Education for Exploitation: Creation of Students' Consent in the Serbian Internship Economy

By
Dragan Đunda

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisors: Prof. Violetta Zentai
Prof. Ju Li

Budapest, Hungary
2017

Abstract

This study analyzes the relations of control and resistance in the Serbian Vocational Education and Training (VET) program, which represents a case of internship economy. Its main goal is to present the micro-hegemonic relations between the students and the foreign shipyard, and to explain how these relations are embedded in the macro-hegemonic project of the competition state. The study suggests that the hegemonic relations are constituted through the narratives of unpaid labor that are broadly based on the company's moralistic strategy of promoting itself as a generous and fair firm. The main source of the students' consent lies in their imaginaries of the permanent and well-paid jobs in the shipyard that are built around the company's hegemonic status in the destitute society. The study argues that the deployment of the narratives and the hegemonic status are structurally enabled by the competition state that is exclusively devoted to attracting foreign capital. The micro and macro hegemonic relations depicted in this way prove that the main purposes of the VET reform are to provide companies with legally unprotected and cheap workforce, and to socialize youth for precarious and exploitative jobs.

Acknowledgment

I would like to express my gratitude to the people without whom I would not have been able to make this research. I am grateful to professors Violetta Zentai and Ju Li for being supportive and constructively critical supervisors, as well as to my academic writing instructor Andrea Kirchknopf for her patient reading of my chapters. Also, I am very thankful to Natasa Szabó for her insightful suggestions and tireless proofreading. What I learnt from professors Don Kalb and John Clarke enriched my ways of thinking about social processes and conceptually shaped this thesis. This thesis would have been impossible without my hosts in Sremska Mitrovica, and my respondents whom I am thankful for their efforts to share their opinions and experiences with me.

Ana Kolarić and Dejan Ilić were my constant support through the whole process of studying at CEU. My achievements would not have been possible without their readiness to improve my texts and to teach me how to be a better writer. Last but not least, I am thankful to my numerous friends, Jovana, Nikoleta, Veljko, Biljana and Dragica, as well as to the Free Cigi members, Natasa, Veli and Alexandra, for being the inexhaustible sources of love, motivation and joy.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The Serbian government is preparing to introduce the Vocational Education and Training (VET) reform in the secondary education in September 2017 through which the relations between companies and schools are strengthened, thus providing companies with the constant inflow of cheap and unprotected workforce. This study, conducted in the Dutch shipyard located in Serbia, brings a multi-sided and multi-level approach to internship programs in peripheral Serbia, primarily analyzing the relations of hegemonic control and resistance between the students and their employer. It explains how these hegemonic relations emerge around the analytically broader hegemonic status of the shipyard, that is created in the wider context of the transnational competitive relations for foreign capital.

The main goal of my study is to explain which means of control the shipyard deploys to ensure the availability and acquisition of students' free labor, and why the students accept these positions, that, in that way, contribute to the maintenance of unequal power relations. While looking for the concrete answers to these questions within the micro-relations of the company, I reiteratively zoom-out in order to explain the structural conditions for these micro-relations in the domain of the state and the state's position within the capitalist system. To connect these two levels and achieve the goal, I employ the theory of hegemony which moves beyond mere coercive forms of control, and provides an entry point to understanding how the ideas and practices related to the case of the Dutch shipyard and the VET program fulfil the hegemonic function. The fruitful ways of establishing the connections between micro and macro levels are at the same time the study's main contributions and merits.

In this study, I analyze the VET reform as a case of internship economy. By internship economy, I refer to the institutional relations between political, economic, and educational institutions which enable the utilization of cheap intern-labor; therefore, producing far-reaching social consequences such as reproduction of inequalities, precarity of labor, and the redundancy of regular employees, among others. The literature on internship economy offers a fruitful account of the institutional arrangements of internships and thoroughly depicts interns' experiences in these programs. However, it has some important limitations: 1) it does not elaborate meaningfully on the reasons for which the students remain in the internship programs despite their initial dissatisfactions; 2) it does not consider the ways the students express resistance to the internship programs; 3) it is theoretically and methodologically superficial since it does not deploy any theoretical frame; and 4) it does not include other actors in internship economy apart from interns. I overcome these methodological and theoretical flaws by employing the theory of hegemony.

I rely on the conceptions of hegemony, as co-constructed by various authors (Gramsci 2000; Williams 1977; Roseberry and others 1994; Smith 2004; Burawoy 1985; Drahokoupil 2009), and consider hegemony as processual and relational phenomenon that is constantly contested and reinforced. For that reason, I deploy interchangeably the terms hegemonic processes and hegemonic relations, pointing to the plurality of these relations on micro and macro levels, as well as to the multiplicity of the sites of their creation, acceptance, and resistance. In my study, this is reflected in the multi-level perspective on the relations within the shipyard and its connections with the competition state. All of these relations are tied through the central notion of the hegemonic status of the company, which demonstrates how the company employs its moralistic and materialistic power to justify the exploitation of interns' unpaid labor, and how such status is structurally enabled by the competition state.

The thesis consists of four chapters. In the chapter *Education for foreign investment*, I provide a threefold context comprised of transnational, institutional, and local to depict the environment in which the VET reform is initiated. I employ Jan Drahokoupil's (2009) concept of "competition state" and explain the economic logic of the reform, as well as its ideological production through the work of "comprador service sector". The chapter *Hegemonic reading of internship economy* brings an overview of the studies dealing with internship economy and constructs the framework of the theory of hegemony through which the relations between the interns and the company are analyzed. The main arguments of the thesis are presented in the detailed empirical chapter, *Ethnography of hegemonic relations in the internship program*, which consists of the three sections. In the first section, I explain how the shipyard creates the hegemonic relations through the narratives of unproductive labor and the disciplinary regimes. The second section describes the emergence of consent, while the third one depicts the forms of resistance employed by the interns, and conceptually elaborates on the possibilities for resistance to hegemonic processes. The conclusion brings the insights on the social and theoretical implications of the study, its shortcomings, and the directions for further research.

Besides contributing to the literature on internship economy through the theoretically and methodologically fruitful approach, this study is important for the overall Serbian society, as well. Its social relevance lies in its temporal actuality since the VET reform will be introduced by September 2017. It offers fresh insights on the ramifications of the pilot phase of the reform, since no data is available to the broader Serbian public. As the results of similar reforms conducted in other countries depict (Beblavỳ and Veselková 2014), the VET reform will have disastrous social effects, since it targets specifically working class children. Among these effects are the legalization

and legitimization of exploitation of youth, as well as the long-term consequences of deepening the already severe social inequalities.

I conducted the research in the first half of May 2017, spending one week in Sremska Mitrovica where I talked to the representatives of the shipyard and the interns, and several days in Belgrade where I interviewed the representatives of the organizations participating in the reform. With the aim to respect the conceptual requirements for the relational approach to hegemony, I covered all important actors in the VET reform, having 11 recorded and 3 unrecorded interviews with 24 people. I talked to sixteen 17-year-old, male[1], working class students, and to one of their teachers. From the company's side, I interviewed the top manager, as well as three supervisors, out of whom two control work of both the regular workers and the interns, while the third one is at the same time a supervisor and a regular worker. The group of the interviewed policy-makers consisted of the representatives of the Ministry of Education, Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ; The German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation) GIZ. The diversity of my informants and contextual circumstances influenced the variety of qualitative methodological techniques I deployed. The dominant techniques were recorded semi-structured interviews. Six interviews with the students were conducted in the school, in small groups of two-three interviewees, while one of them occurred in the shipyard. I also deployed semi-structured interviews with other informants: the manager, the teacher, and the representatives of the organizations. The interview with the representative of the Ministry of Education was conducted via Skype.

[1] It was impossible to include female students in the study because only male students participated in the pilot phase of the VET project. This ratio will probably change from September, when tens of new VET profiles will be introduced. Although it would be important to include a gender perspective in further research, that was not in my focus at this stage.

Some of the interviews, such as those with the supervisors, were not recorded for two reasons. First, one of the supervisors was constantly in the production hall where the noise did not allow me to use the recorder. Secondly, I noticed that some of my informants started speaking about socially and politically sensitive topics only when I turned the recorder off. Thus, I decided to take only notes during these interviews, as I wanted to get their opinion on sensitive topics related to unionism. During the two days spent in the shipyard, I also employed the participant observation technique by following the students at their work places, both in the production halls and on the ships. In these situations, I often relied on "small talk" technique (Driessen and Jansen 2013), which enabled me to capture their immediate experiences of participation in the production process.

The diversity of the informants required to constantly tailor the questions and ways of speaking with them. The most challenging were the interviews with the students which were often fragmented, requiring a lot of stimulating sub-questions, clarifications, and focusing on concrete situations and examples. Though sometimes frustrating, this tailoring helped me to partially overcome my "scholastic point of view" (Bourdieu 1998) and take as relevant those topics that the students considered as important for their work in the shipyard. Another difficulty was to adapt to the bureaucratic style of the officials, which often reflected the superficiality in their understandings of the political, social, and economic aspects of the reform (or they just avoided these aspects). These officials were almost exclusively focused on the promotion of the reform, deploying various defensive strategies when asked about sensitive topics of labor rights, unions, and unpaid labor.

Chapter one: The competition state as a context of the VET reform

In this chapter, I present the three different social contexts within which the examined hegemonic processes emerge, ranging from the widest context related to the transnational and national socio-economic relations, across the middle institutional frame of the VET, to the local levels of the city of Sremska Mitrovica and the shipyard where I conducted my research. The three analyzed contexts do not represent reified and independent domains but are rather tied to each other through the network of "critical junctions": the uneven and dynamic relations in space and time, the relations of dependency, as well as the relations between interrelated cultural, economic and political institutions (Kalb and Tak 2005). The VET project in general, and the shipyard, in particular, represent a window for analyzing the complex and uneven micro - macro interactions as mutually constituting (Kalb 2002; Burawoy et al. 2000). The deployment of such multi-scalar approach is valid since the three settings are produced within the same historical process of the construction of the competition state. This process constitutes the VET project, determines the ownership structure of the shipyard, and produces the analyzed hegemonic relations within the company. The VET reform, which establishes the institutional frame for the internship economy and enables the extraction of unpaid/underpaid youth's labor, originates from the same historical processes of dispossession that have been occurring in the last two decades in Serbia. With these multiple historical relations, the reform transcends the traditional institutional barriers and reveals the complex interplay of the political, economic and educational realms.

