Unpopular Corruption and Popular Corrupt Politicians: A Survey Experiment on Electoral Support for Corrupt Candidates in the Philippines

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ABSTRACT[1]

Why do corrupt candidates enjoy and maintain electoral support? This remains an undying puzzle in Philippine politics. Previous research has focused on ethnical identity, partisan bias, clientelistic networks, and the lack of credible information, only few have looked upon the characteristics of the corrupt candidate in explaining the lack of electoral consequence of corruption. To fill this gap, I build on the logic of Thompson's applied populism and test the hypothesis that candidates' origin (humble, elite or humble and competent) is one of the keys to understanding why corrupt candidates enjoy electoral popularity in the Philippines. Using online survey experiment data collected in the Philippines, I find that participants to the survey are more likely to support a corrupt candidate of humble origin with a good legislative performance record. However, this support varies depending on whether the individual treats the corruption accusation as serious or not, irrespective of treatment. My findings also suggest a novel mechanism of why Filipinos continue to support tainted candidates: individuals seem to perceive that a corrupt candidate can be hardworking, which could be why they are willing to make a tradeoff between acts of corruption and a good performance record.

[1] The title of the thesis was taken from Kurer (2001, 63).

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INTRODUCTION

Ideally, competitive elections ought to deter misbehaving politicians. This is because competitive elections provide citizens the opportunity to throw the rascals out (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2017). In practice, though, this does not happen in countries with competitive elections, where large numbers of officials who are alleged corrupt or prone to illegal practices are still elected (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013). This is the case of the Philippines too, here politicians charged with plunder are still able to run and win in both local and national elections. There are several elected politicians in Congress who are currently charged with plunder and graft cases. Most prominent among them are the following: the former president and now representative of Pampanga Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Imelda Marcos of Ilocos Norte, former president and now mayor of Manila Joseph "Erap" Estrada, and three incumbent senators, namely Juan Ponce Enrile, Ramon Revilla Jr. and Jose Estrada. All these politicians are accused of misusing public funds by pocketing kickbacks and by diverting public funds to fake government projects (Bernal 2014)

Why does corruption fail to have electoral consequences? If corruption is viewed to be morally wrong by voters, then why does this belief not translate into votes? Most scholars suggest explanations that point to factors such as strong ethnic identity and partisan bias (Anduiza, Gallego and Muñoz 2013; Banerjee et al. 2014; Blais, Gidengil and Kilibarda 2015; Chang and Kerr 2017), lack of credible information (Blais, Gidengil and Kilibarda 2015; Klašnja 2017; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013, Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2017), and patronage (Chang and Kerr 2017; Fernandez-Vazquez, Barbera and Rivero 2015; Manzetti and Wilson 2007) as to why voters turn a blind eye to corruption.

Analyzing this issue in the case of the Philippines is relevant for two reasons. First, corruption remains a relevant issue in Philippine politics. Transparency International ranks the Philippines as the 95th on the corruption perception index, along with Armenia and Mexico (Hegina 2016). Out of 100 (very clean), the Philippines scored 35. This is not surprising with the

number of politicians involved in corruption scandals every year. Second, the main motivating puzzle of this study is the prevalent phenomenon of corrupt politicians being continuously re-elected and the reason for their electoral success remains empirically unexplored. Obviously, the Philippines is not a unique case. Candidates with criminal records are also elected in other countries such as India and many others. However, what is astonishing in the case of the Philippines is how famous corrupt candidates can garner and maintain support. In the last 2010 national elections, Erap Estrada finished second to the former president Noy-noy Aquino. In addition, the son of the former dictator Ferdinand Marcos was close to being the vice-president in last 2016 national elections.

This study contributes to the existing body of literature by proposing a novel explanation that explores the influence of the origin of the corrupt candidates on the level of electoral support they garner. This explanation may not sound intuitive to someone not familiar with Philippine politics. However, to those accustomed with the spectacle of the election campaigns in the Philippines, some candidates' emphasis on their humble origin is quite an old story. In fact, the rags-to-riches, ordinary, or self-made (wo)man narrative is quite a common theme of campaign advertisements. Politicians strategically portray themselves as disadvantaged in the hope of garnering support and sympathy from voters. In 2010, for example, one of the then presidential candidates, employed what Thompson (2010a) calls "applied populism". Applied populism is a combination of strong political machinery and populist tactics. One common populist tactic is the sponsoring of noon-time shows that put emphasis on the anti-poverty advocacy and humble origins of the candidate *(Ibid.)*.

This so-called applied populism employed by candidates has an emotional and psychological appeal to the voter which can plausibly lead to overlooking allegations of corruption. The appeal of applied populists come from their messages of "being one" with and of the masses,

and of "alleviation" from poverty, supplemented by their story of how they worked their way to the top.

My study uses the theoretical account provided by the applied populism to study what explains voters' tolerance toward corruption. Specifically, I look at the origin of the candidate, whether coming from modest or privileged circumstances matters in the assessment of corrupt candidates. I argue that people will be willing to overlook accusations of corruption toward a candidate of humble origin and this should be even more the case if especially if s/he displays has a good past record.

The results of my thesis show that a humble origin alone is not sufficient to convince the individual to support a corrupt candidate. What appears from the findings is that individuals prefer a corrupt candidate of humble origin with a good legislative performance record. This is because they perceive him to be as hardworking, hence making them more acceptant of the corrupt candidate. However, this is moderated by the perception of the seriousness of the corruption case of the individual. Those who take the corruption case seriously, regardless of treatment, are less inclined to back the corrupt candidate.

My thesis proceeds as follows. I first build the theoretical framework of my research by drawing on the existing literature about the electoral punishment of corruption. I divide the literature in three categories, namely explanations focused on in-group bias, lack of credible information, and implicit trade hypotheses. I then introduce Thompson's applied populism, which constitutes the foundation of my theoretical argument and hypotheses. The chapter also introduces my hypotheses. The second chapter describes my research design, including the methodology, and the methods of data collection and analysis. The third chapter presents the results of my empirical analyses. Finally, I conclude with the broader implications of my findings, the limitations of my study as well as suggestions for further research.

Chapter 1

CORRUPT CANDIDATES AND THEIR ELECTORAL SUCCESS

"Electoral punishment of corruption is hardly a reality in many democracies." (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013, 472) Voters do not throw the rascals out despite given the chance to do so. In fact, corruption allegations and scandals have limited electoral consequences (Muñoz, Anduiza, and Gallego 2016). In his study, Bagenholm (2013) finds that corruption allegations and scandals, although affecting governmental performances do not harm government survival. It seems that corruption does not affect negatively the political careers of corrupt politicians (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013). Erap Estrada's case demonstrates this. Erap Estrada, a former action star in Philippine cinema, is the 13th president of the Philippines. Being jailed for plunder and being on the list of the ten most corrupt leaders in the world did not put a dent on his electoral popularity. In spite of this, he was able to gain the hearts of a quarter of the electorate in the 2010 presidential election (Quimpo 2008; Thompson 2010b).

There are micro-and macro-level explanations for the lack of electoral punishment of corruption. Macro-level explanations refer to the environmental factors that might facilitate or constrain corrupt behavior of politicians. They are the following: the economic context, the dominant political culture, the quality of the institutions, media independence, the electoral and the party system (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013). Manzetti and Wilson (2007), for example, look at the strength of institutions and how this contributes to the lack of electoral punishments of corrupt governments in 14 countries. Using data from the 1995 World Values Survey, they find that government ineffectiveness along with high perception of corruption do not cause the individual to sanction the corrupt government. It is only government effectiveness along with a high level of corruption that make people withdrawing support from the corrupt government.

However, studies focusing on macro-level explanations are not without limitations and contextual factors are not sufficient to explain the variation in responses toward corruption (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013). Supporting a corrupt candidate is also a product of individual choice and deliberation, hence they have to be supplemented by micro-level factors. Micro-level factors focus on individual features and values that shape the individual's judgment in what is good or bad conduct (*Ibid.*). These conditions can influence the willingness to punish or reward the corrupt politician. In this paper, I group similar studies into three categories based on the explanations they offer: in-group bias, lack of credible information, and implicit exchange.

1.1 In-group bias hypothesis

What this set of studies have in common is that they emphasize group identity be it on the basis of ethnicity, partisanship, or clientelistic bonds to explain the lack of electoral punishment of corruption. They argue that ethnic identity, party attachment, or clientelistic links affect the voters' assessment, making them tolerant of their misbehaving preferred parties.

Kurer (2001), for example, points to the dominant traditional norm of giving those who are socially close the special treatment as one explanation of this acceptance of corruption. Moreover, according to this hypothesis, voters do not question who their party selects as the candidate because party identity influences their level of tolerance for corruption (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013). In this case, connection to the corrupt candidate does not entail material exchange but a sharing of identity, be it ethnic or partisan.

The overall empirical evidence for partisan bias as a source of in-group preference is mixed. In Spain, Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz (2013) look at the role of partisan bias in conditioning the attitude of voters toward corruption, zeroing on whether individuals are more lenient toward corruption if the candidate comes from their preferred party. While voters do give allowances to the candidate of their preferred party, their results suggest that partisan bias is moderated by the level of political knowledge. The blinding effect of partisan bias is lifted from the eyes of political

sophisticated Spanish voters. Similarly, Beaulieu (2014) argues that partisanship distorts perception of corruption. He finds that US voters perceive less fraud when the winning candidate shares the same partisan identity as the voter. Blais, Gidengil, and Kilibarda (2015) examined 11 elections in Canada, France, Germany, Spain and Switzerland and found evidence that partisans of the incumbent party tend to assess it more positively than nonpartisans.

