

The “unplanned” Islamabad: State and evictions in the I-11 sector

Sana Shahid Malik

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Supervisors: Judit Bodnár

Prem Kumar Rajaram

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Abstract

In the rapidly urbanizing capital city of Islamabad, much has gone according to its Master-Plan of 1960. Alongside its modernist spaces, however, an “unplanned” Islamabad has also flourished in the form of informal settlements or *katchi abadis*. In July 2015, when one settlement in the I-11 sector faced eviction at the hands of the city’s Capital Development Authority (CDA), the Awami Workers Party (AWP) set a precedent by holding the CDA accountable via the Supreme Court (SC). How do we explain the emergence of this “unplanned” city? Furthermore, what can be said about the nature of contemporary governance, given the I-11 case? This thesis explores these questions based on interviews conducted in December 2016 and January 2017 with the AWP officials, a CDA official, an architect, and a lawyer who fought the case. It unveils the contingencies of the state in Islamabad with regards to the settlement dwellers and AWP’s action.

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Table of contents

Abstract.....	i
Acknowledgements	ii
Table of contents	iii
Key.....	iv
Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1: Contextualizing Islamabad	9
1.1 The genesis of the modern capital city	9
1.2 Theoretical Considerations: Power and the State	16
1.3 Methodology.....	19
Chapter 2: Informal settlements in the Islamabadi utopia	22
2.1 A Note on Definitions.....	22
2.2 Tracing the “unplanned” in the “planned”	23
2.21 Putting Brasilia in contrast to Islamabad	23
2.22 Processing the process in Doxiadis’ vision	26
2.23 The ‘eventual’ Master-Plan: theorizing the state in Islamabad	29
2.3 Making it “planned” again: The state and the I-11 evictions.....	34
2.31 Theorizing the I-11 evictions.....	37
Chapter 3: Saving the slaves in the Master-Planned city.....	40
3.1 It’s their right: the AWP and APAKA collaborate	40
3.11 The Background Story	42
3.12 Taking the CDA to court: on its invalid claims and ignorance of human rights	43
3.2 Identifying the ‘symbiotic relationship’ and the importance of timing.....	47
3.3 Islamabad’s elitism: an undemocratic city?	50
Chapter 4 Epilogue: Two years on	55
Bibliography	59

Key

CDA Capital Development Authority

Katchi Abadi an Urdu word for informal settlement

I-11 is read as (the alphabet) “I” - eleven.

AWP Awami Workers Party

APAKA All Pakistan Alliance for Katchi Abadis

SC Supreme Court

PML-N Pakistan Muslim League Noon

Introduction

“This doesn’t look like Pakistan, it looks just like a foreign country”, my mother remarked, as we drove into the city of Islamabad on our way from Lahore, 380 kilometers away. In fact, it is this “foreign-ness” which often motivates my family and I to visit it for leisure. And although we have been to several countries abroad, there is a certain level of excitement to find it in one’s own home-country. In fact, having also the Margalla Hills and other nearby scenic spots, those who cannot afford travelling abroad often secure the modern¹ capital city as their vacation destination. Its ‘uniqueness’ further entails clean, wide spaces paralleled by greenery and inhabited by less than 2 million people². Its status as a Master-Planned city reflects in the symmetrically organized residential and commercial areas, as well as sectoral divisions. Furthermore, recent developments, from the entertainment parks, to world-class shopping malls, Metrobus services, and flyover-bridge constructions, add to what its administrative body refers to as is ‘Islamabad the Beautiful’³.

¹ The word modern here is used here to capture what Pakistanis colloquially associate the city of Islamabad with

² The exact figure as of 2016 was 1,433,000 people (Islamabad Population 2017, *World Population Review*)

³ Documented on CDA’s website at <http://www.cda.gov.pk/>



Picture showing Islamabad's Faisal Avenue, with the Faisal Mosque in the background⁴



The Centaurus Shopping Mall in Islamabad⁵



Picture representing a flyover bridge in Islamabad⁶

⁵ Taken from: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1192311>

⁶ Taken from: <https://www.shutterstock.com/video/clip-18829796-stock-footage-islamabad-biggest-flyover-b.html?src=rel/10620572:4>

It is this Federal Government which oversees the functioning of the city, since rather than being part of any province, Islamabad is part of the independent Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), the ICT Administration being the main civil and law and order agency of the Federal Capital⁷. However, the major force which continues to implement Islamabad's Master-Plan of 1960 is the state-run Capital Development Authority (CDA), based on the rules laid out in the CDA Ordinance (1960)⁸. But despite CDA's influential and active role in the city's urban planning and development, several slums and *katchi abadis* (informal settlements) have flourished in the city overtime - an aspect antithetical to this plan. As such, there has been a surge from around 13, 000 inhabitants of such settlements in mid-1980s and 50, 000 in 2013,⁹ to an increase 80, 000 the following year¹⁰. Overall, informal settlements house 40% of the country's urban population, or approximately 35 million Pakistanis¹¹. Even though they are home to essential service providers as cleaners, cooks, drivers or fruit vendors¹², these sites are often seen as tarnishing the city's beauty and/or land-value.

One of CDA's strategies to tackle this "issue" is to evict and demolish these settlements; in July 2015, one such attempt in Islamabad's I-11 sector led to the displacement of almost 20,

⁷ As mentioned on ICT's website as: <http://ictadministration.gov.pk/about-icta/>

⁸ The ordinance states its objective as: "Firstly, planning and development of Capital (Islamabad), [and] secondly completing or authorizing Capital Development Authority to perform functions of a Municipal Committee and to provide for cleanliness, health, education of inhabitants, supply of goods, articles of food and mild, to promote interest of different sections of public. All provisions are for advancing interest and public good." (CDA Ordinance 1960: 1)

⁹ Kreutzmann (2013): 143

¹⁰ Hussain. "[Slum survey: Over 80,000 people living in capital's katchi abadis, says report](#)". *The Express Tribune*. February 2014.

¹¹ Siddiqui 2015: 3

¹² Mahsud (2001: 96) describes the plight of these workers as "providing a clean environment to the residents, but ... living in the dirtiest" themselves (*quoted in* Kreutzmann 2013: 142-143)

000 people (and 2000 families¹³), in the process of bulldozing 3000 homes¹⁴. Known as the *Afghan Basti* (i.e. the Afghan settlement), its residents were accused of being criminals, drug dealers, terrorists, and ‘Afghan[s]’¹⁵ and evicted over a two-day period of 30th and 31st July¹⁶. In addition, the CDA justified evictions by clearing land of illegal encroachers’, in the backdrop of the government’s overall urge to deport the Afghan refugees from the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s¹⁷. The event has henceforth been publicized as a “success story” on CDA’s website¹⁸.

This has been met by opposition from the Awami Workers’ Party (AWP), in collaboration with the All Pakistan Alliance for Katchi Abadis (APAKA). The former is a relatively small political party in Pakistan whose “programme was designed to bring together the disparate struggles of workers, peasants, students, women and ethnic and religious minorities in Pakistan under the banner of a genuinely democratic and socialist politics.”¹⁹ Furthermore, the APAKA, which was founded by members of the AWP, “is an association ... created to protect the rights of *katchi abadi* residents [and resist] arbitrary eviction and force homelessness of the urban poor.”²⁰

This was the first time that a party had successfully petitioned in the Supreme Court (SC) of Pakistan to challenge an eviction drive²¹, which subsequently led the SC to ordering an

¹³ Mentioned on the AWP website at <http://awamiworkersparty.org/campaigns/katchi-abadi-timeline>

¹⁴ Hashmi (2015), ‘A politics of Rage in Islamabad’

¹⁵ Khilji (2015), ‘Too poor for the capital’

¹⁶ This event was also well documented on various Pakistani news channels.

¹⁷ For the purposes of this thesis, Afghan refugees only refer to those from the Soviet-Afghan War, wherever mentioned.


¹⁸ For instance, note the title of one of its news reports: Chairman CDA appreciates successful operation against the illegal slum in I-11”. CDA. August 5, 2015.

¹⁹ <http://awamiworkersparty.org/about-awp/>

²⁰ Islamabad Katchi Abadi Community Database”. *Participedia*. September 2016.

²¹ Note that the matter is still underway. No final verdict has been given by the SC.

immediate halt to any further evictions²². Furthermore, major protests by the AWP and APAKA members, along with the evicted residents, started after the drive²³. Among other claims raised, the AWP has been pushing forth a counter-narrative concerning the mislabeling of the I-11 sector as an *Afghan Basti* when in fact, most of the Afghanis are in the I-12 sector in Islamabad²⁴. The map below shows these sectors (with the I-11 sector encircled in yellow)²⁵:



²² Asim Sajjad Akhtar & others v. Federation of Pakistan & others. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN. Constitution Petition No. 41. Order dated August 26th, 2015.

²³ See for instance: "Facing imminent eviction, slum dwellers protest CDA's plans". *Dawn*. August 2015; "Artists, activists join evicted I-11 residents calling for resettlement". *Dawn*. January 2016; and "Activists hold mural painting event to call for housing rights". *Dawn*. February 2016.

²⁴ Zahid (2015), 'Afghan Basti?'

²⁵ Taken from: https://i1.wp.com/manahilestate.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/islamabad_sectors.jpg

In the background of this ‘turn’ in Islamabad’s politics, and given also that this *planned* sector saw the flourishing of a 35-year-old settlement²⁶, interesting questions are raised concerning Islamabad’s urban trajectory. In particular, how do we explain the inception of this “unplanned Islamabad” in one of the wealthiest and well-planned cities of South Asia? Here, while “unplanned” refers to the rise of the ‘informal settlements’ in the city²⁷, it also points to the unanticipated administrative challenges it faces. Further, what do the political dynamics evolving the I-11 evictions, tell us about the course of urban governance in Islamabad?

In addressing these questions, my thesis will not only cast light on the *contemporary* players: the CDA, SC, AWP, APAKA and the settlements’ dwellers, but will also *historically* contextualize them for a more holistic, micro-level understanding of Islamabad’s developmental politics. As such, while existing scholarly literature provides the basis for this, my thesis contributes to a still neglected area - that of dealing academically with Islamabad’s informal settlements. In doing so, it also utilizes the documents gathered as part of research on the I-11 case, and interviews conducted.

