

**MEDIATE, BLAME, SETTLE: TRACING A DISCURSIVE PATTERN IN
EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY USING EXAMPLES OF THE
YUGOSLAVIAN AND UKRAINIAN CONFLICTS**

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Abstract

The thesis concerns the question of whether there is an observable pattern of European Union discourse when it comes to dealing with major foreign policy crises. Using the empirical examples of the Yugoslavian and Ukrainian conflicts, the thesis concludes that, despite the differences in the contexts of the two conflicts, European discourse shows notable similarities in how it is constructed. The pattern is outlined as containing three consecutive, separate phases, all connected to the notion of Europe viewed as a normative power, especially the concept of normative empire. Initial attempts at being an impartial mediator to the conflict in the first phase, seeking to provide normative transference to all sides for universal benefit shift into the second phase, othering one side for the lack of Union success in mediation and the persistent violation of norms. As the conflict continues without a mediated peace and discourse enters its third phase, Europe abandons the transference mission and settles on preserving its vital, internal interests. In providing detailed empirical evidence supporting the pattern framework, the thesis fills a gap in European studies literature on normative power Europe, primarily through elaborating when and how the European Union chooses to attempt to assert itself as a such an actor and demonstrating that attempts at exerting normative power have corresponded to the outlined pattern.

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1 Introduction

The thesis concerns the question of whether there is an observable pattern of European Union discourse when it comes to dealing with major foreign policy. Structurally, the Union of today is markedly different to the Union of the Maastricht Treaty. European foreign policy has gone through extensive institutional changes, establishing new representative bodies, expanding its member ranks. This issue is of great relevance to academic examinations of the European Union. There has been much work on the constant reinforcement of an idea of an inadequate, unprepared, and overly ambitious Europe¹. This work has often centered on examining institutional changes within the Union as well as analysis of shifting contexts of global power relations. Much of past scholarly attention was focused on analyzing what has been changing in the Union and the world, and leading to unsatisfactory foreign policy results. Research has also often been done through single case studies. What is needed is an analysis of what the EU keeps repeating, what it does almost the same – how it, through discourse, builds its own identity and

¹Soeren Keil, "Europeanization, State-Building and Democratization in the Western Balkans," *Nationalities Papers* 41, no. 3 (May 2013): 343–53, doi:10.1080/00905992.2013.768977; Cristina Chiva, "The Limits of Europeanisation: EU Accession and Gender Equality in Bulgaria and Romania," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 10, no. 2 (June 2009): 195–209, doi:10.1080/15705850902899230; Aydin Babuna, "European Integration, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Stability in the Western Balkans: A New Strategy," *Perceptions* 19, no. 2 (2014): 1; Sergey Markedonov and Ulrich Kühn, "Russia and the West in Light of the Ukraine Crisis," 2015, <http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/view/eth:47385>; Neil Melvin, "The EU Needs a New Values-Based Realism for Its Central Asia Strategy," *Policy Brief* 28 (2012), http://fride.org/download/PB_28_Eng.pdf; Stefan Lehne, "Time to Reset the European Neighbourhood Policy," *Carnegie Europe*, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Brief-Lehne-EU_Neighborhood_Policy1.pdf; Sebastian Rosato, "Europe's Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project," *International Security* 35, no. 4 (2011): 45–86.

understands that of others in different opportunities, different contexts, in trying to act as a normative power in a markedly similar manner.

The thesis will seek to examine this issue through a comparison of the two biggest challenges to European foreign policy influence to date – the war in Yugoslavia and the still ongoing war in Ukraine. These conflicts are difficult to be viewed as extensively similar. They took place in vastly different global political contexts and included dissimilar power relations. The sameness of European discourse seems unrelated to the events of these two conflicts as they warranted unique approaches if the main objective was instituting a peace deal.

This research question is deeply related to issues of developing a European identity. Attempts at fostering Europe as a strong and independent foreign policy actor have been bound by an inability to assert itself as truly influential actor, beyond the scope of the economy, able to present solutions for ending conflicts that are accepted and work. The thesis will analyze a hypothesis that the driving force behind European discourse in both conflicts, in their initial phases, was a desire to finally assert Europe as an actor that can independently bring these conflicts to a decisive, peaceful end through transferring European norms onto the region facing conflict. The thesis will show that such desires prove unsuccessful as Europe is forced to settle for less ambitious rewards in efforts to preserve internal unity and essential material interests.

The central hypothesis of this research is the idea that both mentioned wars, despite their significant differences, were approached by the Union in a notably similar, patterned way.

Based on this, the thesis examines the idea that the observable pattern of discourse manifests itself through a specific set of stages. Europe has constructed discourse that follows the same narrative in both conflicts. Initially there is an observable great focus on attempts to present the Union as an actor that can assert a solution to the conflict at hand, particularly through enforcement of common diplomatic procedures like diplomatic mediation along with organizing and leading international conferences in search of a peace deal. This diplomatic focus does not yield a desired, Europe-driven peace deal, which drives an intensification of rhetoric by implementation of stricter measures like economic sanctions, travel restrictions and threats of military engagement. These more aggressive measures are aimed at one state in the conflict, a state increasingly understood by the Union as a villain of the conflict. As the EU does not succeed in resolving the conflict, this state becomes an object of great attention and increasingly

drastic othering. This villain is understood as eschewing all proper means of communicating and conducting state affairs and is an overwhelmingly dangerous, irrational threat to the world painted by a European perspective. Finally, as Europe becomes more aware of an inability to impose its own solutions and more burdened by the resulting damage done to crucial interests, it seeks to bargain and reintroduce the villainous actor as an acceptable partner once again. It does this by engaging the actor in projects that help secure these crucial and endangered interests.

2 Methodology

The thesis will apply discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is the most appropriate as the object of what is being researched are the changes (or lack thereof) of the debates surrounding and framing conflict in European foreign policy. The analysis will employ Lene Hansen's understanding of the intertextual research models approach to discourse analysis. The thesis takes on this approach from the elaboration presented in Hansen's "Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War²". Model 1 focuses on government issued discourse. Model 1 thus includes official documents with supporting texts issued by the European Union independently. Model 2 is compelling in the case of the European Union as it considers analysis of a "wider foreign policy debate³". The wider debate is situated in the arenas of political opposition, the media and within corporate institutions. These actors have all proven relevant in conducted empirical text analysis. Model 3A was excluded as it engages "Film, fiction, television, computer games, photography, comics, music, poetry, painting, architecture, travel writing, autobiography", forms through which European Union discourse is not expressed through. Model 3B provides a framework for engaging academic analysis and marginal media sources and has been included. It has less comparative importance in the methodology of this thesis as the primary focus remains on official EU sources. It is only used in discursive situations when the Union is under intense pressure from outsider actors, generally situated in states engaged in the conflict Europe tries to mediate away. Thus, the same actor takes on different roles depending on their utility to the actor's set of interests.

² Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, The New International Relations (Routledge, 2006), 53–57.

³ Ibid., 57.

Following Iver B. Neumann's guidelines to discourse analysis⁴, the thesis takes note to locate European Union discourse in relation to other discourses. Union discourse is closely related to discourse conducted within member states as well as within major EU allies, especially the discourse conducted within the United States. This closeness is simultaneously a source of influence of convergence but also stimulation for creating an independent, strong, and single voiced Europe, meriting cautious analysis.

There was little basis for methodologically distinguishing key and secondary texts. In general, European Union politics are conducted through frequent smaller text releases with the same principle applying to both analyzed conflicts. While grand strategic documents of the Union exist, they do not offer enough in terms of substance that would merit an exalted position in the analysis. European Union discourse when it comes to the two conflicts does not work in a way that is suitable to be analyzed in the way Neumann and Hansen conceive categorizing texts, by finding texts that have substantial "ripple effects". The discursive practices the thesis analyzes more suit a *call and response* type model. This model encapsulates the frequency with which the Union published texts relating to its foreign policy, constituting official EU discourse get a media response. The Union often responds further to texts issued by media outlets and other international actors. Officials representing Europe communicate to provide further detail of explanation on the issued documents or to justify the discursive positions they contain.

Monitoring the enunciation of signs within analyzed texts is of special importance. There is no good enough set of predefined signs to serve as an analytical tool. However, the conducted text analysis has been guided by the search for general categories of signs. The explicit naming of who Europe tries to communicate to was deemed relevant. Neutral terms like "partner" and "state" appear much more frequently when Europe tries to portray and communicate with all sides in a conflict. Explicit naming, using terms like "Serbia", "Bosnia" and "Russia" appear in discourse, even when Europe does not communicate directly, when blaming mechanisms of phase two are strongest. This observation is still more of a guideline of terms to encourage rigor in analysis for than a part of a hierarchical list of sought signifiers.

⁴ A. Klotz and D. Prakash, *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, ECPR Research Methods (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008), 66.

Lastly, the section on methodology should comment on how the thesis approached gathering the official EU documents. Official EU documents have been gathered from both online European Union archives as well as academic sources when Union archiving was lacking relevant documents. Sources from news media were crucial to complete analysis. The thesis primarily includes texts from The Guardian, The New York Times, Le Monde, Foreign Policy, Euronews and Euractiv as news media sources. These outlets have generally had a strong focus on the European Union in comparison to other media and can offer coverage of relevant topics from their outset and throughout. This makes them suitable choices for appropriate analysis. These media outlets have also been supplanted by texts from other providers where necessary. Articles that repeated or very closely matched the discursive content of other, already covered media, were excluded. This has assisted in making the immense number of documents covered more easily reviewable. Special attention was required to select texts so that one can cover both the development of the wars themselves through their whole course but also texts that empower framing the discursive context before conflict onset as well as examining the ramifications of the conflict ending in the case of Yugoslavian dissolution. Texts covering the ramifications of the Ukrainian conflict ending could not be gathered as the conflict is still ongoing.

3 Literature review

This thesis will provide an original contribution to European studies literature in outlining European foreign policy as beholden to a pattern.

Furthermore, this thesis provides complementary findings to help complete gaps in European studies literature. It primarily seeks to compliment previous academic work on normative power but is also applicable to compliment literature on European identity.

The term “normative power Europe” has been introduced to academic debates in European studies by Ian Manners’ article titled “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”⁵. While noting that Europe is generally conceived as a civilian or potential military power, he argues that it should be considered a normative power. In analyzing the Union’s influence in transferring norms against capital punishment, the EU is portrayed as in a position of redefining

⁵ Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–258.

what is “normal” in international relations, ascribing this to be “the greatest power of all”. European normative transference practice has, at least in the case study of death penalty abolition, been credited as markedly successful. This kind of power provides the EU with a special place in world politics, guided by a “desire for greater legitimacy through the fundamental norms that the EU represents⁶”. It transfers policy solutions that it has found optimal. It bequeaths norms it finds universally beneficial and to the whole globe. The Union is presented as perceiving itself as constructed on a normative basis. Universal norms and principles are placed at the center of its relations with member states and with the world. Its member states adhere to its foundational principles. This enables the EU, in his conception, to spread norms effectively and earnestly.

Raffaella A. Del Sarto’s paper⁷ on the concept of “Normative Empire Europe” is a markedly critical response to Manners’ argument. It is also crucial for the analysis of this thesis. In analyzing the case of European foreign policy in the Arab Spring, Del Sarto attempts to dispute several claims made in favor of normative power Europe as a valid concept. The author finds Europe not to be predisposed to behave normatively, as it has had a history of transferring rules and applying practices as to serve its own economic and security interests. The normative empire concept attempts to resolve the contradiction “between realist/rationalist and normative conceptions of the EU’s international role⁸”.

If the initial hypothesis of the thesis is proven correct, then the pattern presents enduring. This thesis seeks to locate its place matching the most appropriate argument, out of two opposing arguments, where a pattern would be best explained, if any are applicable. It will provide reasoning to its choice after presenting the empirical findings, in the final section.

Additionally, there has been relevant literature issued examining European identity formation and expression. Ole Waever’s framework, elaborated in his article titled “European security identities” attempts to provide an answer “who or what exists politically in Europe⁹”. Weaver

⁶ Ibid., 244.

⁷ Raffaella A. Del Sarto, “Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, Its Borderlands, and the ‘Arab Spring’: Normative Empire Europe,” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 54, no. 2 (March 2016): 215–32, doi:10.1111/jcms.12282.

⁸ Ibid., 227.