Cordero and Blais (2017) analyzed the success of the Spanish People's Party (PP) in the 2015 general election despite being plagued by many cases of corruption. Although they did not look at partisanship directly, they included a measure of respondents' ideological distance from the PP and concluded that voters who declared themselves as ideologically close to the PP perceived it as still corrupt. However, this view is moderated by their belief that corruption is prevalent in Spain, which is why they are more forgiving of PP.

Ethnicity has been proposed as another type of affinity that could explain the success of candidates charged with corruption and criminality (Banerjee et al. 2014). According to this hypothesis voters employ ethnic ties such as caste as the main criterion in electing a candidate instead of qualification, even if it means turning a blind eye on corruption. Banerjee et al. (2014) tested this hypothesis using a survey experiment in Uttar Pradesh, India in 2010. They concluded that support for the caste-preferred candidate is reduced with strong criminal and corruption charges. This is contrary to their expectations, however when another party receives criminal and corruption allegations, voters stick to their corrupt caste-preferred candidate.

Chang and Kerr (2017) tested the same hypothesis but provide a new framework to analyze tolerance of corruption. They propose an insider-outsider framework where there are two types of insiders: the patronage and identity insiders. In this case, patronage can be classified under the in-group bias hypothesis as they define patronage insiders as those who are members of the patronage network and identity insiders as those who share an ethnic identity or party affiliation with the incumbent. Chang and Kerr (2017) argue that patronage insiders are more likely to

condone and perceive corruption than patronage outsiders. This is because patronage insiders enjoy their monopoly of benefits from the incumbent. Similar to patronage insiders, identity insiders are also more likely to condone corruption but less likely to perceive corruption because of their partisan bias or their predisposition to look for information that reinforces the positive attributes of the co-ethnic.

Using Afrobarometer survey evidence, they show that benefiting from a patronage network makes the individual perceive less corruption. However, they were not able to observe the same behavior from identity insiders. Their results suggest voters knowingly choose corrupt politicians in exchange for material benefits.

It seems that there is weak empirical evidence in support for the hypothesis about the role of ethnic identity in accounting for the condoning of corruption as shown by the studies of Banerjee et al. (2014) and Chang and Kerr (2017). Also, the evidence of partisan attachment is inconclusive. Contrary to Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz (2013), Chang and Kerr (2017), Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013) did not find support for the party mechanism in their studies. It also turns out that sharing an ethnic identity with the corrupt candidate is not enough for the voter to forget about corruption accusations. The individual's support is conditional in the sense that there should not be clean alternatives present, as shown by Banerjee et al. (2014). Although this suggests that being in a patronage network overpowers ethnic and partisan allegiance, one cannot rule out the lack of credible information and the role of nonmaterial inducements.

1.2 Lack of credible information hypothesis

According to this class of explanations, voters do not throw the rascals out because they lack valid information about the candidate's misbehavior (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013). Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) propose the information hypothesis that states that when credible information is accessible and available, voters will withdraw their support from corrupt politicians. To test this hypothesis, they conduct a survey experiment in Brazil. They find substantial evidence

for the information hypothesis: voters are willing to support an incompetent but not corrupt candidate over a corrupt yet competent candidate. In a more recent study conducted in in 2017, they found evidence that politically sophisticated Brazilians are keener on discerning which corruption allegation is credible. This means that federal audits are given more credence by educated citizens, hence they are more likely to implement electoral punishment on corrupt politicians. However, this is contradicted by Pereiro and Melo's (2015) disturbing results: they find that even with verified denouncements, Brazilians continue to support corrupt incumbents as long as they invest in public spending at the municipal level.

A later study done by Klašnja (2014) test the hypothesis that as political awareness increases, support for corrupt incumbent relative to a clean alternative decreases. However, what is counter-intuitive is that he also argues that support for corrupt incumbents increases with high political awareness. This is due to the fact that high political awareness is associated with partisanship. Strong partisans, in turn, discount negative evaluation of the incumbent. Using survey evidence, Klašnja (2014) finds individuals with high political awareness are more sensitive to corruption scandals. Moreover, partisanship does not reduce this sensitivity due to political awareness. Similar to Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz (2013), Klašnja finds no evidence that politically aware individuals will more likely support a corrupt politician regardless of partisanship.

The information hypothesis has received criticisms from other scholars. For Rundquist, Strom and Peters (1977), the ignorant voter explanation is not a sufficient explanation for voting a corrupt candidate because the main assumption of this hypothesis is problematic. If voters are provided credible information, it follows that they will be more enlightened voters and opt for the clean candidate. However, reality shows that regardless of the level of information about the candidate's misbehavior, the voter will still support him or her anyway, especially when partisanship and materital incentives are involved (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013).

1.3 Implicit exchange hypothesis

The proponents of the implicit exchange hypothesis are Rundquist, Strom and Peters (1977). According to this hypothesis, material incentives are not necessary in why voters choose to back a corrupt candidate. It allows for other forms of non-material reasons, such as voters giving more weight to valence issues over integrity issues, voters choosing on the basis of past electoral performance and traditional bread and butter policy issues (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013).

It might appear that implicit trade overlaps with the previous classes of explanations, especially with in-group bias. But what sets it apart is that it assumes that there are other components to an individual's vote: it is possible for a voter to prefer a corrupt candidate who delivers in the form of patronage, with positive characteristics, with a strong record of past experience or a combination of the three (Muñoz, Anduiza, and Gallego 2012). Implicit trade is not exclusive to clientelism alone because it highlights a pleasing attribute of a corrupt candidate.

Rundquist, Strom and Peters (1977) propose that candidates simply have to take a position on issues that the voter attaches more weight to. The voter will prioritize that over the knowledge that the politician is corrupt. To test their hypothesis, they conducted a computer-based experiment. Their sample were students from the University of Illinois. They find that the position of the candidate on Vietnam affected the probability of the participant to vote for the corrupt candidate. The experiment was done in 1972-1973 when the Vietnam War was still on-going, which explains why it was a relevant topic. Those who received the candidate's position on Vietnam—whether for or against— had the probability of .44 of voting for the corrupt candidate compared to the zero probability of those who did not receive this information. Moreover, they find that those who feel strongly for the Vietnam issue have a higher probability of sticking with the corrupt candidate than those who are indifferent to the issue.

In their study, Muñoz, Anduiza, and Gallego (2016) explain why voters support alleged corrupt politicians through the implicit trade hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the chance

the voter supports the corrupt politician increases when the latter has a good performance record. For example, if the incumbent has coincidentally presided in over good economic growth, then there is a good chance that the voter will support him or her in the next election, especially if the candidate comes from the voter's preferred party. Using a survey experiment to test their hypotheses, Muñoz, Anduiza, and Gallego (2016) conclude that there is evidence for the implicit exchange hypothesis. A good record compensates for dishonesty as the likelihood of voting for the accused mayor is thrice larger when the mayor is competent than when he is incompetent.

Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá, and Rivero (2016) test the same hypothesis and argue that the lack of a strong punishment for misbehaving politicians could be the positive externalities that are brought about by their corrupt activity. Voters deliberately ignore the corruption when there are benefits delivered through the politicians' corrupt activity but electorally punish them when they are not given compensation, such as rents, from the corrupt activity.

This study proposes two distinct types of corruption based on the benefits that it yields: welfare enhancing and welfare decreasing. An example of welfare enhancing corruption is a mayor investing in economic activities, such as those that create employment opportunities for constituents, that widely benefit the public. However, welfare decreasing corruption involves fraud in procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and bypassing rules to hire supporters (Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá, and Rivero 2016). The type of corruption matters. It can be the case that voters will react differently to a corruption accusation depending on whether it is welfare enhancing or welfare decreasing. If it is the former, then the voter could be willing to overlook it but if it is the former, electoral punishment could follow.

To test their hypothesis, they use linear regression. However, what is new in their analysis is that they did not combine the two types of corruption so as not to bias their estimates. They find evidence that corruption type affects magnitude of electoral punishment. Mayors who engage in welfare decreasing lose 4.2 percent of the vote share.

Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013) also find empirical support for the implicit exchange hypothesis. They argue that the probability of electoral punishment is reduced with favorable economic policy, clientelistic bonds, and partisanship. However, it will increase if the candidate is engaged in corruption practices that involve something that the individual is entitled to.

To test these hypotheses, they conducted a survey experiment in Greece in 2013. The results of their analyses indicate that favorable economic policy is a statistically significant predictor of support for the corrupt mayor. By cutting council taxes, the mayor engaged in corruption increases his likelihood of getting the support of the voter by 8 percent. However, they did not find evidence that a clientelistic scenario increases the chances of gaining support from the voter. In fact, those who were given this treatment were less likely to vote for the corrupt mayor. Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013) suggest that collective economic benefits, rather than selective ones, outweigh the willingness of voters to punish a corrupt politician. The same leniency in Greece is observed by Weschle (2016). In his survey experiment conducted in 2014, he finds that Greeks have low tolerance for politicians who use special interest money for personal gain but behave differently if the special money is used to buy political support of the participant.