I will argue that the inception of the “unplanned Islamabad” can be understood by tracing the ways in which the city’s laborers have been historically marginalized in the official planning discourse. Moreover, a focus on the ‘everyday’ state practices illustrates that the city’s bureaucratic politics and the settlements’ residents symbiotically engage in a ‘negotiation process’, which affects the way the city is administered. This, for instance, is evidenced by CDA’s attempts to

²⁶ Statistic gathered from Siddiqui’s (2015) report

²⁷ While ‘slums’ have also seen a rise since the city’s inception, the focus in my thesis will remain on ‘informal settlements’.

recognize, regularize and relocate such settlements in certain sectors of Islamabad over time, or doing so to gather votes before an election, rather than resorting to evictions each time. Given also the resistance generated through AWP's leadership, the state in Islamabad can said to have a *mediated* power-base, contingent on these other forces affecting development. As such, the spatial imagery of a 'modernist' capital city is in a state of flux with that created by the presence of the urban poor.

To understand this modernism imbibed in the city's identity, the next chapter (one) will provide the historical setting which helps explain it. It will then provide certain theoretical considerations within which my main arguments concerning power and the state's role in development can be located. This is followed by the methodology I used to reach them. Next, chapter two operationalizes what is meant by 'slums' and 'informal settlements', and addresses reasons for their emergence and persistence in Islamabad. With reference to the I-11 case, it will show how the state is inconsistent and not fully autonomous in its project of urban redevelopment. Chapter three then follows with a more nuanced understanding of the role played by the AWP and APAKA, the SC, as well as Islamabad's residents. This chapter illustrates the tension in Islamabad's political landscape whereby there is the desire to maintain a particular 'image' of the city on the one hand, and dealing with its political critique on the other. Finally, in my concluding Chapter four, I provide an epilogue while pondering over the process of urban Islamabad's development.

Chapter 1: Contextualizing Islamabad

1.1 The genesis of the modern capital city

When military general Ayub Khan came to power in 1958, one of his most immediate aspirations was to shift the capital from the city of Karachi to a place which could better represent the central seat of the government. After the partition of 1947, Karachi had become the new capital overnight. However, from this time, its population had swelled from 400, 000 people to 1.5 million in 1951, whereby most of the people were accommodated in towns resembling shanties spread across the city²⁸. In addition to this administrative incapacity, its position in relation to the most populated parts of Pakistan led to inefficient communications across provincial government staff in the country²⁹. Therefore, in 1959, the Federal Capital Commission strategically chose a site in Upper Punjab, near the city of Rawalpindi – which would provide with the necessary amenities during construction period, in addition to the new capital enjoying the natural benefit of a sub-tropical climate, and the backdrop of the beautiful Margala Hills³⁰. *Nature*, however, was to be *nurtured* in a way not seen in the newly formed country before, and for Ayub Khan, this was to be a “nationalist project draped in the dreams of progress, development and unity”³¹.

In order to fulfil these dreams, the Pakistani state put the Greek planner and architect - Constantinos. A. Doxiadis – in charge of the “Master-Plan” for the city. He was familiar to the

²⁸ Daechsel (2015: 128)

²⁹ Prentice (1966: 58)

³⁰ *ibid*


³¹ Mohr (2010)

Pakistani administration since the Athens based planner was also responsible for another mass initiative – the Korangi Project - Asia’s largest initiative to settle refugees in a satellite town near Karachi, funded by the Ford Foundation³². Just as the Korangi housing units were “shown off” to the world, even when basic provisions for housing had not yet been put in place³³, so too was Islamabad’s development emblematic of an ideological function to realize nationalistic aspirations of representing a *progressive* Pakistan. The figure below represents Islamabad’s design based on this Master-Plan, highlighting the allocation of regions for different purposes³⁴

³² Daechsel (2011a: 132 and 138; 2011b: 156)

³³ Daechsel (2011b: 159)

³⁴ Lovejoy (1966: 926)



Master Plan by Doxiadis Associates. Islamabad is based upon the principle of growth, having a fan-shaped plan centred on the Secretariat and Administrative Sector, which is designed to spread out to the S.W. and will ultimately embrace the city of Rawalpindi. The National Park lies to the E. of Rawalpindi and the Islamabad highway.

Hence, it was under these expectations that Doxiadis worked within his new discipline of ‘ekistics’ – the ‘science of human settlements’³⁵, under the influence of the Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne (CIAM) – a consortium of modern western architects from early- to mid-1900s³⁶. One of the key aspects of urban planning during this time was the insistence on a “functional city” (formalized by the architect Le Corbusier), which referred to dwelling, work, leisure and circulation as the four essentials of a modern urban city.³⁷ Doxiadis was then to pioneer a planning methodology promising the great city Ayub Khan desired. What this also meant, however, was that Doxiadis was never able to *fully* realize his own planning ideals. Doxiadis – ‘the modernist’³⁸ – foresaw a future of continued growth and expansion and thus embarked on engineering a “planetary-scale vision”³⁹. This, for instance, included his approach to see Islamabad as a *dynapolis*, fed by the nearby city of Rawalpindi, to form a *metropolis* and eventually an *ecumenopolis*⁴⁰: “During this era we must expect the cities to grow dynamically and many turn into a metropolis, then become a part of a megalopolis until it becomes a link in the greatest city that man has ever seen, which is going to cover regions and continents with its branches – the universal city, ecumenopolis.”⁴¹ (See figures below):

³⁵ Daechsel (2013: 88)

³⁶ Moatasim (2015: 45)


³⁷ Mumford (2000: 73) *quoted in* Moatasim (2015: 45)

³⁸ Mahsud (2010: 9)


³⁹ Mohr (2010)

⁴⁰ Doxiadis (1965: 20). See also Lovejoy (1966) and www.doxiadis.org for details on Islamabad’s vision and design.

⁴¹ Ibid 7



Doxiadis' sketch illustrating the parallel uni-directional growth to form a metropolis⁴²



Another one of his Doxiadis' sketches demonstrating his vision for the city to form an ecumenopolis⁴³

⁴² Doxiadis (1965: 25)

⁴³ Doxiadis (1965): 7

The tale of Islamabad's 'modernist' trajectory, however, has to be contextualized against the 'Islamic traditional' one: from the very start, there was an agreement within the public discourse that the new city must be simultaneously 'modern' and 'Islamic'⁴⁴. Prentice notes (1966: 61) that the city's intrinsic character comported to a form of architecture swaying between the modern and traditional Muslim, and the East and the West⁴⁵. Even in the case academic institutes (the University of Islamabad), it was held that "the City of Islam ... will be a center for the new dynamic Muslim culture", whereby studies in mathematics and physics would be a way to revive the Muslim origins of these fields back from the Middle Ages⁴⁶. So much so, that it was said "...if Islamabad had to be a city that was only allowed to grow into one direction, this direction should be the *qibla*, the direction of prayer, in order to emphasize its importance as an Islamic capital"⁴⁷. Doxiadis, however, was in opposition to this desire by the local planners to use the footprint of a settlement as a landscape ornament; and yet, it is this that the Pakistani military-bureaucratic elite wished to see⁴⁸.

Doxiadis was, however, cognizant of the local context he was working in, and aspired to blend "tradition" in "modernity". As such, he wasn't against 'tradition' per se. In fact, his wish to incorporate the 2 km by 2 km *gridiron* sectoral pattern (shown in the Master-Plan earlier)⁴⁹, was not new to the land of Pakistan; Stanislawski (1946) provides an account of how this was reverberated in the planning of Mohenjo-daro – one of Asia's largest ancient civilizations. He thus

⁴⁴ Daechsel (2015): 195-196

⁴⁵ Note, however, that Doxiadis himself did not design any architectural buildings (Malik 2003: 75).

⁴⁶ *ibid* 155

⁴⁷ Daechsel (2013): 101

⁴⁸ *ibid*

⁴⁹ Harper (2010: 116)

embedded an aspiration of the traditional design in the newly forming capital city. This way he wanted to construct a city which was to “represen[t] the nation as a whole, and not [a]ny specific group”⁵⁰.

The planner’s ideology of fostering a sense of community was, however, challenged by the Pakistani state on numerous occasions: in a way, Le Cobusier was Doxiadis’ “other”⁵¹, in fact, the planner was especially asked by the General what the distinct characteristic of Islamabad would be, “as for example the pigeon hole idea [o]f Chandigarh or the ‘reversed arch’ in Brasilia”⁵². Further, the bureaucratic elite was happy if certain aspect in the city gave a *forward-looking* and *international* outlook: e.g., it desired to replace the traditional ‘tea houses’ – which Doxiadis wanted to erect, with *cafeterias* – a North American model⁵³. The core of Islamabad today, i.e., the Blue area, is a “ramshackle line-up of offices, restaurants and commercial establishments – a far cry from the large pedestrianized zone offering challenging and pleasing vistas to shoppers and visitors that Doxiadis had originally planned”⁵⁴.

The Pakistani state thus operated with a view towards a ‘city of the future’ which harnessed in prestige building, such as the Pakistan House⁵⁵, one of Asia’s biggest mosques – the Faisal Mosque, and the Diplomatic Enclave area. It was and remains a city where bureaucrats and government officials dominate⁵⁶, whereas Doxiadis was keen on settling those who *build* the city

⁵⁰ Doxiadis (1965: 5).

⁵¹ Daechsel (2015: 46)

⁵² Daechsel (2013: 101)

⁵³ Daechsel (2011b: 161)

⁵⁴ Daechsel (2013: 98); with regards to the grid pattern, the planner had said, “In such a dynamic city we do not have a conflict of man and machine” (Doxiadis 1965: 26). Yet, contemporary Islamabad primarily stands for motorized vehicles.

⁵⁵ Daechsel (2013: 101)

⁵⁶ An interesting point was narrated to me by Mumtaz: Master-Plan hadn’t conceived of any place of worship because

first; in his own words, “if this process is overlooked, the result composite settlement consisting of a central monumental part and several non-coordinated areas, including several slums”⁵⁷. That the contemporary “unplanned Islamabad” fits Doxiadis’ prediction, makes studying the I-11 eviction case even more relevant.

