

Shifting Relations in South-East Asia: The changing Philippine-Sino-American foreign relations in the early era of the Duterte administration.

Juda A. Jelinek

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of International Relations

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations

Supervisor: Professor Achim Kemmerling

Budapest, Hungary

2017



Word count: 17245

Abstract

This thesis investigates the significant change in the Philippine foreign policy towards the USA and China. The causes of the drastic turn in Philippine foreign policy will be examined by assessing the extent to which personal, internal or external factors, such as Duterte's personal perceptions, domestic characteristics and pressure, or the shift in global power, contribute as decisive influences in the process. The research examines the Duterte administration's foreign policy formulation by conducting a thorough multi-level and actor-specific foreign policy analysis and scrutinizing president Duterte's key foreign policy related English language speeches through qualitative content analysis. The thesis argues, that the radical shift in the foreign relations of the Philippines under the rule of president Duterte will be of indicative nature of the underlying trend governing other countries' future foreign policy conduct. Moreover, the thesis argues that the phenomenon of China's ascent as a great-power will re-draw the map of power relations, initially in the unstable Asia-Pacific-region and later elsewhere, and that this process ultimately will result in repercussions which will affect the international community of the global stage at large.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	i
Table of Contents.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Introduction	1
Chapter One: Methodology	5
Chapter Two: The Rise of China and the Shift in Global Power	15
Chapter Three: The Philippines in the Global System	23
Chapter Four: The Recurrence of the Equi-Balancing Strategy	30
Duterte and the USA: the politics of separation.....	32
Duterte’s Pivot to China.....	36
Conclusions	41
Bibliography	43

Acknowledgements

The most sincere gratitude and expression of appreciation to my Supervisor, Professor Achim Kemmerling, for all the guidance, advice and moral support he provided.

To the Department of International Relations at the Central European University for providing me with the skills, knowledge and insights flowing into this work.

*To my beloved and loving Partner, V.P.C. Klemt, for helping me to clear my thoughts, for encouraging me with his optimism, discussions and visions and for being there for me during countless sleepless nights and lighting up my days.
May the Future allow us to continue our happy days together.*

“For those with an interest in thinking strategically about modern international affairs, there is no more important challenge than to understand the nature and implications of a rising China.”¹

Introduction

On 30 May 2016, the anti-crime politician and mayor, Rodrigo Duterte, took office as the 16th president of the Philippines. Since then, president Duterte has jeopardized his country's diplomatic relations with the USA by expressing strong anti-US sentiment and evoking anti-colonialist nationalist rhetoric. On the other hand, he has taken a pragmatic approach in reconciling Chinese-Philippine relations. Controversially, Duterte has put to rest the question of enforcing the long sought-after recent verdict of the International Arbitration Court, which, with regard to the South-Chinese sea dispute, ruled in favor of the Philippines.² These foreign policy (FP) actions are in sharp contrast to those pursued by the prior Aquino administration, which strongly promoted the Philippine's maritime interests in the South-China Sea and sought strategic military alliance with the USA to ensure the geopolitical power-balance in the South-Asian region.³ Fundamental changes in Philippine FP conduct thus are apparent and it is likely that these will show substantial effects on world politics by reconfiguring the not-so-stable order associated with the South-Asian region, which ultimately may result in increased global insecurity.

The thesis assesses the extent of and ways in which the Philippines' history, geography and place in the international system of power influence its FP outcomes. The thesis will also examine president Duterte's perceptions of China and the USA and how this may influence his FP formulation. The thesis moreover, will investigate a host of Philippine FP measures that were, are in force or are in formulation, which will define the Duterte Administration's interactions with the USA and China. Furthermore, another aim of this thesis is to stipulate whether similarly to the Philippines' case, the re-alignment of FP towards China may be expected to become a regional or global trend, which would ultimately reshape the global system of power in world politics as we know it. To achieve this, the thesis will first

¹ G. Segal and Goodman D. S. G, *China Rising* (Routledge: 1997),p.:1

² Permanent Court of Arbitration, *The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic Of The Philippines V. The People's Republic Of China)* (The Hague, Press Release, 12 July,2016), <https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf>

³ S.C. Greitens, "The US-Philippine Alliance in a Year of Transition: Challenges & Opportunities" (Brookings Working Paper, Center for East Asian Policy Studies, May,2016),p.:1-2. Available from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20160713_philippines_alliance.pdf Date accessed 15/05/2017

analyse the origins and decisive factors influencing Philippine FP, then examine Philippine FP actions towards China and the USA (including Duterte's speeches) and the reactions they evoked and based on these findings, the thesis finally speculates about ramifications.

The present thesis has three main arguments. Firstly, it argues that the Duterte administration will seek to resolve the South China Sea conflict through political bargaining with China. Secondly it argues that the turn in the South-China sea conflict, (meaning that instead of waiting for the US to reinforce the applicable international laws, the Philippines will seek bilateral arrangement with China) signals the shift in global power and the continuous erosion of US hegemony. Thirdly the thesis attests that the significant realignment in the Philippine FP towards China is part of a larger and powerful trend, which will manifest itself first in the FP conduct of the countries in the proximity of China and gradually of those further away from it.

In terms of methodology, the thesis benefited the most from the prior works of Hudson on foreign policy analysis (FPA),⁴ Carlsnaes' tripartite approach,⁵ Glaser and Strauss'⁶ book on the grounded theory method, and Glaser and Laudel's⁷ article on content analysis. The thesis builds on the 'level of analyses' approach to the study of International Relations, which was first advocated for by K.N. Waltz in 1959 when he put forward the 'three images' approach. D. Singer in 1961 reviewed and expanded the approach presented by Waltz and established the 'three levels of analysis approach which can be used for FP analysis.'⁸ Hudson's work on FPA and the levels of analysis, claims that FPA is useful to International Relations, because it enables the analyses of the effects of change at one level of analysis on phenomena at a different level. Hudson argues that FPA can be used to examine the effects of substantive change in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, on FP.⁹ In this thesis, actor-specific FPA is used to examine how the ascent of China impairs the unipolar world-order, which shows its effects in the realignment of Philippine FP.

⁴ MV. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Volume 1, Issue 1 March,(2005) P.: 1–30.

⁵ W. Carlsnaes et al., *Handbook of International Relations* (Sage Publications,2007),p.:289-360

⁶ B. G Glaser and Strauss A. L, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company,1967.),p.:2. cited in Brittney Becker, "The Grounded Theory Method and its uses for political science" *Series of Papers: Methods of Field Research* No 4,(2012)

⁷ Jochen Glaser and Grit Laudel, "Life With and Without Coding: Two Methods for Early-Stage Data Analysis in Qualitative Research Aiming at Causal Explanations", *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* (14(2),2013, Art. 5)

⁸ K. N. Waltz, *Man, the state, and war: a theoretical analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press,1959); David J. Singer,(1961) 'The level-of-analysis problem in international relations', (*World Politics*, 14:1, 77–92); cited in Owen Temby, "What are levels of analysis and what do they contribute to international relations theory?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 28:4,(2015),p.:723-724

⁹ Hudson.,2005, "Foreign Policy Analysis",p.:13

It will be explained that Carlsnaes' multi-level, tripartite approach entailing the intentional, dispositional and structural dimensions, was selected for this thesis.¹⁰ Moreover, in line with Glaser and Strauss' recommendations, the thesis recognizes the importance and possibility for the generation of a middle-range theory using the 'hermeneutical circle' approach. The hermeneutical circle approach was first pioneered by protestant Theologian Schleiermacher (1768-1834), and will be elaborated upon more extensively.¹¹ Both the FPA and the middle-range theory approach or in other words grounded theory method (GTM), endorse the use of content analysis and this thesis,¹² as explained in the Methodology chapter, will rely on qualitative content analyses and will summarize and interpret texts from Duterte's key FP speeches to bring about a more robust conclusion.

There is a wide range of literature dealing with the FP of the Philippines. Particularly the recent works of De Castro proved to be the most encompassing and up-to-date and thus served as vital contributions to this thesis.¹³ Generally, however, he presents no-, or only weak linkages between the methodology used and the applicable theoretical considerations. Because internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision maker,¹⁴ the particularity of FPA is that it presents a possibility for International Relations to deal with the 'inside' and 'outside' (internal and external factors to the state's FP) simultaneously, while providing valuable opportunities for the confrontation of theories with the 'real world' as well as for the construction of new theories.¹⁵ Even though there is an ample amount of research concerning the Philippine's FP, they generally fail to theoretically underpin their chosen methodological approach or they lack methodology and neglect theory-generation based on the empirical evidence they examine. Therefore, with an aim to provide a unique contribution to the field, this paper will systematically implement the level of analysis approach in examining the tectonic shift in the Duterte administration's FP and argues for a pre-theory based on the findings.

With regard to structure the thesis pursues the following organization: in the methodological overview section (Chapter One) the thesis will present the key terms of the *modus operandi* utilized; the 'level

¹⁰ Carlsnaes et al., *Handbook of International Relations*, p.:343.

¹¹ F. Schleiermacher, "Hermeneutik und Kritik", ed. M. Frank, (Frankfurt a. M.: 1977) 76. cited in Jean Grondin, "What is the hermeneutical circle?" First draft of an essay to be published in N. Keane and C. Lawn (eds.) *The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics* (2016). Available at http://www.academia.edu/13944229/What_is_the_hermeneutical_circle Accessed: 15/05/2017

¹² Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis"; Glaser and Laudel, "Life With and Without Coding"

¹³ Renato Cruz De Castro, "Twenty-First Century Philippines' Policy Toward an Emergent China: From Equi-Balancing to Strategic Balancing" *Asian Politics & Policy*, Volume 8, Issue 2, April, 2016, p.:305–328; Renato Cruz De Castro, "The Duterte Administration's Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration's Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China" *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 35, 3, p139-159., (2016),;

¹⁴ Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p.:3

¹⁵ S. Smith, et al., *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. (Oxford University Press, 2012), p, 36, 113-114

of analyses' and Carlsnaes' multi-level, tripartite approaches to FPA will be discussed.¹⁶ This section will also elaborate on the middle-range-theory and the hermeneutical circle as well as the method of qualitative content analysis, which will be used to support these processes. In the following sections the thesis will be organized in line with the three preeminent levels of analysis of FPA. Chapter Two, of the thesis will focus on the global systemic level and thus various theories and considerations about the implications of the rise of china as a great-power will be addressed.

Moving onto the domestic-state level of analysis, Chapter Three, explores how the historical, geographical and cultural factors influence the Philippines' position in the system of international relations and thus its FP conduct. In order to do this, the thesis will explore the colonial history of the Philippines and its FP directions during its early stage of democracy as well as the South China Sea dispute which is fueled by the country's specific geographic position and particularly by the valuable and excessive resources its territory embodies. Consequently, in Chapter Four, an assessment of the recent developments in the Philippine FP towards China and the United States will be conducted with a focus at the agent-level. In this section an actor-specific examination of the FP formulation and practice is carried out, which will be further substantiated with empirical evidence derived from Duterte's public speeches through qualitative content analysis. In the final section, an assessment of the findings will provide conclusions and suggestions for possible further research.

This thesis aims to serve as a valuable contribution to the field of International Relations by providing an up-to-date and innovative analysis of the dynamics, processes and directions of contemporary Philippine FP towards the USA and China. The research will further our understanding of the trends of realigning FP and the changing power relations in the South-Asian region, which indeed might be interpreted as a consequence signaling the change in global power and the reorganization of the map of world politics as a result of diminishing US hegemony.

¹⁶ Carlsnaes et al., *Handbook of International Relations*, p.:343.

Chapter One: Methodology

As a field of study in International Relations, foreign policy analysis (FPA) is characterized by its actor-specific focus.¹⁷ In the simplest terms, it is the study of the process, effects, causes and outputs of foreign policy decision – making it either a comparative or case-specific manner.¹⁸ Foreign policy (FP) is a government strategy that will guide the state's action in the international arena. FP consists of actions state leaders have decided to pursue in a given situation, which also includes decisions to do nothing. In other words, FP practice can be defined as the state's action to achieve power through the international community. The elemental and often implicative premise of FPA theorizes that human beings, acting as a group or within a group, constitute and induce modifications in international politics.¹⁹ FPA is well-suited to serve the concrete theory that can reinvigorate the connection between IR actor-general theory and its social science foundation²⁰. Thus, Hudson insists that social science is the study of "how humans perceive and react to the world around them, how humans shape and shaped by the world around them"²¹ and it is this focus FPA could help IR return to.²²

As endorsed by Hudson, the research will test the possibility of the integration of International Relations theories with FPA theories by examining the effects of change at one level of analysis on phenomena at a different level. Hudson illustrates this with the example of the mid-1990s efforts to examine the effects of substantive change in international system (the end of the Cold War), on FP.²³ In this thesis this approach is used to illustrate how the rise of China threatens US hegemony and the unipolar world-order, with this inducing substantive change in the international system which shows its effects in the realignment of Philippine FP.

Policy formulation is a diplomatic process of the FP process which precedes diplomatic activity. Diplomatic Studies is a broad discipline of international relations and it is one of those branches that

¹⁷ Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p.:1–30.

¹⁸ F. Herman, "Actors And Structures In Process And Policy Approaches To China's Peacekeeping", *Asian Journal of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities*, Vol. 4, No. 2, (2016) ISSN 2311-3782
<http://www.multidisciplinaryjournals.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/FULL-PAPER-ACTORS-AND-STRUCTURES-IN-PROCESS-AND-POLICY-APPROACHES...pdf>

¹⁹ Foreign Policy Analysis, Department of Political Science, College of Arts & Science, and the University of Missouri, 2012. [Online]. Available at <http://foreignpolicyanalysis.org> cited in Herman, "Actors And Structures In Process And Policy Approaches To China's Peacekeeping" p.:20

²⁰ R. Lane, "Concrete Theory: An Emerging Political Method". *American Political Science Review* 84:927–940(1990). cited in Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p.:2

²¹ M.V. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, Foreign Policy Analysis (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007), p.:3

²² A.M. Skonieczny, "Trading Stories: Narrative, Event and Social Theory in International Economic Relations" (University of Minnesota, 2008), p.:46

²³ Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis" p.:13

have always resisted theorization. The paper will engage with the preeminent themes of the three dominant research traditions (three levels of analysis) and will concentrate on the areas of most progressive theory formulation in contemporary FPA: decision making, leader characteristics, culture and identity, methodology, and integration.²⁴




FIGURE 1. THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Source: Author's own, based on R. Jackson and G. Sorensen 2010. p.:230-231²⁵

Many IR scholars agree that global politics can best be understood by focusing on one or more of these three levels, because a multi-level analysis seems more capable of coping with the complexity of the world's affairs. FP outcomes result from multiple forces at various levels of the analysis. Therefore, instead of thinking in terms of a logic of mutual exclusion, the research will make use of the conceptualization of a blended analytical framework presented by Carlsnaes et al.²⁶ "Even though they are analytically autonomous, these three dimensions are understood as closely linked in the sense that they can be conjoined in a logical, step-by-step manner to render increasingly exhaustive explanations of FP actions".²⁷ Carlsnaes' tripartite approach consists of an intentional, dispositional and structural dimension of explanation as shown below:

²⁴ Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p.:14

²⁵ R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, *International Relations Theories and Approaches*. (Oxford University Press., 2010), p.:226-247.

²⁶ Carlsnaes et al., *Handbook of International Relations*, p.:342-43

²⁷ Carlsnaes et al., *Handbook of International Relations*, p.:343.

DIMENSIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY




FIGURE 2. Tripartite Dimensions of Foreign Policy

Source: Author's own, based on Carlsnaes et al.²⁸

The crucial aspect that distinguishes FPA from more general IR is this persistence that, “a compelling explanation [of foreign policy] cannot treat the decider exogenously”.²⁹ Hence individual decision makers are important to this thesis since FP is conducted by individuals such as presidents, prime ministers and ambassadors. Dissecting and analyzing FP formulation is one of the key aims of this thesis. The paper considers it crucial because diplomatic practice evolves from the formulation of FP. The goal is not to construct a grand theory but to construct an actor-specific middle-range theory: “to succeed partially is not to fail completely”.³⁰ Rosenau (referred to as the first captain of FPA theories) encouraged the creation of pre-theories through the construction of middle-range theories, which are ‘mediated between grand principles and the complexity of reality’, and would lead to the development of generalizable propositions.³¹ The current thesis, as argued for by Rosenau, aims to integrate grand theories and evidence from various levels of analyses from the individual actor to the global systemic level in order to formulate a pre-theory.

²⁸ Carlsnaes et al. *Handbook of International Relations*, p.:230-231

²⁹ M.G Hermann and W. C. Kegley, “Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology” *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no 4(1995), p.:514.

³⁰ C.W. Kegley, “The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: Paradigm Lost?” *Institute of International Studies*, Essay Series No. 10, (University of South Carolina. 1980), p.:12

³¹ J.M. Rosenau, “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, In Approaches” in *Comparative and International Politics*, edited by R. Barry Farrell. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press.1966). cited in Smith, et al., *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. (Oxford University Press,2012), p, 7, 16

When faced with the dilemma whether to quantify or not to quantify, with a view of aspects that are non-quantifiable, yet influential in the given context, including perceptions, culture, memory and history, the proposed research will take a qualitative approach. Some have argued that FPA implies a “back-breaking burden” of a near-impossible-to-process volume of variables to be scrutinized by the researcher.³² Others claimed that in FPA, hard science like grand theory is not feasible because of too much and too detailed information and because targets and ambitions are both dependent and independent variables, which add to limitations of the scope. But as suggested by Hudson this thesis will regard these assertions as false because FPA theoretically engages the ground of IR.³³ Instead, the thesis provides positive value to IR by devising a pre-theory.

While physical scientists are able to survey the amplitude of light radiating from stars and derive interpretations about heat and other processes which generate it, IR scholars are capable of scaling the spectrum of speech originating from state leaders and establish inferences about thoughts and other processes that induced them.³⁴ In qualitative content analysis, data are presented in words and themes, which makes it possible to draw some interpretation of the results. Individual decisions such as speech acts reflect the values and beliefs of the decision maker as well as their personality.³⁵ After all political processes are induced by ideas which are often expressed through verbal utterances (speeches) thus such instances can give hints of a leader’s mental processes and hence potential future actions.

Actor-specific theory is concrete, contextual and complex, the choice of methods used in the thesis thus includes in-depth case study, content analysis and agent-based analysis. The current thesis chose qualitative approach because many of the variables examined are non-quantifiable.³⁶ In terms of content analysis, the research will examine Duterte’s English language speeches that are considered to be most representative about the future directions of the Philippine-Chinese-American foreign relations. “Content analysis is a research method that provides a systematic and objective means to make valid inferences from verbal, visual, or written data in order to describe and quantify specific

³² H. McColsky, "Concerning Strategies for Science of International Politics" in Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton S., *Foreign Policy Decision-Making*. (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1967), p.:201

³³ Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p.:3

³⁴ S.G. Walker, et al., *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioural International Relations*. (Routledge, 2010.), p.:16

³⁵ E. Brighi, and Hill C., "Implementation and Behavior", In S. Smith, Hadfield, A. and Dunne, T., *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.:120 cited in F. Herman, "ACTORS AND STRUCTURES IN PROCESS AND POLICY APPROACHES TO CHINA'S PEACEKEEPING" *Asian Journal of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities*, Vol. 4, No. 2, (2016), p.:22

³⁶ Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p.:14

phenomena”.³⁷ Although, speech is not the same as FP, speeches of highly ranked government officials, such as president Duterte, can be seen as being indicative of the formulation of states’ FP direction.

During the process of content analysis as advised by Glaser and Laudel, the research will build on extracting relevant information, by separating certain passages and sentences from the public speeches of President Rodrigo Duterte.³⁸ Because the research uses qualitative content analysis the focus will be on *what* was said, instead of *how* it was said.³⁹ A popular definition of qualitative content analysis was put forward by Holsti: “Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages”.⁴⁰ Hsieh and Shannon defines qualitative content analysis as research directed at the features of communication, which is transmitted through the medium of language, by considering the content or circumstantial implications of the text.⁴¹ However, crucially the present thesis uses the definition of Peter Burnham et al.: “Whenever somebody reads, or listens to, the content of a body of communication and then summarizes and interprets what is there, then content analysis can be said to have taken place”.⁴²

Laswell sums up the primary aim of qualitative content analysis as the query into “Who (says) What (to) Whom (in) what Channel (with) What Effect?”⁴³ whereas others claim that exploration, description, comparison, and testing models are the four aims of qualitative analysis.⁴⁴ Hermann and Winter used qualitative content analysis to establish the causes and effects of leaders’ behavioral

³⁷ B. Downe-Wambolt, “Content analysis: method, applications and issues.” *Health Care for Women International*, Volume 13, 1992 - Issue 3 ,p.:314. cited in M, Bengtsson, “How to plan and perform a qualitative study using content analysis.” *NursingPlus Open*, Volume 2,2016 (Elsevier,2016),p.:8–14, ,p.:9.
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352900816000029>

³⁸ Glaser and Laudel, “Life With and Without Coding”,p.:11

³⁹ Ibid,p.:31

⁴⁰ O.R. Holsti, *Content analysis for the social sciences and humanities*. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 1969),p.:14

⁴¹ , R. W. Budd. et al., *Content analysis of communications*. (New York: Macmillan 1967); K. Lindkvist, “Approaches to textual analysis”. In K. E. Rosengren (Ed.), *Advances in content analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.1981)p.:23-41.; D.-G. McTavish, & Pirro, E.-B. “Contextual content analysis.” *Quality and Quantity*, 24,(1990) 245-265; R. Tesch,. *Qualitative research: Analysis types and software tools*. (Bristol, PA: Falmer,1990) cited in H-F Hsieh and S. E. Shannon, "Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis" *Qual Health Res*,2005 15: 1277 (Sage Oct 4,2005),p.:1281

⁴² P.Burnham et al., *Research Methods in Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2008.,p.:259., cited in N. Saeid et al, "Research Methodology In Geopolitics: Application Of Qualitative Content Analysis In Studying The Geopolitical Codes Case". *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations* 2:208-222.,2008. P.:209

⁴³ H. Lasswell, “The Structure and Function of Communication in Society” *İletişim kuram ve araştırma dergisi* Sayı 24 Kış-Bahar,2007,s.215-228,p.217

⁴⁴ B. H. Russel and G. W. Ryan,. *Analyzing qualitative data: Systematic approaches* London, Sage,2010.p.:8-10 cited in Glaser and Laudel,"Life With and Without Coding",p.:4

characteristics by using evidence derived from interviews and speeches.⁴⁵ They engaged in content analysis to examine the unsolicited speech-acts of decision makers to conduct evaluations on habitual patterns, thoughts and emotions of the actors studied.

The study of behavioural traits and ideational processes of the leaders are important because they influence largely the style of their political conduct and thus are considered to be important factors, decisive of the ways politicians use information, act in conflicts and govern their states. Behavioural leadership traits analysis is predominantly conducted by content analyses of politicians' speeches and publications. The major shortcoming of speech-based leadership traits analysis is, that leaders are analysed from far away.⁴⁶ However, since members of the political elites are generally very difficult to access, if at all possible, such a leadership traits analysis based on content analysis of speeches could still provide a valuable contribution to our understanding of FP decision makers.

Of course, the so-called science war showed no mercy on the field of content analysis either, and there is an enduring, heated discussion between the apostles of quantitative and qualitative research paradigms.⁴⁷ On the one side of this paradigm war is the disciplined positivistic notion of research with a quantitative, experimental methodology, whilst on the other side there is the non-exclusive, explorative, descriptive, analytical notion of research relying on qualitative methods.⁴⁸ Currently, qualitative content analysis is a popular method applied to conduct behavioural, psychological, historical cultural and historical inquiries, and also to evaluate social and political changes. In International Relations it is also relied upon, particularly, for the analysis of political communications and political leader's behavioral characteristics.⁴⁹ Of course it is very difficult, if not unattainable, to impute direct inferences based on speeches, however, as Erisen argues, in the case of high profile politicians, such as presidents, these speeches are often the only sources that are available for the

⁴⁵ M. G. Hermann, "Explaining foreign policy behaviour using the personal characteristics of political leaders." *International Studies Quarterly*, 24,(1980).p.:7-46; M. G. Hermann, *Assessing leadership style: A trait analysis*, OH: Social Science Automation,2002. Available at <http://socialscience.net/docs/Ita.pdf>; D. Winter, "Measuring the motives of political actors at a distance". In J. Post (Ed.), *The psychological assessment of political leaders* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,2005). pp. 153-177., cited in J.T.Ishiyama and M. Breuning, *21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook University of (North Texas, Sage,2010).p.:493*

⁴⁶ E. Erisen, "An Introduction to Political Psychology for International Relations Scholars" *PERCEPTIONS*, Autumn,2012, Volume XVII, Number 3,pp.9-28. (Center for Strategic Research,2012)p.:21

⁴⁷ F. Kohlbacher, "The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research" *FQS*, Volume 7, No. 1, Art. 21 – January,(2006)

⁴⁸ P. Mayring, *Qualitative content analysis: theoretical foundation, basic procedures and software solution*.(Klagenfurt,2014)p.:5

⁴⁹ R.P. Weber, "Basic Content Analysis" *Quantitative Applications in The Social Sciences*, Issue: 49, (Sage,1990),p.:14

researcher and thus speeches can still serve as valuable sources of information regarding probable future policy actions.⁵⁰

In order to conduct content analysis, it is necessary to structure raw data and this can be done by explaining the connection between the evidence and the research questions and identifying inference between the empirical evidence. Qualitative content analysis creates categories based on interpretation of the evidence and thus it is an inductive approach, meaning that topics and concepts are derived from the investigator's assessment of the evidence.⁵¹ However qualitative content analysis is not exclusionary of deductive approaches either. In fact, it often uses a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning. This is because the prior construction of theoretical or conceptual preconceptions as well as the forming of the categories can be derived from theoretical consideration.⁵² Such categories may be drawn from theoretical bases or they can also be improvised based on the data that the movie, text or speech represents. Qualitative content analysis methods usually rely on a mix of empirical and theoretical tools of categorization. Moreover, these categories, if founded on theory, can later be altered based on the evidence or they may also be based on the evidence and adjusted to the fitting theoretical constructs.⁵³

The methodology of content analysis is far from having rules that are carved in stone. As a result, these categories are rather fluid in terms of what they embody. One possible definition regards them as "descriptors of empirical information".⁵⁴ The categories selected for the current thesis were formulated given the consideration of the researcher and based on the preconceptions of the thesis and the speeches of Duterte, these categories are: *anti-US*, *pro-China*, *independence-seeking*, *embracing alternative world-order*. These categories are informed by 'topics, key themes and central questions' of the thesis and guide the structuring of the text components as well as provided considerations for the priory selection of the sample units.⁵⁵ The sample entails speeches of Duterte considered to be the most relevant in terms of Philippine-Sino-American FP, were sampled from the first 150 days of his presidency. When the qualitative content analysis seeks to justify or supplement conceptually a theoretical framework or pre-theory as in the case of the present thesis, it means that

⁵⁰ E. Erisen, "An Introduction to Political Psychology for International Relations Scholars" *PERCEPTIONS*, Autumn, 2012, Volume XVII, Number 3, pp.:9-28. (Center for Strategic Research, 2012), p.:21

⁵¹ M.Q. Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*. 9Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002) cited in Y, Zhang and B.M. Wildemuth, "Qualitative Analysis of Content" In *Applications of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and Library Science*, 308–19. (Westport, CT: Libraries Unlimited), 2009.p.:2

⁵² B.L. Berg, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. (Boston, 2001)., cited in *ibid*.p.:2

⁵³ Glaser & Laudel, "Life With and Without Coding" *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 14(2), 2013, Art. 5, p.10

⁵⁴ *ibid*.p.:10

⁵⁵ Kohlbacher, "The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research"

the directed approach of content analysis is being utilized.⁵⁶ Moreover, conditional to the kind of research-inquiries pursued and the magnitude of influence a researcher has on behavioral outcomes and the scope of whether investigating present day or past affairs, qualitative content analysis can use case studies that are exploratory and descriptive.⁵⁷

This research thus uses directed, interpretive, explorative, qualitative content analysis. As previously applied by Klinkforth,⁵⁸ the process of content analysis used in this thesis has two phases. Firstly, text components of Duterte's speeches' are gathered and described. The following guiding questions, which emanate from the inquiries of the research will be used for the analysis: How are Duterte's arguments formulated? What are Duterte's main considerations concerning Philippine-US-Chinese foreign relations? What future actions are being suggested? Secondly, based on the findings of the text components' summary, explication and contextualization⁵⁹ Duterte's main FP motives will be extracted to reveal directions which may determine the course of Philippine FP in the future.

The "hermeneutical circle" approach is also utilized by the thesis. The "hermeneutical circle" is a process used for analysis and interpretation; it consists of the prior formulation of preconceptions or theories and the adjustment of those preconceptions or theoretical considerations based on evidence presented in the text.⁶⁰ The pre-theories are entailed in the three main arguments of the theses and were discussed earlier in the Introduction. These preconceptions will be justified, adjusted or falsified based on the empirical evidence, which will be analyzed later. Thus the thesis also aims to build a pre-theory, which will be grounded in data as it will be constructed based on the analysis of empirical evidence.

Glaser and Laudel explain that although qualitative content analysis provides a sufficient framework for how the evidence (such as texts and pictures) can and should be scrutinized, but it remains rather uncertain what the actual goal of such an examination should be. Glaser and Laudel point out, that the aims of qualitative research more often than not are very abstract and when it comes to the methods of the examination of qualitative data there is just a feeble linkage to various kinds of research

⁵⁶Hsieh and Shannon, "Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis"p.:1281

⁵⁷ R. K. Yin, , *Case study research, design and methods* (3rd ed., vol. 5). (Thousand Oaks: Sage.2003) pp.1, 3-10)4) cited in Kohlbacher, "The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research" *FQS* Volume 7, No. 1, Art. 21 – January,(2006)

⁵⁸ K. Klinkforth, *NATO in U.S. Policymaking and Debate – An Analysis: 'Drawing the Map' of the U.S. Think Tank Debate on NATO since 9/11*. (Osteuropa-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin Arbeitsbereich Politik und Gesellschaft, Berlin,2006).

⁵⁹ Kohlbacher, "The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research"

⁶⁰ Schleiermacher (1768-1834) cited in *Mayring,2014, Qualitative content analysis: theoretical foundation, basic procedures and software solution*. p. 11

purposes that the analysis aims to fulfill.⁶¹ Glaser and Laudel argue that these instances leave out the purpose of constructing new theories. Importantly, Glaser and Laudel reveal that the single methodological approach in which theory generation is consistently addressed is that of the Grounded Theory Method (GTM), which constructs original theory based on the qualitative examination of empirical evidence.⁶²

The present thesis methodologically also builds on the GTM in order to construct a middle-range theory. GTM is an inductive approach, which is well-suited to help researchers to devise theories, which are “grounded” in empirical data and hence are able to provide fitting accounts of the case, subject to the examination.⁶³ Becker explains that, the core idea of the influential *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* is “the discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from social research”.⁶⁴ Therefore the theory is formed in an inductive fashion from an examination of the narrowly inspected evidence, contrary to the deductive approach, which implies “theory generated by logical deduction from a priori assumptions”.⁶⁵ Deductive approaches were the prevailing choice of method before the rise of GTM.

