and therefore the notion of labor power, turning its movement into a major operation of our time.[14] Movement becomes imperative in these relations; in linking the intensive with the extensive processes under globalization. As Mezzadra (2016:33) indicates, the "practices, control, limitations and regulation of mobility are strategic in the commodification of labor power" and to this end the notion is of utmost importance if we are to scrutinize the relation between migration and production and reproduction.

Marx (1993) writes that,

> The object of [the worker's] exchange is a direct object of need, not exchange value as such. He does obtain money, it is true, but only in its role as coin; i.e. only as a self-suspending and vanishing mediation. What he obtains from the exchange is therefore not exchange value, not wealth, but a means of subsistence, object for the preservation of his life, the satisfaction of his needs in general, physical, social, etc. It is a specific equivalent in means of subsistence, in objectified labor, measured by the cost of production of his labor. What he gives up is his power to dispose of the latter. (P. 219)

There is an interruption in this relation, where workers regularly find themselves with no acquired means of subsistence or dignity. Movement has acquired the form of a peculiar

[13] Balibar (2002:147) defines real universality in the following way: "I take it in the sense of an actual interdependency between the various "units" which, together, build what we call *the world*: institutions, groups, individuals, but also, more profoundly, the various *processes* which involve institutions, groups and individuals: the circulation of commodities and people, the political negotiations, the juridical contracts, the communication of news and cultural patterns, and so on"(italization of the author).

[14] Here "operation" is not to be mistaken with the quantitative measurement of a concept. What I mean by it is the very ways in which labor power travels from place to place. See Neilson and Mezzadra (2013a).

means of subsistence. It does not maintain labor power directly, i.e. movement does not have the same qualities as food or water, yet, it generates possibilities for its reproduction, the possibility for one to reach a place, where subsistence will be acquired through the wage form. To scrutinize this interrupted relation, in part two of the thesis, I turn to three cases, where *freedom of movement*, *subcontracting* and *the state* merge together and produce a specific kind of laborer: one who is constantly on the move in order to find a paying job and hence to reproduce herself. Yet, these same conditions are also transparent in the rest of thesis. The Vietnamese workers who came to labor in Bulgaria could not but sell by moving their labor power, a social relation that became a possibility under the liberalization of the regime in the early 1970s. The same can be claimed for the thousands of asylum-seekers (often dubbed economic migrants) who find themselves on European territory compelled by the need to survive physically, often phrased as "looking for better life." In this sense, movement mediates the reproduction of labor power, but also its relation to state and capital. Throughout I show how movement has become inseparable condition from the reproduction of one's labor power and how in turn, it has cumulated to a status as one of the most valued faculties of labor power.

Paolo Virno (2015) scrutinizes interrupted temporalities within capitalist production through Marx's notion of labor power. He emphasizes that capitalism's novelty stems from the treatment of the actual/potential duo as the latter acquires an economic significance found in the way production-in-general relates to real or possible labors. These possible labors are the nature of labor power and namely, that, labor power is a "pure potential" (2015:162). The Aristotelian notions of potentiality-actuality and the movement between them can guide us here. To know motion, for Aristotle, is the ultimate precondition to knowing nature (1984:200b15). The well-known formulation of Aristotle in regards to the relation between the potential and the actual is exemplified by the process of building. He says, "when what is buildable…, is in fulfillment [i.e. being in motion, my intervention], it is being built, and that is building" (1984:201a15-16). Basically, the building (the actual, which is motionless) can only be fulfilled if the potential (the materials which make a building) are placed in motion.[15] When Marx, in the Introduction of the *Grundrisse*, speaks of the relation between consumption and production, of their mediation through each other, he also uses the

[15] In "On Potentiality," Agamben (1999) rebels against the Aristotelian understanding of potential-actual and claims that potential can in fact preserve itself in the actual. This rebellion is an effect of the often understood negation of the potential in the actual, its disappearance, on part of Aristotelian followers.

Aristotelian potential in order to demonstrate the dialectical connection between the two: "The product only obtains its last finish in consumption. A railway on which no trains run, hence which is not used up, not consumed, is a railway only *δυναμις* [dynamis]." (Marx 1973:91). As Paul Nadal (2010) concretizes, in time, the potential "has the power to actualize." In my reading of labor power, the potentiality is precisely these faculties that form the substance of labor power (the muscle, the intellect, the nerve, the leg, the arm) and when acted upon actualize in labor. Movement serves as a link between the potential and the actual. Simply put, the capital-relation has created the conditions where for one to actualize her body power into labor power and then into labor (and potentially receive wage), she needs to move.

Virno (2015:145) identifies this paradox between the potential and the actual as the root of all history and a discrepancy that "attains extraordinary empirical, pragmatic and economic significance" in capitalist modes of production. He calls it the *temporal paradox* of capitalism. My thesis deals with three historical instances of this paradox where the movement of labor power (sometimes called migration, sometimes mobility) mediates and is being mediated by social and political configuration that are not strictly speaking ones that pertain to movement as such. Yet, in all three periods we can see how movement (both as a biological capacity and as a social relation) actualizes certain ideological presuppositions as well, assumptions that form a part of particular historical time (see Althusser below). Moving labor power mediates between these ideological presuppositions and how our societies are organized in their productive and reproductive modes. According to Virno (2015:146), in the junction between free labor and expropriated labor, materializes the possibility for "potential to emerge in the world of appearances as the concrete stakes of an exchange."

This specific faculty of labor-power as potential, or as Virno would have it as a "persistent not-now," opens the possibility for us to place *movement* in the midst of the relation between labor power as potential and labor as the actual, or that moment of commodification that Mezzadra noted above. And here movement is overdetermined in the Althuserian sense noted in the previous section of the chapter.[16] As Pierre Macherey (2015:Np) observes, the productive force (in the singular) is "dynamic," a movement, a "continuous process through which what exists at first as "potentiality" is destined… to realize itself 'in action.'" For him, within the wage system there is an inscribed process, where the capitalist pays for what

[16] It means that there is more than one cause preceding certain effect. See Althusser (1962).

"already is" [labor power] and preserves the right to use what "is not yet" [labor capacity]. Motion is what drives the productive process. Movement, closes the gap between the potential of labor power and the reality of labor. I zoom out a bit, however, and look at this motion between potential and actuality from a bird's eye view. I do not only conceive of it as the immediate processes as they take place in a factory for example, or the link between house work and the working place (as social reproductionist theorists do), but instead I relate it to its transnational dimensions. How do states and capital negotiate this movement between potential and the actual when who travels is dubbed to non-belonging (as with the asylum-seeker) or semi-belonging (as with the social benefit tourist and the socialist internationalist worker)? Is it possible to see the so-called "migrant struggles" in new light? As the struggles of and for potential labor? In a sense, the potential is that which is operationalized, which is a motion between national borders in order to actualize in labor at a later point. This is seen nowhere best but in the context where the welfare state, increasingly absent from the reproduction process, has given way to the state of austerity.

This movement between potentiality and actuality is of utmost importance for the developing of the notion of moving labor power because this is precisely where we can situate the movement apparatuses of the three historical forms under consideration in the thesis. There is a void, a vacuum that exists in this turning of the potential into actuality that is preserved for the making of *proper* (desirable/undesirable) labor power. This void is also set aside for apparatuses of movement. As Virno (2015) conceptualizes labor power, the latter is not simply *a* potential but a conglomerate of different potentials. This means that even though the human body is the container of labor power, capital does not necessarily use all that is contained in the body. Capital picks what to use in accordance to its needs.[17] To this end, we cannot analyze labor power in isolation of social realities and relations. Needs change, desired use values change, hence, production and reproduction are historically determined.

Mezzadra (2016:33) beautifully calls labor power a "zone of indistinction, where the boundaries between the economy, politics and culture are reworked." Labor power in this sense is never isolated from the working of the economy, the political scene, and ideology,

[17] It perhaps goes without saying that capital's ability to "pick what it wishes" from body power is possible as it outsources the reproduction of labor power to other social spheres. The oppression of women is one of the most obvious examples, albeit not the only one. The care labor that women perform within and outside of households is disciplined in a way so as to naturalize, and yet reify, their vital role in the reproduction of labor power at a minimum cost.

from the appearance that Virno speaks about above. It becomes a conglomerate of these. Therefore, in the production and reproduction of labor power, we can trace the workings of configurations of political power as well. To this end, I claim that if we zoom into that zone, we can observe the very making of labor power in motion, its modeling accordingly to ideological forms and the working of politics. The observation that guides such conclusion is that labor power is not a constant. Even though some of its characteristics could be constant (the muscle, the nerve, the capacity to think, the locomotion, etc., and despite their relative latencies), they are harnessed in different ways accordingly to the needs of capital and the politics of the state. Movement increasingly becomes one such capacity to be harnessed, to be appreciated, and sought after.

We find this same thread of thought in Althusser (1993) in his intervention into state theory from a Marxist perspective that questions the base-superstructure dichotomy often taken for granted from some representatives of that same school. He forwards the notion of Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) and differs it from Repressive State Apparatus (RSA), where the demarcating line lies in the usage of ideology by the former and of violence by the latter. Althusser reaches to Marx in order to sustain such claim and he argues that ISA is a conglomerate of appearances which present themselves "in the form of distinct and specialized institutions" (1993:110). Althusser is careful with the sharp division between violence and ideology (e.g. "repressive suggests… [that] it 'functions by violence' – at least ultimately [since repression… may take non-physical forms, 1993:110), he does admit that more often than not these two apparatuses realized in the state interact in order to sustain one another. Althusser proposes such a reading of the state in order to attract our attention towards how the latter functions in order to secure the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production, including the reproduction of labor power.

Althusser demonstrates that the reproduction of labor power is historically determined (as did Virno and Mezzadra) and as such it belongs to the function of ISA. He is right to further the claim that after all, labor power is a cluster of skills that do need to be reproduced in specific ways for specific productions that are historically determined (1993:103). As I trace in my thesis there is a definite interplay between Ideological State Apparatuses (that do concern movement, e.g. asylum courts, municipalities and systems for social benefits, the law, etc.) and the reproduction of specific rhythms of movement that do play a role in the securing of the reproduction of a specific type of labor force that is either legalized or not. Furthermore,

as I demonstrate in the part that concerns freedom of movement, the reproduction of moving labor power has created a class that *does* identify with its ability to move and *not* with a particular skill, which is an effect of the liquidation of industries/neoliberal reforms in the educational system in Eastern Europe and subsequent processes of deskilling. In any case, ideology and its interplay with migration apparatuses is of determining importance for the different instances of reproduction of moving labor power.

Social relations determine labor power as desirable and undesirable (e.g. in chapter two I show the making of race that is attached to the undesirability of a certain type of labor power in order to expulse it, to operationalize movement in the opposite direction, away from capital; in chapters five and six I demonstrate how the acceleration of the speed in movement becomes a condition for the reproduction of labor power and, hence, its desirable form; part two (the asylum-seeker) shows the slowing down of labor power, the ultimate conflict between state and capital).[18] In this sense, labor power is overdetermined. Let us stay for a bit on this later point.

Althusser (1993) says,

> Remember that this quantity of value (wages) necessary for the reproduction of labor power is determined not by the needs of a 'biological' Guaranteed Minimum Wage (Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel Garanti) alone, but by the needs of a historical minimum (Marx noted that English workers need beer while French proletarians need wine) – i.e. a historically variable minimum. I should also like to point out that this minimum is doubly historical in that it is not defined by the historical needs of the working class 'recognized' by the capitalist class, but by the historical needs imposed by the proletarian class struggle (a double class struggle: against the lengthening of the working day and against the reduction of wages).

As such, Althusser is able to transcend biologically deterministic accounts on the reproduction of labor power and insists that the process is in fact historically determined. The feminist debate on the reproduction of labor power has something to say to this end as well.[19] Back in

[18] This is not to say that racialization serves a function of exclusion. Racialization is often a mechanism for differential inclusion and severing forms of exploitation and domination.

[19] There is a large body of literature on the concept of social reproduction when invoked in relation to capitalist accumulation. The knowledge production around it started in the 1960s-1970s and is proliferating to this day. While I seek no comprehensive engagement with the different approaches to social reproduction, a few words are necessary here. Marxist-feminists turned the debate so as to insert the field of reproduction in terms of class struggle. There was a particular dissatisfaction with the ways in which the notion of class struggle was framed and limited to the field of wage labor and production processes. Rada Catsarova (2015) identifies four main bodies of work that deal with the concept: Marxist-feminists, Italian autonomists, anti-Stalinist humanists, and the Althusserian and Foucaultian anti-humanist critique. These works approach social reproduction from different standpoints, "[s]ome take the term to mean the material means of subsistence and survival, both

the 1980s, Lise Vogel (1983) showed that the reproduction of labor power is conditioned upon the oppression of women. She interrogated with an important theoretical remark and namely, that we cannot conflate reproduction of labor power with a form of production. She notes, "Reproduction of labor power is a condition of production, for it *re*posits or *re*places the labor power necessary for production" (1983:139). The author is quick to make an important distinction between different forms of production and the reproduction of labor power thus required. After all, as also Marx showed in the *Grundrisse,* there is a difference between individual consumption and productive consumption, where the former uses products for the maintenance of the individual and the latter uses products for the production of (potential) labor. In class societies, Vogel continues, labor power acquires a class meaning and as such the reproduction of labor power maintains and renews "the class of bearers of labor power subject to exploitation."

Social reproduction under capitalism is the reproduction of potential labor, the reproduction of labor power. This means that the activities performed outside the production process are not conducted in a neutral and non-antagonistic way but are directed towards the production of workers. To turn back to Vogel, she insists that social reproduction under capitalism entails a class divided society, where labor power is capable to produce surplus for the appropriating class. Vogel listed three main aspects of social reproduction processes that maintain and replace labor power for the production of surplus:

> First, a variety of daily activities [that] restore the energies of direct producers and enable them to return to work. Second, similar activities [that] maintain non-labouring members of subordinate classes -- those who are too young, old, or sick, or who themselves are involved in maintenance-activities or out of the workforce for other reasons. And third, replacement-processes [that] renew the labour-force by replacing members of the subordinate classes who have died or no longer work (Vogel 2013:188).

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immediate and infrastructural, from water and food to housing and health care. Others use the concept to underscore reproduction as a particular kind of labor involved in the regeneration and well-being of others, as in domestic, care, emotional, affective, and sex work, which have historically fallen mostly to women. More recent literature has focused on the commodification of reproductive labor and the global economies and transnational chains of domestic, care, and sex work."As McNally and Ferguson (2015) point out, the main category under examination for social reproductionists is that of labor-power, where essentialist readings of the latter are replaced with the understanding that in order for labor power to be available to capital, it has to be reproduced in a socialized manner. That is, labor power is reproduced "through a particular set of gendered and sexualized social relations that exist beyond the direct labor/capital relation (ibid.)." Similar to Foucault (see earlier in the chapter), these approaches turn our attention towards an understanding of labor that is not arrested solely in the field of production, and thus seek to explore the making of labor, i.e. the turning of body power into labor power and then, into labor.

1.4. Movement: The Potentiality and Actuality of Capitalism

Where Vogel inserts issues of gender in this last relation (she says, "sex differences cannot be considered apart from their existence within a definite social system" [1983:142]), I would like to remind here that movement viewed as the capacity of the body to move cannot be considered apart from social systems as well. As I demonstrate throughout the thesis this capacity is apprehended, controlled and let free in a very different forms conditioned upon the specific system in which they unfold. Where for socialism the reproduction of labor power was left in the hands of the state, we see that with the freeing of the movement of East Europeans this reproduction acquires new social meanings and dependencies. The state, strictly speaking, withdraws from reproduction and creates conditions, where the capacity to move (body power) becomes a potential for reproduction (labor power) and hence, a potential for capital. When it comes to the European asylum system, the possibilities to reproduce one's labor power are straitened by the ways movement of that labor power is slowed down by detention centers and regulations such as Dublin. The reaching of a labor market comes much later as a possibility for reproduction via the wage form.

In her chapter "The Reproduction of Labor Power," Vogel brushes over immigration a few times. Objecting the idea that reproduction of labor power is somehow strictly a household issue, she says, "Labor camps or dormitory facilities can also be used to maintain workers, and the work force can be replenished through immigration or enslavement as well as by generational replacement of existing workers" (1983:139).[20] Another approach to social reproduction, migration and labor power is found in the works of Marxist feminism. Here, migration is conceived as bridging the gap between reproductive labor and the social reproduction of labor power, where migrants are conceptualized as "means of reproduction" (*inter alia* Anderson 2000; Lindio-McGovern 2012). I, instead focus on movement in order to fill that gap.[21]

[20] This is an interesting choice of wording on part of Vogel. It is one sided perspective however, reifying agency on the one hand, but also it masks processes that are relevant with anarchic forms of movement (see section 1.5. of this thesis) Vogel's treatment implies blocks of workers.

[21] Again in Vogel (1983:141): "…families are not the only source of such replenishment… other possibilities include migration and enslavement." It is impossible to miss the linguistic choices Vogel makes. She constantly uses migration (movement) and enslavement next to each other. This is something that I talk about in chapter six when I discuss freedom of movement from the point of view of political liberalism.

In other words, I dive into the movement that takes place between labor power as potential and labor as actuality, onto the moments, where apparatuses of movements (be them called migration or mobility) are the intermediate proxy in this relation. One of my primary goals is to trace the forms that sustain the turning of the potentiality of labor power into an actuality of labor and that are linked to the locomotion of the body, the capacity to move in a transnational context. If the motion of capital is spiral (Harvey 2016), then what does that entail for the motion of labor power?[22] It certainly is not spiral but it assumes different speeds, rhythms, and forms. When we look at the different regimes of motion, we see that labor power travels at different paste, which is nonetheless an effect of the particular ideology that informs the concrete regime of motion. Labor power can be tamed in its movement, its speed can be accelerated and it can be moved in blocks.

"There is no capitalism without migration," wrote Sandro Mezzadra in 2011. Movement, we could argue, is a structural necessity to capitalism. There could be no capitalism without the moving of capital, labor power, and technology, and knowledge, relocation from one to another employer, from one to another position and from one to another country. I would like to propose an accompanying reading of the relation between movement and capitalism, namely that movement could be treated as both the potential for and the actuality of capitalism. In other words, without creating the conditions for movement and its subsequent categories (even such that sometimes seem to be antithetical to movement), the changing forms of capitalism would not thrive. This comes about because of the fixing-freeing modes of labor that I spoke about at the end of section 1.2.

Here is the time to make a note on some methodological issues I hope I have avoided in my thesis. In my work I often turn to ideological presuppositions found in Migration Studies, the conditions that make these assumptions possible and attempt to read them critically. That is to say, I attempt to start from where these studies finished and to retrace what made them choose a particular final point. Therefore, some of the categories that we are often used to hear without much thinking about them critically – asylum seeker, refugee, labor migrant – will be placed under scrutiny in light of the ideologies that have created them in the first place. As Stuart Hall (1973:5) insist, the categories that Marx dealt with were scrutinized as if "whole historical development is already 'summed up' [within them]." Just as the Individual was able

[22] According to Harvey (2016), Marx favors a conception of capital that scrutinizes it as "value in motion." Capital, Harvey observes, moves in a spiral form instead of a circle.

to spring as a concept with the dissolvent of feudalism in the transition to capitalism (Marx 1993) and was developed into a "point of departure" by political economists in the 17-18th century, the Migrant is as well a category that is historically evolving and determined according to social relations, a "result" as Marx would say. In this sense, my aim is simple. I delve into the historical unfolding of ideological presuppositions that affect the rhythms and forms of moving labor power. To this end, I would like to distance myself from approaches that universalize the migrant. Such approaches, are not only peculiar to the social scientific field but one can identify them in popular imaginations and unfolding empirically in various political and social movements.

> Creating the concept of *the migrant* allows us to understand the common social condition and subject position of a host of related mobile figures: for example, the floating population, the homeless, the stateless, the lumpenproletariat, the nomad, the immigrant, the emigrant, the refugee, the vagrant, the undocumented, and the barbarian. To be clear, these are all distinct mobile figures in political history and are not always and in every circumstance identical to the figure of the migrant. However, under certain conditions, they become migratory figures. This book is a history of the common social conditions and agencies that emerge when these mobile figures become migrants. In other words, "the figure of the migrant" is a political concept that identifies the common points where these figures are socially expelled or dispossessed as a result, or as the cause, of their mobility. (Nail 2015)

Thomas Nail's *The Figure of the Migrant* (2015) is an important contribution to the literature concerning movement and migration. The author well understands the necessity that stands before contemporary social scientists to speak of movement not in terms of "unfortunate phenomenon", but, on the contrary, as "structural necessity of the historical conditions of social reproduction" (2015:12). Nail has one essential goal in order to achieve the latter: to write a political theory of the Migrant. The author articulates the circumstances around the writing of the book as based on the following realization: "[w]hat became clear was that, today and in history, the migrant is not the exception, but rather the constitutive political figure of existing societies so far." (Nail, in Westmoreland et.al. 2016). Despite my agreement with Nail that movement is socially and structurally conditioned, the second part of his argument, namely that the Migrant belongs to all historical time is methodologically problematic. For me the point is not to take the movement as a given, but to see how movement is molded, changed, regulated, freed under the pressure of different ideological assumptions and concrete material conditions. I hope, I have been successfully able to avoid this methodological mistake in my own understanding of movement and the people who are compelled to move in order to reproduce, and hence, been categorized as migrants. I claim

that the migrant is relatively new category that should not be mistaken for the plethora of categories Nail lists above. Social reproduction under capitalism is specific to capitalism and cannot be mistaken with the conditions of that reproduction under different property regimes and conditions of labor. What is a migrant one could ask?

In Nail's taxonomy, categories such as the barbarian (he calls it the "ancient figure of the migrant", 2015:52), for example, rightly belong to the Migrant. Yet, I insist that the categories I engage with are categories that belongs strictly to our contemporaneity and we have to study it accordingly to relations that also strictly belong to it. Nail makes a theoretical mistake identified by Marx and namely, that constructing categories as if pertaining transhistorically ends up in mystification and inability to grasp relations that stand behind such fetishes. In other words, Nail risks that his political figure of the Migrant becomes yet another "fetish" and not a relation to be scrutinized in its processual unfolding and possible end.[23] In my own reading, Nail's approach hides the danger that the Migrant ends up as an essentialized entity precisely because of this transhistoricism.[24]

In this sense, as any other conceptual structure I assume *movement* to be a system of theoretical presuppositions that operates through the governing of its main categories that are peculiar to their own time. The migrant can be one of these categories but this is not necessary. I look at the historical switches that pertain to political and economic conditions and that in turn inform certain movement apparatuses and the categories these apparatuses harvest. These can affect the construction and racializaton of the different categories under conditions that call for physical movement to be harnessed as a response to social reproduction.

1.5. Organized and Anarchic Forms of Migration

Speaking of her book *Die windige Internationale: Rassismus und Kämpfe der Migration,* Manuela Bojadžijev (2008) related to me her findings regarding the very first years of the guest-worker programs in Germany,

[23] On my mind is Marx's notion of the commodity fetishism.
[24] In a peculiar gesture, Nail (2015:11) constructs mobility as a condition for the migrant: "This book is a history of the common social conditions and agencies that emerge when these mobile figures become migrants."

> …there was already an ongoing movement of migration that was attracted by labor opportunities that did exist in Germany and that was a self-organized migration. Then came the attempts by those states and governments to get hold of and control [this movement]. Here, also, we have to understand that historically migration has usually not been controlled. There was always an attempt to organize it but not in this sort of state run logistical enterprise of bringing people from one place to the other, providing for medical checks before that, seeing who fits and who fits not and so on. This was a large scale enterprise that was basically the invention of the post-World War situation, in some ways it was a planning economy enterprise (interviewed by the author, April, 2016).

November of 1973 marked the end of the guest-worker programs in Germany, where the government ordered a moratorium on the programs, prompted by the economic decline (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007). It is not surprising that in 1973 the International Labor Organization (ILO) pressed strongly on the world agenda the question of international labor migration and the rights of labor migrants. That same year ILO member-states were invited to submit their motivated answers to a questionnaire formulated by the ILO on the subject of migrant labor force. The answers to this questionnaire were to form what is today known as the C143 Migrant Workers Convention of 1975. Whereas the previous convention on migrant labor from 1949 focused on "non-discrimination in wages, benefits and social security, and union activities" and criminalized those who "promote clandestine or illegal immigration," the convention of 1975 appealed to member states to "seek to determine whether there are illegally employed migrant workers" on their territory.[25] In addition to the institution's intention in promoting fair wages and access to social security for the "un-authorized employees," ILO called for implementing sanctions for employees and traffickers involved in such deeds. The question of "illegality" took on a central role in the 1970s, effectively and completely dethroning what was left out of the crumbling sentiments of welfare across the labor force.

Whereas 1973 marked the end of guest-worker programs in Germany, that same year marked the beginning of large scale inter-socialist labor contracts between socialist countries. In its answers to the ILO's call, Bulgaria framed the organization as an institution built by the modern bourgeois state in order to "mellow the conflict between [employer and worker]." Bulgaria insisted that instead of crafting yet another Convention, the questions concerning the

[25] ILO. 1975. "C143 - Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143)." Retrieved July 13, 2017 (http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C143)

measures to be taken against the "discrimination and abuse" of migrant labor needs to be written down in the form of a state contract.[26] Furthermore, the Forum was advised to work on a model contract which would regulate "precisely the work of states that enter bi- or multilateral agreements […] and will serve better the practices [of labor migration] by giving a concrete form for union activists, state authorities, and employers." Two rationales stood behind such suggestion. Firstly, that migration falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and those who participate in "hidden" migration, both perpetrators and third parties, need to bear criminal responsibility. The second rationale sought to compensate the migrants who have fallen victim of "adverse travel conditions," namely conditions that have undermined the well-being of the migrant during her "recruitment, travel, and arrival."[27] The socialist countries believed that the way to avoid "illegal" migration is to regulate it by the help of bilateral state agreements, where national and foreign labor will have the same social and economic rights.

Simultaneously, with the disintegration of the guest-worker programs in the West, many started traveling via the asylum route in order to reach Germany (and other Western European countries). This change in the route has provoked Scheel (2011) to see a transformation in the focus of migration apparatuses from dealing with the guest-worker to dealing with the asylum-seeker as a dominant "figure of migration" and to look at "illegality" as a produced condition. The asylum seeker route is, basically, one such incentive for the production of illegality. We witness the effects of this shift today at their strongest. The "economic migrant" as a concept is grounded in the philosophy and in the practice that create such routes in the first place. As I demonstrate in part three of the thesis, the route exhibits quite anarchic qualities. It changes accordingly to the fluctuating prices of traffickers, the state ability to close off certain parts of the course of migrants' movements, the new technological devices crafted with the sole purpose of detecting movement, the changing strategies chosen by those who try to cross into Europe, etc. Although, during the so-called summer of migration of 2015, these routes were organized after the insistence on migrants that they will cross no matter what, this was an exception. The route differs significantly from the ways internationalist socialist workers and guest-workers travelled. While there was strict organization in that latter way of travelling, the new asylum route, which is the predominant

[26] CAS. 1974. 607/3/676. Bulgaria as represented by a delegate at the discussion during the 59th session of the International Labor Commission which took place in 1974. Unfortunately, finding the name of the Bulgarian delegate in the archival documents proved impossible.
[27] CAS. 1973. 607/3/676.

one in Europe today, is anarchic in the sense exemplified above. This, I believe, stems from a state understanding of whom is approaching the territory (labor or not) and a denial that state regulations fail to maintain what has been framed as "illegal" migration.

The literature rarely refers to this change of route as a loss in a class struggle, i.e. a loss in the bargaining power of those who travel in regards to their position in production and social reproduction processes. I would like to refer to it in these terms. I will delve into this later on, but now I would like to consider another route towards Germany. That of freedom of movement.

As I illustrate in chapter four, the right to free movement of Bulgarians in the EU needs to be related to in terms of a class struggle as Bulgarian workers lost significant access to the means of production with the new forms of ownership initiated in the 1980s and settled in the 1990s. Moving out of Bulgaria became a substitute of these loses. To determine the outcome of this struggle is an ambiguous endeavor. On the one hand, to travel freely was a demand because of hindered reproduction in the departure state and yet, on the other hand it was a successful claim to access to labor opportunities in countries of the West. The route enabled by freedom of movement has undertaken an anarchic form as well. What we witness in the traveling patterns of Eastern European workers is that they travel cyclically (Manolova 2017; forthcoming; Apostolova forthcoming). Often these workers do not receive wages for the work they perform, which forces them to travel from town to town, and country to country in order to find options for reproduction. The gap between the non-reliance on wage and the need to reproduce, is closed by movement. Just as in the asylum route, final destinations often change. Where asylum-seekers might change destination because of traffickers tarifs, new fences, and new legislations (e.g. the EU-Turkey deal), the Eastern European labor's route is dependent on subcontractors and job opportunities. Despite that the literature usually opposes freedom of movement to the asylum route, what we witness is in fact similar way of traveling in terms of experienced insecurities in the plethora of possible final destination.

So what we have so far is two different forms of migration. One of them organized and regulated between states (state socialism) and state and capital (guest-worker programs), and the other one anarchic, which exhibits different scales of conflict between moving labor power, state, and capital. Yet, we have to keep in mind that the above Fordist-type of migration pattern has not withered away completely. There are still state-capital programs that

do bring about labor power in order to fill in capital needs in a regularized manner. Such are for example the temp migrant jobs that are part of recruitment schemes especially for seasonal work in Canada and the U.S. Also, as Stephen Castles (2006) demonstrates there is a resurrected interest in Temporary Migrant Worker Programs in the EU (he gives an example with the EC 2005 Green Paper scheme; 2006:755). Even though the author is clear that these new programs have little in common with the 1960s-1970s guest-worker programs, what he points at is that European states are trying to tame the unprecedented 'illegal' migration through new migration programs. Such are for example the family reunion schemes introduced in Britain and aiming at attracting Information and Communications Technology specialists and health practitioners. Also Germany's 2004 renewed Immigration Law and its "Green Card" Scheme that was operationalized in order to fit the needs of the IT sector would fall under the same category. Castles demonstrates that these schemes concern both skilled and low-skilled labor force.

Can we think of migration apparatuses as an organizational form, a technology, that unfolds between state and capital? Actually, if we consider that states do employ migration organizational forms that bring labor power to capital (for example, different green card systems, guest worker programs, all that gives legal means to labor power to travel) we can say that migration apparatuses exist in both non-conflictual form between state and capital and in conflictual form between state and capital. The latter comes about when labor power travels on its own; in the anarchic form exemplified above, without the blessing of the state so to speak. In the organized form they are not conflictual as state and capital work conjointly, there is a supply chain of labor power between the two entities. It is enough for capital to say, we need an X amount of workers in order to finish a production cycle and the state provides the legal means for the travel of that population. The migration apparatus, thus, becomes an economic condition that guarantees the reproduction of the production process, of capital, nonetheless.

In this sense, the state does not obscure capital from hiring the amount of workers needed. In the conflict (anarchic) form, however, there is no such cooperation between state and capital. If we assume that the owners of capital would prefer more surplus population so as to save on labor power value, this does not necessarily means that the state permits everyone who has required entry. The contrary is true. The state tries to prevent movement via the "illegal" (asylum, see part three) and legal (freedom of movement, see part two) routes by all means

possible, which has resulted in significant, and simultaneous, slowing down and acceleration of the movement of labor power to markets, accordingly to the forms. Here, we have a conflictual relation between state and capital as the interest of capital is often not met and even obscured by the non-economic and legal conditions for movement. But the conflictual nature of this relation between state and capital, in time, turns into a non-conflictual one by the very fact that the former has withdrawn to a minimum from social reproduction, which in turn lowers the bargaining power of the (potential) worker, which in turn lowers the value of labor power. The moving of labor power, in the anarchic form, goes through such fluctuations in the conflict between state and capital. This is well detected in parts two and three.

What the reader will identify throughout the thesis is that the anarchic form (that which is not captured in the state-capital organizational form of migration) devalues moving labor power.Where labor power that travels through the organized form has maintained some leverage in its bargaining power (e.g. even if maintained in the negotiations between states) historically, the labor power that travels through the anarchic form loses leverage. The possibilities for its social reproduction are minimized, which forces people to often take any job available in order to meet basic needs. This is what Marxist literature identifies as the "reserve army of labor." Perhaps ironically, the acceleration of this process is best observed with the labor power that does have the right to move freely. The asylum system also exhibits similar characteristics. If we consider that the route of labor power has changed from the guest-worker to the asylum, from internationalist socialist worker to freedom of movement, we can see how degraded the conditions for reproduction have become. Where the value of the labor power of the guest-workers was negotiated beforehand, and, hence, provided with conditions for fairly eased reproduction such as dormitories, guaranteed wages, health care, pensions, etc., today the labor power that travels through the asylum route is detained, denied access to elementary forms of social welfare, and denied access to labor markets for prolonged periods of time as is the case with the asylum system, etc. [28] We can clearly see the process of the devaluation of labor power in the historical displacement towards anarchic organizational forms of migration.

[28] A similar line of argument can be also found in Alamgir (2014b). The author argues that the gradual turn towards commoditization of Vietnamese labor power in socialist Czechoslovakia was met by resistance both on part of the Vietnamese workers and on the Vietnamese state. She juxtaposes the political weakness of the labor migrants in capitalist states (e.g. the disproportioned rights vis-à-vis domestic workers) to the laboring Vietnamese workers in Czechoslovakia to argue that the framework of socialist internationalism guaranteed the dignity (i.e. the bargaining power) of the Vietnamese workers as the sending state could place political pressure on the receiving state in regards to the well-being of its citizens.

This is another loss in the class struggle that appears with the withering of the Keynesian welfare state. Where advocates of freedom of movement (e.g. political networks such as No Border, No One is Illegal, the liberal theorists discussed above, the UN, etc.) have rightly identified that the people who travel the asylum routes need to be permitted to enter as they are "seeking for a better life", this generic statement turns a blind eye to what takes place when movement is freed in the framework of capitalist relations.[29] We need to radically reconceptualize what freedom of movement stands for and why we need it in the first place. As I demonstrate in the thesis, movement has a peculiar place in the reproduction of labor power: it does not reproduce it directly (it is not water), but it provides channels and conditions for its potential reproduction. In the last decades we have witnessed how the possibilities for reproduction via movement exhibit a double bind logic: on the one hand, with the decline of organized forms, the bargaining power of moving labor power has declined significantly, and on the other, we see an acceleration in the number of people who travel through the anarchic form.

1.6. Mapping the Thesis

I take as a starting point real socialism and the apparatuses that developed in order to fix the international movement of supply labor to Bulgaria. Although I do not treat real socialism as a form of state capitalism, which creates certain difficulties with the conception of labor power under the social conditions of really existing socialism (discussed in chapter two), I follow Lebowitz's (2012) model of "contested reproduction" and trace the formation of a notion of labor power that was permitted to move. Chapter two deals specifically with the ideological projections of the reformist wing under the regime that moved towards partial liberalization of economic structures, which in turn created the conditions for *moving labor power* across borders, not the least as a pressure absorber of the class antagonisms that started bubbling because of the proposed reforms and intensification of the economy. I take the case of the Vietnamese workers who labored in Bulgaria between 1973 and 1989 and engage with two distinct temporalities in their relation to the state: first as internationalist duty and second, as repaying financial debt accumulated by the state of Vietnam.

[29] For the current debate on freedom of movement on part of the UN, see Costa and Martin (2017).

I chose state socialism as a case in point because, I claim, whereas it is conceptually difficult to speak of the existence of commodification of labor power as a relation within the national economies of the socialist states, in the 1970s, we see a definite change when cross-state *movement of labor power* becomes constitutive for the production processes. Bulgaria is an entering point in this discussion as the change from extensive to intensive relations of production was conditioned upon state labor exchange contracts in the 1970s and it was theorized mostly there. The case of the Vietnamese workers that labored in Bulgaria constitutes the creation of a quasi labor market, where states were negotiating the value of the labor power to be contracted. I say quasi labor market, because these markets were state centered, meaning that there is a variable introduced in the concept of labor power used by Marx (1974), where,

> …labor-power can appear upon the market as a commodity, only if, and so far as, its possessor, the individual whose labor-power it is, offers it for sale, or sells it, as a commodity. In order that he may be able to do this, he must have it at his disposal, must be the untrammelled owner of his capacity for labor, i.e., of his person. He and the owner of money meet in the market, and deal with each other as on the basis of equal rights, with this difference alone, that one is buyer, the other seller; both, therefore, equal in the eyes of the law. (P. 119)

Whereas the Vietnamese laborers were "free" to sell their labor power, the negotiations over its price was carried out by the state of Vietnam. After I have discussed the conditions of possibility to think the cross-state movement in socialism as a potential for the emergence of labor power as an organizational concept in "really existing socialism," I proceed to think through what happens to labor power that is no longer needed. To be more precise, I delve into the antagonisms that emerged during the final disintegration of real socialism between foreign workers, civil society, and state when the creation of the conditions for the establishment of free markets became the imperative of the day. The first years of the so-called transition in Bulgaria, were marked by a shift that constituted the attachment of "race" as a characteristic to foreign labor power in the country. Sometimes certain labor power has to be moved out of a territory in order to ease the social reproduction of another type of labor power, the one that has been framed as "rightly belonging."[30] This process of removal of labor power is often accompanied by processes of racialization and active differentiation of populations.[31]

[30] See Cantat (2016) on the interactions between labor and the nation form.
[31] Again, this is not to say that racialization is not a mechanism for inclusion.

The countries of the Eastern Bloc give us a privileged position to examine the crafting of race and its significance for emerging capitalist production as these are the most recent examples in Europe that went through a radical change in the mode of production. As Rajaram (unpublished manuscript:5) puts it, "Capitalist modes of production do not simply create a racilized structure, a superstructure or ideology of racism. Capitalism is constituted by these histories." Not only did Bulgaria was going through processes of primitive accumulation at the time (e.g. change of property regimes), but also the country experienced a scarcity crisis of unseen proportions. The moment of crisis, according to Rajaram (ibid) is a condition that furthers processes of racialization, it "leads to heightened concern about the distinctions between those who belong and those who do not." To be able to think of this labor power in terms of "race" and potential labor to take away jobs from Bulgarians was a starting point for trade unions in their demand for the expulsion of that same labor power. This is in line with Mezzadra's (2016) insight that the relation between migration and capitalism provides an entering point to examine the political dimensions of the making of labor markets. The making of free labor markets in Bulgaria was marked by the production of race.

The thesis then proceeds to examine two anarchic forms of migration: freedom of movement and the European asylum system as it unfolds in Bulgaria. Chapter five and six delve into the former and I engage with it as a particular relation between labor power, the market and the welfare state. The case that I use in order to illustrate the arguments put forward is about Bulgarian migrants who labor in Germany and who are often referred to as either "poverty migrants"or "social benefit tourists." I chose to scrutinize the category of the "social benefit tourist" as it relates to political developments that are peculiar to Europe of austerity and the disintegration of welfare states from the past (at least) two decades.

The social benefit tourist, the category that captures the particular understanding in the EU of this relation, was crafted between 2013 and 2014 when European Union states had to open the remaining closed labor markets to the newest member states: Bulgaria and Romania. Chapter five begins with a discourse analysis of the crafting of the social benefit tourist and relates the conditions behind the emergence of movement as one of the most important faculties of labor power in social reproduction. The chapter further engages the reader in a conversation about labor forms that arose out of free movement. I demonstrate the ways the legal framework of freedom of movement has developed possibilities for labor power to be identified with an

enterprise: that of self-employment. This implicates relations of exploitation, where capital has stopped paying wages. Municipalities greatly impact the reproduction of this type of labor by attempting to withdraw from such responsibilities and entering into a mode of prevention of movement. In this sense, capital and cities join forces and create further conditions for the reliance on movement as means of social reproduction.

Chapter six is about the struggles that develop out of these conditions. In addition to scrutinizing freedom of movement vis-à-vis labor forms, I turn my attention to the ways in which the right to free movement has created conditions for taming political struggles against exploitation. These struggles also need to be read in relation to a process that I have identified as (re)*normalizing the norm.* That is, how actors involved in anti-exploitation struggles tend to struggle for a Keynesian type of capital-labor relations, where wages are paid in full and social security is guaranteed by the state. In other words, (re)normalizing the norm grasps a moment in struggles that attempts to put exploitation back to normal.Or at least to an imagined and desired form of normality.

Part three turns the gaze towards the asylum system in Bulgaria, as part of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). I explore it as a form of migration that captivates moving labor power; an effect of the ideological presupposition found in economic liberalism that divides moving populations into political and economic migrant. I claim that these two entities must be read always in relation in order to denaturalize their existence. Chapter seven is devoted to analyzing the historical and ideological rooting of the divide and engages with Political Marxism – a school that traces the extraction of the "economic" from the "political" under capitalist mode of production – as a possible answer to the question of why the divide persists, and even radicalizes in its contemporary form.

Chapter eight traces the effects of the divide for struggles that develop at the external border of the Union and in detention centers, with a special focus on the category of the "economic migrant." After a historical overview of the development of the asylum-system in Bulgaria after the 1990s and vis-à-vis the political/economic migrant distinction, I zoom onto the case of what I term *moshenolov*, or the movement of "illegal" border crossers from the border to the detention center, and then to the reception centers in the country. *Moshenolov* arrests this process and explores a particular power relation, where the capturing and exposing of the "economic migrant" becomes of utmost importance and produces a whole range of

technologies and technicians whose purpose is to stray the "economic" from the "political." The case I use in order to demonstrate the above is a particular detention center for immigrants in Bulgaria – Lyubimets. While I look into the resistance strategies used by migrants to "escape" the prison, additionally I insert one more actor: the architect, whose role becomes one of breaking the political struggles of the former. The chapter examines the detention center as a space of potentiality for both migrants and capital. While the former struggle is hidden in the nexus potential – actual refugee, the latter accommodates the detention center as potential for profit.

In the conclusion I briefly overview my findings and my contribution to the literature.

1.7. Method

The strategy I have used to approach the cases at hand is to start with the analysis of the ideological propositions that structure each individual one. This allows me to identify assumptions peculiar to each case in the intersection between history and theory. To position myself in the intersection between theory and history, then, allows me to identify the theoretical constitution of the categories as they are presented to us in a particular historical moment. I, then, progress towards analysis of processes not readily available to us only to disentangle the categories outside of their apparent consistency. These ideological predispositions, in turn, demonstrate how movements of labor power are shaped and response (or do not) accordingly. Each case exemplifies a concrete and categorical form of moving labor power. The academic discussions of today so far have focused on either one of these categories but never in relation. This, in my view, is also an effect of liberal ideological frames. When we juxtapose them, we can identify anomalies and commonalities between them which furthers our understanding of how is movement of labor power taking place in the intersection between liberal ideologies and relations of capital. Yet, these narratives and philosophies are only a small part of these movements. They mostly crystalize when one faces them directly in the moments of movement and their concrete unfoldings.

It is hard to determine when I began the research of the data presented here. If I have to establish the chronological order of its institutional form, i.e. the beginning of my PhD, then I must say it began in 2013 when I set on to journey to Munich in order to research the lives of

the Bulgarian day laborers there. Yet, I was long before that involved in political movements that deal with "migration," which brings about certain type of empirical knowledge, but also assumptions prior to entering the field. As the reader will notice some of the data used in part three comes from 2012. Although I did research on the asylum system in Bulgaria specifically oriented towards the goals of my academic research, I could not veil the stories that have informed my questions in the first place. Needless to say, no research starts bare.

I spent six months, between October 2013 and April 2014, in Munich, Germany. The timing of my fieldwork could not have been better. The month of October fell precisely three months before Germany was forced to open its labor markets to Bulgarian workers. All the sate monsters appeared on the scene in these three months. Police violence, exclusion from shelters, discriminatory policies, all appeared as a means of the German state to get rid of Bulgarians and Romanians. After these six months, it became clear that researching the freed movement of labor in the EU cannot take place at one site only. My fieldwork in Germany took me eventually to Berlin and to a few bus trips between European cities where I had the chance to extend my understanding of what does it mean to be freed to move unrestricted labor power. I went back to Munich between October and December of 2015 in order to trace the developments a year after the opening of the labor markets and to conduct interviews that inform my conclusions in chapters five and six.

I must say I was a lucky researcher. I conducted fieldwork on the asylum system in Bulgaria between April 2014 and September 2014.[32] This was at the time when the Bulgarian government figured out a way to significantly decrease the number of border-crossers coming in from Turkey. In fact, what took place in Bulgaria was a microcosm of what would take place a year later throughout the EU: furious building of border fences, push-backs, crowded camps, violence, emerging volunteer networks, returns to Turkey, convincing framing of those crossing as economic migrants. I witnessed first hand the aftershock effects of the "crisis", when integration programs were halted and homelessness was produced on a large scale. These "aftershocks" have great implications over the ways the labor power arriving via

[32] This time framework does not include research that was conducted between April and August 2011, and another one between June and August 2012. These latter researches have been carried out at the Bulgarian-Turkish border and were part of largest efforts on part of political activists and academics in Bulgaria to study systematically the asylum system in Bulgaria. I am grateful to Tsvetelina Hristova, Mathias Fiedler, Ivo Stefanov, Alexander Mirchev, Boryana Alexandrova, Julia Serdarov, and Veit Schwab for their work and consistency in these researches. I am certain, and hopeful, that much of the debates we have carried out together throughout these endeavors have found place in this dissertation.

the asylum route travels further into European space. It only transpires then how much hindered social reproduction in Bulgaria is.

The most challenging part of the research was the one concerning the Vietnamese workers who labored in Bulgaria between 1970s and early 1990s. There was virtually no information on the subject and I had to perform archeological research of the archive, so to speak. In between field trips to asylum camps in Sofia, I also spent time in the Central Archive in Sofia digging documents that could guide me through this particular story. Then, I focused on the contracts that were signed between Vietnam and Bulgaria and I was trying to situate them within larger politico-economic processes taking place between the 1970s and 1990s. Once I oriented myself through the contracts and their different facets, I spent a month in the National Library in Sofia researching newspaper articles concerned with the expulsion of the Vietnamese in the 1990s but also their arrival. I read the newspapers: *Rabotnichesko Delo* (1970-1988), *Duma* (1990-1993), *Demokratsia* (1990-1993), *Trud* (1990-1993), *Podkrepa* (1991-1992). *Rabotnichesko Delo* was the newspaper of the Bulgarian Communist Party between 1927 and 1990 (outlawed between 1935 and 1944); *Duma* became the official newspaper of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and its production began in 1990, still in circulation; *Trud* (also under the name *Banner of Labor* [*Zname na Truda*], 1944-1946) was the organ of the Central Trade Union; *Demokratsia* (1990-2002) was the organ of the Union of Democratic Forces, the pro-liberal opposition in Bulgaria formed on December 7, 1989), *Podkrepa* was the organ of the right wing trade union under the same name.

The outcomes of this research eventually brought me to the State Archives in the northwestern Bulgarian town Vidin in January of 2017. The reason behind this decision was motivated by an article I found in *Demokratsia* which related a protest organized by the right-wing trade union *Podkrepa* against the hiring of foreign labor in 1991 in front of Vidahim, the largest chemical producer in the Balkans during state socialism. I followed the story, which eventually brought on the surface much more than that particular protest. This enabled me to connect the growing anti-foreignism in Bulgaria in the 1990s with the changing patterns in the production processes.

If I have to summarize, between 2012 and 2017 I was conducting participant observation in various settings (support groups, asylum camps, parks, where asylum-seekers sleep, on the road and in buses between European cities, in markets for day laborers, in the Munich Job

Center, organized and observed protests, where demands have persisted throughout the years), archival research (the archives of state socialist institutions and of Vidachim, the newspapers *Demokratsia, Podkrepa, Duma, Trud*), systematically followed media coverage, conducted more than a hundred interviews and benefitted from various people who were generous enough to support me and guide me throughout. Of course, these five years were not devoted all to research but to reflection as well. These were the times in between research patches, when the chaos ot if all was the most clear.

When I first started my research, the initial paradox I was trying to confront was the following: liberal philosophy defines the "free body, the free subject" through her freedom to move. Yet, what we see is that liberal democracies prevent movement of certain subjects by all means possible. For me, back then, the key to this puzzle was to be found in the differentiation between refugees and economic migrants performed on an international scale and informing state policies in the field of migration. One of my questions when I started back in 2012 was *What makes possible the persistence of this seeming contradiction?* My initial approach was to compare the ways Bulgarian laborers move via freedom of movement (perhaps liberalism par excellence, albeit such an arguments would be teleological?) and contrast these movements with the ones exhibited by asylum-seekers, thinking that the former belongs to the category of the "economic migrant" and the latter to the "political migrant". Although portion of these assumptions remained, it was becoming increasingly clear to me that the social benefit tourists (category employed to describe the subjects of freedom of movement) belongs to a new epoch of the practices of liberal democracies.

Where freedom of movement is an ideal still upheld by liberal theorists, the turn that Europe undertook, and namely that of austerity, had to accommodate and to create a new category of movement that was escaping austerity and moving into states where attempts towards the "selling" of austerity belonged to the political field. Social benefit tourism, real or not, this is not for this thesis to answer, belongs to a new definition of movement: its hidden potential to bring about abuse in the crumbling welfare systems. Some may object that asylum-seekers themselves have been often framed as "welfare scroungers." As the reader will be able to identify in the chapters to follow, the conditions of these two seemingly similar narratives, are of different order and their development lies in different historical temporalities, driven by specific understandings of movement and changing patterns of reproduction. I quickly realized then, that where I need to focus the discussion on the political/economic divide

within the asylum system, I had to separate the analysis of the Bulgarian moving labor power out of this dichotomy in order to fully flesh out the stakes peculiar to the emergence of social benefit tourism as both relation to capital and as state strategy towards freed movement.
I needed, however, a case that was contrasting the above two. These would have provided me, I thought and still do, with a fuller picture of what is at stake when we analyse post-1989 liberalism and its forms of movement. I did not want to research the guest-worker programs for two reasons. Firstly, there is already a plethora of quality research on the topic. I felt my research would be only banal. Secondly, whereas the guestworker belongs to relations of capitalist processes of production and liberal welfarism, the socialist moving labor power does not. The case of the socialist workers is a peculiar one. On the one hand, moving labor power was, strictly speaking, a state affair.[33] Its regulations and terms of reproduction was negotiated between states and in response to "real socialist" processes of production. It is what I termed organizational form of migration and it lays in contrast with the anarchic forms. By juxtaposing these cases, I realized I can further the discussions in regards to the history of socialist regimes and track the consequences of their withering for the movement of labor power. Perhaps bluntly put, with the "end of history", there was an end as well to a certain type of moving labor power and the possibility to redefine the conditions of this movement. Furthermore, the case of the socialist moving labor power had the potential to powerfully shake assumptions in regards to freedom of movement and what social scientists see in these concepts. If nothing more, I hope my thesis will contribute to formulate better understanding of the struggles that we witness on various scales of moving labor power. After all, my decision to engage the topics at hand stems from controversies and political debates I have engaged with prior to the conducted research. I believe I was able to distance myself fairly far from them and place aside a great amount of reflection so as to carry out the analysis presented in this work.

[33] Unlike the guest worker who was mostly an affair between state and capital.

PART ONE THE INTERNATIONALIST SOCIALIST WORKER AND THE VIETNAM-BULGARIA LABOR CONTRACTS

I begin this part with the question of what was socialism? I do not intend to settle this question in its entirety but to guide the reader through the most important points that do concern us here, namely the creation of the conditions for the relation of moving labor power to take place in the late 1960s. I approach the next chapter in this manner in order to situate myself in the larger frame of debates regarding the politico-economic "nature" of the regimes in question and insert the notion of moving labor power within this framework. The chapter then proceeds with situating the emergence of moving labor power as a concept in its specific Bulgarian context and the ideological presuppositions guiding these processes. The argument that the reader will find in this chapter is as follows: the moving of labor power between socialist states secured the intensification of production and tamed emerging class conflicts.[34] By focusing on moving labor power I extend the understanding of the regimes and disrupt viewpoints that see state socialism as a static regime.

In order for us to understand the place of movement (of labor power) in the economies of the soviet type, firstly, we need to briefly engage with the question of what type of political-economies we are dealing with. Also, what type of changes took place within these systems that triggered a mass movement of workers across the socialist world in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[35] Right after I provide a sketch concerning the question posed above, I will briefly discuss the economic restructuring that took place in Bulgaria in the 1970s in order to socially situate the semi-liberalization of movement of labor power across the bloc. Moving labor power became a condition for the so-called intensification of the socialist economy and followed the semi-liberalization of the state economy. The intensification was pushed forward during the De-Stalinization processes of the 1960s by the so-called marketuers (*пазарчици*); a

[34] The opposition between extensive and intensive growth comes from the second volume of Capital by Marx. In the socialist countries, according to Wilczynski (1971), "Extensive growth in its pure form is based on quantitative increases in labor, capital and land, whereas intensive growth is derived from gains in overall productivity, i.e. increasing efficiency in labor and a better utilization of capital and other means of production." Wilczynski writes that the first study of the extensive and intensive development in socialist countries was conducted by E. Matiev (The author's name is Mateev) in 1956 in Bulgaria and later on, in the late 60s, the intensification of growth had become the most discussed issue among socialist scholars. Mateev was in fact an opponent of Zhivkov's proposition for radical intensification of production.

[35] It is hard to estimate the exact number of workers that traversed the socialist world considering the various countries involved in the programs and their different time periods. Yet, the number is certainly in the hundreds of thousands. Only in Bulgaria, 20 000 workers from Vietnam resided between the early and late 1980s. This number does not include the workers coming from Afghanistan, Cuba, Nigeria, Mongolia, etc.

reformist wing within the party that pushed for liberalization of markets. Furthermore, moving labor power was a condition not only for the desired economic growth, but also for keeping the social peace in Bulgaria. As Iliana Marcheva (2012) shows, the reforms that took place in Bulgaria in the 1960s did endanger the latter, as Bulgarian workers reacted negatively towards the measures taken for the increase of their labor productivity. By bringing a large number of foreign workers in the beginning of the 1980s, Bulgaria was able to both keep the course of economic intensification and to keep its working class from revolting against the reforms. In other words, I demonstrate that an extensive injection was indeed necessary in order to follow the path towards intensification fought for on part of the marketeurs.

My contribution lays in two directions. Firstly, the account provided here is the first systematic attempt to engage with the foreign workers that labored in Bulgaria between the 1970s and the late 1980s. Secondly, by engaging with the discourses of authors such as Minko Minkov and Zahari Staykov, I situate the enterprise of socialist moving labor power both as an exercise in socialist political theory concerned with social reproduction and as part of the political-economy of the Bloc.

CHAPTER TWO MOVING LABOR POWER: BETWEEN EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE MODE OF PRODUCTION

2.1. Socialism and Its Mode of Production

There are varying viewpoints when it comes to the type of the mode of production under socialism. The idea that the Soviet Union (and the countries of the Soviet type) was in fact characterized by state capitalism, was long in the making by both the left opposition in the Union and also by Western Marxists abroad. According to Miasnikov ([1932], cited in van der Linden 2007), the 1920s saw a transformation of class relations in the Soviet Union and political power (including hegemony) was seized by „numerous petty bourgeois", i.e. the class to become known as the bureaucracy. The latter was expanding its domination throughout the economic sectors by directing capital flows to which "ordinary people" had no access. Rudolf Sprenger's (1934), "Theses on Bolshevism" made parallels between the Czarist rule and that of the Bolsheviks and claimed that just as the former ruled independently from the nobility and the bourgeoisie, the Bolshevik state apparatus had to make itself independent "from its double class basis" (i.e. workers and peasants) and hence, was forced to constantly oscillate between the interests of these two classes. The end result, accordingly, was state capitalism that was appropriating surplus value in order to expand its production, to support the peasant class and to settle its foreign obligations.

Theories of state capitalism were persistent on the left (see also, Worrall 1939; Pollock 1941; Munis 1967; Leo 1970). But they were also viciously criticized mostly on the basis of containing *contradictio in terminis*. Olga Domanevskaya [1934] and Hilferding [1940] (cited in van der Linden 2007) pointed to inconsistencies in state capitalist theories regarding the formation of prices, the lack of competition and profit as economic elements of production, the role of wages (considered to be purely distributive), etc. The above accounts, however, just as the historiography produced at a later point (at least in the context of Bulgaria), treated state socialism as if homogenous in its temporal structures, which in turn erases the possibility to scrutinize struggles. In fact, class struggles in view of reorganizing the production process in a way so as to create conditions for profit making, did emerge in the 1970s to only intensify in the late 1980s.

An East European critical school emerged in Budapest in the mid-1970s that was comprised

of a "new generation Marxists" who attempted to develop class theory of actually existing socialism that did not limit itself to theories of state capitalism or suggestions of convergence between socialism and capitalism in a highly developed industrial form.[36] As Mark Rakovski (1978:15) notes, really existing socialism is "neither socialist, nor capitalist, nor is it a mixture of the two… It is a class society *sui generis*, a different kind of class society existing alongside capitalism."[37] To treat a system as a *sui generis* society allows us to study such societies historically and against its own struggles. Such analytical lens permits seeing through the changing forms of state socialism. This is lens that we need in order to explain how moving labor power turned into a structural necessity in the early 1970s in Bulgaria. Rakovski claimed that a common methodological mistake made by analysts of the socialist regimes is that they follow a framework of comparing the similarities between socialist and capitalist political economies. Instead, they argued, what needs to be done is to establish base for analysing the differences in the economic organization and the class structure of the two blocs.

After all, they continue, "[these differences] are all related to the following very orthodox assertion: under capitalism it is the private ownership of the means of production that is dominant, whereas in Soviet-type societies the means of production are under state ownership (1978:77)." I position my work within approaches similar to Rakovski's framework, yet I take ownership as a subject of struggle. The Zhivkovists in Bulgaria attempted several times to change this dominant and subsequently, class struggles emerged around these attempts. There was not only one persistent regime of property relations under state socialism. In Bulgaria numerous attempts were made to change the state of affairs and to allow private ownership in the means of production. And if many of them were unsuccessful, they would prepare the ground for the eventual and radical change in the regime of property ownership to take place in the 1980s. The 1970 was a tipping point in these relations.

In order to trace the above line of argumentation, perhaps the better equipped hypothesis over the state of affairs in the former Eastern Bloc to follow, emerged already in the 1920s in the work of the economist Yevgeni Preobrazhensky (1965) and later on developed by Michael Lebowitz (2012) in his seminal *The Contradictions of Real Socialism: The Conductor and the*

[36] These would include: András Hegedüs, Agnes Heller, György Márkus, Rakovski (a pseudonym for the philosophers György Bence and János Kis, who broke out of the Budapest School).
[37] Marc Rakovski is a collective pseudonym that stands for György Bence and János Kis.

