Precarization in Turkish Academia and Scientific Field: A Comparative Case of Research Strategies of Academics in Social Sciences

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Abstract

A considerably sizeable body of research has highlighted neoliberalism's effects on universities and production of knowledge, emphasizing the proliferation of the university-industry relationships. Although these previous works have documented the changes in the research practices in a highly meaningful manner, they have not touched upon several elements. Firstly, they do not investigate how the new regime of precarious work that was brought about by neoliberalism affect knowledge production of academics. Secondly, social sciences are left out in these debates largely. Lastly, the rather top-down, macro approach does not pay much attention to internal logics and structures of science as an autonomous space, operating with its own internal laws and logic, that is, as a field.

In this work, I try to take a step further by doing a comparative research between the social sciences departments of the two types of universities in Turkey. First type is the 'elite', American universities that focuses on institutional accumulation of scientific capital, whereas the second type is the 'non-elite' universities whose institutional aims and strategies are more oriented towards profit making through extraction of surplus from academics' immaterial labor. Precarious work being both present in these universities, the research of the academics with high volumes of scientific capital in the elite universities, I argue, are affected the most by precarity, as their research dispositions are reconciled with strategies of hedging risks. In the non-elite universities, however, precarious work prepares the conditions for ensuring research dispositions of the academics with low scientific capital to be put into action.

Declaration of Original Research and the Word Count

I, the undersigned, **Emir Gürsel**, candidate for the MA degree in Sociology and Social Anthropology, declare herewith that the present thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of the work of others, and no part of the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part of the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Neoliberalism and Production of Knowledge in Universities

One of the venues that have been substantially affected by the neoliberalism is none other than the sphere of academia. Next to bringing about drastic changes to the institutional make-up and mechanisms of the universities in a virtually all-encompassing manner on global scale, it also transformed the ways in which knowledge is produced. Establishment of university-industry nexus is perhaps an epitome of how research activities and strategies in the universities took shape in line with the demands of capital, testifying to the influences of neoliberal policies over the last decades. Research now is mostly held in collaboration with corporations, effectively working to wipe out public knowledge in favor of a commodified one.

The aforementioned depiction of change in the conditions of production of knowledge, however, if not inaccurate, is not a complete one either. Firstly, such a picture is valid almost exclusively for the departments that can be incorporated into markets, that is, ones that can possibly produce knowledge that would be of value for, and be compatible with, the demands of the market. Therefore, the above picture accounts mostly for the natural sciences and engineering departments. Social science departments, being more distant to the markets, with some exceptions such as economics, certainly occupy a different place in this debate of neoliberalism and knowledge production. Secondly, above picture dismisses the internal laws and logics of the science, without having regard to the relative autonomy of them. Or to put in a Bourdieusian fashion, since the presence of scientific fields – relatively autonomous space of positions characterized by unequal positioning and struggle over specific

species of capital valued in the space – is dismissed, the above picture falls short of explaining the relation between neoliberalism and knowledge production on another axis. Thirdly, the relationship between neoliberal policies and production of knowledge is understood only in terms of the proliferation of university-industry partnerships. Although the arguments have a great accuracy to it, the effects of neoliberalism on knowledge production are studied merely in this regard, without touching upon other ways in which neoliberalism bears on knowledge production. The relation between the new regime of work – precarious work – that the neoliberal policies brought about, from which academics have not been exempt, and knowledge production has not received much attention. Overlooked are the ways in which neoliberalism affects research strategies of academics.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the effects of precarious work conditions on the knowledge production in social sciences. To be more precise, I look at the ways in which precarity affects internal logics of the scientific field in the social sciences, in the context of Turkish academia. However, as in the scientific fields agents and institutions are endowed with unequal volumes of capital, and therefore occupy different positions, treating the field as if it is a homogenous and equal space would be problematique. For this reason, I conduct a comparative case on the two types of universities endowed with different amount of capitals, where the first type are the universities that are endowed with the highest volumes of scientific capital and the second type are the universities with the lowest volumes of scientific capital in Turkish academia. Universities endowed with high volumes of scientific capital are called ‘elite’ universities, while universities endowed with low volumes of scientific

capital are called ‘non-elite’ universities, as they are perceived as such in the scientific field.

First set of research question is “How precarious conditions are experienced in these two types of universities in Turkey? Does possessing lower and higher amount of capital bring about differences in how it is experienced? Or are there similarities?” Second set of questions is “How does precarity of academics in these two different universities shape research strategies of academics in social sciences? Do precarious conditions disrupt the internal laws and logics of the field – that is dispositions acquired in the scientific field – or do they reinforce them?”

1.2.Methodology and Limitations

I conducted this research by having in-depth interviews with 13 academics, 7 from 2 elite universities, and 6 from 2 non-elite universities. 8 were from Political Science Departments, 3 from History Departments, and 2 from Sociology Departments. The universities I chose were foundational (private) universities each located Istanbul. The reason for this was that state universities, on paper, offer a lot more secure employment to the academics, which is why taking them as precarious would be problematique. This is certainly not the case with foundational universities, where academics are signed to 3 year (elite universities) or 1 year (non-elite universities).

I interviewed them on their subjective experience of lived precarity and on their research strategies. 2 of the interviews were face-to-face interviews, while 11 of them were conducted over the internet. Interviews stretched from 35 minutes to 90 minutes, with an average of 50 minutes.

During the course of the research I ran into several hardships. First was on finding enough respondents. Spring of 2017 was not the best time to have this research. Because of the mass layoffs on academics by executive orders, academics were quite reluctant to be interviewed on their working conditions and employment security. Among the 63 professors I contacted only 16 responded me back. Further, this research was originally designed exclusively for academics in the departments of sociology. As I could not find enough respondents, I widened my sample to academics from political science and history as well. I believe it would be safe to speculate that this was both because some did not want to find the time on being interviewed, and because of their fears and concerns over their employments. The academics who talked to me did so only under the conditions that I will not reveal their nor their institutions' names. Therefore, I am obliged to leave the names of universities, as well as the respondents, anonymous in my findings.

Another problem was conducting the interviews over the Internet. Some of the academics who agreed on being interviewed decided not take part after being told that the medium of interview can only a telephone or a video call. This can be ascribed to the mistrust they might have had, as the situation required talking to a stranger about a topic that is a source of large concern and fear for them.

One important limitation was the access to statistical data. Because of the non-transparent policies of YÖK (Council of Higher Education) – the state body that oversees universities – and of each university I looked at, statistical data on employment practices of these universities were not available. If such was not the case, the data might have been used to extract indicators of precarious work in each university – such as turnover of faculty members, access to benefits, levels of income

– to give a more holistic picture of precarity. Not having access to such information, I focused on the subjective lived experience of precarity of academics, as it is mainly their subjective anxieties and fears, coupled with their dispositions generated by their habitus, that gives shape to their research strategies.

1.3.Outline

In the literature review and theoretical framework, I introduce the works and debates on neoliberalism's effects on universities and knowledge production, debates that mostly emphasize university-industry collaborations. Once I make my case against the shortcomings of the literature, I go onto introduce Bourdieu's sociology of science. After arguing that Bourdieu's understanding of scientific field and research strategies of academics should be investigated in relation to the precariousness academics go through, with a stress on the subjective lived experience of precarity, I move onto Beck's and Giddens' works on risk and uncertainty, to set the stage for analysis.

In the first part of the next chapter, I describe how regime of precarious work in the elite universities disrupts, to a considerable extent, the internal laws and structure of scientific field. I argue that academics in the social sciences in the elite universities, who possess large volumes of scientific capital, and hence occupies a dominant position in the field, employ strategies of hedging risks in their research to decrease a possible risk of future unemployment that might result from not satisfying the performance evaluations that are ambiguous in character. As the expectations of the administrations of the 'elite' universities from the faculty members of social sciences highly stress publishing in the top journals in relatively high quantities,

academics employ research strategies that are at odds with their positions in the field and dispositions, requiring a reconciliation of habitus and strategies of hedging future risk.

Moving onto the next part of the chapter, I describe how precarization in the non-elite universities, instead of disrupting the logics and structures of the field, goes onto ensure and intensify the dispositions and positions in academics in the social sciences departments have. Non-elite universities, rather than strategizing on increasing their capital in the scientific field institutionally, focus more on surplus extraction from the immaterial labor – teaching for long hours to masses of students – of the academics. However, as the expectations of the non-elite universities do not stress research and publication, these academics experience precarity, in terms of subjective experiences of fears and anxieties of losing employment, in a more moderate way. Since there is only little competition for employment in these universities, the academics in the social sciences are not under pressure to publish, making them more secure in terms of employment. I finally argue that institutional strategies of these universities reinforce and intensify research dispositions of the academics in the non-elite universities.

I conclude by arguing that it is highly possible that scientific fields in different contexts are affected by precarization in similar ways.

Chapter 2: Literature Review And Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I review the relevant literature and construct the theoretical framework. I first go over the literature on neoliberalism and institutional restructuring of universities. Then, I move onto the literature and concepts on the relationship between neoliberalism and production of knowledge. Here, I go over university-industry collaborations and the debates over them. After arguing as to why these theories come short of describing the relationship between neoliberalism and production of knowledge in social sciences, I move onto the theoretical framework. I first introduce Pierre Bourdieu's main concepts – social space, capital, habitus, and field – as a prologue to his sociology of science, based on the concepts of scientific field and scientific capital. Once I make my case as to why a field analysis is not sufficient to understand the research strategies of academics, I introduce the literature on precariousness. Lastly, I engage with the theories of Beck and Giddens on risk and uncertainty to prepare the grounds for how academics' strategies of risk meet strategies of research oriented towards accumulation of scientific capital.

2.1. Neoliberal Restructuring and Its Influences on University and Research

Large institutional changes that academia has gone through with the introduction of neoliberal policies since 1970s and 80s have been objects of analyses of research in quite a reflexive fashion. Concepts such as 'academic capitalism' (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004), 'entrepreneurial university' (Clark, 2001; Etzkowitz, 2004), 'corporatization of the university' (Steck, 2003), or 'marketization of the university' (Marginson, 1993), though slightly

differing in their explanations, have tried to explain the mutation of the institutional make-up of the universities, as well as how they have influenced production of knowledge.[1] In overall, these concepts have worked to situate university-industry relationship in the neoliberal era, with an emphasis on the transformation in research strategies of academics and institutions.

In explaining the changes in the universities, many took an approach that contextualized the universities within the neoliberal conjunction, an approach that foregrounded macro and top-down processes, to explain the drastic changes universities have been experiencing on a global scale. In accounting for this transformation, many pointed to the increased competition in the markets, and the cutbacks on public expenditure after the imposition of austerity measures on national and global scale, after early 1970s (Breneman, 1993; Buchbinder and Rajagapol, 1995; Fairweather, 1988; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004).[2] Slaughter and Leslie, for example, claim that private sector, in an environment that had gotten increasingly competitive due to the global opening up of markets after early 1970s, found resort in investing substantially more on technological innovations in order to stay competitive in world markets, a strategy which became established in the late 1970s (1997, p. 37-40). In turn, many corporations, from middle to large-

[1] It is important to point at the outset that most of the works documenting the changes in the universities, to my knowledge, have taken a methodological nationalist approach, having single or multiple countries as their object of analysis. Further, these studies have mostly focused on USA, Canada, UK, Australia, and Western Europe, neglecting universities in other countries.

[2] Although it is certain that each country has particularities to them, the institutions of higher education have gone through similar changes with identifiable similar patterns as a result of roughly same causal mechanisms, however asynchronous these changes might have been (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter and Rhodes, 2004).

sized, approached universities for research collaborations. Universities, affected by the cut-down on public money channeled starting from mid 1970s, tended to welcome these collaborations as well. As the public finance of universities saw a sharp decrease over these years, however, it was now universities that started to approach industry for collaborations, for maintaining, or expanding, their resources and research operations, as well as their prestige (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004, p. 16).

Engagement of university and corporations in research activities amounted, undoubtedly, to an involvement of universities in market activities (Leslie and Slaughter, 1997; Bousqet, 2008). This involvement brought about two crucial changes in research strategies and practices of academics and universities. The first concerns a steep rise in entrepreneurial activities of academics; with the advent of these changes it has become ordinary to observe academics get into competition with each other in order to attract outside resources from corporations, in the form of external grants, contracts, endowment funds, partnerships, and so on. It is, therefore, not just top-down forces that impose themselves on universities willy-nilly; academics actively take part in its making (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004, p. 48-50). The second is the outright profit making by research. Patenting of products, extraction of royalties, and faculty involvement with corporations' governing boards mean direct or indirect profit making by mobilizing resources, employees (or graduate students), and credentials of the university (Bousqet, 2008).

