Gender and Nation in Recent Estonian Historiography

by
Marianne Meiorg

Submitted to
Department of Gender Studies
Central European University

In partial fulfilment of the requirement for
the Erasmus Mundus Master Degree in Women's and Gender Studies

Main supervisor: Francisca de Haan, PhD (Central European University)
Support supervisor: Carla Rodríguez González, PhD (University of Oviedo)

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Approved by

_____
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Abstract

The thesis analyses recent Estonian historiography in the period of the Estonian national movement from 1905 to 1918. In particular, I analyse sections from two texts, one representing an outsider's view of Estonian history, the author being a Finnish historian, and the other representing an insider's view, being compiled by a group of Estonian historians. The aim is to investigate the role gender plays in these historical narratives. I draw on the theoretical framework by Joan Scott and other feminist scholars who have analysed gender in the construction of nation, in particular. The analysis shows how the text by Estonian authors, which (re)creates Estonian national narrative, is (re)constructing Estonian national identity as masculine, constructed in a binary relationship with femininity and a certain, less desirable masculinity. The text does so by relying on the (heterosexual) familial iconography, whereby a paternal figure, representing hegemonic masculinity, is the head of the family, leading, guiding and protecting the wife/mother and the children. In the same text by Estonian historians, hegemonic masculinity is represented by the male leaders of the national movement, who are presented as active, progressive, independent and self-sufficient, intelligent, peaceful, and ethical. This positive image is created in contrast to the feminised image of the Baltic-Germans, who ruled the territory that later became Estonia for 700 years, and the image of (tsarist) Russians as aggressively masculine, images that are somewhat complicated in the other text I analysed, by the Finnish historian. The text by the Estonian historians largely portrays women and feminised Baltic-Germans as helpless and passive, in need of a paternal figure. Due to the association of socialism with Russia, the Estonian socialist movement is depicted as aggressively masculine. The language of sexual difference also defined the Baltic-Germans as a non-threat while Russians are constructed as an ongoing threat that must be constrained, along with the socialist movement.

Declaration of original research and the word count

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of original research; it contains no materials accepted for any other degree in any other institution and no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

I further declare that the following word count for this thesis are accurate:

Body of thesis (all chapters excluding notes, references, appendices, etc.): 25,344 words

Entire manuscript: 28,575 words

Signed _____ Marianne Meiorg

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Chapter 1. Introduction

> "[C]anonical texts become particularly valuable targets because their appeal rests, at least in part, on their ability to embody and express those 'natural' assumptions" (Scott, 1999: 89)

History plays an important part for Estonians. In some ways it is no different from other countries that rely on the notion of the nation as an argument for the right to self-determination, and Estonia clearly identifies as a nation-state. The Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia that was enacted in 1992 specifically states that it "shall guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation, language and culture through the ages" (The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia). Admittedly "language" was added in 2007, but from the beginning the drafters of the Constitution had a firm belief that language is already part of the notions of nation and culture. This was accompanied by the strict language legislation aimed to protect Estonian as the main language of (official) communication in Estonia and the. Thus there has never been any doubt that Estonia was guided by the principle of "one state – one nation – one language"[1] (Tender, 2010: 27). Therefore, maintaining the sense of nation was paramount for the survival of a state that is literally created for one nation.

The justification for a nation-state comes from history. The long line of scholars who have studied the creation of nations attest to that – Benedict Anderson (e.g. Anderson, 1983) and Craig Calhoun (e.g. Calhoun, 1997) are only two of such examples. But even merely looking at the mainstream accounts of Estonia's history, such as the six-part overview of Estonian history (1935-2013), the fifth part of which I will analyse in this thesis, gives a clear indication of the importance attached to the continuity and the assumed constant progress of culture and language, which, as the Estonian Constitution suggests, are the basis and purpose of the Estonian state. The historical continuity is so important as to even warrant forgetting or disregarding disruptions to it

[1] All citations included in this thesis that in original are in Estonian have been translated by the author of this thesis.

– also something not particular to the Estonian nation, as Anderson or Calhoun would readily confirm. Estonian historian Marek Tamm recounts an anecdote told by another scholar that illustrates the confusion it might cause when memories collide: apparently a young woman at a university entrance interview had started to answer a question posed to her by saying that Estonia is a young country, referring to Estonia becoming independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, but then stopped and corrected: “Actually our state is 84 years old but, at the same time, we are still very young” (Tamm, 2012).

The Estonian state relies on “forgetting” such disruptions. And by “relies” I do not mean that metaphorically, but quite literally. When Estonia broke away from the Soviet Union, the independence was “restored”. This is why the young woman was momentarily confused – legally, and according to the construction of the Estonian national narrative, Estonia was not formed on 20 August 1991. The Preamble of the Constitution establishes that the Estonian state “embodies the inextinguishable right of the people of Estonia to national self-determination […] which was proclaimed on 24 February 1918”. However, the decision to rely on the principle of continuity, rather than to start a new state was not the obvious decision in August of 1991. In fact, it was a decision that followed a long and heated discussions among the leaders of the national movement. My mother told me (I myself was too young to remember) that when we were watching television on the night of August 20th 1991, waiting for the decision about the independence, she and my father were afraid that the fundamental argument between the two sides of the movement – one supporting the principle of continuity and the other supporting the proclamation of a new state – would result in losing the momentum and the opportunity to become independent. They were not alone in that fear. What is even more important in the context of this thesis is that the argument that was based on history won, and not the more pragmatic argument of starting with a clean slate.

As I will discuss further in chapter 2, the role of historians in the national movement was pivotal. They did not only uncover previously hidden and censored history and memories, but they also played a crucial role in that final decision on 20 August 1991 (Tamm, 2016). Their significant role is attested to also by the fact that they held a number of ministerial positions first years of the independence. They, indeed, did not only uncover previously hidden historical facts, but they created the reality in which people interpret these facts.

Therefore, when it comes to Estonia, it is especially important to analyse critically the narratives historians create and have created. The sense of Estonian national identity is particularly entangled with the national myths and national narratives continuously told and retold. Historians might consider the analysis and deconstruction of these myths and narratives a normal course of their work in academic fora, but when this critical work breaks out from that small circle of scholars, it is liable to cause uproar among the general public. Certain myths are so ingrained in the consciousness of the ethnic Estonians that an attempt to deconstruct them feels like their very identity is being attacked.

My thesis will, thus, venture into sensitive areas. It will also simultaneously tackle the topic of gender, which is similarly controversial, the reason of which is arguably connected to Estonians' understanding of the past as well. The desire to restore the pre-Second World War Estonian world also meant the desire to "forget" everything connected to the Soviet Union, without critical evaluation. Thus, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, "feminism" was soon met by a negative attitude due to the idea that the gender equality policies of the Soviet Union were representative of feminism (Kivimaa, 2000; Biin & Albi, 2012: 123). This resentment of feminism due to it being associated with the communist regime, also impeded academic research on gender (e.g. de Haan, 2008; Zimmermann, 2014). As Raili Põldsaar has summarised: gender studies as an academic discipline is yet to be developed, the work that has been done is due to "the personal commitment of individual researchers" (2007: 247). This also includes gender analysis of history in Estonia.

Gender being a social construction is a well-known notion among gender scholars (e.g. West & Zimmerman, 1987). Feminist historians have readily made use of this notion in analysing how history has played a part in this construction. But also, as Joan Scott, whose theoretical framework I will be using in this thesis, has pointed out – gender, among other factors, affects and influences historical political processes, institutions, power relations, identities and so on (Scott, 1999[1986]). My thesis aims to study exactly that, i.e. the role of gender in the construction of Estonian historiography. Hence, instead of analysing the historical processes themselves, I am interested in how historians have used allusions to sexual differences in their historical narratives. The reason for this particular choice is precisely because of the special position historians occupy in post-Soviet Estonia, as elaborated above.

1.1. The goal of the thesis and research questions

Therefore, the goal of my thesis is to analyse gender in recent Estonian historiography about the period of the Estonian national movement (1905–1918). In particular I will ask the question: how have historians used references to sexual differences in their historiographies to create the narrative of the specific historical period and describe and interpret the relations of power during that period? What is the narrative that these historians are (re)creating through these reliances on gender construction? In particular I want to know what specific references to gender they use and in which context. This will lead me to ask questions about the implied purpose of specific references in specific power relations, i.e. what are the implication of these references in these particular situations?

1.2. Methodology and sources

The research method I will be using is critical discourse analysis. I rely on the definition of discourse as used by Norman Fairclough (1993). According to him, discourses "are manifested in particular ways of using language and other symbolic forms" (Fairclough, 1993: 3). In particular he recognises discourse as not reflecting some sort of reality but, in fact, constructing or constituting it (Fairclough, 1993: 3). This fits with the theoretical framework I will be using – Joan Scott's notion of gender (Scott, 1999).

I have chosen the particular historical period of 1905-1918 for several reasons. Firstly, it is the period, which led to Estonia achieving independence, which was declared on 24 February 1918. The cultural national movement had developed into a political movement, Estonians using the political means available to them to achieve greater decision-making powers in the politics over the territory of Estonia and the lives of the people living there. Due to the importance of this period for Estonia's independence it is one of the most researched periods in Estonian history and also one of the most informative for and exploration of Estonian national identity. This makes an analysis ot its historiography especially relevant. Secondly, the women's movement in Estonia also gained momentum next to and somewhat interwoven with the national movement. Although by 1900 there were already active women speaking publicly on behalf of women and women's rights, e.g. Lilli Suburg (Tamul and Lätt, 2008) and Natalie Johanson-Pärna (Johanson-Pärna, 1882), the movement became organised only after the 1905 Russian Revolution (Kivimäe, 2008: 32; also Biin and Albi, 2012: 115). That

revolution energised women's activism as did the temporary relaxation of the censorship laws. In addition, women received equal right to vote in 1917 throughout the Russian Empire, and maintained it after Estonia became independent in 1918 (Biin and Albi, 2012: 119-120). Therefore, I was interested in how, if at all, this pivotal period for women in Estonia is reflected in mainstream Estonian historiography and how, if at all, the events especially relevant for women affected the discussion of the national movement.

My analysis in particular focuses on the relevant sections of two historiographical publications, which cover the period of 1905-1918 in Estonian history. One of the books – *Eesti Ajalugu V* (Andresen et al., 2010; henceforth referred to as "Andresen et al. (2010)") – was written by ten Estonian historians while the other – *Eesti Ajalugu* (Zetterberg, 2009; henceforth referred to as "Zetterberg (2009)") – is a monograph by a Finnish historian. Since I am specifically interested in the period from 1905 to 1918, the pivotal years in national movement leading to the declaration of the independent state of Estonia in 1918, I will only analyse the respective sections in these two books. Thus, from Andresen et al. (2010) 89 pages altogether (pages 348-437) and from Zetterberg (2009) 36 pages altogether (pages 355-391). Other sections in these books include information relevant to the period but in order to ensure comparability, other sections will not be covered in the analysis unless explicitly stated so.

The reasons for choosing these two publications are manifold. Firstly, they were published around the same time, and aim to provide a general overview of Estonian history, while relying on the latest published historiography. This makes these two publications comparable, even though the overview they provide is of different density.

Secondly, the two publications provide different perspectives on Estonian history. The Estonian historian Marek Tamm has referred to Zetterberg's publication as one of the breakthroughs in Estonian historiography (Tamm, 2009: 66). Tamm sees his contribution as a fresh external view on Estonian history that challenges the still prevalent national-romantic view in Estonian historiography. Zetterberg's publication has also been published in Estonian, which makes it also accessible to Estonian readers. It was originally published in 2007 in Finnish for the Finnish audience. The Estonian version is slightly different from the Finnish one, to adapt to the Estonian audience, excluding explanations that the author deemed unnecessary for Estonians and including sources that had been made available since 2007 (Zetterberg, 2009: 16).

I considered it interesting to put Zetterberg's book next to Andresen et al. (2010), a publication by Estonian historians for Estonian readers. What makes the comparison especially interesting is that unlike Zetterberg (2009), which was written by one historian at his own initiative, Andresen et al. (2010) is a group effort and somewhat of a state-sponsored project.

The book by Andresen et al. (2010) has an interesting and long history. It is the fifth part of a six-part comprehensive overview of Estonian history and it covers the period from the mid-19th century to 1918. The collection is a continuation of a project that was initiated in 1935, but from the planned five chronological parts only three were published before Estonia was annexed to the Soviet Union in 1940 (Tarvel, 1999 and Vahtre, 1999). In 1999, the Estonian president at the time, Lennart Meri (1999), called for continuation of the project. In his speech at an economic conference, of all places, he announced that the editor-in-chief, Sulev Vahtre, with who he had studied history, had started to work on the new parts with his students. Officially, however, the minister of education, himself a former student of the editor-in-chief-to-be (Tamm, 2017), announced the competition for the project only in 2001 and the decision on public funding was made in 2003 (Minister of Education, 2001; and Minister of Education and Science, 2003). The editor-in-chief and the team of historians seemed to have remained largely the same for parts four to six. Updating of part two and three in 2013 was largely done by a different team. Historian Marek Tamm, who one of the authors of *Eesti Ajalugu II*, explained in correspondence I had with him that there is no formal control from the state; editors and authors have full freedom in their work (Tamm, 2017). However, considering that the president as well as the minister behind the initial decisions were all directly connected and shared the view and approach to Estonian history (this will be discussed to some extent in the literature review section of the thesis), the outcome of the first three parts could hardly dissatisfy the president or the minister. As I will explain in chapter 4, Andresen et al. (2010) is a truly national project, a view on Estonian history from the inside. Thus, comparing it to Zetterberg (2010), a look from the outside, is revealing.

1.3. Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured in five chapters. **Chapter 1**, the current chapter, is the introduction, giving a brief introduction into the topic and why I chose the topic, how it

contributes to the already existing small body of work on gender history in Estonia. It also introduces the sources and the methodology guiding the analysis of these sources. **Chapter 2** places the thesis into the wider body of critical historiographical work in Estonia, first giving an overview of historiographical approaches, followed by the criticism, including the lack of women and gender historiography. The second part of chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework for gender analysis of the two historical texts. It starts with a description of Joan Scott's approach to gender as a category of historical analysis, and ends with the theoretical work feminist scholars have done on gender in the construction of nation, national identity and national narrative. **Chapter 3** provides further context for the analysis of the two historiographical texts by giving a short historical background of Estonia, necessary to understand the historical significance of some events and persons referred to in the analysis. **Chapter 4**, forming the heart of the thesis, focuses on the two historiographical texts. I analyse the narrative they construct of the particular historiographical period through the use of the language of gender, i.e. sexual differences. I look at how Estonian national identity is constructed through gender opposition to Russians and Baltic-Germans, as well as to Estonian women and how the construction of Russians in particular represents undesirable non-hegemonic masculinities that need to be kept in control. The chapter, thus, analyses how gendered language is used to construct Estonian national identity and makes use of certain masculinities and femininities as threatening or unthreatening to the national identity. **Chapter 5** is the concluding chapter in which I reiterate my main findings and reflect on them.

Chapter 2. Contextualising and theorising

This chapter has two aims. Firstly, the chapter aims to give an overview of the Estonian historiography in general and the various approaches historians have used. This is followed by an overview of criticism of the current state of Estonian historiography, including the lack of gender-awareness. The second aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical framework for my analysis of two texts of Estonian historiography in chapter 4. I use Joan Scott's elaboration of gender as a category of historical analysis to analyse the construction of the Estonian nation, national identity and national narrative in these two historical texts.

2.1. Estonian historiography – literature review

2.1.1. Overview of Estonian historiography

Estonians are a post-colonial nation and Estonian historiography reflects this situation. In fact, historian Karsten Brüggemann (2002: 94) has reminded us that Estonians have a double colonial history – first under the rule of the Baltic-Germans and then within the Soviet Union (for a more detailed historical background see chapter 3). This double colonial history of Estonia also marks the historiographical periods, as another historian, Marek Tamm (2009), has already helpfully recounted in his article. He counted four stages in the development of Estonian historiography, adding tentatively a fifth stage as ongoing.