Before I embark on further exploring the way in which Doxiadis’ vision materialized (and the lack of it), I will go over some socio-anthropological perspectives which help ground the subject at hand.

1.2 Theoretical Considerations: Power and the State

While the unit of analysis in my thesis will remain the city of Islamabad, I will nevertheless engage it at different levels, such as with the state, the slum and *katchi abadi* dwellers, and the AWP. In doing so, I will attempt to utilize and echo certain theoretical considerations which are useful in studying the city and the I-11 case.

Since this thesis engages with a ‘planned city’, insight from James Holston’s (1989) *The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia* immediately becomes relevant: the capital of Brazil - Brasilia, in many respects is an immediate point of comparison with Islamabad since it too was a product of the mid-20th century urban planning. In fact, it too emerged in the same year as Islamabad. However, the similarities of the two cities converge more fully in the dynamics surrounding the ‘impermanent’ homes of the cities’ builders which eventually became

the central focus had been the parliamentary house, the president’s house and other key governmental buildings. The Faisal Mosque was completed by 1987 “in the only space they could find, i.e., at the foothills of the Himalayas in the far end of the city.”

⁵⁷ Doxiadis (1965: 17). See also Siddiqui (2012: 164).

‘permanent’ in the form of squatter settlements. In this respect, the ‘high modernist’ spaces of Brasilia too face similar challenges as Islamabad. Here, James Scott’s (1998) *Seeing Like a State* further lays out the conceptual framework within which it becomes possible to imagine the ‘failure’ of ambitious planning in delivering on its social promises. I will argue in this thesis, however, that Islamabad is not an example of a ‘development failure’⁵⁸ since the city shifted to a different understanding of inclusiveness and class control; instead, my emphasis will be on an urban criticism of planning, and studying the processes and actors involved in planning and implementation.

As mentioned before, one of the key stakeholders in doing so is the state itself. Here, since the state-run CDA is one of the key organizations responsible for Islamabad’s urban affairs, it becomes possible to illustrate the nature of the state through governance in the city. If we start with observing the recent developmental schemes in Islamabad, the Foucauldian frame-of-thought can potentially explain the state’s activities; these occur under a ‘panopticon’ whereby the state’s strategic techniques enable unquestioned ‘governmentality’ and ‘control’ over a population.⁵⁹ For Weber, this is rooted in the state’s “monopoly over the legitimate use of force”; in fact, it is this ‘legitimization’ over the I-11 evictions and demolitions, which the CDA has used to frame its stance. Thus, such perspectives dealing with state’s authority and control help explain its capacity to successfully direct the course of urban development.

For Bourdieu, though, this analysis is incomplete without the added dimension of

⁵⁸ Daechsel (2013: 89)

⁵⁹ Foucault (1977); Smart *et al* (1992)

“symbolic violence”, which nuances our understanding of power. This refers to “gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible, even to its victims, exerted for the most part through purely symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more precisely misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling”⁶⁰. Hence, my thesis engages with this lens to also focus on the nature of the discourse framed about those at the margins in Islamabad.

Having said that, I argue against seeing the contemporary state in Islamabad as having an omnipotent presence. This, for instance, is exemplified by seeing CDA’s role as mediated by and dependent on various material artifacts circulating in the city (Hull 2012). This ethnographic approach sheds light on the complexity of state control since it is not just the CDA which holds these key documents - such as those on land distribution, but also the villagers. Hence, forgery, misplacement and fraud complicate urban governance.

In the present study, my account of action by the AWP *further* nuances this problematique over state power, and how urban issues are resolved. Here, I develop on a similar case of squatter settlements in India and identify the approaches used therein to claim the right to them: based on the threat to “illegal” shanty settlements in India, Partha Chatterjee’s (2004) “political society” approach elucidates how *non*-civil society members collaborate to fight the state. This is in opposition to the usual civil-society channels which are often sought to confront it. Hence, using an anthropological lens like Chatterjee’s helps bring out the dynamics of the case in a context-specific way.

⁶⁰ Bourdieu (2001): 1-2

As such, while I too aim to delineate the way actors are involved in political claim-making, I also ponder over the claims themselves; it is here that extrapolation from the “right-to-the-city” framework becomes appropriate. When speaking of technical urban planning, Lefebvre (1996 [1968]) notes the way in which it fails to give every citizen the right to enjoy the core of the city. Moreover, for Harvey (2012: 4), “the question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from the question of what kind of people we want to be, what kinds of social relations we seek...” and that “[t]he right to the city is...far more than a right of individual or group access to the resources... It is...a collective rather than an individual right, since reinventing the city inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power over the processes of urbanization.” I aim to situate these ideas in two ways: firstly, I seek to unravel the form of ‘right to the city’ emblematic in the resistance to the I-11 evictions; and secondly, I problematize Harvey’s definition above to see how ‘collective power’ plays out in urban Islamabad. Here, I aim to revisit how we can think of Islamabad as an ‘undemocratic city’ potentially lacking this ‘collectivity’.

Having laid out the central standpoints which will echo through this thesis, I will now turn to the methodology in order to answer my research questions.

1.3 Methodology

Much as Arabindoo’s (2011) approach on slums in India, my methodology provoked the need to take informal settlements as an ‘anthropological site’ to garner the deeply embedded meanings in the cities of the global south. I began by familiarizing myself with the facts, biases and perspectives being narrated in online newspapers, notably *Dawn*, *Express Tribune*, *The Friday*

Times and *The Nation*; as well as a particular magazine - *Tanzeed*. The accounts therein also incorporate pictures which help gauge the extent of the eviction-drive.

This ‘online database’ of sorts also includes CDA’s website (cda.gov.pk) which not only covers the I-11 case, but also previous operations and minutes-of-the-meetings on informal settlements more generally.

Since the AWP has been one of the foremost actors in the case, my initial step was to contact the Party online. Through this, I could collect a report submitted to the SC by Tasneem Siddiqui (urban policy expert) on low-cost housing; an additional note by urban planning expert Arif Hasan; and finally, the SC orders issued pertaining to the case hearings.

In addition, I conducted a semi-structured focus-group session with five Party officials, which unraveled answers to the specific questions I had, and generated newer ones⁶¹. I was keen to have these officials narrate *their* side of the story to me along the themes in this thesis. In addition, I also held correspondence with a party member and academic - Faiza Moatasim who further aided in this process⁶².

I also interviewed one of Pakistan’s renowned architects, activists and academics - Kamil Khan Mumtaz. Because the thesis aims to problematize ‘urban governance’, I was careful to link his answers to the city’s administration and the state’s current developmental “mood”.

As such, in January 2017, my visit to CDA itself provided a direct channel to understand this. I ensured that in my discussion with the Katchi Abadi Cell official - Ahmed⁶³, I was not

⁶¹ Out of these 5, my most active informants were AWP’s president Fanoos Gujjar, and its General Secretary, Farooq Tariq.

⁶² This was an email correspondence

⁶³ Ahmed is a pseudonym for the official’s actual name. He has a degree in city and town planning and years of work

hinting at CDA's I-11 operation being misguided in anyway. Instead, I aimed to generate data and narratives about the slums and *katchi abadis* in Islamabad.

Finally, in April 2017, I spoke with one of the constitutional lawyers - Abid Hassan Minto, who fought the eviction-case on behalf of the AWP.

My physical presence, both at AWP's and CDA's offices, have had the ability to 'stay-in-touch' with the officials even after my visits. The emphasis on the academic (rather than political) nature of my work, especially to the latter, has helped to galvanize the responses I sought. Overall, I have attempted to have an interplay of primary and secondary data throughout my thesis.

experience with the CDA. Currently he is working in the informal settlement cell at CDA, and was previously dealing with housing schemes.

Chapter 2: Informal settlements in the Islamabadi utopia

That the CDA was given authority over managing the urban affairs of the city, according to Frank Charles Spaulding, “...would give the CDA ‘complete control’ over Islamabad’s residents – particularly residents belonging to low-income groups.”⁶⁴ And although Doxiadis himself had insisted on giving full authority to CDA, there were points of clashes between him and the state. One outcome of this friction has culminated in the sprouting of ‘informal settlements’, sometimes confused with slums, which are a hindrance to effectively implementing the Master-Plan until today. This chapter uncovers the nature of these clashes and further dwells into the reasons for why the ‘eventual’ Master-Plan was implemented in the way that it was. While also gauging from the general understanding of planned cities in literature, it becomes possible to capture Islamabad’s positionality in urban politics. In doing so, it also becomes an avenue to generate an understanding of state power through its governance and administration.

2.1 A Note on Definitions

‘Informal settlements’ and ‘slums’ are usually conflated with one another, although the reasons which manifest in their existence may not always converge. This is also the case with the site in the I-11 sector which is the subject of my study: although the *basti* in I-11’s ‘Afghan Basti’ literally means settlement, the type of settlement it was nevertheless requires clarity; for our purposes, this has implications for contextualizing the case in the way it appears in official public discourse and how the *abadis* are dealt with in terms of policy.

⁶⁴ quoted in Sajjad (2015)

In all of the online newspapers and CDA's own website, it has been either referred to as a 'slum' or its Urdu translation *katchi abadi*. Yet, *katchi abadis*⁶⁵ are translated as 'informal settlements' in English. I came across this confusion in definitions on two occasions during my research: firstly, by one of AWP's officials who stressed on the difference between the two; and secondly, by the CDA official who distinguished between '*katchi abadis*' and 'slums'. As noted by the United Nations (UN), the Pakistani government defines the two terms as follows:

"1 *Katchi abadis*: these are informal settlements created through squatting or informal subdivisions of state or private land. 2 *Slums*: these settlements consist of villages absorbed in the urban sprawl or the informal subdivisions created on community and agricultural land. Here, security of tenure is a rule; but there is no programme to improve conditions other than through political patronage."⁶⁶

Further, there is also a distinction between *notified* and *non-notified katchi-abadis*, the latter of which cannot be regularized "...because they are on valuable land required for development, or on unsafe"⁶⁷.

With this definitional background, I will now return to the historical background set out in chapter two further navigate through the "unplanned Islamabad".