1.1. The formation of the Serbian competition state

In this section, I argue that the government introduces the VET reform and establishes the conditions for the internship economy in order to attract foreign investments. The VET reform represents an additional policy towards the constructing of what Jan Drahokoupil calls "the

competition state". As he explains, during the period of the late 1990s and early 2000s, economic and social policies in the states of South East Europe (SEE) were subjugated to the single goal of being competitive and attractive enough for foreign capital, which would consequently generate economic growth and contribute to the overall development of societies. The need for foreign capital was structurally based on the dependence of the SEE countries on the inflow of technology and knowledge from the core (Drahokoupil 2009; Wallerstein 2004). Thus, from 1989 onwards, the SEE peripheral and semi-peripheral states, and Serbia among them, have carried out the two crucial packages of reforms in order to attract foreign direct investments (FDI).

These packages stand as the examples of accumulation by dispossession that serves to commodify previously public goods, such as public companies, public services, domains of labor, housing and finance, and to open up new possibilities for the accumulation of capital (Harvey 2003). The first package of structural reforms introduced by the Serbian governments from the 1990s onwards consists of the dispossession in forms the massive and often unsuccessful privatizations, trade liberalization, flexibilization of the labor law, reforms in the public sector comprised of layoffs, cuts on spending, reforms of the pension system and fiscal tightness (Upchurch and Marinković 2011, 2013). All these reforms were conducted under the coordination of international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. The latest Labor Law [2] legitimizes and even encourages temporary jobs, resulting in the rates of temporary jobs that go up to 90% in foreign companies[3]. With possibilities for the easier firing of employees and their subcontracting, the labor costs in Serbia are equal to 16% of the EU average costs[4,5]. The pervasive

[2] http://www.minrzs.gov.rs/files/Zakon_o_radu_75-14_preciscen_tekstsl_glasnik.doc Accessed on June 13, 2017
[3] http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1450807 Accessed on June 13, 2017
[4] All these measures contributed to a deep social inequality and high unemployment rates (16% in general population and 37 % among youth) (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2016).
[5] http://ras.gov.rs/uploads/2017/03/why-invest-site-1.pdf Accessed on June 13, 2017

issues of the labor relations in Serbia lie in the fact that the Labor Law guarantees many rights, while the state institutions rarely control their implementation, giving an unofficial possibility for companies to bypass the Law. Following that, many companies have unofficial bans on unionism, while others avoid regular paying for wages, social and health insurance, and overtime work[6]. This legal context enables the shipyard to forbid unions and to exert strict discipline over the workers and the interns. As thoroughly explained in the ethnography chapter, in this way the state creates the structural possibilities for the company's hegemonic status.

The second package of reforms was designed according to the "Schumpeterian workfare model of competitiveness" (Jessop 1993). Besides flexibility in economic and social policies, the model is based on the dispossession of the domain of education (Harvey 2003; Ball 2010) and emphasizes the importance of adjusting educational systems and research institutes to the needs of the industry (Jessop, 1993). Other elements of the model are the numerous stimulating programs through which the interested investors get incentives in the form of cheap or even free land, tax reliefs and enormous subventions per employee[7,8] (Upchurch and Marinković 2013). I consider the VET reform as a meeting point of both packages, since the educational system is designed in such a way to be an additional incentive which provides companies with cheap and qualified workforce.

As I argued at the beginning of the chapter, the local contexts of Sremska Mitrovica and the shipyard are produced through the same process of dispossession through privatizations and

[6] http://rs.n1info.com/a241651/Biznis/Radnici-Gose-nastavili-strajk.html; http://www.danas.rs/ekonomija.4.html?news_id=340742&title=Polo%C5%BEaj+zaposlenih+kod+stranih+intesvitora+u+Ni%C5%A1u Accessed on June 10, 2017

[7] http://ras.gov.rs/uploads/2017/03/why-invest-site-1.pdf; http://ras.gov.rs/invest-in-serbia/why-serbia/financial-benefits-and-incentives Accessed on June 13, 2017

[8] These subventions are around 10 000€ per worker, but in some cases the government pays even 60 000€ per employee. http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1429483&print=yes Accessed on June 10, 2017

the forging of the competition state for foreign investments (Harvey 2003; Drahokoupil 2009). After being a city characteristic for its developed food, wooden and paper industries during the Yugoslavian era, many state-owned companies in Sremska Mitrovica went bankrupt after the series of unsuccessful privatizations[9]. In the last years, foreign greenfield investments were key for the survival of local economy since several foreign companies, mostly from the automobile industry, opened their plants there[10]. The importance of foreign capital for the city is also reflected in the fact that several big companies were revitalized through brownfield foreign investments[11], one of them being the shipyard where I conducted the fieldwork. The shipyard was privatized by the Dutch company after nine years of being closed and seven unsuccessful attempts of privatization. Currently, it produces river cruisers and dredgers – beavers exclusively for international markets. The production of these ships is organized in such a way that ships are built in Sremska Mitrovica, while all detailed work on interior is completed in the shipyards in Gendt, the Netherlands.

In the meantime, Serbia's economic status is determined by its position on the periphery where it competes with other countries for FDI (Upchurch and Marinković 2011). As a transitional "latecomer", through the introduction of the mentioned policies the country tried to catch up with those countries that generally completed the process of transition (Hungary, Poland), but ended up in the competition with former Yugoslav republics, on the one side, and historically more disadvantaged countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, on the other. Moreover, competition between the SEE states grows since foreign capital requires ever more state-subsides, as the VET

[9] http://www.marks21.info/industrijski-izvestaj/izvestaj-sremska-mitrovica Accessed on June 13, 2017
[10] http://www.021.rs/story/Info/Vojvodina/131061/Sremska-Mitrovica-Nagrada-za-grad-buducnosti-20162017.html http://www.blic.rs/vesti/vojvodina/bez-posla-12000-radnika/rxkfnx2 Accessed on June 13, 2017
[11] http://rs.n1info.com/a152596/Biznis/Otvorena-fabrika-Mitros-u-Sremskoj-Mitrovici.html Accessed on June 13, 2017

case shows. Capital always tends to remain flexible, and as such it has the power to direct all the SEE states against each other (Drahokoupil 2009; Kalb 2000). Such power is mirrored in the fact that only 25% of all foreign companies remain in Serbia after the period of subventions[12], leaving the country because other states offer higher incentives.

Therefore, through the introduction of the VET program and establishing the legal conditions for the internship economy, I argue, the Serbian government tries to improve the country's status within these competitive relations by providing foreign companies with already trained workforce and unprotected and cheap youth's labor. Such argument is also confirmed by several informants of mine, such as the representative of the Chamber of commerce who says that "there is a direct link between the VET and foreign investments", while the representative of the German international developmental agency GIZ explains that one of the first things that German investors do when they think of investing in Serbia is that they check the secondary schools' offers of trained workforce. Foreign representatives who support the project also confirm that "Europe needs high quality workforce, especially in the textile industry. We urge parents to forget about the universities and send their children to the VET programs in the schools, since this will secure jobs for their children"[13].

1.2. The VET proponents as the "comprador service sector"

In this section, I explain how the VET reform is organized between the key domestic and international actors. The concept of the "comprador service sector" points to the networks of personal and institutional relations between domestic and international actors operating in governmental and non-governmental sectors, who fulfil important hegemonic roles of introducing

[12] https://insajder.net/sr/sajt/tema/5149/Privilegije-za-investitore-nebriga-za-radnike.htm Accessed on June 10, 2017
[13] http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/srbija.73.html:587116-Evropa-trazi---zanatlije Accessed on June 10, 2017

and legitimizing FDI policies in the SEE states. In this way, the sector promotes and protects the interests of multinational companies by "translating the structural power of transnational capital into tactical forms of power" (Drahokoupil 2009, 3). Following this, I argue that the VET reform is not coercively imposed on Serbia by the core economies, but it represents what Drahokoupil calls "transnationally constituted domestic politics" (ibid, 20). This means that the VET reform mirrors the wider structural conditions of the dependence on FDI, however, these structural conditions only come to dominate through the active participation of the local actors from the comprador service sector. The argument on the hegemonic role of the state is important for the later explanation of the micro-hegemonic relations between the students and the shipyard. As I explain in the ethnography chapter, the company's hegemonic status is partially created by the state.

When applied to the case of the VET reform, the concept of the comprador service sector reveals complex relations among domestic actors, as well as the contours of global and local ties, reflected in the relations between global and local institutions. The reform is based on the pilot project designed and financially supported by international actors such as GIZ, and the Austrian and Swiss chambers of commerce. Also, the reform points to other global-local ties, since the World Bank that governed a similar educational reform in Turkey, recommends the VET as an adequate measure for Serbian economic progress (Bulut 2010; World Bank, 2014), while the EU required from Serbia to introduce the VET during the process of the EU integration (SAA, 2008; Dull 2012). Last but not least, the VET reform is "recommended" by the organization which represents foreign investors in Serbia[14].

[14] http://www.fic.org.rs/projects/white-book/white-book.html Accessed on June 10, 2017.