Conducted. Preobrazhensky argued that the economic system of the USSR was in a constant war between two different systems; that of the law of value on the one hand and that of the law of primitive socialist accumulation. The effect of this struggle was a constant interpenetration between the two logics and none of them could exist in their pure form. Instead of coexistence and balance however, this struggle caused a malfunction in the Soviet system and deformation of each of the systems. Lebowitz (2012) took the inside of Preobrazhensky and developed it further in order to scrutinize the modes of production under real socialism a few decades later. By invoking Preobrazhensky's insight, Lebowitz argued against views that described real socialism as an organic system.[38]

Lebowitz named the struggle between the two systems exposed by Preobrazhensky "contested reproduction" (2012:90, between different sets of productive relations). He claimed that the impossibility to speak of real socialism as an organic system stems from the simultaneous workings of different systems within. The author concluded that the dysfunctional character of real socialism between the 1950s through the 1980s, was the effect of the two competing logics, "neither of which was the logic of the working class." Lebowitz held that even though one cannot speak of socialist managers (of the enterprises) as capitalists (they did not hold the means of production, they could not compel workers to produce surplus [although, as we will see in the unfolding of the next chapter this is disputable], and did not own commodities as a result of the labor process), still, they "do contain within themselves the *logic of capital*" (2012:90).[39] The two competing logics, the"logic of capital" and the "logic of the vanguard" produced antagonistic relations between planners and managers. This process is well captured in late socialist Bulgaria, where the category of profit was gaining importance for the production process, which eventually placed the managerial class in direct conflict with the workers in the enterprises.

My own engagement with moving labor power during state socialism complements one such understanding of state socialism comprised of competing logics. I want to position this conflict between the logic of the marketeurs (intensification) and the logic of socialist

[38] One of the most important theorists to argue that state socialism was an organic system was the well-known critique of socialism Korrnai (1980). Lebowitz confronts Kornai on the basis that the latter disregarded "contested reproduction" (2012:36). Also that was the official ideology contained within the notion of "real socialism." Such accounts follow closely Marx's (1973) discussion in regards to capitalism as organic system that re/produces the conditions for its own existence.

[39] These are the logic of maximization of income (managers) and the logic of the plan (the planners, the vanguard), accordingly.

internationalism (sustaining social welfarism), which at a certain point could not sustain each other anymore and entered a phase of deepening contradiction. Not only did these logics compete with each other on the level of ideology (e.g. the struggle between the different wings of reformists that unfolded in Bulgaria between 1960s and 1980s), but also they had very real effects within state enterprises especially starting with the De-Stalinization process and the emergence of *profit* as a managerial logic behind production. Furthermore, as I show later on in the text, moving labor power was used as an extensive mechanism (expansion of the working force, peculiar to the logic of socialism) in order to boost intensive development (increased productivity for profit, peculiar to liberal markets). Moreover, the very concrete ways in which foreign workers were to labor in Bulgaria did accommodate both of these logics, to eventually give prevalence of the logic of the marketeurs. On the one hand, and towards the beginning of the programs, there were serious attempts towards integration of these workers both within the production and reproduction systems (i.e., share of the social product: wages equal to those of Bulgarians, dormitories, free clothing, free vacations. The logic of socialist internationalism) and by providing them with necessary cultural capital (e.g. language classes, translators, courses in Bulgarian culture, etc.), but at a later point, these workers had to produce surplus that went towards the pardoning of Vietnam's debt.

In order to track how these two logics came in competition, I turn my attention towards the produced conditions that will eventually allow for the prevalence of the logic of the marketeurs.

2.2 Transitions Before the Transition

Bulgarian historiography regarding the post-socialist transition has been moving its time framework further and further into the period regarded as socialism itself.[40] There is a consensus. No matter where these boundaries lay, the transition commenced long before 1989 and it was oriented towards often pro-capitalist market reforms in the economic sphere. There is a paradox, however, that Bulgarian historians and sociologists often cannot escape. Namely, that despite evidence to the contrary, socialism is portrayed as a homogenous time

[40] The Transition is a notion that depicts the apparent rupture that took place in 1989, when leaders throughout the Eastern Bloc stepped down and officially gave way to pro-liberal and pro-capitalist reforms. Seven days before his resignation on November 10, 1989, Todor Zhivkov called for the development of an organizational structure that would ensure the functioning of capitalist forms of ownership.

period. I keep away from such theoretical entrapment and instead delve into the different ideological, political and economic temporalities in the years before 1989, with all their complexities and connections regarding the place of moving labor power.

Christina Schwenkel (2015; 2017) makes an important intervention in the study of what she coins as socialist mobilities, namely her observation that one cannot speak of a single temporality of migration under actually existing socialism.[41] Instead, researchers need to explain the multiplicity of temporalities and pathways of socialist-era migration over time. The mobility of the Vietnamese labor force that occurred in several stages between the early 1970s and late 1980s reflects major ideological and economic-political changes that were occurring in the Eastern bloc. Below, I will introduce some of the major transitions before the commencing of the official transition of 1989 in order to exemplify the larger framework, where the necessity of moving labor power objectified. We start from one particularly important development, namely the destalinization process in Bulgaria, which, as in most of Eastern Europe, took place under the heading of intensification of the production process.

Iliana Marcheva (2012) takes the (in)famous reform of 1963 in order to demonstrate how profit rationalities settled in the country via Liberman's doctrine.[42] Part of this reform was the creation of the conditions for intensive instead of extensive character in social production. According to Marcheva, the idea behind the reform was labor intensification (i.e. intensified labor productivity through increase in working hours and tying benefits to realized production [this is in correspondence with the 'logic of capital' identified by Lebowitz]), However, she points out that the results did not meet the expectation as the wage ratio was increasing more rapidly as compared to the realized production. Simultaneously, management within the enterprises was given more power and incentive to demand intensive work (more hours, night shifts, less breaks, etc.), which resulted in inter-enterprise class conflicts. Marcheva claims

[41] The term actually existing socialism (or real socialism) emerged during Brezhnev and it was used as a self-description in the Eastern Bloc. It signaled a turn away from Marxism and the gap between the ideological frame and the actuality of the political economies of Soviet type. Later on, it acquired a more derogatory tone.

[42] Liberman was a famous economist who suggested that the planning criteria in the economies of the Soviet type have to be changed in order to avoid deficits. He insisted that these new criteria need to be implemented so the key indicator of the planning activities of the enterprise was changed from measuring the total volume of the produced products in value terms to measuring the realization of the products instead (i.e. profit). This also meant that the enterprises had to become self-managed and the funds for material stimulation of the enterprise (e.g. wages, vacation) were to be formed as based on the profit and after dues to the state were paid. The implementation of Liberman's doctrine across the Eastern bloc is known as Libermanization. Liberman was popular both within the Eastern European Bloc and its western counterpart. His article "Plan, Profit, and Bonus" published in the Soviet *Pravda* in 1962 was widely debated and overturned previous view regarding the sustainability of the Plan (Wagener 2002).

that Zhivkov had to step back from further implementation of the reform because of the 1968 Prague events in order to ensure the stability and the cohesion of the socialist bloc. Zhivkov, however, seems to have been relentless when it came to the intensification of social production.[43] In a protocol from 1968, we read Zhivkov saying that "the faster and more fully we mobilize and use in our economic life the intensive factors, the more rapidly we can develop the economy and society as a whole."[44] Intensification thus remained as an objective for Zhivkov to be delivered at a later stage. As Zhivka Valiavicharska observed, such intensification also involved scientific technological revolution that aimed at intensification of production with the goal to shorten the working day; a goal that was peculiar to the wing of the Marxist reformists sociologists.[45] This would not have been possible without movi

What is important in this episode of the history of People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB) is that ever since the 1960s there has been a strong bloc of reformists that supported pro-market reforms to take place under the larger slogan of intensification. Marcheva calls these reformists "*пазарници"* (the marketeurs from above) and places them in opposition to the centrists, who were not against the intensification as a process *per se*, but were in strong opposition to incentives such as the category of profit (e.g. Evgeni Mateev, who is one of the most important theorists of socialist intensification for the entire Bloc, is one such sociologist). Although Zhivkov had to soften his approach towards further implementation of the reform, a strong reformist bloc was born whose ideas will re-emerge strongly on the political scene in the 1970s.

Ivo Hristov (2008:67) claims that when we look at the legislative practice of state socialism in its own right, as opposed to from the point of view of western juridical traditions, we will find a layer underneath that was reserved for practices that did not comprise the formal juridical etiquette. These practices, in other words, were not part of the official "socialist legislation," yet, they did have a certain effect on the social fabric in which they functioned. Hristov's analysis of this additional layer leads him to conclude that from the point of view of the judiciary, „the time framework of the ‚transition' needs to be pushed to at least a decade earlier: somewhere at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the early 1980s" as this lead

[43] Otherwise, this would have been detrimental to the bloc as a whole and internationally read as a move against the Soviet Union (as Bulgaria was now exporting for capitalist markets), according to Marcheva's interpretation.
[44] CAS 1/35/429, p 6.
[45] Personal communication July 25, 2017. I am grateful to Valiavicharska for her reading of part II and critical comments. For her work on state socialism see Valiavicharska (2010; 2014; 2017).

to major restructuring of the social sphere. Such were for example what Hristov called "enclaves of capital". These were for example Texim (a company that worked on the principles of capital accumulation) and other leftovers from the 1963 reform (the so-called State Economic Units) that functioned on the basis of profit (see Marcheva above). In 1981, a new reform took place, the so-called Regulation of the Economic Mechanism (REM), which, according to Hristov meant that for the first time autonomous economic subjects were recognized, although the state (the party) could interfere in their structures at every time. Hristov continues that REM made it so that the enterprises "*de facto* [were] built in accordance to capital enterprises… they were juridical entities, [had] their own so-called constitutional fund, stock capital, their own management structure" (ibid: 82).

As in 1963, the class conflict to emerge in 1981 was supplanted to fit the void between the so-called specialists and/or managers and the workers within the enterprise on the one hand. Property was still state owned, yet, on the other hand, conditions were created where a power struggle emerged between the state apparatus (the party) and the managers' class as the latter would struggle for more autonomy in order to increase the labor productivity within the enterprises. In this triangle of struggles, the workers were the losers of the intensification. In the mid-1980s, it becomes very clear that there are plans to transition to privately owned property and concentrate power in autonomous enterprises. Numerous state regulations (see Peev 2002 for an extensive list), among them Decree № 42 from July 1986, introduced new criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the enterprises; namely, now enterprises had to cover "profitability of the main funds, low quality of production, higher consumption rates of basic material and production processes" (Chalakov 2008:214).

As seen, there are varying accounts when it comes to the transition's temporal framework. But what was the function of moving labor power within these social frames? So far, the Bulgarian historiography is silent on the question. And when such questions are posed outside Bulgaria (e.g. Alamgir 2014; Schwenkel 2015), rarely the answers delve into why such movements took place or their function for sustaining class peace. I attempt to explain both trajectories and to demonstrate how the logic of the marketeurs and the logic of socialist internationalism met each other and created the conditions for moving labor power. Eventually, the former would prevail over the latter.

2.3. Socialism and Labor Power

The Trotskyists Castoriadis and Lefort [1949], (cited in Marcel van der Linden 2007) argued that the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union embodied the supremacy of dead labor over living labor as it controlled the means of production, distribution and social consumption. They insisted that exploitation in the Soviet Union has persisted despite the abolition of classic relation of private ownership. Further, they explained, exploitation was the mechanism through which the bureaucracy was appropriating part of the social product because of its proximity to what the authors called the "production apparatus." The members of *Socialisme ou Barbarie* inserted the imposed lack of mobility among workers (i.e. from one to another employer, from one to another country) as one of the apparatus' devices to sustain exploitative practices.[46] In fact, Castoriadis defended the position that precisely because of this imposed immobility, the workers in the Soviet Union resembled serfs.[47] Similarly, the ossification of the elite, according to Frolich in an essay written in the early 1950s shortly before Stalin's death (ibid: 136), resulted in the sacking of freedom of movement for both workers and the bureaucratic class, which brought about conditions of servility.

For the major part, we can conclude that the lack of free movement was treated rather rhetorically as a means to critique state socialism. Rarely however, did one delve into the question of the social place of movement across the bloc. It is true that such movement was very little prior to the late 1960s and early 1970s, perhaps mostly due to the extensive type of economies that the countries of the Soviet type were trying to sustain. Yet, even authors who would otherwise write at a later stage of the development of socialism, did not find the question intriguing. The deployment of movement for the purposes of production in the 1970s was to bring about a relation that was not part of the picture previously, that of labor power.

Ernest Mandel (1987:N.p.) argues that "the Soviet economy is not generalized market economy. It is an *economy of the central allocation of resources*..." He further claims that we cannot speak of labor power in the Soviet economies as a commodity because, "properly speaking," there is no market. Even though waged labor persists, there is a guaranteed

[46] A periodical published in 1948.
[47] It is interesting to note that such explanatory framework given to the relation of exploitation beseems the development of early political liberalism, but also liberal thought of the late 1990s and early 2000 (see chapters five and six), where a potential redistributive mechanism is attached to the practice of freedom of movement of the individual.

employment and as such people do not have to go to the market in order to sell their potential labor. Mandel argues the following,

> … wage labor also signifies the existence of a labor market, the constraint of producers in selling their labor power in this market, and the determination of the price of 'labor power' by supply and demand in this market, a price which oscillates around an objective social value of the price of such 'merchandise'. For this to happen the wage laborer must have been deprived of access to the means of production as well as from the means of subsistence. This no longer exists in the Soviet Union, to the extent that the 'right to work' is guaranteed not only in the constitution but also in practice. Labor power (with significant exceptions) is thus not a commodity and the wage laborer is not a wage laborer in the capitalist sense (ibid.).

Mandel is correct in his synthesis that we cannot speak of (Soviet) labor power in the same way as we would define it in terms of a relation to capital. Yet, it seems, Mandel was just entrapped by one of the appearances of real socialism. As Lebowitz shows (2012:148), we need to distinguish between the moral economy under real socialism (the idea of common ownership in the means of production and hence, the existence of formal equality) and its political economy (the fact that plans were drawn by the vanguard class and the allocation of output) in the same way as we do with capitalist relations (the free market and appropriation of surplus labor).

Moreover, things become a bit messier when we try to define labor power that is moved, the potential labor. Firstly, in this picture we all of a sudden have two state apparatuses (the one that sends and the other that accepts laborers) that bargain over the conditions of how this labor power will be employed and reproduced. This forms, at the very least, a semi-market of labor power. The moving labor power does not share a stake in the common ownership of production for long periods of time, precisely because of its characteristic of being a moving bloc. It is here today, but it goes home tomorrow. In the next section, the reader will see that that was a condition to puzzle sociologists and attempts were made to resolve the apparent contradiction within a socialist framework. In the process of bargaining, furthermore, the states built a kind of labor market where the law of value, as Mandel would have it, does not dominate, yet, it functions. In fact, the reproduction of that labor power was managed in different ways according to the different temporalities in the relations between Vietnam and Bulgaria on the one hand, but also according to the changing objective economic conditions in Bulgaria on the other. Sometimes this reproduction was to be split between the two states or was a one-state obligation, which, again, raises questions in regards to the share workers had

regarding the social product. As it will be seen, moving labor power under socialism was defined as a need to guarantee the intensive development of socialism through extensive means. Let us first see what conditions brought about the possibility and the objective to move labor power *en masse* and how socialist sociologists in turn defined the form of this moving.

2.3.1. What is wrong with extensity?

At the IX[th] Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Partythat took place in July of 1966, the party took the decision that there must be a reorientation of the production process which will take place with a given priority to the so-called "intensive (*интензивни)* factors" of production.[48] In 1968, the transition from extensive to intensive was still unrealized, for which Zhivkov blamed the methods used for crafting the budget and "the existence of some unfavorable tendencies."[49] He listed several of these tendencies: inadequate use of living and social labor; reduction in the return of the products exported in international markets; the increase in the labor endowment outgrows the productivity of labor; the distribution of national income is more than what is being produced; excess of imports over exports; the amount of cash income significantly outpaces the commodity coverage and the actual realization of those incomes.[50] Zhivkov claimed that there was a "fetishizing of the growth of quantity and underestimating issues of efficiency."[51] For example, Bulgaria was losing millions of labor hours (*човекочасове*) as the potential workers available to the country were not used in an efficient way. The head of the party was obviously angry at certain enterprises who were not using their labor force in an efficient way and "on top of it all" were looking for additional workers, explaining their inefficiency with the lack of workers.[52]

> [In addition to the irrational usage of the labor force in the enterprises], simultaneously, the irrationality of the usage of the labor force is due to the shortcomings of the current Labor Code. It is in contradiction with the new conditions and tasks that lie before the building of socialism and with the new character of labor and humans' consciousness (Zhivkov).[53]

[48] CAS 1/35/429.
[49] CAS 1/35/429, p. 6
[50] CAS 1/35/429
[51] CAS 1/35/429, p. 17
[52] CAS 1/35/429, p. 26
[53] CAS 1/35/429, p. 26

2.4. Why Did Socialism Need Imported Labor? Socialist Presuppositions in Moving Labor Power

Discussing the differences between the Western type of guest-worker programs and the socialist-type of international labor contracts, Alamgir (2014b:38) claims that a significant divergence is detected within the framework of *initiation* of the contracts. Whereas the guest-worker programs are initiated by the receiving state, the author claims that in Czechoslovakia, "the impetus for the launch of the Czechoslovak-Vietnamese labor exchange, originated squarely in the economic preoccupation of the *sending* country" (ibid. emphasis of the author). This is not precisely the case for PRB. The country did actively seek foreign workers to fulfill certain shortages in the industry. The evidence I rely upon to back this argument, evidence that nonetheless unfolds also in the theoretical discussions Bulgarian sociologists had regarding moving labor power and its reproduction, unfolds in the following paragraphs. Furthermore, in the next chapter I review the negotiations taking place in the beginning of the 1970s between PRB and Egypt, and PRB and Vietnam, in order to demonstrate that the labor exchange contracts were desired and called for on part of Bulgaria as well.

From a report issued in 1970, it became clear that the situation concerning the availability of labor power in the country was dire. The low levels of the natural population growth was listed as the prime reason behind the labor shortages: whereas between 1950-1958 the average increase of the population has been 10-11 persons per one thousand, between 1960-1964 that level has decreased to 6-6.5 per one thousand.[54] Politburo was worried that the ever decreasing population will be detrimental to the country and its production especially considering the amount of capital investments (*капиталовложения*) made. The initial estimations showed that even if labor power for the industry was to be supplied by seasonal excess from the agricultural sector or by those unappropriated by the production process (pensioners, housewives, invalids), still, the industry would experience a shortage of about 20 000 laborers for 1970, and about 100 000 between 1971 – 1975.[55] Two of the measures to be taken were the following: immediate implementation of the decisions taken regarding the intensification of production ("mechanization and automation of production and on the basis of technical progress to increase productivity with greater pace, to result in reduction of the

[54] CAS 1/35/1220, p.30
[55] CAS 1/35/1220

demand for labor") and intensification of the movement control of the labor resources.[56] Movement became part and parcel of the intensification. Although the above control intensification concerned the internal movement that, obviously, was immobilizing in its nature, at this stage we can argue that the intensification the production, the immobilization of the labor force internal to the country, and moving labor power developed in an interdependent relation. The desired intensification of the economy determined and was determined by the ways labor power was to be spread territorially.

Moving labor power was a subject of Zahari Staykov's *Division of Labor and the movement of the labor force in People's Republic of Bulgaria* (1962) long before the latter became a posibility for economic intensification. The book was largely concerned with the internal movement, yet, the author devoted a chapter to the potentiality that is hidden in the international movement of labor power between the socialist countries. Citing the improving international situation, the increasing economic achievements in the socialist bloc, the acceleration in the technological progress and the development of the economic cooperation between socialist countries, he envisioned a "communist world without borders" (1962:227). This was possible, according to Staykov, as the property relations in the communist countries allowed for the rational usage of territorial spread of the labor force. Staykov envisioned labor power as a proxy to socialist integration of economic and technological achievements. He wrote about the movement of labor power as if it was hiding the potential to link the socialist countries through shared knowledge (e.g. the achievements in the agricultural sector in one country could travel via the export of labor from that same country to other countries. That way the rest of the socialist world would not need to invest resources in experiments and scientific researchers since knowledge and know-how was already present). The economic sociologist opposed the voices within the camp that spoke ill against the possibilities that stand before moving labor power. He even invoked Lenin's call to unity of the international immigrant class in order to call such voices reactionary.[57] The stakes were high.

[56] CAS 1/35/1220, p.35

[57] Lenin (1913). "There can be no doubt that dire poverty alone compels people to abandon their native land, and that the capitalists exploit the immigrant workers in the most shameless manner. But only reactionaries can shut their eyes to the *progressive* significance of this modern migration of nations. Emancipation from the yoke of capital is impossible without the further development of capitalism, and without the class struggle that is based on it. And it is into this struggle that capitalism is drawing the masses of the working people of the *whole* world, breaking down the musty, fusty habits of local life, breaking down national barriers and prejudices, uniting workers from all countries in huge factories and mines in America, Germany, and so forth."

Simultaneously to the calls for stricter internal control of movement dominating the debates in Politburo in the late 1960s, sociologists of real socialism were increasingly placing forward a demand for the socialist world, where the different units (nations) will be incorporated into a stronger union by moving labor power across that same world. Otherwise, intensification was impossible.

> The question of labor power migration between the socialist countries is one of the least studied issues in the economic literature, both at home and abroad. This is due to the undervaluing of the objective necessity of this process in socialism and the major role that it could play for achieving proper use of the main productive force - the workforce, and the subsequent increase of labor efficiency in the system as a whole. (Minkov 1970:3)

2.4.1. Moving labor power in socialism and the question of social reproduction

Minko Minkov, a Bulgarian economic sociologist, was one of the few theoreticians of inter-socialist migration. His professional life had focused on the subjects of labor and social assistance, population and demography.[58] I will devote the next lines on his seminal *Issues of concern of the migration of labor power between the COMECON member states* as it is an exercise of thinking through and conceptualizing moving labor power and social reproduction under socialism. Minkov's study outlines his vision of modes of moving (foreign) labor power, where the investments made by the sending states in regards to social reproduction have to be taken into account by the receiving states and calculate the price of that moving labor power accordingly. In the book, Minkov welcomed as a positive development the COMECON conference held in Budapest in 1968. According to the author, one of the biggest achievement of the workshop was that it addressed the economic problems experienced by the bloc in terms of the ineffective usage of living labor, where, Minkov foresaw moving labor power as a potential pressure absorber. According to the sociologist, a common mistake made by socialist countries was that, "Labor force, which is the primary productive force, was seen as a constant magnitude that cannot move" (1970:21). Minkov believed that such conceptualization was inadequate anymore and it was an effect of the "simplistic understanding" that the bloc provides full employment to the local working force.

[58] He held positions in the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences between 1972 and 1982 and then between 1990 and 1994 and was one of the founding members and an editor in chief of the famous journals *Sociological Review and Population.*

Minkov rationalized the need to move labor power within the socialist bloc as: a) this will strengthen the intensive development both in the different countries but also in the system as whole; b) bridge the differences in the living standards that exist between different countries in the socialist bloc; c) increase the economic competitiveness of the socialist system vis-a-vis the capitalist one (1970:23). Minkov theorized socialist movement of labor power in opposition to the concept of freedom of movement as it was gaining popularity among capitalist countries at the time. He offered that full employment cannot take place at the expense of an unjustifiable strengthening of the extensive development of just a few countries, as is the case in the capitalist bloc and that when movement of living labor is concerned, socialist countries have to organize such movements in accordance with the interests of every party concerned by it: the laborers, the sending and the receiving country but also the population of the host country. He offered a view of migration that takes the socialist system as a whole and that would ease the goals of equal integration by advocating a holistic approach in the development of such programs (1970:24). Minkov was in fact conceptualizing a type of moving labor power that is close to Balibar's definition of "real universality." Namely, "an actual interdependency between the various 'units' which, together, build what we call *the world*" (2002:148, author's italization).

The movement of labor power between socialist countries would secure intensive development. Minkov was following that particular line of reformist thinking in the socialist countries, which advocated intensity along extensity and liberalization of the forces of production (subject of section 2.1. of this chapter, see also footnotes 33 and 41 for more information). He furthered the debates, however, and added a layer to Zhivkov's objectively needed intensive factors, namely moving (internationally) labor power. But how were intensification and movement to work in concert? Minkov imagined a system of migration that would be flexible and in accordance with the "economic potential" of each territorial unit (not necessarily only national) within the socialist system. He conceived of migration as bringing this potential to the full: the units that experience labor shortages would bring in labor power from the outside, and those who experience labor surplus will export it where it was needed. In my opinion, this was an exercise in internationalist thinking par excellence, where the national units are subsumed under the logic of the international.[59] His book came as a response to the labor shortages experienced by the bloc and the need to tackle the

[59] Not necessarily socialist internationalism. I engage with the concept of internationalism further in the chapters.

subsequent problems for production, but also as a supplement to the ideological presuppositions that were gaining popularity within the Bulgarian reformist bloc and that concerned intensification.

As the question of labor power was in the basis of Minkov's conceptions, he necessarily reached the question of its reproduction. Minkov thought that the territorial units that were to import labor from the outside were to gain even more than the exporting ones if the former had not been involved in the previous reproduction of the labor power in motion. He foresaw that the exchange of living labor shall be organized in a way so as not to harm either the sending, or the receiving country, where two variables had to be taken in mind: 1) what has the sending country spent in order to reproduce the labor power of the migrating potential labor and 2) what is this labor able to produce in the receiving country. As the importing country would gain more out of the moving labor power (as it did not participate in its reproduction prior to its actualization in the receiving country), Minkov believed that the hosts need to pay a certain amount of money to the exporters. The calculation of these sums would be based on: 1) the life fund and the average future life expectancy of the population according to gender and age; 2) the labor fund and the average future active labor life of the population according to gender and age; 3) the productive possibilities of the population and the average future production according to gender and age; 4) consumption possibilities of the population and the average future consumption according to gender and age (Minkov 1970:61). He foresaw a socialist world, where the division of labor would be so developed that moving labor power accordingly to this division of labor would become a necessity. He gave an account of his vision in the following way:

> In certain periods of time when there is an ongoing mechanization of the agriculture for example, the countries where agricultural labor prevails will have to free some of its labor force that, in turn, can be directed towards those countries, where there is not enough agricultural population and which experience sharpened necessity of labor force in their production (1970:66).

If we are to visualize Minkov's propositions then we can see how moving labor power was to be done by maneuvering blocks of certain capacities of labor power from one sector to another depending on the needs of production and technological progress.

It is interesting to point to the way Minkov conceptualized "valuable" moving labor power. Firstly, according to him, the more qualified the labor power, the more its "consumption

abilities" stemming from needs structured by the consumption of culture and science (1970:62-63). Yet, that also meant that the country that has (re)produced such labor power has invested both more time and value in it (e.g. time needed for university degrees). Accordingly, the sums to be paid off to the exporting countries had to also take into consideration to what degree the labor power is a qualified one. Even though Minkov was having a hard time to scientifically ground this "methodological quire," he nevertheless hoped that the social sciences will progress enough in order to supplement the needed variables in the near future. Yet, he noted that in the case when unskilled labor was to be skilled in a country-importer that would not necessary mean that afterwards the home country has to pay any sums to the host country. His rationale was that after all, the labor power would have acquired labor qualification. It only would mean that the country importer will pay less for such potential labor and in some cases not at all (1970:63). The second "valuable" characteristic was that of age: "Obviously, when younger labor power emigrates… the sums have to be higher" (1970:62).

Some of Minkov's propositions will influence these negotiations between Vietnam and Bulgaria, which are subject of the next chapter.

2.5. Conclusion

The debates about the objective need standing before developed socialist countries and in regards to potential migration between Bulgaria and other fraternal countries intensified in the late 1960s. By the early 1970s, Bulgaria began looking around to bring foreign labor to be employed in the expanding industry. Aware of the labor shortages in construction and agriculture, the country was looking for efficient ways to bridge these shortage gaps. Simultaneously, Vietnam was calling on socialist states to accept Vietnamese citizens for vocational schooling and training as the country was trying to rebuild after decades of war.

As we can see from Staykov's and Minkov's theorization of moving labor power, there is a qualitative difference in the framing of the relation between production and reproduction when compared to its capitalist counterpart. Whereas the socialist thinkers saw production and reproduction as complementing each other in a non-antagonistic way, capitalist employers, as we will see later on, refuse to take any responsibility towards the reproduction of the laborer.

There is a clear contradiction between production and reproduction that is structured in the capitalist organization of labor. This profound difference is best detected when moving labor power and migrant labor is concerned. Within capitalist structures, they are bound to legal regimes that bar access to the socialized means of reproduction, expected to and forced to leave if they are unable to produce, wages are increasingly not being paid, and capital strives towards the diminishing of social protection of all sorts. In contrast, the socialist employer would cover all costs of reproduction, including travel to the country and back, and housing, clothing, including pensions and health coverage upon return to the home country.

In the next chapter I relate the ways the theoretical presuppositions of Minkov and Staykov, coupled with the change in the forms of production, affected the concrete conditions of the labor power to be moved between Vietnam and Bulgaria. The reader will be able to trace how these two variables played into each other. Let us see how these conceptions of moving labor power influenced, or not, the negotiations between PRB and fraternal countries in regards to moving labor power between states.

CHAPTER THREE THE SPECIFICS OF MOVING LABOR POWER INTO SOCIALIST BULGARIA

This part of the thesis continues with the concrete unfolding of the relations concerning the implementation of moving labor power explored from the point of view of the contracts between Vietnam and Bulgaria. I analyze archival documents and reconstruct the way the programs operated. I do rely on great many details from these contracts in order to trace the changes that took place between the different periods and therefore, to relate how these contracts followed the logic of the larger politico-economic framework of state socialism. The account provided here is the first attempt to historicize the stay of the Vietnamese workers in Bulgaria, according to research materials I had access to.[60] I shed light on an important case for the study of socialist mobilities. I explore the effects of state socialism's turn towards inter-state moving of labor power and the changing rationales towards this movement. Contrary to accounts that treat state socialism as a homogenous historical whole, we will see that in fact different politico-economic and ideological temporalities worked in the period of the labor contracts, which greatly affected the relation of foreign workers to processes of reproduction and production.

Even today, when the country experiences labor shortage, both state and capital, as if naturally, recall Vietnam as a potential source of labor power. In 2009 for example, Emilia Maslarova, Minister of Social Care at the time, wanted to import Vietnamese to work for the construction sector. Despite her numerous negotiations that took place in Hanoi and the uproar in the media that the Vietnamese will *again* invade the Bulgarian market, this 'invasion' never really materialized. In 2014 a meeting was held between Hanoi and Sofia to discuss cooperation in the economic sphere and training of personnel between the two countries. In May 2016, Sergei Stanishev, former Prime Minister and a leader of the European Socialists also spoke about past ideas for labor import, but from a different angle. Contrary to the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, he outlined the proposal for import of Vietnamese during his cabinet as a proof of the ability of the coalition to manage the market. According to Stanishev, the proposed import was not dictated by the emigration crisis but by the abundance of jobs, therefore the import was needed because of the well working economy. Apparently, the "Vietnamese" have become a cure for the wounds of the market and the management of their movement inwards (or outwards as it will transpire in the next chapter four) corresponds

[60] Much of the data presented here has been already published in Apostolova (2017).

to the necessary and historically specific healing of these wounds. This immediate turn to Vietnamese workers, is representative of socialist labor mobility.

Attempts to scrutinize the question of the Vietnamese workers' presence have been made for other countries that were part of the Eastern Bloc (Bui 2004; Dennis 2007; Alamgir 2013, 2014, 2014b for Czechoslovakia; Schwenkel 2014 for the GDR; Nowicka 2015 for Poland). Yet, no such exploration can we find for the Bulgarian context. The scholarly world in Bulgaria is curiously silent about the issues explored here. The only work that tries to engage the Vietnamese diaspora in Bulgaria is that of Evgenia Mitseva (2005). In her article, Mitseva deals predominantly with contemporary Vietnamese diaspora and its relation to the Embassy of Vietnam, in addition to the numerous Vietnamese business organizations scattered throughout the country. She is sparing, however, in her exploration of the socialist past and largely brushes over the fact that there were Vietnamese workers during socialism. She only mentions briefly that they left by 1991 because of "the lack of information among the Vietnamese regarding the Bulgarian nature, norms, and laws." The highly culturalist, but also in many respects, wrong account of Mitseva disregards the conflictual nature of the expulsion of the Vietnamese from Bulgaria (discussed in chapter four) and refrains from scrutinizing the relations between the Bulgarian socialist state and Vietnam. These relations, however, comprise an important episode in the history of the socialist world and the movement of labor power during the Cold War.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, I show that the decision to employ Vietnamese workers in the Bulgarian industry was not a given. The People's Republic of Bulgaria was negotiating with both Egypt and Vietnam simultaneously and in fact prefered to bring in Egyptian workers as they were considered to be more qualified. It was only due to unfavorable conditions placed by the Egyptian government that Bulgaria took the decision to turn to Vietnam. The labor contracts signed with Vietnam follow three main rationales: internationalist solidarity, chasing after debt, and repayment of debt. The reader will be able to trace the following line of argumentation: while in the beginning moving labor power largely followed an internationalist solidarity line and the surplus product was socialized in the social reproduction, increasingly, the Vietnamese labor was exploited in a way so its surplus labor was accumulated in order to meet state debt. Throughout the chapter I follow the conditions for this change in the rationales, which also affected the ways the two states engaged with questions of production and reproduction of the Vietnamese working force.

Towards the end of the contracts, the responsibility for reproduction was transferred completely in the hands of the Vietnamese state, which is in opposition to Minkov's conceptualization of moving labor power I discussed in chapter two, and moreover, part of the surplus labor performed by the Vietnamese laborers was to cover Vietnam's debt towards Bulgaria.

3.1. Vietnam Was at First Egypt: Moving Labor Power and the Risk of Exchange Rates

Where 1973 was conceived as a tipping point in Germany that brought to the front issues of illegality, dismantling of previous relations between (foreign) labor, capital and the state, increase in racialization of foreigners, etc., we can safely conclude that 1973 was also a tipping point for socialist Bulgaria and its relation to (foreign) labor power. Where the *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker) was to slowly disappear as a su in Western Europe, the internationalist socialist worker was to set in on the scene of labor mobilization in the socialist world. In an excerpt from Protocol 47 from 29 August 1973, we see that Bulgaria experienced a shortage of construction workers; a problem, which Todor Zhivkov himself undertook to resolve. The labor shortages did not comprise solely the construction sector but were a general issue of concern at the time. As we saw in the previous section the shift towards intensive development could only be secured by an extensive injection, i.e. more labor in the industries. In other words, the logic of intensification promoted steadily within socialist Bulgaria, could only be supported by the practice of extensification in the labor force. This becomes evident in the decisions taken on March 9, 1973, to prolong negotiations with Egypt over the sending of labor power to Bulgaria.

Vietnam was at first Egypt. In the early months of 1973, Bulgaria, among other socialist countries, was negotiating simultaneously with Egypt and Vietnam over the sending of labor force to the country. Wilczynski (1972; 1973) argues that shortages of labor on the one hand and the ease by which one was finding employment (e.g. in the USSR quitting employment was decriminalized in 1956), resulted in large number of turnovers and worsened discipline among workers in socialist countries. Simultaneously, the large outputs from production necessitated the employment of large number of workers and hence, created labor shortages. A few reasons were listed as to why Bulgaria was to employ labor from the outside: "Creating; overcoming the shortage of labor in the construction, strengthening of labor discipline, reducing turnover and shortening the time for leave; using trained and qualified

labor; exercising moral and political influence of the socialist relations of production on workers from Egypt."[61] Such incentives are safely placed on the scales between the logic of the marketeurs and the logic of socialist internationalism I spoke about in the beginning of chapter two. While we see "market" logic in the first part of listed reasons, the second part concerns a particular socialist understanding of exercising influence in potential fraternal countries. While for right now the latter logic is somewhat implicit, we will detect its stronghold in the negotiations with Vietnam later on.

To a large degree, the negotiations with Egypt were concerned with the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar (USD) to the BG lev (BGN). The risk stemming from the usage of foreign workers was calculated by the amount of that same exchange rate. This is not surprising considering the devaluation of the US dollar in the 1970s and therefore the devaluation of Bulgarian currency reserves. This crisis of the dollar, which was eventually to become a debt crisis for the socialist world, created conditions according to which the currency exchange rate was in the bottom of negotiating the exchange value of foreign workers. Let us turn to the emerging international socialist labor market in order to see how.

I treat this market according to the information I had found in the Bulgarian archive. My analysis of it could be conducted only in view of the interest of the buyer of labor power. In Marx's reading of the capitalist market, the buyer and the seller of labor power, who is nonetheless compelled to this relation, meet as equals and bargain over the terms of the contract to be signed. What is important in this relation is that labor power is sold by the individual, free laborer. When we are to consider the way the socialist market functioned, in regards to selling and the buying of foreign labor power, we can say that the market form of the latter was organized and negotiated by the state administrations on each side of the market. This is perhaps not surprising given the framing of moving labor power as a relation that is supposed to be of advantage for socialist *countries* (see Staykov and Minkov previous chapter). In this conjuncture, notwithstanding the currency crisis and the shortages of labor, the foreign worker did not hold any direct bargaining power vis-a-vis the buyer of her commodity. The worker was not sitting at the negotiation table. Her bargaining power was instead delegated to the state administration of her residency. In this respect, it was not the individual that was bargaining the exchange value, but the state on behalf of the individual.

[61] Bureau meeting of Ministers 03/09/1973 - point 4 "Options for continuing the negotiations with Egypt on AP Agreement for Exchange of labor."

Yet, a market formed. If we are to compare these trends to what we see in the subcontractor economy of capitalism (see for example Tsing [2009]), the difference that we can detect stems from the ways liberal economies today supply themselves with labor power. We will see in part two that this is done by multiplying and diversifying the market niches for non-state fixers between buyers and sellers, whereas in state socialism we see a concentration of that power within the state apparatus, which also concentrates the possibility for more leverage in the bargaining power. In chapters five of the thesis, the reader will see that the multiplication of market niches has also resulted in the loss of leverage.

Reference 8-10 from the Central Archive tells us that in 1971, a year after the publishing of Minkov's book, the ministers of foreign trade and labor and social care approved a plan according to which Bulgaria was to negotiate with Egypt.[62] From January 9 to 13, 1972, a Bulgarian delegation led by Misho Mishev, minister of labor and social care at the time went to Cairo for eight days.[63] The two parties were unable to reach agreement because of the different clearing dollar rates they both offered. The latter concerned the second half of the salary, which provided that 50% are sent to Egypt in the form of pension and paid in dollars. Here, we clearly see that where the negotiations failed concerned the reproduction of the pensioners returning to Egypt; the once living labor that Bulgaria would have otherwise used. According to Mishev, to accept Egypt's conditions from 1971 regarding the exchange rate, it would have meant to "create a precedent that could require to take on new financial burdens and revaluate already signed contracts in the field of social policy."[64] Similar situation failed the negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Egypt.[65] The devaluation of the U.S. dollar in 1972 changed the perspective. In 1973, the negotiations with Egypt were resumed.

The cost and benefit analysis regarding the hiring of foreign labor closely followed Minkov's abstractions. The bureaucrats integrated in their calculations costs that the People's Republic of Bulgaria would save because of the non-retained costs of past reproduction, training and qualification. As compared to the employment of a Bulgarian worker, the cost for an Egyptian

[62] Reference to a note from the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs and President of the National Bank on how to continue the negotiations with Egypt. Agreement on Exchange of workforce 1973.
[63] Mishev was a "marketeur" (see Marcheva 2012) and a close associate to Zhivkov.
[64] Memorandum of 6.2.1973 issued by Misho Mishev and Kiril Zarev regarding the possibilities for the continuation of the negotiations with AP Egypt on the labor exchange agreement (Докладна записка от 6.2.1973 от Мишо Мишев и Кирил Зарев относно възможностите за продължаване на преговорите с АР Египет по спогодбата за размяна на работна сила.)
[65] Ibid.

such looked like this:[66]

Table 1. Calculating the cost of Egyptian workers

Indicators	For one Bulgarian worker	For one Egyptian worker
Transportation	126	230
Social security tax	130	130
Domestic and utility costs	60	60
Work clothing	30	30
Family allowance	140	-
Total	486	450

According to another table from the Protocol, the profits that Bulgaria would realize if the country was to employ 3,000 workers for seven months each year for three years was counted to 4 275 000 BGN.[67] The Egyptian side of the negotiation table held strongly the position that theclearing rate of the US dollar had to be 1.08 BGN. Bulgaria did not even consider it. The minister of labor had two other suggestions. To cut the rate at 1.85 which would have been of extreme profit for the People's Republic or to offer a rate at 1.24 BGN for 1 USD, which would have been the optimum decision for both countries. Yet, the second option was not favoured so as not to create a "precedent of the multiplicity of exchange rates". Instead, the minister of labor suggested that Bulgaria insists on the 1, 85 rate and add a compensation under a "stimulating premium of 20%" as well. The latter was rationalized as follows: "giving such an incentive premium is justified by the importance of the employment sites of the Egyptian workers, that they will be far away from their families and their homelands, work in an untypical for them climate, etc."

[66] Table is taken from Report 15 from the meeting of the Council of Ministers on March 9, 1973. P.3 / 4. No family costs were calculated as the workers were not supposed to bring or establish families. They were supposed to leave the country in a three-year-period.
[67] Ibid.

At the end it was decided that the exchange rate offered by Bulgaria would be 1.65 BGN to 1 USD. Egypt did not agree. Instead, Vietnam became Egypt.

3.2. The 1973 Agreement: 'Fraternal Solidarity! Absolute Unity!'

"Internationalism is only common sense, for capitalists and socialists alike" (Nairn 1997:27).[68] Historicizing internationalism vis-à-vis industrial developments and empire, Nairn demonstrates how as a creed, internationalism is a function of nationalism and not vice versa. The author turns around the plates of internationalism (against Lenin, 1997:7) and prescribes to it a particularistic, rather than universalistic value. Both Nairn and Perry Anderson (2002) turn against propagandistic accounts of internationalism that do not take in their account its empirical and concrete realities. Perry Anderson (2002) describes internationalism as one of modernity's few political notions that can inhabit normative values and simultaneously be extremely equivocal. In order to tackle such shortcomings, Anderson proposes a view that takes into consideration changing historical versions of internationalism vis-à-vis nationalism in five major respects: the type of capital coetaneous within the particular national form; the geographical zone; the prevalent philosophical idiom and the definition of the nation that is being operationalized at that historical moment; and finally, the relation of the nationalism to the dominant classes (2002:7).

My own treatment of socialist internationalism is one that invokes it as an ideological form particular to a concrete historical moment in the development of state socialism. As we saw from Staykov and Minkov's treatment, the moving of labor power was to be concretized within the rigid boundaries of bettering the conditions for the entire socialist bloc. This is a particular definition of internationalism as well, where movement of labor power is conditioned accordingly to the needs of the particularities and as the necessary feature to complete the zenith for the socialist entirety. In our case, this moment coincides, perhaps ironically, with the attempts behind intensifying the economy and the interests of the emerging pro-socialist liberalization globalization movement on part of Marcheva's marketeurs.[69] At the s, this type of internationalism emerges as an outcome of the de-

[68] It is not my goal to provide an exhaustive account of what is internationalism or to engage with its changing historical forms and discursive usages worldwide. My only task in this chapter is to trace its trajectory as a notion and practice that guided the moving labor power practices in Bulgaria. Yet, the following studies are of interest for further discussion: Wolfe (1958); Marx and Engels (1978); Young (2001).

[69] It is ironic because of Brezhnev's statement that "internationalist duty [is] when … forces hostile to socialism

Stalinization processes. As Anderson (2002:21) shows, the effect of the Stalinist era was internationalism of high disintegration of its "classic form (i.e. belonging to the labor class)." In other words, the internationalism under debate in this chapter concerns the internationalism of the post-Stalinist elite. This type of internationalism functioned in a way so as to push for further liberalization of the economy and to contain the massive uproar against that same liberalization. It was a reaction to the "fratricidal fissiparity" internationalism (Anderson 2002) of Stalinism and the impossibility of the communist states to catch up with the capitalist economies. This type of internationalism was a response to the previous rooting of the means of production within national boundaries. In this sense, I join forces with Alamgir (2014b) against conspiracy theories that frame socialist internationalism as a "fig leaf" (Jarausch 1999, cited in Alamgir 2014b) and instead provide the term with a concrete historical effect.

In the beginning of the 1970s when Bulgaria was looking to hire workers from abroad, internationalism was the setting framework. Certainly, one cannot even imagine an internationalist framework without coeval movement, be it that of ideas, struggles, technology, or humans. The sending and receiving of foreign workers in Bulgaria was always accompanied by statements of internationalism, solidarity in fraternity, and socialist cooperation. The notion of internationalism, in the socialist context of the 1970s, was tightly linked to the reorganization of the economic model, however. The building of socialism was invoked both as a duty, as a moral strive but never it did escape the boundaries set by a particular economic agenda.

Alamgir (2014b:60) argues that the labor contracts between Czechoslovakia and Vietnam were "built essentially from scratch" as previous ties between the two countries were non-existent. I would like to extend and reject such position. The theoretical argument I put forward is that these labor contracts shall not be situated solely in the area of labor, but in relation to previously established connections between the two countries, which included other spheres of production. In the case between Vietnam and Bulgaria, the labor contracts would strictly follow the logic of debt. Whereas in the beginning of the contracts, the forgiveness of debt played into the logic of socialist internationalism (Bulgaria forgives

attempt to turn the development of a given socialism country in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist system.' As we sae, the intensification of the economy also meant the implementation of certain capitalist forms. (Cited in Alamgir 2014b).

Vietnam's debt as a gesture towards the exchange of labor), towards the end of the contracts, the repaying of the accumulated by Vietnam debt entered into the logic of the marketeurs. This accumulated debt was used against the Vietnamese state as a punitive measure, where the debt was not to be forgiven but repaid by the Vietnamese workers.

Official economic relations between Bulgaria and Vietnam go back to 1956 when the countries ratified the first Trade Agreement between them. This was followed by numerous bilateral contracts, both long-term and annual ones. Between 1961 and 1965, mutual commodity trade agreements amounted to fifteen million rubles. Relations fluctuated during this period, however, given the war that engulfed Vietnam at the time.[70] In 1966, Bulgaria started a massive aid campaign for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Over a period of ten years (through 1975), the former lent the latter seventy million rubles, provided "gratitude aid" worth seven million rubles in the form of commodities, and offered "people's aid" worth six million rubles.[71] Additionally, Bulgaria contributed to Vietnam's economy through the construction of refrigeration plants, canneries, brick factories, agricultural sites, and so on. Vietnam was not an inactive recipient of aid, but also exported large amounts of commodities to Bulgaria. For example, between 1976 and 1980, Bulgaria imported the following:

> seven tons of tin, towels for 300,000 rubles, 200 pairs of beach sandals, 200,000 pairs of sports shoes, 200 tons of tea, 1,000 tons of coffee, 10 tons of oils, 50 tons of peanuts and 1,000 tons of compotes and juices made of tropical fruits, products made of wicker and bamboo for 350 thousand rubles, souvenirs for 120,000 rubles, 1,000 tons of wrapping paper and leather products for 300 000 rubles.[72]

In 1973, the relations between Bulgaria and Vietnam deepened as two major events took place. The first was the signing of the practitioners' contracts and the second was the pardon of a large part of Vietnam's debt. On August 5, 1973, just a couple of months prior to the signing of the official labor contracts, Bulgaria pardoned 51 000 000 rubles from the 57 000 000 loan I mentioned above. The rest, 5 900 000 rubles were transformed into a new loan whose purpose was to "restore the destroyed, lost or rendered unfit equipment during the wartime."[73] In a way, the relation of the Vietnamese working force to PRB was always determined by the debt relations between the latter and SRV. Although in 1973, this relation

[70] CAS. 1975. 259/44/283.
[71] Gratitude and people aid are synonymous.
[72] CAS. 1975. 259/44/283.
[73] Ibid.

exhibited more of an indirect character and was subsumed under the internationalist spirit that accompanied the anti-imperialist efforts of the Soviet Bloc, this would change tremendously in 1986. Additionally, at the end of February of 1973, Bulgaria took a decision to ease the visa regime for the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. According to the agreement the diplomatic personnel and their families would travel without entry and exit visas and the issuing of visas for citizens was eased to a maximum.[74]

The political climate of the Eastern Bloc determined the negotiations over the labor contracts to a large extent. Alena Alamgir distinguishes between three types of internationalism that pertained to different periods in the relations between Czechoslovakia and Vietnam, which drove the labor relations between the two countries: "paternalistic internationalism" (until 1973), "mutually advantageous internationalism" (1973-1979) and finally, "beleaguered internationalism" (1980-1989). As Schwenkel (2014) also points out, the mobility of goods and labor found in the official discourse during state socialism was framed as "socialist internationalism." This was also the case of bilateral relations between Vietnam and Bulgaria. The lengthy contracts of aid, often comprising more than twenty pages, were always signed under the umbrella of "internationalist friendship and socialist internationalism." Eventually, the labor exchange contracts would be made to fit similar internationalist sentiments.

By the early 1970s, Bulgaria began looking around to bring foreign labor to be employed in the expanding industry. This decision was based on the country's inability to meet its labor needs for the near future. In a document from 1969 we learn that, "it was estimated that the need of additional labor in 1970, as compared with 1969, will reach 62,600 people … between 1971 and 1975, this demand will be 360,200."[75] Simultaneously, Vietnam negotiated with other states in the Bloc (e.g., Czechoslovakia) to accept Vietnamese citizens for vocational schooling and training, as the country tried to rebuild after decades of war. Alamgir (ibid) demonstrates that the contracts between Czechoslovakia and Vietnam took place as an initiative on part of the latter. The Bulgarian case differs in this regard. As we saw in the section concerning the negotiations with Egypt, PRB was actively seeking labor power in order to fill its shortages. This is not to say that the relation between Vietnam and Bulgaria did not exemplify one of internationalist solidarity, but that, these two relations were weaved

[74] 1973. Decision 128 to negotiate and conclude an Agreement on visa facilitation between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam
[75] CAS. 1969. 1/35/1220.

together and interdependent. Let us see how.

Throughout the 1970s, the Bulgarian newspaper *Rabotnichesko delo* often published coverage about the situation in Vietnam and the war . The latter was a "fraternal country" and the Party defined its solidarity with it through three major political statements: anti-imperialism (both against Washington and Beijing), opposition to Maoist movements, and the construction of real socialism.Vietnam was constructed in the Bulgarian press as a "heroic nation" capable of defeating the enemy forces of imperialism and the "Western hegemon." The agreement from 1973, signed between Bulgaria and Vietnam for the exchange of labor, was different, as we will see, from the one signed later on in 1980 in one major respect, namely, the internationalist power Vietnam exerted over Bulgaria in the name of building real socialism.

The negotiations with Vietnam regarding the signing of an agreement for receiving Vietnamese workers for professional training and practice ended successfully in January 1973. The agreement, affirmed by Bulgaria in July 1973, was signed as an "expression of fraternal solidarity and mutual aid."[76] According to it, the number of people to be sent over to Bulgaria was 3 000 between 1973 and 1975, where 600 were to be sent in 1973. Like the future agreements signed between the two countries, this one also stipulated that the Vietnamese practitioners had rights and obligations equal to those of their Bulgarian counterparts, according to the Bulgarian labor and social legislation, with the exception of family benefits. The Vietnamese practitioners however, unlike the ones coming in 1980, were to spend their time as follows: up to six months of language classes and acclimatization; from two to three years of vocational training in factories; and two to three years of productive labor in order to increase their qualification. Vietnam had to send "[male and female] youth (mainly male) between 17 and 22 years of age … who have finished seventh or higher grade, in good health, and lacking profession."

The negotiations regarding the first labor contract between Vietnam and Bulgaria were tense and lasted five consecutive days, although they were not as rough as the ones with Egypt, considering the relation between the two fraternal countries.[77] On the one hand, it seemed, Vietnam did not possess much of a bargaining power. The country was emerging out of a

[76] CAS. 1973. 259/43/283. Agreement between People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for the receiving of Vietnamese citizens for professional training and practice in the People's Republic of Bulgaria.
[77] CAS.1973. Report by Misho Mishev regarding the negotiations.

major war conflict and still fighting its postwar, economic and political effects. Armed conflicts at the borders of Vietnam would continue long after the official end of the war with the United States. In comparison to Egypt, which was offering qualified labor force, Vietnam had to offer injured veterans who had not acquired any skills and were yet to be integrated into the labor markets. This is the reason behind Vietnam's insistence on sending young men and women to Bulgaria who were to be trained and educated. On the other hand, the real bargaining power that Vietnam possessed was locked in the understanding that the building of socialism was to take place only by international cooperation and mutual aid.

The negotiations between Vietnam and Bulgaria did not go precisely as planned by Bulgaria. During the January negotiations, Vietnam presented to the Bulgarian delegation a draft agreement that was different than what Bulgaria initially envisaged. The major difference came with defining the purpose of the agreement. Where Bulgaria wanted to have workers, Vietnam insisted on practitioners. The archives show that Vietnam insisted on the latter definition and fought for it until Bulgaria stepped back from its initial plans. In the view of Vietnam, its labor force would have been protected if it was clear from the beginning that they were not sent to simply work in Bulgaria, but also to be educated in the building of socialism. In short, they insisted that they were sending specialized work force while gaining training for their workers. The practitioner exerted more symbolic power than the worker. Intensified development required intensified internationalism. As already seen in the account of Minko Minkov, the receiving of foreign labor was defined as a necessity to the intensive development of socialist countries. As a "necessity," the Vietnamese practitioners were cared for in abundance.[78]

Misho Mishev wrote to prime-minister Stanko Todorov that "the two projects were identical to a great extent… In the title of the Agreement, the word 'work' was omitted consciously, however, so that it is not used prejudicially by somebody."[79] Bulgaria made a great deal of concession.

Where Vietnam was responsible for the transportation costs from Hanoi to Sofia, Bulgaria

[78] On the ambivalent position of internationalism in Bulgaria's Communist Party see Tchavdar Marinov (2013). The author examines two axis: Bulgaria's position towards the "Macedonian question" and the country's politics towards its minorities in the period between 1960 and 1989.

[79] Title of the document to be found in CAS: Report regarding the Contract between People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam regarding the receiving of Vietnamese citizens for professional education and practice in People's Republic of Bulgaria. By Misho Mishev. 30.05.1973.

covered the expenses for the return from Sofia to Hanoi, except in the cases, where Bulgaria is at no fault concerning one's return or if the medical condition of the received practitioner differs from what had been stated in the medical protocol prior to arrival. The 1973 agreement, which consisted of eleven paragraphs, stipulated that the institutions responsible for the execution of the agreement were the Bulgarian Ministry of Labor and Social Care and the Vietnamese Embassy. Those institutions negotiated over the concrete jobs that the Vietnamese would train in and carry out, as well as the number of groups and the period of their stay in the host country. The trainings that the practitioners were undergoing (e.g. safety labor conditions, language, culture) in the first six months of their stay were covered by the Bulgarian state. After these six months, the Vietnamese were to receive no less than 80 BGN. Upon their arrival, the practitioners were given two sets of underwear and one set of outerwear for free and if they wanted to travel to another country, that had been only possible after the issuing of visas both by the Vietnamese Embassy and the Bulgarian authorities. They had nine more days of holidays as compared to their Bulgarian colleagues: "one day for commemorating Vietnam's national holiday, one day for the New Year's Eve according to the moon calendar and seven days prior to their return to Vietnam." The practitioners were allocated in the following manner: 1973 - 150 in the industry, 900 in agriculture and 350 in construction; 1974 and 1975 - 250 in industry, 450 in construction and 500 in agriculture.[80]

Vietnam was virtually recommending emigration as the "social question" in the country was gaining more and more political significance internationally. The state was firm when it came to the naming of its emigrating labor power, however. Although, at the end of the day 50% of the Vietnamese were to stay in Bulgaria and work for at least two to three years, how this population was to be classified was an important step in understanding what internationalism was to stand for.[81] The idea to train Vietnamese in the building of socialism through gaining "valuable" industrial and agricultural knowledge was an intrinsic part of the 1973 agreement. The acts of internationalism, in the view of Vietnam, involved symbolic gestures that guaranteed the dignity of practice and the possibility for return of the socialist worker. It was an internationalist duty not to harm these symbolic gestures.

The discontinuation of these principles would begin in the late 1970s when Bulgaria and

[80] Found in the Agreement from 1973.
[81] CAS. 1973. 259/43/283.

Vietnam experienced hardships in regards to the accumulation and repaying of their state debts.

3.3. Chasing After Debt

Todor Zhivkov visited Vietnam in September 1979, and the visit was covered by the newspaper *Rabotnichesko Delo* in detail. Titles ranging from "In the name of friendship and solidarity, " "Vivid display of fraternal friendship and solidarity in the fight," and "Fraternal solidarity, absolute unity" accompanied the covering of official events.[82] The three-day meeting between Bulgarian delegates and their Vietnamese colleagues ended with the signing of a Contract for friendship and cooperation between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. PRB was the third socialist European country to sign such a contract, which, according to *Rabotnichesko delo's* correspondent, was a significant step towards the "deepening of the economic cooperation" between the two countries.

The stakes involved in maintaining Vietnam's direction towards aligning with the USSR and in the meantime building the base for "real socialism" were high on the political agenda throughout the Eastern bloc in the 1970s. The socialist part of the world was firm in showing anti-imperialist solidarity with Vietnam, while extending it not only to rhetorical gestures, but also to humanitarian, economic, and military aid. PRB also participated in these anti-imperialist efforts.[83] Throughout the 1970s, Vietnam and Bulgaria continued signing trade agreements.

During his 1979 visit to Vietnam, Todor Zhivkov sent a political and ideological message, albeit a contradictory one. A document from April 10, 1980 mentions that one of the major missions of the Bulgarian delegation was to "conduct negotiations and sign a protocol regarding the deadline and the manner in which loans are to be repaid."[84] The Bulgarian ministry of external trade had been trying to make Vietnam sign protocols that would ensure the repayment of the accumulated debt. As a result of the official visit, the

[82] Rabotnichesko delo, September 29, 1979.
[83] CAS. ~1985. 259/4/625. For a period of nine years, Bulgaria has given Vietnam 70 000 000 rubles in loans and in gratuitous aid.
[84] CAS. 1980. 259/44/281. Report to Hristo Hristov from Konstantin Todorov, secretary of the ministry of external trade.

delegation succeeded in making Vietnam sign an agreement to repay part of its loans that were acquired in 1973 and in 1974. Thus the visit of the Bulgarian delegation to Vietnam was not confined exclusively to the expression of fraternal solidarity; it also had the purpose of discussing and restructuring Vietnam's debt.

