Contemporary Populism: Actors, Causes, and Consequences Across 28 Democracies

by

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Abstract

Populists are considered the greatest challenge to liberal democracy today. Who are they, why are they successful, and what happens next? These are the three main questions addressed in this dissertation. Conceptually, it starts with an *ideational* definition, according to which populism is to be found in the realm of ideas. It combines praise of common people as a virtuous, homogeneous group, a belief in absolute popular sovereignty in politics, and despise of evil, conspiratorial elites. Based on that, theories suggest that the basic reason for these actors' success lies on an erosion of perceived legitimacy of state institutions. Multiple causes have been presented, which can lead to such a loss of confidence: political and economic crises, endemic corruption, elite collusion, and large-scale social transformations, to name a few. On the other hand, consequences of populism, especially at the attitudinal level, have been scarcely studied. Some have suggested that it might increase even more one's distrust in political institutions, it might influence participation, and can have an impact on tolerance. Research on this area, however, is still in its infancy.

This thesis uses several methods to address these issues. In the first empirical chapter, I use content analysis to classify electoral manifestos and candidates' speeches from 146 parliamentary parties in 28 countries, mostly between 2010 and 2015, on a scale of how populist they are. These include most countries in Western Europe, South and North America. The next chapter turns to causes. With fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA),

I analyze what is behind populists' success across those cases at the country-level. Findings indicate two combinations of conditions: high corruption in Latin American democracies, and elite collusion in European ones. I proceed by testing these causes at the micro-level, using data from the World Values Survey for a sample of those countries (23). At the individual level, the best predictor of support for more populist parties is lack of trust in political institutions. From that, the next part investigates consequences. With similar models, we observe that populism seems to also decrease political trust, and has some impact on participation. Moreover, right-wing populism appears to cause an increase in intolerance. Given the importance of political trust on both sides of the coin, some pages are dedicated to disentangle the relationship between it and populism. I start by investigating this relation among populists in power, with a comparative case study of Bolivia and Ecuador. I find that elected populist leaders adapt their discourse to target actors who can be credibly framed as elites, remaining anti-elitist. And so do supporters, who follow leaders in redefining the elite and remain anti-establishment while being in favor of the government. Last but not least, I use various methods and data sources to identify the direction of causality between populism and trust as attitudes. Results indicate that, rather than a causal connection, the two seem to be manifestations of a common, more fundamental, psychological attribute. This thesis approaches the populist phenomenon from different sides, and concludes with recommendations on how to identify such actors, the contexts in which they rise, and what to expect once they are there.

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List of Abbreviations

A   Arbeiderpartiet – Labour Party

AfD   Alternative für Deutschland – Alternative for Germany

AGC Alianza por el Gran Cambio – Alliance for the Great Change

ALP   Australian Labor Party

ANEL Independent Greeks

APA   Alianza Paraguay Alegre – Paraguay Alegre Alliance

AP-PY Avanza País – Advance, Country

BDP-PBD Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz/Parti bourgeois démocratique suisse – Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland

BE   Bloco de Esquerda – Left Bloc

BNP   British National Party

BQ   Bloc Québécois

BZÖ   Bündnis Zukunft Österreich – Alliance for the Future of Austria

C-Ca Conservative Party of Canada

C-Se Centerpartiet – Centre Party (Sweden)

C-UK Conservative Party (United Kingdom)

C-Co Partido Conservador Colombiano – Colombian Conservative Party

CDA   Christen-Democratisch Appèl – Christian Democratic Appeal

CD   Centro Democrático – Democratic Centre

cdH   Centre démocrate humaniste – Humanist Democratic Centre

CDS-PP CDS–Partido Popular – CDS–Popular Party

CDU   Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands – Christian Democratic Union of Germany

CF   Alianza Compromiso Federal – Federal Commitment Alliance

CREO Creando Oportunidades – Creating Opportunities

Cs   Ciudadanos – Citizens

CSU   Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern – Christian Social Union in Bavaria

CVP-PDC Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz/ Parti Démocrate-Chrétien – Christian Democratic Party of Switzerland

D66   Democraten 66 – Democrats 66

D   Democratic Party

DL   Democràcia i Llibertat – Democracy and Freedom

Ecolo Écologistes confédérés pour l'organisation de luttes originales – Confederated ecologistes for the organization of original struggles

ERC   Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya – Republican Left of Catalonia

F11   Fuerza 2011 – Force 2011

FA   Frente Amplio – Broad Front

FAP   Frente Amplio Progresista – Progressive Broad Front

FDF   Fédéralistes Démocrates Francophones – Francophone Democratic Federalists

FDP   Freie Demokratische Partei – Free Democratic Party

FDP-PLR FDP.Die Liberalen/PLR. Les Liberaux-Radicaux – The Liberals

FF   Fianna Fail

FG-Ir Fine Gael

FG-Fr Front de Gauche – Left Front

FN   Front National – National Front

FP-Ar Frente Popular – Popular Front

FPÖ   Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – Freedom Party of Austria

FP-Se Folkpartiet Liberalerna – Liberal People's Party of Sweden

FpV Frente para la Victoria – Front for Victory

FrP Fremskrittspartiet – Progress Party (Norway)

GD Golden Dawn

GPS-PES Grüne Partei der Schweiz/Les verts – Parti écologiste suisse – Green Party of Switzerland

Green Green Party (Canada)

Grüne Die Grünen – The Greens

Gr-AT Die Grünen – The Greens-The Green Alternative

H Høyre – Conservative Party (Norway)

I Partido Igualdad – Equality Party

IU-UP Izquierda Unida-Unidad Popular – United Left-Popular Unity

KD Kristdemokraterna – Christian Democrats (Sweden)

KKE Communist Party of Greece

Lab-Ir Labour (Ireland)

Lab-UK Labour Party (United Kingdom)

LibDem Liberal Democrats

Lib Liberal Party of Canada

Lib-Au Liberal Party of Australia

Linke Die Linke – The Left

LN Lega Nord – Northern League

M5S Movimento Cinque Stelle – Five Star Movement

MAS Movimiento al Socialismo – Movement Towards Socialism

M Moderaterna – Moderates

MoDem Mouvement Démocrate – Democratic Movement (France)

MP Miljöpartiet de Gröna – Environment Party–The Greens

MR   Mouvement Réformateur – Reformist Movement

MUD Mesa de la Unidad Democrática – Democratic Union Roundtable

ND   New Democracy

NDP   New Democratic Party

NPD   Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands – National Democratic Party of Germany

ÖVP   Österreichische Volkspartei – Austrian People's Party

PAIS   Patria Altiva y Soberana – Sovereign and Proud Fatherland

PAN   Partido Acción Nacional – Party of National Action

Parisi Franco Parisi – Independent candidate

PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement

PCP   Partido Comunista Português – Portuguese Communist Party

PC-PY Partido Colorado – Colorado (Red) Party (Paraguay)

PC-Uy Partido Colorado – Colorado (Red) Party (Uruguay)

PDA   Polo Democrático Alternativo – Alternative Democratic Pole

PDC   Partido Demócrata Cristiano – Christian Democratic Party

PdL   Il Poppolo della Libertà – The People of Freedom

PD   Partito Democratico – Democratic Party

PI   Partido Independiente – Independent Party

PNA   Partido Nueva Alianza – New Alliance Party

PN   Partido Nacional – National Party

PNP   Partido Nacionalista Peruano – Peruvian Nationalist Party

PNV   Partido Nacionalista Vasco – Basque Nationalist Party

Podemos Podemos – We Can

POTAMI Potami: The River

PP-Be Parti Populaire – People's Party (Belgium)

PP-Es Partido Popular – People's Party (Spain)

PP-Pe Perú Posible – Possible Peru

PRD Partido de la Revolución Democrática – Party of the Democratic Revolution

PRIAN Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional – Institutional Renewal Party of National Action

PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional – Institutional Revolutionary Party

PRO Partido Progresista – Progressive Party

PS-Be Parti Socialiste – Socialist Party (Belgium)

PS-Ch Partido Socialista de Chile – Socialist Party of Chile

PS-Fr Parti Socialiste – Socialist Party (France)

PS-Pt Partido Socialista – Socialist Party (Portugal)

PSB Partido Socialista Brasileiro – Brazilian Socialist Party

PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira – Party of Brazilian Social Democracy

PSD Partido Social Democrata – Social Democratic Party

PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español – Spanish Socialist Workers' Party

PSOL Partido Socialismo e Liberdade – Socialism and Freedom Party

PSP Partido Sociedad Patriótica

PSUV Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela – United Socialist Party of Venezuela

PT Partido dos Trabalhadores – Workers' Party

PVC Partido Verde Colombiano – Colombian Green Party

PvdA Partij van de Arbeid – Labour Party

PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid – Party for Freedom

RC Rivoluzione Civile – Civil Revolution

R Republican Party

SAP Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti – Swedish Social Democratic Party

SC Scelta Civica – Civic Choice

SD   Sverigedemokraterna – Sweden Democrats

SEL   Sinistra Ecologia Libertà – Left Ecology Freedom

SF   Sinn Féin

SNP   Scottish National Party

SN   Solidaridad Nacional – National Solidarity

SPD   Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – Social Democratic Party of Germany

SPÖ   Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – Social Democratic Party of Austria

SP   Socialistische Partij – Socialist Party

SP-PS   Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz/Parti socialiste suisse – Social Democratic Party of Switzerland

SVP-UDC Schweizerische Volkspartei/Union démocratique du centre – Swiss People's Party

SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left

UCR   Unión Cívica Radical – Radical Civic Union

UDI   Unión Demócrata Independiente – Independent Democratic Union

UD   Unidad Demócrata – Democratic Union

UKIP   UK Independence Party

UMP   Union pour un Mouvement Populaire – Union for a Popular Movement

UP   Unidad Popular – Popular Unity

U   Partido de la U – Social Party of National Unity

Verts   Europe Écologie – Les Verts – Europe Ecology – The Greens

V   Vänsterpartiet – Left Party

VVD   Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie – People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

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Introduction

Rulers of this Nation Again

As much of the liberal world watched a rainy Washington D.C. on January 20, 2017, appalled and still numb from the unforeseen turn of events at the American presidential elections two months earlier, Donald J. Trump was sworn in as the 45th President of the United States. After a few remarkably unremarkable opening sentences, filled with the usual *thank you and you and you*, carnage begins at the one and a half minute mark...

> *[...] today, we are not merely transferring power from one administration to another or from one party to another, but we are transferring power from Washington, D.C. and giving it back to you, the people. For too long, a small group in our nation's capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the cost.*
>
> (...)
>
> *January 20th, 2017 will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again.*
>
> (...)
>
> *This American carnage stops right here and stops right now.*

Trump is the latest example, also the most successful, from a particular lineage of American politicians. It starts with People's Party, whose 1892 program (the Omaha Platform) pleaded to *"restore the government of the Republic to the hands of 'the plain people', with which class it originated"*, and counts with a diverse lot that includes Huey Long, George Wallace, Ross Perot and, most recently, Bernie Sanders. Left and right, they claim that government has been captured by powerful special interests that enslave and impoverish the many to enrich the few. This group of politicians is usually referred to as "populists".

'Populism' is a word constantly uttered in both academic and popular political parlance, often as a stick to beat politicians on the other side. It has drawn attention from scholars in the most diverse fields of social sciences, including economists, anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists. Many are moved by a curiosity regarding the fascinating attraction that certain leaders exert over large masses, and how is it that even in developed societies, with high levels of education, such a supposedly primitive political style keeps appearing. This curiosity has received a boost with recent events that saw large and unexpected electoral victories by leaders and movements branded as such – most notably the "Leave" campaign during Brexit and the new Commander-in-Chief whose words we just read.

