

Political Opposition in a Hostile Environment: Comparative Party Systems of East and Southeast Asia

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Abstract

The thesis deals with comparative party systems of East and Southeast Asia. The region is characterized by party systems with a dominant or predominant party. The thesis seeks to explain how the second-largest parties become viable challengers in such party systems. The research design employs a theoretical framework of critical antecedents which stimulate the critical juncture that results in the emergence of the major opposition party. In order to find out the constellation of factors that facilitate the appearance of a viable challenger, Qualitative Comparative Analysis is employed. In accordance with the existing theory on viable challengers' emergence, this research checks for the impact of antecedents in the electoral system, government type, economic situation, influence of the international actors, parties' leadership, policies and institutionalization and overall level of the democratization and liberalization in a given country. The analysis provides evidence that the presence of at least two specific antecedents is required for the viable challenger to appear – the inflexibility of the predominant party over the essential political issue and opposition based on strong leadership. If both, or at least one of these two conditions are present, then a viable challenger is likely to emerge. The other causal conditions are economic performance, duration of a predominant party in power and international aid.

Key words: party system, predominant party, viable challenger, East Asia, Southeast Asia, third wave of democratization, csQCA.

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Introduction

Both the first and second wave of democratization were subjected to the reverse (see e.g. Huntington, 1993; 1996; Kurzman, 1998; Doorenspleet, 2011; Markoff 2015). Samuel Huntington describes democratization as a “two-step-forward, one-step-backward pattern” (Huntington, 1993, p. 25). First wave democracies encountered Fascism and Nazism, the second wave democracies faced military coups and juntas (Huntington, 1993, pp. 290-292). The third democratization wave is yet to show its successes and failures.

Most countries in the region of the East and Southeast Asia carried out democratic transition during the third wave. Only Japan made an effort to democratize earlier, but had to start from the beginning after WWII. Contemporary political systems of the region possess the potential for successful democratization, as well as for the reverse of the transition. One of the evidences for the tendency towards the maintenance of the direction of the democratic transition might be found in the party systems of the region.

As is observed, the regional inclination is toward a system with a dominant party. Out of its eighteen countries, the region is represented by six purely authoritarian one-party or non-party regimes (Brunei, China, Laos, Myanmar, North Korea and Vietnam), four multi-party systems (East Timor, Indonesia, Mongolia and the Philippines) and eight systems with a predominant party (Cambodia, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand) which have this system from the beginning of their autonomous history. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the most economically developed countries (so-called “economic miracles”) fall into either the first or third group. Furthermore, all multi-party systems in the region either used to have a pre-dominant party, or the former pre-dominant party still successfully competes in multi-party elections.

According to this, the region can be acknowledged as hostile towards political opposition. T.J. Pempel (1990) emphasizes that East and Southeast Asia is a unique region because nowhere else in the world is it possible to find such a combination of a quite successful democratic development and maintenance of the predominant parties which covers 2/3 of the countries in the region. Not only the homogeneity of these characteristics is unique, but the essence of this combination as well. Pempel (1990) argues that predominant parties and democratic regimes are not expected to fit together for a long time.

However, considering current events in the group of competitive regimes in the region, the situation is not unequivocal. Dominant parties seem to struggle against opposition parties even if winning legislative majorities in most of the elections. In Cambodia, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand major opposition parties managed to win over the predominant parties during the most recent electoral cycles. These party systems demonstrate features of the transition towards a two-party system. The same situation was observed in current multiparty systems of East Timor, Indonesia, Mongolia and the Philippines. Major opposition parties emerge there, institutionalize and challenge pre-dominant parties in some cases even stripping them of their dominance. *The question is therefore what helps major opposition parties to stabilize themselves, enter the party competition and challenge dominant parties under the conditions of a party system with a predominant party.*

The research holds particular importance since the tendency described above can be interpreted differently for new democracies. If solid and competitive opposition parties indeed develop in the region, it can be considered as a part of successful democratic transition and even a shift towards a two-party system. The dynamics in electoral outcomes can also be perceived as another expression of electoral volatility, which is mostly high for the region (Croissant, Bruns & John, 2002; Hicken, 2008). Overall, development and stabilization of single opposition

parties in such a hostile region towards political opposition as the East and Southeast Asia can explain a lot in the process of democratization of these countries.

For this thesis the theoretical framework of critical junctures and critical antecedents is employed. The main point is that the major opposition emergence occurs when certain political and economic factors accumulate resulting in an outcome of the viable challenger to the predominant party. The goal of this thesis is to outline the constellation of these antecedents and to connect them to the observed outcomes. In order to list the potential critical antecedents, the extensive literature on the topics of predominant parties, emergence and solidification of the opposition and regional patterns of the party systems' development is reviewed. From this body of scholarship, nine variables are derived which are mentioned most often by different authors for different countries and regions, for both of the outcomes of the interest – emergence of the viable challenger and maintenance of the predominant party's undisputed reign.

The crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is conducted, for this is the most fitting technique when dealing with the small-N samples for discovering the influential groups of factors and checking for their compliance with the observed outcomes. Since I am interested in the constellation of the critical antecedents nine of the theorized antecedents and the outcomes are dichotomised in the form of “presence/absence”. The outcome that this thesis seeks to explain is the emergence or non-emergence of the viable challenger in a party system with the pre-dominant party.

The results are parsimonious simplified formulas of the critical antecedents that are responsible for the grouping of the cases in compliance with the outcomes. They demonstrate that there are five combinations of variables which can explain the emergence of a viable challenger. The *inflexibility of a predominant party* has the greatest explanatory power. It is present as a sufficient condition in all five formulas and cannot explain only one case out of the

whole sample. The analysis returns 5 potential partners for this variable, some of which have explanatory power only being combined with each other. The *leader-based opposition* is sufficient by itself connected by a logical “AND” to the *inflexibility of a predominant party*. *Duration of a predominant party* is present in the other four formulas. However, it is not sufficient by itself. It gains explanatory power only when connected by a logical “AND” to either *economic decline*, or *general poverty of a country*, or *receiving of large international aid*.

The thesis is divided into four interconnected chapters. Chapter 1. State of the Art discusses theoretical and empirical insights already presented in academic scholarship. This chapter includes reviews of regional studies in East and Southeast Asia, literature on the topic of dominant and predominant parties, and scholarship on the emergence of viable challengers in party systems. Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework and Methodology identifies and justifies the research design solution. It is devoted, first, to the theoretical framework of critical junctures and antecedents. Second, it outlines the universe of case and explains sampling. Finally, it briefly explains and justifies the chosen analytical tool (crisp-set QCA), deals with encoding of the variables and outlines limitations to the method. Chapter 3. Empirical Observations: Party Systems’ Development Dynamics is a narrative on electoral patterns of predominant parties and viable challengers in East and Southeast Asia, as well as with the dynamics in multiparty systems of the region. This chapter emphasizes the general decline of predominant parties in the region as well as solidification of major opposition. Chapter 4. Qualitative Comparative Analysis: When Challengers Emerge presents five combinations of causal conditions which can explain the emergence of viable challengers in East and Southeast Asia. In the Conclusion the major empirical findings and theoretical contribution are outlined as well as the potential for further research.

Chapter 1. State of the Art

This chapter deals with the theoretical foundations for this thesis. It discusses three major sets of the relevant academic literature. First, I discuss the scholarship on the regional patterns of the party system development in East and Southeast Asia and make the tentative theorizing on possible causes of the transition from the system with a predominant party to a two-party system in a region. Second, I go through the literature on the topic of the predominant parties and elaborate their operative definition. Third, based on the literature on viable challengers in party systems, I derive the operative definition of the viable challenger as well the nine hypotheses for this research.

1.1 Party systems' development in East and Southeast Asia

Overall, the literature on the party systems of East and Southeast Asia is rich. However, few scholars concentrate particularly on the development of opposition parties. Most of the scholarship deals with the party systems of the “Asian Tigers”, more precisely on South Korea and Taiwan. However, there is a literature that embraces more countries and substantial time periods. Empirically, patterns of inter-party competition are somehow destabilized after the latest (or couple of the latest) electoral cycle in most of the countries of the region which is to be discussed further. This section is an effort to bring together different opinions on party systems development dynamics in the region and to derive potential independent variables for further analysis.

1.1.1 Regional studies: literature review

The comprehensive analysis of the party systems of East and Southeast Asia in comparative perspective is conducted by Aurel Croissant and Philip Volkel (2012). They compare degree of party systems' institutionalization in the region and come to interesting

conclusion that there is no single pattern of the connection between party system institutionalization and stabilization of party competition. Croissant and Volkel point out that Thailand, the Philippines and especially South Korea possess weakly institutionalized party systems. Mongolian and Taiwanese party systems are well-institutionalized in comparison to the rest of the region, however, even they are weaker institutionalized than the party systems of Latin America, for instance. Surprisingly, weak institutionalization of the party systems in South Korea and the Philippines does not prevent the stabilization of the inter-party competition. Still, Croissant and Volkel argue that weak party system institutionalization is an obstacle for democratic consolidation (2012, pp. 258-259).

The other important conclusion that Croissant and Volkel derive is that party system institutionalization is definitely not enough of a factor to account for the vast variety of party systems' development patterns in the region (2012, p. 259). Another insight within this framework is provided by Allen Hicken and Erik Kuhonta (2011) who, again, point out that the highest degree of institutionalization is possessed by Singapore, Taiwan and Japan (p. 587). Their argument is that parties born earlier institutionalize better than younger parties which is highly relevant for this paper since the opposition parties usually happen to appear later than the pre-dominant parties. Again, the example of Taiwan demonstrates that earlier naissance of the pre-dominant party and higher level of its institutionalization does not guarantee electoral success in a long-term perspective.

Mainwaring et al. (2016) add to this argument the observation that parties of East and Southeast Asia lack well-elaborated programmatic positions. Mainwaring and Torkal (2006) expressed this position in a sense that programmatic parties tend to have deeper roots in the society, therefore, institutionalize better. Taking into account institutional characteristics, scholars present electoral rules as accountable for the party system development. Benjamin Reilly (2007) provides an observation that there is a general shift towards majoritarian electoral

rules in the region. In accordance with Duverger's law, this shift encourages the emergence of strong opposition parties in order to maintain two-party competition. On the other hand, in the same paper Reilly acknowledges that this shift means higher degree of disproportionality of electoral laws. Under such electoral laws, political opposition would have no incentives to form parties and enter electoral competition. However, Reilly remains optimistic about the potential of East and Southeast Asian party systems to successfully transform into two-party systems (p. 199). Timothy Rich finds supportive of this argument evidence that mixed-member legislative systems in South Korea and Taiwan influence party cohesion. If the dominant party is not capable of utilizing such a system to its benefit, it would be quickly overtaken by the opposition (Rich, 2014).

Speaking of East and Southeast Asia, economic indicators cannot be disregarded as explanatory factors no matter what we try to explain. Michael Rock (2013) describes the regional political systems as the example of how governments incline towards authoritarianism in order to maintain economic growth. He points out that East and Southeast Asia is the rare case of the authoritarian governments being unusually good in stimulating economic growth (pp. 18-19). On the other hand, Rock acknowledges that democratization did not bring much of damage to the economic performance of the region. Two alternative assumptions can be made here. First, pre-dominant parties might lose votes because of falter in their economic performance which are expected to be taken very seriously by the electorate of "economically miraculous" countries.

However, this does not explain the emergence of major opposition parties. This could explain only growing levels of electoral volatility accounted for by the losses of the pre-dominant parties. More sound economic explanation could be that some countries of East and Southeast Asia reached certain threshold of economic development that they can afford further democratization without fearing the economic losses. According to the results of the survey

conducted by Zhu, Diamond and Sin in 2001, at least for the citizens of South Korea and Taiwan economic security is more important than democratic development (p. 127), therefore, it can be assumed that for the electorates of East and Southeast Asia having such confidence is vital before they start voting for something else besides the pre-dominant party that proved its competence in providing economic growth. Here it is important to emphasize that not all the countries of the region are “economic miracles”. Variety in economic performance indeed may partially account for the shift in party systems’ development in the region.

Another interesting point of view on the changes in patterns of party systems’ development in the region is provided by Dorothy Solinger. She argues that the opposition was allowed to develop under two pressing factors: first, the desire to distinguish from the communist and authoritarian neighbourhood, and second, to stay in favour with the established democracies of the West (2001, pp. 32-34). Then, she holds corruption and corrosion of dominant parties accountable with the simultaneous emergence of charismatic leaders among opposition powers (Solinger, 2001, p. 36-42). This makes for another probable explanation of the emergence of major opposition parties which is the desire to comply with internationally supported patterns that do not tolerate pre- dominant parties well.

