

**CIVIC RESPONSIVENESS TO THE
REPRESENTATIONS OF REFUGEES IN THE
HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENTAL MEDIA:
GENDERED “CARE” AND CONTROL**

By

Orsolya Lehotai

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Gender Studies

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Dr. Erzsébet Barát

Budapest, Hungary

2017

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a theoretical and empirical exploration of “moral(izing) spectatorship” (Chouliaraki 2016) in Hungary, which, I argue, comes about as a result of the governmental media coverage of the so-called “refugee crisis” and constructs difference between the positions of the spectator and the “distant sufferer.” The empirical media study and audience research are located at the intersection of three conceptual models: moral spectatorship and civic responsiveness, the processes of securitization and militarization, and critical discourse analysis. I analyzed the relationship between media and the reception of the media content and discourses based on five semi-structured interviews with activists from Szeged and Budapest whose participation can be understood as different forms of pro-democratic and non-democratic “civic responsiveness.” My research is concerned with different non-moralizing forms of civic engagement and humanitarian discourse based on understanding different types of solidarity in order to interpret the ways in which the Hungarian “spectator” feels compelled to act in relation to the mediated suffering that was reported by Hungarian media outlets during the summer-fall of 2015 and the Government’s constitution of “difference” in the concept of “migrant” through the construction of the Hungarian identity.

DECLARATION OF ORIGINAL RESEARCH AND THE WORD COUNT

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of original research; it contains no materials accepted for any other degree in any other institution and no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

I further declare that the following word count for this thesis are accurate:

Body of thesis (all chapters excluding notes, references, appendices, etc.): 21,985 words

Entire manuscript: 27,110 words

Signed _____ Orsolya Lehotai _____ (*name typed*)

(Signature appears on the hard copy submitted to the library)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Erzsébet Barát, who helped a lot with her tremendous amounts of feedback and consultations to reach the end of this journey and to learn a lot about language and politics.

I would like to thank Elissa Helms for her helpful feedback, and who taught me about Gender and Nationalism, which was one of the key concepts of this research.

I would like to thank Nicole and Lily for making this year more bearable and helping me through this MA program with their love.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents	v
Introduction	1
Chapter 1 – Constituting Moral(izing) Spectatorship	5
1.1 Moral(izing) Spectatorship and “Mediapolis”	6
1.2 Gendered Nationalism and Securitization	14
1.2.1 The Nation and Its Borders	15
1.2.2 Gendered Securitization of the “Migrant”	17
1.3 Critical Discourse Analysis	21
Chapter 2 – Media Representations of the “Refugee”	25
2.1 Methodological Reflections	25
2.2. The Online Concept of “Migrant” Generated in the Precognox Database	29
2.3 Case Studies	37
2.3.1 Case Study 1: Constituting the “Refugee as Violent Man”	37
2.3.2 Case Study 2: Constructing the “refugee as hyper-sexual terrorist” image	42
2.3.3 Case Study 3: The Petra László Incident: Spectacle in the Making	45
2.4. Competing Masculinities	47
Chapter 3 – Gendered Forms of Civic Responsiveness: an Audience Research	51
3.1 Methodological Reflections: Media and the Spectator	52
3.2 “Mobilizing in the Interest of Our Values and Nation”: The Discourse of Control	54
3.2.1 Militarized Masculinity and (Hetero)sexism	56
3.2.2 “Filiation” and Militarization	62
3.3 Humanitarian Reasons of Civic Responsiveness: the Discourse of “Care”	67
3.3.1 Humanitarian Response vis-à-vis the State	68
3.3.2 “Common Humanity”: “Lifestyle” Solidarity in the Age of Neoliberalism	69
Conclusions	76
Appendix	80
Reference List	81

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 1. Connections between the extracted personal names from all of the examined articles (Source: Precognox)	30
Fig. 2: Illustration for a news article of origo.hu with the title: “25 thousands migrants arrived over the weekend” (source: origo.hu)	34
Fig. 3: “Migrants left their their unnecessary stuff strewn about in front of the train as well” (source: MTI).	35
Fig. 4: “The migrants are transported to trains” (source: MTI)	36
Fig. 5: The priest is shaving a Bangladeshi refugee (source: UNHCR/Linder Bálint)	73

Introduction

On June 25, 2015,¹ the temperature was unexpectedly low compared to an average night during that time of year. That night, activists from Szeged, Hungary managed to successfully lobby the state-owned railways company, MÁV, to allow approximately 50 refugees, primarily from Syria, Afghanistan, and Congo, to spend the night in the waiting room of the main railway station in Szeged. Earlier that day, the activists had been distributing food and water to people who had been waiting at the station, when at 10:30pm, MÁV's security forced the refugees to leave and locked them out in the rain, soon after the last train had left. The first train to Budapest the following morning would leave only at 4:36am. After the local homeless shelter rejected the activists' request for assistance, claiming to have a "full house", the activists argued for permission from MÁV to open the main station up again and eventually got permission for a night. The following night, after requesting permission again, the company rejected the activists' request based on what they deemed a "risk of infection".² Four days later, on June 30th, the Mayor of Szeged, representing the Hungarian Socialism Party (MSZP), instructed several local, self-government-owned companies to help the growing number of refugees according to their available resources by providing mobile toilets, sleeping bags, trash bags, containers, and other necessary equipment.³

¹ Link: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150626_Beindultak_a_civilek_Szegeden_elelmet_pel accessed on May 28, 2017.

² Link: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150627_Bekemenyitett_a_MAV_ejjel_kizarta_a_menek accessed on May 28, 2017.

³ Link: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150630_Botka_utasitasara_segitenek_a_menekultekn accessed on May 28, 2017.

This form of organized “civic responsiveness”, which constitutes what I will argue is part of the discourse of “care”, was one of the first civic engagement acts in response to the humanitarian crisis that took place in Hungary during the summer of 2015. This response, however, was one among many other forms of responsiveness that I will explore and analyze in the following chapters. As I will argue, I do not support references to the humanitarian crisis as the “refugee crisis” because of the ways in which it “became” a crisis. The reason that I still refer to it as crisis is because of the lack of Hungarian governmental intervention that led to both organized “humanitarian” and violent acts towards refugees in Hungary. The lack of intervention is part of what has become a long-term state-sponsored “hate” campaign in the governmental media and via billboards⁴ all over Hungary since the summer of 2015. The main goal of my thesis is to explore the various ways in which the Hungarian governmental media reflects and re/produces the underlying power relations in the state’s securitizing of the “migrant” and how the state as a “securitizing” actor fueled gendered, racialized, and ethnicized Othering during the summer and fall of 2015. This Othering was a political strategy that contributed to the construction of the Hungarian Self identity vis-à-vis the “Muslim” Other.

Within the framework of audience research, I conducted five semi-structured interviews with activists from Szeged and Budapest, whose participation was based on different forms of civic responsiveness and methods of solidarity. I also interviewed a man in his mid-20s, who is a member of the Ultra football club and actively participated in the extreme right-wing assault on the refugees at the Keleti Railway Station in Budapest in September 2015. By analyzing these interviews, I aim to deconstruct the discourses within

⁴ The Hungarian Government started a massive billboard campaign against refugees. These billboards spread negative messages to and about refugees in Hungarian, such as “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away Hungarians’ jobs!” or “If you come to Hungary you have to follow our regulations!” Link: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33091597> accessed on May 29, 2017.

which they are embedded while focusing on the intersection of gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality. I wish to see the different civil responsiveness acts in terms of their moral stance towards the suffering Other, and, thereby, understand the different forms of solidarity and how “proper” or “improper” distance between the Self and the Other is produced by the Hungarian governmental media as a result of moral(izing) spectatorship. Therefore, I shall explore the activists’ motives for acting and the ways in which they argue to have felt compelled to do something in relation to the suffering Other as well as how they reacted to the Government’s constitution of absolute “difference.” In order to understand these phenomena, I will use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a method for understanding the ways in which moral(izing) spectatorship and civic responsiveness come about within the gendered nationalist and securitization processes in relation to constructing the Other. Regarding my choice of wording, I use “migrant” in quotation marks for showing the Government’s language use, whereas I refer to the groups of people going through Hungary in the summer and fall of 2015 as refugees, as a political choice, regardless of its international legal background.

My thesis consists of three main chapters. The first chapter outlines the main theoretical foundations of my analysis, namely the concept of moral spectatorship, civic responsiveness, different forms of solidarity, and mediapolis as developed by Lili Chouliaraki and Robert Silverston (Chouliaraki 2016, Silverstone 2006). In Chapter 1, I will also talk about the different gendered forms of nationalism and securitization. In Chapter 2, I present my analysis of media representations of the refugee, or more accurately the mediated construction of the “migrant” in relation to the new media law, militarized masculinity (Richter-Montpetit 2007), and different competing masculinities using the insights of feminist

media studies and theories of hegemony of Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser. Chapter 3 will present my discussion of the different gendered forms of civil responsiveness based on the ethnographic audience research that I conducted. I will outline the ways in which responsiveness gets mobilized within the framework of care and control, through which the construction of the Self and Other takes place, from a moralizing stance. Finally, I will attempt to draw conclusions about the moral distance that is constructed between the Self and the suffering Other through the different “desirable” and “non-desirable” types of solidarity.

Chapter 1 – Constituting Moral(izing) Spectatorship

The main goal of this chapter is to outline the theoretical framework of my research. The empirical media study in Chapter 2 and the audience research that is presented in Chapter 3 are located at the intersection of three conceptual models. The first of these concepts is “moral(izing) spectatorship” (Chouliaraki 2016), which, I argue, comes about as a result of the governmental media coverage of the so-called refugee crisis, which constructs a difference between the positions of the spectator and the “distant sufferer.” The second concept is concerned with “civic responsiveness” (Chouliaraki 2016) that can take the form of both care — a response of protection of Hungarian “values” or that of the “distant suffering other” — and control as a violent form of response that has emerged in my data as alternative modes of imprisonment and control by non-state actors, paramilitary groups such as the so-called Ultras football fan club or Betyársereg (Army of Outlaws)⁵, and by individuals such as the Mayor of Ásotthalom or one particular journalist who “reported” from the Rösztke incident. The discourses of control and punishment about the “distant suffering other” were reproduced by groups that demanded the extension of the state’s exclusive monopoly on possessing “legitimate” violence (Weber 1994, 311) and then exercised this power to threaten the Other whom these groups mobilized against. By allowing (or encouraging) these groups to exercise these forms of power, the state regime produced “distributive relations of violence” (Pugliese 2009, 158) in which citizens have become reproducers of this extended and re-distributed authority over violence (“taking actions on our own” and “mobilizing for our values and the

⁵ Betyársereg is an extreme right-wing xenophobic and anti-semitic group that got engaged in “border hunting” activities as “arbitrary” border patrols. Moreover, they recruited “fighters” to the “border hunter” program that was organized by the Hungarian Police.

Link: <https://english.atlatszo.hu/2016/09/20/refugees-subjected-to-systematic-abuse/> accessed on May 30, 2017.

Link: <http://betyarsereg.hu/elindult-a-rendorseg-hatarvadasz-toborzo-facebook-oldala/> accessed on May 30, 2017.

nation”). These processes of securitization have contributed to the continuous *performative* reproduction of “national security” and “state of emergency” discourses. I will discuss these processes of securitization in relation to the Hungarian mediated production of gendered and ethnicized identity construction vis-à-vis the European Union, using the Copenhagen School’s approach that understands security as a “speech act” (Buzan and Waever and Jaap de Wilde 1998) that brings about the process of securitization. I will also reflect upon the limitation of this School’s approach regarding gender, based on Hansen’s (2000) critique of the Copenhagen School’s work on the political and social production of security.

For my methodology of textual data analysis, I will use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) based on the work of Norman Fairclough (1995, 2003) to explore the ways in which the concept of “migrant” has been re/signified in the formation of security, border regime, and the nation through and in the articulation of the refugee and the construction of Hungarian identity in the governmental media for the “Hungarian” spectator.

1.1 Moral(izing) Spectatorship and “Mediapolis”

Chouliaraki (2016) introduces the concept of moral spectatorship and defines it “as a reflexive form of ethics-political agency” (2016, 415) through which citizens are interpellated to respond to the mediated suffering of the “distant other” in the digital age from a “proper” moral stance. The refugee crisis — when an unprecedented number of people were forced to migrate to Europe, partly via Hungary during the summer and autumn of 2015 - can be studied in order to explore the complexity of “*civic responsiveness*” as a moral(izing) response of either evaluative or affective forms (2016, 415) towards the Other that is shaped by various discursive political junctures that the refugee crisis evoked in Hungary. Chouliaraki’s approach to understanding what counts as ethical norms of media representation

of others in need is concerned with going beyond descriptive discussions of “desirable” civic responsiveness by discussing, instead, a normative category of media responsibility for imagining the Other, which, she argues, has the potential to produce and sustain active and potent forms of public agency (2016, 415). As Chouliaraki notes, humanitarianism as ethical behavior is understood primarily within the framework of two approaches. One of the approaches recognizes “proper” behavior if there is recognition of human “sameness”, whereas the other approach acknowledges “properness” depending on whether there is a recognition of difference (Chouliaraki 2016, 415-416). Chouliaraki argues that normatively “proper”, ethical behavior is not either the first or the second option, but recognizes agency as a basic human condition, where both sameness, as a shared humanness is acknowledged, but also presents the irony of self-reflexive distance by noting “difference”. My aim with the analytical chapters is to illustrate the ways in which proximity and distance are created in a dialectic relationship through broadcast images and language in the governmental media. I will also explore how the reported and mediated events by the governmental media comes to “mean” and becomes intelligible through the Hungarian moral(izing) spectator. I draw on Chouliaraki’s (2011) concepts on different “paradigms of solidarity” that render civic responsiveness around the blinding proximity of “politics of pity”, the self-other distance of “politics of irony”, and the other-oriented politics of “agonistic solidarity”. I argue that the meaning of the reported events around the “distant sufferer” are, in part, the media’s responsibility, whether it induces pity or irony based on “common humanity” or difference between the spectator and the mediated suffering Other.

Different modes of media representation of the refugee as the suffering distant Other in the Hungarian public media echoed those in the “mediated global public sphere” (Dahlgren 2016, 383) that Silverstone (2006) calls *mediapolis*. Silverstone’s concept of *mediapolis* refers

to different systemic hegemonic relations of power enacted in and by the institution of the media that shape and render legitimate what and who gets represented on whose terms, based on a particular logic and agenda, while, as a corollary, also defining who and what forms of logic get excluded from this range of representation, which “requires [of ‘us’ to assume] a [particular] moral response” (cited in Dahlgren 2016, 383). The question is not whether there is an ethics of “care” mobilized but what particular form of this care is set into play, i.e. what counts as a desirable mode of caring. Silverstone’s concept of “proper distance” alludes to “the more or less precise degree of proximity” (Silverstone 2006, 47) in the mediated relationships with the distant suffering Other that, in my reading, is necessary for evoking what Chouliaraki calls “civic responsiveness”. In these mediated relationships with the sufferer, Chouliaraki’s argues for normative civic responsibility, which is an “active” engagement not in terms of pity but solidarity that recognizes “our” indirect and partial involvement, will be a useful model for me to evaluate the Hungarian moral(izing) spectatorship that came about as a result of the governmental media coverage of “suffering” which produced what Chouliaraki might call the dehumanizing positioning of the spectator. This dehumanizing positioning was the dominant mode in which the media interpellated the spectator and invited a moralizing civic responsiveness, which, ironically, focuses on mobilizing the spectator not in support of the refugee but for protecting and caring about “us”, i.e. the Hungarian “nation and values”. This happened at the expense of a preferred form of normative civic responsibility that is oriented towards elevating the suffering of the Other. I shall argue that constructing and maintaining some “proper” distance from the “refugee-Other” is necessary for the production of “agonistic solidarity” as an ethical imperative that should be evoked by the Hungarian mainstream media ethics of care (instead of the current irresponsibility), in order to bring about an unconditional responsibility with the discourse of

“care” that does not expect reciprocity from the mediated suffering Other (Silverstone 2006, 139). It is important to note that the actual “measure” of distance, or as Silverstone calls it, the “proper distance”, is implicated by moral spectatorship. Concerning humanitarian communication, Chouliaraki emphasizes that even though the mediated spectacle of suffering tries to achieve a moral response, sometimes its mediated nature makes it more difficult to enhance the viewer’s moral commitments to respond to the refugees’s difficult situation (2013, 29). Nevertheless, the normative perspective that is captured by the concept of “proper distance” may call for two discourses of moral(ly acceptable) encounter: common humanity and irredeemable difference (Chouliaraki 2006, 383). Chouliaraki (2011) argues that both “common humanity” (evoking a proximity, centering around the spectator’s pity towards the represented other’s suffering) and distance (underscoring absolute difference between the two positions) are present in the mediation of refugees’ suffering – the latter extending as far as rendering that suffering other around disgust.

What Chouliaraki (2011) would like to propose instead of these two dominant discourses of media solidarity is not an act of moralizing that is based on the importance of acknowledging some relevant difference between the spectator and the mediated suffering Other through self-reflexive (but not self-oriented) “irony” in a “post-humanitarian” (non-pity-oriented) spatiality. As Chouliaraki emphasizes, this self-reflexion of “agonistic solidarity” can challenge the dehumanizing function of the politics of pity and irony as well that, for her, are based on some “improper distance”. Redefining Silverstone’s (2006) concept of “proper distance”, Chouliaraki argues for a self-reflexive distance and moral proximity that acknowledges and challenges the underlying power relations of these mediated relationships (2011, 364). Chouliaraki calls for an “agonistic” type of solidarity in the age of marketized post-humanitarianism, which brings about the question of in/justice as a matter of the public

realm, requiring reflexive judgement but also where the spectator emphasizes with the mediated sufferer (since the voice is vocalized and “heard”), who is an “object of our empathetic identification” (ibid. 364).