Quite prominently, the emergence of the intensified relationship between universities and corporations has fundamentally altered the research activities taking place in the universities. Firstly, with the emergence of this collaboration, research agendas in universities are largely driven, if not fully determined, in accordance with

corporate and market interests (Marginson and Considine, 2000; Slaughter and Leslie, 2001; Steck, 2003).[3] This is, to reiterate, nothing other than a result of corporations' direct investments to universities for their Research and Development (R&D) projects.[4]

In this regard, concepts such as the 'public good regime' – or 'knowledge production mode 1' – and 'academic capitalist regime' – or 'knowledge production mode 2' (1994; Kauppinen and Kaidesoja, 2013; Nowotny et al., 2001; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004), try to capture the differences well between the two distinct types of conditions of production of knowledge, documenting the processual change in these conditions. Public good regime, to begin with, designates a clear demarcation between what it calls "basic research" – conceptualized as 'Mertonian', disinterested scientific research – and "commercial research" – comprising mostly of applied research for product development (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004, p. 15). The boundary between these two lies in the fact that former is strictly a scientific enterprise and the latter is commercial. In the academic capitalist regime, on the other hand, commercial activities take over the basic research to a great extent, shattering the boundaries between basic and commercial research (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004,

[3] An epitome of this is the relation between Novartis and the Department of Plant and Microbial Biology Department in University of California, Berkeley. One of the biggest global pharmaceutical companies, Novartis was granted seats in the research committee of the department for funding it (Steck, 2003).

[4] It is necessary to note that some also argued that the university-industry relationships was present even before 1970s, well back to the beginning of 20th century, and this partnership is not particularly new, difference lies elsewhere (Barrow, 1990; Donoghue, 2008; Newfield, 2003; Watkins, 1992). Surely, it must be granted that it is important not to romanticize the distant past. Going onto argue for a stableness, however, comes at the great cost of downplaying the transformations in research.

p. 29).[5] Yet another change that academic capitalist regime brings about, in contrast to the public good regime, is that basic scientific research is not evaluated only by peer-review, but is judged by university's 'customers.' The scholars who distinguish between the two types of regimes also claim that there has been a move from the former regime to the latter (Gibbens et al., 1994; Nowotny et al. 2001).[6]

It is also crucial to note that the increase in the university-industry partnerships in research activities and knowledge production has had the ramification of favoring departments that are closer to the markets over the ones that are distant from the markets, which, perhaps, is one of the biggest reasons of the inequality of departments among universities. Targeted by the corporations for investment, engineering and natural sciences departments are the ones that absorb and benefit from the external funds the most, as these departments are the only ones that can produce technological innovations which then are potentially transformable to

[5] Academic capitalist regime, as a corollary, is effectively privatizing what used to be a public knowledge.

[6] Contesting historicizations of conditions of production of knowledge also require mention. Although above account is the mainstream understanding of how neoliberal policies have affected knowledge production, there are more nuanced, if not counter, narratives on knowledge production that tries to repudiate the former as too 'simplistic' a view. For instance, Albert and Mcguire, similar to Donoghue, argue that there has never been a clear-cut delineation between the public good regime and academic capitalist regime, or mode 1 and mode 2 (2014). In a similar vein, Mirowski and Sent diverge from the above mainstream narrative to set-up their own, wherein they emphasize both historical ruptures and continuities in the research relationship between corporations and universities; that is to say, they recognize corporations age-long engagement with universities, without romanticizing a disinterested notion of science, while they also see the *qualitative* character of the transformation in the conditions of production of knowledge that was caused, in their account, by globalization (2008). Instead of having a two way taxonomization, they partition conditions of production of knowledge historically into three categories – namely, period from 1890 to WWII, from WWII to 1980, and from 1980 onwards – where they give a detailed account of how the webs of relationships between universities, corporations, and states affect and translate into conditions of research (Mirowski and Sent, 2008).

commercial value (Leslie and Slaughter, 1997). On the other hand, with the exception of economics, social sciences departments– such as sociology, history, political science, and etc. – do not promise nearly as much commercial value as the former. Greater flow of resources to the departments of engineering and natural sciences has led to the enlargement of these departments in terms of resources enjoyed, and number of academics in the departments (professors, doctoral students, staff), whereas many social sciences departments have been shrinking – or they even are even in jeopardy of getting closed down in many smaller universities[7] – as they have little or no potential research activities that can be translated into commercial value.

However accurate they might be in documenting the effects of neoliberalism on research strategies of institutions and academics, the concepts such as 'public good regime'/'academic capitalist regime', 'knowledge production mode 1/mode 2' constitute rather an externalist view to conditions of production of knowledge, that excessively focuses on macro neoliberal processes and policies, without showing much regard to the immanent logics of the production of knowledge. Furthermore, they focus more on how the tides of neoliberalism has affected the production of knowledge in the branches of sciences that can be incorporated to the markets needs and demands – that is to say, natural sciences and engineering departments – than how it has affected knowledge production in social sciences – fields that are largely

[7] An important instantiation is the recent developments in Japan, where 26 universities, at the behest of the government of Japan, announced they would either scale down or altogether dispose of departments of social sciences, under the justification that channeling funds to departments that "serve areas that better meet society's needs" is more desirable.

distant from the market. They, at best, mention in passing how departments of social sciences are getting smaller.

In dealing with these shortcomings, I will start with inserting Bourdieu's sociology of science into the analysis in order to have an understanding of how internal logics of the scientific field affect research strategies.

2.2.Scientific Field

2.2.1. Capital, Social Space, Habitus, Field

It is necessary to go over Bourdieu's wider framework before moving onto his sociology of science. To begin with, Bourdieu's analysis starts from situating different *forms of capital* in what he calls *social space*, the macrocosm in which agents or groups are positioned according to their possession of different volumes of capital – accumulated reified or living labor (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241) –, that is, economic capital and cultural capital (1998, p. 4-6).[8] Positions do not come in absolutes. On the contrary, they are relative and relational – that is, they are defined in relation to each other "through their mutual exteriority and their relations of

[8] In Bourdieu's lexicon, economic capital refer possession of means of production, monetary, financial and other sort of assets (i.e. land), whereas cultural capital refers, roughly speaking, to qualities such as titles, diplomas (institutionalized cultural capital), having possession of scarce cultural goods (objectified cultural capital), and symbolic appropriation of these goods (embodied cultural capital). For a more detailed exposition of forms of capital, see Bourdieu (1986).

proximity, vicinity, or distance…" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 6). In more concrete terms, relationality designates a sense of *distinction*.[9]

For Bourdieu, the positions that agents or groups hold in the social space structure dispositions and principles of vision and division, or what he calls the *habitus*. To elaborate on this, he understands habitus to be the "schemes of production of practices" – that is, dispositions – and "systems of perception and appreciation of practices" – that is, principles of classifications and division according to which agents classify themselves and others in the social space (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 19) – inscribed on the body as incorporations of objective structures (2000, p. 173). The closer the groups are in the social space, the more similar they will be in terms of their habitus; and the more distant they are, the more different their habitus will be.

In this regard, habitus is a structured structure: generative of distinctive dispositions according to the position in the social space (what and how one eats, what genre of music one listen to, and etc.). It is, however, also a structuring structure: it involves principles of classification (classifying and making judgments on what is good or bad, what is intellectual or not, and etc.) that plays active role in upholding (structuring) the social structure, meaning, the social space and unequal distribution of forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 8).[10] To repeat, these principles of

[9] Therefore, if we are talking about, say, class, relationality in the social space comes to mean that bourgeoisie taste is not defined with an absolute indifference and isolation, but defined in opposition to the working class taste, in an act of being *different* and *distinct* (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 2-7).

[10] The difference between structured structures and structuring structure is important to note, since one of Bourdieu's aims is to break with pure structuralism that does not take mental structures into consideration, ignoring the ways in which agents, through their classificatory acts, (re)produce the relationships of domination.

classifications are determined by the position occupied in the social space. As Bourdieu puts it, "we are classified by our classifications" (Bourdieu, 2013, p. 296).[11]

According to Bourdieu, the different principles of vision and division that agents or groups have in line with their positions in social space is situated in the common schemes of classification. In other words, agents' and groups' classificatory acts take place in a shared schemata of classification that enables them to make classifications, albeit differently, in relation to each other.[12] The capacity to establish shared schemes of classification, however, is not equally available to every agent or group in the social space (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 21).[13] Well-endowed with economic, cultural, and more importantly, *symbolic capital* – a recognition of types of capitals, or more precisely, any form of capital that, when perceived by the agents who have necessary cognitive classificatory systems (that are inscriptions of the habitus), is (mis)recognized by these very agents as authority, prestige, reputation[14] – dominant groups, unbeknownst to them, are more capable of imposing systems of classifications.

Moving from the macrocosm of the social space to the microcosms – be it space of arts, religion, law, bureaucracy, journalism, and so on – Bourdieu introduces

[11] This can involve, if we are to give yet another example of class, engaging with *distinctive* consumption practices (choices of cloths, drinks, sports, and etc.) in conformity with taste that corresponds to the position in social space, and, hence, agents' own classification of themselves and others in the social space (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 9).

[12] For example, judging an object as "too intellectual" or "too vulgar" are different judgments that correspond to different position in the social space, and hence different habitus. Nevertheless, these judgments are made in the same, shared classificatory schema.

[13] It is important to note the struggles between the fractions of the dominant groups to impose mental schemata in a given social space (or field) (Bourdieu, 2000, 185-6).

[14] For a more detailed treatment of the concept of symbolic capital, see Bourdieu (2000, p. 240-5).

the concept of *field*. A field is a relatively autonomous, structured space of positions that has its own set of internal laws and specific logics that are imposed on the agents or institutions occupying it (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). Like in the larger social space, occupants within this space are relationally positioned by their volume and composition of the specific species of capital at stake in this space. Any given field is a battleground, a space of clash where occupants struggle over the possession and accumulation of the species of capital at stake, and therefore over the perpetuation or elevation of objective position (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97-8). Occupants, in other words, are in a constant struggle to maintain or elevate their position in the field, which is why they constantly attempt to accumulate and maximize species of capital particular to the field.

For Bourdieu, just as the position in the social space structures habitus, the relative positions hold in relation to the other occupants shapes habitus in the field as well, and thus the dispositions[15] and possible strategies the occupant is predisposed to adopt in maximizing the species of capital – the type of capital most valued in a particular field. In other words, the objective position in the field equips the occupant with a corresponding disposition – that is, 'a feel for the game' in line with one's position – giving the occupant a 'reasonable', as opposed to 'rational', sense of what

[15] It is important to have a few words on the word 'disposition' and the way Bourdieu uses it. It does not mean that position in the field directly leads one to act in a certain definite way in the most mechanistic and deterministic sense of the word. Rather, the words 'dispose' and 'disposition' connote that habitus prepares the grounds for the generation of certain practices, making an agent quite likely to engage with the actual practice, not directly leading him/her (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 57-8). This comes to mean that agents can, by a small chance, statistically speaking, also employ practices that do not correspond to their position in the field.

strategies to employ in the struggle against the species capital of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 120-2).[16] Therefore, the occupants who are endowed with high volumes of species of capital – the dominants of the field – will adopt different strategies of accumulating capital to maintain or further their position in the field than the ones who are endowed with lesser volumes.

2.2.2. Scientific Field, Scientific Capital, and Research Strategies[17]

Scientific field, just as any other field, is a relatively autonomous space of positions with its own set of internal laws and logics, laden with unequal struggle over its species of capital, namely the scientific capital. Scientific capital, for Bourdieu, works virtually as symbolic capital; since the 'value' of the product of an agent can be recognized almost exclusively by other agents in the field who are equipped with necessary schemas of perception and appreciation imposed by the internal logics of the field, scientific capital is based on peer-recognition – or a recognition of authority by the competitor-peers in the field (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 55). Seen thus, symbolic weight of any given agent in the scientific field virtually depends on how distinctive

[16] As implied in the previous footnote, the manner Bourdieu uses the words 'strategy' and 'reasonable' does not come close to an 'economist' conceptualization of these words where individuals are engaging in rational calculation in the way, for example, rational choice theory would have it. Rejecting the notion of a 'consciously' aiming and calculating agent as rational action theory has it, his theory of practice conceives of strategies, aims, and calculations to be the product of "practical sense as the feel for the game", generated by the agent's habitus and position (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 61-2).

[17] Bourdieu's sociology of science is, to a some degree, developed against, firstly, Merton's sociology of science, which was more or less functionalist, and secondly, Actor-Network Theory – whose forerunners are Latour, Callon, Law, and so on – that situates the production of knowledge in the micro-space of laboratory, neglecting the wider structures and webs of relationships that scientists are plunged in.

and original his/her contributions are. Similarly, any sort of feature that endows the occupant with 'prestige' and 'recognition' – such as the universities one has graduated from, associations with the 'known' scientists, kind of journals one has published in, impact of research, access to prestigious grants and so on – performs as scientific capital. Overall, being perceived as *distinctive* and *distinguished*, or *ordinary* and *undistinguished*, by the peers endows an agent or an institution with corresponding scientific capital, determining the occupant's position in the scientific field (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 26).

