

TİBREVANK AND THE RADICAL LEFT IN TURKEY: CHALLENGING THE HEGEMONY OF THE NATION-STATE?

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Submitted to
Central European University
Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary
June 2017

ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on an Armenian boarding school and its alumni association in İstanbul that became a hub for socialist politics for the Armenian society in Turkey in the 1970s. Following the story of Surp Haç Tıbrevank Armenian High School, I analyse the links between Armenian society in post-genocide Turkey and the ways in which socialist politics relate to non-Muslim minorities, given that the exclusion of non-Muslims from the imaginary of Turkishness has been one of the pillars of Turkish nation-state formation. The problem addressed in this thesis is threefold: First, I address the emergence of socialist tendencies at Tıbrevank which enabled the formation of an intellectual current challenging the historical narrative of the Turkish nation-state. Second, I conceptualize the hegemonic position of the Turkish state to impose its historical narrative and the struggle of socialist movements to construct a counter-hegemony to subvert it. Lastly, I elaborate on the concept of history which I conceive as an instrument of struggle in the sense that it equips us with images of past experiences which we can mobilize to understand our present conditions.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARF: Armenian Revolutionary Federation

CHP: Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)

CUP: Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*)

CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union

GDR: German Democratic Republic

DP: Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*)

DİSK: Revolutionary Confederation of Workers Unions (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)

İGD: Progressive Youth Association (*İlerici Gençlik Derneği*)

İKD: Progressive Women's Association (*İlerici Kadınlar Derneği*)

OSF: Ottoman Socialist Party (*Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası*)

PKK: Kurdistan Worker's Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*)

SDHP: Social Democrat Hunchakian Party

THKO: People's Liberation Army of Turkey (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu*)

THKP-C: People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi*)

TİKKO: The Liberation Army of the Workers and Peasants of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi ve Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu*)

TİP: Worker's Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*)

TKP: Communist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*)

TKP/ML: Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist*)

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

In the centenary of the Armenian genocide, a mausoleum was erected in the Dersim¹ province of Turkey. It was built “in memory of Armenak Bakırcıyan, Hrant Dink, Manuel Demir, Nubar Yalımyan, Kevork Çavuş, Monte Melkonian, Antranik Uzunyan... and all heroes without names, without graves,” as written on the gravestone (Agos 2015). On the last days of 2016, the monument was demolished by the Governorship of Tunceli.

The location was not coincidental; Dersim, a province where the majority population is Alevi, witnessed two genocides –the Armenian genocide in 1915 and the Dersim genocide in 1938- and the war between the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Turkish state since the 1990s. Dersim has also been a centre for left-wing guerrilla organizations for more than forty years. However, the first four names written on the gravestone were more significant than the location. Bakırcıyan, Dink, Demir and Yalımyan attended the same Armenian male boarding school, Private Surp Haç Armenian High School², in the Üsküdar district of İstanbul and became either sympathizers or militants of TKP/ML (Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist), an illegal Maoist party founded in 1972. But, TKP/ML was not the only radical left movement organized at Tıbrevank. In the 1970s, the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) also enjoyed remarkable support. In those years, the school and its alumni association were a hub for socialist politics for the Armenian youth in Turkey.

Tıbrevank was founded in 1953 in İstanbul as an Armenian seminary which was conceived as a project by Patriarch Karekin Haçaduryan to save the children of the Armenian community in Anatolia who were deprived of education in their mother tongue. These children were mostly from poor families and seen as “highlanders³” by Constantinopolitan Armenians. Most of them were not Armenian speakers until they came to Tıbrevank. When it came to the 1970s, a time when left-

¹ Officially Tunceli

² *Özel Surp Haç Ermeni Lisesi*; hereinafter *Tıbrevank*, which literally means seminary in Armenian.

³ *Daglı*

wing politics were at their strongest in Turkey, the school and its alumni association became highly politicized. In parallel with the militancy of these years, a wave of Armenian cultural revival unfolded in the alumni association. The 1980 coup meant a major defeat for the alumni of Tıbrevank, like for any other socialist circle in Turkey. However, in the 1990s, the experience of Tıbrevank culminated in the establishment of two prominent Armenian institutions; Agos weekly and Aras Publishing House, which enabled the breaking of the silence around the Armenian genocide and built up connections between the Armenian society and society at large.

This thesis concentrates on the emergence of socialist tendencies at Tıbrevank which enabled the formation of an intellectual current challenging the historical narrative of the Turkish nation-state. It refers to the ways in which radical socialist politics relate to non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, given that the exclusion of non-Muslims from the imaginary of Turkishness has been one of the pillars of Turkish nation-state formation. The question which the present work revolves around consists of three levels: First, based on my ethnographic data, I address the relations between the rise of socialist leanings at Tıbrevank and the concurrent constitution of Armenian identity which empowered certain graduates of the school to undermine the Turkish state's hegemonic discourse. At the second level of analysis, I conceptualize the hegemonic position of the Turkish state to impose its historical narrative and the struggle of socialist movements to construct a counter-hegemony to subvert it. Lastly, I elaborate on the concept of history –and historiography- that I embrace in this study. I conceive history as an instrument of struggle in the sense that it equips us with images of past experiences which we can mobilize to understand our present conditions.

It is difficult to talk about an extensive body of academic literature on socialism in Turkey. The historiography on Turkey's left is a developing field of study, especially regarding the publications in English. The majority of existing works, which are produced either in academic field or by independent researchers, are mainly descriptive and dominated by historical narratives.

Moreover, the left movements' engagement with the questions of ethnicity and minorities remains an understudied subject in the academic field.

In terms of methodology, I adopted an ethnographic approach to be able to move beyond the historical accounts on socialist movements in Turkey which are mainly descriptive. My particular interest in the emergence of a socialist tendency at Tıbrevank necessitated the gathering of data through ethnographical methods. Except for the school's website and its decennial almanacs, I had to confine myself to my ethnographic data due to the inadequacy of written accounts and my incapacity to read materials in the Armenian language. At this point, I need to underline that I do not claim to construct a comprehensive historical account on Tıbrevank. Instead, I aim to trace a genealogy of an intellectual endeavour by analysing my interlocutors' oral narratives reflecting on their past experiences. I treat their memories on Tıbrevank not as "a passive depository of facts, but an active process of creation of meanings" (Portelli 2016, 54).

During my field work in April 2017 in İstanbul, I conducted seven semi-structured interviews in total. Five of my interlocutors are alumni of Tıbrevank from different generations. Two of them –Misak and Garabet- participated in socialist movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Nubar did not directly engage in any movement, but he was active in the socialist circle of the alumni association. Varujan and Sevag are from younger generations who studied at Tıbrevank. My other two interlocutors –Ohannes and Kevork- are not the graduates of Tıbrevank, but they have had close relations with the school's graduates throughout their lives. Instead of their real names, I preferred to use pseudonyms to protect the privacy and safety of my interlocutors. Initially, I was also planning to conduct interviews with the alumni outside left-wing circles, however I failed to realize this objective due to the temporal limitations of this research.

This thesis is structured under three core chapters. In Chapter 2, I outline the theoretical framework of the research by the means of the concepts of history, hegemony and struggle. Chapter 3 provides the historical background under three sections. In Section 3.1, I sketch out the genocide of Ottoman Armenians. In Section 3.2, I address the main tenets of the life of Armenians

in post-genocide Turkey. I give a historical account on the development of socialism in Turkey along with a brief discussion on the historiography on socialism in Section 3.3. Chapter 4 concentrates on my case study on the emergence of socialist tendency at Tıbrevank. In Section 4.1, I provide a brief history of the foundation and early years of Tıbrevank. I seek possible answers for the left-leaning political orientation at the school in sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. In Section 4.5, I address the Tıbrevank Alumni Association as a site for radical left politics and cultural revival. Following Section 4.6 which focusses on an institutional obstruction Tıbrevank faced from the 1980s to the 2010s, the last section touches upon two intellectual initiatives led by the alumni of Tıbrevank which have challenged the official historical narrative of the Turkish nation-state. In conclusion, I wrap up my ethnographic account on Tıbrevank in light of the theoretical framework I adopt in this research.