In a study about the electoral success of Lula and Dilma in Brazil, Balan (2014) talks about a variant of the implicit trade hypothesis that can be summarized by the Portuguese saying *"rouba mas faz"* which literally means he steals but he gets things done. He concludes that Lula's government was able to withstand corruption charges because he managed to get things done with the inefficient system of Brazil. Under Lula's government, the conditional cash transfer expanded from 8.5 to 11.5 million families and the minimum wage increased (*Ibid.*). His success in passing these bills in Congress outshined his corruption allegations. Moreover, Lula was able to draw votes from the beneficiaries of the conditional cash transfer who belonged to the low-income bracket and did not have access to the news about his corruption scandals.

The implicit trade hypothesis paints a negative and problematic picture of the voter. It implicitly assumes that the pursuit of personal interest drives tolerance of corruption. The voter attaches more value to benefitting from the redistribution of public benefits and services and to the fulfillment of his or her personal preferences over ethical standards (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013). The voters do not punish misbehaving politicians because they accept corruption as fact of life (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013*)*. How the politician delivers public benefits matters less compared to the positive externalities they bring. This is what Kurer (2001) was referring to as inconsistent preferences. Voters find corruption as morally repugnant, ceteris paribus. However, they also believe that is morally justifiable to avail of the opportunities that corruption presents.

1.4 Applied populism: An alternative explanation?

While previous studies have offered explanations as to why some voters decide to support corrupt politicians, only few have given attention to the characteristics of the corrupt candidate. Among the studies that attempted to do this are the ones of Banerjee et al. (2014) and Muñoz, Anduiza, and Gallego (2016). In their survey experiment, they included the surname as well as the political party endorsing the candidates. Such information, indicative of the caste of the candidate with a criminal record, were randomized to see whether ethnic identity makes the individual overlook the negative attribute (Banerjee et al. 2014). While testing for in-group bias, they provide information that could counterbalance the negative attribute of the corrupt candidate. In another survey experiment, a hypothetical mayor with a good performance record is provided by Muñoz, Anduiza, and Gallego (2016) to test whether competence compensates for a corruption accusation.

My research is along the lines of Muñoz, Anduiza, and Gallego (2016). I build on the logic of the implicit-trade hypothesis and argue that voters, in the process of deliberating to support a corrupt candidate, compromise integrity for another positive characteristic that they hold more valuable. I propose that the origin of the corrupt candidate could be a potential reason as to why voters are willing to support candidates accused of corruption. I justify this choice by briefly discussing below Thompson's varieties of populism employed by Filipino politicians during election season.

According to Thompson (2010a), politicians in the Philippines struggle for voter support by offering "populist", "rich vs. poor" or "reformist" narratives. Although patron-client relations are still predominant, they are used to garner "command votes". Command voters are delivered from bailiwicks of the politicians. On the other hand, the narratives are meant to attract a different set of votes called "market votes"—votes sought for through media-based appeals (Teehankee cited in Thompson 2010a). The key to gaining market votes is through effective imaging of the

candidate through media reports and advertising. Part of the imaging process is the narratives employed by the candidate.

Thompson (2010a) describes candidates who rely on market votes as populist candidates: they rely more on their media-transported image contrary to their traditional clientelist counterparts who depend on their dyadic ties. He identifies the common populist narratives used by previous politicians: movie star populism, reformist populism, and applied populism. Movie star populism was the key to Erap Estrada's electoral success to presidency. Prior to becoming a politician, Erap was an actor. His films are usually about him being a proletarian hero fighting against corrupt elites (Thompson 2010a). According to Hedman (2001), Erap embraced this image and built his campaign on his long-term superstardom. As an example, one of Erap's famous catchphrase is "*Erap para sa mahirap"* which literally means Erap for the poor. This drew a vast amount of support from his fans which were then translated into votes.

The reformist populist appeal differs from the previous one because it seeks support by claiming that corruption is the root of oppression of the poor. It promises to govern honestly and promote good governance. They appeal to voters of all classes and to the Filipino emotions of *damay* (empathy) and *awa* (pity) (Thompson 2010a). Cory Aquino is known to have adopted a reformist narrative during her presidential campaign against dictator Ferdinand Marcos. She used the martyrdom of Ninoy Aquino, her husband, to evoke strong emotions and to gain sympathizers.

Last among the types of populist narratives is the applied populism. Applied populism is the combination of strong political machinery and populist appeals. According to Thompson (2010a), it is Manny Villar who espoused this strategy in the 2010 presidential elections. Villar is not as charismatic as Erap; instead of relying on a fan base for political support, he sponsored noontime TV shows. In one of the noontime TV shows, the audience members are given an orange sheet of paper—orange was the color of his campaign—so that they can write how they will spend PHP 25,000 (USD 500). Usually, a story of a poor citizen will be featured, which is

reminiscent of Villar's rags-to-riches tale and to be followed by his famous catchphrase "*sipag at tiyaga" (*diligence and perseverance). According to Thompson (2010a), Villar, who was an ordinary shrimp vendor prior to being a successful businessman, used his humble origins to launch his anti-elitist discourse.

The origin of the candidate, whether it is fictional or true, can matter for a Filipino voter. When used wisely, it can mean political success for a candidate. However, could it also be a factor that contributes to tolerance for corrupt candidates in the Philippines? There is no strong basis to say that there is, however according to Chang and Kerr (2017, 71) "ethnicity and party affiliation is used as schema by voters to process political information and to make judgments about the incumbent." The origin of a candidate can make the Filipino voter temporarily forget the misbehavior of that candidate in election period. Take Erap Estrada as an example. Despite receiving public criticism for involvement in *jueteng* scandals and in a plunder case, Erap still enjoys high popularity ratings (Hedman 2001). In 2013, Estrada won the midterm elections as mayor of Manila—a proof that the Erap magic has not waned.

What can be noticed from all types of narrative employed by Filipino politicians is their appeal to the poor voters. Thompson (2010b) argues that Filipinos are now relying more and more on what the media say rather than the material promises of politicians. A Pulse Asia Survey in 2009 reports that 27 percent of the electorate prefer a candidate who "cares for the poor" while only 21 percent and 12 percent say that they will back a candidate described as "not corrupt" and a "good person" respectively.

Drawing on these I expect that a corrupt candidate employing applied populism will still be able to maintain electoral support regardless of corruption accusations. Specifically, the politician who emphasizes a humble beginning will appear more appealing to the voter.

H1. Individuals will more likely support a corrupt candidate of humble origin.

On the contrary, corrupt candidates with an elite origin will be more penalized by voters compared to corrupt ones with humble origin.

H2. Individuals are less likely to support a corrupt candidate of elite origin.

There is also evidence from studies under the implicit trade hypothesis that voters are more forgiving with a corrupt candidate with a good performance record. This leads to my third expectation that a candidate with both humble origin and good performance record will maintain support from the voter despite being accused of corruption.

H3. Individuals will more likely support a corrupt candidate of humble origin with a good performance record.

The weight of considering the origin of the candidate a compensatory asset might vary depending on how serious people consider the issue of corruption to be. Those who see it as unimportant issue will not withdraw their support for their corrupt candidate. Moreover, they will be more likely to support a corrupt candidate of humble origin—and even more one with a good past record on top of the humble origin—compared to those in similar positions who consider corruption a very important issue. Following this logic, I expect that:

H4. The support for candidates with a humble origin will differ as a function of perceived seriousness of the allegation of corruption. People who see corruption as a very important issue will be less likely to support a candidate of humble origin compared to their counterparts who see corruption as an unimportant issue.

H5. The support for candidates with a humble origin and good past record will differ as a function of perceived seriousness of the allegation of corruption. People who see corruption as a very important issue will be less likely to support a candidate of humble origin compared to their counterparts who see corruption as an unimportant issue.

A similar logic applies to considerations about the perceived importance of competency relative to integrity of the candidate. I expect that people who see competency as a more important

feature of a candidate will be more likely to support a corrupt candidate of a humble origin and a good past record.

H6. The support for candidates with a humble origin and a good past record will differ as a function of perceived importance of competency. People who value competency more will be more likely to support a candidate of humble origin and good past record compared their counterparts who see competency as less important of a trait.

Literature about implicit trade point to a positive characteristic that will compensate for the corruption accusation on the candidate. In Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz's (2013) study, it is impressive past electoral performance that proves to be the redeeming quality. Interestingly enough, none of the previous studies have explained what the mechanism is through which people evaluate a good performance record and support a corrupt candidate. My research fills this gap by proposing an analysis of this link. Specifically, I test whether the origin of the candidate is related with people's assessment on a number of dimensions—e.g. approachability, etc.—that in turn are expected to predict people's support for a corrupt candidate.

Here, I attempt to connect the dots by including the five dimensions that the participant could use to assess the corrupt candidate assigned to his or her experimental condition. I believe that one of the dimensions could be the key to figuring out how being exposed to a corrupt candidate of humble, elite or humble and competent origin could be translated into electoral support.

Chapter 2

RESEARCH DESIGN

2.1 Experimental set-up

Most empirical studies concerned with the lack of electoral punishment of corruption have employed an experiment design and very often survey experiments as a means of data collection (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013; Banerjee et al. 2014; Konstantinidis and Xezonakis 2013; Muñoz, Anduiza, and Gallego 2016; Rundquist, Strom, and Peters 1977; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013). They have used vignettes that describe a hypothetical corrupt candidate. Survey experiments are commonly used by political scientists because they are convenient to implement and are more representative because of their sample size.