The final point that can be derived here, and which seems to be lying on the surface, is that emergence of major opposition is related to the overall growth of the level of democracy. In relation to democratic development, Scott Mainwaring provides a very controversial insight that party institutionalization is not associated with the longevity of democratic development (Mainwaring et al, 2016). Ivonne Guo supports argument for democracy impact, stating that diversity in society eventually will demand for better representation, thus, for diversification of the party system (Guo in Guo & Woo, 2016, pp. 196-199). Her conclusion is derived from the research of the Singaporean party system. Taking empirics of the several electoral cycles in

Singapore into consideration, it can be assumed that Singapore is slowly yet steadily moves towards the state of matters which definitely supports Guo's conclusions.

1.1.2 Potential clusters of variables: regime, economy, institutions

This body of an academic scholarship reviewed above allows for tentatively formulating three main groups of conditions are necessary for the major opposition party to emerge in a party system with a pre-dominant party. First, since it is commonly acknowledged that party system consolidation is directly connected to democracy consolidation, I assume that there might be the reversed association. Countries in East and Southeast Asia vary on their level of democracy. It can be hypothesized that the increasing general level of democracy in a society would tolerate pre-dominant party less and create other necessary pre-conditions for the strengthening of the opposition. However, there is a measurement problem. Most democracy rankings employ the presence of opposition party as one of their variables for calculating indices. Therefore, it is impossible to use global researches into democratic performances without threatening causal connections between democracy and the emergence of major opposition parties. However, it is possible to evaluate the averages of common indicators in order to, first, exclude opposition party indicators, second, to reduce the flaws of each particular index.

The second potent variable might relate to the economic performance by the country. Intuitively, it is clear that newly industrialized countries of the first and second wave, which are used to exceptional economic growth, would be very sensitive even towards the slightest declines in the economic growth rate. There is some evidence that in South Korea and Taiwan people prefer economic security over democracy. Only each seventh in the sample of the survey by Zhu, Diamond and Sin (2001, p. 127) chose democratic development at the expense of the economy. Empirically, it can be observed that the most economically developed countries of the region – Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan – have pre-

dominant parties. However, they vary on the outcome concerning the emergence and success of the major opposition party. It can be assumed that the successful major opposition party would not emerge in a society that does not falter in economic performance.

Finally, institutional characteristics seem to be of particular relevance for this research. Electoral systems, electoral laws, their level of proportionality, fairness of representation – all of this can influence the process of major opposition party development at the very early stage. If the electoral system is that of plurality and electoral laws are highly disproportional, political opposition might not even have an incentive to create a party. Permissiveness of the party system is a vital characteristic for the opposition party to appear (Rich, 2014). However, Duverger's law is worthy of mentioning here. The majoritarian electoral system is expected to enhance the development of the two-party system (Reilly, 2007). The hypothesis would be, that for the emergence of a major opposition party a majoritarian electoral system and more or less proportionate electoral laws are necessary. Within this institutional framework, international influence emphasized by Solinger (2001) is to be taken into account. The relaxation of electoral rules can be made not independently but under the pressure of established democracies. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that countries which are more dependent on established democracies would abandon party systems with pre-dominant parties.

In addition, not only the institutional settings surrounding the party system are of importance. The degree of polarization (Dalton, 2008), institutionalization and fragmentation within the party system itself is supposed to influence the same indicators of development for the particular party (Croissant & Volkel, 2012; Hellman, 2014). In the region of East and Southeast Asia the influence of the predominant parties on the process of party system institutionalization should be very carefully accounted for (Hicken & Kuhonta, 2011). Processes of coalition formation and the development of parties' ideologies is neither to be disregarded (Reilly, 2007). Programmatic development is to be taken into account, since if lack

of programmatic position is observed for the pre-dominant parties, but not for the major opposition parties (Mainwaring et al, 2016), this can somehow explain the success of opposition parties.

1.2 *Defining predominant parties*

In accordance with the research question, the sample is supposed to include cases of party systems with the predominant party. In order to conduct the sampling correctly, the definition of the predominant party is of utmost necessity. Different scholars theorized it, mostly talking about the dominant parties that are not to be mixed by default with the type of party that characterizes systems that I am interested in. Predominant party is a term used, first of all, by Giovanni Sartori, who referred to party systems where one party “outdistances all the others” and “is significantly stronger than others” (Sartori, 1976, p. 193). Moreover, he offers a quantitative threshold for the party to be defined as predominant which is 50% of seats (Sartori, 1976, p. 44). James Coleman (1960) set the threshold higher, at 70% of seats. Nicholas Van De Walle and Kimberly Butler (1999) relax the restrictions to 60% of seats. Jean Blondel (1968) measures the dominance in share of votes and his threshold is the lowest among the discussed – just more than 40% of votes.

Duverger relates the dominance of the party to the duration of its reign and acceptance of it by the public as a dominant political actor. His point is that the dominant party is associated “with an epoch” (Duverger, 1963, pp. 275-280). T.J. Pempel summarizes all of these definitions outlining the necessary conditions for the dominant party. His list of conditions consists of the size which is measured as a number of seats in the legislature; favorable bargaining position which allows the party to push their decisions through the legislature; time that this party stays in power and control over government (Pempel, 1990, pp. 4-5). However, as Pempel justly

points out, there is a problem of distinguishing between the dominant and the predominant parties. I use in this thesis a particular term “*predominant party*”.

Pempel emphasizes that long-term dominance of one party is puzzling for industrialized democracies since it undermines the validity of the democracy. This note is worthy of mentioning for the context of East and Southeast Asia which mainly consists of new democracies with a high level of industrialization and systems with predominant parties at the same time. Pempel employs a very particular example of Japan which demonstrates the highest level of democracy in the region simultaneously with the longest duration of one-party predominance. The question is how long one-party reign affects democratic performance by the political system of the country. Pempel’s point is that this phenomenon raises suspicions that citizens are not really granted an opportunity to change the government. Moreover, they internalize the unshakable nature of the party’s dominance even if they are unsatisfied with its performance (Pempel, 1990, pp. 5-6).

For this research I employ the mixed approach to the predominant parties. Since the shares of votes and seats greatly varies in my sample, I cannot use purely quantitative definitions that Coleman, Van De Walle and Butler or Sartori offer. The threshold set by Blondel is intuitively more inclusive, however, predominant parties actively use their administrative resource to manipulate electoral laws, this is why the predominant party can get a very small share of votes and still get a majority in the parliament. Thus, I will side with Sartori on this. The second problem with these quantitative threshold is that they are not elaborated for the usage overtime. The question arises, if the party would be still predominant is the opposition managed to win. The answer from the quantitative point of view would be negative. But, as Duverger and Pempel emphasize, the characteristic of durability is essential for defining the predominant party. Therefore, I define the predominant party as a party that gets a majority of seats for more than a half of the legislative elections set in the country. This allows for satisfying quantitative and

qualitative understandings of the predominant party, which are electoral success for a time long enough for the government to be associated with the given country.

1.3 *Viable challengers*

This section is to, first of all, elaborate the operative definition for the viable challenger, since this is the key concept of the thesis. I employ existing scholarship in order to derive essential properties of a viable challenger. Another goal of this section is to present the existing body of literature which discusses potential factors of viable challengers' emergence. The factors which most of the authors agree upon are to become independent variables or, in other words, potential critical antecedents in this research.

1.3.1 Emergence of a viable challenger: deriving hypotheses

The literature on the topic of the major opposition party emergence provides different potential variables for the development of the viable challenger to the predominant party (see Appendix 2. Table 8). Furthermore, this phenomenon is tightly connected with the development and maintenance of the opposition unity, since in the system with the predominant party minor parties seem to only contribute to the incumbent's party's reign. Nine common micro-foundations can be derived from the existing literature and employed for the analysis of party systems of East and Southeast Asia.

First, the authors mention several times the impact of the electoral system. The main conclusion that they derive is that PR, even if facilitating representation, does not contribute to the formation of a united major opposition party. A purely majoritarian system, according to Duverger's law, advantages the major party and makes for the development of a two-party system. In such a situation, the opposition political forces have no other choice but to unite into one major party if they want to just enter the legislature. However, if the electoral system is

even partially proportional (for instance, the Japanese) opposition leaders have no incentives to unite because under proportionality the minor parties can enter parliament. Pempel (1990) for Japan, Italy, Sweden and Israel derives the conclusion that proportionality elements divide opposition, stripping it from challenger potential. Michael McFaul (2005) makes the same conclusion on Ukraine, Georgia and Serbia. Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand (2002) observe the same in the sample of the countries of tropical Africa. Edmund Gomez (2016) provides another important insight that concerns the proportionality of the electoral law itself. His point made with the example of Malaysia is that if all the parties except for the largest one get a substantially smaller proportion of seats than the proportion of votes they gained, they would have the incentive to unite in order to enlarge their presence in the parliament.

The second prominent and commonly mentioned micro-foundation is economic performance. However, here the opinions of the authors contradict each other. On the one hand, several authors argue that an economic crisis is necessary for the solid opposition to emerge. Ellis Kraus and John Pierre (1990) use the case of Japan to point out the opportunity for the opposition to criticize the predominant party, which is strongly associated with economic growth in order to shaken its support base. Marc Howard and Philip Roessler (2006) hold the same opinion based on the analysis of the elections in several competitive authoritarian regimes.

On the other hand, some authors, to the contrary, argue that economic prosperity is essential for the emergence of a united opposition. Kenneth Greene (2002) uses the case of Mexico and states that the predominant party already occupies the median voter on the economic dimension. Therefore, the opposition is expected to use another dimension relevant for the systems with the predominant party – dimension of the democratic development. As was mentioned above, the presence of the predominant party undermines the quality of democracy, so the opposition parties can appeal to the voters who would not mind further democratic development. Richard Carney (2015) makes another valid point that economic prosperity

produces in a given society values of another, post-industrial nature. In order to use to its advantage, the demands for welfare expansion, human rights and environment protection, further liberalization, opposition is to unite for the voters preferring the “second dimension” of democratization over the “first dimension” of economics in Greene’s terms. Divided opposition would not be able to fully employ benefits offered by the “regime cleavage” (Greene, 2002, p. 127). Randal and Svasand (2002) add to the point that the opposition usually has problems with appealing to the rural and uneducated electorate. Therefore, successful opposition consolidation requires high levels of urbanization, education and civil society development, in other words, economic prosperity of a given country.

Chu, Diamond and Sin (2001) discover via surveys that people in South Korea and Taiwan value economic security over democratic development. Moreover, they observe a significant decrease in the faith in democracy as a suitable form of rule after the severe economic crisis in 1997. Taking into account that South Korea and Taiwan achieved contemporary scores on democratic development by 1995, it seems that Korean and Taiwanese citizens happen to connect democratic transition to economic misfortunes. In such conditions, the predominant party associated with “economic miracles” is not likely to lose its support base.

The third promising variable is the institutional framework of the relationship between the legislative and the executive branches. The authors unite in the opinion that a constitutionally strong parliament is necessary for the opposition to consolidate itself. This conclusion is made by Muhamad Omar (2008) for Malaysia. The findings by Randall and Svasand (2002) for tropical Africa and Howard and Roessler (2006) for competitive authoritarian regimes, in general, support Omar’s conclusion. In order not to outnumber the predominant party in the parliament when bills are being pushed through the legislature, but, at least, to serve as a check and counterbalance and be heard, opposition should unite. However,

this is relevant only if the legislature in the given country possesses real political power and is an independent political entity from the government and the president.

The degree of institutionalization of the opposition, in particular, and the party system, in general, is mentioned as well. Most of the authors who employ these concepts agree that personalization and charismatic leadership is not recommended for opposition parties. In the sense of unification Randall and Svasand (2002) emphasize that personalism within opposition parties will lead to them becoming the instruments of political ambitions of the individual leaders. Gomez (2016) makes the point that a charismatic leader, and their party with them, is easier to defeat for the predominant party with its administrative capabilities. However, Neil Southern (2016) writes that charismatic leadership is essential to divert attention from the predominant party. Ian Cooper (2014) adds to the tasks of the charismatic leader incentivizing the opposition parties to unite in their desire to offer their own alternative candidate for the presidency. These candidates have to be charismatic in order to create a contrast with an unpopular incumbent of the predominant party. Howard and Roessler (2006), in turn, state that it is not the challenger's charisma that is important, but the weakness of the incumbent.