Internationalism captured the national liberation struggle of Vietnam and assumed a new form in the relation between state and labor, where physical movement came to play a major mechanism of social reproduction. The popular imagination in Bulgaria has it that Vietnamese people were paying bribes in order to go to a fraternal country and escape the social disarrays in post-war Vietnam. Their struggles for reproduction found expression in one of the only possible ways out, and namely in movement. In addition, by the 1970s, major socialist countries – Yugoslavia, the USSR, and China – have entered irreversible conflicts. By the 1980s, as Anderson (2002) suggests, "The result was an ever more accelerated disintegration of the internationalism of the classic Communist movement, as Communist states multiplied." Yet, Anderson is incorrect in his analysis that the forces of production under real socialism were less internationalized than those in the capitalist world. By the time, means of production (including labor power) were traversing the socialist world constantly. Yet, it is important to distinguish between the diverse articulations of internationalism under different periods of socialism. It is also central to recall the ways in which internationalism was practiced, who its subject was, and where the boundaries of internationalist struggles were placed. As will become clear in this section, one of the practical reconceptualizations to take place consisted in internationalism being redefined from a duty to be paid to a debt to be repaid.

Moving away from the mid-1970s and prior to signing of the second agreement that would seal the sending and receiving of Vietnamese labor force to Bulgaria in 1980, there were intense conversations between Vietnam and Bulgaria in regards to the former's debt. As the conflict between China and Vietnam was intensifying, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam found it harder to pay back its loans to Bulgaria. In 1975 for example, China ended the construction of 93 industrial plants, stopped the export of essential commodities such as barley, and limited the movement of Vietnamese students and workers, effectively impeding Vietnam's steady reconstruction efforts. As these trends deepened by the day and later on extended to other socio-political spheres, Vietnam was pressured into seeking even more aid from the rest of the socialist countries, which resulted in significant debt increase. In July

1978, Le Than Gi, deputy minister in Vietnam's Council of Ministers, informed Bulgaria's ministry of external trade of the problems faced by his country and asked Bulgaria to increase the amount of exports as laid down for the next year. His request was accompanied by a verbal insurance that China's aggression would not impede Vietnam's "socialist development".[85] By 1978-79, however, Bulgaria was increasingly becoming anxious over Vietnam's impossibility to repay its debt.

In a report issued to Andrey Lukanov, Hristo Hristov, the minister of external trade, warned the Council of Ministers that it was becoming nearly impossible to balance Vietnam's debt payments with import received from the country. The impossibility came partly because of previously accumulated debt but also because of the continuous reconstruction problems Vietnam was facing. Hristo Hristov stated:

> Another unresolved issue is the repayment deadline for the provided loans, which came with the trade agreements dating 05.08.1973 and 09.14.1974, a total of 18 900 000 rubles. In these agreements, it was stated that the two countries will further agree on the time and the manner of repayment. Because the Vietnamese side annually raises the issue of new commodity loans and grants, we have so far not insisted upon firm negotiation of the period and the manner of repayment of these two loans. We do believe that the question of determining the time and manner of repayment of these loans has to be placed on this year's agenda...[86]

Simultaneously, Bulgaria was accumulating a significant amount of debt on its own, which prompted the country to seek ways, if needed through reforms, in order to relieve the situation. As Bueno (2006) shows, 1979 was an important reformist year in Bulgaria.

> The objectives, as they were defined by the economists of the Committee of Planning, envisaged: "to establish a better balance between decentralization and centralization; to extend the scope for the initiative and the independence of the economic organizations (particularly in the decision making about management and production process); to promote the conformity of the production with the market environment...; to assure the self-financing of the economic-productive activities through accountability; to introduce new financial relationships between the State and the economic organizations and among and inside such organizations; and to offer the workers and managers incentives connected to the improvement of the results of the economic organization[87]" The aim was to introduce a technological change in the economy, increase productivity, improve quality of the products and increase competitiveness on foreign markets in order to

[85] CAS. 1978. 259/44/283. Memorandum regarding the meeting from 5.07.1978 between Petar Bashikarov, deputy minister of foreign trade of Bulgaria, and Hguen Van Dau, deputy minister of foreign trade in Vietnam.
[86] CAS. 1979. 259/44/281. Report by Hristo Hristov, minister of foreign trade.
[87] The quote is taken from Kaser (1981).

eliminate the external debt that kept growing.

The Bulgarian word *дълг* [dalg] has a double meaning. On the one hand, it translates into English as duty, and on the other, as debt. The convention signed between Vietnam and Bulgaria in 1980 in regards to the sending of labor force was a turning point in the relations between the two countries, but also in the redefinition of foreign labor under the later decades of actually existing socialism. Gradually between 1980 and 1989, the Vietnamese labor force that resided in Bulgaria was reclassified from internationalist workers' force to a debt paying one. The ways in which Vietnamese labor in Bulgaria was conceptualized exemplify a sliding precisely between this double meaning of *дълг*: from duty to debt. In the period under examination, we have the leftovers of the ghost of the internationalist duty that had to be attained to, but also the beginning of a deep debt crisis. The foreign worker was entrusted with a double function: on the one hand, to produce the value necessary for the construction of real socialism, but on the other to ease the debt both for the giver and the receiver. The foreign worker became the *дълг* itself and she labored in order to repay state loans accumulated in previous periods.

3.4. The 1980 Agreement and the Manufacturing of the New Vietnamese

In March 1980, the Council of Ministers in Bulgaria gave its permission for the beginning of renewed negotiations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam regarding the receiving of workers for professional training and work. As it becomes clear from a report drafted by Krastio Trichkov and Andrey Lukanov, "the Vietnamese side is willing to provide [Bulgaria] with 30 000 workers."[88] The latter statement comes as a direct response to the official visit of Todor Zhivkov in Vietnam in 1979. After the visit, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party agreed on conducting research on the necessity of additional labor force, which showed that 34 000 people would be needed besides the "national" labor. The branches with the largest deficit of labor were construction, engineering, and metallurgy. Lukanov and Trichkov, however, advised the Council of Ministers not to undertake such a decisive step and to consider partial relief of Bulgaria's labor shortage. The reasons behind this caution were the following: "in the next few years, a release of labor from the production and service sectors is expected … [and] the realistic possibilities to accept, accommodate, and

[88] CAS. 1980.136/73/194. Memorandum.

train such an amount of people."

As already demonstrated (section 3.2.), the 1973 Convention defined the Vietnamese coming to Bulgaria as "practitioners" – a category which was insisted upon by the Vietnamese government. This definition is absent from the newly adopted 1980 Convention. Instead, the latter was signed under the title of "sending and receiving of Vietnamese qualified *workers* and engineering-technical workers to work in order to increase their qualification in the organizations in People's Republic of Bulgaria (emphasis mine)."[89] As one can see, the internationalist signifier– increasing qualification – is kept intact, whereas the previous prestigious and less demanding practitioner is substituted by worker.

To recall the 1973 Convention, Misho Mishev's reasons before Stanko Todorov for signing the document were that despite the seemingly different conditions offered by Vietnam, at the end of the day, at least 1 500 Vietnamese workers would remain in Bulgaria's factories for four years on average. Here, we would be right to evoke Anderson (2002) who says that, "[internationalism] only has currency as a back-construction referring to its opposite." Conversely, in 1980 this type of internationalism, the internationalism of duty towards fraternal Vietnam, was brushed aside and a new type of socialist foreign worker was constructed: one whose purpose was strictly the production of national income.

The change from *practitioner* to *worker* was not met without resistance. As a case in point I will take a letter written by Angel Chaushev, chairman of the Labor and Wages Committee to Andrey Lukanov on May 21, 1980.[90] The aim of the letter is to report on the results from the just finished Bulgarian language and professional enhancement of the Afghani, Cuban, Mongolian, and Vietnamese youth (in the male form) in the Kachulka region (Sliven, southeastern Bulgaria), where the Institute for Foreign Students had a branch organized specifically for the needs of the incoming foreign workers. While the report concerns four different nationalities, it only shortly sketches the number and anticipated job positions for the Mongolian and Cuban youth, whereas the behavior of the Afghani and Vietnamese future workers is placed under detailed scrutiny. The two groups are positioned against each other and precisely in this differentiated positioning we can sense what the practitioners of

[89] CAS 1980. 136/73/330. Agreement between the governments of PRB and SRV for the sending and receiving of Vietnamese qualified workers and engineering-technical workers for work and rising of their qualification in the economic organizations of PRB.
[90] CAS. 607/3/859.

socialism in Bulgaria deemed "proper socialist worker." The information found in the letter is valuable in one more respect as it does not only sanction improper behavior but it also outlines measures for its correction, i.e. in the intersection between proper work and proper ideological intervention. The letter is issued in the year when the boundary of the *practitioner* had to be exceeded in order to concretize the role of the foreigners as workers. I now turn to particular lines from the letter.[91]

> While the language training of Vietnamese practitioners, despite some difficulties, was being conducted and completed successfully, serious problems arose in the training of the Afghan practitioners. The learning process was hampered at the outset by the whims of most practitioners to be [categorically] treated as students or with a status different from that established in the agreement. The lack of built-up habits, systematic self-study and intensive workloads contributed to [the problem] – the latter are important conditions for the successful implementation of the language training methodology and it relies too much on the learners' proactive behavior.[92]

In order to tackle the defiance against the change, the management team of the trainings implemented,

> …even stricter organization of the learning process: all-day language education, high pressure and strict firmness… Many personal meetings were organized between the management and individual practitioners. Other measure included conversations, warnings and punishments… Forms of moral and material stimulus were sought after for the good practitioners… The Department of Bulgarian Language and the Cultural Club prepared a program and organized a series of cultural and ideological educational (идейностно-възпитателни) events propagating the success of socialism in Bulgaria, the USSR and other socialist countries.[93]

When it comes to the relation between the two states, the negotiations that took place in 1980 did not have to battle over how to define the subject of the Convention. The worker replaced the practitioner. This time, around 17 000 Vietnamese workers were to be shipped to Bulgaria between 1981 and 1985. Their stay in the country could not be for less than five years. From these 17 000 workers, 10 000 were to work in construction; 4 000 in agriculture, 1 000 in engineering, 500 in metallurgy, 500 in transportation, 500 in forestry, and 500 in other branches of the economy. The number of women was to be "up to 15%". The conditions of the contracts were severely altered from previous years, however. Language training, for example, was reduced from six to three months in 1980. Where the former was oriented

[91] The report is four pages long. I only translate the parts that are important for the purposes of this section.
[92] CAS 607/3/859.
[93] CAS 607/3/859.

towards learning "Bulgarian culture and traditions," the latter focused solely on issues concerning the labor process. Similar processes took place in Czechoslovakia: Alamgir (2013) suggests that Vietnam essentially supplied the country with a tax-paying workforce. In Bulgaria, the Vietnamese labor was thought of as an asset that would "recover the costs incurred" and "accordingly create national income for the country."[94]

With the new agreement, internationalism retreated and gave way to debt recollection and demands for increased labor productivity. This can be seen in a comparison between Paragraph 1 from the 1973 agreement and that from the revamped 1980 agreement (which had eight additional paragraphs):

1973:

> The government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria agrees to accept Vietnamese citizens for training and practice in construction, industry, agriculture, and other sectors of the national economy. For the period from 1973 to 1975, their number will be 3,000, of whom 600 people will arrive in 1973. After completing their professional training and practice, a quota of Vietnamese citizens amounting to no less than 50 percent of their total number will remain to carry out productive labor according to their specialty in order to enhance their qualifications. All Vietnamese citizens mentioned in this paragraph shall be referred to as practitioners.[95]

1980:

> The government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria provides jobs and training opportunities for Vietnamese workers, technicians, engineers, personnel managers, and so on (hereinafter referred to as 'skilled laborers') sent by the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for a period of five years to be employed in the industries listed in Annex 1 to this Agreement. In the event that the SRV cannot recruit the required number of skilled Vietnamese workers, it may, only by exception, send an additional amount of young people who have completed their military service and who have finished seventh or eighth grade.[96]

As evident in the wording, Bulgaria changed from a country that provided professional training to one that also expected to retain the trained and qualified laborers. In this instance, the men and women who came to Bulgaria would stay in the country completing their training. This was a radical shift from the provision granted in 1973, which allowed Vietnam to receive back half of the practitioners after termination of their training. Another substantial change could be traced to the composition of the labor that was desired. While in 1973

[94] CAS. 1980. 136/73/194.
[95] CAS. Agreement between Bulgaria and Vietnam on the receiving of Vietnamese citizens for purposes of training and practice in Bulgaria.
[96] CAS. 1980. 136/73/330.

Bulgaria welcomed Vietnam's unskilled labor, this changed in 1980 as only skilled workers would be permitted, save for a few exceptions. Bulgaria could employ both Vietnamese arriving anew and those who had already received training during the period of the previous agreement (which only required practitioners to provide the Bulgarian state with proof of good health). During this later iteration, potential workers had to show a "certificate of acquired professional qualification and labor service in the SR of Vietnam."[97] Numbers also greatly increased: from three thousand practitioners from 1973-75 to more than seventeen thousand workers between 1980 and 1985.

Employment contracts are another aspect that deserves attention. In 1973, in a report issued by Misho Mishev, the Minister of Labor noticed that, "given that the main issues of the agreement were set in light of training and practice, [the delegation] found it acceptable to get rid of provisions regarding individual employment contracts."[98] In contrast, the 1980 agreement provided that "in accordance with the agreed upon work period, the Bulgarian economic organizations (enterprises)-employers sign individual labor contracts with the qualified laborers." This is poignant to the decentralization undergoing in the country at the time, one that allowed either the enterprises or the Vietnamese workers to terminate their labor contracts prematurely, provided that the worker violated his/her obligations under the labor code, the enterprise did not fulfill its obligations under the code, or such a necessity was imposed by the national interests of Vietnam. In the case where the fault for termination laid with the company, representatives had to find an alternative employer. We see here a movement towards a labor market that was becoming closer to one under relations of capital. The workers were identified by their ability to carry out a particular job and with having a particular skill and belonging to a particular factory. When outward movement was concerned however, the only way the Vietnamese worker could leave Bulgaria before the expiration date of their contract was either limping or in a coffin.

Things would worsen even further for Vietnamese workers, however. In 1985, Metodi Spasov, member of the State's Planning Committee and Marin Marinov, deputy minister at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, recommended to Lukanov that relations between Vietnam and Bulgaria be reassessed.[99] They called for developing the economic relations in such a way as

[97] Ibid.
[98] CAS.1973. Report by Misho Mishev regarding the negotiations.
[99] CAS.1973. Report by Misho Mishev regarding the negotiations.

to secure a "balanced basis" in a way that would ensure that Vietnam could pay off its growing debt to Bulgaria. The repayment schedule stipulated that Vietnam had to pay back 62 00 000 rubles between 1986 and 1990. For the same period, the payments that Bulgaria had to pay for the labor time served by the Vietnamese workers amounted to 9 000 000 rubles.[100] Bulgaria decided to offer two solutions based on this difference: to either refuse Vietnam's suggestion to again postpone the payments (which would result in a discontinuation of exports to Vietnam in order to balance the due payments), or, if Bulgaria agreed to postpone debt repayment, Vietnam could yield the nine million rubles and instead receive the amount in commodity imports from Bulgaria. Spasov and Marinov suggested the following options: 1) increase in the mandatory monthly deductions from the workers' salaries to from 20 to 30 percent, while increasing the Vietnamese workforce by 23,000 workers per year and 2) increase the amount of production outsourced to Vietnam. In either case, the Vietnamese worker, regardless of geographic location, was to pay Vietnam's state debt.

As the payments for the Vietnamese workers' labor time were bound to a currency rate that was in Bulgaria's favor, Vietnam experienced difficulties and in turn placed its own conditions. The country required that the annual labor time payments it received should be increased to BGN 600 instead of BGN 300 per worker; that the salary of each worker be raised by BGN 45 per month and that the workers be exempted from income tax. Bulgaria refused these propositions.

The foreign workers came to represent labor whose surplus went towards the credit payments between the Vietnamese and the Bulgarian states. As Vietnam's debt was once again restructured and related payments postponed, Bulgaria insisted that the transactions collected from Vietnamese workers were made available to the Vietnamese state in order for the latter to pay off its credit.[101] Little by little, from 1980 to 1987, a substantial redefinition of internationalism has taken place. The "moralism of socialism" – solidarity and fraternal duty – was supplanted by mere economistic logic. As such, Paragraph V, article 3 (V.3. hereafter) from the new Convention stipulated that "During his work in People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Vietnamese laborer is obliged to transfer 20% from his monthly wage in favor of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and his family after income tax deduction." By 1986, the funds

[100] As Vietnam could not send the promised quota of highly skilled workers, Bulgaria struck a deal stipulating that if this was still the case after 1983, the country would not pay the Vietnamese state the annual sum of BGN 300 that was due as a compensation for the years of service (*стаж* in Bulgarian).
[101] CAS. 1984. 259/4/625.

raised due to the application of V.3. and VIII.1 – which postulated that Bulgaria pays Vietnam 300 BGN annually for each worker, in order to compensate for the accumulated work experience and subsequent social benefits such as pension and health insurance – were now to be included in the payment balance between the two countries. Each Vietnamese worker was now obliged to pay no less than 10% from her/his salary "in favor of the government of Vietnam". The latter simply meant that the Vietnamese workers were paying off the Vietnamese state debt towards Bulgaria. As we learn from the archive, 12 998 941, 38 BGN from 1986 to 1990 and 2 433 577, 17 BGN for 1991 alone have been transferred for the repayment of Vietnam's debt, a sum accumulated based on the 10% charges mentioned above.[102]

In order to provide a rude picture of the Vietnamese workers who labored in Bulgaria at the time, let us turn to some statistics. In Decision 64 of the Council of Ministers taken on March 11, 1987, we see the following information.

Table 2. Inquiry into the condition of the Vietnamese workers from the 1980 Agreement

Arrived in Bulgaria – total - Including practitioners	12441 607
Departures until 31.12.1986 – total - Including: Concluded the 5 year service period - Left because of (sickness, mothers, pregnant, disciplinary dismissal)	1936 1668 368
Death	27
Availability from the above on 31.12.1986. - Working in different enterprises - Non-working different reasons	10478 9732 746
Departing in 1987	3750
Arriving in 1987	3500
Expected availability on 31.12.1987	10228

[102] CAS. 136/89/656.

Despite this worsening climate, in the late 1980s there were some attempts to expand integration of Vietnamese workers into the Bulgarian labor regime. Such was, for example, the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Council of the Bulgarian Trade Union to allow the foreigners in the country to participate in the activities of the union.[103] Up until then, Vietnamese workers had been excluded from such organizations at their respective workplaces (this thread of the argument is detailed in chapter four).

The archive of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Trade Unions contains a curious rupture if one is to consider the relations between the former and the Vietnamese workers who were in the country at the time. The usual protocols about decisions taken in regards to funding the celebrations of Vietnamese national holidays or comments regarding necessary dorm repairs are interrupted on August 17th, 1989. The end of June 1989, just a few months before the 10th of November Plenum when Zhivkov was made to resign, marked the beginning of what will eventually become a "normal" enmity toward foreign labor.

That same month two incidents took place. On June 20th, over 100 Vietnamese workers were arrested and subjected to police search and painful interrogation. On June 22nd, at 11 a.m., a meeting was held between the Vietnamese embassy in Sofia and representatives of the Coordinational group for the work with foreign workers in the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Three hours after that meeting the Vietnamese workers were released. Just a few days afterwards, on June 29th, another instance of militia brutality against Vietnamese workers took place. In the evening of that day, in the "Bulgaria" plant in Sofia, an argument broke out between Vietnamese and Bulgarian workers after one of the Vietnamese had made use of a forklift without permission. Upon a remark made by the head of the shift, Bulgarians and Vietnamese started quarreling in the assembly line hall but soon after that both groups went back to their duties. The militia, however, had already been called and upon entering the plant started beating the Vietnamese workers. It is not clear how many the victims were, but from a letter written by Kosta Andreev, secretary of the Central Council of the Bulgarian Trade Union, it appears that all of the Vietnamese who were in the plant at the time were subjected to the violent attack. Altogether 120 Vietnamese workers worked for the factory; of whom eighty women and forty men.

[103] CAS. 1986. A copy excerpt of Protocol N1 from the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Council of the BPS from January 2.

The next days were intense both in the plant and in the central trade union. While the Vietnamese workers declared a strike and stopped working for 14 shifts, the Union was trying to work out things with the Vietnamese Embassy. According to Kosta Andreev, the strike caused large losses for the plant. The strike was terminated after the Vietnam Ambassador's intervention. The Vietnamese Secretariat of the General Confederation of Labor was "extremely bitter."

Archival materials show that the Union considered the case under scrutiny extraordinary and unusual, an obvious break from the customary everyday. Throughout Andreev's letter, one can read a genuine disappointment and puzzlement because of the actions of the militia. He fully agreed with the Secretariat of the General Confederation of Labor in Vietnam that this case could potentially harm the "friendship between the working people in both countries." Andreev ensured his Vietnamese comrades that June will be the last month to witness such cases. The correspondence between Vietnam and Bulgaria regarding the incident ended with insurance on the part of the Bulgarian authorities that they would fully cooperate in order to protect the interests of the Vietnamese workers in Bulgaria. The protocol finishes accordingly, "There is an obvious need for a better attention towards the problems of the foreign workers in the People's Republic of Bulgaria."

Just a few months later, such incidents became "normal," albeit not in the factories but on the streets. The rampant racism directed towards the Vietnamese, the irregular work and currency trade that many (former) Vietnamese workers had to participate in so as to survive, and the numerous street fights, three of which ended with the murder of Vietnamese person by the militia, came to be known as the Vietnamese syndrome. Over the years of their presence in Bulgaria, the "need of Vietnamese workers" was reconceptualized a few times, each corresponding to particular political and economic developments. The redefinition following the 1986 agreement remodeled the extraction of (foreign) surplus labor by relocating debt risks from the Vietnamese state to the Vietnamese workers. When the socialist regime fell in 1989, there were already signs of the upcoming dystopian scenario to unfold before the eyes of workers in Bulgaria. Unemployment, homelessness, and increased levels of social insecurity were the first symptoms to accompany the so-called transition. As in every capitalist system, antagonism between "foreign" and "national" labor emerged strongly on the political scene in the country. The epitome of this antagonism was the Vietnamese worker.

CHAPTER FOUR FROM LABOR POWER IN MOTION TO UNDESIRABLE RACE: THE CRAFTING OF PURE RACE FOR PURE MARKETS

> "We have seen how money is changed into capital; how through capital surplus-value is made, and from surplus-value more capital. But the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labor power in the hands of producers of commodities. The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn in a vicious circle, out of which we can only get by supposing a primitive accumulation (previous accumulation of Adam Smith) preceding capitalistic accumulation; an accumulation not the result of the capitalistic mode of production, but its starting point."
> (Marx 1974:507)

At certain point in the movement of labor power, racialization becomes of determining importance. This chapter is about the crafting of race and its function as a barometer of the desires of market purity on part of state and civil society. In the last chapter I traced how the Vietnamese were desirable labor that was crafted as such firstly, to fulfill certain internationalist duty, then to fulfill the gaps in the increasing shortage of labor power, and lastly, to produce surplus in order to cover state debt. This chapter traces a process during which the Vietnamese labor was produced as an antithesis to pure markets, borne under the market ideology of the transition, which in turn allowed the rationalization of their expulsion. Those who are undesirable easily become subject of racialization and attempts are made to remove them from a territory. After 1989, the Vietnamese workers and all the foreign labor in Bulgaria were placed in the midst of the conflict triangle between state, capital and civil society. They were undesirable for the state and civil society, yet desirable to capital. Moving labor power entered in the midst of a conflict between capital, state, and labor. While the previous chapter dealt with bringing labor power in, this one deals with moving labor power out. I demonstrate how race was crafted as a condition of possibility for the emergence of capitalist markets. Moving labor power out was the immediate effect of that process.

I deal with the manufacturing of a race in its relation to the motion of labor power and to the emerging free market in the context of what has been termed "post-socialist primitive accumulation" (theoretical discussion to follow). I turn my attention away from the state and zoom in on the trade unions (one in particular: *Podkrepa*). The making of *race* during the early years of the so-called transition in Bulgaria was paramount for the creation of the "right" conditions to accompany and consolidate the free market. But if we had numerous transitions

before the transition, then what are we to call the historical moment under question here? I have chosen to think through it in terms of primitive accumulation; a process which started well before 1989 but which consolidated its conditions in the years immediately following 1989, where race was one such condition.

This means to look at that period in terms of preparation of the final conditions for the change of the property form and the subsequent mass privatization. In this way, I am able to sustain a momentary view of the processes in the early 1990s as being both a rupture and continuity. As it will be seen further in the chapter, the enterprises, the state (its legislative wing), the unions, and labor had to prepare, enforce and endure such property transformation. And even though the massive privatization started in the mid-1990s, the beginning of the decade was of paramount importance to the preparations for that mass privatization and market economy. I claim that the forging of race was a condition for sustaining the groundwork towards privatization.[104]

I explore a particular condition that turned the Vietnamese workers into a racial category in the final stages of post-socialist primitive accumulation. I.e. if during socialism their worth was measured according to labor input, in the beginning of the transition, their unworth was consolidated within their constructed race. Here, state and civil society in the form of trade unions came together to fashion a race that would stick in the minds of Bulgarians in the decades to come. This chapter demonstrates the flexibility of race and historicizes the emergence of anti-Vietnamism in Bulgaria as a pressure absorber of the changing forms of property and the necessary unemployment/dispossession to follow. Although the Vietnamese workers are in the center of the chapter, I will demonstrate that foreign workers in general entered this specific contradiction in the beginning of the 1990s. I put forward two notions: that of the "small excursion" and that of anti-Vietnamism.[105] I claim that anti-Vietnamism was a process that accompanied primitive accumulation. Where the "small excursion" is a reference to the expulsion of Vietnamese people from the country, anti-Vietnamism demonstrates the process by which labor was turned into race and in turn race was made into a

[104] As Prohaska (1996) explains, "the 1993-1995 period saw the first steps of privatization, the establishment and development of its institutional foundations and in 1995, the phasing-in of actual privatization." In 1992, Bulgaria passed the so-called Privatization Act.

[105] A few months after the changes in 1989, the Bulgarian Communist Party triggered an exodus towards Turkey. 360 000 people from the Turkish minority were forced out of Bulgaria. The term "small excursion" attempts to point to another, largely left unnoticed exodus, that of the forcefull removal of foreigh workers from the country.

condition for capital accumulation.

In what follows I will trace a process by which, the disintegration of state property led to the formation of surplus population and subsequent violent disintegration of the foreign population. The rediscovery of the Vietnamese in new light, their hunting down, arrests, and expulsion, the legal and illegal means to prevent the so-called Soviet workers from working; the expulsion of the "foreign" from the land of the "poor Bulgarian workers" characterized the dawn of liberal democracy in the post-socialist era. The chapter has the following structure: at first I turn my attention to one of the largest chemical producers in the Balkans in the 1980s: Vidachim. I treat Vidachim like a microcosm for the processes under examination and the concrete, empirical data linked to the plant demonstrates the nuts and screws of that same process. I stay within the 1980s for a brief moment and situate Vidachim in the larger framework of socialist production. Then I turn to the relation between the socialist trade unions and the foreign working force in order to compare and contrast it to the one of the early 1990s. Vidachim came under attack by *Podkrepa* in 1991 because of its practice of hiring foreign labor and the trade union effectively changed the collective labor contracts in order to halt these practices as early as 1991. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to the socio-economic context of the first years of the official transition to primitive accumulation and the changed labor conditions in Vidachim in light of the expulsion of the Vietnamese workers. I finish the chapter with a discussion on the processes of racialization.

4.1. Socialist Vidachim, Its Everyday and Its Foreign Workers

In the last chapter we left at the formation of the indebted Vietnamese in the late 1980s and the relocation of debt risk away from the Vietnamese state to the worker. The following years quickly brought forward the conflict between foreign and national labor. Although such conflicts are defined as a mechanism typical for capitalist economies (and that Marx has captured in the concept of Reserve Army of Labor), there is an aspect that we need to keep in mind. Namely, that there are architects that stand behind the unfolding and directing the outcomes of such antagonisms. As division of labor under state socialism created a mass of low-skilled foreigners that were now considered superfluous and useless, industries in the early 1990s thought it wise to apologize for being "forced" to hire this type of workers. The following captures the divisions that were to stabilize in the country in the period between 1990 - 1993:

> Until now we had 250 Vietnamese workers but they are going away. We announced the new jobs in Vidin but nobody wants them. We solve the labor question by hiring Soviet workers for a year. And this is absolutely lawful since there are no [Bulgarian] candidates.[106]

The statement from above came from an employee in Vidachim. Vidachim, like any other industry in Bulgaria at the time, was losing market positions because of the disintegration of CAMECON and because subsequently, its exports were drastically decreasing. To explore the crafting of race, we must go back in time.

The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) decided to establish Vidachim in 1961 and in 1964 its construction began. I will look into the history of Vidachim vis-à-vis foreign labor in order to contextualize the friction that was created between "domestic" and "foreign" labor in the early years of the transition and explore the expulsion of the now reserve army of labor in transitional economies. Being the largest of its type on the Balkans, the construction of Vidachim was supported by the Soviet Union mainly with know-how and intelligence. The so-called Soviet specialists (a name that reoccurs in the archive of the plant) oversaw the process of its construction and future investments made by the plant. The plant was built over 1043 decares and comprised three main productions: polyamide fibers plant, plant for the production of tires, and a power plant.

[106] *Demokratsia* 1991.

Photo 1. Vidachim 1980

One of Vidachim's main buildings in the 1980s. The photo is made by the photographer Ivan Lilkov, who has documented the everyday of the plant. No date. State Archive Vidin 748/9/55. Browsing through the photo album one is struck by the obvious care socialists took to keep the plant and the areas around neat.

Photo 2. Vidachim 2017

Vidachim January, 2017. This is the same building from the photo above but taken from a different angle. The windows are broken; there is nobody in sight except some private company that guards the ruins of Vidachim and some stray dogs that wander around. The contrast to the socialist time is striking. Photo of the author.

As mentioned in chapter two, Bulgaria and Vietnam had signed agreements not solely in the field of labor exchange but also in that of constant capital (machinery, land, natural resources, etc.). Vidachim was one of the production units to participate in these exchanges. In 1984, Bulgaria and Vietnam agreed to continue a previously signed agreement for the primary processing of natural rubber and the plant was to be the main receiver of that production. While Bulgaria was to provide the necessary machinery, equipment and commodities, Vietnam was to secure "the area needed for the extraction and plantation [of the trees] of 1,000 hectares; the adoption and the effective use of the delivered equipment, materials, goods [from Bulgaria]; the supply of natural rubber [to Bulgaria]." For the creation of the industrial area mentioned above, Bulgaria was to supply Vietnam with 20,000,000 rubles in loans. Between 1986 and 1990, Vietnam was to use the loan in the following way: around 5,400,000 rubles for machines and installations; 12,200,000 rubles for materials, chemical products, fuels, etc.; 2,400,000 rubles for medicines and medical equipment. Vietnam, on the other hand, was to provide the following: the area needed for the plantation; the receiving and the effective usage of the machinery, materials, etc., given by Bulgaria; and the supply of natural rubber. The supply of natural rubber was to pay off the loan in a ten-year-period, starting in 1993.

In 1987, Vidachim experienced labor shortage. The management was anxious. T. Yordanov, Chairman of the Economic Commission at Vidachim at the time, turned to the Ministry of Economy and Planning – subdivision "Labor":

> Comrade Nachev,
> [Vidachim] is one of the leading enterprises in the area. Shortage of labor resources in the municipality and their constant reduction leads to serious difficulties in securing the necessary for the plant workforce. For years, the shortage of workers varies between 250 and 300 people. Although the management of the municipality tries to meet the needs, it turns out that this cannot be achieved only by relying on the local labor resources. Therefore we propose to meet the shortage by providing us with 100 Vietnamese workers. We are certain you will assist us in the resolving of this important issue.[107]

Yordanov's proposal was met and from the 3500 Vietnamese workers to come to Bulgaria in 1987 (see Table 2), 100 were to be sent to Vidachim: 50 in the tire production plant and 50 in

[107] SAV 415/10/151, p. 22.

the polyamide plant.[108] From the above 50 to be sent to the tire plant, 25 would fill the jobs of curing (applying pressure to the tire so as to give it a final shape) and in compounding and mixture. The jobs of spinners and drawers were to be filled all by women.

In the archive of Ivan Lilkov, the photographer who documented the everyday life of the plant, one cannot find photographs of Vietnamese workers.

Photo 3. Vidachim's everyday

Source: SAV, Archive Lilkov. The album is called *Ежедневие* (Everyday).

Beneath the photos from above, we see an "everyday" that is sealed in the content and often happy faces of many Bulgarian workers, production lines and the mass of tires. There is a sense of "collectivity," of high spirits and conflict-free production – all of which make part of the cult of the socialist production and workers. The Vietnamese worker is absent, however. Staring at Lilkov's photo archive, we are left with no impression of what the Vietnamese workers could have labored, what was their physical relation to the production process and the product. Not to mention to other workers. Yet, if one is to dig deep in the archive of Vidachim, she can trace the presence of these foreign workers in the lists of work-related incidents closely kept by the administration of the plant.

Fam Tchi Hang; 22 years old; spinner (пресуквач); 2 years work experience; date of

[108] CAS. Inquiry into the condition of the Vietnamese workers from the 1980 Agreement.

incident: October 24, 1988; reason: technical; lost work days: 16…
Ngo Tchm Noy; 29 years old; 2 years work experience; puller/drawer (изтегливач); date of incident: August 30, 1989; reason: negligence…
Tuh Ha; 22 years old; process controller; 1 year work experience; date of incident November 22, 1990.[109]

From the lists, it becomes clear that very young Vietnamese men and women worked side by side Bulgarian workers. The work positions held by them were mostly those of spinning, drawing, and process controlling. At some point (no date), Vidachim documented the physical postures held by workers during the labor process of the professions listed above, so, we can at least take a short look at what this process meant for the Vietnamese.

Photo 4. Drawer

Photo Credit SAV 877-4-307. Job Title: Drawer. The majority of the Vietnamese workers who suffered work-related incidents between 1989 and 1990 were working precisely as drawers. During the labor process, the drawers' working posture is dynamic, standing with single bendings. The bendings do not exceed 10% of the working shift.

[109] SAV 877/4/339.

Photo 5. Spinner

Photo credit: SAV 877-4-307. Spinner.

The photo below is perhaps the most telling of all. Notice the Vietnamese worker, who stands aside, in his work clothes, with a gaze staring at the notebook of the person documenting the labor process. It looks like he was asked to stand there, while the photographer documents the working postures of the Bulgarian worker. Of course, we can only speculate what was taking place and who has taken the decision about the composition of the picture. Yet, considering that many Vietnamese worked as process controllers and that none of the other photos have captured a Vietnamese worker, we are probably not far away from the proposition that his standing aside is not a coincidence.

Photo 6. The Vietnamese worker standing aside



Photo credit: SAV 877-4-307.

Vidachim was not as humble when it came to documenting the work of the Soviet specialists in the plant. The photo below reads: “Soviet specialists in support of the collective.” The

Soviet specialists were working towards the development of the plant from its very establishment. Their re-employment was much different than the re-employment of the Vietnamese. It was a subject of special attention to the skills that they could offer. We see for example that in 1982, in order for the Administrative, Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol units (zvena) attached to Vidachim to convince Kamenov, Vidachim's CEO, to prolong the contracts of the Soviet specialists, they prepared a report citing the achievements of the plant as compared to 1979 and imposing prime merit to the foreign specialists.

> The execution of the plan for general and commodity production in 1980 [as compared with 1979] has increased with 24%; the production increase is with 26 000 000 BGN. Whereas in 1979 we have overspending for 4 500 000 BGN, in 1980 we have surplus for 220 000BGN.[110]

Photo 7. The Soviet Specialists

Photo credit: SAV, no date.

Digging through the lists of work-related incidents, the last time a Vietnamese name appears on paper is in 1993 (the person has most probably remained in Vidin because of a marriage arrangement as the Vietnamese workers were made to leave much earlier) despite that at the time, supposedly, all Vietnamese workers must have had left the country; a contradiction that I will leave unresolved.[111]

[110] SAV Report.
[111] The contradiction stems from the fact that since 1991, because of pressure placed by Podkrepa, Vidachim signed a collective contract that prohibited the plant from hiring foreign labor.

1990 was a turbulent year for Vidachim and many structural changes took place. In a report for the production process in the Tires Plant from the end of 1990, we see that the plant could not meet its plans.[112] It produced 150 677 less tires, 258km² less conveyor belt, 525m less polyamide cord, and 604 tons less of rubber compound. According to the report, we can see that the reasons behind it were complex. Among them were changes in the working shifts; strikes; social pressure within the collectives; and equipment breakdowns. The changes in the number of the personnel were also among the reasons behind the unrealized plans. In June 1990 all of the working pensioners had to be let go; in August 1990, when a new labor categorization decree entered into force, many workers felt under the category "pensioners" and, subsequently, had to be removed as well. The last change came when in November of 1990 the Vietnamese workers had to permanently leave the plant.[113]

What we witness are attempts to shrink the labor force in the country as enterprises throughout could not meet production plans, lost market positions abroad, and had a general difficulty to provide wages to the labor force that was already working. The new categorization of the labor force in Bulgaria was a process that accompanied the accumulation by dispossession. Those now categorized as "too old to work," the foreigners, the processes by which the managerial class was to be boosted as compared to the workers (see Table 3) were conditions that had to be fulfilled in order for markets to start functioning. The Vietnamese fell vicitms of these processes and were now considered illegitimate, i.e. having indefensible claims to access to production and wage. How can we explain this rupture?

4.2. The Trade Unions and the Foreign Workers

Before I go onto exploring the 1990s and the question posed above in detail, I will shortly look at the end of the 1980s as the period exemplifies a change in the attitude of the trade unionists towards the foreign workers. This is important to examine in order to better situate the newly emerged union Podkrepa, its role in the manufacturing of race, and the expulsion of foreign workers.

[112] SAV 877/4/77.
[113] SAV 877/4/77.

4.2.1. 1980: Towards full integration?

For a long time foreign labor in People's Republic of Bulgaria was not represented in the state's central trade union. This tendency somewhat changed in 1986 when the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Trade Unions received an "awkward" request from the Cuban Central Trade Union, which insisted that the Cuban workers who were to work in Bulgaria (5000 of them at the time) be "accepted as members of the Bulgarian Trade Union, participate in the life of the trade union in its entirety, including the possibility to be elected proportionally to the governing bodies." The correspondence between different departments of the BCTU discloses a pure astonishment in regards to the request. I will cite one such correspondence at length so the reader could acquaint herself with the relation between foreign workers and trade unions prior to 1986 but also in order to build up my argument that will follow in this section of the chapter. Namely that in 1989-1990, the newly emerged independent trade union called *Podkrepa* played a tremendous role in the construction of a particular antagonistic subject: that of the Vietnamese worker.

As the Central Committee did not know how to respond to the Cuban request, it conducted a number of consultations with the departments in the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. We read that:

> In the Central Council of the Bulgarian Trade Union, the following departments: "Organizational", "IVR", "Economic", NIIPP "G. Dimitrov"- the directory "building of trade unionism", the jurists group, etc. consider that there are no identified obstacles to the [requested] membership of the Cuban workers in BPS [Bulgarian Trade Union] and that such membership would contribute to a stronger impact on [the Cubans], would make them more active and easy-going, would help in their rapid integration into the workforce and into the socialist way of life. The "International" department, based on their practice with Soviet specialists working in the PBR, with Vietnamese and Polish workers so far, believe that the acceptance of Cuban workers in BPS is a precedent that will create a differentiated situation for the foreign workers from the various countries and influence the approach and the working methods of the union bodies in the country… The request… is a precedent and thus, it needs to be placed under consideration both by the Secretary of the Central Council of the Bulgarian Trade Union and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party.[114]

Despite the fear within the union, a decision was taken that the foreign workers in Bulgaria be

[114] CAS, 31.03.1986.

allowed to participate in the union's' life of the country. The first steps were made possible by the establishment of the Coordination Group that was to work with overseas authorities and organizations of the BPS, foreign workers and professionals working in the PRB but also by the contract signed between the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Trade Unions and the Cuban Central Organ of the Laborers. The coordination group did not hold any power in regards to decision-making but functioned more as a link between the foreign workers in Bulgaria and the Central Trade Union (CTU) as well as between the CTU and the Bulgarian workers working abroad. It had nine goals among which assisting the public authorities to develop arrangements relating to the sending and receiving of workers with a view to more effectively regulate issues related to the organization of production, labor remuneration, household, occupational safety, and others; discussing issues related to the work of foreign workers in Bulgaria, conducting research, etc. It could be argued that the coordination group was after all more preoccupied with the Bulgarian workers abroad than with the foreigners on Bulgarian territory.

In 1987 concrete steps were undertaken in order to integrate the Cuban workers. Among the planned measures were: raising the prestige of the well working Cuban workers; stimulating and encouraging their production successes; increasing their economic knowledge through seminars and propaganda; continuing the work towards mastering Bulgarian language; improving facilities for cultural work in the enterprises; organizing sport and tourist events; among others.[115] Although the document citing the mentioned measures was referring to the Cuban workers in its title, often the text is written in a way so one could also conclude that these measures were to cover all foreign workers.

From the above we see that the foreign workers in Bulgaria were foreign to the representational structures in the workplaces. These institutional practices of exclusion started to change in 1986 by the insistence exercised by Cuba on Bulgaria. The words of Kosta Andreev, a Secretary of the Central Council of the Bulgarian Trade Unions that "the question [of union membership] should be solved not only from the point of view of today's perspective, but also from the point of view of the understanding that in the future the processes of integration and migration of workers, specialists and others will intensify" spoke of the desire for a general approach towards the foreign working force whose goal was to

[115] CAS 55/26/130, p. 66

equip the Central Trade Union with tools of ideological influence. Perhaps for the first time since the arrival of the first working force from abroad, the Vietnamese practitioners, an implicit attempt was made to acknowledge the presence of foreigners outside the factory doors and agricultural fields. In 1986 we see a movement towards full or at least better integration of the foreign working force and acknowledgment that integrationalist approach is the path forward. The latter was not to last for long.

The above is not to say that there was no processes of racialization during state socialism, but that it was a different type of racialization mostly subordinated to the logic of internationalism and the "proper socialist worker." Alamgir (2014b) traces this differential (to capitalist economies) process of racialization via the notion of the "honest socialist labor," which functioned as a mechanism of racialization vis-à-vis presupposed "shortcomings in… [the] work ethic" (Alamgir 2014b:309). In order for the Czechoslovaks to racialize the foreign workers, they had to resort to reworking of the official socialist anti-racist ideology and invoke a supposed violation of socialist principles, which in turn would allow them to position themselves in an hierarchical manner vis-à-vis the foreigners, argues the author. She shows a process of racialization that was in direct opposition to the ones often observed in capitalist economies. Namely, that in capitalist economies the fear of foreigners stems from an understanding that they are too disciplined in production processes, which is a direct threat to one's employment, whereas in the socialist context, the opposite was true. The foreign workers were constructed as never good enough to fulfill socialist standards of work.

As in any other socialist country, the official ideology of anti-racism/anti-colonialism was a praxis to be uplifted and racism in all forms to be condemned in Bulgaria. While I have no data regarding the mirroring of state ideology in popular practices and discourse, I would like to shortly turn to the document found in the Archive, which concerned the shift between the practitioner and the worker (see sections 3.2. and 3.3. for detailed discussion) and which concern the resistance against the shift. Two are the proxies by which enterprises and state constructed the "proper foreign worker" at the time. We saw from that document that the proper worker was constructed vis-à-vis two distinct hierarchies: that of the "good practitioner" who is to be ideologically versed in socialism and that of the "disciplined" performer (that is one who does not question their prescribed class position).[116] The first one

[116] Recall the following statement from the document (CAS 607/3/859), "The learning process was hampered at

is close to Alamgir's "proper work ethic" and the second one concerns the "politico-ideological education" of the foreign workers. The Archive of the Labor and Wage Committee: International Relations holds hundreds of letters between production units and state institutions, where these two proxies crystallize as a way to discipline the foreign workers, to stir the desirable and proper workers from the rest, but also to hierarchize different national groups accordingly to socialist ethics. In these documents one can see that the Vietnamese were the population that was always praised about their labor discipline and tirelessness in the work process.

But why did the Vietnamese workers have to leave? I explore this in the next section.

4.3. Socio-Economic Context of the Transition's First Years: Primitive Accumulation

In recent years there has been a steady return to Marx's notion of primitive accumulation in order to look at transitions in a new light (i.e. the post-colonial and post-socialist transitions). What Marx distinguished as primitive accumulation is basically the preparation of the conditions for capital-type of accumulation, the separation of the producers from their means of production. What Marx aimed at with the concept is to ridicule Adam Smith's notion of "original accumulation" that saw the emergence of capitalism as a natural result of the processes of division of labor. Marx, instead, turned the attention towards the violence that was inherited in the transitions from feudalism and chattel slavery to capitalism. It is the process during which the feudal mode of production is transformed into a capitalist mode of production. Marx made use of a few processes in order to describe what a primitive accumulation might entail: privatization of land; commodification of populations (turning labor-power into commodity); and the conversion of different forms of property regimes into completely private such (Marx 1974; Harvey 2004).

Arguably, the steady accumulation of research on primitive accumulation is a result of Harvey's (2004) expansion of Marx's reading of the transition to capitalism and the coining of the concept of accumulation by dispossession. By it, Harvey challenges Marx on the assumption that primitive accumulation occurs only at an "original stage" and Rosa

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the outset by the whims of most practitioners to be [categorically] treated as students or with a status different from that established in the agreement."

Luxemburg's reading of it as existing outside capitalist systems (2004:12). Harvey instead proposes a reading of the process as continuous and ongoing and as internal to capitalism. His notion of accumulation by dispossession aims at accounting for the continuity and internality of some of the practices that Marx considered under primitive accumulation (e.g. privatization of land, commodification of labor power, appropriation of natural resources, national debt) to contemporary capitalist formations.[117] My work suggests that some of the changing property forms can be treated as such that presuppose primitive accumulation. Whereas I do not claim that we can look at socialism as state capitalism, and hence, we cannot treat the transition's primitive accumulation as simultaneous to already existing capital accumulation, we can clearly see that some of the pre-existing forms were radicalized and developed in order to sustain capitalist production.

Harvey demonstrates the plausibility of his notion by turning our attention to the fact that public services are being privatized, natural resources and even cultural forms are being commodified. In order to scrutinize the emerged post-Keynesian form of capital accumulation, Saskia Sassen (2010) makes a similar point in her analysis of how "advanced capitalism" relies on the destruction of forms of "traditional capitalism." All these accounts are of great importance in order for us to understand the mechanisms behind contemporary commodification of labor power for example. Yet, I would like to turn the attention of the reader towards the historical process of first accumulation in the post-socialist context. After all, as I already demonstrated in the previous chapter, it is methodologically incorrect to scrutinize socialism in terms of capital accumulation. As such, Harvey's and Sassen's accounts are only here kept as a background as they can only inform us regarding already well-developed capitalist systems.

Both in the post-colonial and in the post-socialist context, the scholars who rely on primitive accumulation as an analytical tool do so because they want to challenge and go beyond culturalist accounts of the transitions marked by "post-." As the organizers of a panel devoted to "Primitive Accumulation in the Post-Socialist Transition and the EU Accession Period" (Bembič, Becker and Musić 2013) specify,

> It is very symptomatic that the story of the… historical break of 1989 in Eastern Europe is usually articulated in purely political terms, often with obvious

[117] On this proposition see also Perelman (2000).

> romantically-nationalistic overtones… Topics of the concurrent economical and social transformation are usually given much less attention and tend to be very briefly subsumed under the vague notion of 'liberalisation'.

The Introduction to *Accumulation in Post-Colonial Capitalism,* edited by Mitra, Samaddar, and Sen (2017) has a similar overtone: "[The book] shifts the terrain of understanding of postcolonialism from cultural studies to fundamental social processes."

Joachim Becker (2013), speaking from the point of view of the Czechoslovakian and Yugoslavian disintegrations, defends the idea of the possibility to look at the post-socialist transition in terms of primitive accumulation. He claims that although capital accumulation was possible for certain individuals during state socialism, overall, at the time the private appropriation of surplus was not the case. Becker looks at the partitioning of the state property as the main process of primitive accumulation and therefore, the main political stake in the so-called transitions.

Goran Musić (2013) takes on the case of Serbia and claims that the first privatization law in the country was meant to accommodate a type of organic development of capital accumulation that was to spring out of the old self-management regime of Yugoslavia through the notion of workers' shareholding. He describes a process where already during socialism, social property (i.e. belonging to the entire society) slowly transformed into group ownership (belonging to workers who labor in particular enterprise). The latter process was a result, similarly to the Bulgarian case, to develop from market ideologues within the socialist party. Group ownership eventually gave way to "conventional individual private ownership" in the early 1990s. Out of the first attempts towards denationalization of the means of production, Musić demonstrates the emergence of technocrats became possible because of their social capital (being socially and politically close to the nomenclature) and because of the first privatization law that allowed the buying of shares from the enterprises.

The consequent international isolation and regional armed conflicts, according to Musić, forced Milosevic to go back to nationalization of the economy. Musić makes an interesting turn, however. He questions the plausibility of the concept of primitive accumulation when applied to the Serbian context. Although there were three particular elements that would lead us to conclude the presence of PA, Musić asserts, – processes of dispossession; pauperization; deindustrialization – he contends that after all, there was no accumulation of capital to follow.

On the contrary, there was a "destruction of capital on a mass scale." What Musić basically misses from the whole picture is the *becoming* of primitive accumulation into a capitalist type of wealth accumulation.

Musić is correct to demand a better analysis of the processes during the post-socialist (de)(a)ccumulation. As we have seen throughout the thesis so far, capitalist forms did indeed exist and were competitive to socialist such. Primitive accumulation "performs the prehistory of capital... produces the premises of capitalism before the existence of capitalism as such" (Marx 1974). Strictly speaking, Bulgaria also exemplified a case, where despite the dispossession of the working class from its means of production through changes in the property form, capital in its constant form (e.g. machinery) was in fact destroyed. If we look at Vidachim today for example, we see a pure annihilation. Vidachim has simply stopped producing just as many other plants and industries in Bulgaria and the rest of Eastern Europe. Yet, we cannot claim that the transition to capitalist social structures did not take place. So what is the historical moment of the final transition? We are right to invoke here the words of Lebowitz that when Marx spoke of primitive accumulation, he spoke of the process of becoming and not of being of capitalism. This becoming has two sides to it: the process of becoming into being and the process of passing away of the old forms. The period under consideration here is precisely one such moment of the becoming of capital. Despite Musić's insistence that there is inconsistency between the destruction of capital (e.g. constant capital) and accounts on primitive accumulation, we cannot bypass the fact that the destruction of constant capital was performed as a form of accumulation. Private entities got hold of this capital and sold it for profit, which is very close to the process described by Marx and quoted in the beginning of the chapter.

The rest of the chapter deals with the ways the apparatus of movement of labor power reacted and changed its historical form in order to engulf the processes of accumulation by dispossession. How is the the capacity to move used by states to both tame violence for some and accelerate it for others? As we will see, the transition (as a distinct historical moment within primitive accumulation) produced a distinctive surplus population: it was the labor power defined by its possibility to be moved. As such, the only way to get rid of the potential problems contained within this population was to move it out.

4.4. Legal and Economic Framework in the First Years of the Transition

Regardless of what we will call the first years of the transition in Bulgaria, we can conclude that there were certain elements that were "set free" in order to make possible the accumulation of capital; the appropriation of surplus labor for the production of surplus value and the reproduction of capital accumulation. Even though certain liberalization took place in the 1970s (see chapter two), the prelude to capitalist accumulation was set in the last years of the 1980s and stretched in the early 1990s with a couple of legislative acts playing a foundational role. The changes in the property regime were the most important ones as the production process was now established in a way so as to meet the needs of the private accumulation and not of social production. It is common that the Bulgarian state socialism is described as a socialism for some, and capitalism for others. According to Ivan Chalakov (2008:122), "…already in the late 1950s with the blessing of Todor Zhivkov, formally illegal from the point of view of the existing law, yet, de facto active forms of capitalist economic activities were applied." In this way, Chalakov describes state socialism as having enclaves of capitalist activity that were not legally regulated. Yet, what is of interest for us here is the (in)famous Decree 56 from 1988, which legally established "the world of the markets" (Chalakov 2008:127). There are competitive views regarding the Decree. Some think of it as a way for the "state bureaucracy to maintain its economic power over the nationalized capital and simultaneously to create market competition and hence, more efficiency" (Peev 2002:40). Yet, others, with a bit of a conspiracy overtone claim that the Decree legalizes the enclaves so as different economic figures could "learn elements of market behavior, acquire knowledge and attitudes, work out certain techniques and rules that will provide them with competitive advantages at the start of the 'actual' reforms several years later" (Chalakov 2008:127-128).

Besides such conspiracies, we can see that Decree 56 was one of the legal mechanisms through which the conditions of possibility for "post-socialist primitive accumulation" were prepared. The most important change that the Decree brought was: Article 1, Paragraph 2 "economic activity is based on all forms of property" and Article 2, Paragraph 1 "The main form of economic activity is the Firm." The Decree further stipulated that "the strategy for the socio-economic development of the country is [to be] planned by the state, but the Firms act accordingly to the law of 'market mechanisms'." Therefore, surplus labor was to be appropriated for private means.

Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria's leader for thirty-three years resigned on November 10, 1989, which led to the renaming of the Bulgarian Communist Party to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). November 1989 symbolically marked the beginning of the transition from state socialism to liberal democracy and free markets. The afterwards effects were cataclysmic. The renaming of the party was an attempt on part of the reformist wing within it to seize control over the transition and simultaneously demarcate a rigid boundary with its previous party attachments. In just a few weeks the leading role of the Bulgarian Communist Party was brought to an end by the Parliament. An opposition quickly formed (even though the signs of formation could be felt much earlier, a subject in the next lines) and arrangements were made for the establishment of a transitional government. The first elections were scheduled to take place on June 10, 1990. BSP received close to 53% of the seats in the Parliament, the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union 4%, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms close to 6%, and the rest was taken by the main opposition Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF) – an umbrella for various oppositional parties and associations, *Podkrepa* among them (Creed 1998).

Pro-market reforms seized the day. Bulgaria's production started reorganization and "movement towards Europe" was the slogan of the day both for the socialists and their opposition. In December 1990, Bulgaria officially expressed its desire to integrate into the structures of the European Community (EC), even though the country was already included in the programs launched by EC's institutions to "encourage the transition to democracy and market economy" (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). In May 1990, Bulgaria and the EC signed the first-generation Trade and Cooperation Agreement and the country was included in the Restructuring Funds whose purpose was to channel aid towards the transitioning countries (ibid.). Liberalization of foreign trade began in 1991. According to Dimitrov et.al. (1997), Bulgarian exports fell from USD 6.65 billion in 1989 to USD 3.40 billion in 1992. In early 1993 Bulgaria signed the so-called European agreements that opened the door to trade with the countries from the EC and by mid 1990s, the latter were Bulgaria's main trade partner, ousting the USSR.

Unemployment, which is dispossession from the means of production, became pervasive and persistent issue already in the early years of the transition. Whereas in December 1990, the registered unemployed were 65,079, in December of 1993 that number reached 626,141. Almost 100-fold increase in just three years. These numbers are not surprising. After the

disintegration of COMECON in 1991, exports fell significantly and production was cut substantially. In 1991 Bulgaria saw 27.8% decrease in production and subsequently 210 000 unemployed in 1992. 1991 was the toughest year when unemployment is concerned, as the phenomena took a sudden form. There was not well developed institutional support in order to grapple with it; measures will be taken that same year, but their effects never really realized. Already then, one could see the changes in the structure of production to later settle in Bulgaria. The largest portion of unemployment came from the industries and agriculture, whereas in the field of services employment levels were somewhat stable and in finance employment even increased (Dimitrov 1997).

4.5. Vidachim: From Production to Destruction

Let us see what the numbers from above meant for industries like Vidachim. The plant's analysis of the production process in 1991 showed the following: while in 1989 Vidachim over-fulfilled the commodity production by 238 720 000 BGN, the plant produced commodities for 182 406 000BGN less than what was planned for 1991.[118] The failure in 1991 concerned the following items: outer and inner rubbers, belts, cotton cloth, polyamide cords, and rubber compound. Vidachim listed the following reasons for these failures: irregular supply of raw materials; shortage of labor resources (mainly technological workers), poor technical condition of the machinery; frequent and prolonged breakdowns and lack of spare parts, leading to prolonged shifts; uninsured realization leading to forced labor with reduced capacity; poor labor disciplines; absences due to sickness, etc. Additionally, in 1990, Vidachim estimated a decline in the labor productivity, which, according to the analysis, is due to the shifting towards interrupted (прекъсваем) mode of production since 1st of May of that year. Whereas in the first trimester of 1990, one worker was able to produce 186 tires, in the forth trimester that productivity fell to 169 tires per worker. In order to battle the latter, Vidachim introduced hourly pay and quickly the labor productivity jumped to 159% per tire per worker. The analysis also shows that after the liberalization of prices in the country, Vidachim estimated increase in its expenditure in the import due also to variations in the currency rates of the BGN to the USD.

The data concerning the labor resources shows us a steady decline in employment. Let us

[118] Information taken from SAV 877/4/104, pp.1-9 and 877/4/68, pp. 1-52.

compare the numbers for the Tires Plant. In 1989, 3629 workers were employed, which fell behind the plan by 9 workers and was with 17 less than the employed workers in 1988. Vidachim experienced shortage in 1989 with 94 positions for workers that had to be fulfilled. The average working day was just a bit above 8 hours (8,07) and the salaries went up with 3,2% as compared to 1988. In 1991 these figures looked different. The plant was employing 1813 workers all together. Yet, as compared to other categories of labor, things looked in the following way:[119]

Table 3. Categories of labor. Vidachim 1990-1991

Category labor	1990	1991
Workers	92,2	91,7
Specialists	4,7	4,7
Management	2,3	2,5
Outside	0,8	1,1

What is interesting to note here is the decrease (of 0.5%) in the common share of workers as compared to the so-called highly qualified labor (i.e. management). One of the reasons listed for the decrease of the share of workers is the leave of the Vietnamese. Another fact is of interest here. Whereas in 1990, the wages dependent on the executed production, in 1991, we learn that the wages were tied to Governmental Decrees concerned with the workers' social protection. There is a movement in terms of wage dependency: from amount of produced commodities to labor time.[120] Furthermore, the 4th trimester of 1991 brought about a new system of labor organization, namely the hourly labor payments. All of the above show us the measures the plant had to undertake in order to make the transition to capital accumulation.