⁹ Ole Waever, “European Security Identities,” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 34, no. 1 (1996): 103–132.

elaborates that Europe has been forming its identity through the process of negating previous constructions of European identity. Concurrently, it constructs its own identity by encroaching on the political identities of its member states, leaving them to build individuality through reinforcement of cultural identity. Waever finds Europe a unique challenge to the idea of primacy of identity as Europe exists in what he deems a post-sovereign space. Europe continues to exist and be unique based on being constructed as a “peculiar security arrangement¹⁰”. It requires being secure to have an identity.

Iver Neumann authored “Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation” to explain the utility of several eastern states like Turkey and Russia in the formation and changes in European identity. While European identity is not equal to European Union identity, the Union carries on the essential mechanism of self-definition – othering proximate states. Neumann perceives present-day representations of states in European discourse to “carry with them the memory of earlier representations¹¹”.

These two prominent examples of literature on European identity present smaller potential gaps to fill. They seem to have a general disagreement on how Europe uses history in identity construction. Where Waever sees the EU negating its historical perceptions to construct unique composite ones, Neumann perceives it as affirming and amplifying historical perceptions. If the pattern framework is valid, it could provide the means of verifying their findings on a new set of empirical examples.

3.1 Thesis findings structure

This section briefly elaborates the further structure of the thesis.

First, the thesis will present a section outlining the framework of the foreign policy pattern the European Union repeats. The framework is presented in an abstract manner, making it evenly testable with both utilized empirical examples the thesis analyzes. The general framework is thus

¹⁰ Ibid., 128.

¹¹ Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 62.

also applicable to other, potential future, occurrences of European discourse when constructing understandings of a foreign conflict.

Then follows a section identifying the pattern in the conflict over the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, evidence gathered from analyzed texts to provide a substantive empirical basis for claiming an instance of the pattern.

The section after that applies empirical evidence gathered from discursive analysis of texts on the Ukrainian conflict.

In the conclusions, the thesis draws upon the empirical data to examine the veracity of the central hypothesis suggesting a pattern. Furthermore, the thesis revisits the work portrayed in the literature review to identify its own contributions.

4 Outlining the theoretical pattern framework

In this section I present, in a stylized manner, the pattern of how European Union peace mediation and peacemaking efforts unfold through different phases of the conflict cycle. This pattern was partially inductively discovered in the empirical material of the analyzed case studies and partially constructed of off ideas contained in normative power literature. The pattern consists of three connected phases manifesting in discourse on European foreign policy in an armed conflict. The three phases have distinguishable features appearing in the analyzed conflicts and require elaboration. This framework was finalized based on empirical findings from the cases analyzed by the thesis. While the research design is such that I cannot claim firm grounds for generalizing my case-specific findings, the fact that this pattern can be firmly anchored to a large literature on the normative foundations of, and the specific identity underpinning EU foreign policy, offers reasons for believing that the pattern I discovered is more generally applicable

4.1 The First Phase

The genesis of European discourse concerning an armed conflict abroad first sees the Union present itself as an impartial mediator. The Union chooses no sides and attempts to reach an

agreement suiting the rational needs of all sides. While it no side is to be picked as a favorite, it certainly chooses the strict enforcement of what it considers essential, universal norms of national governance and relations between states. It is important to note that being impartial does not mean being unprincipled. Democracy, the protection of human rights, territorial integrity and the prohibition of state aggression are not to be deviated from. But Europe sees little chance that any one state in the conflict would deviate. The time-tested validity of the norms Europe projects combined with the expertise and experience of European institutions engaged in foreign policy is believed to be more than enough to create and implement appropriate solutions for peace. The warring sides should simply accept the Union's authority and the resulting solutions.

There is a clear mission of normative transference in this phase. The states in war are understood by the union as insufficiently experienced to adopt and protect democracy and the liberal order in their national governance and relations with one another. Europe keeps considering itself as the best equipped actor to teach these norms to others. It does not carry on the problematic foreign policy legacy of the other prominent Western power – the United States. The comprising member states and the Union itself have an extended history of dealing with states on the periphery and outside of Europe. Although this history, as is often left out of the discourse in this phase, is complex and fraught with issues of understanding the other, it is considered a useful basis for establishing dialogue.

Ultimately, Europe conceives a vision of the war-struck region as a development project. The region is to be approached as a student of proper norms, that will, if it is sensible, easily understand and implement norms prevalent in European state structures. If the region properly learns, there will be benefit for all parties involved

There are however notable norm violations occurring early in the armed conflict. European discourse is careful to not exclusively or predominantly attribute the violation to any one side. The violations are not considered to be directed by one of the actors in the war. Europe asks for all the engaged states to establish control rather than urging a side to abandon a villainous project. Even though state involvement in violating is visible to limited extents at this point, norm violations are predominantly seen as emerging from the smoke of conflict, not being (at least not fully) a result of deliberate challenge to the normative order Europe seeks to promote.

Othering is present in this phase, inheriting conceptions of the conflict stricken region Europe held beforehand. The whole group of actors engaging in the conflict are collectively othered. Historical conception of the entire afflicted region being “wild” reappear and influence discourse. The region is portrayed as being politically, economically, and socially underdeveloped. However, individual villains have not been selected yet.

There is also a continuing interest of the European Union to finally, be resolving this conflict, construct itself as a world power in terms of foreign policy influence. It seeks to achieve this primarily through setting up and supervising institutions of diplomatic communication between the sides in conflict.

4.2 The Second Phase

Europe, presenting itself as an impartial mediator, is unable to enact a negotiated solution to the conflict. The violence becomes more frequent and more concerning. A mediated peace becomes more visibly difficult to achieve.

The mechanisms of othering change in this phase. Europe begins to identify one side as the predominant culprit for the failure to reach an end to the conflict. One actor is portrayed as irrationally refusing to cooperate, to realize the validity and universal applicability of the norms the Union propagates. In refusing to cooperate, it also irrationally refuses to receive benefits of applying European norms.

This othering includes a crucial mechanism. Understanding norm violations changes from violations as attributable to no one side to violations as consciously directed by one side in the conflict. This side is presented as planning and conducting a campaign of violating human rights on a massive scale and negating the democratic establishment of other states, irrationally pursuing a continuation of the war.

Actions against the othered actor leave the realm of international negotiation. More severe, punitive measures are deemed necessary. These primarily come in the form of economic sanctions. They are deliberately targeting one of the warring sides, looking to isolate it from potential partners. Conversation around the possibility of Europe initiating more severe

punishment, like engaging military forces of the international community is frequently reappearing. It is, however, stifled by the Union's own lack of independent military resources.

The self-ascribed role of the EU moves from an impartial mediator to a noble enforcer. While still acknowledging that the Union should not keep favorites in the war and maintain objectivity, discourse is positioned to highlight that one side has simply gone too far. It has become the villain of European discourse. The Union is thus obligated to aggressively respond. This implies a mission of ending the conflict by going up against the villain and standing up for its victims.

Additionally, the European Union looks to foster a special, protective relationship with one side in the conflict. This side is given generous financial aid and support in international conversations about the ongoing war. This approach mirrors the demonizing attitude of the side Europe is blaming for the violence, creating a more black-and-white mechanism of othering.

4.3 The Third Phase

The more aggressive discursive position and practices still do not yield the desired outcome of a peace deal supervised by the European Union.

The ongoing policies of dealing with the war in question place an increasing material burden upon Europe. It becomes more apparent that continued discursive aggression towards the norm violating actor might be bringing excessive harm to European interests. These interests include fear of massive refugee inflows, long-term harm to Union trade, possibilities of organized crime affecting member states and other threatening consequences. The European Union also has increasing trouble in mustering support for its policies. Member states have more difficulty in reaching a consensus over foreign policy. Some may be too adversely affected by the ongoing harsh discursive practices and demand a less aggressive approach. Others remain dissatisfied with the Union's lack of results and demand an even more aggressive stance. The more conservative voices gain traction.

The idea of directed norm violation is slowly pushed aside. Norm violations from all sides become more clearly voiced in discourse. Now, like in the first phase, Europe predominantly voices displeasure with all warring actors rather than with one specific side.

Simultaneously, Europe is faced with lapsing faith in its position from the state it chose to protect against aggression. What the protected actor does not get, and greatly wants, is gaining increased ability to protect itself independently and even strike back at the aggressor. The European Union repeatedly refuses such requests. This stance from the EU leaves space for other international actors to overtake Europe's primacy in sponsoring the protected state. The mechanisms of othering revert from the more black-and-white means of understanding to previously prevalent unilateral mechanisms of portraying the entire region of the conflict as wild and still inadequately prepared for understanding, valuing, and implementing European norms.

Europe now seeks a settlement even if this means compromising its normative convictions. Imparting ideal European norms of governance and relations between states on the affected region is no longer a realistic project to be pursued in discourse.

The European Union does, however, remain highly involved with the state it sought to protect. International agreements enable closer economic and political integration. The Union retains a significant influence upon national decision making in the protected state. This outcome is notably lesser than the grand ambition of imparting democracy through European normativity. It becomes an empire of low ambition, turning markedly towards a pragmatic approach. The bare minimum, without significant normative transference, is now the only objective worth pursuing.

5 Identifying the discursive pattern in the Yugoslavian war

This section presents empirical data identifying the pattern layout. The section is structured so that it first provides a brief overview of Yugoslavia before the war and Europe's relation with it. Subsequently it presents a three-part narrative of European union discourse on the topic, matching the three phases outlined in the general pattern framework section of the thesis to demonstrate congruence of empirical data with the theoretical framework.

5.1 Introducing the conflict

Yugoslavia was proclaimed an independent federal state in 1945, following the end of the Second World War. It attempted to follow through on the often extremely difficult task of uniting the both differing and overlapping nationalities that comprise what is today referred to as the Western Balkans from the previous failed state of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. It ultimately failed in doing so.

Since the 1950s, Yugoslavia had been maintaining a neutral position in the Cold War. This stance led to it spearheading initiatives for the Non-Aligned Movement. The position of neutrality still permitted for extensive diplomatic and other ties with both the USSR and the Western states. Yugoslavia was attempting to keep both sides at an equal and proximate distance. As the USSR was dissolving at the same time as Yugoslavia, the country suddenly found itself with no other actor to balance the influence of the West with.

The creeping collapse of previously iron-clad federal political institutions, economic stagnation and the rising strength of nationalist movements began to overwhelm the state during the 1980s. Movements for independence were now strong and free enough to launch initiatives for their state to leave the federation completely. The lack of agreement on how the federal state was to be divided posed a great threat. Prominent discursive actors were frequently voicing displeasure with independence continuing along the borders officially established by the Yugoslavian Constitution of 1972¹². The ethnic communities comprising the country's population were not easily divisible, especially in the urban areas of Croatia and Bosnia¹³. Multiparty elections installed nationalist governments that did not seek to relinquish pressure towards armed conflict. Conflict over the dissolution of the country was under way in the last decade of the 20th century.

It soon turned violent. Starting with the conflict between the splintering forces of Slovenia and the Serbian-led response from the crumbling Yugoslavian National Army in 1991., a series of clashes spread across Croatia and Bosnia and over most of the federation. Out of the six constitutive republics of Yugoslavia, only Macedonia managed to become independent without violence. The country was being swept away in a bloody maelstrom.

¹² Dejan Jović, *Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away*, Central European Studies (Purdue University Press, 2009).

¹³ Ibid.

The onset of the war in Yugoslavia coincided with substantive institutional changes in the European Union, highlighted by the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Maastricht Treaty brought into existence the three-pillar structure intended to, through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, presented the organization with new foreign policy tools. Europe had entered the new decade hoping to exert a much stronger political influence outside of its borders¹⁴. Yugoslavia was a prime opportunity for doing so.

5.2 The First Phase

In 1991, at the onset of the war, European discourse paid attention to not assign blame. It sought to not differentiate between the warring sides. What it did actively seek though was a position of leading mediator between the conflicting sides. It tries to reach this position through first allying itself with other prominent actors to then initiate diplomatic initiatives alone.

As Yugoslavia was facing dissolution in 1991, The European Union presented itself as an impartial and highly skilled mediating party in a conflict, involved to assist towards a peaceful resolution and motivated not by favoritism or material concerns but primarily by the sanctity of European and democratic principles. The European Union officially requested a ceasefire and offered its mediating assistance for the conflicting sides. The European Union proposed and quickly put together expert bodies meant to help resolve the conflict. The main means of countering the violence in Yugoslavia was an eventual peace conference and arbitration procedure convened and supervised by the European Community. The European Union was, since 1990, voicing the need for an international conference on the conflict. It officially established the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia jointly with the United Nations¹⁵.