As a result the analysis of my media materials, I shall demonstrate that the function of the mediated content is to reproduce an absolute distance between “we”, the “Hungarians”, but not in the name of some post-structuralist irredeemable difference that should grant the recognition of the sovereignty of the “migrant other” but one that denies the Other’s entitlement to any degree of “humanness”. The absolute difference is brought about as a result of the Government media’s strategy of dehumanization of the mediated suffering Other. This approach is different from a civic responsiveness and/or engagement of the self-reflexive “agonistic” civic responsibility act that acknowledges both the partial involvement of Self and Other and the difference thereof. As a result of my discourse analysis, I will point out the difference between the construction of proximity versus distance, dehumanizing versus (post)-humanitarianism in the representations of the refugee, who is denied this status right away when named routinely in the Hungarian governmental media as “migrant”.

Based on the analysis of interviews that I conducted with members of the civil organizations who actively responded to the mediated sufferings in the border town of Szeged and Budapest, I shall explore their (indirect) perception of the articulation of a moralizing spectatorship in mainstream media and how their reception got polarized between discourses of care for “us” Hungarians⁶ against the dehumanized “migrant” or care for the “suffering Other” though which “we” Hungarians become more humane in relation to the inhumane Hungarian Government. The former demanded that the state control the situation “effectively” and questioned the state’s monopoly on “legitimate” violence, calling for self-

⁶ For instance, the radical right-wing paramilitary response.

organizing forms of violent acts from below. The latter – advocated by liberal activists for assisting the refugees while passing through the town – voiced disappointment with what they saw as the state’s abuse of power and articulated discourses of humanitarian care to mobilize the local population. I will examine the difference between the two representations of the refugee crisis, pointing out that discourses of “care” in the contemporary global/local political situation appeals to some “common humanity”, while demands for “control” produce moralizing representations that legitimize total dehumanization. I will argue that the care discourse is the only acceptable position of the two. However, as the different motivations of activists’ arguments depend on various “assumptions” about the suffering Other, they cannot be assumed to be the only feasible one; hence, they require more analysis to see if they could have been rearticulated as stances of “agonistic solidarity” Chouliaraki (2011).

For Chouliaraki (2006), the various modes of representation in the media have the power to situate the spectator in relation to the suffering Other differently, inviting different forms of responsiveness that are embedded in different orders of value. So far, I have discussed the problematic forms of responsiveness different from the preferred forms based on the observation that moralizing approaches grant agency to the viewer at the expense of acknowledging the sovereignty of the “observed” refugee. The central questions in critical media research focus on what kinds of responsibility come with the power of the media and what the triggers are in textually mediated “moral witnessing” that invite civic responsiveness, political activities, and practices, and at what expenses for the “migrant Other”. These representations produce different moral(izing) stances that can be assumed, and the actual groups of people did respond with different, sometimes oppositional “affective” responses as was the case predominantly on Hungary’s southern border with Serbia and in the capital, Budapest.

Chouliaraki notes that the language of “common humanity” is shared in humanitarian communication and the spectacle of vulnerability consecutively summons power through language, which, however, reproduces the existing global divides instead of building solidarity beyond the Global North (Chouliaraki 2013, 29). The appeal to sameness of the suffering Other immediately precludes the consideration of any imaginary suffering other than “ours”. Instead of focusing on the vulnerability of Others on our terms through “self-empowerment” and self-expression (Chouliaraki 2011, 371-372) of our own (Western) “humanness” as a matter of using the narcissistic (self-distance-based) vocabulary of justice, we should engage in practicing and creating space for judgement and empathy (2011, 370) and recognize the agency of the Other.⁷ As Chouliaraki suggests it, what is needed is something that beyond self-distance and false proximity, an “agonistic solidarity” (Arendt 1958/1999; Silverstone 2006 cited in Chouliaraki 2011), which does not only recognize and extrapolate our shared vulnerability, granting agency one-sidedly only to “us” in deciding what is the situation and what needs to be done in the public realm, but it instrumentalizes (“co-articulation of” 2011, 373) “imagination” and “judgement” to re-establish the world as “an object of our reflection, empathy and action”, which are necessary for moral acts towards vulnerable and precarious others (Chouliaraki 2011, 373). “Proper distance” for Silverstone consists of both reflection on the shared human vulnerability (as a matter of justice, judgment, and politics) and also requires to relate to the Other “with her or his own humanity” (Silverstone 2004, 4, cited in Chouliaraki 2011, 373). Both Silverstone and Chouliaraki (2011, 373) are deeply aware of the Global West/East, North/South inequality of

⁷ As Chouliaraki cites MacIntyre, “others are always means, never ends” (1981 [2006]: 24 cited in Chouliaraki 2011, 372).

“humanity”; yet, the gendered, ethnicized, and racialized basis of this unequal distribution is less vocalized, which I find unavoidably important for my research.

My concern, in the articulation of the “migrant Other” in the moralizing stance of Hungarian governmental media is to explore what could be the “proper distance” for agonistic solidarity. Chouliaraki cites Arendt’s approach to solidarity in relation to “agonism”, which is about what kind of claims are “...being seen and heard by others” (Arendt, cited by Chouliaraki 2011, 374) and from what perspectives the claims are positioned to be heard or seen, in other words the deliberation of “standpoints” in the public realm. What is important for my thesis, from the point of view of “agonistic solidarity”, is that by raising awareness of, and therefore evoking our capacity to reflect on the multiplicity and pluralism of different social values that evoke action and civic responsiveness, this type of solidarity avoids considering the values that mobilize for and articulate human vulnerability. In short, it orients the public towards the Other, instead of the Self (2011, 374) through “public deliberation” and “collective judgement” of plurality of “truths” and making sense of multiple responsibilities and actions (374). According to the feminist analysis of the problematic public (expression)/ private (justification) distinction of acting towards the vulnerable Other though politicizing the private is crucial in this regard, but insufficient in the sense that “imaginative judgment” in relating to the “vulnerable” Other (376), public deliberation, and plurality of “standpoints” are also matters of unequal power relations. Yet, “agonistic” solidarity could be a promising basis for communicating humanitarianism as a political matter of justice, as an ultimate matter of collective action in the “post-humanitarian” age of market-oriented communication-based neoliberal capitalism.

The crux of the matter is how the mediation of suffering constitutes, negotiates, and articulates the “we” versus “other” distinction, by positioning my research to

the “dominant space–times of the ‘centre’ (that of safe viewing of the spectator) and the ‘periphery’ (the space–time of dangerous living of the mediated suffering)” (Choularakis 2004, 186). By navigating in the space (here–there) and time (now–then) dimensions, I will consider Choularakis’s (2011) strategy of solidarity vis-à-vis and instead of the “politics of pity” (with its absolute proximity) or “irony” (self-distancing, strangeness by distance) towards an agonistic one, which is reflexive to gender, race, and ethnicity as well. These concepts help me understand how Hungarian institutional discourses in the media produce the “us” versus “them” and how the moral(izing) distance can be built upon the construction of Self-Other distinction as a mobilizing force for civic responsiveness. Questions arise about what kind of “care” (as a care for us, for the Hungarians, who are the endangered ones) is mobilized by the “Hungarian spectator” and how the gendered and ethnicized discourse of nationalism and securitization help construct the distance between the spectator and the mediated distant Other(s). Other questions that I will explore are the following: What discursive strategies result in obstacles for producing moral commitments to the image of the refugee that is articulated as “distant sufferer” and what changes are entailed in the shift to a spectatorship that allows for the recognition of agency of both refugee and viewer in the public television broadcast during the peak of the “refugee crisis”?

1.2 Gendered Nationalism and Securitization

As Hansen (2000, 287) argues, unvoiced insecurity, “security as silence” is often ignored in the analysis of “national” security, especially when one discusses gender. Hansen also observes that such silencing takes place through diverse processes that she calls acts of “subsuming security” at the juncture of different intersecting dimensions of identity, such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, and sexuality with gender in the center of the construction of

security issues (Hansen 2000, 287). In the two following analytical chapters, I will explore the ways in which the articulation of the refugee and the construction of Hungarian identity are connected in the notion of the imagined “nation” and how they are framed from within a gendered “national” security. In my analysis of state-related media news, the frame of masculinity⁸ has played a crucial role in the construction of Hungarian identity through the concept of “migrant”. I will deconstruct how legitimate it is to consider “the West and the rest” as a distinction that is articulated in terms of masculinity and examine what form of masculinity comes to be connected with the “Balkan” in relation to the hegemonic “European” by using Bakić-Hayden's understanding of “nesting orientalisms” (cited in Helms 2008). I will also explore the ways in which the mainstream governmental media produced a dominant discourse about the nature of the “crisis” from within nationalist discourses of securitization and militarization. My critical analysis of discourse is concerned with revealing the articulation of the different gendered and ethnicized forms of moralizing commitments that are invited by the representations of the “refugee and border crisis” in Hungarian mainstream media news to facilitate the construction of the ideal audience that is to assume a national identity vis-à-vis both the “West” and the “rest”.

1.2.1 The Nation and Its Borders

According to Anderson, the nation is conceptualized as an “imagined political community” (Anderson 1983, 6) of some inherent sovereignty (rooted in the age of Enlightenment and Revolution) against hierarchical dynastic realms while also imagined to be limited or territorialized in that it is seen to have finite and intact boundaries (Anderson 1983, 4-5). In so far as the ideal image of the “nation” is shared in the mind of the “members” of the

⁸ And, indirectly, the frame of motherhood in relation to the nation as well (see Yuval-Davis 1996; Hill Collins 2005).

community, it may exist even though the actual members will never meet each other in their totality (Anderson 1983, 6). The current nationalist discourse in Hungary refers its members to the imaginary borders of “Greater Hungary”, whereby any “Hungarian” anywhere in the world is seen to have originated “once”, in the “same” place and state. This an important point of difference between Anderson and Gellner (1964, 169 cited in Anderson 1983, 7), who is said to believe that “Nationalism is [...] the awakening of nations to self-consciousness”, whereas Anderson argues that “it invents nations where they do not exist.” That is, while Gellner associates nationalism with an act of (simple and singular) invention, a production that expresses the sentiment of the nation as an already existing community, Anderson sees the nation as systems of cultural representations: “a shared experience of identification with an extended [and imagined] community” (cited in McClintock 1993, 61) indexing particular social and historical contexts. Nationalism as an ideology (Anderson 1983, 5) is constitutive of, or a forming element of, the “nation” but it does not mean that it is a causal precondition for its “existence”. Gellner also acknowledged the performative side of nationalism, “It is nationalism which engenders nations, not the other way around” (Gellner 1983, 55). However, he did not emphasize it as an inherent element of constituting the nation in a dynamic performative process. Nationalist discourses construct the ways in which individuals are positioned and assigned to certain responsibilities and potentials in an imagined community based on their imagined gender/sexuality (in relation to masculinity), racialized ethnicity, and religion. These dimensions are necessary for my analysis because of their function in the articulation of the “migrant” that my data mobilizes for the viewer within the “civic responsiveness” nexus. Drawing upon these dimensions, I intend to substantiate the ways in which non-hegemonic masculinity is associated with the ethnic and “religious” Other and, therefore, is a key element of nationalism, and how it is implicated and what implicates it

as one of a lesser value. As Nagel (1998, 243) contends, these assigned and “exaggerated” positions of gender, index traditionalist concepts of “hegemonic masculinity” and “emphasized femininity,” assigning the “proper” places for actual men and women at the intersection of “terrorist militarized masculinity”, “hyper sexual Arab”, and “radical Islamism”.

In examining the “nature” of nationalism, in my interpretation, one can understand nationalism, and in relation to that, “securitization” as interdependent categories through their performative nature, meaning that nationalism emerges as a discourse in relation to the formation of “*militarized masculinity*” within the framework of civic responsiveness. I will explore the diverse ways in which nationalist discourse is articulated particularly in the discourses of control and discipline performed by the Ultras football fan club member whom I interviewed and through the analysis of the videos shared in the fall of 2015 on the Facebook page of the extreme right-wing nationalist Mayor of Ásotthalom, a village on the Hungarian/Serbian border.⁹

1.2.2 Gendered Securitization of the “Migrant”

In the formation of “nation” and the nation state, internal and external Others are constructed in order to define the members of the nation. Therefore, the Other can be understood as a threat to the existence to the nation. The concept of “migrant” is facilitated to be an existential threat to the “nation”, the state, Europe, and the borders. “Securitization” is

⁹ It is also important to explore the diverse ways in which nationalist discourse is articulated transnationally in the Hungarian “border hunter” discourse of control and discipline. Their intertwined articulation is meant as a response to the Other that is not only the refugee but the European Union or Brussels and results in categories, such as the “Muslim refugee Other,” “the queer Other,” and the “Western, exploiting, liberal EU.” It is important to examine how the interaction of transnationalism and nationalism serve as mobilizing forces in order to defend the “land and the nation”. The mayor of Ásotthalom emphasized the “Visegrád brotherhood” in defense of the Schengen borders by reiterating and re/producing the binary between Hungary and Serbia, the non-Balkan and the Balkan, Europe - the West - and the rest via his videos shared in the fall of 2015 on his Facebook page.

the construction, articulation, and identification process of these threats (Hansen 2000, 288) by discursive and non-discourses means, which utilizes and instrumentalizes different social groups or issues by constructing measures to respond to them that are primarily used by the state. In the concept of securitization, “referent object” refers to an entity that is claimed to be threatened and whose survival needs to be preserved by its legitimate and “axiomatic” existence (Hansen 2000, 288). Usually, state and nation are considered to be referent objects as they are claimed to be threatened in their “existence”. In my thesis, the referent object is the Hungarian “nation state”, which is based on the notion of territorialism, where its territory is enclosed by borders and the “nation” is living in its territory.¹⁰ The “securitizing actor” (Hansen 2000, 289) is the Hungarian Government that presents the concept of “migrant” as a security threat to the state through its “speech acts” (Hansen 2000, 287). It is important to note that, according to Buzan (1998, 40-41), securitizing actors and their “success” depend more on the performed security “threat’s” underlying logic and power relations than the actual person/entity that performs it. The Copenhagen School differentiates between “international” security that “threatens” the collective survival (state, nation) and “social” security that is about marginalization and injustice considered to be on the “individual” level and concerned with “entitlement and social justice” (Buzan 1998, 21-31). The Copenhagen School is primarily concerned with the “collective survival,” whereas a result of the “threat”, state of emergency discourse emerges and political and legal rules are supposed to be “suspended” (ibid.).

The Copenhagen School distinguishes three stages of securitization, namely: the non-politicized, politicized, and securitized stages of different issues. Based on this approach, the

¹⁰ I would note that the hegemonic governmental discourse on the “Hungarian nation” constructs the “wider imagined community” of pre-Trianon Treaty era, which is referred to as the “Golden Age of Hungarians” by the Government.

threat comes about when a matter moves from the politicized stage to the securitized stage via the act of securitization. My analysis is concerned with the Hungarian Government's securitizing process, in which the state has constructed and politicized the concept of "migrant" to convince the relevant spectator ("public opinion", which is constructed to be the general voters of the governmental parties) via the everyday consumption of the governmental media. This is the stage in which the moral(izing) spectatorship comes about as a result of the governmental media's portrayal of the "crisis" and existential "threat", where "our nationhood is endangered". The extraordinary response and state of emergency discourse came about and went beyond "normal politics" by the Hungarian Government's decision to erect the barbed wire fence. As Fairclough argues, the formation of discourse occurs with non-linguistic means as well, such as socio-political practices and institutions, for instance the practices of the police or the military (Fairclough 1995, 122-123). In the following chapters, I will talk about these non-linguistic tools as well, especially the erection of the fence and the performance of the police, border guards, and field guards in relation to securitization. My next analytical chapter will focus on the different elements of the hegemonic discourse on the "migration crisis" that were securitized by the governmental media in order to evoke a moralizing audience by which the existential threat of the state can be legitimized, and so that eventually the extraordinary (state of emergency) political measures can be "justified" and "legalized".

Within the framework of Hungarian nation-building and the identity construction process, the re-positioning of the "West and the rest" comes about. The securitization discourse, based on the axiomatic existence of the nation-state, contributes to maintaining the hegemonic power relations, granting privileges to the "West," in which Western hegemonic power relations are appropriated by the "enlightened" Central-European states, who allegedly want to "protect" the "traditional Christian values" of Western Europe from its own "decline."

Hungarian right-wing nationalist discourses reinforce the notion of Hungarian regional “exceptionalism” as a gatekeeper, whose figure is articulated to protect the traditional European region (politically Western Europe and Central Europe) from the “Balkans” – now indirectly evoked as the location of the “Muslim” refugees – as well as from itself, the “decadent” Western Europe indulging in “liberal” diversity both in relation to “other” cultures and religions as well as sexualities. Western sexuality is considered to be a hyper-sexual, not procreative¹¹ and, therefore, an anti-national activity in this discourse. This “Eurosceptical” Hungarian nationalist discourse through securitizing refugees in the name of a “human security,” (for our values, family, and women) produces the xenophobic discourse that maintains the gendered dichotomy of “Muslim women” as victims versus “Muslim men” as threatening oppressors and calls for the militarization of Western states as a reaction to the “invasion” of “uncivilized” “Middle Easterners” who have caused the “European crisis.” As I will show in the following analytical chapters, “Muslim men’s” bodies are dehumanized in this representation of the “distant suffering other”, where their bodies are “collected” and eventually dominated by the image of the Hungarian authorities and other securitization actors. This domination is not merely against the bodies of these people, but a domination of their culture and “subordinated masculinity.” This domination has other political repercussions as well, namely as Jasbir Puar (2007) argues in relation to torture at Abu Ghraib, violence, torture, and dehumanization are essential for producing and dominating the bodies of the “Muslim terrorist” (2007, 87) in the post-9/11 United States era. Hungary’s position is different on many levels in comparison to the U.S. and Western states, but the discourse around the position of Eastern Europe evoked “exceptionalism” discourse around post-social countries, where securitization of terrorism and “Muslim male” bodies were

¹¹ For its assumed pro-LGBTQ policy.

predominantly not thematized before the refugee crisis. I argue that this attempt of securitization is essential for the Hungarian nation-state regime to reconstruct its state identity in relation to both the “West” and the “East.”