2.2 Tracing the "unplanned" in the "planned"

2.21 Putting Brasilia in contrast to Islamabad


Describing a city's urban engineering based on a 'Master-Plan' can already be assumed to

⁶⁵ The literal translation of *Katchi* is 'weak' and *abadi* is colony implying a settlement of cadent hosung.

⁶⁶ Habitat (2003: 212)


⁶⁷ *ibid*

hold a utopian imagination of the future. For Friedman (2002: 103) this “...is a way of breaking through the barriers of convention into the sphere of imagination where many things beyond our everyday experience become possible”. Created at the same time as Islamabad, Brasilia appears as another outcome of Master-planning by the chief architect Oscar Niemeyer, based on similar notions of embedding modernism with the creation of a new capital (shifting it from Sao Paulo). Given the proposed rational and critical utopia, Brasilia’s planners called it the “capital of the twenty-first century”⁶⁸.



⁶⁸ Hosltun (1989: 85)

As can be seen from the spatial distributions in the map above⁶⁹, Brasilia's planning embodied a 'rigidity' which is explained by the government's insistence on having a small capital, "far removed from direct contact with any of the major centers of urban settlement."⁷⁰ Its Master-Plan, then, called for a city of limited population and inelastic proportions, even though it was envisioned to be the center for regional economic development⁷¹. This aspect is captured by Holston (1989: 290) who points out the socio-spatial exclusionary character of the city since its inception, whereby most of Brasilia's population sought refuge in peripheral satellite cities around the (administrative) region Plano Piloto (see figure below):



The most prominent rendition of Brasilia and other planned cities, notably Le Cobusier's Chandigarh in India, is the emergence of the 'unplanned' squatters as the city urbanizes. It is this

⁶⁹ Taken from Stephenson (1970): 327

⁷⁰ *ibid* 324

⁷¹ *ibid*

particular element where Islamabad's situation can also be contrasted. Although Brasilia's planners held that the city would represent a set of solutions to future developmental objectives⁷², Scott's (1989) anthropological study suggests otherwise. As he suggests, contrary to the new Brazil – orderly, modern, efficient and disciplined, in the actual Brasilia, “it was assumed that the huge workforce (more than sixty thousand strong) would respond to the call to build the city and then quietly leave it to the administrators for whom it was intended.”⁷³ This lack of provision and foresight of construction workers leads to his general conclusions that high-modernist cities fail because: “the legibility of a society provides the capacity for largescale social engineering, high-modernist ideology provides the desire, the authoritarian state provides the determination to act on that desire, and an incapacitated civil society provides the leveled social terrain on which to build.”⁷⁴

The case of Islamabad's rise in squatters seems to fit the above account. However, as I shall show in the next section, the friction between Doxiadis and the state was more than just the ‘ignorance’ in “building for the builders”⁷⁵. This is process behind Doxiadis' communitarian vision must itself be dwelled upon.

2.22 Processing the process in Doxiadis' vision

In linking the above insight to the creation of Islamabad, the very *process* of planning reveals much about Doxiadis' vision and its eventual fate. The backstory to this vision reveals that


⁷² *ibid*

⁷³ *ibid* 127-129

⁷⁴ *ibid* 5

⁷⁵ Adopted from Sajjad (2015)

Doxiadis had deliberately excluded permanent housing options for Islamabad's builders⁷⁶. The capital's initial development saw the builders constructing temporary labor camps near *Bari Imam*⁷⁷ (see map below). These sites not only housed the laborers and low-income CDA staff, but also landless farmers (primarily from rural Punjab and NWFP) who moved into these camps in search of work and residence in the new capital city.⁷⁸ In fact, Doxiadis expressed a great distaste for the camps' existence and insisted that they be hidden from rest of Islamabad in order to preserve its beauty and orderliness.⁷⁹ Having said that, it was only after Doxiadis had left the country that he realized it was crucial to settle the low-income workers first.⁸⁰



Taken from Google Maps. The red arrow indicates the Muslim Colony region.

⁷⁶ Sajjad (2015)

⁷⁷ *ibid*; Akhter Hameed Khan Resource Center (2010) *quoted in* Moatasim (2015: 70)

⁷⁸ Moatasim (2015: 70)

⁷⁹ Sajjad (2015)

⁸⁰ *ibid*

Deeper reflection into the matter, however, unveils another point of conflict between the planner and the CDA, reiterating the way in which the latter perceived the future Islamabadi residents. As Moatasim (2015: 68) points out at length, Doxiadis was aware of the issues of labor housing in newly planned capital cities like Brasilia and Chandigarh, and wanted to avoid repeating the same mistakes in the case of Islamabad:

“We should be guided by the experience gained in the recent completion of two similar projects of Chandigarh and Brazil where this problem [labor housing] was not foreseen and no provision was made for the same. In both these projects [laborers] built their own houses in an unauthorized and uncontrolled way.”⁸¹

In fact, extensive planning was discussed based on the “Proposals” section of Doxiadis’ report cited above; this was seen, for instance, in the need to accommodate labor force near the construction sites, or the sample architectural working drawings (found in 1962’s records) sent to the CDA.⁸² The architect viewed this labor force as constituting the future *citizens* of the new capital, rather than as a *temporary* population⁸³. However, while the CDA did build a few quarters in open spaces near existing *nullahs* (ravines) in sectors F-6 and G-7⁸⁴, his plans were never fully implemented. The key reason for this, as Moatasim intimated to me, was that Doxiadis’ contract was prematurely cancelled so his team only got to plan a few sectors. Eventually, how various communities in Islamabad were developed depended on CDA’s foresight and jurisdiction. As has been shown, the way in which this foresight appeared in the official discourse was thus distinct

⁸¹ Doxiadis Associates (1962c, DOX-PI 28: 3) *quoted in* Moastasim (2015: 68)

⁸² Moatasim (2015: 69); the house plans were designed for both single workers and workers with families on plots that varied from 20’ x 45’ to 20’ x 50’ in dimension, while proper labor colonies were planned in two sectors I-9 and I-10 of Islamabad.

⁸³ *ibid* 70

⁸⁴ *ibid*

from the architect's.

2.23 The 'eventual' Master-Plan: theorizing the state in Islamabad

Based on the account above, the CDA has primarily followed the logic of profit and served the interests of the upper and lower middle classes, while creating room for *katchi abadis* to spring up. The chart below encapsulates this scenario⁸⁵:

MAPPING THE FACELESS			
List of katchi abadies in capital			
Name	Location	No. of families	No. of individuals
Christian Colony	G-6/1-4	10	70
Dhobi Colony	G-6/2	50	250
Shopper Colony	G-7/1	600	3700
66 Quarters	G-7/2	670	4100
48 Quarters	G-7/3-2	400	2390
100 Quarters	F-6/2	500	6150
France Colony	F-7/4	550	6000
Muslim Colony	PM Secretariat	3200	15000
Afghan Basti	I-11/1	783	5488
Afghan Basti	I-10/3	170	1390
Afghan Basti	H-11/4&H-10/1	90	760
Afghan Basti	H-11	19	102
Afghan Basti	I-11/4	372	2564
Afghan Basti	I-11/2	49	415
Afghan Basti	I-10/1	45	184
Roshan Colony	I-12	35	135
Roshan Abadi	I-9/4	12	49
Esa Nagri	I-9/1	180	1436
Muslim Abadi	I-9/1	53	187
Akram Gill Colony	H-9/2	214	1060
Ghorri	Phase-VI	40	295
Dhoke Pathana	Sihala	140	780
Mera Jaffar	Ramna	4804	28536

⁸⁵ Hussain [Slum survey: Over 80,000 people living in capital's katchi abadis, says report](#). *The Express Tribune*. 2014.

It is also here, however, that the nature of the state in Islamabad's governance can be said to be 'mediated', as pointed out in the introduction. Although the unofficial Islamabad has hitherto been a magnanimous challenge to CDA administratively, I argue that it *cannot* be said to be an example of Foucault's (1977) 'panopticism' in relating the power (employed by the state) to social forces⁸⁶. Drawing from Jeremy Bentham's architectural physics⁸⁷, he describes this as "the general principle of a new 'political anatomy' whose object and end are not the relations of sovereignty but the relations of discipline"⁸⁸; and emphasizes the Bentham principle that "power should be visible and unverifiable."⁸⁹ In addition, it is also fitting, here, to expound upon another one of his concepts – that of 'governmentality', before I turn to the analysis on Islamabad. This is the: ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy..."⁹⁰

What makes the case of Islamabad more intriguing is that despite enjoying a historically powerful position, the CDA – as a governing and administrative body, has employed varying degrees of developmental policies in dealing with the informal settlements. In other words, rather than exerting 'panopticism', whereby the residents of these settlements are disciplined into

⁸⁶ As mentioned earlier, I take Foucault as a starting point in understanding the state in Islamabad based on the recent developmental strategies the incumbent PML-N government is exercising; this could potentially be seen as signaling undisputed political progress and requiring changes in Islamabad's contemporary landscape, manifesting itself in acts like slum and informal-settlement evictions.

⁸⁷ Bentham gave an example of an ivory tower in the center of a field, where an officer is watching over inmates in cells around the tower. The idea is that the inmates cannot see who is watching over them and when, so at any point in time, escaping becomes difficult. Overtime, there would be no need for any personnel for the inmates would have internalized that they are being watched (Bentham 1791), and in Foucault's terms, disciplined.

⁸⁸ *ibid* 208

⁸⁹ *ibid* 201

⁹⁰ Smart *et al* (1992: 102)

accepting CDA's actions at face, the organization has instead worked *with* them. This is reflected in its efforts to recognize and regulate some of the *abadis* in the capital city to provide for the poor.

As described earlier, one of the first instances of the maturation of *katchi abadis*, was in the Muslim Colony (Bari Imam); several years after its creation, the site was cleared off of 'encroachers' for the construction of the PIMS⁹¹ Hospital in 1979⁹². As Ahmed also told me, on the orders of the Federal Government thereafter, 10 *abadis* were recognized⁹³ and a cut-off date for their recognition was set at 1995⁹⁴. In 1998, this was increased to 11 and in the same year, a Katchi Abadi Cell was also established in an attempt to provide services for the 11 *katchi abadis*⁹⁵. This can therefore be seen to exhibit a form of 'governmentality' and power which is strongly guided by the existence of these *abadis*. In other words, the Islamabad scenario is one of CDA's own self-discipline, as much as it is a case of *disciplining*.