The pilot project of the VET will serve as a model of the general reform that will be introduced in September 2017. In the VET case, comprador service sector is composed of representatives from the Ministry of education, from the Chamber of Commerce and from Industry of Serbia (CCIS) and of local representatives of GIZ. According to the Feasibility study[15], it is determined that companies will have the main role in deciding upon the educational profiles which will be enabled to them by entering various important boards and institutions. The Chamber, described as "the leader of the educational reform" will coordinate between companies, on the one side, and the Ministry and government, on the other. The draft of the VET law[16] puts the Chamber in the center by authorizing it to decide upon the companies that can participate in the VET. My argument that the aim of the reform is to offer cheap and unprotected workforce is confirmed by the draft which determines that interns can be paid minimally 50% of the legally lowest salary (which would be around 90€) for maximum 35 hours of work per week. In the context in which employers avoid paying their workers, it is even questionable whether the students will get money because the draft avoids to define the loose term "productive labor", giving freedom to companies to decide on its meaning, which consequently determines the amount of money the interns can earn. Importantly, since the VET draft is not limited by the Labor Law which provides at least minimal protection, the interns are not able to count on the rights guaranteed to regular workers. All these defects of the draft follow the global trends in internship economy, as explained in the next chapter.

[15] http://www.pks.rs/SADRZAJ/Files/Centar%20za%20edukaciju/GIZ%20VET%20-%20Executive%20summary%20WEB%20s.pdf Accessed on June 13, 2017

[16] http://www.mpn.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/FINAL-NACRTA-ZAKONA-O-DUALNOM-OBRAZOVANJU-12.05.2017..pdf Accessed on June 9, 2017

The hegemonic role of the comprador service sector consists of defining the limits of what is socially and politically realistic, and of unifying particular, common and opposed interests, which consequently tend to thwart political and ideological alternatives (Drahokoupil 2009). In the case of the VET, the actors from the comprador service sector fulfil this important hegemonic function by deploying a narrative similar to the hegemonic "narrative of globalism" which "trumpets the triplet of liberalization, stabilization and privatization" promising the development of democracy and economic prosperity (Kalb 2002, 321).

The VET actors deploy the discourse of development promising that the VET brings economic growth, higher employability and individual prosperity for all students. Besides the causal relations between the VET and prosperity, they present public interests (economic progress) and private ones (trained workforce and cheap interns' labour) as they were inseparable, as well as the common good (Harvey 2012) was achievable only through the achievement of private gains. Thus, being against – or at least cautious about – the interests of the companies is understood as being against the interests of the entire society. In this way, the actors tend to neutralize any kind of critique and narrow down the field of politically and socially imaginable alternatives.

The legitimization of the VET reform is further conducted through the moralistic discourse which identifies the reasons for high unemployment rate in the moral defects of youth. As the prime minister states: "jobs wait for them (students), we do not want to import workforce"[17], and "we have to change our habits and realize that we have to work while we study[18]". The Head of the Chamber said that "only in Serbian language there is a phrase 'waiting for a job', which is

[17] http://www.blic.rs/vesti/ekonomija/ucenike-po-dualnom-obrazovanju-ceka-posao/4fbrcwb Accessed on June 9, 2017

[18] http://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/vucic-dualno-obrazovanje-najvaznija-tema-za-buducnost-150000-mladih-se-niti-skoluje/05rtk2l Accessed on June 9, 2017

untranslatable into other languages", and that "we have to change our mentality"[19]. These statements implicate that youth is lazy, spoiled and unwilling to work in the factories. Following their way of framing young students, work in general, and the VET in particular, are presented as disciplinary for such youth. Work entails a moral dimension since it "changes mentality", cures spoiled character, and transforms an immature person into a diligent one. Work, as organized through VET, makes the Serbian nation similar to the German or Austrian nations. Thus, the originally German/Austrian model of education helps Serbian people to make dreams about being like "them" come true.

The analysis of media material and available sources on the reform mirrors a specific view in which all the actors work harmoniously in order to promote the interests of the multinationals as it is implied in Drahokoupil's analysis of the comprador service sector. Yet, during my interviews with some of the representatives, I faced what is in policy studies known as the "implementation gap". The concept explains that the relations between the policy actors are rarely homogeneous and in tune, but more often complex and conflictive (de Sardan 2016, 119). For instance, the representative of the Institution for Improvement of Education criticizes the Ministry of Education for paying attention only to the promotive campaign, while neglecting the questions of the quality of the programs, problems of reimbursements for students and their health safety. Moreover, the manager of the shipyard claims that the supervisors are not properly trained, that the government leads "a ridiculous campaign for stupid Serbian people", and that none of the officials come to the shipyard to check what the students do. GIZ, on the other side, criticizes the Ministry of Education for implementing the reform on the massive level and not taking thoroughly

[19] http://www.blic.rs/vesti/ekonomija/cadez-cekam-posao-neprevodivo-svuda-osim-u-srbiji/ddy9xgy Accessed on June 9, 2017

into account the needs of the market. However, despite these slightly conflictive relations, none of the mentioned actors question the economic logic and social consequences of the VET reform as such. Maybe some of them do not intend to protect the interests of the companies, but such protection is, as I argue, the outcome.

Chapter two: Hegemonic reading of internship economy

In the first section of this chapter, I review the literature on internship programs, focusing on three main points. First, using Beverly Silver's (2003) notion of "lean and dual" production regime, I position the interns as peripheral workforce and explain the productive side of internship economy, as well as analyze the institutional frame within which it is structured. Second, I focus on the interns' precarious experiences and point to the empirical gap of control to which interns are subjected to and resistance they exert. In the second section of the chapter, I elaborate on the theory of hegemony, constructing the conceptual frame to analyze the hegemonic relations between the interns and the shipyard, and the position of these relations in the wider context of the competition state.

2.1. Internship economy: the social consequences of institutional alliances

The notion of internship economy is usually deployed loosely in the literature on internships. For that reason, I offer my own understanding which deepens the meaning and makes the term conceptually more useful. I consider *internship economy* as an example of the fourth "critical junction" (Kalb and Tak 2005) because it represents the inseparability of political, economic, and educational institutional domains in a threefold manner. In such institutional context, companies are provided with cheap labor force which reduces their costs and thus facilitates capital accumulation. The social consequences of such arrangements comprise of social reproduction, precarious experiences, redundancy of permanent workers, etc. In turn, these deep social consequences reinforce the economic side and enable the constant inflow of cheap labor. Such multisided approach allows me to understand how economic effects of internships are enabled, and how the students' positions in the shipyard are determined by the complex relations of economic, political, and educational institutions.

From the 1980s on, the number of internship programs has proliferated globally, reaching around 2 million enrolled students per year only in the US, with almost half of them being unpaid (Perlin 2011). This trend is widespread regardless of industries and geographic regions of implementation. The recent literature is focused mostly on the university-to-work transition through the internships in the service sector and creative industry (Perlin 2011; Leonard, Halford, and Bruce 2016; Shade and Jacobson 2015; Frenette 2013; Standing 2011). But internship programs are also a significant part of the transition from vocational schools to jobs in more traditional productive sectors (Polat 2013; Bulut 2010; Koo 2016; Eckelt and Schmidt 2015).

The internship programs are partly so popular because they are packaged as the "win-win" situation for all relevant actors: students, companies, and the state (Leonard, Halford, and Bruce 2016). Students who accept an internship position, the proponents argue, have the opportunity to gain valuable work experience, credentials, and to establish social connections that will help them in finding jobs after the completion of their studies. Companies participating in these programs have chances to utilize cheap or unpaid workforce and recruit new workers, thereby avoiding expensive and long selection processes (ibid). Finally, I would add that through internships, the state delegates its former welfare responsibilities related to employment policies to students, who are to increase their employability by the continuous devotion to their careers.

The economic logic of the internships should be understood through the position of peripheral workforce within the "lean and dual" production regime. This regime is organized in a dual manner: with the protected core workforce on one side, and the precarious and underpaid workers on the organizational periphery, on the other (Silver 2003). Such division lowers production costs since peripheral labor is causal labor, comprising of part-time and temporary jobs (Moody 1997). Interns' positions within companies and organizations correspond to the peripheral

labor force precisely because interns work without decent reimbursements, social security, and labor rights. This tendency of interns to occupy the positions of the peripheral workers can be found in various economic spheres, from vocational schools where interns work on assembly lines (Koo 2016; Liu and Smith 2016; Zhang 2014), to the creative and service industries, where they mostly do monotonous, precarious jobs, and/or time-consuming bureaucratic jobs (Perlin 2011; Leonard, Halford, and Bruce 2016; Shade and Jacobson 2015). The notion of the peripheral workforce is useful for this study because the interns' positions in the shipyard correspond entirely to the logic of "dual and lean" regime.

The relations between interns and companies are structured within the broader alliances between companies, educational institutions, and governments. The roles of educational institutions in the internship economy lie in obligations they impose upon students to attend internship programs as a condition for graduation, as well as in determining the availability of programs to students (Perlin 2011). The relations between companies and educational institutions are further strengthened by the fact that many vocational schools depend on the companies' donations for money or equipment (Koo 2016). In return for donations, these schools and some universities adapt their schedules so as to make interns undertake internships when companies have the biggest needs for additional workforce (Koo 2016; Perlin 2011). Besides providing cheap and systemically abused workforce, educational institutions also ensure legitimization and justification of the precarious, and sometimes exploitative conditions by attributing educational values to internship programs (Perlin 2011). The third actor, the government, is substantial in the internship network. As Perlin nicely explains in the US example, and the mentioned draft on the VET law confirms, governments intentionally create and continually protect the ambiguous legal frameworks within which interns' labor is defined, enabling companies to arbitrarily interpret the

law according to their needs (ibid). The roles of the governments are also mirrored in the educational reforms they conduct in order to establish stronger ties between vocational schools and companies, which aim to satisfy the constant needs for cheap labor force of the export-oriented industries (Sacchetto and Andrijasevic 2016.; Koo 2016; Smith and Zheng, 2016.). In the Serbian case, as I claim in the previous chapter, the VET reform is specifically conducted to attract more foreign investments.

Internship economy takes advantage of the existing class divisions, where the students from middle and upper-class families usually attend unpaid programs in the sectors of creative industry, governmental, and non-governmental affairs, while students from lower classes mostly become placed in the manufacturing and service sectors for their internships (Perlin 2011; Standing 2011). Wealthy interns can afford unpaid jobs, and because they have enough cultural and social capital, they can easily be accepted into the highly competitive programs (Perlin 2011; Frenette 2013). On the other hand, the students from the lower parts of the social hierarchy attend vocational schools that offer internships in factories and the money they earn gives them minimal economic independence and a possibility to contribute to the home budgets (Koo 2016).

