SIMULTANEOUS SOVIETIZATION AND UKRAINIZATION OF TRANSCARPATHIA IN 1944-45

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Abstract

Transcarpathia was a contested region on the Western slopes of the Carpathian Mountains in the first half of the 20th century. Various nationalist movements and political powers claimed it as a part of their projects, and its population faced multiple political regimes in the 1910s-1940s. Only the Soviet Union radically fixed its Ukrainian affiliation and made this region part of Ukraine till these days. In particular, the first year of the Bolshevik rule in 1944-45 had to deal with the complex political composition of the region and integrate it into the Soviet Union.

This thesis explores the role of nationality policy in the Sovietization of Transcarpathia as part of the general approach of the Soviet Union, as well as adjustments to the local peculiarities. I rely mainly on Terry Martin’s model of affirmative action empire, which he developed for the Soviet Union in the 1920s-30s, applying it to the Transcarpathian case. I focus on the local policies and discourses regarding integration to the Soviet Ukraine. I claim that Ukrainization of the region with adjustments to the local status of Russians and Hungarians aimed to transform region to fit Soviet institutional design and make further radical economic and political transformations more palatable.
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The List of Abbreviations

DAZO – State Archive of Transcarpathian Oblast
KPZU – Communist Part of Transcarpathian Ukraine
NRZU – People’s Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine
TsAMO RF – Central Archive of Moscow Oblast of the Russian Federation
Introduction

In his memoirs, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Nikita Khrushchev mentions an episode about the leader of Transcarpathian communists Ivan Turianytsia right before the territory of Transcarpathia became part of the Soviet Ukraine in 1946:

You know, as they say, appetite comes with the eating. Turianytsia created armed militia units and captured some areas that belonged to the Romanian kingdom before the war. However, residents of these areas, mostly peasants, came and asked to include them to Soviet Ukraine. I also met with them. They claimed that they were Ukrainians. Although we did not do anything concrete in this regard, Ivan Ivanovich [Turianytsia] sent his representatives there at his own risk.¹

This episode might be a counter-example to the widespread image of the Soviet policy in Western Ukraine in the 1940s. Annexation of Western Ukraine to the Soviet Union after World War II is usually associated with Bolsheviks fighting local nationalist guerilla. At the same time, the end of the Second World War could be considered a major event for Ukrainian nationalists, because the territories claimed by Ukrainian nationalists were united in a single political unit, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, for the first time in history. Thus the episode with Transcarpathian communists shows that communists shared Ukrainian national sentiments with their main enemies in the region, Ukrainian nationalists, or at least were not shy to use them for their own agenda, in particular expansion of Soviet influence or occupation of a strategic territory in order to gain access to Central Europe.

It raises a question about Soviet nationality policy in the 1940s, in particular in postwar Western Ukraine. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union was formally a federation of national republics, it was usually referred to as Russia, emphasizing some kind of continuation with the Russian Empire and the largest national group in the Union. Moreover, if the 1920s period of the Soviet Union was about extreme proliferation of national groups, the 1930s is a period which may be described as the emergence of the elevated role of Russians and the Russian language in the country. In the 1940s, two different trends can be traced: the mobilization for the war effort to protect the motherland that was even accompanied by a restoration of the church, and the campaign against suspicious groups, even entire nationalities, in the war years. However, continuations and ruptures in the Soviet nationality policy are still debatable. Annexation of Transcarpathia to Soviet Ukraine might have more in common with the policies of the 1920s-30s, rather than the war mobilization.

Transcarpathian communists were not just local activists who simply wanted to unify all the territories claimed as ethnically Ukrainian, but Soviet agents of radical political and economic transformations, which aimed to build communism in the future. It adds the second edge to the Transcarpathian communists’ activities – Sovietization. I use the term Sovietization to describe a process of transplantation of Soviet institutions to the new territories. Keeping in mind the pragmatic use of nationality issues in the Soviet Union, satisfaction of local national sentiments might get the local population on board with the Soviet revolutionary project. Nevertheless, the literature on Sovietization of the new Soviet western borderlands and satellite states in Central Europe mainly deals with the economic and political spheres, while nationality policies are usually downplayed. Soviet national transformations of this period are infamous, first of all, for deportations of national groups, like Poles and Germans, and suppression of various local nationalist movements (Western Ukraine and the Baltics). In this way, Bolsheviks tried to either solve ethnic conflicts
radically (as it was with Ukrainians and Poles in Galicia and Volhynia) or punish nationalities that, in the eyes of Moscow, collaborated with the Nazis (the case of Germans). At the same time, Bolsheviks implemented the Ukrainization of Western Ukraine, making Ukrainians a titular nationality; however, its resemblance to prewar Ukrainization requires a comprehensive investigation. All in all, the positive promotion of certain nationalities (Ukrainians in the Transcarpathian case) as a part of the Sovietization in the 1940s was not analyzed much in academic literature and public discourse on the topic. It is one of the arguments of this thesis that Soviet nationality policies (not just in the sense of deportations and repressions) were a key element of Sovietization in Transcarpathia.

The third edge of the episode with Transcarpathian communists trying to occupy territory of Romanian Kingdom is regional history and struggle of various nationalist movements over the territory of Transcarpathia. In the first half of the 20th century, multiple political regimes were established in the region. Before and during World War I, Transcarpathia belonged to the Hungarian Kingdom in the Habsburg Monarchy, afterwards Hungarian communists led by Béla Kun came to the region and proclaimed it an autonomous unit of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Meanwhile, various local rallies and congregations proclaimed the region’s affiliation to different nations. The Czechoslovak and Romanian occupations of the region only brought more confusion to an already complicated situation. As a result of the Versailles Peace Conference, the chaos of different local congregations, occupations and the Bolshevik regime was finished, and the territory became part of Czechoslovakia. The city of Sighetu Maramației and villages around it were awarded to Romania (Turianytsia attempted to occupy them later in 1945). Nevertheless, the region was still strongly contested in the interwar period; in particular, it was subject to Russian, Ukrainian, and Hungarian irredentist claims, which were also present in the form of different national orientations of local elites. Right before World War II, these irredentist nationalisms
collided. Hungary occupied a part of the region in November 1938, while an independent Ukrainian state of Carpatho-Ukraine was proclaimed in March 1939, but only survived for one day, as Hungarian troops occupied the rest of the territory. So in late 1944, the Red Army entered the region, which in the last 30 years had had quite a turbulent history, and fixed its Ukrainian national and state affiliation, which survived even the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In this regard, although Romanian territories claimed by Turianytsia did not become part of Ukraine, his actions ended previous nationalist struggles in the region.

All in all, the episode described by Khrushchev relates to three broad fields of Soviet nationality policy, postwar Sovietization, and the history of the contested region of Transcarpathia. Therefore, the first three chapters of the thesis correspond to these fields and situate the communist policies in Transcarpathia in 1944-45 on their intersection. In Chapter 1, I will discuss Bolshevik nationality policies in the 1920s-30s and the formula with which they came up in the end of the 1930s with a few remarks about the peculiarities of the Ukrainian question in the Soviet Union. Chapter 2 deals with literature on Sovietization of the 1940s as transplantation of the Soviet system onto the new territories in the west with special attention to Western Ukraine. In particular, I will show the place of nationality policy in the analysis of Sovietization and connect it with the previous set of literature about the 1920s-30s. Chapter 3 will tell a brief story of nationalist projects in Transcarpathia from 1848, when nationalism became a part of the regional political life for the first time, until the time when Soviet troops took control of the region in October 1944.

Chapter 4 and 5 will analyze the nationality policy in Transcarpathia in the period from October 1944 to December 1945. This timeframe delimits the initial period of Sovietization before Transcarpathia formally became a part of Soviet Ukraine as Transcarpathian oblast. The de-facto independent state of Transcarpathian Ukraine conducted administrative work and implemented policy that can be labeled an initial phase of
Sovietization. However, for several months, the local Bolsheviks had to share power with Czechoslovak officials, whom the government in exile instructed to establish a Czechoslovak administration in pre-October 1938 borders. The period of dual rule in Transcarpathia in October 1944 – January 1945 is a subject of the analysis in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 continues the analysis of the previous chapter from the moment, when the Czechoslovak administration stepped out from the struggle in the region, until December 1945.

In order to explore the role of Ukrainization in Transcarpathia, I will use policy and discourse analysis of the documents issued by local administrative institutions and official newspapers. In policy analysis, I will look at the priorities in policies, importance of nationality issues, and the way they were implemented. I will mostly analyze the regional level and the municipal level in case of decisions made for certain areas. I will not cover the upper levels of the Ukrainian republic and the Soviet Union due to the fact that Transcarpathian Ukraine was formally an independent state and decision-making can only be traced to the level of Transcarpathian institutions in most of the cases. Nevertheless, the upper levels might be present as a part of correspondence between Transcarpathian Soviet institutions and Ukrainian or all-Union organs, when there was a need to interfere, like in the Romanian affair.

Discourse analysis will help to differentiate nationalist orientations or their pragmatic usage of local activists and bureaucrats, who were actively involved in Sovietization. I will look at different figurative expressions related to different nationalist sentiments, mainly Russian and Ukrainian. Moreover, all these sentiments were expressed in combination with the Soviet discourse, which became dominant in Transcarpathia with the communists establishing their administration; therefore, I analyze the adoption of official Soviet rhetoric in combination with nationalist feelings of discourse producers. It will help to explore the meaning of the formal part of the policies for the local actors who implemented them.
The source base of the study is official documents, reports, correspondence etc. of People’s Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine and Communist Party of Transcarpathian Ukraine, and official local communist newspaper Zakarpatska Pravda. In addition, I was lucky to gain access to the report of general-lieutenant of the Fourth Ukrainian Front of the Red Army M. Pronin, in which he described the assistance of military units in the Sovietization of the region. For discourse analysis, I will mainly use Zakarpatska Pravda, although some of the documents could also be useful in this regard.

The names of Transcarpathian towns are those present in official Soviet documents in 1944-45, even in Chapter 3, dealing with the pre-1944 period, when Transcarpathian towns had different Hungarian and Czechoslovak names. In Hungarian, Uzhhorod was called Ungvár, Mukachevo – Munkács, Berehovo – Beregszász, and the Hungarian name of Sevlush, renamed Vynohradiv in 1946, was Nagyszőlős. I use the name Transcarpathia to describe the 1944-45 territory, on which rule of NRZU was established, everywhere except Chapter 3. There I use the more widespread term Subcarpathian Rus, because Transcarpathia was then only marginally used to refer to this territory. Moreover, Subcarpathian Rus was the official name for the administrative unit in Czechoslovakia, and many local activists preferred it even during the Austro-Hungarian period, referring to a broader territory than Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1944-45.

The thesis does not address the questions of Ukrainian historiography on the topic directly, as it mainly debates negative or positive aspects of Ukrainization from the normative perspective of Ukrainian nationalism. The aim of the thesis is to analytically investigate the role of nationality policy for the Sovietization of Transcarpathia, so Ukrainian historiographical works will be present as long as they answer important analytical questions, not normative ones.
Chapter 1. Model of the Soviet Nationality policy before the World War II

1.1 Building the Affirmative Action Empire in the 1920s

The Bolsheviks were not unanimous in their relation to nationalism and their position on it was under constant revision. In the 1920s, the Soviet political unit was established as a federation of soviet socialist republics with a capital and center of decision-making in Moscow. Moreover, the national republics implemented an intense policy of indigenization (korenizatsiia), which was oriented towards the promotion of representatives of local nationalities (except Russians) on the leading positions in the Communist Party and government, and the support of development of national languages and cultures. More importantly, the Bolsheviks established national territories, which institutionalized the nationhood of different groups and were constant reminders of their local titular status. In the 1930s, indigenization was transformed and included not only the promotion of national cadres and cultures, but also added exclusion and repression of some of the minorities and active emphasis on the central role of Russians and Russian language in the Union. The Second World War intensified the exploitation of various Soviet national cultures for the war cause and raised the role of Russians as the key element of the Union, but the algorithm of nationality policies was basically established before the war.

In this regard, Terry Martin’s study on the nationality policies in the 1920-30s does not only explore this particular period of Soviet history, but can also be used as a model for study of Soviet nationality policies in general. Martin’s study develops the model of “affirmative action empire” which should explain the logic of Soviet policies towards nationalities. On the one hand, the work shows the uniqueness of Soviet policies in the 1920-30s, on the other, it makes references to post-World War II policies of affirmative action that
can be found in India and the United States. It also traces the changes, possible reasons, and the formula of policies which Bolsheviks developed at the end of the 1930s. Thus, the Soviet Union should be studied neither as a usual nation-state, despite its high centralization, nor as a typical empire, because it tried to promote its periphery, not to exploit it.

Addressing the approaches to the Soviet Union as an empire, Martin advocates for the subjective definition of an empire by Ronald Suny, which looks at perceptions of the population and the way it sees its relationship with the center. Since the Soviet Union does not fit the classical definitions of an empire, but is often called an empire, it is more important to look at the way it was constructed, according to this approach. Therefore, “empire” in Martin’s study corresponds to the perception of Soviet citizens, while “affirmative action” underlines the peculiarity of the empire.

Soviet institutional design was not predestined after the Bolsheviks seized power and won the Civil war, but was a product of internal struggle. During the Civil war, they came up with the Soviet republics as a way to establish their rule where secessionist movements were a serious threat. It was their way to avoid being called imperialist and address the nationality question. However, when the period of conflict was over, the Bolsheviks had to address the future of Soviet republics. According to Swoboda, a centralized Soviet Union was one among many alternatives, and it only won over others by accident. In particular, he describes the outcome of Bolsheviks’ debates as a compromise between the centralizing aspirations of Stalin, who wanted to include the republics into the already established Russian Soviet Republic, and the opposition of republican leaders, who wanted to preserve their autonomy. In the end, Stalin won, but had to accommodate to Lenin’s amendments, who did not want to trigger local nationalisms and thus kept the republics, but with much less prerogatives. In this

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regard, the establishment of the Soviet Union was emblematic for nationality policies, which combined a centralized decision-making process with attempts to be on good terms with local nationalisms.

In order to calm down the demands of some of the local nationalists (for example, Ukrainians) and use nationalist ideas for the Bolshevik cause, Bolsheviks turned to affirmative action. It presupposed special treatment and improvement of minority groups, which concerned every national group in the Soviet Union except Russians. It was the main reason why every group considered developed enough gained its own republic, while less developed ones got different forms of autonomy.\(^4\) All in all, the main idea of the Soviet nationality policy was the support of every national group on Soviet territory, even the smallest ones.

Bolsheviks had their own interpretations of nation, national self-determination, and its role for establishment of Soviet rule. Soviet affirmative action policy was labeled as korenizatsiia or indigenization and was adopted on the 12\(^{th}\) congress of the Communist Party in April 1923. Terry Martin summarized it in four national elements that had to be promoted:\(^5\)

1. Territories – nations were connected to specific territories (the Bolsheviks even defined a nation as a community having their own national territory) and had to be protected from assimilation on their territories, so existing national borders were reaffirmed, and Soviets were formed downwards along national lines

2. Languages – each territory had its titular nationality with its national language that had to be official on this territory, which led to codifications and establishment of various vernaculars as languages of Soviet documentation and propaganda


\(^5\) Ibid., 10–13.
3. Elites – local party and administrative cadres had to be trained from local nationalities and promoted to the leading positions in their administrative units in order to make Soviet power native, intimate, and popular in the eyes of locals.

4. Culture – should follow Stalin’s formula “national in form, socialist in content”, which presupposed a common unified socialist culture across the Soviet Union, but with specific national symbols attached to it in every national unit.