My correspondence with another CDA officer – Asif⁹⁶ - detailed other steps the organization has taken for the cause of housing the poor; he informed me about the three strategies which have been used to regularize the *katchi abadis* (listed below):

- i) By development at existing site in the form of developed plots measuring 20' x 30' along with community facilities (Cost of one developed plot is Rs 40,000/= in sector G-8, which is received by CDA through monthly installment of Rs 500 / per month.

⁹¹ Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences

⁹² Moastasim (2015: 71). I formally deal with 'encroachments' in the next section.

⁹³ The criteria for the recognition of these, as the CDA official enlightened me, was based on a colony having at least 40 housing units.

⁹⁴ *ibid*

⁹⁵ Sajjad (2015)

⁹⁶ This is a pseudonym for his actual name.

ii) By redevelopment in the form of developed plots measuring 20' x 40' along with community facilities and parks, play grounds. (Cost of one developed plot is Rs 21000/= in Model Urban Shelter Project (MUSP) Farash lethrar road, Islamabad which is received by CDA through monthly installment of Rs 400 / per month.

iii) Regularization of Schemes by provision of infrastructure services in existing location /katchi abadies in sectoral area of Islamabad.

In addition, I unearthed that the CDA has spent a considerable amount of money for the upgradation/rehabilitation of the recognized *katchi abadis* in Islamabad⁹⁷ “to enable [their residents] to live a healthy life with dignity and respect” – as Asif put it. Amenities like Sui Gas, Water Supply, Electricity, Sewerage, Drainage etc. are only to be provided to these recognized *abadis*⁹⁸. Asif shared the following table which depicts some of its work in this regard:

S No	Name of Area/ Katchi Abadi	Cost of PC-I (Rs in Millions)
1	Katchi abadies G-7/1, G-7/2, G-7/3-2 & F-7/4	105.537
2	MUSP Farash Pocket-I (For rehabilitation of katchi abadie F-9 park	658.950
3	MUSP Farash Pocket-II (For rehabilitation of katchi abadis Muslim Colony, Haq bahu, Dhoke Najju and Essa Nagri)	38.452
4	MUSP Farash Pocket III	25.796
5	Katchi abadi G-8/1	300 (Approx)
6	Provision of Electricity & Gas in (MUSP) Farash	67.542

In pointing these and various other developmental schemes the CDA has implemented, Ahmed said: “we have done a lot for them [the *abadi* dwellers]”; in fact, the way in which we have constructed houses is probably one of the best in Asia.” It must be noted however, and as the official conceded himself, most of these plans are still in the pipeline and have witnessed major failures in the past. In this regard, a news report from 2014 documents the failure of CDAs planned

⁹⁷ This also reiterates the “wealth” aspect of Islamabad which I set out in the introduction in proposing my research question.

⁹⁸ Almost of these, he mentioned, are in the process of receiving infrastructure facilities.

‘upgradation’ and ‘relocation’⁹⁹. Nevertheless, my interview with him recast light on the administrative commitment of the city towards those who serve it.

Indeed, accounts described on CDAs website¹⁰⁰ does reveal this aspect: for instance, in 2010, it engaged in fumigation efforts against the spread of dengue in these slums¹⁰¹. In addition, in December 2011, the chairman of CDA took an active part in appreciating the Christian community’s efforts in keeping the city clean¹⁰². In fact, the same report also said that:

“[a]s per Government Policy of Housing for the Poor, CDA has allotted plots to the Christian community in different sectors opened from time to time and also given them propriety rights in the existing Katchi Abadies. Out of 10 registered Katchi Abadies 04 have already been upgraded and development of the remaining Katchi Abadies is in progress. CDA has also allotted 4000 plots to the dwellers of the Katchi Abadies and another 2000 allotments of plots are in the process under the Modern Urban Shelter Project Programme.”

Further in 2014, the CDA took notice of possible flooding and its prevention in the squatter settlements along the banks¹⁰³, again highlighting its positive role in enabling

However, based on ethnographic research of the Thaba-Tseka Development Project in Lesotho, Ferguson’s (1990) *Anti-Politics Machine* illustrates a powerful point: what appear has well-intended developmental programs can in reality have “side effects” of extending the state’s power over a population (in the case of Lesotho, by constructing an ‘administrative center’ in the

⁹⁹ Hussain [Slum survey: Over 80,000 people living in capital’s katchi abadis, says report](#). *The Express Tribune*. 2014.

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.cda.gov.pk/>

¹⁰¹ “Chairman CDA Directs Extensive Campaign against Dengue Fever Malaria and other Vector borne Diseases”. *CDA*. October 14, 2010.

¹⁰² “Chairman, CDA plants Christmas Tree, felicitate Christians”. *CDA*.

¹⁰³ “Steps being taken to save slums from flooding: CDA”. *CDA*. September 05, 2014.

village). Perhaps while there may be some truth to seeing the aforementioned projects and plans as extending ‘tactics’ to exert ‘invisible and unverifiable power’, CDA’s efforts have until now *not* followed a one-way approach to dealing with the informal settlements. To illustrate one way in which this is so, the next section turns to evictions of these *abadis*, with particular reference to the I-11 case stated at the onset. It will expound upon the narrative the city’s administration built in its imagination of the *abadi* dwellers.

2.3 Making it “planned” again: The state and the I-11 evictions

As has been demonstrated, the Islamabad governance has entailed modifications to the Master-Plan, in terms of housing the laborers. However, since the recognition of the *abadis*, as Ahmed also informed me, there has been a “pull factor” for workers from the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces¹⁰⁴. This has urged the CDA to be more austere about the implementation of the Master-Plan. In order to achieve this, it has resorted to evictions of informal settlers and bulldozing of their colonies to retrieve land for construction work.

Apart from one of the earlier clearing operation for the construction of the PIMS Hospital¹⁰⁵, more recent ones set the background for the 2015 I-11 evictions: in April 2013, the *katchi abadis* in sector H-9 were demolished on the grounds of illegal settlements and property marketing. This sector experienced further action the following year in 2014, and in the same year¹⁰⁶, “80 illegal structures...were leveled to ground and 200 kanals of CDA land was retrieved”

¹⁰⁴ Workers are motivated to migrate to the city in search of not only work, but the added possibility of being provided infrastructural provisions.

¹⁰⁵ This was constructed in 1985.

¹⁰⁶ “CDA’s anti-encroachment campaign continues”. *CDA*. November 8, 2014. see also Anti- encroachment operation in different Katchi Abadies of Islamabad”. *CDA*. May 8, 2014. and “Katchi Abadis Joint policy to deal with issue”. *CDA*. April 11, 2014.

for developmental purposes¹⁰⁷. In fact, 2 years before this in 2012, CDA had already called for an operation against the *katchi abadis* in sector I-11 of Islamabad, “to facilitate the expeditious development [work]”¹⁰⁸. The same year, a Board Meeting report among CDA officials reveals the reasons for the difficulty in tackling the *katchi abadis* by noting: i) Too many housing units ii) Unfavorable topography iii) Security issues iv) Lifestyle of the inhabitants¹⁰⁹, but the ‘necessity’ in dealing with the issue nevertheless.

The next year, in July 2015, CDA targeted and demolished the I-11 settlement. Based on the definitions laid out in the beginning of the chapter, it would be correct to categorize the Afghan Basti as a *katchi abadi* or informal settlement, rather than a slum¹¹⁰. This is so because the *abadi* gradually grew as a squat whereby mostly fruit and vegetable vendors built mud-houses for themselves. As for the ownership of the land, I unraveled contradictory stances: Ahmed narrated that the I-11 incident has been sparked by private owners approaching the Islamabad High Court (IHC), demanding their ancestral land; on the other hand, Minto claimed that while nobody had filed petitions to the court, the land was partly private and partly publicly owned. In this regard, Mr. Siddiqui’s report suggests yet another side: although CDA has claimed that this land was allotted to government employees, it had conceded itself that it was given to private owners in 1989, 7 years after the settlement was established¹¹¹. Nevertheless, this still fits the settlement’s

¹⁰⁷ “200 kanal of CDA land retrieved during anti encroachment operation”. CDA. May 15, 2014.

¹⁰⁸ “Expeditious development in sector I-11 must be carried out”. CDA NEWS. April 16, 2012.

¹⁰⁹ CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (Directorate of Coordination). “MINUTES OF THE 2ND MEETING OF CDA BOARD FOR THE YEAR 2012”. February 2012.

¹¹⁰ Another reason for this is also that Islamabad is not a primary agricultural city for its soil is not fertile enough for growing agricultural crops on a major scale.

¹¹¹ Siddiqui 2015: 13

existence as an ‘informal’ one (see a picture below)¹¹²:



The eviction event was recorded with a sense of ‘praise’ on CDAs website; for example, the title of one of its news reports states: “Chairman CDA appreciates successful operation against the illegal slum in I-11”¹¹³. This same newspaper further claims that “successful operation would help dispel negative perception about CDA, which is a great achievement”¹¹⁴. There are more than 10 reports on the CDAs website alone, tracking the demolitions occurring from July onwards, and all reports illustrate a sentiment of ‘urgency’ in being ‘strict’ with removing the slum-dwellers and

¹¹² Adopted from Hussain. “Eviction drive in I-11: Major eviction operation at I-11 slum likely today”. *The Express Tribune*. July 2015.

¹¹³ “Chairman CDA appreciates successful operation against the illegal slum in I-11”. *CDA*. **August 5, 2015**.

¹¹⁴ As has been pointed out particularly by Annie Harper (2011; 2012), it is indeed the case that the Islamabadi residents have an uneasy relationship with the slums and informal settlements. The presence of these sites decreases the market value of the homes situated near them – as Ahmed pointed, and also instill the fear of theft from them. As such, the removal of these sites is largely welcomed by the average Islamabadi resident. See, for instance, a journalistic account urging their removal in Islamabad to “beautify it and make it look more like a capital city” (Noor, “Slums in Islamabad”, May 2015). I return to this ‘elitism’ in Islamabad in the following chapter.

discourage them from illegally settling in the future¹¹⁵. Therefore, this drive, which was also called for in 2012 as mentioned, has been an instance of CDA's efficiency in restoring the administering of the Master-Plan.