A survey experiment is conducted by manipulating the form or placement of items or by altering the wordings in a survey (Brader and Tucker 2012; Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007). To reveal the causal effect of a treatment, respondents are randomly assigned to a control or treatment group. To conclude that the treatment does have an effect, there must be a significant difference between the treatment and control groups.

This method has four main advantages. First, it allows us to draw inferences about the behavior and attitudes since the samples of survey experiments are representative of the population or subpopulation of interest. For example, Mullinix et al. (2015) find that the use of convenience samples in survey experiments from Mechanical Turk (MTurk) produce treatment effects similar to population-based survey experiments. Second, since survey experiments are usually part of a larger survey, this allows the researcher to test other factors that could affect the causal relationship studied. Third, it is easy to administer given that it can be conducted online. Fourth, participation in a survey experiment is costless and convenient to the respondent. This convenience could also be a cost for a survey experiment because they are prone to the social

desirability effect. However, this can be rectified with the survey experiment being online as it offers anonymity to the participant.

Fully aware of the strengths of an online survey experiment, this study obtained data by conducting an online survey experiment on the platform Qualtrics in May 2017. The survey was conducted online to accommodate the participants who were located in the Philippines.

The participants were students from the University of the Philippines Diliman (UPD) and Los Baños (UPLB). My sample was composed of undergraduate students who were enrolled in political science, psychology, sociology, social science 3 (gender and sexuality), and the national service training program courses during the second semester of 2016-2017. Participants were invited by their respective instructors to answer the online survey through an anonymous link.

Using students as a convenience sample is discouraged because it weakens the generalizability of results from an experiment. However, Druckman and Kam (2011) argue that student subjects do not threaten the external validity of an experiment, especially if the goal is to test a theory. This skepticism about the use of students as subjects is a result of a limited view of what external validity is. For Druckman and Kam (2011), there are two more important things: 1) making sure that the treatment is indeed the conceptual equivalent, and 2) experimental realism—whether the experiment forces the respondent to take it seriously.

I set up a 1x3 experimental design where respondents are randomly assigned to different treatment groups and to a control group (see Table 1). Having a control group is crucial for two reasons. First, if the means of my treatments groups are statistically different from that of the control group, this suggests that my treatments do have an effect on my dependent variable. In this sense, the control group serves as a baseline (Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007). Second, it is considered as bad practice not to include a control group since comparing means among treatments groups is misleading and not indicative of treatments having an effect *(Ibid.)*.

Table 1 Three treatment groups

Treatment	Humble	Elite	Humble*Competent
Corrupt			

In the experiment, participants in all conditions were told to assume that the coming presidential election is next month and that the presidential candidate is corrupt. In all experimental conditions, the candidate was described to be an incumbent senator and to be receiving kickbacks from government funds supposedly for government projects. All candidates were described as corrupt on purpose so as not to bias the results. It is safe to assume that if participants are given a clean option, they have more reason to vote for that candidate.

Participants randomly assigned to the treatment groups were exposed to three hypothetical backgrounds—the explanatory variable of interest. The hypothetical backgrounds are *humble*, *elite, and humble and competent* for candidate X, candidate Y and candidate Z respectively. These treatment conditions, as well as the control condition, were randomized evenly on Qualtrics. Participants were assigned to only one of the four conditions. The content of the treatments and the control can be seen below in Table 2.

Table 2 Wording of experimental conditions

Humble	**The national elections is next month. Incumbent Senator X is running for presidency. Before beginning his political career, candidate X was a fish vendor until he worked his way up to become a senator. There is news though that he accepts kickbacks from public funds supposedly for government projects. How likely is it that you will support candidate X at the election next month?**
Elite	**The national elections is next month. Incumbent Senator Y is running for presidency. Before beginning his political career, candidate Y is known to come from a prominent family both in business and politics. There is news though that he accepts kickbacks from public funds supposedly for government projects. How likely is it that you will support candidate Y at the election next month?**
Humble and competent	**The national elections is next month. Incumbent Senator Z is running for presidency. Before beginning his political career, candidate Z was a fish vendor until he worked his way up to become a senator. Moreover, candidate Z is known for authoring several bills in the Senate, including his landmark legislation that allows affordable medicines and the development of the generics industry. There is news though that he accepts kickbacks from public funds supposedly for government projects. How likely is it that you will support candidate Z at the election next month?**
Control	**The national elections is next month. Incumbent Senator W is running for presidency. There is news though that he accepts kickbacks from public funds supposedly for government projects. How likely is it that you will support candidate W at the election next month?**

2.2 Data

2.2.1 Dependent variable

My main dependent variable is the willingness to vote for the hypothetical candidate. This is measured with the question: "How likely is it that you will support candidate W/X/Y/Z in the next presidential election?" Participants could choose a response on a scale from 1 (would never vote for him) to 10 (would surely vote for him).

2.2.2. Independent variables

My main independent variable is assignment to the experimental conditions. It has two categories; 1 indicates for belonging to the experimental group and 0 for not. The participants

were also asked to assess the seriousness of the corruption case of their assigned candidate (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013). Participants could choose a response on a scale of 1 (not at all serious) to ten (extremely serious). This variable is measured by the question: "What do you think about this alleged fact?"

Figure 1 Distribution of responses for perceived seriousness



Participants were also asked which of the two they prioritize more: competence or integrity. This is measured by the statement: "Competence is more important than integrity for a candidate." Participants could choose a response on a scale of seven from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree).

Figure 2 Distribution of responses for competence over integrity



To understand how these features translate into different probabilities of voting, the participants were asked to rate their assigned candidate on the following dimensions: approachability, industriousness, honesty, capability at curbing corruption, and competency at implementing law and order. The hypothesized mechanism is that candidates' origins would be related to positive assessments on the dimensions mentioned above. They could choose a response on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). Similar to the measure for perceived corruption, the variable for each dimension is considered as continuous.

Figure 3 Distribution of responses for hardworking



2.2.3 Control variables

A number of the usual socio-demographic predictors of political participation are also controlled for in my study. The selection of control variables to be included is heavily influenced by Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz (2013). The socio-demographic variables are age, gender, and monthly income. Age is treated as a continuous variable. As for gender, a binary variable is used (1 = male, 2 = female). Females are expected to be more forgiving of corrupt candidates *(Ibid.)*. Monthly income is measured with seven categories and is also treated as a continuous variable.

I also take into account the usual predictors of voting. Political awareness was measured using four items that asked about the term limits of the president and a senator, and the positions of current key government officials (see Appendix A). The average of the four items is computed to determine the final score of the participant for this variable. Positioning in the political spectrum as well as interest in politics are also control variables. The former is a ten-point scale

where participants can choose from 1 (left) to 10 (right) while the latter is a seven-point scale where 1 means "strongly agree" and 7 as "strongly disagree". Finally, I include TV as a source of information about the Philippines as Thompson argues that applied populists employ media-based appeals to voters.

Table 3 Descriptive statistics for control variables

Statistic	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Interest in politics	160	2.60	1.250	1	7
Left-right self-identification	160	5.04	1.755	1	10
TV	160	1.93	0.979	1	5
Political awareness	160	2.46	0.592	0	4
Age	160	19.56	4.070	1	55
Gender	160	1.66	0.476	1	2
Monthly income	160	3.74	1.778	1	7

2.2.4 Statistical Analysis

For my statistical analysis, I rely on analysis of variance (ANOVA). ANOVA is useful because it allows inferences to be drawn by comparing several means (Agresti and Finlay 1997). Moreover, it is appropriate given that I treat my main independent variable (assignment to experimental group) as categorical and my main dependent variable as continuous.

I also employ multivariate linear regression for two reasons. First, it allows for control variable in the analysis which ANOVA cannot do. Second, it is through linear regression that I will be able to estimate the influence of my treatments on support for the corrupt candidate.

The linear regression for my study is expressed as:

$$\hat{Y}_{ij} = \hat{\beta}_{0j} + \hat{\beta}_1 Treatment + \hat{\beta}_2 X_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where $\hat{Y}_{ij}$ is the dependent variable, $\hat{\beta}_{0j}$ is the constant, $\hat{\beta}_1$ is the coefficient for the treatments, and X_{ij} is a vector for the control variables.

I later run a moderation analysis in my study to check whether the strength of my independent and dependent variables depend on a third variable. The linear regression with interaction terms is expressed as:

$$\hat{Y}_{ij} = \hat{\beta}_{0j} + \hat{\beta}_1 Treatment + \hat{\beta}_2 X_{ij} + \hat{\beta}_3 Z + \hat{\beta}_4 TreatmentZ + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where $\hat{Y}_{ij}$ is the dependent variable, $\hat{\beta}_{0j}$ is the constant, $\hat{\beta}_1$ is the coefficient for the treatments, and X_{ij} is a vector for the control variables, $\hat{\beta}_3 Z$ is the coefficient for the moderating variable, and $\hat{\beta}_4 XZ$ is the interaction term.