It quickly took on the task of spearheading efforts to bring warring sides to negotiation. A typical example of such an approach was The Hague meeting between President Tudjman and President Milošević on October 10th, 1991. There, Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek of the

¹⁴ Morton Abramowitz and Jacques Rupnik, eds., *The Western Balkans and the EU: "The Hour of Europe,"* Chaillot Papers 126 (Paris: Inst. for Security Studies, 2011).

¹⁵ United Nations Archive and Records Management Section, "Summary of AG-065 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) (1992-1993)," 2015.

Netherlands outlined a peace deal to ensure the withdrawal of Yugoslavian troops from Croatia and to present the EU plans for the political structure of the region. The deal, especially the European suggestion to keep alive the idea of a loose confederation, was vehemently rejected by the Croatian side. The rejection was surprising for Europe, who had hoped to “give reason a chance¹⁶” to the opposing sides. Irrationality was overwhelming prospects for peace. The Union, in the first phase, followed the lead of the UN and applied policies that did not distinguish between the warring parties. The UN instituted a region-wide embargo on procurement of weapons in 1991. Europe applied the same measures. The arms embargo was to be applied “to the whole of Yugoslavia¹⁷”. Europe was emboldened by the commendations received for its efforts by the United Nations Security Council¹⁸.

Europe immediately recognized that the conflict had been a resurfacing of old hatred between ethnic communities of Yugoslavia. The now warring people of the Balkans had returned to “ancient ethnic hatred¹⁹”. It was perceiving a failure of the socialist project that left behind a federal state insufficiently familiar with the benefits of European values²⁰.

Yugoslavia was becoming understood as an area of conflict that the EU could independently resolve. This was the “hour of Europe²¹”. The EU positioned itself as the ultimate deciding body when it comes to political outcomes. It declared itself the actor that would make all border changes valid, to counter attempts of changing border lines through force and against the preexisting constitutional setup protected by Europe²². The communicated message was the Europe was not interested in who triumphed if the sides learned and applied proper negotiation

¹⁶ Paul L. Montgomery, “Yugoslavs joust at peace meeting,” *The New York Times*, September 8, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/08/world/yugoslavs-joust-at-peace-meeting.html>.

¹⁷ European Political Cooperation, “Document 4b/63 Declaration on the Situation in Yugoslavia, Extraordinary European Political Cooperation Ministerial Meeting, The Hague, 5 July 1991,” 1991.

¹⁸ United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 713,” accessed April 27, 2017, [http://undocs.org/S/RES/713\(1991\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/713(1991)).

¹⁹ Jović, *Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away*, 18–19; Michael Rose, *Fighting for Peace, Bosnia 1994* (Harvill Press, 1998).

²⁰ Slavenka Drakulić, *The Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War* (Harper Perennial, 1993).

²¹ Abramowitz and Rupnik, *The Western Balkans and the EU*.

²² European Parliament, “Resolution on the Situation in Yugoslavia,” Website, (July 10, 1991), <http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1b272015-a677-4d59-93e3-b394d81b0bd5/language-en>.

methods. The European Union explicitly conveyed the message that any political outcome will be acceptable as long it is the result of “negotiations in good faith²³”.

Standard EU negotiating meant utilizing very similar methods of communication with all sides. The president of the European council, Jacques Poos of Luxembourg, sent a letter to each of the newly elected leaders of Croatia, FR Yugoslavia, and Slovenia – Tudjman, Milošević, and Milan Kučan. The letters had very similar structures. It started with a section calling the leader to meet with a European Troika of ministers on short notice. It continued by presenting three identical demands in bullet points, asking for a ceasefire, prohibiting declarations of independence, and restoring the constitutional order²⁴. The sides in conflict were to be supervised by Europe and preserve peace by adhering to the normative structure approved by Europe. He called upon the states to assume responsibility and realize the impact the conflict could have upon stability in Europe.

The impartial mediator had achieved its first success in Slovenia. The warring sides reached a ceasefire agreement. Even in ending the conflict in Slovenia, Europe was securing that there were no immediate spillover effects into the adjacent states of Yugoslavia. European involvement in negotiating resulted in a minimum of a three-month moratorium on declaring independence. The moratorium was applied not only to the Slovenian republic but also to Croatia. The settlement of the conflict in Slovenia was quick and did not result in further violence in the country. Europe congratulated itself for “the efforts made by the European Community to promote peace” and perceived the deal to provide universal benefits of peace if “it is respected by all the parties concerned²⁵”. However, war had soon spread to Croatia and eventually into Bosnia. The resolution of these conflicts would prove much more difficult to achieve.

Europe continued towards establishing new expert bodies. The Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia was formed on 27 August 1991 to provide expert legal advice

²³ European Political Cooperation, “Document 4b/65 Declaration on Yugoslavia, European Political Cooperation Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting, The Hague, 19 September 1991,” 1991.

²⁴ Jacques Poos, “Lettres Du Président Du Conseil Des Ministres, M. J. F. Poos Au Premier Ministre Markovic, Président Milosevic, Président Kučan et Président Tudjman, Concernant La Situation En Yougoslavie,” June 30, 1991.

²⁵ European Parliament, “Joint Resolution on the Situation in Yugoslavia,” *Official Journal of the European Communities* 34, no. c 240 (1991): 137.

concerning several issues of secession from Yugoslavia. The decision-making body of this institution was comprised of five presidents of European constitutional courts and chaired by French legal expert Robert Badinter. The conclusions of the Commission, formed based on the presumed immense expertise of Europe leading legal authorities, while not legally binding, were meant to be used as the basis for collective European policy²⁶. The decisions of the Commission formed two essential principles of European policy towards Yugoslavia in the war. First, the borders delineating the constitutive republics of Yugoslavia are not to be altered in any way other than by international agreement between the border sharing states. Second, high levels of protection of minorities and guarantees of human right were necessary conditions for separating from Yugoslavia.

Croatia was, even with a referendum already being held, asked to officially commit to applying higher standards of democracy. An explicit written commitment towards instituting legal protection for minorities in the country, provided by Croatian President Tuđman to the President of the European Commission, was a requirement to gaining European support for declaring independence. The Commission recommended that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not to be recognized as an independent state without a referendum decision for secession. The European Union took on this idea and demanded a referendum to be held in the country and expressed the need for identical standards to apply for all potentially splintering constitutive republics²⁷.

Concurrently, the Croatian side was urging the European Community to adopt a more determined tone of discourse against the Serbians. Croatian President Mesić submitted a list of observed violent incidents against the Croatian population and submitted a list of demands for European discourse. Most notably, President Mesić asked that Europe call upon Serbia to stop organizing and supporting armed aggression against Croatia²⁸. Europe took a more conciliatory discursive position. In August of 1991., the ministers gathered in Brussels acknowledged a connection between the Yugoslavian National Army and the violent incidents. It also called upon the Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia to stop forces under its control. It still did not attribute a project of violation to the Serbs.

²⁶ Matthew C.R. Craven, "The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia," *The British Year Book of International Law* 66, no. 1 (1996): 2–3.

²⁷ Craven, "The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia."

²⁸ Stjepan Mesić, *The Demise of Yugoslavia: A Political Memoir* (Central European University Press, 2004).

Recognition of the reality that European guided measures have not been resulting in the necessary outcomes for peace begin to appear in official sources in 1991. One of the Declarations on Yugoslavia declaring that “the EC monitor mission is no longer able to perform its task in full²⁹”. The Union still has a burden of not being viewed as powerful and capable to resolve conflicts. The European Union publicly admits being under high “expectations of peoples who, on the basis of its economic power and size, overestimate its power to prevent and resolve conflicts³⁰”. These expectations have caused the Union to become hopeful that it can be the same force diplomatically as it is economically, that it can “develop methods to promote the convergence of foreign policy, as it has done with economic policy³¹”. It was to become a normative guardian, taking on the duty to “protect human and minority rights in Europe” and condition the sides in conflict “by the extent to which the individual republics are prepared to respect such rights³²”. Europe was now to set the rules of reconciliation on its own.

But at the same time, Europe was about to face strong member dissent from its intended collective approach. Germany recognized Croatia as an independent state in December of 1991, contrary to the Union position. It justified its decision by appealing to the rapidly increasing levels of violence in Yugoslavia, requiring action even if its damages progress towards normative transference. German dissent from European foreign policy on the question of recognition was caused by “a spiral of mistrust³³”. Mistrust was being exacerbated by differing understandings of what European norms are and underdeveloped foreign policy institutions for the Union. Germany was not disputing the validity of its findings or expertise. It found European collective action too slow and indecisive for the situation at hand³⁴. It was seeing Europe as needing to intensify its discourse to preserve human lives and prospects of successful democracy.

²⁹ European Political Cooperation, “Document 4b/65 Declaration on Yugoslavia, European Political Cooperation Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting, The Hague, 19 September 1991.”

³⁰ European Parliament, “Resolution on Relations between the European Community and the Republics of the Former Yugoslavia” 35, no. C 176 (January 31, 1992): 203.

³¹ Ibid.

³² European Parliament, “Joint Resolution on the Situation in Yugoslavia.”

³³ Beverly Crawford, “Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral Recognition of Croatia,” *World Politics* 48, no. 4 (July 1, 1996): 485.

³⁴ Ibid.

5.3 The Second Phase

In the first phase the European Union discourse declared all the warring national governments equally capable and responsible to contain and counteract factions in their communities driving the violence. It specifically maintained rhetoric of equally calling upon the new governments to rein in military and para-military forces³⁵. The war continued and was soon causing massive casualties in Bosnia, as the official conflict there began in mid-1992. No negotiated peace or enduring ceasefire happened under European mediation. The Serbs and the Serbian state were not yet singled out as the disruptive actor in the conflict. This begins to change in 1992. The European Council states that “although all parties have contributed, in their own way, to the present, by far the greatest share of the responsibility falls on the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav army controlled by it³⁶”. The primary intended solutions remain tied to negotiating and especially the work of the Conference on Yugoslavia. The Conference is highlighted as “the only forum capable of ensuring a durable and equitable solution to the outstanding problems of the former Yugoslavia³⁷”. But the negotiations were perceived as overwhelmingly disrupted by one side. The London negotiations of the Conference saw most European officials single out Serbia as the driver of the conflict and the party disrupting a peace deal³⁸.

The European Union position on recognizing Croatia and Bosnia changed in 1992, as both states were granted independence. This angered prominent Union officials. Lord Carrington expressed disappointment that “there was no carrot³⁹” left to influence the behavior of the warring sides. He, being Europe’s chief negotiator at the time, expressed immense disappointment in decisions to recognize Croatia and Slovenia without securing human, civil and political rights for minorities, declaring the episode to be „our greatest failure⁴⁰“. But this viewpoint no longer matched the Union discursive approach. Carrington quit his position that same year.

³⁵ European Political Cooperation, “Document 4b/67 Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, European Political Cooperation, Brussels, 11 April 1992,” 1991.

³⁶ European Council, “Document 4b/68 Declaration by the European Council on Former Yugoslavia, Lisbon, 26–27 June 1992,” 1992.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ “La conférence de Londres La Serbie a été condamnée par la plupart des orateurs,” *Le Monde.fr*, August 28, 1992, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1992/08/28/la-conference-de-londres-la-serbie-a-ete-condamnee-par-la-plupart-des-orateurs_3893107_1819218.html.

³⁹ Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, *Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant* (Free Press, 1999), 267.

⁴⁰ Doder and Branson, *Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant*, 268.

The states of Europe were moving away from seeking to attract towards trying to punish. Serbia was beginning to be perceived as commanding an extremely villainous project across the former Yugoslavia. The Serbian administration in Belgrade is not only condoning mass rape in Bosnia but purposefully commanding the campaign as a means of waging war against the Bosniak people⁴¹. Europe recognizes itself as having acted too slowly and indecisively in the past and was committing to “match their words with deeds⁴²”. It now explicitly portrayed itself as able to mount “effective measures to stop these crimes and those who commit them⁴³”. Economic sanctions shifted from being applied to all sides to being extended to FR Yugoslavia alone as punishment for not working on a peace deal and continued threats against recognized borders⁴⁴. Serbia continued being specifically targeted by threats of even tighter sanctions⁴⁵. The European Community explicitly banned the state from future meetings of the Conference on Yugoslavia⁴⁶. The continuing violence and lack of a peace deal was the fault of one side.