The constant struggle over scientific capital, Bourdieu argues, means that every scientific 'choice' – choice of area of research, of methods, of place of publication, of rapid or slow publication – is an investment strategy oriented towards maximizing scientific profit, that is, recognition by competitor-peers – and therefore the position in the field (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 27). The strategies and choices are not adopted in a vacuum, however; as in every field, they are structured and shaped by the position occupied in the scientific field. Objective position occupied in the field shapes the possible strategies that agents are authorized and, as a result of their incorporation of the logics of the field in their habitus –or their 'feel for the game' – disposed to adopt, in pursuit of yielding the maximum possible rate of scientific profit (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 8; 2004, p. 41). To illustrate, the agents occupying dominant positions in the field, on the one hand, are authorized and disposed to make "hazardous investments to extensive research", which either may not lead to anywhere or can be very fruitful (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 28); researches that are ambitious, eccentric and risky; or that are "theoretically and empirically wide-ranging and novel" that can even impact other scientific fields (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 59). On the

other hand, the dominated in the scientific field are allowed and disposed to pursue research strategies of "risk-free investments of intensive, specialized research" (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 59), "normal and reproductive", "less ambitious and smaller" projects, or projects that "keep to the "beaten and old tracks of a tried and tested research direction" (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 28). Therefore, on the one hand, the agents who possess high volumes of scientific capital carry a sense of *distinction* to themselves by virtue of having the dispositions and the resources that will enable them to conduct researches perceived to be 'brilliant' and 'high-flying'. On the other, agents with low possession of scientific capital are the ones in contradistinction with whom the former carries their distinction; they are part of the bigger 'mass' of 'undifferentiated', and 'low-flying' academics (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 26).[18]

In light of Bourdieu's sociology of science, I believe that if one is to investigate neoliberalism's effects on knowledge production one has to start from the scientific field, instead of taking a purely macro approach that foregrounds mechanisms of top-down impositions. This is why I use the toolbox of Bourdieu to scrutinize production of knowledge in social sciences in Turkish academia.

Using this toolbox, one must be cautious, however. While Bourdieu's translation of field analysis into science carries a great explanatory power in

[18] As I emphasize in the 16th footnote, when I talk about habitus disposing academics to take on different research strategies by their position in the field, I mean that their position in the field and habitus makes them quite likely to employ such strategies, as opposed to absolutely determining their research strategies. Meaning, depending on the trajectory in the field, there is also a chance, albeit slight, that academics in the scientific field can also adopt different research strategies than their position in the field might suggest. However, I, following Bourdieu, focus more on the clusters and patterns.

describing the 'structured-ness' of what are otherwise thought to be merely scientist's individual research 'strategies', there is a need to take into account the new regime of precarious work that eroded employment security profoundly, which is largely absent in Bourdieu's work as well. In this regard, it is highly crucial to point out that one of the mainstays upon which Bourdieu's analysis lies is the assumption that academics are guaranteed a career and a regular income (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 36). Granted, this might clearly have been the case for French scientific field of 1960s that. Yet, secure conditions of employment of that era do not apply anymore to quite many contexts.[19]

Therefore, I believe that research strategies of academics have to be understood in a more layered analysis. This is precisely why we cannot depart from neoliberalism in investigating research strategies of academics in social sciences. But instead of approaching the issue from integration of academy with the market, one needs to look into another side-affect of neoliberalism: precarious work and risk.

As I shall discuss below, in the universities where employment securities of academics hinge greatly upon the research output, neglecting (in)secure employment as a factor in favor of a mere analysis of scientific field comes at the cost of overlooking how employment insecurity is at play in molding the research strategies – be it topic, scale, theoretical reach, and many others. For this reason, I believe research strategies an occupant is disposed to take in the scientific field cannot be

[19] It is important to note that Bourdieu does focus on neoliberalism publicly towards the end of his life. For example, his book *Acts of* Resistance (1998a) include many writings, public talks, and interviews on neoliberalism and flexibilization. However, he hardly included neoliberalism into his sociological body of work, let alone an analysis of neoliberalism itself.

thought apart from the research strategies taken for hedging the risks of precarious working conditions.

2.2.3. Precariousness and Risk

2.2.3.1. Precarious Work

The neoliberal transformation that global capitalist economy went through has been accompanied by, without any doubt, a transformation in the regime of work. The regime of work, as a direct result of neoliberal policies, has undergone a massive transformation in which work is highly characterized by conditions of what Standing called 'precariousness' (Standing, 2011, p. 6-10). In stark contrast to the welfare period that provided long term, stable and fixed-income jobs, flexibilization of work[20] has significantly undermined employment security. Resulting from the increased competition between governments in attracting foreign capital into their soils starting with 1980s, waves of deregulation[21] of labor markets across the globe made it possible for the capital to be more flexible in its practices of employment. Deregulation of labor markets, in other words, has granted capital a leveraged position in that the firms started to have a higher capacity to adapt themselves seamlessly to the changes in the demand side by hiring or laying off workers with

[20] By flexibilization, I refer to the firms' increased ability of making maneuvers in its employment practices: employing workers for a much shorter span of time, being able to lay off their employees more easily.

[21] It is important to note, however, that Standing emphasizes it was not deregulation, as many argued, but *re-regulation* of labor markets and law. It is his conviction that last decades have not seen the introduction of more regulations than any other before; it is the nature of the regulations making precarization possible that one must consider (Standing, 2008, p. 19; 2011, p. 26).

greater ease, helping them to reduce costs and be much more profitable (Standing, 2011, p. 16). Indeed, the de-regulation of labor markets and labor law that gradually stripped populations off of their employment securities, rights, and benefits was a direct move of governments to ensure flexibility – one defining feature of neoliberalism.

With the weakened welfare regime, duration of employment contracts has indeed been on a steep decline, ranging from yearly-basis contracts to monthly, weekly, daily, or even hourly. This amounts, as a corollary, to both casualization – shift from permanent work to shorter-term work (Vosko et al, 2003) – and contractualization – individualization of contracts as opposed to collectively bargained contracts between the tripartite of state-capital-labor (Standing, 2008), and increase in the sub-contractualization (Crang, 2007). Casualization and contractualization, almost necessarily, are coupled with what Standing calls the transfer of risk from companies to the workers, since income in the form of wages have become the primary and dominant means of subsistence, with enterprise and state benefits – such as pensions, social security, and so on – having taken a nosedive with the erosion of welfare regime (2011, p. 42).[22]

[22] Without any doubt, the concept of precarization in the literature involves other elements as well. Standing, for instance, identifies labor market security, employment security, job security, work security, skill reproduction, income security, and representation security as the elements that what he calls 'the precariat' has been stripped off of (Standing, 2011). For the purposes of this study, however, I limit myself to employment security and uncertainty of future in investigating precarity (Bourdieu, 1998a).

2.2.3.2.Precarity and Precarization

Precarious work, I believe, is not exclusive to a single class of what Standing calls the precariat, but rather is experienced *across* classes. There is a debate in the literature about whether if flexibilization, insecure employment, and casualization are clustered to make a distinct class identity – namely, what Standing calls 'the precariat' – or if different classes are experiencing the *process* of precarization. Standing, who was first to popularize the concept, is adamant that the above features do make up a palpable class that is precariat, distinct from working class and the other classes in his 7-fold class taxonomy.

Some have contested this claim, on two bases: the coincidence of material interests of classes and in Global South. Wright, foregrounding material interests of classes in his class analysis, argues that working class and what Standing defines as the precariat does not have any different material interest to justify conceptualizing precariat as a distinct class entity, and that precariousness of work is not exclusive to a single class (2016, p. 127-135). Taken apart from the 'working class', the so-called precariat, Wright argues, still has the same material class interests as the working class, which disposes with the 'precariat' as a separate class category.

Others have pointed out how Standing grounds his distinction between working class and precariat as different classes based on the historically and the spatially limited Fordist era working class of Global North, enabling him to argue for a purported ideal type of working class that supposedly have been far from being precarious. Though acknowledging a sweeping trend of precarization, especially in countries that were shielded from it before, they claim that flexible work and insecurity has always been the regime of work in the Global South experienced

similarly across the classes, even before the introduction of neoliberalism. They believe, instead, precarious work conditions made a leap from Global South to Global North, making it a process – precarization – rather than a class – the precariat. As a corollary, the conceptualization of precariat as a separate class vanishes away for these scholars (Breman, 2013, p. 48; Munck, 2013, p. 749-53; Frase, 2013, p. 12)

Being in agreement with the second camp, I will treat flexibilization, casualization, insecure employment and contractualization not as the features of a single class that is precariat, but as precariousness that is felt across different class positions. As a corollary, employment insecurity and casualization of work are experienced in, though in differing degrees, private and public sector, and in both the material and immaterial work (Gill and Pratt, 2008) (Bourdieu, 1998a, p. 85).

2.2.4. Risk and Uncertainty

The objective indicators of precariousness – casualization, flexibilization, loss of benefits, having instable income and many others – are accompanied by the subjective indicators of precariousness – that is, constant state of anxiety and fear over losing one's employment (Beck, 2000, p. 48; Sennett, 1998, p. 58). As Standing argues, precarious work inherently leads to a "precariatized mind" – a chronic anxiety and fear over employment insecurity, both for the present and the future. Precarious work, he says, includes constant fear of losing what one possesses in the future (Standing, 2011, p. 18-20). Subjective lived experience of precarious work, therefore, is as much important as objective indicators in the attempts to shed light on the regime of precarious work. Further, this subjective experience of precarity, as

implied, is not only oriented to the present. On the contrary, the constant fears and anxieties over employment insecurity, over losing what you have, concerns future as much as it concerns the present. Regime of precarious work puts one in a condition where one has to constantly worry about what future might bring, or take away for that matter.

The lived experience of precarity, laden with anxieties and fear of future, is in direct relation to the notions of 'risk' and 'risk regime'; as Beck argues, "it is a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety) which generates the notion of risk (Giddens, 1998, p. 207). Indeed, the emergence of precarious work, by decreasing the foreseeability of the future, also made the calculation of risk regarding future quite incalculable. Unlike the welfare state era where the future risk was rendered calculable and 'tamable' through state protection schemes, which shielded the populations from the hazards of unemployment (Giddens, 1998, p. 27-8), in present era of reflexive modernity, "risk regime"[23] – that is, "the political economy of insecurity, uncertainty and loss of boundaries" – makes the calculation and 'control' of future risks is greatly precluded. Speaking specifically of the future risk of unemployment, introduction of flexible work has replaced the relative certainty and calculability of future and risk with the highly incalculable and ambivalent future risk and uncertainty, which agents are increasingly preoccupied with (Beck, 2000, p. 37, 145).

[23] Concepts of 'risk regime', 'risk society', or 'culture of risk' that are used by Beck and Giddens are quite similar to each other. The specific reason I appropriated 'risk regime' is that it puts employment security a tad more focus than the other concepts that has an even wider understanding of risk, including phenomena such as global warming, nuclear catastrophes and so on.

This contemporary experience of fear and anxiety over future employment, for Giddens, almost force the agents to be wary and vigilant about the future and the risks it carries, in contrast to the welfare state era where protection programs were rendering risk 'tamed', leading agents to depend on these programs without future worries or preoccupations. To put it in his words, "living in a "risk society" means living with a calculative attitude to the open possibilities of action, positive and negative, with which, as individuals and globally, we are confronted in a continuous way in our contemporary social existence" (Giddens, 1991, p. 28). Put differently, he argues that agents, thrown into the risk regime, constantly engages in risk assessments and calculating possible routes of action in order to 'hedge' the risks, because of the lack of the old security net of the welfare state. Precariousness, laden with risks and uncertainties concerning future, then, leads agents to employ strategies of hedging risks.

In this regard, academics, like other manifold lines of professions, have not been exempt from precarization and the uncertainty and fears it brought about. As Gill argues, casualization, contractualization, and flexibilization of work are not an exception, but a rule in the contemporary regimes of work in the university (2010, 2013).[24] Living on short-term contracts, academics under casual working conditions are also experiencing a great degree of anxiety over their uncertain futures (Gill,

[24] Figures suggest, indeed, that numerous academics work in casual conditions. In UK, casualization in academia has been on the rise since the early 1980s, culminated in more than one third of the academics working on temporary short-term contracts by the year of 2012 (Gill, 2014). As for USA, figures of 2001 indicate that 45 % of academic staff work on similar short-term contracts (Giroux, 2001). In Australian academy, estimates are that approximately 40 % of the academics are on casual workers in 2007 (Brown, Goodman, and Yasukawa, 2007).

2010, p. 20), a case that goes for Turkish academia as well (Vatansever and Yalçın, 2015, p. 115-7). As the regime of precarious work is felt in Turkish academia, I believe that it is of utmost significance to factor in the subjective lived experience of precarious work and the strategies of hedging future risks in order to understand research strategies of academics. For this reason, I modify Bourdieu's concepts with that of strategies of hedging risks in investigating research strategies of academics in the two types of universities.