The literature on internships reports similar experiences of interns usually related to precarity, boredom, and meaningless work. Many students complain that they do tasks that are completely irrelevant for their education. They experience the deep discrepancies between their initial expectations of internships and what they actually face during the programs (Shade and Jacobson 2015; Leonard, Halford, and Bruce 2016; Koo 2016). The irrelevance of the programs is further accompanied by the precarious working conditions that are structured within what Perlin terms as “the legal limbo” (2011, 64). Since they are not legally recognized as workers, interns cannot count either on social and health security, or on legal ways of making claims on paid work.

This makes the lawsuits against companies, internship programs, or schools/universities almost impossible.

On the other hand, companies and organizations that provide internship programs are in disproportionately more powerful positions compared to the interns. Companies often determine work conditions to satisfy their economic needs, while interns, as the peripheral workforce, must follow determined rules, resulting in precarious conditions. For instance, Chinese students, work nightshifts and overtime on assembly lines (Koo 2016), while those who work in Disneyland have no regular schedule (Perlin 2011). However, not everyone's experience is so exploitative. Some just report being bored because they get those tasks that needlessly take time of the regular workers.

What is noticeable in the literature is that many interns have legitimizing, contradictory, and even positive attitudes towards programs, despite of their negative experiences. They frame internships as "paying their dues" (Shade and Jacobson 2015, 196), as the initial step that every student must make in starting from the bottom of the organizational hierarchy. Others believe in the meritocratic logic of internships and attend one program after another (Leonard, Halford, and Bruce 2016). They also think that they ultimately profit more than the companies, or that they participate in the fair exchanges in which, "I have a top company on my resume and they get some free labor" (Perlin 2011, 70). Also, for the interns from vocational schools, jobs in factories are rare opportunities to earn much needed money (Koo 2016). Thus, although exploited, interns believe that they pursue their interests through the programs and gain social, cultural, or minimal economic capital.

One common tendency in the literature is the victimization of the interns. As Standing simply puts it, internships serve as "a vehicle for channeling youths into the precariat" (Standing

2011, 16). It tends to depict interns as passive actors without giving account to the ways they challenge some aspects of the programs. Moreover, the literature focuses merely on the immediate experiences and none of the studies employs any kind of the theoretical approach to research questions. The reviewed studies are univocal too, because they reduce the whole dynamic of internship programs to only one group, the students, while neglecting those more powerful: the regular employees and their employers.

2.2. Filling the gap: The theory of hegemony in the multi-scalar perspective

I combine my three notions of 1) methodological and theoretical flaws; 2) the absence of empirical data on control/resistance; and 3) the recognized contradictory and even positive attitudes towards internships, to construct the approach and research questions for my study. The present study thus asks: how are the unequal power relations between interns and employers maintained, which forms of control are deployed, and how and why do interns accept, and how do they resist these forms? However, I do not think only about the direct interpersonal control which Lukes (2005) calls the one-dimensional power; I want to understand how interns' consent is produced.

The theory of hegemony explains how interns' consent is created through various ideas, values and practices, and how they contribute to the legitimization of the exploitative relations in the program, and to their acceptance as natural and normative (Gramsci 2000; Howson and Smith 2008). Whenever I deploy the concept of hegemony, I point to the relational, contested and processual nature of the relations between the interns and the company, interchangeably deploying the terms "hegemonic relations" and "hegemonic processes". The reason for the distinction is not merely linguistic but above all epistemological. I follow the figurational approach of Norbert Elias (2001), and understand human relations as changeable and uneven phenomena. This changeability

is precisely what determines the processual nature of the hegemonic relations, while, on the other side, I think of hegemonic processes as relational because all social processes occur in the relations between social actors. Thus, my study analyzes the three interrelated aspects of the hegemonic processes: 1) the micro-hegemonic relations within the shipyard, 2) the broad hegemonic relations between the shipyard, the competition state and the students, and 3) the interns' resistance to the exploitative hegemonic relations.

The basic level of the examined hegemonic processes are the micro-relations between the students and the representatives of the company, that are specifically related to the students' tasks in the production process. I want to understand how they pursue their personal interests while delivering on economic interests of the shipyard. Burawoy's account of the hegemonic factory regimes is fruitful for this goal since it depicts how workers, following their immediate material interests, actually fulfill employers' interests and reproduce their own subjugating relations (Burawoy 1985). While Burawoy is more focused on the level of material interests, I also want to understand how the interns relate to the tasks on the subjective levels, and how such attachment fulfills the hegemonic function. Sturdy explains that through the practices of "escape into work": clerks try to defend themselves from the subordinating tasks by trying to get involved cognitively and emotionally in them as much as possible (Sturdy 1992). Following Sturdy's account, I investigate how the students' positive attitudes towards the tasks blur the exploitative relations in the shipyard and invert the potential for resistance initiated by the claims on money and rest.

However, Ong criticizes Burawoy's approach for being too workplace-centered, and explains that "capitalist discipline operates through overlapping networks of power relations in the workplace and the political domain, regulating daily practices, norms, and attitudes that give legitimacy to the unequal relations that sustain capitalism"(Ong 1991, 286). Her critique is crucial

for this study because it invites me to connect the micro-hegemonic relations in the shipyard to the macro-hegemonic project of the competition state. I do so by creating the concept of "hegemonic status" which represents the company's materially and moralistically defined status, powerful enough to create and justify the exploitative hegemonic relations. The hegemonic status is essentially relational and overarching concept: it is co-produced by the state, the company, and the students, connecting all of them into an inseparable whole.

The hegemonic status of the shipyard is structurally enabled by the competition state which, as explained in the chapter *Education for foreign investments,* introduces the policies favorable for foreign companies, and glorifies foreign capital as crucial for social progress through the work of the comprador service sector (Drahokoupil 2009). The hegemonic status is also co-produced by the company which deploys various materialistic and moralistic strategies to maintain its position. I investigate then these strategies, and their interactions with the competition state and the broader peripheral position of Serbia (Wallerstein 2004). To be effective in justifying exploitative hegemonic relations, the hegemonic status must be a part of the basic ways the students understand themselves and the world around them (Williams 1977). Drawing on Bourdieu's argument that capital exists on both material and subjective levels (Bourdieu 1998), I approach the hegemonic status of the shipyard as something that must be "misrecognized", accepted by the students as authority (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2013), and embodied in the imaginaries of their futures.

Finally, as hegemony is a continually resisted process (Williams 1977), I consider the concept of the "good sense" as a general source of the potentials for resistance. This is so because the good sense represents the inherent ability of subjects critically to face the social world, to establish a partial intellectual coherence in its understanding, and to create the potential for

counter-action (Gramsci 2000; Crehan 2011). For that reason, I deploy it to identify the kernels of resistance in those moments in which my informants recognize some aspects of their exploitative positions and try to challenge them through available means.

There are different stances on the potential for resistance to hegemony, and this study empirically checks some of them. For instance, James Scott considers claims and complaints as the genuine expressions of resistance (not as its potentials) and dismisses any possibility for the hegemony to be accomplished. He argues that subjugated groups are always aware of the conditions of their subordination and thus able "to penetrate and demystify the prevailing ideology" (Scott 1985, 317). They resist such ideology at least through daily compliances and "pragmatic resignation" (ibid, 325), if not in the non-standard individualized manners (Scott 2008). On the other hand, Roseberry opposes Scott's vision and argues that there is no possibility for resistance in the form of rupture out of the genuine fields of force, precisely because "hegemony constructs a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination" (Roseberry 1994, 361). Thus, to resist hegemonic relations means at the same time to express a disagreement in the prescribed form, and at least partially to reproduce the hegemonic order. I compare these two opposed arguments to empirically check both, as well as to grasp the ways in which the students challenge their positions of peripheral workforce.

Chapter three: Ethnography of the hegemonic relations in the internship program

After getting all necessary safety equipment, I enter the production hall where the first group of nine 17-year-old male students is trained. They practice welding with one of the supervisors, isolated in the corner and not participating in the production process. Another group of ten construction millwrights contributes to the construction of ships doing whatever regular workers, whom they help to, need. Groups are switched after five months which means that every student spends several months working in the production for seven hours per day, two days per week.

"Everything is good, I'm very satisfied, I wouldn't change anything" (Jovan) is the most common answer when the students are asked about their impressions regarding the internship program. They express their satisfaction for having an opportunity to practice in the company what they are learning at school. Their first positive experience related to the shipyard took place in the company's canteen on the first day of the internship, when the students got their personal tools, protective equipment, clothes and shoes, and personal lockers. They describe the scene through a mixture of feelings of privilege and gratitude for what is given to them, completely free, as one of them simply describes by the rhetorical question: "Who would give us all of that, plus free of charge?" (Jovan).

However, after the initial interviews it becomes clear that this will not be a report on the utopian relations between a philanthropic foreign company and the interns willing to learn. The students complain for not being paid for their work, being exhausted due to the strict discipline as well as for not getting all promised equipment necessary for normal work. So, what emerges are the complex relations in forms of grievances and claims, hopes and disappointments, disciplining

and its refusal, hegemonic processes and their cracks. In this chapter, I aim to reveal these complex ties and explain why the students still express their gratitude for the company and continue to construct their imaginaries of adult lives, decent and secured jobs around the shipyard despite their unfulfilled claims. More precisely, I will explain how this discrepancy is neutralized and deprived from the potentials for more evident signs of disaffection and resistance, and consequently, how the unequal relations between the students and those who represent the company remain essentially uncontested. I embed these micro-relations in the wider macro-hegemonic project of forging the competition state (Drahokoupil 2009), in which the shipyard as a foreign company enjoys its hegemonic status.