The Need for a Comparative Perspective

To date, the majority of studies looking at causes and consequences of populism have been bound to single countries or regions, and most often to specific kinds of populist parties. In general there are three groups. First on the scene were Latin Americanists, with a bountiful supply of examples since the mid-twentieth century, renewed with neoliberal populists in the early 1990's and later with Bolivarian Socialist populists in the 2000's. Populism was mostly recognized as a problem because, first, it was most often practiced by authoritarian

leaders with varying degrees of repressiveness (Cardoso and Faletto, 2004; Germani, 1978; Ianni, 1975). And, no less important, due to its terrible track record in macroeconomic management (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991; Edwards, 2010).

Another large part of the literature focused on populist radical right parties in Europe. This started picking up steam in the 1990's, with seminal works by Betz (1994) and Kitschelt and McGann (1995), for example, at the wake of right-wing populists' rise in places like Austria, France, Belgium, and Scandinavia. While also discussing a very diverse group of actors, whose only common thread seems to be an anti-immigration stand (Ivarsflaten, 2007), this literature has offered plenty of explanations for their rise, and accounts of consequences on the (few) times these actors have been in power.

A third part, which has moved largely in isolation up to now, is formed by Americanists. In reality, populism traces its roots to the American People's Party, also known as the Populist Party. With its bursts every now and then, American populism has been studied apart from experiences in other regions until very recently. Americanists have focused their analyses on classical American examples (Kazin, 1995), or recent manifestations like the Tea Party (Parker and Barreto, 2013; Skocpol and Williamson, 2012), without almost ever looking at other regions for comparison. This scenario has started to change with the Trump phenomenon, from which point onwards scholars began looking at foreign experiences, especially radical right populists in Europe, when trying to make sense of what was going on (e.g. Inglehart and Norris, 2016).

Until recently, these three have rarely talked to one another. As the next chapter argues, the consequence has been the emergence of theories on causes and consequences of populism that may conflate factors that explain populism with those explaining its specific regional and ideological varieties. To disentangle between causes of populism and, say, causes of radical-right support, it is necessary to look beyond single regions (not to mention single cases). Up to now, however, this has had two practical limitations: first, conceptual

disagreements; and second, as a consequence, lack of comparative measurement. Already in 1969, Peter Wiles (1969, 166). wrote that "to each his own definition of populism, according to the academic axe he grinds". Many definitions followed cases each individual researcher knew better, and emphasized distinct aspects of the topic. Cross-case comparisons were all but impossible.

Recently, scholars have increasingly adopted a quasi-consensus around understanding populism as a set of ideas (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013), with a few defining characteristics. This allowed the development of comparable measurements both at the elite and individual levels (e.g. Hawkins, 2009; Hawkins et al., 2012; Akkerman et al., 2014; Castanho Silva et al., 2017), and a few first cross-regional comparisons started emerging (Hawkins, 2010; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). However, none of which has yet included, in a single study, cases of populism in Europe and all the Americas, in and out of power. This gap is addressed in this thesis.

How

This thesis advances knowledge on the topic by, first, presenting a novel dataset classifying political parties from Europe and the Americas on how populist they are. This is the subject of Chapter 2. 28 contemporary democracies are covered, summing up to almost 150 parliamentary parties, what gives a clear picture of how populism is distributed in the Western world today. The production of these data starts with adopting an *ideational* definition of populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013): it is a set of ideas, with specific necessary components. Therefore, the best way to identify them among political leaders and parties is to actually look at what they write and say. By applying content analysis to electoral manifestos and politicians' campaign speeches, it is possible to have a classification of how populist are political parties across countries using a single ruler to

measure them all, insuring the comparability of results. This way, it becomes feasible to identify the specific causes and consequences of populism irrespective of ideological flavors it is accompanied by.

Next, in spite of all the attention, as a matter of fact we are still far from a good understanding of the causes behind the rise of populism across countries. Some intuitive and popular explanations, such as a reaction to bad economic times, have been shown wrong by repeated studies (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Others seem to be very context-dependent: populism in Austria and Switzerland is unlikely to be a reaction to corrupt governments, the explanation in Hawkins (2009) for a sample that included mainly Latin American cases. And classical radical-right explanations of loss of status by previously dominant social groups, back in fashion with Trump's rise, are not at all applicable south of the Rio Grande. A comparative look, taking several regions and cases into account, is essential to advance our knowledge into why populists rise when (and where) they do.

That is done in Chapter 3. First, I look at the country-level and use fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA Ragin, 2014, 2006), testing a multitude of potential causes for why populists are more successful in some countries than others. Results point to two main explanations: for young democracies, populism is associated with high levels of corruption. In European old democracies, it comes together with what is called *elite collusion*, or large, cross-ideological coalitions in government, that supposedly lead voters to feel there is little difference between mainstream parties. Both explanations point to factors expected to generate an erosion on the public perception of institutions' legitimacy.

The next chapter moves to the individual level. I find that lack of trust in political institutions is the best predictor of whether someone supports a more populist party, with data from 23 countries. Moving on, if we are far from conclusive explanations to the rise of populism, research into its consequences is giving first baby steps. While case studies have

shown the impacts of populists in specific contexts, general assessments are few and with the same geographical/ideological limitations of studies on causes. Moreover, most of these few studies focus on impacts that populism has on countries: how populist governments behave, whether they affect the economy, quality of democracy, or policy outputs. While these are all very important topics, considering that populism is better seen as an idea or attitude that individuals hold about politics, it is essential to ask whether, and how, it might shape other political and social attitudes, as well as behavior. This thesis, therefore, dedicates a part to exploratory work into potential attitudinal consequences of supporting populist parties.

Of causes and consequences suggested up to now in the literature, lack of confidence in political institutions is one of the most cited and accepted. Indeed, it is almost a truism to say that people dissatisfied with the political system are more likely to vote for a party vowing to do away with it. Recently, this has also turned the other way with confirmations of the "fueling discontent" hypothesis, according to which populism helps drive dissatisfaction even higher among its supporters (Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2016). Indeed, this dissertation first finds evidence suggesting that such a reinforcing mechanism might be in place. Apart from that, there seems to be some impact of populism increasing levels of political participation, as theorized by Rovira Kaltwasser (2012), and of right-wing populism on intolerance.

Given the strong relation between populism and political trust, the last two chapters go in depth into this area. First, Chapter 5 focuses on the apparent puzzle of populist discourse in government. Basically, how can politicians and voters square the apparent paradox of supporting an anti-establishment government? I argue that, once in power, populists retain an anti-elite appeal by re-framing who belongs to the political establishment. Most often there is no shortage of credible "elites" to be depicted as powerful enemies even by the government itself. Supporters, on their turn, are influenced by partisanship and

a psychological cognitive consistency drive to harmonize the ideas of holding an anti-establishment attitude and supporting the government, meaning they end up largely buying the re-framing of elites made by populists in power.

After confirming that populism and distrustful views appear to be rooted in psychological dispositions, the last chapter asks if there is a causal connection between the two. And, if so, flowing in which direction? The evidence suggests that, contrary to contemporary accounts, the relation is not causal (in either direction), but simply that supporting populists (and having a populist attitude about politics) and distrust in political institutions seem to be both manifestations of a same shared antecedent cause. They are strongly correlated, certainly, and a rise in one is expectedly associated with a rise on the other. However, there is no reinforcement.

Contributions

This study presents several contributions and advances to understanding populism, one of the great threats to liberal democracy in the West today. First, I present a new dataset classifying the discourse of political parties from 28 countries on how populist they are. A few possible applications of these data are shown in the remainder of this thesis, but it has much more potential for future studies. Comparative researchers can now operationalize populism not only as a dependent variable, but also as an explanatory factor. Moreover, with a nuanced view on levels of populism, we retain much more information on how it is distributed across countries and parties than with the usual binary classifications. Vote-choice models, studies on party system (change), democratization, democratic backsliding, policy formation and implementation, are a few fields that can benefit from taking parties' populism into account.

Next, I use the data set to test, for the first time on a cross-regional sample, what

factors explain the electoral success of populism across countries and its appeal to voters. I find strong evidence against popular economic explanations, and confirm that populism is fruit of political crises and poor governance above any other explanations. Turning to consequences, I show that populism has some impact on increasing political participation among individuals, and that some versions of it also lead to higher levels of xenophobic intolerance. Both of which are of vital importance to have an idea of what to expect if populists continue to win elections in the coming years.

The apparent puzzle of leaders who continue to use populist discourse once in power is also treated. This has been an understudied topic, for most theories which predict support for populism with dissatisfaction should break down once the main populist actor in a country is heading the executive. While studies of elite-level discourse have made the case that leaders find alternative targets as the elites, I show how individual supporters follow through and retain both their dissatisfaction and support for a governing populist.

Last, I also show that a purported populism-dissatisfaction spiral, a hypothesis currently gaining popularity and that has been suggested in a few studies, is not in place. The apparent reinforcing relation is a side-effect of the methods used so far in these investigations. As a small note of optimism, therefore, there is no evidence that individuals who support populism become even more dissatisfied because of that.

At the end, this thesis contributes with new data, and novel substantive findings on the causes and consequences of populism in Western democracies. It helps improve our understanding of this pressingly relevant phenomenon in contemporary societies, and gives some basis from which citizens and policy makers can address at least the negative consequences associated with rising populists. The carnage can indeed stop.

Chapter 1

Populism as a Set of Ideas. So What?

In recent years, populism has started to be seen as a set of ideas with a few defining characteristics (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). This perspective lends itself to theories on what are the causes of its emergence, and on what consequences one might expect once populists enter the political arena. This chapter introduces the definition of populism and implications of an ideational perspective. I draw hypotheses regarding both causes and consequences of populism, to be tested along alternative explanations in this thesis.

Each chapter in this dissertation employs different methods, and therefore methodological discussions are moved to individual empirical chapters, along with operationalization of variables. Regarding data, there are two main sources. The first is an original classification of parties in Europe and Americas on a populism scale, which is the subject of Chapter 2. The second merges data from the World Values Survey (WVS, 2010, 2015) and the European Values Study (EVS, 2011). It is introduced the first time these data are used, in Chapter 4. The present chapter, therefore, focuses on conceptualization and general causal arguments.

1.1 What is Populism?

Populism has been a subject of research by various disciplines in the social sciences. Chronologically, the first theories trying to understand this phenomenon had a sociological vein (e.g. Germani, 1978; Ionescu and Gellner, 1969; Tella, 1965). They investigate and explain support for these movements based on its class composition, and connect its emergence to structural changes caused by modernization, across all kinds of cases from the People's Party in 1890's America to mid-twentieth century Latin American populists. Research interests were on the composition of populists' electorate, and how it was different from that of other *-isms* – most notably authoritarianism and fascism (Germani, 1978). Causally, they consider populism a typical political manifestation during certain stages of a modernization process, in which groups previously disenfranchised are incorporated into politics.

As structuralist understandings fell out of fashion, new populist movements across Latin America in the 1990's drew economists' attention, who presented new sets of concepts and explanations. They connected populist leaders to specific sets of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy which redistribute income in the short term, but are unsustainable in the medium and long terms, generating a cycle of growth and crisis (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991; Edwards, 2010). This notion is possibly the closest to lay understandings of populism until today: in general, a layman's definition of a populist politician is someone who makes great promises that he knows cannot be fulfilled.

A third line of inquiry sees populism as an essentially political phenomenon. From this perspective, it cannot be connected to specific classes and social groups, nor to stages of development. Even less so to particular economic programs. Populism is instead identified with a specific set of ideas about how society and politics work, and certain ways of depicting them. This line has gained ground in recent years, and is explored in the following

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pages. Previous theories are discussed again later in this chapter as alternative explanations to the success of populism.