CHAPTER 2 – HISTORY, HEGEMONY AND STRUGGLE

In writing this thesis, my main motivation is to make a modest contribution to the discussions regarding history -and historiography- as both instrument and field for sociopolitical struggle within the context of radical left movements in Turkey. However, my intention is not to contribute by writing a historiographical account on left-wing politics in Turkey. Instead, I identify an issue generally neglected in the field of politics as well as in the academic field⁴ -namely the attitudes of radical left movements towards the questions of ethnoreligious minorities in Turkey. The past experiences provide us with the necessary tools to analyse our present. In that sense, by the means of ethnographic research on Tıbrevank, I trace the possible dynamics contributing to an intellectual initiative to open an alternative front of struggle for contemporary left-wing movements. This opening of a new front can be read as a challenge to the hegemonic discourse of the Turkish nation-state regarding non-Muslim minorities and genocidal violence.

Therefore, first of all, I need to address briefly the concept of history in relation to the field of political struggle in the past and the present. Walter Benjamin notes that the potential for social struggle is “nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than by the ideal of liberated grandchildren” (2006, 394). Keeping his intervention to this temporal relationality in mind, I focus on the possible connections we can establish between the past and present in Turkey; because “what appear in the current crisis of the hegemonic national narrative of history in Turkey, are the painful remains of a foreclosed past” (Ahiska 2010, 8). Enzo Traverso warns us to prevent any possible erasure of the annihilated *Yiddishkeit*⁵ and Jewish socialism from history through Benjamin’s metaphor of enslaved ancestors (1994). This study follows a similar line of thought in regard to the decimation of the non-Muslim population of Anatolia and the eradication of their political existence in the late Ottoman era. Even though I cannot realize it in an extensive way due

⁴ It should be noted that there is no clear-cut distinction between political and academic fields. As in the example of the declaration of Academics for Peace in Turkey in January 2016, these two fields can overlap.

⁵ Jewishness in Yiddish language

to the limitations of this work, its underlying objective is to reflect on our present through the lens of the political *ancestors* of the left in Turkey. As Benjamin reminds us, “[h]istory is the subject of a construction whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled full by now-time [*Jetztzeit*]” (2006, 395).

What we see in the mirror of history is the image of our present time. However, “[a]rticulating the past historically does not mean recognizing it ‘the way it really was’⁶. It means appropriating a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger” (ibid, 391). This study is an effort to pursue the possibility of appropriating a memory of the radical left movements in Turkey in the current moment of hegemonic crisis disrupting and reconfiguring all existing sociopolitical structures. It is an effort to search for the seeds of a radical and subaltern historiography in Turkey. It is an effort to stand by Benjamin’s angel of history whose “face is turned toward the past”, although it is irresistibly driven “into the future, to which his back is turned”, by the storm of progress (ibid, 392).

In which sense do I stand by the angel of history in the present work? History does not progress through a homogenous and empty time, as Benjamin writes (ibid). Hence, I undertake this research as a critical account against the historicist conceptions of history based on the idea of linear progression. I problematize the historicist attitude to treat social phenomena as norm and necessity within historical development. Benjamin points out the chance of fascism rooted in historicist approach noting that “in the name of progress, its opponents treat it as a historical norm” (ibid, 392). We should avoid treating fascism and capitalism as historical norms and necessities. In *Caliban and the Witch*, Silvia Federici invites us to rethink capitalism as one of many possible responses to the crisis of feudalism in Europe rather than as a historical necessity: “Capitalism was the counter-revolution that destroyed the possibilities that had emerged from the

⁶ Here, Benjamin refers to Leopold von Ranke’s conception of the historian’s task (Eiland and Jennings 2006).

anti-feudal struggle” (2004, 21). In his review of the book, Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı⁷ reconsiders the genocidal violence against the non-Muslim communities as eradication of the possibility of radical politics and alternative modernities in Anatolia and the wider region –Caucasus, Middle East and Balkans, rather than a discussion merely confined to the dispossession of minorities, ethnic cleansing and nation-building process (2012).

This thesis is an initial attempt to overcome the inadequacy of historicist approaches to construct an extensive historiography on the eradication of alternative modernities and other political possibilities in the context of Turkey. Historicist approaches reduce the genocidal violence against Armenians to the elimination of the non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie. By focusing on only one dimension of a complex phenomenon, historicist and economistic approaches constitute a major obstacle to render history an instrument and field of political struggle. They treat social structures as if they consist of only economic foundations (Hall 1986). In addition, they overlook the cross-cutting relations between class, ethnicity and gender. This reductionism also precludes the possibility to construct a wider front of struggle in political and academic fields. However, the critique of economism should not be understood as denial of the decisive role played by economic structures, as Hall emphasizes. At this point, the main objection is that the assumption that social structures are only determined by economic foundations is reductionist and inadequate.

Antonio Gramsci’s overall work is a result of his endeavour to transcend this kind of economic reductionism and build up a theory of political strategy (*philosophy of praxis*). Hegemony, Gramsci’s major conceptual contribution to the Marxist political theory, is the main theoretical tool I adopt in this thesis to analyse the attitudes of radical left movements towards the question

⁷ Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı was a sociologist who lost his life in Kobanê in 2014. As a communist militant fighting against the Islamic State, he used the alias *Paramaz Kızılbaş*, in which *Paramaz* refers to the nickname of Matteos Sarkissian, an Armenian socialist and member of the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party (SDHP) Central Committee who was executed in June 15, 1915 (Akın 2015), while *Kızılbaş* (which literally means “red head”) is a formerly pejorative, but then appropriated name given to Alevis.

of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. I argue that the primary reason why socialist movements could not undermine the nation-state narrative is their failure to establish a counter-hegemony despite their popular strength in the 1970s. They failed to create alternative narratives on nation-state formation in Turkey in relation to political and socioeconomic structures formed as a result of the decimation of non-Muslim communities –with the exception of a few attempts, for instance İbrahim Kaypakkaya’s critique of Kemalism⁸ in the early 1970s (Bora 2017). Because, “[ideologies] are real historical facts which must be combatted (...) for reasons of political struggle: in order to make the governed intellectually independent of the governing, in order to *destroy one hegemony and create another*, as a necessary moment in the revolutionizing of praxis” (Gramsci 2000, 196).

The Kemalist regime was considered progressive by many socialist groups and intellectuals, and consequently they did not feel the necessity to question the official historical narrative of the Turkish nation-state. The failure to transcend the historical narrative of Kemalist nationalism was an obstruction for revolutionary movements to form a counter-hegemonic position led by the historical bloc of subaltern groups. The inadequacy of their theoretical contributions –both in terms of original works and translations of classical Marxist literature- rendered radical left movements in republican Turkey ideologically weak and susceptible to the ideological hegemony of Kemalist nationalism. In the first decades of the republic, the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) could not overcome the influence of the Kemalist modernist conception of ‘national progress’ due to the lack of an alternative ideological background. Consequently, its members were “unable to take their distance from [Kemalist] programme. The result was that a small cadre indulged in a theoretical capitulation which deprived Turkey of any Marxist analysis of its history when this was needed in the 1960s” (Samim 1981, 64). In the 1970s, the political imaginations of revolutionary

⁸ Kemalism is a Turkish nationalist and radical modernist ideology based on the icon of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. It is composed of six principles: Nationalism, laicism, republicanism, revolutionism/reformism, populism and statism. Tanıl Bora remarks that Kemalism was the official ideology in Turkey until the 2010s (2017).

movements inherited this legacy of ideological inadequacy to form a counter-hegemonic historical narrative.

If the counter-hegemonic position is to be led by a historical bloc, we need to take the multi-dimensional aspect of hegemony into consideration. Stuart Hall remarks that “[hegemony] cannot be constructed or sustained on *one* front of struggle alone (e.g., the economic)” (1986). In fact, it would be no exaggeration to talk of an almost counter-hegemonic position of left-wing politics in terms of working-class struggle in the 1970s Turkey. The working-class parties and unions became influential political actors and the interests of ruling classes were undermined to a certain degree. Maybe most importantly, these developments were accepted as social reality by the masses and the right of association became a legitimate claim (Ünüvar 2013). However, these achievements were confined to the economic front which was only one aspect of the struggle to establish a counter-hegemony. The fronts of struggle regarding the ethnic and national questions, mainly the rise of Kurdish liberation movement and the Alevi awakening, have unfolded in the years following the 1980 military coup with the development of identity politics.