Chapter 3

RESULTS

3.1 Basic characteristics of participants

In total, 160 students from the University of the Philippines Diliman and Los Baños participated in the online survey experiment. Qualtrics randomly assigned them to either the control group or one of the three experimental conditions. The number of participants assigned to the *humble, elite, humble and competent* treatment groups and control group are 40, 40, 39 and 41 respectively.

As for demographics, women represent 66 percent of the sample while the remaining 34 percent are male students. Ninety-six percent are of voting age while only four percent are below this age. The average age of a participant is 19 years old. With regard to monthly income, most of the families of the participants belong to the middle-income class with an average monthly income of PHP 31,560-78,900 (USD 487-1,584).

At first glance the sample is biased in terms of favoring women, however it is common knowledge that UP admits more female than male students. Also, having more female students in my sample does not have substantive consequences for my study since there is no reason why female students should respond differently to the treatments.

The average score for political awareness is 2.46 (SD = 0.59). As for left-right self-identification, the average position of a participant in the spectrum is 5.04 (SD = 1.76).

3.2 Main results of the experiment

Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the experimental conditions. Descriptive statistics show that participants in the *humble and competent* show more willingness to vote for the corrupt candidate compared to the control group. This is followed by the *humble* group. Table 4 also suggests that the *humble* and *elite* groups' means do not differ from the control group. Figure 4 illustrates the amount of variation for the support for the candidate using boxplots.

Table 4 Descriptive statistics for support for the corrupt candidate

Group	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Humble	40	2.925	2.347	1	10
Elite	40	2.100	1.614	1	7
Humble and competent	39	4.846	2.631	1	10
Control	41	2.732	2.062	1	10

Figure 4 Boxplot of medians for support for the corrupt candidate



To test whether origin affects the support for corrupt candidates, I use assignment to treatment group as my independent variable and the likelihood to support the corrupt candidate as my dependent variable. I conduct a one-way ANOVA to compare the means of the four experimental conditions.

Table 5 shows the results of the online survey experiment. The F-value (11.48) reaches conventional levels of statistical significance ($p<0.001$). This gives strong evidence against the null hypothesis that the means of the experimental conditions are equal. It can be concluded that a difference exists among the mean of the support for the candidate among experimental conditions.

Table 5 ANOVA table for experimental conditions

	df	**SS**	**MS**	**F value**	**Sig**
Experimental Conditions	3	165.5	55.16	11.48	7.65e-07***
Residuals	156	749.5	4.80		

Note: *** = $p<0.001$

To check which experimental groups do differ, I conduct a Tukey Multiple Comparisons of Means as a post hoc test. In the plot below, it can be seen which experimental conditions display significant differences in support for the candidates. The significant pairs are those whose 95% confidence intervals do not cross the zero value. Figure 5 illustrates that there is a statistically significant difference between *humble* and *humble and competent groups*, *elite* and *humble and competent groups*, and *humble and competent* and control groups.

Figure 5 Plot of experimental condition pairs

Compared to a t-test, The Tukey Multiple Comparison of Means is more convenient to use in comparing group means. With a t-test, two groups of observations can only be compared, hence t-test is both cumbersome and inappropriate because of multiple testing of each pair. If the ANOVA yields evidence that the group means differ, Crichton (in Olleveant, Humphreys, and Roe 1999) recommends the Tukey Multiple Comparison Test in investigating which pair means differ. Similar to the t-test and the ANOVA, it assumes that the observations are of normal distribution and compares pairs of means between treatment groups, and between treatment and control groups. The results of the test found below in Table 6 confirms that of Figure 5. There is a significant difference in support for the corrupt candidate in the pairs with p-values lower than $p<0.05$.

Table 6 Results of the Tukey Multiple Comparisons of Means for support for corrupt candidate

Support for the corrupt candidate		
	diff	p-value
Elite-Humble	-0.825	0.335
Humble and competent-Humble	1.921	0.0008
Control-Humble	-0.193	0.978
Humble and competent-Elite	2.746	0.000
Control-Elite	0.631	0.566
Control-Humble and competent	-2.114	0.0001

In addition to ANOVA, I conducted multivariate linear regression on the sample to determine which factors influence support for the corrupt candidate. To test whether assignment to treatment groups is a significant predictor of respondents' support for the corrupt candidate, I estimated two linear regression models with support for the corrupt candidate as the dependent variable. The first model is a linear regression with the three treatment groups as the independent variables. The control group is the reference category, which means that the estimated coefficients represent the difference between being assigned to the treatment group and to the control group. In the second model, I introduce the eight control variables that I previously described in section 2.1.

Table 7 presents the coefficients with the robust standard errors in parentheses. I estimate robust standard errors since homoscedasticity is not observed from the errors of the two models. Estimating robust standard errors is known to be one of the ways to deal with heteroscedasticity. Williams (2012) recommends using robust standard errors because they do not change the coefficient estimates but yields more accurate standard errors and p-values.

In Model 1[2], I regressed the support for the corrupt candidate exposure to the treatment groups. Model 2 contains the same independent variable along with the control variables. The two

[2] Regression diagnostics were applied to Model 1. There is no multicollinearity observed in the treatment conditions as the VIF test yielded a value less than 2.50. Autocorrelation of residuals is also not present with a Durbin Watson test reporting 2.14. However, influential outliers

models show good model fit given that their F-values are statistically significant at p<0.001; hence we can conclude that my models provide better fit compared to intercept-only models. Seventeen percent of variance can be attributed to Model 1. The treatment *humble and competent* has a significant effect on the dependent variable at p<.001. Participants being exposed to the *humble and competent* treatment show a 2.11 increase in the likelihood to support the corrupt candidate. In other words, on a ten-point scale, a voter who is initially not decided and chooses eight will be convinced to choose a corrupt candidate of humble origin but only when the candidate has a good performance record. These results bring empirical evidence in support of Hypothesis 3. Which stated that individuals will more likely support a corrupt candidate of humble origin with a good performance record. In contrast, I failed to find empirical evidence in support of the first hypothesis which stated that a corrupt candidate of humble origin will be more likely supported. It appears that humble origin alone is not sufficient for the individual to overlook the negative trait of the candidate. This can be the case as the literature for the implicit trade hypothesis suggests that a corrupt candidate should possess positive characteristic or a good performance record on other dimensions (Muñoz, Anduiza, and Gallego 2016, 603).

Also, the expectations formulated by my second hypothesis are not supported by the data. Although the coefficient for elite candidates is in the right direction (negative), it does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. This suggests that corrupt candidates with an elite origin do not appear to be more penalized by voters.

Goodness of fit improves significantly with the inclusion of the control variables in Model 2[3]. It still explains 18 percent of variance. Keeping everything constant, the treatment *humble and*

(observations 87 and 155) have not been removed due to small sample size. Moreover, homoscedasticity is violated as explained above.

[3] The same regression diagnostics were applied to Model 2. There is no evidence for multicollinearity among the independent and control variables and autocorrelation of errors (Durbin Watson Test = 2.04). The same influential outliers and heteroscedasticity remain.

competent is still significant at p<.001. This is indicative of a very stable effect. Exposure to this treatment increases the inclination to vote for the corrupt candidate by 2.10. Interest in politics also reaches statistical significance at p<0.05. This means that an individual who is less interested in politics is more acceptant of the corrupt candidate by 0.26. Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz (2013) and Klašnja (2014) test for political sophistication in their studies and find that individuals who score high on this variable are less tolerant of corrupt candidates regardless of partisanship. Although interest in politics is not the conceptual equivalent of political sophistication, it still could point to a broader understanding of how politics works: someone with a shallow understanding of politics cannot think of the gravity of corruption of as an offense, thus voting for a corrupt candidate.

Overall, Table 7 suggests that there is no evidence that an individual will support a corrupt candidate of humble origin. However, what emerges from the results is that individuals prefer the package of a corrupt candidate of humble origin and a good legislative performance record. This is in line with the argument of the implicit trade hypothesis that a good past electoral performance counterbalances the negative effect of a corruption accusation. Moreover, my findings in Table 7 also suggest that being assigned to the experimental conditions already explain quite a lot of people's decisions to support a corrupt candidate (Adj. R^2 = .17). Contrary to the normal predictors of voting that did not add to the variance that can be explained by Model 2, the experimental conditions show good explanatory power.

Table 7 OLS regression models on support for corrupt candidate

	Dependent variable:	
	Support for corrupt candidate	
	(1)	(2)
Humble	0.193	0.267
	(0.487)	(0.496)
Elite	-0.632	-0.709
	(0.487)	(0.506)
Humble and competent	2.114***	2.097***
	(0.490)	(0.499)
Age		-0.090
		(0.147)
Age^2		0.003
		(0.002)
Political awareness		-0.316
		(0.315)
Gender		-0.545
		(0.381)
Monthly income		-0.036
		(0.101)
Interest in politics		0.263*
		(0.147)
Left-right self-identification		-0.020
		(0.106)

TV		-0.130
		(0.188)
Constant	2.732***	4.936**
	(0.342)	(2.439)
Observations	160	160
R^2	0.181	0.236
Adjusted R^2	0.165	0.179
F Statistic	11.481*** (df = 3; 156)	4.150*** (df = 11; 148)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

3.3 Conditional support for a corrupt candidate?

In the previous section, *humble and competent* appears to have a strong relationship with support for corrupt candidate regardless of the control variables. However, this might vary with how this allegation is perceived to be by voters.