Chapter 3: A Tale of Two Positions in the Scientific Field

3.1. The Elite Universities

In this first part of the chapter, I investigate two elite universities and the academics in the social science departments in Istanbul. After I introduce the general characteristics of these two universities, I move onto the institutional strategies and aims of the university administrations, which focus mainly on the accumulation of institutional scientific capital by pressuring academics into publishing through subjecting them to performance evaluations. I, then, switch to academics' subjective experience of precariousness, where I discuss how the academics in the elite universities are experiencing high pressure to secure their future employment, a pressure accompanied with the anxieties and fears of losing employment. Finally, I go onto argue that the research strategies of the academics in the elite universities, who are authorized and disposed to undertake – thanks to their position in the field and habitus structured by their position, respectively – are reconciled with strategies of hedging risks, that is, mitigating the risks of losing employment in future.

3.1.1. Endowment with Scientific Capital

If one has to take an ideal-typical approach, no other words would illustrate the *distinction* the first set of foundational universities possesses better than 'academic credentials', 'renown', or to put it more concisely, their 'prestige'. Founded in the mid-90s and early 2000s by two of the largest conglomerates in Turkey, these two American universities have managed to establish themselves in the both national and international space of academia at an outstanding pace, thanks mostly to the grand economic resources at their disposal.

As a result of their growing status, they have come to be perceived as 'centers of excellence' in the academic sphere (Readings, 1996). Both universities have magnetized, at increasing rates, the most successful students in Turkey, with the promises of placing their graduates into the 'top-notch' corporations with which they are highly connected. Not only do these two universities attract the "crème de la crème" student body in Turkey, but they have also been centers of attraction both to those who have newly received their doctoral degrees from other prestigious institutions across the globe and who already 'made themselves a name'; indeed, one only needs to pay a brief visit to the websites of the universities to observe that each of their faculty members have obtained their doctoral degrees from either the well-known North American, including 'Ivy League', or European universities. This also explains the fact that these two universities are situated in transnational networks of elite institutions, which is evident in the profiles of collaborations, partnerships in large researches, conferences, memberships in internationally well-known scientific associations and what have you. This transnational reach expends further beyond the academic institutions to the regional or international state bodies. Both were able to mobilize highly competitive grants from institutions like the European Union or the United Nations.

To put all of these in a Bourdieusian fashion, these two institutions are endowed with immense volumes of species of capital peculiar to scientific field, namely, scientific capital – to recapitulate, a specific kind symbolic capital (Bourdieu,

1975, p. 23; Bourdieu, 2004, p. 55) that has currency primarily in the scientific field[25], based on the recognition of other agents in the field that are equipped with the categories of perception necessary to know and recognize it, and make pertinent *distinctions* (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 34, 55-6), both agent and institutional-wise (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 27; Katchanov et al., 2016). These two universities' apparent 'successes' in attracting the 'most distinguished' professors, and 'highly prestigious' research grants indeed lies in Bourdieu's premise that "symbolic capital flows to symbolic capital" (2004, p. 56); Academics who possess relatively more scientific capital, and hence are the dominants of the scientific field, tend to find themselves in these institutions that possess high volumes of scientific capital (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 25).[26] Likewise, the competitive research grants tend to land into the hands of the academics in these institutions – the professors who are recognized by their position and authority in the scientific field, who are perceived to be 'distinct' from the others in academia – than to the hands of the academics who are endowed with lesser volumes of scientific capital.

3.1.2. Institutional Aims and Strategies

Scientific capital, however, does not reproduce itself automatically. Just as any given field, scientific field, too, is characterized by competitive struggle where there

[25] Not exclusively, however. Due to the heteronomous – lower relative autonomy – character of the scientific field, scientific capital is affected by, and hence affects, the outer fields that it is interdependent to (Bourdieu, 2005, 42-4).

[26] Indeed, when asked why they preferred to apply to these universities to others, all of my respondents, without exception, alluded to the "prestige" of their universities.

is always one particular form of capital that is at stake the most, and where agents and institutions constantly seek to perpetuate or elevate their positions in the field. Capital being accumulated reified or living labor (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241), one definite condition of reproduction of position in the field is putting in constant labor, so that the perceived recognition of authority can be maintained. Given that the volumes and compositions of scientific capital, hence the positions occupied in the field, are constituted only *in relation to* each other, the capital accumulated up to a certain point will not be, in and of itself, sufficient for maintaining the dominant position, let alone furthering it, unless the occupant puts in labor to revalorize already accumulated capital and reproduce it. In other words, to maintain or elevate the position in the field occupant has to accumulate scientific capital constantly. This is all the more important as what is at constant jeopardy for an agent or an institution is to be dispossessed of the scientific capital that had been accumulated over a time span, or to put more crudely, getting stripped off of 'scientific credentials' and 'recognition' (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 192).

Not exempt from this said threat, the elite universities, in their struggle in the scientific field, employ managerial/administrative strategies to maintain and, if possible, further their positions in the scientific field. Next to the rather Mertonian strategies, that is, incentive and support based strategies (1957, p. 642)[27], the principal

[27] Notwithstanding their disagreements with administrations on many regards, my respondents informed me that each university is highly supportive of research in manifold ways. Assignment of graduate students for research, issue of small grants for research, coverage of travel and conference expenses, assistance in organizing conferences, as well as financial rewards to those who publish (depending on the 'prestige' of the journal), coverage of expenses of graduate students on state scholarship at the times when relevant ministry fails to deposit the stipends on time, presence of bureaucratic departments that focuses exclusively

strategies to perpetuate their positions in the field involve, so to speak, having the 'sword of Damocles' hanging over the head's of faculty members, leaving them at constant pressure and anxiety over their employment securities, that is to say, in a precarious condition (Standing, 2011). In both institutions academics are signed to a maximum of 3-year contracts, which is the contract given to academics on the renewals in most of the cases. Depending on how academics perform, a faculty might or might not have his/her contract extended for another 3 year. Administrations of these elite universities, according to their faculty handbooks, also resort to 1 or 2 year extensions as a tacit ultimatum to the faculty whose performances were judged to be 'below expectations' or 'unsatisfactory', but whom they found it worth to grant another chance to 'get back on the track' by 'straightening up' the research output.

Annually held performance evaluations in these universities play the most fundamental role in the renewal of contracts. Although performance on teaching – evaluated by student feedbacks – and services – from administrative tasks to representation of university in various mediums – do have a weight in the performance evaluations, they, as both openly pointed out by my respondents and also implied by each university's faculty handbook, are of only little importance. Respondent 3 (39, Political Science), for instance, said that he "[does] not think teaching is valued much in this university", adding that "as long as you are not quite bad at it, then it is fine."

on research related activities and problems; all of these comprise the first set of techniques and strategies. Also, in terms of teaching load, academics in social sciences have to offer 2 courses a semester, amounting to 5 hours of teaching, which is significantly less than teaching load in many other foundational universities in Turkey.

What weighs by far the most in performance evaluations is the research activities and outputs of faculty for the elite universities– an inherently governmental technique in widespread use (Burrows, 2012, p. 357) that relies on calculations and metrics through which administration seeks "to shape and instrumentalize the conduct, thought, and decisions" (Miller and Rose, 1990, p. 8) of the academics, in realizing the continuation of accumulation of scientific capital in institutional level. Number of journal articles, books, book chapters published, external research grants received conferences attended, prizes received on research related activities and many others are taken into consideration. Every type of research output is evaluated under different grades. In this regard, for example, journal publications made in peer-reviewed International Scientific Indexing (ISI) or Social Sciences Citation Index carry greater value than publications made in not peer-reviewed journals. In a similar vein, publications in journals that are highly competitive and more 'prestigious' and 'renown' or publications in university press books have a larger importance than publications in journals that are less competitive and 'prestigious' and 'renown' or in books published from non-university press academic publishers (such as Routledge or Polity), respectively. Overall, the more 'impactful' and prestigious' the journals are, the more valorized the research output, and therefore, the better the performance is.

3.1.3. Precarity in Elite Universities

The strategies employed by university administrations give rise to a substantial subjective insecurity over employment statuses (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 83;

Kalleberg, 2009, p. 2) in these elite universities.[28] Though to different extents, academics in these universities feel the constant threat of losing their employments. My respondents unequivocally informed me that although the first renewal after the very first three years is virtually a routine, the upcoming renewals are not under any sort of guarantee by any means. Respondent 2 (35, Political Science) expressed a more or less common feeling of uncertainty:

> "I'm confident that I will complete my first three years and probably get a second one. But after that…you never know. Academia is getting more and more competitive and you never know who's going to be around when the time of the next renewal comes."

Reflecting upon the conditions of employment security in his university, Respondent 4 (39, History) goes onto articulate similar concerns:

> "I believe a great majority over here feels unsafe, including myself. This is especially the case for the people who will renew their contracts, who feel very stressful. My time to renew is coming in 1.5 years, but even I have started to feel the heat lately."

Sense of insecurity, fear, and anxiety over employment status appears to be quite common among my respondents, due largely to their belief that university administrations of the elite universities have high expectations, which means that subjective lived experience of precariousness academics in social sciences in the elite universities are considerably high.

[28] It is useful to reiterate that precarity is investigated on the basis of the subjective lived experience of precariousness agents of their own sense of employment (in)security, not only because objective indicators (wage, benefits, etc.), other than length of contracts, are not available as data, but for also subjective sense of employment insecurity prove to be a great factor in giving shape to research practices of the faculty, as I will go onto describe later.

The high expectations notwithstanding, performance criteria are heavily characterized by ambiguity over and opaqueness on what the exact criteria are. This, in turn, adds to employment insecurity and related feelings of anxiety and fear. Indeed, even though faculty handbooks and regulations in these universities explicate on what types of publications fall into what category of general importance, they do not detail any kind of procedure of evaluation from thereon. For this reason, many respondents find the criteria to be ambiguous, which is another element that gives flexibility to the university administration in their employment policies, at the expense of curtailing academics' sense of employment securities. Respondent 3, for example, asks out loud on this matter: "Would one high-impact publication preserve our employment security? Or two? I do not really have any idea about it." Pondering on how it affects his employment security, he further adds "I think it is important that this institution values merit. But then again, this issue of non-transparency issue leaves you at doubt, because you have no way of knowing if you have actually met the criteria" (Respondent 3). Opaqueness and ambiguity surrounding the performance evaluations in the elite universities are nothing but an instance of incalculability and uncertainty of the future created by precarious working conditions.

Yet another element that boosts the sense of employment insecurity, and anxieties around it, in these institutions is the fear of losing position in the scientific field after a possible non-renewal case, that is to say, a halt in the accumulation of scientific capital, or even a decline. Several of the respondents indicated that losing employment in these institutions would greatly decrease their chances to find employment in the institutions of similar 'prestige'. As Respondent 8 (42, Political Science) put it:

> "In the case that my contract is not renewed, I think it would be harder to find a position more or less the same as the one I have over here now. In terms of prestige, I mean. If I resign that is different, but when you are not renewed, which simply means that you are laid off, then the word gets out quickly, and similar schools, …, probably would not hire you. That's why I try to stick here."

What this reveals is the jeopardy of losing the accumulated scientific capital, and therefore the location in the scientific field (Bourdieu, 193, p. 2014). The possibility of losing employment in these universities represents, as it were, a 'fall from grace' for these academics; hence double the fear, double the anxiety over employment in these institutions. This doubled up fear and anxieties, indeed, work to disrupt with their scientific dispositions generated by their habitus.

Indeed, the non-transparent nature of the performance evaluations in the elite universities is nothing but an instantiation of precarious work and the uncertainty and incalculability of future that the former brings about. Exposing the academics to an opaque and ambiguous evaluation of performance, university administrations in these universities are favoring flexible employment policies that benefit the universities over the academics. University administrations of elite universities, then, have the ability and justification to not to renew contracts; as the performance evaluations are ambiguous, there is no way of objecting to a possible unsatisfactory performance or a non-renewal.

This uncertainty of evaluations directly translates to uncertainties regarding future employment. Future is highly incalculable for the academics, as they are not guaranteed to have their contracts renewed in any case. It is very significant to emphasize that this is not because university administrations are laying academics off at will. However, it is the palpable but tacit *threat* of losing employment that renders

future as incalculable as it is. For this reason, academics in social sciences in these universities employ strategies of coping with risks to mitigate the future possibility of unemployment. This, as I will discuss, directly bears to their research strategies. In the following section, these strategies are accounted for in detail.

3.1.4. Research Strategies of Academics in Elite Universities

To reiterate, Bourdieu argues that an agent's research choices – to involve him/herself with a specific area of research, of methods, of place of publications, of how 'ambitious' and 'large' research should be, or how 'theoretically novel', as well as the choice to publish rapidly but sloppily or slowly but scrupulously – is one that tends to depend on the position in the scientific field and the habitus– embodied dispositions (generative schemes of production of practices) and systems of perception and appreciation (principles of classifications and divisions) – that is determined by the position in the scientific field (1975, p. 22-3). These choices, generated by one's habitus, are investment strategies that arise from one's "practical sense" towards maximizing scientific capital. According to Bourdieu, the past, present, and possible future positions in the scientific field – strictly speaking, the trajectories taken in the field – molds research choices and strategies (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 27-8).