The General Director of Vidachim, Kamenov was becoming increasingly anxious. Already in November of 1990 he was writing frenetic letters to the Ministry of Economy in order to attract attention to the problems Vidachim was facing. His main concern were shortages in the basic production materials which resulted in Vidachim's working under 50% of its capacity and that this stagnation will lead to production stoppages in the entire technological

[119] SAV 877/4/68, p.7
[120] SAV 877/4/68, p 8

chain (i.e. other important productions such as Neftochim in Burgas).[121] In mid 1991, the Prime Minister Popov, the Minister of Industry, trade and services, Pushkarov and the Minister of Labor and Social Care, Maslarova received a letter signed by the Chair of the Municipal People's Council):[122]

> We inform you with concern that the main enterprise in the municipality [Vidachim] is to stop working due to the ongoing severe oil crisis in the country. The plant has exhausted all of its own available resources… Governmental stocks of these raw materials are also limited… Halting the activity of [Vidachim] will predetermine a multiplying effect on the economy as a whole that is hard to calculate at this point… Moreover, to the already existing 1467 unemployed as of February 1, 1991, the stoppage of Vidachim will add 8000 more. In other words, unemployment in the municipality will reach 10% already in the first trimester [of the year]. This is a harsh social syndrome for our municipality. It is hard to estimate how many more unemployed that will produce across the country [because of the shutting down of Vidachim]… We beg for you urgent assistance and intervention.

The shutting down of industries had a domino effect throughout the country, which led to skyrocketing unemployment.

4.6. The Crafting of Anti-Vietnamism

4.6.1. Primitive accumulation and race

The first remark that I want to make is that when I speak of race I do not speak of something that exists but of something that is made. There are too many definitions of race in order to engage with all of them in this thesis but here I will mention some of the characteristics of the notion that are important to me. Firstly, race creates hierarchies and differentiates people accordingly. Race is a product of ideology in the sense that those who are dominant construct, practice and invoke it when they have to sustain or to build a new social order that would sustain or endorse their domination (in this sense, I am more inclined to think of it as doxa). The crafting of race is always somehow connected to movement: be it one of exclusion or of inclusion, of incorporation or disintegration. Moreover, this part of the thesis is concerned with the crafting of a particular race within a particular historical moment. The anti-Vietnamism to overflow Bulgaria in the 1990s was part of what Patrick Wolfe (2016) identifies as a "trace of history", i.e. the idea that there is nothing essential and stable in race.

[121] SAV 877-4-122, p. 10
[122] SAV 877-4-122, pp. 13-15

Instead, race is a construct, it is flexible and historical, and as Hund (2011) claims, there is no "non-culturalist race theories." The appearance of anti-Vietnamism in Bulgaria was highly culturalist, and it took on a direction different from the representation of the Vietnamese as the honest and disciplined socialist worker peculiar to the socialist period as I examined earlier in the chapter. There are plenty of historical examples to lead us in that direction. Perhaps, the most poignant one is the 19th century U.S.A., where the boundaries of who does and who does not belong to the "white race" were being stretched several times in order to accommodate the integration of different immigration groups (Ignatieff 1995; Jacobson 1999; Roediger 2005).[123] But even if we go to Louis Snyder's *The Idea of Racialism* (1962), we know that the stretching of what is "white" can undertake several hierarchies within: "Racialists, not satisfied with merely proclaiming the superiority of the white over the colored race, also felt it necessary to erect a hierarchy within the white race itself." These boundaries are being remade today as well in Europe, if we are to recall the history of Brexit and the making of the category of the "social benefit tourist" (subject of chapter five and six). What is also important is that racism (the ideology behind race), can transform according to different political conditions and we need to be aware of how its different forms "become lodged in the logics of modernity" (Lentin 2015). In this sense "[r]ace as ordering, as management, sedimentation, sifting, as correction and disciplining, as empowering some while causing others to buckle under that power has always relied on a plurality of processes" (ibid: 1403). In this way we need be aware that process takes a central stage in the exploration of race.

Perhaps the most important contribution to give us a lead in this direction comes from within the Marxist tradition and it is the one linked to Stuart Hall (1980) and the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS). In the late 1970s, Stuart Hall and the CCCS started talking about "historically-specific racisms." The importance of such contribution lies in the definition of race and racism (again, the ideology behind the construct race) as a dynamic and historical idea that can undertake different forms and affect different situations in dissimilar temporal conjunctions. In this sense, the anti-Vietnamism that emerged in Bulgaria in the 1990s needs to be scrutinized in light of its specific historical time and its distinct modalities that linked it to the final disintegration of socialism. Robert Miles (1993) indicates that Hall's center was unable to produce knowledge that would warrant against what is common despite the historical specificity of racism. Therefore, we are left without a definition of racism which

[123] Further, there has been a plethora of studies on the construction of whiteness that deserve mention here. *Inter alia* Allen (1994); Lott (2013).

in turn can produce ambiguity and contradictions. Some theorists have attempted to provide commonalities of what racism is: Oliver Cox for example (1948, 1959) brings it to the emergence of colonialism and capitalism; Hannaford (1996) to modernity (he identifies the weaving between race and modernity to go back as far as 1684). In the case of the anti-Vietnamism and its effect of the "small excursion", the building of a "proper" free market[124] undertook central stage.

There is an abundance of work on race and capitalism. In order to stay focused, here I will engage with those works that speak directly to the question of primitive accumulation and race, i.e. to the question of the constitution of racial differentiations as a condition for capital accumulation. We find such debates predominantly as a reaction against what is often termed political Marxism (subject of part two of this thesis), which defines the emergence of capitalism as a strictly one-country (England) process that took place in the 15th-16th century and that eventually dispersed to other parts of Europe. In this process emphasis is placed upon the changing property relations and a structural separation of economic and political forms that followed from freeing of labor and the creation of market dependencies. Political Marxists are usually accused of Eurocentrism and, more importantly for us here, of the impossibility to explain relations that lie outside of "social property relations" proper (Davidson 2012) and that concern the crafting of race in relations in capitalism (such relations do not necessarily concern only issues between capital and labor. I follow Harvey [2014] and use capitalism and not capital on purpose here).[125] Furthermore, political Marxists are said to limit the trajectory of the process of Marx's primitive accumulation (e.g. Anievas and Nisancioglu 2015) who spoke of enslavement of Africans and colonialism as chief moments in the course and hence, opened the door to think of the making of race as a constitutive to the preparations for capital accumulation and of capitalism as a complex to take place across sites (Anderson 2005). This is not to say that race and racialization are peculiar solely to capitalism, but that they play a distinctive and concrete role within such systems.

[124] This strive towards "proper" free market continues to this day. There is a popular understanding in Bulgaria (and not only, recall the protests in Romania for example) that the severe poverty in the country is due to the impossibility for a real, western free market to be built. The victim of this stipulation are now the Roma people, who are racialized through the proxy of stealing social benefits.

[125] Harvey (2014: 7) says: "… I make clear distinction between capital and capitalism… By capitalism I mean any social formation in which processes of capital accumulation and accumulation are hegemonic and dominant in providing and shaping the material, social and intellectual bases for social life… the history of capitalism is intensely racialized and gendered." What Harvey means by capital is the economic engine of capitalism.

And while researchers engaged in the exploration of post-socialist primitive accumulation have turned great deal in regards to economic processes, there is no mention of the crafting of race as a condition for the sustaining of pro-market ideologies in the period. This is the task before me here.

The racial differentiation of the Vietnamese materialized with the production of the legitimate market worker and the governance of the movement of the illegitimate market worker. In this sense, the expulsion of the "foreign" was not conceived of as strategy that would create a surplus population to be used at a later point. The outer movement was the condition that the legitimate worker, in our case the Bulgarian (not necessarily the white Bulgarian, the Turkish minority was racialized in a different manner. I explain later in the chapter), could acquire its rightful place: the capitalist market. The policing of movement and the deportations to take place became a requirement to ensure the purity of the labor supply so as to prevent contamination of the emerging market relations. The Vietnamese labor was permanently indebted (see sections 3.3. and 3.4.) and easy to dispose of as it did not belong to the Bulgarian territory proper.

In the summer of 1991, if one was to open the short "criminal" section of the newspaper *Demokratsia* (Democracy) – a newspaper of the Union of Democratic Forces, the anti-communist opposition in Bulgaria – s/he would have stumbled upon the following:

> The Vietnamese fly away as scheduled. In the fortress of "Krasna polyana" their number remains the same. Most often than not, they present their names to be *Pak Sam Tuk* (I am here yet again).

This short anecdote, which is meant to be humorous but instead hints at a specific form of racialisation of Vietnamese workers in Bulgaria, is an expression of a social antagonism that emerged strongly with the disassembling of the socialist regime in Bulgaria and the salutation of free markets and liberal democracy. Lurking behind this anecdote is a particularly dark chapter of the history of foreign labor in Bulgaria, when thousands were scheduled for expulsion, their contracts sacked, and social security discontinued. On the one hand, there are the Vietnamese workers who were scheduled to leave the country in bulk. Many anti-communist commentators in Bulgaria today justify these flights with "the working contracts which expired anyway" but this is not the case by all means. The beginning of the 1990s, which is also the beginning of the shock economic reforms in the

country intended to develop an authentic free market, exemplifies the emergence of severe interclass antagonism where often the Vietnamese were framed as migrants who take away jobs and commit crime.

In the previous section, we saw that the reforms that started in late 1989 brought unseen rates of unemployment in Bulgaria. As other countries in the Eastern bloc, Bulgaria resorted to the "necessary" chasing out of foreign labor power. As *Duma* writes, "Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are trying to fix the problems [stemming from unemployment] by returning in the shortest terms possible the remaining foreign labor, most of whom are Vietnamese." To decrease social pressure, Bulgaria undertook swift measures to get rid of one of the most immediate capitalist contradictions, namely foreign labor. The foreign worker became a battleground for state, capital formation, and civil society.

We can safely say that the liberal-capitalist revolution started with the chasing out of the Vietnamese workers and the formation of anti-Vietnamism. On July 26, 1990, the Council of Ministers, at the time under the leadership of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, passed Decision #163 "for creating conditions for an accelerated return of the contingent of Vietnamese workers". The decision came just after the May 1990 meeting between Bulgarian and Vietnamese delegations, which were discussing the problems at hand. At that time, 23 000 Vietnamese citizens resided in Bulgaria. In a letter to Andrey Lukanov, Boyko Dimitrov, the then minister of interior, presented the problem in this way:

> For many of [the Vietnamese workers] speculation has become a major source of income… as a result, there is an increased discontent among the public. There are numerous critical materials in the mass media. The negative attitudes against the Vietnamese workers in the given socio-economic situation could easily lead to more serious incidents. We cannot underestimate the potential danger stemming from exploiting the problem in the course of the election campaign.

Lukanov's cabinet decided to send off the Vietnamese citizens as soon as possible and scheduled for the first returns – around 4 500 people – to take place before December 1990. In addition, those who have been fired from their jobs would be compensated with 100% of their salaries the first month, 90% the second, and 80% the third month. It was also stipulated that those workers who were waiting for their flights were allowed to remain in the dormitories and that the Bulgarian state would defray their leaving. As Lukanov resigned in December that same year, the cabinet never executed this plan in its entirety. The coalition cabinet of

Popov and its successor, the cabinet of the Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF) – the first democratic government of post-1989 Bulgaria, completed the return scheme.

Dimitrov was right. The following years saw the construction of a monolithic object of persecution and hatred that was crafted by the opposition and mainly by Podkrepa. This object was to be found in the image of the Vietnamese (non)worker and its juxtaposing *vis-à-vis* the (new) market. As many Vietnamese lost their jobs due to forceful removal from the factories, a peculiar form of anti-Vietnamism took form. The Vietnamese were cast as "dangerous" in two regards: firstly, because of taking jobs away from "deserving" Bulgarians and simultaneously by imposing impurity over the market by not working, and by the alleged conduct of illegal deeds such as speculation. The understanding of "purity of the market" and its relation to "proper" accumulation can take many forms. As we will see further in the chapter a very similar mechanism works as well towards the Bulgaria day laborers in Munich, whose movement is structured by a particular understanding of freedom of movement. Their attempted expulsion from the market is tightly linked to them being constructed as impure, improper, as pollutants. Being such automatically translates into undeserving to share common market spaces and devalues their labor. While we will see in chapter six how this impurity is transformed into sharing similar structures to the category of "crime", here it suffices to say that the bumpy route to purity of the market in the 1990s was the requirement for a successful transition to capitalism in Bulgaria. To achieve purity of the market, its ideologues completed the historical preconditions for the racialization of the Vietnamese workers and their expulsion out of Bulgaria. Although the ideologues of the free market in Bulgaria foresaw a threat to the purity of the market in all foreign workers, the Vietnamese consolidated the definition of that threat.

Podkrepa, one of these ideologues, was officially established on February 8, 1989. Shortly after, the union became an active architect of race. *Podkrepa* prides itself as being the union of the intelligentsia. Its founding members (the medic Konstantin Trenchev, the poet Petar Manolov, the artists Diana Boyadzieva and Dimitar Boydzhiev) attempted to organize in opposition to the communist regime a year prior to 1989 but they were arrested, which severely restricted their possibilities. To this day, the identity of the union is strongly anti-communist and based on a self-representation as of intelligentsia. "In the time of the totalitarian communist regime, a group of intellectuals - freely thinking people – established

their civic position for the defense of human rights," we read on *Podkrepa's* website[126]. *Podkrepa* was initiated even before the Union of the Democratic Forces, the main opposition to the Communist Party and as such it is often referred to as the authentic opposition to the communists. As Krastyo Petkov and John Thirkell (1991) establish, the initial strategy of *Podkrepa* was to organize on individual basis and was not very much present in the industrial sector, despite the numerous strikes that were taking place in the entire production sector. During its congress in March 1991, *Podkrepa* claimed 100 thousand members (ibid.) as opposed to the 3, 5 million members of the Confederation of the Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions that was the inheritor of the communist trade union. Yet, *Podkrepa* succeeded in organizing the first political strikes and was one of the major ideologues of the transition to the free market. The Union was also one of the most important allies to SDS as the latter relied heavily on the political pressure exercised by the former during the negotiations of the so-called Roundtable.[127]

The new democracy needed a racial category. It was increasingly harder to create it among the Turkish and Roma populations (framed as minorities at the time, see Kalinova and Baeva 2010:242) because of the high moral status these minorities held among intellectuals in opposition who upheld liberal values. Where in 1989, BCP was constructing the object of its racism in the face of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, the liberal opposition was constructing it in the face of the Vietnamese workers. In this situation, the Turkish minority was given a peculiar status in the racialization battles, a dual utility one might claim. The Turks were both already crafted as the communists' most hated subject (although after 89 BSP placed some efforts to erase this shameful history) and being such they had to be the most loved subject of the opposition to the communists. BSP were willing to give up on the Vietnamese because of the fear that the upheaval against them held a "potential danger stemming from exploiting the problem in the course of the election campaign," *Podkrepa* was actively promoting anti-Vietnamism through concepts such as the "Vietnamese syndrome" and "Vietnamada." The new trade union used this image of the impure Vietnamese both in its call for faster integration of free markets in the country and as a point of reference to its enemy - the old BCTU. The Bulgarian Communist Party was guilty in a double sense: it had brought the

[126] Podkrepa. "History." http://podkrepa.org/%d0%b8%d1%81%d1%82%d0%be%d1%80%d0%b8%d1%8f/. Retrieved June 17, 2017.

[127] After the so-called collapse of socialism in 1989, roundtables were taking place in many EE countries between the ruling parties and the opposition. The Bulgarian roundtable took place between January 3, 1990 and May 14, 1990. During the event the opposition and the government negotiated the transition to liberal democracy and market economy.

Vietnamese and now, its inheritor, the Bulgarian Socialist Party was taking too long to get rid of them. Simultaneously, however, the Vietnamese had to be thankful for the jobs that Bulgaria had given them.

As previously mentioned, the Vietnamese workers captured a peculiar contradiction. They came to embody all that is wrong with the market and hence, mirrored the distorted image of what was the desired market. The Vietnamese were both the productive surplus that takes away jobs from the unemployed Bulgarians and the lazy non-workers who contaminate "the market" with unlawful commodity speculation. The negative found in the Vietnamese was attributed as a positive in the market.[128]

"Long live the economic crisis!" is a title of an article published in Podkrepa's newspaper in 1991. The editors of the newspaper upheld the view that:

> Bulgaria's entry into normal economic crisis will be the surest sign that we have broken the chains of totalitarian economic insanity. The crisis is the starting point to normalcy. It will destroy unnecessary structures and imbalances accumulated throughout the years and will be our entrance into the market economy and its universal logic.[129]

The "market" came to be of universal concern for the democratic forces. Six months prior to this proclamation, on November 6, 1990, Podkrepa published a long commentary by Lieutenant Kiril Filev who identified the reason for Bulgaria's "sick market" to be hidden in the Vietnamese population and defined the "Vietnamese syndrome;" a syllogism that became popular among the Bulgarian press on the right spectrum of politics. Generally speaking, the "Vietnamese syndrome" was a thing of impurity. Where for Zhivkov the purity of social security had to be guarded against the non-citizen Turks, for Podkrepa the purity of the economy and the market had to be guarded against the (faked) Vietnamese workers. The political legitimation of a "rapid transition," and hence the crisis, followed two necessary steps. The first comprised of identifying the impure elements (in the face of the Vietnamese) and the second of purging the market of these same elements. According to Filev, a radical impurity was a quality intrinsic to the Vietnamese as "for the years spent in [Bulgaria] they have studied to the smallest detail the intricacies of the black market." Moreover,

[128] This argument is often made in regards to Anti-Semitism as well. See for example chapter three in Wolfe (2016).
[129] Podkrepa 1991.

> the connections that [the Vietnamese] have created in businesses, warehouses and shops are diverse and simultaneously difficult to detect, given the anthropological features and language [of the Vietnamese]. With typical Asian combinations and entrepreneurship they use the weaknesses in our legislation system and trade in order to accumulate wealth without working.

In an article for the newspaper *Podkrepa*, Nora Stoichkova, a journalist who wrote for *Demokratsia* as well, called for fast expulsion. She was willing to even forgive Vietnam's debt just so as to get rid of the Vietnamese "before they sell us for small Dongs, before our eyes pull to the side as a sign of the emerging Asian economic prosperity characteristic of these latitudes." Prosperity of the Vietnamese contradicted the prosperity of the market. The former was viewed as an illegitimate banking on the latter, where simultaneously the latter could only prosper without the former. Stoichkova saw a big conspiracy against Bulgaria as nobody could know who precisely and what type of a Vietnamese was on the territory of Bulgaria. Such information, the journalist thought, was only known by the Vietnamese embassy. "When we add the fact that in Bulgaria all together 6 (six) people know Vietnamese and that the Vietnamese otherwise know Bulgarian but use it only when in their interest, we can see the reason behind the lack of any control over the movement of Vietnamese both inside and outward," explained the journalist. Moreover, Stoichkova adds, in order for a Vietnamese to leave the country, she needs to have worked no less than 5 years, yet, she continues, "there are Vietnamese who have stayed in Bulgaria for 8 years without having even 2 years of labor service." On top of it all, we learn from Stoichkova, the bureaucrats from BSP are willingly selling documents to the Vietnamese in exchange for any type of a speculated "foreign commodity" such as a bottle of whiskey.

The remaining Vietnamese were the last trace of the "totalitarian insanity" to be abolished. Anti-Vietnamism became part and parcel of the protest movement against those, who were believed to hinder the establishment of a true market economy. Where during state socialism the Vietnamese were exploited for their labor, during the transition the attempts of the new anti-communists focused on their expulsion (from the labor market, from the dorms that rightfully belong to Bulgarians, from the territory). The attempted expulsion took place simultaneously with a racialisation that placed the Vietnamese workers to inhabit the triangular, albeit contradictory category of impurity, trickstery, and ethics-free wealth accumulation. This triangular category, which attributed Vietnamese with distinct qualities, was a reason enough for the population in question to be expulsed not only from the territory as such but also from the liberal-capitalist integration. Arguably, some of the most valued

characteristics of capital accumulation were negated in such an image of the Vietnamese, namely competition, abundance of market niches, and an entrepreneurial spirit. The urgency with which capital had to inhabit the Bulgarian markets created the conditions for a relationship between the newly emerged proletariat and the transition that served as cataclysm for anti-Vietnamism. The shift that we saw followed a route that remade the Vietnamese from almost invisible outsider on the inside to a contaminating threat.

4.7. Anti-Vietnamism: An Epitome of Anti-Foreignism

The Vietnamese workers were not the only group to be subjected to expulsion from Bulgaria in the dawn of liberal democracy. The foreign worker was among the most dangerous enemies of 1991 and Popov's cabinet. On August 5, 1991, the Council of Ministers took Decision #246: to "carry out measures in order to prevent potential complications of internal and international nature stemming from the large group of foreigners residing in the country." In it, the citizens of 80 countries were listed as potentially dangerous, Vietnam was among them. It is important to mention here that expulsion from the country was not executed without resistance. Visible protests were organized by Vietnamese citizens who had just acquired the status of "unemployed" in February 1991. Similarly, reacting against Decision #246, Nigerian citizens, now stamped by the seal "illegal," threatened to bomb the plane that was supposed to bring them back if attempts were made towards their expulsion.

Defining foreigners as danger was in junction with and in a response to the ongoing liquidation of industries and subsequent rise of unemployment and "illegal" work practices. Vidachim, as shown earlier in the chapter, came under attack for the employing of Soviet workers. *Podkrepa* was in the base of this attack. We can see that in the beginning of the 1990s the conflict between the union and the management of Vidachim was deepening and especially after a statement of the plant's General Director that "Up until now the unions only destroy rather to come up with constructive critique and suggestions" for the Bulgarian [National] Television.[130] The statement comes as an answer to the union's constant attack over the plant for the employment of foreign workers, specifically such coming from the USSR. The decision for the employment of such workers was taken on December 15, 1990 at

[130] SAV 877-4-58, p. 28.

a session of the Economic Council at Vidachim. The decision is worth quoting at length:

> Regardless of the difficulties in the provision of resources for the plant and the labor cuts that were made, the problems with workers increasingly deepen. After having exhausted all possibilities for recruiting through: regional labor offices, trying to attract free labor from the former Razgrad, Silistra and Kardzhali counties and keeping in mind the categorical refusal of the existing and registered contingent of unemployed in the municipality - the majority of who are approaching retirement or are reassigned, we consider it appropriate to attract 50-100 men of similar enterprises in the USSR - the cities of Tula and Dnepropetrovsk for the needs of the two main plants. By the end of December or early January we also expect the departure of 60 Vietnamese workers working in the clothing department, as machine operators and drawers, which will create even greater interference in the workings of the plants mentioned.[131]

Svetlomira Dimitrova, writing for *Demokratsia* on January 26, 1991 (vol.22, p. 1) accused Kamenov of lying and stipulated that the latter has never truly looked around for domestic labor. The journalist could find only one job ad published by Vidachim from October 1990, and she further claimed that she could find discrepancies between what was written in the ad regarding promised salaries and benefits (400 to 800 BGN and a room) and what was promised in the unemployed in Vidin (400-500BGN). Dimitrova was outraged not only at the differences in the different ads, but also at the proposition that a Bulgarian would be provided a room "where Vietnamese used to live." Later on in her article, Dimitrova cited a Vidachim worker who claimed that they have been threatened by the management of Vidachim to improve the working discipline as otherwise, "Russians will be brought in." Dimitrova was stunned,

> This would not be surprising. As it is known… thousands of workers are thrown in the streets [in soviet cities]. Moreover, they would continue working while their Bulgarian colleagues strike, just as it happened during the general strike in November [1990], when the Vietnamese remained on the floor. But why [the Bulgarian workers wonder] after they have stretched their brotherly hand to the Vietnamese, now they have to carry on their shoulders the soviet [workers] as well.[132]

A few days later, on January 31, 1991, Trenchev, *Podkrepa's* Director warned against the Soviet workers hired by Vidachim. He cited some rumors that these workers have participated in the war in Afghanistan and hinted at the possibility that their arrival in Bulgaria in fact might be linked to purposes other than work. He assured the readers that the Union is doing all in its power to prevent further employment of foreign workers and expressed his "protest"

[131] SAV 877/4/57, p.2.
[132] Dimitrova, for *Demokratsia*, January 26, 1991.

against such practices. “Our territorial organizations will directly oppose the hiring of foreign workers. In order not to get to a conflict, I am certain that … such practices will stop and the hired workers will go home.”[133]

During the Collective Agreement negotiations between the trade unions and Vidachim’s management that took place in March 1991, a new clause was entered into force: “freeing of the employed foreign workers if that does not contradict signed agreements.”[134] April, 1992 brought a new clause in the Collective Agreement: “The employer will not sign contracts for the employment of foreign workers for the year 1992.” Further, we read in the Protocol on the Implementation of the Agreement between Vietnam and Bulgaria from 03.10. 1980 (written in 1991) that the “accelerated removal of the Vietnamese contingent from the country” was necessitated by the “the situation in Republic of Bulgaria in relation to the processes triggered by the ongoing economic reform and the increased tendency of the freeing (*освобождаване*, i.e. firing) of labor force.” [135]

4.8 Conclusion

In the preceding chapters I explored the formation of moving labor power during state socialism. The economists and sociologists who dealt with the *problematique* of inter-state labor movements framed these movements as a structural relation between production and reproduction. Social reproduction was not conceived of as an organization outside of the field of production, but as a relation that was supposed to complement production and vice versa. Dormitories, pensions, health care provisions, free clothing, free transportation were all elements of this symbiosis. While some of these elements remained in the relation of the foreign workers to state and socialist enterprises until the end of the programs, the growing demand for intensification in the economy brought about conditions for the emergence of the commoditization of the labor power of these workers. We saw that their surplus labor was socialized in a way so as to repay Vietnam’s debt.

During the demise of state socialism, the racialization of the Vietnamese worker became an incorporated national discourse that translated into sacking of working contracts, police

[133] Trenchev for *Demokratsia*, vol.26, 1991.
[134] SAV 877/4/355.
[135] CAS. 136/87/517.

violence, and the eventual expulsion of foreign workers from the country. A process that I termed the small excursion. The implementation of free markets was accompanied by violence that recreated the social fabric in a way so as to radically redefine the relation of foreign workers to capital and the state. We traced a historical transformation in the racialization of the Vietnamese worker that altered the relation of foreign workers from one of interiority to one of exteriority. Thus, race enabled the supposed universality of the market through a relation of distinction between national and foreign labor and compressed the post-socialist liberal project. Racialized labor power had to be removed.

Simultaneously, outward movement of Bulgarians became one of the possible ways out of the effects of the disintegration of enterprises, the change in property regimes, and the destruction and robbery of machinery. While Bulgarians were also part of the internationalist socialist project of moving labor power and they labored in countries like Vietnam, Libya, USSR, Zimbabwe, to name a few, the post-socialist transition turned them from subjects of internationalism to subjects of freedom of movement. What were the effects of this shift for moving labor power? How is the relation between production, reproduction, and movement structured in these new conditions? What forms moving labor power took with the demise of labor safety and social security? What are the political responses of those moving as labor power to these developments some twenty seven years later? I answer these questions in the next section of the thesis.

PART TWO THE SOCIAL BENEFIT TOURIST AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

We left the previous section with the expulsion of the foreign labor power from Bulgaria and the argument that *movement* came to be at the center of struggles of reproduction. There are three directions, where we can follow up on this statement. Firstly, outward movement of foreign workers was demanded on part of civil society in order to get rid of foreign labor so as to open space for the reproduction of "national" labor power. Secondly, despite the crackdown on foreigners in the country, the cases of the Nigerians who wanted to remain by all means possible and the protests organized by the Vietnamese citizens, are clear indicators that there was resistance to the expulsions, and hence, a claim to be able to remain within a territory. The case of the so-called "Soviet workers" who were being hired in industries such as Vidachim, exemplifies yet another restructuring in the moving of labor power, where Soviet citizens would seek possibilities for reproduction in Bulgaria. Therefore, we can say that there was pressure to enter the country, simultaneously to the pressure exercised by unions to remove labor power. Thirdly, now that the restructuring of property relations left thousands unemployed, many Bulgarians placed a claim over their right to move by leaving the country and entering "illegal" work-canals towards Europe, claiming asylum in countries as the U.S. and Canada, or travelling through the then opened asylum route towards Germany.

The chapters that belong to part two are organized around the notion of freedom of movement, both its normative dimensions and philosophical underpinnings. I look at freedom of movement as a specific historical and anarchic form of movement, which has accelerated the speed of the movement of labor power. But before I delve into this acceleration, I look into some ideological presuppositions that inform our understanding of what freedom of movement does or shall mean in order to situate it historically and to trace some of the functions that have been attached to it. I turn my attention to the Bulgarians and their struggle for reproduction vis-a-vis the ability to move. Eighteen years after 1989, Bulgarians were granted the possibility to move freely within the EU. Today, in 2017, some of those who find themselves on the road between European countries in search for jobs, are commonly referred to as "social benefit tourists."

The so-called social benefit tourist (SBT) is a new category that belongs strictly to the EU. Its

meaning presupposes that a person moves from one state to another with the sole purpose of claiming undeserved social benefits. SBT was created in the European Union and it is a label for potential crime against the welfare state. It is not written into the law, yet, its discursive emergence has created space for struggles both within and outside the legislative systems of the European Union. The European Commission has reacted to its discursive crafting by writing into EU law mechanisms that would potentially stop the effects of "benefit tourism." The category is, as of currently, a field of struggle between the European pauperized, member states and European institutions.

The category was constructed by the media and western politicians in 2013 and within the particular political context that defined Europe's embrace of austerity. The political aim of its crafting was to exclude certain groups of people on the move from the possibility to claim state benefits in a member state different than their own. The conflict inherent into the category is one that unfolds in a nexus, where those deemed "economically inactive" are punished for their alleged inactiveness. In 2013 the following question emerged on the EU scene: is person X, who is from member state Y, allowed to claim state benefits in member state Z, where he works/resides/is unemployed/is economically inactive? The question was provoked by the opening of the labor markets in Germany and the U.K. to Bulgarian and Romanian citizens. The proposition that 29 million Bulgarian and Romanians (the total number of the population of the two countries) will flood the labor and social benefit markets was widely used in media outlets Europe-wide. This sparked fears among European politicians. David Cameron for example took the challenge to re-negotiate U.K.'s position in Europe in order to stop EU migrants from taking benefits.[136] This was the first time Brexit was seen as a possibility. In Germany, the battle against benefit tourism unfolds mostly within the sphere of claiming child benefits. Yet, the country has sometimes openly led a media battle to cut benefits in other spheres of reproduction as well. The pre-election debates in 2017 in the Federal Republic were also concerned with the issues of benefits and Angela Merkel has expressed support to the proposition that the EU's migrants whose children remain in the member state of origin shall not benefit from Germany's welfare system[137]. That is, the reproduction of the future labor power is to take place with the means available in the departure state.

[136] The Telegraph. "David Cameron Will Keep Out EU Benefit Tourists." Retrieved April 11, 2017. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9783545/David-Cameron-we-will-keep-out-EU-benefit-tourists.html).
[137] The Guardian. Accessed April 11, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/23/germany-angela-merkel-eu-countries-keen-copy-uk-child-benefit-pe

The moving of labor power from Bulgaria to Germany is a particularly interesting process to analyze when trying to grasp the significance of the "social benefit tourist" for the changing economic and political processes within the EU. Where Bulgaria is under high poverty risk (see figure 2, chapter five), Germany, as compared to Bulgaria, is the country in the EU with the most concentration of capital. If in 2014, Germany spent 29,1% of its GDP for social protection, that same year, Bulgaria spent 18,5%.[138] The two countries stay at the very opposite poles of what European integration is supposed to entail. Furthermore, and in light with the next section, Germany depends on Bulgaria to secure the external border of the EU. As it will be seen, the Federal Republic often makes remarks in this direction, which results in multiplication of the meaning of Bulgaria's border. The latter has often been pressured to manage its borders in relation to both external (e.g. refugees) and internal (poor Bulgarians) to the EU "intruders." The movement of labor power from Bulgaria to Germany is important to be examined in detail in order for us to fully understand what freedom of movement entails as a practice within the particular politico-economic context of European integration and uneven development. As such, I treat this movement as a concrete historical form of labor power moving in order to reproduce itself within a context of uneven European development.

A common thread in my thesis is that for the "migrant" to appear as a "migrant," it can only happen with a rise of a migration apparatus that captures a particular movement and molds it accordingly to the politico-economic spectrum around. The migration apparatus in turn necessitates the naming of a category so as to consolidate institutions that govern movement in relation to labor markets and the state. The argument about to unfold is concerned with these same processes. The population that would eventually fall under the discursive category of the social benefit tourist is subjected to freedom of movement and to EU citizenship rights. In this particular production of a migrant category, we witness how the welfare state eclipses the migration apparatus. As the latter is withdrawn to a maximum as an institutional setting from this relation (i.e. there is no borders, no visa requirements, etc), the welfare state and the labor market become the stage, where relations and conflicts of moving labor power unfold more explicitly. In other words, the welfare state and the labor market become the proxies through which the subjects of movement are controlled, racialized, and classed. This is

[138] Eurostat. 2017. "Expenditure on social protection, 2004-2014 (%of GDP)." Retrieved July 27, 2017. (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Expenditure_on_social_protection,_2004-2014_(%25_of_GDP)_YB17.png).

different as compared to the asylum system for example. Yet, this is not to say that asylum-seekers are not classed and racialized through the abovementioned proxies, but that these processes take place at a different scale, and this is the layer of what some have named the border regime (inter alia Walters 2002; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010; Kasparek 2015, 2016).[139]

When I first went to Munich for my doctoral research on Bulgarian day laborers, the social benefit tourist (a neologism mostly used in Britain) and the poverty migrant (the German correspondence of the social benefit tourist) were just blurry, discursive strategies to racialize Bulgarians and Romanians so as to drive away attention from the effects caused by the solidification of the "Europe of austerity," i.e. the tightening of the access to social welfare. The time was perfect. It was 2013 and the last EU labor markets were about to open for the two countries after the lifting of the seven-year-waiting-period. Today, the social benefit tourist is real in its effects. Germany is in constant production of possible limitations to claims of social benefits on part of EU migrants and the roots of Brexit, as we saw from Cameron's speech mentioned above, can be traced to the harsh campaign against Bulgarians and Romanians in the period between 2013 and 2014. In the midst of it all, freedom of movement within the European Union was the largest stake to be discussed.

In the past years, there has been an increasing amount of EU court cases that concern the boundaries of EU citizenship rights, and mostly the erosion of the notion when viewed via the relation between national states and EU migrating citizens. Perhaps the most famous cases are these of *Dano* (2014) and *Alimanovic* (2015).[140] Both of them concern the right to member states (Germany) benefits under EU law. The decisions taken by the Court of Justice in these two cases are in sharp contrast to previously taken decisions. In both of them, legal scholars (Shuibhne 2015) claim, there is an explicit redefinition of EU citizenship from being defined on the basis of "individual-centered approach" to becoming "linked to the market economy of the Union[141]. As it is not my intention to engage with these cases at large here, it is only important to mention that what the Court ruled is that economically inactive migrants cannot

[139] The authors listed above have a working definition of the border regime, which is in opposition to the metaphor of "Fortress Europe," and which takes into account the agency exercised by migrants and the simultaneous change in the meaning of citizenship.
[140] Case C-333/13 *Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig* [2014] ECLI-2358.; Case C-67/14 *Jobcenter Berlin Neukolnn v Nazifa, Sonita, Valentina and Valentino Alimanovic* [2015] ECLI-597.
[141] Barbone, J. 2016. "Dano and Alimanovic – the end of a social European Union." *EU Law Blog.* https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1012#_ftnref6). Retrieved August 25, 2017.

claim benefits. In sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4., I scrutinize the idea of "economic inactivity" in more detail and the reader will be able to see that behind the notion is hidden a process that does not necessary lead to "unemployment", but to concealed employment.

The abovementioned decisions are not contradictory to the definition of EU citizenship by any means as claimed by legal scholars. Freedom of movement is in fact a relation that is based on a particular understanding of the market, and hence, the legitimate participants in that market as it unfolds in the triple relation between state, capital and movement. What is new in this relation is the emergence of the "social benefit" as a high political stake in late neo-liberalism. To be able to scrutinize the changing character of that relation, we need to understand the way the category of the social benefit tourist sprang into being, i.e. to engage with the discourse practice (Fairclough 1992) of its making. Yet, we cannot afford a synchronistic analysis. I, instead, take up a social history approach, that is, I account for the conflictual, and hence historical, process behind its crafting. In this sense, the category of the social benefit tourist corresponds to a specific historical process, where movement has been freed (in a bourgeois sense) and where social Europe has given way to Europe of austerity.

Even though the stories told here come for the most part from Germany, they can be read as the context behind one of the largest political shocks experienced by European integration since 1989, namely Brexit. Part two has the following structure: first, I delve into the historical significance of freedom of movement for the EU and social movements that developed around the claim to it. After analyzing its historical background, in Chapter five, I turn my attention to the historical moment of the racialization of Bulgarians vis-à-vis their freed movement and trace the ways in which the latter notion changed accordingly to this new race. Chapter five intertwines theoretical discussion about the notion of freedom of movement with the case of a young Bulgarian family in Munich whose movement was a subject of attempted suspension in the framework of labor regimes particular to it. One of the points that I make throughout part two is that struggles *for* movement are always already struggles *against* movement (both on part of the state and on part of the subjects of freedom of movement). Chapter six is a continuation of Chapter five and there, I gaze at the different strategies implemented by the city of Munich in order to remove Bulgarian workers from sight. The theme of purity of the labor markets recurs here as once again a demand on part of civil society (in this case the business community in Munich). Moreover, I take a spatio-temporal look at freedom of movement and its practice. I demonstrate how freedom of

movement shortens the gap between the potential and the actual in late capitalism and how the movement of labor power in our contemporaneity and in the context of the EU has accelerated tremendously. Labor power is constantly dispersed. I explore these issues via the cases of Bulgarian laborers in Munich and Berlin and the social movements that support them. I show that these social movements are hard to sustain, perhaps ironically, because of the opportunity on part of laborers to move freely around Europe. But to understand how these developments took place, we need to go back in history.

II.1. Social Movements for Freedom of Movement

Before I approach chapter five, I start with a brief discussion that centers on the social movements that developed around issues of flight in Germany in the beginning of the 1990s and their departure from the field of labor. The arguments made here will eventually build up towards situating the political group Civil Courage; one of the main protagonists in the struggles that emerged in Munich in regards to labor and reproduction. Furthermore, I juxtapose these social movements with claims made in regards to free movement coming from Bulgaria in order to trace their simultaneous development, yet, from very different angles. This will allow me to trace how, despite their geographical remoteness, these movements reinforced each other to eventually meet on the political scene in Germany. The question here is what came out of freedom of movement as a claim to reproduction some twenty years later?

In the beginning of the 1990s movement, and more specifically the demand for freedom of movement, entered the center of political struggles in both the Eastern and the Western parts of Europe. Bojadžijev (2008) examines a post-Guestworker change in the struggles of the *Gastarbeiters*. She describes a situation, where prior to 1973 the strikes and the demands of the foreign workers in Germany revolved around "particular labor situation[s]," where in the 1970s, after the dissolution of the guestworker programs, the question of "return" settled in in these struggles (interview by the author 2016). This historical switch in the focus of demands was Germany's decision in 1973 to halt the guestworker programs. Bojadžijev describes this shift in focus as a continuum between the discourse of "we are not slaves" (i.e. labor demand) and "the right to stay" (i.e. movement becomes the center of struggle). In one of her chapters, Bojadžijev focuses on a strike organized by Korean women in the mid-1970s, who organized

in order to challenge authorities regarding their expired contracts and hence the subsequent obligation to leave the country. For Bojadžijev, this particular strike was a tipping point in organizing for left movements. She explains,

> In the 1970s you can see a change from the struggle within the labor settings and labor strikes that were sometimes connected to the question of dormitory, to residence permission, to the question of life and reproduction, or life and the conditions of reproduction as migrants. In the 1970s you see a shift which marked migrants' struggles and more concern was placed on the life outside of the factory… This has to do precisely with the shifts within the struggles themselves. When you think about it, the most successful workers' fight in the German history, or at least the most well-known, was a migrant struggle, which was the wildcat struggle in 1973 in the Ford factories… Simultaneously to that, the focus of the left struggle was the labor struggle. And you can see a clear shift in the 1970s to other forms of struggles that were part of life: housing, health, education, but then also the question of the right to stay. So this was what these Korean women came up with (interview by the author, April 2016).

This is only the beginning. Towards the late 1980s and early 1990s, the right to stay, and subsequently freedom of movement, become one of the most important demands of various social movements in Germany. There is a consensus among political activists on the left in Germany and various scholars that political and social movements around issues of (physical) movement emerged strongly on the one hand because of the end of the guestworker programs in the mid-1970s, but also because of the change in asylum law in Germany in 1992 and the introduction of the notion of "safe country." These two developments affected the political organization around issues of flight in a way that the struggles centered on issues of deportations, detention, and repression against refugees.[142] In other words, where in the 1970 there was an overlap between the right to stay and labor struggles, in the 1990s the latter question withered away.

In fact, as Mariela (an asylum lawyer from Munich, who was involved in the at the time emerging "right to stay" movement in Germany in the 1990s, interview 2014) explained to me, "there was no refugee movement [as such] in Germany in the 1990s." She explained that refugees (the people who were either in procedure or already given status) were organizing along political lines regarding the situation in the countries they were coming from and were mostly concerned with national liberation struggles.[143] The beginning of what can be considered now a "refugee movement" in Germany (demands for better material conditions in

[142] Interview by the author, Klaus 2016.
[143] This emerges in a few other interviews.

camps, freedom of movement, claims to citizenship) started in 1996 as an exchange and cooperation between some of the anti-racist groups in Germany and the *sans-papier* movement in France.[144] As Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) also explain, the now popular movement "No one is illegal" was a result of these exchanges and the settling of the category of the "illegal" migrant since the 1970s. Basically, the anti-racist group that Mariela was part of, organized conferences and activist group meetings with their French comrades in anticipation that the *sans-papier* movement in France will inspire the same political developments in Germany as well.

This never really took place. Yet, the anti-racist movement started growing significantly throughout German cities in the West, also provoked by domestic rising of ultra-right formations and events such as the Rostock riots in August of 1992 against asylum camps. There were heterogeneous approaches in the German anti-racist movement when it comes to struggles that demanded the right to stay and freedom of movement. Mariela explained that for example where the Caravan (a nation-wide activist network that deals with issues of migration to this day) in Bremen was dealing solely with issues of asylum and refugees (i.e. political persecution), the Munich part of the Caravan instead accommodated a variety of migrant categories within their political activities. These ranged from issues concerning migrant workers, foreign students, refugees, illegals, economic migrants. What consolidated the above categories, however, was not a claim to wages, workers' dormitories, and demands related to the workplace, but a claim against deportations and freedom of movement.[145] As Tobias Klaus explains, while he was part of this particular movement, "[we] never really organized around issues of labor. What was driving us was an anti-state repression and deportation topics. It was against state violence, not economic violence."[146] The emerging *movement* movements reinforced an approach that was focused on status, rather than class. The refugee struggle of the 1990s trumped the worker struggle from the 1970s.

Simultaneously, the debates surrounding the "safe-country principle" (more rigorously

[144] For details about the movement see: Cohen and Grimshaw (2003); Cohen (2003); Nyers (2010).
[145] The Caravan Munich still exists. Although their name is *Karawane München. Für die Rechte der Flüchtlinge und MigrantInnen!* (Caravan Munich. For the rights of refugees and migrants), the network is focused on issues of asylum. When I stayed in Munich, the group barely participated in any of the protests or organizational matters concerning racism against the Bulgarian day laborers even though there is a vibrant community that does organize around the issues subject of the chapters to follow.
[146] Interview of the author, 2016. This statement is particularly interesting, because it shows an overlap between asylum systems' approach to refugees, namely through an understanding of violence that belongs to the "political" and not the "economic." I analyze this in more details in part III.

discussed in part three of the thesis) to be applied to asylum laws and practices in Western Europe intensified tremendously in the early 1990s when more and more countries started applying the 1986 Danish definition of safe country to their own legislations (Hunt 2014).[147] The legislative change to take place in Germany and to introduce the principle to the field of asylum effectively restructured the relation between Germany and Eastern Europe as thousands of asylum-seekers were declared to be *de jure*, economic migrants. In the following years, the "safe country principle" would become a major tool for differentiation and exclusion. For now, I will stop my attention on what took place in Bulgaria in the 1990s with regards to claims to movement. It is important for the reader to keep in mind that Bulgarians were one of the populations that went through status change from being able to claim political asylum up until 1992 to being turned into economic migrants that same year. If we are to take an approach peculiar to the autonomy of migration scholarship, we can safely claim that the struggles of the Bulgarian (now) unemployed for movement were restructured by the new asylum law in Germany through the solidification of the "economic migrant": a category that will continue to shape politics of migration up until today.

Migration was one of the most discussed issues in Bulgarian media at the time as Europe witnessed a mass movement of people towards the West.[148] Outward migration from Bulgaria was on the rise as well. The theme clustered around three issues: the mass emigration from Bulgaria, the foreign workers in Bulgaria, and the relation between the economy and migration. The relation between the economy and migration revolved not only around issues of racial purity (as seen in the previous chapter) but also around the understanding that the mass outward migration could be only stopped if pro-market reforms were implemented. The foreign policy adviser of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF, see previous chapter for details) joined Germany's preoccupation with the mass flow of Eastern Europeans at the time and stipulated that the only way the western country would be willing to invest in Bulgaria is when two conditions are completed: stopping Bulgarians from emigrating and letting foreign

[147] See also Kjaergaard (1994) who says that, "In the refugee field the term 'safe country' is applied to countries which are determined either as being non-refugee producing or as being countries in which refugees can enjoy asylum without danger. The notion, or concept as it has almost become, is therefore applicable in two situations which give rise to separate considerations, namely, the context of *safe country of origin and safe country of asylum.*"

[148] I am basing this argument on a research of the four major newspapers in the early 1990s: *Demokratsia, Duma, Trud, Podkrepa*. I surveyed the issues published between 1990 and 1993 as this is representative of my larger methodological time framework and covers a period when migration management underwent turbulent changes both in Bulgaria and in Europe in general.

capital in (Vladimir Philipov 1991, *Demokratsia*).[149]

This became one of the party's formulas towards successful transition. The only way Bulgaria could attract foreign (to be read German) investments was to stop Bulgarians from emigrating. To stop Bulgarians from emigration, the country had to quickly reform the economy and to let foreign capital in. The vicious circle to be drawn by the UDF was to repeat itself twenty four years later. In 2015, Germany continues to pressure Bulgaria over "illegal immigration." On March 10 2015, Germany's foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke in the capital Sofia and ensured the public about his country's commitment towards increasing the investment plans in Bulgaria as the country is Germany's key partner in the fight against illegal migration.[150] The hint was more than clear. Steinmeier spoke about the importance of the Balkan country as an external border but also of its role as an internal buffer capable of preventing further movement into Germany.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the foreigners in Bulgaria were subjected to expulsions in the turn of the 1990s. Sacked contracts and consequent deportations were conditions for many. Under the same pressure were also many Bulgarian workers abroad. For them as well, the conditions of their being abroad and hence, the conditions for their reproduction were changing. In an article from February 25, 1991 in the newspaper *Trud* (Labor), we learn that seventy Bulgarian workers protested in front of the Bulgarian embassy in Moscow because they were dismissed from work and threatened by subsequent involuntary return. The protesters were construction workers at the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly and represented the rest of their 5 000 colleagues.[151] Not only did the Bulgarian workers in Kursk faced a return back to the country, where unemployment and insecurity ruled the day, but they were also not being paid their salaries for the last two months, could not bring their families in Bulgaria (in the cases when the spouses were not Bulgarian citizens), could not pay for their luggage transportation back to Bulgaria and did not receive the payments for their paid holidays. Where some of the demands were met on the very next day, the workers had to return to Bulgaria despite the insecurity that awaited them in their home country. We see a clear shift

[149] "The emigration wave, the national question and the responsibility of Bulgaria to Europe" [ЕМИГРАЦИОННАТА ВЪЛНА, НАЦИОНАЛНИЯТ ВЪПРОС И ОТГОВОРНОСТТА НА БЪЛГАРИЯ ПРЕД ЕВРОПА], issue 228, p. 4, 25.9.1991.
[150] Novinite. 2015. "Germany to Assist Bulgaria in Implementation of Key Reforms." Retrieved July 17, 2017. (http://www.novinite.com/articles/167108/Germany+to+Assist+Bulgaria+in+Implementation+of+Key+Reforms+-+Steinmeier).
[151] The largest anomaly on Earth.

in moving labor power back in, and out of countries from the former Soviet Bloc.

Just a few months later, in a report written on May 22, 1991 by Lyubomir Pelovski, Minister of Construction and Architecture we read: "In the last months among the Bulgarian construction workers in the USSR many social conflicts emerged. There are strike committees at many of the construction sites and we anticipate that in the next days from warning the strikes will grow into effective such. The basic part of the demands is connected to the due payments. (CAS)" As it turns out, the state could not agree on the manner and the size of the wages to be paid to the construction workers. The problem for decision emerged mostly because of the slow reaction on part of the USSR and Bulgaria to change the international contracts. A situation was created, where the Bulgarian workers were receiving less than their colleagues in Bulgaria and less than their USSR colleagues working at the same sites.[152] Many of the workers returned to Bulgaria before any solution to the problem to be negotiated.

What we see in this particular episode of the history of social struggles around issues of moving labor power is that previously established migration apparatuses were now torn into pieces, and with them modes of reproduction as well. State socialism produced a migration/labor apparatus that was moving labor power in bulk and that guaranteed the somewhat smooth reproduction of labor power through guaranteeing wage, health and social security. In the 1990s these apparatuses changed and claims were instead made to the right to move freely. As it will be seen later on in the chapter, reproduction in the framework of freedom of movement is not anymore guaranteed. On the contrary, it is severely endangered.

Simultaneously, back in Bulgaria there was a massive outward migration, which, coupled with similar developments coming from Romania, Albania and the former Yugoslavia, created the conditions for bitter struggles regarding the place and the meaning of freedom of movement in the new consolidating Europe. These debates were bitter especially vis-à-vis the negotiations regarding the safe country principle and the newly found unwillingness on part of the U.S. to grant asylum to East Europeans. These tensions did not leave untouched the field of international law, where more and more often one could hear propositions regarding the notion of "economic refugee" and its grounding as a legitimate claim for seeking asylum (this will be discussed in more details in part three). Now that the Cold War was finished and exit

[152] CAS. 19 June 1991. Report by Yancho Iv. Velikov – General Director of "Bolgargarzinvest" from Moscow.

visas were no longer a requirement for Eastern European, the United States stopped treating them as potential refugees (list reference). This difference to previous preferential treatment of the latter group came as a direct result of the (perceived) flattening of the ideological differences between the two regions (Wildes 1982). We can argue that in this attempted flattening of the world the battles over *movement* were a serious indicator of the impossibility behind such an endeavor. Freedom of movement was the primary political demand [of Eastern Europe] (Francis Gabor 1991:854).

CHAPTER FIVE MOVING LABOR POWER: BETWEEN BENEFIT TOURISM AND FREE MOVEMENT

5.1. The Structure of the "Social Benefit Tourist"

To demand freedom of movement was to demand the possibility for social reproduction. In this part of the thesis, I turn my attention to the "social benefit tourist," a migratory category, which emerged in 2013 before the opening of all European labor markets to Bulgarians and Romanians. The social benefit tourist corresponds to the disappearing of the last traces of the welfare state, one of the main guarantors of labor-power reproduction (for its forms see Hansson 1979). In this cycle, to be able to move fastly, far and wide more and more comes to represent a major possibility for the reproduction of labor power. The emergence of the social benefit tourist (SBT) has certain implications over the differentiation of the economic from the political as approached in the field of migration and as solidified as an approach in the early 1990s. We may say that the SBT is a post-binary category. If in the economic/political migrant binary we can see a reconciliation of the two central notions of the political and the economic under liberalism – that of the political being violent and that of the economic being voluntarily – the SBT exemplifies a new configuration of powers with respect to violence. If the asylum system defines violence, and therefore the right to protection, in the framework of a particular territory (e.g. safe country is one such concept), in the case of the poverty migrant we have a different type of definition. Violence, here, is contained solely in the subject of fleeing and the potential of abuse that this subject contains in her. Violence is not defined through a territorial configuration. Violence is defined as violence against the welfare state. In other words, the subject assumes the appearance of the violence that is hidden in the disappearing welfare state - on the one hand, she flees that same state, on the other she is told to hold a potential to harm that state in her land of arrival.

Vania Grigorova (2016), an economic adviser in the trade union *Podkrepa,* published a study concerned with the vanishing of state support in the past twenty years in Bulgaria. Her research brought her back to 1998, when, according to the author, a consensus consolidated on the right spectrum of politics (later to be followed by the left as well), which placed the blame on the "generous" state support for the growing poverty in the country. This, as we know, is a typical and historically settled neoliberal discourse, but it was successful and in the

next years the Bulgarian social sphere would experience a full blown attack on state support. As of today, Grigorova has estimated, 36% of Bulgarians live in poverty, yet, only 3,5 % from the national budget is used for social support. Furthermore, "less than 6% of the budget of the Agency for Social Assistance is spent on those in extreme need, i.e. on those who cannot cover vital costs on commodities and services" (2016:40). Furthermore, Bulgaria is one of the countries in the EU to spend the least on social protection per inhabitant. In this configuration, outward migration has become a source for the possibility to socially reproduce.

Figure 1. Expenditure on social protection in PPS per inhabitant, 2012[153]



Bulgaria is also the country with the highest rate in the risk of poverty and social exclusion[154]

[153] Eurostat. 2012. Retrieved July 17, 2017. (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/0/06/Social_protection_statistics_YB2015.xlsx).
[154] Eurostat. 2014-2015. Retrieved July 17, 2017. (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:At-risk-of_poverty_or_social_exclusion_rate, _2014_and_2015(%25).png)

Figure 2. People at risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate, 2014 and 2015



(1) 2015: estimate.
(2) 2015: not available

SBT is still not written into law, yet, even as a discursive category it has implicated the lives of many. SBT is not an economic migrant *per se*, even though she escapes "economic misfortunes." Although SBT escapes the economic category of "poverty," the proxy, which structures the relation of SBT to the labor market and the state is the potential abuse of the welfare state. In this configuration, freedom of movement is constructed as playing the role of decreasing the gap between the potential and the actuality of the appropriating of undeserved social benefits. There is a redefinition of freedom of movement from being a right to becoming a proxy of abuse. The state attempts to control the movement of SBT by restricting rights to welfare. The SBT retains some of the characteristics of the economic migrant as the escape from political violence is denied from her journey. Yet, the articulation of the SBT, at least in the ways that follow the political instruments and technologies that construct it, traces her not as being oriented towards the pursuit of economic interest but interest in receiving undeserved welfare assistance.

When we compare the category to the larger differentiation of the economic/political migrant, we see that the category of the social benefit tourist holds a peculiar place in the historical chain of migrant categories. She is the liberal subject *par excellence* - freed to move and refused state assistance. Where the asylum-seeker enters the threshold of (European) labor

markets as a "trickster" who has to prove that she is not an economic migrant, from the point of view of the legislative system there is no reason for the benefit tourist to prove that she escapes for economic reasons. Her "trickstery" is revealed in her lust for welfare. Moreover, she has been granted the right to travel freely within the European space, which has shortened the temporal gap for capital between the potential to gain labor power and the actuality of exploiting it. For state socialism, this gap was filled in block. Labor power was moved in and for certain periods of time, for certain industries. As it will be seen in the next part, this differs for the asylum-seeker. There, the gap is widened as there is uncertainty of the availability of labor from this particular pool introduced by a) the logic of the differentiation itself (economic/political) b) the infrastructure which supports the differentiation (e.g. detention, interviews, fingerprinting, courts, work permits, integration, etc).[155]

The field from above is woven into conflicts that unfold in two important ways. There is a consistency in the tension between the liberal grasp of freedom of movement and the everyday practices of it, which opens up a situation, where a continuation of exclusion and inclusion has taken shape. Often, there are attempts to discipline this tension inherent in differential inclusion (Mezzadra and Neilson 2012; 2013) in an organized manner and political groups that support foreign laborers enter the scene.

The above structure was articulated in the years between 2013 and 2014. Next, I briefly relate the debates on freedom of movement as they unfolded in 2013 in the European Union, in order to trace the ways in which the category was articulated. Then, I historicize freedom of movement as it pertains to the EU in general and in relation to the SBT in particular.

5.2. The Articulation of the Social Benefit Tourist: "Free Movement Within Europe Needs to Be Less Free."[156]

The statistics exemplified above have of course a concrete effect on those who live in Bulgaria. Emigration is often a strategy used to avoid falling deeper into poverty. A common

[155] In the case of Bulgaria, the labor market cannot really rely on asylum seekers as they leave for Germany. Additionally, the legal framework does not allow asylum-seekers to work for the first three months; from the point of view of German capital again we have restrictions for work permits plus potential deportations plus waiting period for labor coming from the periphery.

[156] Uttered by Cameron in November, 2013. https://www.ft.com/content/add36222-56be-11e3-ab12-00144feabdc0

joke that circulates in the country is the one that depicts emigration as the most relevant escape from the politico-economic crisis. The joke goes like this:

Question: “What are the possible exits out of the crisis?”
Answer: “Terminal 1 and Terminal 2”

Photo 8. Terminal 2

Author: Christo Komarnitski. Source: Ideya za Balgaria. Retrieved May 17, 2016. (http://www.ideyazabulgaria.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4264:-2013-&catid=55:karikaturi&Itemid=107). The caricature captures Terminal 2. In the line on the left is a protester from the February events in 2013. On the right is a protester from the June mobilization, which was comprised mostly by the self-proclaimed creative class.

Sofia airport has two terminals: Terminal 1 and Terminal 2. Terminal 2 predominantly serves state-sponsored airline companies and represents an eclectic mixture of meanings. In the Bulgarian public sphere, the terminal is invoked as a potential for the escape out of the social misery that has stagnated the country in the past almost three decades. It has become an epitome for escape. As I discussed in the Introduction to the thesis, when the potential moves it does actualize in a certain form. Terminal 2 actualizes as one’s potential for flight. Terminal

2 has come to signify an important structure of meaning for Bulgarians and it could be seen as a prophet; the pre-figurative image of one's future as a subject bound to sell her labor power abroad; the *not-yet-to-come*, where one's social reality is locked in between the present, the future, and the past possibilities of escape. The caricature from above represents the two protests that spread throughout the country in 2013. They were socially and chronologically differentiated as the "winter" and the "summer" protests.[157] The winter protests were the ones of the "toothless" and "tasteless" poor. In the summer protests the elite took over and demanded more civilization, more Europe, and real, European-type capitalism.