1.1.1 Something Political

Instead of trying to link populism to a set of economic policies or class constituency, many have proposed definitions based on specific political features it presents. However, besides agreeing that populism is mostly political, there is still much discussion concerning its nature – a syndrome (Wiles, 1969), a political style (Knight, 1998; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014; Taguieff, 2007), a strategy (Weyland, 2001), a thin-centered ideology (Mudde, 2004, 2007), a form of mobilization (Jansen, 2011; Mény and Surel, 2004), a politicized cultural expression (Taggart, 2000), or a discourse (Laclau, 2005; Panizza, 2005) are some of the examples. Regardless of these distinctions – some without a difference – most agree on the very minimal ground Margaret Canovan (1981, 294) presented: in all populist movements there is some exaltation of 'the people', whatever it refers to, together with anti-elitism.

In recent years, the perspective of populism as a set of ideas, referred to as *ideational approaches* (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, 498), has become more prominent among students of the topic. For Cas Mudde (2004, 544), populism is a distinctive kind of ideology, called a "thin-centered ideology" (also Fieschi and Heywood, 2004; Stanley, 2008). These are ideologies that do not have a broad monolitical vision encompassing several aspects of politics and society, but rather focus their ontology on specific phenomena. When introducing the term, Michael Freeden (1996) presented two examples of thin-centered ideologies: ecologism and feminism. Both lack the breadth of classical ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, and can be attached to various "thick-centered" ideologies. For Mudde (2004), populism should be seen as such because of its restricted core of values: exaltation of a unified and homogeneous people with its general will, and anti-elitism, which can be combined with the most varied kinds of full-blown ideologies, left and right.

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This interpretation has been challenged recently, including by Michael Freeden himself (Freeden, 2016). There are two contentions: first, that thin-centered ideologies should have the potential to be expanded into thick ones. For instance, Green politics in Germany, its most successful case, since the the original writing by Freeden (1996) has incorporated enough elements to become closer to a full-blown ideology that is distinguishable environmentalist. Populism seldom shows such potential or intent (Freeden, 2016). Second, thin-centered ideologies are self-aware and have a positive, conscious drive. Populism lacks that. While individuals (proudly) identify themselves as feminists or environmentalists, populists rarely introduce themselves as such. It is rather based on more fundamental social intuitions. For this reason, it has been argued that populism is better seen as a discourse (Hawkins, 2010) or discursive frame (Aslanidis, 2015). This perspective retains the core ideational components of populism, but emphasize the lack of official texts or attempts at forming a coherent worldview (Hawkins, 2010, 31). It focuses on the idea of populism as manifesting a way of deeper thinking about politics instead of being an ideology, thick or thin.

This take also makes populism more a matter of political attitudes and political psychology than previous approaches. It becomes possible to talk about a populist attitude, or a populist way of seeing the (political) world, what has led to a blossoming literature on studying populist voters, and their minds, instead of only parties and politicians (as in, e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014; Bakker et al., 2015a; Stanley, 2011; Spruyt et al., 2016). This approach, or the *ideational* definition, is taken in this thesis, which combines elite and mass level research to understand the populist phenomenon. Before going into causal arguments, however, it is important to define its core contents.

1.1.2 Glorifying the People

The first and most obvious part of populist discourse is that it glorifies 'the people'. The definition of who is this subject of glorification is problematic. As Taguieff (2007, 176) notes, *populus* in Latin had two meanings: it referred to the ensemble of inhabitants of a city or state, but also to the group of citizens who were not noble, i.e. the plebe. This ambivalence is present in contemporary populists' discourse, which often refer to the people as a mass of workers exploited by a corrupt elite controlling the state, emphasizing the class-dimension of the word (Mény and Surel, 2004, 186), while in other moments resorting to the first definition of 'people', as all those who inhabit a country or belong to a nation. According to Laclau (2005) this is the reason why populism keeps its appeal throughout the times: being an 'empty signifier', to which contentious political groups can attach their grievances, makes its appeal resistant to eventual flaws of particular populist movements.

This appeal to 'the people' not only follows a principle of popular sovereignty, but is also strongly moral: 'the people' ought to govern not just because of a democratic self-government principle, but because it is essentially good and virtuous (Taggart, 2000, 91). It is not that any praise of the people already fits for potentially populist discourse. If that was so, almost all contemporary politicians would be guilty of it. The use of 'the people' as a rally cry by a politician somewhat short on ideology, that does not want to make a stand for or against any group in specific, is what Canovan (1981, 260-1) defined as 'politicians populism'. As she notes, most movements typically considered populist are not so in this 'catch-all' spirit: they are somewhat more restricted and specific (Canovan, 1981, 274). Populists attribute to their 'people' a set of loosely defined values which embody true national virtues (Taggart, 2000, 92).

Importantly, the people is considered to be homogeneous. In a spirit reminiscent of Rousseauvian democracy (Riker, 1982), for populists there is a 'general will' in politics (Mudde, 2004). The 'people' is a social actor in and of itself, with its single set of

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values, interests, and desires. There is no space for respectful disagreement within it, or the acceptance that fundamental differences exist and are legitimate (Hawkins, 2010, 29-30). This is the radical embodiment of a fundamental democratic principle: that of government by the people, and outright rejection of pluralism (Müller, 2016). Politicians' role is simply to implement the popular will (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, 505). In this, the call for a 'united people' marks the division between 'us', whose will is the general will, and 'others', who have distinct interests which are, because against the *volonté générale*, illegitimate (Canovan, 1999, 5). The populist leader is the only person capable of interpreting and implementing the will of this 'silent majority', who is alienated from politics by those who hold power (Kazin, 1995, 252).

This last point deserves further attention, since it apparently entails a paradox: according to their discourse, populist politicians simply embody and implement the general will. They have no creative leadership on their own. However, populism is often associated with charismatic leadership (e.g. Pappas, 2016), and preference for a strong leader has been often cited as an important component of populists' discourse and attitude. In a few cases, the anti-establishment appeal of populism is even combined with *elitism*, in the sense of powerful leaders or government being the only ones able to properly guide society (Enyedi, 2016a).

The apparent paradox can be solved by thinking of populists' relation to the people as an instance of delegative democracy (O'Donell, 1994). Because they have been selected and approved by the people, all their actions become by definition the implementation of the general will (sometimes regardless of what the majority actually wants). Much like the divine nature of kings, God's representatives on Earth, populist leaders exert their creative leadership by deferring the basis of all their actions to the supernatural general will, of which they claim to be a mere instrument. In this case, the discourse becomes a simple legitimation rhetoric for leaders' actions and preferences.

1.1.3   Anti-elitism

The second part of populism are elites who illegitimately seized power and exploit the people for their own benefit (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, 502). In populist discourse there is necessarily the opposition of an exploited majority – the people – to a powerful minority – the elite (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Because a "populist people" is always defined as an underdog, an elite is an indispensable part of populist discourse (Hawkins, 2009). At the same time, not all anti-elitism is populist: it is only so when coupled with the claim, by a speaker, of being the only true representative of the people (Müller, 2016).

Many different groups can be fit into this position. Mainstream political parties are the most obvious targets while populists are in opposition, but the elite coalition easily can include the media, judiciary, economic powers, foreign organizations and governments, intellectuals, and effectively all those who oppose populist actors (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Rooduijn, 2014). Importantly, much like the people, the elite is also homogeneous (Hawkins, 2009), in a view that comes close to that of conspiracy theories (Fenster, 1999) or the paranoid style in politics (Hofstadter, 1996).

1.1.4   Good versus Evil

The previous two sections have shown how populism constructs two antagonistic camps in politics, people and elites, following a moral logic. This point must be emphasized here. For a discourse to be populist, the good/evil aspect of this division is essential (Mudde, 2004). There are discourses which despise elites, but do not glorify common people and their values. On the other side, we might find those who praise common folk while not being anti-elitist. In populism, one does not exist without the other – a "populist people" is, by definition, morally opposed to an elite. And the primary interest of the elite is also,

by definition, to keep or expand its power by exploiting the people.

Hawkins (2009) and Hawkins et al. (2010) draw attention to the fact that populism is only one possibility of a Manichaean political discourse. There are others which divide politics in moral terms, but do not fill the antagonistic positions with people and elites. What they do have in common, however, is a tendency towards intolerance and authoritarianism (Hawkins et al., 2010). Manichaean discourses paint opponents as evil entities which, as any evil entity, should be eradicated for the general good. Disagreements are not a legitimate matter of politics, but get closer to blasphemy and cannot be accepted. Understanding the moral aspect of populism is essential to grasp its potentially negative consequences.

1.2 Causal Implications

1.2.1 Ideational Approach

Defining populism as a set of ideas lends itself to testable hypotheses regarding its causes and consequences. Once we consider its defining characteristic to be the division of politics and society into the good people versus the evil elites, explanations for its emergence must be immediately connected with these aspects, more than with the other ideological issues which populist parties adopt (such as anti-immigrant appeal in the case of radical right populists in Europe, for example).

Such a view of politics is expected to be appealing to those who have an utmost distrust of political institutions (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, *forthcoming*). In fact, it is difficult to draw the line that separates populist attitudes from low political trust. Some studies have included confidence in institutions as a predictor of populist support, and found that it outperforms alternative explanations (e.g. Bélanger and Aarts, 2006; Doyle, 2011). Others have posited other causes that lead to populism through lowering individuals' political

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trust (Betz, 1998; Hawkins, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2006). In this case, trust is the mediator, not always explicit, between an antecedent condition and supporting populists. More recently, studies have theorized, and seemingly confirmed, that populism and trust even have a reinforcing relation with one another (Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2016).

In general, therefore, we might also say that the connection between dissatisfaction and populism seemed too obvious to test. Previous research commonly implied a model in which other contextual or psychological factors would cause distrust in political institutions and that would automatically translate into support for populists (where these were a credible option, as argued by van Kessel, 2015). The assumption was that, given a contextual condition to provide demand-side reasons to distrust political institutions, the success of such parties would be a matter of viable populist options appearing.

This thesis, first, evaluates whether such a mediation mechanism is in place. I test the relation between dissatisfaction and voting for populists and, upon confirming it, whether dissatisfaction is indeed a mechanism through which other social, political, and economic factors lead to the success of populist parties. While the connection between dissatisfaction and populism seems clear, there is reason to be skeptical about its role as a mediator. Indeed, several studies have highlighted the correlation between the two. However, only Bélanger and Aarts (2006), Hooghe and Dassonneville (2016) and Rooduijn et al. (2016), who used panel data from the Netherlands and Belgium, have been able to provide evidence on a causal connection. The two most recent find that support for populism and dissatisfaction have a reinforcing relationship, with one driving the other up over time.

On the other hand, if populist attitudes and political trust are hardly distinguishable from one another, these studies might be capturing a spurious correlation between the two: it is not that one causes the other, but rather that both rise (and fall) due to a same antecedent factor. If that is the case, then indeed we should focus on other psychological

and contextual attributes that explain the common variation in both, instead of assuming or proposing a causal relation between the two.

Under such circumstances, the ideational approach implies a set of explanations focusing on country-level factors expected to erode political trust. They refer specifically to what may be called "failures of representation" (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, *forthcoming*), meaning that democratic institutions are failing at goals they were designed for: representing individuals and providing a functioning state capacity (Agerberg, 2017). Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (*forthcoming*) mention two such instances. The first is bad governance, either due to high levels of corruption or incompetence in providing basic services, both of which break the perception of legitimacy between public and state. The second is lack of responsiveness by politicians and political parties, leading voters to feel that representative democracy is not giving them real options to represent their views and interests.

Both of these are expected to break the perceived legitimacy of democratic institutions and fuel support for anti-establishment parties. Such parties – which include but are not restricted to populists –, would thrive in an environment where they can credibly claim that the political system has been corrupted by either failing to deliver on basic services, or by creating an oligarchy of political leaders that has no connection to voters' preferences and interests. They are therefore intrinsically connected to ideational populism.

Ideational explanations, therefore, focus on what can explain what is essential to populism – call for systemic change due to anti-elitism –, and not ancillaries to populist discourse – such as nativism or economic protectionism. Therefore, it is the most likely to yield comparable results across various types of populist parties over different regions of the world. Conceptually, if there is such a thing as populism that can be generalized over very distinct parties, times, and countries, the ideational theory should have a better chance at delivering empirically verified explanations than competing ones.