Some authors mention that the duration of the predominant party in government really matters. Pempel (1990) writes that the longer the predominant party stays in government, the more it looks for citizens that its dominance is "foreordained". The electorate internalize the predominant party and do not demand opposition. Therefore, the opposition has a hard time in performing and few incentives to unite. If they cannot challenge the incumbent, they find it easier to agree for the representation in parliament which does not require unity.

This is somehow related to the flexibility and adaptability of the predominant party. Duverger (1959) mentions that, in general, the main problem of predominant parties is that they are rigid and lack adaptability to the changing context. They prefer to maintain the status quo

and their administrative resources allow them to adapt the environment for themselves. However, when a major crisis like, for instance, major demographic changes (Kraus and Pierre, 1990) in the electorate, occurs, the predominant party loses its attractiveness in comparison with the flexible and up-to-date opposition. Sidney Tarrow (1990) observes the same phenomenon for Italy. He narrows the harmful consequences of rigidity to one salient issue on which the predominant party is not ready to make concessions, while the public demands for it. However, if this salient issue implies only one morally acceptable solution, like, for instance, anti-racist policies by ANC in South Africa (Southern, 2016), any major opposition party will be perceived as a threat to these policies. These researches mention Japan as an example of ultimate flexibility and adaptability of the predominant party. Greene (2002) points out that the LDP is the party that appeals to the median voter on both economic and democratic dimensions. Croissant and Volkel outline problematic political issues in East and Southeast Asia on which predominant parties hold rigid positions. Those are pro-Beijing policies for Hong Kong and Taiwan, state independence for East Timor, communist legacy for Cambodia and Mongolia, disproportionate electoral policies for Malaysia, purely populist platform of the predominant party in Thailand, and North Korean issue for South Korea (2012).

Some authors find substantial international effort in supporting opposition unity in some countries. Carney (2016) in his research of the countries of Southeast Asia makes the point that consolidated opposition would need generous alternative resources to compete with the predominant party. International actors that are interested in the democratic transfer make can be such a resource. Therefore, opposition unity can be a kind of mildly imposed on opposition party via offering them extensive funding and assistance. Howard and Roessler (2006) find the same pattern for their sample of electoral authoritarianisms. However, for instance, in Azerbaijan international efforts did not prove to be enough to turn the opposition into a real challenger (Ismailzade, 2003). I would relate this to the degree of embeddedness of the countries

into the system of international relations and their relationship with the major actors of global democratization. On this aspect, democratic transfer in East and Southeast Asia could attract more attention from international actors.

Finally, the overall level of democratization and liberalization is taken into account. Pempel (1990) argues that the system with the predominant party is not a usual phenomenon for the industrialized democracies. The presence of the predominant party in such an advanced democracy as Japan, is, at the very least, puzzling, according to him. He states that further development of democracy will create a demand in the society for a solid and competitive opposition. Howard and Roessler (2006) derive the same conclusion from their sample. The more democratic and liberal the political system becomes, the higher the probability is of major opposition party emergence.

Concerning all what was discussed above, I highlight nine independent variables that might serve as critical antecedents for a viable challenger emergence and formulate nine hypotheses which will be checked in this thesis.

H1: In a *purely majoritarian electoral system* a viable challenger will emerge;

H2: *Without economic growth* a viable challenger will emerge;

H3: In a *rich country* a viable challenger will emerge;

H4: In *parliamentary system* a viable challenger will emerge;

H5a: If the second-largest party *has no charismatic leadership*, a viable challenger will emerge;

H5b: If the second-largest party *has charismatic leadership*, a viable challenger will emerge;

H6: If a predominant party *does not have a long history of its reign*, a viable challenger will emerge;

H7: If a predominant party holds *rigid position on an essential political issue*, a viable challenger will emerge;

H8: If a country is a recipient of *substantial international aid*, a viable challenger will emerge;

H9: If *overall level of democracy is either already high or growing*, a viable challenger will emerge.

1.3.2 Defining viable challengers

The authors reviewed above provide with different concepts which they employ in order to describe an opposition party which is able to challenge a predominant party. Pempel (1990), McFaul (2005), Randall and Svasand (2002) talk about opposition unity and the weakness of divided opposition. Greene (2002), using spatial theory, suggests that a challenger is getting closer to a predominant party in a sense that it gets its fair share of the median voter, thus, getting closer in terms of votes. My point is that a viable challenger is to be defined in relation to both predominant party and other opposition party. It should be getting closer to the leader of the electoral competition while moving away from all other opposition parties at the same time.

For this research I define viable challenger quantitatively. As the term itself supplies, the key properties of a viable challenger are, first, the relative closeness of its share of vote to a predominant party's, second, the possibility to distinguish it from other opposition party. Both of these conditions are necessary since they form a threat to a predominant party, since they signalize of the opposition unity and its electoral successes. Therefore, for this research two properties of a second-largest party are necessary to transform it into a viable challenger. First, a second-largest party becomes a viable challenger if the difference between its share of votes and a predominant party's share of votes is larger than the difference between a second-largest

party's share of votes and a third-largest party share of votes. Then, a second-largest party's share of votes should be at least half as large as a predominant party's.

Shares of votes are used in order to adequately evaluate the potential of the second-largest party. As was mentioned above, and as is demonstrated empirically below, translation of votes into seats in systems with a predominant party is usually highly disproportionate to the benefit of a predominant party. Shares of votes provide a more real picture of the popularity of both parties.

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework and methodology

This chapter deals with the methodological choices for the thesis. First, it explains the major theoretical framework of the critical antecedents which is used for the case selection and time period identification. Second, I outline the universe of cases and define the case selection strategy. Finally, I identify the analytical tool chosen for this research, the motives to use it and its limitations.

2.1 *Critical junctures and critical antecedents*

Discovering causal connection somewhere in a distant past of a political system is tricky since it requires continuous narrative and endless jumping from one cause to cause of the cause and so on. As Dan Slater and Erica Simmons rightly put it into words, in order to answer the question “why”, first, we are supposed to answer the question “when” (2010, pp. 886-887). Here, the concept of a critical juncture becomes topical. This is a relatively short moment in time when the cases, which were similar in some aspect and developing in a path-dependent way, start to diverge from it (see e.g. Collier & Collier, 2002). Critical antecedents, in turn, are the preceding conditions which, accumulating, combine with the actors’ decisions during the critical juncture “producing long-term divergence in outcomes” (Slater and Simmons, 2010, p. 889). The concept of “conditioning causes”, which ensure the divergence of the cases before the critical juncture, enforcing the further divergence on the characteristic of similarity of all cases (Slater & Simmons, 2010, p. 891), is of an utmost importance for this research.

There is a puzzle in how to treat the emergence of a viable challenger – as a long-time process of an opposition party creation, growth and consolidation, or as a mere moment when a second-largest party became a threat to a predominant party. Party systems’ development dynamics in East and Southeast Asia persuade me to accept the second point of view. As the

cases of Japan, Indonesia or Malaysia show, the opposition party can stay under the threshold of a viable challenger for a very long time and either never cross this line, or do it only when some exogenous changes occur. Or, to the contrary, as the cases of East Timor and South Korea demonstrate, viable challengers do not need time almost at all to emerge which undermines the applicability of the explanation of the phenomenon via long-time processes of opposition growth and solidification. The framework of critical junctures and antecedents, in turn, fits well for the party systems' development in the region because of a given diversity of cases, path dependence on a variable of interest (maintenance of predominant parties) and critical moments of viable challengers' emergence with their long-time consequences of party systems' transformation.

It makes sense to take the variables theorized before as critical antecedents since they produce the large variety of opportunities for further development which eventually become critical and contribute to a second-largest party's transformation into a viable challenger. I assume that certain combinations of these antecedents are crucial for the critical juncture to happen. Therefore, party systems which have such combinations will produce viable challengers in short time. On the other hand, party systems which do not possess these constellations of factors will maintain predominant parties till changes in critical antecedents occur. The goal of this thesis is to discover these constellations which are compatible with the outcome observed.

2.2 Justifying case selection

In order to answer the research question of how major opposition parties manage to stabilize and institutionalize under the conditions of the party system with a predominant party, it is necessary to maintain the broad variety both on the possible causes and the observed outcomes. I use the strategy of the diverse cases. For the comparative within-case study it is

unfeasible to use just two cases that span the maximum variety on the outcome. Since I am interested in mechanisms of major opposition parties' development, it is necessary for the sample to have a variety on the theorized causes as well (Rohlfing, 2012). For research purposes, the unifying features of the sample are, first, the presence of a predominant party (currently, or in the past) and, second, the competitiveness of the regime. Therefore, I exclude legal one-party or no-party systems of Brunei, China, Laos, Myanmar, North Korea and Vietnam. All other party systems of the region are to be discussed in more detail.

As framed by the theory, I am interested in party systems which are formed via the contested elections and maintain the predominant party's presence. It is essential to mention that under the term "contested" I imply legally multi-party elections even if in reality the opposition had no chance to beat the predominant party. Since I am dealing with the critical junctures and antecedents, the mere presence of the opposition in the elections can be considered as a part of the emergence of the viable challenger. In order not to miss the moment of the critical juncture, timelines of the party systems' operations are to be treated carefully (see Appendix 1. Table 7).

Currently, nine party systems, which is $\frac{3}{4}$ of all the party systems in the region, have viable challengers to predominant parties. For these cases I check for the performance on the theorized antecedents for the electoral cycle right before the elections where the viable challenger emerged. There are only three countries, where there the second-largest party does not satisfy the threshold of the viable challenger set by the operative definition for this thesis. These countries are Japan, the Philippines and Singapore. In these cases, I check for the performance on the theorized conditions for the current moment in time. This will provide me with a knowledge of why the second-largest parties in these countries do not turn into viable challengers.

2.3 Qualitative Comparative Analysis: justifying the analytical tool selection

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) in its crisp-set form is an analytical tool for dealing with the number of cases which is too small to treat with statistical methods, yet too large to employ purely qualitative comparative case-study (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) which is why I employ it for my research. Somehow, QCA can be perceived as a middle ground between qualitative and quantitative approaches, or a method that allows to introduce a quantitative element into a small-N analysis. I have twelve cases which are already grouped on the outcome observed (nine cases with a viable challenger, three cases without). I would like to have them grouped on theorized antecedents as well, so I will get the constellations of factors which are compatible with the outcomes, therefore, can be claimed as causing conditions explaining these outcomes.

Since I deal with critical antecedents, I treat my variables in terms of presence and absence. My outcome variable implies this as well because the emergence of a viable challenger is difficult to measure interpret in any other way but a presence or an absence of a challenger. Therefore, I employ crisp-set QCA which implies binary-encoded independent variables and outcome.

2.3.1 Antecedents encoding

The theory provides me with nine antecedents which are 1) electoral system 2) economic growth 3) GDP per capita 4) government system 5) opposition leadership 6) predominant party's duration 7) predominant party's flexibility 8) international aid 9) overall level of democratization.

For the electoral system, I am interested in a *presence of a PR component*. However, I disregard the cases where less than 10% of the legislature is formed via proportional representation. Since minor parties in such systems cannot ensure themselves to be heard by major parties I treat such systems as purely majoritarian. These systems and those without PR component at all are coded as 1. Systems with a PR component responsible for more than 10% of the legislature is coded as 0. This data is derived from the website of International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).

Economic growth is coded as 1 – for economic decline and 0 – for economic growth. *GDP per capita* is coded with the usage of the mean. I employ mean value to clearly distinguish richer countries from poorer once. The inequality in economic performance is large in the region and it was just as large before the emergence of viable challengers. I code countries with a GDP per capita over the mean as 1, and those below as 0. The data is derived from the World Bank website.

Government system is coded in accordance with the relationship between legislative and executive branches. Purely parliamentary systems are coded as 1. Semi-presidential are coded as 0. Semi-presidential systems are put into the second category because in a hostile environment of a system with a predominant party the second-largest party is fragile and even a semi-presidential system can be destructive for it, if a predominant party holds presidency. The data is derived from the Central Intelligence Agency's "The World Factbook".