Europe constantly in this phase increases the discursive pressure on the Serbs. European rhetoric became more suggestive towards the use of force for ending the conflict. However, in doing this it overlooked essential flaws. It consistently remained unclear what force the Union was referring to. The more aggressive messages Europe was sending to the Serbs were vague. Threatening that Europe would not “exclude military means⁴⁷” did not obscure the lack of independent European Community military resources. Europe, as an international organization, had no means to strike with. The Western European Union was sending in a police contingent which the EU began to

⁴¹ Beverly Allen, *Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia* (Minneapolis, Minn.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1996).

⁴² European Parliament, “Resolution on the Impending Catastrophe in Bosnia and the Violation of Human Rights in Former Yugoslavia,” *Official Journal of the European Communities* 35 (1992), <http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1ae9071f-6399-43fb-90e1-9d98327258ac/language-en/format-HTML>.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EEC) No 990/93 of 26 April 1993 Concerning Trade between the European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),” Website, (April 26, 1993), <http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/fee1c622-7f5a-4fa2-855f-c9ab2ec59f87/language-en/format-PDF>.

⁴⁵ “Serbia Threatened with Tighter Sanctions,” *The New York Times*, December 12, 1993, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/12/world/serbia-threatened-with-tighter-sanctions.html>.

⁴⁶ Michael Parenti, *To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia* (London: Verso, 2002), 27.

⁴⁷ “Après l’ultimatum de M. Boutros-Ghali à la Serbie Les Douze ‘ n’excluent pas des moyens militaires ’ en Bosnie pour accompagner leur action humanitaire,” *Le Monde.fr*, accessed May 9, 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1992/06/28/apres-l-ultimatum-de-m-boutros-ghali-a-la-serbie-les-douze-n-excluent-pas-des-moyens-militaires-en-bosnie-pour-accompagner-leur-action-humanitaire_3909451_1819218.html.

finance. But, again, there is no realization of an independent EU military engagement. The lack of autonomous, Union, military forces stays an obvious barrier to discursive action matching rhetoric. All sides, even the villainous one, are still primarily being invited to negotiate under Union auspices. The primary means of discourse are still diplomatic declarations appealing to sides in the conflict as they are a regularly used tool of exerting influence. They are, however, now much more focused on one actor. The European Parliament issued documents demanding that the new, Serbian, Yugoslavia stop all pretensions upon “foreign soil”⁴⁸. The independent Bosnia was to be created with a „mixed population“, and the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia should settle on the idea of living within these independent states holding a „special status“⁴⁹. These declarations had little noticeable effect upon halting the violence and numbers of killed or missing people were increasing⁵⁰.

There was now a discursive connection being made between the Serbian other and the perceived violent history of the Balkans. The new, smaller, Serbo-Montenegrin Yugoslavia was, in discourse propagated by European officials, the source of “a virulent strain of hatred” stemming from, as former Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel expressed, “a long-forgotten history coming back to haunt us”⁵¹. Serbs, carrying out a vision of rampant nationalism spurred by the consequences of the death kneel of Socialism, were now a dire and exclusive threat to essential European principles taking hold in the region.

Europe was forming an ex-Yugoslavian coalition against the Serbs. Croatian forces, themselves engaged in violent conflict with Bosnian armed forces, were being called upon to end these hostilities and engage against the Serbs united. The formation of a coalition was to be conducted, again, under close European assistance and supervision.

⁴⁸ “Boycottée par la communauté internationale La création d’une ‘troisième Yougoslavie’ a été accueillie dans l’indifférence à Belgrade,” *Le Monde.fr*, April 29, 1992, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1992/04/29/boycotee-par-la-communaute-internationale-la-creation-d-une-troisieme-yougoslavie-a-ete-accueillie-dans-l-indifference-a-belgrade_3904377_1819218.html.

⁴⁹ “BOSNIE Lord Owen ‘porteur de nouvelles sombres’ devant l’Assemblée du Conseil de l’Europe,” *Le Monde.fr*, October 6, 1992, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1992/10/06/bosnie-lord-owen-porteur-de-nouvelles-sombres-devant-l-assemblee-du-conseil-de-l-europe_3899433_1819218.html.

⁵⁰ Ewa Tabeau, ed., *Conflict in Numbers: Casualties of the 1990s Wars in the Former Yugoslavia (1991–1999)* (Belgrade, 2009), <http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/testimonies33.pdf>.

⁵¹ John F. Burns, “THE WORLD; New, Virulent Strains of Hatred in the Balkans, and Beyond,” *The New York Times*, May 3, 1992, sec. Week in Review, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/03/weekinreview/the-world-new-virulent-strains-of-hatred-in-the-balkans-and-beyond.html>.

Serbia was to be punished for “its aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina⁵²” and now required “relentless pressure⁵³” put upon it to enforce peace in the future. The European Union, presenting itself as a neutral and capable actor in the conflict’s resolution, has, on multiple instances, delivered the most appropriate plan for peace. But one side continuously refused to accept it. Serbian actions in the war are perceived as guided towards achieving a single goal – the “Great Serbia”. This was the ultimate villainous project discourse in the EU saw itself fighting against. It was portrayed as carrying an irrational victimhood complex, aimed against the Western world. A European diplomat expressed disbelief that “almost everyone here has accepted the national illusion that this is a small heroic country which is being horribly and unfairly victimized” deeming the phenomenon as irrational and one that “that can be better understood by psychoanalysts than by politicians⁵⁴”.

Bosnia was viewed as not strong enough to ensure peace on its own. A peace deal in Bosnia was to be, in the words of then French Foreign Minister Alan Juppé a “global peace⁵⁵”. The only possibility of a peaceful outcome for Bosnia is the deal “tabled in Geneva⁵⁶”. The entire international community was to provide what the region desperately needed – the cessation of violence from the Serbs. Europe was to establish a special partnership with the country to ensure its ability to overcome aggression. Europe views as necessary the “total isolation⁵⁷” of Serbs in Bosnia. European foreign ministers now meet with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović exclusively and prepared for negotiations so they can achieve “benefit for the Muslims⁵⁸”.

⁵² “Boycottée par la communauté internationale La création d’une ‘troisième Yougoslavie’ a été accueillie dans l’indifférence à Belgrade.”

⁵³ Alan Riding, “EUROPEANS URGED TO PRESSURE SERBS,” *The New York Times*, April 6, 1993, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/06/world/europeans-urged-to-pressure-serbs.html>.

⁵⁴ Stephen Kinzer, “The Nightmare’s Roots: The Dream World Called Serbia,” *The New York Times*, May 16, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/16/weekinreview/the-nightmare-s-roots-the-dream-world-called-serbia.html>.

⁵⁵ “Un entretien avec le ministre des affaires étrangères M. Juppé relance l’idée d’un ‘plan de paix global’ pour la Bosnie,” *Le Monde.fr*, February 24, 1994, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1994/02/24/un-entretien-avec-le-ministre-des-affaires-etrangees-m-juppe-relance-l-idee-d-un-plan-de-paix-global-pour-la-bosnie_3798673_1819218.html.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ “Les ministres européens veulent obtenir l’‘isolement total’ des Serbes de Bosnie,” *Le Monde.fr*, September 13, 1994, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1994/09/13/les-ministres-europeens-veulent-obtenir-l-isolement-total-des-serbes-de-bosnie_3818663_1819218.html.

⁵⁸ “La situation dans l’ex-Yougoslavie Les Douze lancent un appel à Copenhague pour la mise en oeuvre des zones de sécurité,” *Le Monde.fr*, June 23, 1993, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1993/06/23/la-situation-dans-l-ex-yougoslavie-les-douze-lancent-un-appel-a-copenhague-pour-la-mise-en-oeuvre-des-zones-de-securite_3951723_1819218.html.

European Union foreign ministers entered the partnership with aggressive rhetorical commitment to assist “using all the means necessary⁵⁹”.

Documents on the conflict issued by the European Union very often eschewed using the official name of the Serbian and Montenegrin state, then called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Instead it frequently refers to this state as the “Serbian state⁶⁰”. They also eschewed using the names of individual political leaders, utilizing the name “Serbs” or Serbia.

5.4 The Third Phase

European discourse was entering its third phase in 1994.

As the war continued Europe was facing the issue of it having major consequences upon Union and member state interests. The European Union engaged every phase of the conflict as a substantively divided actor. It was unable to reach an agreement on to what extent it should be involved, on what demands to make and how to prioritize the pursuit of effective norms over protecting material interests. The material interests were now understood as more endangered than ever. Europe was now trying to settle with preserving them over hopes of normative transference.

Europe was facing a refugee crisis of possibly monumental proportions. Academic discussion over the Bosnian refugee issue was now frequently drawing comparisons to the Hungarian refugees from the extreme political unrest of the 1950s and the Jewish movement resulting from the Second World War⁶¹. Over 500000 individuals sought refugee status in the states of Europe⁶². The counter offensive against the Serbs illuminated further refugee issues for the

⁵⁹ Roger Cohen, “CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; European Union Fails to Set Deadline to Lift the Siege,” *The New York Times*, February 8, 1994, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/08/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-european-union-fails-to-set-deadline-to-lift-the-siege.html>.

⁶⁰ European Parliament Directorate-General for Research, “The Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia” (Directorate-General for Research, 1993), [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/1993/457080/DG-4-AFET_ET\(1993\)457080_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/1993/457080/DG-4-AFET_ET(1993)457080_EN.pdf).

⁶¹ Jasna Čapo, *Strangers Either Way: The Lives of Croatian Refugees in Their New Home*, Berghahn Series (Berghahn Books, 2007).

⁶² Michael Barutciski, “EU States and the Refugee Crisis in the Former the Yugoslavia,” *Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees* 14, no. 3 (1994), <http://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/download/21820/20489>.

Western states. The violence against Serbs, along with the rapidly deteriorating war time economy, drove the understanding that huge numbers of the Serbs, not just Bosniaks and Croats, will be forced to leave their country for developed states. Victimization resulting in refugee status was not at all limited to one ethnic group. A wider body of refugee status seekers meant even further potential costs for the admitting states of the European Union. The newly resettling victims of the Yugoslavian war were often burdened with extreme trauma in need of treatment that required more resources to manage⁶³. Many states had been imposing sharp restrictions on asylum status seekers coming from Yugoslavia, citing excessive costs⁶⁴. All of this resulted in some European states “quietly subtracting themselves from international obligations concerning refugees⁶⁵”.

The costs of assisting the recovery of the Balkan states was steep. Europe had committed itself to being the primary future actor in financing the Bosnian state in post-war rebuilding⁶⁶. It had also committed to providing resources for reconstruction in Serbia and Croatia. European member states and other countries of the continent were expressing dissatisfaction with the material damage to their economies. Greece repeatedly asked for assistance in recovery from the damages of the war⁶⁷. In the timeline of the third phase many more states voiced such concerns more frequently⁶⁸. The war in Yugoslavia stimulated the creation of an expansive smuggling network,

⁶³ Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović, *Women, Violence and War: Wartime Victimization of Refugees in the Balkans* (Central European University Press, 2000); Solvig Ekblad, “Psychosocial Adaptation of Children While Housed in a Swedish Refugee Camp: Aftermath of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” *Stress Medicine* 9, no. 3 (1993): 159–166, doi:10.1002/smi.2460090306; M. Bogic et al., “Factors Associated with Mental Disorders in Long-Settled War Refugees: Refugees from the Former Yugoslavia in Germany, Italy and the UK,” *The British Journal of Psychiatry* 200, no. 3 (March 1, 2012): 216–23.

⁶⁴ Danièle Joly, *Haven or Hell?: Asylum Policies and Refugees in Europe*, Migration Minorities and Citizenship (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016).

⁶⁵ Barutciski, “EU States and the Refugee Crisis in the Former the Yugoslavia,” 35.

⁶⁶ European Parliament, “Resolution on the Situation in Former Yugoslavia,” Website, (April 18, 1996), <http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/31dcd699-aed0-4280-9339-42c0399736fe/language-en/format-HTML>.

⁶⁷ European Parliament, “Question No 6 by Mr STAMOULIS (H-1294/93) to the Council: The War in Yugoslavia and Its Impact on Greece,” Website, (January 3, 1994), <http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5d3955e0-2426-4c0c-bc5b-bbee8ece680b/language-en>; Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EEC) No 990/93 of 26 April 1993 Concerning Trade between the European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).”

⁶⁸ Marko Hajdinjak, *Smuggling in Southeast Europe: The Yugoslav Wars and the Development of Regional Criminal Networks in the Balkans* (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002), https://books.google.hu/books?id=srjE2eFi_nsC.

harming the neighboring economies of members states⁶⁹. Continued war was only to make these costs steeper.