Until the second half of the 19th century the Estonian history was written by Baltic-Germans. They had the benefit of written language and as rulers of the territory that currently is Estonia, they had the interest of recording their lives (Jansen, 1997: 39). According to Tamm (2009: 56), a German priest in the 1220s wrote the first coherent narrative of events in this territory. By the 19th century, historiography by the Baltic-Germans was professionalised (Jansen, 1997: 39) and their version of the discovery of this land and ruling of the locals was the only account of history of this territory (Tamm, 2009: 56).

The second stage of Estonian historiography started in the 19th century. It began with the discovery of the history of those previously disregarded – Estonians (Tamm, 2009: 56; Brüggemann, 2002: 93). The first to do that was a Baltic-German, Garlieb Helwig

Merkel (1769-1850), and he was followed by other colonialists, Carl Schirren and Evgraf V. Češichin. Under the auspices of the Learned Estonian Society, whose members included more and more Estonians, the search for the history from the perspective of Estonians started, and in the second half of the 19th century, the first publications appeared. Together with the Society of Estonian Literati (1871–1893), history was being systematically reinterpreted and the Estonian national movement decided to take ownership of it. Brüggemann illustrates this process through the history of one town by changing of its name depending on the respective rulers: Dorpat (German) became Yuryev (Russian), and then Tartu (Estonian) (Brüggemann, 2002: 93). The main aim was to reevaluate the historiography written by and about the elite – Baltic-Germans (Brüggemann, 2002: 93, 96). Within a few decades, the Estonian history was radically rewritten – "current pluses were replaced with minuses and vice versa" (Tamm, 2009: 56) – and history was now looked at from the perspective of peasants, mostly Estonian (Jansen, 1997: 40). While Brüggemann (2002: 93) places the beginning of the professional academic historiography into the 1920s, Tamm places what he calls the nationalisation of Estonian history – "turning historiography into a nationalist and state enterprise" (2009: 56) – in the 1930s. Estonian history at that time was first and foremost a history of the Estonian people and their living space (Tamm, 2009: 57). Two separate groups of historians started to work on comprehensive collections of Estonian history following this principle of focusing on the Estonians and their living space.

Neither of these two groups of Estonian historians managed to complete their work before the Soviet Union annexed Estonia in 1940. According to Tamm (2009: 57), the central premise of the historiography during the Soviet Union was the friendship between the Estonian and Russian nations, compromising the Republic of Estonia and concentrating on class struggle (also Jansen, 1997: 40). It disregarded the events of the Second World War that would have shed negative light on the Soviet Union, such as mass deportations of Estonians in 1940 and 1949, the Gulag and so on. However, he does admit that writing Estonian history remained in the hands of Estonians who borrowed the general framework from the pre-war period, scaling down the values of the time and adding Leninist-Marxist vocabulary (Tamm, 2009: 57-60). This and the concentration on class struggle retained peasants (who during the rule of the Baltic-Germans where mostly Estonians) as the central historical subjects.

At the end of the 1980s, Estonian historiography took a complete turn. There was a real need and demand from the general public but also from historians for history previously censored by the Soviet Union (Brüggemann, 2002: 94-95). Information previously unavailable and memories previously suppressed of the events of the Second World War and the time within the Soviet Union were published and widely discussed (Tamm, 2016). However, it also meant a return to the post-colonial period that Estonian history had already gone through before the War – the aim was to restore pre-Second World War historiographical approaches and "put Estonians once again in charge of their own history" (Tamm, 2009: 60; see also Brüggemann, 2002: 94-95). In fact, at the encouragement of the President of the Republic of Estonia, Lennart Meri (1999), also a historian, one of the pre-war projects of the comprehensive overview of Estonian history was taken up once again (Vahtre, 1999). One of the texts analysed in the current thesis – Andresen et al (2010) – is part of that project.

Estonian historiography in large part has, until very recently, followed the nations' history traditions. Põldsaar argues that "Rankean principles of historical inquiry" are still used (2007: 248). Maria Bucur has remarked about the historiography of Eastern Europe, a statement that is also relevant in the Estonian context, that it remains "heavily engaged with questions of political history, diplomatic history, and intellectual history" (Bucur, 2008: 1382). The questions that particularly interest historians in this region are "those pertaining to nationalism, to the relations of small peoples and states with the Great European powers, and to the contributions of East Europeans to European civilization at large" (Bucur, 2008: 1389). There is a growing body of work challenging this.

Indeed, Marek Tamm has tentatively referred to a new stage in Estonian historiography, where there is less sense of ownership (2009: 64). He argues that monographs like those by Jean-Pierre Minaudier and Seppo Zetterberg that were published in 2007, have started that new phase: they approach Estonian history from the perspective of "they" as opposed to "we" – an outsider view on Estonian history. Non-Estonian historians have contributed to the historiography on 19th century as well as on the Soviet period (Tamm, 2009: 65).

2.1.2. Criticism of Estonian historiography

Before continuing with a specific point of criticism – the (re)creation of the national narrative – it is worth it to make a preliminary point on historical research in Estonia. Due to the heavy reliance on Rankean principles, the strongest point of Estonian historians has been factual descriptive historiography (Jansen, 1997: 35). Tamm stated as late as in 2012 that "[c]ritical historiographical thought is taking its first steps" (2012: 37) and a few years earlier Põldsaar drew attention to the "hostility from the academic opinion-makers" when attempts were made to "question[…] the canonical versions of national history" (2007: 248). However, the body of work questioning older interpretations and deconstructing the Estonian national narrative and national identity authored from inside and outside of Estonia is growing. The following sub-sections give a short overview of these attempts.

National narrative, myths and identity The main point of criticism regarding much of Estonian historiography has been the (re)creation of the national narrative. Regardless of the political situation in Estonia, historiography has been in the service of legitimisation and identity politics, either by the Baltic-Germans, (Soviet) Russians or, indeed, by Estonians (Tamm, 2009: 61; also Wulf, 2016: 174-176). This is not a recent discovery – Estonian historian Ea Jansen (1997: 36) wrote about the role of historians in construction of the present already in 1997. Throughout the so-called "national awakening" in the second half of the 19th century and the independent Estonian state (1918-1940), the aim was to create a narrative that would unite Estonians behind the forming of a nation and then a newly formed state (Jansen, 1997: 39-40). This was the case in many European countries at the time, as after the Napoleonic war Europe started disintegrating into national territories (Grever, 2009: 49). The nation-building came with "the rise of academic historiography" (Sulkunen, 2009: 69; Kraft, 2009: 78), the two processes mutually supporting each other. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonian historiography reacted by returning to pre-Soviet times (Jansen, 1997), to the nation-building and -supporting phase. Thus, the nation-building and -unifying motivations behind historiography during the initial independence period before the Soviet Union annexed Estonia in 1940 were picked up after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. This, of course, reflects the developments in other countries in the sphere of the Soviet Union's influence (e.g. Zimmermann, 2014: 125).

The problem with historiography being in the constant state of (re)creating a national narrative is that it does not support pluralist approaches. It creates one Grand Narrative through suppression of other, alternative or parallel perspectives. The best example of this in Estonian historiography is the heated dispute that ignited in 2013 upon publication of *Eesti ajalugu II* on the Middle Ages in the territory of what is now Estonia (Kala et al., 2012). he publication, from the same series, fifth part of which I analyse in this thesis, reinterpreted and rebutted some national myths that Estonians have about events and people living in the territory of the current Estonia during the Middle Ages. The dispute among historians transcended the academic fora, as such rebuttals were implicitly interpreted as an attack on the "Estonian nation" (e.g. Kiho, 2013; Maiste, 2013; Salu, 2013; Tamm and Kajundi, 2013; Vahtre, 2013).

Most of the critics of the national narrative are the newer generation of Estonian medievalists. They criticise other historians for trying to create a linear narrative about a fight for freedom starting from the Crusades that resulted in the 700-year-reign of the Baltic-Germans in the territory of the present Estonia throughout all changes of formal power (e.g. Kaljundi, 2007; Jonuks, 2012). Minaudier (2006: 113, 121) provides an example of such a historian and points to a generational change, suggesting that the younger generation of historians is more willing to question and reinterpret the national myths (see also Piirimäe, 2007: 97).

Eva-Clarita Onken (2006: 164) has pointed to the same inability of established historians to problematise certain national myths in Latvia. Onken (2006: 160) framed the Latvian situation with that of the Baltic states in general, noting that as a reaction to what historians in the three states saw as distortions of historical facts under the Soviet Union, after its dissolution they started to look for "historic truth" and "objectivity". They did not take into account the fact that, especially during turbulent times, historians are themselves not only the result of "collective imagining and social realities but also the creators of them" making any notion of "objectivity" an illusion (Onken, 2006: 160).

From this perspective, Marek Tamm's (2016) latest article in which he analyses the extensive involvement of historians in the Estonian independence movement during the final years of the Soviet Union is especially relevant. He claims that the role of historians in Estonia was far greater than in other post-Communist Eastern European states. They were not only countering the official Soviet historical accounts, but also influencing the founding principles and the legal aspects of the break-away Estonia –

all to be based on the principle of restoration – as well as taking up key roles in the first governments of the independent state. “[H]istory during the transitional period was decidedly not about simply introducing previously unknown or forbidden historical episodes and personalities to the general public, but also about shaping a new politics of history and memory” (Tamm, 2016: 165). Many of the historians who are either editors (Sulev Vahtre, Toomas Karjahärm) or authors (Mart Laar, Ea Jansen) of Estonian History V – one of the texts analysed in this thesis – actively participated in these events and contributed to what Tamm terms as “the republic of historians”.

For that reason, some historians have hailed the non-Estonian historians’ interest in Estonian history. Those historians do not have a sense of ownership of Estonian history and instead of seeing Estonian history from the “we” perspective, they see it from the perspective of “they” (Tamm, 2009: 64). Tamm (2009: 64) suspected that even if Estonian historians try to (and they should) reinterpret the past and deconstruct the myths, their national identity will still be in the background and the results cannot be as fresh and innovative as those of non-Estonian historians.

Perhaps most importantly, the constant (re)creation of the national narrative does not allow to ask the questions “why” and “how” beyond what a linear narration offers: why and how certain processes took place but not others, why and how certain events happened and not others, or why certain events have become central to how Estonians see and interpret Estonian history and so on. Questions that help us better understand the history as well as the present. For example, Brüggemann (2008) has pointed out that although the key events of the Estonian War of Independence (1918-1920) are well known and researched, there is still not much known about the reasons behind certain decisions or about the social processes during the period, or the social consequences for the post-war society, for the identity of people and so on.

There have already been a few attempts to deconstruct the Estonian memory politics (e.g. Tamm, 2012) as well as Estonian national identity. For example, Tõnno Jonuks (2012) has established that the Estonian nationalists’ antagonism against Baltic-Germans during the “age of awakening” also influenced the role of religion in the Estonian national identity. The emphasis was on the imagining of a folk religion stripped of any Christianity (which in reality was more a popular interpretation of catholicism of the Middle-Ages than a pre-Christian paganism), the latter being

considered an import of the Crusades. He sees this – folk religion based on heritage – as still forming a part of the Estonian national identity today.

(Lack of) Gender-awareness and women in history In addition to the increasing criticism regarding the reluctance to deconstruct the Estonian national narrative and national identity, there is more and more criticism about the male-centredness of Estonian historiography. Marek Tamm has admitted: "historians have traditionally been old men and what old men are interested in is still power, kings, who sided with whom" (Salu, 2013). Considering that the tradition of the nation's history created in the 19th century was indeed focused on "the history of institutions (state, military, church), of great men and great ideas, [it] made it difficult to ingrate women as historical subjects" (Paletschek, 2009: 169; italics in the original). Politics of that level mostly involved only those with "full rights of citizenship" and it was not long ago that only (certain) men had full citizenship rights (Smith, 2000: 3). This means that the accounts of history reflect only "an extremely small part of the entire spectrum of the past" (Sulkunen, 2009: 72). In this view, the male-centricity of Estonian history reflects the interests of traditional historians and what they consider proper history. Yet, this is probably only one of the reasons for male-centricity.

When discussing male-centredness of Finnish history, Irma Sulkunen (2009) has suggested another reason why historians keep reproducing male-centred historical accounts. She argued that the reason is in the oral narration traditions in Finnish culture – traditions that have a significant place in Estonian culture as well. Just as in Finland, where the national movement was supported particularly by gathering and preserving Finnish folklore (Sulkunen, 2009: 69), so was the "national awakening" in Estonia in the 19th century very much dependent on folklorists and ethnographers for creating the national narrative and forming a national identity (Minaudier, 2009: 132; Šmidchens, 2009). Sulkunen (2009: 70) argued that the traditional folklore narratives that focus on a mythical male character also provide a pattern to follow for the nation's historical narrative. The nation needs heroes that people could get behind, look up to and follow. The mythical characters were thus replaced with real men – "if none could be discovered in the past, suitable contemporaries were construed as such figures and associated without further ado with the ideological foundations of the nascent national state" (Sulkunen, 2009: 70). Sulkunen specifically concentrates on the cult of Elias Lönnrot who, based on Finnish folklore, created the Finnish national epic, which

centres around the male hero Kalevala. Estonians have a similar national epic of *Kalevipoeg* (in English "the Son of Kalev") that forms the basis of and has reflected the Estonian national identity since it was written based on oral folk narrations in the 19th century (Šmidchens, 2009). Ea Jansen also remarked on Estonians' love for their "great men" ("*suurmehed*") (Jansen, 1997: 40).

In that light, the general lack of women in mainstream Estonian historiography does not come as a surprise. It has already been established by several feminist scholars, including Põldsaar (2009), Kivimaa (2001 and 2009) and Annuk (2008). Põldsaar, in particular, notes: "The subjectivity of an Estonian man is not yet solid enough to free the woman from her object status" (2009: 72). It translates into women of any kind being given little or no attention at all. As Grever (2009: 53) stated when discussing the Dutch male-centred canonical historiography: "the mainstream history of historiography often takes these gendered [incl. male-centred] histories for granted", thus continuously (re)producing the "gender asymmetries".

The tradition of writing women's history in Estonia that could offer some balance is still only emerging. Raili Põldsaar, when giving an overview of women's history in Estonia stated that it is "largely yet to be written" (Põldsaar, 2007: 248). The work that has been done, is fragmented. A number of studies in women's history have been published over the years, attempting to make women visible in Estonian history (e.g. Tamul, 1999; Johanson, 2001; Albi & Biin, 2012) but the work is not systematic enough to provide a comprehensive picture. Regarding the historical period close to the current thesis, Brüggemann (2008: 178) has found that when it comes to the Estonian War of Independence (1918-1920) and the time preceding and following it, women as a vital part of the functioning society have not yet been studied.

Analysing Estonian history through a gender perspective is even more rare. For example, Raili Põldsaar has analysed the gendered nature of the Estonian nation (Põldsaar, 2009) in general, Katrin Kivimaa (2001) analysed the same in art. Some have analysed gender in literature (e.g. Kurvinen, 2008; Jõhvik, 2012) while others have used gender, along with other categories to study social systems in Estonian society, e.g. during the Middle Ages (e.g. Põltsam-Jürjo, 2009). Thus, there are a few examples of gender analysis in Estonian historiography, but they are rare.

2.2. Theoretical framework for the thesis

2.2.1. Scott in Estonian historiography

As already mentioned above, analysis of Estonian historiography in general or specific writings using gender as a category of analysis is largely inexistent. Mostly there are occasional generalised statements by historians on the lack of women in Estonian history, such as the one by Brüggemann about the absence of women in the research on the Estonian War of Independence (1918-1920) (Brüggemann, 2008: 178; also Põldsaar, 2009). Analysing how gender informs the historical writing and, vice versa, how historical writing informs gender, is non-existent. Analysis of Estonian historiography currently mostly deals with deconstructing the national narrative without any reference to the use of gender in that narrative (e.g. Jansen, 1997; Brüggemann, 2002; Tamm, 2009). The current thesis is thus an attempt to open up the discussion.