For the *Opposition leadership* the value of 1 is given to cases where second-largest party has strong personal leadership, and 0 – to cases where such leadership is absent. The data is derived from the NELDA dataset by Nikolai Marinov. For the *predominant party's duration*, a threshold is necessary. Since the matter of interest is how long-time reign by the predominant party influence the sustenance of major opposition, I need to distinguish between cases where,

in terms of Duverger, predominant parties are associated “with an epoch” (1963, p. 280). Therefore, I establish the threshold of $\frac{3}{4}$ of the elections won by a predominant party over which I code cases as 1, and those below as 0. This data for Cambodia, Hong Kong, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand is derived from their National Election Committees (NECs) websites. For East Timor and Indonesia the data is derived from the IFES website. For Japan the data is derived from the Statistics Bureau Japan website. For Malaysia the data is derived from the EveryPolitician database.

Predominant party's flexibility implies presence of an essential political issue on which predominant party is or is not ready to make concessions in order to appeal to electorate. I code cases where predominant parties are rigid on an essential political issue as 1, and those with universally adaptable predominant parties as 0. This data is derived from the regional studies reviewed for the thesis in Section 1.1. Cases are coded as 1 if they are the recipients of the large *international aid* and a 0, if they are not. The data is derived from the NELDA dataset by Marinov. For the *overall level of democratization*, the cases are coded as 1 if before the moment of viable challenger (second-largest party) emergence the level of democracy was either high or growing. If not, the cases are coded as 0. This data is derived from the Freedom in the World reports since this is the only global democracy ranking which has consistent time-series data on all of my cases. Its category of “free” serves as high level of democracy in this encoding.

2.3.2 Outcome encoding

The outcome variable “viable challenger’s emergence” is measured via gaps in shares of votes between a second-largest party and a predominant party, on the one hand, and between a second-largest party and a third-largest party, on the other hand. To become a viable challenger a second largest party is to have smaller gap in share of votes to a predominant party than to a third-largest party. Then, it is to hold the share of votes at least a half as large as a

predominant party's share of votes. These two conditions have a logical "AND" between them which means that if at least one of them is not present, a viable challenger is not there and I code such cases as 0. If both of them are presents, a party system has a viable challenger and I code such cases as 1. The data for this variable's encoding is derived from the IFES website.

2.3.3 Limitations of the analytical tool and dichotomizing variables

This analysis has certain limitations that are worth of mentioning. First of all, the twelve cases which are included do not cover the majority of probable combinations of my theorized independent variables. Looking at the visualization of the coverage by the cases of all the possible combinations, it is obvious that there are a lot of logical remainders, which can contain promising explanation for the region. The addition of other cases from other regions would be a way of validating the results that I have got. Still, even considering that the sample I used covers all the universe of cases in the region, there might be a problem of omitted variables which were not mentioned in the extensive literature body that I reviewed for the research.

Second, employing QCA with the framework of the critical antecedents provided me with an opportunity to discover some causal connection with a certainty about its directions. I derive critical antecedents for the period right before the emergence of the viable challenger. However, since multi value crisp-set QCA does not provide anything like the model fit, I don't really know how precisely my model describes the reality, how much of the variation it explains.

The third limitation is in the variables' coding. Using dichotomized variables, I might lose lots of valuable information and diversity of the results by country. Since I am interested in the constellations of the critical antecedents using the framework of "presence-absence" is justified, however, recoding the antecedents and the outcomes into multi-categorical variables can make for a more detailed picture of the causal relationship discovered in this thesis.

Chapter 3. Empirical observation: party systems'

development dynamics

This chapter is to present the observed dynamics in development of the party systems in East and Southeast Asia. First, the electoral patterns for the predominant parties in East and Southeast Asia¹ are presented. I do the same for the electoral patterns demonstrated by the second-largest parties in the region. I outline the main events related to the party systems' development dynamics, in particular, to those events and phenomena which contributed to transformation or, to the contrary, to stability of the system with a predominant party. This is done in order to produce the narrative that would justify the conclusions derived from the csQCA part of the empirics. Another reason is to justify measuring and coding of the theorized variables and the observed outcomes. In addition, I explain why I include current multiparty systems into the sample for this research.

3.1 Electoral patterns for the predominant parties

The region of East and Southeast Asia possesses a variety of electoral patterns being expressed in the share of seats that predominant parties hold. However, the majority of predominant parties in the region demonstrate the decline in share of votes even if maintaining stable legislative majority. Still, there are three cases where the pattern described does not hold true. Cambodian party system is too young to derive any pattern from its elections' results. Thai party system sees too much of electoral fraud by the predominant party. Japanese predominant

¹ The data for this chapter is derived from National Electoral Committees websites for Cambodia, Hong Kong, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. For East Timor and Indonesia the data was derived from IFES website. For Japan the data was derived from the Statistic Bureau Japan. For Malaysia the data was derived from the EveryPolitician database.

party had its share of votes slowly, but steadily declining up to the last two electoral cycles when it got back an absolute majority of the votes casted.

3.1.1 From declining shares to dominance lost: Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan

First, the decline in most of predominant parties' dominance is indeed happening. However, the degree of the decline varies a lot. In case of Singapore the decline of Peoples' Action Party² from 100% of seats to 93% hardly can be defined as a decline accounting for the emergence of the major opposite party. Still, this decline cannot be disregarded by this paper. As will be demonstrated below with the example of Taiwanese Kuomintang, predominant party quickly decline from more than 90% of popular vote to less than 30%.

The party system of Hong Kong has two stable coalitions which are there almost from the beginning of the autonomous history of this special administrative region. Democratic Alliance for Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong³ (DAB) barely can be considered a predominant party in terms of numbers. Even if most of times it becomes the largest party in the parliament, its share of seats never exceeds 20%. However, the Pro-Beijing Alliance⁴ headed by the DAB holds an absolute majority for all the elections held in autonomous Hong Kong. Taking into consideration that no other party in the Pro-Beijing Alliance ever holds the share of seats larger than the DAB, as well as that the opposition Pan-Democratic Alliance⁵ never manages to win legislative majority, the assumption can be made that the Hong Kong Legislative Council mostly makes decisions in accordance with the DAB's preferences.

² Rénmín Xíngdòngdǎng

³ Míngzhǔ Jiàngǎng Xiéjìn Liánméng

⁴ Chān bǎi gīng pāi

⁵ Mǎhn jyú pāi

Therefore, even if the DAB's share of seats is most of times around 15%, it still somehow dominates the party system of Hong Kong. So far, a puzzling pattern observed there is that the DAB increases its share of seats while share of seats held by the Pro-Beijing Alliance steadily decreases. All in all, deeper analysis is necessary in order to comprehend the party system of Hong Kong and to find out if the opposition Alliance is related somehow to this weird pattern.

Another case well falling into this pattern is Malaysia. Barisan Nasional⁶ had the same, in the sense of size, decline as the Taiwanese Kuomintang⁷, however, it encountered not just a decline but a sound crash from around 90% of seats to less than 60% during the last two electoral cycles. This is still a legislative majority and such a short period does not allow for making any long-time predictions so far. However, even without this rapid decrease the trend of Barisan Nasional demonstrates a tendency towards unsteady, but still a decline. Another interesting feature of the Malay party system is that both political mainstream and opposition compete in form of coalitions. Each coalition resembles a consolidated party itself, however, each has a leading party. In case of Barisan Nasional, the leading party is the United Malays National Organization⁸ (UMNO) which is the largest party in the predominant coalition by the impressive margin. UMNO appeared and was competing even before the independence of Malaysia, already being the part of coalition. Opposition coalition, Pakatan Harapan⁹ (The Hope's Pact) is led by the Democratic Action Party¹⁰ (DAP) which appeared and entered the competition much earlier than the coalition.

⁶ Barisan Nasional

⁷ Zhōngguó Guómín Dǎng

⁸ Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu

⁹ Pakatan Harapan

¹⁰ Parti Tindakan Demokratik

South Korea is another fitting example of the struggle by the predominant party that barely maintains around 50% of seats against opposition. The predominant Saenuri¹¹ lost to its long-time competitor – Democratic Party¹² – the majority in parliament by just one seat in 2016. The problem there is that Saenuri allowed for appearance of another opposition party – People’s party – which has won coalition potential and is hardly imaginable in coalition with Saenuri itself. And now, when the President affiliated with Saenuri went under impeachment and the candidate from Democratic Party is very likely to win according to opinion polls in South Korea, Saenuri might follow the path of Kuomintang. It is necessary to point out that Saenuri, even if winning legislative elections most of the times, rarely held an absolute majority in the parliament.

There is the most dramatic decline in share of seats demonstrated by the Taiwanese Kuomintang. This is the example of how the share of seats of around 90% tells us nothing about future patterns of seats distribution in a given parliament. During 2000s Kuomintang managed not to just undermine its overwhelming dominance, but to lose parliamentary majority to the major opposition party. Therefore, Taiwan is an exceptionally fitting case for the main pattern of interest of this research that is stabilization and institutionalization of the major opposition party to the extent where it not just challenges the pre- dominant party from time to time, but insistently pushes it down to the minority position. Taking misfortune of Kuomintang into account, I cannot just disregard Singapore into the group of one- and no-party systems.

¹¹Saenuri

¹²Deobureo Minjudang

3.1.2 Other cases: young party system of Cambodia, electoral fraud in Thailand, stability and adaptability in Japan

It is difficult to make any preliminary conclusions on the development of the party systems of Cambodia and Thailand for the shortage of elections since the foundation of the predominant party in Cambodia and constant problems of Thai predominant party with the constitutional law. Last elections demonstrate the decline in the share of seats by Cambodian Peoples' Party¹³, however it did not strip the party from its absolute legislative majority. Moreover, the overall trend, so far, is towards the steady increase. In case of Thailand, Thai Rak Thai¹⁴ continues working under the name Pheu Thai Party (which is the third label of this party), however, its current position is unclear due to 2014 Thai general elections that were declared illegitimate by the King. Thai Rak Thai went through official ban for the violation of electoral laws, re-branded itself into People's Power Party. This party was again dissolved by the decision of the Constitutional law for electoral fraud ten years later. It won the last legitimate elections in 2011 under the new label of Pheu Thai Party¹⁵, however, its further path is to be observed outside of legislative elections for there was none of those held in Thailand since 2014. Another interesting feature of the Thai party system is that the parties which are now in opposition to different incarnations of Thai Rak Thai had entered the electoral competition much earlier. In the absence of Thai Rak Thai, legislative elections in Thailand are competitive multi-party elections of three-four parties winning seats in comparable shares. When Thai Rak Thai enters the competition, it wins by the large margin.

¹³ Kanakpak Pracheachon Kâmpuchea

¹⁴ Phak Thai Rak Thai

¹⁵ Phak Phuea Thai

Finally, there is the case of Japan which is exceptional because of the longest duration of democracy in the region, on the one hand, and the longest duration of the predominant party's dominance. The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan¹⁶ won by absolute majority in 15 out of 26 legislative elections held in the country. Even without absolute majority it maintained control over government with the disruptions only in 1993 and 2008. The interesting observation is that there is a well- institutionalized major opposition party – Democratic Party¹⁷ – which is in its different variations just as old as the LDP. Japanese party system is an outstanding example of how in an acknowledged established democracy well-institutionalized major opposition party very rarely challenges the predominant party.

The eight party systems presented above provide me with the variety on both possible causes and the observed outcomes of the struggle of political opposition against the predominant party. There are systems which possess the predominant parties of the various degrees of electoral success, but there is no major opposition party (Cambodia, Singapore, partly Thailand, for it has four stable opposition parties). There is Japan that has major opposition party which appeared very late and won one elections out of seven where it participated, which does not look impressive in comparison with the predominant LDP that lost only two elections out of twenty-six. The same goes for Malaysia, which possesses not only the major opposition party, but the whole opposition alliance which, however, cannot win over the predominant party and the predominant coalition. There are South Korea and Taiwan where predominant parties seem to finally have lost to their counterparts. Finally, there is a strange party system of Hong Kong that has the predominant party with the ridiculously small share of seats which, however, keeps improving its performance. At the same time Hong Kong has stable alliances with the opposite

¹⁶ Jiyū-Minshutō

¹⁷ Minshintō

trends in distribution of seats. The alliance headed by predominant party gives up on more and more seats for the benefit of the opposition alliance.