Where should we situate Tibrevank within this theoretical framework? As I delineate in detail in the following chapters, in the 1970s, the students of Tibrevank participated in socialist politics more than any other Armenian school in İstanbul. However, it was not possible for them to take part in their movements with their Armenian identities. Some of them changed their Armenian names by court decisions to protect both the Armenian society and their organizations. For some of them, their Armenianness was invisible and silenced. In this respect, they were not immune to the state’s hegemonic influence on the radical left politics. However, certain aspects of Tibrevank, which I analyse thoroughly in the chapter on the school, contributed to their left-leaning tendencies which resulted in an intellectual endeavour to struggle for the recognition of the Armenian genocide. In Gramsci’s work, along with the political party, the intellectuals are among “the chief agents of a transformation of consciousness and ideology” (Schwarzmantel 2015, 34). The “ideological conquest” of traditional intellectuals “is made quicker and more efficacious the

more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals” (Gramsci 2000, 304-5). In the later periods of their lives, some students of Tıbrevank have taken this role of intellectual to subvert the Turkish hegemonic narrative concerning the genocide and nation-state formation.

However, initially, my intention was not only to find these connections between the 1970s and the contemporary socialist politics in Turkey. Instead, I also aimed to trace back to the links between the Armenian revolutionaries of the late Ottoman era and today’s socialist politics through my analysis on Tıbrevank. Due to the devastating impacts of the genocide, the legacy of these pioneers of socialism in Turkey have remained uncovered until recently. The task to dig up these connections was way beyond the extent of my thesis. But, “no mode of production and therefore no dominant social order and therefore no dominant culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all human practice, human energy, and human intention,” Raymond Williams writes (1977, 125). Keeping his proposition in my mind, in the chapter on the historical background, I briefly touch upon the unexhausted practices, intentions and energies of the early Armenian revolutionaries.

CHAPTER 3 – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In this thesis, following the development of socialist tendencies at Tibrevank, the revival of Armenian culture in its alumni association and the later challenges to Turkish nation-state narrative, I address the connections and tensions between socialist politics and ethnicity. For this discussion, I delineate the essential historical background in three different sections. First, I provide a brief description of the 1915 genocide of Ottoman Armenians. Second, I depict the social atmosphere in which Armenians lived in the aftermath of the genocide. Lastly, I look at the key moments in the history of left-wing politics along with a short reflection on the historiography on socialism in Turkey.

3.1 The Genocide of Armenians

To understand why Tibrevank was founded, you have to go back to 1915. —Hrant Dink⁹

During the night between April 23 and 24, 1915, a wave of mass arrests happened in İstanbul; about two hundred fifty Armenian intellectuals and politicians were taken from their homes and deported to the provinces of Ayaş and Çankırı in Central Anatolia (Üngör 2011). This incident “marked a radically new phase in the Ottoman program to deal with their Armenian subjects” (Suny 2015, 274). The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) had seen entering the First World War as an opportunity to cease the territorial disintegration of the empire and allied with Germany (Ekmekçioğlu 2016). However, the military defeats in the early months of 1915 intensified the ruling elite’s perception of the whole Armenian population as an internal threat allied to the Russian Empire (Suny 2015). According to Akçam, they thus “intended to expel this group from Anatolia, and failing that, to kill them” (2012, 449).

⁹ Cited in Çandar 2016, 48.

In 1915 and 1916, Anatolia witnessed the almost complete decimation of its Armenian population, one of the last Christian communities which remained within the Ottoman territories. Before the genocide, in 1914, the estimated population of Armenians was around one and a half million, equalling approximately the one tenth of the population of Ottoman Anatolia (Zürcher 2004). In the wake of deportations and massacres, about one million Armenians lost their lives and approximately one hundred thousand women and children were forcibly Islamicized (Ekmekçioğlu 2016). The genocidal violence brought about the demographic and cultural devastation of Armenians in Anatolia.

3.2 Armenians in Post-Genocide Turkey

The Armenian political leaders and intellectuals were deported from İstanbul in the beginning of the genocide; however, the CUP government refrained from deporting Bolsahays¹⁰ in mass due to the presence of Western diplomatic community in the city. In the course of the genocide, the magnitude of destruction would remain unknown among the Armenians in İstanbul until the end of the war; because the level of communication with the provinces was minimized by censorship and a travel ban. While Bolsahays tried to keep their heads down during the war years, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the following occupation of its territories brought about a hope among Armenians; they “believed the Allies would keep their promises, bring the perpetrators to justice, and remedy the wrongs of the war” (Ekmekçioğlu 2016, 5).

The remedy that Armenians expected was the establishment of a Great Armenia by integrating the Western provinces of historical Armenia¹¹ to the newly established independent Armenian republic in Transcaucasia. However, “the Armenians’ welcoming and collaboration with the occupying forces, and the related separatism further jeopardized their already fragile existence among the Muslim majority” (ibid, 6) after the victory of the nationalist forces under the leadership

¹⁰ Constantinopolitan Armenians (Ekmekçioğlu 2016)

¹¹ Six Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, *Doğu Vilayetleri* (Ekmekçioğlu 2016).

of Mustafa Kemal¹². Even though the Armenian political parties had stopped their struggle for secession from the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the revolution of 1908¹³, the Armenian's endeavour for an independent Armenia after the great catastrophe in 1915 reinforced the Kemalist elite's perception that the deportations were based on a solid basis (ibid). The stigmatization of Armenians by the accusation of treason have continued until today.

In the course of the construction of the ethnically defined Turkish nation-state, for which “the physical destruction of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire (...) was conceived as a necessary condition” (Kévorkian 2011, 1), these remnants of the sword¹⁴ developed survival strategies by mobilizing their “institutional, social and mental repertoires” which they had attained during their half millennial existence under the Ottoman rule (Ekmekçioğlu 2016, 8). A significant element of this repertoire was the expression of loyalty to the Turkish state, which Armenians were expected to constantly perform¹⁵. The articulation of this loyalty varied in degree; however, for instance, it was not possible for Armenian newspapers to maintain their publication without proclaiming their loyalty to the state (ibid). But, there were also Armenian intellectuals¹⁶ resisting this imposition and struggling against the anti-Armenian propaganda; they paid the price of their resistance in exile, in jail, or by losing their jobs (Suciyan 2012).

The life of Armenians in post-genocide Turkey has been surrounded by the absolute denial of the crimes committed against them. For the first generation after the genocide, fear and silence constituted a collective memory (Beyleryan 2017). Talin Suciyan draws our attention to the maintenance of genocidal crime through denial in a society in which “victims and witnesses have

¹² Later, Atatürk.

¹³ The revolution of 1908 “is the beginning of the establishment –for the first time in modern Turkish history- a constitutional monarchical form of government which legitimates itself on the presence of a representative parliament to which it is totally responsible” (Kansu 1997, 1).

¹⁴ The remnants of the sword (*kılıç artığı*) is an expression in Turkish used for the survivors of the Armenian genocide and their descendants.

¹⁵ The public debates around the memorial ceremonies for the 50th anniversary of the Armenian genocide organized in several cities across the world constitute a striking example of this expectation and responses from the Armenian society. See Bali 2007.

¹⁶ For instance, Aram Pehlivanian and Zaven Biberyan (Suciyan 2012).

continued to live side by side with the perpetrators” (2015a, 1). She defines three fields –in Bourdieusian terms- through which “post-genocidal habitus of denial” operates:

...the law (consisting of the Settlement Law, the Law of Pious Foundations (*Vakıf*), the denial of the recognition of rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne by *de facto* prohibiting the opening of Armenian schools in the provinces, juridical practices such as confiscations of *Vakıf* properties, and court cases on ‘denigrating Turkishness’), in the academic field (selective and directed knowledge production, exclusive support for denialist topics, arguments or methods and inaccessible archives), and in the social field (practices including harassment, discrimination and racism on a daily basis on the streets, in schools, by neighbours or by colleagues). (ibid, 23)

Although Armenians were recognized as an official minority¹⁷ and accepted as equal citizens of the Republic of Turkey (Kılıçdağı and Özdoğan 2012), the Turkish state aimed at the complete de-Armenianization of the Anatolian provinces and succeeded it through these discriminatory and denialist policies and practices. Today, it is not possible to speak of a demographic or cultural presence of Armenians in Anatolia (Suciyan 2015b). In 1929 and 1930, around six thousand Armenian residents¹⁸ of Anatolia were forced to emigrate to Syria. In 1934, another six hundred Anatolian Armenians were sent to exile in İstanbul (Güven 2005). The policy to deprive Anatolian Armenians from their schools played a significant role in this process¹⁹. The Turkish state did not give permission for the re-opening of the Armenian schools in Anatolia (Suciyan 2015a). Moreover, the state abstained from giving financial support to minority schools, which was its liability according to the treaty (Güven 2005). Tıbrevank came into existence as one of the solutions to overcome this absence of Armenian schools in the provinces²⁰.