The use of Joan Scott's theoretical framework, as I have done in the present thesis, is hardly used. Although Maria Bucur, when recounting the story of gender history in Eastern Europe, stated that her generation (whose academic life started in the 1990s) decided to "simply jump over the 'making women visible' stage, and instead shake up the existing historiography at the core, using the theoretical bases provided by Scott" (Bucur, 2008: 1383), this does not apply to Estonia. An Estonian translation of Joan Scott's groundbreaking 1986 article on gender as a category of historical analysis was not published until 2008 (Scott, 2008b). Significantly, it was the only journal of gender research in Estonia, *Ariadne lõng*, that published it and not any of the historical journals in Estonia. In fact, based on a keyword search, I was able to find only two academic articles outside the said journal citing Scott, and neither were strictly historical analysis (Kirss, 2008, explained the term "sex/gender" in general, and Kurvinen, 2008, discussed gender roles in the only women's magazine published in Estonia during the Soviet Union). A keyword search among the electronically available bachelor and master theses and doctoral dissertations from Estonian history departments revealed only one work on bachelor level that cited Scott's 1986 article (Jõhvik, 2012). It is worth mentioning that a historians' handbook, written by one of the authors of the sections by Andresen et al. (2010) analysed in this thesis and intended to be used as study material in the history departments of Estonian universities, does not include any references to post-structuralism (or to Scott's work for that matter) in the sections on

theories of history in the 20th century (Karjahärm, 2010). Thus, in general, it is safe to claim that historians of Estonian history have not yet found Scott's article and the theoretical framework she offered useful for their research.

2.2.2. Gender as a category of historical analysis

In my analysis of the two Estonian historiographical works I use the theoretical framework developed by Joan Wallach Scott, in particular her 1986 article "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis" (Scott, 1999[1986]) and her book *Gender and the Politics of History* (Scott, 1999). Throughout the thesis I also rely on other reiterations by Scott herself and other gender historians to assist in my analysis (in particular "AHR Forum: Revisiting 'Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis'" in the *American Historical Review*, 2008; and Kent, 2012).

In her article, Scott divides history writing into two broad categories by virtue of the approaches historians use (Scott, 1999[1986]: 59). One is descriptive, where the events and persons are merely described, without an attempt to interpret their wider meaning and implications. As stated above (section 2.1.2.), Estonian historiography mostly falls under that category, although historians are more and more exploring the second approach – the causal one. This other approach aims to understand "how and why [certain phenomena or realities] take the form they do" (Scott, 1999[1986]: 59). In her 1986 article, Scott suggested another approach, looking at the processes and asking "how things happened" before historians get to why things happened" (Scott, 1999[1986]: 66). It is not about the causality but the meaning given to specific things, which then help to understand the "why". Scott proposes that gender can offer valuable insight in that regard. I intend to use "gender" as a category of analysis to explore not the processes surrounding historical events themselves but the processes shaping the depiction of certain historical events in Estonian historiography.

Scott's definition of gender as a category of analysis consists of two propositions: (1) "gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and [2] gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power" (Scott, 1999[1986]: 66). The first proposition is composed of four elements: cultural symbols, normative concepts that interpret the meanings of these symbols, investigation into social institutions and organisations and politics in its widest sense, and, finally, individual subjective identity (Scott, 1999[1986]: 66-67).

Scott relies on post-structuralism in her definition of gender. Based on that, meaning is produced as a result of discourse, it is never fixed, predetermined or inherent (Scott, 1999: 5). Thus, she encourages to study the processes through which meaning is created, the discourse that produces it. It is the "plays of power and knowledge [that] constitute identity and experience" (Scott, 1999: 5). What is more, according to post-structuralism, meaning is based on binary oppositions and Scott sees gender as one of the most important binary oppositions that has been historically relied upon in meaning-making (Scott, 1999: 6). The perceived sexual differences "are invoked and contested as part of many kinds of struggles for power" (Scott, 1999: 6) and these struggles for power, in turn, help to (re)create gender, i.e. sexual differences. Thus, gender scholars' task is to analyse how the perceived gender differences are invoked in politics, i.e. in the production of knowledge about (or giving meaning to) identities and power relations that seemingly have nothing to do with gender.

Since according to post-structuralism binary oppositions are never fixed, then gender is also not a fixed concept. It is "a historical phenomenon, produced, reproduced, and transformed in different situations and over time" (Scott, 1999: 6). Scott instructs us to look at "the ways arguments are structured and presented as well as to what is literally said" (Scott, 1999: 7) – what contrasts and differences are used, whether implicitly or explicitly, to make a point (Scott, 1999[1986]: 67). Defining something, that is, to give meaning to it, means necessarily that there is an antithesis against which to contrast it (Scott, 1999: 7). Such contrasting also means that the oppositions are essentialised – their "internal ambiguities" are repressed (Scott, 1999: 7). So the process of defining a category means not only negation or repression of the other but also negation or repression within the other as well as within the defined category itself. In addition, the contrasting refers to hierarchy between the two oppositions – the concept defined is always dominant to its opposition that is rendered "subordinate, secondary, and often absent or invisible" (Scott, 1999: 7). Ultimately, the binary oppositions are interdependent: the meaning of both is dependent on the contrast "rather than [on] some inherent or pure antithesis" – one is what the other is not and one cannot be without the other (Scott, 1999: 7). Scott does admit that at times the oppositions might seem constant or predictable but, nevertheless, it is the "combinations of contrasts and oppositions" that give the precise meaning (Scott, 1999: 7). Thus the precise meanings created are unstable and subject to change over time (as well as in place).

The question for historians is, thus, how are the sexual differences referred to? How are the terms “men” and “women” used and how is the relationship between them seen? What is the exact nature and context of the references made to particular sexual differences? What sexual differences are invoked in what situations and relations? What is repressed, silenced, negated in the course of allusions to sexual differences? And so on. In conclusion, as Meyerowitz has put it: the question is how the perceived sexual differences have “structured, naturalized, and legitimated relationships of power” (2008: 1347).

Scott also recognises that gender cannot be considered “the category that will explain all inequality, all oppression, all history” (Scott, 1999: 10, italics in the original). Because gender must be seen as contextually specific, it should be used in the analyses in intersection with other relevant factors, e.g. race and class (Boydston, 2008: 561, 576; see also Morgan, 2006: 18). Thus, for example, minority women should not be regarded only in relation to men, whether in the majority or a minority group, but also in relation to women in the majority group (Bock, 2006: 115). So, gender scholars should also ask the question: “What is the specific link made in articulations of sexual difference to other kinds of difference (race, class, ethnicity, etc)?” (Scott, 1999: 202). Gender historians maintain that no one is ever just a man or just a woman, one’s identity and status in a society is always in interplay with other factors (though some still prioritise gender).

2.2.3. Gender in nation

Feminist scholars have studied how gender along with other intersecting factors, such as race, class, and ethnicity figure in nation, national identity and nationalism. Anne McClintock started her groundbreaking 1993 article with the statement that “[a]ll nationalisms are gendered” (McClintock, 1993: 61), continuing with the study of the nation based on a (hierarchical) family trope, and illustrating it with the case of Afrikaner nationalism. McClintock, thus, without directly referring to Scott, nevertheless confirmed Scott’s claim that gender, even if not the category that explains politics and signifies relations of power, is indeed one of the most significant.

My analysis of the two historiographical texts of Estonian history relies heavily on McClintock’s article (McClintock, 1993). The elaborations of Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989) and the later reiterations (e.g. Yuval-

Davis, 1997) on the role of women in nationalisms complement McClintock's work. The work of other feminist scholars on nation and nationalism, especially in national historiographies, also guides me in my analysis (e.g. Edwards & Roces, eds, 2004; Sinha, 2006).

Gender historians have found that nations are overwhelmingly male constructions. McClintock referred to many attempts to define nationhood, and found that in those definitions "the needs of the nation [were] identified with the frustrations and aspirations of men" (McClintock, 1993: 62; also Nagel, 1998: 244). However, this "male national power depends on the prior construction of *gender* difference" (McClintock, 1993: 62; Italics in the original), mirroring Scott's elaborations. This gender difference determines who has access to power and who does not. In nation as male construction, masculinity is always preferred over femininity, as McClintock (1993) has demonstrated with her study on nationalism (e.g. also Sihna, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 1989). And the difference in treatment and privilege does not only run along the lines of masculinity-femininity but also along the lines of different kinds of masculinities.

Only certain men and certain masculinities are considered the ideal, and narratives of nations are usually built around the actions and decisions of these ideals (Põldsaar, 2009). Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 846) explain that most men and boys do not embody hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity rather "works in part through the production of exemplars of masculinity (e.g., professional sports stars)" (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005: 846). From historiographical research one could draw a parallel here with Irma Sulkunen's (2009) research on the connections between the Finnish male-centred historiography and the traditions of oral folklore narrative, both centering around male heroes. According to Connell & Messerschmidt (2005: 846), hegemonic masculinity is not forced, but rather is based on "[c]ultural consent, discursive centrality, institutionalization, and the marginalization or delegitimation of alternative" (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005: 846). The ideal is thus always at least in broad terms implicitly agreed upon by the society. Specifically in historiography, men who embody or are presented as embodying hegemonic masculinity are at the centre of historical accounts, the embodiment of the political power. Moreover, hegemonic masculinity is relational in regard to alternative, non-hegemonic masculinities as well as in regard to femininities, both of which are presumed to be subordinate (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005: 846-848). It also means that hegemonic masculinity and its relation with non-

hegemonic masculinity and femininity can change over time and place. Historiography can provide interesting accounts of this.

McClintock pointed out in her study on Afrikaner nationalism that nations are often "figured through the iconography of familial and domestic space" (McClintock, 1993: 63). Indeed, Mrinalini Sinha (2006: 328) has pointed to the well documented connection between nationalisms in Europe and bourgeois – heterosexist – family constructions. McClintock explains how the use of the family trope offers the nation two important characteristics: a seemingly natural hierarchy working for the seemingly common interests and a "'natural' trope for figuring historical time" (McClintock, 1993: 63; italics by the author). Everyone in the family has a clear role to play (McClintock, 1993: 64). Just like in the traditional heterosexual family, nations incorporate not only a clear division of labour along gender lines but also in a clear hierarchical order. "[S]ubordination of woman to man, and child to adult, was deemed a natural fact" at the time when the notion of nations started to evolve (e.g. McClintock, 1993, 64). Just like in families, the husband/father was the head of the family (consisting additionally of the wife/mother and children), leading, disciplining and protecting the unit as a whole, so were men the decision-makers in state institutions, making decisions, leading the state and disciplining the non-conformists.

The family trope also explains the view of the national narrative as a natural progression. Just like "children 'naturally' progress into adults", so does the nation undergo seemingly "organic", non-conflictual changes (McClintock, 1993: 64). This framing legitimises the often violent context in which nations are formulated or where contestations to the national interests have taken place: "What now seem settled, almost natural national identities are the results of symbolic struggles and both cultural and very material violence" (Calhoun, 1997: 85). To use the language of post-structuralism: from the discourse involving competing 'fields of forces', one dominant meaning (of nation) emerges, which is then presented as the only possible natural option. Overt contestations are suppressed or somehow assimilated into the dominant meaning (of nation), which is then presented as a natural progression. This naturalises the nation.

The naturalness of the nation and its unified narrative make the nation seem as something that is permanent — it existed, does exist, and will exist in the future. The nation is at the same time looking back (establishing traditions) and looking forward

(progressing) into the future (McClintock, 1993: 65). And the opposite scales of time are gendered. Men represent the future and progress, women represent past and continuity (McClintock, 1993: 66-67). Thus, in the national narrative women are mostly presented with an emphasis on maternal qualities, as nurturers of the national traditions (Sinha, 2006: 331, and McClintock, 1993: 62). They are rarely seen as actively participating and having agency in their own right: "women are relegated to minor, often symbolic roles in nationalist movements and conflicts, whether as icons of nationhood, to be elevated and defended, or as the booty or spoils of war, to be denigrated and disgraced" (Nagel, 1998: 244).

This discursive context explains the process behind the exclusion of women and their activities from national histories. "[H]istories of antagonistic political struggle" can be suppressed not only to provide a neat picture of the past but also to prevent such confrontations in the future (Edwards & Roces, 2004: 6). In the context of history-writing this can also translate into choices about what to put in and what to leave out. For example, "women's activities are reported […] only in relation to the nationalist movement"; or when women's struggles coincide with a struggle of national importance (an independence movement or a struggle against foreign occupation) then the national interests are prioritised rather than the women's interests – it is the struggle of national importance that is chosen to be included or discussed in detail in the national history (Blackburn, 2004: 97). Edwards and Roces (2004) have noted that sometimes historians might be inclined to rush through the women's struggles. When the state has presented itself as "enlightened", it cannot afford to have it out there that women had to force "the male-dominated government" to pay attention (Edwards & Roces, 2004: 5-6), or that the advancement of women's situation might have actually happened under and with the help of a foreign power that in the national narrative has been framed as the opposition or the enemy (Pearson, 2004: 198). Such accounts would not only undermine the naturalised unified progressive narrative but also what Calhoun terms the "presumptive goodness of the nation" (Calhoun 1997: 79). This challenge to the presumptive goodness would pose a challenge to the nation as a whole, which supposedly was supposed to have common aspirations.

2.3. Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to provide context for my analysis of the two historiographical texts on Estonian history. After giving an overview of the approaches used in Estonian historiography I continued with discussing the criticism that the current historiography has already received. I demonstrated that the main criticism has been directed at the tendency to (re)create the Estonian national narrative, which has also meant a noticeable lack of women, and somewhat connected to it – lack of gender-awareness in the historiography. There is a small body of gender history that has analysed the construction of Estonian national identity at the turn of the 19th century but no in-depth analysis on how mainstream historians at the end of the 20th century construct or deconstruct the identity in their historiography. Therefore, as I explained in the second part of the chapter, I will use Joan Scott's elaboration of gender as a category of historical analysis in my analysis of the two Estonian historiographical texts, which represent two different historiographical approaches. I will also rely on the theoretical work by Anne McClintock and other gender scholars that have already established the gendered nature of nations and nationalism.

Chapter 3. A quick overview of the history of Estonia

This chapter provides a short overview of the history of Estonia in order to provide context for the analysis in the following chapter. I do not attempt to offer a comprehensive overview but provide some key periods, dates and concepts. I made my choice, first of all, based on what is usually considered defining in Estonian history and also part of the Estonian national grand narrative. I determined this based on the literature that has criticised the (re)creation of the national narrative in Estonian mainstream historiography (e.g. Tamm, 2012). Secondly, I made the choice based on what I considered important for the relevant context of the analysis – that is, events, dates, periods and persons that I refer to in my analysis. Therefore, the narrative I provide is meant to serve a specific purpose – provide background information for my analysis. This also means that my periodisation in the form of subtitles does not in any way reflect the generally used periodisation and is only meant to make the narrative easier to follow.

Mostly I use Meike Wulf's book *Shadowlands: memory and history in Post-Soviet Estonia* (2016) as a source, because, having analysed the Estonian national narrative forming the basis of Estonians' memory, she gave an excellent overview of the historical events and concepts also relevant for my analysis. In addition, I have used Andres Kasekamp's *A history of the Baltic States* (2010) to double-check the information and fill in the gaps where I found it necessary.

3.1. The beginning

Kasekamp (2010: 1) recounts that the first settlers arrived in the territories of the current Baltic states at around 11,000 BC. It was not until the Bronze Age when they transitioned from hunting-gathering to farming. People settling in the territory that later became Estonia, arrived first and they spoke (and are still speaking) Finno-Ugric languages and they were later followed by the Indo-European Balts, who settled further south. Up to the 13th century, the people living in this territory were organised into independently functioning tribes that occasionally traded with one another and their neighbours, and created occasional alliances, but had no permanent cooperation.

Thus, when in 1200 the Crusaders came, they were rather defenceless against the numerous and organised attacks.

The Crusades to the North-East of Europe, the last part of Europe to be Christianised, were sanctioned in 1199 by Pope Innocent III as a result of the lobbying by the politically ambitious Albert von Buxhoevden (also referred to as Albert von Buxhöveden) (Kasekamp, 2010: 12; Wulf, 2016: 38). He founded the Sword Brethren (or Swordbrothers or Teutonic Knights) and in lieu of payments, which he could not provide, promised land and glory for saving and protecting what he named to give further incentive as the 'Land of Mary' from the barbaric pagans (Wulf, 2016: 38; Kasekamp, 2010: 13). This started the period that, in Estonian historiography, is commonly referred to as the "ancient fight for freedom" or the "ancient struggle for freedom" (in Estonian: "*muistne vabadusvõitlus*") of Estonians (Tamm, 2012). It correlates with the Estonian War of Independence (1918-1920), which in Estonian is called "*Vabadussõda*" (direct translation into English would be "the War of Freedom"). Marek Tamm, among others, has commented on the implicit (or indeed, when using the terms in Estonian, rather explicit) reference to continuous progression of Estonians fighting for the freedom they lost in the Crusades and getting it back in 1920 (temporarily) or in 1991 (to this day).