3.2 Electoral patterns for the second-largest parties

Theoretically the decrease of parliamentary seat shares by dominant parties does not imply by itself that there occurs an emergence of the major opposition party. Seats might be taken by several smaller parties, which can be stable or can be unstable and constantly replacing each other. If this is the case, then the decrease in seat share by the predominant party is produced by electoral volatility. Then, loss in seat shares by the predominant party does not mean neither relaxation of party system permissiveness, nor democratization of political system overall. Several stable minor parties might signal of the transition towards multi-party system or the cartelization of legislature. The impact to democratic development, therefore, depends on the nature of relationship between predominant parties and minor parties – if there is a real political opposition in minor parties. The case of one second-largest party cannot be acknowledged as ultimately univocal. In theory, there are no obstacles for the second-largest party to form a governing coalition with the predominant party. This research's interest are major opposition parties, which do not cooperate with predominant parties. However, in order to locate such parties, it is necessary, first, to trace seat shares dynamics by the second-largest parties for the twelve cases of this research. In order to account for the disproportionality of electoral laws and evaluate the real performance of the opposition parties, I trace both votes and seats distribution for these parties.

3.2.1 From emergence to challenging: Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan

Following the structure of previous sections, I start with the eight party systems with the predominant party. The surprising fact about Singaporean party system is that there is a major

opposition party that participates in elections since the first elections after gaining independence from Malaysia in 1968. Workers' Party's¹⁸ share of votes varies from 3% up to almost 20%, however, its share of parliamentary seats stays very modest. Another observation is that this modest share keeps growing since 2011. Additionally, since 2011 Workers' Party is the only party left that keeps winning seats except for the predominant People's Action Party. On the graph it is evident that there are discrepancies in the trends of votes and seats percentages. Workers' Party got a seat when it won only 3% of votes and did not get even a single seat when its vote share was around 12%. This is a preliminary empirical evidence for the sustenance of the hypothesis on the impact of electoral rules since such discrepancies could be produced only by the very disproportionate electoral laws that, moreover, seem to be changing from cycle to cycle.

Malaysia, first, is another case of frequent re-branding of the opposition party. Another particular feature is the form of coalition. Currently Pakatan Harapan as well the leading party (DAP) itself demonstrates stable increase in both votes and seats shares. However, this increase is observed only for the period of the coalition's existence. DAP by itself had stable increase in votes percentage that, nevertheless, stayed very modest in comparison with both Barisan Nasional and its leading party, the UMNO. Moreover, it was translated into seats just as inadequately as the already discussed cases demonstrate. Therefore, I again observe the evidence for the disproportionality of the electoral system, favoring predominant party and its coalition. Particularly interesting historical feature of the Malay major opposition party is that it was founded 1965 by the members of People's Action Party which was dissolved in Malaysia

¹⁸ Gōngrén Dǎng

and with its leader, Lee Kuan Yew eventually moved to Singapore where it became the predominant party.

Democratic Party of Korea (Minjoo) is a complicated case to grasp when talking about its foundation year. This party goes through merges and re-brandings almost each electoral cycle (by the way, just like the predominant Saenuri does). Its beginning can be traced to the elections of 1996 when it was called National Congress for New Politics and won 26% of the legislature. It stayed the major opposition party for all elections since 1996 except for the 2004, when part of this party competed as an independent party and won short-lived rule in the parliament. After that, Minjoo stably increases its share of both votes and seats. In 2016 it defeated predominant Saenuri (after presidential impeachment of 2017 re-branded as Liberty Korea Party) and held both legislature and presidency.

The overwhelming parliamentary dominance by the Taiwanese Kuomintang had continued up to 1989. In 1986 Democratic Progressive Party¹⁹ (DPP) derived from the oppositional political movement that existed under the name of Tangwai or “outside-of-Kuomintang”. Right away it won 21 seats out 130 and that was only the beginning of the dramatic path for the Kuomintang. Next elections doubled DPP’s share of seats. Currently it is a ruling party dominating both the Legislative Yuan and Taiwanese presidency. Taiwanese case again presents the discrepancy between votes and seats distribution, though, it is evident only for one elections of 2008. This year was the year of the massive electoral reform, which reduced twice the size of the parliament, introducing 73 seats for the single-member districts and 34 seats for proportional representation. DPP lost heavily to Kuomintang that year, however, quickly recovered and soundly defeated Kuomintang in the 2016 elections.

¹⁹ Míngzhǔ Jìnbù Dǎng

3.2.2 Decline of opposition: Hong Kong and Japan

As it was discussed above, in Hong Kong the predominant Pro-Beijing Alliance demonstrates slight but stable decline, while DAB, the party that leads this alliance, to the contrary, noticeably increases its share of seats. It was expected to have the opposite situation for the Pan-Democratic Alliance of opposition parties and its leading Democratic party²⁰. However, Pan-Democratic Alliance does not demonstrate the increase neither in votes, nor in seat share. It is a puzzle so far, where the seats lost by the predominant alliance and never picked up by the opposition alliance go. Perhaps, it can be somehow explained with the particularities of the electoral system. Another significant trend is that the decline in disproportionality of electoral system is observed concerning both opposition alliance and major opposition party. For the last elections of 2016 the percentages of votes gained and seats won are identical. However, this is the phenomenon of the last electoral cycle. Overall, Pro-Beijing coalition gets majority in parliament even if it has soundly lost in votes gained. This can be caused by the distribution of legislative seats via two different ways of voting – in geographical and functional constituencies. If Pan-Democratic coalition stably wins majority in geographical constituencies, it almost does not get seats in functional constituencies. It is to be discussed further what weight is put into votes in different types of constituencies. The preliminary conclusion is that the electoral system of Hong Kong used to largely benefit Pro-Beijing coalition up to the last electoral cycle.

Japanese opposition party emerged very late in comparison with the predominant LDP. Before 1996 LDP successfully formed ruling coalitions with the second-largest parties or even assimilated them. In 1996 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) entered the electoral competition

²⁰ Mảnh jỵú dống

winning 10% of seats. It won an absolute majority in 2009 which was the only occasion when it managed to outperform LDP. Figure 2.2.8 demonstrates that the number of seats that DPJ won in that election is substantially larger than the number of votes that it gained. Therefore, the preliminary conclusion can be made that DPJ benefited from some changes in electoral system which unexpectedly provided advantage to the opposition. Although this victory was short-lived, DPJ stays the second-largest party by the impressive margin even if it constantly loses to the predominant party.

3.2.3 Young and promising Cambodia and almost multiparty Thailand

Cambodian party system dynamics demonstrate the unusual for the region case of proportionality of party system towards opposition party. Cambodian National Rescue Party²¹ (CNRP) demonstrated unprecedented take-off during the last electoral cycle. However, even before that, CNRP was winning identical shares of votes and parliamentary seats. Gain in seats is similar in size to the loss by the predominant CPP. These two parties are ahead of all other parties by the large margin, however, it seems unreasonable to make conclusions on the dynamics, since the number of elections held in Cambodia is insufficient so far. The analysis of the outlined causes would allow for more confident inferences from the data.

Surprisingly low level of disproportionality towards the second-largest party is demonstrated by the Thai party system. Democrat Party²² performs more or less stably within such a volatile party system. Thailand is an exceptional case because it could be a proper multi-party system if not for the regular violation of electoral law by the different incarnations of Thai Rak Thai which allow for their spectacular victories. When Thai Rak Thai is legally dissolved,

²¹ Kuəŋ paʔ saŋkruəh ciət

²² Phak Prachathipat

Thai party system works as a multi-party system. Democrat party is the oldest political party in Thailand, it started competing right after democracy introduction in the country. With the exception of Thai Rak Thai, can Democrat be called a predominant party? I assume, that this is not the case. Democrat party is the only rival to Thai Rak Thai, when it participates in elections. However, if Thai Rak Thai does not participate, the elections for at least three different parties seem to be fair and competitive. Thai case definitely needs further elaboration from the perspective of the hypotheses suggested by this research.

3.3 Do multi-party systems fit?

This section is to check if four multi-party systems of the region fit into the sample for my research. There are already eight systems with the predominant party. However, if I include into sample party systems where the predominant party is losing its dominance, I have to look at party systems where the predominant party might have already lost. Multi-party systems of East and Southeast Asia hold this potential, therefore, the history of their party systems should be traced back till the beginning of their sovereignty in case of existence of dominant parties that did not maintain dominance. This is of particular relevance for this research, since I am looking for the factors of opposition parties' emergence. If there were such cases in current multi-party systems of the region they cannot be disregarded by my sampling. So, this section is on party systems of East Timor, Indonesia, Mongolia and the Philippines and serves the purpose of possible enlarging the sample with the relevant cases from this group.

East Timor, so far, has a very short history of legislative elections. Out of three parliamentary elections held in East Timor, FRETILIN²³ (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) won one elections with an absolute majority. That was the first East

²³ Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente

Timorese elections after gaining independence from Portugal. Moreover, those elections of 2001 were the only one in the history of independent East Timor where one party managed to get an absolute majority. In addition, it is important to mention that FRETILIN is a nation-building party like Taiwanese Kuomintang. It is the successor of the resistance movement against Portuguese and then Indonesian protectorate. In 2007 National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction²⁴ (CNRT) was founded. It won both elections since then, but without the absolute majority. Therefore, East Timorese party system holds the potential of development into the party system with the predominant party as well as into the two-party system. Three electoral cycle are definitely not sufficient to derive the conclusion. Therefore, the qualitative analysis of the conditions of the major opposition party emergence is expected to provide a knowledge on what is going to be the vector of further development.

Different situation is observed in Mongolia. The Mongolian People's Party²⁵ (MPP) competes with varied success in legislative elections since 1992 (the year of current Mongolian Constitution introduction). Sometimes it holds more than 90% of seats, sometimes it becomes an opposition. The interesting feature of this party system is that two major parties of Mongolia, MPP and Democratic Party,²⁶ formed coalition government when they shared the parliament seats in comparable share. However, after the introduction of new electoral law in 2012 that amended proportional representation part of the elections, MPP won 65 out of 76 seats. Overall, the noticeable disproportionality of electoral system for the benefit of MPP is observed for the third time already. In case of the Democratic Party the votes are translated into seats more or less proportionally. The exception is the elections of 2016 when the Democratic Party won more than 30% of votes, however, got only tenth part of the parliament. Yet, it is unclear if the

²⁴ Congresso Nacional de Reconstrução de Timor

²⁵ Mongol Ardīn Nam

²⁶ Ardchilsan Nam

re-emergence of predominant party is observed or if Democratic Party will now turn into the major opposition party. According to Duverger's Law, the majoritarian electoral system that now works in Mongolia could help the emergence of two major parties not as coalition partners as it used to be, but as counterparts to each other. This is way the Mongolian case is interesting and relevant.

The case of Indonesia is problematic because for my sample these party systems are relevant which do not legally ban the majority of parties from the competition. Indonesian Golkar²⁷ (the Party of the Functional Groups) used to dominate Indonesian party system from 1973 to 1999 under the New Order regime. During that period, only two other parties were allowed to formally compete against Golkar, but its reign stayed undisrupted till 1999. After this Golkar continues successfully competing against another major party that emerged in 1999 right after the end of the New Order – PDI-P²⁸ (Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle) – as well as all the other parties of Indonesian multi-party system. So, Indonesia so far can be labeled as an example of the party system where system with the predominant party that gave in for the multi-party system. It can be said that predominance of Golkar was by law, not by electoral competition. However, the emergence of PDI-P can be labeled as an emergence of the major opposition party, especially, considering that it continued to compete as one of the allowed parties even under the New Order. Another point worth of mentioning is that even under the New Order the percentage of votes and the share of parliamentary seats won by parties is almost identical. This holds for both the predominant and the second-largest parties.

²⁷ Partai Golongan Karya

²⁸ Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan

The Philippines is another fitting example of how predominant party lost its position. Nacionalista²⁹ Party brought the Philippines throughout the most part of the 20th century. It still operates, however does not compete for the predominant position. During Marcos' autocracy KBL³⁰ (New Society Movement) overtook the position of the predominant party (1978-1987). Lakas-CMD³¹ (Lakas – Cristian Muslim Democrats) was founded in 1991 and since 1995 legislative elections up till 2013 it had been winning elections and forming governing coalitions. In 2013 it was beaten by the Liberals³², then again in 2016. The two parties had been forming the opposing each other blocks since 1990s. During the last electoral cycle, PDP-Laban³³ (Philippine Democratic Party – Laban) brought puzzling changes into the party system of the Philippines. Their candidate, Rodrigo Duterte, won presidential elections and saw to making agreements with the other parties.