In the general scheme of Soviet transformative policies, which can be described as Sovietization, the nationality policy had a secondary role compared to Bolshevik main tasks. Martin proposes to distinguish hard line policies oriented towards the core tasks and soft line policies, which had to make the core Soviet goals palatable to the general public through the spheres of culture and education. Therefore, Soviet bureaucracy was divided along this line: hard line institutions implemented and preserved Bolshevik central policies and values, while soft line institutions had to present the main Soviet policies in an attractive light. Moreover, soft line institutions dealt with a positive preservation of national identity, while hard line institutions used surveillance, arrests, and deportations to fight potential national separatism or foreign agents. It also created a signaling system to inform local communists through terror, what policies were approved by the center. So nationality policy mostly played a secondary role for Bolsheviks unless it was connected with security issues.

Bolsheviks could not accomplish these goals by themselves, because they required specialized ethnographic knowledge of the national composition of the former Russian empire. Francine Hirsch describes the mechanics of implementing indigenization from the perspective of expert knowledge. If Martin claims that Bolsheviks proposed a radically institutional design of the affirmative action empire, Hirsch shows that the Bolsheviks used European techniques of population management, especially common in colonies, such as

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6 Ibid., 21–23.
enumeration, mapping, and surveying, which she labels as cultural technologies of rule. However, there is a basic difference between the Soviet and European cases: the Bolsheviks strived to involve all their population in the Communist revolutionary project, while their European counterparts aimed to rule their population more effectively.\(^7\) Therefore, the Soviet leaders used expert knowledge radically differently from the way it was used in European nation-states, although the mechanics were quite similar.

In general, the Soviet Union strived to present itself as a modern, but very different political entity. Peter Blistein compares it with interwar Eastern European states and colonial policies in Africa. Interwar Eastern European states emerged after the First World War and attempted to assimilate most of their population with the exception of specific groups, for example Jews, into their nationalist projects. In contrast, in the 1920s, the Soviet Union prohibited assimilation of minorities and preserved their rights.\(^8\) In the case of Africa, the European colonial powers had a civilizing mission, educating good Africans. Although Bolsheviks had a civilizing mission, too, especially in the case of its Asian territories, their appeal was more universal and had a goal of bring all people a universal proletarian culture, while colonialists put emphasis on different national cultures.\(^9\) To sum up, Soviet nationality policies in the 1920s were more unique than similar to previous or interwar practices.

1.2 Revising the Affirmative Action Empire in the 1930s

As well as the Soviet regime in general, Soviet nationality policies were transformed in the 1930s. Blistein summarizes these transformations in two points: 1) reemergence of Russians – the symbolic role of Russians as a state-bearing nation was emphasized and the

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9 Ibid., 288.
Russian language became mandatory in schools, 2) scaling back and rationalization of indigenization, which was also accomplished with targeted repressions and resettlement of diaspora minorities. Although it was a revision of previous policies, the core idea of promotion of local languages and elites in national territorial units was still in active use. All in all, 1930s policies were a shift from the previous ones, not a rupture. An explanation of this transformation will help to extrapolate the 1930s nationality model into 1940s, when the Soviet Union started the integration of new territories.

According to Martin, the Bolsheviks gradually became suspicious of non-Russian nationalisms, which they had thought to use in their advantage to claim neighboring territories, namely Western Ukraine and Belarus (Piedmont principle in Martin’s terms). However, changes in the international environment, when Poland claimed to use the Ukrainian question to its advantage, in combination with the crises in the Ukrainian republic (suspicion about Ukrainian local communists and grain requisition failures of the 1932-33, which led to the Great Famine) led to the intensification of Soviet xenophobia, another term coined by Martin. So, the revision of language of ethnic proliferation happened when Bolsheviks were searching for the right formula in nationality policy, which would help to consolidate Soviet citizens and eliminate foreign threats inside the Union. That is, the international factor was quite important in Bolshevik reasoning about necessary policy amendments.

In Martin’s explanation of the consolidation, Russians actively entered the sphere of nationality policies in the 1930s. In the 1920s, Russian national identity was excluded from any active support to avoid accusations of Russian chauvinism, which Lenin preferred to use against his opponents in nationality issues, but in the 1930s their symbolical status changed to the state-bearing nation with a unifying role for the whole Union. Now, the promotion of

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10 Ibid., 289.
certain nationalities was accompanied by mandatory Russian language at schools and use of symbols associated with prerevolutionary Russian identity. Moreover, the concept of “Friendship of the Peoples” was introduced as “glue” that would hold the main Soviet nationalities together and provide “the first among equals” role for Russians. All in all, Russian culture was revised in order to create a stronger connection with all-Union institutions and among the Soviet national cultures.

Francine Hirsch presents an explanation of the Soviet nationality policies, which is opposing to that of Martin, especially considering its change in the 1930s. She claims that it was not affirmative action oriented to promote status of minorities, but measures to reduce economical inequality and to take Soviet population through the stages of the Marxist timeline of historical development. It means that indigenization was a temporary step to assist minorities through the process of Soviet radical modernization. Moreover, she uses the idea of double assimilation to explain the policies of the 1930s. Double assimilation first presupposed assimilation into a nationality category, which was happening in the 1920s, and then people categorized by nationality had to be assimilated into the Soviet state and society. However, Hirsch stretches Bolshevik rhetoric over time, trying to present a coherent Bolshevik plan, which does not take into consideration changing circumstances and shifts. Her explanation does not work for change over time, but still grasps the main Bolshevik goal to connect the Soviet population to socialist culture and cause through pragmatic creation and maintenance of nationalities. So Hirsch’s ideas are better in combination with Martin’s, which might be against Hirsch’s intentions, but is more fruitful for this study.

Both in Martin and Hirsch’s works, the issue of status of Russians is not explored very deeply. They only touch upon certain aspects related to the general shift or continuation in the

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12 Ibid., 394.
14 Ibid., 14.
Soviet nationality paradigm. David Brandenberger and Veljko Vujacic comprehensively explore the construction of Russian national identity under Stalin’s rule, which had serious consequences for the whole nationality policy in the Soviet Union. They both agree that the construction of the new Russian national identity was conducted in the 1930s, but the factors that formed its content are different in their models. Brandenberger explains the reemergence of prewar national elements of Russian culture as a pragmatic goal to mobilize Russian and mostly peasant population to defend the Soviet state in case of war, because pure Marxist-Leninist ideas failed to do it effectively in the end of the 1920s, when there was a fear of possible war. So he proposes the term “National Bolshevism” to describe the merger of Marxist-Leninist ideas and Russocentrism, which included national pride of the tsarist Great Power tradition. Moreover, construction was not only limited to Russian identity, but was also related to other nationalities. Bolsheviks proposed the image of Russians as the most progressive nation, giving them a status of “elder brother”, and history became the exclusive domain of the Russian people. Therefore, for Brandenberger, Bolsheviks did not have a coherent project of Russian national identity, but only pragmatically exploited Russocentric etatism for their legitimacy and mobilization.

Vujacic disagrees with Brandenberger about the Soviet top-down exploitation of Russian national elements. He claims that the 1930s was a time of great purges and violent collectivization, when the main subject of mobilization was under huge repressions, which created an unbridgeable gap between the Soviet state and the Russian nation. According to Vujacic, only in the 1930s did the Russian pre-revolutionary symbols stop being threatening and could be used to justify the Stalinist goal of building “socialism in one country”. Symbols

16 Ibid., 93.
of old Russia were utilized to create a sense of motherland and its continuity, and to cement the role of Russians as the state-bearing nationality. The second goal presupposed not only a symbolical emphasis, but also Russian migration to Soviet republics, where Russians had to lead the process and help local titular nationalities to pursue socialist goals.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, Vujacic claims that Russian nationalism did not reemerge in the 1930s and one cannot equate it with prerevolutionary symbols, which were reinterpreted by Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, Brandenberger’s argument about the Russian progressive role still holds up, which works well in combination with Vujacic’s argument about Russian nation as a builder of “socialism in one country”.

The general Soviet model of nationality policy should also have certain amendments for the Ukrainian case. Martin noticed that the Ukrainian question in the Soviet Union had the same status as the Polish question in the Russian empire, meaning that it shifted the whole paradigm of authority on the issue. Moreover, Ukrainian republic was not only a place for promoting the titular nationality of Ukrainians, but also a place where large-scale experiments on creation of Soviets along national lines were conducted. Ukrainization started as an ambitious project to make Ukrainian the main language of the republic, at a certain moment using even its hardline institutions to achieve this goal.\textsuperscript{19} However, at the end of the 1930s, it ended with the emergence of a bilingual public sphere with dominance of Russian in hard line Bolshevik institutions, while Ukrainian was spread in soft line cultural and educational institutions.\textsuperscript{20} All in all, Ukrainization had limited success, if one compares its results with the initial goals, but it was still well institutionalized, and the promotion of local cadres was fully achieved.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 167–69.
\textsuperscript{19} Martin, \textit{The Affirmative Action Empire}, 118.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 123.
Talking about symbolical relations between Russians and Ukrainians in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, Serhii Yekelchyk’s work on the Soviet concept of Friendship of the Peoples provides a crucial analysis on the role of historical policy and memory in Soviet Ukraine in the 1930s. In the Ukrainian case it was used to tie up the three Eastern European Slavic peoples of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians through a historical narrative that they came out of the medieval kingdom of Rus. Stalinist historical narrative allowed the Ukrainian nation agency in history, but it had to be oriented towards Russia. Moreover, Ukrainian intelligentsia was given a possibility to construct this narrative together with Moscow, interpreting the general ideological framework sent from the center. To sum up, Yekelchik specifies the 1930s nationality policy for Ukraine, showing important symbolical connections between Russia and Ukraine, which were incorporated into the Friendship of the Peoples.

To sum up all the aspects of Soviet nationality policy, Yuri Slezkine’s essay on the role of ethnic particularism in Soviet Union can be used. He uses the metaphor of communal apartment to describe the coexistence of different nationalities in the Soviet political entity. The Soviet communal apartment was always associated with constant conflicts among its residents. In this regard, Slezkine shows the way in which the Soviet Union was able to maintain separateness and common Communist cause of Soviet nations at the same time. He also argues that Soviet authority was not able to reduce the implicit contradictions of its policies of homogenization and maintenance of ethnic particularism. So, Bolshevik nationality policy should not be treated as a coherent set of practices, but rather as conflicting principles, which could potentially tear the Union apart.

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22 Ibid., 125.
Concerning the Great Retreat of the 1930s, Slezkine claims that it did not solve the problems, but rather froze them. In particular, the place of every nation was fixed in the Union through symbols (Friendship of the Peoples) and institutions (nationality was given by birth and fixed in the passports). In addition, the Bolsheviks proposed an administrative hierarchy for nationalities with Russians on the top, then republican nations, and national minorities in the republics on the lower level.²⁴ Therefore, Slezkine’s findings are compatible with Vujacic’s conclusions that Stalinism of the 1930s created a basic scheme of nationality relations, which was not replaced by latter developments.

So Bolsheviks kept maintaining ethnic differences in the Soviet Union, making them the basic building blocks of the Soviet political project. The 1920s policies set the general understanding of the nation as a territorial unit, which Bolsheviks should save from assimilation. Moreover, they put their revolutionary project in various national forms and accompanied it with the promotion of local cadres. In this regard, Bolsheviks were not nationalists, but pragmatic politicians, who wanted to utilize nationalist ideas for their core goals, while promotion of nationalist elements was the prerogative of so-called soft line institutions of education and culture. This strategy of disarming nationalism and using it for the Bolshevik revolutionary cause was not abandoned in the 1930s, but even intensified in some aspects.

The 1930s brought the revision of unity of all Soviet citizens, regardless of their national identification. Pure socialist culture in various national forms did not work well in the eyes of Soviet leaders, so they got more into nationality policies, but on the scale of all-Union symbols. They combined repressions of some of the diaspora nationalities with more active use of Russian language, people, and culture as tools in the unification of Soviet nationalities. Particularly, Russian became a mandatory language at schools; Russians

²⁴ Ibid., 445–47.
migrated to the republics as leading cadres, and were symbolically recognized as “the first among equals” in the Friendship of the Peoples. In the Ukrainian case, Russians were even more strongly included through the historical narrative of unity of the three Eastern European Slavic peoples, who came out of the medieval kingdom of Rus.

Extrapolating these findings onto the logic of annexation and integration of the new territories to the Soviet Union in the 1940s, nationality policy could be used both ways: to calm down nationalist demands and to pursue the Bolshevik goals of exporting the revolution abroad and establishing Soviet rule. Soviet interwar policy towards Western Ukraine and Belarus, which was part of Poland, shows that Bolsheviks utilized cross-border nationalism for further territorial annexations under the label of national unification. Although Transcarpathia was not actively referred to and did not have a separate communist party, in comparison to Ukrainian and Belorussian territories in the 1920s-30s, its integration into the Soviet Union followed the same logic. So, Ukrainization did not only continue to be implemented (with a few serious changes in the 1930s), but became an essential part of Sovietization of Western Ukraine, Transcarpathia in particular.
Chapter 2. Sovietization of the Western borderlands of the Soviet Union in the 1940s

2.1 Sovietization of a region

The 1940s were a period, when the Soviets got an opportunity to transplant their system outside of its initial borders. In September 1939, the first such experiment was conducted in Eastern Poland or Western Ukraine and Belarus, which became parts of Soviet Ukraine and Belarus, respectively. Afterwards, the Soviet Union annexed a few other territories, which became separate republics, like the Baltic States, Moldova and Karelian republic, or were incorporated into other republics, like Northern Bukovyna. In 1941, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, and the Soviets were pushed out of all of these territories, as well as from a significant part of its core European area. Soviet authorities returned to their recently acquired Western borderlands only in 1944 and on some of their parts (on parts of them?) were met with severe resistance from local radical nationalist groups, in particular, in former Eastern Polish territories and Lithuania. So, after World War II, Soviets did not only have to transplant their system onto their new territories, but also suppress the resistance there.

In order to understand the logic of Bolsheviks in Transcarpathia, other better-researched examples should be explored. The first attempt of the Soviets to integrate new territories was well researched by Jan T. Gross, who studied the former territories of Eastern Poland. He looks at concrete Soviet policies, their order, and which groups were targeted and proposes his picture of the Soviet state as ultra-violent in its attempts to wipe away previous institutions and replace them with Soviet ones. At first, locals were provided with many opportunities for their initiative to destroy the previous order, but later they were totally taken over by the central authority, which purged many of them. However, there was a crucial
difference between rural areas, where the previous order was wiped away radically and suddenly, and urban areas, where a gradual replacement of local bureaucrats with new Soviet cadres from locals was adopted.\textsuperscript{25} The main idea of the initial lawlessness was to evoke the self-subjugation of locals to the Soviet system, after all previous ties were destroyed and people experienced their lives as completely changed.\textsuperscript{26} These findings fit into one of branches in the totalitarian paradigm about the Soviet Union, when atomization of the society precedes the totalitarian movement, which takes over separated individuals.

Nationality issue was also essential for these processes because Soviets framed the annexation as the unification of Ukrainian and Belarusian nations, and the non-Polish population was encouraged to attack Poles, in particular, Polish Pans. Although victims had both class and ethnic markers, ethnic Poles regardless of their class affiliation suffered the most, especially in villages. Later a lot of representatives of Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Jewish communities were purged, but national dimension was not prominent as with Poles.\textsuperscript{27}

Despite the fact that Sovietization was interrupted by the Nazi invasion, in this case, it showed basic elements of the Soviet algorithm of the export of the Soviet system.