To test Hypotheses 4 and 5, I conducted a regression analysis in which I included an interaction term between treatment assignment and the variable measuring perceived seriousness. In statistical parlance, perceived seriousness is considered to be a moderator, i.e. it moderates the relationship between the dependent variable (support for the corrupt candidate) and the independent variable (assignment to treatment groups).

I tested this moderating effect in the case of *humble* and *humble and competent* groups. I constructed a dummy variable for perceived seriousness where responses greater than eight are categorized as "serious" and those less than eight as "not serious". The rationale behind this transformation is to set those who think of corruption as an important issue apart from those who are indifferent to it. It also makes interpreting the interaction terms and marginal effects of the independent and moderating variables convenient.

Table 8 Perceived seriousness as moderating variable

	Dependent variable:			
	Support for corrupt candidate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Humble	0.193	-0.118	0.385	0.558
	(0.491)	(0.457)	(0.642)	(0.648)
Elite	-0.632	-0.603	-0.615	-0.622
	(0.410)	(0.453)	(0.448)	(0.383)
Humble and competent	2.114***	1.564***	2.505***	2.538***
	(0.530)	(0.469)	(0.609)	(0.626)
Perceived seriousness		-1.700***	-1.001*	-1.059*
		(0.339)	(0.485)	(0.454)
Age				-0.008
				(0.077)
Age^2				0.001
				(0.001)
Political awareness				-0.557
				(0.391)
Gender				-0.227
				(0.381)
Monthly income				0.035
				(0.102)
Interest in politics				0.125
				(0.135)
Left-right self-identification				-0.041
				(0.094)
TV				-0.039
				(0.199)

H*Perceived seriousness			-0.749	-0.984
			(0.801)	(0.858)
HC*Perceived seriousness			-1.991*	-1.896*
			(0.829)	(0.895)
Constant	2.732***	3.893***	3.415***	4.549**
	(0.342)	(0.394)	(0.457)	(2.271)
Observations	160	160	160	160
R^2	0.181	0.295	0.321	0.371
Adjusted R^2	0.165	0.277	0.294	0.310
F Statistic	11.481*** (df = 3; 156)	16.244*** (df = 4; 155)	12.055*** (df = 6; 153)	6.111*** (df = 14; 145)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for Models 1 and 4.				*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 8[4] presents the results of the moderation analysis. I introduced the predictors in blocs. Model 1 included only the three experimental conditions. Model 2 added perceived seriousness as an independent predictor. Model 3 added the interaction terms and its constitutive terms. Model 4 is the full model with the interaction terms and control variables added. All four models estimated have a good model fit given that their F-statistics are significant at $p<0.001$. Model 2 explains 28 per cent of the variance. *Humble and competent* is a significant predictor at $p<0.001$. Being assigned to this treatment group increases support for the corrupt candidate, on

[4] All of the assumptions of linear regression have been met by Models 2 and 3, except Models 1 and 4. Observations 87 and 155 remain as influential outliers in the four models. There is also multicollinearity present in Models 3 and 4 but this is normal as interaction terms are correlated with the terms used for interaction. Even though there is high multicollinearity, this does not drastically affect the standard errors of Models 3 and 4 (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Robust standard errors are used to rectify heteroscedasticity in Models 1 and 4.

average, with 1.56. In contrast, an increase in the perception of seriousness of the corruption accusation decreases the support to the corrupt candidate, on average, by 1.70 ($p<0.001$).

Model 3 confirms the expectation that perceived seriousness would moderate the relationship between *humble and competent* and support for the corrupt candidate. An individual who thinks of the corruption accusation as serious tends to show less support for the corrupt candidate by 1.00. The interaction term for *humble and competent* and perceived seriousness is negative and statistically significant at $p<0.05$. This suggests that people assigned to the *humble and competent* group have different levels of leniency towards the corrupt candidate, depending on how serious they see the allegation. Specifically, those who see it as a more serious issue display a decrease in their support for the corrupt candidate by almost 2 points on the ten-point scale. This brings to Hypothesis 4, but not to Hypothesis 5. Perceived seriousness of the allegation of corruption appears to affect people's evaluation of the candidate only in the case of a candidate with humble origin and good past record. The evaluation of the corrupt candidates with a humble origin does not appear to be a function of the perceived seriousness of the allegation. A humble origin does not appear to compensate for corruption not even in the eyes of those who see corruption as a less important issue.

To ease the grasp of these results, Figure 6 illustrates the effect of humble and competent on support for the corrupt candidate in the case for those who see corruption as an important issue relative to those who see it as less important. *Humble and competent* and perceived seriousness here are both categorical variables. As it is visible in the graph, the effect *of humble and competent* is more pronounced in the case of those who perceive corruption as less of an issue. The opposite can be observed in the case of those who find the corruption accusation as serious.

Figure 6 Cross-sectional plot depicting the interaction between humble and competent and perceived seriousness



Note: Support for the corrupt candidate (Y-axis); Humble and competent (X-axis); Perceived seriousness = Not serious (Red line); Perceived seriousness = Serious (Blue line)

There is significant improvement in the model fit in Model 4 with the inclusion of the control variables. Keeping everything constant, *humble and competent* and perceived seriousness maintain their statistical significance at $p<0.001$ and $p<0.05$ respectively. The interaction term also remains statistically significant at $p<0.05$ suggesting that individuals in the *humble and competent* group who think of the corruption accusation as more serious are less likely to support for the corrupt candidate.

Figure 7 Cross-sectional plot depicting the interaction between humble and competent and perceived seriousness (with control variables)



Note: Support for the corrupt candidate (Y-axis); Humble and competent (X-axis); Perceived seriousness = Not serious (Red line); Perceived seriousness = Serious (Blue line)

As stated in Hypotheses 6 and 7, competency could be the other moderator of the relationship between support for the corrupt candidate and assignment to the treatment groups. There should be stronger effect in the *humble and competent* group for those who report that competence is more important than integrity. Table 9 shows the results of conducting similar analyses, with preference for competency over integrity as an expected moderating factor. The four models have good model fit as well with their F-statistics significant at $p<0.001$. There is a

significant improvement in model fit in Model 2[5] with the inclusion of competence over integrity as a separate predictor. It explains 22 percent of the variance. *Humble and competent* remains statistically significant at $p<0.001$. Being exposed to this treatment increases the support to the corrupt candidate, on average, by 2.10. Competence over integrity also reaches statistical significance at $p<0.01$. The more an individual disagrees that competence is more important than integrity, the more likely s/he is to support the corrupt candidate. In Model 3[6], the interaction term for *humble and competent* and competence over integrity is included in the analysis. *Humble and competent* and competence over integrity maintain their statistical significance at $p<0.001$ and $p<0.01$ respectively. However, in Model 4[7] the strength of competence over integrity is reduced to -0.26 at $p<0.05$ with the addition of the control variables. What is notable from Models 3 and 4 is that the interaction terms are not significant. This suggests that competence over integrity is not a moderating variable. Those who see competence as much more important than integrity are not more likely to support a corrupt candidate of humble origin and good legislative performance record than those who do not see competence as being more important. In other words, there is no difference in competence over integrity for all groups and Hypotheses 6 and 7 are rejected.[8]

Interestingly enough, this suggests that the competency side of the competent and humble mix does not weigh that much in people's support for the candidate. This suggests that it is rather

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[5] Model 2 in Table 9 does not have multicollinearity among its independent variables and autocorrelation of errors. However, observations 87 and 155 remain as influential outliers and heteroscedasticity is still present.

[6] All the assumptions of linear regression have been met by Model 3 except multicollinearity. The interaction term yields a VIF value more than 2.5 which is normal since it is correlated with the variables used for interaction. Also, influential outliers are present in observations 62, 67 and 155.

[7] Model 4 has both multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. The former is due to the interaction term being correlated with the variables used for interaction. The latter is rectified by estimating robust standard errors. Influential outliers are present in the observations 36 and 135.

[8] I tried to dichotomize the variable competence over integrity with three as the cut point. Before doing this, I checked the distribution of the responses. In spite of this, the competence over integrity does not reach statistical significance. This gives more evidence that it is not a moderating variable. The results of this regression analyses can be seen in Appendix B.

the mix of the two features rather than each of them in particular what makes the candidate appealing.

Table 9 Competence over integrity as moderating variable

	Dependent variable:			
	Support for corrupt candidate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Humble	0.193	0.242	0.234	0.307
	(0.491)	(0.481)	(0.472)	(0.501)
Elite	-0.632	-0.699	-0.687	-0.713
	(0.410)	(0.393)	(0.472)	(0.396)
Humble and competent	2.114***	2.096***	2.902***	3.081**
	(0.530)	(0.502)	(1.078)	(1.139)
Competence		-0.356**	-0.295**	-0.258*
		(0.107)	(0.126)	(0.117)
Age				-0.145
				(0.095)
Age^2				0.003*
				(0.001)
Political awareness				-0.377
				(0.380)
Gender				-0.502
				(0.405)
Monthly income				-0.019
				(0.100)
Interest in politics				0.204
				(0.145)
Left-right self-identification				0.009
				(0.099)
TV				-0.046
				(0.202)

HC*Competence			-0.182	-0.232
			(0.219)	(0.250)
Constant	2.732***	4.322***	4.050***	6.763***
	(0.342)	(0.566)	(0.654)	(2.432)
Observations	160	160	160	160
R^2	0.181	0.240	0.243	0.290
Adjusted R^2	0.165	0.220	0.218	0.226
F Statistic	11.481*** (df = 3; 156)	12.206*** (df = 4; 155)	9.884*** (df = 5; 154)	4.578*** (df = 13; 146)

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for Models 1, 2 and 4.