Europe was settling on no longer conceptualizing Serbs as the distinct other. The Serbs were no longer commanding a villainous project across the former Yugoslavian space. The Serbian side was now being portrayed more as unable to assert control over extremist forces. The European Union presented itself as willing to its regime in reasserting some degree of control. This was packaged with recognizing Slobodan Milošević as an acceptable partner. An unnamed Western diplomat expressed that “whatever Milosevic was in the past he is now saying and doing all the right things⁷⁰”. This rapprochement did not imply complete absolution for Milošević. He was still construed as a tyrant, repressing his people, but this was no longer a reason to not collaborate with him. Normative concerns of transferring democracy were no longer brought up in discourse.

Prominent European politicians were returning to highlighting that the entire Balkans are a long-troubled region. The people of the former Yugoslavia were driven to conflict by enduring, mutual hatred between ethnic communities. Now, like in the first phase, Serbs had no exclusive blame to shoulder. Croatian and Bosniak communities were themselves castigated as insufficiently reasonable. And this hatred was a leading culprit for dismantling the Union’s attempts at creating a peace deal. Europe had to settle. These new states were, in Lord Owen’s interpretation, still “locked in history⁷¹”. Even discourse on Bosnia showed signs of exclusive othering. Europe was afraid of, as worded by a German official, a “festering Islamic problem⁷²”.

Actors other than the Serbs were now being singled out as detrimental to finally achieving a peace deal. The European Parliament emphasizes, as the very first point in its 1996 resolution, that “a failure of the Muslim-Croat Federation would put the entire peace agreement in jeopardy⁷³”. Sides opposing the Serbs were now being called upon to be rational, accept the

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Chris Hedges, “Prospects for Change, Not Hope,” *The New York Times*, December 1, 1996, <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/01/weekinreview/prospects-for-change-not-hope.html>.

⁷¹ Norman Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy Of “ethnic Cleansing,”* Eastern European Studies (Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 12.

⁷² Saadia Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years, 1990 - 95*, Advances in Political Science (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), 115.

⁷³ European Parliament, “Resolution on the Situation in Former Yugoslavia.”

terms put forth by Europe and finally end the war. The familiar talking point of irrationality driving the rejection of Union peace deals resurfaces for all the Yugoslavian actors. For Europe, war has been going on for too long, has caused too much damage for all parties and a rational actor should easily recognize that it should end as soon as possible.

All the warring sides were responsible for not pursuing peace. All the warring sides had responsibility for atrocities committed. Bosnia was now being portrayed as also wanting the conflict to continue. Where previously the Serbian side was highlighted as the actor driving the violence, now all parties were held responsible. The European Union was now issuing reports on the violence incurred against the Serbian population. It voices a new, explicit concern for “Serb lands” that “continue to be torched and looted⁷⁴”.

International actors from outside the EU were seeing Bosnia forced to fight with little and fight alone⁷⁵.

The Union was making a turn back towards being impartial. Conversations surrounding the war still seemingly recognized that “impartiality is impossible”⁷⁶. But European officials are now the leading voices for engaging all sides in dialogue again. Lord Owen, chief European negotiator for the peace plan in 1995, publicly committed to remaining “inflexible on the notion of impartiality⁷⁷”.

As material concern became more apparent for member states, support for united European solutions for Yugoslavia further dwindled. Foreign ministers of the European Union, spearheaded by British representatives, rejected calls of French officials for reinforcing Bosniak enclaves under assault⁷⁸. Disunity also nullified related initiatives for troops for Europe to be

⁷⁴ Parenti, *To Kill a Nation*, 72.

⁷⁵ “Le conflit dans l’ex-Yougoslavie Les Bosniaques s’apprêtent à résister seuls,” *Le Monde.fr*, December 1, 1994, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1994/12/01/le-conflit-dans-l-ex-yougoslavie-les-bosniaques-s-apprentent-a-resister-seuls_3851674_1819218.html.

⁷⁶ “L’impossible impartialité face au conflit bosniaque,” *Le Monde.fr*, June 21, 1995, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1995/06/21/l-impossible-impartialite-face-au-conflit-bosniaque_3866677_1819218.html.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Craig R. Whitney, “CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: IN BRUSSELS; DISUNITY IMPERILS FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR BOSNIA FORCE,” *The New York Times*, July 18, 1995, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/18/world/conflict-balkans-brussels-disunity-imperils-french-proposal-for-bosnia-force.html>.

engaged in Goražde or for the breaking of the Sarajevo blockade⁷⁹. European unity over foreign policy was now even more difficult to achieve as its leaders looked inward and blamed “the lack of our own decisiveness⁸⁰”.

Even the most violent act of the entire war, The Srebrenica Genocide, did not mean more intense othering of the Serbs. Official EU documents were now singling out individuals rather than warring ethnic communities. For instance, a European Parliament resolution expressed concern that “war criminals like Mladic and Karadzic⁸¹” were holding political office without naming the state nor the ethnicity they were representing. When speaking on the establishment of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the European Parliament was separating the culpability of Republika Srpska from Serbia as well as equally and sequentially castigating all warring sides, including Croatia and Bosnia, for not bringing enough indicted individuals to trial⁸².

The European Union was settling on the realization that Bosnia, the desired protected partner, was dissociating from the Union. The European Union was being perceived as unwilling to substantively help the Bosnian war effort. There was a strong perception within Bosnia that the war was being controlled and artificially prolonged by the international community. Bosniaks began regularly expressing such sentiment to foreign media. A gravely injured victim of the siege of Sarajevo opined to the New York Times that “Somebody needs this war; somebody needs the encirclement of Sarajevo⁸³”. Bosnia wanted the power to fight for itself. A general staff member of the Bosnian army, when speaking to the same paper, rejected the reliance upon European and Western protection to independently fight “be able to live where we have always lived⁸⁴”. Voices in Bosnia were also raised against the perceived ethnic division to Serbs and

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ European Parliament, “Resolution on the Situation in Former Yugoslavia.”

⁸² European Parliament, “Resolution on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Website, (November 14, 1996), <http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b84a6da0-c28c-4df5-b7cc-48ae11ffbfa3/language-en/format-HTML>.

⁸³ Roger Cohen, “In Sarajevo, Victims of a ‘Postmodern’ War,” *The New York Times*, May 21, 1995, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/21/world/in-sarajevo-victims-of-a-postmodern-war.html>.

⁸⁴ Chuck Sudetic, “As Bosnians Gain Militarily, They Lose Status as Victims,” *The New York Times*, January 23, 1994, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/23/world/as-bosnians-gain-militarily-they-lose-status-as-victims.html>.

Muslims Europe was supposed to be conducting in its discourse⁸⁵. The at-the-time prime minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris Silajdžić, even accused the international community of supporting the “Great Serbia” ideal⁸⁶, singling out France, and condemning the „anti-islamic syndrome that exists in Europe⁸⁷“.

The Union was unwilling to follow US calls for arming Bosnia. Providing Bosnia with more weaponry was invoking immense danger to the establishment of a peace deal. Such actions would “only fuel the cycle of violence to the detriment of the search for a negotiated peace settlement, which is the only durable solution to the conflict among the Bosnian communities⁸⁸”. Enduring European hopes of a deal recognized as universally beneficial were being ousted as harmful. Discourse coming from international institutions other than the Union was countering European discourse, expressing support for Bosnian self-defense. The Union’s pursuits of a mutually agreed upon peace deal were often portrayed as obsessive. They were also viewed as too forgiving to the Serbian side and now insufficiently protective of Bosnia. Bosnia was being understood as forced into an unfavorable position by the Union. A United Nations official castigated European directives for a peace plan at any cost, declaring that the Bosniaks had “no reason to stop fighting for a peace plan they know is unjust⁸⁹”.

Europe was settling on not being the primary international mediator to a peace in Yugoslavia. Following a military campaign against Serbian forces, The United States took on the ultimate power of convening a peace conference, held in Dayton, Ohio in 1996. The conference resulted in a deal to finally end the war. Europe ended up not spearheading the achievement of peace. It was instead being forced to settle with being sidelined as a peace maker. Union officials took on the task of downplaying the significance of United States in the peace deal, blaming the country

⁸⁵ “La détresse des Musulmans bosniaques Les Slaves islamisés que le fondamentalisme ne tente guère, comptent avant tout sur l’Europe, mais ils commencent à désespérer,” *Le Monde.fr*, accessed May 29, 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1992/09/02/la-detresse-des-musulmans-bosniaques-les-slaves-islamises-que-le-fondamentalisme-ne-tente-guere-comptent-avant-tout-sur-l-europe-mais-ils-commencent-a-desesperer_3894563_1819218.html.

⁸⁶ “Le premier ministre accuse la communauté internationale de soutenir la ‘Grande Serbie,’” *Le Monde.fr*, October 22, 1994, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1994/10/22/bosnie-herzegovine-le-premier-ministre-accuse-la-communaute-internationale-de-soutenir-la-grande-serbie_3541532_1819218.html.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Richard W. Stevenson, “Britain and France Criticize U.S. on Bosnia Positions,” *The New York Times*, November 29, 1994, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/29/world/britain-and-france-criticize-us-on-bosnia-positions.html>.

⁸⁹ Sudetic, “As Bosnians Gain Militarily, They Lose Status as Victims.”

for looking “at this affair in ex-Yugoslavia from a great distance for nearly four years and basically blocked the progression of things”⁹⁰. But simultaneously if conceded to seeing itself as a failure with French Minister of Foreign Affairs Hervé de Charette acknowledging that “this was a failure of the European Union”⁹¹.

Europe found itself discursively shifting to helping all sides, including the Serbs, in repairing the material damage caused by the war. Europe pushed that future aid programs to the war stricken Balkans be administered to all three warring sides⁹². The Union was reverting to its position as an economic power first.

The Union was no longer the main reason the war was to end and had given up on transforming the entire region to democratic standards and a high level of human rights protection it had instituted upon in the first phase. It would, however, seek to establish a foothold on at least a portion of the ex-Yugoslavia space. The European Union has established a strong influence upon governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the war. It still maintains an office of the High Representative in the country. The high Representative has overreaching veto powers in the legislative system and can remove national office holders and political representatives⁹³. The mandate has endured for over 20 years since the war’s end. However, the High Representative possesses a comparatively weaker mandate than in relation to UN administrators in Kosovo and East Timor⁹⁴. Bosnia and Herzegovina remains dependent on European Union aid and to the long accession process and the aftermath of the war has meant eventually beginning the process of Union integration for all previously warring sides. Europe retains a “special responsibility for this area” based on the EU’s own policy for Central and Eastern Europe⁹⁵. Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a state under close watch of the Union.

⁹⁰ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War: The Conflict in Yugoslavia—America’s Inside Story—Negotiating with Milosevic*, Modern Library Paperbacks (Random House Publishing Group, 2011).

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Craig R. Whitney, “1.23 Billion Is Pledged In New Aid For Bosnia,” *The New York Times*, April 14, 1996, <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/14/world/1.23-billion-is-pledged-in-new-aid-for-bosnia.html>.

⁹³ David Chandler, “Bosnia: The Democracy Paradox,” *Current History*, accessed May 28, 2017, <http://www.davidchandler.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Current-History-Democracy-Paradox.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Richard Caplan, “International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *Global Governance* 10, no. 1 (2004): 53–65.

⁹⁵ European Parliament, “Resolution on the Former Yugoslavia,” Website, (October 26, 1995), <http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1ae9071f-6399-43fb-90e1-9d98327258ac/language-en/format-HTML>.

6 Identifying the discursive pattern in the Ukraine conflict

Like the previous presenting of empirical findings, this section presents data identifying the pattern layout. The section begins with briefly introducing the background of the Ukrainian conflict with reflecting on the European Union's role. Following this, there is a three-part narrative detailing findings on European discourse relating to the conflict, testing the framework outlined in the general section.

6.1 Introducing the conflict

Following the Second World War the Soviet Union became the premier enemy of the Western world. Splitting the European continent in half, the two blocs kept the Cold War ongoing. However, the erosion of Soviet federal institutions along with decades of economic disappointment it could not reverse helped guide the Union into dissolution.

Unlike in the Balkans, the dissolution of the federal Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was not gained through war between the newly separating states. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR declared independence on 24 August 1991 with the entire Soviet Union dissolving on December 26th, 1991. The post-Soviet development of the new states took on different paths. The Baltic states pursued and eventually achieved European Union integration. Russia was still maintaining a terse relationship with Europe. While Russia has been resistant to joining mechanisms designed by the Union like the European Neighborhood Policy, it has gradually been establishing new arrangements in economic and political cooperation ever since the signing of The Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation on 24 June 1994 at the Corfu European Council. The Russian state entered several international agreements with the Union but simultaneously came in conflict over a wide variety of issues.