Gross’ study fits into the large scheme of Russian and Soviet borderlands, which were shaped by the violence of the surrounding empires. In this regard, Alexander Prusin conducted a similar study but took much broader temporal perspective (1870-1992) on the territories annexed by the Soviet Union in the 1940s. He argues that acts of imperial violence unified these territories in the period of his study. Particularly, in the second half of the 1940s, when Bolsheviks annexed new territories in the West and took under control states of the Central Europe through loyal communist regimes, modernization became the main rhetoric of the economic and cultural assimilation of the new territories in comparison with previous


\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 67–70.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 35–41.
attempts to annex these territories. So Prusin treats the Soviet annexations as imperial, although they had a strong emphasis on modernization.

Nevertheless, Sovietization was uneven, because there was still organized resistance to the Soviet rule in Western Ukraine and Lithuania. On other territories, where resistance was absent, for instance, in Transcarpathia, Sovietization started much earlier. Moreover, West Ukrainian regions differed in terms of the element could not be integrated into the Soviet system in the Bolsheviks' perspective. While Poles required deportations from the Soviet territory, Romanian and Hungarian minorities were left relatively unscathed in North Bukovina and Transcarpathia. All in all, Sovietization was only a final act in previous attempts to homogenize these territories, and national homogenization through deportations was one among many instruments in the Bolshevik repertoire that they applied differently, depending on the circumstances.

Central European states had to experience also the process of the Sovietization under the Socialist regimes, but it significantly differed from the territories incorporated into the Union. Bolsheviks did not have a single and stable plan for Central European countries but attempted to take under administrative control occupied territory of Germany or to build loyal to the Bolsheviks regime through the spread of the Soviet soft power through the international propaganda. Moreover, John Connelly shows that communists in Central European countries, usually the main agents of Sovietization, interpreted and implemented the Soviet model in different ways, therefore, Sovietization of these states was a heterogeneous

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29 Ibid., 215.
30 Ibid., 220–22.
and uneven process.\textsuperscript{33} Overall, transplantation of the Soviet system in Central Europe was more autonomous from the will of Moscow and less planned in comparison with territories that became part of the Soviet Union. In addition, their status of independent republics was preserved, and they did not have to integrate into the Soviet institutional design.

In relation to the previous policies of Sovietization in the 1930s, Soviets followed the same formula but tried to implement it in much shorter terms. It is the main argument of David Marple’s study on the Stalinism in the 1940s. Sovietization is analyzed mainly through the lens of economic transformations, while nationalities are given lesser priority. Thus he is mostly focused on the collectivization of agricultural production. Nevertheless, Marples explores political issues, which were inseparable from economic, particularly, elimination of kulaks (rich peasant landowners). He shows that there was a lack of peasants with large households, so this category was applied to those who opposed the establishment of kolkhozes and Soviet rule in the village. In addition, the category of kulak continued to be applied in the 1950s, when collectivization was officially finished.\textsuperscript{34} Therefore, Marples treats Sovietization as a process of radical economic transformations accompanied by purges and deportations in rural areas. National and urban changes are missing or marginalized in his analysis, which equalizes Sovietization with agricultural collectivization.

Marples is mostly focused on the Ukrainian regions of Galicia and Volhynia, although some information on Transcarpathia can be found. It was easier to Sovietize Transcarpathia not only due to the absence of nationalists but its small size. Bolsheviks were able to mobilize a population that did not have experience of collectivization like other West Ukrainian territories. Besides, collectivization in Transcarpathia included migration from impoverished


highlands to more prosperous lowlands. So Sovietization of Transcarpathia was much easier and less violent in comparison to other parts of the Soviet Ukraine. Nevertheless, Marples did not take into consideration the fact that Hungarians, who were not deported like Poles in Galicia and Volhynia, lived in lowlands in Transcarpathia.

Marples starts his analysis in 1947 when active economic transformations started. He claims that Bolsheviks were reconstructing the economy till 1947 and had no opportunity to start before. On contrary, Prusin finds an explanation of 1947 in the beginning of the Cold War and the need to unify in the face of the enemy. Both explanations did not look much into the period of 1944-46, treating it only as the process of reconstruction after the war. However, Bolsheviks had to establish some ground, which would allow radical transformations later.

Another study by Amir Weiner emphasizes changes in the Soviet system caused by the experience of the Second World War. Although his work deals with territories that were part of the Soviet Union before 1939, he argues that the war finished the process of the consolidation of a legitimate regime. Weiner argues that war experience changed Ukrainian peasants, who connected their local identity through Ukrainian identity with a much broader Soviet project. In turn, it unified Soviet regime with peasant population, creating among peasants the sense of common faith in the Soviet state. Therefore, nationality policy was one of the pillars of the Sovietization not only in the 1920-30s but also in the 1940s.

Red Army played a key role in the transformation of the Soviet peasant society. Soviet regime reestablished itself through demobilized Red Army servicemen, who became legitimate representatives of the authorities. They occupied the positions of the heads of

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35 Ibid., 114.
36 Ibid., 112.
kolkhozes, which made kolkhozes more legitimate institutions in the eyes of peasants and overcame a gap of distrust between the Party and peasants. Moreover, they brought discipline and compassion from their war experience, which was utilized for more effective countryside work.\textsuperscript{39} Despite the fact that the Sovietization of Western Ukraine differed from other parts of the Soviet Union, Red Army became an essential actor in the establishment and maintenance of the Soviet rule.

The revival of religion became another important instrument of legitimation. Reopening of Orthodox churches that had been closed and repressed before the war confused some of the local party cadres initially, but they conformed to the new party line. It had some effect on the older population of rural areas, but youth and Red Army servicemen did not trust the church.\textsuperscript{40} Thus revival of the religion became another instrument of the Sovietization, which emerged after the Second World War. Although it had limited effect on the pre-1939 territory, the situation differed significantly in Western Ukraine, which was not exposed to the anti-religious propaganda, and where Greek-Catholic Church, which was dominant in Western Ukraine, was respected among the peasants.

\textbf{2.2 Sovietization of a city}

Although peasantry constituted the majority of the new territories, changes in the in the urban environment were essential for the success of Sovietization. There are developed studies of the Sovietization of city of Lviv due to its status as the main city in Western Ukraine. Tarik Cyril Amar’s study on war and postwar Lviv investigates transformations of the city in the 1940s. Nazi and Soviet policies to make city fit their political projects is in the focus of Amar’s study. He claims that both regimes made Lviv Ukrainian city since Nazi exterminated Jewish population of the city, while Soviets expelled all Poles after the war.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 314–17.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 309–12.
After these events, Lviv became ethnically homogeneous and a subject to Soviet transformative policies.\textsuperscript{41} Therefore, Ukrainization was the outcome of the Sovietization, if not its objective.

Amar summarizes Soviet transformations of Lviv in three policies: Sovietization, Ukrainization, and rapid industrialization and modernization in the Soviet mode. However, he did not distinguish clearly these policies, claiming that Sovietization had the highest priority for Bolsheviks, who aimed to prove the Soviet superiority over capitalism in the region. Sovietization was also inseparable from Ukrainization because Ukrainians and Russians were in the privileged positions. In addition, special treatment of locals unintentionally created a specific West Ukrainian identity with their own sense of modernity, despite the fact that Bolsheviks strived to unify Lviv with other Soviet cities. This situation meant that different Ukrainian identities (Soviet identity of the migrants from pre-1939 Ukraine vs. identity of anti-Soviet nationalists) met in Lviv.\textsuperscript{42} Although Amar does not address broader questions of the Soviet nationality policy and his understanding of Ukrainization and Sovietization might be confusing (what Sovietization and Ukrainization included and why it was Ukrainization, if the dominance of Russian culture was prominent in Lviv of the 1940s), he catches Ukrainizing role of the Soviet regime.

The absence of clear summary of the content of Ukrainization in the Stalinist period of Lviv, besides the accidental emphasis on Ukrainian ethnicity in the Soviet official discourse, partially undermines Amar’s argument. In this regard, William Risch’s book on the broader period of postwar Lviv shows that Ukrainization was actually downplayed, and fight against bourgeois nationalism overshadowed any attempts of Ukrainization.\textsuperscript{43} He also does better

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 4–19.
work defining Sovietization in relation to nationality policy as acceptance of the Soviet multinational state, where Russians had a leading role.\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, relation to Great Russians received more attention from the symbolical policies in the situation of fighting against radical nationalists of UPA.

Although Lviv was ethnically cleansed from Jews and Poles, positive content of Ukrainization is quite ambiguous. Definitely, Soviet Ukrainian identity was present, but real mistrust of the Soviet institutions to the locals as possible collaborators of UPA led to the dissimulation, when individuals hided their true beliefs to have better working and living conditions; however, some of the youth accepted Soviet values partially. Moreover, majority of local party cadres were outsiders, although ethnically Ukrainians, and occupied higher positions.\textsuperscript{45} So Ukrainization was not efficient and essential policy of the integration of Lviv into the Soviet system, although it is impossible to imagine Soivetization without formal recognition of the status of Ukrainian nationality as titular. It meant that Soviet Ukrainian identity manifested itself through Russian-speaking Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine, while newcomers from Galician villages and native Lvivians were alienated from it.

Amar’s argument about Ukrainization can be proved but from another angle of Soviet experience and goals in the Second World War. Alfred Rieber proposes to look at the warring Soviet Union, as a participant of multiple civil wars in its Western borderlands. Rieber claims that Stalin perceived World War II through the lens of “civil war mentality” and had the territorial view of revolution, rather than internationalist. In this regard, the war gave an opportunity to secure Soviet revolution from external interventions, cleansing border groups that might be threatening in the perception of the Bolsheviks.\textsuperscript{46} So desirable for Stalin

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 38.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 70–80.
outcome of the Second World War was an integration of borderlands into the Soviet Union, so there was no place for any external influences.

Here Stalin dealt with Russian perennial problem of the loyalty in the Western Borderlands, in which Poles and Western Ukrainians were unreliable elements for the Soviet system. If Poles, who did not fit into the Soviet project of Ukrainianhood, could be deported, West Ukrainians had to be radically transformed. When local peasant and urban dwellers already internalized Ukrainian national identity, Soviet policy of Ukrainization presupposed more Russifying steps to tie up local Ukrainians to the Soviet regime. Thus Bolsheviks did not deviate from their nationality policy but had to adjust to the circumstances of Western Ukraine, and Amar’s argument about Ukrainization should be accepted as the perspective of the center, not West Ukrainian locals.

Western Ukrainians that joined the Soviet society had to be re-Ukrainized, in order to fully become Soviet citizens. As Weiner states, World War II, or the Great Patriotic War in the Soviet official narrative, became one of the main legitimizing myths that connected locals with the Soviet regime; Bolsheviks planned to establish their legitimacy using the symbolical connection between locals and common Soviet struggle against Nazis. In Lviv, there was an official commemoration of the Narodna Hvardia imeni I. Franka – Soviet underground partisan group. According to Amar, official representations of this group was de-Polonized, and their Ukrainian character was strongly emphasized, even I. Franko referred to the prominent West Ukrainian nationalist activist accepted by the Soviet Union. In addition, Bolsheviks were excited to establish this symbolical connection already in 1945. Therefore, Sovietization of Lviv was fixed symbolically Ukrainian and was inseparable from the sense of Soviet Ukrainian identity.

Study on another major city in the region Chernivtsi adds to the general pattern of the postwar Sovietization, particularly, to Ukrainization and commemorative practices of the Great Patriotic War. Svitlana Frunchak investigates Soviet commemorative policies in the city of Chernivtsi after World War II. Like Amar, she addresses the commemoration of Communist resistance during the war. Frunchak claims that local Soviet party elites aimed to expel remembrance of Jewish participation in local resistance despite its leading role, emphasizing Ukrainian character of the resistance. Nationality was the main reason why more active communist resistance group did not receive a commemoration in the form monuments or annual celebrations, unlike much smaller and short-lived group of young communists in another regional town of Khotyn.\textsuperscript{48} To sum up, the Ukrainized commemoration of the communist resistance to Nazis as a part of the key myth of the Great Patriotic War was a model that Bolsheviks tried to follow on the new territories. Locals were always reminded not only about the war heroes and their importance for peaceful and prosperous life in the Soviet Union but also about Ukrainian nationality of these heroes.

Pulling together all the aspects of nationality policy in Sovietization of Western Ukraine in the 1940s, Bolsheviks perceived national identity as an empty vessel that could be filled with political and economic transformations of society. They attempted to transplant their policy formula of Ukrainians being a titular nation with the leading role of Russians, imposing their sense of Ukrainian identity. It played as a legitimation tool and protection of the borderlands from the external influences. So the territory had to be cleansed from unreliable elements like Poles, who claimed the territory of Galicia and Volhynia, and Ukrainian radical nationalists, for whom Soviet Ukrainianhood was not genuine. However, locals did not necessarily greet Soviet policy of favoring Ukrainians, because they had their own sense of being Ukrainians; so attempts to connect Ukrainians with Russians

\textsuperscript{48} Svitlana Frunchak, “Commemorating the Future in Post-War Chernivtsi,” \textit{EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETIES} 24, no. 3 (August 2010): 446.
symbolically, and to implement mandatory courses of Russian language might be seen as Russification policy. Nevertheless, Ukrainization was an essential part of the Soviet legitimization and further political and economic transformations.

Therefore, Soviet nationality policy of the 1920s-30s is important for the 1940s Sovietization, which is often overlooked in the literature. More importantly, nationality policy of the 1940s included not only exclusion of minorities, but also quite active promotion of titular nations in the territorial units, as it was before. In this regard, Sovietization of Transcarpathian is a more illustrative case, in which Ukrainization was salient in comparison with Galicia and Volhynia due to the fact that Ukrainian national identity was not strongly institutionalized before the Bolsheviks came. Moreover, Transcarpathian communists attempted to impose Ukrainian identity on the locals without strong competition with Ukrainian nationalists. Thus Bolsheviks did not have to disarm nationalists as it was with guerilla resistance on the former Polish territories, but they fulfilled more traditional for them role from the 1920s-30s of promoters of national cultures and cadres.
Chapter 3. Nationalist Projects in Transcarpathia before 1944

3.1 General remarks about nationalism in Transcarpathia

Two previous sets of literature should help to situate annexation of Transcarpathia in the logic of Soviet policies of political, social, economic, and cultural transformations, in particular, how nationality policies and Sovietization of the 1940s met on the territory of Transcarpathia. The argument of the study is a statement that promotion of titular nationality on its territory was one of the key elements of Sovietization. Nevertheless, nationality policies could vary depending on particular circumstances. The general context of the 1940s Sovietization of the Western borderlands was reviewed, so peculiarities of Transcarpathian nationalist movements before Soviet annexation should be investigated in order to understand the logic of Bolsheviks in the region.