As mentioned above, the people in the territory of current Estonia "were not politically united" (Kasekamp, 2010: 14). They did unite their efforts in 1217, but lost, and the central and southern parts of Estonia fell under the Swordbrothers' power (Kasekamp, 2010: 14). The Danish Crusaders approached from the North. The locals were "forced into serfdom and Christianized" (Wulf, 2016: 38). Regardless of the power struggles between different Orders from the Crusade period and between formal state powers later, the (Baltic-)Germans remained a constant and actual power vis-à-vis the locals. They were the masters in the feudal system that was set up in the territory.

Wolf (2016) explains that even though the Crusaders did introduce serfdom, which all locals were subject to (with few exceptions), the period did also bring considerable progress. The Protestant Reformation, which most of the Swordbrothers Order went along with, brought with it services in the local language and standardisation of the written language – the Bible was the first publication in Estonian (Wulf, 2016: 38). The Moravian Brethren, missionaries, "promoted peasant education" and as a result of that the adult literacy rate in the 18th century was the highest in the Russian Empire.

Indeed, it has remained constantly high, as the population censuses since 1881 demonstrate (Tiit, Rosenberg, & Valk, 2011).

After the territory of the current Estonia had been part of and/or had been divided between Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Denmark it finally ended up in the composition of the Russian Empire as the result of the Great Northern War (1700-1721) (Wulf, 2016: 41; Miljan, 2004: 9). During the Russian reign, the serfdom was abolished in the northern part of Estonia in 1816 and the southern part in 1819 (Wulf, 2016: 41; Miljan, 2004: 10). Allowing peasants to buy farms on perpetuity (Miljan, 2004: 11) meant that the country that in the beginning of the 19th century was "exclusively agrarian society [developed] into one with a small emergent middle class" (Wulf, 2016: 41). This also meant that some more successful peasants could have their off-springs educated, "a development crucial to the crystallization of the Estonian nation and the emergence of an Estonian national movement" (Wulf, 2016: 41-42).

3.2. Formation of the Estonian nation

The mid-19th century, is usually referred to as "the beginning of the national awakening" (in Estonian: "*ärkamisaeg*") (Wulf, 2016: 40; also Miljan, 2004: 11). Specifically, the year 1857 when Johann Voldemar Jansen started publishing a weekly magazine in Estonian called the *Pärnu Courier*. Apparently, in the first issue Jansen used the term "Estonians" "instead of 'the people of the country'" for the very first time (Wulf, 2016: 40). Also from 1857 to 1861 (Miljan, 2004: 11), Friedrich Robert Faehlmann wrote and published Estonia's national epic *Kalevipoeg*, which has since then become a substantial part of the Estonian national identity (Šmidchens, 2009). Wulf writes that the epic was written "based on thousands of songs, fables, sagas and fairy tales of the common people, which had been collected by public appeal" (Wulf, 2016: 40). At around the same time (1868-1870), Carl Robert Jakobson delivered his three patriotic lectures that form the basis of the Estonian national narrative. He divided the Estonian history into three periods: the time before the Crusades was the time of light, the "700 years of serfdom" was the time of darkness, which was followed by the "renaissance or dawn of a new era – in other words, the contemporary cultural awakening" (Wulf, 2016: 40).

Estonian language became the foundation of national movement. The national epic, the lectures and the weekly *Pärnu Courier*, which was soon one among many weeklies,

were all in Estonian, the language of the peasants. The regular Song Festivals, a tradition domesticated from the Baltic-Germans, promoted Estonian even further and functioned as “an interactive performance to forge a sense of solidarity and national consciousness (social imaginaire) among the participating masses” (Wulf, 2016: 41). Logically then, education in Estonian and the development of the language became central issues in the national movement (Wulf, 2016: 41). This also explains the fear and worry that was connected to the tsarist Russia’s resolve to install Russian as the official language in administration and schools – termed as the “Russification” process (Miljan, 2004: 13).

1905 is the year when national movement transitioned from cultural movement to political. In the attempt to resolve uprising throughout Russia, the Tsar published the Manifesto that gave considerable freedoms, including “freedom of speech and assembly, and permitted the creation of political parties” (Wulf, 2016: 42). Thus, first political parties in Estonia were founded: the Estonian National Progressive Party (led by Jaan Tõnisson) (Wulf, 2016: 42) and the Baltic-German Baltische Konstitutionelle Partei (Baltic Constitutional Party) (Zetterberg, 2009), both considered loyal to the Tsar. Various socialist groups were also founded but because they were not considered loyal, they could not register them as parties. In November, a pan-Estonian congress of representatives was organised, but the disagreements on the future and on the measures to be used quickly broke up the meeting.

The 1905 Revolution was accompanied with violent riots, including in Estonia, and the newly found freedom was soon taken away. While tsarist authorities quelled the riots encouraging the punishment squad to use all necessary measure, the new period of “Russification” started – press was once again censored and Russian imposed as the official language in administration and schools (Wulf, 2016: 42).

The 1917 Revolution that ended with the Tsar being overthrown, brought with it autonomy for Estonia (Wulf, 2016: 43) as well as women’s equal right to vote and stand for election. The power struggle in Russia presented Estonians with the opportunity to declare independence on 24 February 1918. The prime minister in the provisional government was Konstantin Päts (Wulf, 2016: 43), who 20 years later was the (last) head of the state before the Soviet Union annexed Estonia. The ongoing World War I, then the Armistice on 11 November 1918 and the ambitions of the new bolshevik government meant that the declaration of independence was symbolic and the

Estonian War of Independence ensued (Wulf, 2016: 43-44). Estonians could start building the independent state only after the Tartu Peace Treaty was signed with Russia on 2 February 1920.

Meike Wulf (2016: 44-45) recounts that as everywhere in Europe, the economic crisis also hit Estonia in 1920s and with it increased anti-democratic movements. After quashing a local bolshevik coup in 1924, the anti-democratic agitations from the War of Independence Veterans' League resulted in President Päts declaring the state of emergency in 1934. This started the so-called "era of silence", referring to the suspension of normal democratic life. It also saw the emphasis on "traditional national values", the national-romantic view on the countryside, culture, history – all amounting to "a clear case of the 'invention of tradition'" (Wulf, 2016: 45). In fact, the compilation of Estonian history, which was again taken up in 1999, was initiated during the "era of silence". One of the texts analysed in this thesis is part of the updated version of that compilation.

3.3. The Soviet and the Post-Soviet period

Then began the Second World War, the first step of which was the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 (Wulf, 2016: 45). The Pact was accompanied by secret protocols, which divided Eastern Europe between the Soviet Union and Germany; the Baltic States were left for the Soviet Union. Not being aware of the secret protocols, President Päts signed the Mutual Assistance Pact with Russia. Stalin, after accusing Estonia of violation of the afore-mentioned Pact initiates invasion of Estonia in summer of 1940 (Miljan, 2004: 19). Soon after the founding of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR), the first mass deportation of Estonians to Siberia takes place. It is estimated that about 10,000 persons were deported (Kasekamp, 2010: 131).

In summer of 1941, Hitler invaded the Baltic states in violation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Wulf states: "German army was greeted as 'liberators' from the Soviet rule" (Wulf, 2016: 46). Relying on locals, the "Final Solution to the Jewish Question" was carried out in Estonia, including local Jews (1500-2000) and Jews brought in from abroad (appr. 15,000) (Wulf, 2016: 47). The Nazi occupation also meant conscription of Estonian men (some also volunteered), which led to the situation where they fought against the Red Army that had the previous year also conscripted from Estonia (some

also volunteered): “The local population fought on both sides, leaving people with traumatic memories of fratricidal war and collaboration for decades to come” (Wulf, 2016: 45). In September of 1944, the Red Army pushed Germany out.

By the end of the war, “Estonia had lost between 10 and 25 per cent of its pre-war population through deportations, military and civilian fatalities, political executions, emigration and territorial transfer” (Wulf, 2016: 47). Additionally, in March of 1949, the Soviet Union conducted the second mass deportation, resulting in estimated 21,000 people being deported (Kasekamp, 2010: 146). This was conducted to ease the forced collectivisation of farms that was underway (Wulf, 2016: 48). Survivors were able to return in the mid-1950s, during the “Thaw” of Nikita Khrushchev (Wulf, 2016: 48). Throughout the Soviet Union there was, in addition to normal immigration, also planned large influxes of Russian-speaking immigrants to support the industrialisation process (Wulf, 2016: 48-49). Therefore, “[w]ithin the ESSR the titular nationality dropped from 94 per cent after the war to 68 per cent in 1970 (and 62 per cent in 1989)” (Wulf, 2016: 49). All this led to Russian-speakers being seen as the representative of “the repressive Soviet regime” (Wulf, 2016: 49).

After the war, there was guerrilla resistance movement, which comprised “at its peak of approximately five thousand men” (Wulf, 2016: 48). However, it was not until the 1980s and the *glastnost* and *perestroika* policies of Mikhail Gorbachev that the dissident movement, now mostly non-violent, started to become organised and more fruitful (Wulf, 2016: 51). The dissent was a combination of environmental protection (“planned increase of phosphate mining and oil shale extraction in North-East of Estonia” – Wulf, 2016: 51) and national heritage movement. Thus, in addition to demonstrations and marches for environment protection, mass demonstrations to commemorate various historical events, such as the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Tartu Peace Treaty, mass deportations, the Independence Day of 24 February 1918 etc, also took place (Wulf, 2016: 52; Miljan, 2004: 23). The independence movement relied on history to argue for illegality of the Soviet annexation and “to secure mass support for the Estonian independence movement” (Wulf, 2016: 52).

Similarly to 1918, the power struggle in Russia “created a power vacuum” (Wulf, 2016: 53) that the Baltic states exploited to declare their independence. Thus on 20 August 1991, making use of the coup in Moscow, the decision was declared (Wulf, 2016: 54).

The newly declared Estonian Republic was based on the principle of continuity that aimed to restore as much as possible of the situation preceding its annexation to the Soviet Union (Tamm, 2016). That meant, among other policies, the exclusion of more than one-third of the population from Estonian citizenship, unless they go through a naturalisation process.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to provide context for the following analysis of the two historiographical texts. It introduced key concepts in the Estonian grand narrative that a new generation of historians increasingly criticises. It also introduced the role of the Baltic-Germans and Russians, who are the main Others in the construction of the Estonian national identity and the following chapter will go into in more detail about.

Chapter 4. Gender and fear of Russia and socialism in the Estonian "nation"

This chapter analyses how two mainstream historiographical texts use gender to convey the power relations between the newly emerged nation of Estonians and its opposing powers, the Russians and the Baltic-Germans. I am interested in how the two texts, one written by Estonian historians and the other by a Finnish historian, construct the Estonian nation in their narrative. I will look at the authors' literal and metaphorical uses of gender in this construction. Relying on works by authors who have analysed the construction of Estonian nation at the turn of the 19th century I will look at how this construction has changed by the turn of the 20th century. For that I will look at the specifics of the construction of the Estonian nation at these two points of time in order to determine what these changes entail for the national narrative in Estonian historiography and to some extent for the society as a whole.

4.1. Overview of the two analysed texts

The two historiographical texts that I analyse in the following sections represent two different approaches to Estonian history – one that represents a nationalist insider view and the other that provides an outsider non-nationalist view. As explained in the literary review section (Section 2.1), the mainstream Estonian historiography has until recently largely been the tool of (re)creating a unified national narrative. This is mostly due to the historical circumstances – the constant political and social turmoil has placed Estonia as a state and Estonians as a nation in a defensive position (Tamm, 2009: 61). In this context, a small group of historians with no national affiliation with Estonia – e.g. Seppo Zetterberg, Jean-Pierre Minaudier, Karsten Brüggemann – with different scholarly background are said to be offering a valuable different perspective of Estonian history (Tamm, 2009: 66). The texts selected for analysis represent the two perspectives of the current Estonian historiography – Andresen et al. (2010) giving the insider view (the post-Soviet Union national narrative) and Zetterberg (2009) giving the outsider view (the tentative 5th stage in Estonian historiography) to Estonian history.

The differences of the two selected texts are evident not because of the national affiliation of the authors, although this aspect indeed does create a certain presumption

– they primarily come from the way the authors approach Estonian history. Firstly, the structuring of the publications already reflect the perspective. When Zetterberg (2009) structures Estonian history based on international context (historical periods are determined based on the rulers and wider, major events that also affected this territory), then Andresen et al. (2010) determine historical periods based on the insider view – "National Awakening and Russification" in Andresen et al. (2010) versus "Second Century in the Composition of Russia" in Zetterberg (2009). This is not to say that the publication ignores different rulers of the territory, but that the focus is on the perspective of the Estonians and the people who later became to be known as Estonians.

Secondly, the unified national narrative (re)created in Andresen et al. (2010) becomes particularly clear in the presentation of the historical subjects and events. For example, the sections of the Andresen et al. (2010) analysed in the current thesis give a rather simple linear narrative of the historical subjects and events, while Zetterberg (2009) provides for a more complicated picture. One such occasion, which will be analysed in more detail later, is the presentation of Jaan Tõnisson – in Andresen et al. (2010) he is a calm, rational, paternalistic figure in Estonian politics while Zetterberg (2009: 358) hints on his temperament. Another example of Andresen et al. (2010) following the nationalist narrative, is the unproblematised use of certain concepts cast in doubt by some historians without referring to the ongoing discussions among historians. One such terminology is "Russification" indicating Russia's attempt to assimilate non-Russians. Brüggemann (2009), among others, has found that historians thus far see it in darker colours than it actually was at the end of the 19th century as well as after the 1905 Russian Revolution. Andresen et al. (2010) do not refer to this discussion.

Although there are significant differences, the structures as well as the content of the two texts are also similar in many ways. Firstly, the topics they cover are similar – in addition to specific chapters on political and war history, they include an overview of social and economic context, such as population, industries, economy etc, reflecting wide processes over long periods. Neither include discussions on people's everyday lives during the period. The particular sections on the period of 1905-1918 that are analysed in this chapter are mostly on political and war history, with short sections on cultural life (literature, arts, music) and in Andresen et al. (2010) additionally on education, print, journalism and civil society. Secondly, they are similar in the treatment

of gender in the texts, reflecting the traditional national historiographies and, thus, indicating that in certain respects, historical narrative does not necessarily differ.

4.1.1. Male-centricity

It is important to recall that traditional national histories tend to have a gender bias for the very simple reason of being interested in the political elite that was historically mostly male (see in more detail section 2.1.2). Although Tamm, among others, hails Zetterberg as a breakthrough in Estonian historiography for its more pluralist historiographical approach, it is significant that he does not mention gender anywhere in the article titled “Who does the Estonian History Belong To?” (Tamm, 2009). It is worth mentioning that none of the reviews for Zetterberg’s publication went beyond the comments regarding the way he treated this or that historic event compared to how it is traditionally seen in the Estonian national narrative (see e.g. Alenius, 2007; Arumäe, Graf, & Raudkivi, 2008; Ilmjärv & Värа, 2008). None of the reviews paid attention to the lack of women or the use of gender in general in Zetterberg’s publication. Neither was this issue raised in the reviews of Andresen et al. (2010) (e.g. Seppel, 2010; Veidemann, 2010; Zetterberg, 2010). In fact, both texts include women as historical subjects remarkably little, and gender as a category of analysis has not been used at all.