Furthermore, the police also act in defense of the nation-state, where, in addition to territorialism, the “nature and quality” of the population is also of a political “concern” not only against the immediate enemy of the “refugee” but, indirectly, vis-à-vis an alleged cosmopolitanism of anti-nationalist “multiculturalism” and “liberalism.” The latter are associated with the “bad, improper” Europeanness of Western Europe in comparison with the “good” Europeanness of “Central Europe”, whose perspective on the “refugee crisis” as “illegal mass immigration” is presented and articulated “properly” with the effects of different strategies of Othering.

In conclusion, the militarization of the Western border regime is a response to this securitization of the “Muslim male refugee other”, which is essential to the confirmation of European and Hungarian exceptionalism and its gendered “human security” regime. Militarized masculinity reclaims the traditionalist “ideology of manliness” that is associated with “protection” and undertakes aggression and violence to enhance its relative power both in relation to Western (EU-related) hegemonic masculinity and non-Western subordinate ethnicized masculinities in the re/formation of the nation and in the name of a “Europeanness” that is in need of defense.

1.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

Building upon this scholarly literature, my research is concerned with revealing the different gendered, ethnicized, and religious forms of moral commitments articulated in the media representation and to contrast them with the interviews that I carried out with activists

to establish the major forms of civic responsiveness and engagement the mediated representations of the “refugee” and “border” crisis (of the Western nation-state concept) in Hungary did or did not evoke.

My data consists of two major sets of texts. The first one consists of news reports mostly published in the summer-autumn of 2015 in the Hungarian state mainstream broadcasts (primarily M1 and TV2) and online media. The online accessibility of the prime-time government media news makes it possible for me to conduct a critical discourse analysis of the texts and images through which the mainstream media organizations produced and presented the framework of their own participation in the Hungarian Government’s xenophobic campaign against the refugees. I conduct a critical discourse analysis of images and texts as proposed by Fairclough (2003) for critical research in social science. I will analyze the articulation of the meaning of the refugee and the expected moral response to that figure with the help of Fairclough’s analytical category of “textual assumptions” in relation to the category of “migrant” and explore the ideological interplay between the implicit and explicitly articulated dimensions of meaning of the images and texts in the news, exploring the hostile perspectives of nationalist and xenophobic discourses making up the order of political discourses from within which they are being produced. My analysis is dynamic in its approach in that I will focus on the intersection of the diverse discourses to explore the “multiplicity of relations of subordination” (Mouffe, 1992, 372, cited in Van Zoonen 1994, 4), to explore the multiple ways in which subordination comes about in relation to the constitution of individual and collective identities, such as gender, ethnicity, and religion (Van Zoonen, 1994, 4). As Van Zoonen argues, gender and other nexus of power can be understood as a form of discourse:

that is, a set of overlapping and often contradictory cultural descriptions and prescriptions referring to sexual difference, which arises from and regulates particular economic, social, political, technological and other non-discursive contexts. (Van Zoonen 1994, 33).

As Van Zoonen (1994) emphasizes, gender as a discourse is “inscribed in the subject” in relation to and along with other discourses (ethnicity, sexuality, race, and class for instance) and, therefore, it is an ongoing dynamic process of production, in which subjects come about as a result of discursive negotiations (33-34). Consequently, any analysis of discourses should engage in a dynamic approach in its own textual reading of the data. In my understanding, assuming a dialectic relationship between the said/unsaid aspects of any utterance for its intelligibility relative to a given perspective enables me to attend to multiplicity that organizes the meaning of any concept. What is also important to note is that language has a key role in the discursive struggle over power, in which language and non-linguistic elements re/produce what counts as the “reality” and not merely reflect on it (Van Zoonen 1994, 39). Discourse as a “particular set of meanings and narratives” (Van Zoonen 1994, 39) and the processes in which different symbolic interactions take place show how discourse is a form or rather effect of power: the opportunities of interpretation and meaning-making procedures are highly a matter of privilege even if it happens within the framework of a negotiation procedure (39) – like discursive sites of agonistic solidarity that are proposed by Chouliaraki for acceptable ethical norms of media representation of suffering.

I choose discourse analysis as a methodological approach to be able to see the discursive articulations of effects and entitlements and not just the “content” of the images and texts that produce the political and ideological meanings as if “attached to” civic responsiveness. In other words, language is not a mere and innocent container of concepts, but a form of symbolic capital, the very stake in political struggles over access to recognition

of sovereignty. CDA explores the ways in which language as a “system of differences without positive terms” (Howarth 2000, 37) can capture this “negativity” that is capable of evoking but never literally representing things and events in their substantive positivity as the logic of content analysis would have it. Through analyzing the assumptions in the discursive articulation of moral(izing) spectatorship through the representation of the “refugee crisis,” I will deconstruct the ways in which the binary opposition, “us” versus “them” functions for the construction of Hungarian identity within this “system of differences” and is constructed by the media as an institution embedded in the Hungarian political context.

Chapter 2 – Media Representations of the “Refugee”

To understand the ways in which the Hungarian governmental media portrayed refugees I draw on Lilie Chouliaraki’s (2016) concept of moral spectatorship that outlines how affect in relation to mediated suffering of the refugee regulate moral arguments in public debates. In short, she discusses how affect is shaped by the political climate that invites particular forms of civic responsiveness to images of mediated suffering – from blocking it to accelerating it to emerging as practices of spectators’ moral responsibility and political agency to act for the suffering other. In this chapter, I analyze the strategies of the Hungarian mainstream media’s representation of the migration crisis (over the summer and fall of 2015) to explore the ways it interpellates the audience as citizens to respond to the mediated suffering of the “refugee other”. My interest is to explore the intertextual links between the state and the media that mobilize the spectator to respond to the “distant other”. The results will function as the point of comparison for the analysis of the interviews that I conducted with key figures in the diverse forms of civic responsiveness on the Serbian-Hungarian border over the same period.

2.1 Methodological Reflections

Van Zoonen (1994, 17) discusses feminist themes of doing research in communication and media studies, she argues for the importance of exploring dominant stereotypes and ideology in the media content. Van Zoonen cites Tuchman (1987, 7 cited in Van Zoonen 1994, 17) in relation to functionalist media theory, which suggests that the “media reflect society’s dominant social values” (1994, 17). Exploring what the content of the media does to the spectator can be further explored by audience research¹², but I shall argue that media does not

¹² See Chapter 3.

merely reflect the dominant ideology of the society, but re/produce them through various forms of representations. By this, I also mean that the audience is not only a passive recipient and consumer of the media content and messages. Van Zoonen (1994, 23-24) raises awareness of theories of (dominant) ideology (and their lack of gender), by Gramsci and Althusser, specifically when the author discusses how media have the role of being “the contemporary mediators of hegemony” (24). I use Althusser’s stance regarding the formation of subjects (of individuals) as a result of being interpellated by ideology (Van Zoonen 1994, 24), which as a process, as Gramsci argues, constitutes the “general consent” in demand for the ruling class. In this way, general consent becomes naturalized and is interpreted (in demand for the ruling classes, the elite) as “common sense”, which is interpreted as “regular” (primarily working-class) language and experiences by “ideological institutions” or as Althusser refers to them “ideological state apparatuses” (ISAs) such as the media, politics, law, and religion (Van Zoonen 1994, 24). The media is one of these mediators that naturalizes the “commons sense” ideology of the existence of nation-state and borders for instance, for the construction of the “Hungarian” identity. The question arises, to whose benefit, and what “values” are being re/produced in the media content and to whose expense?

The data for my analysis is taken from governmental broadcast media and news articles that are accessible online. They were mostly broadcast in the summer and autumn of 2015 in the Hungarian state-owned television M1 and the commercial channel TV2.¹³ The current Hungarian media context from where my news data is taken was shaped by the reconfiguration of the Media Law in 2010. According to the new Media Law, Act CLXXXV

¹³ M1 is the official public service media platform in Hungary, whereas TV2 is a private channel that was bought by the Government-related “oligarch,” Andrew Vajna in October 2015.

of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Communication,¹⁴ the main media service provider and distributor in Hungary is the *Magyar Távirati Iroda* (MTI), which has undergone significant changes in terms of its functions. Since the legislation came into effect, the whole of the public media service can only access information provided by MTI as a source,¹⁵ which is in conflict with the principle of independent editing in journalism. Apart from this, Article 74 (1) and (3)¹⁶ state that the provider distributes this service free of charge, which inevitably disfavors every other non-state related, independent news agency that provides news as a commercial product. These structural changes have resulted in a centralized power structure in the Hungarian “public” media, providing “news” for all state-owned media outlets, forcing mainstream news rooms to primarily rely on the only free source of news. The monopoly on news production and provision by MTI has resulted in the proliferation of state-biased news and accordingly facilitated governmental propaganda on migration.¹⁷

The response to the “refugee other” is particularly relevant understanding what ethical disposition comes about and then I can see how activists respond to it and for what reasons. In

¹⁴ Link: http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/153/Mttv_110803_EN_final.pdf accessed on May 4, 2017.

¹⁵ Article 74 (1) “The media service distributor shall be obliged to transmit a total of four linear audiovisual media services and three linear radio media services of the public media service provider free of charge, with the exception of media service distribution performed by means of broadcasting transmission. The media service distributor may not claim an additional fee from subscribers in excess of the costs of access related to ensuring access to such media services. The public media service provider shall not claim consideration from the media service distributor for the distribution of its media services”.

¹⁶ (3) “The public media service provider shall make its media services as per Paragraph (1), distributed using broadcasting transmission, available to subscribers free of charge.”

¹⁷ Gábor Polyák (2014) wrote an article about the “Controlled Public” (“Irányított nyilvánosság”), where the author raises awareness of the changed media structure since the Government introduced the new media law. He emphasizes that the first important point to note is that the Hungarian news consumers primarily acquire information via broadcast news in commercial and public media channels compare to online channels and platforms. Relating to this acknowledgement, commercial media channels and radio frequency ownerships have been changed to politicize the spectator and listener, according to the Government’s agenda, besides the new legal controlling mechanisms or other means, such as operating with advertisement taxes (14-18).

this chapter, I will explore the ways in which the mainstream governmental media produced a dominant discourse about the “migrant” and the nature of the “crisis” and argue that it is constructed from within nationalist discourses of securitization and militarization. My critical analysis of discourse is concerned with revealing the articulation of the different gendered and racialized forms of moral commitments that are invited by the mediation of the “refugee and border crisis” in Hungarian mainstream media news. The focus of the analysis of the texts and images is the strategies of representation of the “crisis” through which the chosen media organizations produce and present the framework of their own participation, their stance in support of the Hungarian Government’s xenophobic campaign against the refugees, inviting the audience to distance themselves from the refugee in the name of a reverse responsiveness that should mobilize disgust towards refugees, dislocating it from any affect of sympathy and human rights and hospitality while inviting the spectator to reorient this affect in the interest of the nation to “defend us”.¹⁸

I will analyze the particular discourses with the help of the analytical category of “assumptions” to explore the ideological interplay between the implicit and explicit meanings of the images and texts in the news and their investment in the re/production of a hostile nationalist and xenophobic political context from within which they are being reiterated as a legitimate and the morally only responsible disposition.

¹⁸ Chouliaraki (2016) draws attention to the “discursive fluidity” of civic responsiveness in relation to the different subject positions that the competing and shifting moral(izing) discourses create in particular social events (415-416). The fluidity results in multiple subject positions in relation to the “refugee crisis”, including the possibility of the emergence of a favorable shift to moral responsibility. The dominant governmental media discourse in Hungary is articulated through the “polarizing discourses of *disgust*” (Chouliaraki 2016, 416), in which racist images and texts are used. As Chouliaraki emphasizes, the “moral valence of disgust” as a “pre-discursive construct” (as a “specific regime of affect”) that constitutes multiple boundaries between the national and progressive “us” and “less developed” refugees similarly sets up the dichotomies between an international “them” versus national “us” (2016, 416). The same logic is at work in my data and produces further distinctions between the “legitimate immigrants” who, therefore, deserve humanitarian “care” and the “illegal immigrant”, whose case is not worthy of any care, but rather “control”.

2.2. The Online Concept of “Migrant” Generated in the Precognox Database

The response towards the Other is shaped by various discursive political junctures that the refugee crisis evoked in Hungary during the summer and autumn of 2015. The three case studies that I have chosen and that I consider as representative of the dominant images of the “refugee” by the Hungarian state-owned media, should be first situated in some statistics on the media coverage of the refugee crises by different media platforms.¹⁹ The data miners and analysts of the company Precognox are specialized in “automation of knowledge work”²⁰ and have built a database and dashboard regarding the topic of migration from approximately 40,000 online articles in Hungarian and pictures that were posted between September 27, 2014 and June 11, 2016 from 25 different Hungarian news portals. The main topics and keywords for the corpus²¹ that were searched by the researchers were, “immigration,” “immigrant,” “migrant,” “migration,” “refugee”, and “asylum seeker.”²²

The use of words and different modalities of expression are particularly important for their frequency and the emotions they evoke on a more structural level. It is insufficient though to rely on the keywords for understanding the discourse and the wider political context of the production of their meaning. Furthermore, keywords alone will not help me understand the ways in which different mainstream media platforms constitute their (political) strategies of covering media stories and the visualization of refugees and the migration crisis. Yet, the

¹⁹ The source of this database that I used was published online in a blog, called Language and Science (“Nyelv és Tudomány”) Link: <https://www.nyest.hu/hirek/migransok-menekulok-bevanderlok-mit-sulykol-a-media> accessed on April 20, 2017.

²⁰ Link: <http://precognox.com/about-us> accessed on April 20, 2017.

²¹ Link to the dashboard: <http://labs.precognox.com/migration-dashboard/> accessed on April 20, 2017.

²² Link: <https://www.nyest.hu/hirek/migransok-menekulok-bevanderlok-mit-sulykol-a-media> accessed on April 20, 2017.

database can reveal the preferred terms that different media portals used and the distribution of those expressions over the period that I am interested in.

According to the database, the number of the published articles started increasing in 2015 and reached the highest number of articles published in August 2015 and September 2015. This is exactly the interval that the case studies are taken from, because of the culmination of refugees entering Hungary. Finally, from October 2015 to May 2016, the articles appeared evenly until the next rise in June 2016.



FIG. 1. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE EXTRACTED PERSONAL NAMES FROM ALL OF THE EXAMINED ARTICLES (SOURCE: PRECOGNOX)

Regarding the frequency of the actual terms in the news from different political actors in Hungary, Precognox made a graph, presented in Figure 1. One can see that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is represented with the highest number of connections to others, and he is the one who is mentioned by name the most in the database.²³ The second most dominant cluster

²³ In addition to the Prime Minister, three other key actors of the Fidesz regime are central in terms of frequency and connectedness: Péter Szijjártó, Antal Rogán, and János Lázár.

is presented in the color magenta and primarily contains the key actors of Western-European countries. They tend to be western European politicians who are said to stand for pro-migration politics, but sometimes they are mentioned in the same article in connection with anti-migration sentiments and opinions. German Chancellor Angela Merkel is the key actor in this cluster with the highest degree of connectedness.²⁴

The PrecognoX database also provides information on the different emotions and attitudes in relation to the migration. Sentiments were sorted into three categories — negative, positive, neutral — and emotions were classified into six categories — surprise, joy, fear, distress, disgust, and anger.²⁵ Basically, these sentiment and emotion variables are attributed to words and expressions based on the content of the different texts. The analysis of the researchers basically shows that the average sentiment values of the different articles cluster around the “neutral” category. This means that the sentiment evoked is more or less balanced on average in the examined time interval.

I have taken their results and my task is explore the ways in which the different expressions²⁶ are used, taking into account by whom and in what context they are used, in order to unveil the underlying power relations. My main interest is to explore how the term “migrant” has predominantly become a gendered (at the intersection of race, ethnicity, and

²⁴ Who is dominantly mentioned with politicians who represent a more pro-migration politics, such as Francois Hollande (at then socialist French President), Federica Mogherini (then and currently the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), and Martin Schulz (former President of the European Parliament). Within the magenta cluster, the politicians who represent anti-migration politics most prominently are Donald Tusk (the current moderate conservative President of the European Council), David Cameron (former conservative Prime Minister of the United Kingdom), and Nicolas Sarkozy (former conservative President of France).

²⁵ Link: labs.precognoX.com.