But the proponents of GTM had a strong preference of inductive theory generation, contrary to the verification focused deductive approaches. Glaser and Strauss argue against the neglect of theory generation in political science and claims, that constructing the theory inductively, helps in devising theories, which reflect the evidence and therefore are better suited to describe real world phenomenon, which is subject to the scientific scrutiny.⁶⁶ The construction of middle range theories present a tool for the mechanistic explanation of a phenomena. And thus, such scientific endeavors usually start with research questions that are originated from theory.⁶⁷ Since the end of the 1990’s there was a shift away from “grand theories” to “middle-range theories” and this was particularly relevant in the sub-disciplines of political science such as the field of International Relations.⁶⁸

The thesis uses FPA to research the FP conduct and formulation of the Duterte Administration. It will focus on the three levels of analysis: global system, state-level and agent-level. As discussed earlier,

⁶¹ Glaser and Laudel, "Life With and Without Coding" p.:4

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*.p.:4

⁶⁴ Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*.p.:2. cited in Becker, "The Grounded Theory Method and its uses for political science",p.:5

⁶⁵ Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*.p.:3 cited in Becker, "The Grounded Theory Method and its uses for political science",p.:5

⁶⁶ Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*.p.:6 cited in Becker, "The Grounded Theory Method and its uses for political science"p.:5-6

⁶⁷ Glaser and Laudel, "Life With and Without Coding",p.:5

⁶⁸ Becker, 2012, "The Grounded Theory Method and its uses for political science"

one way to achieve an agent-level, actor-specific FPA is by the use of qualitative content analysis of a leader's speeches. The conducts qualitative content analysis in order to supplement the agent-level inquiry and build a more robust conclusion. The thesis will use English language speeches of president Duterte presented during his campaign and the first 150 days of his presidency that are most relevant to the Philippines' FP towards China and the USA. The pre-theory which this thesis argues for, is that the phenomena of China's ascent as a great-power will re-draw the map of power relations. This change will initially manifest itself in the unstable countries of the Asia-Pacific-region and later elsewhere. This process has important implications since ultimately it will result in the reconfiguration of the western-centric world-order.

Chapter Two: The Rise of China and the Shift in Global Power

The previous chapter discussed the research methods, which will be utilised in this thesis. As mentioned before, the analysis on the systemic level is one way to conduct foreign policy analysis. In order to establish the analysis on the systemic level the following section will elaborate on the shift in global power which significantly influences the Philippine foreign policy (FP) on the systemic level because it changes the global structure of power. Some scholars argue that the US-dominated World-Order has reached its impasse and the Western-focused global political organization has begun to crumble and that at the same time the created power vacuum will be filled by the rise of the *Eastern Giant*. Niall Ferguson, the popular historian, in his seminal book writes about “the descent of the west” and a dramatic “reorientation of the world”⁶⁹ towards the Orient. Realist interpreters of the phenomena claim that since China gains more domination and the hegemonic position of the USA relapses, China will increasingly seek to utilize its increasing leverage to readjust the rules of the game and institutions of the global order, in a way which best suits its causes. Moreover, states belonging to the ‘western focused system’ and particularly the USA will increasingly recognize China as source of risk against their security. The shift in global power is expected to manifest suspicion, rivalry, strife and even violent conflict. In this simplistic realist understanding the ascent of China and the demising USA thus will bring about a tense competition over the laws and governance of the global order.⁷⁰ From the realist point of view a state on the rise will simply always want more.

Spykman came to the conclusion that there are only very few instances when a progressive and tenacious state has exercised heavy limits to its potential.⁷¹ Carr similarly to the simple realist perception, attested that the possession of power invariably provokes the desire to gain more power.⁷² Gilpin, notes that states whose power is on the rise aim to expand their political domination.⁷³ Moreover Morgenthau claims that on occasions when the international balance of power shifts, all states will make use of the opportunities to further their status. Therefore, the underlying principle of

⁶⁹ Quoted in F.A. Chowdhury, "The Rise of China and Transitional Anxieties" Working Paper Series n°5: *Narratives of Peace and Conflict*, (Liverpool Hope University, UK July,2015)

⁷⁰ Ikenberry G. John, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West' *Foreign Affairs*, 00157120, Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87, Issue 1.(2008)

⁷¹ Nicholas Spykman *America's Strategy in World Politics*.(New York: Harcourt, Brace 1942),p.: 20–4 cited in J. Kirshner, "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China." *European Journal of International Relations* 18: 53–75,(2012),p.:58-59

⁷² EH Carr "The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939"2nd edn. (New York: St. Martin's Press 1946) ,p.:112 cited in *ibid.*,p.:58-59

⁷³R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)p.:112 cited in *ibid.*,p.:58-59

international organization is that a power vacuum will always be filled by intrinsically power hungry states.⁷⁴ Although traditional realist interpretations, these assumptions are applicable to the current conduct of international relations as well and especially when attempting to investigate the phenomena of the emerging China and the reaction of other states to this process. China is a rising great-power, is congested between other great-powers due to its geographical position and is entangled in an array of security issues. China's pressing need for raw materials implies the possibility for competition over resources with other states. Moreover, while China is a major contestant of the USA's hegemony, the two countries' economies are deeply interrelated.⁷⁵

Based on the historical evidence, some scholars stipulate that since Imperial China was more peaceful than the European empires, similarly, the modern-time ascend of China could be a process defined by 'peaceful rise'. Their standpoint is that the advent of China contrary to the realists' claim will result in the development in a more harmonious system of international order.⁷⁶ For example, Martin Jacques, in his 'When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order' stipulates that imperial China was the oldest 'civilization-state' whose cultural integrity and high self-esteem remained unparalleled during history. Preceding the West by far, China established a sound and unique organization of state administration, which was managed by professional civil servants. Jacques explains that in ancient China, rather than using coercion, education was used to win minds and hearts, moreover the empire was able to adjoin surrounding territories to its tributary system with little use of crude force. This interpretation imputes that as China becomes more powerful and expands its influence onto the regions that surrounds it, a contemporary version of this tributary system will evolve and become the defining feature of political organization. Together with this, the ancient pride of China and China's self-image based on perceived superiority would also come to the fore.⁷⁷

Overall, however even Jacques' humanistic interpretations, he too agrees to the basic premise, namely, that the ascend of the Asian Giant will ultimately result in the turning of the table in the international system and bring about a world in which US hegemony decays and thus the US and other powers feel increasingly insecure. The rise of China of course also makes itself felt by reshaping the

⁷⁴H. Morgenthau "In Defense of the National Interest" (New York: Knopf. 1951)p.:33, 135 cited in *ibid.*,p.:58-59

⁷⁵ "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism.",p.:58-59

⁷⁶ S. Zhao,2015. "Rethinking the Chinese World Order: The Imperial Cycle and the Rise of China." *Journal of Contemporary China* 24: 961–982. P.961-982

⁷⁷ M. Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order* (New York: Penguin Press,2009).
cited in *ibid.*p.:970-971

distribution of power in Asia.⁷⁸ In terms of the South East Asian regional security order, some, such as Renato Cruz, see China as becoming aggressive which manifests in its coercive assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea,⁷⁹ whilst others, such as the believers of the 'peaceful rise' endorse it and argue the opposite by claiming that China is actually exercising 'restraint' which can be seen, for example, in its dealing with the South China Sea dispute.

This potential for China's 'peaceful rise' was underlined by the period of a 'charm offensive' during the 1990's and early 2000s.⁸⁰ During this time, China showed ambitious engagement with South East Asia's regional intergovernmental organization ASEAN. In 2000, the Foreign Ministry of China, with relations to the South China Sea, stated that China prefers "negotiated settlement of international disputes through peaceful means".⁸¹ This led to the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea being adapted as the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002,⁸² which entailed among others: "self-restraint on the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, including among others refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays and other features."⁸³

However, the possibility for a 'peaceful rise' came under question as China has become more forceful, particularly in the matter of the South China Sea dispute. Moreover, Chinese expansionism in the East China Sea and its dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diayou islands also seem to justify those doubtful of the peace-oriented nature of China's ambitions. On the other hand, it must be noted that even though China has a great military might over members of the ASEAN, to some extent it could be argued that it still is exercising some form of restraint, because as Acharya points out China has not invaded any populated island in the archipelago since 1974 and it has solely captured uninhabited islands.⁸⁴

This two-sided interpretation of the phenomenon is also represented in the contradictory views of politicians, academics and policy think-tanks. Although the Obama administration propagated a step-by-step strategy of encircling in order to keep China in check and thus constrained the US military in

⁷⁸ Amitav Acharya, "Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerging Security Order", *International Studies Quarterly* (2014) 58, 158–173, p.:158

⁷⁹ De Castro, "Twenty-First Century Philippines' Policy Toward an Emergent China" p.:305

⁸⁰ Acharya, "Power Shift or Paradigm Shift?", p.:168

⁸¹ PRC Foreign Ministry, 2000, quoted in, Shicun Wu, Keyuan Zou, *Non-Traditional Security Issues and the South China Sea* Routledge, 2014

⁸² Tran T. T., "Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Security and Cooperation" *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, 30.06.2011, p.:1

⁸³ ASEAN, DECLARATION ON THE CONDUCT OF PARTIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2

⁸⁴ Acharya, "Power Shift or Paradigm Shift?", p.:168-169

taking any major steps, other recent statements of advisers and experts argue for the necessity of an assertive US military involvement of China.⁸⁵ The intense escalation of the situation is indicated by the heightened US military engagement in the region such as freedom of navigation operations⁸⁶ as well as the flyover of US and Australian⁸⁷ B52 bombers above the contested reefs, coincide with the ramification of claims propagating for more intensive military action.⁸⁸ In their 2015 report prepared for the Council of Foreign Relations Blackwill and Tellis for example also argued that the Obama administrations liberal and humanistic approach towards China, which aims to integrate it into the global order through peaceful means, must be replaced with a tactic incorporating firmer containment and military coercion.⁸⁹

Australia's former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd thoughtfully commented on the two types of understandings in his article examining how ancient Chinese military logic applies today. He thoughtfully drew attention that Chinese President Xi Ping relied repeatedly on passages from the 'Methods of the Sima', which is one of the seven military classics of ancient China. The 'Methods of the Sima' teaches that 'A warlike state, however big it may be, will eventually perish' this underlines China's objective to maintain peace, however the book also states that 'those who forget warfare will certainly be endangered'. These two sentiments are still relevant today and show that imperial China was war-avoiding and war-prone because conflict was perpetual.⁹⁰

The swift takeover of the South China Sea by China is absolutely contrary to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas.⁹¹ This brings rise to the question what kind of Asian Giant China will become: One which rules by law and thus abides it or one who makes law by might? China's seizure of the region already has and will endure to cause perverse implications on the adjacent states' security

⁸⁵ Richard MC. "Hawks Gain the Upper hand in US Policy on China." *Financial Times* September 8.,2015 cited in Rolf and Agnew, "Sovereignty regimes in the South China Sea",p.:261

⁸⁶ Ankit Panda,2015, "More FONOPs Coming Soon to the South China Sea?" *The Diplomat*, February 14,2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/more-fonops-coming-soon-to-the-south-china-sea/>

⁸⁷ BBC, "Australia conducting 'freedom of navigation' flights in South China Sea" *BBC*, 15 December,2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-35099445>

⁸⁸ Rolf & Agnew, "Sovereignty regimes in the South China Sea"p.:261

⁸⁹ Robert Blackwill, and Ashley Tellis. "Revising US Grand Strategy towards China" New York: Council on Foreign Relations,2015, cited in Rolf and Agnew, "Sovereignty regimes in the South China Sea",p.:261

⁹⁰ Kevin Rudd, 'How ancient Chinese thought applies today', *The World Post* (4 February,2015), available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/chinese-strategic-thoughts_b_6417754.html?clear. cited in Suisheng, "Rethinking the Chinese World Order",p.:970

⁹¹ Kraska J.,2015, *The Lost Dimension: Food Security and the South China Sea Dispute*, Online Article,2015/*The Lost Dimension*.p.:6

as it creates disturbance in maritime trade, supply chains of food and other resources.⁹² In response to this the US as the dominant global power aims to achieve international cooperation by joining interests of other countries to maintain a 'win-win' international system. The US' elemental international objective is thus to reinforce international maritime law and freedom of navigation rights, which would benefit not only the US but all countries concerned, hence the US' goal supersedes that of a limited, self-centred cause.⁹³

Following the global financial crises which hit the USA hard, but affected the Chinese economy to a lesser extent, the Xi administration exploiting its economic strength has adapted a more coercive FP.⁹⁴ Under the governance of Xi Jinping, a potent and centralized leadership emerged. Analogous to the US military revamp and spread of multilateralism, the People's Liberation Army was reinforced and China started to display its military might even beyond its own domain.⁹⁵ Although pluralism, both political and economic, was a traditional characteristic of the post-Cold-War global order, multi-polarity and fierce great-power competition is on escalation within the context of the South China Sea conflict, thus making it a theatre where the shift in global power may be observed conveniently.⁹⁶

The rise of China as a soft power will see Chinese-led institutions aimed at fostering international development such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank become more influential tools for supplementing Chinese FP and therefore expanding the Asian giant's sphere of influence. Although it currently may be facing some economic adversities, China is clearly showing signs of dynamic economic progress and is expected to keep growing and thus will achieve even more substantial economic and political significance in the future. In 2014 China was the largest exporter of goods and services globally, and the second largest importer of goods and services,

⁹² A. Cooper, "Emerging Issues: South China Sea Takeover: Destroying Fisheries and Creating Economic Dead-lands for Surrounding Coastal States" University of Baltimore *Journal of International Law*, Volume 4 Issue 1 Volume IV, No. 1, 2015-2016 Article 7(2016), p.:175

⁹³ Rolf & Agnew "Sovereignty regimes in the South China Sea", p.:265

⁹⁴ Richard Javad Heydarian, 2014, 'Hide your strength, bide your time' *AlJazeera* 21 NOVEMBER, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/china-hide-your-strength-bide-y-201411198028498329.html>

⁹⁵ Economist., 2016a. "Xi's New Model Army." Accessed Feb. 12, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/china/21688424-xi-jinping-reforms-chinas-armed-forces-to-his-own-advantage-xis-new-model-army?fsrc=scn/tw_ec/xi_s_new_model_army cited in Rolf & Agnew "Sovereignty regimes in the South China Sea", p.:252

⁹⁶ Rolf and Agnew, "Sovereignty regimes in the South China Sea", p.:252

following the United States.⁹⁷ In terms of economic weight, for example, China will surpass the United States as the largest state in the global system sometime around 2020.⁹⁸

China is already aiding the development of the states around its periphery and the funds are expected to become more generous, however this is not out of pure charity since President Xi Ping aims to counter US influence in the region.⁹⁹ The underlying geostrategic conviction of the leadership is that, once these countries are under the influence of the Chinese economic sphere they would be less attracted to support the US controlled regional security arrangements that is geared towards the 'encirclement' of China.¹⁰⁰ President Xi's new strategic mega-project, surpasses both in term of its amplitude and objectives that of the Marshall Plan's, which was used to reconstruct Europe following World War II.¹⁰¹ The initiative presents a blueprint for Asia's future infrastructure developments and thus it can be expected, that it will be important shaper of the development patterns in the Pacific-region in the 21st century.¹⁰² The formidable project which has evoked much enthusiasm from state-leaders who look forward to receiving large grants and investment is dubbed "One Belt, One Road" aims to re-establish a "New Silk Road" which will re-connect China to central Asia and Europe. The project consists of the construction of motorways, railways, power projects and building infrastructure for serving maritime shipping lanes.¹⁰³

This will likely impact on the situation in the South China Sea because although almost all states involved in the dispute reject China's claim and consider it aggressive imperial expansionism, it is more than possible that economic factors will be turned into political ones and thus used to appease their fierce contestation of China's claim. Being a strategically positioned major economic partner of China, the Philippines can expect essential and extensive funding. This puts the Philippines in a difficult

⁹⁷ World Bank, 2016, *Global Economic Prospects: Spillovers Amid Weak Growth*, Washington DC, January, 2016, cited in J. Howard, *U.S. International Economic Strategy in a Turbulent World*, (Rand Corporation, 2016)

⁹⁸ Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West"

⁹⁹ Y. van der Leer & J. Yau, "China's new silk route The long and winding road" PWC, February, 2016, p.:4

<https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/growth-markets-center/assets/pdf/china-new-silk-route.pdf>

¹⁰⁰ K. Churchman, 2015, "CHINA'S VISION FOR A NEW ASIATIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORDER" The National Bureau of Asian Research, *TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC*, December, 2015, p.:2

¹⁰¹ Wharton University Pennsylvania, "Where Will China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative Lead?", Wharton University Pennsylvania, *Public Policy*, Mar 22, 2017, <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/can-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-match-the-hype/>

¹⁰² Xuhua Huang & Haibo Mo, 2015, "Opportunities for Singapore from the One Belt, One Road Initiative" *KWM*, 27 May, 2015, <http://www.kwm.com/en/sg/knowledge/insights/opportunities-for-singapore-from-the-one-belt-one-road-initiative-20150527>

¹⁰³ The Economist, 2017, China's battle for influence in its region, *The Economist*, Print Edition, Special Report, Apr, 20th, 2017, <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21720718-countrys-status-among-its-neighbours-not-keeping-up-its-growing-powers-chinas>

position when considering whether to pursue its South China Sea claim - which was found righteous by the UN tribunal - over features presently controlled by China.¹⁰⁴

As Rolf and Agnew, in their extensive research, which investigates the possible strategies in response to the shift in the Asia Pacific power system due to the rise of China, suggests that one option for the smaller countries in the region could be to pursue a balancing-strategy between the US and China, an approach which is in line with defensive realism. From among the several options presented in the study this would most likely serve the small states the best, because it gives them certain level of autonomy and agency, which they can exploit for their own advantage. Collective defence arrangement as well as concert organization with greater powers like Japan and the USA are also possibilities. However, these would indoctrinate the severe power and capability inequalities between the weaker and more powerful states. In a collective defense arrangement the goal is to punish and deter aggressors, with the aim being to provide security "against adversaries".¹⁰⁵ This necessitates hard power and military, but since the weaker states would only be able to provide a limited material contribution, and since they would have to invest in military at a rate which is beyond their means or accept an unequal structure with an inferior position in the arrangements, which again, makes collective defence unlikely to bring about a suitable arrangement. In their paper, Rolf and Agnew, present the shared leadership system in other words consociational system as the most desirable arrangement.