1.2.2 Antecedent Causes of Populism

Several other theories have been advanced for explaining populist support. They are not all incompatible with ideational explanations, and not mutually exclusive. These alternatives may be grouped into *institutional*, *Downsian*, and *Durkheimian* approaches (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, forthcoming). I discuss each, and their causal implications, over the following paragraphs.

Institutional Explanations

A first set of explanations focuses on institutional features of political systems. They do not share a single definition of populism, but rather offer explanations to the emergence of parties broadly identified as such. More specifically, they argue for the importance of institutions that make it easier for newcomers and/or charismatic leaders to gain power quickly, being facilitators of populists' emergence (Norris, 2005). This is because both in established and new democracies populist leaders tend to first appear as outsiders. Therefore, higher barriers to enter the political arena make it harder for a (populist) challenger to become a relevant political force.

Two kinds of institutions can be identified with such theories: proportionality in the electoral system and presidentialism. The first eases the establishment of smaller and niche parties. Majoritarian systems notably impose high informal thresholds for entrance into parliament, following Duverger's Law (see Singer, 2013). For example, a new populist party could get 15-20% of votes for several elections without ever making more than a handful of MPs, and this makes its emergence into a relevant position in national politics more difficult (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995).

Presidentialism, for its part, facilitates the election of charismatic leaders with little party structure to speak of (Carreras, 2012; Linz, 1990). Presidential systems, especially in conjunction with weak party systems, have occasionally observed politicians rise to

power who were relatively unknown shortly before the elections, or who created taxi-parties for themselves to run. If charisma is a correlate of populist leadership (Weyland, 2001; Pappas, 2016) – even if not a definitional part of it –, presidential systems should facilitate the emergence of populist actors.

A related third condition which might foster the rise of populists is the age of democracy in a country. First, because younger democracies tend to have less institutionalized party systems, leaving more room for populist mobilization (Kriesi, 2014). Indeed, while much talk is done about rising populists in Western Europe in 2016, the only countries in the continent ruled by unquestionable populists are third- and fourth-wave democracies: Greece, Hungary, and Poland.[1] Second, one might expect that in young democracies the public does not have a high attachment to liberal democratic norms, so that an illiberal discourse such as populism is more palatable.

Durkheimian Approach

Durkheimian arguments, as they are referred to by Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (*forthcoming*), focus on great social changes as the explanation for the success of populism. They draw from early sociological work which saw populism as an outcome of modernization in Latin America (Cardoso and Faletto, 2004; Germani, 1978). Large scale social changes, as those brought about by industrialization in mid-20th century Latin America, created new cleavages and politically realigned social groups. Large sectors of society were either made available, as older political groups and parties were not any longer their proper representatives, or became available as they were first enfranchised and incorporated into politics (such as urban workers). Populism offered a quick and easy way to instill a new point of convergence for identity formation – the people – around which political actors could mobilize new participants in national public life (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011; Roberts,

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[1]The first two branded "populist democracies", for having populists as both governing party and main opposition (Pappas, 2013).

2006; Tella, 1965).

While classical structuralist arguments by Latin Americanists have fallen out of favor, such explanations for the success of populism have been adopted to explain its more recent rise in Europe and North America. In these accounts, industrialization and modernization are replaced by globalization as the causes of great social transformations. Sectors of society made available are the "losers of globalization" (Kriesi et al., 2006), mostly blue-collar workers from developed countries who have lost social and material status due to automation, de-industrialization, and immigration of low-skilled workers willing to compete for jobs with lower pay (Betz, 1994; Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016; Spruyt et al., 2016). These workers see in (radical right-wing) populists the promise of restoring national identity as a source of pride and prestige, thus restoring their lost social status.

Connected with this idea is that of focusing on how globalization changes societies' values, alienating groups whose values are challenged and broadly marginalized as a result of such processes. For instance, conservative individuals among "losers of globalization" groups react against the stream of post-material values (such as secularism and minority rights) that follow contemporary social transformations, and turn to reactionary right-wing populists as the defenders of an old order dominated by traditional values (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Parker and Barreto, 2013).

The current stream of Durkhemian arguments for populism, however, suffers from the empirical limitation of having been developed and tested almost exclusively with right-wing populists in Europe. Its claims are intrinsic to an idea of populism combined with nationalism and reactionary discourse, mostly appealing to traditionally dominant groups in society. It says nothing about other flavors of populism, or its emergence in other regions. First, ideological arguments are directly fitted to conservative populism – left-populists presumably have nothing against many of the changes in values that emerge in post-industrial societies. Regarding social status, if we consider that left-wing populism has

an inclusionary nature (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012), it is antithetical with the idea of a group yearning to recover social dominance. If we wish to find the causes of populism writ large, and not of only right-wing populism, it is necessary to look for arguments that can be better generalized to other regions and ideologies than European (and now North American) right-wing varieties. Nevertheless, these arguments are considered and tested in this thesis as alternative explanations to the ideational ones.

Downsian Approaches

The third set of explanations focuses on economic grievances for explaining populist support, and was termed the Downsian approach by Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (*forthcoming*). It treats populist voters as rational actors who behave according to their material interests. Economic hardship leads to dissatisfaction with the entire political system, as unable to deliver on better living conditions, and this is captured by populists who frame economic failures as the results of intentional actions by elites (Acemoglu et al., 2013). It has also been connected with Durkheimian approaches, proposing that globalization and the transference of industrial jobs overseas make blue-collar workers in developed nations resent mainstream political parties (Betz, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006; Kriesi, 2014). Contrary to theories in the previous section, this time workers' grievances are for material losses, and not symbolic or cultural. In consequence, these classes turn to anti-globalization populists who combine protectionist economics with anti-immigrant policies (de Lange, 2007), at least in the case of radical right populists in Europe. This explanation also resonates well with popular understandings of populism across the continent.

Deteriorating material conditions leading to resentment against the political establishment, and that to populism, possibly has the most face-validity of all theories outlined so far. However, economic explanations have been consistently challenged by recent empirical findings. The left-populist wave that swept Latin America in the 2000's followed a period

of relative economic prosperity in several countries (Remmer, 2011), including widespread talk of a growing Latin American middle class. In Europe, there is a far from perfect overlap between the countries hit hardest by the 2008 crisis and those which saw the rise of populism in this period (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). Various voting behavior studies of populist radical right supporters show that other factors are more relevant than economic considerations when determining individuals' vote choice for such actors (e.g. Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013; Spruyt et al., 2016). I test this line of arguments as well in this thesis, as another alternative explanation to the success of populism.

1.2.3   Only One Populism?

At this point, it is important to stop and ask the question of how valid it is to talk about populism in the singular. Its regional variations seem large in several ways. First, in terms of their strength, with Latin American populists apparently stronger than most European ones (Hawkins, 2009, 2013). Second, on their host ideologies: the popularity of left-wing versions in Latin America, and of right-wing ones in Europe (what is changing recently). Third, the causes given for parties' success, connected to corruption and failures to deliver public services in Latin America (Doyle, 2011; Hawkins, 2010), and globalization or representation crises in Europe (Kriesi et al., 2006). Given these differences, is it meaningful to treat and try explaining populism as a single phenomenon?

For this thesis, the answer is yes. First of all, the definition of populism accepted by researchers studying these actors in both regions is very similar. In minimalistic terms, those studying Europe, Latin America, or the United States see populism as dividing politics morally between a good people and an evil elite (see, e.g., Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart, 2015). If the concept is defined the same way for movements in different

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regions, one can expect that causes and consequences should also travel between them.

Second, measurement attempts have shown that, using the same instruments, it is possible to find manifestations of populism in both contexts. Kirk Hawkins (2009) has developed a text analysis coding scheme to measure populist discourse in speeches, applied equally to cases in various regions, and highly populist speeches are identified in Latin America, Europe, and more recently the U.S. with Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump (Hawkins, 2016). At the individual level, populist attitudes are found to be a stable, identifiable construct among the public in the Americas, and Eastern and Western Europe (Castanho Silva et al., 2017). Therefore, not only the same concept is applied across regions, but researchers are able to find it manifested consistently at both the elite and mass levels.

If we accept the meaningful application of this concept in both regions, and we observe it manifested consistently in them, there is no reason not to look for potential overarching causes of populism. While immediately it seems to be caused by low institutional trust in both Europe (e.g. Kriesi, 2015; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015) and the Americas (Doyle, 2011; Hawkins, 2010), it is important to investigate whether that is indeed the case, and if there are contextual factors shared across cases. It is possible that, besides political discontentment, causes are completely different in Europe and Latin America. Indeed, we might confirm that contexts are so different that the emergence of populism is a very distinct phenomenon in each region. However, no single study up to date has tested this hypothesis.

1.3 Consequences of Populism

While definitions and causes of populism have been widely theorized in the literature, much less attention has been given to its consequences. Similar to causes, we can group potential impacts of populism into two levels: countries and individuals. The rise of such

actors, eventually also making into office, may have transformational social and political consequences. At the same time, we might hypothesize attitudinal effects of being exposed to, and consuming, populist discourse for individual supporters.

Of studies that do engage with consequences, the majority focuses on the country level. They look, for example, at how populists in power affect the quality of democracy, notably on respect for rule of law, balance of powers, free media, and free and fair elections (Houle and Kenny, 2016; Huber and Schimpf, 2015, 2016; Levitsky and Loxton, 2013; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012), their impacts on party systems and polarization (Castanho Silva, 2017a; Enyedi, 2016b; Mudde, 2014), socio-economic policies (Röth et al., 2017), and whether they influence other parties' programs (Rooduijn et al., 2014).

Thinking of consequences of ideational populism, however, calls for a theory on what should be the specific impact(s) of populism itself, instead of its host ideologies. For example, whether populist governments engage on more redistribution (what Houle and Kenny, 2016, found not to be the case in Latin America) depends on their economic ideological orientation, and not their populism – Neoliberal populists in Latin America and Scandinavia are not particularly known for supporting big government. The same goes for whether populists pass nationalist, anti-immigrant legislation when in office (Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013), what is likely restricted to European right-wing examples.

Individual-level consequences, on the other hand, are only now starting to get more attention. For this reason, they are the focus of this dissertation. First studies are finding that support of populist and protest parties lead to lower levels of trust in political institutions in the Netherlands (Rooduijn et al., 2016) and Belgium (Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2016). This is the "fuelling discontent" hypothesis (Rooduijn et al., 2016), according to which being exposed to a discourse that attacks political institutions would strengthen anti-establishment ideas over time, even among people who were already dissatisfied to begin with. Both studies (Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2016) have

confirmed the reciprocal relationship between lack of trust and support for populists.

Lowering political trust is one of the first impacts that an ideational theory might predict for populism. Just like it is an immediate predictor of populist discourse, political trust should be affected by being exposed to, and supporting, a discourse that makes strong claims about the awfulness of all political institutions. Theories on how elites impact public opinion are well established in political science. Voters often form their policy preferences following partisan alignment (Lavine et al., 2012; Zaller, 1992), due to the amount of time and resources necessary to follow closely all the latest political and policy debates to construct an informed opinion on all relevant ones. Parties and politicians serve as a trusted source, and work as a shortcut for voters to form their opinion accordingly (Lupia, 1994). If a trusted actor spends much of their time attacking the political system, supporters are expected to follow through.

Beyond that, individual-level impacts of populism are a thoroughly understudied area, so further hypotheses have an exploratory nature. Considering the Manichaean aspect of populist discourse, we might expect it to make individuals more intolerant and polarized: if others are painted as evil, and not legitimate participants in politics, populist followers should become more extremists the more they are exposed to this discourse. This theory fits the idea of a polarizing spiral in which populism in both sides reinforces the other, generating an ever more polarized party system (Enyedi, 2016b). In the Netherlands, it has been observed that mass-level polarization followed the emergence of the populist radical right (Castanho Silva, 2017a).