Currently PDP-Laban holds the plurality in the parliament after the majority of the elected members from the Liberals abandoned their own party for PDP-Laban. Moreover, PDP-Laban, having performed rather poorly in the elections, signed lots of coalition agreements with all more or less large parties which members were elected in 2016. The situation is further complicated by the fact that all parties under the label of Laban, including PDP-Laban, were traditionally considered as a democratic opposition throughout the Philippine history. Therefore, the Philippines as well is relevant for my sample for it even if it demonstrates the transition from the system with the predominant party to the multi-party system in elections, the predominant party seems to grasp the real political power securely. It is obvious that lots of essentially relevant things happen not during the elections but between them. Liberals won the majority in elections but gave it away to the party that won 3

²⁹ Partido Nasyonalista

³⁰ Kilusang Bagong Lipunan

³¹ Lakas-Demokratang Kristiyano at Muslim

³² Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas

³³ Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Laban

seats out of 297. The possibility that the Liberal party is the major opposition party is, thus, highly contested. The current predominant party is not clear neither.

It seems that I cannot disregard any of multi-party systems of East and Southeast Asia since they all provide relevant patterns of party systems' development. All of them either used to have a pre- dominant party, or still have it competing. Some of them hold potential of having major opposition party developing within a party system that is the main interest of this paper. Maximum variety on the outcome of interest, the emergence and stabilization of the major opposition party, as well as on theorized causes is to be maintained within this sample.

Chapter 4. Qualitative Comparative Analysis: When Challengers Emerge

This chapter presents the results for the crisp-set QCA. The analysis provides the key antecedents for second-largest parties in competitive regimes of East and Southeast Asia to turn or not to turn into viable challengers. I include all cases of the party system with the predominant party. Only three cases out of twelve currently do not possess viable challengers – Japan, the Philippines and Singapore, so I code the outcome for them as 0. Outcomes of all other cases are coded as 1. Crisp-set QCA is expected to send cases into groups with the similar critical antecedents leading to the similar outcomes. The analysis demonstrates that there is a solution that explains all outcomes in the sample. However, there is evidence that a group of poorer countries has an alternative solution. Overall, I get three simplified formulas which neatly describe the process of critical antecedents facilitating outcomes.

4.1 *Simplified solutions: what creates challengers?*

First, I put all theorized antecedents into the analysis. The truth table (see Table 1) demonstrates that each case has a unique combination of antecedents that contribute to an outcome. No grouping happened at this initial stage of the QCA.

Table 1. Truth table for the emergence and non-emergence of viable challengers

V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9	O	ID
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Philippines
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	Indonesia
0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	Cambodia
0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	East Timor
0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	Thailand

0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Mongolia
0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	Singapore
0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	Japan
0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Taiwan
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	South Korea
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	Malaysia
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Hong Kong

4.1.1 Parsimonious formula: predominant party's stance and opposition leadership

Boolean minimization of the number of combinations with removing repetitive and contradictory solutions provides me with one parsimonious formula for both the *outcome of 0*:

*Inflexibility of a predominant party {0} * Leader-based opposition {0}*

This a surprising finding. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the authors mention much more often obstacles in electoral system and system of government. However, QCA demonstrates that the predominant party's flexibility on essential political issues combined with the absence of a strong leader in opposition hinder the emergence of a viable challenger. The logical "AND" between these two conditions gives reasons to believe that for the outcome of 1 the presence of these two conditions with the logical "OR" between them might suffice.

Indeed, one of the formulas which QCA suggests as a solution for the *outcome of 1* is:

Inflexibility of a predominant party {1} + Leader-based opposition {1}

Logical "OR" between them signals that these conditions are sufficient separately.

The first part of the formula holds true for Cambodia, Hong Kong, East Timor, Malaysia, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The second part is true for Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia and South Korea (see Table 2).

Table 2. Explanatory formula for the emergence of viable challengers (1)

Antecedents	Explained cases	Coverage (raw)	Consistency
Inflexibility of a predominant party {1}	Cambodia, Hong Kong, East Timor, Malaysia, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand	0.66	1.0
Leader-based opposition {1}	Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, South Korea	0.5	1.0

Coverage by the formula: 1.0

Consistency of the formula: 1.0

While the assumption that flexibility of the predominant party is an obstacle for the major opposition to emerge is quite strong in existing theory (Duverger, 1959; Kraus & Pierre, 1990; Tarrow, 1990; Southern, 2016), the hypothesis on the impact of the strong personal leadership was not this straightforward. State of art on this matter does not provide me with the single assumption. There is an expectation, that personal leadership is a destabilizing factor, on the one hand (Randall and Svasand, 2002; Gomez, 2016), and, on the other hand, there is an expectation, that in new democracies opposition is easier to consolidate around strong and charismatic leader, since there is not enough experience in institutionalization and organization (Cooper, 2014; Southern, 2016).

4.1.2 Alternative formulas: personal leadership substitutes

QCA suggests four other formulas which explain the emergence of viable challengers in East and Southeast Asia. What is interesting is that *inflexibility of a predominant party* is present in all these formulas. The analysis offers four alternative substitutes for the strong personal leadership in opposition which was reviewed in detail in previous sub-section. All these four alternative solutions include duration of predominant party in power combined with three alternative variables via logical “AND”. The first alternative solution is:

$$\text{Inflexibility of a predominant party } \{1\} + \\ + 3/4 \text{ of legislative elections won by a predominant party } \{1\} * \text{Parliamentarism } \{0\}$$

Table 3. Explanatory formula for the emergence of viable challengers (2)

Antecedents	Explained cases	Coverage (raw)	Consistency
Inflexibility of a predominant party {1}	Cambodia, Hong Kong, East Timor, Malaysia, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand	0.88	1.0
¾ of legislative elections won by a predominant party {1} * Parliamentarism {0}	Indonesia, South Korea	0.22	1.0

Coverage by the formula: 1.0

Consistency of the formula: 1.0

The second part of the formula is true for Indonesia and South Korea. This formula again returns the viable challenger in all cases where it is present (see Table 3).

This solution contradicts the theoretical expectation derived from the literature reviewed for this research. The authors are unanimous that strong parliament is necessary for the opposition to have incentives to consolidate (Randall & Svasand, 2002; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Omar, 2008). In turn, the analysis provides an evidence that semi-presidential and presidential systems being combined with a long-time duration of a predominant party can sometimes produce viable challenger. The possible explanation is that in case of weak legislative branch the incumbent in government does not really care of viable challengers in parliament. They cannot threaten ruling party, which is why they are allowed into legislature.

However, the coverage of this combination by itself is low. Moreover, South Korea is covered by both parts of the formula connected by the logical “OR”, which means that it might be explained by the inflexibility of the predominant party exclusively. This solution, so far, explains only the emergence of the viable challenger in Indonesia.

The second alternative solution is:

$$\text{Inflexibility of a predominant party } \{1\} + \\ + 3/4 \text{ of legislative elections won by a predominant party } \{1\} * \text{Economic growth } \{0\}$$

Table 4. Explanatory formula for the emergence of viable challengers (3)

Antecedents	Explained cases	Coverage (raw)	Consistency
Inflexibility of a predominant party {1}	Cambodia, Hong Kong, East Timor, Malaysia, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand	0.88	1.0
3/4 of legislative elections won by a predominant party {1} * Economic growth {0}	Indonesia, South Korea	0.22	1.0

Coverage by the formula: 1.0

Consistency of the formula: 1.0

Surprisingly, it returns exactly the same groups of explained cases (see Table 4). The outcome in Indonesia can also be explained by the lack of economic growth before the viable challenger emerged. However, it seems that more important antecedent for Indonesia is the long-time history of the predominant party's rule. The next alternative formula gives additional evidence to this conclusion:

$$\text{Inflexibility of a predominant party } \{1\} + \\ + 3/4 \text{ of legislative elections won by a predominant party } \{1\} * \text{High GDP per capita } \{0\}$$

Table 5. Explanatory formula for the emergence of viable challengers (4)

Antecedents	Explained cases	Coverage (raw)	Consistency
Inflexibility of a predominant party {1}	Cambodia, Hong Kong, East Timor, Malaysia, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand	0.88	1.0
3/4 of legislative elections won by a predominant party {1} * High GDP per capita {0}	Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea	0.33	1.0

Coverage by the formula: 1.0

Consistency of the formula: 1.0

The second part of the formula can explain the emergence of the viable challengers in Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea (see Table 5). Malaysia and South Korea are covered by both parts of the formula, so they can be explained by both the inflexibility of the predominant parties and the combination of long-time rule by the predominant parties and low GDP per capita before the emergence of the viable challengers.

These two alternative formulas are consistent with the theoretical insights outlined in this thesis. The authors agree that the long duration of a predominant party in power can discourage opposition from trying to challenge the incumbent (Pempel, 1990). However, long reign by predominant party accompanied by poor economic performance can give opposition parties the reasons to act on it and appeal to the dissatisfied for a long time electorate (Kraus & Pierre, 1990).

The final explanatory formula that QCA returns is:

$$\begin{aligned} & \textit{Inflexibility of a predominant party } \{1\} + \\ & + \textit{3/4 of legislative elections won by a predominant party } \{1\} * \textit{recipient of large} \\ & \quad \textit{international aid } \{1\} \end{aligned}$$

Table 6. Explanatory formula for the emergence of viable challengers (5)

Antecedents	Explained cases	Coverage (raw)	Consistency
Inflexibility of a predominant party {1}	Cambodia, Hong Kong, East Timor, Malaysia, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand	0.88	1.0
3/4 of legislative elections won by a predominant party {1} * recipient of large international aid {1}	Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea	0.33	1.0

Coverage by the formula: 1.0

Consistency of the formula: 1.0

This formula returns exactly the same result as the previous one (see Table 6). This occurs because GDP per capita before the moment of a viable challenger emergence in a given country has perfect negative correlation with a given country being a recipient of international aid (see Table 1). Therefore, a viable challenger can emerge both from disappointment with a predominant party's economic performance and international efforts to facilitate democratization in a recipient country.

4.2 Interpretation of the results

The findings by csQCA do not fully confirm any of the hypotheses put forward by this research. The strongest evidence is found for Hypothesis 7 on the impact of the rigidity of a predominant party on an essential political issue. The variable of a predominant party's inflexibility is present in all explanatory formulas offered by csQCA and holds true for all cases which have viable challengers except for Indonesia. DPP in Taiwan and Pan-Democratic Alliance consolidate themselves around political agendas limiting the influence of Mainland China. Minjoo in South Korea that managed to win over the predominant Saenuri promotes dialog with North Korea. Opposition parties in Malaysia were basically forced into coalition by

the disadvantageous formation of electoral districts set up by Barisan Nasional. CNRP in Cambodia and Democratic Party in Mongolia promote economic liberalization. Policies offered by CNRT in East Timor go beyond struggle for independence promoted by FREITILIN. Democrat Party in Thailand has much better elaborated and inclusive program than populist Thai Rak Thai (Croissant & Volkel, 2012).

The only case which is not covered by this variable is Indonesia. Golkar was making concessions to opposition even during the authoritarian New Order era allowing for competition. This case is included in explanatory formulas only with additional antecedents which are not necessary for all other cases. They are neatly grouped by the inflexibility of a predominant party into two group compatible with the outcome. The case of Indonesia requires alternative solutions and additional factors.

The first of these additional variables is a leader-based opposition. Despite the fact that most research considers personal leadership as a destabilizing factor, csQCA provides evidence that the presence of a strong leader who either founded the party or whose party is associated mainly with them explains the transformation of a second-largest party into a viable challenger.

The second variable which turned out to be influential is the long-time history of a predominant party's rule. However, the impact is reversed. The analysis demonstrates that if a predominant party won $\frac{3}{4}$ of legislative elections or more, this, actually, does not discourage opposition parties from consolidation and competition. However, this holds true only if one of three other antecedents is present with the long reign by a predominant party which is not sufficient by itself. These antecedents are economic decline, general poverty of a country and acquisition of international aid before emergence of a viable challenger. The long reign of a predominant party contributes to a viable challenger emergence either if economic performance by a predominant party is poor, or if poverty and long duration of a single party attracted

attention of advanced democracies. Moreover, economic misfortunes do not become foundations for a viable challenger emergence if they are not aggravated by their persistence during the long-time predominant party's reign.