The consociational system, instead of having a great-power dominating the security arrangement, has shared leadership structures that ensure equality and pluralism between weaker and more powerful states. The consociational defense arrangement is a cooperative security system seeking to achieve security with an adversary through restraint and reassurance. Thus, as opposed to collective defense, it aims to maintain security "with an adversary", or rather despite the presence of a competitor. However, such a consociational defense arrangement is not yet available nor is it likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. Balancing-strategy seems to marginalize the weaker states the least and thus could presently serve as the best means for weaker states to hedge themselves against security adversities in a situation when they have to navigate between an eroding US and a rising China, neither of which is currently able to show decisive power to conclude the rivalry.¹⁰⁶

It is evident that China presents a critical challenge to the balance of power in Asia. Its economy will surpass the USA's in the coming decade, and it is feared that as it continues to grow rapidly, while the

¹⁰⁴ Rolf and Agnew, "Sovereignty regimes in the South China Sea", p.:259-260

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Acharya, "Power Shift or Paradigm Shift?", p.:167

West experiences an extensive period of little to no growth, China could shortly be dominating Asia,¹⁰⁷ or perhaps even the world.¹⁰⁸ Although, and despite China's economic growth, the USA will remain superior in terms of military power for a long period ahead. Thus, China may experience increased anxiety as it eagerly seeks to project its influence as a great-power and it can be expected that China will engage in smaller confrontations within its geostrategic sphere of influence, such as denying access to the US and its allies close to its shorelines. Should freedom of navigation of the vital shipping lanes traversing the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean become under Chinese blockade, the US may promptly retaliate with the help of its allies, Japan and India.¹⁰⁹ Presently it seems that there is an inevitable, albeit gradual shift in global power as China, the world's populous state enduringly rises. The process introduces considerable uncertainties particularly because China is not part of the traditional post-World-War II global order. On the long run the phenomena will eventually lead to the inescapable termination of the USA's "unipolar moment" and result in a new global order evolving around the preponderance of the ascendant Asian Giant: China.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ A. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for the Mastery of Asia* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011) cited in Michael Cox, 2012, Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?, *International Relations* 26(4) 369–83, p.:371

¹⁰⁸ Jacques, *When China Rules the World*. cited in *ibid.*, p.:371

¹⁰⁹ Acharya, "Power Shift or Paradigm Shift?", p.:167

¹¹⁰ Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West"

Chapter Three: The Philippines in the Global System¹¹¹

In the previous chapter the research addressed theories and perceptions of the potential implications of the ascent of China, which contributed to the analysis of the systemic level as prescribed by the methodology of Foreign Policy Analysis. In the following section the thesis will examine the state level and how the history and other domestic attributes of the Philippines influence the way, how the Philippines is positioned in the global system of power and thus affect its foreign policy (FP). Following the discovery of the archipelago by Spanish explorer Ferdinand Magellan in 1521, the Philippines became the colony of the Spanish Empire. During the rule of the Spanish which endured for almost four centuries there was a considerable European influence posed at the local population in terms of religious teachings, language, culture, and the organization of the state. In 1896, Katipunan, a Philippine nationalistic insurgency group under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, attempted a revolution against the Spanish. Violent conflict broke out particularly in provinces around the capital region Manila. However, the revolution was oppressed by the Spanish and ended with a truce agreement in 1897.¹¹²

Shortly later, in 1898 the Spanish-American war broke out and in the same year, the USA achieved naval victory over the Spanish at Manila Bay. US soldiers landed at Manila with the help of the Philippines and forced the Spanish to capitulate. Aguinaldo had re-organized its supporters from the 1887 revolution and the Philippines declared independence and adopted a constitution in 1889. However, despite initial expectation the USA was less than supportive of the Philippine's quest for independence and convinced the Spanish to transfer the Philippine colony to the USA which was officially declared by the signing of the Paris Treaty in 1898 and was later ratified by the US senate in 1899. Thus, the period called the Spanish Colonial Era ended in 1898 with the eruption of the Spanish–American War. And despite serious attempts to achieve independent status, the aftermath of the war brought about the beginning of the American Colonial Era of Philippine history.¹¹³

Therefore, the Philippines had been in the European sphere of influence for almost the entire duration of the past half millennia. In 1946, the Philippines finally achieved independence from their new colonial master the USA, but it has remained a strong military ally and trading partner to America.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Parts of this chapter were previously submitted in a substantially different form for Environmental Security Course, Winter Term 2016-2017 CEU,

¹¹² MANUEL L. QUEZON III et al., 2016, "HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE REPUBLIC" Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, p.:22-24

http://www.depedbataan.com/resources/96/historical_atlas_of_the_republic_of_the_philippines.pdf

¹¹³ Encyclopedia Britannica, "The Spanish period" in Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016,

<https://www.britannica.com/place/Philippines/The-Spanish-period>

¹¹⁴ George Philip & Son, *Encyclopedic World Atlas* (Oxford University Press, 2002), p.:184

In March 1947 US Ambassador to the Philippines Paul McNutt and Philippine President Manuel Roxas signed the Military Base Agreement, which gave the United States the right to build army bases, allowing America to maintain a permanent military presence at several localities of the country such as the Subic Bay Naval Base. In 1951, the USA and the Philippines signed the Mutual Defense Agreement which practically meant that the USA guaranteed the security of the Philippines and, rather ironically, the Philippines that of the USA's, should any of the parties be attacked.¹¹⁵ During the Cold War, besides Thailand the Philippines was the only South East Asian member of the 1954 South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and it was dedicated to fight against the spread of communism.¹¹⁶ Moreover as one of the founding member of the ASEAN, established in 1967, the Philippines' supported the ideal of regional cooperation and even integration.¹¹⁷ However, until the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War the Philippine FP and international economic relations were at large determined by its dependence on the USA.¹¹⁸

The US bases were functioning uninterruptedly until 1992 but then negotiations reached a halt between the two parties. Due to escalating anti-US sentiments, the Philippine Senate voted against the continuation of the lease provisions for the American army bases. Although, the renunciation was perceived by many Philippine citizens as a historic milestone in the process of eradicating the last remainders of the U.S' colonial rule, in reality it has not impacted substantially the strong military and economic collaborations between the two countries in the long-run.¹¹⁹ But the immediate aftermath of the termination of the US military presence in the Philippines left behind a temporary power-vacuum that China sought to fill in. In 1995, the Mischief Reef incidence saw the Chinese Navy detaining Pilipino fishermen in a disputed area of the South China Sea. Subsequently the Philippines discovered that China was constructing an army base on the reef. These incidents caused tensions between China and the ASEAN Regional Forum, which besides others also entails the United States and the Philippines as members, to escalate dramatically to a potential bursting point.¹²⁰

Following from the escalation of military threat in the South China Sea and the new unconventional sources of destruction originating from terrorist groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf group and Jemaah

¹¹⁵ E. Albert , "The Now and Future US-Philippines Military Alliance" *Defense One*, JUNE 29,2016.

<http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/06/us-philippine-military-alliance/129504/>

¹¹⁶ Rommel Banlaoi, 2010, *Philippine Security in the Age of Terror*, (Taylor Francis, 2010), p.:326- 328

¹¹⁷ ASEAN, "History: The Founding of ASEAN" <http://asean.org/asean/about-asean/history/>

¹¹⁸ M.B. Yahuda, 1996, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific* RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, P.23

¹¹⁹ Albert , "The Now and Future US-Philippines Military Alliance"

<http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/06/us-philippine-military-alliance/129504/>

¹²⁰ R.J. Heydarian, 2010, "The China-Philippines-U.S. Triangle" *Foreign Policy In Focus*, December 16, 2010.

http://fpif.org/the_china-philippines-us_triangle/

Islamiyah, which became prominent especially in the more backward southern territories, the Philippine government invited the US troops back again to provide the country with protection. In 1998, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was signed and this bilateral deal enabled significant US military presence in the country. Moreover, importantly, this also allowed for Philippine-US joint military drills, called Balikatan, entailing training and capability building, in which the troops of the two countries participated "shoulder-to-shoulder".¹²¹ The VFA was an important element of a larger security framework, which made it possible for the USA to maintain its geostrategic dominance in the Asia Pacific.¹²²

As an evident sign of the willingness to 're-warm relations' in 2003 George W. Bush has made the Philippines a 'major non-NATO ally'. President Bush argued that this "will allow our countries to work together on military research and development, and give the Philippines greater access to American defence equipment and supplies".¹²³ Amongst the Members of ASEAN countries Vietnam and the Philippines have been the most assertive in voicing their territorial claims over the South China Sea heightening the conflict with the Asian Giant and causing disconnect amongst the members of the organisation.¹²⁴ From 2010 to 2016, the administration of president Benigno Aquino III was welcoming towards the USA's concept of 're-balancing' or, in other words, of the 'US pivot to Asia' and the Philippines took on a key role in serving as the USA's strategic outpost, for which in turn the Aquino administration has received defence as well as political backing from America.¹²⁵ This time was also called the period of 'Balancing Strategy'¹²⁶ because Aquino aimed to neutralize the Chinese threat of domination with the help from the USA. He attempted to consolidate relationships with China through containment, however, in reality there was a significant tilting towards the USA¹²⁷ particularly with regards to security policy.¹²⁸

The Obama administration openly supported the Philippines in the dispute concerning the South China Sea territories. In 2011, Philippine Foreign Secretary Del Rosario during a meeting with Hillary Clinton,

¹²¹ Albert, "The Now and Future US-Philippines Military Alliance"

¹²² Heydarian, "The China-Philippines-U.S. Triangle"

¹²³ Jim Garamone, "Philippines to Become Major non-NATO Ally, Bush Says" U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, May 19, 2003

<http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28968>

¹²⁴ Lucio Blanco Pitlo III and Amruta Karambelkar, "Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea" *The Diplomat*, October 21, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/philippines-and-vietnam-in-the-south-china-sea-2/>

¹²⁵ De Castro, "The Duterte Administration's Foreign Policy" p.:139.

¹²⁶ Ibid. p.:139–159.

¹²⁷ De Castro, "Twenty-First Century Philippines' Policy Toward an Emergent China" p.:305

¹²⁸ Ibid, p.:324

then US Secretary of State, referred to the US as 'strategic partner'.¹²⁹ Later, in 2014 during his visit to Manila, Barack Obama declared, that the two countries are 'vital partners' and allies with a historic past.¹³⁰ During the same visit Obama and Aquino signed the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). As Obama explained, the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement took US-Philippine security cooperation "to a higher level of engagement", moreover it was an affirmation of the two countries' "commitment to mutual defence and security, and promotes regional peace and stability".¹³¹ This agreement allowed the stationing of US troops at the Philippines on a rotational basis. The Enhanced Defence Agreement has an initial term of 10 years. The Philippines must provide access to the Agreed Locations for the US bases without "rental or similar costs" and will aid the transportation of US forces to public land and facilities, including those owned by local governments. The US however is banned from storing or installing nuclear weapons and at the end of the term must return the possession of the Agreed Locations with all fixed parts to the Philippines.¹³²

President Aquino considered the South China Sea dispute and the Philippines' territorial claim as one of the top priority geostrategic interests of the country.¹³³ To secure this interest, he was willing to take part in heightened confrontation with China when he filed a claim with the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. While taking advantage of the rapid economic growth of the Philippines, Aquino found the worsening of the political and economic relations with China to be acceptable.¹³⁴ Meanwhile he aimed to increasingly rely on the partners of the ASEAN and the USA and its allies, Japan and South Korea. The FP of Aquino has further reaffirmed the Philippines' alliance with the USA and supported the USA's strategies which were devised to keep China's territorial expansion in check.¹³⁵

¹²⁹ US Department of State, 2011, Remarks With Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario After Their Meeting, Washington, DC, June 23, 2011

<https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/06/166868.htm>

¹³⁰ The White House, 2014, Remarks by President Obama and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint Press Conference, Office of the Press Secretary, April 28, 2014

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-join>

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² C. Thayer, "Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement" *The Diplomat*, 2014, May 02, 2014

<http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/>

¹³³ France-Presse-Agence, "Facts on Aquino's legacy as Philippine president", ABS-CBN News, Jun 30, 2016,

<http://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/06/30/16/facts-on-aquinos-legacy-as-philippine-president>

¹³⁴ R.G. Sutte, *The United States and Asia: Regional Dynamics and Twenty-First-Century Relations* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), p.:205

¹³⁵ S.C. Greitens, "The US-Philippine Alliance in a Year of Transition: Challenges & Opportunities" *Brookings Working Paper*, Center for East Asian Policy Studies, May, 2016, p.:1-3

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20160713_philippines_alliance.pdf

Undoubtedly, one of the most important concerns for the formulation of Philippine FP is the South China Sea dispute. This chapter discusses the analysis at the nation state level, or in other words investigates the dispositional dimensions of FP. The case of the South China Sea dispute presents an excellent example of how the geographic disposition of a region provides possibilities and incentives for rivalry over controlling the vital maritime trade routes and the environmental resources that the ocean embodies, potentially leaving the surrounding States entangled in a win-lose game.¹³⁶ The very much anticipated verdict on the claim filed by the Aquino administration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague has been finally made in July 2016. The judgment ruled in favour of the Philippines and the coastal States, and disqualified the nine-dot maritime territorial claim of China.¹³⁷

However, China does not recognize the verdict, which is based on applicable international law, as binding. As a result, the question of who and how they will rule the South China Sea and its environmental resources is far from decided. Presently, China continues the aggressive development of artificial islands that are also being equipped with military compounds and airstrips. The Chinese agenda entails the development of the contested shoals and reefs into islands capable of supporting life. Due to the Chinese landfilling activities, the size of the occupied Spratly and Paracel islands has increased by around 50 per cent since May 2015.¹³⁸ Harassment and interception of fishermen occurs on a regular basis, this is a critical aspect of the conflict, since this directly affects the livelihoods of sustenance fishermen, who historically engaged in the fishing of these waters, and now due to Chinese navy blocking the access to the waters, their human security is being infringed.

