The Origins of Party and Party System Institutionalization in Third-Wave Democracies

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Abstract

How do the characteristics of previous authoritarian regimes affect the institutionalization of subsequent democratic party systems? Focusing on the institutions of previous authoritarian regimes, this thesis analyzes the root causes of party system institutionalization in third-wave democracies around the world. I propose a new logic that links authoritarian past to democratic party systems by emphasizing the way in which the existence of opposition political parties under the authoritarian rule contributes to party system institutionalization in subsequent democratic regimes. I argue that multiparty competition under authoritarian regimes incentivizes both incumbent autocrats and opposition factions to invest in political parties, leading to higher levels of overall party institutionalization. This has a long-lasting legacy on subsequent democracies. The analysis of 137 elections from 35 third-wave democracies around the world reveals that the degree of overall party institutionalization under authoritarian rule determines the trajectory of party system institutionalization in subsequent democratic regimes. The findings suggest that democratic party systems that inherit robust political parties from previous authoritarian regimes are more likely to institutionalize. Moreover, the findings also reveal that previous authoritarian regime type has an impact on party system institutionalization in subsequent democracies. Institutionalized patterns of party competition are more likely where democracies replace multiparty authoritarian regimes. The odds are against those democracies that follow from single-party or party-less authoritarian regimes.

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Table of Contents

1.	Intr	oduction1				
2.	2. Conceptualizing Party System Institutionalization					
3.	Literature Review: The Legacy of Authoritarianism10					
4.	4. Theory: Linking Party Institutionalization in Authoritarian Regimes to Systemic					
Ins	titutio	onalization in Democracies16				
5.	5. The Approach to Political Regimes23					
6.	6. Empirical Analysis28					
6	.1.	Data Set				
6	.2.	Analysis 1: Party Institutionalization under Authoritarian Settings				
6	.3.	Model Specification35				
6	.4.	Results				
6	.5.	Analysis 2: Linking Authoritarian Past to Democratic Party Systems				
6	.6.	Model Specification				
6	.7.	Results				
7.	Dis	cussion and Summary of the Results54				
8. Conclusion						
References						
Appendix						

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1. Theoretical Expectations Based on the Proposed Typology 2	27
Table 2. Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects Estimations of Party Institutionalization in Authoritarian	
Regimes	39
Table 3. Pooled OLS and Random Effects Estimations of Party System Institutionalization	52
Figure 1. The Illustration of Hypothesized Sequential Relationship.	22
Figure 2. Distribution of Authoritarian Regime Types Over Time	26
Figure 3. Distribution of Party Institutionalization by Regime Type.	33
Figure 4. Mean Electoral Volatility Scores Per Country	44

1. Introduction

Party systems across new democracies display considerable variation in terms of institutionalization levels. Despite the earlier accounts that suggest party systems tend to become more institutionalized as countries spend more time under democracy (Tavits, 2005), new democracies are far from exhibiting a linear relationship between time and institutionalization. Hence, the institutionalization of party systems is not an equilibrium. Almost four decades after the third-wave of democratization began, we still observe weak institutionalization as a widespread phenomenon across new democracies. Making sense of the variation in institutionalization levels across new democracies and understanding the factors that contribute or hinder party system institutionalization is crucial. Although a growing body of literature deals with the causes and consequences of party system institutionalization since Huntington (1968) underlined the importance of the phenomenon in the context of new democracies, we are far from reaching a consensus on what makes institutionalization more likely.

Unearthing the determinants of party system institutionalization is crucial for several reasons. Perhaps the most important reason is that institutionalization has implications for survival of democratic regimes (Bernhard et al., 2015) and consolidation of democracy (Dix, 1992). Institutionalized party systems are better situated to channel conflicts through established procedures (Diamond, 1997), curb anti-systemic forces and populist leaders' path to power (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006), enhance accountability and diminish governmental corruption (Schleiter & Voznaya, 2016). Hence, given the importance of party system institutionalization, a voluminous body of research is devoted to understanding the process of institutionalization in new democracies across Africa (Lindberg, 2007; Riedl, 2014; Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014), Asia (Hicken & Kuhonta, 2015), Eastern and Central Europe (Bielasiak, 2002; Casal, 2012) and Latin America (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Roberts 2014).

The problem with the existing studies, however, is the lack of substantive empirical account on the relationship between historical variables and the prospects for the institutionalization of party systems in new democracies. The origins of institutionalized party systems are yet to be subjected to comprehensive empirical analysis. It is surprising that even though we acknowledge that the legacy of authoritarianism determines a variety of outcomes in new democracies from democratic consolidation (Hagopian, 1993) to institutional change (Hanson, 1995), so far we have not provided a full explanation on the link between authoritarian legacies and the trajectory of party systems. Nevertheless, recent works provide an avenue for such analysis. Hicken and Kuhonta's (2015) contribution is significant since they underline the fact that historical legacies are crucial in affecting current levels of party system institutionalization in Asia. Some scholars reveal destabilizing effects of relatively longer authoritarian rule on party systems (Lupu & Stokes, 2010). Others shows the impact of a dictator's approach to political parties on party system stability (Frantz & Geddes 2016). Some analyses also document authoritarian successor parties' impact on party system institutionalization (Riedl, 2014).

My work contributes to this developing body of literature on several grounds. First, the analysis goes beyond the case studies and region-specific investigations to capture the global trend in party system institutionalization across new democracies. This would enhance the generalizability of the conclusions that the analysis make. Second, the thesis employs a new measure of party institutionalization developed by Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al., 2016). This new measurement captures previously overlooked aspects of party institutionalization in a way that takes a step forward to better alignment between conceptualization and operationalization. Third, the thesis demonstrates the effects of institutional characteristics of antecedent authoritarian regime on party system institutionalization in the subsequent democracies and presents a theory that links these two distinct political settings.

The main argument of the thesis is that the installation of a particular authoritarian regime type constitutes a critical juncture that establishes a path, which structures probabilities attached to several outcomes. The concerned outcome here is, of course, the development of party systems and, particularly, its institutionalization levels. I argue that the degree to which party systems are institutionalized is contingent on the previous authoritarian regime type and to the extent that actors invest in parties under authoritarian settings. Hence, party system institutionalization in the subsequent democracies are endogenous to antecedent regime characteristics.

The thesis illustrates that democracies that arise from multi-party dictatorships are more likely to enjoy high levels of institutionalization compared to those that arise from single-party or party-less dictatorships. I show globally that some form of competition under authoritarian rule contributes to institutionalization of parties, which is positively associated with party system institutionalization in the subsequent democratic era. That is, even though installation of democracy fundamentally alters the structure of inter-party competition and intra-party dynamics, the legacy of previous levels of institutionalization remains prevalent.

Multi-party dictatorships are positively associated with party system institutionalization in the subsequent democracies for three reasons. First, although the playing field is highly skewed in favor of the incumbent party, holding elections and allowing the participation of opposition political parties creates opportunities for parties to establish linkages with their constituents and invest in organizational capacity. Increased competition between political parties incentivizes actors to further invest in political parties and position parties as prime mechanisms of politics, which fosters institutionalization of political parties. Second, since opposition political parties continue their operations during authoritarian interlude, they are able to build party brands which provides cues to

the electorate regarding what these parties stand for. Party brands are crucial for the establishment of partisan attachments (Lupu, 2014). Political parties that inherit such a legacy are more likely to flourish in the democratic era compared to those parties that attempt to cultivate partisan loyalties from scratch. Finally, the existence of institutionalized political parties at an earlier point in time installs stability in inter-party competition as these parties raise the barriers for new parties that lack electoral linkages and organizational capacity to compete in democratic elections.

To test the hypothesis, the thesis classifies authoritarian regimes in three broad categories. These are party-less, single-party and multi-party authoritarian regimes. Such classification allows interpreting authoritarian regimes in purely institutional terms and limit my attention to relevant aspects of regime characteristics. The thesis covers 35 third-wave democracies across the world and subject these cases to time-series cross-sectional analysis. I employ various methods such as pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects models with different model specifications for each hypothesis.

The results lend support for my theoretical expectations. I find a significant effect of multiparty competition on the institutionalization of political parties under authoritarian rule. Moreover, previous regime type and previous levels of party institutionalization exhibit a strong association with the degree to which party systems are institutionalized in the subsequent democratic era. The results are robust even after controlling for a set of institutional, structural and historical variables and taking the variation within and between countries into account. My analysis shows no effect of the year in which democracy was inaugurated on party system institutionalization after controlling for a number of historical factors. Hence, the results are in conflict with one of the prominent theories of party system institutionalization, which suggests late democratizers tend to have low level of institutionalization compared to early democratizers due to structural conditions in which these democracies were born (see Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007). Such a theory might be useful in explaining the difference between party systems of advanced and new democracies but has no explanatory power regarding the variation in party system institutionalization across new democracies.

The thesis consists of two main empirical investigations. After presenting the conceptual and theoretical framework, I analyze the determinants of party institutionalization in 35 autocratic regimes from 1946 to 2008. All of these regimes experienced a transition to democracy during the so-called third-wave of democratization. Later I present an empirical analysis that demonstrates the effect of previous authoritarian regime type and party institutionalization levels on party system institutionalization in the subsequent democratic era.

2. Conceptualizing Party System Institutionalization

This thesis conceptualizes institutionalization as value infusion (Huntington 1968) and as the regularization of patterns of social interaction (O'Donnell, 1994, p. 57). In his seminal work, Huntington (1968, p. 12-15) underlines the importance of institutionalization for the strength of political organizations and defines institutionalization as a process by which an organization becomes "valued for itself". In more broad terms, institutionalization is understood as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington, 1968, p. 12). Huntington argues that as an organization becomes more institutionalized its members give greater importance to the preservation of the organization itself rather than their commitment to its goals. Therefore, an organization becomes institutionalized as far as it is infused with value beyond the achievement of a particular objective (Levitsky, 1998). In a non-institutionalized organization, members value the organization to the extent that it helps them to achieve specific goals and they are not concerned with the survival of the organization once their goals are achieved (Levitsky, 1998, p. 79). Panebianco (1988, p. 53) applies this point to political parties, saying that "party is institutionalized when it becomes valuable in and of itself". To illustrate, Fernando Collor de Mello, president of Brazil from 1990 to 1992, created his own party to run for the presidency. After de Mello achieved his goal and won the presidency, the party weakened drastically, and following his resignation in 1992, it disappeared from the political scene (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). This is a perfect case of a weakly institutionalized party.

In addition to value infusion, institutionalization entails regularization of patterns of interaction among the actors involved in an organization. O'Donnell (1994) argues that institutionalization is a process by which actors' expectation and behaviors become highly embedded to the rules and norms installed by an organization. This perspective, therefore, perceives institutionalization as the stabilization of behavior and expectations (Levitsky ,1998).