These protests created a deep chasm along class lines. The self-proclaimed "creative class," usually associated with minority that lives in the center of Sofia city, in their attempt to resist the taking-place-at-the-time racialization of Bulgarians coming from political figures such as David Cameron and Hans-Peter Friedrich, in turn racialized their "poor" co-nationals and articulated them through the figure of the undeserving migrant.[158] To break the chains of racialization, this particular segment of the population blamed the poor for the social disarray in the country. In a provocative letter, written by participants in the summer protests and addressed to the European countries, we read:

> Dear European Countries,
>
> You've always complained about us, Bulgarians, not being ready for the European Union. You elect parties in your local parliaments, who make a strong stand against immigration. You don't want uneducated and poor people to come and abuse your welfare states. You are looking at the tip of the iceberg, but failing to grasp the whole of it.
>
> Not all Bulgarians are thieves and criminals. The majority of immigrants who come to your countries may not be the best people, but they are not the typical Bulgarian. Some of them go to study abroad and work hard, but most (the ones you see) are people who have nothing to lose and immigration is an easy decision for them. The true Bulgarians, the educated working Bulgarians are different. Many stay in Bulgaria and build careers. They start families and try to provide for them. They start new businesses. They create. But the government gets in their way.[159]

[157] For an elaboration on the significance of the protests, see Tsoneva (2014) and Stoyanova (2016).
[158] Friedrich is a politician, member of the German Christian Social Union (CSU). He served as a Federal Minister of Interior between 2011 and 2013. His figure is controversial as in 2013 he stated that "Islam has no place in Germany." 2013. The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/03/07/immigration-theresa-may-question-_n_2827785.html. Retrieved June 30, 2017.
[159] Slavo Ingilizov's blog. 2013. https://medium.com/@slavoingilizov/dear-europe-please-help-bulgaria-6644463c9a96. Retrieved June 30, 2017.

The discursive strategy to separate "them" from "us" employs the image of the poor emigrant, who is denied the production of value in her easy decision to leave. Her freedom of movement is necessarily articulated as an abuse and social benefits are displayed as the antipode to productivity. Such articulations were not random however. They were in the making for some time at places outside Bulgaria. The class chasm mentioned above is not a particularity to the participants of the summer protests only. The protests in Bulgaria coincided with the attempt of central political figures in Europe to hinder the movement of "poor" Bulgarians. In 2013, for the first time in several years, the notion of freedom of movement – one of the main pillars behind project Europe – was under serious threat posed by figures such as David Cameron (UK), Angela Merkel (Germany), and, implicitly, by representatives of the European Commission. The threat transpired because of the impending opening of all European Union labor markets to Bulgarian and Romanian workers scheduled to take place in January 2014. Two debates came together and transformed the nature of what constitutes the Bulgarian border. On the one hand, there was the discussion surrounding the country's im/possibility to join the Schengen zone at the time and the increased threats posed by countries such as Germany that stricter control needs to be implemented in regard to outward movement from Bulgaria. Movement and social benefits, both of EU citizens and third-country-nationals, is what drove these discussions forward.

The debates over migration at the time in Europe obtained the language of obligation and abuse. Firstly, the *obligation* of the poorer member states to keep both their deprived and those who cross onto European space inside their borders. Secondly, to oppose those who *abuse* the principle of freedom of movement by restricting that same movement. In the words of the German Interior Minister at the time, Hans-Peter Friedrich's,

> The right to freedom of movement means that every EU citizen can live in every member state, if they are working or studying there. Any EU citizen who fulfills these criteria is welcome here. But whoever is only coming to cash in on state benefits, and is therefore abusing this freedom of movement, needs to be meaningfully prevented.[160]

In the same speech, Friedrich warns the Bulgarian authorities that its impossibility to prevent the migration of illegal migrants towards Germany will result in Bulgaria's eternal impossibility to become part of the Schengen area. As a response, on March 7, 2013, Tsvetan

[160] Friedrich. February 2014. https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/blog/freedom-movement. Retrieved March 27, 2017.

Tsvetanov, Bulgaria's Minister of Interior at the time, blamed those same "benefit tourists" for being the main reasons behind Western Europe's unwillingness to welcome Bulgaria into Schengen. Tsvetanov went further than expected however. Despite the political turmoil that took place in early 2013 in Bulgaria, or perhaps because of it, the leader assured that the government will undertake measures against "social benefit tourism" and firm actions will take place in order to prevent it. The meaning of the Bulgarian border multiplied overnight. In addition to the role of the country to protect the EU from *outside* intruders, it now also had to protect from *inside* such, from "its own."

David Cameron for his part had much more to say:[161]

> But of course people are most concerned with the action we are taking now [against benefit tourism]. We are changing the rules so that no one can come to this country and expect to get out of work benefits immediately; we will not pay them for the first three months. If after three months an EU national needs benefits – we will no longer pay these indefinitely. They will only be able to claim for a maximum of six months unless they can prove they have a genuine prospect of employment. We are also toughening up the test which migrants who want to claim benefits must undergo. This will include a new minimum earnings threshold. If they don't pass that test, we will cut off access to benefits such as income support. Newly arrived EU jobseekers will not be able to claim housing benefit. If people are not here to work – if they are begging or sleeping rough – they will be removed. They will then be barred from re-entry for 12 months, unless they can prove they have a proper reason to be here, such as a job. We are also clamping down on those who employ people below the minimum wage. They will pay the price with a fine of up to £20,000 for every underpaid employee – more than four times the fine today (David Cameron 2013).

Class (the poor Bulgarians who need social benefits) articulated race (as race is always already differential and inherited in the notion of the border). In the lingo above, the social benefit tourist is both classed and raced. There is no simple counterposing of these elements. From the very beginning the creators of the social benefit tourist relied on the theoretical presupposition that movement of the poor hides the potential of abuse for the welfare state. What happens, however, is that the articulation from above creates a social sphere, where thus differentiated labor power (the Bulgarian poor) enter a social formation (e.g. Germany) through a mode of entry that hides the potential for abuse. As such, and as it will be seen in the next chapter, once that labor power has reached its destination, it has to be policed.

[161] Cameron. November 2013. https://www.ft.com/content/add36222-56be-11e3-ab12-00144feabdc0. Retrieved March 28, 2017.

5.3. Historical Forms of Free Movement: Freedom of Movement in the Context of the European Union

In this section I engage with three major aspects of freedom of movement: as a discourse and practice that enables the workings of a free market; the violent production of self-employment and irregularized labor; and finally the symbiosis that emerges between municipalities and police within this framework. Firstly, I take a look at its historical importance for the development of the post-socialist European common market and then I juxtapose its construction as utopia with the actuality of its practice. Often, freedom of movement is analyzed as the undeniable ethic of civility, liberty and equality. Yet, freedom of movement is also an economic-political materiality that takes place in real time. I look at the unfolding of the practice of freedom of movement via the actualization of moving labor power into the labor form of self-employment. Self-employment has made a comeback into the national labor markets throughout Europe in the post-socialist and flexible employment context of the continent and beyond (Muller and Arum 2004). As the authors show throughout their book, *The Re-emergence of Self-Employment,* this economic practice cannot be dismissed as being on the verge of capital accumulation, but on the contrary, we need to respond to it and analyze it as one of the prevailing types of labor power commodification. The authors posit the question of self-employment within the framework of the national market. Instead, I extend the analysis to include it in a framework where the labor power in question is on the move; enabled by freedom of movement. Furthermore, I engage the municipality as an active side in the pauperization processes concerning moving labor power. Municipalities, as Lisa Reidner (unpublished manuscript) shows, have become an important factor in the migration-labor apparatus.

5.3.1. Free movement and the market

During the international conference held by the Confederation of German Trade Unions (abbreviated DGB in German) in April 2014, Annelie Buntenbach, a member of the executive board of the union, insisted that freedom of movement has to stop serving the needs of markets and start serving the needs of people. “Equal pay for everyone in Europe,” demanded Buntenbach. The name of the conference *Free movement for workers in Europe – the fair way* holds two presuppositions: that free movement is an unresolved political demand within

European space, and that, if fair, it will contribute to the wellbeing of workers. The conference was well attended. Unionists from Poland, Germany, Spain, Romania and Bulgaria, all gathered in response to the posed threat on free movement and to defend the right of *all* EU citizens to move freely. These demands pose the question of what historical forms has freedom of movement undertaken? If we need to suppress the power of one of the components of freedom of movement (the market) in order to arrive at its opposite one (the people), then what are the various historical forms that *freedom of movement* has preserved in its development to this very moment?

One of the decisive moments in the post World War II European integration was the creation of the Schuman Plan of 1950 and the subsequent establishment of the Coal and Steel Community in 1951 (Anderson 2009). In 1951, the right to move freely within European space was conceptualized as based on the expanding production in the coal and steel industries and the stabilizing at the time hegemony that battled bilateral state agreements. Bilateralism came under increased attack as "[such] trade agreements, with their tendency towards autarchy, have restrained the free movement of goods, services, and capital" (Bebr 1953:3). This prevailing discourse translated into practical policy that was oriented towards the needs of free markets and ensuring free competition. The beginning was marked by an intervention on part of trade unions as the freeing of trade led to a demand for skilled workers. As European market integration deepened, the demand for freely moving labor power increased. The 1951 Paris Treaty provided for the right of skilled laborers to be employed in the steel and coal industries of any of the member states.[162] It prohibited any discrimination in wage and working conditions as based on the distinction between national and migrant workers (article 69, paragraph 4). Furthermore, the Treaty called on member states to ensure that "social security arrangements do not inhibit labor mobility." In fact, if a situation emerged, where labor shortages formed, the member states were obliged to "adapt their immigration regulations to the extent necessary to eliminate that situation" (article 69, paragraph 3). As De Genova (2010:58) points out, "The unbounded mobility of capital… demands [the] parallel freedom of movement of laboring humanity."

But what is interesting to note here is how social security was framed as that which is to enable labor mobility, resettlement, and re-skilling. Such situation emerged as weaker and

[162] "Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community." *Consilium Europe EU.* Retrieved July 25, 2017. These states included: Germany, Italy, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

smaller enterprises within the Community could not compete. To smooth the closing off of smaller enterprises, the Agreement provided that they are assisted financially to establish new industries. If that was to happen, the Community was obliged to provide "economically sound" employment for the released miners (reskilling) or unemployment compensations (Berb 1953:11). Additionally, non-repayable grants were provided for the resettlement and the relocation of workers, and re-skilling. The 1951 Treaty did not close off social security as subjected to potential abuse that lurks over, but on the contrary, it needed to remain opened so as to enable the reproduction of moving labor power and ensure the reproduction of capital enterprises. This was due to the then strong union movement in the countries of the Community, and particularly in Germany.

Pressured by the Socialist Party and the Christian Democratic Union, the German Parliament ensured the establishment of codetermination (i.e. participation of trade unionists in the management) in the enterprises (Bernstein 1961). The signing of the Schengen agreement in 1985, which began the dismantling of internal borders within Europe heralded this notion as a constitutive part of what now is known as the European Union. The Union was organized around an articulation of an internal and common market, where the freedoms to move (of goods, services, capital and people) formed a seemingly harmonious entity. Behind such an appearance we can recognize the work of deeply antagonistic relations, where (the battle over) freedom of movement plays a major role.

Photo 9. Representation of the European internal market

This poster hangs at one of the offices of refugee support and research groups in Munich. I am thankful to Bernd Kasparek for taking and sending me the photo in April, 2015; something I never found the time for while staying in Munich. The image speaks loudly regarding the imaginations accompanying the European markets, especially the circle that depicts countries as umbrellas on the left side. If we look closely, these are workers who are not portrayed as being static. They are in the midst of movement.

The transition from state socialism to liberal democracy in Bulgaria, which commenced officially in 1990, was based on an overall political consensus that the future must be oriented towards a Euro-Atlantic partnership. The subsequent economic and political reforms followed the so-called "shock therapy."[163] For Bulgarian labor, European integration was an inseparable part of the transition, where freedom of movement was a prioritized political demand as I noted in the beginning of this section. Such demands stemmed from previously unseen rates of unemployment and sweeping social insecurity. In this sense, and perhaps counter to Francis Gabor (1991), we cannot view freedom of movement strictly as a political demand, the claim to freedom of movement belongs to political economy in the sense that it is a claim to the possibility to reproduce socially and physically.[164]

By achieving the right to travel freely, the Bulgarian integration, and arguably East European integration in general, entered a seeming contradiction. Free movement is two-edged. On the

[163] „Shock therapy" basically stands for the „structural adjustment programs" as facilitated by the IMF and the World Bank. Today, these programs are known as „austerity measures," which have swept throughout Europe resulting in major political struggles. The shock therapy involved liquidation and subsequent privatization of industries and resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe that beholds the countries to this day.
[164] In all fairness, Gabor well understands this, as seen in his proposition of what constitutes the "economic refugee."

one hand, it relocates the risk stemming from unemployment and social insecurity from one EU state to another by providing people with the right to escape "social suffering" and on the other, it deterritorializes labor power from dead and dying industries. Freedom of movement brings fresh power. Hence, here, freedom of movement conceals violence by fastening of the C-M (commodity-money) process and releases social pressure. If I may say, the speed of the "salto mortale" that Marx talks about across territories is accelerated.[165] Freedom of movement creates the conditions for accelerated extensive (constant traveling from one place to another; or back and forth, which eases the quantitative availability of living labor) and intensive (no payment, no homes, etc., the near impossibility of reproduction) exploitation, where laborers enter into patterns of subcontractors and capital's fluctuation in space. In this light, freedom of movement plays a constitutive role in the ways labor power is commodified in a context, where the travel of capital, labor and the capital-labor fixers (e.g. subcontractors) are freed/deterritorialized. This is the context of the moving labor power freed by freedom of movement.

The freedom of movement of people in Europe is not defined solely as a political freedom. By definition, freedom of movement is an economic freedom (Schiek, Olver, Alberti 2015:20) that is conditioned upon one's freedom to sell her labor power. As the authors say, "[t]he guarantee of free movement of persons distinguishes the EU concept of regional economic integration." They further continue that what connects societies and the Common Market is precisely freedom of movement (Schiek et.al.: 21). This economic freedom is in an unbreakable relation with two other such freedoms: the freedom of trade and the movement of capital. This relation was set from the very beginning of practicing freedom of movement in the European economic area. This is because capital cannot reproduce without labor. In this sense freedom of movement of people is of defining character to the EU not solely as a moral justice, but also, and perhaps even more so, as an economic relation.

As we will see in the third part of the thesis, liberalism defines the "economy" as coercion-free. In this context, freedom of movement acquires two meanings. Whereas the freed movement of the economic engine of capitalism – capital – is not scrutinized as a motion that brings forth the potentiality of violence or coercion, the free movement of the true engine of capital – labor power – acquires and appearance of potential violence (against the state). All

[165] C-M metamorphosis. The leap taken by value from the body of the commodity into the body of gold is the commodity's salto mortale.

of the above comprise what Schiek (2012:81) calls a "set of individual liberties for transnational economic actors." Such freedoms, we are told, suppress the state and instead they intensify and extend the power of the market (i.e. "any national rule can be challenged if it has the potential to adversely affect intra-Union trade or make cross border services or movement less attractive than inner-national economic activity" (ibid: 21). Once again, we can see the intended separation of violences, this time in their relation to EU law and space, the transcending importance of the market and the organizational logic of movement. Such separation however, only transpires as capitalist politics or what Barker (1997:11) identified as the equation between "the growth of freedom and of legal equality before the law, itself a direct, entailed function of the growth of market principles of contract."

We need to exceed the normative – i.e. the law – in order to be able to attain to the accelerated tensions around the conceptions of *movement* in liberal thought. Hannah Arendt (2005:129) conceptualizes freedom of movement as being the purpose of politics. Freedom of movement is "the substance and meaning of all things political." Here, we are bound to pay strict attention, however, to Kotef's (2015:4) definition of one of the major features of the liberal subject (and political liberalism), or, the way movement "functions as a pivot of materialization for the liberal body." The author traces her argument in the writings of Plato, Hobbes, Arendt, Locke and shows how freedom of movement *is* "the materialization of the liberal concept of *liberty*" (2015: 5). As Sheller (2008:25) comments, "It has often been assumed that mobility equals freedom, and that freedom requires mobility." For her, the mobility injustice of the modern world consists of the idea that mobility belongs to the sovereign and it hence depends on the immobilization and the denial of movement for others (2008: 28). Kotef, however, demonstrates that the modern subject emerges through political systems that order movement and that are not necessarily reducible to the state. For her, such systems, that are defined as "technologies of citizenship" (after William Walters as cited in Kotef 2015:3) and that follow patterns of movement, are deployed to either preclude or to enhance free citizenship. Where the former is preoccupied with the stability of movement, the latter is consumed by its preclusion. I would like to shift the attention from the notion of citizenship and the sovereign however, and instead enter in the midst of the contradiction offered to us by liberal thought and its conception of movement as it pertains to the movement of labor power.

5.3.2. Is freedom of movement utopia?

In the introduction to the IUAES World Congress in 2013, we are told, "But 'free movement of people' goes well beyond questions of labor migration, and opens for questions about issues as diverse as luxury tourism and its ecological consequences, the administration of welfare with or without welfare states and the future of citizenship" (Abram et.al. 2017: 124). The author makes this remark after assuring us that the debate regarding free movement today (as of 2015) is more pressing than it was back in 2013. This is a rhetorical device that is supposed to bring one's attention to the so-called "long summer of migration" (Kasparek and Speer 2015), when thousands of refugees were defying European borders. If we have to be more accurate, this is a methodological mistake made by many in the social sciences. Freedom of movement is invoked only when its non-actual is discussed. It pertains to the analysis of attempted immobilization (I discuss this in more detail further in the section). The author dismisses the fact that 2013 was a turning point in the redefinition of what is freedom of movement vis-à-vis citizenship and labor. In all fairness, freedom of movement does not belong to labor proper. As I have been trying to show throughout the thesis, forms of movement concern mostly the reproduction of labor power and modes of commodification of moving labor power, i.e. potential labor.

In the debate from above, the question is posed as such: Is freedom of movement utopian? It seems, when we discuss freedom of movement we cannot but put our moral glasses on and decide whether we are for or against it. The motion under discussion here is opposed by Shahram Khosravi and Nicolas de Genova (i.e. freedom of movement is not utopian) and defended by Bela Feldman-Bianco and Noel Salazar (i.e. freedom of movement is utopian) (Abram et.al. 2017). Let us turn for a moment to what the anthropologists had to say. Posed in the way it is, the motion provokes a discussion not solely about free movement but also about utopia. Khosravi (in Abram et.al. 2017: 130) constructs free movement as a 'utopia gone wrong.' The anthropologist makes the claim, again, vis-à-vis the people whom we see struggling to defy a border (i.e. illegalized, asylum-seekers, internally displaced). Only a "small category of humanity… enjoy unrestricted mobility rights" (in Abram et.al. 2017: 130). The proposition to view freedom of movement as a right that is already achieved by some, coupled with the implicit assumption that this same right is "enjoyable," cancels a whole lot of relations out of it. If we stop here, we would not be able to see them. As I demonstrate throughout the section, the latter right is nothing but bourgeois relation that

accelerates the speed of labor power's ability to be sold across national borders. To paraphrase Costas Douzinas (2000; 2007) who speaks about the destiny of human rights, freedom of movement has settled as an ideology after the end of ideologies, i.e. we can think of it and attempt to defy it only via its opposite, but never in itself and as a definite relation.

De Genova (in Abram et.al. 2017:144) takes a bit of a different approach towards utopia. He relies on Friedrich Engels in order to establish that utopias might be insufficient, yet, necessary. In this way he is able to retract free movement as a potential good (as utopias are potentially good, yet, hard to achieve). De Genova insists, perhaps too close to the classic liberalism of Hobbes, that to be human is to be able to move. By turning the plates around, he persist that what is utopian in the free:not-free-to-move configuration is actually the notion of the nation state as the latter has successfully placed boundaries that do restrict the most natural and human characteristics of all – the freedom to move. Let me cite, "What is Utopian is the statist delusion of border policing ensuring a comprehensible control over geopolitical space; our freedom, however, is not Utopian at all" (in Abram et.al. 2017:145). I will take no issue that an opposition to such a view of freedom of movement can stem only and solely from accusations of "blowing Utopian pipe dreams," according to de Genova. However, I do see a problem in the way the author approaches the question of freedom in a transhistorical fashion, and hence, as a natural relation. He, as the previous author, can only defy the idea that freedom of movement is utopian only when approached from the point of view of the *not-yet* and what Arendt called the "barbed-wire labyrinth" (1973:145), meaning that our contemporary world has seen more barriers to movement than ever before. Even if this is the case, which is doubtful (see for example the discussion on Locke in chapter one), I insist on the historical character of freedom of movement and our ability to concretize its praxis in specific conditions. De Genova is right, freedom of movement is an objective fact but not in the humanistic sense that he wants to see. I am more inclined to agree that his notion of "border spectacle" (De Genova 2012; 2013) captures a reactionary force against the push to defy borders, yet, this is yet another view that only points towards the attempts to immobilize certain subjects, but not to the concrete situation of those who are freed to move. His call for critical social scientists to theorize the struggles of the illegalized vis-à-vis struggles for freedom of movement stops short of what the historical form of movement that we witness within the EU – freedom of movement – has meant for millions who are free to move. This is the attempt for me here: to scrutinize the very concrete forms of what it means to be labor power freed to move via the notion of freedom of movement. I argue that this particular

freedom can be read in another nexus of freedoms. That of the doubly freed labor; a notion peculiar to Marxist scholarship: freed from the means of production and free to sell one's labor power.

5.3.3. The production of regular labor on hold within the framework of free movement

Although at first resistant to the attempted control of freedom of movement via the sacking of the possibility to social benefits, the European Commission slowly changed its position on the rights of EU citizens. Marianne Thyssen, the EU labor commissioner has been actively working on implementing some of the proposals against social benefit tourism in the past couple of years. On December 13, 2016, the EC released the news that there is a proposal in place to change the rules within the EU. The exact propositions are:[166]

Table 4. Taking your unemployment benefits with you to another EU country

Current law	As a jobseeker you can take your unemployment benefits with you to another Member State for 3 months, with a possible extension to 6 months. The employment services of your home country may request a monthly report on your activities from your host country.
Proposed change	You can take your unemployment benefits with you to another Member State for 6 months, with a possible extension to your whole period of entitlement. Your host country must send a monthly report to your home country on your efforts to re-enter the labor market.

[166] Taken from the Commission's website: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4302_en.htm Accessed April 11, 2017.

How that affects you	You are registered as unemployed in Finland, but would like to look for work in Estonia. You can do so while receiving your unemployment benefits from Finland for at least six months. In return, you will need to respect all the conditions imposed by the Estonian employment services in the same way as any other jobseeker in Estonia. Estonia will send a monthly report on your performance to Finland.

Table 5. How long you must be insured in a new EU country before having a right to unemployment benefits

Current law	When you become unemployed and taking up work and residence in a new Member State, you may request that periods of previous insurance in other Member States where you have worked are taken into account when your host country assesses if you meet the minimum period to qualify for unemployment benefits (so called "aggregation"). The current rules do not specify a minimum period of prior employment in the new Member State before you can ask for such "aggregation".

Proposed change	The "aggregation" principle is not changed, but now there will be a minimum period set. You must work for at least three months in a new Member State before you can ask for aggregation. Your existing rights to unemployment benefits remain protected. If you have worked in your new country for a shorter period, you can seek unemployment benefits from the Member State
How does that affect you	After five years of work in Portugal, you move to Italy to take up a new job. You become unemployed after one month. As you have been employed for less than 3 months in Italy, you will need to seek unemployment benefits from Portugal. Italy will not be obliged to provide such benefits by taking into account the periods of your insurance in Portugal.

We further learn that:

> In the case of mobile **EU citizens who are not working or not actively looking for work**, the revision makes clear that the host Member State can make their access to certain social security benefits subject to proof that they have a legal right of residence under EU law. However, Member States must comply with the conditions set out in the Free Movement Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC). This means in the case of social

> security benefits a difference in treatment compared to nationals of the host country can only be justified by a legitimate objective (such as the need to protect the finances of the host Member State), and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain such objective… The proposal will help identifying and tackling "grey zones", fraud or error in the application of the Regulations, including via the periodic exchange of personal data between Member States to facilitate data-matching, for example in cases of export of pensions and unemployment benefits (emphasis of the author, ibid.)

As evident, the Commission is supporting a change in EU law that severely cuts one's opportunity to seek benefits. There is an unspoken assumption in these propositions that creates a seemingly flat European sphere, where inter- and intra-country inequalities in welfare and income are non-existent. "Multi-speed" Europe, a concept that became famous in 2017 and that proposes a differential integration in decision-making of European countries within the Union as based on economic output, has been in fact indivisible actuality of the EU and especially when placed in the material reality of class relations.

The Migration Observatory of the University of Oxford commented the emergence of the category of the social benefit tourist in the following way:

> The lack of an agreed definition about who counts as a benefits 'tourist' makes it very hard to discuss the subject with any real clarity. One definition would be someone who travels with the primary objective of acquiring benefits, but there are no useful data on motivations of this sort, and it would be difficult to devise an accurate means of collecting such data. Non-EU migrants do not have recourse to public funds until they have been resident in the UK for 5 years, so benefits alone are not realistic as the primary motivation for non-EU migrants to travel to the UK. So the easiest way of beginning to identify the potential scale of 'benefits tourism' as an issue is to look at the use of benefits by EU migrants.[167]

The above is a reflexive exercise in settling the boundaries of what counts as a certain population. This exercise does not have to arrive at a definite outcome. It only needs to commence in order for us to imagine the existence of a population in question; to conceptually trace the border of that population; what constitutes it; who is to be conferred upon within it. It is an exercise in the declaration of the existence of a population. The production of economically inactive population concerns Bulgarians and Romanians.

In regards to movement European integration for Bulgarians and Romanians involved a few

[167] Migratory Observatory. 2014. Retrieved April 11, 2017. http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/costs-and-benefits-benefits-tourism-what-does-it-mean/

stages. After the immediate fall of the Berlin wall, travelling from Romania and Bulgaria was very similar to what asylum-seekers experience now at the borders of Europe: risky and fractured into numerous possibilities of being caught. Moreover, such traveling was often quite creative. Ivan for example, one of the most persistent young men in the protest mobilizations in Munich (subject of discussion in the next chapter), remembers that he flirted with the idea of working for the cleaning company responsible for the Bulgarian-Serbian border in the mid-1990s in order to escape the country. Eventually, this idea materialized and one night he crossed the border dressed as a cleaning mate on the back of a trash truck, "showing [the Bulgarian authorities] the finger" (interview by the author, November, 2013). Conversely, this type of "illegal" crossing into European countries resulted in a settled migration precisely because of the risk one was undertaking when engaged in criminalized traveling. The situation eased after a while, however. The decision for the two countries' accession into the EU was taken in 1999 and ratified in 2000, which, in turn, gave the right to their citizens to travel to the EU without a visa for a period of 90 days, with the exception of labor- and study-related visits. Access to social security was part of these restrictions. Certainly, as borders are always penetrable, thousands found their way into the EU for labor purposes as well.

The year 2007 brought about a peculiar situation for Bulgarians and Romanians. On the one hand it eased their traveling as visas were no longer a requirement but on the other it did not bring about the final stage of European integration. According to EU law, there is a seven-year-long gratis period for old member states until they are obliged to fully open their labor markets to new members.[168] What that meant for Bulgarian and Romanian laborers who worked in Germany is that despite their EU citizen status, they still had to apply for a work permit in order to be regularly employed. Alternatively, they could acquire a self-employed status or work irregularly. Such situation can be described as one of creating *regular labor on hold*, where irregularity and self-employment were similar to the main aspects of what De Genova (2005:234) describes as "an active process of inclusion through illegalization" in the U.S. context. This process, for De Genova, is crucial for the creation of a reserve army of labor (in the Marxist sense).

In our case however, such processes involve a falling-off of regular status as many workers

[168] Germany and the U.K. waited until the last possible moment, whereas countries like Greece, Spain Denmark, Hungary and Portugal lifted the restrictions already in 2009.

could become "false self-employed" overnight. This irregularization is the effect of a complicated set of bureaucratic requirements concerning those with a self-employed status, e.g. having to provide business plans and invoices, which is hard for someone who speaks no German. As Lisa Reidner, one of the main actors in Munich when it comes to political organizing (interview by the author 2016) suggests, "In my experience people we worked with did not like being self-employed and often closed their businesses again soon. Or did not even open one. One reason is that submitting tax declaration is complicated, you basically need a professional for it. And if you don't do it, the *Finanzamt* will estimate the tax you have to pay and this will be pretty high." According to Julia Serdarov (interview by the author 2013), another activist from Munich, people would often forget to do the paperwork, or even would not know that they have to do it, which eventually automatically places them in the status of "faked self-employed." Yet, they are not threatened by deportation, as is the case of De Genova's analysis and hence, do not go underground, which, strategically speaking, often translates into staying away from regularized labor markets.[169] On the contrary, the way moving labor power deals with "irregularity" in the framework of freedom of movement is to move fast to another labor market, not necessarily within the same national or city borders.

5.3.4. Self-employment in the context of moving labor power

The self-employed in Germany are a largely heterogeneous group. As Lohmann and Luber (2004) demonstrate these could vary from highly skilled professionals to low skilled manual workers. The authors deal with the so-called successful self-employed. They focus on the self-employed whose character is largely determined by a class position within a national framework. While analyzing the composition of the self-employed in Germany as compared to that of the United States, the authors conclude that:

> The notion that the largest part of self-employment in Germany is not precarious is further confirmed by a second quality measure: job stability, which in self-employment is usually higher than in dependent employment. Comparing Germany and the United States, one can observe that this holds true for both countries, but

[169] This is relative though. Deportations of EU citizens are possible. Perhaps the most telling case is the deportation of thousands of Bulgarian and Romanian Roma from France in 2010 (see Bărbulescu 2012; Nacu 2012). The so-called voluntary returns, which are well spread among Bulgarian citizens in Europe, have also been discussed from the point of view of actual coercion and some scholars consider them a form of deportation (Webber 2011).

> especially for Germany... Here, 78 percent of the newly self-employed enter into stable jobs, while the share in the United States amounts to only 41 percent (ibid: 39).

Perhaps not too surprisingly, self-employment is largely studied in the framework of entrepreneurship and human capital in contemporary economics (*inter alia* Cramer et.al. 2002, Sarasvathy 2004, Caliendo et al 2014). What is important in this latter framework is that the coercion of the objective reasons behind one's falling into the category of self-employment, as is the case of the pauperized moving labor power, is erased as a possibility.[170] On the contrary, the economists' approach to such understanding of self-employment is largely psychologizing and some "natural" human characteristics are usually cited as determining both the entry (successful self-employed) and exit (unsuccessful self-employed) of such employment status.

There is another side of self-employment that can be traced within the Foucaltian framework of what he calls the *homo economicus.* Self-employment follows a framework in which, competition is the prevailing governmental logic. *Homo economicus* is useful in this sense as it depicts a historical moment, where the subjectification seeks to establish a "man of enterprise and production" (Foucault [1978-79] (2008)). The Bulgarian self-employed are legally defined as an enterprise; individualized enterprises at that. They are firms made of one. As Jason Read (2009) demonstrates, the *homo economicus* closes an important gap, that of the opposition between labor and capital and hence erases the possibility for struggle between the two. In the author's own words, "The terms 'labor' and 'human capital' intersect, overcoming in terminology their longstanding opposition; the former becomes the activity and the latter becomes the effects of the activity, its history." In the case of the Bulgarian self-employed they are both labor power and entrepreneurs without capital. The only thing they have is their capacity to work, hence their labor power must be commodified, yet, legally speaking they are a financial enterprise that has to pay taxes as a firm and whose relation with social security regimes is ambiguous and question of ongoing struggles (Vogel and Dribbusch 2009).

But to add to this, we can see a fragmentation within the market nexus and the creation of multiple individual self-employed units/individuals for whom, as we will see, to organize as

[170] Self-employment is often celebrated as clearing the way to one's creative capabilities and in the case of Bulgaria, it has even created a demarcating line capable of sustaining class racism (Nikolova 2014).

class for itself becomes that much harder. This development within neoliberalism has of course certain implications for the relation between the self-employed and capital, where the relation of exploitation is obliterated. Self-employment is largely framed within such provocative framework: it is supposed to serve self-interest and provide a continuation, a non-stop engagement in production processes.

What self-employment reveals in our case, however, is a class process in neoliberalism, where this particular relation does retain the labor-capital relation, i.e. the self-employed under examination here do own only their labor power and they have to sell it at a market. They do not own any means of production (e.g. laptop, truck, some construction tools). They go to the market bare. The extraction of their labor does provide them with a wage (at least on paper, as we will see this is not always the case, however, not because of a set legal framework but because of "unfair" practices) and with surplus for the capitalist despite that production takes place outside the factory doors. Production here accumulates wealth for a capitalist that does not belong to the enterprise of the self-employed. The enterprise of the self-employed is solely labor power. Them being self-employed is an effect of them moving as labor power and entering the nexus of a social and legal framework, where they are forced into acquiring such status because of the migration and labor apparatuses set in place. That is, for example, the seven-year hold on free work as inherited in the regulation of movement and the promotion of self-employment as part of the flexibilization of labor laws in Germany (Eichhorst and Marx 2009). As Kontos (2010) shows, there was a shift in Germany around the 1980s, during which the country started promoting self-employment among non-privileged groups. The shift was reinforced in 1986 with the introduction of the so called bridging allowance instrument which benefitted unemployed and further stabilized by the Red-Green government coalition that passed the Act to Promote Self-Employment (*Gesetz zur Förderung der Selbständigkeit*) in 1999 (Vogel and Dribbusch 2009).[171]

5.3.5. The role of municipalities in pauperization

Employers and municipalities do not mind the irregularity from above and sometimes contribute to the precarization of the self-employed. As my research in Munich showed, the falling-off of self-employed status – which prior to January 2014 meant losing the right to

[171] Needless to say, my interlocutors from Munich were not subject of this instrument.

employment and hence fitting the framework of irregular labor – often happens because of the bureaucratic work involved in keeping the status intact, which is complicated by workers' lack of German language skills and hindered access to lawyers in order to seek after their rights.[172]

The Bulgarian day laborers in Munich struggled with both the production and the reproduction process. Many would work without pay, which in turn would make it that much harder for them to find shelter or other reproductive necessities. These conditions would often prompt them to leave a certain labor market for another. In this configuration we need to think of the criss-crossings between labor market, movement and reproduction in a singular framework, where moving labor power acquires new meanings. The municipal role in maintaining and contributing to the hardened reproduction of these laborers and their family members is linked to the growing impossibility to meet the increased need for space in the homeless shelters and other social costs inherited by the austerity state. There is a constant policing of Bulgarians, whether or not they are providing faked address registrations. The municipality in Munich and the police collaborate in their oppression over Bulgarians and Romanians.

Alex, a social worker for the Munich office of Caritas, explained to me the long standing oppressive tactics. They started already in 2007 and increasingly intensified with the arrival of more and more people from Bulgaria. Although the story here concerns the begging Bulgarian population in Munich, we will be able to see later on that these same measures are used also against the self-employed and the irregularized day laborers. Back in 2007, the Munich police started controlling the streets of Munich and fining people who were involved in practices of begging. Alex explained that this was possible as the city of Munich has a directive that specifies the proper usage of sidewalks; they can be used only for walking and if any other activity is initiated (e.g. playing music, food stands, etc.) then one needs a permission. Obviously, beggars do not have such permissions. The directive stipulates that begging is an "illegal use of the sidewalk." While explaining, Alex pulls out a file of documents. The file belongs to Fidanka, an elderly lady who has lived in Munich since 2007. The documents is a few pages long, all filled with the different fines Fidanka had acquired. "July 12, 2007: 20 EUR fine. July 17, 2007: 100 EUR fine." The first time one is caught begging, she has to pay

[172] Interview Julia Serdaroff (as part of Civil Courage).

20 EUR, each other time the fine increases to 100 EUR. The document stops at 20 July, 2009 with the total amount of 7390, 50 EUR.

As the job of Alex entails a confrontation with the municipal authorities over cases like this one, he called the City only to understand that the fining will not stop. “It is a tactic,” an official explained to him. “For every fine one can spend two to three days in jail. Once the fines accumulate we can imprison them for a month. Then they leave.” People do indeed get imprisoned over fines for begging. A 74-year-old Bulgarian woman, Katya, spent a month in prison and is now back in Bulgaria. Her health condition did not allow her to find a job and the only way she could put aside some money for rent was through begging. Numerous women in Munich live this way. Sleeping a few in a small room, trying to support their families with the little money they can make on the streets. For the most part these are women who do have families in the city, husbands, children, and even grandchildren. But entire households are entangled in the circle of self-employment, irregularized work, and begging. When their children or husbands find a job, this does not always last for long. They also do not get paid very often. When their lives hit such cycle, the women go out so as to support the household with some small change towards the rent.

The situation is further complicated by the property market in Munich. There is lack of available social housing, the prices are the highest in the entire Germany, and market speculation is a flourishing business in the city. Furthermore, as there is a concentration of capital in the city, it attracts large population of labor power and the demand for living space is skyrocketing. These conditions add to the homelessness and the crowded living arrangements of many Bulgarians. “What does the city do? After all, this is a persistent problem,” I ask naively. “Nothing. They don’t want to create pull factors,” replies Alex. “For the most part people do not have the right to social welfare [as they are economically inactive according to the law] and they have no means to support themselves. The homeless shelter opens only during the winter, and then again, you have to leave it at nine a.m. each morning.”

The city of Munich could not get rid of begging Bulgarians and Romanians despite the fines and the imprisonment. In 2013, however, the city changed its tactic. While prior to 2013, the fine letters sent on part of the municipality had to be sent directly to the addresses of the charged people, a new regulation entered into force. Now, the city could appear as the addressee of this official mail.

> Prior to 2013 the Bulgarians would receive what is called *Bescheid.* You can see it here: 100 EUR fine and 23, 50 EUR tax for the work the city has done over the processing of the letter. [The people] would receive it at their home addresses. Starting in 2013 the people stopped receiving letters. What took place is that they would still get fined but will not be informed about it. Instead, the city started sending the official letters to itself. This could only work as beggars were now forced to sign a special document, at the time of the fining, that they give up their right to receiving official mail and instead delegate this right to person X from the municipality[173]. They give this document to the people, tell them 'sign!' and people in turn sit there in fear and sign everything that is given to them. They do not understand what they sign. (Alex, interviewed by the author, November 2013)

This new document basically delegates the rights of Bulgarians to municipal officials to receive in their name every issued court decision or other administrative decisions. Not only that but there is a paragraph in the letter that says: "I give this permission for the future without the right to take it back." The latter is against the law, and it cannot be reinforced, but it is still written down.

Additionally, municipalities, I was being told multiple times in my conversation with municipality employees, felt increased pressure from the Federal authorities to deal with migrants coming from the two Eastern European countries[174]. Some of the rules that were overlooked for other EU citizens were in fact reinforced and meticulously applied when it came to Romanians and Bulgarians. For example, when Bernd Kasparek talked to an independent councilor back in October 2014 during the *Bundesfachkongress Interkultur* in Mannheim, Germany, he learned the following:

> I asked him [the counselor] … about the "extensive counselling offer" the city makes to newly arrived migrants from Bulgaria and Romania. He just laughed, and explained that while for any EU citizen, *Anmeldung* [address registration] is just a formal act, during which you go and immediately get your confirmation of registration, for Romanian and Bulgarian migrants, there is a written directive in the city to use the maximum allowed period of processing. Then, not the registration is sent out, rather, the invitation to the counselling session goes out. People generally feel they need to go to this counselling as a prerequisite to completing registration. Once they are there, there is a long questionnaire, and they are asked many questions. Only then do they get their registration (email correspondence October 2014).

Given the context of 2013/2014 this is not really surprising. Lisa Reidner's (unpublished manuscript) study for example on the processes of municipality-made homelessness in

[173] I saw one such letter and the official translation in Bulgarian is Пълномощно за доставяне. Разяснение на процесуалните права при наложен следствен арест.
[174] Interview Gudrun Scheringer (2014) and Bernd Kasparek (2015).

Munich, shows very well how a large portion of the working homeless in the city are being created by various strategies used on part of the municipality to erect barriers against sheltering poor EU migrants in the discursive framework of poverty migration. Reidner demonstrates how the municipality is part and parcel of a migration management regime. Her study successfully adds the municipality as a side of the growing interdependence between migration apparatuses and social security agencies, where the latter acquire the functions of the former.

As mentioned earlier, one of the claims that I make is that the struggles *for* movement are always already struggles *against* movement. The following short story, the story of Anka and her family, speaks to the ways in which the state apparatus, in our case represented by the Ministry of Youth and the Job Center, attempt to suspend movement within the framework of freed movement. From the point of view of the state, this conflict emerges as the movement of some hinders the reproduction of the other "deserving subject". From the point of view of the travellers, movement allows them to socially reproduce.

5.4. Suspending Movement within the Framework of Freed Movement

Freedom of movement, as any other social form, is conflictual in nature. But are the antagonisms inherent in the notion pertaining solely to movement as such? So far in the thesis we have seen that moving labor power, to which freedom of movement belongs, cannot be discussed without a wider sociological scope. The conflicts that were now surfacing in 2013 did not concern only freedom of movement as such, but also how that movement would be inserted in a framework of demising welfare state, flexibilization of labor policies within the Union (Fedyuk, O. and Paul Stewart, forthcoming) and an understanding of who belongs in legitimate ways to these systems via the crafting of race.

I met Peter at Civil Courage's office – a sunny room comprised by a large rectangular table and a few chairs, where Bulgarians gathered on weekly basis. I first met his grandmother, a woman in her 50s, who came screaming out of horror into the office.[175] As I was the only one left who spoke Bulgarian she came to me and spoke as fast as if in a tongue-twister contest. The story went as the following:

We sleep in the car. My son too. His wife gave birth and is still in the hospital. They [the

[175] I discuss Civil Courage and its activities in detail in the next chapter.

> hospital] don't let the baby out. They will take it away from them. They tell them this. They want 3000 euro. We want Anka [the baby]. Five people sleep in the car but we can care." The story took place in January of 2014. As it turns out, Peter and his wife Elena resided in Munich the summer before. As Peter's passport was about to expire they went back to Bulgaria to issue a new one. They came back on a January Sunday, entered the hospital on the following Monday, gave birth on the Wednesday and came to the office on the Friday. Peter was 20 years old at the time and Elena 23. As they could not pay the hospital bill, the Ministry of Youth got involved and a whole saga started as they were considered "poor" and "unable to take care of a child.

The Civil Courage activist Jovanni and I went to the hospital in a couple of days so as to check on Elena but also to test the waters with the social workers from the *Jugendamt* (Youth welfare administration). In the meantime, a lawyer who was helping Civil Courage was able to secure a meeting with the Job Center in two days and more importantly, a letter from an independent doctor from a local hospital in Munich that stated that Anka is unable to travel before she reaches six months. When we went to the hospital Elena and the baby were moved into a special unit which guaranteed the recovery of newborn babies and their mothers. They had a studio apartment all by themselves with a large bed, bathroom, and a little kitchen. During our visit, representatives of the *Jugendamt* came to visit Elena as well. The purpose of their visit was to take the baby away, yet, once we showed them the appointment with the Job Center (which would have guaranteed the beginning of the process in finding a social home) and the medical recommendation that Anka could not travel, they could not do much.[176] Instead, they scheduled an appointment for Peter and Elenka in a month period so as to control the "development of the case." In the months to come the whole family was under threat. They could be either separated with the baby, or sent back to Bulgaria.

The Job Center was obliged to find a place in a boarding house for the duration of Anka's suspended movement. The latter proved to be a tedious process. Jovanni, Peter and I went to the *Amt für Wohnen und Migration* (Housing and Migration administration) in order to start the process. While waiting to be called into the office, I could not help but notice a large mural hanging on the wall. For the most part the picture was black and white, yet, here and there one could see colored human figures. They were painted in orange, red or yellow, and simultaneously looked as if trying to portray the message that there are those among us who need social support. Once in the office, the interview with Peter during which Jovanni and I

[176] We never learned whether or not the authorities had an issued *Inobhutnahme* (a decision for reclaiming a baby).

translated, resembled more of an interrogation. Where do you live in Bulgaria? Does the address written on your i.d. match your real place of residence in Bulgaria? What about your wife and her address? When did you come to Munich? Where did you stay while your wife was giving birth? Oh, you stayed with a friend? Can you prove it? Why don't you go to your friend again instead of asking us for house? You have to give us proof that you stayed with that friend and a written and signed by him statement that he is not able to host you anymore. Can you prove you have nowhere to live in Bulgaria? Are you homeless in Bulgaria? Where did you live there? With your grandmother? Does she own the house where you stayed?

The potential suspension of movement was translated as if the ethical obligation to safeguard a newborn was driving the bureaucrats. The young family was threatened that the *Jugendamt* will take their child away unless they return back to Bulgaria. The latter could have placed Anka even in a more precarious situation, yet, the rationality that the representatives of the social services follow is a territorial one. Once the baby is not in their jurisdiction, the burden is deterritorialized; the responsibility displaced. The following month exemplified a battlefield between the family on the one hand and the *Jugendamt* on the other over Anka. Anka became a body who could guarantee a couple of things. On the one hand, a potential for the state to get rid of social benefit tourists by returning them back to Bulgaria. On the other, Anka could guarantee the reproduction of Peter's family as they would have received state money for Anka. For the former to take place, the state had to prove that Peter and his wife are unable to take care of Anka, hence the state will take care, unless Elena and Peter leave. For the latter to take place, Peter had to prove to the state that he is employable. He had to find a job in a certain period of time. If he did not, the state would have taken Anka or had the family removed from its territory. But in order to secure the security of Anka, Peter had to find regular employment. The "irregular" market is not an option for the authorities, this type of employment is invisible, it does not count.

Anka, Elenka, and Peter remained in Munich. They were given housing at a mix-dormitory (for refugees and economic migrants) and Peter went on to seek employment. But it must be kept in mind that there are perhaps hundreds of other families that do not have access to lawyers who would provide them with the necessary paperwork in order for them to remain. Some must go home.

What we witness is that state welfare (reproduction of labor power) has become only

legitimate if and when the potential of labor power turns into active labor and there are constant attempts to shorten this gap. Movement, as it will be seen, not only accelerates the speed of this condition, but, as is the case of Anka's family, the suspension of movement has become a trump used by the state in order to terrify potential welfare abusers. Here, freedom of movement enters a contradiction. On the one hand its existence must be protected; even celebrated. As Kotef (2015:53) mentions, to be able to move fast is a priority for some subjects within liberal regimes. The acceleration of movement, "is part of progress, of man overcoming nature, of the achievements of technology, engineering, and construction" (ibid). We will later see that fast movement is also considered to be progress in the relation between capital and labor. Just-on-time moving labor power restructures that relation, where the concentration of capital requires the dispersal of laborers. But there is also another side to freedom of movement. When it endangers the "legitimate" distribution of welfare, it needs to be suspended. This is precisely what Anka and her family battled. The potential suspension of their right to move freely and the opportunity to socially reproduce given by that right. This part of the chapter has shown that hospitals, different ministries, labor institutions, and municipalities are all present in the conflict that free movement brings about. The threats do not concern the freedom to move per se. There are more relations to be considered than simply movement as such. Even if EU migrants are frightened enough into leaving a territory, nothing holds them back. They are free to come back immediately.

5.5. Conclusion

The EU's freedom of movement is premised on a normative division between the "inside" and the "outside." It fragments the subjects enabled by it. Aradau et.al. (2010) show that some EU citizens are rendered more deserving based on their economic activeness and low potentiality of becoming a burden on the welfare state. The authors define freedom of movement as a regime that "[governs] cross-border movement in the EU, which operates at the interstices between individual citizenship rights that facilitate movement and security and welfare policies that restrict these rights." Such analysis, however, veils the productive part of freedom of movement which makes a specific type of labor power: labor power, we might say, who traverses Europe in a gallop in order to find the next subcontracted job. As Samaddar (2014) points out, "transit labor occupie[s] a crucial place in capitalist production." In our contemporary political conjuncture, however, the speed with which such transit labor

travels has accelerated immensely. The movement of this labor force is eased by the notion of freedom of movement in a way that does not necessarily guarantee "regular" status of its subjects[177]. In fact, EU labor has been immensely fragmented as expressed in differentiated discursive statuses. These statuses are not necessarily a part of a legislative framework. Their existence could be only discursive, yet, they do bear material consequences for the people who are racialized by them. In the post-2008 constellation and a year after Bulgaria and Romania's accession into the EU, we witnessed a proliferation of migratory categories: "poverty migrant," "fake self-employed," "benefit tourist," "a beggar Mafioso," etc. The social-benefit tourist absorbs all of the above.

In the Introductory part of my work, I mentioned that the differentiated subjects of migration are often thought of as exhibiting two dissimilar spheres of social interaction. What happens when we place *free movement* in the midst of this observation? The right to move is essential for the ways social movements organize but also the ways in which the market articulates the subjects of autonomy and contractualism. With relation to the two seemingly dissimilar social spheres that pertain for example to the refugee and the social benefit tourist, freedom of movement, and hence unfreedom of movement, organize the market upon two distinct principles. The first principle rests upon the contractual and autonomous individual (the social benefit tourist) as the subject par excellence of neo-liberalism. The poverty migrant moves, she is said to be free in her choice of workplace and residence. Certainly, there are attempts to confine her movement as she may abuse the state as we saw in the case of Peter, but there are enough market ideologues out there who quickly suppress such desires. The second principle is based on another side of liberal thought; where the freedom to move is conceptualized as a hazard. In this differentiated sphere, the asylum-seeker is restricted from movement. This does not comprise solely the unfreedom to cross a national/union border but also the ways the asylum systems are designed. The asylum system in Germany for example resembles such an instance, where one is not solely made belong to a particular nation-state within the Union but also to a particular camp, city, and a region. In the German case that would be the *Resdenzflicht* principle, which forbids the mobility of those whose asylum is rejected, or still have to live in a residence center, or somehow do not cooperate with authorities viz. their place of residence beyond a district or a province border. The recent changes in the Hungarian

[177] Having the legal right to remain in Germany, and hence being considered "legal" as opposed to "illegal" migrant, prior to opening of the labor markets, did not guarantee regular working status. Regularity is contingent and constantly being reinvented.

asylum system foreclose asylum-seekers within the border region. In Bulgaria, the attempts to close off reception camps and to promote a similar to the German *Resdenzflicht* administrative measure grow by the day.[178]

In my thesis I shift my attention within and between the two inseparable conditions of movement: its freedom and its unfreedom. The rest of thesis is preoccupied with two cases in order to elaborate on the dialectical relation between them but also to see how movement implicates the division of labor in Europe. I show, in turn, how this dialectic simultaneously differentiates and intersects political movements that are concerned with migration(s). Liberal thought situates the "free" subject as a moving, mobile subject and constructs physical movement as an imperative for freedom. In a similar manner, one of the main principles behind the implementation of the 'European project' – *freedom of movement* – contains the notion of freedom on the one hand and movement as a constitutive element on the other. In the pages to follow I decipher the normative notion of freedom of movement and analyze its significance for both transformations in the EU division of labor and political organizing on the part of those dubbed "social benefit tourists."

[178] The exact term is *Räumliche Beschränkung.*

CHAPTER SIX POLICING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND DISPERSING OF MOVING LABOR POWER

Liberty and the restriction of (physical) movement live in opposition, we are told. Freedom of movement neutralizes immobility. It gives us the means to move unrestricted, to have the liberty to choose where to stay and where to go; where to work and where to rest. Immobility restricts these choices, it bounds us to a particular space which exhibits its own particularities. Mobility erases the possibility to be restrained by these particularities and it seemingly opens a world with an infinite sets of possibilities. Some better, others worse. Our present is preoccupied with the misery of human immobilization; today we often invoke human despair when we see images of what it means not to be able to reach the European shores, or the restrictions imposed on bodies in the occupied Palestinian territories, or indeed in asylum and detention centers, where immobility lives not only through its physicality but also through the imprisonment of the body in a sequence of repetition and everyday monotony. Immobility is shocking.

Here, I set out to discuss immobility from the perspective of practices of mobility, however, in order to disturb the self-evidence of the liberation potentialities of freedom of movement. This self-evidence is often arrested in formulas where freedom of movement supposedly replaces inequality, it trumps injustices, and erases violence. Human immobilization has informed much of the scholarly work in relation to regimes of deportability (De Genova 2002), "gradation" of statuses (Goldring, Berinstein and Bernard 2009), its role in constituting new ways of "being political" (Isin 2002), enactment of citizenship by non-citizens (Andrijasevic and Anderson 2009; Isin and Saward 2013), and indeed its role in sustaining binaries such as legal/illegal (Squire 2010). I shift the attention towards the prerequisites behind seemingly unrestricted mobility: the citizen, the legal, and the un-deportable and seek to explore violence from this point of view. I also divert the attention placed on struggles of migrating bodies as always already expressing and being oriented towards citizenship (Nyers 2015).[179] And I believe having a critique of freedom of movement can help us go beyond a framework of citizenship and sustain a discussion on the reproduction of labor power outside of the realm of citizenship. After all, the Bulgarian workers in Munich do have EU citizenship rights. By analyzing the seeming break, the void that exists between the presence and the absence of the right to move must propel a new gaze in our understanding of freedom of

[179] I delve in this critique in details in section 6.3. of this chapter.

movement as a distinct historical form that has developed in the framework of multiplying free markets within Europe and the celebration of political liberalism in the 1990s as the only alternative left for political imagination.

My analysis in this chapter is organized around the relation between capital, moving labor power and the state via its repressive apparatus (the police). This chapter is driven by the question of what frameworks could be used in order to think the social processes of immobilization when contrasted to its supposed antithesis of freed movement. Could we remain within the seeming antidote axis between processes of immobilization and freed movement in order to apprehend the violence behind the historical formation of moving labor power? In other words, is freedom of movement the achieved liberal violence-free telos? The rhetorical formation of this telos can be perhaps traced back to the 1990s with the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc that I discussed in the previous chapters. A telos so stable that it still inspires social and political movements throughout the continent. If we analyze freedom of movement as a semantic configuration that expresses a particular social question -- necessary migration out of poverty -- we can see that it developed as a legitimate definition of the solution to the social question at hand. To repeat, freedom of movement became a formula that was supposed to cancel inequality, domination, and violence. My goal here is an analytical one, however. I approach freedom of movement as pertaining to the above. Freedom of movement is not an antidote to unfreedom of movement; it is weaved into structures of violence, domination, and inequality and as such it retains them. To exemplify some of the risks that stem from exploring movement as always already antithetical to immobilization, I mobilize freedom of movement to see how a field has been created, where the movement of populations is approached either through its absence or presence.

I gaze at that relation from the starting point of moving labor power – Bulgaria, a country on the "edge" of the EU, where the dialectic between freedom of movement and "fortress Europe" is frequently played out. I trace the relation as it unfolds in (one of the) final destinations – Germany, and in particular Munich. I travel with moving labor power, so to speak, in order to answer the question of what freedom of movement – as an ideology and practice – has meant to workers after the battle over it was won (gradually) some twenty-seven years ago. When we stay at that edge, we can see that the structure of moving labor power that travels to so-called "capitalist core" is comprised of a peculiar temporal rhythm, where taming and acceleration work conjointly. The former will be discussed in the next

section of the thesis via the notion of the "economic migrant." The latter is a subject of this chapter. And here is the time to mention that these aspects of moving labor power rob capitalist spaces of their constancy and brings about labor with differentiated legal statuses (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). These differentiated legal statuses presuppose differential access to labor markets and differentiated relation to state and capital.

The following story unmasks the reasons behind the steady lack of employment among the daily laborers from Pazardzjik, a town in Central Bulgaria, who usually stand at the street corner in the months before and after the opening of the labor market to Bulgarians. I complement this analysis with a discussion over freedom of movement as a mechanism of labor power dispersal. Afterwards, I turn to study the specifics of the struggles as they unfold in the circumstances at hand.

6.1. Policing Freedom of Movement

As I walk down Goethestrasse to reach Civil Courage, the activist group I was working closely with during my fieldwork (discussed in section 6.2., this chapter), a crowd attracts my attention. About twenty people are standing at a street junction and I can see a police minivan parked along the corner, its emergency lighting is on. The minivan belongs to the Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit (FKS), or the German Financial Control of Illegal Employment; police unit under the authority of the German customs. And even though it is only my first day of fieldwork, I have a gut feeling that these are Bulgarians. I have heard of the *контрол* (control) before; police checks during which the so-called corner laborers are made to present documents and asked "routine" questions about what is the purpose behind their standing at the corner. The corner is also a political junction, activists from Civil Courage often go there in order to gather people for protests or discuss the latest oppressive measures enacted by the city of Munich against the Bulgarian day laborers. The working men usually go there at around 6.30-7.00 in the morning and remain until the early afternoon hours or until it gets dark[180]. It depends on the day. Sometimes employers come as if a part of a convoy, whereas other days there is no work at all. While standing at the corner, social reproduction often enters the conversations. From the local Job Center's newly hired assistant who is supposedly "friendly" to the social needs of the workers to the homeless shelter's old

[180] The space is gendered. No women stand at the corner to seek for work.

bunk beds, one is always kept aware of the best deals in the city that are supposed to ease one's life.[181] Bulgaria rarely appears in these conversations, unless regarding family issues and newcomers.

Usually people disperse or just move on the other side of the junction soon after the police drives away. As I approach the crowd I see a man in his early 30s whom I know from my previous visits in Munich. There are six Bulgarian men surrounded by twelve police officers. The police officers, of whom only one is a woman, wear green vests and for the most part they stare silently at some documents or talk between themselves and on the radio transmitters. The whole procedure is slow. There is really nothing the police can do but be slow and bothersome, they cannot really arrest people for just standing at a corner. The only loud speech one hears comes from the laborers who are angry because of the yet-another police check that same day. There is a translator in the police group, who, I was told later on, was required from the FKS a while ago as the communication between the Bulgarians and the police unit was hindered. The workers were switching between Bulgarian and Turkish in order to undermine the power of the translator and especially when I enter the scene in order to communicate to me "how barbarous the cops are."