In this chapter, I will use name Subcarpathian Rus, not Transcarpathia, because it was more or less widely accepted among nationalist activists in the period 1848-1944 to describe not only the territory of today Transcarpathia but also parts of Eastern Slovakia, Southern Poland, and Northern Romania. Moreover, it existed in the imagination of local activists during the period of Austria-Hungary and gained fixed borders and the official name Subcarpathian Rus only as a part of Czechoslovakia in 1919. Name Transcarpathia will be used in the next chapters that deal with Soviet rule in the region when the official name of the de-jure independent state was Transcarpathian Ukraine. In addition, I will also use the word Rusyn to describe indigenous Greek Catholic predominantly peasant population, not prescribing specific national affiliation. In order to indicate national affiliation that locals supported, I will distinguish three political orientations, which included Subcarpathian population into different nations – Ukranophiles, Russophiles, and Rusynophiles.
Paul Robert Magocsi is the main historian of Transcarpathian ethnic groups and nationalist movements. His first basic work on the history of the region is *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus’, 1848-1948*, which directly addresses the history of different nationalist movements before the Soviet annexation. The scope of Magocsi’s study is bigger than the territory of Transcarpathia, which became part of the Soviet Ukraine. It includes not only Transcarpathia, but also Eastern Slovakia (Presov region), a small part of Northern Romania (Maramures County), and part of Southern Poland (Lemkovyna). Magocsi justifies these vague borders with the common ethnicity of local peasants, which were exposed to different nationalist movements in the 19th century. Although construction of the ethnic commonality might be interpreted as a nationalist claim and Magocsi is a Rusynophile activist himself, his work still tracks competition of various political orientations to impose a certain national identity on the Subcarpathian population.

Magocsi’s book is a study on different projects of national identity, which state and non-state actors attempted to implement in Subcarpathian Rus. He focuses on local activists, whom he labels as intelligentsia (they were mainly lawyers, teachers, and civic servants), and who tried to find a place of local peasant population among modern nations. They distinguished themselves from Hungarian elites in the main cities of the region Uzhhorod, Mukachevo, and Presov with their common Slavic and Greek Catholic background, but their political orientations towards affiliation with particular group dramatically differed. The generation that was educated before World War I grew up in a religious environment, in which Hungarian culture was worthy of the greatest achievement. The situation changed after the war when Subcarpathian Rus became part of Czechoslovakia, and Prague (and to a lesser degree Bratislava) became the main educational center, which reinforced their Slavic identity.

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that still had various interpretations and national affiliations.\textsuperscript{50} Therefore, local intelligentsia, being without their own university in Uzhhorod or Mukachevo, was not autonomous from the main regional cultural centers like Prague and Budapest; however, it felt its difference from dominant national groups of Hungarians and later Czechs with their nationalizing projects.

Magocsi distinguishes three nationalist projects, which struggled with each other in the 19th – the first half of the 20th centuries: Rusyn, Russophile, and Ukrainophile. The success of each project heavily relied on the interests of much bigger actors, such as Hungary, Germany, and Russia/USSR. In addition, the interwar period was a time when competition among these orientations became most intense, comparing with other periods due to the relatively pluralist Czechoslovak regime.\textsuperscript{51} Thus Transcarpathia was strongly divided around the question of the relevant national affiliation despite its peripheral place in relation to Ukrainian and Russian nationalist centers.

3.2 The emergence of the main nationalist cleavages in the 19th century

Maria Mayer proposes three-part periodization of Rusyn national movement in Subcarpathian Rus in the period of 1849-1918, when nationalist politics became part of the local political life: 1) 1849-1871 – Russophile period, when local intelligentsia associated themselves with Great Russians from the Russian empire, 2) 1870s-80s – Magyarization and decline of the nationalist movement, and 3) 1890-1910s – moderate renewal of the nationalist movement with the dominance of Rusynophile tendency led by St. Basil Society, and minor positions of Ukrainophiles and Russophiles, represented only by separate activists.\textsuperscript{52} Overall, internal debates about the relevant national group were present during this period, although

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 17.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 18.
\end{footnotesize}
they were overshadowed by opposition to Magyarization and strive to save local ethnographic peculiarities from the assimilation in Hungarian culture.

Emphasis on specific features of Transcarpathian Greek Orthodox peasants was brought into nationalist struggles beginning with the Spring of Nations of 1848 in Hungary. Mayer shows that the first major cleavage along the national lines was about loyalty to the Hungarian national movement or strong cultural connections with Russian people and Russian emperor. Before 1867, when Hungarian nationalist project got its own political entity to implement its nationalizing aspirations, affiliation with Russian culture of the local intelligentsia was part of the Habsburg’s game against Hungarian nationalists. Adolf Dobrianskyi, who was the only non-Hungarian representative in Austrian parliament from the territory of Subcarpathian Rus, personified Habsburg’s support of local Russophile sentiments. Moreover, there were other candidates in Subcarpathian Rus, who mobilized Rusyns against Hungarian domination, connecting local cultural peculiarities with the idea of Russian culture; however, the majority of local Greek Orthodox clergy expressed loyalty to Hungarian movement and supported pro-Hungarian candidates in elections.53 So general split between Habsburgs and Hungarian nationalists expressed itself in Transcarpathia as cleavage between traditionally loyal to Hungarian elites clergy and first nationalist attempts of Russophiles to distinguish local peasantry from Hungarian national project, connecting them to Russian culture and people.

In the 1860s, the Russophile camp led by Adolf Dobrianskyi and Alexander Dukhnovich organized the local cultural organization of St. Basil Society, which codified local vernacular, rather than imposed Russian language that was used in Russia, and even referred to locals as Rusyns. So their Russophilism did not presuppose immediate national

53 Ibid., 28–32.
unification with the Russian nation, which was quite ambiguous and underdeveloped project at that moment, but some form of local particularism connected with nationalist ideas that locals deserved some kind of national autonomy with their national language and without Hungarian domination. Nevertheless, it was a small group of educated people that shared these ideas, while the illiterate majority of Transcarpathia was outside of these debates and were ignorant to the nationalist appeals of nationalist activists.

Dobrianskyi and his circle did not limit their activity to the cultural enlightenment, but also advocated for political autonomy of the region. They claimed that local peasants were a distinct nationality, and they should have their own national autonomous unit in Hungarian kingdom. These claims remained unfulfilled due to the strong opposition of Hungarian elites, which even did not allow Dobrianskyi to participate in work of the parliament.

Marginal status of local national activists was only reinforced after 1867 compromise and establishment of Habsburg dual monarchy when Habsburg stopped playing minority card against Hungarian nationalist and provided a form of nationhood for the Hungarian nation, in which assimilatory practices of Magyarization could be implemented. This situation did not change the line of conflict between a small group of nationalist activists with Hungarian elites and Magyarones (assimilated locals). Period of 1867-1918 could be labeled as Magyarization when Hungarian nationalists tried to impose Hungarian national identity on the territory of Hungarian kingdom. Hungarian national identity was open for minorities, who wished to accept Hungarian language and culture, which led to the phenomenon of Magyarones. Moreover, being a high culture of urban life, Hungarian culture attracted Subcarpathian educated strata, which strived to move socially upward and join the urban life in regional

cities like Uzhhorod or Presov, or move to the capital city of Budapest. Although Hungarian language and culture dominated in the urban life of Subcarpathian Rus, urban secularized intelligentsia of the region still continued to be divided between Magyarized and nationalist camps.\footnote{56 Mayer, \textit{The Rusyns of Hungary}, 153–54.}

According to Mayer, local nationalist intelligentsia became active after the period of relative decline in the 1870s-80s, when Hungarian Catholic People’s Party was established as an opposition to the ruling Liberal Party in 1895. Catholic Party had a program that would guarantee cultural rights of the minorities, such as instruction at schools and publishing of books in national languages. This program resurrected St. Basil Society, which stopped being active in 1871 and created a place for Rusynophile orientation, which supported not Russian standard of language, but local vernacular.\footnote{Ibid., 74–75.} The new generation of intelligentsia had a more populist orientation towards local peasantry, which mainly expressed itself in a form that would not potentially pose a threat of irredentist nationalism like previous Russophile orientation could do it. Nevertheless, Ukrainophile orientation expressed itself at that time too due to the intellectual influences from neighboring Galicia, where Ukrainophiles was winning over their Russophile opponents. Russophiles were the most dangerous in the eyes of Hungarian authority because they could work for Russian imperial government, so they were suppressed for a moment and did not have the same prominence as Rusynophiles. Overall, despite Hungarian assimilationist policy and attempts of the local nationalist intelligentsia, majority Subcarpathian peasantry was indifferent to nationalist politics, and local cities remained predominantly Hungarian with a very limited public sphere of local nationalist activism.\footnote{Magocsi, \textit{The Shaping of a National Identity}, 58–66.}
At the beginning of the 20th century, Russian and Ukrainian nationalists included Subcarpathian Rus in their nationalist projects. Ukrainian nationalist movement, which was limited to a small circle of the intelligentsia in the South of the Russian empire, but had a broader popular base in Austrian Galicia, included Subcarpathia as Western borderland of the Ukrainian nation. It was preoccupied with struggles with Russian and Polish nationalists and did not have a powerful base to conduct the same competition with Hungarian nationalism, so Subcarpathian Rus had much lower priority for Ukrainian nationalism at that moment.

Russophile orientation posed more serious threat in the eyes of Hungarian elites due to a relatively strong domestic orientation towards Russia before 1867 and Russian support of Subcarpathian Russophiles. In addition, Subcarpathian Rus, as well as Galicia, was popularized in Russia as a part of Russian national project, which gave a basis for irredentist claims.\(^{59}\) So outside actors with Ukrainophile and Russophile orientations towards Subcarpathian Rus were more prominent than local activists, who were marginalized by the policy of Magyarization.

John-Paul Himka’s study on the development of different national identities in neighboring Galician Rus is also a summary of nationalist struggles in the 19th century Subcarpathian Rus in comparative perspective. He explores the emergence and success of Ukrainian nationalist movement in Habsburg’s Galicia. It depicts not only Ukrainian movement but also alternative projects of Polish, Russian and Ruthenian (specific local identity) nationalisms. The main argument of the study is an idea that only political support of Vienna allowed Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia to survive and partially defeat its opponents, in particular, Russophiles.\(^{60}\) Subcarpathian situation differed from Galician case because Hungarian authority did not support any nationalist movement in Transcarpathia and

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 67.

attempted to Magyarize local Slavs, which left the weak Russophile project with underdeveloped Ukrainophile and Rusynophile ones. To sum up, Himka and Magocsi admit peripheral status of the region and its strong dependency on the successes of major regional players and the interimperial competition. Before 1918, mostly Russophiles gained some support from the outside and had limited local tradition starting from the 1848 revolution.

3.3 Intensification of Provincial Political Life after World War I

World War I and its results disrupted the provincial political life of Subcarpathian Rus, which faced new order, where national self-determination had to be implemented instead of empires. Dissolution of Austria-Hungary brought various congregations and rallies of representatives from local villages, which decided national future of the region. Magocsi claims that there were three possible options for the locals according to previously established political orientations: 1) to proclaim independence, 2) to join another state (Russia, Ukraine, and Czechoslovakia), 3) and to remain in Hungary. The first option was abandoned because the territory of the possible independent state was very small and could easily become a victim of its aggressive neighbors while remaining in Hungary was against the interests of Allies who were interested in punishing Hungary after the war. So joining other Slavic nation-states, in particular, Ukraine and Russia, which were on the agenda of local nationalist activists, was a more feasible option. Nevertheless, the territory of the former Russian empire was in civil war, and Poland suppressed Ukrainian independent state in Eastern Galicia, which made Czechoslovakia the best option. Therefore, post-World War I national self-determination of Subcarpathian peasantry did not solve competition among Ukrainophiles, Russophiles, and Rusynophiles, but only terminated the conflict.

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61 Ibid., 147–48.
Despite the continuation of previous conflicts, Subcarpathian Rus stopped being only a product of the imagination of local activists and became a single administrative unit with defined borders. On the local level, national activists viewed Rusyns as the third equal part alongside Czechs and Slovaks. On 8 May 1919 in Uzhhorod, local representatives proclaimed a declaration that “Rusyns will form an independent state within the state of Czecho-Slovak-Rusyn Republic”. On the international level, peace treaties of Trianon and Saint-Germain defined the status of Subcarpathian Rus. Trianon defined territories which Hungary lost to its neighbors, which included Subcarpathian Rus, while Saint-Germain was partially about obligations of Czechoslovakia towards its minorities. It mentioned two important aspects about territories and organization of self-government, which were described in vague terms. Concerning territory of Subcarpathian Rus, it was written, “the Ruthene territory South of the Carpathians”; which did not demarcate border with the Slovak part. Self-government was also open to different interpretations, “the fullest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of Czecho-Slovak State”. Henceforth, international treaties finished transition of Subcarpathian Rus to Czechoslovakia, but its territorial and political status was not clear.

Interwar Czechoslovakia was a democratic state in comparison to other Central European countries and allowed limited pluralism in political competition. Nevertheless, Subcarpathian activists perceived government in Prague limiting their national rights. According to Magocsi, the institutional design had two main problems for local nationalist interests regardless of their political orientation: 1) the borders of Subcarpathian Rus as an administrative unit in Czechoslovakia, 2) and the level of autonomy that this unit had de-facto. These issues unified different political orientations of Rusyn activists in their demands to include part of Eastern Slovakia with Greek Catholic population (Presov region)

63 Magocsi, With Their Backs to the Mountains, 188.
64 Ibid., 193–94.
to Subcarpathian Rus, and allow the same autonomy with elected local diet and governor, as it was the case in other administrative units of Czechoslovakia.

Prague government did not want to change borders and provide full autonomy to Subcarpathia Rus in order to avoid possible conflicts with Slovaks, who opposed the idea of losing part of their territory, and Communist and pro-Hungarian activists, who could take region under their control. Moreover, Czech administration perceived local population as backward, which was a basis for Czech civilizing mission and direct rule of Subcarpathian Rus. As a result, Czechoslovak central government alienated local activists, regardless of their national orientation, with such an attitude towards Subcarpathian Rus.

The polarization between Ukrainophiles and Russophiles (Rusynophiles were not well-organized) took place in the interwar period. Ukrainophiles had their own prominent political leaders such as Avhustyn Voloshyn and Iulian Revai and cultural organization of Prosvita, which popularized the Ukrainian language through reading rooms in villages. Parallel to Ukrainophile camp, Russophile leaders like Andrii Brodi and Stephan Fentsyk also had a strong institutional basis: Brodi was a leader of Autonomist Agricultural Union, Fentsyk established his own Russian National Party, and they both supported Dukhnovych Society, which operated in the same way as Prosvita, but with Russophile agenda of promotion of Russian language and culture. If Russophiles and Ukrainophiles were active during the 1920s-30s, Rusynophile orientation became comparably active from the mid-1930s due to the support of Prague government, which feared Ukrainophiles and Russophiles as a potential threat to the integrity of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, debates about language divided local schools, because each school supported certain national orientation and implemented language according to its political views. Comparing to the pre-war competition among

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different political orientations, Ukrainophile and Russophile camps became more crystallized and formed their own political and cultural organizations.

Czechoslovak neighbors, who had their co-nationals on the Czechoslovak territory and had claims for its territories (Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union), supported certain political orientations of Rusyn activists. Hungary and Poland gave resources to Russophiles parties (Brodii received money from the Hungarian government, and Fentsyk from Polish). Hungarian influence was very prominent in the region due to the Hungarian population in the Southern part of Subcarpathian Rus and domination in the urban area. Although Hungarian irredentism was quite strong in the interwar period, they did not plan to continue similar to the prewar Magyarization policy but used local activists, who did not have direct conflicts with Hungary. Local Russophiles were good candidates for this role due to their opposition to Czechoslovak government and absence of the prerevolutionary imperial Russia, which would support them.

