CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2017
| Author | Hoveman, Frederick Robert |
|---|---|
| Title | Perception, Realism and Materialism |
| Summary | This thesis examines the three principal theories of perception, the sense datum theory, representationalism and relational directional realism. The arguments for sense data are more compelling than many now think. Moreover, representationalism is much closer to the sense datum theory than is also commonly realised. Howard Robinson has argued that both theories can also be considered realist theories insofar as they are compatible with semantic direct realism which is the position that judgements based on perceptual experience can be directly about a mind-independent world even if the direct objects or perception are mind-dependent. I argue this is an unstable position and that at best such judgement based on perception can only be true of a virtual reality if the sensible properties experienced in perception are mind-dependent. The only truly realist theory is what Robinson calls phenomenological direct realism. This is the view that mind-independent properties of objects are directly experienced in perception and thereby so are mind-independent objects. However, although phenomenological direct realism has answers to the five arguments which gave rise to the sense datum and representationalist theories, it also has three features, I argue, which make it problematic for a materialist ontology. |
| Supervisor | Robinson, Howard |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2017/hoveman_frederick.pdf |
Visit the CEU Library.
© 2007-2021, Central European University