To accomplish these tasks, I give voice to the representatives of the company – the manager and the supervisors, and to the interns, following the flow of the hegemonic process from its creation, through its acceptance, to its resistance, which results in consent. First, I explain how hegemonic relations are created by the company – through the mixture of coercion in forms of the disciplinary regimes which serve to block public expression of discontent, on the one side, and the legitimizing narratives of unproductive labor, on the other. I show that both are strategically enabled and justified through the company's hegemonic status. Then I explore how hegemony is accepted by the students through the narratives identical to the company's, their hopes and expectations regarding the internship program and material security in the company. Finally, as hegemony is inherently a contested phenomenon, I depict how the students resist the hegemonic processes through claims and work as construction millwrights. However, I point out that due to the contradictory nature of the means of resistance, the challenging of hegemony ends in the partial reproduction of hegemonic relations.

3.1. The creation of hegemony through discipline and narratives of unproductive labor

The company deploys the disciplining regimes and legitimizing narratives to create the hegemonic relations and maintain the possibilities for utilizing the unpaid labor of students. I consider both as the exploitative means that the company utilizes relying on its hegemonic status. Control over both the students and workers is exerted through the official and unofficial disciplinary regimes. The official rules comprise of the strict time discipline, bans on having conversations with fellows, sitting during the production process and using cell phones. The obedience to these rules is thoroughly controlled in the Panopticon-like halls in which all the tasks are monitored through surveillance systems and direct oversight by the supervisors who sit in the glazed rooms. The unofficial rules are related to the bans on complaining on anything concerning the everyday functioning of the company, as well as to the bans on any kind of collective organizing.

The students report that they are mostly affected by the ban on sitting because they work only with two breaks and they feel very exhausted. However, they avoid challenging the ban because if some of them sat down, the whole group would be punished by cleaning the whole hall as it happened several times:

> Andrej: I think that we shouldn't stand for all the time. When I'm not welding, I must stand for half an hour and just watch others. If I sat, they would force us to clean the hall, which happened two-three times. If we had a possibility to sit that would help our legs and backs. And it is meaningless that we can't sit since we don't get any money for our work.

Besides the company's control over behavior, the unofficial bans on complaints are efficient in discouraging overt grievance since many students say that if they complained about reimbursements, equipment or discipline they would get fired or fined, just like one of their fellows and other workers were for complaining about food. As explained in the chapter on literature review, their fears are well-founded knowing that they work as peripheral workforce in a "legal limbo" – without rights guaranteed to regular workers and with disproportionate power placed in the hands of the management.

Apart from preventing discontent, the disciplinary regimes have an important function of "producing" obedient workers with an internalized will for work. As the supervisor explains in a moralistic manner, the interns should not sit because "if they are supposed to become workers, they must behave like the real workers. It would be rude towards workers if the students sat" (Mile, the supervisor). The creation of the ideal worker is channeled through their relations with the supervisors who decide upon specific tasks and the workers whom the students will assist. Through the disciplinary connectedness to the supervisors, the students learn to be "obedient and fair workers who work because they love work, (…) on such level of consciousness which makes them to come on their own asking for next tasks" (Stanko, the supervisor).

Such freedom to exert the disciplinary measures is a part of the broader precarious position of the regular workers who are not allowed to establish a union as the company threatens to fire anyone who would try to do so. Both anti-unionism and the disciplinary regime facilitate the precarization of students' and workers' labor, while the company justifies both relying on the same hegemonic status of a fair and generous firm. As explained in the first chapter, both are parts of the room for maneuver that the competition state provides foreign companies with, in this case through the exploitative VET law and informal permissions of anti-unionism.

The notion of *hegemonic status* is one of the central notions of this study since it represents a meeting point between the legitimizations deployed by the company and the consent of the students. It helps me to connect the micro-hegemonic process between the students and the company with the macro-hegemonic project of creating the competition state (Drahokoupil 2009), and shows that these two are hardly separable. As explained in the chapter on the social context, the competition state pressured by the transnational competitive market forges *the structural conditions* within which companies operate. These structural conditions consist of laws, reforms, tax regimes, unofficial practices (the VET law is an example) – everything that facilitates capital accumulation, as well as of the imaginaries constructed by the comprador service sector through which foreign companies are glorified as the saviors of the disadvantageous social context. On the other side, foreign companies utilize such structural conditions to reinforce their hegemonic status through different moralistic and materialistic strategies. The *moralistic strategies* are related to the discourses of generous, almost philanthropic companies, while the *materialistic strategies* consist of companies' ability to provide higher wages and better working conditions vis-à-vis what domestic companies and the impoverished labor market offer[20]. It is not only the economic ability of the companies, but also their willingness to offer higher wages, knowing that some foreign companies provide only minimal salaries, while others such as the shipyard pay significantly more. Both strategies are interchangeably utilized to justify various exploitative practices such as anti-unionism and the exploitation of youth's labor. Moreover, as I argue in the next section, both the

[20] The distinction between the moralistic and materialistic strategies of the companies is only analytical. In fact, they are inseparable, as material conditions provide "proofs" for the moralistic status of generous company, while moralistic strategies serve as an ideological base for capital accumulation accomplished through various exploitative practices.

structural conditions, on the one hand, and moralistic and materialistic strategies, on the other, stimulate imaginaries, hopes, expectations, through which consent is achieved.

The work of the hegemonic status is illustrated by the moralistic strategy that the manager utilizes to justify the lack of collective organizing in the company. More precisely, she deploys the narrative of generosity and claims that the workers do not have a union because they do not need it – the "fair company" pays them everything and guaranties them the labor rights provided by the Labor Law (except for unionism, which she obviously does not consider as a right despite the Labor Law). Simultaneously, the harsh Serbian context gives the manager power to declare that "If someone wants a union then he must go to the Serbian boss, and not here", continuing:

> Beware that Serbia is a very poor country with a few companies like the shipyard willing to pay for everything they are supposed to. There is no better company in the region. No one wants unions, people only want to work and get money every 20th in a month. (…) That's pure capitalism and we don't live in democracy. I have money – you don't. (…) But if the workers endanger the company requiring more provisions, although the company gave them everything having in mind the country they live in… One Western boss will not allow that.

The reason why a union would be dangerous is what one of the two supervisors condemns as the weaknesses of Yugoslavian self-management: overprotection of workers, which made them "lazy, and disrespectful for hierarchy and discipline" (Mile, the supervisor). In fact, the absence of unions in the shipyard enables the company to employ the strict disciplining regime, to decide without constraints upon overtime, and to neglect limitations of allowed work with dangerous gases. Since both anti-unionism and the internship economy are parts of the process of the precarization of peripheral labor force, the process ensures for the company a possibility to exploit

the labor of youth. As one of the supervisors responds when I ask him about his opinion on the fact that the students are not paid: "This is expectable, even regular workers work without wages in Serbia" (Stanko, the supervisor).

The absence of a union in the shipyard is not only an isolated case, but it depicts that one of the aim of the competition state is to socialize for precarity. I claim this having in mind the irrelevance of unionism and topics related to labor rights that I noticed during my interviews. For instance, when I ask the students what they would do if their future employers require them to work unpaid overtime, they say they would accept it, or quit their jobs if the situation is too prolonged. They do not find other alternatives. The lack of alternative ways of protecting their rights is connected to the fact that most of the students do not have information about unionism – neither from teachers and parents, nor from media. Some of them think that unions are organizations that ensure discounts to employees[21]. Even when I explain them the purpose of unions, they reiterate the manager's narrative: if everything is paid, workers do not need any organization to represent them, and explain further:

> Vladimir: You can enjoy labor rights only in your own company. As an employee, you are supposed to work and be obedient, not to decide upon anything. And that's pretty normal.

On the other side, one of their teacher tells me that she does not believe in unions' power, while the official responsible for the VET reform in the Ministry of education explains me that the questions of labor rights and unionism are irrelevant for the VET education. On my insistence that

[21] This is not only a matter of the lack of knowledge. Indeed, Serbian unions organize "syndical sales" and obviously, this is what mostly defines them in broader public. This study does not investigate the reasons for such status of unions because the problem goes beyond the initial research questions. There is a debate on what causes the status of unions in Serbia: corruption, historical weakness, their organizational inability etc. – but this study does not enter that debate (Arandarenko 2001; Stanojevic 2003).

labor rights are extremely relevant for students lives because they will work in an environment where exploitation is normalized, she simply replies that the complaints on companies' abuses are only the media spins. Similarly, when asked why the VET reform comprises only of the tightening relations with companies and not also of courses on labor rights, the representative of GIZ bureaucratically answers that only the domain of training for labor is a part of the reform.

Such absence of the topics related to unionism and labor rights suggests that besides ensuring unprotected and cheap workforce, the long-term goal of the VET reform is to socialize students for precarious and exploitative jobs that are reality for many workers on the periphery of capitalism (Wallerstein 2004). What can be another intention of the policy-makers when they direct students towards gaining their first work-related experiences within the legal frame that makes them vulnerable in the conditions of banned unionism and strict discipline, and without teaching them how to protect themselves?

The legitimizing narrative is the point where the hegemonic process transcends the merely disciplinary regime and begins to operate as a justification for the avoidance of paying for the students' productive labor. It becomes an example of the transition from the "dominative hegemony" based on coercion to the "aspirational hegemony" that is achieved through subalterns' consent (Howson and Smith 2008). This transition is illustrated by the moment when the manager denies to recognize the productive side of the interns' labor and explains that the shipyard as a socially responsible company provides the students with opportunities for learning, free food, equipment and transportation. As it is the case with unions, she utilizes the same hegemonic status with an emphasis on the generous provisions, inverting in that way the exploitative relations into the relations beneficial for the students.

The management of and the supervisors also construct the benevolent narrative which serves the same function of legitimizing the exploitative relations. They frame the students as unproductive and unskilled pupils who do not participate in the construction because the company wants to protect them from potential safety risks. They are also described as those who disturb the regular workers in fulfilling everyday tasks, while their labor, being declared merely as a learning process, is characterized as inefficient. I name this narrative as benevolent because on the surface it is supposed to protect the inexperienced pupils who are already generously given everything necessary for the competent learning process. In fact, it is hegemonic because it establishes the interpretative ground for reverting the interests of dominated and dominant (Howarth 2010) by putting the company's provisions as its expenses in front, while hiding its gains.