External support of Ukrainophiles was more complicated, due to the presence of the Soviet Union, which formally established the Ukrainian Republic and planned to unify all Ukrainian lands, and Ukrainian nationalists, who immigrated to Czechoslovakia or supported from neighboring Galicia. Although Transcarpathia did not have separate Ukrainian Communist party like in Poland and local communists took part in a general election as a part of Czechoslovak Communist Party, they supported Ukrainophile position. Nevertheless, Ukrainian migrants from former Russian empire contributed to the development of Ukrainian cultural life in the 1920s. In the 1930s, the influx of political migrants from Galicia, predominantly members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), brought a fascist version of Ukrainian nationalism into the political life of Subcarpathian Rus, which seriously worried Prague government. Moreover, OUN had limited support from Nazi

Shandor, Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century, 67.
Germany, which planned to create Ukrainian state in the late 1930s. So Ukrainophiles had communist, moderate, and radical currents, which corresponded to the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Nazi external sources of support respectively.

Before 1938 partitions of Czechoslovakia, divisions among different political orientations were not critical, and activists found common ground around the demands to central government about autonomy and changes of borders. After Munich treaty, when France, Britain, and Italy agreed that Germany occupied Czechoslovak lands with German majority, Prague decided to create Subcarpathian government and promised to hold the elections to the local diet. The first government was a mix of Ukrainophiles and Russophiles led by Russophile Brodii. However, the Czechoslovak government quickly found out that Brodii started preparations for Hungarian annexation of Subcarpathian Rus, so he was imprisoned and Ukrainophile leader Voloshyn became the new head of the local government. Despite the fact that he was a moderate Ukrainian nationalist, he relied on the support of members of OUN, who created at that moment nationalist paramilitary organization Sich. It all led to the parallel to Czechoslovak military forces that would be a basis for domination of Ukrainophiles (shutdown of Czech and Russian schools, imprisonment of political opponents, and pressure on the elections), and possible separation.

Despite Ukrainophile offensive in the last months of Czechoslovakia, independent Ukrainian state in Transcarpathia risked being annexed by Hungary without German support. In November 1938, Hungary annexed Hungarian-majority regions with three the biggest cities (Uzhhorod, Mukachevo, and Berehovo), which forced Subcarpathian government to move to the town of Khust. On 15 March 1939 in Khust, independent state Carpatho-Ukraine was proclaimed. It was occupied by Hungarian troops the next day with a minor resistance of

68 Ibid., 165.
69 Magocsi, With Their Backs to the Mountains, 276–78.
Sich Riflemen. Most of the government emigrated, and Hungarian administration with loyal Russophiles was in control of the region.\(^70\)

Russophiles expected to gain autonomy and to russify local population in Hungary, but Hungarian authority had different plans for Transcarpathia. Andrei Pushkash claims that, initially, there were some plans for the autonomy of Subcarpathian Rus, but all the projects of these autonomy were developed in Budapest independently from the wishes of local Russophiles, who were excluded from the process of writing and negotiations. Budapest did not take Fentsyk and Brodii’s propositions into consideration, and Hungarian parliament declined plan of very limited Subcarpathian autonomy developed by the government. As Czechoslovak elites had been before, Hungarian government feared popularity of communists in the region and did not fully trusted local Russophiles, especially Fentsyk, who had strong Russian fascist ties and dreamt of building fascist Great Russia with Subcarpathia in it.\(^71\) So aspirations of local elites for more autonomy were not fulfilled, and they even lost what they had in Czechoslovakia.

Hungary also betrayed Russophile expectations regarding cultural policy and support of Russian national identity. Commissioner of Subcarpathian territory (the official name of Subcarpathian Rus in Hungary) Miklos Kozma expressed full support of Rusyn political orientation and encouraged usage of local name Rusyn instead of Russian and instruction at schools in local vernacular, which was codified by the member of local intelligentsia Ivan Haraida.\(^72\) Russophiles had a possibility to publish their materials in Russian and they were not a subject of repessions like Ukrainophiles, who were associated with Soviet and nationalist clandestine groups, although Kozma recommended Brodii to change the language of his journal *The Russian Messenger* from Russian into Rusyn. Moreover, teacher and school

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\(^70\) Shandor, *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century*, 220–25.


\(^72\) Magocsi, *With Their Backs to the Mountains*, 287–88.
administration of Russophile orientation were constantly under suspicion, especially when Hungary entered the war with the Soviet Union.\(^73\) Therefore, Russophiles became marginal cultural actors, while Rusynophiles stopped being only individual members of the intelligentsia and became the institutional instrument of Hungarian policy in Subcarpathia.

To sum up, before Soviet troops entered the territory of Transcarpathia, three political orientations of local national identity were still in play. Ukrainophile orientation was split between pro-Soviet and nationalist camps, which had popularity among the population but had to go underground under Hungarian repressions. Russophiles were present in the local public sphere, but their influence on local political and cultural life was limited. Despite the domination of Hungarian language and culture, Rusynophiles received a prominent institutional substitute from the authority to implement their version of national identity. If Czechoslovak period was a time of competition between Russophiles and Ukrainophiles, the period of 1938-44 was a momentum for the Rusynophile nationalist project, which strongly relied on the support of the Hungarian administration. Therefore, when Soviet troops came into the region in late 1944, they faced three national orientations, which did not fit Soviet institutional design. Bolsheviks’ decision became a key moment for local nationalist struggles because Soviet nationality policy presupposed a clear institutionalized definition of everyone’s national identity, and pluralism on the national affiliation of the local population had to end.

Chapter 4. Dual rule in Transcarpathia (October 1944 – January 1945)

4.1 Brief Initial Peaceful Coexistence

When Soviet troops were on the offensive against Wehrmacht in 1944 and started approaching their Western prewar borderlands, the question of the administration of liberated non-Soviet territories was raised. Prewar Soviet territories were a prerogative of Soviet administration, but the civil administration in Central European states had to be decided between the Soviet Union and governments in exile. Edvard Benes’ Czechoslovak government in exile agreed with the Soviet Union that Czechoslovak territory would be recognized in the pre-Munich borders. According to the treaty between Soviet and Czechoslovak governments, all administrative work was split between war administration of the Red Army on the territory close to the front and Czechoslovak civic administration on the liberated territory in the rear. So Transcarpathia, being a part of the interwar Czechoslovakia, had to be governed by both administrations and to give full control over the territory to Czechoslovakia gradually.

In October 1944, when Soviet troops took under control Transcarpathia, the Czechoslovak administration arrived in Khust and started reconstruction of Eastern Transcarpathia, where five years before, Carpatho-Ukraine was proclaimed, and military administration controlled the biggest cities of the region (Uzhhorod, Mukachevo, and Berehovo), which were in the Western part. The delegation consisted of representatives of each party that were members of the government in exile and was led by the representative of Social-Democrat Party Frantisek Nemec. On the way from London to Khust in Moscow, the

representative of the Communist Party, which was not part of the government in exile, Ivan Turianytsia joined the delegation. He was a Transcarpathian communist, who was a local prewar activist, studied in Kharkiv and migrated to the Soviet Union in March 1939, when Hungarian troops entered Carpatho-Ukraine.

Initially, Turianytsia greeted the idea of the reemergence of Czechoslovakia with Czechia, Slovakia, and Subcarpathian Ukraine at the demonstration in Khust on the arrival of the delegation. The same ideas also could be found in the town of Rakhiv in Eastern Transcarpathia, where the committee of the local council sent a letter to Khust, in which representatives thanked Stalin and the Red Army for the liberation, but the future of the people was inseparable from Czechoslovakia. At the same time, 1919 congregation in Khust was mentioned, when local representatives proclaimed the will to join Ukraine, but “at that moment, international circumstances in Europe changed and, not abdicating our people’s ideal, we had to look for other roads to solve our state affiliation, and we chose what was the most appropriate at that moment... the democratic Czechoslovak Republic.” Although Czechoslovak integrity was not questioned initially, the speaker popularized Ukrainophile orientation as the only legitimate political position, because another post-World War I congregations were not mentioned, and the put strong emphasis on the Ukrainian national affiliation of the locals. Overall, initially, administration of the liberated territories was conducted as agreed in the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty.

4.2 Building a basis for the Sovietization

A few days later, Turianytsia left Khust and started independently from Czechoslovak delegation campaign for unification with the Soviet Ukraine in towns and villages of Transcarpathia regardless of their zone of administration. Magocsi claims that it was not Turianytsia’s sole initiative, and Bolsheviks planned to annex Transcarpathia in accordance

75 DAZO, f. P-14, op. 1, s. 6, l. 1-2.
with the previous pattern of the Sovietization in 1939-41, agitating locals to support the movement for the unification. Self-organized people’s councils, which Czechoslovak administration encouraged locals to create, became a basis for Turianytsia’s activism. In addition, the Soviet army assured that these councils consisted of local communists or loyal to the idea of unification with Ukraine persons. Another aspect of the Sovietization was the establishment of separate Communist Party of Transcarpathian Ukraine (KPZU) in Mukachevo on 19 November 1944. The last step of building parallel to Czechoslovak civic administration was the First Congress of People’s Committees of Transcarpathian Ukraine the week after the establishment of KPZU on 26 November, when Act of Reunification with the Soviet Ukraine was proclaimed.

Symbolically, the Act meant that Transcarpathia was given to Soviet Ukrainophile political camp. From the legal perspective, People’s Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine (NRZU) was established parallel to the Czechoslovak delegation. These two aspects show that Congress finished preliminary preparations for Sovietization and Ukrainization of Transcarpathia. Territory and its population could not just become part of the Soviet Union after signing a formal treaty, as President Benes imagined. According to Jan Gross, integration into the Soviet Union presupposed deep social and political changes, which symbolically had to come from below with the assistance from the Party. So Bolsheviks strived to prepare a basis for these transformations.

The first steps were done even before Soviet troops took under control the territory of Transcarpathia when groups of partisans were sent on its territory in summer 1944. According to Oleksii Korsun, their main task was to prepare locals to greet Soviet troops and organize people’s committees that would participate in the Congress dedicated to the Reunification

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76 Magocsi, With Their Backs to the Mountains, 295.
77 Maryina, Zakarpatskaia Ukraina (Podkarpatskaya Rus) v politike Benesha i Stalina. 1939-1945 gg. [Transcarpathian Ukraine (Subcarpathian Rus) in the Policies of Benesh and Stalin. 1939-1945], 39.
with Ukraine; they also were involved in the formation of the local militia. Moreover, they were referred from time to time in the military and administrative documents as the best way to solve organizational problems. Only one of these partisans Vasyl Rusyn was present in NRZU, while all others continued operating on the local level.\textsuperscript{78} Thus Bolsheviks had a strong organizational resource, which Turianysia only mobilized later.

The Red Army was the main agent of Sovietization at the early period of the establishment of the Soviet rule. The Transcarpathian population was mobilized to the army formally on the voluntary basis. As Nemec notices in his memoirs, it became the first major conflict between Czechoslovak delegation and the Soviet side, because formally Transcarpathians were citizens of Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovak president could allow a Czechoslovak citizen to serve in the foreign army on the individual basis. The Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty states that the population on the territory of interwar Czechoslovakia had to join Czechoslovak military units, but Transcarpathians were conscripted to the Red Army at the same moment.\textsuperscript{79} According to the witness of the events and later Ukrainian diaspora scholar Vasyl Markus, Bolsheviks conscripted approximately 10 thousand Transcarpathians to the army, using both threats and material encouragements.\textsuperscript{80}

The main reason for this conscription is a need for soldiers for the front and future offensives, but it also played an essential role in tearing off the region from Czechoslovakia. From the perspective of the Soviet authority, the Red Army could Sovietize locals as one of the most powerful institutions in the Soviet Union, which became the main connection between population and the Soviet regime through the course of the Second World War, as


Weiner claims. Joining the Red Army, Transcarpathians cut off their ties with Czechoslovakia and could expect to be materially supported in the future due to new important status in the community and material goods for them and their families. Overall, service in the Soviet Army meant that Czechoslovakia started losing its citizens.

The conscription to the army was conducted not only through personal meetings with locals but also through agitation in the press. On 3 November 1944, local communist newspaper Zakarpatska Pravda was reopened, and it started referring to locals as the Soviet people and to Moscow as our capital. Regarding agitation to join the Red Army, it was present in the form of direct calls and personal stories why people joined it. In these stories, Russian and Ukrainian national sentiments were present quite prominently. In the third number of the Zakarpatska Pravda, local soldiers’ stories were presented for the first time. Local peasant F. Shvardak called himself a Stalin’s soldier and claimed that he loved Russia from his childhood, although his text was written in Ukrainian.  

81 Other locals, who told their stories of joining the Red Army, also expressed their national sentiments against Hungarians and Germans, who were always depicted as foreign occupiers, but pro-Russian sentiments sometimes were stronger than pro-Ukrainian. Local decorator V. Kalinich expressed his desire to join the Red Army in the following way “Hungarians wanted to make me their soldier. I ran and hid because I am a Russian [Rus’kyi], and I want to serve only in the Russian army. Now my wish is fulfilled.”  

82 The Ukrainophile sentiment was not present that much in the stories, except the small greeting text of a worker at the Mukachevo tobacco factory Ieva Vinar’, who thanked equally the Red Army and brothers-Ukrainians that “brought liberation”.  

83 Overall, the Soviet version of Ukrainophile orientation could include both Russian and Ukrainian sentiments, and Russian one was initially more prominent in

81 F. Shvardak, “Ia - Stlinskyi Soldat [I Am a Stalin’s Soldier],” Zakarpatska Pravda, November 7, 1944, 3.  
82 Zakarpatska Pravda, November 7, 1944, 4.  
agitation than Ukrainian, although all stories were written in Ukrainian, which emphasized affiliation of the region together with the new official name of the region Transcarpathian Ukraine. More importantly, these sentiments could not be disentangled from the pro-Soviet, because Russian and Ukrainian were utilized for the Soviet victory at war.

Bolsheviks treated Russophile sentiment very seriously in Transcarpathia and decided to address it with some support. First of all, the main local newspaper Zakarpatska Pravda was bilingual with a majority of articles in Ukrainian. Reporting to his high command, chief political commissar of the Fourth Ukrainian Front general-lieutenant M. Pronin noticed that newspaper had to include both Russian and Ukrainian language orientations. In this way, Russophiles, who were detached from active political life in Hungary, could express their love and gratitude to the Soviet army and its leadership in Russian. Moreover, Russophiles Petr Sova and Petr Lintur occupied high positions in NRZU and published their articles in Zakarpatska Pravda quite often. So Soviet framework of nationality policy provided space for Russian language and national sentiment, which were instrumentalized for the war purpose and mobilization.

4.3 The Reunification and Its Enemies

Negative sentiments against Hungarians and Germans were also used in mobilization quite intensively. Agitation against Germans followed usual Soviet wartime clichés, while Hungarians received special attention. In the stories of mobilized soldiers, Hungarians were depicted as occupiers and conquerors, who had prohibited using mother tongue. Hatred against Hungarians was expressed in almost every story. Exploitation of this sentiment had, first of all, a military reason to fight against Soviet enemies. At the same time, ethnic Hungarians were still on the territory of Transcarpathia and were a quite prominent national group, which dominated political and cultural spheres before the Soviet troops coming. It did

84 TsAMO RF, f. 244, op. 2980, d. 97, l. 311
not encourage violence against local Hungarians (calls for such actions similar to Galician case against Poles in 1939 were absent) and just indicated collective guilt of Hungarians for their support of fascism.