¹⁷ The Treaty of Lausanne granted minority rights to all non-Muslim communities in general; but in practice, only Jews, Armenians and Greeks were recognized by the Republic of Turkey (Kılıçdağı and Özdoğan 2012).

¹⁸ The total population of Anatolian Armenians was ten thousand (Güven 2005).

¹⁹ Diyarbakır MP Şerif Bey’s account on the city in the early years of the republican era constitutes a striking narration of this policy: “[Turkifying the Armenians] might have been very difficult had their connection with the outside world not been cut. They have neither schools here, nor Armenian literature. Intellectuals have already left; 80 per cent of those who are left behind are illiterate. The elderly die, and the younger generation is educated in Turkish schools” (Haladjian 1932, quoted in Suciyan 2015a, 68).

²⁰ As I address in the following chapter, Tıbrevank had a dual role in this process.

3.3 Socialism in Turkey in the 1960s & 1970s

3.3.1 Historiography and Early Years of Socialism

This research, which focusses on the emergence of socialism at Tıbrevank, is closely related with the current discussions around the field of the historiography on socialist politics in Turkey. For this reason, alongside delineating a brief history of socialism in Turkey, I feel the necessity to shortly reflect on two questions related to this burgeoning field of study: When did modern socialism emerge in Turkey? And who were the pioneers of socialism on these lands?

Until recently, the general tendency of the left has been to trace its origins back to 1920, the year in which the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) was founded in Baku under the auspices of the Comintern. In other words, TKP marked the beginning of the left's own historical narrative. The field of historiography on the left in Turkey has been under the influence of this tendency for a long time, except for few studies focussing on the earlier periods²¹. Even though Mustafa Suphi, the founding leader of the party, regarded the Ankara government as “radical nationalists²²”, a committee of TKP came to Anatolia to participate in the War of Independence. Fifteen members of the party were assassinated on the shores of Trabzon in 1921 by the Ankara government. This tragic event was the first indication of the intolerance of the future Kemalist regime against socialists (Bora 2017). TKP's attitude towards republican nationalism followed a tortuous path throughout its history until the 1980s. The major reason of its unstable attitude towards Kemalism was the dependence on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In other words, TKP's analyses on Turkey could not be contradictory to the policies of the USSR.

However, at this juncture, the historical narrative of the left needs some elaboration; the foundation of TKP constitutes the origin of socialism only in post-Ottoman period²³. In the earlier

²¹ See Tunçay's *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar 1908-1925 [Left-wing Movements in Turkey 1908-1925]* (1967), Ter Minassian's *Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement* (1984), Tunçay and Zürcher's *Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1923* (1994).

²² *Mutaassıp milliyetçi* (Bora 2017).

²³ An important dimension of the debates on the history of modern Turkey is around the continuities and ruptures between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. In his seminal work, *Turkey: A Modern*

decades, several left-wing movements, mostly founded by non-Muslims, had appeared in the Ottoman territories. The Workers' Federation of Thessaloniki was a socialist and internationalist organization mainly formed by Jews, who formed the largest ethnic group of the city. The federation advocated the integrity of the empire through the recognition of national rights and decentralisation. Two left-wing Armenian parties were founded in the last decades of the 19th century. The Hunchakian Party²⁴, which was founded in 1887, was a revolutionary-populist organization. (Bora 2017). It was the first organization to proclaim being Marxist in the Ottoman Empire (Kürkçügil 2014). The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), also known as Dashnaksutyun, was established in 1890. Although the ARF was a self-proclaimed socialist party, it involved a powerful liberal-nationalist section as well (Bora 2017). *İştirakçi*²⁵ Hilmi and his Ottoman Socialist Party²⁶ (OSF) were further pioneers of socialism in the late Ottoman period. Hilmi's socialism²⁷ was an eclectic interpretation with Marxist, humanist, liberal, anarchist and Islamic elements. For this reason, Hilmi and his party were not included in the left's own historical narrative for a long time. The movements founded by non-Muslims have also been ignored in this narrative (ibid). I read this as a reflection of the underlying question of this thesis; under the hegemonic influence of the Turkish nation-state narrative²⁸, the socialist movements of the republican era have disregarded these non-Muslim precursors of socialist politics in the Ottoman period.

History, Erik Jan Zürcher does not follow the mainstream periodization which addresses the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 as a radical rupture; the Ottoman Empire had dissolved in 1918, but, “politically, ideologically and economically, there is a great deal of continuity” between 1908 and 1950, the period that he calls the Young Turk Era (2004, 4).

²⁴ The party changed its name first into Social Democrat Hunchakian Party in 1909, and later the party was legalized under the name of Ottoman Social Democrat Hunchakian Party in 1910 (Bora 2017).

²⁵ *İştirak*, which means participation, was the first Ottoman Turkish word used for socialism/communism (ibid).

²⁶ Later, Socialist Party of Turkey.

²⁷ In their article on *İştirakçi Hilmi*, Benlisoy and Çetinkaya problematizes the usage of “socialism” in the literature as a narrow Marxist interpretation. For them, this reductionist approach contributes to the attitude that ignores the socialist currents which do not accord with the classical Marxist tradition (2008).

²⁸ See page 8.

3.3.2 1960-1971: Rise of Socialist Politics

In the republican era, the 1960s were the first period in which socialist movements appeared as influential actors in the sociopolitical life in Turkey. Tanıl Bora notes that the intellectual atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s was shaped under the ideological hegemony of the left (2017). After the arrests in 1951, the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) was not able to maintain its existence; some of its members took refuge in socialist countries (Ersan 2013). During the 1950s, all attempts to establish a legal socialist party were repressed by the state (Belge 2008). This forced interlude finished after the foundation of the Worker's Party of Turkey (TİP) by a group of trade unionist in 1961 (Ersan 2013).

The awakening of socialist politics became possible in consequence of a series of sociopolitical dynamics. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey's capitalization process accelerated and resulted in a relative increase in the level of wealth. This transformation revealed the widening gap between the poor and the rich (Bora 2017). In May 27, 1960, the first military coup in the republican era happened; a junta formed by colonels, majors and captains seized the power and toppled the Democratic Party government under the leadership of Adnan Menderes. Within a year, a new constitution was issued by a constituent assembly. "The main aim of the authors of the new constitution was to prevent a power monopoly such as the DP (and the [CHP] before it) had held, by counterbalancing the national assembly with other institutions" (Zürcher 2004, 245). Moreover, a relatively more liberal political atmosphere was established by the 1961 constitution. TİP emerged in consequence of these circumstances (ibid).

Beyond advocating workers' rights, TİP became a socialist party following the participation of intellectuals and individuals from left-wing circles. The Workers' Party kept its political activity within the limits of legality. In the 1965 general elections, TİP gained fifteen seats in the parliament (Bora 2017). The belief in the possibility of a socialist revolution through parliamentary means was a distinctive feature of TİP among other socialist movements of the 1960s (Ersan 2013). The party attracted the attention of the Armenian society, as a continuity of the connections with the

socialist circles established through the political activities in TKP in the previous decades. Many Armenian intellectuals joined the party; writer Zaven Biberyan was elected as a member of municipal council in İstanbul (Kürkçügil 2015). The Kurdish question was also on TİP's political agenda under the title of the Eastern Question²⁹. The Eastern Meetings³⁰ organized by TİP pioneered the popularization of Kurdish politicization (Bora 2017). Until 1969, TİP was the only organizational hub for socialist politics. The divisions within the party, fascist attacks, the rise of youth movements and radicalization of their activities undermined TİP's influence towards the end of the 1960s (Ersan 2013). In 1971, the party was closed due to a decision of the 1968 congress acknowledging the Kurdish question (Bora 2017).

The university occupations and student protests in the summer and fall of 1968 were the first indications of the new militant orientation for socialist politics in Turkey. The mass uprising of workers in June 15-16, 1970, was another open manifestation of this new trajectory. Influenced by the 1968 upheavals in Europe and the United States and the anti-imperialist struggles in Asia and Latin America, these young people who were not content with the parliamentary inclinations of TİP began a search for new strategies, which culminated in the formation of armed organizations. It was the materialization of an ideological and political rupture within the socialist current, most importantly the separation from Kemalist tendencies (Bora 2017).