When faced with my argument that the interns' labor is actually productive, the manager justifies the avoidance of paying through the impossibility of establishing meritocratic criteria: "I don't want 20 of them to be burden of the company, and I don't want to pay all of them indiscriminately because not all of them are equally engaged". The narratives described above depict the room for maneuver for the strategical defining of productive labor which the competition state provides the shipyard with. Such freedom the foreign company enjoys clearly confirms the global tendency explained in the literature review, that governments protect the ambiguous legal frame and give freedom to companies to decide what productive labor is (Perlin 2011). These relations will be paradigmatic for Serbian internship economy too, since the Ministry of education intentionally avoids to define the meaning of the term "productive labor" deployed in the last draft of the VET law, as well as to guarantee the minimum of labor rights from the Labor Law.

3.2. The moments of consent in the hegemonic relations

Hegemony becomes effective when the subalterns' acceptance of the dominant values, practices and ways of interpreting the social world reinforces their subjugated positions (Gramsci 1971). In this section, I draw on the elaborated concept of hegemonic status to present how students' consent is produced: through the narratives of generosity and unproductive labor that are based on the moralistic strategy of the company, as well as through the students' hopes and expectations created through the materialistic strategy that promises material security in the future. In return, these hopes and expectations silence grievances and prolong the students' readiness to work without money.

Hegemonic relations between the students and the company are reflected in the fact that many students accept the narratives of the representatives of the shipyard and express their gratitude for provided opportunities to learn. The commonsensical gratitude to the generous, almost philanthropic shipyard directly relies on and reinforce the moralistic hegemonic status of the foreign company which fits well with the descried power of the company to interpret the meaning of productive labor. The students undervalue contribution of their labor by framing themselves as unproductive pupils who only "waste the company's materials and equipment" (Milos). With such understanding of their own roles, the potential reimbursements do not seem as what they earned, but as an additional provision by the generous company. Other students recognize their productiveness but look at the relations with the shipyard as simple exchange: they get free training, materials, tools and equipment, providing in return their help to the workers:

> Me: Are you angry for not being paid?
>
> Marko: Nope, because we come here to learn, not to be lazy. (…) The company wastes wires, gas, machines on us, so this is a kind of exchange.

Me: But in the next school year you will work even more?

Jovan: Yes, and although we don't get money I don't feel exploited because the company thought me to work. I'm grateful for that.

Hegemony penetrates in all pores of the social life and influences the basic ways in which individuals understand themselves, others and the world around them, how they imagine their future, and interpret their present and past (Williams 1977). Due to such attachment of hegemony to the very subjective levels, one of the strongest sources of consent are the hopes and expectations for wages and employment in the shipyard, as well as beliefs in the usefulness of the internship program. The hopes and expectations, as parts of the imaginaries of decent jobs built around the company's hegemonic status, prevent the students from understanding their positions in more critical ways.

Many of the interns express their expectations that "we will be paid in the third year because we will be more skillful and we will work longer hours" (Vladimir). They also claim that they will probably have opportunities to work in the company during the summer, which will ensure them financial independence and protect some of them doing seasonal jobs. Yet, the hopes for money are not results of the students' daydreaming because the school's director promised them that the company will provide them textbooks and stipends, while one of the supervisors tells me that the students will maybe have chances to work during the summer for money.

Even more significant than immediate money are the hopes for permanent and well-paid jobs after graduation. The hegemonic status of the shipyard serves as the basis of the students' hopes since they are conscious of the company's economic superiority in the wider impoverished social environment. They perceive the shipyard as a general source of security because they know

that the shipyard pays its workers for usual expenses such as food, transport, equipment, overtime work, as well as high and regularly paid wages. On the other hand, they are also aware of the harsh economic environment in which their parents and relatives do not get salaries for months and lose their jobs at the end without any hope for legal protection. Putting the shipyard in this contrast, they accept its hegemonic status by describing it as generous and fair. Such hopes reflect the broader structural constraints of the Serbian competition state, showing that the needs for material security are the strongest sources of consent in the exploitative and precarious working conditions forged in the peripheral capitalist relations (Drahokoupil 2009; Wallerstein 2004). In such context, even the students' consent on the absence of labor rights presented above seems usual. It proves that the worse the conditions on the periphery are, and the wider the room for maneuver created by the competition state is, the better the possibilities for consent based on the hopes for material certainty and the companies' hegemonic status will be.

Not only does the attachment of the hopes to the hegemonic status reveal how consent is produced, but it also points to the crucial nature of the way in which the hegemonic status functions. In the previous section, I explained that the hegemonic status is co-produced by the company and the competition state, inseparably. However, it starts to be relevant for micro-levels of social life when it is recognized by the students as normative and desirable. Here I follow Bourdieu's notion of "misrecognition" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2013) and his understanding of capital as both material and subjective (Bourdieu 1998), to argue that the crucial moment of the creation of consent is the embodiment of the company's hegemonic status through the students' expectations, hopes, (mis)recognitions.

Despite the students hopes, the manager declines the possibility that the students will earn any money, and explains that hardly anyone will be employed in the shipyard. She maintains that the students should stop daydreaming and accept their parents' present as their own future:

> And do they want permanent jobs from the very beginning? I can't be responsible for whether these kids will have stable jobs and regular salaries in the company which they will not ever want to leave. That is idealistic and socialist. The state, the school and their parents should teach the kids that they don't live in Germany where students get jobs after graduation. When we bring up these kids, we should tell them that they will not have such possibilities, that they shouldn't live in dreams. Only Marx and Engels can still think in such a way. (Anita, the manager)

This quote illustrates the way in which the manager actively re-creates the shipyard's hegemonic status. The quote is not merely an explanation of the cruel social conditions in Serbia but it also limits the horizon of social possibilities by defining precarity as both real and realistic, that is, what the students can hope for. In such normalized precarious context, the manager creates the key contrast between Germany as a symbol of the "prosperous world" and Serbia as a backward society, and puts between them her company as a Western promised land. In the context ordered in this way, the refusal of the possibility for employment makes the company even more glorified and unattainable, while the students' "daydreaming" gets only more reinforced. On the other side, the quote proves that "the state and the school" indeed "teach the kids that they do not live in Germany where students get jobs after graduation" since they prepare the students to be exploitable workforce through the education that totally neglects labor rights.

However, the hegemonic status and the interns' hopes are unstable and fragmentary, and both start to evaporate when the materialistic ground for the hopes is shaken. Exactly this scenario

occurs when I tell the last group of my interviewees that they will not get what they expect. The quote below shows that when the hopes disappear, the negative aspects of the labor organization such as the ban on unionism that was not so important earlier because of the promised material security, start to be relevant:

> Veljko: I had very positive impression about the shipyard because I considered it as serious and fair company. But knowing now all about bans and complaints as well as that we will not get what we expect, I don't have such positive impression anymore.

Besides the hopes and expectations, the beliefs in usefulness of the internship program ensure the students' consent as well. Unlike the interns who report boredom and irrelevance of programs as their main experiences (Perlin 2011; Koo 2016; Leonard, Halford, and Bruce 2016), my interviewees do not express any doubts regarding the competence and relevance of the program. Quite oppositely, they understand the internship as a self-development project, and believe that through work in the shipyard they gain skills and knowledge which will subsequently improve their chances on labor market and protect them from harsh conditions characteristic for the Serbian transitional context:

> Me: How would you protect your rights if you, for instance, don't get salary for months?
>
> Aleksandar: I don't worry about that because my profession is popular and there will always be jobs for me. What I learn here will give me a possibility to choose where to work.

Therefore, the unpaid internship is perceived not as an exploitative program but as the crucial self-investment through which the students gain advantageous skills and knowledge, ensuring valuable yields after graduation. The hopes and expectations regarding the program and jobs in the shipyard represent a skeleton of students' imagined lives, and they justify the present situation in which the students are not paid – all in hope that the future will finally award them for their patience and skillful work. Thus, being deprived in the present can be understood as a necessary step for a promising future.

The analysis from the previous two sections implies that the hegemonic relations between the company and the interns are based on the interplay between the disciplinary coercion, on the one hand, and consent accomplished through the narratives on productive labor, beliefs in promises of the internship program and hopes for employment, on the other. This intertwinement of coercion and consent questions Burawoy's dualism of hegemonic and despotic regimes (Burawoy 1985). It shows that there is no regime based exclusively on one means of control, and raises a question whether it is possible to speak of the specific "peripheral competition state regime". Such regime, the initial analysis suggests, is broadly installed on the hegemonic status of foreign companies: material possibilities they provide, and on promises and imaginaries they stimulate. On the other hand, the hegemonic status enables foreign companies to employ various exploitative practices and policies in order to ensure low prices of production in peripheral countries.

3.3. From hegemony to resistance and back

The work of hegemony cannot be fully grasped unless the ways in which it is challenged are examined. This is so because hegemony does not represent a fixed order but rather an unfinished project that is continuously resisted and must be constantly renewed (Williams 1977). In this section, I depict how the interns resist the hegemonic process: first, through their claims

on productive labor, and second, by preferring to work with construction millwrights to bypass the disciplinary regimes. Yet, I argue that the means of resistance are fragmentary and at the same time the sources of hegemony's renewal.

I deploy Scott's notion of the importance of claims and complaints for recognizing alternative and overt manners in which people resist domination especially in the situations when open resistance is too risky (Scott 2008). However, for the reasons explained in the last paragraphs on the debate between Scott and Roseberry, I consider claims and complaints more as potentials for resistance than as completed forms of resistance. Since the disciplinary regime is strict, the students partially challenge the company's benevolent narrative and discipline by deploying the switching narratives of being students/workers. More precisely, these narratives consisting of claims and complaints are based on Gramsci's "good sense". Such good sense, as the seed of coherent and critical understanding (Gramsci 2000), fragments the incoherent commonsensical (and hegemonic) meanings of internships as simple exchange or as a generous relationship, and represents a potential for more materialized forms of resistance. Therefore, through the work of good sense some students understand their positions in the economic relations in the shipyard, which serves as the background for the claims on money, equipment and rest.