Organization of people’s committees in Hungarian region of Transcarpathia illustrates their new status in Transcarpathia. Initially, local Hungarians organized people’s committees in Berehovo and Sevlush regions, where Hungarians were in majority, but partisans, who were a Soviet main initial organizational force, dissolved them, even though a lot of “honest communists” were members of the committees. M. Pronin explained these actions with a need to clean committees from enemy elements, which were overwhelmingly Hungarian, and show that Ukrainians were in power. Therefore, new committees consisted of Ukrainians, while partisans explained to Hungarian communists that they shared collective guilt of Hungarian nation for their previous policies in the region, and more importantly, for the actions of Hungarian state in World War II.\textsuperscript{85} So Hungarians were recommended not to occupy administrative positions, which marked Soviet offensive on the Hungarian cultural and political domination right from the beginning of the occupation.

There was also another ethnic group, which administrative presence initially was ignored in \textit{Zakarpatska Pravda} – the Czechoslovak delegation. Critique of Czechoslovakia and presence of its administration on the territory of Transcarpathia was quite gradual. Even the first day around the conflict about conscription to the Red Army did not start a campaign against Nemec and his delegation. Only after meetings in Uzhhorod and Mukachevo, \textit{Zakarpatska Pravda} started publishing texts criticizing experience of Transcarpathia in Czechoslovakia. In particular, in the sixth number on 13 November 1944, Turianytsia criticized Czechoslovak period that Prague did not allow Ukrainians to occupy a leadership

\textsuperscript{85} TsAMO RF, f. 244, op. 2980, d. 97, l. 338-39.
position in the region, and it was ruled directly from Prague by Czechs.\textsuperscript{86} After the establishment of KPZU, 11th issue of \textit{Zakarpatska Pravda} launched anti-Czechoslovak campaign focused on the Czechoslovak delegation in Khust. The front page of the issue had a slogan in capital letters “We do not want to live in the foreign state anymore”. The usual narrative of the nationally disadvantageous position of Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia was continued with a statement that “reactionary Czechoslovak circles do everything to stay on our path to happiness, they want to prevent us from building our own life on our own land freely”. \textit{Zakarpatska Pravda} proved Czech evil intentions with a depiction of the occasion when the Orthodox priest was imprisoned because he agitated for the Reunification with Ukraine. In addition, local committees reported how they resisted Czechization when they opened new schools in towns and villages.\textsuperscript{87} Thus Czechs became a real enemy in Transcarpathia, while the Red Army fought Hungarians and Germans somewhere in the distance.

Pronin claimed that Hungarians did not pose a real threat to the Soviet rule in the region because they were suppressed after military victory and internalization of 30 thousand of Hungarians. However, the Czechoslovak delegation had administrative capacities to undermine Soviet order. So political commissars initiated and supported the anti-Czech campaign to create the most uncomfortable environment for the Czechoslovak delegation.\textsuperscript{88} Being not able to connect anti-Czech campaign with the war cause, Bolsheviks relied heavily on the nationalist ideas of the previous oppression and the need to live in the national homeland. This rhetoric was also followed by the extreme poverty of Transcarpathian Ukrainians and exploitation by Czech colonists. The demand of national reunification became

\textsuperscript{86} P. Ivanytsia, “Obrannia Narodnoho Komitetu v Mukachevi [The Elections of the People’s Committee in Mukachevo],” \textit{Zakarpatska Pravda}, November 13, 1944, 3.

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Zakarpatska Pravda}, November 23, 1944, 1.

\textsuperscript{88} TsAMO RF, f. 244, op. 2980, d. 97, l. 298.
the main idea, which justified policies of NRZU, and it aimed to overcome national and social injustices, which Soviet rhetoric quite often did not differentiate.

The idea of Reunification with the Soviet Ukraine became central to the discourse of *Zakarpatska Pravda*. After rallies in Uzhhorod and Mukachevo, when the will to join the Soviet Ukraine was firstly expressed, reunification had been constantly reminded on the first pages of local newspapers. Usually, it was a slogan in the head of the front page of Transcarpathia Truth “Long live the reunification of Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine”. The slogan emphasized symbolical basis of the Soviet regime in Transcarpathia in fulfillment of “perennial will” of Transcarpathian Ukrainians.

Reunification had strong Ukrainophile orientation, thus local activists, who joined the Soviet project, had to reinvent themselves. At the rallies in Mukachevo and Uzhhorod, Russophiles Ivan Kercha and Petr Sova praised Soviet Army for liberation and expressed the strongest desire to unite with the Soviet Ukraine, which contradicted their Russophile orientation that they had expressed in Czechoslovak and Hungarian periods. Certainly, they had to become Soviet patriots, which in their case presupposed the acceptance of Ukrainophile positions that local population was Ukrainian. Nevertheless, at the rally, where the Act of the Reunification was proclaimed, Petr Sova emphasized that Transcarpathian Ukrainians were “a drop in the sea of Russian-Ukrainian nation”, and they equally join Ukrainians and Russians. Moreover, he followed the main tropes about the Soviet concept of the Friendship of the Peoples for the Ukrainian nation. Firstly, he emphasized the role of the Russians as a leading force in the liberation of the Transcarpathia, “Soviet Russia in the form of the Red Army not only liberated us, but she caresses, fondles, and raise up us by herself. She recognized us as her own children. She brought us full national and cultural liberation”. Then Sova depicted Kyiv as “a mother of Rus’ cities” with a monument of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, who pointed to the path, from which “we have not to turn off”. His speech
ended up with the greetings to Stalin, the Red Army, Ukrainian and Russian nations, and other nations of the Soviet Union. So in the moment of the greatest moment for local Ukrainophiles Act of Reunification with Ukraine, Russophile Sova put stronger emphasis on the connection with Russia and Russian nation, using Soviet discourse about the leading role of Russians in the Union, historical inseparableness of Russians and Ukrainians (Kievan Rus and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi historical moments), and the Friendship of the Peoples under the leadership of Stalin.\textsuperscript{89} His speech could be interpreted as a way of Russophile finding himself in the Soviet Ukrainophile discourse, which also had a lot of praise about Russians. Markus describes this situation as Russophiles had to learn how to be Soviet patriots, which combined both Ukrainophile and Russophile sentiments.\textsuperscript{90} Therefore, Sova and other Russophiles did not switch from one position to another, but rather they made a compromise looking for the expressions of Russian national sentiments under new rules.

Orthodox church was another channel for Russian national sentiment, which local Russophiles used to express themselves. Formally Transcarpathian Orthodox church was under the denomination of Serbian church, so Orthodox priests and some of the local activists usually claimed reunification with Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) parallel to the reunification of Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine. Moreover, their appeal to ROC always underlined “Russian spirit” and “Russian culture” of the locals, which Transcarpathian priests maintained in opposition to Hungarian domination.\textsuperscript{91} Alliance of Orthodoxy and Russophilism was apparent in the Transcarpathian delegation to Moscow, which consisted of several local Orthodox hierarchs and one of the leading Russophiles Petr Lintur. Orthodox church was one of the ways of the Soviet leadership to mobilize population

\textsuperscript{89} Petro Sova, “Nasha Mechta Sbylas’ [Our Dream Came True],” \textit{Zakarpatska Pravda}, November 27, 1944, 3.
\textsuperscript{90} Markus, \textit{Pryiednannia Zakarpatskoi Ukrainy do Radianskoii Ukrainy 1944-1945 [Accession of Transcarpathian Ukraine to Soviet Ukraine 1944-1945]}, 44.
\textsuperscript{91} “Zustrich Z Otsem Feofanom [The Meeting with the Father Feofan],” \textit{Zakarpatska Pravda}, December 26, 1944, 3.
for the war cause. In the new Western borderlands, it became also a tool of integration to the Soviet Union, where Greek Catholic Church dominated in religious life. So Orthodox Church competed with Greek Catholic, transmitting Russophile sentiments that aimed to tie local population to Ukrainian and Russian nations simultaneously.

Orthodox priests also were quite prominent activists at local rallies and agitation against Czechoslovak presence on the territory of Transcarpathia. Orthodox priest Georgii Shelever was imprisoned for his agitation of the locals to join the Red Army in the Eastern Transcarpathian town of Rakhiv. He did not spend much time in jail, and on the demand of the military command of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, he was quickly released. Right after he was free, he published an article in Zakarpatska Pravda, claiming, “In Rakhiv County, Czechoslovak governmental bureaucrats started causing disorder and disorganizing people. It raised huge outrage. The population of Rakhiv region demands to remove Czech officials from our towns and villages immediately.” 92 In this way, Orthodox priests became not only Soviet agitators but also legitimate representatives of local communities on the pages of the official newspaper, unlike Greek Catholic priests, who were mostly absent from the new Soviet public sphere in Transcarpathia.

If Greek Catholic Church was not a target of Soviet repressions in the first months of the Bolshevik administration, even Greek Catholic Bishop Theodore (Fedor) Romzha greeted unification with Ukraine;93 Rusynophile orientation was prohibited right from the beginning as “a fascist project” (association with the Hungarian rule). The Rusyn Question was raised mainly in connection with the language of instruction at schools, where teachers still used

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92 Georgiy Shelever, “Dobro Dlia Vsioho Narodu [Good for All the People],” Zakarpatska Pravda, November 30, 1944, 3.
Haraida grammar\textsuperscript{94} in the classes. Two arguments were used against Rusyn language: 1) its only purpose was to separate Transcarpathians from Russians and Ukrainians with “the unscientific theory of the third language”, and 2) Rusyn language was confusing for locals, which meant that no instruction was possible in it.\textsuperscript{95} Initially, support of Rusynophiles was mostly ascribed to Hungarian rule, but when conflict with Czechoslovak administration intensified, Czechs were also blamed of Rusynophile sympathies.\textsuperscript{96} All in all, there was no place for Rusynophile position in the Soviet discourse, when it was put in the sharp opposition to the main ideological theme of that period, Reunification with Ukraine, and it risked to trigger Ukrainophile sentiments, which considered Rusyn identity as a separatist identity aimed to split the Ukrainian nation. Moreover, the Soviet Union was more interested in enlargement and consolidation of its nationalities since the second half of the 1930s,\textsuperscript{97} which could help to secure such a remote area as Transcarpathia that did not have well-developed communications with the rest of the country and was separated by Carpathian mountains.

Local communists and intelligentsia also had plans to include into the Reunification also neighboring territories in Eastern Slovakia and Maramures County in Romania. The Temporary Constitutional Law of Transcarpathia Ukraine, which prescribed NRZU to implement laws in harmony with constitutions of the Soviet Union and Soviet Ukraine, claimed that it “would automatically spread on Carpatho-Ukrainian lands of Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, which would unite with Transcarpathian Ukraine later.”\textsuperscript{98} In addition, NRZU sent a letter to Benes, in which it asked for the Reunification and mentioned

\textsuperscript{94} Grammar of Russian Language was a standard of a Rusyn literary language developed by a local linguist Ivan Haraida and adopted by Transcarpathian schools in 1941.

\textsuperscript{95} A. Shepa, “Do Pochatku Navchalnoho Roku [Before the Academic Year Starts],” Zakarpatska Pravda, November 23, 1944, 4.

\textsuperscript{96} I. Tsyrykus, “Vpershe v Istorii [For the First Time in History],” Zakarpatska Pravda, December 9, 1944, 2.

\textsuperscript{97} Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, 409–10.

\textsuperscript{98} DAZO, f. P-14, op. 1, s. 12, l. 2.
unification rally in Presov. After the proclamation of unification, people’s committee in Presov sent a letter to NRZU asking to unify with Transcarpathian Ukraine. Although Presov communists used name Transcarpathian Ukraine, they described themselves as Russians or Rusyns (they used both names interchangeably), which meant their Russophile orientation.

Maryina proposes to interpret such actions of NRZU as the Soviet game against the Czechoslovak government in exile, which might fear to lose part of Slovakia, so it would quickly agree to give up any attempts to negotiate about Transcarpathia. So Bolsheviks used broader unification sentiments to secure their claims for Transcarpathia. It shows their pragmatic approach in dealing with Ukrainian question, not totally following nationalist sentiments.

Facing the pressure from the NRZU and pro-Soviet activists and being unable to solve these, leader of the Czechoslovak delegation Frantisek Nemec left Khust for Moscow to clarify the situation in Transcarpathia on the 11th December 1944. Czechoslovak communists, who were at that time in Moscow, told Nemec that Benes agreed that Transcarpathia would secede from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union. However, Benes rejected any previous agreement about Transcarpathia secession, told to follow spring agreement and passively observe Transcarpathian communists’ activities. After Moscow, Nemec traveled to Slovakia to establish Czechoslovak administration there, leaving small staff led by Ukrainian Ivan Petrushchak in Transcarpathian Ukraine. Lieutenant Pronin noticed that it was important that Nemec left ethnic Ukrainians in Transcarpathian Ukraine, which was a basis of the end of the confrontation with the Czechoslovak delegation and for

99 DAZO, f. P-14, op. 1, s. 13, l. 1.
100 DAZO f. 4, op. 1, s. 11, l. 1.
further cooperation. In addition, the remaining representative of the Czechoslovak delegation Ivan Petrushchak was a communist, which meant that the region was fully under the Soviet rule from the moment Nemec left the territory of Transcarpathia. Therefore, the Czechoslovak delegation made a definitive gesture that it did not want to claim the territory as Czechoslovak, but it saved its face, being still formally present on its pre-Munich territory. Local Bolsheviks felt no troubles with a Czechoslovak representative, who was an Ukrainophile communist, so the Czechoslovak delegation stopped being threatening to the Sovietization.

January 1945 was the end of the system of dual rule in Transcarpathia when Bolsheviks implemented Ukrainization and other aspects of Sovietization in competition with another administration. It was the main reason why Czechs became a target group for the negative campaign along the enemy nations of Hungarians and Germans and a separatist threat of Rusynophiles. The algorithm of the first stage of Sovietization presupposed that locals had to cleanse un-Soviet elements and organize local councils, expressing their will to join the Soviet Union. Czechoslovak delegation with a mission to renew prewar order was an obstacle for grassroots expression of Ukrainian and Russian nationalist sentiment mixed with socialist rhetoric about previously underprivileged working masses that had to be the driving force of unification, not a bilateral treaty between Soviet and Czechoslovak governments. Thus Bolsheviks played with each of the national orientations of Transcarpathian elites in a different way: Rusynophiles were totally suppressed and there was no opportunity of being recognized as a Rusyn, Russophiles were coopted into the administration and they could enjoy the cultural status of Russians in the Soviet Union, but they lost any possibility to claim that Transcarpathia was a Russian territory, and Ukrainophiles achieved their goal to unite Transcarpathia with Ukraine, even though being a Ukrainian nationalist in Western Ukraine

103 TsAMO RF, f. 244, op. 2980, d. 97, l. 351-53.
meant being under serious suspicion of anti-Soviet attitudes. Nevertheless, Soviet nationality policy gave priority to the Ukrainophile sentiment in the process of the Reunification, because the territorial basis of the policy required direct promotion of the titular nationality on the respective territory.

In January 1945, Benes decided to leave Sovietization of the region to Bolsheviks, but formally the future of the territory had to be decided between two states. Therefore, the further period between January and June 1945, when Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty about secession of Transcarpathian Ukraine was signed, continued Soviet transformation without Czechoslovak interference, and local elite could consolidate previous measures in order to finish the integration of Transcarpathia to the Soviet Ukraine.
Chapter 5. Consolidated Ukrainization of Transcarpathia in 1945

When the Czechoslovak administration was forced to leave Transcarpathia, the Bolshevists could continue their policies without interference. In 1945, the preparations for the formal inclusion of Transcarpathian Ukraine into Soviet Ukraine were finished with the signing of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty and ratification of the Treaty by both sides in late November. In January 1946, Transcarpathian Ukraine officially became the Transcarpathian oblast of Soviet Ukraine. So, 1945 was a year, when local communists had to finish all the necessary preparations of the region being ready for Sovietization as a part of Ukraine. Ukrainization was not the only policy at that moment, as creation of Soviet organizations like Komsomol (Communist Youth Union) and nationalization of big industrial enterprises were also happening at that time. Nevertheless, Ukrainization was then the most intensively implemented policy, while the extensive creation of kolkhozes and industrialization were implemented later in the 1940s.