The narratives in Zetterberg (2009) and Andresen et al. (2010) about politics and war in the sections analysed are overwhelmingly focused on men. According to these texts, the state-building and leading work was done by men. It was men who acquired positions high enough in the Russian Dumas (formed after the 1905 Revolution) to negotiate Russian policies on Estonia and Livonia. It was men who fought in various wars during that period and negotiated politics during the wars. It was Estonian men who achieved autonomy for Estonia, thus, paving the way to independence following soon after. The discussions over the fate of Estonian territory, the legal form the governing of that territory should take, and who should have a say in it, were conducted by men. The Declaration of Independence was written and declared by men. It is not an exaggeration to say that women in any form – named, unnamed, generic groups, specific groups – are virtually missing from the texts, as the short quantitative overview below in the separate box demonstrates. As such, these texts reflect the general state of Estonian historiography, where women are noticeably absent. Women figure in the

texts only on rare occasions (see the box on that) and if they do, they only have a marginal or supportive role to play. Men, on the other hand, are not only the main players in history but, as the next sub-section explains, are also largely seen as the very embodiment of a historical subject.

Quantitative data on women in the two texts

On the eighty-nine pages from Andresen et al., there were mere eight women mentioned by name, two of them were women from outside of Estonia (Andresen et al., 2010: 393 and 413) and six from Estonia (Andresen et al., 2010: 354, 389, 390, and 393). In Zetterberg, there were five women mentioned by name (Zetterberg, 2009: 354, 366, 369 and 370). Women as a group, i.e. the word woman or equivalent used, was expressly mentioned in Andresen et al. on nine occasions (Andresen et al., 2010: 383, 384, 388, 410, 411 and 415). In Zetterberg women or equivalent was referred to on six occasions (Zetterberg, 2009: 362, 364, 365-366, 369, 374, 379) and on one occasion a mixed choir that by definition must also include women was mentioned (378). In addition, Andresen et al. had two photos of a crowd that also included women, although the captions in both cases were minimal and only indicated the place, event and time depicted on the photos (Andresen et al., 2010: 386 and 395). Zetterberg had four photos, one of which depicted a sculpture of a female character from a national mythology (Zetterberg, 2009: 368, 369 and 373, 389). On two occasions in Andresen et al., soldiers' families were mentioned, probably in most cases including wives (Andresen et al., 2010: 353 and 402).

4.1.2. Universal Man

Gender historians have brought attention to the long tradition of historians using what they call the Universal Man. It refers to "an archetypical actor, a universal human agent" (Scott, 1999: 179; also Kent, 2012: 66; Spongberg, 2002: 5) through which historians tell the stories. The term refers to the use of "universal representative" (Scott, 1999: 179) when in fact the historian is talking about a diverse group people. Gender historians have found that the concept of Universal Man is often "embodied in a (white) male" (Scott, 1999: 179; also Kent, 2012: 66; Spongberg, 2002: 5). This happens at the expense of others in the society, such as women, national minorities, certain classes etc. Through the use of the Universal Man as the representative historical subject, these women, national minorities, and certain classes are made "either

invisible as historical subjects" or treated "as less central, less important" (Scott, 1999: 179), pointed out as particular in relation to this universal male subject (Scott, 1999: 25 & 84). This ensures the position of a particular type of man as the representative of universal experience, as the normality, while other groups that do not fit that particular type are an exception. It, thus, creates a hierarchy between genders but also between masculinities and femininities.

In the texts of Zetterberg (2009) and Andresen et al. (2010) the reliance on the masculine form of the Universal Man is evident already from the terminology they use. In neither of the texts do the authors shy away from talking about "female journalists" (Andresen et al., 2010: 389), a "female poet" or a "female conductor" (Zetterberg, 2009: respectively 366 and 369). At the same time, unsurprisingly, positions occupied by men are never qualified by reference to sex, as if men are the embodiment of the profession and women in the same profession represent a particular type of, an exception in that profession. Perhaps even more revealing is the language used when Andresen et al. (2010) mention the extension of the right to vote in 1917, which gave men and women equal standing, but somehow women still end up in parenthesis as a lesser (and a more particular) form of "all": right to vote is given to all "payers of local taxes (also women)" (Andresen et al., 2010: 404) and "the universal right to vote (also for women)" is declared (Andresen et al., 2010: 411).

The notion of the Universal Man is also evident in the use of linguistically gender-specific terminology in reference to generic categories, such as peasants or farmers. Many of the terms have historical significance and have been used by the historical subjects themselves as well as by others to refer to the particular group of persons. Historians have habitually continued to use them without problematising them.

An especially good example is the use of the term "*talupoeg*" ("*talupojad*" in plural). It refers to "peasant(s)" in general. The literal translation of the Estonian word into English would be "son of the farm". This term is habitually used in reference to the social status of the group of people or a person who were or had been in serfdom (depending on the historical period). For example, at various points in the text, Andresen et al. (2010: e.g. 357, 367) provide statistics on the composition of the population using the male-specific term "*talupojad*" to refer to peasants as a social group. The Estonian thesaurus also confirms that the social status "peasant" is commonly signified with this linguistically male-specific term "*talupojad*" (Karelson et al., 2009). When the term

"*talutütar*" ("daughter of the farm") is used, the meaning would change. One could never use "*talutütar*" ("*talutütred*" in plural) to refer to peasants in general or to even signify the female portion of the peasants. In common use and as explained in the Estonian thesaurus, this term refers to the daughter of the master of the farm, and could, thus, only be a daughter of a peasant rather than a peasant in itself (Karelson et al., 2009). In comparison, "*talupoeg*" means a peasant and can never be used as a reference to a son of a peasant. At the same time, Estonian language has a gender-neutral term "*talurahvas*" ("people of the farm") as well as "*maarahvas*" ("people of the country") that means a group of people that make up peasantry (Karelson et al., 2009). It could, thus, be used instead of the plural form of "*talupoeg*", which is habitually used for "peasantry" in both Zetterberg (2009) and Andresen et al. (2010). And, indeed, Andresen et al. does use "*talurahvas*" a few times without finding the need to explain the term or qualify it in any way (Andresen et al., 2010: e.g. 355, 375). The fact that historians use a gender-specific term instead of a non-gender-specific term with the same meaning, demonstrates the extent of the use of the male person as a universal historical subject. And this is not particular to the two texts analysed here, these terms are widely used by most, if not all, historians of Estonian history. One particularly telling example is a debate in one of the leading historical journals, where five historians debated over 30 pages about the situation of peasants in Livonia and Estonia at the end of the Swedish rule (in the end of the 17th century) (Küng, Loit, Kroon, Põldvee, & Seppel, 2013). While the title of the whole debate used linguistically the gender-neutral term "*talurahvas*" or "*maarahvas*", the historians themselves used it only 21 times while the various forms of "*talupoeg*" was used 211 times.

Perhaps even more problematic is the use of gender-specific terms in cases where historical associations are less strong than with "*talupoeg*". The terms that have a shorter history and are used even today with the same meaning could arguably be more easily substituted. For example, the use of "*põllumees*" ("man of the field") referring to a farmer, both as a social status but even more as simply a person of a specific profession (Andresen et al., 2010: e.g. 352, 388, 389) or "*valijamees*" ("electing man") referring to electors in electoral bodies in the system of indirect elections (Andresen et al., 2010: e.g. 367, 373; Zetterberg, 2009: e.g. 360, 379, 380). This electoral system was used in the former Russian Empire for the duma elections at the period analysed in the current thesis. Both terms were already used during the relevant

historical period and are still in use with the same meaning. Also both have other Estonian terms that do not include reference to a male person but would retain the same meaning. "*Põllumees*" has several alternatives in Estonian language with same meaning. It is, thus, difficult to see how the liberal use of these gender-specific terms to refer to generic groups of people today, without even once problematising them, is justifiable.

4.2. A masculine and heterosexual "Estonian nation"

The following sections deconstruct the Estonian national identity through two mainstream historiographical texts, one representing traditional national narrative and the other complicating the narrative and the identity somewhat. In large part Andresen et al. (2010) recreate the Estonian national identity created by the Estonian national movement at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, as one would expect in the situation of a nation with double post-colonial history (Brüggemann, 2002: 94) within one century. Before and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonians went through the remasculinisation process. Feminist scholars have identified remasculinisation processes in cases where nation is being "perceived to have become degenerate and effeminate" (Kent, 2012: 92), as was the case with the Great Britain at the beginning of the World War I.

However, before getting to the post-Soviet period, which is the context of Andresen et al. (2010) and Zetterberg (2009), it is necessary to explain shortly what were the circumstances of the first post-colonial period – the period of breaking free from the domination of the Baltic-Germans. As a nation ruled and controlled by another for centuries – thus submissive and feminine (Põldsaar, 2009: 67) – Estonians needed to redefine themselves. In order to claim a position comparable to their (former) rulers that would allow them to make demands and be taken seriously, they needed to gain an equal position to those in power. Since, at the time, only certain men, those with full citizens' rights, had the capacity to have power, Estonians "logically turned to masculine rhetorics" (Põldsaar, 2009: 71). Estonians first had to prove that they were men and therefore as capable of governing themselves as any other nation in Europe (Põldsaar, 2009: 71). Being the construction of the particular socio-economic and historical circumstances, the framework predetermined how the Estonian national identity was constructed.

(Re)masculinisation of a nation goes hand in hand with (re)feminisation (e.g. Kent, 2012: 92). Nation, being based on gender differences, as demonstrated by a long line of feminist scholars (e.g. McClintock, 1993; Sinha, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 1989), mainly (but not solely) defines its masculinity through opposition to femininity. Therefore, in the (re)masculinisation process, the notions of traditional gender roles with corresponding separate spheres for genders are emphasised – men with public sphere (politics, war etc) and women with private sphere (home, "giving and preserving of life" etc) (Kent, 2012: 92). To place it into the context of historiography, Sylvia Paletschek explains that "[a]cademic historiography is influenced by memory culture, which reflects […] the gender relations prevailing at a given point in time" (Paletschek, 2009: 163) and in the 19th and 20th century national memory cultures "mirror[ed] the bourgeois gender model" (Paletschek, 2009: 165). As explained in section 2.2.3., the bourgeois model means not only gendered division of work but also hierarchy within it.

The promotion and reliance on this bourgeois set-up along with the rise of nationalism in Estonia in the 19th century has recently been researched more and more. Marika Mägi (2009) has written about this change and, among other reasons, has linked it to nationalists' desire to become one of the cultured nations among other European nations. There are two interlocking reasons for that. First, Merili Metsvaht has explained that in the 19th century more and more Estonians took over the German bourgeois social structures, which was inevitable for those who wanted to break free from the rural post-serfdom constraints – there were a set of rules, so to speak, that one had to conform with, in order to achieve a social (and political) standing that would make it possible to break out from these constraints (Põldsam, 2016). Thus, the more educated Estonians became (which in the 19th century still meant German and later Russian-language schools) and the more jobs they acquired in cities, the more they immersed into the German bourgeois social structures (Põldsam, 2016). The second reason for the adoption of the bourgeois patriarchal rhetoric, according to Marika Mägi (2009), is the nationalists' desire to prove the Estonians worthy of being among the "high cultures" of Europe. The Estonian nationalists adopted the same patriarchal rhetoric prevalent among these European nations that encompassed gendered roles in the bourgeois family trope whereby women are marginalised. It became part of the Estonian national narrative.

Before and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonians again entered a masculinisation process. However, differently from the turn of the 19th century, it is not only the colonial-heritage, i.e. that provided by the Baltic-Germans, providing input to the (re)creation of the Estonian national identity, but also the short post-colonial period in between the two World Wars. Kivimaa (2000) observed that the desire to return to the pre-Soviet period resulted in the restoration of what was seen as "traditional" gender roles and system. The rapidly assimilated idea of a bourgeois gender model at the end of the 19th century by the nationalists of the time was seen as the "traditional" or "natural" social system that the Soviet Union disrupted and which thus needed to be restored, just as everything else that the Soviet Union had disrupted. The Estonian national memory during the collapse of the Soviet Union was, thus, linked to this bourgeois social system and the history-writing inevitably reflects that.

The analysed sections of Andresen et al. (2010) provide an excellent example of such remasculinisation work – in descriptions of the male heroes and their actions culminating in the declaration of the independent Estonian state in 1918. Zetterberg (2009), in this regard, provides a comparative material complicating the image of the Estonian national identity. Especially revealing are the differences in descriptions and in focuses in these texts when compared side by side.

The following sections will demonstrate how the hegemonic masculinity of the Estonian national identity is constructed through opposition to femininities and other, non-hegemonic, masculinities, and how the construction has somewhat changed since the beginning of the 20th century. The analysis of Andresen et al. (2010) will demonstrate how Russians have gained a considerably more significant position in this construction, in opposition of which Estonian masculine national identity is weighed, while the Baltic-Germans, although still relevant, have lost their primary position. This change could mostly be credited to the period when Estonia was annexed to the Soviet Union, which greatly increased the perception of threat Russians apparently pose to Estonians. At the same time, the still prevailing heterosexuality in the Estonian national identity, could be credited to the post-Soviet desire to return to the pre-Second World War "traditional" values and social order that the Soviet Union was perceived as a threat to.

4.2.1. Femininity in the "Estonian nation": Estonian women

Bourgeois family trope prevalent in the construction of Estonian "nation" explains why women are in the marginalised position in Estonian historiography, as Põldsaar (2009) and Kivimaa (2001), among others, have concluded. Both of them note the general lack of women in the Estonian historiography and in section 4.1.1. I demonstrated the applicability of this general rule also to the texts analysed here. This in itself is already demonstrating the marginalised position women and femininity have in the patriarchal system. However, it is not only about the lack of women but also about the roles women are generally given in Estonian historiography. Because when women are demonstrated as actively participating, they are seen to be doing so within the frames of the gender hierarchy (Kivimaa, 2001: 62), thus also confirming the hierarchical as well as gender complementary (i.e. different spheres) structure. The few women who are brought out are either set as a rare exception or they are mentioned in passing or as an after-thought and are rarely described in any significant length, if at all. Women and their activities in mainstream Estonian historiography never seem be carrying the same weight as men and their activities. Põldsaar (2009) and Kivimaa (2001) were talking about the historiography (re)producing Estonian national narrative in particular. The following analysis demonstrates how heterosexism is not a prerogative of national historiography – Zetterberg (2009), hailed for his work for problematising the Estonian national narrative, also (re)produces heterosexist social structures, placing women and femininity in a clear hierarchical relation with men and masculinity.

In the two texts analysed, the few times that women are mentioned it is implicitly along the traditional gendered division; separation of spheres is observed – women are described to be in home and as preservers of a way of life. This traditional feminine sphere, of course, does not only involve home or giving and preserving life in its literal sense. For instance, Susan Kingsley Kent (2012: 92), when discussing the discourse surrounding the activities of men and women during the First World War in England, established that depictions of women mostly in connection with home front and the maintenance of the way of life (and the preservation of life as nurses) there clearly placed them in the traditional private sphere, while men, through associations with the front, were placed in the public sphere. Similar separation can be seen both from Andresen et al. (2010) and Zetterberg (2009). Similarly to Kent's findings about the Britain's World War I experience, women in Estonia during the same war are also

reported as having an instrumental role as the workforce in maintaining the industry (Andresen et al., 2010: 410; and Zetterberg, 2009: 374). Differently from Kent's findings, the only other role the two texts see women in during the wars (the Russo-Japanese War and the World War I) is as part of the families of soldiers – depicted as sending soldiers off (Andresen et al., 2010: 353; Zetterberg, 2009: 373 depicting a photo) or as implicitly part of the families (women are not expressly mentioned) that the government had to support during and after the war (Andresen et al., 2010: 353, 402).