²⁶ “migrant,” “refugee,” “asylum seeker”.

religion) concept, where the initial meaning of a “catch-all” umbrella term becomes a narrowly understood expression in the mediated governmental political discourse.²⁷

In spite of the questionable nature of the method of measuring the volume of different emotions and sentiments, the database does show the changes of emotion-related words that are associated with the media events covered. The changes can help us understand the ways in which moral spectatorship comes about and how this moral spectatorship can contribute to triggering civic responsiveness. For instance, expressions and representations of negative emotions, such as distress and fear were at their peak in relation to other classified emotions on August 31, 2015. That day several articles covered the humanitarian catastrophe at the Keleti Railway Station in Budapest, and as a result of the massive amount of refugees and the decision of Hungarian authorities to not let them in trains, the transport system was centrally and blocked. The other articles on the same day reported negative opinions about Hungary’s migration policy in western Europe, the denial of the proposed quota system, the number of refugees envisaged to increase in the forthcoming days, the barbed-wire fence, and the “border hunters,” and about the volunteers working in the transit zones and at the Keleti Railway Station. The identified keywords about negative sentiment relating to these articles were predominantly “problem,” “war,” “terrorist,” “sick,” and “inconvenience.” Articles that were associated with the emotion of fear contained keywords such as, “terror,” “qualm”, “dread”, and “fear.” The “measured” distress and fear-related words can be interpreted as the reflection of the Government’s discourse on migration, which connects migration with crime (or as this connection is referred to “crimmigration process”, by Brouwer and van der Woude and van der Leun 2017) and a result of this produced connection, the Government adopted

²⁷ In this governmental discourse, the concept of migrant and the physical camp with the barbed-wire fence have become intrinsic to the Hungarian Government’s biopower.

restrictive migration policies, and permanently re/produced its anti-migration discourse²⁸. The discourse of “crimmigration” is deeply entrenched in the nationalist processes of securitization and militarization. I argue that the politicized issue of migration first becomes securitized directly through the governmental articulations of moral panic and indirectly through the securitization of “them” versus “us”, and then it comes to be criminalized through legislative means. The state’s response to what they see as the violation of this legislation is performed through acts of militarization, such as the erection of the barbed-wire fence at the southern border of Hungary and the violent push-backs of refugees to Serbia from the transit zone.

The limitations of the database²⁹, merely based on content is the reason that motivated me to further analyze the governmental discourse in the articulation of the concept of “migrant”. The three case studies relating to this aim that I have selected to analyze in the next section include broadcast media as well to capture the complexity of linking images, texts, and videos all together in the meaning making procedure. The database also addresses the connection between the content of the text and the corresponding images. The method for producing and analyzing the visual data of online images was the same as extracting the online texts in the database. There are eight different topics, or in other words, visual

²⁸ For instance, about deportation, push-backs, and detention.

²⁹ For further analysis, one can also find 47 various thematic groups identified in the online articles. There is an algorithm used for exploring how each text represents the different (semantically related) topics and in what proportion. Based on the description, the logic of the algorithm is based on the frequency and the connectedness of the expressions. Each text is shown to be connected to almost every topic; but on the average, every text can be categorized to relate most to two or three topics. The most relevant topic (out of the 15 topics that consist of the most related articles) for my research is the one called “Catching illegal immigrants and human traffickers,” which primarily consists of expressions that mobilize gender as an analytical category well: “police officer,” “man,” “illegal,” “Syrian”, and “forbidden.” Within this topic cluster, “positive words” are rarely used compared to the ones that evoke negative feelings.

The researchers who built the database used the so-called [Mallet tool](https://www.nyest.hu/hirek/migransok-menekulok-bevandorlok-mit-sulykol-a-media)’s Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic model for this. Link: <https://www.nyest.hu/hirek/migransok-menekulok-bevandorlok-mit-sulykol-a-media> accessed on April 20, 2017.

strategies identified by the database, comprising the governmental discourse about migration. These topics are “mass without face”, “maps, graphs, screenshots”, “politicians”, “war zones and, refugees” “temporary stay,” “representatives of armed corps, soldiers from wars and in the hosting countries”, “portrays, close shots, mugshots”, “at the border, at the fence, on the road, in the water”, and “pictures taken from smaller groups: children, families, youngsters”.³⁰

There is a body of scholarly literature that explores the ways in which minorities, or any “othered” groups, are represented in different visual images (Bernáth & Messing 2015, Greussing & Boomgaarden 2017). These representations are argued to share the tendency of alienating and dehumanizing the people depicted in the images. For instance, they have in common portraying refugees as a group, primarily from above, showing the group as a “waving mass” without faces: both are strategies of alienation. Based on the database, one can establish that the highest number of articles that contained images of masses without close



FIG. 2: ILLUSTRATION FOR A NEWS ARTICLE OF ORIGO.HU WITH THE TITLE: “25 THOUSANDS MIGRANTS ARRIVED OVER THE WEEKEND”³¹ (SOURCE: ORIGO.HU)

30 Link: <https://www.nyest.hu/hirek/migransok-menekulok-bevanderlok-mit-sulykol-a-media> and Link: labs.precognox.com accessed on April 20, 2017.

31 Link: <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20151012-23-ezer-migrans-erkezett-a-hetvegen.html> accessed on May 25, 2017.

pictures of faces were produced in September 2015. The same tendency can be seen with images related to the topic of “representatives of armed corps, soldiers from wars and in the hosting countries” and that of “portrays, close shots, mugshots” in the examined interval.

Between June 1, 2015 until the end of September 2015, I extracted and analyzed every video screened in the prime time evening news on TV2. Many of these videos show only faces, primarily male faces, in situations when the Hungarian police had an official interaction with refugees, mostly in cases of a turmoil in the transition camp in Röszke on the Hungarian-Serbian border. The meaning and effect of this strategic visibility is to re/produce and maintain a securitized milieu of fear and panic, which can be a basis for legitimizing the Hungarian “state of emergency” policies. As Marr and Wilkinson (2003, 194–210) suggest that this strategic visibility and portrayal in the governmental media serve as a political means for the state to dehumanize asylum seekers and refugees as “dangerous and inhumane others” in order to legitimize its inhumane and disciplinary performance for the general public.



FIG. 3: “MIGRANTS LEFT THEIR THEIR UNNECESSARY STUFF STREWN ABOUT IN FRONT OF THE TRAIN AS WELL” (SOURCE: MTI).

Another example of this alienation and strategy of visibility emerged after the Paris terror attack in November 2015 when the mainstream Hungarian news circulated mugshot photos³² of the suspected person. This representation strategy increased the imbalance between the negative content of the news and the coverage of the humanitarian crisis. Within the framework of this coverage, the complex meaning of the concept of “migrant” was reproduced by the governmental media in a way that evoked fear. The faces of “migrants” could be seen in relation to “terrorist attacks”.



FIG. 4: “THE MIGRANTS ARE TRANSPORTED TO TRAINS”³³ (SOURCE: MTI)

In addition, there are also pictures showing war-shed countries and smaller groups of women and children walking, which shows a different representation strategy of the “distant” Other. The importance of this difference is that the governmental media discourse constitutes and maintains the binary of male “migrant” and female/children “refugee” in its visual strategy.

³² Link: <http://www.blikk.hu/aktualis/politika/a-magyarok-is-rettegnek-brusszelben-a-terrorrol/t31sv3n> accessed on May 19, 2017.

³³ Link: <https://ripost.hu/cikk-ujabb-migransaradat-erkezett-zakanyba> accessed on May 25, 2017.

2.3 Case Studies

2.3.1 Case Study 1: Constituting the “Refugee as Violent Man”

On September 4th, 2015, in the context of the Hungarian-Romanian football match, Hungarian football hooligans, the Ultras were marching through downtown Budapest, chanting anti-Romanian and anti-police slogans. These chantings portrayed Romanians as sexually and ethnically “backwards” (“fag Romanians” or “ciganis from Bucharest”) in comparison with “Hungarians”. The Romanians were constructed to be the Hungarian nation’s “queers” (in relation to the Trianon discourse on the peace treaty of World War I). On their way to the football stadium, the Ultras attacked the refugees who were temporarily staying and waiting at the nearby Keleti Railway Station in Budapest. The Ultras’ attack on refugees was not mentioned in any of the prime-time news on TV2. They only mentioned the football hooligans’ attacks against the Hungarian policemen. The above-mentioned intersection of anti-Romanian and anti-refugee sentiments by the football Ultras is an important analytical case for exploring the ways in which ethnicity, culture, masculinity, and nationalism come together.

In the news on TV2 on the same day was the most serious conflict in the border zone in Röszke – represented by the title “They burst out of the camp”.³⁴ This report was broadcast in the evening prime-time news in the show called *Tények* (“Facts”), the most popular program for the age cohort 18-59, approximately watched by 351,000 unique spectators between 6 pm and 7 pm in the evening.³⁵ According to the television newsperson,

hundreds of refugees burst out of the Röszke camp because of the slow Hungarian administration procedures. As far as we know, first they threw rocks at the police

³⁴ Link: http://tenyek.hu/belfold/185413_kitortek_a_taborbol.html accessed on April 18, 2017.

³⁵ Link: http://sales.tv2.hu/nezettseg/3516_a_tv2_36_heti_nezettsegi_toplistaja.html accessed on May 20, 2017.

then approximately 300 people headed to the direction of the highway and neighboring lands, while destroying the fence. Even the M5 highway had to be closed down for a while. The escapees (“menekülők”) were eventually successfully caught by the police and were taken back to the camp. The police also used tear gas on those who are now standing in line.³⁶

It is important and relevant to point out the similar word use of “menekült” (refugee) versus “menekülő” (escapee) in the report. This choice of expression implies that a person who managed to get protection in another country, suggests the continuation of a precarious situation where the individual is still on the move to a safer place.³⁷

Then the next images show chanting men at the fence, while policemen are walking nearby. “Freedom” or “szabadság” was what the refugees were chanting when they saw the cameraman of Tények. Therefore, the policemen asked the cameraman to move further and record further away from the enclosed “migrants”. Then an armed police officer in emergency outfit with his shield and helmet tells the reporter that “if *they* [refugees] see the camera they will burst out.” Then the narration of the reports continues with:

There are many policemen who enclosed the makeshift camp from outside, while there are many migrants inside of the fence. There were women and children as well in the crowd. As one can see in the video report, some children were taken out from the crowd, and allegedly the elderly and women were taken out as well. Meanwhile, some people were transported by buses. Later in the afternoon, some people started throwing rocks again at policemen who used tear gas on them.

The category of “assumption” and the interpretation of these assumptions’ ideological effects on the production of the “spectator” is in the center of the analysis of this case study. The police’s authority distances the cameramen and, therefore, also the spectator from the group

³⁶ The narration continues with: “More and more of them [police] have enclosed the camp so those (referring to “migrants”) who are still inside cannot escape. Meanwhile, they (referring to the policemen) are trying to collect those who ran away from the makeshift camp. By late afternoon, it was successful and, according to the police, they managed to “collect” every refugee and take them back to the camp, where the mood was tense.”

Link: http://tenyek.hu/belfold/185413_kitortek_a_taborbol.html accessed on May 20, 2017.

³⁷ *ibid.*

of people they report on. The assumptions are articulated through absolute difference between “us” and “them” and by constituting relative difference between the male “migrant” and woman/child “refugee.” The “migrant” is read to be a man, who arrives to take space and resources on “his” own willingness, whereas “refugee” is understood to be dependent and passive woman or child, who has been oppressed by “her”/“their” culture” in the making of the moralizing spectatorship. We know this, based on the word use of TV2, which connects the use of refugee to reports about passive media footage on women, children, whereas, it primarily uses “migrant” in their reports in relation to “misconduct” and “misbehavior” in different situations.

This given video report contributes to maintaining hegemonic Western power relations by creating the notion of “Fortress Europe” against non-Western migration. But these Western hegemonic power relations are subverted by the enlightened “Central-European” states, who want to protect Western Europe from its own “decline.” From the depiction of the collection point and makeshift camp, the space that encloses the “migrants” symbolizes the binary between Hungary and Serbia, the western Christian and the Orthodox, the EU and the Balkan based on a similar logic as right-wing nationalist discourses that reinforce the notion of Hungarian regional “exceptionalism.” It facilitates Hungary as a gatekeeper that protects the continent from the “Balkan” for the “decadent” Western Europe. Facilitating the dichotomy of Europe versus Islam is crucial in the construction of the Hungarian identity as the “bulwark” of Christianity and Europe, which can be described with the pattern of “nesting orientalisms” (Bakić-Hayden, cited in Helms 2008). In the nationalist Hungarian governmental discourse, Hungarians are portrayed as European (western), and therefore, superior compared to the eastern “non-European” countries of the “Balkan Route”. The different socio-political distinctions are re/produced, the binary patterns are recurring within

the different oppositional dichotomies, such as EU/Balkan, Europe/Islam, West/East, Central Europe/Eastern Europe, man/woman in the anti-“migrant” discourse.

The Hungarian “exceptionalism” discourse is interlinked with the wider “Eurosceptical” Hungarian nationalist discourse through securitizing refugees in the name of Western “human security,” uses xenophobia that maintains the gendered dichotomy of Muslim women as victims versus Muslim men as threatening oppressors and calls for the militarization of Western states as a reaction to the “invasion” of “uncivilized Middle Easterners”, who have caused the “European crisis.” This “uncivilized” Middle Easterner or “Muslim” masculinity is produced to mean, to be read as “Muslim” in the media texts, as a matter of connotation and ideology produced by the state. The intertextuality between the state and the mainstream media is very important for my analysis. As Herman and Chomsky argue (1988, cited in Klocker and Dunn 2003 74), the relationship between the state and the media can be assessed according to a propaganda model, which is based on some crucial points. In the Hungarian mainstream media’s case, these are the state’s influence on the media and spectatorship emerges through presenting the unquestionable source of “credible information”, based on MTI structural position. Through MTI, the state’s economic influence on providing free news also positions it as the most powerful player. By comparing these media texts with the diversity of refugees, I argue that the state contests and negotiates its hegemonic position (“negotiation of hegemony”, Gramsci 1971, cited in Klocker and Dunn 2003, 74) by reiterating “Christian Europeanness” in comparison with “multiculturalism” in which, Muslim as a cultural, ethnicized, and religious category is constructed as a central element. In other words, the concept of multiculturalism is associated with Western Europe and considered to be failed in the Hungarian discourse, based on argumentation about “clashing” cultural and ethnicized differences. The intersection and homogenization of

religion and ethnicity can be seen in the usage of terms “Muslim” and “Arab” under the concept of “migrant” as relatively equivalent, interchangeable expressions. Therefore, the concept of migrant allows a very narrow meaning in the governmental media. It is important to note that by comparing the different media texts with the “diversity of the refugees”, it can be captured that “Syrian” as an image gets singled out as refugee, with their lighter skin color and partly or potentially Christian religious background compared to other groups of fleeing people from North-Africa or Eritrea, predominantly Muslim communities, and have darker skin color, who are referred to as “migrants”.³⁸

The male refugee bodies are dehumanized in this representation, where their bodies are “collected” and eventually dominated by the Hungarian special police guard. This domination based on “hegemonic masculinity” is not merely against the bodies of these people, but a domination of their culture through representing their maleness as “subordinated masculinity” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, Nagel 1998, Richter-Montpetit 2007) When the gunned policeman orders the reporter to move further from the “uncontrollable” crowd because that “encourages migrants to burst out” while they are chanting, he re/iterates the stereotypical notion of refugee as violent man. Women and children are mentioned only as a passing remark at the end of the report when the reporter mentions, while the camera strictly focuses on men, that there are women and children as well in the crowd, who, along with elderly, are being “rescued” by the police from the “chanting men.”

The Hungarian “white” police guard image as “protector” is imagined to work in favor of “difference” or the assumption of this difference, and the visual images and texts are highly

³⁸ The concept of “migrant” as image was represented in the Hungarian governmental media in a racialized, gendered, and sexualized way. Online opinion forming blogs reported on “African migrants” in relation to news reported on sexual violence, rape, and crime.

Link: <https://888.hu/article-900-ezer-afrikai-migrans-var-arra-hogy-atjusson-europaba>

Link: <http://badog.blogstar.hu/2015/10/10/hirek-40-/21569/> The blog of Bayer Zsolt, a founder member of Fidesz.

oriented towards constructing “difference.” In the “we” versus “them” dichotomy the image of the “Christian” Hungarian policeman is portrayed as a savior of “refugee” women and children from the “uncontrollable and uncivilized” furious male crowd of “migrants”. In this way, the police not “only” control the furious crowd, and, therefore, protect the Hungarian nation, but also protect “Muslim women” from “Muslim men”. This “protection” is constituted to be the “triumph” of “European hegemonic masculinity” over “Muslim masculinity” (Richter-Montpetit 2007) or in other words a reclaiming of the Western nation-state concept, where besides territorialism, the “nature and quality” (Yuval-Davis 1996) of the population is a political “concern” vis-à-vis anti-nationalist “multiculturalism” and “liberalism.” The latter are associated with the “bad, improper” Europeanness of Western Europe in comparison with the “good” Europeanness of “Central-Europe”, whose perspective on the “refugee crisis” as “illegal mass immigration” is presented and articulated “properly” with the effects of different strategies of Othering.

2.3.2 Case Study 2: Constructing the “refugee as hyper-sexual terrorist” image

On October 5th, 2015, the political daily, *Hungarian Times* (“Magyar Idők”) cited a news report from the prime-time news of M1, the 24-hour news channel of the Hungarian public television, entitled “The favorite videos of migrants: beheading, mutilation and porn.”³⁹ The news portal that identifies as a conservative portal cited the following lead: “The public television found immigrants’ phones that were thrown away. The content of devices are

³⁹ Link: <http://magyaridok.hu/belfold/a-migransok-kedvenc-videoi-lefejezes-csonkitas-es-porno-37936/> “The migrants’ favorit videos: beheading, mutilation and porn” accessed on April 19, 2017.

quite informative: Islamist conqueror propaganda, ferocity, and sexual acts. The owners [of the devices] are probably already in Germany...”⁴⁰

This report uses the term “immigrant” which in the Hungarian governmental discourse is associated with “illegality” and a person who is not fleeing, but arriving on her/his “own” willingness. These “immigrants” are reported in relation to some so-called “Islamist conqueror propaganda,” content on some cellphones that are apparently left behind in the transit zone by the refugees on their way to Germany. The meaning of the immigrant is articulated as a militant Other, who is conquering “Europe” for their own (and “their” group’s) sake. The image of the conqueror is “proved” for the spectator by the report, when the actual weapons (“meat cutter blades and knives”) are added to the list of armament “found” that are implicated to be suitable for carrying out the “invasion” of Europe. The lack of any mention of the humanitarian need of the refugees is juxtaposed with the technical devices and “military” tools to make two points. One is that the “refugee” as such is not in need (either political or economic) because they can afford the journey aided by their own expensive devices (“portable charger and two hundred euros left in a pair of shoes”) and they are dressed as “Europeans”. The second point is that the “refugee” image is only a disguise and “he” is member of a paramilitary troop: “there were smaller groups of people who left the bigger group on purpose and chose to go on a different route... they bypassed the authorities by using GPS...”⁴¹

The second discrediting point constitutive of moral(izing) spectatorship comes about by referring to GPS coordinates in relation to the smart phone “weapons” as a way to re/

⁴⁰ Link: <http://magyaridok.hu/belfold/a-migransok-kedvenc-videoi-lefejezes-csonkitas-es-porno-37936/> “The migrants’ favorit videos: beheading, mutilation and porn” accessed on April 19, 2017.