Another dimension of populist discourse is praising the common people, and emphasizing the role of the general will in politics. Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) suggests that, due to this emphasis and their frequent calls for direct democracy, populism has an effect of increasing participation in politics. While country-level studies have not found evidence of populism leading to increased aggregate participation (e.g. Houle and Kenny, 2016; Huber

and Schimpf, 2015), this is an argument that still needs to be tested at the individual level. Aggregate numbers might easily hide facts such as that populist supporters do participate more while other sectors are alienated.

Finally, a clear concern is with individuals' democratic standing: at the country level, as mentioned, populists in power have a mostly negative influence on democratic quality. Is it that populist individuals also have democracy in lower consideration? A last test, therefore, is whether supporting populist parties lowers people's perception of the importance of having a democratic political system, and whether they have higher preference for strong leaders with little checks on their power.

1.3.1 What about Populists in Power?

Arguments relating populism to lack of trust in political institutions are expectedly uncontroversial while we refer to populists in opposition. Given the influence of elites' discourse on public opinion, if a sizeable part of it spends its time demonizing the existing political system, at least a part of the public should follow suit. This argument is more complicated when populists actually gain power. If the governing party is populist – and if it remains populist once in office – how come its anti-establishment appeal finds support?

The last part of this dissertation draws from two cases of populists in office – Ecuador and Bolivia –, to study this relation. I propose that populism and (dis)trust remain related under this scenario, drawing from psychology and the idea that individuals have a need of consistency in their beliefs, values, and actions. Cognitive dissonance theory proposes that individuals feel psychological distress when they act in a counterattitudinal manner, and in response will act to reduce that uncomfortable feeling (Festinger, 1957). This can be done by changing one's behavior, changing the original attitude towards that behavior, or changing their beliefs about the object of that attitude (Festinger, 1957; Simon et al., 2004).

Imagine someone who has a populist latent disposition, and therefore a general anti-elitist view of politics, and votes for a respectively anti-establishment party. If this party wins the election and becomes the executive head, it enters a position of being the political establishment. This creates a situation of cognitive dissonance for the partisan, who a) identifies herself as an anti-establishment person but also b) identifies herself with that political party which is now (part of) the establishment.

The first option would be to change her behavior, meaning stop supporting that party. However, two points make this a very unlikely alternative. First, the well-known strength of partisanship (e.g. Green et al., 2005), even in new and uninstitutionalized party systems (Conroy-Krutz et al., 2016). And second, the fact that individuals tend to change their prior beliefs to avoid being on the *losing* side after an election, not to leave the winner's camp (Atkeson, 1999). The second possibility would be to change her belief about the prior attitudes, or not see her politics as anti-establishment any longer. However, self-verification theory (Swann, 1983) suggests that individuals will not change their perceptions about themselves easily. Therefore, our imaginary voter will not suddenly think of herself as a pro-establishment person. Nor is it very likely that she will start to consider her preferred party, which just won an election, the new elite – what is antithetical to a fundamental point of her (anti-elitist) political views.

The most likely way out is updating perceptions about the object of their attitude and behavior. In this case, it means changing the perception of what constitutes the political establishment. Even though there is a new government, old political forces are still considered strong and the real elite – associated with economic and/or transnational elites – against whom the new government has to work. The *locus* of anti-establishment feelings continues to be on the same actors, even if their roles in the political system changed.

This also happens because, as an individual grows to despise the old political system

while forming her political preferences, she associates it with specific groups and individuals. The problem is not an abstract "political elites", which can be filled by anyone who is an actual political elite at a certain point in time, but becomes quickly synonymous with a specific party or actor (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Therefore, even if this actor lost the control of government, it is still painted as a political elite with whatever rationalization one can find. The animosity lives on against the political actor or group itself, even if their momentary position changes.

As a matter of fact, most of the time, old figures who were associated with the political establishment do not just vanish. Defeated parties often remain strong oppositionists in Congress, or at least their inheritor parties and movements do. This makes it easier to claim that old elites are alive and well, and are still elites. We know that populist leaders in government have no trouble finding new elites to blame (e.g. Enyedi, 2015; Hawkins, 2010). The question that has not been answered is whether voters buy this discourse. After populists are elected, is lack of trust in political elites still key at understanding support for populism? In the last part of this dissertation, I focus on two cases where populists came to power, Ecuador and Bolivia, to test what effects the victory of populism has on its relation to trust on political institutions among voters.

1.4   Who, Why, and What Next?

With this definition and hypotheses at hand, the next chapters tackle three questions: *who* are the populist actors in Europe and the Americas, *why* are some more electorally successful than others, and *what* are the consequences of populism at the individual level. Chapter 2 starts by looking at parties' electoral documents to measure their levels of populism, and identify those actors that deserve this label.

Chapter 2

Mapping Populist Parties

[1]

One of the main challenges in studying populism in comparative perspective is finding ways of measuring it across large numbers of cases, including not just multiple countries but multiple parties within those countries. Most large-N studies classify cases by *fiat*, based either on literature reviews or on the judgments of country specialists (see, for example, Doyle, 2011; Bustikova, 2014; Mudde, 2007, 2014). The problem with the first approach is that it often relies on second-hand literature instead of primary sources, and has little room for testing reliability. The problem with the second is that it depends on the different conceptions of populism experts might have, which are often divergent from one another and incompatible with the definition used in this thesis. Ultimately, these approaches struggle to provide an objective basis for comparing cases across different contexts.

In this chapter I develop a source of data to guide comparative analysis for the remain-

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[1]A significant part of this chapter (sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3) will appear in Hawkins and Castanho Silva (*forthcoming*). Work division: both authors contributed equally to training coders and following their progress during data production. I have run the analyses. Both authors contributed equally to writing those sections. Analyses and text in section 2.4 have been done by me alone, and Hawkins has made comments and suggestions.

der of this dissertation, employing textual analysis. Generally speaking, textual analysis is useful for anyone using the ideational approach to populism because it is focused on ideas, and because the ideas of political elites can be hard to measure through anything except the texts they produce for other purposes. Most of the earliest efforts at measuring populism objectively were in fact textual analyses by scholars favoring some kind of ideational definition (Armony and Armony, 2005; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Hawkins, 2009). Here we explore a particularly difficult version of this challenge by adapting textual analysis to the measurement of populism across party systems in large numbers of countries.

We apply a validated human-based approach to measuring populism – holistic grading (Hawkins, 2009) – to 146 parties from 28 countries, mostly in Europe and the Americas. Specifically, we look at campaign documents – electoral manifestos and speeches by party leaders – from all main parties in each political system to observe how populist each actor is, and compare that to a range of international cases. In the process we create the first cross-regional dataset classifying entire party systems. With these data in hand, I first observe how populism is distributed across the regions in this study, and how specific parties are classified. Next, I focus on European cases to assess the typical question of whether populism is a left or right-wing phenomenon.

These data will be the source to studying the causes of populism across countries, in Chapter 3, its causes and consequences at the individual level in Chapter 4, and its relation to political trust in Chapter 6. The method will once again be used, for new texts, in the case studies of Chapter 5. For this reason, it is important to be specific about how it was generated, and how populism is spread across the cases covered in this study.

2.1 The Method: Holistic Grading

Researchers have used different content analysis methods to measure populism in recent years. Jagers and Walgrave (2007) test a dictionary-based content analysis to classify populist parties in Flanders, which is extended to three more countries in Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011). This technique consists in defining a dictionary of "populist" terms and classifying documents based on their frequency. In contrast, Rooduijn et al. (2014) and Wirth et al. (2016) use quantitative human-based content analysis of party communication from Western European countries. Both approaches have paragraphs or sentences as units of analysis, and use trained coders to classify each one as populist or not, with the aggregated proportion of populist snippets being the party score. A third comparative approach has been put forward in Hawkins (2009), and consists of holistic grading. There, chief executives' speeches are coded as a whole, without breaking them down into words or paragraphs.[2]

From these alternatives, this dissertation uses the third, mostly for practical reasons. The dictionary-based technique demands a high knowledge of each specific country and time period for the selection of relevant terms. It may be feasible in single case studies or small-n comparisons, but becomes much less so when a larger number of cases are included. Of the other two, both depart from a similar definition of populism and could potentially be used for the purposes of this study. Hawkins' approach has the upper-hand, however, for having been tested and validated across a large number of countries and time-periods. The original study (Hawkins, 2009) included 40 contemporary and historical presidents and prime-ministers from Latin America, Europe, and Asia, while a second round was done with chief executives from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Hawkins, 2013). Furthermore, because it works at the level of whole texts, it can be used to generate data relatively quickly, at least for human-coded analyses. The techniques by Rooduijn et al. (2014) and Wirth et al. (2016) have not yet been applied outside of a few Western European

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[2]For a review of content analysis methods measuring populism, see Poblete (2015).

countries and, while they have the clear advantage of generating more fine-grained data, both are much more time and resource consuming.

Holistic grading was developed in educational psychology for assessing students' writing (White, 1985; Sudweeks et al., 2004). It is a human-based approach that evaluates the text as a whole. Coders are trained to assign scores based on the elements of the concept and a set of anchor texts defined as examples for the each score in the scale. In our case, coders were trained in English on the concept of populism, and the set of training documents and anchor texts was also in English.[3] In order to ensure measurement validity, the anchor texts were drawn from a variety of regions and capture different ideological flavors of left and right.[4] The training emphasized that the most important dimension of populism is the notion of a reified will of the common people, and that this reified people has to be defined in opposition to an "elite", who is powerful and oppressive. Therefore, even if there was a great deal of anti-elitism in the text, coders could not assign a score of 1 unless there was also a reified will of the people. As in Hawkins (2009, 1062), scores come from a 0-1-2 scale defined as follows:

- 0 A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a manifesto expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

[3]Most of the data collection and coding work has been developed together with Kirk A. Hawkins and students at Brigham Young University, during a research visit by the author to that institution in January 2015. For this reason, the use of "we" when discussing the specific activities conducted.

[4]For the speeches training, we use speeches by Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (scored a 2), Evo Morales of Bolivia (2), Sarah Palin of the United States (1), Stephen Harper of Canada (1), Barack Obama of the United States (0), and Tony Blair of the UK (0). Because the manifesto training comes after the speech training and coding, we rely on a more narrow set of anchor texts from the US, including the Populist Party platform of 1892 (scored a 2), the Progressive Party platform of 1912 (1), the Progressive Party platform of 1924 (1), the Libertarian Party platform of 1972 (0), the US Democratic Party platform of 2000 (0), and the American Independent Party platform of 2008 (0). We also use a manifesto from Australia, the Australia First Party manifesto of 2010, which provides a contemporary example of strong populism (scored a 2). The rubric is available in the Appendix A, and anchor texts at the Team Populism website (http://populism.byu.edu).

- 1 A speech in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers them by including non-populist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion of the people and the idea of a unified popular will (indeed, it must in order to be considered populist), but it avoids bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy.

- 2 A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist.

Because coders in earlier studies reported that it was often difficult to choose between these blunt categories, this time we instructed them to give decimal scores, and told that 0.5 rounded up to a categorical 1, and 1.5 rounded up to a categorical 2, and that they should consider these qualitative differences when assigning decimal points. After the training, coders received the texts, whether speeches or manifestos, and coded them in their original language (most graders were native speakers). For each text, the coder filled out a rubric that included a score, representative quotes, and a qualitative summary of their judgment. Each coder worked independently and filled out one rubric per document; afterwards, final scores were discussed with the other coders and the coordinator to clarify questions and check for possible misunderstandings.