This means that the interns are not a homogeneous group but consisted of those who accept the company's narrative, as well as of those who resist it. Only a minority of the students interpret their tasks in the shipyard as productive labor, such as cleaning the boat before it sails, cleaning screws and motors, honing and caring pipes, arranging stockrooms, etc. They deploy the narrative of being productive workforce to justify their claims on the deserved money:

> Sasa: Yesterday, I helped a worker cutting and honing metal pieces. (…) One regular worker would spend a month on cleaning the screws while we, the students,

did that in two days. So, we do all the tasks which would unnecessarily take the time of regular workers".

Ivan: They should pay us because we do all the regular jobs. All the tasks we do would be done by some regular worker. Basically, we participate in the construction of ships.

Apart from the claims on money, several students explain that they should also have right on the regular change of equipment guaranteed to all workers:

Marko: We signed confirmations about getting all equipment, but we didn't get pullovers and sweaters. So, we were freezing during the winter when we worked outside, on the ship (..). The clothes we got at the beginning are burned and teared up now. The company promised us that we will get new equipment every 3 months, just as other workers, but we haven't got anything.

These claims on money and equipment do not reflect only material claims, but also deeper refusal of the company's hegemonic narrative according to which they are merely unproductive students.

Yet, the narrative is not fixed but strategically switched. Unlike the claims on money and equipment, when my interviewees require the rights on rest refusing the disciplinary regime, they deploy the narrative of being the students – not workers. As in the case of claims on productive labor, through the moment of good sense they recognize the economic logic of the discipline: "If someone sat, the boss loses productive time. It is great for him that all of us work, but it is bad for us" (Marko). Subsequently, they confront the measures of control by deploying the narrative of being the students: "if we are not workers, if they don't want to pay us, then I don't see any reason for not having right to sit and not having more than two breaks". Thus, it can be noted that the

narratives of being students/workers reflect the strategic game played by the interns who choose one of them to support their claims. Eventually, the claims and complaints mirror the fact that neither do some students accept the benevolent narrative as normative, nor do they legitimize the inevitability of discipline.

As explained in the theoretical part, Scott argues that complaints and claims are genuine forms of resistance and crucial proofs of the ineffectiveness of hegemony (Scott 2008). According to his vision, the students who express claims on money and rest truly resist the hegemonic process in the shipyard. However, my case suggests that claims cannot be taken as resistance because resistance implies a fulfilled process which results in specific consequences. Unlike Scott, I do not consider claims as genuine forms of resistance, because both claims and good sense are incoherent and fragmentary, often mixed with common sense – as the following excerpt illustrates:

> Andrija: Several days ago, I was polishing a piece of metal with my friends and we finished that in several hours. The worker alone would spend two days on that.
>
> Me: Is it then OK that you are not paid?
>
> Andrija: It is, because we both learn and work. But also, it isn't because it would be good if the company gave us at least some stipend.

The quote depicts how common sense in a form of the company's narrative neutralizes the recognition of productive labor based on good sense, and confirms that hegemonic processes operate through the fragmentation of subalterns on both individual and group levels (Howson and Smith 2008). Consequently, the fragmentation tend to thwatr coherent understandings and potentials for meaningful actions.

Apart from the claims, the interns express resistance when they prefer to work as assistants of the construction millwrights. However, although it slightly improves the students' positions, this form of resistance in fact reproduces the hegemonic relations and ensures interns' productivity. As Sturdy (1992) explains, when they "escape into work", workers get emotionally and cognitively deep into work, so the experiential flow blurs their subjugated positions. For instance, the students excitingly report that they enjoy working with the construction millwrights, which gives them opportunity to participate in the real process of production comparing to welding where they spend a lot of time standing and observing other students. The engagement and enjoyment the students talk about hide the costs and benefits of the work with construction millwrights. They become subjugated to the hegemonic process when they feel that they *wish* and *like* such work, which consequently blurs the power-side of the relations between them, their supervisors and workers through which their labor is exploited.

The preferences of the participation in the construction process hide the contradictory nature of the relations with the regular workers and represent a key moment of inversion of the means of resistance into hegemonic means. More precisely, for the students, the workers are sources of necessary knowledge and skills, as well as of alternative and low-risk strategies by which they bypass the discipline. So, when they work with the construction millwrights on ships, the interns can sit when they need to, chat about everyday stuff with other employees, work slowly without being afraid of surveillance and control. On the other side, these relations are immediate canals through which the students' labor is extracted. This illustrated by the fact that only when they work as construction millwrights, are the interns productive for the company because they are assisting the workers in the construction processes, while as welders they merely practice in

isolation[22]. Through the contradictory relations with workers they employ their productive labor which is then transformed by the discourses of the company into merely unproductive labor.

The presented example illustrates the resistance-consent dynamic and serves as an empirical check for Roseberry's (Roseberry 1994) and Scott's (Scott 2008) opposed conceptions of resistance to hegemony. My interpretation of the example suggests that the students resist some aspects of the hegemonic control, but they do so by reproducing the exploitative relations. Such dynamic of resistance-consent raises an important question of the possibilities for resistance. The fragmentary nature of claims that I depict above suggests that claims and complaints are potentials for resistance rather than acts of resistance as such. Oppositely to what Scott argues (Scott 2008), it does not mean either that resistance to one aspect, such as ban on sitting, necessarily results in the challenging of the whole hegemonic order, such as the hegemonic status of the shipyard. The fact that the students recognize the costs of open resistance and try to find alternative ways of expressing discontent does not imply that they are also aware of the wider constraints. Quite oppositely, as I illustrated through the fragmented claims and work with the regular workers, these constraints remain largely unrecognized and thus uncontested. It does not follow either that the students are aware of that when they protect their interests - by preferring to work with the workers – they also promote the company's and workers' interests. And this fulfilment of the dominants' interests is how hegemony finally operates (Drahokoupil 2009; Howarth 2010).

I argue that Scott's oversimplified understanding of hegemony originates from the dualistic view on agency and structure as mutually exclusive. In such a view, actors are ontologically

[22] The distinction between productive labor with construction millwrights and unproductive labor with welders is one that both the company and the students deploy. However, it is a commonsensical, hegemonic distinction because it hides the productive side of practicing with welders. When the students learn welding, they make use of such knowledge as construction millwrights. This is important because both groups of interns are switched after five months meaning that all of them work as both welders and construction millwrights, and contribute to the production process.

separate from and completely aware of their positions within the structure, which enables them continuously to resist and at least mentally reject the structure. The case of the resistance through work with construction millwrights confutes such approach while confirming Roseberry's conceptualization of hegemony and resistance (Roseberry 1994). It suggests that available means of resistance are structurally determined and dependent. Everyday ways of challenging the disciplining regime, such as sitting, chatting and slower fulfilling the tasks are the parts of the grey zone that is still unregulated but nevertheless unofficially allowed by the company. For that reason, since resistance occurs through structurally available means, it results in at least partial reproduction of the hegemonic process, as illustrated above. My case thus confirms that when hegemony is understood as processual relations and not as fixed domination (as Scott does), then resistance and a hegemonic process are dialectically inseparable. Therefore, I argue that potentials for resistance always exist as valuable proofs of the openness of history for social change, but resistance – when conceptualized as indispensable aspect of hegemonic relations - can hardly undermine the totality of structure and its hegemonic nature.

Conclusion: From the consent of interns towards the consent of workers?

My main goal in this study has been to reveal why the interns express their sympathies towards the VET program at least do not resist them, despite their negative experiences and the fact of serving as cheap, unprotected workforce. More precisely, I have deployed the theory of hegemony to analyze the various legitimizing ideas, values and practices accepted by the interns as normative, which consequently reproduces their positions in the exploitative relations. Fully acknowledging the embeddedness of these relations in wider structural processes, my study relates many of these hegemonic ideas and practices to the wider hegemonic status of the shipyard in the peripheral context of the Serbian competition state.

The study suggests that the hegemonic relations are created and accepted through the narratives of unpaid labor, which are broadly based on the room for maneuver for exerting various exploitative practices, and on the hegemonic status of the generous and fair company. The purpose of such narratives is to normalize the exploitative practices such as not paying for students' labor or banning unions. The main means of consent and reasons why many interns do not resist lie in their imaginaries of the permanent and well-paid jobs in the shipyard. Such imaginaries are built around the company's hegemonic status in the destitute society in which the shipyard pays higher salaries than many domestic and foreign companies. On the other hand, only a minority of the students resist the hegemonic relations, mostly through claims, complaints and everyday tasks. However, due to the contradictory and fragmentary nature of these means of challenging hegemonic relations, resistance ends up in the partial reproduction of hegemony.

Such results imply that the studies on internship economy must deploy wider and combined approaches from sociology, anthropology and political economy in order to fully grasp the complex dynamic of programs – from the micro-level relations to macro-level conditions within

which the programs are forged. However, what my study illustrates is that these scales should not be combined independently and in a fixed manner – as putting smaller Russian dolls into bigger ones – but should be thought of as mutually constitutive processes. This is well-illustrated by my argument that the hegemonic status produces consent only when the competition state, the shipyard and the students construct the hegemonic status together.

Despite its merits, the study has several methodological shortcomings. Although I tried to include all relevant actors, due to the lack of time and resources, I could not interview the students' parents and the regular workers. Also, I spent only two days in the shipyard which has not been sufficient for detailed participant observation, and which has made my insights on the interns' resistance slightly undifferentiated. Further studies which overcome these limitations may bring more diverse and empirically more grounded insights. For instance, parents' imaginaries of the students' futures, as well as their ideas regarding foreign companies, unionism, labor rights, memories on socialist period, etc., could serve hegemonic functions by being informal parts of the education for exploitation and precarity, or they could represent the sources of resistance to it. Longer fieldwork in workplaces could offer data on the variety of alternative and individualized forms of resistance that the students might exert during their work. Interviews with the regular workers could provide further studies with workers' perspectives on their roles in and understanding of the exploitative relations in which the students take part, as well as their views on unionism and the status of the foreign company.