Huntington (1968) combines two broad elements of institutionalization, value infusion and routinization of behaviors, by setting out four dimensions of institutionalization of a political organization. These are adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of an organization's behaviors and procedures. Adaptability of an organization can be estimated through assessing the ways in which it copes with environmental challenges and responds to changes in its environment through functional adaptation. Second dimension of institutionalization is complexity, which is understood as the existence of a high number of organizational subunits that are hierarchically and functionally separated. More complex the organization is, more able to adapt to changing circumstances and transform itself accordingly. Third dimension is autonomy. Huntington argues that institutionalized political organizations are those that are independent from other institutions and social groupings. Fourth dimension of institutionalization regarding its core values, procedures and functional boundaries. More precisely, an institutionalized organization is expected to display great degree of internal unity.

Huntington's definition of institutionalization is helpful to pinpoint the properties that an institutionalized organization should possess. This is useful to gauge the institutionalization of political parties. But we need to go a step forward and define not only institutionalization of individual political parties but also institutionalization of a system in which these parties operate. After all, institutionalization of political parties and party systems have different facets and might not go hand in hand (Randall & Svasand, 2002). A political party might become highly institutionalized but if other political parties are yet to develop as institutionalized organizations, systemic institutionalization is likely to fall short.

The thesis defines party systems "as the set of patterned interactions in the competition among parties" (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, p. 4). As Sartori (1976) underlines, a system must have at least

two constituent elements; therefore, it must involve more than one party. Moreover, a party system includes a set of established rules that structure how competition between these parties takes place. In other words, a party system displays some regularities in inter-party competition that implies continuity in the rules that determine the nature of competition and the composition of parties that interact with one another (Mainwaring & Scully 1995). Nevertheless, a change in a system does not mean that there is no party system as such but drastic changes in the rules and composition of parties could lead to collapse of the system, as was the case in Venezuela and Peru (Seawright, 2012). Some political parties, of course, will rise and others will decline but the degree to which such changes happen is crucial and depends on the institutionalization of the system.

Having clarified the notions of institutionalization and party systems, I can now present the concept of party system institutionalization. I follow Mainwaring and Scully's conceptualization, who present a definition that builds on four pillars. First, and perhaps most importantly, an institutionalized party system displays a great degree of stability in the rules and the patterns of inter-party competition. Hence, there must be a considerable degree of continuity in the rules of the game and in the composition of parties, which compete in the system. A system in which new parties frequently emerges and replace existing parties cannot be considered as institutionalized. Second, in institutionalized party systems, political parties enjoy stable roots in the society. Rootedness of a party can be assessed by the degree of citizens' attachment to the party. Hence, some degree of partisanship in the society is crucial for the development of institutionalized party system is under threat since citizens have no structured preferences. Weak party roots in the society would cause massive electoral shifts from one election to another, hindering the regularity in electoral competition (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). Third, in institutionalized systems parties are perceived as legitimate representation mechanisms and seen as the sole means to access to power. If political elites do not

attach legitimacy to parties they might undermine parties' operations and even their existence. Finally, parties have strong organizational structures in institutionalized systems. They acquire value of their own (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, p. 5) and they are autonomous from any organization, socio-political movement and not subordinated to ambitious charismatic leaders.

3. Literature Review: The Legacy of Authoritarianism

Democracies do not form as *tabulae rasa* (Gryzmala-Busse, 2002, p. 12). New democracies around the world carry the traces of history both in their formal and informal institutions. As one of the essential formal institutions, party systems are no exception in this regard. They inherit some crucial historical legacies that structure their formation, development and institutionalization. Analysis of historical variables and path dependency in the evolution of party systems is nothing new and attracted much attention. Studies examined the impact of political conflict during the early 20th century on Latin American party systems (Coppedge, 1997). Others provide empirical support to the argument about "stickiness" of political alignments that are formed at an earlier point in time and which shaped contemporary party systems (Kitschelt et al. 2010, p. 177). However, despite the historical relevance of authoritarianism across the developing world, scholars have long neglected the effect of this variable on the institutionalization of democratic party systems and considered democratic transition as a starting point for such analysis. Nevertheless, recently scholars turned their attention to the origins of party system institutionalization, which requires understanding the particularities of the authoritarian past in new democracies.

A voluminous body of literature examines how authoritarian legacies influence the type of transition, institutional choice and the prospects of democratic consolidation (Geddes, 1995). The impact of such historical legacies on party systems is also acknowledged. We know, for instance, that such legacies influence party system competitiveness in new democracies (Gryzmala-Busse, 2006). On the one hand, the findings also suggest that voters' political socialization and partisan attachments, which are crucial in the formation of new party systems in the third-wave democracies, are to some extent carried over from the old regime (Dalton & Weldon, 2007). Yet, a theoretical and empirical gap remains to be filled to understand how and why some new democracies inherit certain legacies that contribute/hinder the development of institutionalized party systems.

Riedl's (2014) work presents an agenda-setting analysis to uncover the legacy of authoritarianism on party system institutionalization. Examining four African democracies, Riedl finds that the strength of incumbent authoritarian party during the transition to democracy affects the formation of democratic party systems. Her theory rules out the possibility that antecedent authoritarian institutions might be effective in shaping balance of power during the transition. Instead, it invests heavily on the nature of patronage networks and the cultivation of local elite support during the authoritarian era and propose a linkage between these variables and the strength of incumbent authoritarian party. More specifically, Riedl's findings suggest that the regimes that maintained strong patronage networks and ensured support of local elites, were able to shape the transition to democracy. This consequently enabled authoritarian incumbents to remain in power in the subsequent democratic era, which in turn contributed to the institutionalization of party systems.

The problem with Riedl's theory, however, is the lack of substantive empirical investigation regarding the relationship between antecedent authoritarian institutions and party system institutionalization in the subsequent democratic era. Looking at four cases, Riedl concludes that previous regime type and domestic institutions are irrelevant. However, as I show in this thesis, previous regime type and authoritarian institutions in fact matter. The position of the party vis-à-vis opposition political parties might be determined by the extent of the authoritarian regime institutions' impact on party-building. After all, not all dictatorships invest on political parties to the same degree. Some relies heavily on political parties to rule while others rely alternative institutional mechanisms. Hence, what is missing is a thorough explanation that brings institutions of antecedent authoritarian regime in to the theoretical framework and an empirical evidence to reveal the relationship. Bringing authoritarian institutions back in to the picture would allow us to go beyond the regional specificities that reflect on informal institutions and extend the analysis outside of the four African cases that Riedl examines.

Asian countries also display patterns that support the linkage between authoritarianism and party system institutionalization. Mongolia, Taiwan and Indonesia's well-institutionalized party systems argued to be the result of the strong presence of former authoritarian regime parties (Croissant & Volkel, 2012). Croissant and Volkel speculate that the centrality of political parties in the previous authoritarian regime might be influential. But they do not systematically test this hypothesis. The studies also find that the institutionalization of party systems in Malaysia and Singapore is rooted in authoritarianism (Hicken & Kuhonta 2015). Hicken and Kuhonta argue that where there is a highly institutionalized authoritarian party at an earlier point in time, subsequent party systems tend to become more institutionalized. This work is counter intuitive in the sense that, in contrary to many accounts, it argues party systems might well be institutionalized under authoritarianism, calling for the separation of the process of institutionalization from the concept of democratization.

In the context of Asian party systems, earlier institutionalization levels are highly correlated with the subsequent levels of institutionalization (Hicken & Kuhonta 2015). Hence, understanding current levels of party system institutionalization requires an analysis of authoritarian past. Nevertheless, assessing party system institutionalization under authoritarianism might be problematic since inter-party competition that forms the essence of party systems might not display the degree of stability in full clarity in authoritarian settings. That is why Hicken and Kuhonta's examination of volatility levels under authoritarianism might be misleading since official figures are likely to conceal exact results. In fact, there might not be a competition in its full sense that would result in a considerable vote shift between political parties. For instance, low levels of electoral volatility in Singapore, which leads scholars to treat the case as an institutionalized party system, might be the result of uneven playing field. It is for this reason that "indicators of institutionalization under democracy do not necessarily imply institutionalization under authoritarianism" (Mainwaring, 2016, p. 713). As this being the case, in the case of authoritarian regimes, the attention should be paid on

the degree of institutionalization at the level of individual political parties rather than on the stability in inter-party competition. Party institutionalization does not necessarily translate to the institutionalization at the systemic level (Randall & Svasand 2002). Nevertheless, competition between robust, institutionalized parties, which inherit organizational capacities (Loxton 2015) and partisan attachments from authoritarian era, is more likely to lead to stable party competition compared to where nascent weak parties compete one another in the initial rounds of democratic competition.

Moreover, it is not clear from the findings of Hicken and Kuhonta that whether continuity in institutionalization levels exists in cases where democratic transition has occurred. Since empirical support for their argument comes from Malaysia and Singapore that remain autocratic, additional analysis is needed to link institutionalization in authoritarian and democratic settings. Assessing the continuity in institutionalization levels is crucial as openness of democratic playing field might significantly alter the way in which inter-party competition takes place, and therefore, might represent a break between past and current.

Interesting findings on the topic are also put forward in the context of Latin American countries, supporting arguments regarding authoritarian legacy on democratic party systems. Some Latin American party systems display great continuity in terms of pre-authoritarian and post-authoritarian party composition in party systems. Depending on the experience with dictatorships, some party systems emerged unchanged after authoritarian interlude, causing greater party system stability in the post-transition era (Frantz and Geddes 2016). Frantz and Geddes convincingly argue that authoritarian interludes left long-lasting legacies on subsequent party systems either negative or positive. They show that dictators' decision whether to outlaw or ally with existing parties or creating new ones was significant for the trajectory of party system stability.

In another study, Lupu and Stokes (2010) assemble a unique data set on Argentine constituencies that covers the period between 1912 and 2003. The study reveals the saliency of

authoritarian interruptions on party system instability. Lupu and Stokes' findings cast doubt on the assertion that rule out age of democracy as a variable that predict the degree of partisan attachments over time (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007). They argue that partisanship and, in turn, party system stability increases as democracy lasts, however, it erodes when democracy is interrupted. The study also shows that longer the authoritarian interludes the more destabilizing its effect will have on democratic party systems. Hence, the findings encourage the consideration of authoritarian interludes and history of interruptions of democracy in the study of emerging party systems (Lupu & Stokes 2010, p. 103). Nevertheless, the study overlooks the possibility that such an impact might be different depending on the characteristics of authoritarian regime.