2.1.1 Sampling

Two innovations were introduced to the sample relative to previous studies using holistic grading. First, because our goal was to capture the level of populism in the party system, the sample was expanded from chief executives to candidates of all major parties to the highest executive office (usually all parties receiving more than 1% of the vote). Second, in order to capture as many parties as possible, we focused on coding party manifestos

rather than speeches. Manifestos are a common choice in analyses of partisan ideology but also in the populism literature (Rooduijn, 2014; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). The main reason is that these documents explore a party's discourse as an institution, which may be distinct from that of its top candidates. Also, together with speeches, manifestos are the documents most comparable across countries: almost everywhere parties produce some kind of election program. This means we are looking for populist discourse in documents that are produced and made public with similar purposes across cases. Moreover, as a practical note, manifestos are more accessible than speeches across time and space. It is very difficult to find speeches for defeated candidates (and sometimes even for winning ones) more than one or two election cycles back, while manifestos are usually available for longer periods. This makes manifestos an essential text for studies of whole party systems.

Some might question the relevance of party manifestos. In many countries, especially in Latin America, few voters actually bother to read them, and people are often unaware that parties even have them. There are a few standard answers to this objection. First, there is the empirical observation that parties actually do implement a fair share of what they promise in their electoral manifestos (e.g. Bara, 2005; Budge and Hofferbert, 1990; Naurin, 2014). Therefore, even if no one is reading them, manifestos give important insights into what political parties are thinking and what they will do once in power. Second, even if parties do not see their manifesto as their highest priority, writing it still requires effort by people involved in the communication side of the campaign who are usually party members. Odds are that they approximate the average party discourse.

In terms of coverage, the total sample includes 146 parties from 28 countries mostly in the Americas and Western Europe.[5] The selection of countries was partly dictated by convenience: we had to include those for which there were coders who spoke the language.

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[5]Greek parties did not produce proper electoral manifestos for the January 2015 elections. However, they all had editorials which outlined party policies, and these documents were used as the most comparable to manifestos.

This was less of a problem in the Americas, where most of South America plus the whole North America were included. In Western Europe the sample was more limited, but we could not identify any evident biases: the sample includes countries where populism is often said to be high, and others where it is usually off the radar. Also, it includes both Southern and Northern European countries. What are completely absent, though, are post-socialist Central and Eastern European cases.

Our target was to include every party that received more than 1% of the valid national votes. This was met for half the countries in our sample. In the other half, either manifestos were unavailable for smaller parties (for example in Bolivia, Ecuador, or Argentina), or party system fragmentation imposed a higher limit: with too many parties, our resources for hiring coders get scarce, and we sensed the diminishing marginal utility of coding the eleventh party in a country just to meet the quota (such as the Party for the Animals in the Netherlands).[6] All documents are from the most recent national elections up to March 2015 in which the chief executive was defined.[7]

2.1.2   Validation with Speeches

To test the validity and reliability of results obtained with manifestos, we also collected and coded candidates' speeches in twenty of our countries.[8] We focused on the two campaign speeches most likely to be similar in format across countries: the opening speech where the candidate announced his or her candidacy, and the final or closing speech of the campaign.

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[6]Countries where the 1% rule applied: Australia, Belgium (vote shares considered for each electoral college), Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Germany (Pirates, with two percent of list votes, were not included), Mexico, Peru, Spain, United Kingdom, Uruguay, United States, and Venezuela. Countries with a 5% cutoff: Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Paraguay, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. In some of these, one or more smaller parties were still included, when sources were available. From Norway, only the three largest parties are present in the sample.

[7]Exceptions are Canada, where documents from 2006 were used; Austria, where we coded the 2008 legislative election; and Spain, where we included the December 2015 election.

[8]Countries in which we did not include speeches: Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland.

If we find that manifestos give widely different results when classifying parties, it is an indication that coding the two kinds of documents actually measures two different things, and that reliable measures for individual parties require more than just the one text.

We use speeches by the party main candidate (leader, in case of parliamentary systems, or presidential candidate, for presidential systems) from national election campaigns. While for the manifesto we effectively use a census sample, as there is usually only one manifesto, for speeches we use a quota sample (the beginning and ending speeches of the campaign). The beginning speech is ideally the one where the candidate is announced by the party, or confirms her candidacy, frequently done in a large party event with significant media coverage. The second speech comes from the end of the race, a few days before the election (first round, in cases where there is a runoff), often given in the context of a large rally closing the campaign that also has significant media coverage. The reasoning behind this choice is to, first, capture the discourse in distinct moments in the race. Also, if it is possible to have speeches from events that received large coverage, we are looking at those which have the most potential to be heard by the largest number of voters; if a politician is to use a populist discourse, these are the moments when she would most likely have been heard. Finally, limiting the number of speeches to two is dictated by a practical reason: it is very difficult to find more than two campaign speeches for several candidates.[9]

2.2   Description of Results

This is the first time that holistic grading has been applied on such a large scale to party manifestos, and some issues of adapting it to this kind of document emerged. First, as coders began reporting results, many indicated that there were two very different tones in

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[9]In Hawkins (2009) it was suggested that three to four speeches were enough for a reliable grade. However, there a politician's discourse was studied for all her time in office. Because we are limiting it to how populist are political campaigns, shorter in time, and with almost repeated speeches over several days, it may be expected that there is less variance, and fewer speeches are needed.

some manifestos, where the preamble, or introduction, contained high levels of populism, while the rest (always a list of policy proposals) had a more pragmatic or technical feel. We decided to ask coders to give separate scores for the preamble/introduction, where it existed, and the list of policy positions. In the end, we found that the mean level of populism in preambles is 0.29, while that of the list of positions is 0.23. The difference, however, is not statistically significant.[10] The scores for all parties coded are found in Appendix B, Table B.1. In it, the manifesto column is a simple mean of the preamble and the list of issues scores, the same practice adopted by Rooduijn et al. (2014). Because the preamble is always shorter than the list of positions[11], the net result is to weight the preamble more heavily.

Results confirm an intuitive expectation: manifestos are less populist than speeches. Given their nature as formal party documents for elite consumption, it is not surprising that the tone is more sober. The mean grade for manifestos is 0.297, while that of speeches is 0.457. This difference is statistically significant on a paired sample t-test (t = 2.40, $p < .05$). Speeches from the the beginning and end of the campaign have no difference on levels of populism (means of 0.47 and 0.46, respectively). In categorical terms, this means the average campaign speech is almost at the 0.5 threshold that indicates the presence of necessary elements of populism. This shows that populism in political campaigns might not be dominant, but still has a non-negligible presence.

The correlation between speeches' and manifestos' final scores is presented in Figure 2.1. It is .56, and there are only two cases of parties where one kind of document received a categorical 2 (a decimal score equal or above 1.5) and the other a categorical 0 (a decimal below 0.5). These are the Civil Revolution (RCI), in Italy, with an average for speeches of its leader, Antonio Ingroia, of 1.5, while the manifesto scored 0.4, and the National

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[10]Paired sample t-test, t = -.86, $p = .39$.

[11]The length of manifestos ranged from 4 pages, from the German AfD, to 810, from the Walloon Ecolo. The length of preambles span from two paragraphs to five pages.

Figure 2.1: Correlation between Speeches and Manifestos.

r = 0.56, n = 90

Solidairity (SN), from Peru, whose manifesto received a 0.0 and the candidate's speech 1.6[12]. These results indicate that, when possible, it is ideal to have both manifestos and speeches to give a more complete picture of how populist individual parties are, but in the absence of speeches, manifestos still give a reasonable approximation.

After the coding efforts in Hawkins (2009, 2013) showed high intercoder reliability, it seemed possible to have only one coder doing some cases, in order to increase the number of countries and parties covered. Part of this sample, therefore, is based on the grades assigned by only one coder. For the other part (103 documents out of 308), two were kept, and the results of intercoder reliability checks confirm that the method is reliable. Krippendorff's alpha is high: .85 for manifestos, .87 for speeches. Using only one coder for part of the sample should not bring major measurement errors. Figure 2.2 shows the correlations between scores assigned by two coders to each document.

Document Format

Eighty-three speeches in our sample were available only on video format, while ninety-one were coded from transcripts. One might hypothesize that speeches graded from videos, where the coder can see the emotions and receive all the non-verbal communication from the speaker, might be perceived as more populist than those coded from transcripts. A comparison of these two groups, however, does not indicate such a difference. Indeed, speeches coded from video have a higher average grade (0.50) than those from text (0.41). However, the reason we used video is because they were not available in another format, and that is often caused by the simple fact that no one bothered to transcribe them. In fact, video-speeches came mostly from smaller parties, with an average vote share of

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[12]Both might be explained by two shortcomings in the data available from these parties. The RCI manifesto was one of the few that had no preamble, only a list of policy positions, what may have contributed to its lower score. For the SN, only one speech from its presidential candidate, Luis "Lucho" Castañeda Lossio, was found and coded, and the version of the speech had been edited before it was made available. This score, therefore, is more sensitive to the possibility of a single non-representative speech or of non-representative fragments that have been kept.

Figure 2.2: Intercoder Reliability.

Krippendorff's alpha = 0.85 n = 53   Krippendorff's alpha = 0.87 n = 50

16.7%, compared to 22.6% for transcribed speeches. Most importantly, we also observe that manifestos of parties for which we coded video-speeches are more populist (0.38) than those for which speech transcripts were available (0.30). It seems, therefore, that speeches for which there are no transcripts are simply from smaller and more populist parties.

2.3 Regional Differences

Having shown that manifestos can provide a reasonably accurate dataset for large-N analyses of populism, I focus on them for the remainder of the chapter. Table 2.1 indicates all parties whose manifestos surpassed the categorical threshold of 0.5, indicating there is a non-negligible component of populism in their discourse, even if not consistently used. The four most populist parties identified, all of which received a grade above 1.5, are from Latin America. They are the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), founded by Chávez; the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), Evo Morales' party in Bolivia; PAIS Alliance, from president Rafael Correa of Ecuador; and a small party from Chile, Equality

Table 2.1: Populist Manifestos in Europe and Americas.

Score	Americas	Europe
≥ 1.5	Equality Party, Chile (2.0) United Socialist Party of Venezuela, Venezuela (1.85) PAIS Alliance, Ecuador (1.7) Movement Towards Socialism, Bolivia (1.55)	
≥ 1.0	Civic Radical Union, Argentina (1.3)	Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), Greece (1.45)
	Popular Unit, Uruguay (1.2)	National Democratic Party of Germany, Germany (1.4)
	Socialism and Liberty Party, Brazil (1.1)	The Left, Germany (1.3) Party for Freedom, Netherlands (1.25) United Left-Popular Unity, Spain (1.15) Swiss People's Party, Switzerland (1.0) Austrian Freedom Party, Austria (1.0) Democracy and Freedom, Spain (1.0)
≥ 0.5	Party of the Democratic Revolution, Mexico (0.95)	Left Front, France (0.9)
	Democratic Unity Roundtable, Venezuela (0.8)	Republican Left of Catalonia, Spain (0.8)
	Conservative Party, Canada (0.8)	Portuguese Communist Party, Portugal (0.7)
	Bloc Québécois, Canada (0.75)	Podemos, Spain (0.65)
	Socialist Party, Chile (0.7)	Democratic Party, Italy (0.6)
	Creating Opportunities, Ecuador (0.6)	Independent Greeks (ANEL), Greece (0.55)
	Peruvian Nationalist Party, Peru (0.55)	Popular Party, Belgium-WAL (0.55)
	Front for Victory, Argentina (0.5)	British National Party, UK (0.5)

Score refers to the electoral manifesto score.

Party, whose leader in the 2013 presidential campaign, Roxana Miranda, followed closely the radical-left ideology of the previous three. Bolivarianism is found here to be strongly associated with populism: of the three Latin American parties that have scores between 1.0 and 1.5, two hold a similar ideology as well. The one exception is the Civic Radical Union, a center-left Argentinean party not usually associated with populism.