The workers who usually stand at the junction of Goethestrasse and Landwehrstrasse are from the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.[182] Standing there is pretty much the only way they could get a job, which, for the most part lasts for a few weeks, sometimes even for just a few days and is usually in the construction sector. The "grey" labor market in Munich, at least when Bulgarians are concerned, is spatially separated so as to fit groups that come from different parts of Bulgaria. Where this particular corner is reserved for the people who come over from Pazardzjik, just a few blocks down the street, one can meet beggars who have departed from another town, Omurtag, northeastern Bulgaria. Yet, day laborers from other towns in Bulgaria hold the grey labor markets in the periphery of the city. These groups fall into the category of the "poverty migrant" or the "social benefit tourist" that transpired in Cameron's and Friedrich's discourse I discussed in the previous chapter. For newcomers, who depart from other towns, it is close to impossible to enter these labor markets.[183] Their boundaries are

[181] Job Center is basically an Employment Office.
[182] On the specifies of migration of the Muslim minority in Bulgaria see Neda Deneva (2007; 2009; 2012).
[183] I disagree with accounts that construct begging as a form of labor as there is no direct relation between beggars and capital. Yet, begging is a mode of social reproduction. For the purpose of simplicity, I do use "labor market" as construction here despite my awareness of the inadequacy of the term. Yet, the beggars, whom I

strictly kept as it has become harder to find employment or to remain on the street without being removed and charged with either "begging" or "illegal work." Marta, for example, a woman in her 60s who begs on the streets of Munich since 2010, had accumulated 50 000 euro in charges for begging when I met her at the Caritas office in 2014. She will of course never be able to repay the accumulated debt. Begging only provides her with enough money so she can contribute to the rent expenses her husband and her pay. Not to mention the medical bills she has accumulated because of her diabetes.[184]

In the months between October 2013 and February 2014, police checks were so intense that the topic preoccupied Civil Courage, the workers and even the press. The main reason behind this preoccupation was a specific police control, which took place in October of 2013. Just a few months prior to this particular police check, in August of 2013, the local to the Goethestrasse and Landwehrstrasse intersection business owners distributed a petition against the daily laborers. The petition stated:

> Petition of the residents and employees at the crossing Goethestreet/Landwehrstreet
>
> 1.We, the residents and employees of the area around the crossing Goethestreet and Landwehrstreet demand that the current problems, which have been increasing in recent weeks, with illegal labour markets at our crossing, are finally acknowledged as such.
>
> 2.We are ready to support any humane and socially-fair [caring] solution which contributes to people not being exploited and abused by criminal traffickers and building contractors.
>
> 3.By now, the crossing and the adjacent buildings and retail businesses are regularly being Beleaguered by constantly increasing crowds of workers.The sidewalks are being Blocked and littered, food is discarded and people are spitting and urinating.Some Buildings are already affected by serious problems stemming from health-damaging pest. Customers are being harassed and remain absent, and there have been aggressive scenes. This scenery is making it increasingly impossible for us tolive and work normally. We demand that our crossing is not increasingly affected [requisitioned] by such scenery. The current situation is not acceptable anymore and should not be allowed to entrench. We would like to point out that we have a right to a humane and civilised living and working environment, as well. We demand coordinated, consequent and sustainable countermeasures both in the area of social work and police work.[185]

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discussed in more details in section 5.3.5. are also family members of day laborers, albeit not always to the workers from the particular corner I discuss. Thus, their lives are explicitly entangled with the workings of the day labor markets and their specificity.

[184] 80% of the women in Munich who beg on the corners around the train station have complained to me that they suffer from diabetes. Begging is exhausting for them as often they have to stand on their feet for hours, which is harsh on their swollen and bruised legs.

[185] I am thankful to Philipp Lottholz for the translation of the text.

The petition starts with a desire for recognition, namely that a market is illegal, that it stands outside a pre-configured norm. As we saw in chapter four, the potential abnormality of the labor market was a source of panic for the free market ideologues in the beginning of the 1990s in Bulgaria. But why the sudden panic in Munich? After all, whereas in Bulgaria the panic preceded, or at least it was simultaneous to the creation of the market, in the case of Munich the market preceded the panic. We know from Lisa's description of the history of Civil Courage (see below) that the workers have been standing at that particular intersection for at least four years before the petition was issued. The petition obviously addresses that which has been there for long, but in a different form from the perspective of those signing it. Are we to trust the raised concerns over "exploitation" and "criminal smugglers?" If so, why not attack the German authorities for creating the conditions for such social developments? Why not attack the employers who come to pick up the junction workers? But more importantly, even if the concerns are genuine, I do not want to dismiss this possibility, the question is why now?

When discussing the moral panics that surrounded mugging in the early 1970s in Britain, Stuart Hall (2013:182, in Hall et.al. 2013) asked "Could it be possible – historically plausible – that a societal reaction to crime could precede the appearance of a pattern of crimes?" I want to be clear, however, that the "crime" considered in this chapter has nothing to do with harm imposed on individuals. Yet, what interests us here is the question of why "illegal marketing" emerged as a crime in this specific historical moment? And it did emerge as crime, strictly speaking, as police control not only increased tremendously in that period but the latter also intensified in its violent tactics. I find Hall's intervention plausible for the case under examination here. He shows that the societal reaction towards mugging in that particular historical moment, entered a mode of panic not because there was an increase in the phenomena of mugging, but because "a quite distinct new social group appear[ed] to be involved" (2013: 183).

Here, as well, we are strictly concerned with the crafting of a new social group. That of the Bulgarian poverty migrants and that, which I described in the previous chapter. In this sense, and as Hall demonstrates, the reaction to "crime" is not only a relation between the criminal, the victim, and the police. There is a concrete structure that works from the outside of this immediately visible relation. During such process, the crime of the wrongdoers is imbued

with political meaning. In other words, if "deviance" is that to which the society reacts, then, there "must be a society whose norms, rules and laws are transgressed, control institutions whose task it is to enforce the norms and punish the infractor" (2013: 185). There must be an understanding of what is "deviance" vis-à-vis the norm. In our case this structure, the norms of which have been transgressed by the "illegal" workers, is the market.

As shown in chapter four, there is a certain understanding that the market has to retain racial purity for it to be able to perform its functions. Moving labor power has the capacity to contaminate this purity; it becomes a source of potential impurity. We saw this in the case of post-socialism, we see this with the Bulgarian day laborers, and we will see this logic unfolding in the asylum system as well. After all, the Bulgarians were crafted as a "new social group" around that same year. It is not a coincidence that the petition ends with appeal for measures to be taken that include "police and *social* work." We saw the fright with which European press was discussing the issue of abuse conducted by free traveling welfare scroungers. The petition is a result of the creation of the social benefit tourist, the intensification of police control is the result of the petition, and the cause for panic is the "deviance" vis-à-vis the market. Just by the proxy that the junction laborers come from Bulgaria, it was enough to subsume them as the impure particles of an otherwise desired pure market.

The petition is also a reaction to a particular type of market space that is part of Tsing's (2009) supply chain capitalism, where outsourcing and subcontracting are shown to be developed capitalist practices, disciplined under the totality of a chain however.[186] As Peano (2016) demonstrates, this type of chain analysis, sprung as an analytical tool within "world-system" theory in order to explore whether or not capitalism can be conceived in terms of a world system (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Kalb 2000; Dunaway 2003) and later on "implied the need to historicise commodity chains and account for their cyclical as well as linear, or 'secular', transformations, and the tracking of the major operations in production, starting from its end products and the loci of their consumption." Although I do not rely on this approach, one of the benefits of this argument is that it enables us to imagine a networked production processes, where subcontracting of moving labor power plays a central role in the provision of living labor for industries. As we will see further in the

[186] For a critique of the notion see Mezzadra and Neilson (2013).

chapter, many travel to Germany relying on this type of chains and depending on subcontractors who find jobs for them. Subcontractors often function as traveling fixers; they find employment, sleeping arrangements and often even food for the moving labor power. This relation between subcontractors and moving labor power will be explored in more detail later on in the chapter. What needs to be remembered for right now is that the Bulgarian junction workers are the product of the type of relations that have allowed the outsourcing of recruitment practices to third parties. In this conjuncture, we are left with an appearance that there is no direct contact between capital and labor. In this sense, economic coercion appears as an effect of "unfair" subcontractor practices, and not as an effect of the relation between capital and labor. The latter, as we saw, was a concern for the petitioners as well.

Still, a lot of travelling laborers, as is the case of this particular market, just come to the city and find subcontractors on the spot. The Munich market is one such spot. Articulated as it is in the citizens' petition, the market emerges as a polluted object. It is not simply a street intersection anymore, but it becomes a specifically embedded spatial (and hence, social) junction of illegality, smugglers, contractors, interrupted mobility for those who are not necessarily part of it, abnormality and dirt.[187] As we see, the answer to such pollution is socially responsible policing. The petition from above is not telling solely to the type of conflicts and negotiations that exist in this particular neighborhood. It is also pointing towards the type of spaces that are being produced by capital whose accumulation is embedded in a chain of exploitation termed self-employment (see previous chapter) and where state violence mediates the relation between subcontractors, labor and the "local business."

As already shown, a year before the opening of European Union labor markets to Bulgarians and Romanians, a fully-fledged campaign took place against them on a European scale during which freedom of movement was redefined. From being considered a right to strive for and one of the main strongholds against nationalism, it came to be associated with its potentiality to enable abuse of nation-states' social security systems. Although the campaign was directed towards the new discursive category of the "benefit tourist," day laborers and self-employed in Germany became objects of state repression as these categories were used interchangeably. Further to this grotesque, the petition of the local businesses intensified the pressure in the

[187] It is interesting to note here that smugglers, in fact, have no role in this type of markets. Freedom of movement has erased the need for smugglers, in the sense of fixers who ease the very physicality of the movement from point A to point B, but it has increased the need for subcontractors.

city against the Bulgarian laborers. They became center of attention for the police, the social services, and the city at large.

As a result of the petition, Munich saw unprecedented police raids of the day-labor market. Between October and December 2013, daily police checks took place usually early in the morning, intimidating both employers/subcontractors and laborers away. Sometimes these checks would repeat a few times a day, often a police minivan would drive up and down the street just to show its presence. Nikola, a Bulgarian in his late 60s who worked for a lead factory between 1974 and 1987 but could not get a pension because of the 1997 reforms in Bulgaria, was one of those frequently checked. "It is humiliating. I am an old man. [The police] looks into my pockets. [They] strip us naked sometimes even on the street, before the eyes of all. If they want to strip me naked, they should do it in the police department. This is what I call shame."[188] One of the most vivid examples of a police check took place on 21st of October at about 8 o'clock in the morning, when thirty Bulgarian day laborers were pushed into a backyard near the central train station by twenty police officers. As the workers told me after the police check, they had to sign documents that they could not understand and the officers intimidated them through spreading false information that they would be charged one thousand euros if they were caught working without the required documentation.

Yet, the most atrocious police tactic came just before the release of the laborers when they were made to wear neon green bracelets, effectively becoming branded laborers. Over the next couple of days, one could see marked Bulgarians wandering around the neighborhood. "Humiliation," "fear," "anger," "frustration," were just some of the words used by them to describe this act of branding. According to a press release issued by the police department the neon bracelets served to indicate the people who were already checked so that no double checks would occur. The laborers, however, feared that the bracelets contained electronic chips that would track their physical movement and as fear prevailed they did not want to remove them. The produced anxiety was too intense to be handled rationally. People were trapped because of the possibility of being physically followed as they could not hop on the cars with subcontractors and therefore could not obtain employment.

[188] In fact Nicola was not able to receive pension that was able to guarantee his reproduction minimum as he has fallen under the reforms in the Pension law. In 1997, the Kostov cabinet, formed by the central right United Democratic Forces (UDF) changed the methodology according to which pension coefficients were being calculated. According to experts in the National Social Security Institute (interviews conducted in August 2014), the new methodology (which is extremely complex in order for me to do it justice here) has resulted in decrease of individual pensions and moreover, has been detrimental for people with low incomes.

Photo 10. The Green Bracelet

Photo of the author. The Green bracelet on one of the Bulgarian day laborers.

As the angst and uncertainty of the events grew, people started inquiring into the police actions. Civil Courage issued press releases and called the head of the FKS in order to question the green bracelets. Mr. Luft, the head of the Munich's FKS responded immediately. He assured that the neon bracelets were only to make certain the singularity of the control and that the only purpose was to inform the day laborers about their "rights and duties." His arguments attempted to lead to the understanding on part of Civil Courage that both parties want the same outcome: improved conditions for the Bulgarian laborers. Here is how a member of Civil Courage related the conversation between her and Mr. Luft:

> Hey, I had a call with Mr. Luft and he was so *** friendly. He said that the wristbands were just to prevent to control one and the same person twice DURING the control and that they should have put them off directly after the control. I said that this was obviously not communicated since lots of people were still wearing it on the next day and felt very anxious and degraded about this. I said that wrong information was given by the police about their right to work and that they had to sign a document of which they did not know the content and that we experience the behavior of the police very unfriendly, rough, arrogant and racist. I said that in my experience police repression does nothing but reinforce racist exclusion which is very present in the everyday life of the Bulgarian workers etc. He said that we actually want the same, better conditions for everyone. I said again that police repression does only lead to worse conditions etc (I

> offered him to join us to claim unpaid wages, if he really wants to do something for the people...). He said that he is worried about my reports about miscommunication and rough behavior and that he will try to change this and I said that these are not the only problems; that if it is true, as he said, that they only want to inform these people about their rights and duties they can just come with a translator and talk to the people, instead they drive the crowd in some backyard in order to make a big control, mark the people with wristbands and massively intimidate them not to stay on the junction again. I said that in my opinion by this praxis they play only the accomplice of racist shop owners. He was adamant that he is against racism, that he is decisively against formulations like "*Arbeiterstrich*"[189] because they are discriminating, he claimed that the current actions are not against the poor people on the street, but that they unfortunately can only come through them to the exploiters who profit from undocumented work. He clearly stated that they will never blame workers for undocumented work but only their employers!! I said that the workers are not only poor victims but that they are serious people who know what they do, and that they can struggle against exploitation by themselves, you can support them but police repression does only the opposite...It was hard to struggle against his performed correctness and friendliness... I almost had the impression Herr Luft was a bit glad that eventually someone is questioning the order by that he has to perform the current actions, caused by the racist petition (email correspondence 23 October 2013).

But what happens to struggles in the framework of freedom of movement? I turn to this question next.

6.2. Organizing Those Who Move

The story of Civil Courage starts with a taxi driver.[190] A Turkish man whose name is Cercan and who worked for Turkish subcontractors did not receive his wage.[191] One day he got angry and demanded to be paid. The subcontractors chased him around the city and threatened that they will bring him to the airport and kick him out of Germany. Cercan escaped in a taxi. The taxi driver was Turkish himself and when Cercan told him why he is running, the taxi driver recommended that he gets in touch with Ouz. Ouz was running a cultural center at the time and he offered to the tricked laborer to remain there until things work out for him and he stabilizes his situation. Furthermore, Ouz supported Cercan with finding a lawyer and together they fought for the unpaid wages. It was 2006.

Ouz and Cercan started going to construction sites around Munich and finding more and more

[189] An insult which refers to laborers who stand at junctions in order to find work. As *strich* is a word largely linked to sex work, it implies that the workers "prostitute" themselves at the *strich*.
[190] The story is reconstructed from an interview conducted with Lisa Reidner by the author (October, 2014).
[191] The names of the Turksih men are changed.

workers who were not being paid their wages. One year later, things started developing even further. Rumors started spreading and an email reached the Caravan (see previous chapter) with information regarding the struggles of the Turkish workers. Lisa, the backbone of Civil Courage today, was involved at the time with the Caravan and her and a few other activists went to meet Ouz, Cercan and the rest of the Turkish people. The first support that Lisa and her friends were able to organize was to help the Turkish workers to receive *duldung* (temporary suspension of deportation). This was necessary as the workers were staying in Germany on short-term contracts, which condition stipulates that if the employment arrangements are lost, one immediately loses her stay permit. The struggle of the Turkish short-contractors eventually grew into an activist initiative, which later on Ouz named Civil Courage.

From that moment on, the initiative started growing and some of the activists, including Lisa, visited Istanbul in order to research the conditions surrounding the sending of short-contractors to Munich. From the very beginning, Civil Courage had to deal with the Financial Police on regular basis. There were numerous controls in the workers' dormitories; former refugee shelters, where the Turkish contractors were staying. Police checks were occasionally taking place in these buildings also because many (homeless) Bulgarian families and Turkish short-term contractors were all using them. At some point, Lisa tells me, there were so many people who would be entrapped in the precariousness of short-contracting that FKS gave the Turkish workers the phone number of Ouz so they could seek some help from the Initiative. "At first twenty two came, then forty four more people came. So we started going to (labor) Court on regular basis," Lisa says.

By 2010, all the short-term contractor workers were gone. The Initiative was at a crossroad: shall they continue with their efforts to support migrant laborers in Munich? Despite that there were no Turkish workers in sight, it was still obvious for the activists that these practices of over-exploitation do take place anyhow. Civil Courage decided to install an info point table at *Landerstrasse,* at the street junction, where Bulgarians stand, and just see what happens. They made flyers with information regarding the rights of short-term contractors and started distributing them to random passengers. "At some point I noticed that across from our table there was a bunch of people who stared at me, obviously wondering what is this table all about. I remember wondering why these mostly young men just stood at the junction. What were they doing?" As it turns out, these were all Bulgarians, later to be known as the workers

from the junction. “At that point stuff really kicked off!”

After a few meeting and conversations with the Bulgarian workers, it was clear that they were subjected to a very similar situation as their Turkish colleagues, with the only difference that now, three years into Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, they did not face deportation. Humiliating police controls, unpaid wages, homelessness, it was all at place. Eventually, that same year, Civil Courage was able to move into a space, where they could continue with their support work. It was a ground floor office near the junction, where workers would gather. I visited the office in the early 2013. It was big enough to accommodate a large amount of people. Workers were going there not only for the sake of filling paper work, but to also visit with friends, sleep and even get some food when available. Large pots of tea were always at everybody’s disposal and discussions about housing and labor conditions were ongoing all of the time. In 2011 Civil Courage was able to secure 5 000 EUR from a municipal fund that supported self-help groups in the city of Munich, which provided the majority of the payments for rent. As they shared the space with an artist collective, Civil Courage was only paying half of the rent; about 400 to 500 EUR a month. When this money run out, they relied on private donations. The group had to move out of this particular place later on in 2013 as the owners had different plans for it. The group was sheltered by the Madhouse in Munich: a non-profit organization dedicated to social work with Roma and Sinti Youth. The group remained there until I left in 2014.[192]

Soon enough the news of the branding from above spread and the political party of the German Greens and various radio stations picked on the story. But despite the visibility of police violence, the city used other imperceptible tactics as well. Blacklisting addresses to prevent further registration of Bulgarians in Munich, intimidating German citizens who helped with address registration, having special memos on “how to behave with Bulgarian and Romanian citizens” spread through the social services offices. Those were just some of the daily reality for day laborers and German citizens and personnel employed by the city.[193] The branding incident that I discussed above was not the last raid. Such practices became commonplace in the months before January 2014 in addition to the situations, where workers often found themselves in jobs that did not pay for their labor, placed in prison because of unpaid public transportation fees, and unlikely to find shelter because of below O˚C

[192] The group is there no longer.
[193] Employment in Germany and acquiring self-employment status depend on address registration.

admission policies in homeless shelters.[194]

6.2.1. (Re)Normalizing the norm

I believe Balibar (2015) is on the right track when he speaks of the normalization of overexploitation. He acknowledges that there is a theoretical difficulty in the differentiation between overexploitation and exploitation. Exploitation is regulated by a fair contract and as such it is not unjust. The theoretical difficulty in this differentiation, comes from the observation that already any extraction of surplus labor leads to *overexploitation* (for example overtime that is not part of the fair contract). Nonetheless, he proposes that we call the conditions of capitalist use (of labor):

> ... a *normalization of overexploitation*. The reverse side of this is a class struggle that tends to impose limits, establishing, as it were, "normal conditions of exploitation," which for that reason, are deprived of any technical or economic objective criterion, but merely express an unstable relationship of forces between the tendency towards over-exploitation and the counter-tendency or resistance which reduces it (Balibar 2013:3; italics of the author).

With the theoretical difficulty stemming from differentiating exploitation from overexploitation, comes also the theoretical difficulty to agree upon what the structure of the norm in relations of capital looks like. In other words, it is perhaps correct to claim that the forms of labor we witness proliferating today (overtime, non-paying of wages, one-day labor contracts, hardened reproduction, involving child labor in the production process, etc.) and that are often called by the name of the precariat (Standing 2011; Wacquant 2014; Lorey 2015) are in fact not post-Fordist but pre-Fordist (see also Francesco Di Bernardo 2016 with a similar reading of the notion of precarity). That is, today we go back to overexploitation, where the 'fairness' of the contract is often abused. In this sense, we witness a normalization of the norm and subsequently attempts directed to discipline that same normalization.

During my stay in Munich, it became very apparent that the political and everyday struggles of the Bulgarian workers and their German friends, revolved around issues of unpaid wages, shelter, social benefits and police violence. In other words, around attempts to tame the

[194] The city of Munich opens the homeless shelters only if the temperature is below O˚C. The warm winter of 2013/2014 forced many to sleep under bridges as the shelters did not open regularly. In the years of 2015, 2016, and 2017, there have been regular protests organized by Bulgarian laborers against this rule.

existing modes of these relations and to *put exploitation back to normal* (at least to its Keynesian version), i.e. paid labor which guarantees shelter, children benefits, pension, health insurance, etc.

Civil Courage meets each Tuesday and spends hours in filling in social benefit forms, trying to reach subcontracts and make them pay back wages and fighting for shelter rights. The group is somewhat small although the number of people involved in it changes often. When I was there four German citizens were involved in the efforts described above on constant basis. The rest were mostly the Bulgarians who stand at the Goethestreet/Landwehrstreet junction and some Munich activists that came and went randomly.

There is a peculiar boringness in these procedures of reading and filling-in bureaucratic forms. If the life out on the street is covered in danger and all sorts of unexpected situations, the space where the Initiative meets is just the opposite. The communication between the Germans and the Bulgarians is somewhat difficult as not all speak the same language and even when some of the Bulgarians know some German, it is not quite enough. The problems facing the Bulgarians, however, have been similar for years now and it is enough that somebody shoves a particular document from the Job Center that already everybody knows what is needed. Prem Rajaram (2015) says that capitalism is not a neutral translator, it "translates potential and desire (a potential for dignity, a desire for education), into specific material provision." Similarly, the modes of (over)exploitation and reproduction experienced by Bulgarian workers have been adequately translated into the struggles for the normalization of exploitation. There is rarely the need to speak of what is needed. The monotony of capitalism, its "already-has-happened" banalizes and monotinizes the struggles to the point that there is no need to share the same language. Overexploitation has a language of its own which both activists and workers share.

In the months after the green-bracelets police check, the intimidation did not stop. In fact, it is ongoing even today as Boris assured me when I met him two years later in October of 2015. People are still being followed to their working places, threatened with 1000 euro and three years of probation if they are caught to work illegally.[195] For many, 2014 changed nothing;

[195] I do not know of a case where people were actually charged with such sanctions. These threats are mostly a scare tactic, with the exception of the jailing for unpaid transportation fees. In fact, many do not mind a couple of months imprisonment during the winter months.

others now work in factories near Munich or in other cities, where, even though the pay is low, the security of having a regular job pays off. But back in 2013, the actions of the police and the Munich municipality did not stay unquestioned. As already mentioned, a few attempts of political organizing took place.

The first attempt came right after the branding incident. That day people were coming in and out of Civil Courage's office and the usual lethargy of filling in documents and contacting and threatening of subcontractors with legal actions was suddenly interrupted by the workers' anger. They were all shoving their green bracelets in the air and asking how long it would take before they could take them off. The workers expected answers that nobody could really give. That day they were coming and going, always with the bracelets on. As the chaos intensified a decision was taken that on the Tuesday the following week an organizational meeting would take place. At some point a mass distortion of bracelets took place in the office. People were throwing them in the air or angrily smashing them into the tables, calling for action. A protest was in order.

The next week, on the designated Tuesday, as I go to the office, I stumble upon the usual monotony. Everybody is sitting around the rectangular tables that are organized in a way so as to form a larger quadrate. The German activists are filling in papers, and trying to communicate the information they found in letters that people have received from the municipality regarding transportation fees, residence permits, and social security documents.[196] As I walk in, the meeting could begin. I am the only one who speaks Bulgarian and the translators from Turkish are nowhere to be found. As I inquire around the room I only see Radoy and two or three other men who were present during the branding. We instantly go out to seek after the rest of the group. As we walk out the door, however, I could not help but notice that many of the women who remained back in the office were disappointed. For them it meant that the filling in of papers that day is most probably over as the meeting about the protest would have taken the rest of the time available to Civil Courage activists.
"Many left. They took the buses," tells me Radoy, a single man in his 40s who came to Munich in the early 2000s and who managed to get a working permit. Although with a permit, he is a regular at the junction. To have a permit does not mean one can find a job. Radoy tells me this in disappointment while puffing on a cigarette and as we are walking down the street

[196] People receive these documents if they have provided an address. Usually, a faked one, where many workers are registered. A few times I had to go to one such address and pick up the mail.

in search of people. Despite his irritation, we find at least ten who are interested in joining for some talks. As we go back to the space, ten more are present. When the meeting is about to begin some even erupt in a spontaneous protest as "now it is our time [for helping us with our documents.]" In the midst of the discussion if we are to have an organizational meeting or to continue with chasing after dishonest subcontractors and threats of imprisonment, a new comer walks the door and hearing me speak in Bulgarian, he asks, "Do they [points his head towards the Germans] do something for gypsies here? Could they find me a job?"

A protest against the police violence never took place. Despite the numerous efforts on the part of Civil Courage to politically support the laborers in order to organize around the issue of police raids, a visible struggle against them never took place. Fear, more pressing issues and the possibility of escape are among the reasons behind the impossibility to establish a response to the actions of the city. As Mladen, a young man in his mid-20s who came to Munich three months prior to the beginning of the police raids and was a regular at the day labor market, told me: "I am going to Frankfurt now. It is obviously written on my forehead that I am a Bulgarian and Munich cannot offer anything anymore for me. I will go to find job elsewhere, but I cannot stand it here anymore." Munich lost quite a lot of Bulgarians these two weeks. Many left for either other cities within Germany or for other European countries, or went back home. Depending on where fixers brought them.

6.2.2. Mall of Shame and its Romanian Workers: "The Bulgarians told us our resistance will not last for long"

The moving labor power that migrates unrestricted is the perfected liberal subject. To go back to Kotef's (2015:4) argument, "throughout the history of liberal thought movement functions as *a pivot of materialization for the liberal body*" (emphasis of the author). In addition to this *liberal body*, however, we shall not forget the importance of movement for the relation between the body as potential labor and the possibilities for its reproduction that come with that same movement; the liberal body and its movement are inseparable from material conditions.

The argument that I make is that the right to move freely as inscribed into the notion of freedom of movement within the EU, spreads potential labor territorially and tames political

organization. The normative status of freedom of movement prohibits its suspension by nation-states. Yet, repression often avoids the normative to touch its object in seemingly indirect ways. As the increase of popularity of right wing rhetoric regarding Bulgarians and Romanians, but also the moral panic, which translated the "corner employment" as a crime, the city of Munich had to somehow suspend the legal right to freedom of movement by secondary measures. It had to prevent further movement *in*, on the one hand, and thus, make the city unattractive by using repressive measures that effected laborers' social and physical security on the other. One has the "choice" however, to escape such repression by exercising her right to move freely, to escape. And many did. Escape has become inseparable from freedom of movement. This continuous escaping reproduces a certain type of labor power. One that is constantly on the go. Freedom of movement oscillates between possibilities of escape and opportunities for exploiters.

The notion of freedom of movement has enabled a spatio-temporal dimension of traveling labor power, where it has become increasingly easy (and necessary) to leave one site for another. In this conjuncture, it compresses time and space as the discharge of (cheap) labor from one site leads to a fast gain of labor power at another site. Europe has become a miniature space for traveling laborers. The visa requirement, or the border check, the insecurity of traveling and the dependence on a smuggler are not there to slow such traveling. On the contrary, the travel fixer (i.e. the subcontractor, who is a fixer in both production and reproduction relations) inhibits the entrepreneurial spirit of neoliberalism. She always finds new jobs, new cities, and makes deals with companies. In my frequent traveling by bus to different European cities, I encounter precisely such pauperized laborers. They traverse the European space depending on where subcontractors call them to be. Two laborers I met in November at Frankfurt's international bus station hectically drew a picture of their traveling during the past months – from construction sites in Spain to agricultural fields in the Czech Republic and Italy to fields in England. They never stayed in a place for more than three months. Often such "calls to job" end in disappointment, as promises are broken and men and women are forced to leave. Some go to the next European country and to the next subcontracted job. Others go back to their home countries to wait for yet another call so they can stay awhile with their families. And yet, when a job indeed exists, this does not necessarily mean one will make a living out of it.

Wages are rarely being paid anymore. Such is the story of the laborers who came to be known

as the Mall of Shame workers. These are Romanians who worked on the construction site of the Mall of Berlin in August 2014. This (in)famous mall was built in the fast developing quarter around Leipziger Platz, an area which more and more resembles Times Square of New York City. The few-blocks-long massive edifice cost approximately 1 billion EUR, making it the most expensive extravagance in the business of mall construction. The Mall advertises itself as "the heart of the heart," invoking an image of Berlin as the most dynamic metropolis in Europe. The mall is built on a total of 210 000 m² and shelters around 270 shops, a 12 000 m² hotel, close to 1000 parking spaces and offices that comprise about 4000 m².[197]

Photo 11. The Mall of Shame

Source: Mall of Berlin official website.
(https://www.mallofberlin.de/en/start/anfahrt/anfahrtmitpkw). Retrieved July 4, 2017.

The story of the Romanian workers is almost identical to the tens of other stories I have heard elsewhere in Germany and on my bus travels. A friend of a friend contacted one of the eleven men and offered them a job. That friend also has a friend who was looking for more laborers, possibly from Bulgaria and Romania as they travel unrestricted. The deal was a contract, good payment and 150EUR accommodation fee in a shared flat. Arriving in Berlin, it turns out that there was no contract, the payment was 5 EUR per hour as compared to the lawful 8.25EUR, and the apartment was a phantom. The Romanian workers found themselves frequently sleeping rough on the streets. In the next three months, they would often experience what they

[197] Information taken from the official site of the Mall of Berlin. Doi. http://www.mallofberlin.de/en/service/fakten

described as humiliating behaviour on part of the subcontractors: ranging from changing promised pay to unrealized accommodation opportunities, to eventually no payment of wages at all. The workers changed one subcontractor due to unpaid wages and ended up in the same situation with the second. As it turns out, "hundreds of Romanians left the [construction] site without being paid just before we came."[198] Not knowing that wages are not being paid is perhaps explained by the fact that all eleven came to work in Germany for the first time. Unpaid wages have become the norm at that time. Despite the many assurances uttered by their Bulgarian and Turkish colleagues that "[they] will not resist for more than a month," the Romanians decided to stage a protest.

On 2nd of October, 2014, fifteen Romanian workers unfolded a banner in front of the office of one of the subcontractors. The banner read, "Metatec Fundus GmbH, slavery is protected by law in Germany."[199] Thirty-three people were willing to protest in case their wages were not paid. The number of people willing to participate in a collective action scared the subcontractors and each two or three days a portion of the wages were in fact being paid back. 200 EUR today and 300 EUR tomorrow. Yet, the amount paid was not even close to what was being owed. "Soon," the Romanians heard each day. In a four-day time workers started going back to Romania. The pressure between the workers and the subcontractors intensified as the latter stopped paying even the small portions. The laborers decided to strengthen the scale of the protest and gathered in front of the main entrance of the mall, where hundreds of thousands pass by on a daily basis. In a few days, a fellow worker contacted the protestors with the FAU – a Free Workers' Union, a union that represents itself as anarcho-syndicalist.

The Union supported the protest by finding night shelter when possible, applying for demonstration permits, and strategy building. My conversations with the Mall of Shame workers, as well as with different members of FAU lead in the direction that one of the hardest element they experienced in the sustaining of the struggle was building the possibility to continue with it. Already at this stage of building the collective struggle, at its very beginning, it was becoming very clear that finding the means to sustain and reproduce the very physicality of the body in order to continue to struggle – to find shelter, to find food, to find medical supplies if needed – is a major preoccupation, which often makes strategic and political conversations secondary to the resistance process. The culmination of the protest of

[198] Interview December 7, 2014.
[199] The name of the subcontracting company.

the Mall of Shame workers came on December 6, 2014, when, with the support and networking of FAU, around 400 people joined a three-hour-demonstration.

The protesters were circulating around the mall for the duration of the event and demanding that the salaries of the cheated workers were paid. As we were making our way through the small streets surrounding the mall, one could hear the slogan "Freedom of movement is everybody's right!"[200] As if, the Romanians were precluded from that right (for a critique see the next section).

Despite the large turnout and the media and public pressure exercised in favour of the Romanian laborers, most of them went back to Romania; only two were still there at the beginning of 2015.[201]

Photo 12. Demonstration against the Mall of Shame

Photo of the author.

As hinted at in the beginning of this section, often the subcontractors are part of the same community, where laborers come from. They could be from the same village, neighborhood and even from one's extended family. In this sense, the mediator between capital and labor does not necessarily become subject of antagonism as is the case of Mall of Shame. But even

[200] The slogan is chanted during protests that are organized around issues of asylum. It is linked to political movements such as No Border and No One is Illegal. Its chanting during the Mall of Shame protest is sympomatic about the acceptance of freedom of movement at face value.
[201] Social media conversation February 15, 2015.

without such immediate connection, subcontractors have found strategies to deal with potential problems stemming for example from Court orders to pay back or large scale protests, which could scare potential labor away. For many Bulgarians I have spoken to, the role of the subcontractors as fixers is more important than to stage an open struggle. They are the ones to revivify the cycle of movement, which has become indispensable from the chains of exploitation and moving labor power further and further. And again, the fixers have found ways to deal with potential lawsuits. They usually declare bankruptcy in such cases, move to other cities and find fresh moving labor power. This is what happened in the case of Mall of Shame. Today, in 2017, we can read on FAU's website:

> In 2015 and 2016 most of the lawsuits against the subcontractors were successful, but - as was to be expected - the questionable subcontractors declared bankruptcy or went underground. Now in 2017, the Romanian construction workers, with support of FAU Berlin, have proceeded to file lawsuits against the responsible commissioner, Harald Huth's Leipziger Platz GmbH & Co. KG (FAU 2017)[202]

6.3. Freedom of Movement: To Escape a Habit

I argue that it is not solely the absence or the imposed absence of movement that could be thought concurrently to violence; it is also the presence of unrestricted movement, as guaranteed by an inclusion in liberal democracies which often goes hand in hand with violence.

To examine the ambivalence of the notion of freedom of movement as it pertains to political and economic liberalism, however, we cannot divorce it from assumptions in regards to the redistribution-justice nexus. In social movements that organize around issues of flight and migration, the notion of justice is often automatically assumed when attached to the notion of freedom of movement. But this is also the case for the social theorists who deal with the notion of free movement. Loren Lomasky (2007:225-229) for example, affixes a semi redistributive function to the right to free movement. Being given the right to enter a wealthy state, those who escape from the social miseries in their own countries, get closer to the possibilities provided by the simultaneous working of "private property and the rule of law" in wealthy states. The opening of the borders is already an act of justice in itself, which

[202] Taken from FAU's website: https://berlin.fau.org/kaempfe/mall-of-shame?set_language=en&cl=en. Retrieved March 27, 2017.

enables a better physical proximity to a greater resource base. In fact, Lomasky, as in much of the current debate regarding immigration, suggests that welfare for immigrants shall be abandoned altogether and instead the initial support of those arriving ought to be moved to the private sphere, where *bona fide* employment offers and family members assume the primary role of support. Immigration is emancipated from the political to enter the premises of the free market, where, eventually, the entrepreneurial and self-regulating spirit of the immigrants will bring them closer to what they have come for in the first place.

Similarly, Carens (1992:26) equates freedom of movement with the equality of opportunity, claiming that, "[y]ou have to be able to move to where the opportunities are in order to take advantage of them." Carens' utilitarian perception of freedom of movement identifies it as a means to escape an antagonistic relation which he further grounds in "political and economic inequalities." By holding the right to move freely, which for Carens must become an indispensable human right and foundational for the promotion of other liberties and freedoms, the author claims back the moral coercion of the poor to reclaim what remains in abundance in wealthier countries. In this definition, the very acts of escaping and arriving are acts of redistribution already. Carens' adversary, Woodward (1992) points that the holding of a "fundamental right" is not restricted to the needy and the poor and would enable the movement of more affluent members of society as well. Woodward's concerns over Carens' egalitarian perception of freedom of movement, stem from the potential conflicts that unrestricted number of immigrants are to bring to a host society, the wage dumping that labor will inevitably experience and the increase in racist sentiments. His preoccupation with the moral duty to avoid conflicts by protecting the citizens of a wealthy state contributes social antagonisms to be the by-product of immigration and not to larger relations in the political-economy. Despite such shortcomings, nevertheless, Woodward's observation invites us to rethink a claim for freedom of movement that is based purely on moral grounds. Namely, that freedom of movement in itself cannot alleviate poverty or inequality and in fact often deepens them considering for example existing relations of private property and consequent modes of appropriation and distribution.

Much like the debates on migrants' agency and its relation to citizenship, where one can identify a creeping assumption that migrants act politically in the name of becoming a member of a host society, Carens and Lomasky's propositions fall in the trap of integrationalism. Such accounts of freedom of movement articulate it as an infrastructure, as a

logistic that proximates one closer to a common (e.g. welfare system). Yet, the dismantling and the destruction of the notion of the common (that is for example the austerity state) from our contemporaneity have successfully positioned it only at the unattainable horizon.

The fleeing subject, when represented by studies of refugees and "illegal" border crossers, arrests one of the fundamental living conflicts in contemporary liberal democracies. On the one hand, we are used to seeing detained people at the European borders but on the other, there is the constant piercing through these same borders. The migrating body is both immobilized and yet successfully migrating. This seeming contradiction is well captured by the Autonomy of Migration (AoM) approach, which shifts the attention from the often taken for granted power of regulation to the excess of this regulation and the ways this excess in fact shapes institutional practices (*inter alia* Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008; Mezzadra 2011; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Casas-Cortes et.al. 2015). Inspired by the Italian *operaismo* of the 1960s, which rearranged the Marxist debates from a focus on the moving power of capital to the moving power of the worker (Tronti 2012), similarly, AoM is preoccupied with the practices of insubordination and struggle.

For some, AoM holds the risk to ultimately "[fall] back to a representationalist understanding… and potentially essentialise a specific phenomenology of migration" (Schwab 2014: 7). The problem for me however, stems not because it breathes on romanticization of migration (for a critique on the AoM approach see also Scheel 2013), as ambivalence is one of its major conceptual tools (Schwab 2014; Casas-Cortes 2015), but because some of the accounts of AoM tend to engage solely with (attempted) immobilization as a terrain of struggle. Perhaps, the latter approaches within the AoM stem from the way the subject of research is being chosen and namely the one who is a subject of border controls; the non-citizen, the non-European, etc. Such an approach, however, risks turning the immobilized subject as an outsider or a surplus to struggles within and against capital.[203] Considering the root of AoM, namely *Operaismo*, we can see that such an approach, which settles accounts solely in the field of attempted immobilization does not reveal much in regards to the relation between labor power, capital, the state and movement. And in this sense, it is methodologically narrow.

[203] As it will be seen this is only a tendency in some accounts and in fact, some of its major theorists offer precisely the opposite.

To exemplify,

> If *operaismo's* Copernican revolution was to invert capital–labor relations, refocusing on the multiplication of labor struggles and the diverse mechanisms capital employs to fix the social relation in its favour, AoM similarly seeks to focus on the ways in which equivalent relations of deterritorialization by migrant mobilities are currently forcing the state to reterritorialize its border management regime (Casas-Cortes et.al.2015:15).

There is an implicit separation between "labor struggles" and "migrant mobilities" in this approach and it dislodges mobilities from being under scrutiny as actual part of labor struggles. But this is not all. Movement, in this account, is being denied its inextricable relationship with capital (see below for more details). What I am getting at here is that such readings risk that migratory categories such as the refugee or the asylum-seeker remain at the level of what they have been constructed to be: dehistoricized and static movements, i.e. these movements belong to a particular realm – the border and the camp. Furthermore, the reader is implicitly invited to exempt these relations from labor-capital relations as mobilities are suddenly disembedded from labor markets. Yet, we need to always keep in mind that, despite one's reason to flee and despite the category she is placed under, the only commodity she possesses when she reaches the final destination, or even during her transit, is that of her labor power. In this sense, everybody is potential labor. This is a defining characteristic of capitalism: there is a necessitated "economic" relation of compulsion.

Certainly, AoM cannot be viewed as a flat terrain despite attempts to present it as such. There are different levels of engagement with the issues at hand. In some accounts, borders do play a role in the configuration of bodies as labor power and therefore, breed border struggles that are not outside the realm of labor markets and capital (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013:20-21). This take on the productive side of the border speaks to labor power as a pure potential (Virno 2015), where, eventually, labor power (as a capacity) leaves its content of potential and becomes productive labor (Marx 1973:204).[204] When labor power and freedom of movement is concerned, we see that the legal framework behind this freedom has intensified and eased the movement of labor power in and out of labor markets. Freedom of movement has influenced the ways labor power is sold and bought and has shrunk the temporal gap between the potential of labor power and the reality of labor. Not to be missed out of sight, freedom of

[204] I discuss this in theoretical detail in the Introduction to the thesis.

movement when viewed from the perspective of an anarchic form of migration, also diminishes the bargaining power of the future worker.

The "market" is of universal concern in liberal democracies and political theory. Moving labor power could almost always be a barometer to the particular needs of this universal from the point of view of these theories. When the refugee enters the fortress, she simultaneously enters the threshold of capital accumulation in Europe—the so-called needs of the European labor market and, to use an operaist insight, the struggle is already *dentro e contro* (within and against). As Pasquinelli (2014:182) suggests, Tronti, one of the leading figures in *Operaismo,* never lost from sight the wholeness of capital. We shall not leave this sight when moving labor power is concerned, and moreso when we try to historicize freedom of movement in relation to the other two form of movement. This threshold is the guise decisive for political economy: the possession of labor power, the particularity of the labor desired, the temporal gap between the potential to gain and the reality of contracting labor. Movement (and hence the lack of movement) configures these.

To further our understanding of AoM, Casas-Cortes tell us that "[an] autonomous reading of migration goes beyond the victimization and objectification of migration, questioning classical functionalist analyses that attempt to explain migration as either the product of cost–benefit calculations in the framework of push and pull factors or as a mere supplier of labor market worker shortages (Hess, cited in Casas-Cortes 2015). Of course, labor markets are not mere black holes comprised of shortages. In fact, as Mezzadra and Neilson (2013:22) point out, the legal and political composition of labor markets are important to be understood in regards to the subjective (political?) composition of living labor, which does not exclude migrants. On the contrary, as the authors encourage, borders, and may I add, the lack of borders, shall be thought together with labor markets. There is a naval string between the two under capitalist relations. Where I believe it is of utmost importance to eradicate victimizing and objectifying readings of migration and that liberal understandings of cost-benefit analysis has to be cautioned away, I am afraid that to entirely turn a blind eye to the so-called labor market and its workings is to obscure the working logics of capitalism as well, where not only "shortages" or pull and push factors dictate. Such narrow readings of the labor market jeopardy the changing patterns of capitalist accumulation, mask the continuum between moments of expropriation and moments of exploitation and the struggles that are contained by and within this continuum, and risk that migration systems are observed as a thing in

themselves.

Reducing restrictions on movement allows EU nationals to follow capital wherever it goes and wherever it is. The same could be said about capital. There is a sharp contrast in the ways in which labor power and capital are organized however, as based on their freed movement and in a post-Fordist context (see Moody 1997). Where capital tends to consolidate in transnational companies, in the process concentrating power, the movement of labor often leads to dispersal and to the impossibility to organize politically as expressed both in the decreased presence of unions and in the freedom to escape. These, in conjunction with the demising welfare state, have direct consequences on the reproduction of a traveling labor power and the political struggles of EU migrants. As Mezzadra and Neilson (2013:95) show, analyzing the possibilities of translation between struggles and subjects can only happen by addressing "the complex ways [in which the heterogeneity of global space] crisscrosses the production and reproduction of labor power." Above I addressed some of the productive spatial and temporal aspects of freedom of movement that speak to the reproduction of labor.

To move fast and wide is one of the intrinsic characteristics of EU labor. Freedom of movement, as a historical form of moving labor power, and in conjunction with flexibilization of labor and strong reliance on subcontractors as the primary recruiting force and fixer in production, has brought about a continuously migrating working force. These workers are often brought directly to the work locations, in bulk, and it this sense it resembles a bit the moving of labor power during state socialism. Of course, as is the case with the workers in Munich, the labor market still relies on recruitment that is individualistic in its nature. This type of work force does not have the job security as offered by employers in settled job-situations, for example, in incentives that aim at preserving, training, conserving, or bettering the work force.[205] On the contrary, the fragmentation of the labor market by numerous subcontractors needs an easily disposable labor and movement which is neither hesitant nor slowed by barriers in order to leave or arrive. Usually, such workers do not get attached to the working place and they go through cycles of de- and re-skilling since hopping from town to town, country to country, and sector to sector requires one's speedy adaptation. The type of worker that is being created is not one that identifies with a workplace or a skill but with the capacity to move.

[205] Certainly, I would not want to dismiss the fact that such "protection" is minimized under the ethos of flexibility and versatility for the so-called settled workers.

6.4. Conclusion

Having a job does not necessarily mean settlement. The struggles from above are confronted by a double bind logic. On the one hand they tackle the frontstage of capitalism, "the legitimate sets of commercial and productive relations" and on the other, the backstage of capitalism, "the shadowy markets, unpaid work of all sorts, and irregular recruitment and hiring practices" (Rajaram 2015). If the decision to leave a place for another is a social movement in itself (Mezzadra 2004; Papadopolous et.al.2008) then freedom of movement has the potential to multiply these social movements and to radicalize them. This however is only a present possibility insofar as it overcomes its embeddedness in the making of capitalism and turns its power precisely against such makings. This is hidden in its spatio-temporal character, which enables the fast and wide physical movement of people who are subjects of the double bind of accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by exploitation (see Harvey 2004; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013:232-242). Political organizing along the crisscrossing points of this labor is necessitated by the way labor power moves. As we learn from Bologna (1973:8), at the turn of the 20th century the labor movement in the U.S. was well equipped to face the challenge of the "mobile proletariat." The IWW, in particular, organized the latter by means of placing agitators who "[swim] within the stream of proletarian struggles, move from one end to the other" (ibid.).

In the struggles described above, a dimension comes forward that is not celebratory; there is nothing heroic about it. It is the failure to struggle further, to continue. Continuity has been interpreted as the navel string between immediate demands and general ends (Panzieri [1958] (2014)) and as such affirming it is an immediate task.[206] The interruptions from above largely take place as laborers lack political networks, but often, even if such networks exist, they can rarely ensure shelter, food supplies, new jobs, in other words reproduction. People move on to the next possibility in order to meet such basic needs. One of the spatial dimensions of the EU workers struggling in both Berlin and Munich is that they take place literally blocks away from the proliferating refugee movements in and beyond these two cities. I have heard of

[206] The notion of continuity implies a process which is not defined simply in time boundaries but it is related to the developing of consciousness about one's role in the production process, development of institutions and uniting different sectors of production.

short-lived instances where participants of these differentiated struggles have crossed paths; however, to my knowledge, there has not been a persistent organizational endeavor to combine efforts. And even when and where such efforts took place, they failed. In fact, according to many of my interlocutors, the possibility of such efforts would be too tedious, or impossible to achieve as the rights held by EU migrants are too great compared to those of the third-country-national.[207] Deportability is perhaps the most cited reason behind the impossibility to translate EU laborers' struggles into the structures of the refugee and anti-racist movements. "You know, this is all great, but then these labor migrants can at least stay here. They don't face deportation," I am sometimes told.[208]

The struggles *for* movement are always already struggles *against* movement. We see how the break I spoke about in the beginning of the chapter, the void between the absence and the presence of the right to move, has grown wider. Perhaps the latter comes about because of the strong, albeit not the only, focus on border controls in refugee movements and the theoretical construction of freedom of movement as being an outstanding demand. In the meantime, such presuppositions leave conceptions of class aside and erase possibilities for relating the struggles at hand. Moreover, they erase the heterogeneous, yet common aspects of many of these movements. To create radical possibilities of collective response, we must first decenter the political habit in which we recall freedom of movement. This is not to say that the millions of migrants who are struggling with violent border controls, often dying at sea, or those who have already made it to peripheral Europe and still struggle to reach the "core" of European capitalist societies have to abandon this demand. But we need to denaturalize the liberation potentialities of freedom of movement and interrogate its material and conceptual instabilities. Otherwise, we stay within *making capitalism normal back again.*

[207] Such interlocutors include both German citizens and non-citizens who have been involved in the anti-racist movement.

[208] Conversation with a refugee supporter. September, 2014. In fact, not all EU citizens are exempted from deportation. To this we can recall the infamous deportations of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens from France in 2010 and also of Italian citizens.

PART THREE THE ECONOMIC MIGRANT AND THE ASYLUM SYSTEM

The subject of this part of the thesis is a historic form of migration captured by the economic migrant/refugee distinction. The argument here is that these two seemingly separate entities – economic migrant/refugee - are in fact relational and hence they have to be analyzed vis-a-vis each other, in their reinforcement as separate categories, in the ideological practices that produce them as separate, and, not least, in the type of struggles to emerge out of them. While I will engage with the former two in chapter seven, chapter eight is devoted to the analysis of the produced conflicts at hand.

There are certain historical moments that had settled the distinction to which I will return in details in the following two chapters. When it comes to the relation of the divide to labor power, an argument I make is that the latter undergoes a process of concealment as a relation in the type of movement that takes place at the so-called asylum route. There is a peculiar paradox in this particular reading of the divide, that, hopefully, I will be able to address below. The paradox stems from the way the particular form of movement is structured by the ideological presuppositions that inform it. To simplify: on the one hand, there is a claim that traverses across academic studies and political discourses that these movements take place mostly by "economic migrants," by which is implied that for the most part the people who use the asylum route do so in order to seek economic gains in a country different than their own. That same claim presupposes, thus, that at the end of their journey, the economic migrants will commodify their labor power, which in turn will harm the host society (for variety of reasons ranging from culturalist accounts to economist such that claim wage dumping). As there is a constant process of filtering the economic migrants from the refugees there is also a counter-claim that attempts to hide the possibility that one travels in order to commodify her labor power, i.e. the possible commodification of one's labor power. The journey oriented towards economic gains needs to be hidden from border and asylum technicians as a possible rationale behind movement. In this constellation, a conflictual terrain is being established, where the potentiality of labor power must be concealed from sight.[209]

In an interview for the magazine *Маргиналия* (Marginalia), Marina Lyakova, a doctor of sociology, a prominent professor at the Education University of Karlsruhe, and a regular

[209] This observation also makes me conclude that the distancing of the "refugee" from labor markets as a subject of research (e.g. as exemplified by some of the scholars who belong to the AoM approach, see previous chapter) plays within the terrain of this precise concealment of labor power as potential.

social commentator in Bulgaria, claims that:[210]

> We [the European countries] never agreed upon how to distribute the incoming migrants and refugees. And most importantly – we never agreed upon the criteria of whom is to be considered an immigrant and whom a refugee… In the moment when the Dublin agreement was signed, already then European countries have had to agree upon quotas and regarding the distribution of responsibilities (Lyakova 2016).

Lyakova is wrong. The categories governing European immigration are well agreed upon. The possibility to speak of refugees and migrants stems precisely from this consensual agreement on part of European structures and the political spectrum that in recent years has developed a rightist rhetoric towards migration.[211] What we witnessed during the clashes taking place at the Greek-Macedonian border on February 29, 2016 that attempted to destroy the fence between the two countries, was an effort on part of the subjects of these categories to disintegrate them. Such practices of resistance are not novel; they have taken different forms ever since the pinning of the differentiation in the post World War II period and its solidification through the concept of "safe country" that was settled as a European notion in the early 1990s. In this part of the thesis I engage with such practices and follow them as they unfold in the Bulgarian asylum system. When I write about the Bulgarian asylum system I also keep in mind that the conditions for the existence of this system are laid in the European Union's legislative system on the one hand but also in the very ideological presuppositions found in the system of economic liberal thought. The Bulgarian asylum system is a result of the common migration approach as built and practiced in the entire Union. In this sense, this part of the thesis is as much about Bulgaria as about the Union as a whole.

In 2015, as a result of the largely successful defying of European border controls on part of migrants, a language came about that was missing before. It is the obligatory and politically correct use of the words "refugees" and "migrants" side by side. If before 2015, these notions were often used interchangeably in order to signal the inadequacy of international law and its separation between the two, today, it seems, there is an implicit agreement that yes, indeed, these flows are causes of different rationales. This language comes about as a result of the

[210] Translation is mine.

[211] See for example Open Society. 2016. "Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union." Open Society Foundation. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-migration-and-asylum-european-union. Retrieved July 6, 2017. "The EU Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is a set of EU laws, completed in 2005...The CEAS sets out minimum standards and procedures for processing and deciding asylum applications…" The procedures mentioned are aimed at guaranteeing the exclusion of economic migrants from receiving asylum.

differentiation between political and economic migrants, as enshrined in international law, asylum systems in nation-states and in practices characteristic to the European asylum system, which creates subjects of legitimate violence and illegitimate escape. When these subjects reach European shores, they need to demonstrate of which type they are: of the type that is running away from political violence or of the type that is running because of economic misfortunes.

Asylum-systems have been studied as border regimes (Tsianos et al. 2009; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010; Kasparek 2016), approached from the perspective of the autonomy of migration (Papadopolous and Tsianos 2007; Mezzadra 2011; Cortes-Casas et al. 2015), from the point of view of its contradictions (Guiraudon 2003), as "humanitarian reason" (Fassin 2012; Ticktin 2011), externalization/Europeanization in its normative dimension (Toshkov and de Haan 2013), to name just a few approaches. These paths have informed tremendously our understanding of asylum systems but my goal here is different. In my work I pursue a different strategy. I attempt, using elements from the work of political Marxists and their critics, to answer the question of *why* this differentiation exists in the first place. I assume that the knowledge practice of distinguishing economic migrants from refugees is instrumental in the asylum knowledge formation from the perspective of two modes of hoping, and especially when viewed from the point of view of the external border. One is the point of view of the border custodians and technicians (e.g. border guards, translators, interviewers, judges) who hope to protect against economic migrants. The other is the point of view of those who cross the border and hope to convince the former that they are not economic migrants. These two modes of hoping clash. After Bloch, Benjamin and Rorty, Miyazaki (2004) turns the plates on *hope* and seeks to rediscover it as a method and not as an emotional status. She notes that turning the plates on hope, that is to turn away from psychological readings of the concept and instead scrutinize it anthropologically, serves 'radical temporal reorientation of knowledge.' To my understanding, hope can then accommodate the notion of struggle. The clash between these two seemingly different, yet subordinated to the same rationale reorientations of knowledge, between the practice of the guardians and the migrants perpetuate their antagonistic counterparts. These two hopes form an antagonistic terrain, where they unite different ways of knowing that are nonetheless informed by the attempts to sustain or disintegrate the difference between what is 'economic' and what is 'political.'
In what follows I examine this separation from two perspectives: that of the asylum system and its organization in Bulgaria and that from the perspective of those who strive against the

imposition of the categories under examination. I have chosen Bulgaria as a space of analysis as the country stands at the European edge, where, as I mentioned in the previous part, the dialectic between freedom of movement and Fortress Europe is often played out. In this part of the thesis, we will be able to witness the unfolding of this dialectic in its full extent. The struggles against the imposed categories of economic and political migrant take place at two interconnected levels: that of the asylum-system-now (i.e. the camps, prisons, determination of status in Bulgaria) and the asylum-system-as-it-could-be (i.e. the *illusio* [in the sense that Bourdieu uses it] of what Germany has to offer to asylum-seekers). The struggles that take shape against this classification are struggles against the very production of knowledge that disciplines migrants according to their "belonging" to a different level of the taxonomy (e.g. on the level of legislation, NGO articulations and academic production of knowledge). I first turn my attention to some of the theoretical and ideological presuppositions of the binary in order to recreate its historical significance for the specific form of moving labor power that has been forced to travel via an asylum route.

Chapter seven is fairly short. It is structured in the following way: I first relate the significance of the differentiation for popular imaginations that crisscross European space. The binary established between refugees and migrants informs much of what Europeans understand by migration and as such, it is important to focus on some of the most persistent popular imaginings. Afterwards I weave together historical accounts and my theoretical understanding of the binary. I show that even when critical historical approaches are being applied to the differentiation, rarely do historians engage with the ideological assumptions inherent in it and hence cannot explain its persistence and importance for governing. I supply their readings with some of the ideological assumptions as they pertain to the differentiation and hence, answer the question of *why* is the differentiation meaningful for contemporary liberal democracies. The effects of the binary are placed under scrutiny in chapter eight.

CHAPTER SEVEN THE ECONOMIC MIGRANT AND HER HOST

7.1. The Coming Out of the Refugee/Migrant Debate

> We should not use the word migrant. Migrant is a political word that used to take away the real status of these people. They are refugees. They are running from war and they actually liked their homes and they're not leaving their homes because they want to live in Italy or they want to live in Ireland. They're leaving their homes because they don't have any homes (Bono 2015).

This is Bono, the frontman of the popular music band U2 and the voice of Western good conscience, who also leads the charity charts that throw millions of dollars to fight poverty and hunger, mainly in Africa.[212] At the time of his talk, to speak of simply refugees or simply migrants had quickly turned into a heresy following the long summer of migration in 2015. What we learn from Bono is that the refugees like it where they (used to) live, while the migrants do not; refugees have no homes, while migrants do; the state of being a migrant is political; the state of being a refugee is real. He speaks the above through a clamor of applause and screaming fans in the days after thousands of migrants from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia have made their way across Europe, defeating long established mechanisms of movement control. The beginning of this political movement, as simultaneous to the physical movement, began when thousands left the crowded Keleti train station in Budapest and started walking towards Austria on September 4, 2015.[213] In the subsequent months, images of marching migrants would reappear continuously, from the Croatian-Serbian-Croatian, Croatian-Slovenian, Macedonian-Greek, and Serbian-Macedonian borders. Bono's message was seemingly simple: some of the people that we see coming into Europe deserve to be welcomed as they run from war. They are not all "migrants." Presumably, a migrant is someone who retains a choice in her escape, and usually flees economic misfortunes. Instead, we were told, these were refugees, players in a zero sum game, where choice was not an option; one had to either run off or die. In fact, in the months of August and September of 2015, readers of popular media outlets such as the Guardian, the Telegraph, and Deutsche Welle were steadily participating in the debates whether the usage of the word "migrant" is derogatory or not.

On August 20, 2015, Al Jazeera published an editorial entitled "Why Al Jazeera will not say

[212] Parts of this chapter have been published in Apostolova (2015) and Apostolova (2016).
[213] For a detailed account of the event, see Kallius, Monterescu and Rajaram (2016); Kallius (2016); Kallius and Ryökäs (2016) .