⁴¹ *ibid.*

produce the gendered image of refugee as a militant and combatant agent with technological skills and devices: "the group consists of many young and strong men, who as it is well noticeable got military education." The next half of the report re/iterates the "uncivilized muslim man" trope when the reporter talks about a lost mobile phone that allegedly contains "only pornographic photos." Through these allegations the "conqueror" comes to be implicated as hypersexual as well, and is, therefore, particularly "dangerous" to "European (Christian) women".⁴²

The narration of the report from here continues with re/producing the ethnicizing nationalist discourse on refugees reiterating the image of the "muslim migrant terrorist" who deceives the well-meaning citizens of Hungary/Europe:

On the devices thrown away by the migrants, one can find various documents, different religious photos and videos: invasion by the Islamic State's terrorists, mutilated soldiers, beheadings, and among the personal images, there are plenty of propaganda and religious related material on the phones.

This report provides "evidence" and argues in terms of "factuality" about the militant tools and intentions in order to constitute moral panic and fear by locating the meaning of "refugee" at the intersection of the constituent elements of terrorist danger, hypersexuality, and radical Islamism. The constitution of "difference" based on the "male refugees" hypersexuality ("pornographic images") evokes the moral superiority of "Christian Europe" by using sexuality and women's bodies as an instrumentalizing power against the "muslim refugee other." In so far as these moralizing argumentations are used in defense of women (ironically, both "theirs" and "ours") on the basis of nationalist, xenophobic, and particularly islamophobic discourse, primarily in Western European politics, the Hungarian mainstream

⁴² Link: <http://magyaridok.hu/belfold/a-migransok-kedvenc-videoi-lefejezes-csonkitas-es-porno-37936/> "The migrants' favorit videos: beheading, mutilation and porn" accessed on April 19, 2017.

media enacts what Farris calls “femonationalism” (2017). I would argue that this act of Othering around the concept of “endangered Hungarian women”, may reproduce the nation as an “imagined political community” (Anderson 1983, 6) attached to its “territory” to be defended at all expense.

2.3.3 Case Study 3: The Petra László Incident: Spectacle in the Making

My third case refers to events that happened on September 8, 2015, when the reporters of N1TV (“National TV,” a channel that is connected to Jobbik, the radical right-wing party in parliament) were recording for a report at Röszke at the Hungarian-Serbian border. Petra László was the camerawoman for the TV. Different recorded videos were released that show that László kicked and tripped some of the refugees multiple times.⁴³ In the particular event, primarily Afghani and Syrian refugees were chased by the border guards and were running towards the fields from where reporters were shooting videos. The case evoked a lot of attention and emotions and was wide-spread in the national and international media because of the inhumane act in general, but also because of the journalist’s behavior. A reporter, who is expected to do non-biased media coverage for informing the spectatorship, committed and recorded a violent attack. As a result of her actions, the journalist was fired from the television, and she was eventually indicted on charges of breach of peace.⁴⁴

This case is particularly relevant for my analysis because gender has played a central role in the violent act and its representation and in the letter of apology the journalist later wrote as well. In the various videos, one can see that she first kicks a running girl and then trips a fleeing man with a boy in his arms. In these videos, the Hungarian “white”, militarized

⁴³ Link: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-camerawoman-idUSKCN0R90KK20150909> accessed on May 26, 2017.

⁴⁴ Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/world/europe/hungarian-journalist-syrian-refugee.html?_r=2 accessed on April 27, 2017.

masculinity appears embodied by a “white” Hungarian woman. Abusing the position of the reporting journalist, she engages in the fight on the side of the border guards, hindering the escape of the fleeing, much more vulnerable people. The spectator witnesses a competing act between Hungarian violent masculinity (embodied by a woman) and the non-white, muslim masculinities on the run.

As a result of the public condemnation, the journalist wrote a public letter of apology that was published by the Hungarian newspaper, *Magyar Nemzet*.⁴⁵

I am very sorry for the incident, and as a mother I am especially sorry for the fact that fate pushed a child in my way. I did not see that at that moment. I started to panic and as I re-watch the film, it seems as it was not even me.

In this letter, she explains that she acted violently to defend⁴⁶ herself. Her status as a mother comes into the focus of the letter, when she talks about her act of kicking children. The public apology is based on the moralizing spectacle that gives “special status” to children. She does not mention the man whom she tripped and talks about “fate” (but implicates “fate” as the “responsible” agent) that pushed people in her way in general. Reflecting on “fate”, she ironically does not talk about the human-face of this “fate”, namely the Hungarian border guards who pushed fleeing people in her way.

After the trial, László announced to the media that her husband wants to prove the innocence of his wife in order to restore his honor.⁴⁷ This statement emerges in the context of militarized masculinity and shows its fragile nature, that requires constant proof and

⁴⁵ Link: <https://mno.hu/belfold/megszolalt-a-rugdosodo-operator-laszlo-petra-1303854> accessed on April 27, 2017.

⁴⁶ The court decision on January 12th did not find sufficient evidence for her claim about self-defence and she was sentenced to three years of probation. Link: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/01/12/hungarian-reporter-who-kicked-migrants-gets-probation.html> accessed on April 27, 2017.

⁴⁷ Link: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/10/21/camerawoman-who-tripped-refugee-to-sue-victim.html> accessed on April 27, 2017.

competition for restoring and maintaining personal (masculine), family-based and national “honor” and pride. The case of the “honor” is also an interesting intersection of the family and the nation, similar to nationalist discourse. In this way, the family and the head of the family is the only one that can acquire and restore honor to the family, and eventually to the nation against the “refugee”, who is charged of the lost honor of both the family and the nation.

2.4. Competing Masculinities

The militarization of the Western border regime is performed in my three case studies via the securitization of the male militant “Muslim refugee other.” It indexes Hungarian exceptionalism and its gendered human security regime as “crimmigration” discourse, in van der Woude and van Berlo’s (2015) sense of the term, namely the process of criminalization of migration by linking immigration control and crime control (van der Woude and van Berlo 2015, 62). This process of Othering is the procedure through which the constructions of Western hegemonic masculinities occur and re/produces and shapes subordinate masculinities that are ironically portrayed as a (European) human security issue.

Militarized masculinity reclaims the traditionalist “ideology of manliness” (Richter-Montepetit 2007, 45) and undertakes aggression and violence to further its relative power in relation to the construction of Western hegemonic masculinity and non-Western subordinate masculinities on the formation of the nation and “Europeanness.” Relating to Richter-Montepetit’s argumentation, it is important to note that all forms of masculinity are associated with “militancy” except in a binary of justified versus hostile militancy. It is also important to expose the indirect militarization process of “us” through the securitization, whereby the gendered discourse of protection has become part of the daily discursive and material practice of the Hungarian government, the police, and the border guards.

The construction of the “Visegrád brotherhood,” which emphasizes an imagined belonging to the Western “Christian” community, while ironically criticizing the “non-nationalist, cosmopolitan, liberal” European Union, as a discursive force used against the common Other(s) in relation to the refugee crisis and the European Union. I argue that the chosen broadcast reports, videos, and online articles, and the broader anti-refugee sentiment and securitization was an impetus for my interviewee from to Ultra club to join the militarized paramilitary border “guard”. Border hunting can be seen as a strategy to relatively improve men’s own power in comparison to Western and/or Hungarian hegemonic masculinity and subordinate “non-European” masculinities. It is important to note that the processes of securitization and militarization re/produced the positions of “marginalized” versus “real” Hungarian men. Richter-Montepetit (2007) while discussing the notion of “militarised masculinity”, cites Whitworth (2004) who talks about the “ideology of manliness” (2007, 45) that is necessary for the operation and justification of these kinds of paramilitary, militarized groups (2007, 45). I argue that this “justified” entitlement through militarized performances signifies a “fragile” discourse of permanently proving what is national what is not, and who are citizens, who are not, is necessary for maintaining the Othering procedures. The moralising spectatorship produced by the governmental media constituted the Other in order to mobilize for “our” values and “nation” that are fragile without the permanent Othering.

Based on the moralizing spectatorship that these case studies reveal, several questions arise. Who benefits from “women's rights” in Europe? How are Muslim women refugees’ bodies re-victimized upon arrival to the European Union, specifically in Hungary? In what ways are male refugees’ rights neglected by the Hungarian state who performs permanent moralizing Othering procedures to explain the lack of legal and political responsibility of the state for upholding a commitment to helping asylum seekers? How does the “deathscapes” of

the refugees in Hungary converge with spaces of living and the potential of death in the shipping containers?

Regarding the distinction between problematic (moralizing) and the preferred (moral) dispositions, in the Hungarian political context and media discourse, civic responsiveness can take the form of both care and control. “Care” is mobilized to protect Hungarian “values.” From the perspective of the refuge their stance is that of disgust with different possible motives behind those care acts. Control is evoked by the image of different militia groups that advocate for disciplinary acts of the state and, therefore, maintaining the interlinking of crime with migration. In moralizing spectatorship, care and control are understood not in response to the refugee but as mobilizing forces to protect “our” family and values. Besides the moralizing form of care, the humanitarian caring mode of responding to the tragedy of the refugee crisis emerged, for instance, in the activities of Migrant Solidarity Groups in Szeged and Budapest. Violent responsiveness also emerged, such as different alternative modes of imprisonment and control by non-state actors, paramilitary groups, and the Mayor of Ásotthalom who demanded the extension of the state’s exclusive monopoly (or not necessarily extension, but reclaiming the shared monopoly of violence) on possessing “legitimate” violence (Weber 1994, 311). Therefore, the state regime has produced different “distributive relations of violence” (Pugliese 2009, 158) in which citizens become reproducers of this extended and re-distributed authority over violence (“taking actions on our own”), which have contributed to the permanent *performative* production of “national security” and “state of emergency” discourses.⁴⁸ This kind of civic responsiveness discourse requires the intervention of the penalizing state that is masculine enough for controlling the situation and

⁴⁸ “Now Ásotthalom is again the land of peace and order, one of the safest towns of Europe.” Link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AR8FoOwwQkE> Accessibility: April 18, 2017.

is contrasted by the moral(izing) spectatorship of the governmental media with a feminine and weak humanitarian responsiveness acts of care.

Chapter 3 – Gendered Forms of Civic Responsiveness: an Audience Research

This chapter will present my analysis of the role of alternative media and social media in relation to the centralized media market and explore the different dynamic connectedness between people who organize themselves as active citizens and social media platforms. The pro-democratic and anti-democratic “activists” that I interviewed were core actors of engagement with the humanitarian crisis. They dis-identified with the government’s decisions that they see as not acting but reacting only to the “crisis” that came about as a result of the lack of global/local intervention. In this way, a main trigger for civic responsiveness was the neoliberal, minimalist (non-interventional, but militarized) agenda of the Hungarian state. At the time of the “crisis” in 2015, the internet became the medium of political mobilization through which citizens responded to the “information” that the Hungarian governmental media re/produced. Social media created a space in which it was possible for the audience to engage actively, and, thereby, become agents within the socio-political context in which they were embedded. For all of the acts of civic responsiveness that I analyzed, the internet served as a means of organizing actions and working groups and relaying political messages for the public supporters who were concerned about the Government’s stance on the “refugee crisis”.

Civil activism may go in two directions as “civic responsiveness”, or in other words, I shall state that disappointment with the Government can result in oppositional resistance in the formation of pro-democratic groups and grassroots groups that pursue antidemocratic agendas. Within the framework of my research, I interviewed five “activists” who mobilized themselves during the summer and autumn of 2015 as an act and response vis-à-vis the governmental media and billboard campaign. Four of my interviewees (representing the pro-

democratic stance) were engaged in humanitarian work in Szeged and Budapest, whereas one of my interviewees considered himself to be an “active citizen” (active in a neo-Nazi group), who in disagreement with the Government’s action, responded to the refugee crisis “adequately” by going to Keleti Railways Station in Budapest to insult refugees who were waiting there. He is in his late 20s and is member of the Ultras football fan group, is currently studying, unemployed, and resides in Budapest. Regarding the four other activists, two of them are women in their 20s and 40s (one of them is employed, the other one is a student); and the other two are men are in their 30s, with university degrees, and currently employed in Szeged. I conducted, on average, a one-hour long semi-structured interview with all five of them, to explore their understanding of civic responsiveness and solidarity in relation to the Hungarian state and the suffering Other in the wake of the governmental media campaign.

3.1 Methodological Reflections: Media and the Spectator

In her book *Feminist Media Studies*, Van Zoonen (1994, 105-106) argues that in order to understand what media content does to the spectator, what kind of political and cultural meanings texts and images come to have, and how they are understood by the spectator, feminist scholarship needs to engage with the audience(s) as well. As Lewis emphasizes, the researcher must aim to understand the cultural and political media products “as they are understood by audiences” (1991, 47, cited in Van Zoonen 1994, 105). Van Zoonen (1994, 132-133) outlines several different interpretative approaches to researching audience’s engagement with media programs, including the news media set of my data. To explore the conceptualization of the “refugee” and “us,” she contends, requires a discoursal operationalization of the concepts or notions the researcher is interested in. One aspect of this approach is to identify how the particular concepts come to be encoded in the media

programs⁴⁹ in order to see “what meanings [and reader positions] are available” (ibid, 131) so that one can see how the actual members of the audience (in my case the five activists interviewed) engage with those meanings and how they “construct [refugee] out of the socially situated interaction with media texts” (ibid, 131), i.e. from within their particular positions as “humanitarian aid” workers or a “neo-Nazi football Ultra.” The interpretative, i.e. qualitative approach, entails diverse methods that all start from actual viewers’ lived experience. One of them is usually referred to as “ethnography”. In media studies, however, in van Zoonen’s view, “ethnography” has almost become synonymous with “interpretative” research, which is very different from the original perception of ethnography that was “aimed at the reconstruction of everyday life in specific (sub)cultures by using the terms, concepts, definitions, and understandings of the members of these communities” particularly through “participant observation as a means of data gathering” (ibid, 131). “Methodological purism, however, does not stand much chance in a field that is increasingly distinguished by commonalities rather than differences,” (ibid, 132).⁵⁰ Although van Zoonen only includes ethnomethodology and symbolic interaction as particular methods of interpreting the textual data that is collected through semi-structured interviews, I would like to argue that critical analysis of discourse is another possible interpretative approach, and one that seems to have dominated the field since the late 1990s (Lazar 2005, Gorton 2009). In my analysis of the interview data, I focus on the construction of “Hungarian” and “refugee” identities as a particular form of “reality construction” that relies on different (news report mediated)

⁴⁹ which is what I carried out in Chapter 2

⁵⁰ Hence, following Lull (1990), she advocates, for pragmatic reasons, the use of “ethnography” for exploring interpretation of the people under study with an emphasis on the signifying practices of the interviewees as well as on the meanings they give to their actions, and the ways these meanings shape their subsequent actions.

interactions between the Self and the Other, and the ways in which the receiver makes sense of the mediated content (Van Zoonen 1994, 132).

Although my analysis in this chapter can be called ethnographic audience research it may be helpful in exploring what Lindloff (1987, cited in Van Zoonen 1994, 133) calls an “interpretative community” in so far as my individual interviewees are representative figures of their particular activists groups. In this regard, what is most valuable of my findings is that the pro-democratic and nondemocratic dispositions towards civic responsiveness share their assessment about “insufficient” media news content, what they call the failure of reporting “properly” on the events of the crisis. Their shared evaluation in itself is indicative of the intense ideological domination of the (news) media by the Government in the country.

3.2 “Mobilizing in the Interest of Our Values and Nation”: The Discourse of Control

In Chapter 2, I argued how nationalism and securitization have emerged as intertwined discourses that have enabled the formation of militarized masculinity. It was also an important to see the ways in which the nationalist discourse in Hungary is articulated transnationally to combat the Other (refugees and the EU) at the intersection of a multiplicity of meanings, such as the “Muslim refugee Other,” “the queer Other,” and the “Western exploitative, liberal EU.” It is, especially revealing to see how transnationalism and nationalism serve as mobilizing forces that reinforce and conflict with each other at various points in order to defend the “land and the nation.” After building the razor-wire fence at the southern border of Hungary, László Toroczkai, the ultranationalist⁵¹ Mayor of Ásotthalom⁵² released two videos, under the title of

⁵¹ Toroczkai is widely known for his extremist, irredentist views as the former leader of the 64 Counties Youth Movement, which calls for Hungary to reclaim the lands outside of its current borders after World War I or in other words, reclaiming “justice” after the Trianon Treaty.

⁵² A village of 4,000 inhabitants in southern Hungary.

“Message to illegal immigrants from Hungary” on his Facebook page in September and October 2015. He threatens refugees with arrest and visualizes his town’s “security hardware” in a video edited in the aesthetics of a (low-budget) action movie featuring a helicopter, a motorcycle, burly bald men with guns, and two men on horses. The Mayor uses Google Maps to illustrate that the land route from Serbia to Germany is longer through Hungary than it is via Slovenia and Croatia. “Hungary is a bad choice,” he intones at the end of the video. “Ásotthalom is the worst.”