Turning our attention to young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, we see that some studies also document the relevancy of authoritarian past. Epperly (2011) provides empirical support for Bielasiak's (2002) observation that volatility is significantly higher in countries were once sub-state entities of the Soviet Union. Epperly claims that the existence of multi-party elections in satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe provided representation for some segments of the society and preserved social distinctiveness between the groups. Consequently, he argues, this led to relative electoral stability compared to what we observe in former sub-states. Nevertheless, post-communist party systems display some distinctive patterns. For instance, in contrast to Latin American cases, there is no pre-authoritarian parties in post-communist party systems (Geddes, 1995). Moreover, after four decades of communist single-party rule, citizens in Central and Eastern European countries have weak partisan attachements (Mair, 1998). Hence, there is almost no partisan attachments that are carried over from the previous communist regimes. These are logical reasons for why we observe weakly-institutionalized party system in some of these countries. Nevertheless, distinctive characteristics of post-communist party systems should not discourage us to incorporate them into a comparative framework. Closer look at the variation in previous authoritarian institutions across new

democracies, would allow us to capture the particularity of communist party rule compared to other single-party dictatorships elsewhere. Moreover, some important political parties that have been consequential to the development of post-communist party systems have roots in post-communist past. To name a few, Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and Poland's Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) are such parties (Loxton, 2015). These observations call for a detailed analysis of the impact of communist rule on post-communist party systems.

Current work contributes to this literature by putting greater emphasis on authoritarian institutions by focusing on the impact of political parties under authoritarian era on the development of democratic party systems. Such institutional emphasis allows me to move away from countryspecific characteristics and enable me to test my theoretical framework cross-regionally. This contributes to the generalizability of empirical findings. Moreover, I diverge from existing literature by examining the institutionalization of individual political parties under authoritarian setting rather than interaction between them. This approach clearly demonstrates the legacy of authoritarian political parties on subsequent democratic party systems. Most importantly, I provide a theory and empirical evidence that link previous regime characteristics to democratic party systems.

4. Theory:

Linking Party Institutionalization in Authoritarian Regimes to Systemic Institutionalization in Democracies

Even though the playing field is highly skewed in favor of authoritarian incumbents (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009) and citizens' face a series of strategic dilemmas that push them to vote for incumbent autocrats (Magaloni, 2006), elections under authoritarianism are far from being meaningless. Not only because elections have a democratizing effect (Lindberg 2006; Teorell 2010), but they also install a culture of political mobilization and political participation. Where autocrats hold elections, and allow opposition factions to mobilize and participate, political parties as vehicles of representation and as means to access to power gain more opportunity to flourish.

The relevance of formal institutions such as political parties might be challenging to identify in authoritarian settings since there is no enforcement mechanisms that make autocrats and other political actors limit their actions within the boundaries of these institutions (Svolik, 2012). But the significance of authoritarian political parties can be traced in their contribution to regime longevity (Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Ample empirical evidence suggest that dictators establish political parties with the aim to alleviate threats to the regime (Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012).

These explanations help us to understand the persistence of single-party authoritarian regimes. But why some dictators allow the formation of opposition political parties, however, is less clear. And even if they do whether these parties are actually parties in their full sense is also questionable. Schedler (2009) argues that multi-party elections provide a legitimacy boost for authoritarian incumbents. Another explanation is that dictators permit opposition political parties to contest elections to foster organizational proliferation that serves as a co-optation mechanism for regime dissidents (Haber, 2006). Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) show that regimes which allow more parties than necessary last longer than those allow only few parties. Parties stand as necessary tools for dissidents to reach bureaucratic office such as legislatures that provide mechanisms to collect rents (Gandhi & Przeworski 2007). Therefore, the function and reasons behind the formation of political parties might be different in dictatorships than in democracies where their primary mission is to channel citizens' demand to policy outputs.

Even though the characteristics and meanings attached to political parties are different, once they are established, there is a great room for their institutionalization. Allowing opposition political parties to contest elections, therefore, might have unintended consequences on behalf of dictators. As Lindberg (2006, 2009) shows in the context of Africa, electoral contestation is a learning process for both the masses and elites. In a global time-series analysis, Bernhard, Edgell & Lindberg (2016) find that authoritarian elections may lead to democratization especially in the first three consecutive elections. Thus, political parties may become effective weapons in mobilizing masses and resolve collective action problems among dissident elites. Hence, neither elections nor opposition political parties are trivial in authoritarian regimes. Similar to democratic environments, albeit to a limited extent, political parties born under authoritarian settings have the opportunity to form linkages to the electorate and invest in party organization. Despite hostile bureaucratic structures that undermine institutionalized patterns of party politics, actors are capable of planting the seeds of robust political parties under authoritarian regimes.

Scholars have long claimed that successful party-building requires stable democracy. It has been argued that regular elections under democracy fosters partisan attachments (Converse, 1969), making party survival and stabilization of party systems more likely. Aldrich (1995, p. 286), for instance, argues that stable democracy creates incentives for politicians to see parties as primary means to achieve their goals. However, evidence from developing countries suggests that elections and democracy might not be related to the development of robust political parties and stabilization of party systems. Levitsky, Loxton and Van Dyck (2016) observe that in the context of Latin America, only Brazil's Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) was born under democracy and has been successfully institutionalized. A series of investigations led Levitsky and his colleagues conclude that robust parties emerge not from stable democratic competition but rather from extraordinary conflict such as authoritarian repression (Levitsky et al., p. 3). By developing a conflict-centered approach to institutionalization of political parties, they highlight that periods of intense political polarization fosters partian attachments, incentivize organization building, and facilitate internal cohesion. Hence, such periods might in turn foster development of robust political parties.

Some authoritarian regimes might create more suitable environment for political parties to flourish. For actors to invest in political parties there must be at least some form of competition. Although some dictators form political parties, as long as they face no substantive opposition mobilization, their incentive to invest in party organization would remain low. Smith (2005) skillfully shows that authoritarian elites who face organized mass-mobilizing opposition parties tend to form robust political parties to counter the opposition movement. This logic also resonates in the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), who argue that where non-elites gain sufficient power that makes repression more costly, elites tend to invest in more institutionalized way of participation. Reversing the causal direction, Hicken and Kuhonta (2015) speculate that the existence of strong ruling party may lead opposition parties also become more institutionalized. What these arguments suggest is that to get highly institutionalized parties there must be some form of interaction between multiple parties. Therefore, one might expect robust political parties to develop as strong organizations in multi-party authoritarian regimes where opposition political parties are to some extent allowed to form linkages with electorate and continue their operations to mobilize their electoral base.

As discussed, a voluminous body of literature explain why autocrats invest in parties. But, what is the mechanism that lead opposition parties to institutionalize and how can we link this to the institutionalization of subsequent democratic party systems? Opposition parties face various challenges in authoritarian settings where media tend to be biased and the opposition's access to media is likely to be limited. Since media is an important tool to reach out to the electorate this presents a great obstacle for opposition parties to garner votes. Such limitations to opposition parties' operations, however, might paradoxically foster party-building. Interestingly, some scholars speculate that increasing importance of mass media in 20th century electoral politics weakened partisan attachments and hindered the establishment of robust party organizations by decreasing the importance of party organization vis-à-vis media sources as primary mechanism to reach out to voters, causing party system instability in late democratizing countries (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007). Lack of access to media creates incentives for parties to invest in territorial organization and means of mobilization at constituency-level, which result in a strong party organization (Van Dyck, 2016). The extent of territorial organization allows for active mobilization at the constituency-level that is key for crafting mass partisanship (Samuels & Zucco, 2014). Hence, a political party that is established under authoritarian era and continue to operate in democratic era is likely to have a clear advantage over its counterparts that are established in a democratic environment since former inherit a solid organization from previous regime.

Multi-party competition during the authoritarian era also enables political parties to establish strong roots in the society. Besides inheriting strong organizational capacity, parties that are established during authoritarian era and continue to operate after democratic transition, are better situated to form robust linkages to the electorate. Under authoritarian regimes there is a clear-cut division between incumbent and opposition political parties, which enables voters to easily identify what these parties stand for. High degrees of polarization between pro- and anti-regime political parties allow these parties to establish explicit party brands that fosters partisan attachments (Lupu, 2012, 2014, 2016). Therefore, multi-party competition during authoritarian era allows incumbent and opposition political parties to establish identifiable party brands over time, which contributes to the development of partisan attachments. Partisan attachments that developed during authoritarian repression crystallizes societal factions as supporters of incumbent regime and dissidents. This makes vote shifts between political parties less likely compared to political environment where such division between political parties do not exist. More precisely, contestation and mobilization that occurs in multi-party dictatorships politically construct partisan cleavages along with established party-brands and divide electorate in two opposing camps, which would decrease the likelihood of vote shifts between political parties and consequently stabilize inter-party competition (Roberts, 2016).¹

As a result, democratic party systems in which political parties inherit party brands from previous dictatorships are more likely to institutionalize. Where such parties do not exist, opening of electoral arena followed by democratic transition would create a void. Many parties without a brand recognition and a partisan base would appear during the initial rounds of elections. Since party brand is crucial for party endurance (Lupu 2014, 2016), party systems in which parties lack brand recognition are likely to induce frequent changes in the composition of parties. Hence, in such party systems, many parties are likely to rise and fade away from one election to another, creating instability in terms of inter-party competition.

Finally, robust political parties that arise from multi-party dictatorships limit feasible alternatives and structure the choices of political elites and voters during democratic transition. Regime transitions are the processes in which elites and voters invest time in learning what political decisions would bring the best outcome (Gryzmala-Busse, 2002). The existence of robust political parties

¹ I do not argue that party brands continue to reflect divisions between regime supporters and opposition to it even decades after the democratic transition. However, parties that have roots in previous dictatorship are adaptable to changing environments and can be more flexible in shifting their appeals. This makes their survival more likely and, consequently, prevents drastic changes in party system.

emanated from authoritarian era closes the electoral arena for new parties since political elites perceive these parties as only feasible tool to acquire political power. Such political parties also provide information short-cuts for voters through their pre-existing party-brands, which rescue voters from investing considerable energy on deciding which party to choose from. Such an environment incentivizes political elites to invest in existing parties as voters' party choice are inclined towards these parties. Since these parties remain as feasible option on behalf of both elites and voters, they stand as legitimate mechanisms of political representation in the democratic era.

This theoretical discussion allows me to derive the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Multi-party competition in authoritarian regimes contributes to the institutionalization of incumbent and opposition political parties, which result in high levels of overall party institutionalization.

Hypothesis 2: Party system institutionalization is predicted to be higher in democracies that follow from multi-party authoritarian regimes, which historically tend to have high levels of overall party institutionalization, compared to those that follow from single-party or party-less authoritarian regimes.

Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized sequential relationship discussed in this section. It illustrates that dictators' decision on whether to ban all parties, govern through a single-party, or allow multi-party competition determines party institutionalization levels, which cast a shadow on the subsequent democratic party systems.



Figure 1. The Illustration of Hypothesized Sequential Relationship.

5. The Approach to Political Regimes

There are various types of authoritarianisms around the world. Identifying the differences between authoritarian regimes and classifying them based on the characteristics that they display has been attracted much scholarly attention. Such classifications are important for analytical purposes and to capture the diverse characteristics it is essential to understand the variation that these regimes exhibit in various dimensions. Hence, conclusions that we draw are highly sensitive to the way we classify the regimes. Identifying regime types, therefore, has utmost importance for the purposes of this thesis.

Before moving forward, it is crucial to define what counts as dictatorship or democracy. Dictatorships are those regimes that fail to meet established criteria for democracy (Svolik, 2012, p. 20). Such criteria are contestation and participation as famously put forward by Dahl (1971). Hence, my approach to divergence between democracy and dictatorships rests on the minimalist conception of democracy (Alvarez et al., 1996; Boix, 2003). According to this conceptualization, contestation occurs when opposition has some chance of winning office (Alvarez et al. 1996, p. 5). That is, there must be positive probability that alternation in the government will take place if the opposition is to win the elections. For example, even though some opposition parties were allowed, Mexico was dictatorship until 2000 because it had been certain that PRI would won all elections held throughout the 20th century. Moreover, elections must be held in a free and fair manner. Finally, considerable segment of the population need to be enfranchised. In sum, democracy is a regime that legislative seats and executive position are filled through free, fair and competitive elections in which suffrage is expanded to wide segments of population. That said, dictatorship can be considered as a residual category that includes all countries that do not meet with above listed criteria.

One of the most significant challenge for the scholars of authoritarianism has been to define and classify the regimes that are essentially authoritarian but display some form of competitiveness. Some scholars consider such regimes somewhere between full democracy and full authoritarian and label them as hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002). Depending on the degree of competitiveness, Diamond further differentiate between competitive authoritarian regimes and ambiguous regimes as a residual category. Similarly, Schedler (2006) and Levitsky and Way (2010) also classify authoritarian regimes based on the degree of competitiveness.

Geddes et al. (2014), on the other hand, distinguishes between personalist, military, monarchy, and dominant-party regimes. Doing so she ignores the difference between single-party regimes where no opposition is allowed and dominant-party regimes where a party holds the majority of the seats in the legislature but opposition parties are allowed to compete (Hadenius & Teorell 2007). For example, Geddes classify the 20th century Mexico as single-party regime but the regime was essentially a multiparty dictatorship with a dominant party system. After all, in the 2000 presidential elections Partido Revolucionario Instituticional (PRI) lost to Partido Accion Nacianol (PAN), main opposition party.

Since main concern of the thesis is political parties under authoritarian regimes and their longlasting effect on party system institutionalization in subsequent democracies, I classify authoritarian regimes based on their treatment of political parties. Such approach has two main advantages compare to other regime typologies. First, it rescues me from the challenging process of establishing regime typologies that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. As Svolik (2012) shows categorizing regime types is inherently flawed as dictatorships can include various traits at the same time. For example, a dictatorship can be run by professional soldiers while govern through a political party. Most of the classifications treat such regimes either military or single-party (i.e. Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; Geddes et al. 2014). Second, classification based on restrictions of political parties concur with the purposes of the thesis. If we are interested in the institutionalization of a political party or parties and outcomes related to the regimes' treatment of party organizations, theoretically, the role of military or whether the leader is civilian or not has not much to say on the matter. Considering these issues, I opt for a typology of authoritarian regimes based on the restrictions imposed on political parties. This thesis, therefore, considers three types of authoritarian regimes. Regimes that impose total ban on political parties (1). Regimes that govern through a political party but ban parties other than ruling party (2). Third, regimes that allow political parties other than ruling party (3).

According to this classification, multi-party authoritarian regimes in which opposition parties compete in elections are those that highly resemble what Levitsky and Way (2010) call competitive authoritarian regimes whereas single-party and party-less regimes fall into the category of full authoritarian regimes in terms of their terminology. In multi-party authoritarian regimes elections are held regularly and opposition political parties can open party branches, recruit candidates and organize electoral campaigns (Levitsky & Way 2010, 7). But, as discussed, what distinguish these regimes from democracies is that alternation in power is highly unlikely.

Although what I call multi-party authoritarian regimes converges with Levitsky and Way's competitive authoritarianism, I diverge from them in classifying full authoritarian regimes. Minimalist conception of democracy employed in this thesis disregards approaching authoritarianism as a matter of degree. The regime is either democratic or autocratic. Levitsky and Way considers some regimes that allow the formation of opposition political parties as fully authoritarian. According to their terminology, in full authoritarian regimes electoral fraud is massive and party campaigns are barred regularly. Since I predict that mere existence of opposition political parties to have significant impact on institutionalization under authoritarian settings and party system institutionalization in subsequent democracy, theoretically, there is not much difference between competitive authoritarian and full authoritarian regimes as long as both allow for multi-party competition.



Figure 2. Distribution of Authoritarian Regime Types Over Time.

Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of authoritarian regimes based on restrictions on parties from 1950 to 2008. Density plot clearly demonstrates increasing frequency of multi-party authoritarian regimes starting from early 1990s. Downward frequency in single-party regimes is most likely result from the collapse of communist single-party regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and in other countries such as Mongolia. Several single-party regimes transitioned not to democracy but to multiparty dictatorship such as Ghana, which transitioned to democracy only several years after it allowed multi-party competition in 1992. On the other hand, we observe that majority of regimes between 1970 and 1980 were those regimes that ban all political parties. This frequency is, for example, partly attributable to the inauguration of regimes such as Allende's rule in Chile, the regime of Torrijos in Panama, the installation of military regimes in Argentina and Turkey.

Authoritarian Regime Type	Overall Party Institutionalization	PSI in Subsequent Democratic Party System
Single-party	(-)	(-)
Multi-party	(+)	(+)
Party-less	/	(-)

Table 1. Theoretical Expectations Based on the Proposed Typology.

Finally, Table 1 demonstrates my theoretical expectations based on three regime types proposed in this section. I predict low overall institutionalization in single-party regimes followed by weak party system institutionalization in subsequent democracies. I also expect party-less regimes to be replaced by weakly institutionalized democratic party systems. On the other hand, I foresee multiparty authoritarian regimes to display high overall party institutionalization followed by highly institutionalized democratic party systems.

6. Empirical Analysis

6.1. Data Set

To assess the implications of the theory I collected data from nine different sources. These are Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013), Svolik (2012), Magaloni et al. (2013), Weghorst and Bernhard (2014), Miller (2015), Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al., 2016), Mainwaring et al. (2016) and Quality of Government (Teorell et al., 2017). My first dependent variable to test Hypothesis 1, a measure of party institutionalization, comes from Varieties of Democracy data set, whereas my second dependent variable comes from Mainwaring et al.'s (2016) recently constructed global electoral volatility scores data set, which I employ to measure party system institutionalization in democracies. To compensate missing data for some democratic African countries (i.e Ghana and Senegal), I collected data from Weghorst and Bernhard data set (2014). For the operationalization of authoritarian regime type and authoritarian institutions, I collected data from Svolik (2012) and Magaloni et al. (2013). Finally, I use Quality of Government data set (Teorell et al., 2017) for several control variables such as ethnic fractionalization, district magnitude, democratic regime type (parliamentarism or presidentialism).

The analysis covers 35 countries around the world for a period between 1950 and 2008. All the countries included in the analysis experienced transition to democracy during the third-wave of democratization and excluding Russia, most of them continue to remain democratic according to th minimalist conception of democracy adopted in this thesis. To determine the year of democratic transition and whether a country fulfils the criteria to be considered as democratic, I collected data from Boix, Miller and Rosato's (2013) dichotomous measure of democracy, which considers countries as democratic if they satisfy Robert Dahl's (1971) contestation and participation criteria.

The structure of following chapters is as follows. In Analysis 1, I test Hypothesis 1 which suggest multi-party competition contributes to the institutionalization of political parties under authoritarian settings. First, I present the operationalization of dependent and independent variables. Second, I discuss model specifications. Finally, I present empirical findings and discuss their implications. In Analysis 2, I assess Hypothesis 2 which claims democratic regimes that follow from multi-party authoritarian regimes tend to have more institutionalized party systems then those that follow from single-party or party-less authoritarian regimes. In this analysis, I regress electoral volatility on a number of historical variables along with institutional and structural variables.

6.2. Analysis 1: Party Institutionalization under Authoritarian Settings

6.2.1. Dependent Variable: Measuring Party Institutionalization

There is no consensus in the literature regarding the operationalization of the concept of party institutionalization. A vast body of literature deals with the conceptualization of party institutionalization but studies fall short in providing a convincing operationalization that is in harmony with the concept. Although several studies skillfully address this inadequacy, lack of cross-sectional time-series data has been a major issue.² Varieties of Democracy Project (V-dem) presents an unprecedented data that covers 173 countries from 1900 to 2016 and offers a sophisticated approach to measure party institutionalization in a way that closes the existing gap between the concept and its operationalization. With a team of 3,000 experts, V-dem relies on expert knowledge in each country.

V-dem party institutionalization index evaluates the scope and depth of party institutionalization for 116 years for each country (Bizarro, Hicken & Self 2017). The index considers party organizational characteristics, local party branches, party linkages to electorate, distinctiveness of party platforms and party cohesiveness in legislatures. The index is formed by taking the point estimates of each indicators from a Bayesian factor analysis (Coppedge et al., 2016, p. 123).

V-dem index coincides with four conceptual criteria of institutionalization which I adopt in this study. First, strong linkages to society would foster party's adaptability to changing environment. V-dem considers programmatic linkages as a sign of party institutionalization (Bizarro et al., 2017). Parties that establish programmatic linkages to electorate rather than clientelistic linkages are likely to overcome challenges that they encounter. For instance, a party that rely on programmatic linkages

² For a detailed discussion on the operationalization of party institutionalization see Dix (1992), Randall and Svasand (2002), Levitsky (1998) and Basedau and Stroh (2008).
would be able to protect its support base even if authoritarian repression blocks its financial resources that are crucial to form clientelistic linkages. Where authoritarian repression restricts the availability of resources, those parties that rely solely on clientelistic means would experience serious obstacles to protect their support base. Hence, clientelistic linkages tend to be more instable and short-term oriented whereas programmatic linkages are more stable and long-term oriented, signaling that a party is valued for itself. Second, V-dem index of party institutionalization also considers the criteria of complexity which depends on the multiplication of subunits and hierarchically well-ordered, functionally differentiated organizational parts that constitutes political party's overall organizational capacity. The index evaluates the existence of local party branches and party organizational characteristics to assess the complexity aspect of party institutionalization. Third, by considering party cohesiveness in legislature the index takes coherence aspect into account. Finally, the distinct party platforms correspond to autonomy aspect of institutionalization. Where opposition political parties are simply the tools of autocrats and serve as co-optation mechanisms, parties' autonomy would be limited. In these cases, it is unlikely that there would be any major differences between party platforms of incumbent party and that of opposition parties.