In turn, the absence of a viable challenger is explained by only one solution based on variables analysed. For a viable challenger not to emerge the combination of two conditions is necessary – inflexible predominant party and leader-based opposition. If, at least, one of these conditions is present, a viable challenger will emerge. This means that the conditions for a second-largest party to never become a viable challenger are much stricter than the conditions for it to cross this threshold. A broader variety of the sets of antecedents which contribute to a viable challenger emergence is a promising conclusion for an opposition development. This conclusion means that, overall, second-largest parties in East and Southeast Asia have more opportunities than obstacles to challenge predominant parties.

It is essential to mention that the very strong hypotheses in theory turned out to be irrelevant according to the analysis. These variables are electoral system and overall level of democratisation. Some speculations can be offered to explain these unexpected conclusions. The electoral system might be not relevant for East and Southeast Asia due to power concentrations in other centres outside of a legislature. Clientelist and Personalist tendencies can tug attention from electoral rules since the real goal of political parties is not a competition in a legislature, but presidency or positions in government, for instance. As for the overall democracy level, the coexistence of predominant parties and democratic or successfully democratizing regimes was identified by Pempel (1990) as the unique phenomenon of the region. This explanation also seems plausible for opposition parties. If presence of predominant parties in the region is uncorrelated with the level of democracy, this might imply, that emergence of viable challenger does not depend on democratic performance as well.

Conclusion

The goal of this thesis was to identify the causal conditions for the transformation of the second-largest parties in East and Southeast Asia into the viable challengers to the predominant parties in the region. The theory provided nine promising independent variables: 1) electoral system, 2) economic growth, 3) GDP per capita, 4) system of government, 5) strong personal leadership, 6) duration of a predominant party in power, 7) flexibility of a predominant party, 8) international aid, 9) overall level of democratisation and liberalisation.

In order to discover critical antecedents for viable challengers' emergence crisp-set QCA was conducted. Inflexibility of a predominant party turned out to have the greatest explanatory power. It is present in all solutions suggested by the csQCA and explains the emergence of viable challengers in Cambodia, Hong Kong, East Timor, Malaysia, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Indonesia is not covered by this variable, however, the emergence of the viable challenger there can be explained via other variables or combinations of variables. One such alternative variable is a leader-based opposition (which can explain outcomes in Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia and South Korea). These two variables are sufficient on their own.

Four following constellations of causal conditions include duration of a predominant party in power, however, this variable is never sufficient by itself. The csQCA suggests four possible partners for this variable. The first is parliamentarism, which combined with long-time rule by a predominant party explains outcomes in Indonesia and South Korea. The second alternative partner is economic decline (the combination explains outcomes in Indonesia and South Korea). The third is low GDP per capita (the combination explains results for Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea). Finally, substantial international aid combined with long duration

of a predominant party in power can explain the emergence of viable challengers in Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea.

While inflexibility of predominant parties is a commonly mentioned factor encouraging opposition (Duverger, 1959; Kraus & Pierre, 1990; Tarrow, 1990; Greene, 2002; Southern, 2016), the conclusion on a positive impact of a strong personal leadership in opposition diverges from most of the insights provided by the theory which state that personal leadership is a destabilizing factor (Randall & Svasand, 2002; Gomez 2016). The interpretation can be derived from Southern's (2014) and Cooper's (2016) assumptions that parties in new democracies do not possess enough experience in institutionalization, therefore, strong leadership is essential for such parties to consolidate. The impact of parliamentarism again is also inconsistent with the theory. A vast body of academic scholarship states that a weak legislative branch will discourage opposition from competition (Randall & Svasand, 2002; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Omar, 2008). However, surprisingly, the analysis returns that a weak parliament can sometimes explain the emergence of a viable challenger. It can be explained with the lack of incentives of ruling parties to prevent opposition from challenging them in a legislature, if this legislature cannot hold a government and a president accountable. Economic performance, as well as receiving international aid, combined with a long duration of a predominant party in power seems logical and is consistent with the theory. Either the opposition will appeal to a long-dissatisfied electorate, or international actors will make an effort to democratize the recipients of their aid.

What is interesting, is that non-emergence of a viable challenger can be explained for this sample only by the first two variables – inflexibility of a predominant party and leader-based opposition if both of these causal conditions are absent. Therefore, for Japan, the Philippines and Singapore, where there are no viable challengers the absence of these two conditions is necessary.

These solutions might work for countries with predominant parties outside of the region. It is essential to remember that the twelve cases used for this research cover a very small part of possible combinations of variables which could explain the outcome. The only opportunity to cover more logical remainders is to include more cases into the sample, which means going beyond East and Southeast Asia, countries which are unique for their long-time cooperation of democratic regimes and predominant parties. This issue is directly connected to a problem of the information loss by dichotomization. Perhaps, multi value or fuzzy-set QCA will provide more precise constellations of antecedents. However, if the number of combinations is substantially increased, the problem of insufficient coverage by the cases will be even more aggravated.

There are two disconfirmed hypotheses which were commonly offered by the academic scholarship: impact of the electoral system and impact of the overall level of democracy. Still, it is possible to somehow explain the irrelevance of electoral system with the concentration of political power in alternative centres outside of a parliament. Those might be presidency or prime ministry, for instance, which serve as real goals of parties. The irrelevance of the overall level of democracy was mentioned by Pempel (1990) as a unique feature of East and Southeast Asia where predominant parties do not intervene with democratization

Overall, the results of the research present an optimistic conclusion in terms of democratisation and political competition. The second-largest parties have more opportunities to turn into viable challengers than to never cross the threshold. This means that the region has a potential for party system transformation into more democratic and competitive forms.

Appendix

Appendix 1. Table 7. The viable challenger emergence. Time periods³⁴

Party system	Period of contested elections	Political regime	Viable challenger? (+ notes)
Cambodia	1946 – 1955 1993 – 2017	1947 – 1993 – Authoritarian 1993 – 1995 Open anocracy 1995 – 2000 Autocracy 2000 – 2017 Open anocracy (FH: Not free)	<u>2013 – 2017</u> (founded in 1995) Became a viable challenger after merging with the minor Human Rights Party the mere sum in votes with which still would not create a viable challenger
East Timor	2002 - 2017	Democracy FH: partly free	<u>2007 - 2017</u> However, CNRT is the part of the governing coalition with the predominant party FRETILIN – not a challenger?
Hong Kong	1997 - 2017 CEU eTD Collection	Democracy (not-sovereign)	<u>Party: 2004 – 2012</u> <u>Alliance: 1997 – 2017</u> Since 1997 Democrats have been winning both more votes and seats. In 2004 Democrats won more votes than DAB, but lost in

³⁴ For this table the data is derived from Freedom in the World and Polity IV datasets, NECs websites, NELDA dataset, EveryPolitician website and IFES website.

			number of the seats. Between 2004 and 2012 had been losing both in votes and seats but maintained the gap with DAB smaller than with the third party. Since 2012 stopped being the viable challenger, sharing the position with Civics (same Alliance) and losing the gap with minor parties. In 2016 mixed with minor parties, even if still being the second-largest party in seats. However, the Pan-Democratic Alliance stays a viable challenger.
Indonesia	1955 – (1971) 1966 – 2000 (but only 3 other parties were allowed under the New Order) 2000-2017	1946 – 1953 open anocracy 1953 – 1966 closed anocracy 1966 – 1999 autocracy 1999 – 2017 democracy FH: partly free	<u>1999 – 2017</u> In 2009 both Golkar and PDI-P lost to the Democrats. In 2014 PDI-P won elections pushing Golkar out of my definition for the viable challenger. Next elections are in 2019.
Japan	1946-2017 CEU eTD Collection	democracy FH: free	1946 – 1949 – multiparty system Since 1949 – dominance of LDP and its predecessors. <u>1955</u> the challenger (Liberal party), however, the same year was merged into the LDP. <u>1958</u> , 1960 - 1993 Japanese Socialist Party was a second-largest party by the substantial margin from all other parties. However, its gap from LDP was even larger. In 1993 JSP managed to become a part of the governing 8-parties' opposition coalition (none of those parties was a viable challenger). By the elections of 1996 the party has been split into multiple parts. Some joined ruling coalition,

			<p>some formed Democratic Party of Japan that became the third viable challenger</p> <p><u>1996</u> New Frontier Party was dissolved right after this elections, in 1997. Most of MPs joined DPJ.</p> <p><u>2000 – 2012</u></p> <p>In 2009 Democrats finally won the elections with the margin of around 8% to LDP. However, in the next election they stopped being the viable challenger, even if it still does not mix with the minor parties in its proportion of votes.</p>
Malaysia	1959 - 2017	<p>1959 – 1965 democracy</p> <p>1965 – 2017 open anocracy FH: partly free</p>	<p>The calculation is complicated by the fact that there is no information on UMNO's share of votes, only on BN's, which complicates the comparison of its votes to those of the non-allied parties.</p> <p><u>1999</u>, <u>2008</u> – viable challenging Alliance (informal), including parties which never became viable challengers on their own even just to UMNO</p> <p><u>2013</u> – opposition Alliance won more of popular votes, however, much less seats than the predominant Alliance.</p>
Mongolia	1990-2017 CEU eTD Collection	<p>1924 – 1990 autocracy</p> <p>1990 – 2017 democracy FH: free</p>	<p>1996 – Democratic Union Coalition outperformed the predominant MPRP</p> <p>2004 – Motherland Democratic Coalition repeated the success of the opposition</p> <p>both coalitions included Democratic party that became a viable challenger in the next elections</p> <p><u>2008 – 2017</u></p>

			<p>In 2008 DP won the elections which brought radical change of the electoral laws by the predominant party, making the electoral system purely majoritarian in order to eliminate minor parties. However, it brought MPP (ex-MPRP) back to dominance, reducing DP to minor parties with barely any seats. Still, DP stays the viable challenger in votes, losing to MPP only 12%.</p>
The Philippines	<p>(1941)</p> <p>CEU eTD Collection</p>	<p>1945 – 1971 Open anocracy 1971 – 1987 Autocracy 1990 – 2015 Democracy FH: partly free</p>	<p><u>1946 – 1957</u> major opposition party (Liberal) appeared in 1946 as the liberal wing of then the predominant Nationalista and becomes the viable challenger to it. Despite of gaining less votes, it won more seats than Nationalista. In 1949 Liberals won in both votes and seats.</p> <p><u>1961 – 1978</u> In 1961 Liberals lost to Nationalista but had both the President and the Vice-President. In 1965 won parliamentary elections, however lost main executive positions (the beginning of Marcos).</p> <p>1978-1987 – Marcos’ KBL predominance. Emergence of PDP-Laban (current predominant party). Liberals boycott the elections.</p> <p>1987 – 1995 – multiparty system</p> <p>1991 – the emergence of Lakas-CMD – third predominant party</p> <p>2001- 2007 – no data on votes percentages. Looks like NPC was the viable challenger, perhaps they were closer to the third-largest Liberals, than to Lakas-CMD. This cannot be clarified with my data.</p> <p><u>2013-2016</u> – Liberals win the parliamentary elections, by the large (for the Philippines) margin with no viable challengers to them. However, most of their MPs joined PDP-Laban right after the 2016 elections giving it the majority in the parliament.</p>

Singapore	<p>(1951) 1965-2017</p> <p>In 1965 Singapore became a sovereign state</p> <p>In 1980 opposition boycotted the elections</p>	<p>1965-2017</p> <p>Closed anocracy</p> <p>FH: partly free</p>	<p>1951 – 1955 – multiparty system</p> <p><u>1963</u> – Barisan Sosialis – left-wing party that was further merged into the current second-largest Workers’ Party</p> <p>Even if the proportion of the votes given to WP slowly but steadily grows, the margin between WP and PAP is usually around 50% of all voters.</p> <p>Therefore, there was no viable challenger during the sovereign history of Singapore.</p>
South Korea	<p>1948 – 2017</p> <p>*contested elections did not stop during the rule of the Park’s military junta</p> <p>CEU eTD Collection</p>	<p>1946 – 1960</p> <p>Closed anocracy</p> <p>1961 – democracy</p> <p>1961 – 1965</p> <p>Autocracy</p> <p>1965 -1973</p> <p>Open anocracy</p> <p>1971 – 1981</p> <p>Autocracy</p> <p>1981 -1990</p> <p>Closed anocracy</p> <p>1990 – 2017</p> <p>democracy</p>	<p>1948 – 1954 – multiparty system</p> <p><u>1958</u> – Democratic party became the viable challenger and in <u>1960</u> won the election by the large margin, maintaining power only for 1 year, before being overthrown, reconstituted, became a minor party and merged with another minor party</p> <p>1963 – the current predominant party was founded as a support for the military junta regime</p> <p><u>1967 – 1980</u> New Democratic Party. In 1978 won the parliamentary elections. In 1980 was dissolved due to major internal disagreements over Park’s changes to the Constitution</p> <p><u>1985</u> – New Korea Democratic Party founded by the leaders of the New Democratic Party (Kim Dae Jung)</p> <p><u>1992</u> – Democratic Party (again, kim Dae Jung)</p> <p><u>1996-2000</u> National Congress for New Politics (in 2000 Millenium Democratic Party) (Kim Dae Jung), so, I refer to all the opposition variations just like I refer to the predominant party’ variations – as the one party under different names. 1997 – 2008 – opposition manages to have their candidates elected for the presidency.</p>