Three illegal organizations were founded by the revolutionaries of 1971 and began to conduct guerrilla warfare in the early 1970s. Deniz Gezmiş founded the People's Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO) in the late 1970; Mahir Çayan founded the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C) in December 1970; and İbrahim Kaypakkaya founded the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML) in April 1972. In March 12, 1971, the Chief of General Staff forced Süleyman Demirel's right-wing government to resign by handing a memorandum and a new government was formed headed by Nihat Erim, a member of the right wing of CHP (Zürcher

²⁹ *Doğu Sorunu*

³⁰ *Doğu Mitingleri*

2004). The new regime responded to the guerrilla movements by killing their leaders and mass arrests. Çayan and his nine friends were killed in a conflict on March 30, 1972; Gezmiş and two other leaders of THKO were sentenced to capital penalty and executed on May 6, 1972; Kaypakkaya was tortured to death on May 18, 1973 (Ersan 2013). The defeat of these revolutionaries was the beginning of another interlude for socialist movements in Turkey.

3.3.3 1974-1980: Heyday of Socialist Struggle

The interim regime following the 1971 military coup came to an end following the 1973 general elections and another chapter of socialism in Turkey began with the amendment of amnesty law in 1974 (Bora 2017). The 1970s refers to a period of six years which was violently terminated by the 1980 coup and remained incomplete³¹. The 1970s witnessed a rapid proliferation and popularization³² of socialist groups; dozens of legal and illegal organisations were founded (Ersan 2013). The socialist movements of this period can be grouped under three main ideological and political lines; the “independent” left, the Maoist movements and the pro-USSR movements (Belge 2008).

Similar to previous decades, the society experienced rapid socioeconomic and political transformations. In the late 1970s, the economic crisis due to the rise of oil prices on the global markets intensified societal discontent (Zürcher 2004). Besides the rise in the number of socialist formations, the left’s influence over the masses increased. Kerem Ünüvar remarks that the 1970s was probably the unique period during which the left became the most hegemonic political actor; nonetheless it constitutes one of the least studied periods of the history of Turkey (2013). However, in these years, the ideas of the 1971 rupture could not be thoroughly discussed in the urgency of the struggle, they rather became doctrines. The Marxist classics and contemporary Marxist

³¹ Işık Ergüden attributes the influence of this period in shaping today’s possibilities and impossibilities to this state of incompleteness (2012).

³² According to the 1983 statistics of security forces, the total number of militants of “extreme left-wing organizations” was one hundred thirteen thousand (Ersan 2013).

literature remained unknown for a majority of socialists (Bora 2017). In this period, fascist movement also increased its violent activity and attained its political power through acts of murder and intimidation. From 1977, the popular support for leftist movements started to decrease (Ünüvar 2013). The 1980 military coup ultimately suppressed and destroyed the radical left in Turkey (Bora 2017).

Considering the limitations of this thesis, I confine this section to the brief descriptions of only two socialist currents –TKP and TKP/ML- and their approaches to national questions in the 1970s. The significance of these two movements for the present work is that they were the main socialist circles which were organized at Tıbrevank.

3.3.3.1 Communist Party of Turkey

The Communist Party of Turkey did not show an active presence until the 1970s. In the trials following the mass arrests in 1951, one hundred thirty-one people were sentenced. The wave of arrests, tortures and trials obstructed the party's existence in Turkey; many members of TKP left the country (Çetinkaya and Doğan 2008). After a long period of inactivity in Turkey, the reorganization of the party was initiated by two old cadres of TKP -İsmail Bilen and Aram Pehlivan- residing in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1974. This period was called *Atılım*³³ after the name of the party's official newspaper. The organization in Turkey was carried out by a group of young people called *Partizan* which separated from TİP (Ersan 2013). In 1975, TKP took the control of the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers Unions (DİSK) and instrumentalized it to legitimize and popularize its political existence. The organization of TKP was expanded to tens of thousands of people through the establishment of the Progressive Youth Association (İGD) and the Progressive Women's Association (İKD) (Bora 2017).

³³ *Atılım* means "leap" in Turkish.

The ideological and political leanings of TKP was in parallel with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), with which the party was connected. In the 1973 programme, Turkey was defined as a “semi-feudal backward capitalist country which is dependent to the US imperialism” (Bora 2017). For this reason, a socialist revolution cannot be pursued; instead a transition to progressive democracy should be established through democratic gains and social progress in accordance with the CPSU’s theses on peaceful transition to socialism (ibid). In terms of the question of national minorities, there was a continuity between the 1920s and the 1970s. The 1973 programme³⁴ developed an approach limited to the recognition of their constitutional rights and emphasized that self-determination did not necessarily mean secession. The text marked out the TKP’s strategy concerning national minorities throughout the 1970s (Kakışım 2016).

3.3.3.2 Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML)

After its leading figures were either killed or jailed, the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML) was dispersed in 1973. However, the militants of old TKP/ML who survived the military regime launched a reorganization campaign following the 1974 amnesty. The first conference of TKP/ML was organized in 1978. The TKP/ML’s legacy was embraced with a critical tone. Between 1978 and 1980, the party increased its activity in working-class neighbourhoods and rural areas. The Liberation Army of the Workers and Peasants of Turkey (TİKKO) was the military section conducting armed struggle which had a key significance for the movement (Ersan 2013).

The political analyses of TKP/ML and its strategies for organization and struggle were based on the articles written by the party’s founder İbrahim Kaypakkaya. In these writings, following a Maoist fashion, Turkey was described as a “semi-feudal and semi-colonial country which is dependent to imperialism and under the control of comprador bourgeoisie and landlords”. Depending upon this analysis, Kaypakkaya advocated the strategy of people’s war and practiced it

³⁴ The programme named only Kurds and Lazs (Kakışım 2016); in other words, there was no mention of non-Muslims.

in the last years of his life (Ersan 2013). Moreover, his work constituted a radical ideological rupture both from his contemporaries and past socialists through his analyses on Kemalism and national questions. For him, “Kemalist dictatorship is a military fascist dictatorship over workers, peasants, urban petty-bourgeoisie, low-ranking officials and democrat intellectuals” (Kaypakkaya 2004). His 1972 article *National Question in Turkey* constitutes an elaborate analysis on the Kurdish question. In a later writing, he also touches upon the connection between the confiscation of Armenian and Greek properties and the emergence of landlords (Bora 2017).

CHAPTER 4 – TİBREVANK: A PERSISTENT FLAG OF SURVIVAL

“Tibrevank is the greatest and most persistent flag of existence unfurled in these lands in the aftermath of 1915,” Misak (73) said. Misak, who studied at Tıbrevank between 1957 and 1962, is a publisher. I asked why he sees the existence of the high school as a symbol of persistence. He gave a brief answer: “It is not possible to found a school like Tibrevank, unless you are persistent and resolute.” In a later part of our interview, Misak explained further what he meant: “I said Tibrevank is a persistent and resolute flag of survival, because the children of an almost extinct Armenian population in Anatolia attained education.”

Starting from 1953, Tibrevank provided free boarding education for the children of the Anatolian Armenian society that was living on the edge of assimilation. However, as I argue in this thesis, its role cannot be confined to its objective to save these Armenian children and their families from assimilation and cultural destruction. The school and its alumni association opened a space for cultural revival and socialist politics for the Armenian society in the 1970s. In this sense, Tibrevank had a distinct position among all Armenian schools in post-genocide Turkey. In the 1970s, some of its alumni participated in armed struggle and even attained leading positions in their organisations. But, we should not fall into the error of thinking that the majority of students and alumni of Tibrevank participated in the militant socialist struggle. My fieldwork data reveals that it would be more realistic to speak of a general sympathy towards socialist ideas³⁵. As I describe in a following section, the alumni association was the site for a more radical form of politicization.

Even though it is not possible to talk about a direct influence of this small Armenian school on the socialist movements in the 1970s, the alumni of Tıbrevank have played a crucial role in the opening of new fronts of struggle for the left in contemporary Turkey. Firstly, they pioneered the revival of Armenian culture through their folk music and dance activities in the Tibrevank Alumni Association in the 1970s. Secondly, in the 1990s, some of the Tibrevank alumni founded some

³⁵ We need to consider that there were a number of students at Tibrevank who remained distant to socialist politics –some were even against it.

prominent Armenian institutions, such as left-leaning *Agos* weekly newspaper and Aras Publishing, which have bridged the Armenian society with society at large and made major contributions to the process of breaking the taboo around the Armenian genocide and question of minorities in general. In this sense, the alumni of Tıbrevank influenced also a great majority of the contemporary left-wing currents and even mainstream politics in Turkey in regard to the Armenian genocide.