Although the application of field analysis into the scientific field does have immense explanatory power, relying on such an analysis certainly overlooks how precarious working conditions affect the research strategies and choices. This is especially so for the universities where employment security depends on the research

output. To be more precise, because of the performance evaluations and the aforementioned precarious employment conditions they create for academics, one needs to take a more holistic approach to academics' research strategies than one that merely focuses on their position in the scientific field and their habitus. Without fully abandoning the scientific field, academics must be situated in what Beck called "risk regime" (Beck, 2000, p. 145).

As I discuss in the following parts, it is not only academics' position in the field and habitus that largely shapes their research strategies. Their assessment and handling of risks (Giddens, 1991, p. 28) as coping strategies with precariousness also affect their research strategies. Research strategies of academics in these elite universities, then, are the negotiations between what their position in the field predisposes them to undertake, and mitigation of risks related to the performance evaluations and the insecure employment conditions they engender. In other words, they are reconciliations of the strategies generated by their habitus in an attempt to maximize returns of scientific capital, so as to maintain or elevate one's position, and of the strategies that will minimize the risk of unemployment.

These reconciliatory strategies that meet maximization of scientific capital and mitigation of risk of unemployment operate along five axes: the research design, 'risky' research, application to 'prestigious' grants, adaptation of research areas, and sustainable relationships with the Turkish state institutions.[29]

[29] One could also add, for example, the oft-used strategies of building networks, increasing visibility of one's work (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 3), or publishing exclusively on English language international journals (Paasi, 2005, 779-80) as instantiations of strategies both aiming at maximizing scientific capital and at securing one's employment. The motive behind not

Research Design:

Academics of these two elite universities, as a result of their precariousness, find themselves in a position where they have to forego the research design that their position and habitus predispose them to undertake. Although their dominant position in the scientific field authorize *and* predispose them to design research that is comparably far more extensive, in terms of both 'theory-driven-ness' and empirical richness than their counterparts who possess relatively lower volumes of scientific capital, they, as a strategy of fulfilling performance criteria, tend to 'trim down' their research. These strategies amount to research designs that are smaller in scale and less theory-driven than the designs their habitus and position in the field would generate. For example, when asked if the performance criteria affect his research, Respondent 12 (44, History) complains that he feels compelled to do "less in-depth" and less extensive work:

> "So right now is trying to get as many publications as possible, without having really the time to go into the depth of things…I think I would produce more meaningful scholarship, less in terms of quantity, if I had an actually secure employment. Because I would have the time to, like I said, draw more comparisons between more cases...I could actually expend the range of empirical possibles."

Respondent 7 (35, Political Science) also voices a similar complaint regarding the research constraints over the scale of the works:

> "In some areas, like mine [political philosophy], you'd be expected to have more holistic and encompassing works. A short article cannot come close to

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including these strategies in the analysis lies in that they are not at odds with each other; these strategies go hand in hand, not standing in contradiction to each other. The listed ones, however, demand a negotiation, a reconciliation between the strategies of securing or furthering position in the field and reducing the risks of a future unemployment.

> what a book offers. That's why in United States people in political philosophy do that a lot. But here it's different…Let alone writing a whole book from scratch, I haven't even been able turn my PhD dissertation into a book, because it takes a lot of time and effort. If I invest that time into writing articles instead, it would be better [for performance evaluations]. Articles have more currency to them."

Aside from the scale of the work, degree of theory involved in research is another element of complaint for academics. Many academics in these universities believe that they cannot make their works as theory-laden as they would like them to be. Respondent 4 (39, History) says that because of the high demands of his university he cannot find the time to delve deeper into theory so as to make his research more 'enriched'. He further elaborates on the constraints under which he devises his research by a concrete example:

> "Let's say I work on the theme of property relations in colonial settings. I would actually not only go through the sources but through all the theory that has been written around it. So it would be a much more theoretically driven and deep contribution than just presenting the empirical side of my research. But now with the things as they are I can't do everything I want." (Respondent 4).

These statements, especially the last one, prominently demonstrate that academics in these elite universities do want to conduct extensive researches that carries the possibility of being theoretically novel and impactful and/or empirically sizeable. They are indeed disposed to engage in 'high-flying' research with *distinction* that would be perceived as having far-reaching theoretical contributions (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 28). Yet, these dispositions are reconciled by with strategies of risk hedging, which retards the rate at which scientific capital is accumulated but also mitigates the risks of a future

unemployment, since devising research as such can put their future employment in jeopardy, lest they cannot publish as fast.

'Risky' Research:

Directly related to the size of the research design, academics in these universities mostly do not tend to go after what they deem 'risky', 'hazardous', and 'ambitious' projects on their own individual researches. These so-called 'risky' research designs involve investing great amounts of time and energy for a possible research output that might be recognized as 'distinguished' and 'brilliant' research by the peers if the desired results do come up. However, these projects are, in a way, academic 'gambles'; just as one could gain high rate of symbolic profit in the field, the labor put into the project can also prove to be labor done in vain if the output of the research is not recognized as 'brilliant' by the peers. The academics, nevertheless, occupy a position in the field that would enable and dispose them to undertake such research projects with possibly high rates of yields of symbolic profits. Yet, taking such a research route is rife with risk of future unemployment. Several of my respondents told me that those would be too 'risky' for them to pursue, since the uncertainty of the outcome puts the performance evaluations into risk. As Respondent 3 (39, Political Science) put it:

> "For example you decided to do this research that would take three to five years, where you're testing a huge hypothesis, and you have to collect data for a long time, analyze them and etc. Something very groundbreaking might come up, but chances could be also high that nothing special comes up. In the second case, you can still say that it is scientifically important to have found out that…the results turns out to be, say, just as an ordinary person would expect. Yet, it is not the same thing. If you get the unexpected result then…of course, you then can publish it on better journals. If not, then it's still valuable, but it's a

> different story. So those are kind of research people with tenures would do, because they are a bit too risky."

These attest to how the precarious work regime intervenes with the structure and the internal logics of the social scientific fields. Understood from a Bourdieusian perspective, academics in possession of large volumes of scientific capital, because of their positions in the scientific field and their corresponding habitus, would be authorized and predisposed to take on research that can perpetuate their *scientific distinction*, that is, research that will differentiate them from the 'ordinary' academics. Their ability to mobilize greater resources would enable them, per Bourdieu, to design researches that would be *recognized* to be original contributions – contributions that are empirically, nut more importantly, theoretically novel and far-reaching (1991, p. 9). When the performance evaluations and possibility of losing employment factors in, however, possession of large volumes of scientific capital does not directly translate to the mobilization of resources and realization of dispositions generated by scientific habitus. Instead, academics find themselves in a position where they have to employ strategies that would decrease their chances of future unemployment, that is, strategies towards mitigating risks **(**Giddens, 1991, p. 34-5**)**. Put differently, they reconcile the strategies they are predisposed to undertake by their habitus, in pursuit of scientific capital, with risk hedging strategies that their precarious work conditions necessitate. They have to constantly conceive of future incalculability and take measures.

Research Centers and Prestigious Grants:

Although academics in these two elite universities appear to be mostly hedging research risks rather than amplifying them, some risks are calculated to be worth taking. This is especially so for the academics who pursue grand research funds that regional or international state bodies offer – such as European Research Council Grants (ERC), Horizon 2020 grants that bestow the researchers with millions of Euros, at the very least[30], or individual fellowships, such as Marie Curie. As these grants and fellowships are exceptionally sizeable for social sciences, as well as highly prestigious, there is an intense competition over them. Quite a few of academics in the social science departments of these universities target these grants. But since the bodies that offer these grants demand highly extensive research proposals, academics make applications not individually but in teams, via the research centers in these universities, established mainly for capturing these highly regarded grants.[31] In preparation for the applications, academics make heavy investments in time and energy, ranging from writing hundreds of pages of research proposals to partaking in numerous meetings – a research design process that can go well up to a year.

Applying for these grants constitute a considerable risk for academics, as, with the competition high up, it is by no means that they are guaranteed to land these type of grants; in fact, the probability of getting a grasp of these grants are considerably weak. Academics, then, run the risk of tossing away months of labor – a labor that

[30] See https://erc.europa.eu for further information. ERC grants, for example, range from 1.5 million to 2.5 million Euros for social science researches.

[31] Depending on the type of grant and project it is also ordinary for several research centers/teams from different universities to build a consortium to apply.

otherwise might have been invested differently – lest they end up not winning these grants. In such a case, all the labor invested does not show up the least in the performance evaluations, since there is no palpable product produced. Just as coming up with extensive research designs make up a risk for academics, so does applying to these grants. Respondent 7's (35, Political Science) past experience on a grant that they as members of a research center failed to get is indeed telling of this:

> "I remember us spending a year on this grant application. We were the leading team in the consortium, and I was at the school almost at every weekend on the last 2 months. And we ended up not getting it…For that application we and another consortium got both 14.5 out of 15. But they were rewarded with the grant after all. All of the efforts we put were wasted in the end. There is a tremendous competition."

Yet, although pursuing these grants is at least as risky a strategy for an academic as it is to undertake an extensive, sizeable research, former carries a much greater symbolic, as well as material, profit than the latter does. Attaining these grants earns the collaboration of academics and the university high rates of symbolic profit, which adds to the 'prestige' and 'renown' of both, as well as material profits.[32] However risky it might be for academics, winning these grants automatically translates to 'scientific credentials' and, therefore, employment security (as academics imagine, accurately or not), making it well worth for academics to 'take a shot', so to speak. After asked whether if pursuing these grants are risky, Respondent 10 (41, Political Science), who has been in preparation for an application for a while in

[32] Both schools, as a part of their external grant policies, get an overhead from the grants, that is to say, a share of 10-15 % of the total amount that the research centers are rewarded with. Percentage of the shares, per my respondents, depends on the size of the grants. Also, academics who accomplish to get these esteemed grants are financially rewarded as well.

affiliation with a research center, remarked: "Well, yeah it kind of is. But these grants are also are very prestigious grants, it certainly gives you a recognition if you can get it. That's why I think it's definitely worth it." Asked further on whether if this has a positive contribution to the performance evaluations and to the future chances of contract renewal, he answered: "For sure. [Administration] would definitely be more likely to renew your contract if they perceive you as what they would call 'a valuable asset'. After all, you're bringing in grants that they value and that increases the prestige of the university" (Respondent 10).

As these examples demonstrate, academics of social sciences in elite universities who choose to apply to these 'prestigious' and competitive grants do so in calculation of the risks and symbolic profits involved.[33] Not bound merely by the internal logics of the scientific field, strategy of applying for grants is also decided by the need for these academics to mitigate the risk of future unemployment **(**Giddens, 1991, p. 28**)**. Academics, in this case, take on risks insofar as they calculate that a possible accumulation of scientific capital that will help them both maintain their position in the scientific field and their future employment in these institutions outweighs the risks of a possible 'poor' performance evaluation and a non-renewal. It is important to note that this strategy, as I will discuss immediately in the next sub-section, cannot be thought apart from research strategies that balance the risks taken in other areas.

[33] It is important to note again that this calculation do not take place in the sense of a 'rational calculation' as rational choice theory would have it. Not grounded on meticulous models and calculations, these strategies rather are what Bourdieu calls 'reasonable calculations', as opposed to 'rational', that depends highly on one's "practical sense" and "feel for the game" in the scientific field (1990, p. 62-3).

Adaptation of Research Areas:

Yet another strategy employed for coping with the risk of future unemployment concerns research areas. Academics in the elite universities supplement their major research areas with minor research areas, as well as adapting their research areas for the said grant applications, as a strategy to cope with their precariousness. As with the other strategies, we observe another reconciliation of the strategies to accumulate scientific capital and of the strategies that will increase the likelihood of meeting the performance criteria in a more satisfactory way and of having contract renewal. As Respondent 3 (39, Political Science) remarks:

> "Many people here add minor research fields into their major areas so that you can publish in the times of… in the times of droughts, let's say. I did that too. There was a time where I wasn't quite lucky about my research output. I couldn't have a paper of mine published in top journals, a paper I spent a good deal of time for. So I decided that it would be better to diversify my artillery (laughs). If you do that then you can quickly write something up and have it published so that you don't seem like you didn't do anything at all for the year…Long story short, [performance evaluations] give you incentive to support your main line of research with minor ones… or let me say it forces you."

This strategy can also go to the lengths of making shifts in one's research areas, especially in the case that the agent calculates that his/her main research area is one that does not have as much 'currency' as other research areas. Respondent 7 (35, Political Science), who is moving further away from what used to be her main research area, political philosophy, to more applied research, is an epitome of this strategy:

> "What I really want to do, what lies in my heart is working on political philosophy, with a focus on deliberative democracy and gender. But the thing is it's a very small and competitive field. I knew it already but it hit all the more when I started looking for employment… Top political philosophy journals are

> even more competitive than the other research areas in political science. So for the last 2 years I have started to do field work in social movements. I mean, it's not that I do it without liking it, but I would stick to theoretical work more, wasn't it for the employment security."