Moreover, the Chinese dredging of the seabed in order to obtain material suitable for the reclamation of artificial islands, as well as the extensive poaching of giant clams and large-scale unregulated fishing causes detrimental and irreversible damage to local coral reefs and with them to one of the most diverse marine eco-systems of the world, evidently putting the livelihood of small scale Philippine subsistence fishermen at risk and compromising the region's environmental security.¹³⁹ Unfortunately, since China does not regard the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration as binding, the ruling of the Arbitration Court only means a limited, formal success, and in practice it has not been able to stop

¹³⁶ Rolf and Agnew "Sovereignty regimes in the South China Sea", p.:261

¹³⁷ Ibid.p.:254

¹³⁸ Cooper, "South China Sea Takeover" p.:165

¹³⁹ Y. Tayag "China's Artificial Islands in the South China Sea Are Killing Ocean Life" *Inverse*, Sept.25,2015.

<https://www.inverse.com/article/6465-china-s-artificial-islands-in-the-south-china-sea-are-killing-biodiversity>.

the escalation of the conflict which has already reached a state of becoming a potential trigger point of an armed conflict.¹⁴⁰

The Chinese stance on the issue is seemingly unalterable: “(China) has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof”.¹⁴¹ The logic behind the Chinese standpoint is that: “China’s Nanshan Island is fully entitled to territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and Continental Shelf”.¹⁴² The Nanshan Island belongs to the Spratly Islands archipelago and the Chinese argue that the Spratly Islands thus are able to generate their own maritime zones, expanding Chinese UNCLO maritime Exclusive Economic Zone far towards the South and thus, this discredits the Philippines’ grounds for the sovereignty claim over the territory. The main reason for China to establish itself as the sovereign ruler of the territory is economical.

With its rapid economic growth and widening middle-class, China has a rising dire need for raw materials. To cater for this need, China is becoming more and more active in the resource extraction in the environmentally endowed South China Sea region.¹⁴³ Fishing is another important aspect, since and although currently the East China Sea accounts for the largest share of Chinese fishing activities, due to over-exploitation the catch volume is decreasing there and it is only the South China Sea where catch volumes are on the rise.¹⁴⁴ In addition, when one assesses the impacts of China potentially gaining absolute control over the South China Sea, the fact that some of the World’s most important maritime shipping lanes and sea lanes critical for international navigation traverse across this area also becomes a noteworthy global security aspect.¹⁴⁵ China regards mining, oil and gas industries as ‘strategic pillar sectors’ and thus these are understood to be priority industries.¹⁴⁶ Since the South China Sea is considered to be endowed with these natural resources including rare minerals, gas, oil,

¹⁴⁰ Y. Mincai, 2016, “The South China Sea dispute and the Philippines Arbitration Tribunal: China’s policy options” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 70:3, 215-234.p.:218

¹⁴¹ (PRC., 2009. “Communication to the UN, No. CML/17/2009, May 7.” Accessed October 6, 2012. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf), cited in Ibid.p.:227

¹⁴² The Permanent Mission of the PRC (People’s Republic of China)., 2011. “Communication Dated April 14.” Accessed August 10, 2015. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf cited in Ibid.p.:227

¹⁴³ Andrew-Speed et al., Chinese engagement in Southeast Asian energy and mineral resources: motivations and outlook, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, VOL. 57, NO 3. 316-342, (2016), p.:336-37

¹⁴⁴ Kraska, “The Lost Dimension”, p.:6

¹⁴⁵ Cooper, “South China Sea Takeover”, p.:168, 170

¹⁴⁶ Andrew-Speed et al., “Chinese engagement in Southeast Asian energy and mineral resources”, p.:326-27

as well as living resources (fish, clams), or in the own words of the Chinese it is 'cunningly packed',¹⁴⁷ the origin of the strong Chinese motives to expand sovereignty over the South China Sea becomes evident.

¹⁴⁷ PRC.,2014. "Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, December 7." Accessed December 7. http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1217143.html cited in Mincai, "The South China Sea dispute and the Philippines Arbitration Tribunal",p.:227

Chapter Four: The Recurrence of the Equi-Balancing Strategy

In the past chapter the thesis presented the Systemic and domestic-state-level analyses of major factors relevant to Philippine foreign policy (FP) towards China and the USA. In the consecutive section the thesis focuses on the agent-level analysis of Foreign Policy Analysis, this will be substantiated by the content analysis of Duterte's English language speeches, which were given during the first 150 days of his Presidency and during the campaign leading up to it. Already during his presidential campaign Duterte has expressed his strong criticism on the Aquino administration's strategic balancing policy, which was most relevant to the countries' FP concerning the South China Sea dispute. While situating himself on the political palette as a social democrat, nationalist and environmentalist Duterte claimed that he was willing to engage in bilateral talks with Beijing regarding the possible resolutions to the South China Sea dispute. Moreover, he flashed up the possibility for joint exploration and extraction of the natural resource base with which the South China Sea is endowed and expressed his desire to see China constructing a railway on the economically lagging Mindanao Island in return for temporarily putting aside the South China Sea dispute.¹⁴⁸

During his presidential campaign, he stated in a speech at Mindanao: "Build us a railway just like the one you built in Africa, and let's set aside disagreements for a while."¹⁴⁹ This suggests that Duterte would prefer some kind of reimbursement of an economic nature in exchange of shelving the issue of the dispute. Moreover, Duterte also made the point that he is prone to put the territorial sovereignty dispute to rest, in case China is willing to do the same.¹⁵⁰ At a meeting of the women's group named Forum of Women for Action with Rody Duterte he proclaimed:

I will tell China to set aside its claim for a while so that I will not bring up the issue of (Philippine) national patrimony ... But if (China) insists, I will tell them, that is our fishing ground and why are you building an infrastructure that my country does not need?¹⁵¹

He refers to the possibility of a more tolerant FP towards China concerning the South China Sea dispute. However, Duterte remarks that China constructs undesirable infrastructure and implies that his future FP directions are dependent on what kind of compensation China is willing to provide to the

¹⁴⁸ D. Steinbock, "Could Duterte's Ascent Mean Cooler Philippine Ties with U.S." *CNN Wire Service*, 10 May, 1. Cited in, De Castro, "The Duterte Administration's Foreign Policy" p.:146

¹⁴⁹ G. Lacorte, "Duterte tells China: Build us a railway and let's set aside differences for a while" *Inquirer.net*, February 29, 2016 <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/137093/duterte-tells-china-build-us-a-railway-and-lets-set-aside-differences-for-a-while>

¹⁵⁰ A. Baviera, (2016), "President Duterte's Foreign Policy Challenges" *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 38, 2, 202–207. p.:203 Cited in DeCastro, "The Duterte Administration's Foreign Policy", p.:146

¹⁵¹ Lacorte, "Duterte tells China: Build us a railway and let's set aside differences for a while" *Inquirer.net*

Philippines (such as efficient infrastructure) in return for Duterte shelving the issue of the territorial dispute.

Moreover, Duterte already during his campaign expressed his doubtfulness about the potential advantages of the US-Philippines alliance, voicing his opinion, according to which the US would not provide the protection promised in the defence agreements, if conflict was to erupt in the South China Sea.

America would never die for us, (...) If America cared, it would have sent its aircraft carriers and missile frigates the moment China started reclaiming land in contested territory, but no such thing happened.¹⁵²

Duterte does not believe that the US will protect the Philippine interest and he points to the past experience of the lack of protection by the USA, which enabled the situation to escalate. Prior to the commencement of his presidency he already commented that he will seek closer cooperation with China, and that he would stop the technological upgrading of the army, which was a key policy of the preceding Aquino administration.¹⁵³ The heavy focus on the technological upgrade of the army was a significant element of President Aquino's policy of confronting the territorial expansion and the sovereignty claim of China in the South China Sea.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, it may be imputed that the FP of Duterte will resemble more to that of Aquino's predecessor President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's 'equi-balancing'. 'Equi-balancing' refers to the 21st century FP strategy of Southeast-Asian States, who neither bandwagon nor balance with great-powers but pursue 'swing-politics', developing FP relationships with two or more great-powers and thus through this can influence the great powers' to their advantage while isolating themselves from foreign domination.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² J. Moraleda, "Duterte: America would never die for us" *Philippine Canadian Inquirer*, August 3, 2015, <http://www.canadianinquirer.net/2015/08/03/duterte-america-would-never-die-for-us/>

¹⁵³ E. Baculinao and C. Marker, "Rodrigo Duterte, Philippines' 'Trump,' Runs on Rape Jokes, Violent Promises" NBC news, MAY 2, 2016, by <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-trump-runs-rape-jokes-violent-promises-n561631>; Wyatt Olson, "Philippine presidential front-runner could hinder US military ties" *STARS AND STRIPES*, April 28, 2016, <https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/philippine-presidential-front-runner-could-hinder-us-military-ties-1.406656#.WSG1IuuGOJA>

¹⁵⁴ R. Dancel, "US\$671m arms buys to upgrade Philippine military" *China Daily*, March 17, 2014, http://www.chinadailyasia.com/news/2014-03/17/content_15125348.html;

P. Chalk, 2014, "Rebuilding while performing: Military modernisation in the Philippines" *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, June, 2014, Special Report, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/rebuilding-while-performing-military-modernisation-in-the-philippines/SR68_Philippines.pdf

¹⁵⁵ De Castro, "The Duterte Administration's Foreign Policy" p.:141.

Duterte's initial statements regarding his FP agenda suggested, that he would give up with the steady modernization of the military which was undertaken under the framework of the Aquino administration's 'balancing strategy'. As a result, it could be expected that instead of further pursuing the Aquino administration's 'balancing strategy' which sought to 'contain' China and relied on the American provision of security, the Duterte administration will return to the 'swing-politics', of 'equi-balancing' in between China and the USA.¹⁵⁶ This would imply that the Philippines would tilt towards China while showing little concern on regional defence and instead direct more attention at the domestic security threats including organized-crime and terrorism.

The new strategy of president Duterte to initiate bilateral agreements to resolve the territorial sovereignty dispute could result in the plummeting of investment supporting the development of the Philippine army's defence capabilities. The modernization of the military was linked to President Aquino's agenda of challenging China's expansive maritime claim in the South China Sea. President Duterte's current agenda to improve bilateral relations with China, and mediate a mutually beneficial deal instead of pursuing the US-Aquino security system's containment strategy to which intense militarisation and arming were used as key elements of deterrence, may mean that public investments in territorial defence would be significantly decreased.

Duterte and the USA: the politics of separation

The international press has been heavily reporting on Duterte's indiscreet comments, with this, making the Philippines' changing attitude towards the western hegemon more relevant and spectacular. For instance, President Duterte in July 2016 has accused the USA and Great Britain with perpetrating the spread of terrorism in the Middle East through their military engagements.¹⁵⁷ In August, 2016 Duterte has addressed the USA's ambassador to Manila with homophobic remarks.¹⁵⁸ However, generally there has been little attention spent on the underlying real-political considerations. The Obama administration has been critical of Duterte's radical anti-drug campaign and has called attention to the protection of human rights. The Philippine president became frustrated for being 'lectured' and used unsavoury remarks, these were originally directed at a reporter, however, later thanks to the media's

¹⁵⁶ V. B. Watson, 2016, "Post-Hague: The Philippines and Strategic Balance" *Sigur Center for Asian Studies*, Policy Brief, George Washington University, July, 2016, p.:3

http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/PolicyBrief_July2016_PhilippinesPostHague.pdf

¹⁵⁷ Joyce Ilas, 2016, "Duterte slams U.S. anew, says it 'imported terrorism'", *CNN Philippines*, 09.07.2016.,

<http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/07/09/Duterte-United-States-imported-terrorism.html>

¹⁵⁸ France-Presse-Agene, "Philippines' Rodrigo Duterte insults US envoy with homophobic slur", *The Guardian*, 10 August, 2016

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/10/philippines-leader-calls-us-ambassador-gay-son-of-a-whore-prompting-summons>

distorted portrayal of the event was widely perceived as having been directed at the US president Obama.¹⁵⁹ As a consequence of Duterte's previous statements the bilateral meeting of the two country-leader was cancelled by the American side.¹⁶⁰ Duterte is largely sceptical of the USA's intentions when dealing with international affairs and he voices harsh criticism about the USA's FP involvements. "And of late, I see a lot of these Western nations bullying small nations. And not only that, they are into so much hypocrisy."¹⁶¹

The relationship between the two leaders has not been restored, on the contrary in the turn of the 29th ASEAN Summit it has further deteriorated. The Philippine president has missed the ASEAN-USA Summit's negotiations due to a headache. Setting aside his previously prepared script, while presenting pictures showing murders committed by American soldiers against Philippines, he has begun to talk about the existing variations in the perceptions of human rights.¹⁶² At the same time Duterte also subverted to a milder stance regarding the South China Sea and restrained himself from implying harsh criticism against China. However, he sought the support of other ASEAN Countries to join his radical anti-drug campaign, which has evoked much controversy.¹⁶³ In the followings, Duterte continued to pursue his anti-USA comments, in turn of which he has argued in favour of his independent FP of 'separation', and asked for the withdrawal of US military troops from Mindanao,¹⁶⁴ while at the same time he has made it clear that he does not want to revoke the defense agreement that is in force.¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁹ Oliver Holmes, "Duterte tells Obama 'son of a whore' remark wasn't personal", *The Guardian*, 6 September, 2016

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/06/son-of-a-whore-was-not-meant-to-be-personal-duterte-tells-obama>

¹⁶⁰ D. Gayle, "Barack Obama cancels meeting after Philippines president calls him 'son of a whore'", *The Guardian*, 5 September, 2016

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/05/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-barack-obama-son-whore>

¹⁶¹ Martin Petty, "Meeting Putin, Philippines' Duterte rails at Western 'hypocrisy'" *Reuters*, Nov, 20, 2016

<http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-apec-summit-philippines-russia-idUKKBN13F09X>

¹⁶² Manuel Mogato, "Duterte tells regional leaders, U.S. not to lecture Philippines on rights" *Reuters*, Sep 8, 2016

<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-laos-obama-duterte-idUSKCN11E1PV>

¹⁶³ Tarra Quismundo, "Duterte takes anti-drug campaign to ASEAN" *ABS-CBN News*, Apr 29, 2017

<http://news.abs-cbn.com/business/04/29/17/duterte-takes-anti-drug-campaign-to-asean>

¹⁶⁴ Motoko Rich, "Rodrigo Duterte, in Japan, Calls for U.S. Troops to Exit Philippines in 2 Years" *The New York Times*, OCT. 26, 2016

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/world/asia/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-japan.html?_r=0

¹⁶⁵ ABS-CBN News, "Manila to 'respect' military pacts with Washington, Yasay says" *ABS-CBN News*, Sep 29, 2016

<http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/29/16/manila-to-respect-military-pacts-with-washington-yasay-says>

On his official visit to China he explained it to a Chinese TV reporter as follows: “We are not the vassal of everybody, we have long been independent.”¹⁶⁶ Duterte has a strong desire to bring about an independent Philippine FP. This needs an independent leader and he thus rejects any interference with his mandate to run the Philippines: “You can deal with me as an independent leader. Don’t worry, the US is not part of the equation at all.”¹⁶⁷ While distancing himself from the USA he has also disapproved of the USA’s attempts to discipline him on the issues of human rights and he argued that new allies are needed such as Russia and China, especially, because the USA is not willing to provide him with the necessary military technologies. He promised to make an end to the common US-Philippine patrol operations on the South China Sea as well as the discontinuation of the US-Philippine military drills, called Balikatan which are held on a yearly basis.¹⁶⁸

We do not go into a patrol or join any other army from now because I do not want trouble, ...I do not want to ride gung-ho style there with China or with America. I just want to patrol our territorial waters.¹⁶⁹

However, contrary to this statement that he will discontinue the Balikatan US-Philippine bilateral military exercises, the 33rd such exercise – albeit with a scaled down style – began on the 8th of May 2017.¹⁷⁰

On the 20th of October 2016, during his visit to Beijing, he discussed his strong intention to move away from the USA. One day prior to his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping president Duterte in the Great Hall of the People on a meeting attended by Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli, stated that the USA has squandered and a new episode of the Philippines, China, and Russia versus the western-centred world will commence.