Tıbrevank was not only a “persistent flag of existence” in terms of the cultural survival of the Armenian society in Turkey. It also paved the way for the formation of an alternative front of struggle for radical left politics to challenge the Turkish nation-state narrative regarding the decimation of non-Muslims in Turkey. In this chapter, following the ethnographic data from my fieldwork in April 2017 in İstanbul, I seek possible answers to the question how a socialist tendency appeared at Tıbrevank at a degree incomparable to other Armenian schools in Turkey. This chapter, which I built upon my interlocutors’ oral narratives, does not have any claim of recounting a historical reality of that period. Rather, it aims to reflect on how my interlocutors construct their past looking from the present. The present work does not –and cannot– constitute a history of Tıbrevank. It is just an attempt to reveal how a number of people situates Tıbrevank in the past from today’s perspective.

4.1 Tıbrevank’s Establishment and Early Years

Tıbrevank, Surp Haç Tıbrevank Armenian Seminary³⁶ with its initial name, was founded in 1953 as a boarding male school in Üsküdar district of İstanbul by the initiation of Archbishop Karekin Haçaduryan, the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople of that period. Before Tıbrevank, another Armenian seminary called Surp Haç School³⁷ had existed on the same location until 1932. Tıbrevank was founded on the purpose of educating clergymen for the Apostolic Armenian community (Atılğan et al. 2012). But, it was more of a solution for the Armenian children in

³⁶ *Surp Haç Tıbrevank Ermeni Rıbban Okulu*

³⁷ Also known as *Tıbradun ve İskolya*, meaning “clergy home and seminary” (Atılğan et al. 2012).

Anatolia who were deprived of education in Armenian language and culture (Beyleryan 2016). The Surp Haç Tibrevank Seminary Foundation was administered by the Armenian Properties Communal Administration Committee³⁸ and the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople. In 1960, the committee was abolished and the administration of the foundation was taken over by an elected board of trustees (Atılğan et al. 2012).

In the early years, the school consisted of three academic divisions: secondary school, high school and theology department. However, the theology department, which had started to operate following the graduation of the first class in 1959 (SHLYKK 2003), was shut down by the Directorate of National Education in İstanbul in 1967 under the pretext that it could not fully function due to “the lack of students”. In 1969, under the pressure of the Ministry of National Education asserting that the existence of seminaries was in contradiction with the principle of laicism, the status of Tibrevank was redefined as minority school under the name of Private Surp Haç Armenian High School³⁹ (SHTL, 2017).

Tibrevank is the only instance of an Armenian high school whose establishment was recognized by the Turkish state in the republican era (Güreş 2012). The re-opening of minority schools was prohibited by the republican elite, even though the provision of educational buildings was a duty of the Turkish state according to the Lausanne Treaty (Suciyan 2015a). In this context, the establishment of Tibrevank constitutes an odd phenomenon. Why did the Turkish state allow an Armenian seminary to be founded in 1953? We need to read the establishment of Tibrevank in parallel with the ruling Democratic Party’s (DP) liberal policies in the first years of the multi-party regime in Turkey. Following the victory in the 1950 elections, the bureaucrats of DP provided convenience during the elections of religious leaders of minority communities. The academic and administrative restrictions were loosened⁴⁰ (Güven 2005). Tibrevank’s foundation became possible

³⁸ *Ermeni Malları Müşterek İdare Komitesi*

³⁹ *Özel Surp Haç Ermeni Lisesi*

⁴⁰ For instance, the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary (*Heybeliada Rubban Okulu*) resumed admitting students from Greece and other countries (Güven 2005).

during this relatively liberal and tolerant period. But, the intensification of the Cyprus crisis in 1954 ended this transitory tolerance towards minorities⁴¹. The reason why the state allowed the school to remain open in later years can be found in Tıbrevank's accelerating role in the migration of Armenians from the Anatolian provinces to İstanbul.

Tıbrevank's impact on the existence of Armenian population in Anatolia is another question that should be addressed. The foundation of the school had dual consequence. On the one hand, the Armenian male children were gathered from the Anatolian provinces; they attained education and learned the Armenian language at Tıbrevank. It was crucial for the continuity of the Armenian culture in Turkey. "In the eyes of Armenian community leaders, not attending Armenian schools ultimately amounted to assimilation" (Suciyan 2015a, 68). On the other hand, Tıbrevank had a devastating effect on the Armenian existence in the Anatolian provinces. Their children's presence in İstanbul led the Armenian families to migrate to the city, and this migration wave resulted in the evacuation of Armenians from Anatolia⁴² (ibid). Tıbrevank's dual impact on the Armenian society poses an inextricable dilemma revealing the conditions in which Armenians have lived in post-genocide Turkey. If these children had stayed in their hometowns, they would eventually be assimilated. However, their cultural emancipation also meant the completion of the de-Armenianization of Anatolia.

4.2 Socioeconomic Background: From Anatolia to Tıbrevank

Tıbrevank was founded with the purpose of reaching out the Armenians scattered all around Anatolia whose children were deprived of education in their mother tongue. For this reason, the student population at Tıbrevank consisted of male children mainly from Anatolian cities, towns or

⁴¹ In September 6-7, 1955, the anti-minority campaign resulted in the İstanbul pogrom targeting non-Muslim communities, especially Greeks, which was orchestrated by the Turkish state. The September pogrom marks the end of Greek Orthodox existence in İstanbul (Güven 2005).

⁴² According to Varujan (1988-1994) and Sevag (1992-1999), a great majority of students was from İstanbul in the 1990s.

villages. These children were mostly from poor families and almost none of them was Armenian speaker when they came to İstanbul. The Anatolian identity of students was a distinctive characteristic of Tıbrevank in comparison to other Armenian schools in the city. Misak stated that: “Unlike the schools that could exist in İstanbul, Tıbrevank is an educational institution which gathered students from towns and provinces where some Armenian population still existed and afforded them education. It didn’t admit students from İstanbul with a few exceptions⁴³.” Their Anatolian identity was also decisive in the way in which bourgeois Armenians in İstanbul perceived them. According to Nubar’s (68) account, these children were called *kavaratsi* (provincial), and occasionally *vohmag* (wolfpack). Misak added *lermtsi* (highlander) to this list, saying that “we were rude people”. In the interviews I conducted, the regional and class background of Tıbrevank students was repeatedly articulated among the possible reasons which may have led to the formation of a left-wing tendency at Tıbrevank. Hrant Dink⁴⁴ also established such a link between their class background and socialist tendencies: “We students came mostly from the parts of Anatolian society that had been economically depressed. It was unthinkable that we would remain separate from the political movements of the time, and inevitable that we would be drawn into the current” (cited in Çandar, 51).

For Armenians, the life in post-genocide Anatolia was much harsher than the life in cosmopolitan İstanbul. Misak, who is from a small town in the Kayseri province, pointed out the relation between the difficulties of Anatolian Armenian life and their inclining towards left-wing ideas: “Until they came to Tıbrevank, in their hometowns, these children felt that they are different. (...) Therefore, they did not reason, but felt that this is not a fair life and this is not a fair order. So, it shouldn’t be difficult to grasp that when they encountered with socialist ideas, they sympathised with them.” Nubar, who attended Tıbrevank between 1959 and 1966, is a student

⁴³ The main purpose of Tıbrevank was to provide education for the Armenian children in Anatolia. In order to admit as many students as possible, the school must have restricted the admission only to Anatolians.

⁴⁴ Hrant Dink was an Armenian journalist and founder of Agos weekly, whose significance I address in the last section of this chapter.

from İstanbul. He described the life of Armenians in post-genocide Anatolia in a striking way: “These people were the remnants of the sword. They lived in fear. (...) There was a lot of oppression. And additionally, there is the poverty of Anatolia. (...) These people came from a tense atmosphere. They did not come from an ordinary life. They came from an extra-ordinary life. There was desperation and poverty. And additionally, they were Armenians.” According to him, Anatolian parents considered Tıbrevank as salvation for their children.

These students were all over the Anatolia: Diyarbakır, Ankara, Malatya, Adana, Kastamonu, İskenderun, Şırnak, Kayseri... They were gathered by a priest assigned by the patriarchate in İstanbul and later by the alumni of Tıbrevank (Çandar 2016). Misak emphasized several times that this assemblage of children from many different locations brought about a diversity which did not exist in İstanbul. Varujan (40), a younger graduate, has spent most of his professional life as a publisher among older alumni of Tıbrevank. His interpretation of this diversity was overlapping with Misak’s account: “...it was a sharing and heterogeneous [environment]. Eventually, all of them were going back to their hometowns for the summer holiday. Probably, they were bringing some stuff from their hometowns.” In other words, at Tıbrevank, the students were learning how to co-exist with all their differences according to Misak’s narrative. It is also possible to talk about a diversity in terms of their first languages⁴⁵. My interlocutors who came from Anatolia to Tıbrevank learned the Armenian language either at Tıbrevank or Karagözyan Orphanage, where some of them received their primary education. Both Misak and Garabet noted that apart from Turkish speakers, there were also students whose first languages were Kurdish or Arabic.