Mediterranean 'migrants.'"[214] The author, Barry Malone, explained that 'migrant' is a pejorative umbrella term that obfuscates the horror of Syrians' experience as well as Europe's humanitarian duty in their regard. By using the term 'migrant' we "give weight to those [governments] who want *only* [emphasis is mine] to see economic migrants." Al Jazeera performed a symbolic displacement, framing migrant subjects as victims, in an attempt to elicit more compassion from its audience and peers. The performance was undoubtedly a success. Al Jazeera's profession of faith resounded like a call, and the call reverberated quickly throughout major media outlets such as The Washington Post and The Guardian.[215][216] The latter questioned the legitimacy of narratives about "economic migrants," proposing instead to tell a story about "refugees," "asylum-seekers" and "displaced people"—in other words: "a story about humanity." "Economic migrants, unlike refugees, do not necessarily suffer persecution," confirmed The Huffington Post.[217]

The impact of Al Jazeera's call registered quickly on social media as well. Users started calling on and disciplining each other. The choice of 'refugees' over 'migrants' was strategic and makes sense in light of Al Jazeera's liberal inclinations. The point was to stress in particular the legitimacy and rights of Syrians escaping a country devastated by a war, in which moreover the West is not without responsibility. Al Jazeera's symbolic move made all the more sense that the last global wave of far right movements, on the tail of austerity policies and of the 2008 economic crisis, further discredited migrants' already fragile social conditions in receiving countries. In this ideological context, the economic migrant was cast out of humanity.

Two months after the media quarrel over how to refer to the people that cross European borders, the material effects of the ideology that stands behind Al Jazeera's and Bono's symbolic gestures translated into segregation of real refugees and economic migrants along European borders and within asylum systems. In Šid, Serbia, a town of about fifteen thousand people and situated at the Serbo-Croatian border, police prevented more than 500 people from

[214] Barry Malone. 2015. Retrieved April 25, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/editors-blog/2015/08/al-jazeera-mediterranean-migrants-150820082226309.html
[215] Washington Post. 2015. Retrieved April 25, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/24/is-it-time-to-ditch-the-word-migrant/
[216] The Guardian. 2015. Retrieved April 25, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/28/migrants-people-refugees-humanity
[217]The Huffington Post. 2015. Retrieved April 25, 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/09/03/refugee-crisis-coverage-words-and-meanings-matter_n_8084016.html

entering a train to Croatia on the 20th of November, 2015. Those were people other than Afghanis, Iraqis or Syrians. A volunteer on the ground recalls that about twenty Moroccans and Pakistanis were caged behind a metal gate on that day with no explanation being provided to them on what basis they are being separated from the rest. As the volunteer explains, representatives of the UNHCR have told her that "segregation is done on economic migrants and refugees from war zones " and "The Commissariat has prepared the building and tents for these people and [the UNHCR] now take care of them" and "we wait for further instructions and decisions."[218] "Welcome to apartheid!" finished the volunteer.

Towards mid-December, such segregation became common practice along the Greek-Macedonian border. AYS News Digest reports:

> While only SIA [Syria-Iraq-Afghanistan] refugees and non-SIA families can get shelter in Athens (single non-SIA men are left in the streets with no protection), tension is building up on the islands, where ethnic segregation is ongoing and registration is extremely slow. In scenes reminiscent of Idomeni a few weeks ago (in which those who weren't from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq were refused entry to Macedonia), the authorities at Camp Moria in Lesvos have stopped registering asylum seekers from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, prompting some of these people to go on hunger strike at Moria yesterday. Wild Lemon team reports that situation in Moria camp on Lesvos is getting worse every day. While the immigration is officially rejecting 'unwanted nationals,' today they didn't open the offices to anyone. As a result, around 5000 people are stuck in front of the camp, some of them waiting for days to get any kind of help. While the UNHCR is providing some shelter, it only satisfies the needs of the smallest percentage of the refugees on site, still leaving thousands sleeping on the cold stone in freezing winter conditions (AYS News Digest, December 20, 2015).

While this segragation along the refugee/migrant binary elicited much critique and drew attention mostly because of its ethnic aspect, its relation to labor and class remained largely unnoticed. What are the implications for moving labor power when we engage with the question of the economic/political migrant division that has settled in? I argue that the binary is an effect of ideas that belong to classic economic liberalism, which have been translated into asylum systems throughout Europe. One of the effects of this ideological assumption is that the movement of labor power is slowed down by illegalized border crossings, detention centers, and regulations such as Dublin. This assumption overlooks the fact that asylum-seekers as well are labor power. Upon entering the European space, they have nothing else to

[218] The information is taken from a public social media volunteer group dedicated to spreading information about the circumstances on the ground and in different parts of Europe regarding refugees and their endeavor towards western countries.

sell but their very capacity to labor. Consequently, the passages, borders, and detention centers all have a function in the relation between labor markets and the moving labor power that moves via the asylum route. Labor markets would eventually provide exploitation points for that particular labor power; be these points in or outside the 'regular' economy. As Mezzadra (2016) eloquently argues,

> Far from being reducible to the presumed 'norm' of a contractual exchange giving way to 'free' wage labor the commoditization of labor power can take multiple shapes. Practices, controls, limitations, and the regulation of mobility form a strategic field for the development of these processes, struggles and conflict. (P. 33)

In other words, border regimes cannot be separated from labor markets. In this light, the struggles witnessed in Bulgaria are also struggles of labor power. They are struggles that are performed in a way that conceals the potentiality of labor power (i.e. to be commodified). Before taking an in-depth look into these struggles in chapter eight, I examine the history behind the production of the refugee/migrant binary as it belongs to international law, and then discuss the assumptions of economic liberalism that inform European asylum systems. This is a necessary step in order to understand how the political/economic migrant binary reifies moving labor power.

7.2. Historicizing the Binary

Why do we distinguish between economic migrants and refugees? What are the conditions of possibility that allow us to see those fleeing war as more worthy of protection, when compared to those running away from relations of poverty, unemployment, and relations of production in general? Let us look a little closer at this differentiation from the point of view of international law and its historical footing before tracing the ways in which it has been translated into state and European Union practices.

The historical origins of the refugee regime have been a subject of much debate. One could argue that the tracing of the genealogy of the figure of the *refugee* has preoccupied much of the scholarly attention within and beyond the so-called migration studies (*inter alia* Salomon 1991; Skran 1992, 1995; Lippert 1999; Barnett 2002; Chimni 2004). What has emerged is a scholarly consensus that, with a few exceptions, states that the refugee regime as understood today can be traced back to the interwar period. Next, I will engage with some of the most

detailed accounts of what is a refugee and how she sprung into a being, in order to come closer to an understanding of the historical origins of the differentiation between economic migrants and refugees.

Parsanoglou and Tsitselikis (2015) look at the institutionalisation of refugeedom as a sequence of two interconnected events: the emergence of the "refugee question" and the subsequent definition of a "refugee" by the United Nations in 1951. The so-called "refugee question," later to be turned into an institutionalized regime, is usually traced as an effect of the disintegration of the Ottoman and Russian Empires. These disintegrations brought about three representations that informed the subsequent institutionalization of the figure of the "refugee." The first one relates to the so-called "exchange of populations" between Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey and to a smaller degree Romania in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan wars. This "exchange" has been represented in historical studies as a form of "ethnic unmixing" (Bade 2003:178) and follows the representation of the Balkans, as always, already overtly concerned with "ethnicity" (see Maria Todorova's [2009] critical account on representations of the Balkans). Parsanoglou and Tsitselikis (ibid: 23) position the second representation the unprecedented waves of *forced migration* in the first half of the twentieth century and the "collapse of empires and the formation of new nation-states" in order to pin the emergence of refugee regimes. The third historical representation of the "early refugees" was the Armenians escaping the massacres of the Ottomans and the people escaping Tsarist Russia. These three representations converge in representing the idea of the "early refugee." This "early refugee" was a subject who was not quite a refugee, but was on the way to be tamed and defined by the emergence of the "international migration management" regimes.

Such representations have made it possible for social scientists, lawmakers and the political elite until today to think of refugees through the prism of being forcefully pushed away from a territory, usually the nation-state. The recognition of the Internally Displaced People (IDPs), denoting people who have fled but have not crossed an international border, as a form of a refugee comes much later on. This state-centered ontology shows that despite the claim that "refuge" is an individualistic safety net that saves humans from oppression and gives the opportunity for *individuals* to escape political violence, the nation-state has always guided the implementation of asylum laws. In a way, the liberal understanding of an individualised refuge- and asylum-seeking crumbles in the minute it reaches European shores. We see this

today very clearly through the concept of the Syrian-Iraqi-Afghani (SIA) from the beginning of this chapter. Liberal definitions of "refuge" always have two sides to them: the side of the individual and the side of the collective punishment of groups of people who claim asylum, but are dubbed as arrivals from "safe countries" and hence, illegitimate asylum-seekers. International approaches to the flows of refugees, strictly speaking, are probably the most vivid example of the contradiction of liberal universalism, which attempts to de-capsulate issues of class and race.

Parsanoglou and Tsitselikis continue to argue that the three representations above were eventually captured by the United Nation's definition of what constitutes a refugee. According to the Geneva Convention, one can be recognized as a refugee, if she escapes "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (UNHCR)." In the narrative of UNHCR, the refugee is always juxtaposed to the migrant:

> Global migration patterns have become increasingly complex in modern times, involving not just refugees, but also millions of economic migrants. But refugees and migrants, even if they often travel in the same way, are fundamentally different, and for that reason are treated very differently under modern international law. Migrants, especially economic migrants, choose to move in order to improve the future prospects of themselves and their families. Refugees have to move if they are to save their lives or preserve their freedom (UNHCR 2016).[219]

In the historical development of the European asylum system, the economic migrant takes on central stage instead of the asylum-seeker as it against her movement that border apparatuses emerge the strongest.

7.3. The Logic Behind Violence and Its Historical Position in the Production of Political/Economic Migrants

One of the effects of the so-called refugee crisis of 2015, was that there was an explicit agreement that the "economic migrant" must leave. From Berlin's decision to widen the

[219] UNHCR. 2016. Retrieved April 23, 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/turkey/home.php?lang=en&page=72

definition of "safe country" zones and the fast execution of deportation orders, to hunters of economic migrants along the Bulgarian–Turkish border and mass recruitment by the government of Victor Orbán in Hungary, our memory was persistently being pressed on the idea that the European space is reserved for "genuine refugees" only. Refugees are welcome. Their counterpoint—the economic migrant—is not. Manuela Bojadžijev and Sandro Mezzadra (2015) write, "One can see … a 'difference machine' at work, which discriminates between 'first-class' refugees of brutal war (the Syrians) and potential seekers of political asylum (the Iraqis) while branding people from the Balkans as 'economic migrants.'" What we saw, however, was that this "difference machine" worked in a complete oscillation, moving back and forth from one extreme to the other, feeding on the contradictions it necessarily breeds. The temporary protection that was being distributed to Syrian asylum-seekers throughout Europe was precisely this: a temporary protection from being labeled an "economic migrant." What does it mean, however, to accept one's refugee-ness but not one's economic migrant-ness? How does the so-called "refugee crisis" articulate the economy?

7.3.1. The pre-migration world and the "economy"

To answer these questions, I turn to the role of ideology in the construction of categories of migration. Retracing the legal definition of the refugee, Robert Miles (1993:120) concludes that "[the notion] was … structured by ideological considerations which refracted the domination of capitalist interests in Western Europe and the United States." But what are these ideological considerations? The constructed division around refugees and economic migrants has a particular implication over how we are schooled to think of the "global market," the "economy." To describe one as a non-genuine refugee is to construct the opposite of what constitutes political persecution, and hence political violence. Therefore, the opposite of political violence is the economy as prescribed in the concept of the economic migrant. The category of the economic migrant and the debates around true refugeeness teach us that the pre-migration world is separated into two distinct zones. The one, where refugees come from, is a space where bombs fall, heads are cut off, and murder has become the norm. The flight of the refugee is "involuntary." We learn that political violence leaves one with no choice. Conversely, economic migrants come from places where "economic" mechanisms are at play. Here, the act of fleeing is deemed voluntary because the economy, it is widely accepted, retains choice and will among its subjects; they are encouraged to endure poverty and unemployment and to be more entrepreneurial as, eventually, the economic burdens will

go away as the market clears. As such, the pre-migration world closely follows the ideological impetus of economic liberalism. Capitalism, in this mythological sequence, remains a relation where distribution and production is nonpolitical. "Economies" are nonviolent. Hence, Europe has no obligation toward those who decide to flee the economy.

Yet, whether excess populations are pronounced economic or political migrants, they always seem to reach their final destination. Unlike the economy, however, migrants, as relative surplus populations must be monitored and regulated by all means possible. A complex hierarchical system is assembled, where people are classified under different migratory categories and are made to enter into stark competition with each other. The initial classifications, as woven into the apparently straightforward economic/political migrant dichotomy, produces a complex sequence of bogus asylum seekers that the European asylum system needs to control. This sequence merges with juridical rationales and furthers the migratory classification by fragmenting migrants according to differentiated access to work permits, labor markets, social benefits, and labor rights.

The possibility to segregate economic migrants from refugees at the European borders stems from the predisposition to maintain that there is a non-correspondence between the 'political' and the 'economic'. In our present moment, it seems, we cannot talk of one of the sides of the political/economic migration binary without necessarily negating its opposite. Why?

The economic/political migrant binary is oxymoronic in its nature, and it belongs to a particular ideological presupposition readily available to economic liberalism, i.e. the ways the latter construes the "economic" and the "political" vis-a-vis violence. Economic liberalism disembeds the "economic" from the "political" by detaching coercion from processes of production, distribution and allocation, which makes "the economy" appear as force-free. The elements that enable this particular ideological presupposition have been translated and arrested by the economic/political migrant binary so as to accommodate the two central notions of the political and the economic under liberalism: that of the political being violent and that of the economic being voluntary.

Building on Marx's account on private property's historical development into a pure economic form, Ellen Wood (1981; 1995) presents us with an explanation of the stakes and historical developments concerning the separation of the "economic" sphere from the

political. Partially, one such separation concerns the ways in which (the appearance of) violence is being structured. What Wood demonstrates is that the uniqueness of capitalism shall be traced in the ways in which "property-and-class-relations, as well as the functions of surplus appropriation and distribution, so to speak liberate themselves from – and yet are served by – the coercive institutions that constitute the state, and develop autonomously." Such "liberation" implicates the extraction of surplus labor (see Rioux's [2015] critique) which suddenly undertakes a solely economic form and the political coercion previously at work in its extraction is now removed from the relation between capital and labor. In this sense, economic categories such as "poverty" and "unemployment" (of which economic migrants are often accused of escaping) appear as if free of violence. Rioux (2013) argues that political Marxism (or the characterization of capitalism as marked by economic coercion in surplus extraction and of which Wood is representative) presents us with a "sanitized conception" of capitalist relations and reproduces a bourgeois understanding of the market – or precisely one such understanding that the economic is marked out of the political, where extra-economic violence disappears from capitalist relations. Rioux's critique is crucial. When one is to consider the existence of different forms of labor and surplus labor extraction in relation to capital, the persistence of different forms of dependence and slavery under capitalism, then, indeed, speaking of "economic" and "extra-economic" coercion becomes dubious.[220]

The "economic migrant" is the representation of this dubiousness *par excellence.* The notion of the economic migrant can be placed in the midst of these debates. This can happen if we consider whether or not economic coercion is a feasible notion that describes the structure of violence under capitalist relations. Then we can see that the ideal-typical conception of the European liberal state and its migration regime are here to convince us that the social has two parts. One is marked by political violence only, violence that the authentic refugee escapes. The other part is constituted by economic relations that are free of political violence. These economic relations are preserved for those who consciously migrate out of an entity (e.g. nation-state) in order to better their lives.[221]

Despite Rioux's critique, however, this construction persists in its real effects. The separation

[220] For details on the debate see *inter alia*, Thompson (1978); Anderson ([1980] 2016); Barker (1997); Banaji (2010).
[221] See the UNHCR definition of a refugee vs. economic migrant in the beginning of this chapter.

of the "economic" from political coercion, thus, becomes a field of struggle. The economic/political migrantness is its real appearance (Marx 1973; Hall 1973), in other words, the effect of the ideological construction that holds the market as free of violence. The aforementioned struggles of movement unfold in the terrain of this real appearance. Accordincly, the European migration regime and its concrete practices in the state forms of detention, push-backs, and asylum procedures appear as attempted sustaining of the apparent separation of violences. These relations structure the appearance of violence, which now emerges as possible to define only when its manifestation is of "political" nature. Yet, the economic migrant/refugee binary is oxymoronic in a sense. It is oxymoronic not because it is paradoxical but because it creates its own terms.[222] As applied by Rioux, the separation of economic and political is an impossible dualism as well as a desirable condition of freedom under liberal ideologies. If the process of "creating terms" assumes the existence of conflict and struggle, then the relation between the economic and the political can be read as an oxymoron, as always antagonistic. The surplus of that conflictual relation is locked in the "economic migrant," explicitly defined by the UN refugee convention as the opposite of the refugee; a construction that creates the possibility to divide moving bodies into such that exhibit economic voluntarism and such that exhibit political coercion. Then, the political/economic (migrant) binary can be treated not as a "real" separation, but as an illusion to be sustained.

7.3.2. History and the Refugee

There is a complex relation between these seemingly separate spheres that informs the formation of liberal approaches to international law, including the government of movement. As Sundhya Pahuja's (2010:10) critical investigation of international law shows, the attempts to define meanings of universal categories operates through the law's "constitutive function to cast and recast certain issues or questions as properly belonging to one set of institutions rather than another -- the 'economic' rather than the 'political'." For the author, the institutional separation between "economic" and "political" spheres that took place in the aftermath of World War II, has a concrete implication for a specific mode of power that governs the conduct of international law. This insight is important also for the ways in which physical movement between member states of the European Union is being approached and

[222] I borrow this insight of the "oxymoronic" from Lecercle's (2016) review of Virno's *Grammar of the Multitude* (2004), who in turn relies on Simondon.

controlled. I now turn to the historical roots of the separation between political and economic migrants.

Where the literature on international migration has been for a while concerned with the so-called migration-asylum nexus, which basically stands for the conclusion that such separation is arbitrary and the flows are interconnected and follow both political and economic reasons (Castles 2003), not much has been done to take a deeper historical look at the differentiation, let alone its ideological presuppositions. While the goal of this part of the thesis is to tackle the latter, I rely on secondary literature to engage with the former. The limited amount of studies that confront our task speaks volume to the normalization of the separation. Katy Long's (2013:4) article on the separation between migrants and refugees sets out to "[trace] the tangled history and migrant identities" Certainly, treating these categories as identities brings about methodological problems. Long concludes that, "treating refugees as migrants in the 1920s and 1930s failed to ensure their protection from persecution because their admission was entirely dependent upon economic criteria" (ibid:4). The author traces a process during which the economic criteria, i.e. the ability to perform work, slowly gave way to humanitarian and political prerequisites as a base for admission. UNHCR, according to the author, used the strategy to separate refugees from migrants in order to stop slave-trade-like practices that occurred in the late 1940s (ibid: p. 17-20). In the author's words,

> Considerable energy was invested by the UNHCR into trying to encourage refugee resettlement to be seen not only in terms of migration and labor recruitment, but – in order to include and even prioritize the vulnerable and the 'unemigrable' – to focus on refugees as objects of *humanitarian concern first, and only then consider* economic value (ibid:20).

It is important to engage with the methodological lens of the author as well. She states that her usage of the term refugee is consistent with the assumption that refugees leave "a country of origin because they were politically excluded (as opposed to simply impoverished). Migration is understood as a primarily socio-economic phenomenon" (ibid: 6). Interestingly, Long points out that refugees are something more than migrants (ibid: 21). They are superior in their claim to protection as their claim is humanitarian, which means that they cannot go back home. The refugee retains a "migrant identity", yet, add something more to it. Again, the refugee in Long's work retains the separation by advocating an understanding of the economy as free from the political. The author does not go further than what an immediate reading of

history would entail. Instead of this immediacy, I would like to think of this separation as a point of summary where we can disentangle ideological forms and hence, disturb their persistence in our contemporaneity.

I rely heavily also on Karatani (2005) in order to reconstruct the history of this binary as it pertains to migration laws. Karatani shows how two approaches to migration confronted each other in 1951 and produced the model of migration management that was to govern international movements in the next decades. Namely, these were the International Labor Organization's (ILO) "international coordination approach" and the US' "functional operation principle." The former was foreseen as an addition to bilateral agreements. In 1947, the common understanding regarding "migration problems" was that the ILO, in cooperation of course with the UN, shall have the permanent mandate to deal with "problems of an economic and social nature" stemming from migrating populations (ILO as cited in Karatani 2005). The secondary organizations (e.g. International Bank for Development and Reconstruction, World Health Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization) were to take control over "incidental" situations (ibid.). One such secondary organization was the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization, which speaks to generality as a defining feature of migration and incidentality as a defining feature of refuge. This approach towards international movements has permanently settled, as evident from the ways in which the Guestworker programs in the 1950s in Germany were organized, namely with the idea that eventually the foreign workers would leave and will not settle down[223]. Turkish singer and songwriter Cem KaracaIn captured this contradiction in the famous line *They called on workers but humans arrived* from his 1984 song "Es kamen Menschen." In other words, the generality of migration is acknowledged in its permanency. Its particularities (i.e. workers' transfers, refugee movements) however, are to be dealt with in their incidence.

Eventually, in 1947, the Secretariat Levels of the UN and the ILO agreed upon division of labor between the two bodies as it follows (it is worth quoting at length):

I. The competence of the International Labor Organization should include --
  a. the rights and situation of migrants in their quality as workers, as for example--
  (i) recruitment and selection;
  (ii) vocational training;
  (iii) care during transportation;

[223] Interview Manuela Bojadziev (2016). This is also true for the internationalist socialist workers.

(iv) employment;
(v) working conditions;
(vi) social insurance;
(vii) formalities in connection with the departure from the country of residence and admission to the country of destination;

b) such general assistance and advice to Governments on migration schemes as the ILO may be able to give from its experience.

II. The competence of the United Nations should include:
a. the migratory problem from the population point of view (demographic needs, consequences and possibilities);
b. rights and situation of migrants in their quality as aliens, as for example --
(i) conditions of residence;
(ii) expulsion, deportation and repatriation;
(iii) naturalisation
(iv) relief in case of indigency;
(v) enforcement of maintenance obligations;

c) economic and financial aspects of migration;

d) the political and legal aspects of migratory movements as related to their social and economic aspects (ILO, "Note concerning the Co-ordination of International Responsibility in the Field of Migration, Agreed on the Secretariat Level between the United Nations and the International Labur Organization." 1947. 30 *Official Bulletin:* 419)

We see that from the very pinning of the separation, the aliens, later to become refugees, were scrutinized as if they do not hold labor-power. In this way, the refugee was disarticulated from the worker. As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, this approach is retained in the political movements that organize around issues of flight. As Karatani (ibid: 524) mentions, "the rights and situation of 'migrants' were compartmentalised into two: those aspects of migrants as *workers* fell under the mandate of the ILO, whereas those as *aliens,* the UN." (Italics of the author).[224] In the next few years, international coordination was to be organized under the above mandate. In the meantime, however, Karatani continues, the U.S. was under increased pressure to tackle problems emerging from the increase of people fleeing Europe in the 1930s and 1940s simultaneously to its restrictive policies regarding immigration at the time. As a result of public pressure, the US helped the establishment of a few organizations that were to deal with questions of refugeedom and displacement: the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGGR), the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the temporary International Refugee Organization (IRO) as their successor (ibid.).

[224] This division of labor strikingly reminds of the way "social movements" are organized today around issues of migration.

Karatani makes the important point that the IRO's selective membership policy enabled the exclusion of the Soviet Bloc and therefore the taking of decisions without the latter's intervention. Additionally, the notion of the refugee was for the first time individualized, meaning that the collective basis as arrested in previous conceptions of the term withered away. In this last thread of thought, Karatani proposes that the separation between refugees (their fleeing is forced by their country of origin) and migrants (fleeing voluntarily as surplus labor populations) was theoretically plausible at the time, despite the difficulties of its implementation. The distinction has persisted.

7.4. The Dichotomy in Migration Studies and Its Ideological Presupposition

There are studies that do play with the difference between economic migrants and political refugees and speak to its implementation both on discursive and practical level. Rarely, however, such studies go to the bottom of the separation. Very often, they take the separation for granted and not as what Marx called "real appearance," i.e. the real effects of an ideological construction. For example, Adelson (2004) takes the UK asylum system and speaks to the subjective sides in the determination of one's status according to this particular taxonomy. The author concludes that by "crafting the difference," the UK government displays hesitation in upholding responsibility for political and economic developments abroad. The legal separation has also proliferated in the formation of somewhat peculiar sociological questions and methodological approaches. Kalena Cortes (2004) obediently applies the taxonomy in the US context in order to explore the different market outcomes according to one's status as either a refugee or an economic migrant. The author, stepping on a human capital investment research schemes, tells us that refugees make greater market gains as compared to economic migrants. Estimating the determinants for annual Jewish migration between 1881-1914 by applying economic variables, exploring chain migrations and indicators of religious violence, Boustan (2007) asks "Were Jews Political Refugees or Economic Migrants?" Such a theoretical question is methodologically flawed as the distinction did not exist in the time period concerned.

The political/economic migrant binary, arguably, is a common approach in the social sciences literature on international migration. Furthermore, there is an almost scholarly consensus of the necessity to separate the so-called *labor migration* and *forced migration.* This necessity is

an effect of the ways in which the particularities of migration have to be studied (see for example Diner 2008). Migration studies tend to preoccupy, and hence give answers to the curiosity of the *determinants* and *consequences* of people's moving. This necessity comes about because of the uneasy relation between migrations in general and migrations in particular I mentioned above. Methodologically speaking this has been translated in Migration Studies as a way to study a particular form of movement pattern (e.g. freedom of movement, asylum system, climate refugees) but never the relation between these seemingly separate fields or place them in a politico-economic constellation. This is evident when taking a short look at Andreas Demuth's (2000) "Some Conceptual Thoughts on Migration Research." The author simply translates the categories pinned by international law in order to narrate different approaches in migration. In this account, the reader learns that, "the refugee is an involuntary migrant, a victim of politics, war, or national catastrophe… In short, every refugee is a migrant, but not every migrant is a refugee" (27). Politics and economics remain firmly disintegrated. These words are strikingly reminiscent to Bono's take on migration in the beginning of this chapter. The individual, in this story, is the starting point as only the individual, after all, decides to migrate or not (p. 30). Demuth does not question these classifications but instead leads the reader to the proposition that such categories are legitimate and shall be used as a base for methodological approaches in the field:

> Categories therefore have their worth as an analytical tool. As opposed to some academic, judicial, or administrative delineations of such categories, it must be clear that in real life there are mixtures of migration types...Also, academic categorization does not *per se* have other objectives than clearing a path through a jungle of difficult academic terrain: explain the complicated (ibid: 27).

Following such paths gives an epistemic primacy to legal categories and provides them with a science-like form in addition to the preclusion of the conflictual nature of such taxonomies. Certainly, scholars have questioned such epistemological approaches. For example, Stigter and Monsutti (2005) have argued that the reason for flight among Afghans is a combination of both livelihood strategies and a response to war and hence, it is hard to determine only one, "true" reason for their flight. But even when such studies seemingly question the division, they nonetheless reproduce its premises by tackling the particularities of escape under the generality of migration, but not their ideological presuppositions. In other words, and risking reiterating the obvious, such studies tend to scrutinize the analytical points of departure and not of arrival.

To reason migration and to create complex taxonomies have always been a peculiar preoccupation in sociological research. For example, the well-known study of Petersen (1958) has categorized migration according to the individual's relation to the state, to nature and to cultural norms. This study has set the basis for exploring migration in terms of having either voluntarily or involuntary nature (see J.A. Jackson ed. 1969). The importance of migratory typologies is that:

> They force us to make both explicit the logical relationships between categories and to select the distinguishing criteria with some insight into the migrant situation. They are neither theories nor, in the absence of causal relationship between categories, classificatory systems; nor does anyone yet produced met all the requirements but they are useful in imposing order on a large mass of heterogeneous material and marking out clearly the ground to be covered by any general statement (Charles Price (in Jackson ibid.:195)

Even when the theoretical plausibility of models that scrutinize migration in terms of either being "voluntary" or "forced" is being questioned, methodological individualism still creeps in. Such is the case for example with Richmond's (1993) distinction between "reactive" and "proactive" migrations, which delineate the distinction between the different types of agency exercised by the individual. Ultimately, when the analytical departure point is the typology of migration according to reason (i.e. is it voluntary, involuntary, ecological, economic, political, etc), what is being generally maintained is an explanatory model focused on imputed choice of some abstracted individuals (i.e. methodological individualism).

There are critical engagements with the binary as well. The most recent one and perhaps the closest to my approach is Yarris and Castañeda's (2015) special issue in *International Migration*, "Displacement and Deservingness: Interrogating Distinctions between 'Economic' and 'Forced' Migration." In the Introduction to the issue the authors make the point that the distinction between "forced" and "voluntary" migration has affected the experiences of migrants. Their ethnographic approach, which encompasses "various legal, social, and symbolic frames" aims at arriving at an anthropological understanding of the interests and power relations involved at the distinction at hand. The starting points for the articles in the issue are international and national laws, public policy and media, everyday lives and particular ideologies. Where Willen (2015) emphasizes that the "economic" and "political" framework is not feasible in Israel, and the distinction between deserving and non-deserving

migrants is locked in vernacular frameworks of 'moral economies', Castañeda (2015) demonstrates that in Europe, even legal frameworks such as European citizenship are unable to distort the binary preoccupations and display great reliance on the "political"/"economic" migration binary in order to situate and categorize the traveling Roma populations within the European Union.

7.5. Conclusion

Where the Special Issue discussed above displays an uncertain understanding of *ideology*, I grapple with the term as a "real effect" and bring the political/economic migration binary as belonging particularly to classic economic liberalism. This expands our comprehension of the concrete ways that liberal political economy affects struggles around movements around the historical form of the "economic migrant". Sometimes, moving labor power does not always appear as if potential labor moves, as was the case with the internationalist socialist worker and the social benefit tourist. In the case of the economic migrant, this disappearance of the relation of labor power stems precisely from the struggle on part of those moving, nonetheless a struggle subsumed under a particular liberal ideology, to be able to stay.

But to what type of historical moment we can refer when attempting to think through the relationship between the term economic migrant and the relation of labor power? What is the connection between economic migrants and labor power, so to speak? First of all in sections 7.3. and 7.3.1. of this chapter I have argued that there is an overlap between nonviolence and the economy, which has translated into the economic migrant's undeservedness to claim belonging to a particular territory and which is historically determined by the "violent-free economy" ideology. The assumption is that economic migrants (i.e. ready to commodify their labor power) move. Yet, to claim deservedness, the economic migrant must convince the asylum technicians (interviewers, judges, etc.), that she does not travel as labor power, i.e. she is not arriving at a territory in order to commodify her capacity to work. Returning to the discussion on Jason Read (see section 5.3.4. of this work), who claims that the term *human capital* erases the opposition between labor and capital and the latter is subsumed under activity, whereas labor becomes history. Following Read's logic, I claim that the term 'true refugee' conceals, cancels out the relation of labor power through the very struggle one performs in order to sustain the *illusio* of being a true refugee.

As I demonstrated, the relation of labor power is in fact erased from appearance when "refugees" travel. This does not mean, however, that refugees are not moving labor power. The asylum system in Europe approaches moving labor power from the perspective of race/ethnicity (e.g. "safe country principle") and not from the perspective of class (e.g. the poverty migrant is such a historical form). As I have demonstrated in the theoretical frame of the thesis, the relations that have come about out of this ideology have been translated in the asylum system as a whole. The next part of the chapter will be devoted to the "real appearance," the effect of this distinction as it pertains to those who have been forced to seek asylum. Furthermore, I bring the discussion to a site that has not been studied so far in the terms I have settled throughout the thesis. Namely, I approach the effects of the differentiation from an external border of the European Union – Bulgaria.

My goal in this thesis is of different order also in regards to the historical accounts outlined above. It is not the point for me to restate that the people who move from one to another state do this for different reasons that are weaved into both political and economic factors and as such the categories that govern migration are inadequate and need to sustain conceptual change. My point, rather, is to see what quality the border acquires when we approach those who travel from the point of view of potential labor, i.e. moving labor power, through the prism of the ideological presuppositions that economic liberalism has left us with. To approach border crossers in this way allows us to ask questions that go beyond asylum systems and border regimes as such and to trace a rhythm of traveling to labor markets and social security systems. In other words, the border de-classes people.[225] It places them in a particular social position which coerces people to sell their labor power, more often than not, at the backstage of capital (Rajaram 2015). But before those who cross borders illegally reach that point, they have to travel through the loops of the *moshenolov.*

The next chapter scrutinizes the struggles against one's appearance as an economic migrant.

[225] Before crossing a border people usually sell all their property and spend all their savings in order to pay for the trip. Despite one's social class position prior to leaving a place to another, the pre-border world coerces her into becoming a bare labor power when finally the (semi-)final destination is reached. Many acquire debt along the way. In this sense, people are de-classed.

CHAPTER EIGHT MOVING LABOR POWER IN CAPTIVITY. *MOSHENOLOV* AND THE ASYLUM-SYSTEM IN BULGARIA

This chapter deals with the effects of the political/economic binary upon asylum systems in Europe and especially when looked at from the point of view of an external border, where asylum-seekers first arrive. Bulgaria is one such external border and considered a transit country. This means that the people who arrive in the European Union through the asylum route do not aim at remaining on the territory of Bulgaria. More often than not, they leave towards countries such as Germany, Sweden and Austria. Bulgaria is considered to be one of the most important external borders of the Union because of its proximity to Turkey and Greece, both of which hold an extraordinary number of refugees and hence, potential travelers to the Western core of the Union.

The so-called "refugee crisis" (see Rajaram 2015; 2016 and Cantat 2016 for a critical examination of the term) of 2015 has created the conditions for using refugees as biopolitical weapons of sorts. Turkey regularly threatens the EU that if certain conditions are not met in the relation between the two entities, it will open its borders so asylum-seekers can flood into the Union.[226] Bulgaria is the first country where this mass of people could concentrate and the Bulgarian political elite embark on these threats in order to block entrance by any means possible. Boyko Borisov, Bulgaria's Prime Minister since 2009 had made it clear that although the Republic of Bulgaria is a reliable partner of the European Commission, the country has no capacity to "receive any more economic migrants."[227] He is supportive of the President of European Council, Donald Tusk's position that Europe is to welcome only political migrants and has held that same political line ever since 2013 when Bulgaria first experienced growing number of border crossings from Turkey.[228]

In the following pages I show how the effects of the ideology that stands in the base of political and economic liberalism unfolds at the borders of Bulgaria and its asylum system.

[226] For example in 2016 the threat came over EU membership negotiations; in 2017 it was because of Germany's ban on Turkish diplomats from holding political rallies prior to the infamous referendum that took place in April of that same year.
[227] BNT. 2009. Retrieved July 17, 2017. http://news.bnt.bg/bg/a/boyko-borisov-za-ikonomicheski-migranti-poveche-nyamame-vzmozhnost
[228] Ibid.

These effects can be best grasped by the notion of the "economic migrant" which is in itself a notion whose possible existence belongs to the ways in which the "economic" is separated from the "political" sphere. The empirical cases that I engage with in this chapter demonstrate how the ideological presuppositions informing the European asylum systems use the typology of "economic" migrants and "genuine" refugees to reproduce such abstractions as the "economy."

The very notion of the 'economic' migrant and the refusal to offer her protection invisibilises coercion as a possible characteristic of the market, or the sphere that 'economic migrants' supposedly escape. This point is important in identifying the distinctive character of the forms that govern migration today in order to grasp their inner logics and not treat them as separate from larger ideological presuppositions and forms of oppression.

I already demonstrated that such separation is a relation of domination. In other words, the political/economic migrant binary is not simply an abstract structure. Asylum systems throughout Europe have enclosed their own coercion (stemming from the binary itself) into pockets of alienation and exclusion: border arrests, detention camps, registration camps, where the prime function of the European guardians is to isolate the 'economic' from the 'political'; the 'bogus' from the 'real'. This confronts people in a very real way and they resort to hunger strikes and self-harm so as to eradicate such boundaries. This is a terrain of struggle where those who are subjected to such differentiation act in relation to it. The battle on part of those kept in detention centers to be repositioned to reception centers, which would guarantee the start of the asylum procedure, is one instance of this struggle.

The second part of the chapter is concerned with the way detention centers slow down the movement of labor power into labor markets. I take advantage of the concept of the "decompression chamber" as utilized by Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) in order to demonstrate the above-mentioned argument. I complement their analysis of the movement between asylum-systems and labor markets with introducing one more actor, namely capital. I look into the ways capital (in our case an architect company) does not stay away from the struggles that unfold between moving labor power and the state. Capital embraces these struggles and its genius has found ways to commodify and produce profit out of these struggles.

8.1. Asylum in Bulgaria: A Historical Overview

In 1992, Bulgaria ratified the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees and that same year it opened the National Bureau for Territorial Asylum and Refuge. The Bureau was renamed to Agency for Refugees in 2000 and to State Agency for Refugees (SAR) in 2002. After a series of legal and infrastructural changes (e.g. the introduction of detention centers that hold foreigners in 2006), Bulgaria is now part of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Since 1992, CEAS "[sets] out common high standards and stronger co-operation to ensure that asylum seekers are treated equally in an open and fair system.[229] As other countries within the System, its asylum procedures and policies are subordinated to international and EU law precept. According to Bulgarian and international law, every foreigner has the right to submit an asylum application, in both cases of legal and illegal crossing. This can be done before every state representative but only SAR officially registers applications. According to the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC 2016), the majority of the asylum applications are submitted to Border Police (at the border) and to the Migration Directorate (in the detention centers). This is due to the fact that for the most part asylum-seekers cross the state border "illegally" (usually from Turkey by land) and are subject to arrest and detention. This also means that this is the point of time when those crossing have to start convincing the state (i.e. SAR) that they are not economic migrants.

Prior to 2013, Bulgaria was not receiving much asylum applications. This is due to the general unattractiveness of the country as a final destination and its transient character. Even when people made it to its territory for the most part they left for Germany, Switzerland and Austria with the first chance they had. According to many of my interlocutors who have made it to Bulgaria one way or another, and have different statuses in relation to legality, prior to 2006 (a year before Bulgaria's accession into the EU), it was much easier to remain in the country even without documents and without having to go through the asylum procedure. The table below demonstrates the change in the number of people who sought protection in Bulgaria from 1993 to March 2017. This table should be taken with a pinch of salt, however. As we can see there is a sharp increase in 2013, 2014, and 2015, with the number decreasing in 2016. This decrease is due to push-backs and the border fence that was constructed in 2015.

[229] Few are the directives under CEAS: the revised Asylum Procedure Directive, Reception Conditions Directive, Qualification Directive, Dublin Regulation, EURODAC Regulation. EC. 2017. Retrieved July 17, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en. .

Table 6. Asylum-seekers 1993-2017

Information regarding the persons who sought protection and decision taken in the period 01.01.1993 r. - 31.03.2017 r.						
Year	***Number of people who sought protection***	*Received refugee status*	*Received humanitarian status*	*Refused status*	*Discontinued asylum procedure*	***Total number of decisions***
1993	276	0	0	0	0	**0**
1994	561	0	0	0	0	**0**
1995	451	73	14	6	28	**121**
1996	283	144	13	28	132	**317**
1997	429	145	2	28	88	**263**
1998	834	87	7	104	235	**433**
1999	1349	180	380	198	760	**1518**
2000	1755	267	421	509	996	**2193**
2001	2428	385	1185	633	657	**2860**
2002	2888	75	646	781	1762	**3264**
2003	1549	19	411	1036	528	**1994**
2004	1127	17	257	335	366	**975**
2005	822	8	78	386	478	**950**
2006	639	12	83	215	284	**594**
2007	975	13	322	245	191	**771**
2008	746	27	267	381	70	**745**
2009	853	39	228	380	91	**738**
2010	1025	20	118	386	202	**726**
2011	890	10	182	366	213	**771**
2012	1387	18	159	445	174	**796**
2013	7144	183	2279	354	824	**3640**
2014	11081	5162	1838	500	2853	**10353**
2015	20391	4708	889	623	14567	**20787**
2016	19418	764	587	1732	8932	**12015**

2017	1338	293	324	745	2987	**4349**
Total	**80639**	**12649**	**10690**	**10416**	**37418**	**71173**

Source SAR.

Certainly, what statistics can point to is the state gaze towards what is rendered important population knowledge. We can read these statistics as "knowledge-gathering exercise" that stabilize hegemonic projects (Rajaram 2015). How many people cross a border; how many apply for asylum; how many are granted protection or not; and how many people leave a country for another (this is shown by the "Discontinued asylum procedure" column). The numbers that we see also lay an understanding of whom is to be admitted as worthy of protection and whom not. The latter is a function of the rationale productive of the economic/political binary.

Prior to 2016, the detention of asylum-seekers was against the norms required by law, yet, in 2016 the latter was amended in order to introduce such a possibility (Ilareva 2015; 2016). The amendment followed a regularly reported malpractice from previous years where asylum-seekers were regularly detained despite their submission of an asylum application (which can take place both in a written and oral form). Even though Bulgarian law did not provide any explicit basis for detention of asylum-seekers (Global Detention Project 2011) this was a common practice in the country, and one that pertained mostly to the grey area of the law.[230] This grey area is now legitimated and in it the conflict that pertains to the political/economic migrants unfolds both spatially and temporarily.

Bulgaria provides four types of international protection: refuge (given by the President of the Republic), refugee and humanitarian status (given by the State Agency for Refugees), and temporary protection status (given by the Council of Ministers). The asylum system is not centralized. The two main bodies that have responsibilities in the field of asylum are the State Agency of Refugees (SAR), which is under the auspices of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Interior, which guards the border on the one hand but it also manages the detention centers for foreigners in the country. The asylum system in the country supposedly strictly follows the recommendations and obligations that come with the ratification of the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees and European standards in the field of

[230] Global Detention Project (2011) Bulgaria: profile. Retrieved December 27, 2016. https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/bulgaria Accessed: 29-11-2016.

international protection."

Photo 13. Geographical Location of Detention Centers in Bulgaria



Source: Bordermonitoring Bulgaria

Emanating from the above, the detention facilities are not supposed to hold asylum-seekers, yet, the practice of the Bulgarian state has for years imprisoned people despite their verbal assurance that they seek protection. The detention centers are in the towns of Busmantsi (near Sofia) and in Lyubimets (close to the border with Greece and Turkey). Elhovo, close to the Turskish-Bulgarian border on the Bulgarian side, is a semi-detention center, meaning that those who cross are initially arrested there and afterwards distributed to other asylum spaces. SAR manages the so-called reception centers, which accommodate those whose asylum application had been *accepted* by the Agency. There are seven of these centers: four of them in Sofia (Ovcha Kupel, Vrajdebna, Voenna Rampa, Kovachevtsi), two of them close to the Turkish-Bulgarian border (Harmanli and Pastrogor) and one situated in Central Bulgaria (Banya). SAR is also the institution that decides whether or not one is a *true refugee* in the first instance. Let us look shortly at its history.

In a decision 590 from December 1992, we see that Filip Dimitrov, a Prime Minister at the time has approved the Project concerning the amending of the Law on the residence of foreigners in Republic of Bulgaria.[231] The motives of the amending pursue the following line:

> The change of the foreign political and economic priorities of the country, and the growth and deepening of migratory movements in recent years, forces a revision of the system of entry and residence of foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria on the basis of

[231] CAS. The name of the document: Decision 590 of the Council of Ministers approving a draft Law on Amendments to the Aliens Residence Act in the Republic of Bulgaria (Решение 590 на МС за одобряване проект за Закон за изменение и допълнение на Закона за пребиваване на чужденците в РБ).

> a new concept of the visa regime. This concept should be in line with European standards that had been developed and applied by both regional and target structures and of individual countries with experience in regulating and controlling the processes of migration (ibid.).

Here, as well, we see a shift in the approach to foreigners in Bulgaria as compared to the socialist regime (see chapter four). Where socialists in the trade union interpreted the "deepening of migratory movements" in a way that was to integrate them into existing social structures and institutions, the transition brought a new understanding in the management of such populations. Namely, one of protecting the republic from economic migrants and controlling the movement of people in accordance to their reason of escape. What concerns us here is the changes that took place in regards to the meaning of asylum, its subject and what does that entail for the political/economic divide. That would be paragraph 17 that was changed in the following way: In 1972, the foreigners who held the right to asylum were:

> those persecuted for defending the interests of laborers (*трудещите се*, literally translated as those who labor); for partaking in national liberation struggles; for progressive political, scientific and artistic activity; for struggle against racial discrimination or for the defense of peace.

The definition of a refugee changed in the following way in 1992:

> [those] when persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, belonging to a particular social group or political convictions, or for activities defending the rights and freedoms recognized in international treaties to which Republic of Bulgaria is a side.[232]

The class-based approach towards those who could seek asylum was erased in the first years of the transition.

Bulgaria's transition to a liberal-democratic state required a substantial change in its definition of asylum. Rositza Guentcheva (2012:12) demonstrates that the excitement accompanying the initial debates regarding the notion of a refugee, did not last for long. Already in 1991, the fear of the possibility to have 'economic' migrants entering Bulgarian territory captivated members of parliament.[233] Guentcheva argues that, '[such fears] would form the basis for a new understanding of refugees as bogus [*фалшиви*] refugees' (ibid:14).

[232] Ibid.

[233] Bulgaria was declared to be a safe country that same year, ultimately turning thousands of Bulgarian asylum-seekers abroad into economic migrants.

Bulgaria's transition was conditioned upon a specific understanding of who is to be admitted and perpetuated the economic/political binary from the very beginning. This understanding of a population also requires a certain response stemming from its undesirable (the economic) portion. Yet, as Guentcheva also demonstrates, this conditions are not peculiar to Bulgaria. In the author's (2012:15) wording: "In the 1980s the Western European countries replaced the generous acceptance from the previous couple of decades with practices of strict migration control, in which the refugee is considered to be an unwanted foreigner, who is inclined towards cheating and abuse only so as to achieve her/his aim to economic migration."

What is to be done with those who are potential economic migrants? How are we to separate them from the genuine refugees? These are the questions the state preoccupies itself with in the particular historical form of moving labor power known as the European Asylum System. These questions are posed and answered throughout the asylum procedure; from the very moment of crossing to the very moment of asylum decision. They undertake peculiar spatio-temporal dimensions. Let us take a look.

8.2. Moshenolov in Bulgaria: Temporal Spaces Between the Potential and the Actual

Being an external border of the EU, Bulgaria has been very committed to its role as a guard. Fences, people-hunters, border arrests – all resources to protect the Union and the fatherland have been employed to capture the false, the economic (i.e., the economic migrant) and to separate it from the genuine, the political (i.e., the politically persecuted migrant). The asylum system of the external borders is subjected exactly to this logic. Catch the tricksters, the *moshennik* among the true ones. This *мошенолов* [*moshenolóv*] grants meaning to a whole array of technicians (translators, interviewers, smugglers, human rights activists, psychologists), infrastructural improvements (the so-called 'smart borders', accommodation centers, school classes particularly for refugees), a legislative and an executive system.[234] In addition, this *moshenolov* has its own course: crossing the border, pushbacks or detention, interrogation, court, prison, registration centre, and finally a rejection or granting of a refugee status. In this temporality of becoming a refugee, one of the most important tasks for both migrants and technicians, is to adjust their knowledge to this movement from potentiality to

[234] *Moshenolov* is a neologism of mine. from *мошенник* [*moshennik*] – scoundrel, fraud, trickster, and *лов* [*lov*] – hunt, trap, chase.

actuality. This task is also spatially incorporated in detention centers such as Lyubimets and Busmantsi, but also in the reception centers in the country. In other words, an answer is sought to the questions 'How to convince them that I am a genuine refugee?' and 'How can we be sure, that the person is *not* a genuine refugee?' We could imagine the progression of the *moshenolov* as a string of knots of temporal spaces, where the movement potentiality-actuality is constantly renegotiated. I examine two such spaces that consist the *moshenolov* chain: the border and the detention center.

When an asylum-seeker crosses the Bulgarian border, she is placed in detention; either in the towns of Lyubimets, in Busmantsi, or, as is the case since 2013 when Bulgaria experienced high number of crossings, in Elhovo, near the Turkish border. As Lydie Arbogast (2016:10) notes, "[s]ince the 1990s, detention has become the method of choice to manage migrant populations in Europe and beyond." The building of detention centers for immigrants in Bulgaria, however, was a prerequisite for the country's accession into the EU. The first such facility was opened in Busmantsi in 2006, one year prior to Bulgaria's accession in the Union. Petar Kostadinov (2010) for the *Sofia Echo* claims that the center was opened "supposedly as a civilized solution to the challenges Bulgaria faced as a European Union frontier country." Prior to 2006 migrants were detained together with Bulgarian 'outcasts,' however.

I learned this while doing research in a small park behind the Mosque in Sofia in 2012. At the time the park was used as an irregular labor market, where both migrants and Bulgarians hung out in hope that somebody picks them up for a small job.[235] This is how I met Kalin (an Iraqi in his 40s who has been in Bulgaria since early 2000s) and Vassil (a Bulgarian "junkie" in his late twenties) whom happened to have spent time in Drujba. Drujba is a place, where "illegal" migrants and Bulgarian 'junkies' were being detained in the same facility prior to the opening of the detention center for immigrants in Busmantsi (a year before Bulgaria's accession into the EU). Kalin and Vassil met at the park and not in Drujba. The three of us went to the detention facilities one day so they can show me the place for 'outcasts'.

After a forty-minute-travel we reached Drujba, a neighborhood on the outskirts of Sofia, where 'illegal migrants' used to be detained. The premises were quite hidden from site and one could only reach them via a dusty, unpaved and narrow road. As we reached the building,

[235] This labor market is very similar to the one depicted in the previous section, yet, the labor process would take place strictly in a field determined as "illegal." The possibility of self-employment status is not used.

Kalin and Vassil decided to stay away. They stood at the outset of the dusty road while I made my way towards the premises. I approximated the short metal sheet wall, orderly garnished with cameras and barbed wire, which stood in the way to the detention premises themselves. Even though the walls were short, as compared to other detention facilities, I still had to jump in order to see what laid behind them. I could not. Shortly, two police officers came running and opened the door to the prison. "What is this building?" I asked. My puzzlement was genuine. I could see the Ministry of Interior emblem on the entrance but have never heard of the place before. "This is for people with a roaming way of life [*skitnicheski nachin na jivot*]," responded one of the guards. "Is it true that it used to hold illegal migrants?" "Yes. But ask the press center." This is all I could acquire from the guards. They slammed the door and sneaked back into the police covering to hide from the summer heat. It was obvious they would not let me in, so I left.

On the way back to the Mosque's park, Vassil broke the silence and narrated the first time he was detained in Drujba. "I was walking back home that night. Surely, I looked dirty, I was on heroin back then and you know how it is… but despite that I did have where to live. They [the police] did not have to detain me just because I looked dirty." The Ministry of Interior detains even mothers with small children, according to Vassil. "The police keep detaining the same people over and over again. They make them eat from bawls like dogs, you know. I don't understand why they detain them. Why they detain them? After a while they just let them go and do nothing for them. It is all for money?" Vassil's monologue further revealed that many of the homeless are picked up from parks and streets when the "high-ranking" (*visokopostavenite*) people come to town.[236]

The story from above reveals a rupture. A rupture that performed the separation of one

[236] The detention of people who have "roaming way of life" is regulated by Ordinance #1 of the Sofia Municipality. Occasionally, the Ministry of Interior would publish on their website actions that have taken place against such people. One such report was published in 2010. It reads, "A regular joint operation to locate people living in a roaming way of life, begging and cleaning car windows at junctions, was held on the territory of the capital during the past week. It was attended by officials from the Street Crime Sector, Prevention and Security Forces, inspectors from the Children's Pedagogical Room at the State Agency for Child Protection and employees of the Social Activities Directorate at Sofia Municipality. In the territory of the Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth Police Departments, 63 people were detained, 10 of them under 18 and 12 under 16 years of age. The children are accommodated in the social home 'Faith, Hope and Love' in 'Nadezhda' and 'Mladost' districts. Begging adults have been charged according to Ordinance №1 of Sofia Municipality and for the wanderers - protocols for police warning with disposition were issued." MoI. 2010. https://www.mvr.bg/press/%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BE/%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B4/%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8/news100329_01. Retrieved July 11, 2017.

"other" from another "other;" the outside other from the other within; the "illegal/economic" migrants from the Bulgarian "*скитник* [roamer]." This rupture can be thought in two ways: as an outcome of the increased dependence on European funds in order to sustain state institutions in the EU (i.e. neoliberal governance) and as a combination between humanitarian and securitizing policies towards migrating populations in the context of the first decade of the 2000s in the EU. In my research on Assisted Voluntary Return Programs (AVRP) (Apostolova 2012), I demonstrate how migration management in the framework of the EU has relieved the seeming tensions between securitization and humanitarianism. The different mechanisms employed in this particular type of management in fact exemplifie a hybrid rationale towards populations in motion, a rationale that accommodates both securitization and humanitarianism. This separation of the detention of immigrants from the detention of internal outcasts is one such instance. Humanitarianism is an important logic in this relation as (potential) refugees are subjects of regimes of care (Ticktin 2011). Ultimately, the new Homes for Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners had to cover human rights standards allocated by European institutional bodies and actors working in the field of humanitarian relief (e.g. NGOs such as Caritas, the Red Cross, etc.). These Homes (even when only considered in the language mark "home") are a case in point. They accommodate (humanitarianism), yet, they also secure the "nation-state" from undesired populations (securitization).

When we go back to Arbogasts' proposition that detention is one of the predominant migration practices within the EU and combine it with Julia Morris' (2016) research which shows how detention centers grew both in popularity and numbers throughout the world as a result of a humanitarian nexus, then we should be able to also question how detention becomes a point of potentiality for capital. As Arobogasts (2016) well demonstrates, detention centers are turned into points of accumulation. According to her (2016: 20), the management of detention in the EU "reveals three distinct forms and levels of privatization." We can devise this into full privatization and semi-privatization. Bulgaria is of the second type, of a public-private partnership: while the detention falls within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, some of the services are outsourced to private entities (as it will be discussed further in the chapter).

The Ministry of Interior claims that there is not enough space in the reception centers of the

country in order to place all those who have the right to be there.[237] People can stay detained for months before being let go to a reception center. In the meantime a definitional vacuum is being established as it is not rare that people who are detained have expressed their desire to claim asylum in Bulgaria: an utterance that, by international law, is enough of a reason for one to be considered for refugee status. In the meantime they are imprisoned in the so-called "Special Homes for the Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners", aka detention centers, which render one to be illegal migrant. The centers are supposed to hold people who await their deportations as 1) they could not prove to the state that they are arriving because of fear of political persecution and hence they are considered economic migrants; 2) they have been caught at the border but not claimed asylum. This vacuum is often performed on part of the state in a way so as to excuse the detainment of asylum-seekers.

Being let go to a SAR reception center, repositions one from a state of being considered an illegal body to holding the position of legalized asylum-seeker, i.e. one enters an asylum procedure. The possibility of considering one to be illegal within the prerequisites for asylum stems from the very obsessions that characterize European asylum systems in general and, in our case, Bulgaria as well. Schematically placed, between the 1980s and the early 2000s, the European obsession with the figure of the migrant was marked by the need to recognize the "objective" reasons behind one's escape. Is it voluntary or forced; is it economic or political? These are of course interchangeable. Today, this obsession has taken another political angle which has exceeded the closed systems of asylum. There is a constant need to convince us the public that the people who cross the European borders are here because of "subjective economic reasons" and not because of "objective fear of political persecution." They are, hence, economic migrants and not refugees. Once humbly locked within the premises of asylum-seeking this type of narrative is now freely roaming everywhere we look. This type of narrative teaches us that in order for "economic migrants" to stay within 'us', they have to trick us and to change their outward appearance from an economic to a political migrant. The outward appearance is locked in the stories that they would eventually present to the state in order for the latter to declare them truth or false. These stories have one goal: to convince the State Agency for Refugees in Bulgaria that one is *not* an economic migrant. Their goal, to be more precise, is to delineate a rigid boundary between "me, as a true refugee" and "them, as the economic migrants." This boundary has a special place in the ways the Bulgarian State

[237] Hungary is another member state that practices detention of asylum-seekers.

Agency for Refugees approaches its 'outside.' This boundary shapes political struggles to a large degree as it creates a vacuum within which a competition is being established between the different categories of migration as they are differentially included within legal systems, labor markets, health-care and the crumbling welfare state in general. Being on the right side of this boundary has the potential for its subjects to stay within and to perhaps enjoy the "fortunes" of legality.

The boundaries of what is to be considered "political" in these stories is elastic. Miriam Ticktin (2008; 2011a; 2011b) shows that in the case of the French and U.S. asylum system "the political" can stretch in order to include sexual violence and illness as a formidable ground for claiming asylum. What takes place is that a loop is created, where illness and sexual violence, considered to be of humanitarian urgency, are treated as exceptions and thus, form an asylum ground. Focusing on humanitarianism as a form of governance, Ticktin (2011b:141-142) suggest that the above is double edged, "while biology and the evidence it is seen to provide fuels hope for a better life whatever the context, it simultaneously provides a means for stratifying populations and maintaining discriminations that derive from colonial and imperial histories, by rendering those histories invisible." In other words, the political in the equation can be stretched so as to shelter humanitarian reasonings for escape. Humanitarianism becomes yet another boundary of the political that functions as another front to guard the political-economic equation, i.e. to make invisible histories of economic violence. While the "political" out of the economic-political equation can be stretched, it can never resemble an economic form. In this equation, the economic is the negative conception of the political. Otherwise, no protection will be provided.

In the tracking of economic migrant, we are faced with the constantly recurring notion of the "trickster," of the *мошенник*. Trickster-y is always presumed when the "outside" is concerned. No matter if the "outside" comes from "within" as is the case with the EU social benefit tourist or the outcasted homeless such as Vasil. This symbolic structure informs the asylum infrastructure at place in Bulgaria which has developed in order to track tricksters. This is especially pronounced in light of Bulgaria's role as a guardian of the external borders of the Union; a role that has been taken very seriously by all political parties in the country. Such asylum systems employ forms of knowledge that speak to the old anthropological archetype of the figure of the trickster: "complicated characters, as they easily slip and slide between one extreme to the next" (Nadelberg 2008:8). This type of knowledge practice, both

in its requirements of its facilitation and outward effects, valorizes different forms of intelligence, which are arrested in the asylum system itself: interviewers, translators, detention and reception camps, and even smugglers and "story sellers" that operate before the reaching of the border. I will look into this asylum chain next and in the ways it unrolls in Bulgaria.

Proving non-economic-migrantness is preceded by crossing physically the European border. One has to prove she is a genuine refugee in order to remain on European territory. The entire apparatus in place for the purpose: interviewers, translators, professionals who collect evidence regarding the scale of "hotness" at the "problematic zones," psychologists – is the condition known as "asylum-seeking." The latter is a temporal space laid aside for the potential of being pronounced a refugee or being turned into an economic migrant. This temporal space is constituted by knots which progress towards one being declared to be worthy of protection. I will focus my attention on two of these knots: crossing the border and repositioning from the detention to reception. I call the processes *moshenolov*: the filtering of the economic form the political.