The value of the methodological and theoretical approach deployed in this study lies in the further directions it points to. My initial question of how the interns' consent is created can be generalized towards the question of how workers' consent is produced on the capitalist periphery. More precisely, most of my data suggests that the normalization of interns is based on the

hegemonic status of foreign companies, and that this status is inseparably defined by the materialistic and moralistic strategies of foreign companies. While the materialistic strategies provide workers with material incentives and the basic ingredients for their imaginaries of a prospective future, the moralistic narratives are deployed to justify various exploitative practices which facilitate the accumulation of capital for the companies. However, as one of my interviews implies, the whole hegemonic status in the eyes of the interns collapses once the materialistic promises disappear. This scenario is contradictory because it challenges the conception of the hegemonic status as defined by both materialistic and moralistic strategies. It indicates that in the absence of promises of material security, the moralistic narratives cease to be effective. Such contradiction invites us to think about the specific characteristics of "the competition state production regime", and raises a question of how workers' consent is created in such a regime. What is the purpose of the moralistic narratives, why do foreign companies feel the need to deploy them if the provided material security is what matters the most? These are some questions that can bring us closer to the understanding of the contemporary condition of labor in the post-socialist peripheral countries.

Finally, what motivated me to do this research were not only the theoretical and methodological puzzles, but also the relevance of the VET reform for Serbian society. My initial fears have been confirmed by the finding that the students are put in the position of totally unprotected labor force which can in the best case earn twice less than those who work for legally minimal wages. These initial fears are also exceeded by the finding that the reform is not only about supplying temporary exploitable youth, but also about socializing these youth for precarity and exploitation. The irrelevance of the topics related to labor rights for the policy-makers implies that the final aim of the VET reform is to make of precarity and exploitation normal conditions for

peripheral workforce, to prevent discontent and to limit the possibilities of ideological and political alternatives. These precarious practices might be mitigated by some concrete recommendations regarding the VET law, such as a clear definition of what productive labor is, more strict control of internship programs by professionals and unions, or the subjugation of the VET law to the Labor Law, etc. However, since one of my main claims in this study has been that the VET reform is the least an educational, but a political and ideological project of education for exploitation on the capitalist periphery, the temporary solution can be a withdrawal of the Law from the procedure. This solution is temporary because the VET reform is only a symptom of the broader neoliberal project. A more durable solution must include establishing the wide counter-front that will confront neoliberal economic, ideological and political assumptions that Serbian state relies on.

References

Arandarenko, Mihail. 2001. "Waiting for the Workers: Explaining Labor Quiescence in Serbia." *Workers after Workers' States: Labor and Politics in Postcommunist Eastern Europe. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield*.

Ball, Stephen J. 2010. "New States, New Governance and New Education Policy." *The Routledge International Handbook of the Sociology of Education*, 155.

Beblavỳ, Miroslav, and Marcela Veselková. 2014. "Future of Skills in Europe: Convergence or Polarisation?" https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2402161.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1998. *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*. Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loïc Wacquant. 2013. "Symbolic Capital and Social Classes." *Journal of Classical Sociology* 13 (2): 292–302.

Bulut, Ergin. 2010. "Transformation of the Turkish Vocational Training System: Capitalization, Modularization and Learning unto Death." *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies* 8 (1): 362–388.

Burawoy, Michael. 1985. *The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism*. Verso.

Burawoy, Michael, Joseph A. Blum, Sheba George, Zsuzsa Gille, and Millie Thayer. 2000. *Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World*. Univ of California Press.

Crehan, Kate. 2011. "Gramsci's Concept of Common Sense: A Useful Concept for Anthropologists?" *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 16 (2): 273–287.

Drahokoupil, Jan. 2009. *Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe: The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment*. Routledge.

Driessen, Henk, and Willy Jansen. 2013. "The Hard Work of Small Talk in Ethnographic Fieldwork." *Journal of Anthropological Research* 69 (2): 249–263.

Dull, Laura J. 2012. "Teaching for Humanity in a Neoliberal World: Visions of Education in Serbia." *Comparative Education Review* 56 (3): 511–533.

Eckelt, Marcus, and Guido Schmidt. 2015. "Learning to Be precarious–The Transition of Young People from School into Precarious Work in Germany." *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies* 12 (3): 130–155.

Elias, Norbert. 2001. *Society of Individuals*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Frenette, Alexandre. 2013. "Making the Intern Economy: Role and Career Challenges of the Music Industry Intern." *Work and Occupations* 40 (4): 364–97. doi:10.1177/0730888413504098.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections Form the Prison Notebook, Edited and Translated by Quintin Hoare & Goffrey Nowell Smith*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

———. 2000. *The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916-1935*. NYU Press.

Harvey, David. 2003. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford University Press, USA.

———. 2012. *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*. Verso Books.

Howarth, David. 2010. "Power, Discourse, and Policy: Articulating a Hegemony Approach to Critical Policy Studies." *Critical Policy Studies* 3 (3–4): 309–35. doi:10.1080/19460171003619725.

Howson, Richard, and Kylie M. Smith. 2008. "Hegemony and the Operation of Consensus and Coercion." http://ro.uow.edu.au/era/538/.

Jessop, Bob. 1993. "Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary Remarks on Post-Fordist Political Economy." *Studies in Political Economy* 40 (1): 7–39. doi:10.1080/19187033.1993.11675409.

Kalb, Don. 2000. “Localizing Flows: Power, Paths, Institutions, and Networks.” *The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back in,* 1–32.

———. 2002. “Globalism and Postsocialist Prospects.” *Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia,* 317–334.

Kalb, Don, and Helmut Tak. 2005. “Critical junctions–Recapturing Anthropology and History.” *Critical Junctions: Anthropology and History beyond the Cultural Turn,* 1–27.

Koo, Anita. 2016. “Expansion of Vocational Education in Neoliberal China: Hope and Despair among Rural Youth.” *Journal of Education Policy* 31 (1): 46–59.

Leonard, Pauline, Susan Halford, and Katie Bruce. 2016. “‘The New Degree?’ Constructing Internships in the Third Sector.” *Sociology* 50 (2): 383–99. doi:10.1177/0038038515574456.

Liu, Mingwei, and Chris Smith. 2016. *China at Work: A Labour Process Perspective on the Transformation of Work and Employment in China*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Lukes, Steven. 2005. *Power, Second Edition: A Radical View*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Moody, Kim. 1997. *Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy*. Verso.

Ong, Aihwa. 1991. “The Gender and Labor Politics of Postmodernity.” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 20 (1): 279–309.

Perlin, Ross. 2011. *Intern Nation: How to Earn Nothing and Learn Little in the Brave New Economy*. Verso Books.

Polat, Selda. 2013. “Neo-Liberal Education Policies in Turkey and Transformation in Education.” *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies* 11 (4): 159–178.

Roseberry, William, and others. 1994. “Hegemony and the Language of Contention.” *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico*, 355–366.

SAA - Stabilization and Association Agreement. 2016. Accessed November 27. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/key_document/saa_en.pdf.

Sacchetto, Devi, and Rutvica Andrijasevic. 2016. “The Case of Foxconn in Turkey: Benefiting from Free Labour and Anti-Union Policy.” *Flexible Workforces and Low Profit Margins: Electronics Assembly between Europe and China*, 113.

Sardan, Jean-Pierre Olivier de. 2016. “For an Anthropology of Gaps, Discrepancies and Contradictions.” *Antropologia* 3 (1 NS). http://www.ledijournals.com/ojs/index.php/antropologia/article/view/438.

Scott, James C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

———. 2008a. “Everyday Forms of Resistance.” *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 4 (1): 33.

———. 2008b. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. yale university Press.

Shade, Leslie Regan, and Jenna Jacobson. 2015. “Hungry for the Job: Gender, Unpaid Internships, and the Creative Industries.” *The Sociological Review* 63 (May): 188–205. doi:10.1111/1467-954X.12249.

Silver, Beverly J. 2003. *Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization Since 1870*. Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Chris, and Yu Zheng. 2016. “Chinese MNCs’ Globalization, Work and Employment.” *Flexible Workforces and Low Profit Margins: Electronics Assembly between Europe and China*, 67.

Smith, Gavin. 2004. “Hegemony: Critical Interpretations in Anthropology and beyond.” *Focaal* 2004 (43): 99–120.

Standing, Guy. 2011. *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. Bloomsbury Academic.

Stanojevic, Miroslav. 2003. “Workers’ Power in Transition Economies: The Cases of Serbia and Slovenia.” *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 9 (3): 283–301.

Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. Final report. 2016. Accessed November 26. http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Public/ReportResultView.aspx?rptKey=indId%3d24000200IND01%26102%3dRS%266%3d1%2c2%2c3%2c4%2623%3d0%2c1%2c2%262%3d%23Last%231%2640%3d15%2cL15-24%2cL15-64%26sAreaId%3d2400021200%26dType%3dName%26lType%3dSerbianCyrillic.

Sturdy, Andrew. 1992. “Clerical consent:‘Shifting’ Work in the Insurance Office.” *Skill and Consent: Contemporary Studies in the Labour Process. London: Routledge*, 115–149.

Upchurch, Martin, and Darko Marinković. 2011. “Wild Capitalism, Privatisation and Employment Relations in Serbia.” *Employee Relations* 33 (4): 316–33.

———. 2013. *Workers and Revolution in Serbia : From Tito to Milošević and beyond*. Manchester ; New York : Manchester University Press ; New York : distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. 2004. *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Duke University Press.

Williams, Raymond. 1977. *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford University Press.

Zhang, Lu. 2014. *Inside China's Automobile Factories*. Cambridge University Press.