In this venue, your honours, in this venue, I announce my separation from the United States. [...] Both in military, not maybe social, but economics also. America has lost. [...] I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow and maybe I will also go to Russia to talk to

¹⁶⁶ Charlie Campbell, "Philippine President Duterte's Bold Move on China Spells Trouble Ahead" *Time.com*, Oct,20,2016

<http://time.com/4538177/philippines-south-china-sea-rodrigo-duterte-xi-jinping-hague/>

¹⁶⁷ R.J. Heydarian, "Political scientist Richard Javad Heydarian on Rodrigo Duterte, US-bashing, and the South China Sea" Quartz, October 16,2016

<https://qz.com/807203/political-scientist-richard-javad-heydarian-on-rodrigo-duterte-us-bashing-and-the-south-china-sea/>

¹⁶⁸ T.Moss, "Philippines Suspends Patrols With U.S. in South China Sea" *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 8,2016, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/philippines-tells-u-s-no-more-joint-patrols-in-south-china-sea-1475826120>

¹⁶⁹ The Japan Times, "Duterte seeks arms from China, may end maritime patrols with U.S.", *The Japan Times*, SEP 14,2016

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/14/asia-pacific/duterte-seeks-arms-china-may-end-maritime-patrols-u-s/#.WRyJVvmGOiQ>

¹⁷⁰ P.Parameswaran, "How Significant is the,2017 US-Philippines Balikatan Military Exercise?" *The Diplomat*, May 16,2017,

<http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/how-significant-is-the-2017-us-philippines-balikatan-military-exercise/>

(President Vladimir) Putin and tell him that there are three of us against the world - China, Philippines and Russia. It's the only way. Foreign policy veers now towards [China]. No more American interference. No more American exercises. I will not go to America anymore. We will just be insulted there.¹⁷¹

However, he later explained himself as not wanting to sever the two countries' economic, diplomatic or defence relationship and claimed that he only wanted to achieve a shift in FP towards more independence.¹⁷² Instead, he aims to focus on mutual cooperation with the USA as well as others and at the same time he also noted that he does not plan to give up on US investors either, but since so long they were unable to deliver the critical infrastructure projects, thinks that new partners are necessary. China is seemingly willing to offer the kind of infrastructure investments that the Philippines need so direly. In fact, his point is that he does not wish to take part in the 'rebalancing' strategy concept as announced by Barack Obama which would imply the continued maintenance of hostilities with China, because that would be far from beneficial for his country as he sees it. Instead he wants to develop candid relationship with the Chinese which would be difficult to achieve if the country had to engage in arming itself against China with US support.

If we continue to treat each other as brothers, and understand, especially the plight of [Filipino] fishermen – I know the dynamics inside China, it has been explained to me very well – the Chinese people might find place a place in their hearts for the Filipinos, ... I hope you treat us like your brothers, not your enemies and take note of the plight of our citizens.¹⁷³

Besides real-political considerations we cannot leave Duterte's long enduring and strong anti-US sentiment unexamined. His ancestors were heavily affected by the USA's occupation and memories of the violence committed against the Moros live on vividly among the Philippines. During his university years, he became close friends with the founder of the Philippine Communist Party Jose Maria Sison, whose ideals have influenced Duterte's world-view and thus up to the present day he considers himself as being a leftist thinker. During his time serving as a mayor he has collected multiple negative experiences with the Americans, which contributed to his heightened dislike towards them.¹⁷⁴ Duterte believes that contrary to its rhetoric, the USA is an unreliable ally, who only acts on the basis of its own

¹⁷¹ I.Reifowitz,2016, What Does It Mean That the Philippines Just Dumped the U.S. and Embraced China and Russia? HuffingtonPost, 10/25/2016 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/what-does-it-mean-that-the-philippines-just-dumped_us_580f9449e4b099c434319c73

¹⁷² A. Calonzo, "Duterte Says 'Goodbye' America Before Meeting Xi in Beijing" *Bloomberg*, October,20,2016 <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-20/duterte-says-goodbye-america-before-meeting-with-xi-in-beijing>

¹⁷³ Jamaine Punzalan, "Duterte to China: Treat Filipinos as brothers, not enemies" ABS-CBN News, Aug 29,2016, <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/29/16/duterte-to-china-treat-filipinos-as-brothers-not-enemies>

¹⁷⁴ Prashanth Parameswaran, "Why the Philippines' Rodrigo Duterte Hates America?" *The Diplomat*, November 01,2016 <http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/why-the-philippines-rodrigo-duterte-hates-america/>

self-interest and is not concerned with the Philippine people, while at the same time it treats its allies degradingly and exploitatively.

It is not severance of ties. You say severance of ties, you cut the diplomatic relations. I cannot do that. Why? It is in the best interest of my country that we maintain that relationship. Why? Because there are many Filipinos in the United States. Well, Americans of Filipino ancestry. Why? Because the people of my country [are] not ready to accept. I said separation – what I was really saying was separation of a foreign policy.¹⁷⁵

Duterte understands that he cannot terminate FP relations with the US and instead considers the need for an independent FP. The new US administration run by Donald Trump may open a new chapter in the relationship of the two countries since according to Duterte, Donald Trump supports even his anti-drug campaign not to mention the rest of his policies.¹⁷⁶ Overall, it is more likely that the change in the Philippine relations to the USA will be gradual without any dramatic and immediate consequences as it would have been expected based on the prior events. From the Philippine-side, there was no concrete measure taken to renounce any agreement or dismantle the historic alliance through which the USA and the Philippines have been partners for decades.

Duterte's Pivot to China

In the beginning of August 2016, Fidel Ramos,¹⁷⁷ former president, retired Filipino general and politician, arrived to Beijing as the leader of the Duterte administration's special envoy to China. The envoy began initial negotiations aimed at easing the tensions concerning the South China Sea and discussing the possibilities for peaceful cooperation. The positive attitude of China has created adequate preconditions and enabled the possibility for Duterte's official visit to China which took place between 18-21st of October. During this visit Duterte negotiated with Xi Jinping Chinese president and Prime Minister Li Keqiang.¹⁷⁸ Although, the media directed most of its attention to Duterte's speech on the Chinese Trade and Investment Forum in which the president again voiced his concerns about the need to separate from the USA,¹⁷⁹ which suggested serious geo-political consequences. In fact,

¹⁷⁵ J. Griffiths, Matt Rivers and Pamela Boykoff, "Philippines not severing ties with US, Duterte says" *CNN News*, October 22, 2016 <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/21/asia/duterte-china-philippines-us/>

¹⁷⁶ F. Villamor, "Rodrigo Duterte Says Donald Trump Endorses His Violent Antidrug Campaign," *The New York Times*, DEC. 3, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/world/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-donald-trump.html>

¹⁷⁷ Ramos later resigned from his role as the leader of the Philippines' special envoy, mostly because of Rodrigo's harsh political leadership style and disagreeing on Duterte's anti US foreign policy sentiments.

Reuters, "Philippine special envoy Ramos quits; aide says China mission accomplished" Reuters, Nov 1, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-china-ramos-idUSKBN12W3B2>

¹⁷⁸ V. Terehov, "Philippine President R. Duterte visits China" *New Eastern Outlook*, 29.10.2016 <http://journal-neo.org/2016/10/29/philippine-president-r-duterte-visits-china/>

¹⁷⁹ B. Blanchard, "Duterte aligns Philippines with China, says U.S. has lost" *Reuters*, Oct, 20, 2016 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS>

Duterte's visit has also brought about an array of actual political and economic agreements.¹⁸⁰ At the same time, to guarantee that nationalists would not frown upon him, Duterte consistently maintained that he is not willing to grant any allowances to China in terms of the South China Sea territorial claims. "We will not give up anything there; it's an entitlement ... You can only negotiate to prevent a war ... They invited me for talks, and I will go."¹⁸¹

However, he has agreed to the bilateral negotiations to settle the disputes on the mutually beneficial and friendly exploitations of the natural resources.¹⁸² Duterte has a clear intention to settle the South China Sea dispute through bilateral arrangements with China which resembles more the foreign policy conduct of an undemocratic country.

This is a purely bilateral issue. It's between the Philippines and China, I'm not going to raise it in any international forum, including the ASEAN.¹⁸³

Duterte has very low trust in the efficiency of multilateralism, which of course understandable since the ruling of the Arbitration Court seems to be of little use to the country. Thus, he sees that a bilateral deal negotiated directly between the two countries is the only possible option for his FP.

I will only bring [up] the [arbitration case] face-to-face [with China]... because if you quarrel with them now, claim sovereignty, make noise here and there, they might not just even want to talk. ¹⁸⁴

Duterte claims that he is ready to go against his predecessor, the Aquino administration's balancing FP strategy and expresses his willingness to engage with China through bilateral negotiations. He also voices his concern about potentiality of the situation escalating would the Philippines insist on the enforcement of the ruling of the arbitration court.

One positive immediate result of the Beijing negotiations was, that the Chinese naval patrols has, for the first time since 2012, begun to allow Philippine fishermen to access the disputed areas surrounding

¹⁸⁰ A. Calonzon, "China Visit Helps Duterte Reap Funding Deals Worth \$24 Billion" *Bloomberg*, October 21, 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-21/china-visit-helps-duterte-reap-funding-deals-worth-24-billion>

¹⁸¹ Al Jazeera News, "Rodrigo Duterte interview: Death, drugs and diplomacy" *Al Jazeera News*, 16 Oct, 2016 <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2016/10/exclusive-rodrigo-duterte-war-drugs-161015100325799.html>

¹⁸² AFP-JIJI, "Philippines willing to share South China Sea, says government" *Japanese Times*, JUL 8, 2016 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/08/asia-pacific/philippines-willing-share-south-china-sea-says-government/#.WRyt_PmGOiQ; D. Genalyn, "Wealth Sharing with China Eyed" *Manilla Bulletin*, 25 March, 2017, <https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/manila-bulletin/20170325/281479276242820>

¹⁸³ R.J. Heydarian, "Political scientist Richard Javad Heydarian on Rodrigo Duterte"

¹⁸⁴ R.J. Heydarian, 2016, Barack Obama's pivot to Asia in tatters, *AlJezeera*, 24 SEPTEMBER, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/09/barack-obama-pivot-asia-tatters-160922122523631.html>

the Scarborough Shoal.¹⁸⁵ The parties moreover agreed on the establishment of a common coastguard committee, furthermore crucially on this occasion, Duterte has also announced the discontinuation of the joint naval patrol missions with the USA.¹⁸⁶ The improvement of economic relationship between the two parties was a major goal of these negotiations and the fact that President was accompanied with 400 Philippine business men also shows that the focus of the talk was mostly directed at economic matters.¹⁸⁷ The negotiations seemed to be successful and 13 bilateral agreements¹⁸⁸ with a value of USD 24 billion have been signed by the parties. USD 15 billion of the total sum is made up of Chinese investment and USD 9 billion will be made available as a soft-loan facility.¹⁸⁹

The Philippines, of course, is also looking forward to take part in the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt which is a major Chinese strategic initiative. The Chinese development funds are already being allocated in alignment with the aims of this strategy and thus are largely directed towards infrastructure improvement projects. According to the plans USD 780 million will be dedicated to the landfilling reclamation of the Davao shorelines and port area. Moreover, the Cebu international Terminal project will receive USD 328 million while the construction of the Manila Port was supplemented with USD 148 million. Besides these, the development and upgrading of motorways and railways is also part of the future plans.¹⁹⁰

The embittering of the Chinese relations during the Aquino administration has caused an array of inconveniences to the Philippine economy. Chinese investments were withheld to the country,¹⁹¹ moreover, China has even put a ban on Banana imports from the Philippines. When keeping in mind that the Philippines is globally the second biggest exporter of banana following Ecuador, this policy instrument becomes a crucially impactful economic sanction used for political retaliation. Albeit this

¹⁸⁵ Asian Correspondent, "China confirms Philippine fishermen allowed into Scarborough Shoal, Asian Correspondent" 31st October, 2016, <https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/10/china-confirms-philippine-fishermen-allowed-scarborough-shoal/#dF07fQTLTbzD3Zuh.99>

¹⁸⁶ Jane Perlez, "Rodrigo Duterte and Xi Jinping Agree to Reopen South China Sea Talks" *The New York Times*, OCT., 20, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-china-xi-jinping.html>

¹⁸⁷ Terehov, "Philippine President R. Duterte visits China"

¹⁸⁸ P. Parameswaran, "Why Did China's Warships Visit the Philippines" *The Diplomat*, May 05, 2017, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/why-did-chinas-warships-visit-the-philippines/>

¹⁸⁹ Calonzo, "China Visit Helps Duterte Reap Funding Deals Worth \$24 Billion"

¹⁹⁰ W.Cheng, "Duterte heads home from China with \$24 billion deals" *ABS-CBN News*, Oct 21, 2016 <http://news.abs-cbn.com/business/10/21/16/duterte-heads-home-from-china-with-24-billion-deals>

¹⁹¹ R.J. Heydarian, "The Diplomatic Implications Of Philippines-China Arbitration, *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, 2015 JANUARY 21, 2015 <https://amti.csis.org/the-diplomatic-implications-of-philippines-china-arbitration/>

banana ban as promised by Chinese Ambassador Zhao Jianhua was later lifted.¹⁹² Furthermore following judgment of The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, there has also been a significant drop in the number of visitors travelling to the Philippines for reasons of truism.¹⁹³ Duterte's visit to China and the successive negotiations have signalled a change in Chinese-Philippine relationships and highlighted that the new Philippine administration is ready to cooperate on issues exceeding the sphere of mere geo-politics, such as the building of a strategic, economic collaboration.