Strategies of adding minor research areas and engaging in wholesale shifts are accompanied by adapting research areas for the aforementioned 'prestigious' grant applications. Academics of social science departments in these universities who decide to apply for grants often tailor their research areas depending on the grant, to great extents on some occasions. Respondent 10 (Political Science, 41) tells: "When applying to these kinds of grants, you have to make sacrifices sometimes of your long term scientific goals and ambitions. You can find yourself applying for a grant that has only little to do with your main research areas." Prestige attached to these grants encourages academics in these universities to act on the opportunities as they appear, preventing them from pursuing their main research areas. Respondent 2 (Political Science, 35) is not quite content with this, as she thinks that it fragments her ideal long-term research goals into short-term, discrete researches:

> "Applying for these grants are important and university administration encourages them. But you can't really say 'we want to do this and whenever opportunity comes along we'll apply to it'. Instead, you go 'here's the grant how can we fit our research areas into this grant call' Again, it is great that we are able to compete for these grants. But this comes at the cost of doing research that do not cumulate, that do not build on top of each other, which is the complete opposite of how the process should be." (Respondent 2)

Next to encouraging academics in the elite universities to move away from their main research areas, pursuing these 'prestigious' grants, as a corollary, pressures academics into doing short-term, piecemeal projects instead of long-term ones.[34]

Supplementing main research area with minor ones, shifting main research areas, and tailor-making main research areas according to grant applications; all of them give rise to strategies of hedging risks in researches and maintaining position in the scientific field. As the Respondent 2 and 10 makes it clear, hedging these risks cuts across what their scientific habitus disposes them to do. These strategies, then, are yet another instances of the reconciliations of strategies.

Sustaining Relationships with State Institutions:

Quite apart from the strategies listed so far, these strategies are not as much related to the administrations of the elite universities as they are to maintaining 'harmonious' relations with the Turkish government.

To give a backdrop on the wider condition of academia in Turkey, academics, especially the academics in state universities, have been under great pressure in the last several years. Crackdown on academia has begun anew in a more intensified form after thousands of academics partook in a rather critical petition – with the now famous motto of "we will not be a party to this crime" – that charged the governing party AKP (Justice and Development Party) of committing massacres in the regions

[34] In this respect, processes of knowledge production in these universities are quite reminiscent of the change from long-term goals to short-term and fragmented projects that are prevalent in the workings of contemporary capitalism (Sennett, 1998, p. 53).

populated overwhelmingly by Kurdish population ('Academics for Peace', 2016). Immediately after the publicization of this petition, 3 academics were imprisoned and hundreds of the signatories faced layoffs from not only state universities, but, through the pressures of government, from foundational universities as well. After the failed coup attempt that took place in the summer of 2016, AKP, under the state of emergency, sporadically dismissed more than a thousand of academics, whom they saw as oppositional, from their positions by executive orders. This is the precise reason why academics in Turkey in general are under constant pressure and fear of losing their employment with the issuing of the next executive order. Although executive orders mainly target academics in state universities, the one issued recently in May, 2017 laid off several academics working in foundational universities as well, proving that it is not only academics in state universities that face the threat of losing employment.

Undoubtedly affected by the wider pressures academia in Turkey is under, academics of social sciences in these universities find the need to adopt strategies to handle the risks and cope with the precarious conditions created by the Turkish state.[35] These strategies comprise mostly in toning down the language used in publications or reports, which is adopted for two reasons; namely, not sticking out, and having access to data. For example, Respondent 3 (39, Political Science) goes onto talk about the former:

[35] It would be inaccurate to not mention academics who are prominently oppositional to government. Therefore, although I am committing a generalization here, one must not forget that there are academics who do not adopt similar strategies.

> "For the publications I am going to send for my associate degree exam[36] I am going to write 'AK Parti' and not AKP.[37] Just in case. No big deal, but I would write it as such. You never know who's going to take a look at your file."

Respondent 7 (35, Political Science) gives a similar account:

> "Now I am doing a project on women, peace, and justice. This is a research funded by TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey). I am supposed to give the final report to them. And, of course, I am going to be careful about what I will write. That's for sure. Because they're investigated very closely."

On the other hand, Respondent 2 (35, Political Science), a scholar whose main focus is on migration research, talks about a more extensive self-censorship for keeping the relationships good so that access to data is not interrupted:

> "To carry out our research in the migration area, we need the cooperation of state institutions. After all, they have the data. And to have access to that data we are trying to develop a sustainable network of relationship with them, and this affects how critical you can be…When you are aware that the actors whom you want to work with are conservative, their refusal of cooperation for the next time means that you can't do any work on this area. Because, like I said, they have the data."

Apart from the self-censorship or toning down of the prose for the sake of not 'sticking out', academics in these universities find the need to have sound relationship with the state institutions, especially with YÖK and TÜBİTAK, both for the sake of their employment and for having access to data, which is directly connected to the process of accumulation of scientific capital. Although my respondents were clearly not content with how they felt the obligation to impose a self-censorship on

[36] Titles of 'associate' and 'professorship' are granted by YÖK after an examination process.
[37] Members of the governing party prefer their party to be called AK Parti (AK Party), rather than AKP, since the word 'ak' in Turkish signifies the color white, with an overtone of 'pure' and 'untainted'.

themselves, they adopted these strategies of reconciliation of continuing accumulation.

Among the other elements, the pressure Turkish state exerts on Turkish academia is no more directly felt than in the way the former deter the academics from pursuing research agendas that could investigate the Turkish state in a substantially critical attitude. Because of fear of losing employment or of getting openly and publicly targeted by the government, as some of my respondents in the elite universities informed me, academics in the elite universities cannot take the risk of devising such research. As Respondent 12 (44, History) describes:

> "Many here, including myself, do not really do research that will be… let's say too critical of the government. I mean, it's not that no one does it. There is definitely some who does it. But mostly, to my observations, they do it from rather fringe subjects, which is critical, but only indirectly…This probably can be generalized to Turkey as well. And the worst thing about the censorship is that it's not only politics that the pressures affect, but also our profession. Don't get me wrong when I say this, but Turkey is actually a very interesting country in terms of empirical cases it has…and also theoretically, too. Doing an actual free research here could be very fruitful and open up the way for theoretically interesting work that can break with our assumptions. I mean let alone the coup attempt and the entangled the rivalry of AKP and Cemaat[38]…"

This detailed account, I believe, attests to how accumulation of scientific capital also carries a great risk of a future (and even rather immediate) unemployment. Academics in social sciences in the elite universities are presented with many cases in the context of Turkey that can be recognized as 'distinguished' in the scientific field. Indeed,

[38] "Cemaat", whose direct translation to English is "the Community", is a large transnational network of Sunni Muslims whom the government accuses of committing the coup d'etat through its infiltration to army, among with many other state institutions. Many also claim thatthe AKP government and Cemaat have had tight relationships of interest in the past, despite their current rivalry.

designing research that would feed from the context of Turkey would be ripe with symbolic profits, as the categories of perception in the field would possibly lead the agents to perceive these studies as 'theoretically novel', and 'groundbreaking', new contributions, as opposed to conducting research that would be on, as Bourdieu put it, "beaten and old tracks" cases and theories (1975, p. 27). Due to these said pressures, however, research strategies that have the possibility to yield great symbolic profits are 'out the window'. Academics in the elite universities believe that they cannot go in such a research path, which means a foregoing of research with possibly high volumes of symbolic profits in the field, in favor of mitigating risks of unemployment.

3.2.Non-elite Universities

In this part, I investigate the precariousness and the research practices of the academics of social sciences faculty in the two non-elite universities in Istanbul. After, briefly going over their main characteristics, I shift to the institutional goals and strategies of the university administrations, which are, unlike the elite universities, more oriented towards extraction of surplus value from immaterial labor. I then move onto the subjectively experienced precarity, which I found to be considerably less in comparison to elite universities, due to the 'tacit' agreement between academics and administrations in each university on their employment, despite the shorter contracts lengths. Lastly, I move onto their research strategies and come to the conclusion that their research strategies that are generated by their habitus are not undercut by their precarity, since their employments depend to their research only to a very little extent.

I investigate their research strategies on three axes: research design, risky research, and sustaining relationships with state institutions. Lastly, I touch upon how, in stark contrast to elite universities, regime of work in the non-elite universities increases the chances that research strategies of the academics with low scientific capital are realized in line with their positions in the scientific field.

3.2.1. Endowment with Scientific Capital

In many respects, the so-called non-elite universities represent quite a different position than the position the so-called elite universities occupy in the field. Unlike the elite universities that carry a *distinction* to them, these two foundational universities are rather the ones that the former constitutes their distinctions against. Put differently, just as distinctiveness of the taste and consumption patterns of the dominant class are defined in relation to, and in contradistinction with, to that of dominated class (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 6), the elite universities are perceived to be distinct only in relation to the so-called 'undifferentiated' and the 'mediocre' universities (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 23). Therefore, the non-elite universities are perceived as such in relation to their counterparts.

Founded in late 90s and early 2000s by mid-sized conglomerates of Turkey, these two universities are home to more than ten thousand students each, with quite high student to teacher ratios. Perceived to be universities of lower ranks, their student bodies are comprised of those who are less successful but who can afford to receive university education, as well as a small minority who are lured by scholarship opportunities. Not possessing nearly as much prestige as the elite universities either in

national or international space of academia, they have neither the symbolic nor the financial means to attract the scholars who have received their doctoral degrees from the most prestigious institutions in the globe. Rather, an overwhelming number of the academics employed in these institutions have obtained their doctoral degrees from institutions in Turkey. As a result, these two universities are not present in the densely woven transnational academic networks of elite institutions as their counterparts, hence their lack of 'academic credentials' and 'scientific prestige'.

In a more Bourdieusian sense, all of these amount to saying that these two foundational universities possess small volumes of scientific capital, and therefore occupy a lower position in the scientific field, both in terms of agents and of institutions (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 23-4). They are short in the social, and more importantly, symbolic capital to have as voluminous a scientific capital as the elite foundational universities possess. If indeed "symbolic capital flows to symbolic capital" as Bourdieu claimed (2004, p. 56), then the converse also applies; the lack of perceived 'prestige' and 'scientific credentials' of these universities almost effortlessly reproduce itself. Generally speaking, it is the agents who are endowed with lower volumes of scientific capital who apply to these universities for employment. As these academics occupy a lower position in the scientific field – in terms of both social capital (having transnational networks) and symbolic capital (recognition of authority in the field) – they are far less likely to, for example, publish in 'top' journals, organize 'high profile' conferences, pull highly competitive and 'prestigious' research grants, or have the necessary means and resources to conduct research that have *distinction* to them.

3.2.2. Institutional Aims and Strategies

When speaking of these two non-elite universities one cannot but note the divergence in institutional aims from the so-called elite universities. Even though it would be safe to claim that agents in these two institutions, driven by their habitus, are predisposed to undertake strategies of maximizing scientific capital, and position in the scientific field, this does not necessarily apply to the institutions themselves. Though it would be no less than bizarre to say that administrations of these universities regard 'academic credentials', 'renown', and 'prestige' as insignificant, primary institutional goal of theirs is undoubtedly oriented towards profit-making.

For-profit practices of these universities take different forms for different faculties. While faculty of engineering and natural sciences, in congruence with the global trends surrounding academia (Leslie and Slaughter, 1997), are expected to bring in overheads by pulling in external grants, academics in the social sciences faculties contribute to the profits of the universities by taking place in a capital accumulation process – in the quite Marxist sense of the term – wherein universities are extracting surplus value from immaterial labor of the academics (Gill, 2013, p. 17-8; Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. 292) , making these universities, as some prefer to call, rather 'sweatshop universities' (Vatansever and Yalçın, 2015, p. 21). For this reason, the institutional ambitions over scientific 'prestige' – that is, advancement in the scientific field – if not insignificant, are only second to the primary goal of profit-making.[39]

[39] The income and expenses tables of the universities that YÖK prepared testify to the surplus extraction regime that thrives on immaterial labor in these two non-elite universities. Whereas

The institutional goal of capital accumulation, in the Marxist sense of the term, translates to strategies that are highly reminiscent of a tightly regulated, labor-intensive 'labor control regime' – one that is based on the techniques of absolute surplus value extraction of immaterial labor. Academics in these universities are expected to offer 4 to 6 classes a semester, which amounts to 12-18 hours of teaching per week. Sizes of the classes in these non-elite universities generally stretch from 30 up to 100 students. Not leaving the grading schema to academics' initiative, university administrations in both universities, with some exceptions, enforce standard grading criteria for students' performance in the classes in social sciences departments, which comprises of a pre-set number of quizzes, homework, midterms and final exams. Having in mind the number of classes academics have to teach and the number of students in each class, the standardized grading criteria make up a considerably heavy amount of labor for academics. Another reminiscence to a 'labor control regime' is the practices of surveillance. Academics, for example, have to read a card when they get into and out of university premises at all times. This is mainly to enforce the 'open office' policy so that students can pay visits to their professors as they wish – a policy that is an indicator of, in line with the capital accumulation, how students are seen rather as customers/consumers by the administration (Molesworth et al., 2011).