Figure 3. ***Moshenolov***



[1] This is a sketch of the possible outcomes of the entire process of the *moshenolov*. Due to limitations posed by the format of a PhD thesis, I will engage only with the relations marked by the red arrows.

8.2.1. Border crossing

As any other peripheral EU border, the Bulgarian one is like a swing that oscillates between life and death. Annually, thousands are trying to cross it claiming "better life opportunities" but some, instead, find a fatal end. What is extreme in the case of Bulgaria is that it does not offer death only at its entrance but it extends it also at its exit. On June 4, 2014, an Afghani was shot and wounded by the Bulgarian border police while trying to escape into Serbia. On November 19, 2014, four refugees tried to cross the Serbian border on their way out of Bulgaria and were found dead. Reason: freezing. Nine days later, on November 28, a body of a refugee was found frozen near the Turkish-Bulgarian border. On March 12, 2015, Mohammed Jawad Kadhima and Elias Murad died after they sustained leg injuries in a violent attack exercised upon them by the Bulgarian border police. The limbs of the two refugees were broken, which resulted in the impossibility for them to move forward and subsequent death by freezing occurred.

Never mind the deaths, those who had made it to the anterior of the asylum system in Bulgaria have crossed a border illegally. There is no other way around. Embassies never issue visas to people deemed "undesirable" and the transfers of people that the UNHCR is supposed to perform are a rare occasion and they usually do not reach countries like Bulgaria. Border crossing is the first step one needs to undertake in order to enter the negotiations over her category. But what takes place *at the border*, and here I mean the delineating line between one nation state and another, is a reversal of the sacred principle of criminal justice, and namely "innocent until proven guilty." The body of the crosser is perceived as if a body of an economic migrant and hence guilty of illegal crossing. Hasan, among hundreds of others narrates his experience of crossing as such:

> It was a group of four of us and we hid in the bushes before we crossed [from Turkey to Bulgaria]. It was dark. We crossed and after some time we were stopped by police. Green jackets. They made us sit on the ground, our hands behind our backs and wait. They took our luggage. I never saw it again. Two cars came. We were taken to a police arrest in Svilengrad. We stayed two days before we were taken to Court. We said we were refugees. After that we were placed in buses and told "camp Sofia." We were very happy. We celebrated in the bus. We sang songs. We were going to a refugee camp. After just a few minutes the bus made a turn into a secondary road. We realized we were not being sent to Sofia after the police told us to get off and brought us in a yard behind tall walls with barb wire on top of the walls. We were not happy anymore. We realized we are in prison now. Why? We are just refugees…
> (Interviewed by the author)

Photo 14. Lyubimets' front yard

Photo credit: Ministry of Interior. This is the front yard of Lyubimets and the first thing Hasan saw when he left the bus.

Hasan is from Afghanistan and he told me this during one of my trips in 2013 to Pastrogor, the home of the transit center for asylum-seekers near the Turkish-Bulgarian border. The storytelling took place at the local "park": a small concrete square surrounded by small flower islands that belong to the mayor house of the village. He was sitting right across from me and we were part of a "story circle," a research practice that resembles focused groups. People left the "story circles" from time as it was close to 40C. The nearby water fountain was the only place, where one could get rid of the clammy sweat and prevent heat stroke. Hasan was just transferred from the detention center in Lyubimets to the reception center in Pastrogor, where he was free to walk out "any time he wants;" just not between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. I was barely trying to keep my spontaneous yawn unnoticed. I have heard the same story repeatedly for at least a year. Let us compare Hasan's story with Mikita's story a year later. My conversation with Mikita took place over the phone as at the time of the interview she was in Edirne, Turkey. She explained to me that her four children and she started towards Bulgaria as they had family members there and wanted to reunite. They walked two days and eventually found themselves lost in the forest. In time they were able to reach the town of Voden, Bulgaria, where a local man called the border police for them. Then the story continues like this:

Bulgarian border police came to take us. They told us 'camp Sofia' but instead

> brought us [back] to the border. It was two policemen, then six or seven more came… On the Turkish side of the border they started beating us because the boy wanted food. 'No, no, go away, don't come to the Bulgarian side,' they were screaming and beating us.[238]

Mikita and her children were pushed-back. Border crossing can be terrifying. The violence at the Bulgarian border, however, cannot be looked upon without referencing its relation to the European Union in general and Germany in particular. Bulgaria's continuous impossibility to enter the Schengen area has been translated in the country as a goal, whose achievement is only possible if it could be proven that the country prevents illegal, i.e. economic migration. Germany has also exercised pressure on Bulgaria (see chapter six for analysis of this pressure). In March of 2015, for example, Germany's foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke in the capital Sofia and ensured the public about his country's commitment towards increasing the investment plans in Bulgaria as the country is Germany's key partner in the fight against illegal migration. Such "hints" are taken very seriously by Bulgarian authorities. German capital is very important to the country. After all, we shop in Kaufland, repair our houses with Bosch and the Bulgarian garment industry comprised by underpaid female workers depends on the German market to export its commodities.[239]

In 2015, push-backs were an everyday. As part of my involvement in Border Monitoring Bulgaria, part of my job was to expose these stories. This is how knowledge production works in asylum activism. As the premises upon which asylum is decided upon are humanitarian, one has to make a humanitarian scandal out of such stories as a) in some rare occasion maybe somehow someday this could change the treatment of "refugees" b) because these humanitarian scandals have the power to increase one's chances to make it into Germany. As I went on the Bulgarian National Radio to scandalize the beating and the pushing-back of Mikita and her four children I knew precisely what to expect. To be called a "liar." The imposition of "*moshennichestvo*" is not solely attached to the economic migrant but also to her "defender." My counterpart during the radio show was chief commissioner and head of Border Police, Zaharin Panov. Let us see what the qualities of the *moshennik* according to him are:

[238] The interview was conducted for project Border Monitoring which published a report in 2014 named *Trapped in Europe's Quagmire* and authored by Hristova, Apostolova, Deneva, Fiedler.
[239] Bulgaria has been called "the sewing sweatshop of Europe" by researchers from the Clean Clothing Campaign. Novinite. 2014. http://www.novinite.com/articles/161426/Bulgaria+Is+%E2%80%9CThe+Sewing+Sweatshop+of+Europe%E2%80%9D+-+report. Accessed April 21, 2017.

> [On the day mentioned by Raia Apostolova] Bulgarian Border Patrol has established the presence of five persons who were close to the border line [between Bulgaria and Turkey] on the Turkish side. The Turkish border authorities have been informed [by the patrol]. Until their arrival, the five subjects have had extremely provocative and aggressive behavior, resulting in throwing stones at Bulgarian border guards, throwing stones at the official car and turning on the loudspeaker of their phones and speaking in broken Bulgarian language and offering money to the Bulgarian officers so as to assist them with the passage on Bulgarian territory. When the Turkish authorities arrived, *лицата* [*litsata,* the persons, much impersonated official language] have tried to escape. It has been necessary to chase the persons in order to arrest them. Not in a single moment a contact between the persons and the Bulgarian border employees took place. [The persons] have never been on Bulgarian territory.

In a statement issued a couple of weeks later, the Bulgarian Minister of Interior at the time qualified a report on push-backs issued by Human Rights Watch as "pouring of outright lies and slander."

The increased number of border crossings in the period between 2013 and 2014 increased also the presence of migrants in the central areas of Sofia, which did not go unnoticed by neo-fascist formations. Organized militias started patrolling the streets in order to "protect civilians." For a couple of years, Bulgarians were also encouraged by neo-fascist groups such as National Resistance and the parliamentary-represented party Patriotic Front to go to the border and protect it against the intruders. There has been a few instances of self-organized groups along the Bulgarian border who go and "hunt" illegals. Hunting is not only metaphorical in this case. Hunting has become a concrete practice. Its emergence is somewhat not surprising considering the simultaneous employment by the media of the words catching (*zalavjam*) and illegal immigrants (*nelegalni imigranti*) in abundance for years. This wording in turn effectively reduced migrants to prey to be caught. One such instance was the civil arrest of fifty border crossers that took place on October 20, 2015 by a group of thirteen game hunters who, "admire the courage of the three border police officers" who killed an unarmed Afghan boy just a few days prior. When hunters hunt, they look for economic migrants, "who [do] not look like refugees."

Dinko Valev was one such head of a hunter gang who chases economic migrants at the southern border. In 2016, he became a media star not only in Bulgaria but also in the international press as he had tremendously improved the hunting practices. He used dogs, horses, off-road bikes and even military vehicles to trace "illegals." Once the gang catches migrants, they make them turn face down on the ground until the police came to pick them

up. Valev was either recognized as a hero by right-wingers, despised, or sanctioned by NGOs or even ridiculed as a low-educated man from the countryside by elitist academics. Yet, the propositions on part of intellectuals in regards to the European borders were not far from Valev's own. Andrey Raichev, a well-known sociologist and Mihail Konstantinov, a professor of mathematics called for the army to be able to "shoot" in case of mass influx and acts of disobedience as the ones that took place between Macedonia and Greece on February 29th, 2016. The intellectuals were invited to speak about the "refugee crisis" and on the occasion of Donald Tusk's yet another statement that "economic migrants shall not come to Europe." Raichev and Konstantinov became the radicalized Dinko Valev.

Unlike the surgical precision that we witnessed in the organization of the movement of migrants during the so-called "long summer of migration" (Kasparek and Speer 2015), the crossing in and through Bulgaria at the time was completely different. There was a dispersal of the movement of people through the acts of constant escaping - escaping border guards, escaping fingerprinting, escaping refugee camps.[240] As we saw, shootings, push backs, and hunts figure well into the reasons of escape as well. The above resemble escape from *politics of death.* It is right to recall here, the opening sentence of Mbembe's work "Necropolitics," "the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die" (2003:10). I would

[240] Taking one's fingerprints at the first entry point of the EU is a member state obligation under the Dublin Directive. The development of the Dublin regulation has gone through three stages: the Dublin Convention of 1997, the Dublin II Regulation of 2003 and lastly, the Dublin III Regulation of 2013. The rationale behind the Dublin System is to distribute the "burden" of asylum-seekers and, in this light, to determine which member states are responsible for asylum claimants (see Schuster 2011, Mozourakis 2014, Kasparek 2015). Dublin has been discussed in terms of the "repression hypothesis" (Schuster cited in Kasparek 2015) in the sense that Dublin is essentially a political movement against asylum. Conversely, Kasparek (ibid.) is afraid that one such scrutinizing of the regulation reifies asylum and precludes us from seeing the "many twists, turns, and internal contradictions" that crisscross the system and instead, proposes a view on Dublin as being part of the larger European border regime, which is comprised by negotiations and conflicts. Some (Guild 2006) have read through the Dublin system in order to gain a better understanding of the ways in which lives are impacted and yet, others (Costello 2012, Moreno-Lax 2012) have based their critique on Dublin in the framework of rights. What these studies show is that in a way, Dublin is a European-craft that attempts to sedentarize non-EU migrants at their first country of entry into the European Union based on a cost and benefit accounts of shared burden, or, if we would like to put it in other words, of shared solidarity. And *attempt* is the operative word here as in the past years there has been a growing resistance against the Regulation. The implementation of this underlying principle of sedentary politics is guaranteed by EURODAC: a fingerprint database, which assists EU authorities in identifying asylum-seekers. The main stake of the Dublin regulation is the prevention of the movement of asylum-seekers within the European Union. Deportations from one EU country to another take place in case it is proven that the asylum-seeker in question has entered through another country. The choosing of entry routes depend on many variables, the price of destinations being one of them. The result of the regulation is that asylum-seekers are stuck at geographically peripheral countries, which often happen to be in a situation of social disarray as well, just as is the case of Bulgaria. The Dublin regulation also needs to be scrutinized as a legislative tool that slows down the movement of labor power to core capitalist countries.

like to consider for a moment the possibility that the *state of the border* (e.g. dispersal practices, hunters, push-backs) have something to do with the way enmity is worked through in Mbembe's conceptualization of power that "refers and appeals to exception, emergency, and fictionalized notion of the enemy" (ibid: 16). Marina Grzinic's (2012) reading of Mbembe's is of interest here. The author proposes a reading of Foucault's biopolitics and Mbembe's necropolitics as captured in the differentiation between their main suppositions in regards to governmentality. Accordingly, between "make live and let die" and "let live and make die." Where liberal governmentality for Foucault was captured by "taking care," Mbembe's necropolitics, according to Grzinic's reading, radically transforms the "make live" into "let live", where the former is a form of making "better life" and the latter a "pure abandonment."

The ideological condition which allows for a distinction between "true refugees" and "economic migrants" spreads to the *border* apparatus (here I include the camps as part of that apparatus) and captures rather a "make disappear and if not let live" acronym. "Make dead" could be part of "make disappear" or it could be not. The power of "make disappear" works through rending one invisible, refusing and masking existence, preventing the potentiality of becoming political. The contract signed between the EU and Turkey is one such power as it displaces that which we do not want to admit. "Let live" comes as a technique after "make disappear" had not been successful. I turn my attention to "let live" next. "Let live," as mentioned, for Grzinic means "pure abandonment" which presupposes radicality. I would like to offer a different reading of "let live," which is not as submissive to "pure abandonment" but is instead arrested by the monotony of maintaining the minimum of reproduction and the leftovers of what Didier Fassin (2012) eloquently called "humanitarian reason."[241]

I make the move to think of monotony of maintenance as to avoid Agamben's understanding of the camp as producing "bare life" but to also include Mezzadra's critique of Agamben who warns against a reading that does not take into account the camps in their relation to labor markets, and hence capitalism. Mezzadra and Neilson (2006) instead, think detention centers as "diffusing tensions accumulated *on the labor market* (2006:5,

[241] "Humanitarian reason", according to Fassin "governs precarious lives" (ibid: 4), where humanitarianism "has [the] remarkable capacity [to] fugaciously and illusionary bridge the contradictions of our world, and make the intolerableness of its injustice somewhat bearable. Hence, its consensual force. (ibid:xii)"

emphasis of the author)" and as "administrative space in which men and women who have not committed any crime are denied their right to mobility." The relation between detention camps and labor markets is well captured by Mezzadra and Neilson's (2013) metaphor of the "decompression chamber", where the former controls and changes the tempos of the "traditional" supply and demand of the market through prolongation and slowing down the gain of labor power.

But perhaps more importantly, we should not place aside the struggles that are staged by the very subjects of the detention camps in Bulgaria in order to escape them on the one hand but to also reorganize knowledge that would allow for their consideration of being "true refugees." In this reading, by no means could this monotony of maintenance of life be read as a condition "of bare life." The philosopher Chamayou (2012) observes that there is a dimension of a specific power that is present in hunts, the power of hope: "without the hope to escape, no prey will run."

8.2.2. Reposition: from detention to reception

Pastrogor is a small village in southeast Bulgaria which in the past used to be part of the so-called "secondary border zone." It stands twenty kilometers away from Kapitan Andreevo, the busiest border check between Bulgaria and Turkey; twenty kilometers away from Lyubimets, where the Ministry of Interior built the second detention center for foreigners in the country; and just thirteen kilometers away from Svilengrad, the largest town in the proximity and home of the Headquarters of Border Police. Pastrogor is a home of the first transit center for third-country-nationals in the country. The building of the center was weaved in scandals. The first time I went to Pastrogor was in August of 2011, precisely ten months before the opening of the transit center.

The asylum system does not stand in its own and the villagers in Pastrogor were clear about it. This was well unveiled by the locals of Pastrogor when they started complaining of their lost hopes for employment opportunities despite the promises given by the management of SAR and the back then mayor of the village. During the building of the center only two people worked on the construction site and rumors had it that they did not even get paid. Where for asylum-seekers the transit center was to provide them with shelter while awaiting decision regarding their status, for Pastrogorians that same center stood for shattered dreams of employment and anticipated instability that was to come with the newcomers.[242]

[242] See Tsvetelina Hristova's (2013) MA thesis that deals in detail with the relation between the locals and the

The building of the center was also preceded by scandals revealed by the NGO sector in Bulgaria and in particular the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC). After the discovery of a large scale corruption scheme surrounding the construction of the transit center, its finalizing took more than expected. The human side of this, according to BHC was the prolonged and unlawful detention of asylum-seekers. What does that mean? Let us turn to BHC's official statement from 2011:

> According to the Law on Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria (FRBA), in the Special Homes for Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners (SCTAF) are only to be held foreigners who have resided illegally in Bulgaria and who were issued a deportation or expulsion order…Border Police has no right to accommodate foreigners in SHTAF who have applied for asylum at the border. The detained foreigners who apply for asylum in the facilities of SCTAF must be released and transferred to the centers of the State Agency for Refugees…In practice, however, the report from the civil monitoring at SCTAF conducted by the "Open Society" foundation in Sofia shows that out of 75 respondents, 16 were children detained for longer than three months, and more than half - 42 persons have submitted application for protection. Due to overcrowding and inadequate architectural environment "home" does not allow for privacy - [e.g.] one a room accommodates up to 20 people, where families put blankets or sheets around their bunk beds in order to "seclude" themselves from the rest. In combination with limited social contacts and opportunities for communication with the outside world, this leads to increased vulnerability and increased risk of depressive conditions and stress. The solution? First, termination of the accommodation or rather the detention of asylum seekers in these homes, which is in violation of international legal standards for the protection of human rights. Their place is in the registration and reception centers of the State Agency for Refugees. Lack of sufficient capacity to accommodate asylum seekers in the [available] centers of SAR cannot be a justification for detaining this vulnerable group. Promised by SAR To open the new center in Pastrogor that will partially alleviate the problem of insufficient capacity to accommodating asylum seekers (BHC 2011).

The above shows us a definitional gap in the understanding of humanitarianism on part of the state and on part of civil society. Seclusion, communication with the outside world, adequate architectural environments are what the asylum-seeker needs so as to guarantee her healthy psychological condition. Simultaneously, workers employed by SAR or Border Police regularly go through human rights trainings. In 2011, I had the chance to visit the detention center in Lyubmets and to be shown around the facility. I entered as a translator for representatives of the Bavarian Refugee Council, an NGO from Munich that provides legal and social assistance to asylum-seekers and refugees in the province of Bavaria. Beforehand, I

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asylum seekers.

had to seek an official permission by the Ministry of Interior, dictate the names of those who would visit, give the dates of births and the identity cards. I have the suspicion that the only reason behind receiving the permission was that Bavarian Refugee Council just sounds too official. In actuality, it is comprised by a group of young activists whose job is to criticize the Bavarian province over its misconduct. The director of SCTAF Lyubimets at the time called me a day prior to entering the center in order to scold me why I have not mentioned that we are part of the pro-refugee campaign that was taking place at the time.

When Tobias Klaus, Mark Speer from the BRC and I entered the detention center we were greeted by the director himself and an employee of his. The director gave us full round of all facilities: the kitchens, the basketball courts, the praying rooms, the sleeping rooms, the game rooms and even the women's bathroom where he did not even endeavored to knock on the door so as to dismiss the possibility of women's presence. Luckily, there were none. The detention center was a state of art. We were numerous times shown and told how "humane" everything is despite the blasphemy of the NGO sector. At the time, this particular detention center was nearly empty, yet, we were invited to the "TV room" and "accidentally" stumbled upon a young family. They barely spoke English but assured us that "the home is super."

A different type of story reached the outside, however. The detention center in Lyubimets has been sharply criticized by its inhabitants. Not enough walking time, not enough meat, no medical attention, lack of trustee translators and lawyers, no privacy, beatings, often imprisonment in solitary confinement cells are among the most often complaints I have heard.

8.2.3. Resistance strategies

In the following section, I would like to turn my attention towards a perspective of the detention center which would give us an idea of the strategies employed inside in order for one to reposition herself from detention to reception. The latter is a subversion strategy which attempts to delete the "economic" and hence "illegal" appearance of one. To achieve this, there are a couple of stages. First, one tries to accelerate the tempo of seeing a lawyer by individual acts and if that does not work, collective strategies come into play.

Below, I will look at the moving of bodies from the detention center in Lyubimets to the

transit center in Pastrogor. As mentioned, these facilities are separated only by thirteen kilometers. When it was built, the purpose of the center was to serve as a transit station, where Dublin decision and fast procedures were to take place. The Dublin decision consists of taking one's fingerprints in order to identify the first European country of entry; the so-called country of contact. If it turns out that this country is Bulgaria, then a Dublin decision is taken that the foreigner's asylum status will be considered by the Bulgarian state. From there, the asylum procedure goes into its second stage or to the so-called *uskoreno proizvodstvo* (accelerated production [of status]). During the fast procedure, an interviewer of SAR assesses the validity of the reasons behind one's departure from their home country. If enough evidence is presented at the SAR interviewers that one fits the description of a "politically persecuted person," then she is granted the status. If not, as indeed the majority of the cases, she is considered to have escaped a place for illegitimate reasons and hence, in pursuit of economic gains. One can appeal the latter decision in front of a higher court. From the above the reader could already sense the importance of finding oneself in a transit camp; it is the first stage towards the possibility that one is proclaimed a real refugee.

In the summer of 2012 the number of people who were crossing the border with Turkey was increasing already. At the time, my research consisted mainly of staying at Georgi's, a local pub, where those who were in the reception center hung out for coffee or for smoking cigarettes. I was also occasionally walking to the reception center itself, which is about two km outside the village. The talks usually took place behind the premises of SAR, where a narrow river was running and where asylum-seekers were occasionally, and unsuccessfully, fishing in order to feed themselves. It was mostly men who could afford the trip of two km to Pastrogor as the only route one could take was the two-lane high speed road used by many truck drivers. Women who had children preferred to remain behind the barbed wires of the center than to risk the trip. When I was visiting the center itself, the security guards would never let me cross the fence separating the inhabitants from the narrow sidewalk outside the center's gates.

One night in mid-August that same year, I was having dinner with about fifteen people sitting at an outside table at Georgi's pub. The crowd was comprised by activists from Sofia, with whom I was often visiting Pastrogor in order to collect information and conduct research, and people who were accommodated at the time at the transit center. It was Ramadan and after sunset, some of the inhabitants of the transit center enjoyed the end of fasting that day.

Despite the fasting, however, that evening was tense with political debates over the situation in Syria, the privileging of Syrian refugees over the rest and general conditions of asylum in Bulgaria. The usual mode of research was ongoing, patient listening, recording the everyday experiences in the camps that ranged from no showering due to hot water deficit to fishing in the small river behind the camp and looking at bug bites so as to try and guess the type of insect that caused it. A phone rang at some point which interrupted the monotony of it all. "They have declared a hunger strike," said Alaa, a Syrian in his late 30s. "They" were twenty-one Syrians and four Iraqis, four minors among them, who found themselves in Lyubimets, the detention facility nearby.

Five of us, three Syrian men, a Somali and I went to the detention center the very next day. We called a taxi driver from Svilengrad, who was known as the "best *шеф*" (translates as boss, it is commonly used to describe likeable qualities) in the flourishing cab business around the open camp. He left us at a desolated parking lot that was easily seen from the prison's bedrooms. A valley of thorns and tall concrete wall separated the lot from the prison. Yet, the long distance between the two, paradoxically, eased the communication between those on the inside and those on the outside. Indeed, a closer proximity would have hindered the otherwise visible lot (because of the tall walls) on the one hand and would have too easily attracted the attention of the prison guards on the other. The parking was often used as a communication stand. The communication was of course only possible because cell phones (without cameras) were allowed inside the detention.

As we were standing on the parking lot, Alaa called somebody inside the center. In just a few seconds we saw a person climb the window grid of the third floor of the prison and wave a white t-shirt. As we looked closer, we could see around forty more people, all waving their white t-shirts. On one of them, with a black, thick sharpie "Freedom" was written. We waved back. The conversation was conducted over the phone and it became clear that the only demand the prisoners held was that "[they] want out of Lyubimets!" The people inside, according to my interlocutors, were tired of waiting. In fact *waiting* was always uttered in its Bulgarian imperative form *чакай!* (*chakai*!). The word had become inseparable of one's dictionary even when not much contact with the world outside existed.

Hunger striking is not the only strategy used by detainees. Self-injuries of all sorts, rioting, refusal of going outside, and breaking property all take place as a demand for repositioning at

a reception center. Kawe, a Kurd in his late 20s was showing off his self-made arm wounds that he slowly carved into his flesh breaking a window in order to provide himself with a sharp edge. He was punished. A doctor carefully washed his wounds and then the prison guards threw him in the confinement cell. Kawe wanted out of Lyubimets as well. He escaped Bulgaria not too long after he was transferred to the transit camp in Pastrogor when he realized that even harsher punishment awaits him for breaking the property of the center. Namely, refusal of refugee status. Such dubious punishments are in fact possible. The arbitrariness of the political/economic binary sustains that same arbitrariness in the asylum-system as well. Articles 17 and 18 from the self-made rules in a reception center in the country read:

> (17) You have to be patient in receiving status. The impatient ones may not receive status if they break relations with the administration; (18) Those who do not wear badges… will receive status at a later point (interview volunteer 2014)

Olivarius (2014), describing hunger strikes that have taken place in other detention centers for migrants says, "... necropolitics is not an alternative to biopolitics. Rather, necropolitical death is a precondition for biopolitical cultivation of life." The author notes that this relation between necro- and biopolitics could be also detected in the relation between the dominant and the dominated. Self-injuring is also one such relation. One's self-harm brings her closer to the actuality of becoming a refugee. This was not the first or the last such hunger strike. It is the most widely spread form of protest in Bulgarian (and not only) detention facilities for foreigners despite the risks such tactics breath as the general invisibility of the inside often precludes one of the most important sides in hunger striking, and namely the audience. Hunger, in our case, accelerates one's chances to end up in the transit center in Pastrogor and thus, to be repositioned as a potential refugee.

8.3. Detention Centers and the Genius of the Architect: How to Commodify a Struggle

Mezzadra and Neilson (2013:143) write, "The temporality of migration is increasingly marked by the emergence of various zones and experiences of waiting, holding, and interruption that assume many institutional forms, among them camps…" (for further discussion on asylum systems and their temporalities, see Panagiotidis and Tsianos 2007; Andrijasevic 2010). The authors make two further important points. One is that the

temporality of migration is often negotiated in spaces, where the boundary between economic migrants and refugees is remade and tested, and secondly, that detention centers cannot be studied as standing on the outside of labor markets. On the contrary, scholars need to further pay attention to the relation between detention and reception centers and labor markets. Their notion of the "decompression chamber" is perhaps the best suited concept for the grasping of this relation. As Mezzadra and Neilson (2003) show in an interview, "the effort to control the migrant's mobility becomes the motor of the capitalist system and the contemporary detention center appears as one in a long line of administrative mechanisms that function to this end." The authors elaborate on this observation and demonstrate how the detention center, when seen as a "decompression chamber" slows down the movement of labor power into the labor markets. This is also true for the case of Bulgaria.

Firstly, those captured within detention facilities fight in order to be repositioned in reception centers and hence, given the chance to receive status (i.e. to be legalized) but also because such reposition gives them the chance to enter a labor market. The state support given to asylum-seekers in Bulgaria is only 32 euros. But secondly, and from the point of view of Bulgaria as a transit country, being let from a detention center also means that one can continue her journey to countries like Germany. The second scenario takes place more often. In my interviews with asylum-seekers in Bulgaria, the majority found it extremely hard to find a job, and when they do, often they work without contracts. All of the informants I have had contact with have refused that I join them in their search for work or at their employment sites, if they had such. Their explanation was that they are afraid of attracting the attention of the police. As Neda Deneva (2013) argues in her report for the UNHCR,

> Overall, the number of beneficiaries of international protection and asylum-seekers with working rights is very low. Therefore, the overall impact of these groups on the labor market and the economy is negligible. On the whole, beneficiaries of international protection and asylum-seekers do not compete with Bulgarian workers in the labor market, due to their low numbers and their lack of engagement with formal mechanisms for finding employment. The low impact and low visibility of beneficiaries of international protection and asylum-seekers in the job market makes them a non-priority category for policy makers (Pp 16-17).

What we witness in transit countries like Bulgaria is that once people defy the detention system and are repositioned in reception centers, for the most part they leave the country shortly. Their imprisonment in peripheral countries like Bulgaria slows their movement to

labor markets seen not only from national but also from transnational perspective. This observation has a great impact over the ways sociologists and anthropologists can scrutinize the relation and the embeddedness of the asylum systems within forms of capital accumulation and labor markets. As we saw in the previous section, in the case of Bulgaria the way the temporality of migration unfolds concerns long period of waiting which would eventually bring one close to the possibility to claim and struggle for asylum status.

When we compare the ways in which this temporality inherited in the asylum system works to the previous two historical forms of moving labor power (i.e. freedom of movement and internationalist socialist worker), we can see that the latter exhibits its own peculiar rhythm of movement. It stands in stark opposition with freedom of movement. We saw that the latter accelerates the movement of labor power to the point where we can speak of resemblance to CERN's accelerator complex.[243] We also saw that the regimes involved in the supplement of labor power to socialist industries were organized in blocks and accordingly to the needs of the industries in question. When we consider the European asylum system from the standpoint of temporalities of migration and their relation to labor markets, we can see the unfolding of a two-staged struggle.The first stage is to reach the domestic market in the transit country. The second stage is to escape the transit country and to reach a labor market further in the EU.

Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) argue, the Agambian approach to detention facilities and camps as based on logic of exception and bare life, preclude us from seeing the more political aspects and the forms of differential inclusion that such 'social institutions' produce[244]. Struggles within detention camps, according to the authors, destabilize Agambian methodologies and instead demonstrate that the latter are spaces of conflict and antagonism, where the asylum spaces are not fixated but a subject of renegotiation. But if Mezzadra and Neilson provide us with an understanding of the relation between detention and labor markets, I would like to complement their analyses by introducing one more actor in the scene of struggles in detention camps. I approach the struggles as emerging out of the assumptions that differentiate between economic and political migrants and ask the question: has capital found a way to tap into these struggles in order to make profit? If so, how?

[243] CERN. Accessed April 20, 2017. https://home.cern/about/accelerators

[244] The so-called Agambian approach (scrutinizing camps as zones of exception and processes of exclusion) to camps for migrants has sparked a controversy in the past decade. Some of the most important accounts on the subject can be found in: Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2004); Mitropoulos and Neilson (2006); Rygiel (2011); Bigo (2007); Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos (2008); Walters (2008).

In order to answer the question posed above I will focus the discussion on the Special Home for Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners in Lyubimets. I will examine Lyubimets as a space maintaining the fantasy of the already-mentioned division, but also one where a struggle against that same division unfolds.

Lyubimets is a space of potentiality, this means that conflicts unfold in the movement in-between and along the axes of potentiality and actuality – between being a 'genuine refugee' and an 'economic migrant'. At the same time, the conflict involves many different social actors. According to the official narrative of the state, the premises functions in order to accommodate illegal immigrants: those foreigners who are *potentially dangerous* to the national security and those who have been served deportation orders as they have turned out to be economic migrants, and not genuine refugees. In practice SHTAFs detain *potential economic migrants.* At the same time, according to the non-governmental sector Lyubimets (together with Busmantsi) is actually detaining *potential refugees* and therefore breaches international laws and regulations for the protection of asylum seekers. According to this position those who cross our borders in search for asylum must instead be accommodated in the registration centres of the State Agency for Refugees (SAR). Practically, there is an overlap in the functions of both institutions. However, Lyubimets is also a space of *potential for capital*. A space where the movement between potentiality and actuality as well as the struggle inherent to this movement bear possibilities for profit.

The physical transfer from the migrant prisons to the centers of SAR initiates the movement between potentiality (an asylum-seeker) and its possible becoming of actuality (receiving a humanitarian or a refugee status). However, this movement is also being counteracted. This counteraction comes from the technicians, including the ones responsible for the architectural execution of detention centres. In the following story, *the power of the architect* appears as one of the most cunning powers; one which, through the genius of its own knowledge, manages to withhold the wave of protest of the convicted. The following paragraphs will tell a fragmented story of action and counter-action. It has multiple characters, who follow different timelines and have not met one another, but are nevertheless intertwined in the precise execution of the *moshenolov*.

Let us shortly return to Hasan's story from above and recall how it finished: "After just a few minutes the bus made a turn into a secondary road. We realized we were not being sent to

Sofia after the police told us to get off and brought us in a yard behind tall walls with barb wire on top of the walls. We were not happy anymore. We realized we are in prison now. Why? We are just refugees…" Hasan actually ended up in Lyubimets. Despite the fact that the building opened its doors on the 15th of March, 2011, the idea for such a centre in this area dates from the beginning of this century and closely accompanies Bulgaria's preparation to enter the European Union with its prescriptions for Europeanisation. The project for Lyubimets' construction was initiated back in 2005, one year before the prison for foreigners in Busmantsi was opened. I met with architect Ivaylo Petkov in order to place the physical location and the role of Lyubimets in the wider context of the Bulgarian migration system.[245] He is the founder of the '10 Architects' office and works closely with the Department of Migration ever since the drafting of the first projects for accommodation facilities in Bulgaria. The initial idea behind SHTAF in Lyubimets has been to renovate the original building of the former army barracks and to restructure it in a way that would respond to the new needs. Despite these original intentions, architect Petkov manages to convince the Department of Migration that such a task would be unprofitable and inefficient with regards to its operational purpose:

> ...the reconstruction would have meant a 30% increase in the price because to adapt something that has never been something else [that has a different purpose], does not work. In the army barracks there is a certain discipline, after all you are training them [soldiers] in something, right? Here you cannot search for discipline. You can't compare these centers to the barracks... It is not possible to look for the same thing as in the barracks. Here, you should rather look for some kind of shared tolerance, a shared tolerance in living together. (Interview with architect Petkov, September 2016)

[245] I would like to express my gratitude to architect Pavel Yanchev for putting me into contact with arch. Petkov, as well as to arch. Petkov for the extensive and extremely useful and interesting conversation.

Photo 15. Lyubimets: Before and After

On the left (photo credit: Ministry of Interior) we see the old barracks that the ministry wanted to reconstruct so as to fit the purposes of a detention center for immigrants. On the left (photo credit: 10 Architects) we see a presentation of the project "Lyubimets" made by 10 Architects, architect Petkov's company.

In the end, only one of the old army barracks is reconstructed, while the rest of the complex is built from scratch. And even if architect Petkov thinks that one cannot speak of discipline in the accommodation centers for foreigners, it is nevertheless detectable. To be more precise, it is a side of disciplinary power, one which Michel Foucault describes not as a triumphant, but as a modest, suspicious power, and which functions through minor and simple procedures, rather than through majestic rituals. This is easily detected in Lybimets' time schedule. According to it, the detainees are split into groups and your time for walks, prayers, sports and even 'personal time' depends on which group you are assigned to. The lights go out at 23.00h, while the dormitories remain locked between 22.30h and 08.00h. They are equipped with bunk beds and so-called 'personal time' is rather a luxury.

These buildings, such as the ones in Lyubimets and Busmantsi, also hide a potential for profit. There are rumours that six new ones will be opened for exploitation in the coming years. As to everyone with an 'entrepreneurial spirit', to architect Petkov it is clear that, if the initially invested capital is a little bit higher than permitted by the Procurement Law, the return-on-investment would also be higher. However, according to the architect's flair, the state remains either blind-eyed or with its hands tied.

> [The state] could make an open call, but instead someone just shows up, wins the procurement for 4 leva [2 eur] and starts their project... while I have delivered the know-how, and now they are asking me to give them this and that, it's becoming a vicious circle. Nothing works in such a vicious circle... Officials [of the Department of 'Migration'] appreciate what you do for them, but the system doesn't allow them to take the right decisions. Moreover the society also doesn't allow it, because people start complaining about Procurement Laws and price tags, here will be cheaper, there will be better. Well, cheap, but... (Interview with architect Petkov, September 2016).

There are risks faced by entrepreneurs and the state when building cheap migrant prisons. This risk is inevitably linked to the repositioning – both social and physical – of bodies from detention to reception camps. The migrants often describe the transit-registration centre for asylum-seekers in Pastrogor as the 'big prison', while Lyubimets is identified as the 'small prison'.[246]

As can be seen on one of the photographs, and according to a tacit consensus, Lyubimets is a prison. But what is the criminal act which Lyubimets actually sanctions? According to juridical prescriptions, the detainees at Lyubimets are to be expelled from Bulgaria. In practice those, who are not found guilty of economic migration, are set free. And since the 'process' (the decision whether one is a real refugee or not) is taken after having been detained, it is hard to define Lyubimets as a pure prison. If it were; it would aim to correct deviant behaviour, presuppose rehabilitation, a change of beliefs, or the prevention of future crimes and so on. Lyubimets does not cure souls. It is evident for everybody that migrations will not stop, despite the push-backs and deaths at the border. Lyubimets punishes the collective victim of structured social relations. Moreover, Lyubimets punishes economic migrants who, according to the definition of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'choose to move mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons.' [247]

The practical punishment embedded in the refugee system, is set in the discursive construction of the notion of an economic migrant. She flees from 'the economy', understood

[246] The reference to a 'small' and 'big' prison is a metaphoric, and not a spatial one. This comparison might at first sight appear paradoxical, but it aims to position Pastrogor as a site of violence as well. Pastrogor represents a big challenge to asylum-seekers, mainly due to the long duration the stays there and the sense of insecurity this causes. For more information, see *Bordermonitoring Bulgaria*'s report: Trapped in Europe's Quagmire.
[247] UNHCR. Accessed April 28, 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html. The use of the verb 'to move' (instead of 'to migrate') is noteworthy here. Movement has a special and universalised place in liberal thought, while migration is a comparably newer phenomenon and appears as a particularity of movement. It is telling that UNHCR uses precisely the verb 'to move' in their definition of non-'refugee status'.

as free of violence, and thus making her fleeing unjustified. But the important thing to note is that Lyubimets punishes *the potential* of someone being an economic migrant; *the potential* that somebody having run away from her own misery, caused by the non-functioning of markets, poverty, and unemployment. Lyubimets punishes the wish for a better life.

As shown, in order to free themselves from embodying this potential crime, in order to destroy, remove it and avoid a lengthier punishment, to attain the possibility of proving their uneconomical migration, the detainees at Lyubimets often resort to self-harm. We have seen how the location of the prison in Lyubimets allows for the internal protest to seep out. We have also seen how different forms of protest, which take place in the centre, are targeted not only at the own body, but also at the property of the Ministry of Interior (and respectively SAR) – there, where it hurts the most. As if these forms of protest have turned into a specific indicator, almost a disciplinary measure for the prison guards, which expresses the will of the detainees to be relocated. The protest brings along with it an investment risk, which was also mentioned by architect Petkov. The risk consists in the fact that covering the costs inflicted by the resistance will turn out much higher than the initially estimated costs for the exploitation and maintenance of the prison. The protest also reveals the capacity of the accommodation centre to constitute a potential for capital. They could always be improved, and as for the investments – they could be increased.

As I mentioned before, there is an implicit understanding that no matter how many fences are built, the border will always be crossed. The situation is similar with migrant prisons. No matter how many isolation cells are build, the detainees will keep resisting. During my conversation with architect Petkov, it became increasingly clear that property damage is one of the biggest challenges for him and his product. '[Migrants] will come up with anything... This needs to be considered in its spatial dimension.'

The architect understands very well that innocent people are being held in these prisons: 'if the faucets are just standard, they would break them, if they do not stop automatically, they would just let them flow, because they are just people who have been forcibly brought there, they don't wish to be there.' As he puts it himself, 'the innocent suffer along with the guilty.' It is absolutely clear to him that the thrashing will not stop, and that the continuous buying of sink faucets will raise the maintenance costs of the centre and respectively influence the return on the investment. And despite the fact that "on a civilisational level, measures have

been taken [medical control and two stationaries—for communicable diseases and a regular one], on a spatial level there exists normalcy and abnormal normalcy. This means that it [every detail in the furnishing] needs to be properly adjusted for normal abnormal use, as a counter-reaction to malice."

In order to combat the constant protests – the so-called 'malice' – architect Petkov is preparing an 'abnormal normal' project for future camps. All basins will be equipped with a button, so that when these are pressed, the water will flow for about seven to fourteen seconds; the temperature of the water will be maximum 38 degrees, in order to prevent burnings; and the new bathrooms will have no drains. Instead, there will be holes under the walls, which will lead to drains in other premises. These would then be overlooked by the personnel, so that they do not get clogged with socks. Architect Petkov also takes self-harm into consideration. He is truly convinced that ultimately Bulgarian migrant prisons need to follow some sort of standards, which are set on an international level and which take the necessity of the multi-functionality of such housings into account. The architect wants to make future prisons 'vandal-resistant'. Welded wire meshes would have to be replaced with chicken wire, while spring beds would have to be done away with.[248] "There is a danger that they make a weapon or some kind of tool out of everything... Despite the looser regime of this type of prisons, [the detained migrants] try to make a weapon out of everything."

Architect Petkov deploys the weapon of innovation against the detainees' resistance and explains how the Ministry of Interior faces losses because of it not willing to invest more money into innovative solutions. If his project gets realised, architect Petkov would save the Ministry of Interior around 77% of the expenses that Lyubimets is currently generating:

> ...a newly-build SHTAF could cost less than 12 million leva, while the exploitation of only one centre, housing around 600 people, costs 3-4 million leva. This means an exploitation of three years. If there 70% innovations are made, even if there are 50% innovations, this would mean that these six years will be payed off only by innovations.

Returning to our conversation about how much water is being wasted because of faucets left-open, clogged drains and other 'hooliganisms', the architect shows me the following chart:

[248] Chicken wire is not welded but just stitched and thus more easily convertible into a potential weapon.

Photo 16. How to save money through containing a struggle



Photo of the author.

In the picture above architect Petkov poses a simple question: How can Lyubimets save money if we calculate the costs of 600 migrants inhabiting the building? The architect shows that if all the vandal-resistant technologies are put in place, then the price of exploiting the center will be reduced by 77%.

The refugee system in Europe works through and on the basis of the creation of differences. Those who cross the European borders are being categorised as migrants, refugees, pursuers of economic interests and so on. While keeping the separation economic/political and the therein hidden presumptions on the nature of what violence actually is, the refugee system creates the conditions for the practice of the *moshenolov*: to filter the subject of authentic violence (the refugee) from the subject of the inauthentic one (the economic migrant). In

places such as Lyubimets, the struggle unfolds between the technicians of the *moshenolov* and the 'tricksters' themselves. This conflict also presumes the repositioning from one space of violence (such as Lyubimets) to another one (like Pastrogor). Or as migrants put it: from the small prison to the big one. However, this social and physical repositioning conveys the path from potential to the actual that is, the path of becoming recognized as a genuine refugee. The repositioning needs to be accomplished by all means and this often becomes a catalyst for physical self-harm and the damaging of property owned by the state. The repositioning is a conflict in itself. The unfolding of this conflict through its inherent forms of protest doesn't escape the attention of capitalists such as architect Petkov. The creation of a division between economic and political migrants in turn creates the conditions for accumulation of profit through constant innovation of the technologies of suppressing the struggle of subjects of this division.

8.4. Conclusion

The chapter examined two knots in the larger process of what I termed *moshenolov*: the filtering of the economic migrants from the true refugee as it unfolds at an EU's external border. I demonstrated how the struggles of those captured in the *moshenolov* unfold accordingly and I framed the battle over the repositioning from detention to reception as one that aims at disintegrating the notion of the economic migrant. I explored how even if the asylum-seeker is temporarily prevented from reaching a labor market, capital does find a way to reach her when in detention in order to commodify her struggle. Eventually, people are repositioned to reception centers (see the Figure 3 for the full picture of possibilities) and, according to Bulgarian law, they do acquire a work permit three months after their asylum application has been accepted by SAR. Out of this, three are the possibilities for commoditization of one's labor power: to be employed in a regular way, to seek a job in the informer labor market, or to leave the country so as to find a job further in Europe. The least possible one is the first one.

In 2013, when the country experienced the largest incoming of migrants through the asylum route, the "business" saw an opportunity and roundtables between the latter and the state were organized, where the question of asylum-seekers' employment was debated. According to SAR, in 2013, forty-five refugees have found work in the garment and service industries,

seventy-two people have sought work via the Employment Bureaus in the country, and twenty-one have been "included in some type of employment." This official data comes against the background of 11 000 asylum-seekers residing in Bulgaria at the time. The second possibility is to find employment through "irregular" channels, i.e. labor markets of the type I discussed above. And yet, the most preferable option is to leave Bulgaria.

The anarchic forms of migrating that accompany the asylum system are at the entrance (border crossing) and then on the exit of the detention center. The detention center captivates potential labor power for long periods of time. We must place the question of bargaining power in the midst of this discussion. We saw how tiresome it is to be captivated: hunger strikes, confinement cells, and physical violence are all measures that exhaust those who are detained. Simultaneously, even when asylum-seekers leave the detention, their only possibility to sell in a legal manner their labor power comes after three months. From this equation we cannot leave aside factors such as racism, which do prevent many from finding a job or places them in a position to take whatever, and however gruesome, comes about. As we saw in part two, the possibilities for reproduction in Bulgaria are taken to the minimum, which has intensified outward migration. When it comes to asylum-seekers who largely rely on the state for such reproduction, the possibilities are even grimmer. In the period between 2013 and 2015, the reproduction of asylum-seekers was transferred in the hands of volunteers and the whim of civil society. The asylum-system produced conditions of homelessness, hunger, and disease, and refused to meet basic needs of those who found themselves in reception centers.[249] The above minimizes the leverage that asylum-seekers have when bargaining their labor power. They are willing to take any labor opportunity there is. If we are to take Mezzadra and Neilson (2013:20) formulation that,

> to affirm that the border plays a decisive role in the production of labor power as a commodity is also to contend that they ways migratory movements are controlled, filtered, and blocked by border regimes have more general effects on political and juridical constitution of labor markets, and thus on the experiences of living labor in general,

then, we can trace how the particular historical form of migration arrested by the asylum-system plays into the changing patterns of the conflict between state and capital I spoke about in section 1.5., and which unfolds in the configuration of lowering the price of moving labor

[249] For a detailed account of these conditions, see Hristova, Apostolova, Deneva, and Fiedler (2014).

power.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages I argued that if we separate migration from other political and economic processes, we risk essentializing the category of the migrant and migration itself. In other words, we risk reducing the migrant to a standardized figure that should be examined in a separate field of inquiry – an (imagined) "pure" migration theory (i.e. border regimes, forced vs. voluntary migration, labor migration, EU circulations of migrants, etc.). This thesis questioned the reproduction of this standardized figure and introduced an historical analysis of the formation of migratory categories. Migratory categories do not stand on their own, as if they had sprung out of some natural movement of populations. They reflect historical and ideological logics that belong to particular and concrete politico-economic conditions. The three categories that went under examination in the thesis – the economic migrant, the internationalist socialist worker, and the social benefit tourist – belong to concrete historical unfolding and are shaped by the political theories that had prevailed in their making.

The thesis forwarded an argument that we are best equipped to accomplish the task of analyzing the antagonistic relationship between migration and capitalism when we investigate the historical making of categories that seemingly belong to the former. This historical analysis is set aside for the direct relationship between those who move and the migration and labor apparatuses that capture them. When we enter this field, we can tease out the political forces that condition the making of race and class and that reflect struggles around differentiated forms of movement.

One of the main arguments I presented in the thesis is that we need to exceed the legal frameworks of migration that are readily available to us and interrogate the very spaces (historical, ideological, socio-political), where these categories are made. The proliferating field of "migration studies" had created an academic space where scholars choose one of the available categories and approach them as points of departure instead of results. Scholars in the field of "forced migration" start from the category of the refugee and examine border controls, securitization, humanitarianism, and migrants' autonomy. Recently, social scientists have started to explore migratory patterns characteristic to internal to the EU movements, where the EU citizen becomes a category of examination. The latter approaches often focus on pull and push economic factors, discrimination against Roma populations, and circular mobilities of labor or East European imaginaries towards the West. Studies of socialism

rarely, if at all, examine the unfolding of different forms of movement peculiar to the countries of the Eastern Bloc, in the meanwhile stabilizing a view of socialism as a homogenous temporality and movement-free reality. With the embedding of migration as a theoretical field that can stand on its own, subfields were quickly created: labor migration, forced migration, refugee migration, economic migration, border studies, and asylum mobilities. One of my contributions lies in choosing to place these forms of movement in a conversation, as belonging to relational processes and often reinforcing each other. This allows me to exceed the points of departure chosen by other studies and instead to think through movement as a dialectic between historical specificity and historical process.

This dialectic, I claimed, is best analyzed when positioned in the temporality that lies between production and social reproduction, and where movement of labor power takes a central role. In order to tackle approaches that take migratory categories at face value, I pin them against each other and think of them as moving labor power. Moving labor power is a concept that transcends the constructed field of migration studies and instead offers a view that is embodied in ideological, juridical, and political forms relational to economic processes that make movement imperative for both social reproduction and processes of production. I focused on one particular relation between migratory categories; that of their subjects moving as labor power. This is to say that at certain point of any movement there comes a time when one is compelled into selling her capacity to labor. The concept of moving labor power is strategically situated so as to be able to explore the moments that take place between the turning of body power into labor power and the transformation of labor power into labor. Here, the transformation from potential to actual enters the stage. I treated the very capacity of the body to move (and to be moved) as a potential of moving labor power. This faculty of the body is often turned to as a possible escape from conditions such as war, unemployment, and poverty. These are the moments before moving labor power. Once somebody starts moving, her capacity to move turns her into moving labor power. This moving labor power is apprehended by migration apparatuses that eventually configure its relation to labor markets. I thought through this process as one that grasps the potentiality of labor power and the actuality of labor. My thesis addressed the reversed process as well: when actual labor is disposed of by various means (non-payment of wages, police violence and expulsions from territories) only to be turned into moving labor power once again.

This approach provided me with three points from where I could explore the relation between

migration and labor apparatuses. What state mechanisms are triggered when a moving body has to be included in, or excluded from labor regimes? How is the very bodily capacity to move (body power) inserted in differentiated regimes of movement and what relations are being produced between migration and labor regimes? What productive powers lay behind the actualization of the potential of body power into labor power and then into labor? In order to answer these questions I coined the notion of moving labor power and explored the relation between movement, social reproduction and modes of production. That is, into the gap between the starting points of one's movement and her becoming a subject of labor markets. Borders, visa regimes, freed movement, detention centers for immigrants, inter-state migration agreements are always in relation to labor apparatuses. My study aimed at providing a platform for possible entries into this relation in order to delve into the heterogeneous logics of the workings of capital, state, and migration apparatuses.

A further argument to be found in the thesis is that capitalism has developed in a way whereby the reproduction of capital is dependent upon the reproduction of an exploitable class that has no other choice but to *sell by moving* its labor power. With this view in mind, I argued that reproduction processes of labor power under capitalism have become more and more dependent on movement that takes place across national borders. In this conjuncture, both blocking and freeing movement move to the center of struggles between state, capital and (potential) labor. Movement closes the gap between labor power as potential and the actuality of labor, and in this sense, movement becomes the key potential and the actual factor of capital. But if the above answered the question of the relation of production to movement, what about the relation of reproduction to movement?

I looked at the motion between labor power and labor from a bird's eye view: I did not only conceive of the possibility for reproduction as immediate processes, for example in a factory, or as the link between housework and the working place exemplified by feminist theories of social reproduction. While these latter approaches have tremendously widened our understanding of relations that take place in the production-reproduction nexus, I proposed to engage with a wider perspective by relating reproduction to its transnational dimensions. This thesis thereby addressed the following questions: How do states and capital negotiate the movement of labor power when those who travel are framed as non-belonging (as with the asylum-seeker) or semi-belonging (as with the social benefit tourist and the socialist internationalist worker)? Consequently, is it possible to see the so-called "migrant struggles"

in a new light, manifesting in fact struggles of and for potential labor? Social reproduction, and the struggles that emerge around it, was of importance in order to engage with these questions.

If the above were arguments that addressed issues concerned with larger historical processes, let us now turn to the claims I made regarding the historical specificity of each case of the thesis.

There is a dialectical relation between the three cases presented in my work that can be captured by examining the differentiated rhythms of movement characterizing each migratory category. In the transition between state socialism and liberal democracy, we can see how the moving labor power "in bulk" during the former period was trumped by the liberal understanding of free movement and the asylum system set in place in Western Europe. With this putative "end of history," when liberalism triumphed over socialism, the regulation of the movement of labor power undertook a decisive turn towards two logics peculiar to liberal political thought. These logics are manifestations of the ontological and epistemological place of movement in liberal social organizations. They are fully expressed in the fact that the consolidation of the European Union could only take place if movement was both strictly controlled and simultaneously freed. In other words, freed movement was conditioned upon securitized movement and vice versa. This dialectic is best illustrated by the re-categorization of Eastern Europeans from being asylum-seekers to becoming economic migrants that I discussed in parts two and three of the thesis. The effect of this restructuring, I claimed, entangled class struggles with juridical reclassification of migratory categories. Furthermore, with the disintegration of the Socialist Bloc, the turning of friends into foes, the (trans)formation of a reorganized political realm was only possible through the expulsion of contingents of previously welcomed workers.

In chapter two I demonstrate how state socialism framed moving labor power as a complementary and non-antagonistic relation between production and reproduction. The two processes were organized in view of really existing socialism that had to adhere to principles of socialist internationalism and extensive integration. We saw that the bargaining power of the laborers to come to work in Bulgaria was transferred to the hands of the state and that socialist internationalism influenced a relation of moving labor power, where its reproduction was organized in view of the dignity of foreign workers. In chapter three I demonstrated how

with time, this initial framing of moving labor power withered away and migratory apparatuses (i.e. the inter-state labor contracts) bent under the debt crisis that struck the socialist world. Little by little, socialist internationalism changed its form and had to accommodate this politico-economic crisis. The historical switch that I analyzed between the notion of the practitioner and the notion of the worker as enshrined in the development of the inter-state contracts pointed towards the changing character of internationalism. Internationalism was reoriented towards intensified modes of production, where moving labor power pacified emerging class conflicts between national labor and enterprise managers. In this trajectory, the surplus labor of the Vietnamese workers was eventually socialized so as to repay previously acquired financial dues on the part of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

In this historical process we clearly saw how migratory categories, when conceived of as a relation between production, movement, and social reproduction, absorbed the changing patterns of political, ideological, and economic forms. With the final disintegration of state socialism in Bulgaria, the relation between labor and migration apparatuses changed significantly. One of the most immediate ruptures to emerge was the racialization of foreign workers, which changed their relationship to production. The constitution of racial differentiations locked in the concept of anti-Vietnamism in the immediate years of the transition became a condition for capitalist accumulation. In this conjuncture moving labor power *out* became a condition for the consolidation of free markets in Bulgaria.

Chapter four analyzed the racialization of foreigners in Bulgaria and traced back a process, where the previously foreseen steady course towards full integration of foreign workers gave way to police violence, protests against foreigners, terminating of working contracts, and violent chase of foreign labor from the country. I argued that this particular episode from the history of the post-socialist transition shows the structural relation between capitalist relations of production and the making of race. This is where we also saw most clearly the transition from one form of movement to another as they relate to production and reproduction processes. Whereas state socialism implemented moving labor power in a way so as to complement production and reproduction, the full implementation of capitalist structures in Bulgaria and the country's final integration into European structures necessitated the freeing of movement. Social reproduction via movement bent under individualistic logic. The political tune of the day insisted on a certain logic, whereby the more absent the state was from social reproduction and the organization of movement, the faster the country would

move towards liberal democratic and capitalist forms of organization.

In this way, the movement of labor power entered into a clear contradiction between production and reproduction. Those freed to move were denied access to both socialized means of production and to social welfare. Similarly to the Marxist understanding of labor that is doubly freed – from the means of production and freed to sell its labor power – Eastern Europeans acquired a triple freedom – free from the means of production, free to sell their labor power, and freed to move. Their free movement closed the gap between the former two freedoms and it became their only means to physically and socially reproduce. I argued that whereas movement across national borders is not a substance that maintains body power directly (it is not water or food), it generates possibilities for the reproduction of labor power, and hence, it provides possible routes for the maintenance of body power.

One of the claims that this thesis sought to establish is that struggles *for* movement are always already struggles *against* movement. This comes about because of the dialectical relation between fixing and freeing of labor power on the part of state and capital. While more research needs to be conducted in this direction, it is pertinent here to recall that with the disintegration of socialist states, foreign workers resisted their expulsions (e.g. the protest of the Vietnamese workers in front of the Embassy, the strikes of the Bulgarian workers in the USSR, the threats of bombing the returning planes by Nigerian workers in Bulgaria). The so-called social benefit tourists as well, resist the accelerated rhythms of their lives enabled and imposed by freedom of movement. This is best illustrated by the housing struggles they enter into; claiming (and not stealing) a right to social housing that would allow them to remain in a territory. These housing struggles are entangled in labor struggles as well, as the subcontracting character of accumulation has developed in such a way that wages (one of the main guarantors of reproduction) are rarely paid, which in turn forces many to travel wide in order to find paying employment. I traced the unfolding of these struggles in chapters five and six.

While this former form of moving labor power exemplified an accelerated rhythm of movement, i.e. it moves far, fast and wide across European cities without the obstacles of border controls, the asylum system in the EU manifested the opposite. Chapter seven delved into the ideological formation of the category of the economic migrant and chapter eight related its effects on the slowed speed and taming of moving labor power into European labor

markets. While at first the struggles of asylum-seekers seem to be principally oriented towards the claim to move, a closer look identified the same pattern of struggles against movement. This was best exemplified via the resistance strategies that have developed against the European Dublin Directive, which forces people back to their first country of entry into the EU. In such way, those who had once been caught in the *moshenelov* of the external borders, confront the possibility to be returned to these same countries once they reach Germany or Sweden. Protests at airports, resistance during flights, fighting deportations in European courts comprise strategies against return movement. That is, the once struggle *for* movement, turns into struggle *against* movement.

This last thread was an important part of my attempt to defetishize forms of movement and categories of migration. I did so by arguing that "migrant struggles" – a proliferating concept across the social sciences – should be looked upon as struggles for and of potential labor (which does not preclude the actuality of labor, because of the double process of fixing and freeing of labor discussed in chapter one). Some may object that this move contains the possibility to fetishize labor and/or labor power. Yet, I believe that the notion of moving labor power is equipped to meet such criticism. It is so, because moving labor power opens possibilities to enter into its very making as an overdetermined relation. It does not exclude the making of race, gender, and class, but on the contrary, it inscribes them into a continuum (and often ruptures) between moments of expropriation of body power, moments of turning body into labor power, and moments of actual exploitation, where movement becomes of decisive importance.

When we historicize migratory categories we come closer to a political angle that de-essentializes them and allows for seeing different struggles – that unfold in the realms of housing, construction sites, detention centers, and social welfare – not as a rift but as a possible bridge. Migratory categories and the struggles they express cannot be separated from struggles against capital and logics of domination. To be constructed as either an economic migrant or a political refugee is part of larger forms of historical oppression. This is why the field of migration studies needs to take into consideration how these categories are made, what economic and political processes stand behind this making, and last but not least, how the connection between past and present affects the changing symbolic and material meaning behind migratory categories.

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