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

3.4 Inside the black box: Explaining the mechanism of influence

Having found that a humble and competent candidate is more likely to be supported whereas one with an elite background is less likely, I inquire what explains this. What types of considerations triggered by the origin of the candidate make people more supportive of a corrupt candidate? What are those features that make them turn a deaf ear to the accusations of corruption when they look at the origin of the candidates?

To explore this, participants were asked to evaluate the corrupt candidate on the five dimensions seen below in Figure 8. These dimensions are approachability, hardworking, honest, competent at implementing law and order, and competent at curbing corruption. I see them as possible traits associated with a humble and competent background and as potential criteria of assessing candidates' electoral suitability.

Participants in the *humble and competent* group seem to think of the corrupt candidate assigned to them as the most dishonest even though all the experimental conditions were given uniform corruption accusations (see Figure 8). This is followed by the *elite*, control and *humble* groups. The higher the mean, the more the participant disagrees on the statement.

Results presented in section 3.2 (Table 7) have indicated that there is a positive association between *humble and competent* and support for the corrupt candidate. Specifically, exposure to the said treatment increases support for the corrupt candidate with 2.11. However, this does not fully capture the individual's deliberation in why to support for the corrupt candidate. A black box exists and the question how my independent variable is related to my dependent variable remains unanswered.

Figure 8 Evaluation of corrupt candidates by experimental group



To add depth, I conducted a mediation analysis whose logic can be summarized by Figure 9. X has a direct effect on Y but it could also have an indirect effect through M. In my case, I assume that the effect of the treatment *humble and competent* could be mediated by how the individual evaluates the corrupt candidate using the given dimensions.

Since I have already established the association between my independent and dependent variables, I turn to running a regression between my main independent variable and my mediating factors, which are the dimensions. Among the five models in Table 10[9], it is only hardworking that has a statistically significant relationship with the *humble,* and *humble and competent* group at $p<0.05$

[9] It is only Model 2 that suffers from heteroscedasticity but aside from this all of the assumptions of a linear regression are met by all the models. Influential outliers exist in Models 1 and 2 as observations 44, 75 and 155; in Model 3 as observations 12, 28 and 37; in Model 4 as observations 87 and 155; and in Model 5 as observations 15, 135 and 142.

and p<0.001 respectively. For this reason, hardworking is the variable I considered a plausible mediator.

Figure 9 Simple mediation analysis



Source: (Hayes 2013, 87)

If M is a mediator, one should see a decrease in the effect of X on Y, when M is added as an independent variable. This is a sign of partial mediation. The sign of complete mediation—i.e. M fully explains the relationship between X and Y—is the loss of the significance in X when M is included in the analysis. In my analysis, seeing the candidate as a hardworking person is considered to be a mediator.

Table 10 Dimensions regressed on experimental conditions

	Dependent variable:				
	App	Har	Hon	CCC	CLO
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Humble	-0.331	-0.882*	-0.107	0.059	-0.147
	(0.299)	(0.344)	(0.416)	(0.424)	(0.404)
Elite	0.119	0.293	-0.032	-0.166	-0.047
	(0.299)	(0.344)	(0.416)	(0.424)	(0.404)
Humble and competent	-0.551	-1.398***	0.344	0.147	-0.840*
	(0.301)	(0.347)	(0.419)	(0.427)	(0.407)
Constant	3.756***	3.732***	4.707***	4.366***	4.122***
	(0.210)	(0.242)	(0.292)	(0.298)	(0.284)
Observations	160	160	160	160	160
R^2	0.038	0.162	0.009	0.004	0.034
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.146	-0.010	-0.016	0.016
F Statistic (df = 3; 156)	2.060	10.087***	0.450	0.190	1.835

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for Model 2.

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Model 2 in Table 11[10] shows the relationship between hardworking and support for the corrupt candidate. I transform hardworking into a dummy variable where the cutting point is five. The two have a positive and significant relationship at $p<0.05$. Moreover, when hardworking is added to the model, the coefficient of *humble and competent* remains statistically significant but records a drop in its strength. Although the drop is relatively small, this is an indicator that hardworking is a mediator. The results do not change when the control variables are included in Model 4. Hardworking thus appears to be a partial mediator. This means that part of the support

[10] All the assumptions of a linear regression were met by Models 1, 2 and 3, except for homoscedasticity. Influential outliers also exist as observations 87 and 155 for Model 2 and observations 36 and 155 for Model 3.

for a candidate with a humble origin and a good past record has to do with the fact that s/he is seen as a hardworking person. Interestingly enough, this suggests an explanation that hinges upon the humble origin rather than the good past record. It also indicates that other considerations too enter this decision.

Interest in politics also reaches a statistical significance at $p<0.05$. Similar to the results in Table 7, interest in politics has a positive and a statistically significant relationship with support for the corrupt candidate. An individual who is less interested in politics is more willing to support a corrupt candidate by 0.30. The findings seem to unpack the implicit trade hypothesis by suggesting that how the individual makes sense of the treatment. The corrupt candidate is seen in positive light resulting in the individual expressing electoral support.

In Model 3, the strength of mediator increases from 1.15 to 1.19 at $p<0.01$. This is also evident with the drop in the strength of *humble and competent*: it is reduced to 1.92 at $p<0.01$ holding everything else constant. However, the decrease is not drastic with only a 0.19 change. Again, what this tells us is that hardworking is a partial mediator because once it is introduced to the analysis, the coefficient of *humble and competent* slightly declines.

Table 11 Hardworking as a mediating variable

	Dependent variable:		
	Support for corrupt candidate		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Humble	0.193	0.083	0.146
	(0.491)	(0.513)	(0.528)
Elite	-0.632	-0.512	-0.583
	(0.410)	(0.390)	(0.383)
Humble and competent	2.114***	1.919***	1.916***
	(0.530)	(0.539)	(0.531)
Hardworking		1.148*	1.190**
		(0.523)	(0.417)
Age			-0.072
			(0.081)
Age^2			0.002
			(0.001)
Political awareness			-0.398
			(0.393)
Gender			-0.412
			(0.416)
Monthly income			-0.019
			(0.099)
Interest in politics			0.299*
			(0.136)
Left-right self-identification			-0.026
			(0.102)
TV			-0.135
			(0.219)

Constant	2.732***	1.780***	3.610
	(0.342)	(0.556)	(2.485)
Observations	160	160	160
R^2	0.181	0.205	0.260
Adjusted R^2	0.165	0.184	0.199
F Statistic	11.481*** (df = 3; 156)	9.972*** (df = 4; 155)	4.296*** (df = 12; 147)

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

In this study, I have followed the logic of the Thompson's applied populism and focused on the origin of the candidate as a factor that can counterbalance the negative attribute of being accused of corruption. Survey experimental evidence suggest that a humble origin alone is not sufficient to make the individual more acceptant of corrupt candidates. What emerges from the experiment is that individuals prefer the combination of a candidate of humble origin with a good legislative performance record because they perceive him to be hardworking, which, in part at least explains why a humble origin and a good past record translates into an increased support from the public. However, this support is conditional on whether the voter considers the corruption accusation as an important issue. Those that do think of the corruption accusation as serious are more likely to withdraw their support for the corrupt candidate.

Although the results are derived from an experimental design, I remain hesitant to claim that my findings are conclusive but merely suggestive. First of all, I conducted my online survey experiment on a sample of convenience. The students of the University of the Philippines Diliman and Los Baños are hardly a representative sample of my population of interest. Suffice it to say that my treatments do have an effect but limited in the sense that my findings cannot be generalized beyond my sample. Second, I acknowledge that experimental realism is more important than mundane realism (McDermott 2002), however it cannot be denied that participants in my experiment could have been holding back with their reactions given that they were presented a hypothetical situation. Despite these limitations, I believe that my research can be improved with further research by first disentangling the effect of having a good track record and finding out if it is indeed responsible for the tolerance of corrupt candidates in the Philippines. This, in turn, would provide a more comprehensive analysis. Having also the link of the survey experiment uploaded

on a social media website could, for example, reach a wider audience. The treatment can be tested on a more diverse population than undergraduate students.

My findings have three implications. First, it provides a novel explanation as to why Filipinos continue to support corrupt candidates in elections by focusing on the origin of the candidate. Despite not having enough empirical evidence to support Hypotheses 1, that a humble origin alone compensates for a negative trait, I cannot discard my proposed mechanism because it can be the case that I had too few cases of observations. The experimental treatment could have also been more convincing with a visual campaign advertisement that can be conducted in a laboratory. Second, the results of my analysis support the claim of the implicit trade hypothesis that individuals are willing to trade off "acts of corruption for valuable outcomes such as good management or economic well-being" (Muñoz, Anduiza, and Gallego 2016, 612). My hunch is that individuals are realistic in terms of their expectations of candidates and their understanding of how real politics operates. They find corruption morally repulsive but when left with no clean alternative, they choose to compromise. This leads to the third implication. The tradeoff between acts of corruption and a positive characteristic from voters is moderated by perceived seriousness. Regardless of the treatment group, those in the *humble and competent* group that find the corruption accusation as serious are less acceptant of the corrupt candidate. Also, those who report that they are more interested in politics are less tolerant of the corrupt candidate. This signals that people who understand the consequences of corruption for the whole political system are not ready to put up with it even if the candidate has a good track record. Further research can test this more directly. This finding is a glimmer of hope in the pessimistic literature about Filipino voting behavior.