The series of videos⁵³ from the Mayor of Ásotthalom emphasize the importance of possessing “legitimate violence” (Weber 1994, 311) in the name of which he formed “his” militant field guards “to handle” the crisis. In these videos, he talks about his experience of the “know how” of how to defend “his” village, and by extension, his country, and (Christian values of) Europe. His emphasis, for example, on the “Visegrád brotherhood” as a defense of the Schengen borders re/produces the binary between Serbia and Hungary, the Balkan and non-Balkan, and Europe and the rest, in a way that the Mayor does not acknowledge the “help” of the Serbs.⁵⁴ The videos also contribute to maintaining the hegemonic power relations (but subverted by the enlightened “Central-European” states) through securitizing refugees in the name of (European) “human security” by using xenophobic discourse and then militarizing against them.

The departure point of my analysis of the videos is to underscore the ways in which Central and Eastern Europe is constructed and positioned (or as Larry Wolff argues (1994) “invented”) as the “post-socialist Other” (Kulpa 2014, 2). This is not only a geopolitical and

⁵³ Link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AR8FoOwwQkE> accessed on 18 April, 2017
 Link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fgJRjy2Xc0c&t=19s> accessed on 19 April, 2017

⁵⁴ The Visegrád —V4— countries.

historical category but, as Kasia Narkowicz and Konrad Pędziwiatr (2017, 290-291) argue, it is an “*epistemological category*” in the sense that the former “socialist” position of Central-Eastern Europe is a way of construing the position of the “capitalist West” and the “communist East”. In this discourse “post-socialistness,” the permanent discussion of “catching up” to the West and the emphasis on the construction of Central-Europeanness (in opposition to Eastern-Europe) are continually fostered and become a source of public frustration.⁵⁵

3.2.1 Militarized Masculinity and (Hetero)sexism

McClintock (1993, 62) discusses how nationalism is implicated in gender relations of power, mostly from the perspective of womanhood while Cynthia Enloe explores nationalism in terms of manhood, saying that it “typically sprung from masculinised memory, masculinised humiliation and masculinised hope” (Enloe 1989, 44). The Mayor of Ásotthalom’s use of the inclusive possessive pronoun “our” (“taking the actions on our own”) is the index of national agency and belonging associated with maleness, where his Hungarian citizens stand up and fight for the nation as a man stands up for a woman to protect her. It is reiterated through the Mayor’s statement on young male Others who endanger Our country, Our women, and Our land. The representation of militarized national power in the videos is gendered in the sense that it depends on the construction of a binary gender difference, as McClintock states (1993, 62). In the case of the Ásotthalom-videos, the gender equality discourse emerges only in connection with the hostility towards the “Muslim refugee Other.” The Mayor states the “fact” that 80% of migrants traveling through Hungary are young men.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ In the case of Hungary, this indefinite fostering has been articulated in relation to Austria since the system change and resembles the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’s economic-political dualism.

⁵⁶ Link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fgJRjy2Xc0c&t=19s> accessed on April 18, 2017.

The Mayor's invitation to protect the borders is addressed to militant-looking Hungarian men against the image of the "organized young migrant men" emphasized by him. His statement resembles the general discourse of constructing the refugee as a dangerous man for his assumed fighting age and capabilities. Even though it is not stated explicitly, the protection of the state and borders – in so far as it is addressed to the "patriotic men" of his village on the border – is intertwined indirectly with protecting Hungarian women and nationhood.⁵⁷

After the Mayor of Ásotthalom posted these videos, he passed a series of self-government regulations that target other Others as well. The regulations included the prohibition of performing "Muslim activities" such as building mosques, wearing a burka, all activities of muezzins, and additionally any "propagation of gay marriage" and "rainbow families" that deviate from the definition of "family" in the Basic Law.⁵⁸ These political debates over national belonging are not primarily about struggles over sexual identity politics, but more about the understanding of Europeanness in relation to both the "West" and "East" within the framework of "Fortress Europe," especially within EU migration policies. Right-wing notions of identity are not merely about who is part of the nation and who is not, but a critique of the allegedly Western understanding of "gender" and "sexuality" in comparison with traditionalist "Christianity." Right-wing discourses, such as the Mayor's, reinforce the

⁵⁷ Spike Peterson discusses five gender-differentiated dimensions of state-centric nationalism that expose the latter's heterosexist presumptions – and enduring problems (Peterson 1999, 38). In her final point, Peterson argues that identity groups (whether based on race/ethnicity, religion, or nationality) that have been most closely associated with (state-centric) political power have also been based on (heterosexist) gender inequality. As members of state-centric groups, women have an interest in their group's "success," including the group's acquisition (for example, men going to the border and "standing up" for the nation) of political power vis-à-vis competitors. However, insofar as these groups reproduce gendered hierarchies (social hierarchies linked to the denigration of the feminine), identification with and support for them is problematic for feminists and all who seek non-oppressive social relations. By analyzing the state-citizen and citizen-non-citizen relations, the heteropatriarchy of state orders is key (ibid, 38).

⁵⁸ Hayden, Sally. 2017. "This Small Hungarian Town has Banned 'Gay Propaganda' to Become a Far-Right Refuge" Accessed June 9, 2017. Available from: <http://time.com/4688381/asotthalom-hungary-far-right-laszlo-toroczka-lgbt/>

notion of Hungarian regional “exceptionalism” as a gatekeeper that protects the politically defined “European continent” from the “Balkans” for the non-deserving “decadent” and “declining” Western-Europe.

My interviewee, who is a member of the non-democratic specific audience, the militant Ultra member, similarly to the Mayor’s videos, reinforced the “in-between” position between the “East” and the “West” several times during the interview. In the interview, when recounting his memories, he calls the the attack, the “battle” against the refugees at Keleti Railways Station, which is the same category he mentions in relation to the fight with the police in the course of Hungary-Romania football match, in the stadium in Népliget. His stance is the extension of the moral(izing) spectatorship that was produced by the news coverage of the Hungarian governmental media. This form of civic responsiveness is based on what I have called the discourse of control and punishment. When asked about what should be the right response to the situation he says:

I think expulsion [of refugees] is the answer, we have to protect white people because we are in minority. I do not want my daughter (my emphasis) to be with an Arab or a Nigger (sic)... They [referring to Muslims] look down on European women. They are more endangered than white men. They live according to a book, they make women wear burka. If they don’t respect their women in their own country, then what will they do here? Why can’t European women wear provocative clothes here if they want to? It is their home. This is the clash of civilizations...History repeats itself.

This “in-between” position of Hungary is bound up in the Hungarian “exceptionalism” discourse that was re/produced by the interviewee through the Othering of both the ethnicized “Middle East” and “Western Europe” through gender, race, and ethnicity intersect. What is at stake in the right-wing notion of moral(izing) within the diagnosis and prognosis of the “world” and Hungary is who owns the “uncontestable, obvious truth” by which the “legitimate” actors are allowed to express their concerns about how the Other party/side

violates those values – without ever considering their own practices of sexual) violence against those women. Re-claiming “Europeanness” is part of this strategy in the governmental media discourse as well, in which the developed and morally superior Europe versus the “Muslim” and morally inferior East are compared to each other. Moreover, the reiteration of the dichotomy of the East and West and its recurring fractal patterns or in other words, “nesting orientalisms” (Bakić-Hayden cited in Helms 2008), in the understanding of the “European development” and values are (re)signified in the Hungarian “exceptionalism” discourse in a way that Western Europe’s development is considered to be exaggerated as a result of the “overt individualism” that is also assumed to be against self-governmentality — or a lack of collectivity - which, therefore, is against the neoliberal nation-state concept. As a result of this assumed “in-between” position, the simple binary of East and West is complicated by the inherent criticism of Western development, which is not a desirable form of politics due to its “destruction” of the nation state. Therefore, I would argue that even though the East-West binary is reiterated, the Hungarian “exceptionalism” discourse constitutes a *center* versus *periphery* binary, in which West is in decline in relation to the *periphery* because of overt individualism, and Hungary claims its universal righteousness as a bulwark, who is part of the *center*, Europe, and while also claiming the right to declare who is not part of (East) and who does not have the right to have right (the West).

Utilizing women’s bodies and women’s rights is thematized in service of the anti-Muslim statements about “their” oppression of women. Through the Ultra football hooligan’s statements about European women and the Others’ values, “bad” and “good” sexualization come about through a heterosexist male gaze, where the “Western” male gaze maintains its hegemony over women’s bodies and “proper” clothing in comparison to the “improper” veiling of female bodies. This strategy of undermining a non-Western “male gaze” serves as

an attempt to emasculation through which the racialized, ethnicized, and gendered subordination of the “Muslim” Other takes place. This subordination is embedded in the discourse, which constitutes “Muslim” masculinity and male refugees as “cowards” due to their “decision” to flee from war and not fight. Militarized and control-based responses to the “invasion of the nation” are justified in my interviewee’s answers as well:

They are not allowed to demand anything. They should just be happy if someone is that idiotic to host them. These are moral issues. You are a refugee, don’t demand. You know, they are traveling thousands of kilometers, wearing better clothes than me and then they want to demand services from us without papers. We don’t even know where are they from. Primarily, 80% of them are men. Young men of fighting age. Then their big families with 10 members will come after them...I feel sorry for those people...don’t get offended...who welcomes all of them without any consideration and reason...I would never flee from a war if it happened here. It is unpatriotic, a patriot is not a coward. Women can leave, but they can also fight if they are capable. But if they have validated papers that they are really fleeing from war, then they would remain in Greece or Turkey and wouldn't come here...

According to the interviewee, the refugees’ class status threatens and challenges the development-underdevelopment nexus set up by the “Western” discourse in which “Europeans” and their “wealth” are endangered by the “economic migrants”. Within the framework of “*culturalizing*” racism, claiming and instrumentalizing Muslim cultural difference, serves as a strategy of dislocating cultures, which become dominant in the construction of the Hungarian identity and the moral(izing) spectatorship. The historicization of Hungarian victimhood is also a constitutive element of the nationalist governmental discourse repeated by my interviewee: Hungary is understood as to have been protecting (Western) Europe for a thousand years against the Turkish Empire, conveniently standing in for the “East”. This historicizing, in the Ultra’s words, renders the current Government’s “protective” mechanisms justified acts of saving the West – yet again – from the “Muslim” Other and from itself:

We are the periphery of Europe, as we have always been. Serbia has never been part of Europe or the EU. This is not based on religion, it is a matter of socialization and way of life, it is a huge cleavage between them and us. Turkey is the same situation. If Turks could enter the EU without visa, then all the migrants could come as well. Millions of them. Then we could just destroy the fence (barbed wire fence). If not now, then 30 years later there will be huge issues.

In the light of these arguments, the debate between the (radical) right wing and the EU (specifically Germany) about what measures to enforce in relation to the migration, in my understanding, may be more revealing to see as a debate about who can define what counts as “Europeanness”, “European culture”, and what role “Christianity” should have in it. This is, at the same time a debate about whether they can be “protected” in favor of nation-state structures vis-à-vis those of globalization and multiculturalism.⁵⁹ The Ultras member shared the criticism of the “Western way of life”, which seems to have influenced his acts of “civic responsiveness” at the time of the refugee crisis in September 2015. During the interview with him, his prognosis of the imagined “future” was dominant in our conversation:

Westerners are degenerated because of multiculturalism. Everything is pink and happy, but the world is not like this. It is cruel. If we look at the average citizen and we compare a Croatian with a French person, then the Croatian would eat the French person in a minute.⁶⁰ Hungarians are more down to the Earth, 40 years of communism, and nothing is happening in the last 25 years. Everyone is screwed. Freedom and democracy are new things to us. We don’t think enough and go in the wrong direction, just watching television and advertisements. Meanwhile terrorists are recruiting soldiers in the West.

A similar approach is mediated through the Mayor’s videos. In them, the refugee crisis and the “crisis of borders” are considered to be the result of the “anti-nationalist, liberal”

⁵⁹ From 2007 to 2008, violent homophobic attacks that specifically targeted sexual minorities did not primarily construct LGBT people as “scapegoats for political and economic alienation” (Renkin 2009, 24-25), but as scapegoats for the “anti-nationalist” operations of the liberal-socialist governmental coalition that facilitated EU membership and gave the green light to globalization and promoted allegedly Western-European constructions of gender, sexuality, and LGBT rights.

⁶⁰ “Romanians are cowards, and gross, have you seen Bucharest? And then Trianon is also there, it still hurts...But the Serbs, they know how to fight, they are not normal. I wouldn’t play with them.”

European Union of multiculturalism. To the extent the latter resonates with “diversity”, it can produce the connotation of “pink” as “queer rights” as well, that indirectly comes to be implicated as a hostile action “against the nation” imposed on “us” by the EU. What is also at stake politically in the eyes of extremist, nationalist discourses then is the biological and cultural re/production of members of the nation and its boundaries (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, Yuval-Davis 1996, McClintock 1993). According to this logic, lesbian bodies are primarily seen as female-assigned bodies and as such potential “reservoirs” or reproducers of the nation while gay male bodies are seen to have the potential for procreation, failing to exercise their “manly” capacities. The videos and the Ultra interview equally implicate this biopolitical understanding of queer bodies in the socio-political hierarchies of the nation constructed from within a radical right-wing, eugenicist, and pronatalist framework (Yuval-Davis 1996).

3.2.2 “Filiation” and Militarization

McClintock cites Edward Said’s argument about the shift to “filiation” (1993, 64) as a culture that is primarily based on familial relations in the late Victorian era to the culture of “affiliation”, namely to the emphasis on non-familial relationships. The importance of this shift according to Said is that the social service of family got displaced onto the emerging national bureaucracy (1993, 64). McClintock argues that the former shift to filiative culture did not disappear, but rather was reinvented within the affiliative order of the formation of the nation state and became naturalized (1993, 64). In this way, social difference became a category of nature in this setting, just as in the case of the family trope, especially in man-woman, man-children relations (1993, 64). In this particular case, the Mayor represents the father, who takes care and protects his woman (the nation, Hungary) and also his infantile,

unreliable, and “selfish child”. According to the Mayor, Europe went too far and, therefore, he suggests in his video, in a patronizing way, to “come and meet,” and declares to be enlightening Europe by “open[ing] the eyes of millions of Europeans...if we remain silent, we will become victims”.

In the interview with the member of the Ultra group, there is the rejection of “passivity” and “victimhood” reiterated when he talked about his motives for engaging in “civic engagement” vis-à-vis the insufficient state and its mediated “reality” in the news and billboard campaign:

The billboard campaign was ridiculous. That money could have been spent better on building the fence way earlier. Or, for instance, on collecting all those migrants from the Keleti Railways Station. The media pissed me off, it didn't make me think about issues. Also relating to the billboards...It just pissed me off that they put into my mouth what to think, so it didn't influence me in the direction of what they said but made me see that they just wanted to influence me. The state mustn't tell me what to think. I could have done the billboard campaign, it was so ineffective against the migrants.

The anti-establishment feature of my interviewee was predominant in the interview, he delegitimized the state for not performing properly and fast enough regarding control and punishment. The lack of state intervention, according to him, made other groups' actions and demands legitimate for sharing and extending the Hungarian state's exclusive monopoly on possessing “legitimate” violence (Weber 1994, 311):

It was upsetting that those people [refugees] were there, especially that it was renovated not so long ago [referring to Keleti Railway Station] and then they [the state] let them be there for months without any monitoring and control. It was a huge mistake and every European politicians admitted that they don't know who entered the EU.

Regarding the role of the state, assumptions about “proper” behavior towards the suffering Other came up in the interview. These assumptions included ideas about what the state should have done and how non-state actors should behave in response to the refugees. For the

interviewee, absolute difference was a mobilizing force towards the suffering Other, where the capability of people for “democratic self-governance” (Alhayek 2014) was denied as a result of their assumed “culture” and “underdevelopment”, a perspective that Alhayek terms the “politics of disgust”. This assumed difference between the “Hungarian” Self and the “Muslim” Other is gendered, ethnicized, and racialized in the formation of nation and construction of the Hungarian identity, through which “desirable” and “undesirable” European politics and citizenships are constituted. The dominant and systematic way of referring to state security re/produces an “imagined” and “performative”, i.e. verbally and visually “spoken” threat (Hanzen 2000, 300-301) relating to people fleeing from war-torn countries. As a result, refugees are considered to be a threat to border security and by that indirectly to the citizens of European countries. In addition to being portrayed as endangering “Europeanness” with their assumed culture and its lack of “development”, the state security discourses reiterate the refugee as “Muslim other” in a dichotomy that produces the underlying hierarchical and imperialist power relations. On the supra-nation-state level, securitization of the presence and movement of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants (re)produces the colonial historical dichotomy of “Christian, white, civilized Europe” and the “Muslim, Arab, barbaric East,” which contributes to the Western hegemonic social order and hierarchy of “developed” states. This development versus governmentally nexus was present in my interview as well with the young man from the football fan club. To my question about his opposing opinion about refugees coming to Hungary, his answer was:

The state should have cleaned them away earlier. For instance, they could have set up collection camps earlier. They wouldn't have been there [at Keleti] for months. I would have not let them to enter Hungary though. Okay, I understand that you run away from the war, but why to Europe? These people are economic immigrants, not refugees. And this is not a problem, but the hosting countries have the right to decide whether they want to let them in or

not. But you still cannot say what *Merkel* said, that come, come, we will host 600,000 Syrian refugees. When Hungarians emigrated in 1956, we were also Christians, it is the same culture, *we are white and educated*. Those who come here now are from completely different background from the middle of the desert. They do not even now what an English toilet is. They can't be integrated.