Table 2.	Components	of V-dem	Party	Institution	nalization	Index.
----------	------------	----------	-------	-------------	------------	--------

Party Organization	Permanent national-level offices and local party branches.
Distinct Party Platforms	Publicly disseminated and distinct party platforms.
Legislative Cohesion	The degree to which political elites submit to paries' position
	Form of linkages: Clientelistic, Mixed clientelistic and local
	collective (goods that target specific groups or constituencies),
	Local collective, Mixed local collective and programmatic,
Party Linkages	Programmatic.
0 D' $1/204F$	

Source: Bizarro et al. (2017) and Coppedge et al. (2016).

6.2.2. Explanatory Variable: Regime Type

Main explanatory variable is regime type that signals whether a regime can be considered as multiparty authoritarian regime in which opposition political parties are allowed to contest in elections or not. I make use of Svolik's (2012) data set to identify regime type based on the restrictions imposed on political parties. This is a dichotomous variable that takes value of 1 for multi-party authoritarian regimes and 0 for single-party authoritarian regimes. I drop regimes that impose total ban on political parties from the analysis. In my sample, there are 896 country-year observations for multi-party authoritarian regimes and 600 country-year observation for single-party authoritarian regimes. I predict party institutionalization to be higher in multi-party authoritarian regimes compared to singleparty regimes and some degree of competition continues. That is, the presence of opposition political parties and some degree of competition increases the overall party institutionalization. Therefore, if my hypothesis holds, this variable should have a positive sign and should demonstrate statistically significant relationship with party institutionalization index at 0.10 level.

Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of party institutionalization levels by regime type as violin plots. Each contains a box plot that demonstrates central tendencies of the party institutionalization index comprising mean values, highlighted as bold black lines. We observe that single-party regimes demonstrate more variation in terms of party institutionalization compared to multi-party regimes. But observations for single-party regimes clustered around the bottom of the violin plot, indicating lover levels of party institutionalization. The average party institutionalization is roughly 0.39 for single-party regimes, while the value is around 0.5 for multi-party regimes.



Figure 3. Distribution of Party Institutionalization by Regime Type.

6.2.3. Control Variables

Competitiveness: Contestation and Participation

It is open to empirical inquiry that whether mere existence of opposition political parties contributes to overall party institutionalization or what actually matters is the degree of competitiveness. To test if the latter suppress the effect of the former, I add a variable that measures the extent of electoral principle of democracy is achieved (Coppedge et al., 2016). This variable is the aggregate measure of freedom of association, the extent of suffrage, fairness of elections, and whether chief executive is elected through elections.

Regime Duration

Although I predict a positive relationship between multi-party competition and party institutionalization in authoritarian regimes, persistence of authoritarian rule could be detrimental to institutionalization and override the impact of competition. That is, longevity of authoritarian rule should be factored in. Longer authoritarian interludes and repression might lead opposition party members to defect and lead to decrease in the number of committed party activists. Hence, even though multi-party competition is expected to lead to the development of robust parties, persistent and long-lasting authoritarian rule might curb the impact of competition over time. To take this factor into account, I created a variable that counts years under authoritarian rule.

Economic Performance

Economic performance might also have an impact on party institutionalization in various ways. First of all, access to resources has utmost importance in party-building. Economic malaise might limit the resource allocation which could lead to defections in ruling party elites, thus, it might inhibit party coherence. Moreover, diminishing resources might cause decrease in party's ability to provide rents and clientelistic good and might make harder for party to deliver its promised policies. This would in turn deteriorate linkages to society and hinder party's ability to adapt to challenging environment. In addition, lack of resources might also harm organizational proliferation and damage institutional complexity. Considering these potential implications of economic performance on party institutionalization, I control for GDP growth. I collected the data for GDP growth under authoritarian regimes from Miller (2015). GDP growth is captured by the percentage change in GDP per capita.

Personalism

Finally, I control for the degree of personalism in a regime. Personalism can hinder party institutionalization as it may cause ruling party to become increasingly subordinate to the ambitions of a leader. Such parties are likely to develop as an instrument of the leader rather than developing a value for their own. Rather than treating this feature of authoritarian rule as a particular regime type as Geddes et al. (2014) do, I consider it as a feature that might be exist in all types of authoritarian regimes. I employ Magaloni et al.'s (2013) personalism index, which is based on two characteristics displayed by the regime. One is the institutional constraints on the executive and the other is frequency of leadership change. Higher values in this variable reflects high level of personalism.

6.3. Model Specification

To test Hypothesis 1, I employ time series cross sectional model (TSCS), conducting ordinary least squares regression analysis with country and year fixed effects. To obtain unbiased coefficient estimates and standard errors, there are number of important assumptions that need to be addressed in the context of time series analysis. These are weak dependence and stationarity, zero conditional mean assumption or exogeneity assumption, homoskedasticity, no serial correlation or autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2012; Pickup, 2016).

Stationarity implies that the probability distribution of dependent variable is stable or identically distributed over time. That is, the statistical properties of the data do not vary simply as a function of time (Beck and Katz 2011: 333). A common way to test this assumption is to conduct the Dickey-Fuller test where the null hypothesis is that series has a unit root (i.e. non-stationary). For Model 3 in Table 2, the results suggest a p-value = 0.018, which is below the conventional threshold of p < 0.05. With the obtained p-value we can reject the null hypothesis that data is non-stationary.

In time series cross sectional data, we have multiple observations for the same units. One of the assumptions of TSCS regression analysis is that these observations are independent. This is referred as exogeneity assumption. If this assumption is violated we would face the problem of endogeneity that suggests our independent variables are correlated with the error term in the regression model. In addition, dependence of observations would cause the problem of autocorrelation that residuals are not independent. One way to overcome the problem of endogeneity is the inclusion of lagged independent variables and, considering serial correlation, the literature recommends the inclusion of lagged dependent variable in the right-hand side of the equation (Beck 2001; Boef & Keele, 2008; Beck & Katz, 2011). These modifications also allow us to account for the direction of the causality and to control for the history. I expand the discussion on the inclusion of lagged dependent variable in which the results are presented.

I include lagged dependent variable in Model 1 and 2 to deal with serially correlated errors. Some scholars argue that presence of autocorrelation is a theoretical misspecification rather than being a purely technical problem (Beck, 1985). Without lagged dependent variable, Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge appear significant at 0.01 level, demonstrating no evidence to reject alternative hypothesis that suggest the presence of serial correlation. Test for both models revealed a p-value very close to 0. After introducing lagged dependent variable, the resulting p-value was 0.26 for both models, indicating no serial correlation.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that some scholars raised concerns over the use of lagged dependent variables, arguing that lagged independent variables induce multicollinearity that causes coefficient estimates for independent variable of interest to be biased downward (Keele & Kelly, 2006). Considering this potential bias, I also include a model without lag specification (see Model 2 in Table 2).

To consider the assumption of homoscedasticity I implement panel corrected standard errors for all models as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995), who show that panel corrected errors perform well in TSCS data that often allow for heteroskedasticity.

Finally, I prefer fixed effects model over pooled OLS regression.³ Fixed effects model is an attractive regression method as it allows us to control for characteristics of each unit that are unobservable (Allison, 2011). In other words, such method will allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across the units under investigation and reduce the likelihood of omitted variable bias. Moreover, fixed effects models allow us to control for time-invariant variables such as colonial legacy or some other specific characteristics belong to particular political unit such as ethnic heterogeneity, religion etc. Nevertheless, we should include relevant time-varying variables into our model since fixed effects model cannot control for them (Allison, 2011).

In addition to controlling for country-specific characteristics, I add year fixed effects to the model since any variation in my dependent variable might be simply due to passage of time without any association to my explanatory variables. Lagrange Multiplier Test for time effects was significant at p = 0.004. Hence, there is an evidence that we can reject the null hypothesis that no time-fixed effects needed.

Main equation I will estimate to test Hypothesis 1 will be the following: (Model 3 in Table 2):

Party Instituionalization_{i,t}

- $= \beta_0 + \beta_1$ Party Institutionalization_{i,t-1}
- + β_1 Multiparty_{i,t-1}
- + β_2 Regime Duration_{i,t-1} + β_3 GDP Growht_{i,t-1} + β_4 Personalism_{i,t-1}

(1)

+ β_5 Competitiveness_{i,t-1} + γ_i + $\delta_t T_t$ + $\varepsilon_{i,t}$

³ At first instance, fixed effects model may not sound a good option to test the effect of the presence of opposition political parties on overall party institutionalization since this variable may not demonstrate enough variation across time. But restrictions on political parties under authoritarian regimes exhibit enough variation, indicating that dictators' policies regarding parties change from one year to another. Moreover, F-test provides support for the use of fixed effects model at p < 0.01 significance level. That is, there is an evidence for unit-level unobserved heterogeneity (Allison 2011: 13). In addition, I conducted Hausman test where null hypothesis suggests that random effects model is appropriate (Greene 2008, chapter 9). The results reveal a p < 0.01, so I opt for fixed effects model.

where γ_i is the coefficient for the entities, δ_t is the coefficient for the binary time regressors, T_t is time as binary variable and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is the error term.

6.4. Results

Table 2 presents three different model specifications to test Hypothesis 1. The first model is pooled OLS, second model presents bivariate relationship between multi-party competition and party institutionalization, third model displays the result of fixed effects estimations without lag of dependent variable, and finally, fourth model presents fixed effects estimations with lag of dependent variable. Interpretation of dynamic models that includes lagged dependent variable can be tricky. Lag dependent variable model assumes that "the effect of x decays geometrically" (Beck and Katz 2011: 334). Note that all independent variables are lagged one year. This means that the effect of x is not felt instantaneously, so the maximum impact of x occurs one year later (ibid: 336). For instance, the impact of economic performance on party institutionalization is distributed over time.

All four models provide support for the Hypothesis 1 that suggests multi-party competition contributes to overall party institutionalization over time. In other words, multi-party authoritarian regimes tend to have higher levels of overall party institutionalization compared to single-party authoritarian regimes. Hence, once opposition political parties are allowed, political actors, including dictators have an incentive to invest in political parties.