			<p>2004 – both the predominant and the major opposition party lost to the Uri party – which was a splitter from the major opposition party</p> <p><u>2008 – 2017</u></p> <p>In 2016 the major opposition party under the name of Minjoo won the parliamentary elections. In 2017 they have their candidate elected for the presidency</p>
Taiwan	<p>1972 – 2017</p> <p>However, up to 1989 no other party except for KMT was getting more than 1 seat.</p>	<p>1949 – 1986</p> <p>autocracy</p> <p>1987 – 1991</p> <p>closed anocracy</p> <p>1992 – 1995</p> <p>open anocracy</p> <p>1996 – 2017</p> <p>democracy</p> <p>FH: free</p>	<p>1989 – DPP – current second-largest party was founded</p> <p>1992 – 2017 In 2001 DPP won parliamentary elections, however, their coalition lost to KMT-led coalition. The same happened for 2004 elections. DPP won both parliamentary and presidential elections in 2016</p>
Thailand	<p>1957 – 2014</p> <p>*elections in 2006 were boycotted by all parties except for the predominant TRT no acknowledged elections since 2011. Since 2014</p>	<p>1946 – 1960</p> <p>closed anocracy</p> <p>1960 – 1980</p> <p>Autocracy with take-offs towards open anocracy, however, very short-lived</p> <p>1980 – 1991</p> <p>open anocracy</p>	<p>Up to 2001 multiparty system</p> <p><u>2001</u> – Democrat party – one of the parties of the previous multiparty system becomes a viable challenger. All other parties become minor. In 2005 Democrats become minor party as well.</p> <p><u>2007 – 2011</u> – Democrat party</p>

	Thailand is ruled by the military junta	1992 closed anocracy 1994 – 2004 democracy 2005 – 2008 closed anocracy 2008 – 2011 open anocracy 2014 – 2017 autocracy FH: not free	
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Appendix 2. Table 8. Factors contributing to the viable challenger emergence

Factors contributing to the viable challenger emergence	How exactly?	Cases	Authors
JSP – ideology in accordance with the demands of the society and development. Conservatism and socialism brought JSP to decline (Otake, 1990, pp.155-157). Then, salient issue prevented JSP from solidifying, but the same issue worked for LDP. So, solid ideology, platform, program. Time since communist threat?	Perhaps, LDP is challenged exactly by the same thing. Japan might long for political progress and conservatism becomes unsuitable at some moment in time? Indeed, conservative centrist oriented parties lose in the region (Korea, Taiwan). Most successful opposition parties are leftist. Perhaps, they needed a moment when fear of communism would fade away.	Japan (LDP vs JSP period)	Hideo Otake, 1990
Changing context – flexibility of the opposition party	Predominant party is unable of adapting its strategy pragmatically to changes. However, how to check for the flexibility of the opposition party if it never governed?		Duverger, 1959, p.312
Demographic changes in electorate, economic crisis, welfare and environmentalist demands	Opportunity to effectively criticize the government and gain electoral support from the newly formed groups of the electorate. So, overall, new issues and generational changes in electorate? +LDP is associated with the rapid economic growth and successful capitalism, so when the performance faltered, the support faltered as well. The particular stage in development when more left is necessary (like welfare and environment protection).	Japan	Ellis Kraus and Jon Pierre, 1990, pp. 233
Inflexibility of governing party on salient issue and its exclusiveness	If the predominant party is flexible, centrist, plural and inclusive enough it disarms the opposition that, therefore, has nothing to offer to the electorate (works for Japan, perhaps, for Singapore;	Italy	Sidney Tarrow, 1990,p.309

<p>*economic performance is not relevant (p.311)</p> <p>-> so, the “harder is the hegemony, the stronger is the possibility that the major opposition party will emerge.</p>	<p>harmed DPs in Taiwan and South Korea – Pro-Beijing and North Korean issues respectively).</p>		
<p>Majoritarian electoral system (like, fully majoritarian)</p>	<p>Proportional or partially proportional systems provide incentives for the minor opposition parties to compete by themselves since they have chances to get seats without making concessions to each other (again, Japan) + it legitimizes and democratizes x)</p>	<p>Italy</p>	<p>Giuseppe Di Palma, 1990</p>
<p>Overall democratization level advancement</p> <p>+ lesser duration of the predominant party</p> <p>+PR components in electoral systems again, multipartism (p.336)</p>	<p>One-party dominance is unusual and abnormal for advanced democracies. The demand for solid opposition would grow with the further democracy duration and development</p> <p>+ the longer the predominant party stays in power, the more it dominance seems to be “historically foreordained” (p.334) and voters internalize it (Singapore, but South Korea, Malaysia).</p> <p>+However, too much of proportionality allows for disintegration of the predominant party itself (p.339). Multipartism allows to rule with less than an absolute majority (ibid)</p>	<p>Japan + Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia</p>	<p>Pempel, 1990, p. 333 + Michael McFaul, 2005</p>
<p>Free market, capitalism, economic freedom -> some generous and independent from the state source of financial support</p>	<p>Large share of the state-owned business would deprive the major opposition from the sufficient financial support. Someone should be interested in financing strong and solid opposition which would be much more expensive than minor opposition parties</p>	<p>Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand</p>	<p>Richard Carney, 2015</p>
<p>Parliamentary system + constitutionally strong parliament</p>	<p>Even if opposition party loses in terms of votes and seats, in a parliamentary system with the powerful parliament it still can work as a counterbalance for the predominant party as well as push through the legislature its own political preferences (the</p>	<p>Malaysia</p>	<p>Muhamad Omar, 2008</p>

<p>*+social basis for unification is briefly mentioned (ethnicity, religion and so on), but then the opposite group should be as major as the mainstream group, otherwise - fragmentation</p>	<p>Philippines – the example of the opposite situation, weak parliament – too strong parliament and president, Singapore – a very particular parliamentary republic, where MPs are ministers at the same time). However, first, the party needs to get into the parliament, and, if there is no proportionality, unity is necessary</p>		
<p>one salient issue (apartheid, in this case) → de-emphasis of socio-ethnic differences, promotion of political unity, inclusiveness</p> <p>+ absence of the salient issue on which the predominant party controls the morally exclusive position (like anti-racist policies by the ANC)</p> <p>*+energetic and charismatic leader</p>	<p>” when democracy arrived in 1994 the liberal tradition in South Africa lacked orientation”. Again, North Korea for South Korea, Pro-Beijing politics in Taiwan</p> <p>+ if such issue is present, then opposition to the predominant party would be presented as an opposition to the morally rightful policies</p> <p>*+ shortage of democratic legacy makes leadership important</p>	South Africa	Neil Southern, 2011
<p>*to the contrary, institutionalization and absence of the charismatic leadership is needed (p.573)</p> <p>+factionalism within the predominant party</p> <p>+ disproportionate electoral system with gerrymandering</p> <p>+ “fresh policy initiatives” (p.579)</p>	<p>A person is easier to defeat, than an organization. My point would be that this depends on the legal situation, the rule of law in a given society.</p> <p>+opposition parties are provided with the example of how harmful factionalism and fragmentation is for electoral outcomes and, thus, might get incentives for enhancing unity</p> <p>+ electoral system of Malaysia (just like Singapore’s) is that only relatively large and well-funded parties can successfully compete (SMD with disproportionate populations of voters – “opposition” districts are much larger)</p>	Malaysia	Edmund Gomez, 2016

Strong political ambitions (catch-all program, candidate for the presidency)	If the party seeks just to have a representation and some voice at the parliament, it lacks incentives to unite in more or less proportional systems	Namibia	Ian Cooper, 2014
<p>position on the “second dimension” of the regime change – typical major issue for transitional states, “regime cleavage”</p> <p>+ predominant party leaves some place at the “center” (like center-right Saenuri or Kuomintang)</p> <p>+ lack of resources provides for more elaborated programs to attract activists and to get whatever support from them + incentives for the opposition strategic voting</p> <p>+ absence of economic crisis (like that of 1997 in Asia)</p>	<p>Taking into account, that predominant party are mostly conservative and, for the region, mostly associated with the economic development, major opposition can take a progressive stance on further political development and use insufficiency of democratization rate, for instance, to its benefit. Since there are only two major dimensions, unity around two political powers is essential (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, but not Japan, since LDP appeals to the median voter on the “regime change” dimension)</p> <p>+ “second dimension” would not appear in the moment of economic crisis since people in NICs prefer economic stability over democracy (p. 127). Considering that both Taiwan and South Korea finished democratization right before 1997, citizens might discriminate democracy (including political competition and opposition) on this basis. So, we need economic stability or even prosperity.</p>	Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan	<p>Kenneth Greene, 2002</p> <p>+ YunHan Chu, Larry Diamond and Don Chull Sin, 2001</p>
<p>More or less independent subnational entities (would federalism matter?) where opposition could get substantial support</p> <p>+not too huge ideological gap between uniting parties</p> <p>+ fair share of secularism (?)</p>	<p>“opposition forces can gain by winning important subnational offices and then creating a governance record that they can use to win new supporters” (p.290) BUT gerrymandering, unitary state, administrative resource? (like Malaysia)</p> <p>+ If predominant party holds the position with the dominant religion, opposition might be considered as non-grata from this</p>	South Africa, Turkey	<p>Danielle Langfield, 2014</p> <p>+Sinan Ciddi & Berk Esen, 2014</p>

	perspective in a highly religious societies (like Turkey or, perhaps, Malaysia)		
<p>High level of education, urbanization, quality of life → economic development</p> <p>+civil society development</p> <p>+no salient social division that are impossible to overcome</p> <p>+lack of personalism, charismatic leadership</p> <p>+party system institutionalization</p> <p>+ purely majoritarian electoral system again and parliamentarism</p>	<p>Most of electoral support for the political opposition is expected to reside in urban areas, cities, especially, in capitals. Since they appeal to ideology – they need an educated voter. Opposition parties usually encounter difficulties with appealing to the rural and uneducated voter voter (p. 33)</p> <p>+without the stability of electoral patterns and rules, rootedness in the society, legitimation by political actors, only the predominant party would have major electoral opportunities thanks to administrative resources.</p> <p>+personalism will lead to the parties becoming instruments of individual ambitions of their leaders, making unity hardly imaginable</p>	tropical Africa (?)	Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand, 2002
Interest of international actors	International effort in order to strengthen opposition can compensate for the lack of resources as well as limit the predominant party's usage of the administrative resource. If the given country is highly dependent on some foreign agents, international effort in supporting opposition can be substantial.	Azerbaijan	Fariz Ismailzade, 2003
<p>Public dissatisfaction with the establishment</p> <p>+ incumbent's weakness like in South Korea or Taiwan)</p> <p>+ economic crisis</p>	Due to the lack of resources, general public dissatisfaction with the predominant party could help the opposition to organize protests and lower the legitimation of the predominant party's dominance, thus, limiting opportunities for the administrative resource usage. However, mass protests would not happen for the minor opposition party. In order to mobilize public, unity of opposition political actors is necessary	Armenia, Albania, CAR, Chad, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory Coast, Kenya,	Marc Morje Howard and Philip Roessler, 2006

+ again, international effort in transferring democracy + again, parliamentary system or relatively strong parliament + overall level of democratization and liberalization	+if the autocrat is politically weak and unpopular, opposition can use it for offering their own alternative candidate. Again, alternative should be only one in order to make the contrast substantial + economic crisis lowers bargaining potential of the predominant party which is associated with the economic misfortunes	Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe	
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