The interview quote reiterates the notion of portraying Muslim women as victims of Muslim men that “follow a book” and Muslim men as threatening oppressors to Western women and “culture,” and calls for the militarization of Western states as a reaction to the “invasion” of “uncivilized Middle Easterners” who have caused the “European crisis.” As it was emphasized in my interviewee’s comments as well that individual, bodily danger emerges in their discussions about women. Women are the ones who are considered to be threatened by refugee men, according to him. When I asked a question about how “they” are dangerous to “European men”, he discussed his fears of violations of “European culture”, buildings, and casualties, as a result of terrorist attacks.⁶¹ The militarization of the Western border regime is a response to the pre-constructed securitization of the “Muslim refugee Other,” which is essential to the confirmation of European exceptionalism and its gendered human security regime. The question arises: whose security are we talking about, whose security is at stake on a collective level? Whose security is ignored meanwhile and kept in continuous precarity, and at whose expense? This process of Othering is the procedure through which the constructions of Western hegemonic masculinities occur and re/produce and shape subordinate masculinities that are ironically portrayed as a human security issue. Militarized masculinity in Hungary reclaims the traditionalist “ideology of manliness” that engages aggression and violence to further its position in relation to “Western” hegemonic masculinity and non-Western subordinate masculinities in the formation of the nation. Physical

⁶¹ “How would *they* be dangerous to me [laugh]. Are they going to *rape* me? No, they are primarily dangerous to European women.”

characteristics are overtly emphasized in this embodiment of masculinity and power that was galvanized by a group of football Hooligans who on their way to the Romanian-Hungarian match at Népliget went to Keleti Railway Station in September 2015. My interviewee told me his memories about the chain of events like this:

It is a duty as a citizen. You protect your country. Those people [refugees] were at the railway station for weeks. It is unacceptable. Everyone knew about them. They were everywhere in the news. It was predictable what happened. Especially when you are on your way to fight with your ancient enemy, the fag Romanians and we are at Keleti, a couple of kilometers from Népliget. And then the battle at Népliget. Everyone felt it that this would happen. Just imagine if all the tens of thousands people had gone there... Then there could have been issues, but not like this. You know, if the migrants are there only for 2-3 days, then no one would have done anything because we know they would have been taken away. But the government didn't do anything, so people had to act. And then they were taken away right away... We coerced the state to do something.

Taking away the legitimate violence used by the state and employing it as a way to “blackmail” the state and state apparatus was a form of “civic responsiveness” that the Ultra said was effective against the passivity of the state. In his eyes, this passivity was effeminate and unpatriotic, whereas the hooligans acted to “protect” the Hungarians and the Hungarian streets and buildings. This violent act was an important marker of this groups’ construction of “Hungarian” identity, both against the refugees and the Romanians. In this nationalist discourse, the moral distance between the Hungarian Self and the refugee Other or Romanian Other is the same and serve the same purpose. Facilitating an absolute difference that “legitimizes” violent speech and physical acts in defense of the nation. Gender takes an important role in this, because in both Othering procedures, fears of emasculation has a key element in the construction of “Hungarian masculinity”.

3.3 Humanitarian Reasons of Civic Responsiveness: the Discourse of “Care”

The humanitarian activists that I interviewed within the framework of this research were reported in the Hungarian and international mass media as well, but their actions and the recruitment of people was primarily facilitated through the social media platform of Facebook. In this section, I study the four interviews that I conducted with these activists that I knew previously who played crucial roles in the civic engagement of Migszol Szeged and another humanitarian activist group in Budapest. My questions were concerned with their thoughts and reactions to the governmental media coverage and political campaigns in relation to the humanitarian crisis and their main motives to get engaged and be the “engine” of full-time civic responsiveness during the summer of 2015. I found that they appealed to the need of “responsible” civic behavior against the irresponsible and non-humanitarian action of the Hungarian government that, in their reading, was predominantly evoked through dehumanizing images of the “refugee” accompanied by strategic use of a depersonalizing language in the related texts in the Hungarian governmental media. The activists told me about their assumptions of “proper” behavior. These assumptions revolved around “proper” clothes that activists should wear or not wear and about the capability of people for “democratic self-governance” (Alhayek 2014). At the same time, they also used tropes that reiterated the stigmatizing government media discourse as well, resonating with the figure of the sexualized Arab man and the oppressed Muslim woman. These kinds of underlying sentiments that can be deconstructed in the “humanitarian” responses to the positions of the refugees in Hungary are important to detect in order to understand the limits of solidarity that comes about as a result of engagement with the mediated position of moral(izing) spectatorship.

3.3.1 Humanitarian Response vis-à-vis the State

The most frequently mentioned reason for the activists to start mobilizing the local community and counter the governmental media was the hate campaign against the refugees produced in the governmental media and the lack of state intervention that constructed the “crisis”. One of the four main activists of Migszol Szeged talked about his motives for his humanitarian response:

For me, this was a political motive. I was pissed at the way the Hungarian government triggered hate. If this didn't happen, I wouldn't have got involved this much. The Hungarian government did not do anything to prevent any conflict, just think about the Rösztke case. These conflicts were in their interest to prove to Hungarians how the state protects us. I don't support the idea of open borders either. But this is unacceptable to grab only the security risk and dimension of migration and leave the job to the billboards and the media to trigger hate instead of proper state intervention. This is not the task of billboards but the legitimate institutions' task to take care of security.

Besides the main motive as being oppositional in relation to the government, and by default helping people, one of the other activists told me about his experiences and the ways his “Hungarianness” and masculinity were questioned by people who wanted to take advantage of the precarious and vulnerable situation of the sufferers. These insults came from taxi drivers in Szeged, who called him “Soros, jew, fag” for not letting them to financially take advantage of the refugees:

We told the refugees that they can travel from Szeged for free by train. Therefore, the taxi drivers got pissed because they couldn't technically “steal” 500 euro for taking them to Budapest. They yelled at me and said that the main issue in Hungary is that we, Hungarians don't cooperate with each other in times like this. Why do you help these fuckers instead of Hungarian fellows? - he asked. I said, because I think you are the fucker for doing this. They also told me that I am fucking with them [the taxi drivers] because I haven't seen a pussy before.

Another important aspect of the humanitarian civic response was a certain level of claiming “Hungarianness” while cooperating with other groups. Three of the activists

explicitly said that they do not support the “open borders” policy for various reasons. This became directly an issue when, in the middle of August 2015, the international media coverage about the situation in Hungary increased tremendously, especially when the news started spreading in the second half of the month that the Hungarian government planned to close down the borders.

One of the main coordinators of Mígszol Szeged expressed his opinion on the dynamics between these groups in relation to “proper” actions and his understanding of “proper” distance to the suffering Other.

A huge international activist network got engaged, and we had a lot of conflicts with them. We could not really cooperate. This was a few group of people who thought this was a festival, they cooked for themselves and the refugees without any coordination or listening to us. This looked crappy in the media and the coverage mixed us up with them. This was not a party or a festival, this was serious. This was also a matter of pride, we had been doing this for two months then.

In the Hungarian governmental and right-wing nationalist discourse, helping refugees became conceptualized as a marker of national belonging or rather being a traitor. In Szeged, the local Jobbik party and the Mayor of Ásotthalom, a member of the party, attacked the activists several times both verbally and physically. The reiteration of the left-right division occurred when, as one of the activists mentioned, the Mayor sent Betyársereg (“Army of Outlaws”) activists to communist Szeged (referring to the socialist mayor in Szeged) that supports these anti-national “migrant-petting” activists.

3.3.2 “Common Humanity”: “Lifestyle” Solidarity in the Age of Neoliberalism

In agreement with Chouliaraki’s (2011) argument about the notion of celebrity solidarity that is embedded in the “global humanitarian market” based on consumerism and is oriented to the self, I would argue that a similar form of civic responsiveness (out of the

many) emerged in the Hungarian discourses of the refugee crisis, while bearing in mind the limits of my data. This move is rather self-oriented in that it acknowledges the human suffering of the Other, yet does not challenge the underlying power relations and systematic inequalities between the West-East, North-South divisions. Two of the humanitarian activists whom I interviewed explicitly mentioned their commitment to helping the suffering Other regardless of skin color, religion, or nationality, reiterating the notion of “common humanity.”

Besides these motives, a certain level of “lifestyle” solidarity was also noticeable during the summer of 2015, as pointed out one of my Mígszol informants. He discussed how the civil helpers turned the occasion into self-care humanitarianism, engaging in self-therapy by helping the suffering Other. This kind of self-centeredness-driven solidarity re/produces a moral distance between the Self and the Other by being embedded in neoliberal consumerism:

We went to Spar and bought some food. Once, I helped to buy a train ticket for a boy and also loaned my phone for a while. We, as human beings, have a responsibility that if we have the possibility to help other human beings then we have to do that. Doing protest is ridiculous. The oppositional parties were also lame ass. If you give them a food, that is already a protest act. That makes sense. But there were plenty of attention seekers at Keleti. People acted like certain kinds of European saviors. Then there were the NGOs and human rights organizations, who were more reasonable and wanted to help but by following the rules. I don't agree with this “open borders” thing.

The presence of the humanitarian activists was prominent in the oppositional media, in which the representation of the suffering Other was portrayed as a passive victim. This desirable form of passivity triggers “lifestyle” solidarity and to some extent that is the limitation of lifestyle solidarity as well as a result of moral distance between the Self and the Other. Most of the activists talked about their heavy feelings when any of the refugees gave voice to their dislike of the activists’ treatment, or when single men asked for food. One of the activists

recalled their memory when at Keleti Railway Station, before the “March of Hope”⁶², primarily men gathered together and started praying before the protests started, then activists started to panic and felt endangered:

As I recall, 98% of the activists were women. There were weird things, especially about Islam. For instance, how much should we respect it. I respect them, but I also expect respect from them, so I won't wear burka and I will wear shorts. If they won't accept food from me because of that then that is the case.

This kind of emphasis on the “European” self was dominant in the four interviews with the Migszol activists. The reiteration of the Self through the suffering Other primarily came up in the conversation about expressions of demand and agency, instead of the assumed passive victimhood of the sufferer. This increases the moral distance between the Self and the Other, while also maintaining “European” hegemony in comparison to the Rest, while not challenge the “European” understanding of humanity and underlying values.

They were coming from various countries. There were some that looked Muslim but turned out to be Christian. Maybe they came because they were endangered based on their religion in the Muslim country. Helping is an elementary force. If you can help, and give food and water, then you do. The state did not help at all. They evoked fear against the migrant. The terminology is very interesting, migrant means something bad, like Nigger. We rather referred to them in our internal slang as our “Migroes”. You know it contains more love.

In some way, this kind of solidarity coming from my interviewee is based on the politics of pity, which acknowledges some sort of difference based on “culture”, and the “care” is mobilized by the assumption of the refugee's lack of “agency”. The discourse of common humanity (“helping is an elementary force”) is dependent on governmentality enacted by the activists and victimhood of the vulnerable Other. The politics of pity is “blind” to the fact of

⁶² September 4-5, 2015, thousands of refugees were marching from Keleti train station to the Austrian border, after being stuck at the station in Budapest.

Link: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/04/hundreds-refugees-march-austria-budapest-hungary-syrians> accessed on May 26, 2017.

any of the refugees' agency (Silverstone 2006, 46) without "punishment" of being ungrateful or dangerous from the activists. The excerpt from the interview in my interpretation draws on "common humanity"-based solidarity that Chouliaraki (2011, 10) problematizes, where the humanitarian discourse does not challenge the existing power relations, but rather normalizes that: "if you can help... then you do".

One of the Migszol activists referred to an evangelist priest, Sándor Cserháti, who encouraged a humanitarian response based on religious beliefs. He was interviewed by the official webpage of the Hungarian Evangelic Church ("Magyar Evangélikus Egyház"),⁶³ from where I took the photo taken of him in Szeged. He said the following in response to the journalist's question: "People would think that, if you help, then you give. Can helping make you addicted? What do you mean by that?":

People can feel in all parts of their life that if we help someone that we not only help the other, but also ourselves. This relationship is based on mutual interdependence. The personal experiences, looks, a few kind words can give a huge amount of energy and sometimes can help in our own crises, when we see others' worse situation and how determined they are, while sometimes keeping joy meanwhile.

What is important about the above quote is the expression of self-care humanitarianism, as a way of maintaining "our" lifestyle and using the distant sufferer's situation as a therapy for the activists' personal struggles. There were other activists, who emphasized the presence of the self-therapy motive (for instance, overcoming the emotional demands of a divorce in several helpers' cases), in addition to being interested or curious, where the activist subject is rather oriented towards (de-politicized) consumerism, or even the "glamour" go help than political commitment of ethical citizenship, as Chouliaraki may call this, a certain level of post-humanitarian way of acknowledging and communicating suffering and human

⁶³ Link: <http://www.evangelikus.hu/cserhati-sandor-menekultek-szegeden> Accessed on 2 May, 2017.

vulnerabilities. Acknowledging “mutual interdependence” is also a denial of hegemonic “Europeanness”. This approach, nevertheless, keeps a certain degree of Self-Other moral distance, while assuming a generally passive stance associated with victimhood, where the



FIG. 5: THE PRIEST IS SHAVING A BANGLADESHI REFUGEE (SOURCE: UNHCR/ LINDER BÁLINT)

Other is dependent, not the other way around.

The above-mentioned addiction came up several times in the interviews. Another important observation about this type of solidarity-based help is that it is plausible in a way that moralizing argumentations are used to recreate not only the Self-Other distinction but the underlying power relations between the “European savior” and the “ungrateful refugee” Other. For instance, two of the activists mentioned that after the news came up about the terrorist attacks and rumors became public about someone throwing their child over the fence, some volunteers quit. As one of them put it:

There were assholes there as well that I wouldn't give not only residence permit but a glass of water either. They were impatient and demanding. There were cases when a man ran away with a sleeping bag that was in the hand of more vulnerable groups, such as children, women, and elderly.

Both “oppositional” solidarity and “lifestyle” humanity create an “improper” moral distance between the Self and the suffering Other, whereby the engagement is not merely based on engagement towards the Other based on suffering, but based on opposition to the state and the government. As a result of the moral distance, the engagement is also embedded in a neoliberal self-oriented pride, either as a result of help or the opposition of the government, which reiterates the construction of the “Hungarian” identity, based on either calling humanitarian act progressive, to serve as a certain way of reclaiming Hungarianness and Europeanness. The other reason is to form alliance against the government, in the name of common humanity, which instrumentalizes the distant sufferer in the name of doing domestic politics.

Based on my data, I analyzed different kinds of “humanitarian” positions vis-à-vis the various data types in relation to the construction of the “Hungarian” Self and the “refugee” Other. During the summer and fall of 2015, one of the non-democratic “civic responsiveness” types was “control”, which was mobilized for protecting “us”, Hungarians and Europeans. The other type of civic responsiveness was “care”, which was mobilized for various reasons. The “humanitarian” positions vis-à-vis the government were oppositional to the Government’s act and criticized the humanness of the state, which then reclaimed “banal” nationalism, by reiterating “Hungarian progress”. Another type of responsiveness was mobilized based on “lifestyle” humanitarianism, which was a self-expression, self-care-based solidarity that stemmed from either narcissistic self-distancing or the pity-based “common humanity”. In this way, “improper distance”-based solidarity towards the suffering Other can

be captured in these interviews, which is mobilized without collective judgement instead of market-based self-expression, and instead of politicizing global “injustice”, rather focuses on criticizing the Hungarian state that represents “Hungarians” improperly (not accruing to banal, “proper” European “Hungarianness”) according to this approach.

Conclusions

The ultimate objective in this research was to explore the construction of the “migrant” Other through the discursive representations produced within the Hungarian governmental media and see what kind of audience responses it implicates. I have argued in this thesis that the Hungarian governmental media, as an “Ideological State Apparatus” - to use Althusser’s understanding of the media as an institution that mediates hegemonic ideology or “common sense” (Althusser 1971, cited in Van Zoonen 1994: 24) — interpellates the audience as citizens to respond to the mediated suffering of the Other, which, as I have argued, indirectly articulates an “us”, “Hungarians”, belonging to the “nation”, underscoring Hungary’s role as the “bulwark of (Christian) Europe”.

In Chapter 2, I argue that a state-centered news production reiterates gendered, nationalist, ethnicized, and racialized understandings of the “migrant” and re/produces what may count as “proper” reaction from its audience. These nationalist discourses re/produce the hegemonic masculinity that is seen as threatened by the “migrant troops” within a framework of securitization that eventually “legitimizes” the militarization of the state. Using Bakić-Hayden's understanding of “nesting orientalisms” (cited in Helms 2008), I have deconstructed the ways in which “the West and the rest” binary is re/produced, by focusing on the centrality of “Central-Europeanness” as an important political and epistemological category in the construction of a simplified East/West, North/South distinction. I also explored the ways in which mainstream governmental media produced a dominant discourse about the nature of the “crisis” as a crisis of Europe and “proper Europeanness” (in defense of “traditional Christian values” due to the “invasion of (Muslim) migrants” that was met with the “insufficient” reaction, and therefore, the failure of the European Union. This dominant discourse of the

Hungarian government, and specifically that of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, directly connects the concept of migration with terrorism: “the growth of criminal activities”, and the attack against “our culture, lifestyle, customs and traditions”.⁶⁴ Therefore, the suffering of the Other and their entitlement to have rights to state-related protection are delegitimized and denied through the governmental media’s visual strategy and depersonalizing language use. Through the state-centered media coverage and news production, the figure of “migrant” became re/signified narrowly as a non-white, Muslim, “dangerous male perpetrator”, who is not considered to be a vulnerable and suffering Other and, therefore, is not worthy of the state’s legal and political protection. Instead, it is the “Hungarian nation” that needs to be protected from “him”. The mediated construction of the “migrant” as a dehumanized threat is mobilized to invite the “ideal” actions of the audience that should assume a national identity at the intersection of gendered, ethnicized, and racialized regimes of “difference” against and over the suffering Other, but also from the “liberal and multicultural” EU.