Accordingly, performance evaluations in these universities emphasizes teaching rather than research output, which shows that, unlike the elite universities,

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the elite universities are spending more than they receive from students on aggregate, these two non-elite universities are making yearly profits around 9000 Turkish Liras (roughly 2500 €) per student on aggregate (Vatansever and Yalçın, 2015, p. 58).

the non-elite universities are more interested in maintenance of capital accumulation through providing a satisfactory service for the 'customers'. Although the faculty handbooks seemingly give the same weight to research, teaching, and administrative tasks in performance evaluations, my respondents, without exception, told me that it is the teaching that is valued the most in evaluations. These universities, it must be said, do encourage research through incentives – such as financial rewards or writing off one class a semester in the case that an academic lands external research grants. Research activities, surely, are positive for performance evaluations on paper. However, since these universities are for-profit universities, administration evaluates performances of the academics in social sciences based mostly on their teaching performance, which are hold on the basis of student evaluations and fulfillment of the elements in the standardized grading criteria.

Overall, then, since the institutional aims of these two non-elite universities regarding social science departments are oriented more towards extracting immaterial labor than towards advancing in the scientific field through an institutional accumulation of scientific capital, their strategies include more of appropriating surplus value from the immaterial labor of academics than putting pressure on academics for high-impact publications, as is the case of the elite universities.

3.2.3. Precarity in Non-elite Universities

Just as the elite universities, the non-elite universities also employ a regime of work that leaves the academics in a precarious condition. Undoubtedly, performance evaluations are one of the key elements, on paper, in this flexible regime of work that

constitutes an ever-present threat swinging over the academics. Failure to meet the requirements can lead to a possible non-renewal of contracts. Unlike their counterparts, however, these universities offer contracts to their academics on an even shorter period, that is, on an annual basis. Therefore, academics in these universities work in the conditions of a greater precarity compared to their colleagues in the elite universities.

Despite the greater level of precarity in terms of shorter contracts, precariousness is experienced in a quite different way. Although academics in social science departments in these two non-elite universities are signed to one-year contracts, the perceived employment security is considerably higher than in the elite universities. Almost all of my respondents expressed there is a tacit agreement over employment security between them and the university administrations. Clearly, they by no means think that their employment status is fully secure. They conceded that they feel worrisome and tense to over their employments, as they are fully aware that administrations might in a given future time find it appropriate, for any reason, not to renew contracts. Nevertheless, they do not experience the subjective employment security (Bourdieu, 1998a, p. 84) on the same level as their colleagues in the elite universities do. My respondents in non-elite universities believe that they have a sense of *de facto* employment security, making their lived experience of precarity less severe than the academics in the elite universities. Respondent 1 (36, Political Science) expresses how he perceives his employment security saying:

> "I mean of course...I can't say I don't have any reservations. [Employment security] is at the back of your mind always, especially during May and June when contracts are renewed. But I can't say I have a great worry that upsets me all the time."

Respondent 11 (39, Political Science), expressing more concerns over employment security, still talks along more or less the same lines:

> "Well, it's a bit contradictory here I think. On the one hand, you hear the talks starting to circulate about layoffs at some summers. And it certainly gives you a feeling of insecurity, no question about it. Enter economic crisis, and university can put many out the door. But, thinking about it, that goes for many jobs in private sector. So I don't think I'm that much worried about it. Yes, they do layoff some academics, but you really have to perform really, really bad for it."

This largely stems from the difference of the institutional goals and strategies of the university administrations. Different from the strategies of exerting pressure for yielding research output that the administrations of elite universities embrace, the non-elite universities, as explained, do not require research activities from the academics in the social science departments. Academics in the elite universities are threatened more, for there is a high-level competition for employment in these universities. They fear that they might not be employed in the future in these universities, if they do not take part in the competition of doing 'distinctive', 'top-notch' research. In stark contrast, academics in social science departments in the non-elite universities do not feel this pressure at all, since they are not thrown into the fierce competition over publishing in 'top', 'prestigious' journals. They, therefore, feel a presence of safety net, albeit not so protective, under them.

As these two non-elite universities' institutional strategies regarding social sciences revolves around surplus extraction from the immaterial labor of the academics, performance evaluations, hence the employment security, hinge mainly upon the fulfillment of teaching responsibilities. Although performance evaluations, as pointed out above, regard teaching, research, and administrative tasks with equal

weight on paper, teaching is overwhelmingly valued, with others having only little influence on evaluations. As Respondent 1 (35, Political Science) says:

> "I don't think publications help a lot. I mean it's great if you do, but the main thing [administration] is looking at is teaching, definitely teaching…Their main concern is more about filling the classes to the fullest and you do your job without any problems. Without this, nobody would really care even if you get your work published in American Political Science Review. As long as you do this, and do not cause any problems for the administration, there is no real reason for them to lay you off."

Respondent 11 (39, Political Science) also shares similar thoughts: "If you do your teaching responsibilities and keep your relations fine with the administration, you should be able to be here till you retire." Respondent 6 (37, Political Science) further elaborates on this by stating his understanding of strategies of the university he is employed in:

> The first that comes to my mind is nothing other than the pressure on classes, on offering as much classes as possible. That's what they understand from performance…here the more classes you offer, the more likely you're to hold onto to your job, for sure. Publishing is good, and [administration] encourages it as well… They give some money if you publish on an indexed journal. But it's not that important for [employment security]…What they want to have at the end of the day more pragmatically…they want to have minimum number of academics offer classes to maximum number of students.

These respondents' words attest to how their performances are evaluated based almost solely on teaching. This is so because university administrations of these non-elite universities are interested in having as little problems as possible over the course of labor processes, that is, delivering the commodity to consumers to keep the circulation of capital uninterrupted. Further, as Respondent 6 (37, Political Science) put it above, administrations of the non-elite universities engage in strategies of

maximizing the rate of profits by having least amount of academics and maximum amount of students.

To recapitulate, academics in the social sciences departments have the perception of a *de facto* employment security in these universities. Therefore, their experience of precarity, in the sense of having worries and fears of employment status, is quite lower than it is experienced in the elite universities. The reasons for this perceived relative security is firstly that they are not under constant high competition to publish in the top journals. Secondly, many find it not a challenge for themselves to satisfy the requirements of performance evaluations. As Respondent 5 (44, Sociology) put it concisely "I find it really easy to fulfill the requirements over here. Yes, you have a lot of workload, it's really burdensome. But content wise you only have to teach your classes, and that's it. In that sense, it's easy I would say." Therefore, despite the similar vagueness and opaqueness surrounding performance evaluation criteria and procedure – some even believe that performance evaluations are not hold at all – the requirements of the administrations of these universities give them the sense of *de facto* employment security.

To make a comparison to the academics in elite universities, the academics in social science departments in the non-elite universities do not experience precarity, in terms of lived experience, as intensely as the former. Although performance evaluations are as opaque and non-transparent in the latter and the employment policies are as flexible on paper, the academics of social sciences departments in the non-elite universities do not find the future as full of uncertainties and risks, mainly because of they are not subjected to performance evaluations that prioritizes research output. Overall, they perceive a less degree of risk of future unemployment than their

colleagues in the elite universities.[40] Further, they do not experience the same fear of 'falling from grace' – that is, the possibility of losing employment in 'prestigious' institutions that would dispossess them off of scientific capital. It is for this reason that they do not engage in risk-mitigating strategies to cope with precarity, which reveals a difference between the strategies of the academics in the social sciences in elite and non-elite universities.

3.2.4. Research Strategies of Academics in Non-elite Universities

As agents located in the scientific field, academics in the non-elite universities are no different than others in employing research strategies for maximizing their scientific capital. However, they, as a result of their low possession of scientific capital and hence lower position in the field, tend to employ different research strategies than their counterparts. Seen from a Bourdieusian field analysis, they would be expected to engage in less risky, less extensive, less sizeable, or in overall, research that are not 'distinguished' or 'brilliant'. For 'the objective chances of profit', defined by the position in the field, largely shapes the possible research strategies that will yield the maximum rate of symbolic profit. Their objective position informs their 'practical sense', predisposing them to employ these possible research strategies that are "'reasonable' strategies of investment" (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 27-8).

[40] To repeat, this is to say that the *levels* of subjectively experienced precarity – in terms of anxieties and fears of future employment – are different in these two types of universities.

I argue that this is the indeed the case for academics of social sciences in the non-elite universities, in contrast to the academics of elite universities. In other words, their position in the scientific field and habitus do shape the scientific research strategies and choices of these academics, without having to be reconciled by strategies of risk hedging, as in the elite universities. To be sure, these academics, as documented above, experience precarity. Yet, since research activities have only little to do with their future risk of unemployment, they do not incorporate strategies of hedging risks into their research.[41] If anything, the workload they are burdened with only works to ensure their research dispositions are put into action. I will discuss this by looking at the process of research design and the risks involved in their research projects. Only exception to this pattern of research strategies is the relationship with Turkish government.

Research Design:

Academics in the social science departments in these universities tend to design research projects that are less extensive and sizeable, both theoretically and empirically. In contrast to their colleagues in the elite universities, they do not do so as strategies of coping with risks that their precarious employments conditions bring about. It is quite the contrary; since they are endowed with lower volumes of scientific capital and hence occupy a relatively lower position in the scientific field, they are authorized by their objective conditions and predisposed by their habitus to

[41] Many academics in these non-elite universities did not even find it relatable to them when I asked if the insecure employment conditions affect their research in any way.

employ such research strategies – strategies that are more likely to maximize their scientific capital and promise elevation in the scientific field.

To begin with the objective positions in the scientific field, lower positions in the scientific field that academics in these universities hold are not authorized to have such researches. Unlike the academics in elite universities who are authorized by their positions in the scientific field to carry out large and extensive research but who do not to hedge the risk of unemployment, the academics in the non-elite universities do not have the resources at their disposal to carry out such research. Respondent 13 (47, Sociology) says, for example, that

> "I'm generally doing research that are not quite big, well because how am I supposed to do it without money and assistance? Many of the big names in the field – I mean at least in sociology – had necessary finances and research teams to do those great works. Here I don't even have a PhD student. So I do everything more or less myself."

Just as large volumes of scientific capital can be reconverted to other types of capitals (such as economic capital) and resources (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 25; 2004, p. 55-6), endowment with small volumes of scientific capital, in a similar manner, tends to deny access to the other types of capitals and resources. Lack of resources that academics with low volumes of scientific capital, in turn, obstructs the means to conduct such extensive research.

Aside from the having access to resources by virtue of the position in the field, engaging in larger and more extensive research design is, more importantly, a matter of scientific dispositions generated by academics' habitus that is determined by the position in the field. As Respondent 5 (44, Sociology), whose main research area is historical sociology, remarks:

> "My researches so far have been mostly small researches. When I think of a research question, I look at the literature and try to think of a single case that would challenge the empirical and theoretical findings…I don't go for large researches really, but more for case specific researches. I mean, I'm no Chuck [Charles] Tilly (laughs). I don't think it works for me to have huge, overly ambitious research designs. If I was in Columbia, well maybe (laughs). Jokes aside, I think it makes more sense for me to use the little time I have for research more wisely."

Indeed, the allusion to Charles Tilly and Columbia University – an agent and an institution, respectively, that possess immense volumes of scientific capital and are in dominant positions in the scientific field – bears testimony to how agents endowed with lower amounts of scientific capital are more predisposed to carry out research that are smaller in scale and less 'ambitious' precisely because of the position in the scientific field. By spelling out those names, Respondent 5, refers both to their and his objective position in the scientific field, and subjectively gives them a *distinction* them by their "recognized authority" in the field, a distinction that he defines in relation to, and in contradistinction with, himself. It is the internal logics of the scientific field that equips him with the necessary categories of perception and principles of vision and division that enables him to give *recognition* to them. Further, it is nothing other than his habitus, determined by his position in the field, that gives him, and predisposes him to pursue, scientifically "reasonable aspirations", as opposed to "ambitious aspirations" (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 27-8) that he associates with Charles Tilly and Columbia University. To make an analogy, just as an agent in the larger macrocosm of social space would be disposed by his/her habitus to find everyday "upper class" taste and consumption practices – practices as seemingly minute as holding a fork in a specific manner or preferring some sports over the others – as "too bourgeoisie" and would distance him/herself from it, in a quite

similar way, Respondent 5, equipped by the categories of perceptions that enables him to recognize the *distinction* of the said occupants, is disposed by his habitus to deem large and extensive research projects as too "high-flying" for himself, 'settling' for smaller and less ambitious projects. In other words, the practical sense and the feel for the game that Respondent 5 (44, Sociology) has predispose him to carry out research smaller in design, as a strategy that is calculated to yield the maximum amount of symbolic profits in the field. Therefore, both dispositions generated by habitus and the endowment with small volumes of scientific capital leads academics in these universities to conduct research that are of, as Bourdieu puts it, "low-flying trajectories" (1975, p. 28).