Building on my findings, it seems that the traditional literature about Filipino voting behavior needs revisiting. The usual patron-client framework, although useful, is no longer sufficient in explaining why we are stuck with the traditional corrupt politicians. The results of the

survey PolMindscape, published in the Manila Times, report that Filipinos base their vote on their perception of the character of the candidate ("Getting to Know the Filipino Voters" 2015). In choosing a president, being pro-poor is mentioned as one of the main criteria. Although there was not enough evidence that a humble origin of the candidate gives out the impression of being pro-poor, my findings reflect how the mind of the Filipino voter works.

APPENDIX

Appendix A. Questionnaire

Q1 Good day! I am Esther Calvo and I am currently taking my Master's in Political Science at the Central European University. Your name has been selected as part of an online survey experiment about the processes of electoral decision-making. Rest assured, the information you will share will be strictly held confidential and will only be used for this research. Should you have any questions, please email me at calvo_esther@student.ceu.edu. Thank you for your participation!

Q9 For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say:

	Very important (1)	Rather important (2)	Not very important (3)	Not at all important (4)
Family (1)				
Friends (2)				
Politics (3)				
Studies (4)				
Religion (5)				

Q11 Are you a registered voter?
- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q13 What city or province are you registered to vote?

Q14 Would you register to vote?
- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q15 To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I am interested in politics.
- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Somewhat agree (3)
- Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- Somewhat disagree (5)
- Disagree (6)
- Strongly disagree (7)

Q16 In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
- Left (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)
- 7 (7)

8 (8)
9 (9)
Right (10)

Q18 When elections take place, do you vote always, usually or never? Please answer separately for each of the following levels:

	Most of the time (1)	Usually (2)	Never (3)
Barangay (1) Local and National (2)			

Q20 People learn what is going on in the Philippines from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never.

	Daily (1)	Weekly (2)	Monthly (3)	Less than monthly (4)	Never (5)
Daily newspaper (1) Printed magazines (2) TV news (3) Radio news (4) Mobile phone (5) Email (6) Internet (7) Talk with friends or colleagues (8)					

Q22 People hear or talk about politics in different ways. How often does the subject of politics come up in each of the following?

	A lot (1)	Some (2)	Hardly ever (3)	Never (4)	Does not apply (5)
At University (1) In your place of worship or church (2) In conversations with friends (3) In conversations with family (4)					

In conversations on an internet message board or blog (5)					

Q24 Do you belong to a religious group or a religious denomination?

No, I do not belong to any group. (1)
Roman Catholic (2)
Protestant (3)
Iglesia ni Cristo (4)
Other Christian denomination (5)
Muslim (6)
Other (7) _____

Q26 How often do you attend religious services these days?

Several times a day (1)
Once a day (2)
Several times each week (3)
Few times each week (4)
Only on special holidays (5)
Once a year (6)
Less often (7)
Never, practically never (8)

Q28 Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge. How many times can an individual be elected as president in the Philippines under current laws?

1 time (1)
2 times (2)
3 times (3)
4 times (4)
5 times (5)
I don't know (6)

Q30 For how many years is a Philippine Senator elected, that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a Philippine Senator?

2 years (1)
4 years (2)
6 years (3)
8 years (4)
10 years (5)
I don't know (6)

Q32 Here are a few questions concerning various public figures. The first name is Aquilino Pimentel III. What job or political office does he now hold?

Mayor of Cagayan de Oro City (1)
Secretary of Department of Justice (2)
Ombudsman (3)
Senate President (4)

I don't know (5)

Q34 Conchita Carpio Morales. What job or political office does she now hold?
Governor of Ilo-Ilo (1)
Secretary of Department of Justice (2)
Ombudsman (3)
Senator (4)
I don't know (5)

Q36 The national elections is next month. Incumbent Senator X is running for presidency. Before beginning his political career, candidate X was a fish vendor until he worked his way up to become a senator. There is news though that he accepts kickbacks from public funds supposedly for government projects. How likely is it that you will support candidate X at the election next month?
Would never vote for him (1)
2 (2)
3 (3)
4 (4)
5 (5)
6 (6)
7 (7)
8 (8)
9 (9)
Would surely vote for him (10)

Q38 The national elections is next month. Incumbent Senator Y is running for presidency. Before beginning his political career, candidate Y is known to come from a prominent family both in business and politics. There is news though that he accepts kickbacks from public funds supposedly for government projects. How likely is it that you will support candidate Y at the election next month?
Would never vote for him (1)
2 (2)
3 (3)
4 (4)
5 (5)
6 (6)
7 (7)
8 (8)
9 (9)
Would surely vote for him (10)

Q40 The national elections is next month. Incumbent Senator Z is running for presidency. Before beginning his political career, candidate Z was a fish vendor until he worked his way up to become a senator. Moreover, candidate Z is known for authoring several bills in the Senate, including his landmark legislation that allows affordable medicines and the development of the generics industry. There is news though that he accepts kickbacks from public funds supposedly for government projects. How likely is it that you will support candidate Z at the election next month?
Would never vote for him (1)
2 (2)
3 (3)
4 (4)

5 (5)
6 (6)
7 (7)
8 (8)
9 (9)
Would surely vote for him (10)

Q42 The national elections is next month. Incumbent Senator W is running for presidency. There is news though that he accepts kickbacks from public funds supposedly for government projects. How likely is it that you will support candidate W at the election next month?

Would never vote for him (1)
2 (2)
3 (3)
4 (4)
5 (5)
6 (6)
7 (7)
8 (8)
9 (9)
Would surely vote for him (10)

Q44 What do you think about this alleged fact?

Not at all serious (1)
2 (2)
3 (3)
4 (4)
5 (5)
6 (6)
7 (7)
8 (8)
9 (9)
Extremely serious (10)

Q46 To what extent do you agree with the following statements: I find the candidate_____.

	Strongly agree (1)	Agree (2)	Somewhat agree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat disagree (5)	Disagree (6)	Strongly disagree (7)
Approachable (1)							
Hardworking (2)							
Honest (3)							
Competent at curbing corruption (4)							

Competent at implementing law and order (5)							

Q48 To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Approachability is more important than integrity for a candidate.

Strongly agree (1)
Agree (2)
Somewhat agree (3)
Neither agree nor disagree (4)
Somewhat disagree (5)
Disagree (6)
Strongly disagree (7)

Q50 To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Competence is more important than integrity for a candidate.

Strongly agree (1)
Agree (2)
Somewhat agree (3)
Neither agree nor disagree (4)
Somewhat disagree (5)
Disagree (6)
Strongly disagree (7)

Q52 Age

_____ Click to write Choice 1 (1)

Q54 Gender

Male (1)
Female (2)

Q56 Are you enrolled in school as a part-time or full-time student?

Part-time student (1)
Full-time student (2)

Q58 Which program are you enrolled in? Please do not abbreviate.

Q60 On average, how much does your family earn in a month?

Less than PHP 7,890 (1)
PHP 7,890-15,780 (2)
PHP 15,780-31,560 (3)
PHP 31,560-78,900 (4)
PHP 78,900-118,350 (5)
PHP 118,350-157,800 (6)
At least 157,800 (7)

Q62 Are you currently:

Married (1)
Living together as married (2)

Divorced (3)
Separated (4)
Widowed (5)
Single (6)

Q64 Thank you for participating in this survey! If you have any feedbacks or comments, please enter them in the box below.

Appendix B. Competence over integrity as moderating variable (Dummy)

	Dependent variable:			
	Support for corrupt candidate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Humble	0.193	0.278	0.257	0.355
	(0.487)	(0.472)	(0.470)	(0.498)
Elite	-0.632	-0.735	-0.709	-0.732
	(0.487)	(0.472)	(0.471)	(0.404)
Humble and competent	2.114***	1.967***	1.544***	1.472*
	(0.490)	(0.476)	(0.564)	(0.686)
Competence		1.250***	0.942**	0.889*
		(0.362)	(0.424)	(0.422)
Age				-0.127
				(0.092)
Age^2				0.003*
				(0.001)
Political awareness				-0.357
				(0.382)
Gender				-0.582
				(0.397)
Monthly income				-0.001
				(0.098)
Interest in politics				0.210
				(0.140)
Left-right self-identification				0.013
				(0.099)
TV				-0.060
				(0.202)
HC*Competence			1.121	1.212
			(0.808)	(0.938)

Constant	2.732***	2.366***	2.456***	5.095**
	(0.342)	(0.347)	(0.352)	(2.405)
Observations	160	160	160	160
R^2	0.181	0.239	0.249	0.300
Adjusted R^2	0.165	0.220	0.224	0.238
F Statistic	11.481*** (df = 3; 156)	12.198*** (df = 4; 155)	10.201*** (df = 5; 154)	4.812*** (df = 13; 146)

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for Model 4.

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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