4.3 Life at Tıbrevank

Tıbrevank was distinct from all other Armenian high schools in İstanbul also as a boarding school. My interlocutors who studied at Tıbrevank emphasized in several occasions that the atmosphere

⁴⁵ Instead of “mother tongue”, which is Armenian for them, I prefer to use the concept of “first language”.

of the boarding school was decisive in their political formation. Their narratives on the life at boarding school centred upon the concepts such as solidarity, fraternity, responsibility, sharing and equality. Considering also their lower class and Anatolian background, it would not be unreasonable to argue that the experience of boarding school contributed to the left-wing attitude of Tıbrevank students.

The students of Tıbrevank were staying at the school for almost all year round. Misak told me that three classes before him –these were the first three classes of Tıbrevank- were allowed to return to their home only every other year. In these early years, the students spent a whole school year at Tıbrevank. In later grades, the students who had their families or relatives in İstanbul could leave the school for weekends. Misak explained these strict rules by Tıbrevank's seminary status back then. Garabet (67), who attained Tıbrevank six years later than Misak, told that they were not allowed to leave the school every weekend.

Garabet described the atmosphere at school by laying emphasis on the sharing practices between students: “You become a family there. A year is twelve months and you live nine months together. (...) You share everything you have. You share your clothes, you share any kind of your problem, you share your education.” In the early years, students were responsible for the distribution of food and cleaning of classrooms. Garabet related these practices to the ideas of equality, solidarity and responsibility.

4.4 Influence of Teachers

The influence of teachers on the students of Tıbrevank was articulated by all my seven interlocutors. Based upon their narratives and other secondary sources, I conclude that certain teachers had a great impact on the formation of a left-wing tendency in students. However, in the course of analysing my interviews and secondary sources, I realized that the influence of teachers has several different –and even some contradicting- aspects in this respect. The relations between students and teachers give hints about the tension between socialist politics of the period and the

Armenian identity of students. In this section, I follow the narratives of my interlocutors and another graduate of Tibrevank from an oral history study to provide an in-depth depiction of teacher's impact on the students of Tibrevank.

Misak emphasized the significance of teachers that “left a lasting impression on all of them” in several parts of the interview. He thinks Tibrevank's teaching staff of that period were among the best teachers of the country. For him, these teachers who dedicated their life for education were treating their students with love, compassion, understanding and appreciation. “They were intellectual people,” Misak said. Like him, Nubar noted that these teachers were kind and caring people. He wanted to prevent a possible misunderstanding concerning their influence on their students: “These people never made any propaganda or train militants. (...) I never saw any of them asking us to read a single [political] book, newspaper or paragraph or to memorise a single poem. (...) But they [showed] us how to be a kind person by their attitudes and life styles”. Garabet, who studied at Tibrevank for seven years between 1963 and 1970, remarked that the values these teachers instilled in their students such as kindness or sharing were not directly political. Although the teachers at Tibrevank did not have a direct political influence on their students, some of them had been members of left-wing political parties in the earlier periods of their lives. Some teachers had been even detained for their political activities. As Garabet said, Keğam Kerovpyan, who taught Armenian at Tibrevank between the years of 1962 and 1968, had been jailed during the TKP arrests in 1951.

Literature teacher Sabri Altinel and physics, chemistry and mathematics teacher Vahan Acemyan were other left-leaning teachers who had major impacts on the students of Tibrevank. Kevork (70) did not study at Tibrevank, but he has always had close ties with those who studied at the school. He drew my attention to the general influence of literature teachers in Turkey's high schools in the 1960s and 1970s. Kevork noted that there was a direct connection between literature and socialist movements in the 1960s. For instance, literature teacher Sabri Altinel was at the same time a poet who had relations with left-wing intellectual circles.

However, Mihran Dabağ, a historian who studied at Tıbrevank, approaches to the left-leaning teachers from another angle: “[Sabri Altınel] is one of the people who gathered students around himself and gave rise to a left-wing current at Tıbrevank. He was always saying: ‘What is important is human’. And I was telling ‘what is important isn’t to be Armenian’ underlies saying ‘what is important is human’. This fostered a way of thinking leading to ‘let’s get Turkified’” (Suciyan 2015b, 146-147). Dabağ also speaks of a negative attitude towards Armenianness and the Armenian language among students which he considers as a result of the influence of Sabri Altınel and Vahan Acemyan. Dabağ’s account complicates my interlocutors’ descriptions of left-leaning teachers at Tıbrevank. However it does not necessarily contradict their narrative about the teachers’ discourses based on “being a kind human” which was isolated from their Armenianness.

4.5 Tıbrevank Alumni Association: A Site of Politics and Cultural Revival

Tıbrevank never fit in with the prevailing order – indeed, it existed to challenge and subvert it- and once it began sending its young out into the world, it became famous. —Hrant Dink⁴⁶

The Tıbrevank Alumni Association⁴⁷ was established for the purpose of “coping with the difficulties of life in the aftermath of graduation” and “guiding the next generations” in 1962⁴⁸ (SHTYD 2017). Remarking the “unpreparedness to the traps of life”, a 1971 booklet published by the association reads that “the first graduates of our school founded the association in order to re-create and sustain this exemplary and sincere atmosphere [of the boarding school] feeling the necessity to gather under the same roof” (ibid).

In our interview, Nubar, who actively took part in the activities of the association after his graduation in 1966, also related the establishment of the association to this necessity to survive the hardship of life in Istanbul together: “The first graduates couldn’t attend university. Because they

⁴⁶ Cited in Çandar 2016, 50.

⁴⁷ *Surp Haç Tıbrevank’tan Yetişenler Derneği*

⁴⁸ The association was officially registered in 1962.

didn't have any place to stay, any acquaintance, anyone to turn to. They didn't know how to behave, to manage properly. Because they were brought from Anatolia. They were left destitute. (...) They established an association. They arranged ten-fifteen beds in that association. (...) People stayed there and began to study in university”.

The narratives on the Tibrevank Association, both from my interviews and other sources, mainly centre around its cultural and political dimensions. First, the association became a site where Tibrevank alumni and other people discovered Armenian folk culture, music and dance which were completely unknown to most of them. According to Garabet, Armenian music had been secretly practiced behind the closed doors of schools for decades. Meanwhile, a graduate of Tibrevank went to Armenia to learn Armenian folk dance; this cultural initiative was one of the first contacts with Soviet Armenia (Estukyan 2015). The folklore branch of the association organized shows, in which Turkish, Armenian and Kurdish folk music and dance were performed for the first time in İstanbul and drew a considerable public attention (SHTYD 2017). The association had an instrumental role in forming the relations with the rest of the Armenian society. According to Garabet, the activities of the association contributed to the acceptance of Tibrevank among Armenians.

In Nubar's narrative, it is possible to capture some socialist-populist motifs of this involvement in Armenian folk culture. For him, these activities reversed the course of existing musical practices of the Constantinopolitan Armenian bourgeoisie based on the performance of harmonized pieces with piano; popular songs and musical instruments were re-introduced in the association. Nubar defined this orientation towards folk culture and music as “a new voice, a new inspiration and a new start”. There was also a rising interest in Armenian literature, especially socialist poets of last two centuries, such as Hovhannes Tumanyan and Yeghishe Charents (Estukyan 2015). The Tibrevank Association was a site for the revival of a culture which was destroyed in 1915.

Second, in the 1970s, Tıbrevank Association became a significant hub of socialist politics for the Armenian community. In this period, the members of the association became more inclined towards left-wing currents in comparison to the general Armenian population (SHTYD 2017). Ohannes (64), who is not a Tıbrevank graduate, told that “the spirit of 1968 was experienced much more intensely in the Tıbrevank School and Association, than any other Armenian circle”. The association made possible the continuity between the alumni and the students. In their spare times, the students went to the association. And some of the alumni undertook tutorship at Tıbrevank during their university studies. In an article, Hrant Dink pointed out the significance of these connections in terms of the politicization of students: “Tıbrevank graduates who had gone on to college made sure to send us all of their left-wing literature; this was nothing more than spreading propaganda and agitation to schools, and it was very effective” (cited in Çandar 2016, 50).