2.31 Theorizing the I-11 evictions

What can we make of this approach of the state in forcefully evicting I-11's dwellers? If we go with the Weberian definition of the state, then the CDA – as a state-run body, has a right to use the physical force it did during the drive. However, in order to *legitimize* its actions, it has had to craft an account which can said to have served as a 'justification mechanism'. This, in Bourdieu's terms, is the idea of "symbolic violence"¹¹⁶. As Asim Sajjad Akhtar¹¹⁷ also pointed out "...the katchi abadi in I-11 could not be saved in spite of the fact that police brutality unfolded on live television ... [because of the way public discourse was shaped]."¹¹⁸ But rather than dichotomizing 'symbolic' and 'physical' violence in Bourdieu, a more nuanced analysis calls for seeing them as complementing one another¹¹⁹. In fact, this gives a better framework to examine CDA's stance on the matter.

In this regard, my interview with Ahmed brought out this *assumed* need to free Islamabad of such settlements: "if we don't address the problem effectively, Islamabad will become a city of

¹¹⁵ This was to the extent that announcements in the loudspeakers from the mosques were used to give warnings - an instrument otherwise used for religious services.

¹¹⁶ This isn't to suggest that this is consistent with the Weberian understanding of the state; as Colaguori (2010: 393-4) points out, the Bourdieu-an conception of power is similar to the Weberian one, for social control is *legitimately* exercised, and consistent with his concept of 'symbolic violence'.

¹¹⁷ AWP's Punjab President

¹¹⁸ *ibid* 38; here, it is also possible to draw from Chomsky and Herman's (1988) *Propaganda Model* in discerning the way in which the media represents state-led activities. Even though there is a proliferation of private news channels in Pakistan, any aspect of news which is considered too controversial from the state's point of view is controlled.

¹¹⁹ Thapar-Björkert *et al* (2016: 149)

informal settlements”, he said. His description of these sites emphasized how they are like a jungle where it is easy to get lost. Thus, because it is thereby also hard to police these settlements – like the I-11 one, criminal issues are rampant: “the Muslim colonies are relatively fine; the Christian ones, however, are filthy – they drink alcohol, they consume drugs. You will feel weird if you go there ... this has an impact on the surroundings as well”. He went on to tell me that the existence of *katchi abadis* also drops the market value of the homes located around them, by up to 60%, and overall gives a “very shabby look”, worthy of being removed.

One of the reasons why these sites must be cleared is for developmental reasons; Ahmed, being more knowledgeable about CDA’s upcoming plans, indicated the overall expected rise in Islamabad’s infrastructural work. This includes the intensity of work in the Central Business District of Islamabad, and residential-plot construction. In fact, the demolition in the I-11 sector have been followed by the latter, given the 400 acres of land which was retrieved. When I asked if the occupants of the ‘Afghan Basti’ were legal and had National ID card, he conceded that they did¹²⁰. Nevertheless, he went on to narrate to me how this land was given to government employees, but thousands of Afghan refugees had come and settled there. After the clearing drive, the plots were given back to the former, he said.

Upon the way in which this drive was conducted, the official mentioned the resistance which was initially put forth the *basti*’s dwellers, but “then the CDA cleared the land in a nice manner”. “The government can’t be resisted if it wills”. Further, on inquiring about where the evicted should go, he said, “they can go wherever...the settlement was a threat”. “This was not a

¹²⁰ I was told that the *katchi abadis* have C-numbers in the address section, C standing for CDA. CDA has details of the head of the family, family members and the plan of the house.

katchi abadi, this was an encroachment”, he added. “These people are also not poor; all of their family members work and they make lots of money in month...in the *abadi* near Jinnah Super, these settlers have possessed land worth 100, 000 00000 Pakistani rupees!”. On the action by the AWP, he reiterated that the CDA has been lenient with the *abadi* dwellers people and cared for their housing needs; in fact, there have been instances of where the homes constructed for them are sold on the black market where they make more money. Finally, on the SC’s involvement in the I-11 case filed by the AWP, he was of the opinion, “well if they were justified, they would have won the case.”¹²¹

My research with the AWP itself brought out divergent perspectives and accounts. It enabled me to gauge contradictions in the information I was given. It is to this ‘other’ side of the plot, already indicated, that I turn to in more detail.

¹²¹ Ahmed hadn’t been following up on the court case since his job is primarily to deal with the day-to-day operations related to the *katchi abadis*. I decided not to point out that the case at that time had still not been officially closed, neither did I point out that the SC had in fact instructed the CDA to immediately stop any further evictions. I gauged that doing so would have potentially directed the Ahmed in a direction he might have considered too sensitive for discussion at the time. It needs to be noted that there is a separate Law and Order department at the CDA which deals with such matters.

Chapter 3: Saving the slaves in the Master-Planned city

Like the ‘informal settlements’, what was also not foreseen by the Pakistani state at the time of Islamabad’s creation was the transformation in its political map. As mentioned before, Islamabad was born under a military dictator; in fact, Pakistan’s politics has been subsumed by military-run stakeholders, with the first transition to democratic power taking place in only 2013. Given this, imagining the action taken by the civil society (and the lack of it) against the I-11 evictions becomes clearer. As such, this chapter engages in providing further context to the I-11 case, which stands in sharp contrast to the narrative provided by the CDA, based on what sparked the I-11 eviction, reviewing the SC orders and reports, and signifying the importance of *timing* to understand Islamabad’s urban governance. It also gives credence to viewing the political dynamics of the city among its residents at large.

3.1 It’s their right: the AWP and APAKA collaborate

Ways in which mobilization occurs in order to resist the state, casts much light on the everyday practices of the people involved. Returning to Chatterjee’s (2004) account mentioned earlier, Calcutta’s illegal squatters on public as well as private land¹²² is a comparable case in point with Islamabad’s I-11 *abadi*: “The squatters, on their part, admit that their occupation of public land is both illegal and contrary to good civic life. But they make a claim to a habitation and a livelihood as a matter of right and use their association as the principal collective instrument to

¹²² The search for livelihood by peasants affected from the great famine of 1943 had eventually transformed into a hotbed for accommodating thousands of migrants in the aftermath of India’s partition in 1947 (Chatterjee 2004: 53-54)

pursue that claim.”¹²³ When it then came to attaining facilities, Chatterjee (2004) describes what he calls is the “political society” rather than the “civil society” approach¹²⁴; this, for instance, refers to the links these dwellers had made with the Communist Party, the Master or teacher in one of the primary schools, or the Welfare Association in achieving electricity and gas connections on their illegally occupied land¹²⁵. That is to say, these organizations/individuals were not members of the ‘civil society’ as recognized by the state, yet made *political* claims to be recognized for the provision of services.

Further, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Hull (2012; 2008) described the Islamabadi bureaucracy as mediated by the various documents circulating in the city, which thereby taken away from CDA’s position as an omnipotent body influencing action. In a study of the Badia Qadir Bakhsh village in Islamabad, he presents an account of the difficulty the CDA had to expropriate land so that it could begin developmental work¹²⁶. He traces the reason for this in the mechanisms by which original files, reports and other CDA documents make their way out of the office and into the hands of the village residents. As such, the CDA, in this case, finds itself in a helpless position to plead before the court, due to the lack of proof of documents illustrating land allotments.

¹²³ *ibid* 59

¹²⁴ In making his argument, Chatterjee (2004) works within the subaltern studies paradigm, involving Antonio Gramsci’s ideas. For Gramsci (1999: 532): “it should be remarked that the general notion of State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the [armor] of coercion).” Chatterjee (2004: 51) suggests, “Gramsci begins by equating political society with the state, but soon slides into a whole range of social and cultural interventions that must take place well beyond the domain of the state.” His main argument is then centered on these ‘other’ forces working beyond the state realm.

¹²⁵ *ibid* 54-57

¹²⁶ Hull (2008)

While the case of the ‘Afghan Basti’ stands in contrast to the scenario in the village describes above, Hull’s logic of pressurizing the CDA may still apply: my interview with the AWP officials brought out that had the party not been present, and had the APAKA not been established through its efforts, residents of the *abadi* would probably have “cried and wailed but eventually left the site without any further action”. Instead, the presence of the Party as well as the Alliance has been necessary to garner support of and for the *abadi*’s residents, to protest and eventually take the matter to the SC. In comparison also to the case of Calcutta, when it came to structuring a narrative before the SC, the AWP¹²⁷ emphasized the illegality of the CDA, rather than the *abadi* dwellers. On what grounds the party has been able to engineer its counter-narratives, and subsequently also gather SC’s support, requires further dwelling into the precise “trigger moment” for the I-11 case (something absent from the CDA’s narrative).

3.11 The Background Story

While the eviction operation took place in July 2015, an incident from the previous year had sparked it: on January 28, 2014 Amin Khan, - originally from FATA - had petitioned the IHC that NADRA¹²⁸ issue him a computerized National ID card¹²⁹. NADRA had claimed that it had no records of Khan’s address, even though the *abadi* had had electricity and telephone connections, AWP’s Tariq informed me. “Now the malevolence of the Judge who received Khan’s petition”, he continued, “was that upon receiving it, he remarked, ‘oh, there are katchi abadis here? Why is he sitting there? Remove these settlements!’”¹³⁰ The CDA was henceforth ordered to evict and

¹²⁷ For the sake of simplicity, I hereafter primarily mention the AWP only, rather than the AWP and APAKA. Both

¹²⁸ The National Database and Registration Authority

¹²⁹ Zehra Hashmi (2015), ‘A Politics of Rage in Islamabad’

¹³⁰ I was told that it is not clear why the IHC judge proposed this, except to work with the consequences of his decision.

demolish the Afghan Basti, which in Tariq's words, was a "naked decision", for CDA simply needed an excuse to do this. In the meantime, even though Khan had withdrawn his, the pressure of eviction from the CDA nevertheless continued. It is also at this point that the AWP gained its mandate to stand by the residents of the *abadi* which potentially faced eviction.