After leaving the Soviet Union, Ukraine was simultaneously keeping close economic, political, and cultural ties with Russia but also progressively drawing nearer to the West, especially the European Union. Before the violent conflict broke out in the country, the borders between Russia and Ukraine remained the same ever since the Soviet Union collapsed. This was about to be greatly challenged. Ukraine was much more dwarfed by Russia's political and economic power

than any remnant state of Yugoslavia was by the Serbian state. In 2013, at the onset of the Ukrainian crisis, Ukraine was supposed to sign a landmark international agreement with the European Union – the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement. The Union, expecting the deal to be signed, was faced with President Viktor Yanukovich refusing to sign the deal amid speculation of Russian pressure.

Almost immediately after the deal fell through, a series of protests emerged in Ukraine. Collectively titled “Euromaidan”, the movement asked for the deal to be signed and for the President to resign. Concurrently, the country saw campaigns for the continuation of prioritizing connections with Russia over the EU. This was the zenith of the conflict “between Western and Eastern conceptions of Ukrainian identity and the political agencies that promote them⁹⁶”. Ukraine was being split by the weight of choosing its primary partner.

In 2014 Ukraine was starting to be torn apart militarily. In February of that year, violent armed conflict began in the Crimean Peninsula. In March, the violence broke out in the Donetsk region with Luhansk following suit in April.

6.2 The First Phase

The post-Lisbon European Union was once more engaging a foreign conflict.

Again, like during the “hour of Europe”, the Union portrayed the Ukrainian conflict as a “major test⁹⁷”, an opportunity to assert itself as an actor capable of influencing the conflict towards peaceful resolution as it had tried to do in the past.

Even despite the political turmoil of Ukraine seemingly choosing over European integration and disquieting Russia, the context in which violent conflict broke out did not immediately signal to the Union that immense disruption was about to manifest. The European Union had in the previous years engaged both Russia and Ukraine in a series of international modes of cooperation. These were designed to overcome political, social, and economic

⁹⁶ Yitzhak M. Brudny and Evgeny Finkel, “Why Ukraine Is Not Russia: Hegemonic National Identity and Democracy in Russia and Ukraine,” *East European Politics and Societies* 25, no. 4 (November 2011): 820, doi:10.1177/0888325411401379.

⁹⁷ Gavin Hewitt, “Ukraine: Europe’s Major Test,” *BBC News*, March 17, 2014, sec. Europe, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606674>.

underdevelopment, bringing substantial mutual benefit to all sides. The premier example of this, the Union's flagship project of integration including Ukraine titled the European Neighborhood Policy, was discursively being described as bringing benefit to not just the official partner states (Ukraine being such a state) but to the entire region, including Russia, as the problems the entire European continent faces "have an inherent cross-border character and can be better tackled through a cooperative effort at regional level"⁹⁸. Union involvement in the former Soviet region was being portrayed as immensely beneficial to Russia, producing results on issues like financial aid, economic cooperation, environmental preservation, and other connected matters⁹⁹. Europe understood the Eastern Partnership as bringing "benefit of our neighbour but also to the benefit of the neighbour of our neighbours"¹⁰⁰.

The onset of the war was forcing Ukraine to make a "civilizational choice"¹⁰¹ between the European Union and Russia. The delayed signing of the association agreement left Ukraine stranded between two hotly engaged discourses. Europe was about to engage once more.

The crisis over the signing quickly spiraled into organized gangs of armed irregular fighters occupying land through large parts of the country. Russia had been very quickly discovered to support the irregular fighters in Crimea, even bolstering their ranks with active military personnel and securing self-proclaimed borders with Russian army members¹⁰². Despite this rapid escalation and military engagement, Europe tried a more conciliatory approach in official documents. The Union was portraying Russia as on basic common grounds with the Union on global issues. Despite seemingly backing two different factions in an armed conflict, both sides were deemed responsible for peace. The Union recognized in Russia "a common interest to

⁹⁸ European Commission and Directorate General Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid, "Panorama of EU Regional Programmes and Projects Eastern Partnership and Russia" (Publications Office of the European Union, 2013), 6.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ European Commission and Directorate General Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid, "Panorama of EU Regional Programmes and Projects Eastern Partnership and Russia."

¹⁰¹ Nicolai N. Petro, "Opinion | How the E.U. Pushed Ukraine East," *The New York Times*, December 3, 2013, sec. Opinion, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/opinion/how-the-eu-pushed-ukraine-east.html>.

¹⁰² Roland Oliphant, "Ukraine Crisis: On Crimea's New Border the Russian Army Waits," March 3, 2014, sec. World, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10674305/Ukraine-crisis-On-Crimeas-new-border-the-Russian-Army-waits.html>.

jointly address global security challenges¹⁰³” and invited it to help settle differences through dialogue.

Europe was already being countered by other Western actors in engaging the conflict as primary mediator. Leaked audio from the United States government dismissing Europe’s role in the resolution of conflict¹⁰⁴ already put pressure on the Union.

Europe was again discursively committing to take up the cause of protecting essential norms in a conflict. As the crux of Russia’s perceived issue with Ukraine was the process of European integration, the EU simultaneously attempted to not castigate Russia excessively but also highlight commitment to defending the process. President Grybauskaitė of Lithuania proclaimed that Ukraine is under attack “because of its European choice” and that through self-defense it also defends “Europe and its values¹⁰⁵”. Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt argued that “The principle of respecting existing borders was laid down as one of the key foundations of peace in our Europe¹⁰⁶”. Through committing to defend essential European principles it committed to assisting states outside of the Union to do the same. European policy towards Russia still sought to engage the country into highly institutionalized arrangements with a view of creating structures based on the EU’s norms and values¹⁰⁷.

Compared to the Yugoslavian conflict, officially recognizing Russia’s active role in having control over forces committing violence was much easier to do. The presence and activity of the Russian army in the region was swiftly admitted to by the Russian state¹⁰⁸. Like with Serbia, it was acknowledged that Russia commanded military forces that have committed violence but

¹⁰³ European Commission, “EU-Russia Summit (Brussels, 28 January 2014),” accessed May 31, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-58_en.htm.

¹⁰⁴ “‘Fuck the EU’: US Diplomat Victoria Nuland’s Phonecall Leaked - Video,” *The Guardian*, February 7, 2014, sec. US news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/feb/07/eu-us-diplomat-victoria-nuland-phonecall-leaked-video>.

¹⁰⁵ Chrystia Freeland, “Opinion | Why #RussiaInvadedUkraine Matters,” *The New York Times*, September 5, 2014, sec. Opinion, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/opinion/chrystia-freeland-why-russiainvadedukraine-matters.html>.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Hiski Haukkala, “From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations,” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 23, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 25–40, doi:10.1080/14782804.2014.1001822.

¹⁰⁸ Shaun Walker, “Russia Admits Its Soldiers Have Been Caught in Ukraine,” *The Guardian*, August 26, 2014, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/26/russia-admits-soldiers-in-ukraine>.

there was still no ascribing a directed project of norm violation. Russia was being called upon to establish control rather than take blame.

The United States took charge in applying more punitive measures towards the Russian Federation. Once again, Europe was following other international actors in applying sanctions. United States President Obama ordered sanctions to be imposed on the 6th of March. Europe applied its targeted sanctions of individuals on the 17th. Like in the process of administering sanctions in Yugoslavia, Europe was following another prominent international actor. The rest of 2014 only included sanctions targeted against individuals thought to be culpable for norm violation.

The European Union had been presenting itself as able to assist through expertise. The Support group for Ukraine was formed in April. The support group was to transfer solutions for “political and economic reforms that are necessary to stabilise the country¹⁰⁹”. The Union was deepening its contractual association with the Ukrainian administration. The previously rejected Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement was partially signed on the 21st of March and completely signed on the 27th of June. Even though it publicly sought no conflict with Russia it continued to further bequeath norms of European legislature to Ukraine.

Despite already having sanctions in place, all sides were- still to negotiate, “decrease the tensions immediately through dialogue” as the Union urged being the interlocutor for the now warring sides¹¹⁰. It was not getting an exclusive place as negotiator. As was the case in Yugoslavia, the conflicting sides came to a ceasefire agreement, this one brokered by the Ukrainian government and the separatist forces¹¹¹. And like in Yugoslavia these deals had little noticeable effect in stopping the violence, with the signed ceasefire being broken a mere two days later¹¹².

¹⁰⁹ “European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - Support Group for Ukraine,” accessed June 1, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-413_en.htm.

¹¹⁰ The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Developments in Ukraine’s Crimea,” March 1, 2014.

¹¹¹ Shaun Walker, “Ukraine Ceasefire ‘Agreed for East of Country’ at Minsk Peace Talks,” *The Guardian*, September 5, 2014, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/05/ukraine-ceasefire-east-minsk-peace-talks>.

¹¹² Shaun Walker, “Ukraine Ceasefire Breached in Donetsk and Mariupol,” *The Guardian*, September 7, 2014, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/eastern-ukraine-ceasefire-russia>.

6.3 The Second Phase

As soon as late 2014 priorities begin to shift as Europe's discourse begins being more confrontational. The discursive space in Europe begins to highlight a villainous project directed by Russia. Where official documents used to portray a strong Europe, unharmed by Russian action and supporting Ukraine as a normative guardian, the EU now seeks to highlight the damage Russia has done to the economic and political stability of its neighbors and the European Union itself. It also, in efforts of building consensus, attempts to appease all members to support European solutions through an engaged system of repairing Russia's damage. For instance, the Union has adopted a 28 million Euro support package for milk producers in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In introducing the package, the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, Phil Hogan, highlighted how the restrictions in market access for dairy producers directly imposed by the Russian state have led to worrying liquidity problems for Baltic producers¹¹³. The European support package covered the earnings difference between milk product revenue before and after the Ukraine war. Europe was there to cover all of Russia's damage. The 28 million have been used to cover disruptions in three national markets caused by Russian state decisions affecting only their own national market regulations. This is markedly unusual behavior for the EU. Previously, when announcing aid and development programs in agriculture it had avoided singling out states that caused the market situation Europe attempted to correct. When comparable trade disruption happened with other prominent non-member states like China the discourse takes on a much more neutral tone, not casting blame¹¹⁴. The need for more intense action against the villain state uses highly atypical rhetoric in discourse speaking on trade policy, an area almost exclusively devoid of language singling out guilty parties.

Ceasefire agreements were periodically instituted but reclamation of the splintering territories of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk or a lasting peace were still unattained. Blame for the lack of

¹¹³ European Commission, "Press Release - €28 Million Package for Baltic Milk Producers," accessed May 8, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1960_en.htm.

¹¹⁴ European External Action Service, "Remarks by the High Representative Mogherini Following the 7th EU-China Strategic Dialogue," *EEAS - European External Action Service*, accessed May 31, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/24821/Remarks by the High Representative Mogherini following the 7th EU-China Strategic Dialogue](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/24821/Remarks%20by%20the%20High%20Representative%20Mogherini%20following%20the%207th%20EU-China%20Strategic%20Dialogue); Xiudian Dai, *Understanding EU-China Relations: An Uncertain Partnership in the Making* (na, 2006), <http://www2.hull.ac.uk/FASS/PDF/Politics-Daipaper.pdf>; Angelos Pangratis, "EU Statement on 5th Trade Policy Review of China," accessed May 31, 2017, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149542.pdf.

substantive peace agreements was being cast onto Russia. Negotiation failed as there was “not enough flexibility from the Russian side¹¹⁵”. Russian failure to “meet their international and legal obligations” have stopped common progress towards “shared values and principles, such as democracy and rule of law, and on common interests¹¹⁶”.

The response for Europe was to increase pressure through further economic sanctions. Sanctions are applicable to much broader segments of the Russian economy than they were in the first phase. The EU is explicitly trying to punish for “actions undermining or threatening Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence¹¹⁷”.

The European Parliament noted that when Russia began involvement in harming the territorial integrity of Georgia in 2008 “the EU opted for an increased cooperation model as a way to continue the engagement with Russia, for their mutual benefit¹¹⁸”. This was no longer an option. Russia was to no longer be partnered with. The European Union was portraying itself as forced into a position where Russia “can no longer be treated as, or considered, a ‘strategic partner’¹¹⁹”. The Union was also portraying itself as an undivided actor, commending “the solidarity and unity demonstrated by the Member States in the context of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and direct involvement in the war in Ukraine, allowing the adoption and further extension of responsive measures¹²⁰”.