Both texts also place women in the role of the preservers of culture. This also casts them in the traditional private sphere in the bourgeois family structure – they are in the role of maintaining and transferring the family values and traditions. In both texts girls are mentioned in connection with the opening of girls' (high-)school (gymnasium) (Andresen et al., 2010: 384; and Zetterberg, 2009: 364). Traditionally, girls striving towards education does not fit within the traditional gendered division of spheres, but in this case this was the first school where Estonian was the primary language of study. As such, it was an important step in the preservation of Estonian culture. Indeed, Andresen et al. (2010: 384-385) explicitly connects the girls' increased demands for education with the increased interest of Estonians in education in general, thus, implicitly framing it as preservation of Estonian culture. Feminist scholars have long established that in nationalist narratives if women's activities are mentioned, it is usually in relation to the nationalist movement, as Blackburn (2004: 97) found in regard to Indonesian historiography. It is, thus, no surprise that this happens in Andresen et al. (2010) as well. Interestingly, Zetterberg (2009: 364) does the same thing – the only occasion when girl's education is mentioned at all, is when he talks about the opening of the afore-mentioned school in the context of the post-1905 Russian Revolution "Russification" process and the fight for Estonian-language schools. He also finds it important to underline that the school had a male principal, thus, the girls are seen as not only serving the greater national good but also doing it under the guidance of a male figure.[2]

This leads to another important aspect of the bourgeois family structure – it is headed by a father figure, who rules, makes decisions, protects the familial unit. By habitually

[2] Admittedly one of the reasons for this is his connections with Finland, and Zetterberg might have considered it relevant to the Finnish readers of the Finnish version.

depicting women in roles of dependency, helplessness and passiveness, by implicit as well as explicit association, the two texts emphasise the role of men as decision-makers, protectors of the helpless, leaders who lead the nation towards a bright future (in this particular case, the independence). Women are never presented in the role of making decisions or actively participating. This is perhaps best illustrated with the example of women as the war-time workforce, discussed in both texts (Andresen et al., 2010: 410; and Zetterberg, 2009: 374). In itself such a situation could potentially imply action from the part of women – they broke out of the domestic sphere and actively contributed to the war effort. Indeed, women clearly seemed to have entered into a part of industry where previously they were not allowed to work, since Andresen et al. (2010) explicitly mentions a permission that was given to employ them as well as minors. Women certainly had not previously formed such a notable percentage of the whole workforce (composing 40% of the workforce in factories in total). And yet the language both texts use, places women in a passive position and men (who formed the government) in an active position: the government "permitted" to "use" women and minors (and refugees and war prisoners) to help with the deficiency in workforce in the defence industry. Implicitly and along with other similar associations it links femininity with passivity and masculinity with activity.

The gender hierarchy in the bourgeois family structure sees women mostly in a secondary role to the male head. For example, Scott found in her study on the construction of working class, how women were placed "in auxiliary and dependent positions" in relation to men and "however public or political [the] activities [were] they carried different status than did men's wage work" (Scott, 1999: 64-65). Zetterberg (2009) spells this out in relation to the women working in factories during the war time. Indeed, he explicitly equates adult men with the term "skilled labourer", which is then put into hierarchical opposition with women and minors (and at later stage also refugees and war prisoners): "As a result of the mobilisations only half of the workforce in Tallinn's factories in 1916 was adult men. The deficit in skilled labourers was attempted to be overcome by using the workforce of women and minors" (Zetterberg, 2009: 374). In Andresen et al. (2010) women are often mentioned only in passing. They are mentioned as one name in a long line of men – as happened to Elfriede Lender, an educational reformer, and Anna Prants, a journalist (Andresen et al., 2010: respectively 390 and 354). Or they are included as an afterthought in parentheses as

in Andresen et al. (2010: 404, 411) when discussing the extension of the voting rights, or at the end of a paragraph as if remembered at the last minute - as happened to professional journalists Linda Jürmann and Helmi Press-Jansen (Andresen et al., 2010: 389). Interestingly, by comparison, in Zetterberg (2009: 379), the only time women do appear alongside men on equal footing, is when Zetterberg announces the extension of voting rights irrespective of voters' gender. This re-enforces the set binary: women-femininity-secondary and men-masculinity-primary. In bourgeois family structure, woman could never overshadow the head of the family.

4.2.2. Femininity in the "Estonian nation": Baltic-Germans

Põldsaar (2009: 72) recounts that hegemonic masculinity, around which the "Estonian nation" was constructed, was created in opposition to not only Estonian women but also to non-Estonian men, in particular Baltic-Germans. Gender historians have long demonstrated how gendered language in nation's narratives has been used to "legitim[ise] relationships of power, say, between the ruler and the ruled" (Meyerowitz, 2008: 1347) or "to mobilize constituencies, to tar enemies, to put groups and individuals in their place" (Scott, 2008a: 1423). The gender constructions inform here the power relations, e.g. because women and femininity are not regarded as highly as men and masculinity, as the previous section (4.2.1.) demonstrated. Meyerowitz (2008: 1351) brings an example of how the 18th century Philadelphian merchants feminised and stigmatised "their failed and dishonest colleagues as 'weeping victims and harpies'" and thereby secured their masculinity and the higher position in power structures (Meyerowitz, 2008: 1349-50).

Thus, at the turn of the 19th century, for Estonian nationals to masculinise themselves also meant feminising those they were attempting to emancipate from, and thus claiming a higher position in the power relationship. In the case of Estonian language this meant feminisation of the Baltic-German aristocratic. Thus intersecting not only gender but also class and ethnicity. Since many privileges were (implicitly) associated with aristocracy, which as a birth-right was out of reach for Estonians, the Estonian hegemonic national masculinity was to be non-elitist. Due to the peasant roots of Estonians, the Estonian national narrative glorifies peasants, in historical context, or farmers, in modern context, and their connection with land (Põldsaar, 2009: 72). It was

based on "the ideology of agrarian free man (masculinity[3] and stoic firmness) and the cult of physical work contrasting elitism" (Põldsaar, 2009: 72). In addition, intellectualism and self-cultivation were essential in the hegemonic masculinity, since Estonians had to prove that they belong among the "civilised" European nations. As opposed to the intellectualism of aristocratic Baltic-Germans, the Estonian national hegemonic masculinity required the Estonian intellectual to maintain a connection with his national roots, which are land and the culture that has sprung from it (Põldsaar, 2009: 72). Thus, the (symbolic) connection with land or, from agricultural perspective, actual earth was what established masculinity in the Estonian national identity, in opposition to the Baltic-Germans.

Feminisation Although Põldsaar (2009) detects feminisation of the aristocratic Baltic-Germans in the initial construction of Estonian national identity at the turn of the 19th century, it can still clearly be traced in the depiction of the Baltic-Germans specifically in Andresen et al. (2010). Just as Meyerowitz (2008: 1350) observed US policymakers imagining "India's male leaders as passive, emotional, and lacking in virility", so do the authors describe Baltic-Germans throughout Andresen et al. (2010): backward, passive, unable to progress and emotional. They come across as unable to act successfully and when they do, this is earmarked as exceptional: "extraordinarily active" (Andresen et al., 2010: 360). The terminology used to describe Baltic-Germans clearly refers to their emotionality – they were in the "state of shock" because of the events of 1905 and saw the events as a "catastrophe" (Andresen et al., 2010: 360). Baltic-Germans are also depicted as unreliable and deceitful – one could apparently never be sure what they actually intended: making manoeuvres (Andresen et al., 2010: 360), proposing sneaky legislation that would ensure them their privileged (Andresen et al., 2010: 361) and falsely presenting the intentions and actions of Estonians to the Russians (Andresen et al., 2010: 352). One can bring parallels here from Scott's gender analysis of the *Statistique de l'industrie á Paris*, 1847-1848, where the statisticians had continuously referred to single working women as "doubtful", which "conveyed not only a negative judgment about dubious behavior, but a sense of duplicity and deception as well. The investigators could never be sure what these women really did; appearances might not be accurate" (Scott, 1999: 135). This is

[3] Põldsaar uses the word "mehemeel", which according to the Estonian thesaurus means manly mind, virility and masculinity (Karelson et al., 2009).

framed in stark contrast with Estonian politicians who are seen as honourable and rational: e.g. Jaan Tõnisson and the "moderates" he represented promoting morality, ethics, idealism (Andresen et al., 2010: 349), offering "peaceful cooperation" (Andresen et al., 2010: 351-2), acting "as an innovating and progressive party and promis[ing] numerous benefits and reforms to the voters upon coming to power" (Andresen et al., 2010: 352). Especially in this context, when the authors claim that Baltic-Germans were arrogant and condescending towards Estonians (Andresen et al., 2010: 351-2) and considered Estonians impertinent and megalomaniac (Andresen et al., 2010: 360), the Baltic-Germans simply come across as emotional and irrational, and unable to recognise progressive forces, in addition to being deceitful.

The depiction of the relationship between the Baltic-Germans and the tsarist Russians during the events of the 1905 Russian Revolution is especially revealing of the feminine-masculine binary prevalent in Andresen et al. (2010), mirroring the position of women in both Andresen et al. (2010) and Zetterberg (2009) – always in dependent and auxiliary positions (section 4.2.2.). Baltic-Germans are depicted as helpless during the post-Revolution riots in the country-side resulting in the destroying of over a hundred mansions. The authors in Andresen et al. (2010) explained that the Baltic-Germans started to ask for help from the Tsar, adding with curious sarcastic undertone: "This [i.e. asking for help] was mainly what the leaders of the baltic orders of knights were busy with in 1905" (Andresen et al., 2010: 355). In this light when in the next sentence they use the word "headman" ("*peamees*") to refer to the leader of the Estonian order of knights, it almost seems like a jibe. Although the authors do add that the Baltic-Germans formed armed cohorts, there is no further information provided on their activities or the success, casting them in an implicitly passive position – they did form the cohorts but what happened then? Instead, the measures ("repressions") that the tsarist Russia took when the threat posed by the rioting had become clear to the government find extensive description at a later stage. Moreover, in that later description the Baltic-Germans are mainly in the position of helpers (one Baltic-German is mentioned as a leader): specifically as honorary police officers in the position of junior assistants to the heads of counties, which were volunteer positions with tasks that included being a guide, an interpreter, and exposing rioters (Andresen et al., 2010: 362-3).

In comparison, Zetterberg (2009) takes the Baltic-Germans noticeably more seriously, highlighting the feminisation process in Andresen et al. (2010). Zetterberg clearly credits the Baltic-Germans to be in an active position – the cohorts formed by the Baltic-Germans are expressly reported to fight back the rioters and apparently be on an equal footing with the tsarist Russians (Zetterberg, 2009: 359). But what is more, Zetterberg also mentions that about twenty high-ranking Baltic-German officers also lead the punishment squads. This diverging construction of the Baltic-Germans is noticeable elsewhere as well. A stark example of this is when the authors are discussing the Baltic-Germans declaring the *Estländische Ritterschaft* (territory of Estonian Knighthood) separated from the newly founded Soviet Russia in 1917. In Andresen et al. (2010: 426) the narrative is spiced up with calling the initiators "a small group of mansion owners" and putting certain words in quotation marks. Baltic-Germans were said to be relying on "historical" arguments ("*'ajaloolistele' argumentidele*") and they declared "independence", in quotation marks ("*'sõltumatuse' deklaratsioon*"). Zetterberg (2009: 384) treated the efforts of the Baltic-Germans more seriously and also recounted the serious consequences that these Baltic-Germans faced as a result (they were arrested and deported to Russia). Andresen et al. (2010) leaves this part of the narrative out.

Familial imagery With the silences in the text and the use of language, Andresen et al. (2010) constructs a feminine image of the Baltic-Germans as helpless. In their helplessness they had to turn to the Tsar, who in contrast with the Baltic-Germans, is constructed as a masculine force who comes (albeit with a delay) to the rescue. Baltic-Germans in their femininity are depicted in the course of the 1905 Revolution as dependent on the Tsar, who in this relationship is in a clearly masculine and even paternal position. Contrasting Baltic-Germans and the tsarist Russians, Andresen et al. (2010) seamlessly (re)constructs the binary of feminine – passive and weak-helpless – and masculine – active and physical-strong. The femininity of the Baltic-Germans is later further reinforced with a detailed descriptions of them turning to the German Empire (to no avail) after the Russian Tsar had turned against them (Andresen et al., 2010: 372-373).

To the backdrop of the image depicted of the feminised Baltic-Germans, the Estonian national hegemonic masculinity comes out as a capable leader, in control of the (nation's) future and in no need for external help. Just as it is capable of guiding and

ruling Estonian women, it is capable of protecting the Estonian nation as a whole, unlike the feminine Baltic-Germans who failed to protect their position. It perhaps comes out best in the sentence concluding the chapter on 1905 Russian Revolution: "The Baltic-German aristocracy with its extensive foreign connections had a **thousand times more opportunities** to influence the public opinion of Europe in manners favourable to them than did the Latvians and Estonians" (Andresen et al., 2010: 364; the bold by MM). The phrase "a thousand times more opportunities" is an interesting choice of words, departing from the generally academic language and indicating an emotional connection that the authors feel regarding the topic and their need to make perfectly clear the Baltic-Germans' inability to achieve success despite their privileged position. The authors have created the feminine-masculine binary in emotional and deceitful – Baltic-Germans – and rational and ethical – Estonians. In their feminised position, the Baltic-Germans are subjugated not only by tsarist Russians but also by Estonians, people that formerly were dominated by them both.

Unthreatening feminine Finally, it must also be added that feminisation of the Baltic-Germans casts them aside as the losers of history, someone who had lost already before losing had become a historical fact. In the beginning of the 20th century, the Baltic-Germans were the main enemy (Zetterberg, 2009: 396), the main other in opposition to whom Estonians defined themselves. Whoever were the official rulers of the territory that later became the Estonian state, the Baltic-Germans always remained the immediate executors of the serfdom since the 13th century. Even during the tsarist Russia, the immediate masters were the Baltic-Germans. This meant that Estonians' emancipation was to be from them and, thus, the masculinisation of Estonians' identity in the beginning of the 20th century was constructed heavily in relation to the Baltic-Germans. However, in Andresen et al. (2010), their position is noticeably less threatening in relation to the Estonian nation. Meyerowitz (2008: 1349-1350) has pointed out the use of feminisation as a tool to designate the enemy as unthreatening. Indeed, after Estonians gained legal and factual independence in 1918, Germans (not Baltic-Germans anymore) appeared in Estonian history only once more, occupying Estonia for the period of 1941–1944 during the Second World War. Having concentrated on the initial construction, Põldsaar (2009) did not go into the particularities of these changes and their implications in the current construction. However, these changes are relevant for understanding the position the Baltic-

Germans occupy in the construction of Estonian masculine national identity in Andresen et al. (2010).

The fall of the Soviet Union meant a complete change in the politics of history and memory – complete reversal of the positions of heroes-victims and traitors-perpetrators – something that none of the Western European states have gone through (Brüggemann, 2006; Minaudier, 2006; Minaudier, 2009; Wulf, 2016: 174). The foreign historians have discussed mostly the stark contrast between how many of the Western European states perceive the role of Germans in the Second World War and how do Estonians, including some of the historians. Namely, for several reasons, Estonians tend to see Germans (during the Second World War) in a more positive light, not automatically equating them with nazism. Scholars have pointed out the clearly negative perception Estonians had of the Baltic-Germans before the Second World War, compared to that of today (Lehti, 2009: 149; Petersoo, 2007: 122). In the 1990s this also meant a re-evaluation of the position and role of the Baltic-Germans in Estonian history: the Baltic-Germans, "previously bitterly resented and no longer physically present, […] today valorised and used as a positive Other" (Petersoo, 2007: 123; see also Wulf, 2016: 56). The position of the Baltic-Germans in the construction of the Estonian national identity, is thus mainly to demonstrate the particular successful masculinity of the identity through opposition with failed femininity.

4.2.3. Non-hegemonic masculinity in the "Estonian nation": (Tsarist) Russians

The Baltic-Germans, however, are not the only non-Estonian men who have a vital role in the construction of the Estonian masculine national identity. Russians have had an increasingly vital role. Meike Wulf (2016: 37) has termed this "the Double Other" of the Estonians – both Others are simultaneously needed and present. Meyerowitz (2008: 1351) has referred to the practice of either feminising the opposition or masculinising to the extreme. Thus, when a nation has more than one Other, it may choose to feminise one of them, as Estonians did with the Baltic-Germans and to masculine to the extreme, as US leaders did during the Cold War to Russia, portraying it "as 'monstrously masculine' and rapacious in the post-World War II years", thus justifying all the actions undertaken to neutralise the threat Russia was apparently posing (Meyerowitz, 2008: 1350). I argue that this has also happened in the Estonian historiography (re)creating national narrative.