5.1 Promotion of the Soviet Ukrainian Identity and Its Obstacles

First of all, the NRZU prioritized educational policy, along with redistribution of land and purges of local unreliable elements. Local educational facilities had two main issues at that moment: war destructions and poor state of their buildings, and lack of Soviet teaching materials. In both cases, NRZU asked Kyiv for assistance, as it lacked the resources to do it on its own. Partisans, who did the most important local organizational work in villages, reorganized schools, providing new schoolbooks and instructing teachers on following Soviet standards. For example, Turianytsia, the head of NRZU and KPZU, and Andreiko, who was a member of the Ukrainian Communist Party sent from Kyiv to monitor the local party, requested 2,000 primer books, 2,000 Ukrainian and 1,000 Russian grammar books, 500

104 TsAMO RF, f. 244, op. 2980, d. 97, l. 311.
history books by Shestakov (the main history book in the USSR, according to Brandenberger), and other books for various school subjects.\textsuperscript{105} Moreover, local people’s committees informed NRZU that they lacked Ukrainian-speaking cadres for the schools.\textsuperscript{106} In general, the schools lacked human and material resources to function properly. Therefore, there were various reports in the press that many schools were not opened because there were no teachers or the school buildings were severely damaged.\textsuperscript{107}

In spring and summer of 1945, the local leaders acknowledged the critical status of the cadres and infrastructure of the educational system, but they still planned to use teachers not only for school. At a rally in Uzhhorod before the start of the school year, NRZU leaders demanded to teach children Soviet culture, “national in form, socialist in content”, alongside more material matters of repairing school buildings and helping with grain procurements.\textsuperscript{108} These tasks illustrate the poor state of educational system in Transcarpathia, which still did not recover from the war and also demanded teachers to provide help on other objectives. Therefore, Sovietization through education was more of a formal step at that moment.

Despite all shortcomings of the functioning of educational system, Bolsheviks had limited success in finding cadres for Russian-speaking schools in Uzhhorod and Mukachevo and opening a university in Uzhhorod. The first aspect was achieved due to the previous Hungarian toleration of Russian schools and teachers, while Ukrainian schooling was prohibited. It explains why a majority of local applications for teacher position were sent to Russian schools. Moreover, non-communist Ukrainophile teachers would most probably be connected to Voloshyn and Carpatho-Ukraine supporters, which was one of the main dangers

\textsuperscript{105} DAZO, f. 4, op. 1, s. 78, l. 3.
\textsuperscript{106} DAZO, f. P-14, op. 1, s. 22, l. 10.
\textsuperscript{107} Zakarpatska Pravda, September 14, 1945, 1-2.
for Bolsheviks in the region according to Pronin.\textsuperscript{109} Therefore, Russophiles became a backbone of Soviet education in the urban area. However, according to Markus, some of the Russophiles could switch into Ukrainophiles,\textsuperscript{110} so they represented a pool of school cadres for Ukrainization of education.

In order to receive a teaching position, teachers included two types of arguments in their applications: 1) their poor current state as a result of Hungarian policy (one applicant even claimed that his hardships were a result of him being Russian)\textsuperscript{111}, and 2) their long experience of teaching at Russian schools. Some of the applicants explicitly expressed their Russophile sentiments sending a “Russian greeting” to their local school inspector.\textsuperscript{112} So as in the case with collaborating intelligentsia in NRZU, the Russophile sentiment of locals was instrumentalized for establishing the Soviet regime in Transcarpathia.

In order to solve the problem of an insufficient number of teachers at schools, especially in mountainous rural areas, NRZU asked Soviet Ukraine for teachers. The Ukrainian government sent approximately 800 pedagogues from its western regions. According to the report on their arrival to Transcarpathian Ukraine, they faced material hardships and had to be convinced to start working at Transcarpathian schools. A part of the arrived teachers even left the region and went back to their previous homes.\textsuperscript{113} Thus, even transfers of pedagogues from Soviet Ukraine could not solve the cadre problem, and Ukrainization of education was seriously slowed down.

While rural schools desperately required teachers, Bolsheviks were able to open the Transcarpathian-Ukrainian University in Uzhhorod, which was a major step in the training of local Soviet cadres. It had four faculties with Ukrainian and Russian languages of instruction:

\textsuperscript{109} TsAMO RF, f. 244, op. 2980, d. 97, l. 315.
\textsuperscript{110} Markus, \textit{Pryiednannia Zakarpatskoii Ukraiiny do Radianskoii Ukraiiny 1944-1945 [Accession of Transcarpathian Ukraine to Soviet Ukraine 1944-1945]}, 44.
\textsuperscript{111} DAZO f. 1517, op. 2, s. 186, l. 23.
\textsuperscript{112} DAZO f. 1517, op. 2, s. 186, l. 26.
\textsuperscript{113} DAZO f. 4, op. 1, s. 198, l. 27-28.
Philological, Historical, Biological, and Medical. Encouraging students of senior years at secondary schools to enter the university directly without graduation, the University accepted 240 students to preparatory courses. The first rector of the university was the Russophile Stepan Dobosh, who very quickly abandoned his position and moved to Czechoslovakia in November 1945. In addition, the university required professors from Soviet Ukraine, as there were not enough people with higher education in Transcarpathia. The Bolsheviks marked historical development with opening the first institution of higher education in the region, although its proper implementation still required more time and resources.

Instruction of Ukrainian language at urban schools was an important symbolical step in winning Transcarpathian cities for Ukrainophiles. It required implementation of the Soviet standard of the Ukrainian language and suppression of any deviations. In this regard, the Rusyn language was the main target as a deviant form of local vernacular that aimed to split Transcarpathian Ukrainians from the rest of Ukraine. The critique of the language of instruction at Uzhhorod gymnasium is exemplary in this case. Teachers were criticized for their inability to have classes in Ukrainian and avoidance of prescribed schoolbooks. Instead, they had to follow Soviet standards in form (either Ukrainian or Russian language) and content of their classes. For this reason, there was a call to establish special language seminars of Ukrainian and Russian for teachers, which had to exclude any use of “Haraida’s Uhro-Russian language”. So if before there had been a call for Ukrainization, Bolsheviks started monitoring how locals follow their standards.

The implementation of Soviet standards of Ukrainian and Russian, which also had pre-revolutionary standard, was one of the main concerns of local pro-Soviet activists. Special

114 DAZO f. 4, op. 1, s. 142, l. 32.
language courses were opened for workers in the main cities,\textsuperscript{116} liquidating illiteracy and easing communication with their future co-nationals from Soviet Ukraine. Public space also had to follow the line of Ukrainization. There were reports of signboards in mixed languages from Sevlush and Berehovo, where Hungarians were a majority. For example, in Sevlush, the local committee requested to change the language of signboards to Ukrainian, but locals changed it to the “Czech-Ukrainian language”, which was unacceptable for the communists.\textsuperscript{117} In Berehovo, the people’s committee asked for a specialist in Ukrainian language to close the signboards question.\textsuperscript{118} Therefore, the implementation of standard Ukrainian was not a formal requirement from the center, but still a crucial step in assimilating local towns and villages to Soviet Ukraine.

Bolsheviks could still accommodate local national orientations, and it would be cheaper and easier to implement than Ukrainization of local public sphere. According to Rieber, Bolsheviks aimed to solve the Ukrainian question for good during the Second World War in order to avoid having neighboring territories, where Ukrainian nationalism could grow and threaten the integrity of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the region was separated from the rest of the country by the Carpathian Mountains and had strategic importance for access to Central European states, so it had to be strongly integrated into the Soviet system in any way possible. Thus, Transcarpathia had to close one of the most important national questions of the Union, and become a safe place for Soviet operations in Central Europe.

Hungarian and Czech were other enemy languages for Soviet Ukrainization of the region. If the Czech language was expected to evaporate with Czech bureaucrats leaving Transcarpathia, Hungarian speakers were still a present and prominent minority. Hungarians were excluded from participation in people’s committees; they still had cultural influence,

\textsuperscript{116} Zakarpatska Pravda, 7 March, 1945, 3.
\textsuperscript{117} DAZO P-14, op. 1, s. 19, l. 1.
\textsuperscript{118} DAZO, f. P-14, op. 1, s. 73, l. 53.
which did not satisfy the Ukrainizing attempts of Bolsheviks. Initially, the Bolsheviks decided to fire all officials, who did not know Ukrainian, and close schools with Hungarian instruction.\textsuperscript{119} Later, they faced lack of Ukraininan-speaking cadres and the risk to alienate the local Hungarian population completely, thus they opened Hungarian classes, but in Ukrainian and Russian schools nonetheless. In addition, Bolsheviks decided to soften restrictions for Hungarians to occupy local administrative offices. However, as was the case in Berehovo, they had to take the oath in Ukrainian, not necessarily understanding what they were saying, and only afterwards, they were explained in Hungarian what they said in their oath.\textsuperscript{120} This caricature example illustrates the attempt to follow the general line of Ukrainization, while also integrating minorities into the Soviet project. The process of reconciliation with the Hungarian minority was finished in the end of 1945, when NRZU issued a decree that allowed to open Hungarian secondary schools with the same curriculum as in other schools, but with Hungarian language instead of Ukrainian.\textsuperscript{121} In general, during 1945, discrimination against Hungarians was not as harsh as initially, but they were still a target of repressions and relocations as an ethnic group. It could be explained by the fact that Hungary stopped being an enemy nation, and Soviets started taking it under control.

The idea of Hungarians loyal to the Soviet regime was still present, and they were not an irredeemable ethnic group, unlike Poles in Galicia and Volhynia. In Pronin’s report, Hungarians were depicted as non-dangerous, although they required additional attention. In particular, Bolsheviks decided to tolerate the leading position of Hungarians in local trade unions, but NRZU was recommended to pay special attention to them in order not to deviate from the nationality policy adopted for the region.\textsuperscript{122} So, in those spheres and regions, where

\textsuperscript{119} DAZO, f. P-14, op. 1, s. 73, l. 8.
\textsuperscript{120} DAZO, f. P-14, op. 1, s. 73, l. 24.
\textsuperscript{121} DAZO, f. 4, op. 1, s. 149, l. 46.
\textsuperscript{122} TsAMO RF, f. 244, op. 2980, d. 97, l. 357.
Hungarians were the majority, Bolsheviks decided not to adopt radical policies of exclusion, and to provide limited access to official positions.

Hungarians were not just passive bystanders and victims of Soviet policies, but tried to find their agency under new circumstances. Although Hungarians were not given a voice in the main local press like Zakarpatska Pravda or Molod Zakarpattia and were referred to as Magyar fascists and oppressors, they had their own press and had their voice in local committees and trade unions. On the other hand, at the trade union rally, Hungarian workers greeted the reunification of Transcarpathian Ukraine with Soviet Ukraine. Moreover, they appealed to the Friendship of the Peoples in the Soviet Union, asking for local press in Hungarian in order to understand what was happening in their new homeland, which they received.\textsuperscript{123} In this regard, the Soviet nationalizing policy and discourse on nationalities provided some space for maneuvering even for national groups, who were the enemies at the time of war.

5.2 The Reunification through Ukrainophile and Russophile lenses

While Hungarians had a limited reconciliation in their relations with the Bolsheviks, the Greek Catholic Church faced gradual deterioration of the Bolshevik policy towards it. NRZU issued a decree allowing free change of religion, which was the start of the serious campaign against the Greek Catholic Church. The decree did not have any discriminatory norms against Greek Catholic Church in particular, but Transcarpathian Ukraine claimed that it would prevent any attempts by the Greek Catholics to prevent conversion to Orthodoxy. Moreover, Greek Catholic Church was accused of collaboration with Hungarian authorities in their policy of Magyarization.\textsuperscript{124} Despite the fact that Greek Catholic Church was formally

\textsuperscript{123} TsAMO RF, f. 244, op. 2980, d. 97, l. 356.
\textsuperscript{124} “V Interesakh Narodu [In the Interests of the People],” Zakarpatska Pravda, March 25, 1945, 2.
destroyed in 1947, 1945 marked the way in which it became an unredeemable element for the Soviet system.

The reports of the Russophile Petro Lintur, who was the Commissioner in the Affairs of Religious Cults, enlighten local perspective on the importance of the elimination of Greek Catholic Church for nationality policies. Lintur established his negative Russophile position towards Greek Catholics in his first report, “the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church, which was always a determined enemy of Slavic and Russian peoples and played a sad role during the Hungarian-German fascist occupation, once again started hostile to the Soviet Union propaganda lately.” Afterwards, the description of conflicts between Greek Catholic and Orthodox priests follows, but the anti-Russian character of the church is framed right from the beginning. Thus, Russophile Lintur emphasized the constant anti-Russian orientation of the Church, however, since the Bolsheviks were suspicious of any uncontrolled church institutions, they could use Russophile sentiments to cover their general policy towards religious institutions.

Its anti-Russian orientation led Greek Catholic Church to collaboration with Hungarian authorities before 1918 and in the 1938-44 period, according to Lintur. He claims that this alliance between Hungarians and the Uniate Church aimed to denationalize the local population through Western calendar and customs, spreading not Russian and Ukrainian national consciousness, but Hungarian. Nevertheless, he rehabilitated some Russophile priests, “who considered themselves consciously or unconsciously belonging to the big Russo-Ukrainian unity”. Lintur used Russophile tropes of Russo-Ukrainian unity for his reports against Greek Catholic Church, just like Sova used the same tropes for his greetings of Reunification with Ukraine. Therefore, the Russophiles clearly found a discursive space in

125 DAZO, f. P-14, op. 1, s. 662, l. 1.
126 DAZO, f. P-14, op. 1, s. 662, l. 6.
127 DAZO, f. P-14, op. 1, s. 662, l. 10.
Soviet Ukrainization to express their sentiments and actually work for some kind of unity with Russia. However, their Russophile agenda could only be applied on the individual level, allowing Russophiles to be Russians, while the territory itself was still Ukrainian, and locals could only choose between Ukrainian and Russian national affiliations.

Promotion of Ukrainian culture alongside with Russian was the work, for which Russophiles subscribed with Soviet Ukrainophiles. Due to the Hungarian repressions of Ukrainophiles and communists, and support of Carpatho-Ukraine by non-Soviet Ukrainophiles, Pronin could summarize the characteristics of those in power as either communists or Russophiles.\(^\text{128}\) He adds that Ukrainophiles associated with Voloshyn were the main enemies of the Bolsheviks in the region, not Hungarians or Czechs, because they could still hide in the people’s committees,\(^\text{129}\) and the army command probably feared Ukrainian nationalistic armed resistance or subversive activity similar to that in Galicia and Volhynia. There was constant monitoring of Voloshyn and Carpatho-Ukraine-related Ukrainophiles in local councils, which ended up with exclusion and arrests of non-communist Ukrainophile activists.\(^\text{130}\) Therefore, the Ukrainophile intelligentsia paradoxically became separate from the Bolsheviks’ Ukrainizing force in Transcarpathia, unlike other Western Ukrainian territories, where local Ukrainophile intelligentsia was used for legitimization of the Soviet regime.