Some of the most faithful supporters of these processes are made up from the Philippine economic elite who have ancestral links to China and can expect extensive business opportunities and profit from the new strategic partnership¹⁹⁴. Lucio Tan, one of the richest magnates of the Philippines, who made his money from tobacco and liqueur production and has also Chinese ancestry, is looked upon as the representative figure of the Philippine economic elite and one of the greatest supporters of Duterte, has already for decades pressed for the closest possible cooperation with China.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, it is also an important factor that despite Duterte's bloody anti-drug campaign and seemingly anti-elite policies, the economic elite is increasingly in approval of Duterte's politics, and according to a recent survey of Pulse Asia, ratings among the ABC group of his supporters increased significantly from 69 percent in 2016 December to 86 percent in 2017 March.¹⁹⁶

Moreover, the Chinese billionaire, Huang Rulun, and head of the privately held real estate developer, Century Golden Resources Group, made a promise for the founding of a drug rehabilitation center. The support of Huang for the rehabilitation facilities is a form of antithesis to the denunciation of Duterte's anti-drug campaign by the United States and other Western countries. Duterte applauded China and said, it offered help "without boasting, without news, without publicity" [...] "This is how you treat your friends," [...] "You do not go about reprimanding."¹⁹⁷ It is an important aspect for Duterte that the Chinese government represents a similar stance in relations to his radical anti-drug policies and they

¹⁹² B. Hayton, "Duterte's China visit could move regional goalposts" *Nikkei Asian Review*, October 17, 2016, <http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Bill-Hayton/Bill-Hayton-Duterte-s-China-visit-could-move-regional-goalposts>

¹⁹³ M. Stella and F. Arnaldo, "Chinese arrivals fell, 20% in August on South China Sea ruling" *Asia Maritime Reviews*, October 26, 2016, <http://asiamaritime.net/chinese-arrivals-fell-20-in-august-on-south-china-sea-ruling/>

¹⁹⁴ P. Nyri, D. Tan, *Chinese Encounters in Southeast Asia*. University of Washington Press, (2016), p.:127; T. Cerojano, "Filipinos seen backing Duterte despite rising drug killings" *PhilStar Global*, August 27, 2016 <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/08/27/1617798/filipinos-seen-backing-duterte-despite-rising-drug-killings>

¹⁹⁵ L. Suryadinata, "Southeast Asian Personalities of Chinese Descent: Biographical dictionary" *Chinese Heritage Centre*, 2012, p.:1092

¹⁹⁶ Manila Standard, "Performance and trust" *Manila Standard*, April 08, 2017. <http://manilastandard.net/index.php/opinion/editorial/233843/performance-and-trust.html>

¹⁹⁷ A. Jourdan and J. Cai, "Behind Philippines' ties with China, a billionaire and his rehab centers" *Reuters*, Nov 1, 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-rehab-idUSKBN12V2K4>

both refuse foreign criticisms regarding the issues of human rights violations.¹⁹⁸ President Duterte evidently wants no interference with his domestic affairs, in his own word “household” issues and stated: "We urge everyone to allow us to deal with our domestic challenges in order to achieve our national goals without undue interference." ¹⁹⁹

Moreover, the authoritarian Chinese governance may also seem appealing to Duterte, after all, he also fundamentally aims at progressing and cementing his power. From a geo-political hedging point of view the close collaboration with China might propel the USA for making further gestures in order to maintain its prior dominant position, and while being able to exercise some agency in the process of balancing between the two great-powers, at least the Philippines can reap some benefit of this situation as well.²⁰⁰ President Duterte is very much looking forward to the turning of the tables in the global political system, and the re-drawing of the map of international relations: “You know, if China and Russia would decide to create a new order, I will be the first to join,” said Duterte, during a meeting with Vladimir Putin on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Lima, Peru, on 19. November 2016.²⁰¹

When Duterte met with Russian President, Vladimir Putin, he made a bold declaration, which perhaps best sums up the FP direction he intends to bring the Philippines toward: "Historically, I have been identified with the Western world. It was good until it lasted."²⁰² It is clear from his statements that he believes in the termination of the Philippines’ historically strong alliance with the USA. At the same time, he anticipates closer engagement with China and Russia, whom he considers together with the Philippines to be the sole contenders of the USA dominated unipolar world-order and it is precisely this club he wishes to embrace.

¹⁹⁸ T. Gao, “Duterte’s Unlikely Pivot to China” *Berkeley Political Review*, JANUARY 23, 2017. <https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2017/01/23/dutertes-unlikely-pivot-to-china/>

¹⁹⁹ David Brunnstrom, "Philippines tells world not to interfere in Duterte drugs war" *Reuters*, Sep 25, 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-philippines-idUSKCN11U0QT>

²⁰⁰ Robert Shines, "Increased Great Power Competition Changes Strategy of “Swing” Powers" *Foreign Policy Association*, October 26th, 2016. <https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/10/26/increased-great-power-competition-changes-strategy-of-swing-powers/>

²⁰¹ Michael Peel, "Philippines’ Duterte backs ‘new order’ led by China and Russia" *Financial Times*, NOVEMBER 17, 2016 <https://www.ft.com/content/5e51dd92-acaf-11e6-9cb3-bb8207902122>

²⁰² Martin Petty, "Meeting Putin, Philippines' Duterte rails at Western 'hypocrisy'" *Reuters*, Nov, 20, 2016 <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-apec-summit-philippines-russia-idUKKBN13F09X>

Conclusions

The thesis shows that Duterte's foreign policy (FP) will be influenced rather by internal than external factors: he will not consider the respect of international law or common custom of FP as imperative and, instead of regional stability, his focus will be on domestic development and security including organised crime and terrorism. Duterte is obviously diverting from the common customs of FP conduct which is known to rely on an intricate and bureaucracy driven formulation of FP. Instead - most likely without any consultation of his advisers not to mention foreign leaders - he speaks his mind when making harsh or extremely rude statements cursing heads of states and other high ranking foreign officials. This is a distinctly different style of FP to that of the western-centric states' traditional diplomatic practices.

Since China is not going to respect the verdict of the Arbitration Court on the South China Sea dispute and the United States is no longer able to or willing to take charge in the maintaining of International Rule based order, the Philippines must come to an agreement with China which will be bilateral, and possibly come in the form of economic reimbursement in exchange of the disputed territory being permanently occupied by China. Thus, if an analogy between the current ascent of China and the Ancient Chinese Empire must be made, the research claims that the South China Sea may be the first tributary gift, which the Philippines has to display, in order to join the 'New Chinese Empire'. On a positive note, however, by being able to make an agreement with the Chinese outside the boundaries of law and prior political considerations, Duterte might be able to move the issue of the South China Sea from the sphere of hard-power military security issue into the sphere of normal political bargaining process.

The primary finding of the research is that the shift in the Philippine FP indicates the beginning of the reorganisation of the unipolar system of international relations. The research thus argues that the phenomenon to which the Philippines is a primary example, namely, the realignment of FP necessitated by the ascendant great-power China is not going to remain an isolated instance. The thesis asserts that the trend manifested in the case of the Philippines is only the beginning of a commencing greater trend which will have wide-reaching impact on many countries. The first signs of the tectonic shift in the changing order of international relations are of course most apparent in the immediate proximity and within China's geopolitical sphere of influence.

However, it is expected that in the foreseeable future other weaker states who are in the sphere of Chinese influence and traditionally had been independent or western-focused with regard to their FP, will also shift their FP to better accommodate China. Particularly if they are struggling with economic development and domestic security issues and their quest to achieve prosperity and stability was not

successfully aided by their western partners who they are in alignment with, but China is able or is perceived to be able to better assist them on their way towards prosperity. Thus, the rise of China and the dismay of the unipolar-world induces a very significant shift in the global system, which already demonstrates some of its repercussion on the FP of the Philippines. This trend of deviation from the traditional FP conduct which was conventional in the post-Cold-War practice of international politics is apparent not only in the FP of Duterte but also in relation with other leaders, who are often referred to as populists.

Given the limited capacity of this thesis and given the framework of analysis used it was unattainable to analyse any form of Duterte's communication channels in their totality. Hence with regard to future research which do allow for more detailed and precise analysis it is recommended to examine Duterte's speeches in their totality and compare them to actual policy actions taken. Furthermore it is recommended in the future when history has provided more insights into the coming foreign policy conduct to reflect and evaluate this thesis and see how many of the predictions of this thesis have been correct in order to obtain further recommendations and understanding.

Albeit this thesis has not specifically addressed the populist leaders' FP conduct, the thesis may serve as the primary starting ground for the comparative study of the populist leaders' FP. Future research may be conducted, for example, on Viktor Orban and Donald Trump, analysing the similarities of their 'independent', 'nationalistic', and 'domestically-focused' FP rhetoric, formulation and practice. This may allow for the conception of an empirically grounded theory of the populist FP formulation and conduct, which would greatly benefit the discipline of International Relations.

Bibliography

ABS-CBN News, "Manila to 'respect' military pacts with Washington, Yasay says" *ABS-CBN News*, Sep 29 2016. Available at: <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/29/16/manila-to-respect-military-pacts-with-washington-yasay-says> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Acharya A., "Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerging Security Order", *International Studies Quarterly*. 58, 158–173, (2014).

AFP-JIJI, "Philippines willing to share South China Sea, says government" *Japanese Times*, JUL 8, 2016. Available at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/08/asia-pacific/philippines-willing-share-south-china-sea-says-government/#.WRyt_PmGOiQ Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Al Jazeera News, "Rodrigo Duterte interview: Death, drugs and diplomacy" *Al Jazeera News*, 16 Oct 2016. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2016/10/exclusive-rodrigo-duterte-war-drugs-161015100325799.html> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Albert E., "The Now and Future US-Philippines Military Alliance" *Defense One*, JUNE 29, 2016. Available at: <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/06/us-philippine-military-alliance/129504/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Andrew-Speed et al., "Chinese engagement in Southeast Asian energy and mineral resources: motivations and outlook", *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, VOL. 57, NO 3. 316-342., (2016).

ASEAN, "History: The Founding of ASEAN" Available at: <http://asean.org/asean/about-asean/history/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

ASEAN, "Declaration On The Conduct Of Parties In The South China Sea" Available at: http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2 Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Asian Correspondent, "China confirms Philippine fishermen allowed into Scarborough Shoal" *Asian Correspondent*, 31st October 2016. Available at: <https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/10/china-confirms-philippine-fishermen-allowed-scarborough-shoal/#dF07fQTLTbzD3Zuh.99> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

BACULINAO E. and MARKER C., 2016, "Rodrigo Duterte, Philippines' 'Trump,' Runs on Rape Jokes, Violent Promises" *NBC news*, MAY 2 2016. Available at: <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-trump-runs-rape-jokes-violent-promises-n561631> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Banlaoi R., *Philippine Security in the Age of Terror*, Taylor Francis, 2010.

Baviera A, "President Duterte's Foreign Policy Challenges" *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 38, 2, 202–207., (2016).

BBC, "Australia conducting 'freedom of navigation' flights in South China Sea" *BBC* 15 December 2015, Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-35099445> Last accessed: 15/05/2017

Becker B., "The Grounded Theory Method and its uses for political science" *Series of Papers: Methods of Field Research* No 4. (Free University of Berlin 2012) Available at: http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/docs/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCSDerivate_000000002093/Becker_GTM_Political_Science.pdf Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Benoit, W. L., "Content analysis in political communication". In E. P. Bucy & R. L. Holbert (Eds.) *Sourcebook for political communication research: Methods, measures, and 6 analytical techniques* (pp. 268-279). (New York: Routledge 2011)

Berg, B.L., *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001).

Bill H., "Duterte's China visit could move regional goalposts" *Nikkei Asian Review*, October 17, 2016. Available at: <http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Bill-Hayton/Bill-Hayton-Duterte-s-China-visit-could-move-regional-goalposts> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Blackwill, R. and Tellis A. *Revising US Grand Strategy towards China*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).

Blanchard Ben, "Duterte aligns Philippines with China, says U.S. has lost" *Reuters*, Oct 20, 2016. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Boeije, H., *Analysis in qualitative research*. London: Sage, 2010.

Brunnstrom D., "Philippines tells world not to interfere in Duterte drugs war" *Reuters*, Sep 25, 2016. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-philippines-idUSKCN11U0QT> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Budd, R. W., R. K., Thorp, & L. Donohew, *Content analysis of communications*. (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

Burnham P. et al., *Research Methods in Politics*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

Calonzo A., "China Visit Helps Duterte Reap Funding Deals Worth \$24 Billion" *Bloomberg*, October 21, 2016. Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-21/china-visit-helps-duterte-reap-funding-deals-worth-24-billion> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Calonzo A., "Duterte Says 'Goodbye' America Before Meeting Xi in Beijing" *Bloomberg*, October 20, 2016. Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-20/duterte-says-goodbye-america-before-meeting-with-xi-in-beijing> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Campbell C., "Philippine President Duterte's Bold Move on China Spells Trouble Ahead" *Time.com*, Oct 20, 2016. Available at: <http://time.com/4538177/philippines-south-china-sea-rodrigo-duterte-xi-jinping-hague/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Carlsnaes W., Risse T., and Simmons B. A., *Handbook of International Relations*. (London: Sage, 2007).

Carr EH., *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939*, 2nd edn. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1946.

Cerojano T., "Filipinos seen backing Duterte despite rising drug killings" *PhilStar Global*, August 27, 2016. Available at: <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/08/27/1617798/filipinos-seen-backing-duterte-despite-rising-drug-killings> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Chalk P., "Rebuilding while performing: Military modernisation in the Philippines" *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, Special Report, June 2014. Available at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/rebuilding-while-performing-military-modernisation-in-the-philippines/SR68_Philippines.pdf Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Cheng Willard, "Duterte heads home from China with \$24 billion deals" *ABS-CBN News*, Oct 21 2016. Available at: <http://news.abs-cbn.com/business/10/21/16/duterte-heads-home-from-china-with-24-billion-deals> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Chowdhury F.A., "The Rise of China and Transitional Anxieties" *Working Paper Series n°5: Narratives of Peace and Conflict*, Liverpool Hope University, UK July 2015. Available at:

Churchman K., "CHINA'S VISION FOR A NEW ASIAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORDER" *The National Bureau of Asian Research, TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC*, December 2015.

Cooper A., "South China Sea Takeover: Destroying Fisheries and Creating Economic Dead-lands for Surrounding States" *University of Baltimore Journal of International Law*, VOL 4, No.1 Article 7., 2016.

Cox M., "Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?" *International Relations* 26(4) 369–83, 2012.

Dancel R., "US\$671m arms buys to upgrade Philippine military" *China Daily*, March 17, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinadailyasia.com/news/2014-03/17/content_15125348.html Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

De Castro R.C., "Twenty-First Century Philippines' Policy Toward an Emergent China: From Equi-Balancing to Strategic Balancing" *Asian Politics & Policy*, Volume 8, Issue 2, April 2016, p.: 305–328, p.305, 2016.

De Castro R.C., "The Duterte Administration's Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration's Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China" *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 35, 3, p.:139–159 (2016).

Downe-Wambolt, B. "Content analysis: method, applications and issues." *Health Care for Women International*, Volume 13, 313–321. 1992.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, "The Spanish period" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 2017. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Philippines/The-Spanish-period> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Erisen E., "An Introduction to Political Psychology for International Relations Scholars" *PERCEPTIONS*, Autumn 2012, Volume XVII, Number 3, p.: 9–28. Center for Strategic Research, 2012.

Foreign Policy Analysis, Department of Political Science, College of Arts & Science, and the University of Missouri, 2012. [Online]. Available at <http://foreignpolicyanalysis.org>

France-Presse Agence, "Facts on Aquino's legacy as Philippine president", ABS-CBN News, Jun 30 2016. Available at: <http://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/06/30/16/facts-on-aquinos-legacy-as-philippine-president> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

France-Presse Agence, "Philippines' Rodrigo Duterte insults US envoy with homophobic slur", *The Guardian*, 10 August 2016. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/10/philippines-leader-calls-us-ambassador-gay-son-of-a-whore-prompting-summons> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Friedberg A, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for the Mastery of Asia*. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).

Gao Tianlang, "Duterte's Unlikely Pivot to China" *Berkeley Political Review*, JANUARY 23, 2017. Available at: <https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2017/01/23/dutertes-unlikely-pivot-to-china/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Garamone J., "Philippines to Become Major non-NATO Ally, Bush Says" U.S. Department of Defense, (Washington, May 19, 2003). Available at: <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=2896> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Gayle D., "Barack Obama cancels meeting after Philippines president calls him 'son of a whore'", *TheGuardian*, 5 September 2016. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/05/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-barack-obama-son-whore> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Genalyn D., "Wealth Sharing with China Eyed" *Manilla Bulletin*, 25 March 2017. Available at: <https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/manila-bulletin/20170325/281479276242820> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

George P. & Son, *Encyclopedic World Atlas*. Oxford University Press, 2002.

Gilpin R., *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Glaser B.G. and A.L. Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Strategies for Qualitative Research*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967.

Glaser J. and Laudel G., "Life With and Without Coding: Two Methods for Early-Stage Data Analysis in Qualitative Research Aiming at Causal Explanations", *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* (14(2) 2013, Art. 5) (2013) Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jochen_Glaser/publication/236345335_Life_With_and_Without_Coding_Two_Methods_for_Early-Stage_Data_Analysis_in_Qualitative_Research_Aiming_at_Causal_Explanations/links/00b7d535938ab4949a000000/Life-With-and-Without-Coding-Two-Methods-for-Early-Stage-Data-Analysis-in-Qualitative-Research-Aiming-at-Causal-Explanations.pdf Last accessed: 15/05/2017

Greitens S. C., "The US-Philippine Alliance in a Year of Transition: Challenges & Opportunities" *Brookings Working Paper*, Center for East Asian Policy Studies, May 2016. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20160713_philippines_alliance.pdf Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Griffiths J., M. Rivers and P. Boykoff, "Philippines not really severing ties with US, Duterte says" *CNN News*, October 22, 2016. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/21/asia/duterte-china-philippines-us/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Hennie B., *Analysis in qualitative research*. (London: Sage,2010).