Threatening aggressive masculinity Russians are still seen or rather they are increasingly seen as posing a threat to the Estonian nation. This differs from how Estonians perceived Russians in the beginning of the 20th century, which explains why Põldsaar (2009) had not discussed the role of Russians in the initial construction of the Estonian masculine national identity. Not to say that Russians did not have any role in it, but the Russians held a somewhat secondary role to that of the Baltic-Germans. Historians have observed that before the Second World War (tsarist) Russians were not necessarily seen in a negative light. However, by the end of the 20th century, the situation had changed and the trauma from the Soviet Union had altered Estonian's attitude toward Russians. This may also have changed the way Estonian historians retroactively interpret the actions and attitude of the Russians, as some foreign historians have suggested (Brüggemann, 2009: 117; Minaudier, 2009: 138-139; Zetterberg, 2009: 396). Ethnic Russians are now perceived as a threat and their position in the construction of the Estonian national identity as the main negative other (Petersoo, 2007: 124; Wulf, 2016: 56). I argue that this perception of Russians as a threat to Estonian nation, as opposed to the Baltic-Germans who are no longer seen as such, predetermined the Russians being constructed along the lines of how US leaders did during the Cold War – "monstrously masculine".

Similarly to the Baltic-Germans, Andresen et al. (2010) depicted the Russian tsar and its officials as passive and unsuccessful.[4] But unlike in the case of Baltic-Germans, such passivity does not lead to their feminisation, there is no attempt to ridicule or belittle them. Quite the opposite – Russians are constructed as masculine: authoritative, potentially a great threat, a big machinery that saw the Baltic region as unimportant, the Russian government "**demanded** humility and obedience" (Andresen et al., 2010: 351; bold by MM). However, the Russians' masculinity, unlike the Estonians' masculinity, is seen as aggressive and brutal and, to use the phrase by Meyerowitz (2008: 1351), even "repulsively masculine". For example, in the chapter on the 1905 Russian Revolution, the following terms are associated with them: "repressions", "provocative", "merciless", "bloodshed" (Andresen et al., 2010: 355), one of the officials is cited to have said that the mutiny, i.e. the revolution, must be "crushed

[4] According to the authors, there was "total standstill", "stagnation", the "bureaucratic machinery was clumsy and inert" and there was no real action or desire to act – they "did not hurry" with reforms, they thought that the existing reforms "would take root and come to fruition", they "tried", they "sought", they "hoped" (Andresen et al., 2010: 351).

with military might" (Andresen et al., 2010: 361), "subjecting" civil power to military power, imposing "military-police dictatorship and terror", "exceptional harshness", "mass murder" of 53 people (Andresen et al., 2010: 362) etc. It is, thus, clear that tsarist Russians are associated with aggressiveness, which is cast in a negative light.

Zetterberg (2009) also sees the Russian Tsar and his followers as passive and backward. However, he actually somewhat feminises them. They are certainly not depicted as "monstrously masculine" as Andresen et al. (2010) demonstrate. Zetterberg's first description of the Tsar sets the tone: he is described as a "lovely man, small in stature, […] [who] hung on to the autocrat's position. In this he was supported by, in addition to his determined wife, also by various advisors inherited from his father" (2009: 355). In the sentence the patronising tone is accompanied by a subtle reference to his dependency on his wife and his (dead) father. He is thus depicted not as a man of leadership of his own. In fact, by emphasising the determination of his wife, in particular, it is hinted that he was under the influence of a woman and is thus by association feminised. Through reference to his father's advisors, he is additionally infantilised. The infantilisation and feminisation is further emphasised at a later stage – after he apparently forced the Chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers, Sergei Witte, to resign – as somewhat petty: not accepting people of high competence and ambition in his vicinity and not forgiving Witte for persuading him to give up his autocratic position (Zetterberg, 2009: 355). Zetterberg (2009) describes the Tsar more as a bad decision-maker rather than a particularly monstrous leader. This is not to say that Zetterberg is glossing over, for example, the brutality of the measures the Tsar authorised in quashing the 1905 Russian Revolution, but he certainly does not go to such lengths as Andresen et al. (2010) to describe the extent of his brutality.

Estonian peacefulness The hegemonic masculinity of the Estonians in Andresen et al. (2010) was constructed in opposition to this aggressive masculinity of the (tsarist) Russians. Throughout the sections of Andresen et al. (2010) I analyse here, the authors clearly condemn aggressiveness. Peacefulness of Estonian politicians is praised throughout – especially the liberal moderate wing and its leader's emphasis on non-violent methods is heralded (Andresen et al., 2010: 349, 356, 358, 359). The authors made a special point of remarking that all the Estonian parties had condemned the violent uprising of workers and peasants in summer-autumn of 1905 (Andresen et al., 2010: 360). The choice of dealing with political discord is referred to by the authors

as a “war of quill” (Andresen et al., 2010: 349, 350). Still masculine in its choice of the word “war” but referring to intellectual, thus confirming my finding in the above section 4.2.2. on the Estonian hegemonic masculinity being intellectual. In comparison, (tsarist) Russians used actual physical force in quelling the 1905 Russian Revolution and in waging actual war first against Japan, then Germany, and finally against Estonia.

It is important at this point to explain that the preference of intellectualism (and agrarianism as explained in the afore-mentioned section) over aggression in Estonian hegemonic masculinity is a conscious choice, which has very much to do with the location and size of Estonian nation (and state) (Põldsaar, 2009: 72). Because Estonians were mostly peasants until very recently, thus directly connected to land, the Estonian national identity is directly connected to land. And because Estonian nation was (and still is) small, excluding the possibility to impose oneself forcefully, focusing on physical aggressiveness would be unfruitful and dangerous. Thus, focusing on the aggressiveness of (tsarist) Russians emphasises, in comparison, the peacefulness and intellectualism of Estonians. In this light, a curious anecdote in Andresen et al. (2010: 418) that, at first strikes the reader as insignificant or irrelevant to the wider picture becomes intelligible as a praise to and example of Estonians’ peacefulness in the midst of brutal war. It is about a German pilot who was shot down by a Russian pilot during the First World War and Estonians decided to bury the German pilot with military honours. This anecdote is, of course, from the later stage of history (the World War I) than the previous analysis of descriptions of aggressiveness (the 1905 Russian Revolution), but the disparity between how the image created about Estonians and that about Russians is striking when these two descriptions (only about 10 years apart) are put next to each other.

4.2.4. Non-hegemonic masculinity in the “Estonian nation”: Socialism and liberalism in the “Estonian nation”

The aggressive masculinity of (tsarist) Russians also lends intelligibility to the way socialism and socialist movement is perceived in Estonia. Historian Marten Seppel (2010) observed how treatment of socialism in Andresen et al. (2010) – e.g. workers’ movement had been described, but without giving it a meaningful ideological background – revealed the unattractiveness of the subject in Estonian historiography. Minaudier (2009: 138) explains the reluctance regarding the left-wing ideology, in

general, with the sense of tragedy that Estonians associate with the Soviet Union claiming to be communist. In fact, he writes that Estonians consider marxist internationalism being the cover for Russian imperialism, thus inherently inseparable from Russia and Russians. Left-wing ideologies, in general, are discredited not only in eyes of Estonians in general (see also Kivimaa, 2000: 44) but have also inevitably influenced Estonian historians in their work when interpreting history (Brüggemann, 2009: 117). This explains the association of aggressive masculinity that Andresen et al. (2010: 350) link to the tsarist Russians also with the socialist movement, which is mainly identified as coming from Russia.

Liberalism – the ideal The sections of Andresen et al. (2010) dealing with socialism are especially telling in regard to the association of aggressive masculinity with Russians and its undesirability in the construction of "Estonians". From the outset it is important to note that liberal parties and politicians are in general given precedence over socialist parties and are always talked about first and in more detail.[5] For example, the chapter on the 1905 Russian Revolution starts with detailed introduction of Jaan Tõnisson and his national-liberal political views, setting him up as the main character of that chapter (Andresen et al., 2010: 348-65). The authors' unconditional admiration in the chapters I analyse is undeniably towards him and the liberal centre party he formed. He is introduced as a young legal scholar who is an editor of a newspaper. His ideas are described as follows: ethnocentrism, nationalist idealism, ethical motivation, belief in progress, reliance on peasants and rural culture, and idealisation of the past, which is complemented with "ancient freedom" in parentheses (Andresen et al., 2010: 348-9). His speeches were apparently guided by principled stance and moral pathos. It is as if he is the embodiment of the Estonian national identity and its hegemonic masculinity.

In this light, Zetterberg's (2009) description of the liberal politics and Jaan Tõnisson is especially interesting, as it does not shy away from showing his different facets. Zetterberg (2009) initially demonstrates the conservativism, and not progress, in their liberal politics. He describes Tõnisson's politics as "a traditionally loyal take on Petersburg's government", motivated by fear (of Germany), propagating loyalty among Estonians to Russia (Zetterberg's, 2009: 375). Through the *Courier*, the newspaper headed by Tõnisson, Zetterberg (2009: 356 and 362) also demonstrates liberals'

[5] As a side-note it must be noted that the same applies to Zetterberg (2009) as well.

initially discouraging Estonians, as a small nation, to even take interest in political questions, let alone participate in them. Zetterberg's portrait of Tõnisson changed throughout the sections, and by 1917, he was already seen to be advocating for Estonia's autonomy (2009: 378) and even criticising Russia (2009: 381). In Andresen et al. (2010), such development is missing; the loyalty to Russia, the embodiment of real and continuing threat to Estonia, discouraging Estonians from participating in politics is unthinkable in the national narrative that the authors construct. It would create doubt in liberalism and Tõnisson being the representative of the hegemonic masculinity of Estonian national identity.

Socialism and politicians partial to socialist ideas, however, seem to pose a challenge for the authors of Andresen et al. (2010), especially in the section on the 1905 Russian Revolution. On one hand, they cannot deny its positive impact to the Estonian national movement, considering the 1905 Russian Revolution the culmination of the Estonian societal-political movement (Andresen et al., 2010: 364). On the other hand, they clearly feel too uncomfortable with the idea to represent socialism in a positive light. This results in a somewhat contradictory information. At one point the authors presumably quote[6] "socialists and radicals" in their call for people to fight against the government of violence (referring to the Tsar and his government) with all measures (Andresen et al., 2010: 358). Two pages later the authors specifically state that none of the Estonian parties publicly condoned the violent acts that took place within one month after the said call, even though they admit that there were social democrats that participated in the uprising (Andresen et al., 2010: 360). Yet, from the text it is made clear that the previously mentioned "socialists and radicals" did include Estonian parties, specifically socialists. In fact, the text muddled the waters to the extent that it is not possible to determine who exactly was responsible for the agitation that eventually led people to riot. The text makes it clear that the agitators could not have been the moderates (Jaan Tõnisson and his party) or the Baltic-Germans or the tsarist Russians, but other than that the agitators could have been anyone from any nationality, party, variation of socialism or social class. Clearly the authors are struggling to create a cohesive narrative of Estonian nation. They also seem to have a problem with the overall construction of Estonians as non-aggressive, rational and

[6] It is unclear from the text if it is in fact a quote or authors simply wanted to emphasise their point, because the call was italicised but did not give a clear indication as to the source.

intellectual not properly fitting in with the events in 1905 and the role Estonians had in these events.

Temporary insanity The solution reached by the authors is to admit to the aggressiveness of the Estonian socialists, but to make it clear that such were the times, it was temporary, and that they got carried away. Thus, the hegemonic, i.e. ideal, Estonian masculine national identity in general does not include aggressiveness, and especially violence. As a result, those Estonian political parties and their leaders who were affected by socialism or got involved in the events of the 1905 Russian Revolution and its aftermath were described as radical and making decisions that were "*käredad*" (Andresen et al. 2010: 349, 356, 358 etc) – Estonian word referring to the combination of temperamental, aggressive, and sharp (Karelson et al., 2009). The authors state that the people who participated in the violence in 1905, were in fact, under the influence of mass psychosis (Andresen et al., 2010: 360), which was a mixture of two reasons in particular: hatred towards the Baltic-Germans (violence was directed towards them and their property), but mostly socialism, which according to the authors, promised unrealistic solutions to people who felt oppressed and had been treated unfairly[7] (Andresen et al., 2010: 350, 354). Both of the reasons, the authors claim, made Estonians susceptible to the ideas that reached Estonia through Russian literature and spread because of favourable conditions created by increased fluency in Russian, which was the main language of study in schools (Andresen et al., 2010: 350). This was further fuelled by socialist agitators – some social-democratic federalists but also Marxist-Leninist internationalists (Andresen et al., 2010: 350). Therefore, even though the revolution did bring out aggressiveness and even violence in Estonian national masculinity, it is presented by Andresen et al. as temporary.

This is remarkably different from the way Zetterberg (2009) deals with socialism and socialists in the sections analysed for this thesis. First of all, for him, socialism is not *per se* linked to Russia. It is a social movement and political ideology. Secondly, he seems to separate socialism and social-democrats as such from radical-left, i.e. the Bolshevists (Zetterberg, 2009: e.g. 377, 381, 383). For him, the latter poses a threat

[7] E.g. "Socialism was the only ideology, which promised to resolve all burning issues quickly, release the working people from all kinds of oppression and inequality and create a new and fair world order" (Andresen et al., 2010: 350) or "In 1905 in particular the socialist world mender became the embodiment of the coup leader, whereas anyone who was dissatisfied could call themselves a socialist." (Andresen et al., 2010: 354).

and is also framed aggressively, somewhat similarly to how Andresen et al. (2010) have framed socialism in general. Thirdly, Zetterberg (2009: 356) sees socialist movement as a logical response to Tsar's politics and inability or unwillingness to solve the social and political problems in the impoverished country. Socialism in Estonia is also not portrayed negatively. Especially in the light of the conservatism of liberals, the critical stance – and not utopian ideals as described in Andresen et al. (2010) – of Estonian socialists even comes across as positive (Zetterberg, 2009: 357). Fourthly, socialism *per se* is not aggressive or violent for Zetterberg (2009: 356-357). Considering the general context, it is surprising when he does connect social-democracy directly with violence, stating that the number of attacks against mansions and the Baltic-Germans in Estonia was lower than in Latvia because "truthfully, social-democracy appeared in Estonia only during the 1905 riots" (Zetterberg, 2009: 359). But then he ends the section by actually linking Estonians' violence not to socialism but to the centuries-long oppression by the Baltic-Germans. In the end, though, it seems that, in general, for him socialism does not pose the same dilemma as it does for Andresen et al. (2010). For Zetterberg there is no negative direct connection to Russia because for him Bolshevism, which he does see as aggressive and threatening, is not the embodiment of socialism. For Andresen et al. (2010), there is no difference and, therefore, Estonians participating in the socialist movement must somehow be justified, which they have done by making their association temporary.

Describing the parties The temporality of aggression and its association with socialism comes out especially clearly in comparison with descriptions of the liberal party and politicians. In Andresen et al. (2010) liberalism seems to be the embodiment of the ideal political ideology for the Estonian national identity. This is clearly demonstrated through repeated references to Jaan Tõnisson and his liberal party calling for non-violence in the midst of the events in Estonia resulting from the 1905 Russian Revolution. The terminology and tone convey stability, rationality and maturity, fatherliness even (see on this more below). In this idealised form there is no room for controversiality in the portrayal of Tõnisson and his liberal party, similar to that by Zetterberg (2009).

Homogeneous portrayal of liberalism and its leader, Jaan Tõnisson in Andresen et al. (2009) serves also the purpose of contrasting with socialism. The tone used to describe socialist influences is completely different from that used to describe liberalism – it

conveys rebelliousness, radicalism, youthful enthusiasm that needed confining; references to emotionality in this context did not refer to femininity but aggressive masculinity. The description of the activities of the leftist liberal grouping[8] is revealing in this regard, i.e. liberal, but influenced by socialist ideas. When their political achievements were described, although they apparently had a "fierce battle", i.e. competition at elections, with the German side, they were "tactical" and managed well to "govern" the cities where they had "achieved" or "won" their positions (Andresen et al., 2010: 352). However, when their socialist agenda was in focus, the terminology changed, e.g. in introducing their politics they were "radical", unlike the right wing of liberals, their platform was fragmented (Andresen et al., 2010: 349-50), or in their activities during the 1905 Russian Revolution adopted "*käredaid*" decisions. In comparison, Zetterberg (2009: 358) uses the word "categorical" to describe the same decisions that Andresen et al. (2010) term as "*käredad*". The overall image that a reader gets of the leftist liberals in Andresen et al. (2010) is somewhat disorganised and overlapping with clearly socialist parties. There are a number of men acting and talking and attempting to lead people and advancing their political agenda, but it is not always possible to understand who is representing which party or grouping. At the same time, the right wing liberals, always referred to as "moderates", are presented as an orderly group of people with a clear political agenda, led by Jaan Tõnisson, while the other members of the party, Estonian National Progressive Party, remain in the background and are mentioned only occasionally.