Finally, I exposed the “banal nationalism” – in Michael Billig’s (1995) sense of the term – that emerges in the Hungarian humanitarian discourse articulated by aid activists, which is based on the notion of passive “victimhood” of the suffering Other and so the lack of acknowledgment of their agency. Moreover, the humanitarian “care” in this endeavor re/iterated “good Hungarianness” by instrumentalizing refugee bodies to be protected by activists who come to be seen as “morally superior” in comparison with the Hungarian nationalist governmental discourse. My analysis was based on interviews in the frame of an ethnographic (interpretative) audience research that I conducted with humanitarian activists from Szeged and Budapest who felt compelled to respond to the mediated crisis for various,

⁶⁴ Link: <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2015/11/16/viktor-orban-hungary-is-at-war/> accessed on June 4th, 2017.

often contradictory reasons. I have tried to illustrate the different motives of civic responsiveness as a result of different types of solidarity towards the suffering Other, by piecing together the different narratives of activists' testimonies in relation to the construction of the moral(izing) spectatorship in and by the governmental media.

In Chapter 3, I built upon Chouliaraki's (2011) discussion of strategies of solidarity such as the "politics of pity" and "irony" and her arguments instead for an agonistic strategy of desirable representation of the suffering other. In agreement with her, I propose such strategy provides more space for participants' reflections on gender, race, and ethnicity relations within humanitarian action because of understanding the notion of injustice as a matter of political question (Chouliaraki 2011,377), inviting collective response, or in other words, challenging the public (self-expression of humanitarian act) versus private (justification of action) division. An agonistic disposition can serve as a mobilizing force for civic responsiveness that goes beyond various configurations of "improper" distance between the Self and the Other.

What I aimed to explore through deconstructing the logic of mainstream mediation of suffering is the possibility of resisting these governmental strategies and came to arguing for a different ethical basis for agonistic solidarity that can help overcome obstacles for producing moral commitments for civic responsiveness without denying their sovereignty. The "main" finding of my research is that "democratic" civic acts of responsiveness in Szeged and Budapest showed us that solidarity for the suffering Other can also come about vis-à-vis the state, as an opposition. At this point, though, now the question arises: what kind of spectatorship can allow the recognition of agency of both refugees and audience and has the possibility to also subvert humanitarian discourse and the construction of the "progressive" humanitarian Self that is embedded in neoliberal and "banal" nationalist values and norms?

Based on my initial findings, further analysis would allow us to explore further how, for what reasons and with what effects comes about the overlap between “care” and antidemocratic militant “self-defense” through the perception of a distance between the “Hungarian” spectator and the mediated suffering Other(s); which is especially painful to see in the aid activists’ disposition of “care”.

Appendix

Hundreds of refugees burst out of the Röszke camp because of the slow Hungarian administration procedures. As far as we know, first they threw rocks at the police then approximately 300 people headed to the direction of the highway and neighboring lands, while destroying the fence. Even the M5 highway had to be closed down for a while. The *escapees* (“*menekülők*”) were eventually successfully caught by the police and were taken back to the camp. The police also used tear gas on those who are now standing in line.⁶⁵

Police men are running in the field nearby Röszke, and they are chasing the migrants who escaped from the collection point. Approximately 3,000 refugees broke down the fence that was set up around the makeshift camp and broke out from Röszke camp. Most of them were running towards the highway and the neighboring lands. Before that, they allegedly threw rocks at the police because, as far as we know, they became furious at the slow administration procedure. There are around 2,000 people in the camp and 500 people are still unregistered and some of the unregistered people wanted to run away. The refugees, beforehand, gave 2 hours to the administration to decide on their asylum seeking procedure, and then they said if they won't do the procedure faster, they will encourage their fellows to do the same and burst out of the camp...⁶⁶

...The policemen are adjusting their equipment... they were continuously arriving from Szeged and the neighboring cities. They were brought by police cars and buses. Most of them are wearing bulletproof vests and also have shields with them. More and more of them have enclosed the camp so those (referring to “migrants”) who are still inside cannot escape. Meanwhile, they (referring to the policemen) are trying to collect those who ran away from the makeshift camp. By late afternoon, it was successful and, according to the police, they managed to “collect” every refugee and took them back to the camp, where the mood was tense.

There are many police men who enclosed the makeshift camp from outside, while there are many *migrants* inside of the fence. There were women and children as well in the crowd. As one can see in the video report, some children were taken out from the crowd, and allegedly the elderly and women were taken out as well. Meanwhile, some people were transported by buses. Later in the afternoon, some people started throwing rocks again at policemen who used tear gas on *them*.

⁶⁵ Link: http://tenyek.hu/belfold/185413_kitortek_a_taborbol.html Accessed on 20 May, 2017.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

Reference List

- Alhayek, Katty. 2014. "Double Marginalization: The Invisibility of Syrian Refugee Women's Perspectives in Mainstream Online Activism and Global Media." *Feminist Media Studies* 14, no. 4: 696-700.
- Amar, Paul (Paul Edouard) 2011.. "Middle East Masculinity Studies: Discourses of 'Men in Crisis,' Industries of Gender in Revolution." *Journal Of Middle East Women's Studies* no. 3: 36-70.
- Anderson, Benedict R. 1983. *Imagined Communities : reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Atlatszo. 2016. "Refugees subjected to systematic abuse". atlatszo.hu. Accessed May 21, 2017. Available from: <https://english.atlatszo.hu/2016/09/20/refugees-subjected-to-systematic-abuse/>
- Bayer, Zsolt. 2015. "Hírek 40." badog.blogstar.hu. Accessed June 9, 2017. Available from. <http://badog.blogstar.hu/2015/10/10/hirek-40-/21569/>
- Balogh, Kitti, Fülöp Nóra, Ilyés Virág, Varjú Zoltán. 2016. "Migránsok, menekülők, bevándorlók: mit sulykol a média?" Nyelv és Tudomány. nyest.hu. Accessed May 30, 2017. Available from: <https://www.nyest.hu/hirek/migransok-menekulok-bevandorlok-mit-sulykol-a-media>
- Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*, London : Sage Publications.
- Bernáth, Gábor, and Vera Messing. 2015. "Bedarálva: A menekültekkel kapcsolatos kormányzati kampány és a tőle független megszólalás terei [Governmental anti-migrant narratives and the potentials of independent discourses]." *Médiakutató* 16, no. 4: 7-17.
- Betyársereg. "Elindult a rendőrség-határvaszütoborzó Facebook-oldala". betyarsereg.hu. Accessed May 21, 2017. Available from: <http://betyarsereg.hu/elindult-a-rendorseg-hatarvadasz-toborzo-facebook-oldala/>
- Blikk, "A magyarok is rettegnek Brüsszelben a terrortól". blikk.hu. Accessed May 21, 2017. Available from: <http://www.blikk.hu/aktualis/politika/a-magyarok-is-rettegnak-brusszelben-a-terrortol/t31sv3n>
- Brouwer, Jelmer, Maartje van der Woude, and Joanne van der Leun. 2017. "Framing Migration and the Process of Crimmigration: A Systematic Analysis of the Media Representation of Unauthorized Immigrants in the Netherlands null [article]." *European Journal Of Criminology* no. 1: 100-119.
- Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security : A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1989. *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, London: Pluto Press.

- Chouliaraki, Lilie. "Watching 11 September: the politics of pity." 2004. *Discourse & Society* 15:, no. 2/3: 185-198.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie. 2010. "Post-humanitarianism: Humanitarian communication beyond a politics of pity." *International Journal Of Cultural Studies* 13, no. 2: 107-126.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie. 2011. "'Improper distance': Towards a critical account of solidarity as irony." *International Journal Of Cultural Studies* 14, no. 4: 363-381.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie. 2012. *The Ironic Spectator: Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism*. (Cambridge, Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie. 2016. "Concluding Comment: Moral Responsibility and Civic Responsiveness: Spectacles of Suffering on Digital Media." *Javnost-The Public* 23, no. 4: 415-419.
- Connell, R. W., and James W. Messerschmidt. 2005. "Hegemonic masculinity: Rethinking the Concept" *GENDER & SOCIETY* 19, no. 6: 829-859.
- Dahlgren, Peter. 2016. "Moral Spectatorship and Its Discourses: The "Mediapolis" in the Swedish Refugee Crisis." *Javnost-The Public* 23, no. 4: 382-397.
- Dunn, Kevin M., Natascha Klocker, and Tanya Salabay. 2007. "Contemporary racism and Islamophobia in Australia: Racializing religion." *Ethnicities* 7, no. 4: 564-589.
- Enloe, Cynthia. 1989. "Gender Makes the World Go Round: Where Are the Women?" *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relations*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fairclough, Norman. 1995. *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. London: Longman.
- Fairclough, Norman. 2003. *Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Farris, Sara R. 2017. *In the Name of Women's Rights : the Rise of Femonationalism*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Fox News. 2015. "Camerawoman who tripped refugee to sue victim" foxnews.com, Accessed May 21, 2017. Available from: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/10/21/camerawoman-who-tripped-refugee-to-sue-victim.html>
- Fox News. 2017. "Hungarian reporter who kicked migrants gets probation" foxnews.com, Accessed May 21, 2017. Available from: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/01/12/hungarian-reporter-who-kicked-migrants-gets-probation.html>
- Gellner, Ernst. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford : Blackwell.
- Gorton, Kristyn. 2009. *Media Audiences: Television, Meaning and Emotion* (Media Topics Series). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

- Emma Graham-Harrison and Jon Henley. 2015. "Hungary to take thousands of refugees to Austrian border by bus". [theguardian.com](http://www.theguardian.com). Accessed May 21, 2017. Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/04/hundreds-refugees-march-austria-budapest-hungary-syrians>
- Greussing, Esther, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. 2017. "Shifting the refugee narrative? An automated frame analysis of Europe's 2015 refugee crisis," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*: 1-26. DOI:10.1080/1369183X.2017.1282813
- Hansen, Lene. 2002. "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School." *Millennium* 29, no. 2: 285-306.
- Hayden, Sally. 2017. "This Small Hungarian Town has Banned 'Gay Propaganda' to Become a Far-Right Refuge" time.com. Accessed June 9, 2017. Available from: <http://time.com/4688381/asotthalom-hungary-far-right-laszlo-toroczka-lgbt/>
- Helms, Elissa. 2008. "East and West Kiss: Gender, Orientalism, and Balkanism in Muslim-Majority Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Slavic Review*, 1: 88-119.
- Hill Collins, Patricia. 2005. "Black sexual politics : African Americans, gender, and the new racism." New York : Routledge.
- Horváth-Bolla Zsuzsanna. 2015. "„A személyes tapasztalatok elfűjják a menekültekkel szembeni irracionális félelmeket!" [evangelikus.hu](http://www.evangelikus.hu), Accessed June 26, 2015. Available from: <http://www.evangelikus.hu/cserhati-sandor-menekultek-szegeden>
- Howarth, David. *Discourse*. 2000. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
- HVG. 2015. "Beindultak a a civilek Szegeden: élelmet, pelenkát vittek a menekülteknek" hvg.hu, Accessed June 26, 2015. Available from: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150626_Beindultak_a_civilek_Szegeden_elelmet_pel
- HVG. 2015. "Bekeményített a MÁV, éjjel kizárta a menekülteket az állomásról" hvg.hu, Accessed June 27, 2015. Available from: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150627_Bekemenyitett_a_MAV_ejjel_kizarta_a_menek
- Hungarian Spectrum. 2015. Viktor Orban: Hungary is at war" hungarianspectrum.org, Accessed May 27, 2017. Available from: <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2015/11/16/viktor-orban-hungary-is-at-war/>
- Kimmel, Michael S. 2005. "Globalization and its Mal(e)contents: The Gendered Moral and Political Economy of Terrorism." In *Handbook of Men and Masculinities*, edited by M.S. Kimmel, J.R. Hearn and R.W. Connell. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Klocker, Natascha, and Dunn, Kevin M. 2003. "Who's driving the asylum debate: newspaper and government representations of asylum seekers." *Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy: quarterly journal of media research and resources*, 109: 71-92.
- Kryakidou, Maria. 2015. "Media Witnessing: Exploring the Audience of Distant Suffering." *Media, Culture & Society* 30, no. 2: 215-231.

- Kulpa, R. 2014. "Western Leveraged Pedagogy of Central and Eastern Europe: Discourses of Homophobia, Tolerance, and Nationhood." *Gender, Place & Culture* 21, no. 4: 431–448.
- Lazar, Michelle M. 2005. "Politicizing Gender in Discourse: Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis as Political Perspective and Praxis." *Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis* 1. New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lull, J. 1990. *Inside Family Viewing: Ethnographic Research on Television's Audiences*. London: Routledge.
- Magyar Idők. "A migránsok kedvenc videói videói lefejezés, csonkítás és pornó." magyaridok.hu. Accessed May 27, 2017. Available from: <http://magyaridok.hu/belfold/a-migransok-kedvenc-videoi-lefejezes-csonkitas-es-porno-37936/>
- Magyar Nemzet. "Megszólalt a rugdosódó operatőr, László Petra. mno.hu. Accessed May 27, 2017. Available from: Link: <https://mno.hu/belfold/megszolalt-a-rugdosodo-operator-laszlo-petra-1303854>
- Marr, David, and Wilkinson, Marian. 2003. *Dark Victory*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- McClintock, Anne. 1993. "Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family." *Feminist Review* no. 44: 61-80.
- Médiatörvény. 2010. "Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Communication". hunmedialaw.hu Accessed May 30, 2017. Available from: http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/153/Mttv_110803_EN_final.pdf
- Nagel, Joane. 1998. "Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 2: 242-269.
- Narkowicz, Kasia and Konrad Pędziwiatr. 2017. "Saving and fearing Muslim women in 'post-communist' Poland: troubling Catholic and secular Islamophobia," *Gender, Place & Culture* 24, no.2: 288-299.
- Karasz, Palko. 2016. "Camerawoman Who Kicked Refugees in Hungary Is Charged With 'Breach of Peace' *New York Times*. Accessed May 30, 2017. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/world/europe/hungarian-journalist-syrian-refugee.html?_r=2
- Origo. 2015. "23 ezer migráns érkezett a hétvégén" origo.hu. Accessed May 30, 2017. Available from: <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20151012-23-ezer-migrans-erkezett-a-hetvegen.html>
- Peterson, V. Spike. 1999. "Sexing Political Identities: Nationalism as Heterosexism," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 1, no. 1: 34-65.
- Precognox. 2017. "News about migration in Hungarian online media" labs.precognox.com. Accessed May 30, 2017. Available from: <http://labs.precognox.com/migration-dashboard/>
- Puar, Jasbir. 2007. *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Next Wave)*. Durham: Duke University Press.

- Pugliese, Joseph. 2009. "Civil modalities of refugee trauma, death and necrological transport," *Social Identities* 15, no. 1: 149-165.
- Renkin, Hadley Z. 2009. "Homophobia and Queer Belonging in Hungary," *Focaal* no. 53: 20-37.
- Rettberg, Jill Walker, and Radhika Gajjala. 2016. "Terrorists or cowards: negative portrayals of male Syrian refugees in social media." *Feminist Media Studies* 16, no. 1: 178-181.
- Richter-Montpetit, Melanie. 2007. "Empire, Desire and Violence: A Queer Transnational Feminist Reading of the Prisoner 'Abuse' in Abu Ghraib and the Question of 'Gender Equality'", *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 9, no. 1: 38-59.
- Ripost. "Újabb migránsáradat érkezett Zákányba" ripost.hu, Accessed June 30, 2015.
Available from: <https://ripost.hu/cikk-ujabb-migransaradat-erkezett-zakanyba>
- Silverstone, Roger. 2006. *Media and Morality: On the Rise of the Mediapolis*. Cambridge: Polity, 2006.
- Szlavkovits, Rita. 2015. "Botka utasítására segítenek a menekülteknek" hvg.hu, Accessed June 30, 2015.
Available from: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150630_Botka_utasitasara_segitenek_a_menekultekn
- Tények. 2015. "Kitörték a táborból" tenyek.hu Accessed May 20, 2017.
Available from: http://tenyek.hu/belfold/185413_kitortek_a_taborbol.html
- TV2. 2015. "A TV2 36. heti nézettségi toplistája" tv2.hu. Accessed May 20, 2017.
Available from: http://sales.tv2.hu/nezettseg/3516_a_tv2_36_heti_nezettsegi_toplistaja.html
- Krisztina Than. 2015. "Hungarian TV journalist fired for tripping up fleeing migrants" reuters.com Accessed May 30, 2017.
Available from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-camerawoman-idUSKCN0R90KK20150909>
- Thorpe, Nick. "Hungary's poster war on immigration" bbc.com. Accessed May 30, 2017.
Available from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33091597>
- Van der Woude, M.A.H., and van Berlo, P. 2015. "Crimmigration at the Internal Borders of Europe? Examining the Schengen Governance Package." *Utrecht Law Review* 11, no. 1: 61-79.
- Weber, Max. 1994. *Political writings*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 309-369.
- Wolff, Larry. 1994. "Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilisation on the Mind of the Enlightenment." *Dix-Huitième Siècle: Persée*.
- Youtube. 2015. "Message to illegal immigrants in Hungary" youtube.com. Accessed June 9, 2017. Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fgJRjy2Xc0c&t=19s>

Youtube. 2015. "2nd message about illegal immigration (invitation to Custodela)" [youtube.com](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AR8FoOwwQkE). Accessed June 9, 2017. Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AR8FoOwwQkE>.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1996. "Women and the Biological Reproduction of the Nation," *Women's Studies International Forum* 19, no. 1-2: 17-24.

Yuval-Davis, Nira and Floya Anthias (eds.). 1989. *Woman-Nation-State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Polyák, Gabor and Uszkiewicz Erik. "Foglyul ejtett média" mertek.eu. Accessed June 9, 2017. Available from: http://mertek.eu/sites/default/files/files/szeliden_foglyul_ejteni.pdf