Herman F., "Actors And Structures In Process And Policy Approaches To China's Peacekeeping" *Asian Journal of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities*, Vol. 4, No. 2, (2016). ISSN 2311-3782 Available at: <http://www.multidisciplinaryjournals.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/FULL-PAPER-ACTORS-AND-STRUCTURES-IN-PROCESS-AND-POLICY-APPROACHES...pdf> Last accessed: 15/05/2017

Hermann M.G. & Kegley W. C., "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology" *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no 4.,(1995).

Hermann, M.G. "Explaining foreign policy behaviour using the personal characteristics of political leaders." *International Studies Quarterly*, 24, 7-46., (1980).

Hermann, M.G., "Assessing leadership style: A trait analysis" *Social Science Automation* (2002) Available at <http://socialscience.net/docs/lta.pdf> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Heydarian R. J., 2016, "Political scientist Richard Javad Heydarian on Rodrigo Duterte, US-bashing, and the South China Sea", *Quartz*, October 16, 2016. Available at: <https://qz.com/807203/political-scientist-richard-javad-heydarian-on-rodrigo-duterte-us-bashing-and-the-south-china-sea/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Heydarian R.J., "THE DIPLOMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF PHILIPPINES-CHINA ARBITRATION", *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, 2015 JANUARY 21, 2015. Available at <https://amti.csis.org/the-diplomatic-implications-of-philippines-china-arbitration/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Heydarian R.J., 'Hide your strength, bide your time' *Aljazeera* 21 NOVEMBER 2014. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/china-hide-your-strength-bide-y-201411198028498329.html> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Heydarian R.J., "The China-Philippines-U.S. Triangle" *Foreign Policy In Focus*, December 16, 2010. Available at: http://fpif.org/the_china-philippines-us_triangle/ Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Heydarian, R. J. "Barack Obama's pivot to Asia in tatters" *Aljazeera*, 24 SEPTEMBER 2016, Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/09/barack-obama-pivot-asia-tatters-160922122523631.html> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Holmes O., "Duterte tells Obama 'son of a whore' remark wasn't personal", *The Guardian*, 6 September 2016. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/06/son-of-a-whore-was-not-meant-to-be-personal-duterte-tells-obama> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Howard J. "U.S. International Economic Strategy in a Turbulent World" *Rand Corporation*, 2016.

Hsieh Hsiu-Fang and Shannon S.E., "Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis" *Qualitative Health Research*, 2005 15: 1277 (Sage Oct 4 2005) DOI: 10.1177/1049732305276687

<http://www.multidisciplinaryjournals.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/FULL-PAPER-ACTORS-AND-STRUCTURES-IN-PROCESS-AND-POLICY-APPROACHES...pdf> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Huang X. and Mo H., "Opportunities for Singapore from the One Belt, One Road Initiative" *KWM*, 27 May 2015. Available at: <http://www.kwm.com/en/sg/knowledge/insights/opportunities-for-singapore-from-the-one-belt-one-road-initiative-20150527> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Hudson MV, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. (2007)

Ikenberry G. John , "The Rise of China and the Future of the West" *Foreign Affairs*, 00157120, Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87, Issue 1., 2008.

Ilas Joyce, "Duterte slams U.S. anew, says it 'imported terrorism'", *CNN Philippines*, 09.07.2016. Available at: <http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/07/09/Duterte-United-States-imported-terrorism.html> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Ishiyama J.T. and B. Marijke, *21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook* University of North Texas, Sage 2010.

Jackson R., Sornsen Georg, *International Relations Theories and Approaches*. Oxford University Press, 2010.

Jacques M., *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*. London: Penguin/Allen Lane, 2009; 2nd edition 2012.

Jourdan A. and C. Jackie, "Behind Philippines' ties with China, a billionaire and his rehab centers" *Reuters*, Nov 1, 2016. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-rehab-idUSKBN12V2K4> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Kirshner, J., "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China." *European Journal of International Relations* 18 (2012): 53–75.

Klinkforth K., *NATO in U.S. Policymaking and Debate – An Analysis: 'Drawing the Map' of the U.S. Think Tank Debate on NATO since 9/11*. Osteuropa-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin Arbeitsbereich Politik und Gesellschaft, Berlin, 2006.

Kohlbacher, "The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research" *Forum Qualitative Social research* Volume 7, No. 1, Art. 21 – January,(2006)

Kraska J., "The Lost Dimension: Food Security and the South China Sea Dispute." *Harvard School National Security Journal*, 2015. Available at: <http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/James-Kraska-Article-.pdf> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Lacorte G., "Duterte tells China: Build us a railway and let's set aside differences for a while." *Inquirer.net* February 29, 2016. Available at: <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/137093/duterte-tells-china-build-us-a-railway-and-lets-set-aside-differences-for-a-while> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Lane R., "Concrete Theory: An Emerging Political Method". *American Political Science Review* 84:927–940 (1990).

- Lasswell H., "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society" İletişim kuram ve araştırma dergisi Sayı 24 Kış-Bahar 2007, s.215-228 (2007)
- Lindkvist, K. "Approaches to textual analysis." In K. E. Rosengren (Ed.), *Advances in content analysis* (pp. 23-41). (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981).
- Manila Standard, "Performance and trust" *Manila Standard*, April 08, 2017. Available at: <http://manilastandard.net/index.php/opinion/editorial/233843/performance-and-trust.html> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017
- Mayring P., *Qualitative content analysis: theoretical foundation, basic procedures and software solution*. (Austira, Klagenfurt, 2014)
- McGregor R., "Hawks Gain the Upper hand in US Policy on China." *Financial Times*, September 8, 2015. Available at: <http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2015/09/hawks-gain-upper-hand-in-us-policy-on-china> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017
- McTavish, D.-G., & Pirro, E.-B., "Contextual content analysis" *Quality and Quantity*, 24, 245-265., (1990).
- Mincai Y., "The South China Sea dispute and the Philippines Arbitration Tribunal: China's policy options" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 70:3, 215-234., (2016).
- Mogato Manuel. "Duterte tells regional leaders, U.S. not to lecture Philippines on rights." *Reuters*, Sep 8, 2016. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-laos-obama-duterte-idUSKCN11E1PV> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017
- Moraleda J., "Duterte: America would never die for us." *Philippine Canadian Inquirer*, August 3, 2015. Available at: <http://www.canadianinquirer.net/2015/08/03/duterte-america-would-never-die-for-us/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017
- Morgenthau H., *In Defense of the National Interest*. New York: Knopf 1951.
- Moss T., "Philippines Suspends Patrols With U.S. in South China Sea" *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 8, 2016. Available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/philippines-tells-u-s-no-more-joint-patrols-in-south-china-sea-1475826120> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017
- Nyri PI, Tan D., 2016, *Chinese Encounters in Southeast Asia* (University of Washington Press, 2016)
- Olson W., "Philippine presidential front-runner could hinder US military ties." *STARS AND STRIPES*, April 28, 2016. Available at: <https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/philippine-presidential-front-runner-could-hinder-us-military-ties-1.406656#.WSG1luuGOJA> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017
- Panda A., "More FONOPs Coming Soon to the South China Sea?" *The Diplomat*, February 14, 2015. Available at: <http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/more-fonops-coming-soon-to-the-south-china-sea/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017
- Parameswaran P., "How Significant is the 2017 US-Philippines Balikatan Military Exercise?" *The Diplomat*, May 16, 2017. Available at: <http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/how-significant-is-the-2017-us-philippines-balikatan-military-exercise/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Parameswaran P., "Why Did China's Warships Visit the Philippines" *The Diplomat*, May 05, 2017, Available at: <http://thedi diplomat.com/2017/05/why-did-chinas-warships-visit-the-philippines/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Parameswaran P., "Why the Philippines' Rodrigo Duterte Hates America?" *The Diplomat*, November 01, 2016. Available at: <http://thedi diplomat.com/2016/11/why-the-philippines-rodrigo-duterte-hates-america/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Patton, M.Q., *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002.

Peel Michael, "Philippines' Duterte backs 'new order' led by China and Russia" *Financial Times*, NOVEMBER 17, 2016. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/5e51dd92-acaf-11e6-9cb3-bb8207902122> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Perlez J., "Rodrigo Duterte and Xi Jinping Agree to Reopen South China Sea Talks" *The New York Times*, OCT. 20, 2016. , Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-china-xi-jinping.html> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Petty M., "Meeting Putin, Philippines' Duterte rails at Western 'hypocrisy'" *Reuters*, Nov 20, 2016. Available at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-apec-summit-philippines-russia-idUKKBN13F09X> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Petty M., "Meeting Putin, Philippines' Duterte rails at Western 'hypocrisy'" *Reuters*, Nov 20, 2016. Available at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-apec-summit-philippines-russia-idUKKBN13F09X> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Pitlo III L.B. and Karambelkar A., "Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea" *The Diplomat*, October 21, 2013, Available at: <http://thedi diplomat.com/2013/10/philippines-and-vietnam-in-the-south-china-sea-2/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

PRC, "Communication to the UN, No. CML/17/2009, May 7." PRC 2009. Accessed October 6, 2012. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf.

PRC. 2014. "Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, December 7." 7. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1217143.

Punzalan J., "Duterte to China: Treat Filipinos as brothers, not enemies" *ABS-CBN News*, Aug 29 2016. Available at: <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/29/16/duterte-to-china-treat-filipinos-as-brothers-not-enemies> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Quezon M. et al., "HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE REPUBLIC" (*Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office*, 2016). Available at: http://www.depedbataan.com/resources/96/historical_atlas_of_the_republic_of_the_philippines.pdf Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Quismundo Tarra, "Duterte takes anti-drug campaign to ASEAN" *ABS-CBN News*, Apr 29 2017. Available at: <http://news.abs-cbn.com/business/04/29/17/duterte-takes-anti-drug-campaign-to-asean> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Reifowitz Ian, "What Does It Mean That the Philippines Just Dumped the U.S. and Embraced China and Russia?" *HuffingtonPost*, 10/25/2016. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/what-does-it-mean-that-the-philippines-just-dumped_us_580f9449e4b099c434319c73 Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Reuters, "Philippine special envoy Ramos quits; aide says China mission accomplished" *Reuters*, Nov 1, 2016. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-china-ramos-idUSKBN12W3B2> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Rich M., "Rodrigo Duterte, in Japan, Calls for U.S. Troops to Exit Philippines in 2 Years" *The New York Times*, OCT. 26, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/world/asia/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-japan.html?_r=0 Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Rolf S. and Agnew J., "Sovereignty regimes in the South China Sea: assessing contemporary Sino-US relations." *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 57:2, 249-273, (2016).

Rosenau J.M., "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy." In *Approaches in Comparative and International Politics*, edited by R. Barry Farrell. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

Rudd K., 'How ancient Chinese thought applies today', *The World Post* (4 February 2015), available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/chinese-strategic-thoughts_b_6417754.html?clear. 15/05/2017

Russel H. Bernard, and Gery W. Ryan, *Analyzing qualitative data: Systematic approaches*. (London: Sage, 2010).

Saeid N. et al, "Research Methodology In Geopolitics: Application Of Qualitative Content Analysis In Studying The Geopolitical Codes Case". *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations* 2:208-222., (2008).

Shines Robert, "Increased Great Power Competition Changes Strategy of "Swing" Powers" *Foreign Policy Association*, October 26th, 2016. Available at: <https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/10/26/increased-great-power-competition-changes-strategy-of-swing-powers/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Smith S., Hadfield A., Dunne T., *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. (Oxford University Press, 2012).

Spykman N., *America's Strategy in World Politics*. New York: Harcourt, Brace 1942.

Steinbock, Dan, "Could Duterte's Ascent Mean Cooler Philippine Ties with U.S." *CNN* 10 May, 2016.

Stella Ma. And Arnaldo F., "Chinese arrivals fell 20% in August on South China Sea ruling" *Asia Maritime Reviews*, October 26, 2016. Available at <http://asiamaritime.net/chinese-arrivals-fell-20-in-august-on-south-china-sea-ruling/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Suryadinata L., *Southeast Asian Personalities of Chinese Descent: Biographical dictionary* Chinese Heritage Centre, 2012.

Sutte R.G., *The United States and Asia: Regional Dynamics and Twenty-First-Century Relations*. Rowman and Littlefield, 2015.

Tayag Y., "China's Artificial Islands in the South China Sea Are Killing Ocean Life" *Inverse* Sept.25,2015. Available at: <https://www.inverse.com/article/6465-china-s-artificial-islands-in-the-south-china-sea-are-killing-biodiversity>. Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Terehov V., "Philippine President R. Duterte visits China" *New Eastern Outlook*, 29.10.2016. Available at: <http://journal-neo.org/2016/10/29/philippine-president-r-duterte-visits-china/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Thayer C., "Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement" *The Diplomat* 2014, May 02, 2014. Available at: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

The Economist, "Military Reform: Xi's New Model Army." *The Economist* 2016. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21688424-xi-jinping-reforms-chinas-armed-forcesto-his-own-advantage-xis-new-model-army> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

The Japan Times, "Duterte seeks arms from China, may end maritime patrols with U.S.US" *The Japan Times*, SEP 14, 2016. Available at: <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/14/asia-pacific/duterte-seeks-arms-china-may-end-maritime-patrols-u-s/#.WRyJVvmGOiQ> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

The Permanent Mission of the PRC (People's Republic of China). "Communication Dated April 14." 2011. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf Accessed August 10, 2015

The White House, "Remarks by President Obama and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint Press Conference." *Office of the Press Secretary*, April 28, 2014. Available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Thuy T.T., "Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Security and Cooperation", *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, 30.06.2011.

US Department of State, "Remarks With Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario After Their Meeting" Washington, DC, June 23, 2011. Available at: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/06/166868.htm> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

van der Leer Y. and Yau J., "China's new silk route The long and winding road" *PWC*, February 2016. Available at: <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/growth-markets-center/assets/pdf/china-new-silk-route.pdf> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Vidich, A. J., and Lyman, S. M. "Qualitative methods: Their history in sociology and anthropology." In Denzin N. K. and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The landscape of qualitative research: Theories and issues* (pp. 41–110). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage (1998).

Villamor F., "Rodrigo Duterte Says Donald Trump Endorses His Violent Antidrug Campaign" *The New York Times*, DEC. 3, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/world/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-donald-trump.html> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Walker S. G., Malici Akan, Schafer Mark, *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioural International Relations*. (Routledge, 2010).

Watson V. B., "Post-Hague: The Philippines and Strategic Balance" *Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Policy Brief*, George Washington University, July 2016.

Wharton University Pennsylvania, "Where Will China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative Lead?", *Wharton University Pennsylvania*, Mar 22, 2017. Available at: <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/can-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-match-the-hype/> Last Accessed: 15/05/2017

Winter, D., "Measuring the motives of political actors at a distance" In J. Post (Ed.), *The psychological assessment of political leaders*. (pp. 153-177). (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2002).

World Bank, "Economic Prospects: Spillovers Amid Weak Growth." Washington DC, January 2016.

Wu S. and Zou K., *Non-Traditional Security Issues and the South China Sea*. (Routledge, 2014).

Yahuda M. B., *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific*. Routledge Curzon, 2004.

Zhang, Y. & Wildemuth, B.M. "Qualitative Analysis of Content." In *Applications of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and Library Science*, edited by B.M. Wildemuth, 308–19. (Westport, CT: Libraries Unlimited, 2009).

Zhao, S, "Rethinking the Chinese World Order: The Imperial Cycle and the Rise of China." *Journal of Contemporary China* 24: 961–982. P.970-971, (2015).