Nevertheless, all models provide varying degrees of support for Hypothesis 1. Looking at pooled OLS estimations we can reject the null hypothesis that multi-party competition has no effect on party institutionalization at 95% confidence intervals. All else being equal, the effect of multi-party competition is statistically significant at 0.01 level. However, it should be noted that although there is a statistically significant relationship, the effect is not substantial. Having multi-party competition increases overall party institutionalization in a country by around 0.006 over time. Since party

institutionalization index ranges from 0 to 1, this effect is very small. In model 1, we also see that competitiveness variable has also statistically significant relationship at 0.05 level with overall party institutionalization. Holding all else constant, an increase in competitiveness variable results in an increase of 0.023 in my dependent variable. What this suggests is that the degree of freedom of association, freeness and fairness of elections, the extent of suffrage and whether a country holds elections for executive post are effective in explaining party institutionalization. This can be interpreted that more a regime resembles competitive authoritarian regimes, more the parties get institutionalized.

	Pooled	Fixed	Fixed	Fixed	
	OLS	Effects	Effects	Effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Party Institutionalization _{t-1}	0.988***			0.928***	
	(0.004)			(0.018)	
Multi-party _{t-1}	0.006***	0.045*	0.042*	0.018***	
	(0.002)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.006)	
Log Regime Duration t-1	0.00003		0.0003	-0.00008	
	(0.0001)		(0.001)	(0.0012)	
GDP Growth (percentage change) t-1	0.0002		0.0003	-0.0001	
	(0.0002)		(0.001)	(0.0002)	
Competitiveness _{t-1}	0.023**		0.277***	-0.036**	
	(0.009)		(0.058)	(0.016)	
Personalism _{t-1}	-0.003		-0.05	-0.011	
	(0.004)		(0.038)	(0.009)	
Constant	0.020*				
	(0.012)				
R^2	0.97	0.10	0.18	0.80	
Ν	1372	1372	1372	1372	
Year Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	

Table 1. Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects Estimations of Party Institutionalization in AuthoritarianRegimes.

Note: Panel Corrected Standard Errors in Parentheses

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

I estimate Model 3 to account for concerns regarding the use of lagged dependent variable to deal with the presence of autocorrelation (see Achen, 2001; Keele & Kelly, 2006). Including both

specifications with and without a lag dependent variable, will allow me to compare both models and see whether there is a substantial divergence in the estimations resulting from difference in model specification. Model 2 explains around 18 percent variation in my dependent variable, indicating an acceptable model fit. The model also lends support for Hypothesis 1. However, although there is an increase in coefficient estimate, the effect of multi-party competition is statistically significant only at 0.10 level. Controlling for other factors in the model, the presence of multi-party competition in a country increases overall party institutionalization by around 0.042. It must be noted that even though there is a statistically significant relationship the effect is not substantial. On the other hand, the results reveal a considerable increase in the coefficient estimate of competitiveness variable and its relationship with party institutionalization. The relationship is statistically significant at 0.01 level. All else being equal, an increase in the competitiveness level in a country improves overall party institutionalization about 0.227.

Model 3, however, violates the assumption of no serial correlation in residuals. Keele and Kelly (2006) warn against the use of corrected standard errors when data is autocorrelated and the process is dynamic. Approaching the process as dynamic or static is largely a theoretical issue. Party institutionalization entails a slow-moving, historical process in which previous levels of party institutionalization are likely to determine current levels of institutionalization. After all, theoretically, overall party institutionalization cannot exhibit a dramatic shift from one year to another. This is perhaps also practically almost impossible. Dynamic interpretation of the model, therefore, is theoretically sound.

There are also technical issues to consider. Another aspect to examine is that whether the inclusion of lagged dependent variable overcomes the problem of autocorrelation. As Keele and Kelly shows, if the inclusion of lagged dependent variable fails to account for autocorrelation, lagged dependent variable model is not appropriate. In the previous section, I noted that once I include

lagged dependent variable the problem of autocorrelation fades away. Finally, lagged dependent variable is not appropriate when the dependent variable is non-stationary (Achen, 2001). Tests reveal an evidence that data is stationary (see page 32). All these evaluations provide convincing ground to include a lagged dependent variable.

Model 4 explains 80 percent of the variation in overall party institutionalization index. This suggests a 62 percent increase compared to Model 3. Hence, the inclusion of lagged dependent variable increased model fit as expected, functioning as a proxy for omitted variables. Previous levels of party institutionalization have high predictive power for subsequent levels of party institutionalization. The results also reveal that the presence of opposition political parties under authoritarian regimes contributes to overall party institutionalization by 0.018 in a country. This relationship is statistically significant at 0.01 level, lending support for Hypothesis 1. In Model 4, the coefficient sign of competitiveness variable changed, indicating a negative relationship between competitiveness and overall party institutionalization. The relationship is significant at 0.05 level. What this suggest is that higher levels of competitiveness under authoritarian settings has a negative impact on institutionalization. This is at odds with what Model 1 and 3 reveal. To speculate, increasing openness under authoritarian regimes may result in high level of fragmentation in electoral field demonstrated by excessive number of political parties. Przeworski and Gandhi (2007) claim that autocrats who allow more parties than necessary tend to reign longer. Perhaps high levels of freedom of association result in the emergence of weakly institutionalized opposition political parties. Of course, this is just a speculation and requires additional analysis to confirm whether this is really the case.

In sum, the existence of opposition political parties has significant implications even in dictatorships where electoral playing field is highly skewed in favor of the incumbent. Multi-party competition contributes to overall party institutionalization in a country. That is, party competition incentivizes both incumbent autocrats and opposition actors to invest in political parties. The results show that electoral competition in dictatorships is not purely theatrical and contributes to the development of political parties. Thus, party competition in dictatorships enhances organizational capacity, boosts linkages to electorate, and installs legitimacy on behalf of parties in the eyes of party members as is demonstrated by increase in legislative cohesiveness.

6.5. Analysis 2: Linking Authoritarian Past to Democratic Party Systems

6.5.1. Dependent Variable: Measuring Party System Institutionalization

Having found supportive results for the first step of the hypothesized sequential relationship, I now turn to the examination of whether the extent of restrictions on parties and overall party institutionalization under previous authoritarian regime is associated with systemic institutionalization in the subsequent democratic party systems.

Measuring party system institutionalization has been controversial. Similar to the problems that literature encounters in the operationalization of party institutionalization, scholars fail to connect the concept of party system institutionalization with an adequate operationalization. Some scholars use the average age of the political parties (Roberts & Wibbels, 1999; Schleiter & Voznaya, 2016) while others use electoral volatility (e.g. Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007; Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014), that measures the average vote shifts between parties from one election to another. Recently scholars also proposed an operationalization of Mair's (1998) concept of party system closure that refers to the stability and institutionalization of party systems (Casal & Enyedi 2016).

Due to limitations of data availability, I employ a measure of electoral volatility, which is the most commonly used measure of party system institutionalization. The data comes from Weghorst and Bernhard (2014) and Mainwaring et al. (2016). While the data allow me to conduct a global scale comparative study of third-wave democracies, such operationalization of party system

institutionalization has its own problems.⁴ While electoral volatility levels enable me to capture the most important aspects of party system institutionalization, that is, the stability in interparty competition and citizen's attachment to political parties, it does not report the extent of perceived legitimacy of political parties as mechanisms of political representation and their organizational capacity.

According to the employed measure of party system institutionalization, higher electoral volatility demonstrates instability in inter-party competition and weak linkages between citizens and parties. Therefore, positive (negative) coefficient estimates would indicate that increase in the value of that particular variable weakens (fosters) the institutionalization of party systems.

Figure 4 illustrates mean electoral volatility per country. We observe that late third-wave democratizes such as post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, Senegal and Benin in Africa clustered higher in the figure, display weakly institutionalized party systems, whereas early third-wave democratizers such as Latin American countries exhibit relatively higher levels of party system institutionalization. There are, of course, some exceptions such as Chile that transited to democracy in 1990 and Ghana in 1997. Further analysis is needed to make more precise inferences.

⁴ For a detailed critical evaluation of electoral volatility as a measure of party system institutionalization see Luna (2014).



Figure 4. Mean Electoral Volatility Scores Per Country.

6.5.2. Explanatory Variables: Previous Regime Type and Party Institutionalization Levels

To test Hypothesis 2, I use previous regime type and previous levels of party institutionalization as main explanatory variables. Some dictatorships change their policies towards political parties from one year to another. In these cases, my coding is based on the average number of years a country allows for party competition. For instance, if a country spends more years under multi-party rule than under single-party or party-less rule, I code it as multi-party. Moreover, I give more weight to the last 5 years of autocratic rule. If a dictatorship were single-party or party-less but had shifted to multi-party competition 5 years before democratic transition, I code it as multi-party dictatorship. I also created a variable that considers the average party institutionalization levels under previous authoritarian rule. I divided sum of party institutionalization for each year to total number of years a country spends under particular authoritarian rule. This variable takes a value of 0 for those democracies that replace partyless dictatorships and for newly born countries such as former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia member countries. If Hypothesis 2 is accurate, coefficients of this variable should be negative and statistically significant with a 90 percent confidence interval.

6.5.3. Control Variables

The model controls for additional factors that are shown by the previous studies to be influential in affecting party system institutionalization. These can be categorized as institutional, structural and historical determinants.

Institutional Factors

As demonstrated by previous studies, electoral rules and regime type (Parliamentary/Presidential) might have significant implications for party systems and their institutionalization (Bertoa, 2012). Although some scholars find no relationship between regime type and party system institutionalization (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007), others reveal negative impact of presidential system on the institutionalization of party systems. I control for this factor by using World Bank Political Institutions Database (Beck et al., 2001). The variable for regime type originally has three categories: presidential, Assembly-elected President and Parliamentary. I recoded Assembly-elected presidential systems as parliamentary systems since there is no direct election for the presidency. The variable takes the value of 1 for parliamentary systems and 0 otherwise. For electoral rules, I collected data for average district

magnitude in each country (Bormann and Golder 2013). My analysis showed that this variable is positively skewed. To avoid any assumption violation, I take the logarithm of its original values.

Another potential determinant of electoral volatility is the number of political parties. Previous studies indicate that high number of political parties leads to greater volatility (Mainwaring et al. 2016). I collected data from Borman and Golder (2013) to consider the impact of party system size on institutionalization. The data indicates the effective number of electoral parties.