Perceptions of Russia were now portraying an actor interested in more than neighboring territory with a majority Russian ethnic population. The Russian villainous project has a massive reach. “This is not just about Ukraine. It’s about Moldova, it’s about Georgia,” said German Chancellor

¹¹⁵ Hans von der Burchard, “EU Bid to Appease Russia over Ukraine Deal Collapses,” *POLITICO*, December 21, 2015, <http://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-russia-fta-tade-eu/>.

¹¹⁶ European Parliament, “European Parliament Resolution of 10 June 2015 on the State of EU-Russia Relations,” Website, (June 10, 2015), <http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b2f7ca01-a222-11e6-8401-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF>.

¹¹⁷ Alec Luhn, “EU Poised to Cut Funding to Russia and Widen Sanctions over Ukraine Conflict,” *The Guardian*, July 16, 2014, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/16/eu-cut-funding-sanction-russia-ukraine-banks-assets>.

¹¹⁸ European Parliament, “European Parliament Resolution of 10 June 2015 on the State of EU-Russia Relations.”

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

Merkel. “If things carry on like this ... we will need to raise the issue of Serbia, of the states in the western Balkans¹²¹”.

Russia’s villainous project was being understood as immensely irrational, with no concrete goals in mind. European Council President Donald Tusk portrayed Russia’s policy as “simply to have enemies, to be stronger than them, to destroy them and to be in conflict¹²²”.

The Union felt compelled to release a “frequently asked questions” document to dismiss, as the most relevant question on the crisis in Ukraine, “Have the European Union and the West destabilized Ukraine?”, blaming Russia for not following “responsibility for peace and security on the European continent¹²³”. The Union was portraying Russia’s actions as deliberately secretive, seeing the country’s measures applied “without any rationale for their adoption or any forewarning of their existence¹²⁴”.

Leading European officials were communicating understandings of the Union as needing its own resources to match Russian aggression. The stated objective is to counter Russian projects more directly, using Union resources independently. The European Union’s diplomatic corps took on the task of countering Russia’s project of propaganda through promoting “EU policies and values¹²⁵”. The plan included explaining methods of training and “capacity building” but no explanation of what actual policies and values it sought to protect. It was not clear what exactly, other than territorial integrity, was Europe fighting for.

More controversially, Commission President Juncker called for the formation of a European Union army. Such a move was deemed needed for the purposes of persuading “Russia that it was

¹²¹ Ian Traynor, “European Leaders Fear Growth of Russian Influence Abroad,” *The Guardian*, November 17, 2014, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/17/european-leaders-fear-growth-russian-influence-angela-merkel-vladimir-putin>.

¹²² Ian Traynor, “Donald Tusk: Putin’s Policy Is to Have Enemies and to Be in Conflict,” *The Guardian*, March 15, 2015, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/15/donald-tusk-putins-policy-enemies-conflict-european-council-sanctions-russia>.

¹²³ European External Action Service, “EU Sanctions against Russia: Ukraine Crisis – Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),” *EEAS* -, accessed May 31, 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/4082/EU-Sanctions-against-Russia-Ukraine-Crisis-Frequently-Asked-Questions-FAQs.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Rikard Jozwiak, “EU to Counter Russian Propaganda by Promoting ‘European Values,’” *The Guardian*, June 25, 2015, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/25/eu-russia-propaganda-ukraine>.

serious about defending its values in the face of the threat posed by Moscow¹²⁶”. Even more importantly for European Union identity, the move was supposed to overcome its problem of not being “taken entirely seriously¹²⁷”. A common EU army was still not an appealing project for member states as Juncker’s proposal was almost unanimously dismissed by officials. Even though it had once again been facing a discursive villain, capacity building was not in sight.

6.4 The Third Phase

The final phase shift took place in 2016. as Europe was to again resign on normative concerns and seek partnership with the former villain for material repair. Like in the Yugoslavian war, Europe enters the third phase being faced with increasingly obvious danger to its essential material interests.

Again, a refugee crisis has seen Europe burdened. The refugee crisis of the Syrian war has so far resulted in over 900000 people applying for asylum in European states¹²⁸. In 2015 the number of asylum applications to the EU have increased over 5 times the number of applications in the previous decade¹²⁹. And again, member states have been split on the issue of norm prioritization, especially when it comes to the refugee issue. Accepting asylum applications is an enduring norm of international law but some member states have sought to circumvent or completely ignore essential norms¹³⁰. Fears of economic unsustainability, national culture disruption, and terrorism were categories of excuses now generated to avoid refugee intake.

Europe was being called upon settling that economic sanctions are to be removed. Many European member states and their citizens were calling for the end of sanctions, seeing them as

¹²⁶ Andrew Sparrow, “Jean-Claude Juncker Calls for EU Army,” *The Guardian*, March 8, 2015, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/08/jean-claude-juncker-calls-for-eu-army-european-commission-military>.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response,” *UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response*, accessed May 31, 2017, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php>.

¹²⁹ European Commission, “The EU and the Refugee Crisis,” 2016, <http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/refugee-crisis/en/>.

¹³⁰ Patrick Wintour, “Hungary Submits Plans to EU to Detain All Asylum Seekers,” *The Guardian*, February 7, 2017, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/07/hungary-submits-plans-automatically-detain-all-asylum-seekers-donald-trump-viktor-orban-zoltan-kovacs>.

harmful to their economies¹³¹, with the most direct challenge coming from France, whose Parliament passed a resolution called for the repeal of EU sanctions¹³².

Immense disruption of member state unity came with Brexit. Comparatively, Brexit has hurt the material prospects of more aggressive European engagement the most. Where British troops were the predominant military presence from the European continent in Yugoslavia, now they are leaving the Union altogether. This was a monumental event in Union history, leaving consequences that cannot yet be fully comprehended. While the details of Britain's further arranged relationship with the EU remain unknown, their participation in Union foreign policy will almost definitely be lessened.

Europe was once more promoting the idea of universal benefit to all sides over a desire to punish and blame Russia. German defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen called dialogue with Russia "in the interest of our neighbors" and invited the country to form a partnership "for combatting our common enemies¹³³". This is not a message of complete absolution to the Russian regime. Russia is still viewed as "a source of instability for Europe¹³⁴". But it is also commended for working towards a "reestablishment of a durable peace in Syria¹³⁵". Russia has become an acceptable, potentially critical actor in pacifying the civil war in the war-torn country. Even though Russia has been, by Europe's own acknowledgement, likely responsible for "war crimes¹³⁶" and causing civilian deaths in great numbers in Syria a strategic partnership between the two entities is now portrayed as necessary.

European officials no longer publicly attempt changing Russia's behavior through means like widening sanctions of threatening military action but primarily through, as Commission

¹³¹ "EU Sanctions Against Russia Under Pressure | International Affairs Review," accessed May 31, 2017, <http://www.iar-gwu.org/content/eu-sanctions-against-russia-under-pressure>; Gallup, "Russians, EU Residents See Sanctions Hurting Their Economies," *Gallup.com*, accessed May 11, 2017, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/191141/russians-residents-sanctions-hurting-economies.aspx>.

¹³² "Analyse Du Scrutin N° 1267 - Première Séance Du 28/04/2016 - Assemblée Nationale," accessed May 31, 2017, <http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/scrutins/detail/%28legislature%29/14/%28num%29/1267>.

¹³³ "En Europe, « c'est notre société ouverte qui est attaquée »,» *Le Monde.fr*, accessed May 29, 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/01/18/en-europe-c-est-notre-societe-ouverte-qui-est-attaquee_5064616_3214.html.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ "EU: Russian, Syrian Aleppo Bombing May Be 'War Crimes,'" *Al-Monitor*, October 17, 2016, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2016/10/syria-conflict-eu-russia-crimes.html>.

President Juncker declared, “continuing dialogue¹³⁷”. Even though Russia is still breaking norms within the state and outside its borders and economic sanctions remain in place, Juncker proclaimed his task to now be “building bridges¹³⁸”. The issue of European policy failing to change Russia’s norm breaking has been actively ignored. The same Juncker address at the 2016 St Petersburg international economic forum had the President not respond to the question whether sanctions changed Russia’s behavior¹³⁹.

Some officials from within the Union perceive the move towards Russia a vital threat. A group of six members of European Parliament signed an email declaring that Juncker’s actions “will strengthen Putin’s position and set a precedent for doing ‘business as usual’ with Putin’s regime while formally preserving the policy of sanctions¹⁴⁰”. Their communiqué did not result in change.

Much of the compromises Europe has been making with Russia come in the forms of agreements on energy supply. Where previously Europe sought to convene international talks with more ambitious ideas of achieving a peace agreement, it now pursues less lofty goals. Around 65% of EU’s gas is imported¹⁴¹. Russian supplies of gas remain an essential source for Europe. Partnering has gone as far as to reach deals where Russia sends gas into Europe intentionally bypassing Ukraine territory¹⁴².

States more distant from Russia have attempted to lower the expectation of more proximate, especially Baltic, states. Again, the development of the war has been presented as going unfavorably for Europe and unraveling in a way that brings excessive damage to the Union. The

¹³⁷ Alec Luhn, “Juncker Says Russia Visit Is to ‘Continue Dialogue’ despite Tensions,” *The Guardian*, June 16, 2016, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/16/juncker-russia-visit-sanctions-eu>.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid

¹⁴⁰ “MEPs Say Juncker’s Russia Trip Will ‘strengthen’ Putin,” *POLITICO*, June 1, 2016, <http://www.politico.eu/article/meps-say-jean-claude-juncker-russia-trip-will-strengthen-vladimir-putin-moscow/>.

¹⁴¹ European Commission, “Commission Welcomes New Rules to Secure Gas Supplies in Europe,” accessed May 8, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-766_en.htm.

¹⁴² Kenneth Rapoza, “For Europe Bound Gas, Russia Successfully By-Passing Ukraine,” *Forbes*, accessed June 1, 2017, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/12/30/for-europe-bound-gas-russia-successfully-by-passing-ukraine/>.

Baltic states, driven by a great sense of endangerment, demanded more substantive action. These calls have been answered by demands to “not ask for too much”¹⁴³.

Just like it was being castigated for insufficient support for Bosnia during the Yugoslavian war, the European Union was now facing accusations of insufficient support for the Ukrainian people. The Union repeatedly delayed appeals for allowing visa-free travel for Ukrainian citizens. Ukraine was insufficiently politically stable, economically secure to be granted further deals for integration. As it was losing Britain, the EU was also faced with a more distant Ukraine. The Union has repeatedly issued statements celebrating Ukraine’s progress in reforms¹⁴⁴. However, it had repeatedly delayed agreements on vital deals like visa-free travel. Issues over the EU integration process have harmed relations. Again, like in the Yugoslavian conflict, the European Union experiences increased difficulty in maintaining consensus over collective foreign policy. The Dutch voting populace refused agreement that would establish closer economic ties between Ukraine and the EU in a referendum vote¹⁴⁵. Ukrainian officials were publicly recognizing “complete impotence in the European Union¹⁴⁶”. Where Bosnia sought the United States as the new primary partner, Ukraine has been establishing dialogue with China, who takes on a discursive role resembling the commitment of Europe to play “a constructive role in promoting a political resolution to the crisis”¹⁴⁷. While the new partner is different, the basic mechanism remains the same. Both analyzed wars have seen the side Europe wants a special relationship with search for assistance elsewhere due to perceived insufficient support.

Clear European pursuit of its own interests has been manifested in a variety of ways. Even though Europe is not ready to completely neglect caring for norms in its discourse, it is willing to

¹⁴³ “Merkel Tells Eastern Partners Not to Expect Too Much,” *EurActiv.com*, July 22, 2015, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/merkel-tells-eastern-partners-not-to-expect-too-much/>.

¹⁴⁴ European Commission, “Ukraine’s Reform Achievements and the EU’s Support,” accessed May 8, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3573_en.htm; European Commission, “EU-Ukraine Summit: Strengthening Our Partnership and Highlighting Significant Reform Progress Achieved by Ukraine,” accessed May 8, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3988_en.htm; “European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - EU Report: Ukraine Carrying out Unprecedented Reforms,” accessed June 1, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4344_en.htm.

¹⁴⁵ Jennifer Rankin, “Dutch EU No Vote Has Worrying Lessons for Anti-Brexit Campaign,” *The Guardian*, April 7, 2016, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/07/dutch-eu-no-vote-worrying-lessons-anti-brexit-campaign-referendum>.