If Ukrainophile sentiment was publicly present in the form of Reunification with Soviet Ukraine, the perennial desire of locals to be a part of the Ukrainian nation, and promotion of the Ukrainian language in the first months,\(^\text{128}\)\(^\text{129}\)\(^\text{130}\)\(^\text{131}\) Transcarpathian Ukraine started publishing more poets from Soviet Ukraine, like Sosura’s famous war poem “Love Ukraine” with strong nationalist sentiments and organization of Ukrainian main nationalist poet

\(^{128}\) TsAMO RF, f. 244, op. 2980, d. 97, l. 330-31.
\(^{129}\) TsAMO RF, f. 244, op. 2980, d. 97, l. 315.
\(^{130}\) Korsun, “Vid Uporiadnyka [From the Editor],” 14.
\(^{131}\) Zakarpatska Pravda, October 14, 1945, 3.
Shevchenko’s evenings dedicated to the Ukrainian poet and his writings. The Bolsheviks also transported books about Ukrainian history and school literature to educate locals as Ukrainian Soviet citizens.

There was also a communist Ukrainophile intelligentsia, which published its works on the pages of Transcarpathian Ukraine. The most prominent example from this camp is Andrii Patrus-Karpatskii, who escaped to Soviet Union with other communists after Hungarian troops came to Transcarpathia in 1938, fought in the Red Army, and then returned. During the Czechoslovak period, he was a Russophile, like Lintur and Sova, and published his works in Russian, but when he came back, he fully embarked on the Ukrainophile project, unlike other Russophiles, who stayed and were looking to express themselves in the Soviet discourse. Patrus-Karpatskii followed the usual discursive patterns of Soviet intelligentsia, also trying to connect the local cultural particularities of Transcarpathia to the Soviet Ukrainian identity. In his article Trembita Calls for the Fight, he used the local musical woodwind instrument trembita to symbolize local folklore, describing Hungarians as oppressors and calling to resist them. It combines peasant populist overtones, broad depictions of Transcarpathian rural and mountainous areas and praise of wisdom of the common people. More importantly, he connected local Transcarpathian geographical symbols with their Ukrainian counterparts:

Tysa [the biggest Transcarpathian river] heard that from the East, from the broad steppes, from Dnipro-Slavutych [the biggest Ukrainian river], the wind of freedom blows, because brave Stalin’s regiments of avengers went westward like unstoppable avalanche for woe and tears of much-suffering Ukrainian land.

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132 Zakarpatska Pravda, March 9, 1945, 1.
This passage illustrates how local (Tysa), national (Dnipro-Slavutych) and Soviet war (Stalin’s regiments of avengers) symbols all came together. In this regard, Patrus-Karpatskii was an exemplary Transcarpathian Soviet patriot, who could lead local intelligentsia in the process of Sovietization. It actually happened when Patrus-Karpatskii briefly headed the Transcarpathian branch of the Writers’ Union of Ukraine until he was imprisoned in 1947 for working for Czechoslovakia during World War II. Nevertheless, his writings led local intelligentsia in its transformation into Soviet patriots in 1945.

Another rising figure of local intelligentsia, Ivan Chendei, who came out of Khust gymnasium, dominated by Russophiles like Lintur, was in transition to Soviet Ukrainophilia. He joined Zakarpatska Pravda in March 1945, his first writings were in Russian and dedicated to partisan and war stories. However, he switched to Ukrainian and followed a Soviet Ukrainophile position similar to that of Patrus-Karpatskii. For example, covering tours of the Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia State Theater, Chendei emphasized, “The performance evenings were hot meetings of brothers with brothers, these were meetings of two brothers, two sons of one mother.” So the depiction of performances, mainly about Ukrainian peasant or Cossack stories of the 19th century, aimed to bring the omnipresent motive of Reunification and further popularize Ukrainian culture.

Although local writers like Chendei and Patrus-Karpatskii transformed their writings to fit Soviet standards, they had their freedom to express nationalist sentiments, like the empowered Russophiles. Unlike Russophiles, Soviet Ukrainophiles could express their greetings of the Reunification more directly, addressing Ukrainian nationalist ideas of the united Ukraine. Soviet policy and discourse changed Russophile and Ukrainophile positions in Transcarpathia, making them compatible with each other. They were not the same interwar

135 Ivan Chendei, “Sto Vechoriv [One Hundred Evenings],” Zakarpatska Pravda, October 17, 1945, 2.
orientations, because all of them became Soviet citizens with fixed national identities, who recognized the titular status of the Ukrainian nationality in Transcarpathia and the leading status of Russians in the Soviet Union. While Russophiles praised “the Russian Army” and the Orthodox Church, Soviet Ukrainophiles used Ukrainian peasant populist symbols. Nevertheless, as their later careers in the Soviet Union demonstrate, all of them were interested in local peasant life in their studies and fiction. Thus, 1945 was a time to express Russian or Ukrainian nationalist sentiments as long as they fit the Soviet discourse on Reunification of Ukrainian lands, but in the end Transcarpathia joined Ukraine with its special place for Russians, not Russia itself.

Sometimes, the Reunification and Ukrainian and Russian nationalisms unleashed by it crossed the limits defined by Moscow. In particular, the Reunification process ignited the irredentist claims of local communists, who were eager to annex the Presov region of Slovakia and Maramures County of Romania. While Presov was not a part of the territory negotiated with Czechoslovakia, and the question was settled after transition of Transcarpathia to the Soviet Union, Maramures was still in the game. In February 1945, people’s committees subjected to NRZU were established there, proclaiming unification of Maramures with Transcarpathian Ukraine. Nevertheless, the local Romanian population and representatives of Bucharest did not want to lose this territory, so they established a Romanian administration against the will of NRZU. They also beat down Ukrainian Maramures delegates, risking escalation of a conflict with 2,000 Red Army soldiers mobilized from Maramures villages, according to Andreiko’s telegram to Khrushchev. In the end, Tyrianytsia did not attempt to reoccupy the territory of Maramures and left it to Romania.

According to Stykalin’s interpretation of those events, Moscow unleashed Ukrainian nationalism in order to annex Transcarpathia but did not control it directly. Therefore, Stalin

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136 DAZO f. 4, op. 1, s. 103, l. 1.
137 DAZO f. 4, op. 1, s. 78, l. 6-7.
had to personally interfere to prevent additional annexations to Transcarpathian Ukraine.

Initially, the Bolsheviks were ready to annex Maramures, but when the left-wing government of Petru Groza came to power, the Soviet Union did not want to risk a conflict around a small piece of land like Maramures County. This was the reason why Stalin told Khrushchev to inform Turianytsia that he had to stop any activities regarding annexation of the territory to Transcarpathian Ukraine.\textsuperscript{138} Despite being forced to abandon Maramures County, Turianytsia tried to help the Red Army soldiers, who returned to their villages and faced discriminatory treatment by the local Romanian administration. In his letter to the Ukrainian Commissar of Foreign Affairs of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Turianytsia asked to negotiate equal treatment of veterans of the Red Army and Romanian army with the Romanian government.\textsuperscript{139} All in all, local communists tried to have agency in Maramures affair and truly follow the Ukrainian nationalist zeal of Reunification of Ukrainian lands, which might have been ignited from above, but became autonomous and very active on the local level.

Local nationalist activism contradicts Magocsi’s interpretation of Transcarpathia becoming part of Soviet Ukraine only by central decision in Moscow,\textsuperscript{140} and shows a complex picture of local activists pushing their irredentist agenda. This was a rare occasion when Ukrainian and Russian nationalists could work hand in hand. Although the Russophiles could enjoy the leading role of Russians in the Union and occupy leading positions along with communists, they lost the symbolic battle over Transcarpathia, which officially became Ukrainian. Thus, Ukrainian nationalist sentiment was an autonomous force, channeled by Moscow and accepted by local Russophiles.


\textsuperscript{139} DAZO f. 4, op. 1, s. 104, l. 5.

\textsuperscript{140} Magocsi, With Their Backs to the Mountains, 295.
In a broader process of Sovietization of Transcarpathia, Ukrainization aimed not only to eliminate elements that did not fit Soviet system, as it was with Czechoslovak administration in 1945, but also to expand Soviet presence on the new territory across the Carpathian Mountains. On the one hand, Soviet nationality policy had to win over hearts of local Russophiles and Ukrainophiles, who received a chance to unite with their kin-state (either Russia or Ukraine), and on the other, Transcarpathians had to conform nationality standards of being either Russians or Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. Therefore, national assimilation preceded major political and economical transformations associated with Sovietization and was a basis for further integration into the Soviet system.
**Conclusion**

The Sovietization and seizure of Transcarpathia by the Soviet Union is a case of a multi-layered transformation in the domain of nationalities. Moreover, these changes were at the core of making a certain territory and its population Soviet. On the one hand, the Bolsheviks followed their algorithm of providing a titular status to a certain nationality on the territory, which the nationalists could claim as theirs; this was the case with Ukrainian nationalists in Transcarpathia. On the other hand, they adjusted their Ukrainization of the region due to differing political orientations of local activists.

The Soviet nationality policy had always been an essential part of the Soviet regime since the 1920s, when the basic design of Soviet state was established. The Soviet Union consisted of national republics, which were the primary building blocks of the Bolshevik political project. Bolsheviks treated nationality as a territory-based community, with national rights, the national language of documentation and promotion of its members to the party and government positions guaranteed to the national group considered dominant on a certain territory. While in the 1920s this principle was applied to myriads of nationalities with their own territory-based national Soviets, the 1930s brought a revision of this policy by merger of nationalities, repressions against groups considered unreliable by the Bolsheviks, and a new role of Russians and the Russian language. Despite these changes, the basic principles of strongly institutionalized nationality and titular nationalities on their territories were in place. Addressing the question of continuity of the nationality policy, Bolsheviks continued to maintain the national diversity of the Soviet Union.

The main reason for this heavy reliance on national diversity was an attempt to calm down the nationalist movement and use it to popularize Bolshevik ideas among every Soviet nationality, expanding their influence. In Ukraine’s case, Ukrainization gave an opportunity to
create a political unit for Ukrainians and Ukrainian culture, which could attract the Ukrainian population of neighboring Poland to the Soviet cause. At the same moment, a cross-border nationality might create paranoia of foreign agents on Soviet territory, which was a trend in the 1930s. Overall, nationality policy was one of the basic tools to expand and maintain Soviet rule, because socialist ideals always had to have a national form.

Transplanting the Soviet system westwards, Bolsheviks did not only implement the Soviet version of socialism, but also transformed the status of local nationalities in order to integrate the new territories into the Soviet institutional design. Although these policies are associated, first of all, with deportations and prosecution of certain minorities like Poles or Hungarians, Bolsheviks also promoted nationalities that were now considered dominant in their respective republics. Moreover, on the initial stage of Sovietization such promotion had the highest priority, as Bolsheviks planned to win over the annexed population by satisfying their national sentiments and to make further economic and political transformations more palatable for the population.

Sovietization of Transcarpathia posed a challenge for Bolsheviks due to its complex problem of different national orientations of local nationalist activists, and national minorities. Ukrainian, Russian, and Rusyn nationalisms claimed the Transcarpathian population for their national projects. Previous competition usually relied on support from external actors, but none could achieve a definitive victory over its opponents. Local communists supported the Ukrainophile position, although they were in conflict with local Ukrainian nationalists, while Russophiles and Rusynophiles collaborated with the Hungarian government to pursue their national projects. In 1944, the Red Army and communist activists accompanying it had to solve the dispute between these three political orientations and integrate Transcarpathia into the Soviet Union in national terms.
Bolsheviks adopted a complex approach to the Ukrainophile-Russophile-Rusynophile dispute, favoring Russian and Ukrainian national identities and totally rejecting the Rusyn one. Although Rusyns were proclaimed Ukrainians, it meant that Rusynophiles had a choice between Russian and Ukrainian identities. Local communists represented the Ukrainophile orientation and agitated for the unification with Soviet Ukraine and promotion of Ukrainian national identity. Russophiles were recognized as Russians, but they had to join the Ukrainian project in the Soviet Union. Both Ukrainophiles and Russophiles had an opportunity to express their national sentiments for unification with Russians and Ukrainians, although the territorial framework of Soviet nationality policy could not satisfy both groups, therefore, Transcarpathia became a Ukrainian territory with Russians and Ukrainians. The Rusyn nationality was condemned as an enemy project aimed to divide Transcarpathians and Ukrainians.

There were also other nationalities, like Hungarians and Czechs, whose status had to be settled. The Czechs were mainly bureaucrats, who planned to restore Czechoslovakia in its pre-Munich borders, and thus became the main target of Transcarpathian communists, who held a congregation proclaiming Reunification with Ukraine. Czechs stopped being a Bolshevik target only after their delegation left the territory of Transcarpathia. Hungarians were initially also discriminated, but when Moscow started gaining control over the Hungarian state, the Hungarian minority received some national rights, such as the right for schools with instruction in Hungarian and the right to join local institutions. The status of minorities really depended on international relations with their respective kin-states, and if there were no serious ethnic conflicts like the one between Ukrainians and Poles in Galicia and Volhynia, Bolsheviks did not deport, but accommodated the minority.

Ukrainization of Transcarpathia became an instrument to secure strategically important territory for the Soviet Union and to solve one of the most important internal national
questions – the Ukrainian question. Transcarpathia was the westernmost territory, which could be used to expand direct Soviet rule through cross-border nationalities. Moreover, it was also a base for a possible Ukrainian nationalist movement. Using nationalist claims to fight nationalism and popularize the Bolshevik revolutionary cause was behind the intensive Ukrainization of Transcarpathia. So the 1920s policy continued in Transcarpathia.

If the Rusyn identity was unredeemable due to the risk of triggering Ukrainian sentiment and creating a possible separatist threat in a region already detached by mountains and poor communications, Russophile as well as Ukrainian sentiment was considered acceptable. Local Russian sentiments also helped to advance the unification, but with a stronger emphasis on Russia, and to make other aspects of Sovietization look more attractive for those affiliating themselves with the Russian nation. Nevertheless, the Russophiles had to forget their ideal of the pre-revolutionary Russian nation, and become Soviet Russians, a state-bearing nationality on the territory of the whole Soviet Union. Some of them, like Patrus-Karpatskii and Chendei, even decided to become Ukrainophiles, but in either case definitely had to change their identity. Overall, the Russian national identity was integrated, but its previous basis in the form of the prerevolutionary Russian nation was destroyed, and they could only rely on the Soviet status of Russians and Russian culture.

Local activists also had a place for their own agenda, if they learnt to play by the Soviet rules. The Reunification of Ukrainian lands became a framework for Transcarpathian communists like Turianytsia to push for territorial expansion into Slovakia or Romania, who were only stopped by Moscow, which wanted to avoid conflicts over minor annexations. Russophiles like Lintur, who supported conversion to Orthodoxy, had an opportunity to destroy the Greek Catholic Church, expressing their Russophile sentiments. Even though pre-Soviet interests and sentiments were in play, they were now a part of their new Soviet identity: Soviet Ukrainian or Soviet Russian.
The Transcarpathian case shows that nationality policy combined both adjustment to local sentiments and transformation of local national identities to fit the Soviet project. Local particularities had to be placed into the already established institutional framework with the titular status of Ukrainian nationality in Ukrainian republic and Russians as the state-bearing nation. It could be said that Bolsheviks were pragmatic in using nationality policies as long as it fit their priorities, but the institutional heritage of affirmative action empire from the 1920s pushed them to certain ways of dealing with nationalities issues, which could be more expensive than the alternatives (like in the case of Ukrainization, when the local cadres were better suited for Russification). Therefore, Sovietization required a national form before it could use it for further revolutionary economic and political transformations.
Bibliography