Structural Factors

In terms of structural variables, the model involves economic performance as is measured by percentage of annual GDP growth and ethnic fractionalization. Bad economic performance may increase dissatisfaction among voters and lead to drastic vote shifts between parties. Ethnic fractionalization, on the other hand, may have more stabilizing effect as it draws sharp boundaries between political parties based on cleavages, making vote shifts less likely. As Bartolini and Mair (1990) illustrate, in their seminal work, party systems based on established cleavage structures are more likely to become stabilized. In addition, ethnic cleavages are likely to have such a role in party systems of new democracies. Nevertheless, others argue that ethnic fractionalization might also exacerbate electoral volatility (Madrid 2005). There is no consensus in the literature regarding the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on party system institutionalization.

The data for GDP growth comes from World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016). I measure ethnic fractionalization by using Alesina et al.'s (2003) fractionalization index that take linguistic and racial characteristics into account. This variable reflects the probability that two randomly selected people will not share similar linguistic and racial characteristics. According to the index, the higher numbers indicate higher levels of ethnic fractionalization.

Historical Factors

Finally, in addition to my main explanatory variables, my model includes several historical variables. I coded a number of historical variables that speculated to be influential on party system institutionalization by previous studies but at the same time have never been subjected to rigorous cross-country empirical analysis. Scholars show that in some contexts partisan loyalties to pre-authoritarian parties remain unchanged even after years of authoritarian repression (Geddes 1995; Frantz & Geddes, 2016). This is likely to have stabilizing effect on party systems once these parties re-emerge under democratic rule since in these cases voters might have already possess pre-established partisan loyalties. However, I suspect that the stabilizing impact of pre-existing partisan loyalties could be the function of citizens' experience with democracy. Where citizens have more experience with democratic competition they might be more likely to develop attachment to parties and preserve it over time. In my analysis, I control for this factor by creating a variable that considers years of democratic experience that a country had since the beginning of 20th century. This measure, of course, excludes the years spent under current democratic regime.

Moreover, as I mentioned, restrictions on parties in authoritarian regimes can change from one year to another. For instance, when armed forces ousted Brazil's democratically elected in 1965, they initially banned the parties but starting from the late 1970s they allowed the formation of opposition political parties. At the end, voters who have more experience with multip-arty competition may inherit more established partisan loyalties. To control for this factor, I created a variable that counts the number of years a country had experienced with multi-party competition under dictatorship.

Another potential confounder that I control for is the longevity of authoritarian interlude. Scholars show that longer authoritarian interludes are likely to have more destabilizing effect compared to shorter ones (Lupu & Stokes, 2010; Frantz & Geddes, 2016). In addition, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) propose a sequential explanation of party system institutionalization, showing that democracies which were inaugurated at an earlier point in time tend to have relatively more stable party systems compared to those that were inaugurated more recently. Therefore, in my model I examine the effect of democratic transition year on party system institutionalization.

Finally, I control for communist regimes. Post-communist countries in Eastern Europe reflect higher levels of electoral volatility than countries in any other region (Epperly, 2011). Considering this observation, I created a dummy variable that indicates whether previous regime was communist or not. I also control for age of democracy measured as years since democratic transition. Some studies show that party systems tend to stabilize as countries spend more time under democracy (Tavits, 2005).

6.6. Model Specification

My data covers 137 elections in 35 third-wave democracies around the world. To test the effect of previous regime type and party institutionalization levels on party system institutionalization in subsequent democratic regimes I ran a random effects model. I prefer random effects model over fixed effects model since main explanatory variables of concern in the model are time-invariant. This is the main advantage of random effects model since fixed effects model cannot estimate the effect of such variables (Allison 2011). Moreover, pooled OLS and fixed effects disregards the variances across entities, which might be valuable to estimate. Nevertheless, to justify my model selection I also ran pooled OLS regression (see Model 3). I conducted Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test to see whether there are significant differences across countries. The results were significant at 0.01 level with p-value very close to 0, suggesting that random effects model is appropriate to consider variance across entities. It must be noted that although random effects model is useful to estimate time-

invariant variables and is more efficient than pooled OLS estimators, it requires me to assume that unobserved effects is uncorrelated with explanatory variables in the model (Wooldridge, 2012). Considering this ambitious assumption, I included as many control variables as possible.

In order to see whether model 4 violates the assumption of no serial correlation I conducted Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data models where alternative hypothesis is the presence of serial correlation. The results show no evidence of serial correlation with p-value at 0.11 level. As a next step, I conducted Dickey-Fuller test to see whether the assumption of stationarity holds. The p-value appears to be below 0.05 conventional threshold, lending support for the rejection of the null hypothesis that the data is non-stationary. Finally, I test for the assumption of homoskedasticity by using the Breusch-Pagan test. With p-value below 0.05 level, there is an evidence for the existence of heteroskedasticity. To overcome this assumption violation, I employ panel corrected standard errors that estimates heteroskedasticity consistent coefficients (Beck and Katz 1995).

To test Hypothesis 2, I constructed following equation (Model 4):

Party System Instituionalization_{i,t}

- $= \beta_0 + \beta_1$ Multiparty_{i,t} + β_2 Average Previous Party Institutionalization_{i,t}
- + β_3 Parliamentary_{i,t} + β_4 Log(Mean Distrcit Magnitude)_{i,t}
- + β_5 GDP Growth_{i,t} + β_6 Ethnic Fractionalization_{i,t}
- + β_7 Log(Effective Number of Parties)_{i,t} + β_8 Communist_{i,t}
- + β_9 Birth Year of Democracy_{i,t} + β_{10} Authoritarian Interlude (Years)_{i,t}
- + β_{11} Log(Age of Democracy)_{i,t} + β_{12} Log(Democratic Experience)_{i,t}
- + β_{13} Log(Multiparty Experience)_{i,t} + $u_{i,t}$ + $\varepsilon_{i,t}$

where $u_{i,t}$ is between entity-error and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is within-entity error term.

6.7. Results

Table 3 presents the results for pooled OLS and random effects models. Model 1 includes only the main explanatory variables, whereas Model 2 only includes variables that are shown to be influential by previous literature. Model 3 entails all of the main explanatory and control variables. Model 4 estimates the effect of the variables included in Model 3 but with random effects specification so that we can account for the effect both within and between countries over time. All models provide support for Hypothesis 2 that previous authoritarian regime type and overall party institutionalization levels has an impact on the institutionalization of subsequent democratic party systems.

All model specifications reveal acceptable model fit. Main explanatory variables in pooled OLS specification in model 1 account around 21 percent variation in my dependent variable, whereas Model 2 captures 18 percent of the variation. Pooled OLS estimations in Model 3, which includes the main explanatory variables and all control variables, account for 35 percent of the variation. Random effects estimators in Model 4 explains about 34 percent of the variation in my dependent variable.

In Model 1 we observe that holding previous party institutionalization levels constant, the presence of multi-party competition in previous authoritarian regime decreases electoral volatility in subsequent democratic party systems by around 12.5-point over time. The relationship is statistically significant at 0.01 level. On the other hand, holding previous regime type fixed, previous party institutionalization level also appears to be associated with systemic institutionalization in following democratic party systems. An increase in the institutionalization tends to lead to a roughly 13-point decrease in electoral volatility over time. This relationship is also statistically significant at 0.01 level.

Model 2 reveals support for the argument that late democratizers tend to have weakly institutionalized party systems (see Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007; Mainwaring et al., 2016). Controlling

for other variables in the model, an increase in the birth year of democracy variable, is associated with a 0.6-point increase in electoral volatility. Although the relationship is statistically significant at 0.01, the magnitude of coefficient estimate is not substantial. Model 2 also shows that more permissive electoral rules exacerbates electoral volatility. An increase in district magnitude raise electoral volatility by 3.7-point. In addition, the results illustrate that ethnically heterogeneous countries tend to experience higher levels of electoral volatility.

Looking at Model 3, which presents pooled OLS estimations of all variables, we observe that, holding all else constant, the presence of multi-party competition under previous authoritarian regime reduces electoral volatility by around 20-point in subsequent democracies. The magnitude of the effect is substantial and the relationship is statistically significant at 0.05 level. Higher levels of institutionalization under previous authoritarian regime also contributes to party system institutionalization in subsequent democracies. Where party institutionalization levels historically had been higher, electoral volatility decreases by roughly 10.5-point. This relationship is statistically significant at 0.10 level.

There is also an evidence that countries that historically had longer democratic experience tend to have lower electoral volatility even after some period of authoritarian interruption. This variable appears to be statistically significant at 0.05 level in Model 3 but the magnitude of the effect is not substantial. Looking at Model 4, this variable demonstrates statistically significant relationship with electoral volatility at 0.10 level, while there is not much change in the effect size.

On the other hand, parliamentary systems appear to be negatively associated with electoral volatility. Model 4 shows that the having a parliamentary system of government instead of a presidential one decreases electoral volatility by around 12-point. The effect is statistically significant at 0.05 level.

	Pooled OLS	Pooled OLS	Pooled OLS	Random Effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Multi-party	-12.442***		-22.322**	-21.787**	
1 2	(3.925)		(8.453)	(8.428)	
Previous Institutionalization	-13.332***		-10.295*	-11.158*	
	(6.04)		(5.836)	(6.473)	
Parliamentary		1.292	-6.965	-11.944**	
		(4.174)	(4.174)	(4.593)	
Log Effective Number of Partie	es	4.187	3.343	1.705	
		(4.812)	(4.145)	(4.106)	
Communist			5.296	3.883	
			(5.938)	(6.261)	
Log Mean District Magnitude		3.729*	1.691	2.088	
		(1.995)	(1.685)	(1.894)	
GDP Growth		-0.192	-0.235	-0.315	
		(0.366)	(0.335)	(0.322)	
Ethnic Fractionalization		18.538*	15.732*	16.642**	
		(10.528)	(8.091)	(8.866)	
Birth Year of Democracy		0.607*	0.089	0.23	
		(0.354)	(0.374)	(0.278)	
Log Democratic Experience			-0.515**	-0.475*	
			(0.214)	(0.235)	
Log Multiparty Experience			0.341	0.226	
			(0.17)	(0.163)	
Authoritarian Interlude (Years)			-0.219	-0.307	
			(0.163)	(0.186)	
Log Age of Democracy		0.47	-1.621	-2.306	
		(2.469)	(2.226)	(2.225)	
Constant	47.466***	42.64	46.93	-43.60	
	(3.346)	(40.25)	(44.52)	(43.036)	
R	0.21	0.18	0.35	0.34	
N	137	137	137	137	
Note: Panel Corrected Standard	Errors in parent	heses	*p<0.10**p<0.05***p<0.01		

Table 2. Pooled OLS and Random Effects Estimations of Party System Institutionalization.