¹⁴⁶ “Ukraine Feels Let Down by EU with Visa Deal Elusive,” *VOA*, accessed May 31, 2017, <http://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-feels-let-down-by-eu-with-visa-deal-elusive/3625132.html>.

¹⁴⁷ “China’s Xi Says Willing to Help Resolve Ukraine Crisis,” *Reuters*, January 18, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-china-idUSKBN1520AN>.

collaborate with the former villainous Russia on a relevant set of projects. A meeting between High Representative Mogherini and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov had the Representative conceding that “there are some issues of disagreement. We are open and frank about that¹⁴⁸”. “Disagreement” even if it’s over essential norms like territorial integrity of an allied sovereign county is now viewed as not being an obstacle to joint pursuit of common interest.

The potential of Russia’s economic assistance has allowed for new avenues of settling. The European Union has supervised and approved the signing of a deal for a nuclear power plant backed by a 10 million Euro investment by the Russian state. The power plant contract came into being only after the Commission reversed its past position of not allowing the deal. It was challenged as contrary to EU state aid legislation. The Hungarian government provided undisclosed “substantial commitments¹⁴⁹” that now made the deal permissible.

Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom and the Union were reestablishing partnership. Gazprom was pointed out as in violation with several instances of European legislation but had an offer of commitment approved as it could “provide a forward looking solution to fix the issues we've found – and help to better integrate gas markets in the region¹⁵⁰”.

The message that Russia is acceptable again was being publicly broadcasted. High Representative Mogherini relayed the agreement between European ministers that Russia can be cooperated with when there is a “clear European interest¹⁵¹”.

Most interestingly, settling with Russian violations has been happening concurrently with accusations from Europe being brought against Russia over attempts at tampering with

¹⁴⁸ European External Action Service, “Remarks by HR/VP Mogherini at the Joint Press Conference with Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov,” *EEAS - European External Action Service*, accessed April 30, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/24982/Remarks by HR/VP Mogherini at the joint press conference with Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/24982/Remarks%20by%20HR/VP%20Mogherini%20at%20the%20joint%20press%20conference%20with%20Foreign%20Minister%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation%20Sergey%20Lavrov).

¹⁴⁹ “Hungary Gains Final EU Approval for Its Russian-Built Nuclear Power Plant,” *RT International*, accessed May 24, 2017, <https://www.rt.com/business/379706-hungary-russian-nuclear-reactor/>.

¹⁵⁰ European Commission, “Statement by Commissioner Vestager on Launching Market Test on Gazprom Commitments Concerning Central and Eastern European Gas Markets,” accessed May 8, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-590_en.htm.

¹⁵¹ “EU Wants to Boost Arctic Ties with Russia despite Ukraine Tensions,” *EurActiv.com*, April 27, 2016, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-wants-to-boost-arctic-ties-with-russia-despite-ukraine-tensions/>.

democratic procedure in the Western world. Russia has been the object of Union accusations of attempting to tamper with democracy on the continent¹⁵².

Again, Europe began to move away the referent object it previously sought to protect. Just like it moved away from committed protection of Bosnia, it has been moving away from a self-understanding of being Ukraine's protective partner.

Angela Merkel has stated that the European Union "must remain friends" with Russia "where possible"¹⁵³. Union discourse is acknowledging that it will continue to have disagreements on norms and practices Russia maintains but that this does not obstruct the need to partner with it on pressing issues.

The European Union did not completely abandon its prior commitments. The Union continues to not recognize the Republic of Crimea as well as the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. It continues to proclaim their declaration of independence as illegal, seeing itself as dedicated to "fully implementing its non-recognition policy"¹⁵⁴. But it concurrently keeps attempting to downplay Ukrainian and other ex-Soviet state calls for not associating with Russia and releasing international pressure. Ukraine was being circumvented for progress in relations with Russia. Like in Bosnia in the 90s, news of European considering a lift on sanctions against the villain in the war were very unfavorably received¹⁵⁵.

European practice now deems acceptable to see prominent norm violators as essential partners in resolving pressing issues endangering European interests.

Union policy was also willing to compromise on lifting sanctions on partners of Russia.

President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko, formerly proclaimed "Europe's last dictator", eased in 2016 with the European Union commending Belarus for its "constructive role in the region"

¹⁵² "La victoire d'Emmanuel Macron vue par la presse internationale," *Le Monde.fr*, accessed May 29, 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/05/08/la-victoire-d-emmanuel-macron-vue-par-la-presse-internationale_5124078_4854003.html.

¹⁵³ "Angela Merkel : « Nous, les Européens, devons prendre en main notre propre destin »,," *Le Monde.fr*, accessed May 29, 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/05/29/angela-merkel-nous-les-europeens-devons-prendre-en-main-notre-propre-destin_5135183_3214.html.

¹⁵⁴ "Declaration by the High Representative Federica Mogherini on Behalf of the EU on Crimea - Consilium," accessed May 31, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/17-hr-declaration-crimea/>.

¹⁵⁵ "Ukraine Angered by German Call to Lift Russia Sanctions," *EurActiv.com*, May 27, 2016, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/ukraine-angered-by-german-call-to-lift-russia-sanctions/>.

coming after Belarus hosted the four-party peace talks on Ukraine in Minsk¹⁵⁶. High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini denied this was a move motivated by help in negotiating with Russia, crediting “significant, even if limited steps, in what we feel is the right direction” for the easing but not pointing out what these commendable steps were¹⁵⁷. Just like in the case of Serbia during the Yugoslavia conflict, Russia was, as conceptions of being an unacceptable partner are phased out, being encouraged to rejoin negotiating¹⁵⁸.

Again, like in the Yugoslavian conflict, the United States were taking on Europe’s role as the aggressive discursive actor. The official Union position, contrary to the position of the United States, excluded the option of transferring weapons for Ukrainian fighting against opposing forces¹⁵⁹. The United States castigated the continuing plans for the “Nord Stream 2” pipeline project as threatening the economies of Ukraine¹⁶⁰. However, where during the Yugoslavian conflict, US military involvement meant a definitive turning point in the war, the new US President seems comparatively less eager to engage the villain militarily.

Violations of negotiated ceasefire agreements have remained a constant feature of the conflict¹⁶¹. The outcome of the Ukrainian conflict remains unknown. What is known is that Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk have remained self-proclaimed as independent, with the Kiev government having no effective territorial sovereignty over their proclaimed territories. Europe, when it comes to resolving the Ukrainian Civil War will potentially have to settle with solution that is far from original projected intentions of. Maintaining pre-war borders of a sovereign Ukrainian state may no longer be an option.

¹⁵⁶ Jennifer Rankin, “EU Lifts Most Sanctions against Belarus despite Human Rights Concerns,” *The Guardian*, February 15, 2016, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/15/eu-lifts-most-sanctions-against-belarus-despite-human-rights-concerns>.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Kremlin.ru, “Meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel,” *President of Russia*, accessed May 31, 2017, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49452>.

¹⁵⁹ Michael Pearson and Michael Martinez CNN, “As Europe Pushes Peace, What’s next for Ukraine?,” *CNN*, accessed May 31, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/06/world/europe/ukraine-whats-next/index.html>.

¹⁶⁰ “United States Is Attacking Russia’s Gas Projects in Europe,” *EADaily*, accessed May 31, 2017, <https://eadaily.com/en/news/2016/07/14/united-states-is-attacking-russias-gas-projects-in-europe>.

¹⁶¹ “Ukraine Truce Violations At ‘Worrying Levels,’” *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*, accessed May 31, 2017, <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-osce-fighting-at-worrying-levels/27704264.html>.

Europe has failed so far in what it committed to do. It has not established territorial integrity for Ukraine and had not effectively transferred its norms on issues like it proclaimed to have wanted. Its partnership with the Ukraine has been under threat. Europe does, however, maintain a relevant but fragile connection with the country through the still ongoing process of European accession. Normative influence survives but haughty goals of rectifying the conflict in Ukraine's favor do not.

7 Conclusions

This section is intended to complete the thesis by first, providing a definitive answer whether the central hypothesis of a pattern existing is valid or not. Subsequently, the section synthesizes the empirical findings with the general framework to explain where the thesis fits with regards to normative power Europe literature as well as literature on European identity formation. It also mentions possible further research and includes final remarks.

Despite the dissimilar contexts of the two analyzed conflicts, changes in European Union foreign policy institutions, and the differences in the global relations framework, the pattern outlined by this thesis is observable in both instances of conflict.

Europe approaches both attempting to be an impartial mediator with a stated mission of protecting and transferring norms it finds essential and universal to produce a peace acceptable to all sides. When the approach of an impartial mediator does not produce normative transference nor an enduring peace deal, the European Union discursively changes to blame one side for the failure. This villainous side becomes targeted by harsher measures like increased sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and threats of military intervention. The harsher measures do not produce desired results and Europe, pressured by international actors placing extensive blame upon it and the danger upon material interests of the EU and its members, begins to settle. The harsh mechanisms of othering the villain are replaced by efforts to look for compromise and to refocus on solving Union problems and regain unity of member states.

The pattern illustrates more what the European Union identity is and what it can do rather than illustrating consequences of "objective" developments on the ground. For instance, little about the Serbian forces losing ground to international and Croat-Bosnian forces, meant that Europe

had to lower its expectations on its role in the peace process. Similarly, Russia's fast breach of Ukrainian borders did not seem congruent with the conciliatory discourse undertaken by the EU

This thesis has not sought to predict the future. The aftermath of the armed conflict in the Ukraine remains unknown. What the thesis has sought to do was show that discourse on the Ukraine conflict has shown identifiers of the three outlined phases. It remains plausible that the EU's position on the conflict could dramatically change, that it could finally develop and implement tools that could substantiate the more aggressive othering mechanisms displayed in the second phase. So far, Europe has behaved according to the same phases in Ukraine as well as in the former Yugoslavia.

The question of why Europe fails in asserting itself as an actor capable of resolving crises as a normative power remains relevant. In both Yugoslavia and Ukraine, the pattern of the Union seems to be connected to a gap between expectations and capability. The mechanisms of othering in the second phase of the pattern undermine the EU discursive strength as it does not have its own, primarily military capabilities, that would match the expectations set by discourse.

The findings of the thesis are relevant to the previously presented literature on normative power.

Ian Manners' theoretical framework is not congruent with the empirical evidence. Europe clearly shifts away from trying to be a normative power in the third phase of the conflict. Also, Europe's often lacking precision in describing what the norms it tries to promulgate are suggest that there is no consensus over what, even if Europe were completely willing and capable to be a normative power, European norms mean. Furthermore, the unique features of the European Union that Ian Manners ascribes as permitting normative power to be exerted seem to have had consequences that have made the use of power ineffective. The costly material consequences of the Union's engagement in a conflict, especially those accrued during the second phase, are not inflicted on states equally. Some members find themselves overwhelmed by material burdens and extricate themselves from a unified position with the Union. With no substantive mechanisms of cost redistribution, the EU ensures that, when faced with differing material costs of foreign policy engagement, states will not be able to find a commonality of interest.

The identified pattern has compatibility with Del Sarto's concept of normative empire. The third phase of the pattern aptly matches her theoretical framework. Europe accepts that norm

transference is to be neglected over efforts to preserve interests of the Union itself. Material concerns override normative identity.

However, Del Sarto's understanding should be amended with the knowledge that realization of normative empire has in practice meant settling. From an ambitious project of normative transference to the entire conflicted regions of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet space, with the potential of instituting forms of empire, Europe has been forced to establish smaller, fragile, fiefdoms in Bosnia and Ukraine with more limited influence upon the remainder of the region.

The findings of the thesis have provided compelling direction for future research. Can the pattern describe above be applicable to other European foreign policy engagements in war? Examples of the armed conflict in Kosovo and the ongoing civil war in Syria could perhaps provide evidence of a similar or identical course of European discourse. And could the pattern be detectable in EU foreign policy discourse on issues that are not resulting in armed conflict? Issues like the crisis over Iran's nuclear proliferation program might be subjectable to analysis finding identifiers of the pattern this thesis has presented.

Additionally, given that Europe's presence in the Ukraine has so far been institutionally less well established a productive line of further research would be examining whether attempts at exerting normative power of Europe have diminishing returns. The sample size provided by this thesis is insufficient to substantiate a strong claim on the issue but further empirical research, whether on the foreign policy issues outlined above or in the case studies analyzed as part of the articles presented in the literature review.

Europe is a "settling empire", burdened by the inability to assert itself as powerful enough to be a normative power, resolve international conflict and continuously stunted by the lack of its own capabilities to gain and use power without relying on other international actors.

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