'Risky' Research:

In direct relation to the preference of not going after large and extensive research, academics in these universities also choose to carry out research projects that are more risk free investments; rather than designing and conducting research that can have great implications, but also research that run the risk of not yielding any important result, they pursue less hazardous projects that will guarantee a yield of symbolic profits. Contrary to their colleagues in the elite universities who are endowed with enough scientific capital – and therefore predisposed to – to pursue more risky projects yet do not because of their precarious conditions, academics in the social science departments in the non-elite universities do not engage with such research as they are endowed with enough capital to withstand a possibility of an unyielding project.

To embellish on this, possessing large volumes of scientific capital, and thus a dominant position in the field, enables the agents to invest on such risky research strategies because they can hold onto to their position in the field, by virtue of having an established position of "recognized authority". Endowment with low volumes of scientific capital, however, puts the agent in a more vulnerable condition if the research fails, that is, research output that is not perceived to be "brilliant" or "groundbreaking". Since such agents do not enjoy the same recognition of authority, all the investments will be in vain in case of a failure. It is for this reason that the latter tends to invest in research that will guarantee the accumulation of scientific capital and the furthering of position in the field.

Respondent 9 (42, History), a scholar who works mostly on labor in late Ottoman Empire, illustrates his redundancy in engaging such risky research strategies:

> "I was thinking of doing this research project to investigate the relationship between labor unrest uprisings and the ethnicity after the Tanzimat era. I mean there are works on labor and ethnicity in Ottoman Empire, but labor uprisings are not really investigated in relation to different ethnicities, and I had this sort of hunch that it I could find quite interesting results, and they could have lead to a whole different set of research agendas for other people…As I got more into it, I decided not to do that because I think I started to think that my hunch was wrong. So I mean in the case…if I went on with that project and found out there wasn't any interesting relationship, or any other thing, then what I was going to do with that? I mean it could have been great, but if not, then I would have spent great time and energy in archives for a not-so-interesting project."

Respondent 11 (39, Political Science) also shares similar thoughts:

> "I don't like putting my energy into projects that seem very interesting at the outset, but that also has the chance to give you results that are not so important. For example, just a few months ago a friend of mine came to me and asked if I wanted to do a project with him together. It did seem to really interesting and everything, but I thought that project might have given results that might be quite commonsensical as well. So I kindly told him that I wasn't going to do it. I mean, you know… why would I put the already little time I have into that? I

> rather put my time into the projects that probably can give you good results. It's a trade-off."

As apparent from what my respondents said, they find the risky projects as not worth pursuing. This is because unlike their colleagues in the elite universities, they do not have enough resources to take their chances on 'gambling' their time and energy into an uncertainty. Rather, they follow the strategies that will ensure the continuation of accumulation of scientific capital.

Sustaining Relationships with State Institutions:

Quite similar to the experiences of academics in the elite universities, academics in the non-elite universities also feel the pressure to do research that would not 'stick out'. This, in fact, is the only area in which strategies to accumulate capital is reconciled with the strategies of hedging risk. Being under the exact same pressure to lose employment through executive orders issued by Turkish government under the state of exception, academics in the non-elite universities, too, adopt strategies that will hedge the risk of a future unemployment. One of these strategies includes toning down of the language. Caught up in between two currents, Respondent 1 (36, Political Science) talks about her attempts to reconcile the two:

> "On the one hand, it's really hard to say that, for example, "Turkish democracy is on the verge of death" on a journal. Even on English journals. Because…I mean, you know why. But without writing it down, how are you supposed to publish on a decent journal without saying that. So once, I ended up writing things on an actual journal article things like "The path Turkey is on is worrying", "Turkey should avoid getting derailed from the tracks of democracy", "It would be better for Turkey to embrace democratic norms"…I was like EU (laughs).

Respondent 6 (37, Political Science)'s redundancy in writing "Turkish democracy is on the verge of death" illustrates how the strategies to maximize scientific capital have to be reconciled with strategies to hedge the risks of unemployment. By offering euphemisms, he cannot yield as much as symbolic profit from publications. Yet, he calculates the need to employ strategies of hedging risks, as he believes doing otherwise would be risking his future *and* present employment in universities in Turkey.

Academics in these universities also tend to engage themselves in more major practices of censorship, as well. As is the case in the elite universities, here it is also for not interrupting the channeling of data that are in exclusive possession of the state institutions and/or ministries. As Respondent 13 (47, Sociology), who is working more with quantitative methods, remarks:

> "If I can't get data from the state, it would be a lot harder for me to publish. Of course they don't share every dataset, but still the ones I got so far was quite nice. To keep that coming, I mean… you have to tone it a bit down, let me put it that way."

As his accumulation of scientific capital and chances of advancement in the field is directly related to data that he has access from state institutions, he has to reconcile the maximum yields of symbolic profit with the trust of the institutions he is in direct contact with.

Similar to the elite universities, many academics in the non-elite universities also reported that they are not able to do the research they would have otherwise, due to the pressures of Turkish state. Majority of my respondents told me that they are not doing the research they would do if the pressure of the Turkish state was not as pressing. Respondent 11 (39, Political Science), for instance, says that: "I would

definitely do the things that I can't right now. Turkey is not that good a place to live, but in terms of material for social sciences, it's a goldmine. I would love to do projects from a more radical, more leftist perspective." Respondent 5 (44, Sociology) gives a more concrete account:

> "Couple of years ago, I and a friend of mine were talking about doing a project on the trenches.[42] It could have been a great project. I told this to several of my colleagues and they strongly advised me not to do it. And thinking about it now, they weren't wrong."

Since these academics believe conducting these projects would be too risky, they hedge it by not even initiating it, leaving it as a counterfactual. Again, this strategy is employed at the expense of symbolic profits in the scientific field.

The Workload and Time:

Lastly, I find it crucial to note the affects of time limitations on the research strategies and paths of these academics, as they make up yet another contrast with the elite universities.

As explained above, academics in the social sciences in the non-elite universities are under high teaching workload. Depending on the needs on a given semester, they teach between 4 to 6 classes, amounting to roughly 12 to 18 hours a week, which can even stretch to further hours on some occasions. Aside from the actual teaching, teaching load also requires them to put as much labor time for preparing the class materials as they put in classes. When the standardized grading

[42] Respondent refers to the state of war in the Kurdish region of Turkey.

schema that university administrations impose is also taken into consideration – which includes quizzes, homework, and exams for classes of 30 to 100 students – it would be safe to say that an academic spends between 35 to 50 hours a week, on average, for the fulfillment of their teaching responsibilities.

This regime of work in the non-elite universities increases the chances of academics to pursue abovementioned research strategies. Spending a good deal of their time and energy to teaching, academics in the social science departments, as the quotations hint, are left with quite a little time to devise new research and conduct them. Many of my respondents told me that they have two or three days a week to do research related works, at most. The time limitations, in turn, works to reinforce the dispositions of the academics oriented towards devising and conducting research that are both theoretically and empirically less extensive, and less riskier – projects with less ambition. Next to their position in the field and dispositions that predispose them to undertake such strategies aiming at maximizing symbolic profits and advancement in the field, the regimes of work that prioritizes teaching oriented immaterial labor forces them to employ such research strategies. As a corollary, then, whereas the regimes of work in the elite universities are at odds with the internal logics of the scientific field and require the academics to employ reconciliatory strategies to hedge risks of unemployment, the regimes of work in the non-elite universities reinforce and intensify the internal logics. The limitation of time leads, or almost further imposes, these academics to employ research strategies that they are already predisposed to, meaning that amount of time do not allow for divergences. As Respondent 9 (42, History) expresses: “I even have troubles going about the research I have right now,

which is not that big. I can't wrap my head around how for god's sake I could make it happen with bigger projects." Likewise, Respondent 6 (37, Political Science) says

> "To be honest, it makes sense for me to do mid-sized projects. Doing wider projects would take a lot of time and I'm not sure if it's worth it…that would be almost impossible."

These statements point out that the research strategies that objective position of these academics in the field would allow and habitus would predispose to undertake, are further ensured and even intensified by the regime of work in these universities.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

In this thesis, I discussed how neoliberalism influences knowledge production in social sciences. Instead of viewing the relationship between neoliberal policies and universities merely on the basis of university-industry partnerships, or of a shift from public good regime to academic capitalist regime, I look at how the new regime of precarious work neoliberalism engendered affects research strategies of academics in the scientific fields that are distant from the markets encroachment. As any given scientific field is not a homogenous space of positions where every agent is equal, I investigated how precarization affects research practices of both agents occupying higher and lower positions in the field.

I argued that the academics in the social sciences in the elite universities experience precariousness – precarity understood on the narrow basis of feeling the constant fear of losing employment in the future – to a greater extent than their counterparts. They fear it not because university administrations lay people off *en masse* every year; rather, they fear because they constantly feel the tacit threat that mainly arises from the ambiguities of the performance evaluation criteria. This fear reflects onto the research practices of academics in social sciences in the elite universities; to mitigate the possibility of future unemployment they reconcile their research strategies generated by their habitus with strategies of hedging risks. Even though they are authorized – by their objective position in the field – and disposed – by their habitus, structured by the position in the field – to undertake research strategies that are large, extensive, theoretically far-reaching, and risky – that is, research with *distinction* – they find it too risky to pursue such research. This is so, because of the paradox they are caught in; institutional strategies of accumulation of

scientific capital are at odds with academics' dispositions to accumulate scientific capital. University administrations of the two elite universities adopt the strategies of pressuring academics into a publishing-spree, as they calculate this is the best possible strategy that will maximize the accumulation of scientific capital for maintaining or elevating position in the scientific field institutionally. Academics in these institutions, because of the institutional strategies, reconcile their research strategies with strategies of hedging risks of a future unemployment, as they find themselves having the need to calculate for the risk. Institutional strategies of the elite universities oriented towards accumulation of scientific capital actually disrupt academics' strategies of accumulation of scientific capital.

These academics, interestingly enough, are in a further paradox. If, academics do take the risk of not adopting the strategies of hedging the risk of a possible future unemployment, an actual case of a layoff would result in the *dispossession* of scientific capital, since losing employment in these institutions is perceived to be the equivalent to having one's 'epaulettes getting cut off' in the scientific field. It is precisely for this reason they adopt strategies of foregoing research that would yield more symbolic profits, in return for having their future employments relatively more secure. Since strategizing merely on the basis scientific dispositions would be 'gambling', they trade-off between the two.

Same cannot be said for the academics in the non-elite universities. Undoubtedly, they do feel precarity, as they also get worrisome about their renewals on a yearly basis. Yet, the tacit agreement they have with the administration over their employment and the lack of competition for their positions in these universities render them far less precarious, in terms of having anxieties and fears of losing employment.

Unlike their colleagues in the elite universities, their research strategies are not undercut by their working conditions, as less extensive, less ambitious, and less risky research strategies – in other words, research without *distinction*–are compatible with what their work requirements are.

In contrast with the elite universities, realization of dispositions of academics in the non-elite universities is further ensured by the regime of precarious work in these universities. Although many openly expressed that they find the requirements of performance evaluations rather easy to satisfy because of their non-challenging content, they are also in the full knowledge that if they do not fulfill these requirements that demands immense amount of labor – teaching plenty of classes to the masses of students – they will be 'out the window' at the end of the academic year. Therefore, the precarious work conditions experienced by academics in the social science departments of the non-elite universities are further 'guiding' them into their dispositions by imposing time constraints.

Comparing these two types of universities, one indeed witnesses a rather unexpected scenario. It would be, for example, safe to expect that possession of high volumes of scientific capital would immediately translate to, as Bourdieu would have it, access to more resources and less constraints on research strategies, enabling the academic to indeed conduct research that would *distinguish* him/her from the masses of other 'low-flying' academics who engage in research that is 'less interesting' or who, to cite the same quote again, beat "the old tracks of a tried and tested research direction" – that is, using the 'same old' theories, rather than engaging with "high-flying" research ambitions that targets making 'original' theoretical contributions. Much alike the "bourgeoisie" taste that, defined in relation to, and in contradistinction

with, "working class" taste, distinguishes itself from the lower classes in the social space, an agent who is well-endowed with scientific capital would be expected to 'shine out' amidst the agents who are endowed with low volumes of scientific capital in the scientific field. Though this is surely still accurate, what is intriguing is that precariousness influences the research strategies of the dominants in the field a lot more than that of the dominated. Having to hedge the risks of a future unemployment, they engage in research strategies that enable them to produce less *distinctive* projects than their positions in the scientific field and dispositions would authorize and dispose them to produce; the intensity of 'shine', with the introduction strategies of hedging risks, is dimmed down.

This condition, I believe, is not only peculiar to Turkish academia. As agents who occupy a lower position in the scientific field tend to find employment in similar universities that stress teaching – or to put it more precisely, extracting surplus value from immaterial labor of academics – in other contexts, I would expect precarious work conditions to ensure that research dispositions of academics in such universities are put into action. As for the 'elite' universities in other contexts, possession of high volumes of scientific capital, if not reinforced by a secure employment, can very possibly put constraints onto the research strategies and dispositions, pulling down the *distinction* of the research. It is, I argue, precisely in this respect that precarization in academia infects and disarranges the structure and logics of the scientific field, that is to say, intervening with the research dispositions of the dominants in the scientific field.

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