Members of AWP and APAKA had been present at these court hearings and had consistently called for a resettlement plan before the evictions had happened¹³¹; in fact, as Tariq pointed out, the I-11 *katchi abadi* was the only settlement where residents had become party members and almost all of their rooftops had AWP's flags on them. "We kept at it, but this was unacceptable to the CDA". It was with this background that *abadi* was finally evicted, but which also gave further impetus to AWP's action. "Initially, the *abadi* residents made a human chain with women and children to resist the eviction, this continued for three days. On the fourth day, however, the CDA came with more bulldozers which eventually destroyed it". It was at this moment that the matter was taken to the SC in order to put the CDA on trial¹³². I now turn to this in more detail in order to further support the main arguments in this thesis.

3.12 Taking the CDA to court: on its invalid claims and ignorance of human rights

AWP's main agenda has been to forward a consistent narrative which brings out how CDA's action was baseless. In the court hearings¹³³, the party stressed on the discriminatory

¹³¹ Zehra Hashmi (2015), 'A Politics of Rage in Islamabad'

¹³² The full court report is available at AWP's website at: <http://awamiworkersparty.org/supreme-court-petition-challenging-katchi-abadi-demolitions/>

¹³³ These court hearing refer to the SC orders prepared by the judges, and can be referred to in the 'bibliography' section. For the purposes of this thesis, the information I have used appears in all of these orders and is hence not mutually exclusive. As such, wherever I mention court hearings, I refer to all of them collectively rather than one particular court order (unless stated).

attitude of NADRA towards a laborer, who came from a site where there *were* gas and electricity connections. As one of the AWP officials also emphasized, “if the settlements were illegal, then why had the CDA provided its residents with these connections?”. Another official continued on IHC’s unfair attitude as well: this was the same court which had also passed an order on banning any commercial activity in residential areas; “this was never implemented and the ‘big people’ continue to have it their way”, said Tariq, but the evictions were pushed forth as necessary nevertheless.

The invalidity of CDA’s claims to evict the Afghan criminals, as mentioned earlier, was further illustrated by the party in the court and also online. An account by member of the AWP and APAKA writes, for instance:

“Ruins of I-11 katchi abadi¹³⁴ reminded me of my village in Kurram, an agency in FATA¹³⁵. When the Taliban torched our villages a few years ago, they forcibly evicted people from their villages, killing women and children ... The Capital Development Authority (CDA) did to the katchi abadi what the Taliban and the army did to the people of FATA ... forced millions of people – primarily Pashtuns – to flee their homes in the name of war, arrived at the I-11 katchi abadi to evict its primarily Pashtun residents¹³⁶.”

The Pashtuns mentioned by Turi above are part of the second largest ethnic group in Pakistan, after Punjabis, amounting to over 40 million people, and who are often associated with being Afghans. On the ground, there is a distinction between the Pakistani Pashtuns and the Afghan Pashtuns – mostly refugees taken by the State of Pakistan in the 1979 Soviet-Afghan war. Nevertheless, ‘Afghans’ have become CDA’s main target. For Zahid (2015: ‘Afghan Basti’), this

¹³⁴ Informal settlements or slums

¹³⁵ *the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan*

¹³⁶ Hassan Turi (2015), ‘Razed our Homes’

was “dehumanization of an entire population on the basis of non-existent facts”. This, according to Abid Hassan Minto, is unacceptable since “the state shall provide for whoever is a Pakistani citizen, regardless of ethnicity.”



A news article emphasizing that the residents of I-11 were citizens of Pakistan with national ID card.¹³⁷

What it further pointed out, however, was the *illegality* of the CDA, rather than of the *abadi*'s dwellers. All of the SC orders which summarize the hearings of the petitions, point to one fundamental point: the I-11 *abadi* was not a case of illegal encroachment due to the presence of the several rules and rights which exist to protect its citizens. As Gujjar also pointed out when talking about human right: “this is not something that the Constitution of AWP was saying, this is something promised by the Constitution of Pakistan itself”. He went on to say that if people’s

¹³⁷ Zahid (2015: ‘Afghan Basti’)

fundamental rights will not be given to them, they would have no choice but to snatch them from the state.

At the SC hearings, the AWP foremost pointed out articles found in the Constitution of Pakistan which guards the:

- ‘right to life and liberty’ (Article 9)
- ‘right to dignity’ (Article 14) and
- ‘right to equality’ (Article 25), along with
- Article 38(d), which puts it the state’s obligation to provide housing.

While this isn’t the space to provide details of further laws and conventions, a report prepared by the petitioners, submitted to the CDA, further highlights the state’s international obligations.

These include:

- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, and
- The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966¹³⁸.

The same report also details CDA’s own policy for the upholding the housing needs of the citizens; this includes:

- The National Housing Policy of 2001, along with
- The National Policy on Katchi Abadis, Urban Renewal and Slums Upgradation 2001, which safeguards *abadi* dwellers from evictions without any resettlement plan¹³⁹.

Finally, another report¹⁴⁰ spoke of the:

- Modalities and Procedures for Development of Private Housing Schemes in Zones II & V of Islamabad Capital Territory, and
- The Islamabad Land Disposal Regulation, 2005.

¹³⁸ Asim Sajjad Akhtar & others v. Federation of Pakistan & others, C.M.A. No. 7339, September 2015.

¹³⁹ See also Habitat (2014) for a detailed analysis of the criteria under which forced evictions can take place.

¹⁴⁰ Asim Sajjad Akhtar & others v. Federation of Pakistan & others, C.M.A. No. 7339, August 2015.

In addition to this, two further reports suggesting expert solution to the lack of affordable housing, were presented to the SC upon its request (as already referred to in Chapter 1).

AWP's action has been a success in terms of eliciting speedy action from the SC; although the case hearings continued on in the year 2016, SC's order dated August 26th, 2015, had clearly ordered the CDA to stop any further evictions. What also emerges from the extensive court case is that for the first time in Islamabad's political history, an eviction case had begun a conversation on low-income housing in Islamabad more generally. It was able to involve the SC in reprimanding CDA, and urged it to devise tangible plans for housing the *abadi* dwellers.

Returning to the 'right-to-the-city' framework alluded to in Chapter 1, most of AWP's claims have been legislative and judicial in nature. Its action on behalf of the evicted I-11 dwellers stands in contrast to Lefebvre's (1996 [1968]: 158) notion that "[t]he *right to the city* cannot be conceived of as simply visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed *right to urban life*." In the I-11 case, this 'right to urban life' has primarily meant the demand for the implementation of rules and laws which already exist to safeguard the basic shelter requirements, rather than push for a more philosophical understanding of leading an urban life. Having said that, the party's claims can nevertheless be interpreted as challenging the bourgeois status-quo - a key element in Lefebvre's writings. In the I-11 case, this must also be seen in tandem with the overall timing of the incident.

3.2 Identifying the 'symbiotic relationship' and the importance of timing

In contemplating the dynamics of the I-11 event, its *timing* is central for discussion. In other words, why was it then (July 2015) that the CDA resorted to evictions? And what can this

say about the contingencies of the state in Islamabad in this regard?

Turning first to this latter question: in CDA's attempts to provide housing to the urban poor, as mentioned earlier, what must also be recognized, as Moastasim (2015: 70) notes is "that many existing squatter settlements enjoy [this] support since they function to supplement the master plan by fulfilling the need for housing a population (mainly low-income government employees)." This demonstrates that complete removal of these *abadis* is not an aim the CDA is pursuing in the first place.

Further, however, its everyday practices were brought to my attention by Gujjar who narrated that the CDA regularly engages in extortions, i.e., it allows some of these settlements to thrive on public land in exchange of a monthly amount of money. Minto allows pointed out that "these *abadis* don't just come out of nowhere; CDA itself brings them here and does so for political reasons as well." By this, he referred to generating enough population to support the government in elections in return of infrastructural facilities (such as gas and electricity given to the Afghan Basti, as already mentioned).¹⁴¹

What can then be said about the I-11 evictions given this symbiosis inherent in CDA's relation to the *abadis*? As alluded to in the introduction as well, the evictions came in the wake of global concerns over terrorism and a sense of urgency in deporting the Afghan refugees. In the I-11 evictions alone, over 2000 people were booked, and 66 were (unfairly) arrested under the Anti-

¹⁴¹ Scott (1989: 130) also mentions this aspect of symbiosis in the case of the official and the unofficial Brasilia: "one could say that the cost of this kind of order and legibility at the center of the plan virtually required that it be sustained by an unplanned Brasilia at the margins. The two Brasilias were not just different; they were symbiotic."

Terrorist law¹⁴². Speaking more broadly, nearly 600,000 Afghans have been deported since July 2016, of which nearly 365, 000 were registered¹⁴³. More importantly, however, is Asim Sajjad's conclusion that "lack of political will to create subsidized housing for the working-class."¹⁴⁴

Indeed, the Federal Government does recognize the need for this: "Housing is a basic and fundamental human need. Today, there is a virtual housing crisis in the country. Rapid population growth, overcrowding, shortage of supply, aging housing stock [and] development of slums and Katchi Abadis has further aggravated the situation."¹⁴⁵ However, the incumbent PML-N government has not lived up to its "Low-income Apna Ghar Housing Scheme" promised in 2013¹⁴⁶. In April 2017, it again reiterated the government's plans to do implement it.¹⁴⁷

The timing of this reiteration is significant for PML-N politically: the I-11 eviction and the subsequent residential construction therein, can be seen as a way to "show" the government's commitment to the city, just in time for the 2018 election. In the meantime, its plans to develop low-income housing remains a 'cover' for the ground realities the laborers face. Islamabad then presents a complex anthropological case where the CDA operates in an inconsistent manner – symbiotically engaging with the *abadi* residents on the one hand, and engaging in evictions for developmental (political) reasons on the other. At best, this behavior can be explained by a balance the CDA strives to maintain between the two approaches. The I-11 event became one instance,

¹⁴² Siddiqui (2015): 14

¹⁴³ Mentioned in a Human Rights Watch report at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/02/13/pakistan-coercion-un-complicity/mass-forced-return-afghan-refugees>

¹⁴⁴ "Islamabad Katchi Abadi Community Database". *Participedia*. September 2016.