Class Handling of socialism in Andresen et al. (2010) also reveals, in addition to gender-bias, the class-bias of Estonian national identity. Indeed, all men that are central to the narrative of gaining independence in 1918, are highly educated and articulate – they have gained higher education, mostly in law or medicine, and are newspaper editors or at least journalists, many able to establish or buy newspapers. The few women that are mentioned by name, also seem to be educated, they are journalists and writers. They all clearly represent the bourgeois social class. Neither Andresen et al. (2010) nor Zetterberg (2009) provide more specific information on their socio-economic background. There might have been politicians who were workers, maybe in the parties with socialist leanings, but none of them are described in the extent that would allow to make such determination. In general, intellectualism through

[8] Initially they had not registered a political party.

education and culture have an important position in Estonian national identity. Due to attempts to prove that Estonians do belong among the cultured Europe despite their double post-colonial history and peasantry roots, striving towards education was and still is highly regarded. Both Andresen et al. (2010: e.g. 382-385) and Zetterberg (2009: e.g. 362, 364) describe attempts to open Estonian-language schools, and Estonians attending universities. Similarly important in these historical accounts are sections dedicated to development of Estonian ethnic culture and language into something that could be academically researched and that was continually developing and also consciously developed (Andresen et al., 2010: 385-388; Zetterberg, 2009: 362-370). Although peasant roots were and are considered important – it was something that tied this group of people together into the Estonian nation – but it had to be developed to make the nation fit into to the modern Europe (Minaudier, 2009: 142). It means that intellectualism plays an important role in the Estonian national identity and forms the basis of the hegemonic masculinity idealising intellectuality, rationality and calmness.

Working class is not the focus of Estonian national identity. Workers are only mentioned as a generic group and, in the sections analysed here, mostly during the 1905 Russian Revolution and the following riots. Women are mentioned as the war-time workforce (see section 4.2.1. above) and that is all. The sections on the 1905 Russian Revolution in Andresen et al. (2010) are especially revealing in regard to the authors' somewhat disapproving attitude towards the social class that got carried away with socialism. For example, even though the authors do state that all social groups participated in the 1905 revolutionary actions in Estonia, including factory workers, intellectuals and students, and at a later stage peasants were added to the list (Andresen et al., 2010: 354-355), the later description of the demonstrations, strikes and riots only made references to workers and peasants. At one point, the authors did not even shy away from equating workers with "extremists" for having taken up arms and willing to use violence (Andresen et al., 2010: 359). Intellectuals, including named leaders, unnamed local intellectuals (such as teachers, rural municipality secretaries) are discussed only when the record of punishments by the tsarist Russians is reported, in fact they are emphasised as "especially harmed" by the punishments (Andresen et al., 2010: 363). It remains unclear why intellectuals were specifically targeted for punishments, since based on the previous descriptions, the rioters were mostly workers and peasants. Workers seem to be representing masculinity that needs to be

held in check, capable of endangering the nation as such (since apparently their actions led to the suffering of intellectuals in particular). In comparison, the liberals led by Jaan Tõnisson, who seemingly were mostly intellectual bourgeois were the calming voice throughout, the rational masculinity that, in the grand scale of the narrative, led the population to the independent state. Therefore, even though the revolution did bring out the aggressiveness and even violence in Estonian national masculinity, it is presented in Andresen et al. (2010) as temporary and most of all, also working class-specific.

Paternalism In the depiction of the temporary nature of aggressiveness of Estonians when under the influence of socialism is a particularly great example of the heterosexist family trope which the construction of the Estonian nation relies on. In the narrative of Andresen et al. (2010) about socialism, the people influenced by socialist ideas seem to be presented as children, while liberals led by Jaan Tõnisson assume the paternal role, guiding the nation towards the right direction. Among other gender historians, Meyerowitz (2008) has found this father-child trope in foreign policies of countries that attempt to justify their imperialist ambitions: e.g. “gendered language of fatherhood helped U.S. policymakers and marines to justify imperialist violence as a manly attempt to protect, educate, and discipline the allegedly childlike Haitians” (Meyerowitz, 2008: 1351). However, I argue here that the same trope is as easily recognised in the internal politics that Andresen et al. (2010) is narrating - the period when socialism and liberalism were in competition in the public discourse.

Throughout the description of the (violent) events influenced by the 1905 Russian Revolution, Andresen et al. (2010) keeps referring to “moderates” and their continued attempts to encourage rationality. In fact, the attempts of moderates, and specifically their leader, Jaan Tõnisson, are given a paternalistic role: Tõnisson as a rational father figure towering over youthfully misguided enthusiastic socialists (overwhelmingly identified as workers), cautioning them to calm down and scolding them for using violence, instead of intellect and culture. The moderates’ paternal position is accentuated by stating that the decisions they, as led by Tõnisson, took at the very first gathering of pan-Estonian representatives in late autumn of 1905, which had quickly split into two meetings – that of “socialists and radicals” and that of “moderates” – did not embody the very radical spirit of the times (Andresen et al., 2010: 358). It might seem like criticism of stagnation, but the general framing of the moderates puts it in a

different light: in the text it was positioned between “socialists and radicals” making “*käredaid*”[9] decisions and calling people to “fight the government of violence with all measures” (Andresen et al., 2010: 358) and workers who were equated with “extremists” for having taken up arms (Andresen et al., 2010: 359). In this context what initially might seem criticism for being too conservative, in fact, turns into praise for being stable, not going along with craziness of every trend in society. The non-criticism is almost like mirroring a trope of a son (child) criticising his farther (adult head of the family) for not moving with the times, but the surrounding text is making it clear that the adult head of the family (the father) – i.e. Tõnisson and the moderates – knows best and the son – i.e. Estonian “socialists and radicals” – goes through certain motions – i.e. socialism – as part of the process of growing up. In this context, Tõnisson and his supporters are the embodiment of the national hegemonic masculinity, thus the figurative head of the family of the Estonian nation: sensible, calm, non-aggressive, intellectual (Tõnisson, after all, was a lawyer and a newspaper editor). It is also worth reminding that Jaan Tõnisson’s initial description in Andresen et al. (2010: 348-65) – see the beginning of the current sub-section – mirrors the very hegemonic masculinity of the Estonian national identity, as established throughout this chapter and summaries in the previous sentence.

The omissions in the text of Andresen et al. (2010) are also telling. Jaan Tõnisson is set as the central hero at this stage of Estonian history, the epitome of Estonian national identity, representing its hegemonic masculinity. In contrast, in Zetterberg (2009: 358), Tõnisson’s person is somewhat complicated, although it does not fully question his position as an appropriately male leader of the nation. Unlike in Andresen et al. (2010: 358) where the “socialists and radicals” seem to be bearing the brunt of the responsibility for splitting up the above-described meeting in late autumn of 1905, in Zetterberg (2009: 358), the two sides share the responsibility. He does not shy away from quoting Tõnisson’s contemporary describing the atmosphere of the meeting, where different men, among them Tõnisson, are struggling and failing to gain control in the overall chaos of yelling and physical attacks, which they all equally contributed to (Zetterberg, 2009: 358). Indeed, based on external sources (e.g. Tuomioja, 2011), the description of Tõnisson in the above-mentioned quote is probably closer to his

[9] Just to remind that this Estonian word refers to the combination of temperamental, aggressive, and sharp (Karelson et al., 2009).

actual character, which was more fiery than the idealised, made-to-fit version in Andresen et al. (2010).

However, even though Zetterberg (2009) complicates Tõnisson's character, thus undercutting the hierarchy between different masculinities, he at the same time maintains the gender hierarchy between male-masculinity and female-femininity – he uses the writer Ella Murrik (also known as Hella Wuolijoki) to demonstrate the leadership capabilities of Tõnisson. Her person, in fact, is never merited with importance on its own (with the exception of being mentioned once as belonging to a young writers' group). Her memoirs are cited equating Tõnisson with Moses – "a man, who could lead his people through the Red Sea" – and with a "beacon that gathered people around himself and gave them national awareness and fighting spirit" (Zetterberg, 2009: 355). Thus, similarly to Andresen et al. (2010), Zetterberg in fact also turns Tõnisson into a paternal figure, somewhat even more bluntly through the clear allusions to gender hierarchy and without references to political ideologies.

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the "Estonian nation" is a masculine and heterosexual construction, constructed in a binary relationship with femininity and a certain, less desirable kind of masculinity. The two historiographical texts analysed here presented a traditional view of nation's history, whereby a nation is heavily based on gender differences and hierarchy. The text by Estonian historians, Andresen et al. (2010) puts forward a masculinised image of Estonian nation as active, progressive, independent and self-sufficient, intelligent, peaceful, and ethical. This image is created in contrast to the feminised image of the Baltic-Germans and the image of (tsarist) Russians as aggressively masculine. Both the feminisation and aggressive-masculinisation are somewhat complicated by the outsider to Estonian history, the Finnish author, Seppo Zetterberg (2009), pointing out the silences and emphases in Andresen et al. (2010). The latter is also, at times, struggling to portray events and situations in the Estonian history during the period of 1905-1918 that do not fit with the hegemonic masculinity that the image of Estonian nation is built on. In particular this relates to the socialist movement, which Estonians were greatly influenced by and which had an undeniable role to play in Estonia becoming independent in 1918. The analysis of Andresen et al. (2010) demonstrated the implicit use of familial imagery, whereby socialism was

considered a necessary growing pain for a young nation. At the same time it was also considered a threat that must be kept in check.

The nationalist discourse of Andresen et al. (2010) constructs Russians and also socialism, which is largely connected in their narrative with Russians, as an ongoing threat. This is something that was not present in the Estonian national identity at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century, when it was constructed mostly in opposition to the Baltic-Germans. This shift away from Baltic-Germans as a real threat and towards Russians as an ongoing threat has been noted by mostly non-Estonian historians. The new paradigm is also reflected in Andresen et al. (2010), where aggressive masculinity, associated both with Russians and socialism, is seen as something to be constrained, the failure of which would harm the Estonian nation and its future.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

The goal of my thesis was to analyse gender in recent Estonian historiography on the period of Estonian national movement (1905–1918). I analysed sections from two historiographical texts – one written by a Finnish historian and representing an outsider view on Estonian history (Zetterberg, 2009) and the other written by a group of Estonian historians and representing the insider view (Andresen et al., 2010). Even though these two texts represented different perspectives, I found that they both follow the traditional approach to national histories with a heavy emphasis on men's role in the nation's history and a significant lack of women as well as with the use of the Universal Man notion, in which the universal representative is a man, even if the group he supposedly represents was in fact diverse.

My analysis attempted to answer one particular question: how have historians used references to sexual differences in their historiographies to create the narrative of the specific historical period and describe and interpret the power relations at work? I established that Andresen et al. (2010) (re)created the Estonian national narrative, which some Estonian historians have determined as one of the main problems in Estonian historiography in general. In that national narrative, the authors further (re)constructed the Estonian nation as masculine. This was established in opposition to femininity and undesirable masculinity. In opposition to femininity, represented by Estonian women and feminised Baltic-Germans, the hegemonic masculinity of Estonian national identity was active, progressive, rational, and ethical. In opposition with non-hegemonic and non-desirable masculinity, represented by Russians, Estonian masculinity was presented as non-aggressive. The representation of the socialist movement in Estonia, associated with Russia and Russians, emphasised the rationality and non-aggressiveness of Estonian hegemonic masculinity even further. This was particularly achieved through portraying the Estonian participants of the riots during the 1905 Russian Revolution as temporarily rash, while Estonian liberals were positioned in a paternal role, trying to calm down the rash socialists.

The hegemonic Estonian masculinity constructed in Andresen et al. (2010) is all the more visible in comparison with Zetterberg (2009). The comparison reveals the silences and emphases in Andresen et al. (2010) that contribute to the national

narrative and construction of Estonian masculine identity. For example, Zetterberg (2009) is complicating the portrayal of the Baltic-Germans as well as the portrayal of one of Jaan Tõnisson. However, regardless of the complication of the national narrative, Zetterberg still maintains the gender order, portraying the Estonian nation as a masculine-construction with women in their passive femininity needing guidance and protection. This is further demonstrated in his portrayal of the last Russian Tsar who is feminised and infantilised by making him seemingly dependent on his "determined" wife and on his departed father through the latter's advisors. Zetterberg, thus, reproduces the gender hierarchy.

A second significant finding related to how Andresen et al. (2010) use gendered language to signify threat, or lack of it. This becomes especially apparent when reading Zetterberg (2009) in parallel. For example, by feminising the Baltic-Germans, Andresen et al. (2010) signify the lack of threat they posed. This was a lack of threat to the Estonian national identity as well as to the nation as a whole, which becomes clear from the jeering tone the authors assume when talking about the Baltic-Germans' general failure to achieve their goals (see Section 4.2.2.). In contrast, the image the authors construct of the Russians is the complete opposite – the Russians are presented as aggressively masculine. In comparison to the ideal non-aggressiveness of Estonian masculine identity, the Russians stand comes out as a real threat that needs to be kept in check. The construction of the Russians as the aggressive Other also affected how Andresen et al. (2010) presented the socialist movement. The people influenced by socialist ideas are presented as youthful rebels that get carried away by idealistic promises. Nevertheless, through association with Russians (the authors link the socialist movement that brought about violent riots in 1905-1906 in Estonia directly to Russia), they assume the Russian aggressive masculinity but, because the Estonian socialists are presented as young rebel idealists, it is only a temporary though necessary phase in their maturing process. Thus, by placing liberal politicians and the liberal party in the paternal role, the socialists assume the role of children that must be disciplined and kept in line, so they will not grow up to be a threat to the non-aggressive and rational hegemonic masculinity of the Estonian national identity.

This portrayal of Russians as well as socialism seems understandable to me in light of the trauma of the Soviet Union that several (foreign) historians have pointed to. This

portrayal also almost functions like a narrative tool in Andresen et al. (2009) – the very last sentence of this book announces that "the newly born Republic of Estonia entered into war for the independence of Estonia with the great power, Soviet Russia – the War of Independence" (Andresen et al., 2010: 437). The earlier portrayal of Russians and socialism in this light seems like a preparation for dramatical events ahead. In a historical research, this could be problematic – narrative seems to take precedence over research. It results in historical subjects and events being presented as one-dimensional, either heroes (or heroes-to-be) or villains. This is what my findings in my analysis of Andresen et al. (2010), especially in their portrayal of events before, during and after the 1905 Russian Revolution, demonstrated

What is more, considering the importance of history and even the special position of historians in the Estonian society, the consequence of historians closing their minds and refusing to question the national myths and narratives is a society also not willing to ask questions. This means that the myths about traditional Estonian way of life and values, which do not necessarily correspond to how the "people of the country" or peasants lived or what they valued, keep being repeated, even if there are lone voices attempting to rebut these beliefs. One such example is the referral to traditional family set-ups and values that to correspond to the ideal bourgeois family set up but, according to research, does not actually reflect the way the "people of the country" (later called "Estonians") lived (e.g. Mägi, 2009). As a feminist scholar, I see that, first of all, there is a great need for research into women in Estonian history, not only individual, "great" women (as in "great men") but also into the lives of different ordinary women and groups of women. Estonians, even Estonian feminists such as myself, know far too little of our diverse past. Secondly, through working on this thesis and studying Joan Scott's theory on gender as a signifier of power relations, I understand now how illuminating it can be to analyse history through a gender perspective. For example, the research that Inna Põltsam-Jürjo conducted in archives on indecent women in the mid-17th century was extremely illuminating regarding the social system and societal controls, reaching far beyond the "indecent women" and helping to explain a feudal system that in this case was enforced through women. I would not want to suggest any specific directions for further research in Estonia. Women's and gender history in Estonia is still in the early stages and there is still a long way to go.

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