As the absence of cases in the top-right box hints, populism is stronger in Latin America than in Europe. While we identified 13 parties with a score higher than 0.5 in Latin America, meaning 28.9% of the regional sample, there were only 16 European ones in this range out of 92, or 17.4%. Therefore, not only the highest levels of populism are found in Latin America, but the proportion of populist parties to the total in the region is substantively larger than in Europe. This point is made in Figure 2.3, which compares the means of populism in party manifestos across the two regions. The gray bars are unweighted mean scores of populism, while black ones present scores weighed by parties' vote-share. Latin American averages are higher than European ones. More than that, populism in Latin America is used by electorally stronger parties: when vote-shares are weighed in, the level of populism in manifestos goes up. In other words, populism is a more mainstream discourse in Latin America.

This pattern is an important finding in itself. While this has not been openly expressed or argued for, the common assumption in studies comparing populist parties in both regions is that they are populist to the same extent. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012), for example, study the difference between left and right populism, concluding that one is inclusionary (left) while the other is exclusionary (right). They select typical cases of each, which are the French National Front and the Freedom Party of Austria for right-wing populism, and Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez for left-wing. The underlying assumption is that the only thing that differentiates these movements, at least in terms of their ideas, is their "thick" ideology – populism is treated as a constant. What we see here, however, is

Figure 2.3: Regional Means of Populism in Europe and Latin America.

Manifestos

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
that the National Front, with a score for its manifesto of 0.4, is not nearly as populist as Morales' MAS (1.55) or Chávez's PSUV (1.85). And while the Freedom Party of Austria might come closer (1.0), it is still one category below the two Latin American ones.

2.4   Left and Right Populism in Europe

Western Europe is often said to be living a wave of right-wing populism. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012), when choosing prototypical cases that represent populism in the region, select the radical right parties National Front (France), and Austrian Freedom Party, and state that "Populism is a relatively new phenomenon in Europe that has come to prominence with the formation of the populist radical right party family in the 1980s" and that "there are only a few isolated cases of successful non-radical right populism in contemporary Europe" (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012, 155). According to Zaslove (2008, 329), "in the current European context, populism is usually associated with center-right, or radical right populism" – after which the author proceeds to explain that left-populists in Europe should not be ignored, even if there are fewer examples of them (idem).

However, this perception and the underlying facts are starting to change. That is both because of the rise of new parties, and of new research into the topic. First, two very successful emerging parties in Europe are *Podemos* in Spain, and *SYRIZA* in Greece. Both clearly leftist and recognized by most as populist. The automatic association between populism and right-wing politics – long gone among those who study the phenomenon in Latin America, for instance –, has been challenged in Europe as well by the rise of such parties. Moreover, Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015) investigate the relation between degrees of populism in party manifestos and left-right ideology from parties in five West European democracies.[13]   They find that ideology is not a significant predictor of the

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[13]France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and the UK.

degree of populism found in a party's manifesto. It is equally distributed among left and right. What matters most is radicalism: populism is mostly associated with the radical left and the radical right, and much less frequent among centrist or just moderately left/right parties. Indeed, the authors go as far as claiming that *"all radical left parties, and not just some of them, endorse the populist set of ideas to a certain extent"* (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015, 9).

With the data just presented at hand, I further this analysis in a few regards. First, replicating Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015) results on a more complete sample of Western European countries – thirteen, as opposed to five. Second, investigating how populism is associated with different dimensions of ideological divisions. While there are examples of parties considered both left- and right-populists, the first are usually called so based on their left-wing position on economic issues, while the latter are mostly considered right-wing on socio-cultural issues, without a common economic ideology.

2.4.1 What's Left and Right in Populism

The fact that populism *can be* used both by the left and the right does not mean that it *is* equally used by both. If we think of the two-dimensional understanding of ideological distribution (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995), where one axis represents economic issues and the other socio-cultural ones, left-populism may be said to give priority to the first, while right-populism gives priority to the second.

For left-populists, the important division is economic. As March (2007) notes, they see the split between people and elites as one between haves and have-nots, in a classic class-based division of society. Therefore, we may expect left-populism to be characterized by preference for left policies in the economic dimension, but not necessarily on cultural issues. Populist right-wing parties, on the other hand, are known not to share a core of beliefs about the economy. It is not uncommon that populist parties labeled as right-

wing defend economic policies that sit well with social-democrat or socialist ideologies, such as protecting the welfare state (see de Koster et al., 2012) or increasing economic protectionism (the new "winning formula", as seen in de Lange (2007)); the difference is that these parties are particularistic in these demands, for instance calling for more social benefits only for nationals (de Koster et al., 2012). What instead characterizes right-populists is their views on socio-cultural issues. Their rise has been linked to the growing prominence of cultural issues in European politics over the last decades, against the relative decline of economic cleavages (Bornschier, 2010). In fact, an anti-immigration stance has been pointed to as the only common topic among all right-wing populist parties (Ivarsflaten, 2007). The "right" in right-wing populism refers to their ideological position specifically – and uniquely – on these topics.

Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015) were the first to make the case, across a range of parties in five different countries, that populism is not necessarily left or right, but associated with extremism. They find general left-right radicalism to be the only significant predictor of higher levels of populism in party manifestos in their sample, as opposed to ideology. The results holds even when controlling for GAL-TAN issues, what can be explained by the fact that left-populists are strongly GAL, while right-populists are very TAN (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015, 7). Their choice, however, is to use general left-right instead of focusing on issues. It is important to notice that their OLS models controlled also for party size and whether it is in opposition, none of which turned out to be a significant predictor.

Data

In total, there are manifestos published by 92 parties from 14 West European countries in this sample. Table 2.2 gives a first look into the orientation of these parties, and indicates that no ideology is dominant: considering just a general left/right divide, there is an even split with eight parties on each side. Among the eight which got an average of 1.0 or higher,

Table 2.2: The Most Populist Parties in Western Europe.

Party (score)	Country/Year	Vote	Orientation
SYRIZA (1.45)	Greece-2015	36.34%	Left
NPD – National Democratic Party of Germany (1.40)	Germany-2013	1.3%	Right
Linke – The Left (1.30)	Germany-2013	8.6%	Left
PVV – Party for Freedom (1.25)	Netherlands-2012	10.1%	Right
IU-UP – United Left-Popular Unity (1.15)	Spain-2015	3.68%	Left
DL – Democracy and Freedom (1.00)	Spain-2015	2.25%	Right
FPÖ – Austrian Freedom Party (1.00)	Austria-2008	17.5%	Right
SVP – Swiss People's Party (1.00)	Switzerland-2011	26.6%	Right
FG – Left Front (0.9)	France-2012	11.1%[*]	Left
PCP – Portuguese Communist Party (0.7)	Portugal-2011	7.9%	Left
ERC – Republican Left of Catalonia (0.7)	Spain-2015	2.39%	Left
Podemos (0.65)	Spain-2015	20.68%	Left
PD – Democratic Party (0.6)	Italy-2013	25.42%	Left
PP – Popular Party (0.55)	Belgium-2014	4.1%[**]	Right
ANEL – Independent Greeks (0.55)	Greece-2015	4.75%	Right
BNP – British National Party (0.5)	UK-2010	1.9%	Right

[*] Presidential election, first round.
[**] French-speaking electoral college.

five are right-wing parties, and three are left. Seven parties of the list got more than 10% of the national votes; four are left or center-left, and three are right or center-right. This list indicates, therefore, not only that populist ideology is evenly spread across left and right, but also that neither of the sides seem to be stronger electorally.

Data on Ideological Orientation

I use data from the 2010 and 2014 Chapel Hill expert surveys, which ask party experts to classify individual parties on a range of policy issues (Bakker et al., 2015b,a). [14] To test the relation between populism and extremism I use the general left-right placement question: "What is the position of the party in 2014 in terms of its overall ideological stance", ranging from 0 = extreme left to 10 = extreme right. Regarding social-cultural issues, I use the GAL-TAN scores (green, alternative and libertarian versus traditionalist, authoritarian and nationalist) and an additive index composed of three separate questions on whether the party favors law and order, favors tough immigration policies, and opposes more rights for ethnic minorities. On economic positions, I use both one general "economic left-right" placement, and another three-questions additive index, based on parties positions regarding support for tax cuts, support for market deregulation, and opposition to redistribution.

2.4.2   Results

Figure 2.4 shows the scatterplot of the relation between parties' populism scores and their general ideological stance, where 0 corresponds to the extreme left and 10 to the extreme right. I fit a curve representing the regression of populism on ideology, using a second-order polynomial. The adjusted R^2 of this model is 0.21. An ANOVA test of model fit shows it is significantly better than a linear model without the quadratic term (model adjusted R^2: 0). This figure is similar to that presented in Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015, 6), and confirms their observation of the relation between populism and extremism. It is clear that centrist parties have very little scores on the populism scale, which go up once we move towards either of the extremes. It is not the case that all extreme parties are populist –

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[14]The 2010 version was used for the UK and Austria, where the coded elections happened in 2010 and 2008, respectively. For all other countries, where the elections studied occurred between 2011 and 2015, we used the 2014 version of the survey.

Figure 2.4: Correlation between Populism and Ideology.

Figure 2.5: Populism and Left-right Parties.

51

there are enough dots at or close to 0 in the vertical axis which are at the ends of the ideological scale. But there is a discernible trend of increasing populism together with radicalism.

In the first panel in Figure 2.5, the continuous populism scores are split into two categories: those equal or above 0.5 defined as populist, and those below 0.5 as non-populist. We see that the mean ideology of both populist and non-populist parties is around the center, regardless of weighing by electoral results. The average ideology of populist parties is indistinguishable from that of non-populists.

In the second panel, parties are dichotomized as left or right (where above 5 = right, below 5 = left). The intention is to see on which side parties overall have more populism. Left-wing parties have a noticeably higher populism score than right-wing ones. Weighing by electoral results reduces the mean populism score in both cases, but not by very much, maintaining the gap between left and right. In this graph, there seems to be more populism among left and center-left parties than among right and center-right ones. Given the little difference we observe when looking only at populist parties, the explanation for this difference lies on the role of non-populists – those with scores between 0 and 0.4. In this group, left-wing parties have higher populism than right-wing ones. However, this is only marginal populism, not enough to be granted this label. Results up to now confirm that populism is indeed found among parties at both sides of the spectrum, but mostly associated with extreme ones instead of centrists. Also, there is little indication that populist parties are electorally less successful than non-populists.

2.4.3 Socio-cultural Issues

Figure 2.6 shows scatterplots with OLS regression lines superimposed, fit on either side of 5.0 in the ideology scales. Shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals. The first plot refers to a question on parties' ideological stance on democratic freedoms and rights, divided

Figure 2.6: Parties' Position on Socio-cultural Issues and Populism.

in a continuum with extremes at "Green-libertarian-postmaterialist" and "Traditional-authoritarian" values – the GAL/TAN scale. The second is an index from positions on the dualism "civil liberties" versus "law-and-order", lax versus tough immigration policy, and supporting or not more rights to ethnic minorities. The right-wing position is always coded with higher values. The regressions show the same idea: on the left, there is no relation between a party populism level and the degree of its ideology in these issues. The split-sample OLS line is virtually flat on the first, and stays within the confidence intervals on the second, in spite of a downward slope. The OLS lines on the right-hand side of each plot, however, show steep slopes and statistically significant relations.

What we see here is that, among right-wing parties populism is indeed associated with extremism in socio-cultural issues. Authoritarianism, xenophobia against "out-groups", and consistent calls for law-and-order policies are issues central to populist right-wing parties' ideologies' identified in Mudde (2007). According to the expectations, this relation is not present among left parties. Those more extreme do not tend to be more populist. This may be explained by the fact that Green parties, which score far left in these scales, are

not at all populist. All left-wing parties that received a populism score above 0.5 are red, not green, and therefore we observe a balance between high and low populism values on the extreme left of this scale.

2.4.4   Economic Issues

Figure 2.7: Parties' Position on Economic Issues and Populism.