¹⁴⁵ <http://fgeh.gov.pk/>

¹⁴⁶ "After 3 years low-cost Apna Ghar Housing Scheme still remains a distant dream". *Pakistan Today*. November 2016.

¹⁴⁷ "PM Nawaz vows to facilitate low income people in housing sector". *Times of Islamabad*. April 2017.

however, where this balance was shaken at the hands of the AWP, even as the settlement itself could not be rescued.

3.3 Islamabad's elitism: an undemocratic city?

When contextualizing the type of democratic narratives described above, much can also be garnered from unearthing the dialectical interplay of space and the social relations within it; in order to see why the I-11 evictions witnessed a lack of 'communal power' that Harvey describes, Islamabad's design can be studied vis-à-vis its residents. This is similar to the 'duality of structure' approach of Anthony Giddens (1984): 'structure' involves the "rules and resources, or sets of transformation relations, organized as properties of social systems", whereby these 'systems' comport to the reproduced relations among agents¹⁴⁸. The 'structuration theory' then asserts a 'duality of structure' for "the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize."¹⁴⁹

Given Islamabad's socio-historic background set out at the onset, Islamabad can said to be relatively 'undemocratic' in nature if one situates its 'elites' in relation to the 'other'. Relationally speaking, "[t]he middle and elite class of Islamabad sees the slum dwellers of the city from a *lens of privilege* [emphasis added], not realising that without these low-cost housing with minimum facilities, the working class poor have nowhere to go"¹⁵⁰. Annie Harper (2010; 2011) also establishes the way in which Islamabadis engage in a tense relationship when identifying with Pakistan on the one hand, but retaining a sense of honor in being part of Islamabad (a city which

¹⁴⁸ ibid 25

¹⁴⁹ ibid

¹⁵⁰ Humayun, Siddique (2015 "[Evicting the homeless, keeping Islamabad beautiful?](#)")

is rather ‘foreign’ to the ‘rest of Pakistan’) on the other: “the urban space which has emerged sits uncomfortably in Pakistan, its orderly framework contrasting sharply with the more chaotic Pakistani spaces around it, or in the case of *katchi abadis*, inside it”. In fact, “Islamabad needs the presence of [the ‘other’] Rawalpindi for its own self-definition”¹⁵¹, the latter of which is a city which looks more like the ‘rest of the country’

This ‘authoritarianism’ in its design is put into further perspective when one sees that Doxiadis’ eventual work ended up echoing the colonial urban spaces of the past, whereby its legacy is pervasive in contemporary times¹⁵². Here, Islamabad’s character and function can be described by the analogy of the old colonial “Hill Station”¹⁵³: this “Hill Station” essentially epitomized the Foucauldian concept of a ‘heretopia’, which was a place away from the normal order of the society, in order to grant positive isolation to the rich and middle-classed Indians¹⁵⁴. The city’s administrative units shown below echo this aspect as well, illustrating how they are unwelcoming as public spaces and boast an ‘orderly’ space. Given also the overall linearity and uniformity in Islamabad’s continued ekistical development, strong bureaucratic influence is showcased in the city. This thereby signals the lack of power and control held by the ordinary residents in Islamabad, i.e., the exercise of ‘sovereignty’, to use Foucault once again.

¹⁵¹ Harper (2010: 198)

¹⁵² Harper (2010: 118)

¹⁵³ Daechsel 2013: 98)

¹⁵⁴ *ibid*



View of Model along Capitol Avenue showing the rectilinear plan and square divisions culminating into the Administrative buildings¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ Doxiadis (1965: 31)



A picture of the Supreme Court of Pakistan barricaded to retract entry¹⁵⁶

With this background, it becomes easier to explain the lack of mass mobilization against the evictions from the average residents of Islamabad themselves; as Harvey (2012: 5) points out, “To claim the right to the city in the sense I mean it here is to claim some kind of shaping power over the processes of urbanization, over the ways in which our cities are made and remade, and to do so in a fundamental and radical way.” My analysis above is an attempt to illustrate how this ‘power over the process of urbanization’ is institutionally driven to produce a reduced sense of social inclusivity. The activism by the AWP and APAKA then becomes more important for as

¹⁵⁶ Taken from: <https://explorepak.wordpress.com/about-pakistan/islamabad/>

described above, its claims directly have hitherto sought to provide a strategic check on Islamabad's urbanization.

Chapter 4 Epilogue: Two years on

“So, when can we expect a decision about the I-11 case”, I asked Mr. Abid Hassan Minto.

“Every [case] hearing has ten to twelve employees working on it, right? They come with all their files etc. So, the courts don’t have much time. Now, there are 17 judges in the Supreme Court, 2 or 3 of them have been working on the I-11 case and not all of them are available all the time. One judge could be sitting in Quetta, one could be sitting in Karachi; it is our misconception to ask why the courts aren’t making a decision. If the Chief Justice wants all the judges to go to Karachi, then they will go to Karachi, and cases on Islamabad would be put on a hold, right? So, it is a difficult country...”, was his response. It put into perspective the way in which the justice-system works and the reasons why two years have passed, since the evictions, and there hasn’t been a final verdict from the SC yet.

My study of this case in the background of Islamabad’s planning has revealed the potential for systematically imagining the course of future CDA operations against these settlements. As it attempts to realize the ‘dream of Islamabad’, it is no surprise to learn what Doxiadis remarked about the project, “what we have achieved is not enough”¹⁵⁷. Although Doxiadis was critical of *utopias*, he believed in the human potential “to master the future”¹⁵⁸. In the case of Islamabad, this future held contradictions and troubles, some of which Doxiadis has already predicted many

¹⁵⁷ Daechsel (2015: 289)

¹⁵⁸ Daechsel (2015: 45)

decades ago; Islamabad, today, is essentially a legacy of urban planning which ‘misplaced’ Doxiadis’ initial ekistical vision¹⁵⁹ under the postcolonial context of the Pakistani state.

This ‘misplacement’ can be seen in the sprouting of informal settlements, creating what this thesis has claimed is the “unplanned Islamabad”. When the CDA puts this forth as an “issue” hampering the proper implementation of the Master-Plan, what must not be forgotten is not only the structural forces which brought them up in the first place, but also those which create the room for their continued flourishing. The desire to thwart their existence by the state – the I-11 settlement in our case, defies its own contingencies: the “unplanned Islamabad” has generated an order of its own whereby the state is bound by the legal humanitarian concerns which eschew its complete removal. Furthermore, political ones overshadow the nepotism involved in providing services at a critical time, such as when an election is coming up.

As has been illustrated in this thesis, the *timing* of an event is a key factor that informs an episode’s background. Hence, CDA’s attempt to have a legal cover for evictions cannot be seen in isolation from the rapidly urbanizing Islamabad, neither from the fact that the incumbent Pakistan Muslim-League Noon (PML-N) government is preparing for upcoming election in 2018. Nevertheless, the governance in the city is drawn between ‘progress as development’ on the one hand, and civil society pressure over its own vulnerabilities on the other.

A similar response to an extensive Orange (Metro) Line development - which was to pass through primary heritage sites of Lahore - was also seen in 2015: major protests by activists (including academics, architects and lawyers) eventually led the Lahore Development Authority

¹⁵⁹ See Daechsel (2013)

(LDA) to discontinue working towards the Line. The case of Islamabad, however, shows that it has institutionally been structured to be rather *undemocratic* by the Pakistani state, which still iterates a frictional relationship with its colonial past. As Tikekar (2004: 43) suggests, Pakistanis often remark that “Islamabad is in Pakistan but Pakistan is not in Islamabad” and that “one needs to travel 14 km from Islamabad to find Pakistan in Rawalpindi”. This retention of a ‘foreign’ image of the city feeds into the city’s character which Tapner (1977) was perhaps correct in pointing out: “A cross section of the inhabitants is needed to bring the community to life, but in the meantime, it remains a city without a heart”¹⁶⁰.

The collaborated efforts of the AWP and APAKA, however, are key steps taken in the direction of bringing this ‘community to life’. In the words of Tariq himself, “we wanted to create the I-11 case an issue so the courts would take us seriously, and we did”. In nurturing leftist politics this way, AWP’s action can be interpreted as implying the main argument in this thesis: what underlies the state’s stance over both “symbolic violence” and actual force (in the form of demolitions and evictions), is an inherent power struggle when it comes to addressing informal settlements. Rather than acting within a ‘panopticon’, it is also the settlements’ dwellers which hold power through the same ‘ivory tower’ which is governing the city. As such, the state cannot afford to ignore the “unplanned” creation of its own, both, due to its continued role in extortions through the CDA, and for the precedent set by the AWP in using democratic channels to hold it accountable.

When speaking of democratic cities, Mumtaz pointed out how an assumption implicit in

¹⁶⁰ *quoted in* (Malik 2003: 75-76)

seeking democratic inclusivity is that democracy is the best system, when actually “[it] is the legitimizing idea.” By this, he pointed to the ‘modernist paradigm’ adopted by the bourgeoisie from the Renaissance in Europe which saw the replacement of God by “Man with a capital ‘M’”. This laid the path towards the pursuit of modern society, state, industry and technology which, in the 20th century, Doxiadis was part and parcel of as well. “Man was seen as the center of the universe” where the dominant political system became the “rule by the people, for the people and of the people”. Thus, saying that Doxiadis was a ‘humanist’ who envisioned the connectedness of various socio-economic classes, cannot be divorced from the understanding where this humanism and egalitarianism originates.

Following from the above, in then trying to understand the future of cities like Islamabad, Mumtaz emphasized the symbiosis mentioned in this thesis, in his own words:

“in nature’s economy, there is a necessary *symbiosis* between the host and the parasite, in other words a system of trade off. In contemporary times, cities are touted triumphantly as engines of growth which will take us into a wonderful future; but cities by definition are not sustainable, so how do they survive? They derive their sustenance from the host region as a parasite - something which is not possible at a village level. In turn, this parasite provides the host with certain services. If this trade off will balance justly and fairly, it will endure. What has been happening, however, in that it is sucking more and more, concentrating wealth in a few hands and if you think this should result in prosperous cities, that is not happening.” As Simone (2008: 30) also points out, “the city is a constant reminder of what could be but isn’t”.

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