TKP’s youth organization İGD and TKP/ML were two main movements which gained sympathy in the association. TKP tradition did not raise a critical voice regarding the question of national minorities. However, starting from 1940s, Armenian intellectuals joined TKP (Estukyan 2015), and later some of them attained leading positions⁴⁹. Moreover, as I note in a previous section, some of these intellectuals taught at Tıbrevank, for instance Keğam Kerovpyan. The presence of TKP/İGD at Tıbrevank can be traced back to this earlier connections between Armenians and the party. I attribute the sympathy for TKP/ML to Kaypakkaya’s radical stance on Kemalism and national questions. A significant number of Tıbrevank alumni took this sympathy a step further and participated in the party and its armed section TİKKO. This wave of politicization led to internal conflicts in the Tıbrevank Association. In the elections, these two movements even fought over the association’s directory board.

⁴⁹ For example, Aram Pehlivanian was a member of TKP’s politburo in the 1970s (Ersan 2013).

When the 1980 military coup happened, like all other associations in the country, the Tıbrevank Alumni Association was also closed by the military regime. Even though it was re-established in 1988, the association could not resume its previous state (SHTYD 2017).

4.6 The 1980 Coup and Tıbrevank's Status Problem

The 1980 military coup's impacts on Tıbrevank were not limited to the closure of the Tıbrevank Alumni Association. Some of its alumni left the country. Some were jailed. Some were killed by the state and far-right militants. In parallel with the suppression of any form of dissidence, the left-wing atmosphere at the school disappeared in a short while. The "harmful" books in the library were burned (Mildanoğlu 2015). For Varujan, who studied at Tıbrevank between 1988 and 1994, the school was quite apolitical and not capable to equip its students with curricular and extra-curricular knowledge.

In the mid-1980s, Tıbrevank encountered an institutional obstruction which would last until 2012. The Surp Haç Tıbrevank Seminary Foundation held the regular elections for its board of trustees in 1985. However, the documents of the elected board were not given by the Governorship of İstanbul. In later years, the representatives of the foundation asked for the renewal of the elections. But their request was rejected on the pretext that the work related to the foundation was still in progress. On the other hand, Tıbrevank did not cease its educational activity. Due to its unrecognized status as a community foundation, the school had to function in the status of private school. This situation also created problems related to the registration of the foundation's properties. In 2012, the Council of Foundations finally recognized Tıbrevank's foundation status and the Surp Haç Tıbrevank High School Foundation was registered as community foundation (Atılğan et al. 2012).

By the means of oral accounts that I gathered and written documents, it is not possible to establish a causal link between the highly politicized environment at the 1970's Tıbrevank –school and association- and this bureaucratic hardship concerning the status of Tıbrevank. Considering

the Turkish state's discriminatory practices against minorities and its long-established anti-communism, we can only say that this kind of causality would not be surprising.

4.7 A New Intellectual Path: Agos and Aras

In the 1990s, two significant intellectual initiatives which enabled the Armenian society to come out from its shell and contributed to the subversion of nation-state discourse on the Armenian genocide and other minority questions emerged: Aras Publishing and Agos weekly newspaper. These two outlets indicated a new path of struggle which was considerably different from the socialist militancy of the previous decades. They were the offspring of the last decade's political reservoir, but they adopted a new language and new set of strategies.

First, Aras was founded by four alumni of Tıbrevank⁵⁰ in 1993. It publishes books bilingually in Armenian and Turkish. In its first ten years, Aras' publications mainly consisted of short story books, novels and poetry books. Later, starting from 2005, it also started to publish history books on the genocide (Şekeryan 2013). Rober Koptaş, the editor of Aras, remarks that "its purpose is to tell those who are not Armenians the story of the denigrated, despised and marginalized small Armenian society", and continues: "Agos undertook a more actual version of the same mission which requires intense political struggle" (2016).

In 1996, Aras was followed by the establishment of Agos weekly. Its editor-in-chief was Hrant Dink who studied at Tıbrevank for two years⁵¹. The newspaper is published predominantly in Turkish in order "to open the Armenian community to society at large" and to reach Armenians who cannot speak their mother tongue (Dink; cited in Çandar 2016, 181). As suggested in its name, Dink's Agos opened a *furrow* on the Turkish national memory (Zırh 2015). The issues regarded as taboos including the Armenian genocide, the Armenian diaspora, Islamicized Armenians and the

⁵⁰ Mıgırđıç Margosyan, Yetvart Tomasyan, Ardaşes Margosyan and Hrant Dink.

⁵¹ Starting from the school years, Hrant Dink and Armenak Bakırcıyan were close friends. While Armenak Bakırcıyan participated in armed struggle as a militant of TİKKO, Hrant Dink stayed in İstanbul. In 1980, Bakırcıyan was killed by security forces (Çandar 2016).

relations with the Republic of Armenia were brought to the attention of public by Agos for the first time (Agos 2015). However, Dink became target after the publication of his 2004 article claiming that Atatürk's adopted daughter Sabiha Gökçen was an Armenian orphan. In the following years, Dink was threatened by ultra-nationalists, warned by the agents of National Intelligence Organization and sued for insulting Turkishness. In January 19, 2007, he was assassinated in front of the Agos building. His death brought about a public outcry. Tens of thousands of people marched in his funeral. It marked another threshold in the struggle: The Armenian society finally began to speak out about its own reality (Gültekin 2017).

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

In the present work, standing by Walter Benjamin's angel of history and looking back to the story of Tıbrevank, I searched for the conditions of possibilities for a political struggle challenging the hegemonic narrative of the Turkish nation-state. The story of Tıbrevank reminds of Marx' famous quote: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past" (1972, 10).

Keeping this in my mind, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I established the connections between the circumstances in which the experience of Tıbrevank was shaped. The second section of Chapter 3 on the life of Armenians in post-genocide Turkey provided a general overview of the circumstances of survival underlying the foundation of Tıbrevank. The second set of circumstances is related to the life of students at Tıbrevank which I described in Chapter 4 based on my ethnographic fieldwork. These circumstances enabled them to embrace left-wing ideas and later to find alternative ways to challenge the hegemonic narrative of the Turkish state. Lastly, the rise of socialism in the 1960s and 1970s, which I delineated in the last section of Chapter 3 and the section on the Tıbrevank Alumni Association of Chapter 4, constituted another set of circumstances. Their socialist tendencies empowered them to resist the state and contributed to their future endeavours to challenge its hegemonic narrative. But, in turn, socialist politics came under the influence of this intellectual challenge to the state discourse concerning the decimation of minorities.

In the last instance, the analysis of these historical circumstances served for the theoretical discussion of this thesis. By the means of Gramscian theory, on the one hand, I identified the hegemonic influence of Turkish nation-state narrative over the radical left movements' approaches to the questions of ethnoreligious minorities. On the other hand, my ethnographic account on Tıbrevank delineated the dynamics which contributed to the formation of an intellectual initiative challenging this ideological hegemony of the nation-state. The re-constitution of their Armenian

identity in the association played a decisive role in the construction of this intellectual position challenging the Turkish state's overwhelming historical narrative.

The intellectual genealogy which was briefly delineated through the ethnographic account on Tibrevank can be traced back to the Armenian left-wing movements in the late Ottoman era. Although I find this historical connection essential, I abstained from conducting an extensive discussion due to the limitations of my ethnographic data. However, Raymond Williams' conceptualization of the relationality between residual and emergent elements in the epochal analysis of culture can be mobilized to establish a historical connection between Tibrevank and these earlier political formations. I think this theoretical approach provides useful tools to overcome the disconnections and inadequacies of the historiography on socialism in Turkey, which were shortly described in the chapter on historical background. For the case of Tibrevank, this approach provides a solid theoretical basis for extensive researches focussing on the historical continuities and ruptures and the strategies of cultural survival. Unfortunately, this thesis could not realize these research objectives due to the abovementioned constraints. I rather content myself with identifying certain problems which can be addressed in future studies.

This work was written in a period during which any form of collective resistance, any possibility of actual dissidence has been suppressed by the Turkish state which is going through radical transformations under an authoritarian rule. In the context of the current sociopolitical crisis, I find it essential to critically reflect on the past experiences of survival, resistance and struggle against the hegemonic position of the state in Turkey. The comprehensive analyses of these experiences and the circumstances in which they occurred have the potential to enable left-wing movements and subalterns to make sense of the unpredictable unfolding of sociopolitical struggle. This thesis came into existence also as a consequence of this concern.

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