Moreover, ethnic fractionalization remains influential even after accounting for a number of additional factors. Model 3 suggests that electoral volatility tend to be higher in ethnically

heterogeneous countries. An increase in my ethnic fractionalization index lead to increase in electoral volatility by around 16-point. Turning to Model 4, this relationship becomes statistically significant at 0.05 level. And the magnitude of the effect rises to 17-point.

Moreover, similar to Model 3, Model 4 point outs that the presence of multi-party competition under previous authoritarian regimes decreases electoral volatility on average about 22-point, revealing a statistically significant relationship at 0.05 level. Previous levels of party institutionalization also remain influential in Model 4. Higher institutionalization is associated with 11-point decrease in electoral volatility. These results provide an evidence in support of Hypothesis 2.

7. Discussion and Summary of the Results

My analysis suggests that previous authoritarian regime type has a substantial impact on the institutionalization of subsequent democratic party systems. These results are in conflict with the previous work that find no impact of previous regime type on party system institutionalization (see Riedl, 2014). The findings provide support for Frantz and Geddes' (2016) arguments, who suggest Latin American dictators' policies regarding political parties have long-lasting effects in terms of party system stability even after transition to democracy. Once we move beyond the case studies and region specific cross-country analysis we observe that characteristics of previous authoritarian regimes cast a long shadow on democratic party systems. The magnitude of the effect is substantial, indicating the importance of path dependent processes in the evolution of institutionalized party systems. Hence, a better grasp of authoritarian past which new democracies build on, presents a great leverage in understanding why some new democracies display more institutionalized patterns of inter-party competition while others do not.

Linking authoritarian past to democratic party systems is not a straightforward task. Previously, Hicken and Kuhonta (2015) suggest that the degree to which party systems are institutionalized under authoritarian regimes has a profound impact on the institutionalization of democratic party systems. However, they provide support for this argument by assessing the electoral volatility under authoritarian regimes which, as I argued, might lead to misleading interpretations. To overcome this potential pitfall, I proposed an alternative logic that links the institutionalization of individual parties under authoritarian regimes to the institutionalization of party systems in new democracies. My analysis reveals that there is an association between the two variables, providing support for my argument. Hence, previous levels of party institutionalization under authoritarianism might signal the prospects for systemic institutionalization in the subsequent democratic era. Countries in which parties historically played an important role tend to display more stable patterns of interparty competition even where regime characteristics changed fundamentally.

Besides these main findings, I find support for structural explanations of institutionalization. The results demonstrate that ethnic heterogeneity hinders party system institutionalization. Previous research argues that ethnic heterogeneity contributes to party system stability and institutionalization by drawing sharp boundaries between political parties and social cleavages, which makes vote shifts between parties less likely (Evans & Whitefield, 1993). However, my results are aligned with those findings that reveal a destabilizing effect of ethnic fractionalization (see Madrid, 2005).

Institutional factors are also at work in the process of institutionalization. Previous research showed that the system of government has a profound impact on the way in which parties develop and organize (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). In this thesis, I find that parliamentary systems exhibit more institutionalized patterns of inter-party competition. These findings are in line with Casal's (2012) argument that presidentialism has a negative impact on party system institutionalization.

Finally, the results illustrate that party systems in countries that had more experience with democratic politics in the past are more likely to become institutionalized. Democratic experience before authoritarian interruption matters even after controlling for the longevity of authoritarian interruption. It might be the case that pre-authoritarian parties remain relevant and voters' attachments to political parties, at least to some extent, survive despite an authoritarian interlude. Perhaps parties might dissolve physically or their activities may be hampered drastically due to authoritarian repression but they survive in the minds of the voters. Once these parties re-emerge after democratic transition they might induce stability by closing off the electoral arena for parties that have no social roots and brand recognition in the society.

8. Conclusion

It is surprising that much influential research on party system institutionalization in new democracies, takes democratic transition as a starting point to understand the factors behind the process. But as Gryzmala-Busse (2002, p. 12) nicely puts it, new democracies do not form as *tabulae rasa*. Although scholars consider some historical factors such as birth year of democracy (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007), colonialism (Weghorst &Bernhard, 2014), and the implementation of neoliberal policies during the 1980s (Roberts, 2014), only recently has research turned its attention to authoritarianism. This thesis builds on and contributes to the latest scholarly works that underline the relevance of authoritarianism regarding the development of robust political parties (Levitsky et al., 2016) and the institutionalization of democratic party systems (Riedl, 2014; Hicken & Kuhonta, 2015; Frantz & Geddes 2016).

These findings reveal that a substantive amount of variation in party system institutionalization across third-wave democracies can be explained by the characteristics of previous authoritarian regime that these countries follow from. By testing this effect through various model specifications, I find that previous authoritarian regime type explains institutionalization over time in all countries analyzed and the effect is substantive when we consider the process both within and between countries.

Restrictions on political parties and the extent to which actors invest in parties during the authoritarian era leave a legacy on democratic party systems. I argued that multi-party elections under authoritarian settings incentivize actors to invest in parties, resulting in the development of robust political parties. Once democratic transition occurs these parties inherit party brands and strong organizational capacity from authoritarian era. The presence of such parties closes the electoral arena in the democratic era in a way that prevents nascent parties which lack brand recognition and organizational capacity from competing in elections.

The central implication of this work is that the authoritarian regime type that new democracies follow from is a neglected factor in explaining party system institutionalization. Once we consider this

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factor the effect of some influential theories in the literature such as birth year of democracy fades away. Having said that, the reader must be aware of the fact that electoral volatility is not the best way of measuring party system institutionalization. Due to the data limitations, I followed the standard way of operationalizing the concept by using electoral volatility figures. Nevertheless, until we come up with a more expanded and comprehensive measure of the concept, electoral volatility is arguably the best way of measuring party system institutionalization. Another limitation is that even though the thesis demonstrates the associations between key variables this does not imply causation. Future research on this topic should approach this issue more carefully. Such limitation is valid for most of the observational studies but one way to address this issue would be to delve deeper into the cases and assess whether the process functions in a way that I suggested in this research.

This thesis raises some additional questions that need to be addressed by future work. Although I limited my attention to restrictions on political parties in the authoritarian era, future work should examine whether additional institutional factors such as military involvement in politics under authoritarian regimes determines the trajectory of party system institutionalization in subsequent democracies. Another question is whether the extent to which political parties are institutionalized influences the odds for democratic transition. I believe these questions open interesting avenues for future research.

Finally, considering the findings that suggest institutionalized party systems enhance the odds for democratic survival (Bernhard et al., 2015) and boost accountability (Schleiter & Voznaya, 2016), my analysis implies that international democracy promotion advocates should guide local practitioners to develop robust political parties under authoritarian settings. If there is no multi-party competition, democracy promoters should pressure autocrats to allow opposition parties to contest elections, even when the results are determined beforehand.

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Appendix

	Std.					
	Ν	Mean	Deviation	Min.	Max.	
Multi-party	1372	0.6	0.5	0	1	
GDP Growth	1372	2	5.7	-13.1	10.5	
Party Institutionalization	1372	0.6	0.2	0.03	1	
Regime Duration	1372	20.4	23.1	1	80	
Personalism	1372	0.8	0.3	0.1	1	
Competitiveness	1372	0.3	0.1	0.02	0.8	

	Std.				
	Ν	Mean	Deviation	Min.	Max.
Electoral Volatility	137	33.1	17.7	4.2	83.7
Mean District Magnitude	137	16.3	29.4	1	150
Effective No. of Electoral					
Parties	137	5	2.3	2	13.8
Communist	137	0.3	0.5	0	1
Transition Year	137	87.1	5.4	78	100
Previous Institutionalization	137	0.8	0.1	0	1
Age of Democracy	137	11.2	6.7	1	37
GDP Growth	137	3.4	4.2	-9.3	12.7
Ethnic Fractionalization	137	0.4	0.2	0.002	0.8
Authoritarian Interlude (Years)	137	33.4	18.6	3	80
Democratic Experience	137	5.6	15.2	0	41
Multi-party Experience	137	12.1	15.2	0	80
Parliamentary	137	0.3	0.5	0	1
Multiparty	137	0.6	0.5	0	1

 Table B Descriptive Statistics for Analysis 2

	Regime Starts	Regime Ends
Ecuador	1962	1979
Ecuador	1962	1979
Brazil	1965	1986
Bolivia	1946	1982
Chile	1974	1990
Argentina	1956	1958
Argentina	1963	1963
Argentina	1967	1973
Argentina	1977	1983
Uruguay	1974	1985
Poland	1946	1991
Hungary	1946	1990
Czechoslovakia	1949	1990
Yugoslavia	1946	1991
Bulgaria	1946	1990
Romania	1946	1990
Russia	1946	1991
Dominican Republic	1946	1964
Benin	1962	1991
Turkey	1946	1961
Turkey	1972	1973
Turkey	1981	1983
Mexico	1946	2000
Mongolia	1946	1990
Korea, South	1954	1988
Philippines	1970	1986
Guatemala	1955	1986
Honduras	1946	1958
Honduras	1964	1971
Honduras	1973	1982
El Salvador	1946	1980
Nicaragua	1946	1977
Nicaragua	1980	1982
Nicaragua	1989	1990
Senegal	1960	1999
Ghana	1959	1969
Ghana	1973	1979
Ghana	1982	1992

Table C. Authoritarian Spells Included in the First Analysis.

	Elections
Ecuador	1984 1986 1988 1992 1994 1998 2002
Brazil	1990, 1994, 1998, 2002
Bolivia	1989 1993 1997 2002 2005
Chile	1993, 1997, 2001, 2005
Argentina	1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2003
Uruguay	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
Poland	1993, 1997, 2001, 2005
Hungary	1994, 1998, 2002
Czech Republic	1993, 1996, 1998, 2002
Slovakia	1998, 2002, 2006
Macedonia	1994, 1998, 2002, 2006
Slovenia	1996, 2000, 2001
Bulgaria	1991, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005
Moldova	1998, 2001, 2005
Romania	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004
Russia	1993, 1995, 1999
Estonia	1995, 1999, 2003
Latvia	1995, 1998, 2002
Lithuania	1992, 1996, 2000
Ukraine	1998, 2002, 2006
Dominican Republic	1982, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002
Benin	1995, 1999
Turkey	1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002
Mexico	2000, 2003, 2006
Mongolia	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004
South Korea	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004
Philippines	1992 1995 1998
Guatemala	1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2003
Honduras	1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001
El Salvador	1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
Nicaragua	1996. 2001. 2006
Panama	1994, 1999
Senegal	2001, 2007
Ghana	1997, 2000, 2004, 2008

Table D. Countries and Elections Included in the Second Analysis.