The last test uses four questions on parties' economic positions. The first plot, on the left in Figure 2.7, reflects overall positioning in economic issues. The one on the right is formed by an index of parties' positions on three issues: redistribution from the rich to the poor, the dichotomy between increasing public spending and cutting taxes, and (de)regulation of the markets. Again, higher numbers indicate a stronger right-wing position – respectively, opposition to redistribution, support for lower taxes, and supporting deregulation of the markets. Once again, two regression lines with 95% confidence intervals are fit in each graph, one to the right of 5.0, the other to the left.

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Table 2.3: Populists' Most Important Issues.

Issue	Parties
Immigration	FPÖ; PP; PVV; SVP
Nationalism	NPD ; ERC ; ANEL
Redistribution	SYRIZA; IU-UP; PCP; Linke; FG
Others	Podemos ; PD

Source: 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015a)

On each ideological side separately, the relation between left-right in economics and populism is not significant. We observe some radical left parties with high populism scores, but also a similar amount of populists very close to the center – slightly left or right. The labels allow us to identify them as parties usually considered radical right because of their positions on socio-cultural issues. Their economic programs, as discussed previously, are more varied, and not rarely left of center. If we look at the whole sample, however, there is a statistically significant relation, where populism is associated with more left-wing positions.[15] From these we see that the relation between populism and economic issues is less clear than that in socio-cultural issues. In general there are two clusters of populist parties: around the extreme left, and around the center, for those which are normally considered extreme right. This amounts to an overall association between populism and left-wing ideology: there are few parties with a clear right-wing economic ideology that are also populist – only the SVP in Switzerland and the PP in Wallonia.

However, the reason why the association between populism and extremism was so high in Figure 2.4, where just a general left-right ideology was used, seems to be that experts who answer these questions rely on the salience of issues for these parties when classifying them. For populists classified on the extreme right, this corresponds to these parties' positions on socio-cultural issues – since most are not strongly right-wing on economics, with the exceptions of PP and SVP. When it comes to populists classified as radical left,

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[15]For the general economic left-right question, β = -0.044, $p < .01$, R^2 = .09; for the additive index, β = -0.052, $p < .001$, R^2 = .11. In both, N = 90.

experts seem to attribute the general ideology based on their economic position – as there was no identifiable relation between being more radically GAL and more populist, but all of the general left-wing populists are on the extreme left on economic matters. As Table 2.3 shows, immigration was named as the first most important issue for four of the eight right-wing populists – for the NPD and ANEL it is the second, after nationalism, while the DL did not exist at the time of the surveys.[16] For five of the eight left-populists, however, the first most important issue is redistribution, with the exceptions of Podemos and PD, for which it is the third most important, and the ERC. Therefore, populists on the left focus on economic issues, while those on the right focus on (anti-)immigration policies, and that is the basis for their usual classification as either radical left or right.

2.5 Discussion

This chapter started by introducing what is, up to date, the most comprehensive dataset of political parties classified by how populist their discourses are. We applied a technique of holistic grading to party manifestos and to candidate speeches from Western Europe and the Americas, to see how much populism they displayed in these texts. From the methodological perspective, we showed that the method can transition to manifestos – a novelty in its application – and that it is possible to use only one coder if resources are scarce and the focus is on producing a large dataset rather than diagnosing particular parties.

The classification data on their own are a relevant contribution that may be used for a wide array of future research. Models trying to explain support for populist parties, for instance, have up to now mostly relied on dichotomous divisions based on literature reviews or experts' classifications of parties (see, for instance, Bustikova, 2014; Doyle,

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[16]The BNP was not included in the 2014 round, and this question was not present in the CHES 2010.

2011; Remmer, 2011). It is now possible to model these preferences based on data on parties' levels of populism in comparative perspective, across different regions, derived directly from party communication and coded using a single definition of the term. This reduces measurement error, increases precision (by using a continuous measurement instead of a dichotomous one), and increases the comparability of results. If country experts overestimate the level of populism in parties they know well, this may now be corrected by having a scale that puts parties into fully comparative perspective.

A clear regional cut stands out from the results. While there are populists in both regions, the level of populist discourse found among Latin American parties and politicians is much higher than that found among their European counterparts. A prototypical European populist, the National Front, had a score of 0.4 for their manifesto, and Marine Le Pen's 2012 campaign speeches received an average of 0.75 out of 2. Other typical European populists did not fare much higher – Beppe Grillo's speeches averaged 0.65, Berlusconi's 0.35, and Nigel Farage's a round zero. The Sweden Democrats' score, whose recent electoral success has spurred much debate in Europe about the rise of yet another radical right populist party, shows that it might be radical right, but it is definitely not populist – it is not even the most populist party in Sweden. This does not mean populism is not found in all cases expected. Nick Griffin and the British National Party get moderately high scores, as does the German extreme-right NPD, and Geert Wilders' PVV in the Netherlands. However, if we isolate only the populist portion of their discourse, they are still not as radically populist as a couple of Latin American examples.

A skeptical reader might say that low scores for some parties may be a result of a bad measurement or a poor selection of texts, rather than parties' lack of populism. It is possible to find quotes by Farage, for example, which sound very populist. We admit that relying on a single text such as a manifesto is risky for making judgments about particular parties and advise other scholars to use larger samples when this is the objective. But especially where

we are relying on larger samples of texts, there are two counterarguments that should be offered. First, while three documents might not be ideal, and there may be large variation in a politician's discourse, the odds of all three being the few non-populist exceptions from a very populist candidate are quite small. As we have seen, strongly populist actors have this discourse even in the list of policy proposals of their party manifestos. Second, our selection of speeches has a partial bias for high profile speeches: the opening and closing of campaigns. The simple fact that speeches were available online often indicates that they received at least some attention, and were not obscure talks to small audiences. Therefore, we are capturing political discourse in moments when it has a better chance of being heard by the public. If populism is to matter in a politician's discourse, those are the right times. It might be that a politician's tone is more populist to her partisans than to the general public, but then the question goes to another level: is intra-party populism more relevant than the party's discourse made for mass consumption? If our larger concern is with the causes of support for, and consequences of populism at the society in which it is embedded, the answer is probably negative.

We may also mention what our coders have used to justify giving low grades to supposedly very populist European parties. In general, student coders have identified these parties as being "very nationalist, but not populist", in that "people are not portrayed as an oppressed majority with a unified will" (in comments to the Sweden Democrats' manifesto), or that there is "no notion of a reified will [of the people]" (comments to the Vlaams Belang). According to the coding of the Front National, "The manifesto is nationalist, but it lacks enough references to the general will or to a reified people to be considered populist." Given that a notion of the "general will" of a homogeneous people is central and necessary to the existence of populism, its absence on these manifestos is the main reason why they do not receive higher scores.

These findings have important consequences for future research comparing populist ex-

periences in the two regions, a topic which is currently flourishing. Knowing that Latin American populists are more radical in their populism than Europeans may have implications for explaining their support, as well as for the parties' and politicians' actions in office. For example, this might be one of the keys for explaining the openly anti-democratic actions taken by some Latin American populists in recent years (see Levitsky and Loxton, 2013; Huber and Schimpf, 2015). Such a high degree of populism comes together, by definition, with a high level of demonization of the opposition, which is used to justify their persecution as illegitimate actors. At the same time, it reinforces the argument made by Cas Mudde and others (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Mudde, 2014) that public fears about the rise of radical right populism in Europe may be exaggerated. Not only have they not been as successful as one might think from reading the news but, in general, they are not as populist as generally thought. While concerns may be raised over their radical right-wing ideology, their populism may not be as important an issue.

If these findings may call for a change in how we see populism in Europe, they are also of practical concern for the state of Latin American politics. While for some readers it may be sobering to see that Marine Le Pen is far from the populism of Evo Morales or Nicolas Maduro, the fact that her score is similar to that of moderate Latin American leaders, who are not usually associated with populism, may show just how how deeply ingrained into the region's political culture this kind of discourse is. In this chapter, the European "surprises" were mostly cases that were expected to be very populist and turned out not to be. In Latin America, the "surprises" were rather parties that unexpectedly had moderate or high levels of populism (even rising above prime European examples) and are commonly not thought of as such. For example Peruvian president Ollanta Humala, who is usually seen as having dramatically moderated his tone during his successful electoral bid in 2011; or Henrique Capriles, the leader of the opposition to Chavismo in Venezuela who, our findings indicate, has adopted much of his opponent's populist discourse. This

observation, coupled with the finding that populism in Latin America is the language of stronger parties, gives cause for concerns over how its democracies will keep on dealing with the divisive aspects of this discourse.

Another finding is that populism in Europe is associated with extremism in general, and not necessarily with either left or right politics. In almost all indicators, the lowest levels of populist discourse were to be found among parties around the center. While it is possible to claim that populism can be combined with both left and right ideologies, it seems more accurate that populism can be combined with extremist ideologies, and does not go well with moderation. This is consistent with the idea of populism as a redemptive discourse opposed to pragmatism (Canovan, 1999). Once again, while this was expected among the right, the way that populism and radical left walk hand-in-hand was difficult to foresee based on most contemporary studies on European populism. If we bring Latin America back, which was excluded from the second part because there is little question that the highest populism scores were almost all for left-wing parties, the relation between left ideology and populist discourse seems even stronger.

Chapter 3

The Causes of Populism

3.1 Out with Them All!

[1]

"Out with them all!"[2]: this was the motto of popular revolt in Argentina during the 2001 crisis. As we have seen earlier, these words, and the context in which the slogan emerged, enclose much theory on definitions and explanations of populists' rise. Conceptually, populism is typically seen as a call for systemic change, to wipe out all traditional politicians and bring politics back into the people's hands (Canovan, 1981; Mudde, 2004). This sentiment is clear, for example, in Donald Trump's promise to "drain the swamp" in Washington. As for its causes, intuitively and in general discourse it is often associated with crisis scenarios.

Often, however, crises in Western democracies have not spurred populist parties and leaders. The European Great Recession since 2008 has led populists to power in Greece

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[1]Parts of this chapter will appear in Castanho Silva, *forthcoming*.

[2]*Que se vayan todos!*, in the original.

and close to it in Spain and Italy, but not in Portugal or Ireland. In Latin America, the left-populist "pink-tide" came together with relative economic prosperity and improvement in life conditions (Remmer, 2011). These, and other exceptions, beg the question of why populism emerges in some countries and not others, and in response to some crises but not all.

Chapter 1 has provided several of the tentative answers that have been offered as to why populism emerges when and where it does. It argues in favor of those derived from an ideational approach, according to which populism is associated with utter dissatisfaction with political institutions. Translating the ideational theory to the macro-level means that populist success is explained by contextual factors triggering, at individuals, contempt for the political system, which makes them more supportive of populist parties and politicians. It is a simple mediation structure, depicted in Figure 3.1. Contextual causes to trigger a distrust in the entire political system (as opposed to simple dissatisfaction with the current government) are proposed to be two: poor governance and bad provision of state services, especially with endemic corruption, and elite collusion, symbolized by mainstream parties being almost indistinguishable from one another at voters' eyes. In the figure, the dashed arrow between bad governance/elite collusion and populism indicates the possibility of partial mediation. These are cases where one leads to the other without going through the theorized mediator.[3]

Alternative explanations to the rise of populists have also been reviewed. They were classified under the broad terms of institutional, economic/Downsian, and Durkheimian approaches. All of which can also be translated to the macro-level, and are therefore tested in this chapter as alternative causes of populism. In brief, institutional theories highlight the role of political and electoral systems that make it easier for outsiders to reach power.

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[3]Another point must be noticed in this figure: the right-headed arrows indicate *sufficient* relations in the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) framework used in this chapter. It means that the occurrence of a condition on the left-hand side of an arrow is sufficient for the occurrence of the condition on the right-hand side.

Figure 3.1: The Mediation Model.

Downsian approaches see support for populists as a rational answer to material grievances, while Durkheimian ones relate preference for populism with a sense of social decay among groups who have lost status and prestige in contemporary developed societies.

This chapter examines these theories at the country-level with fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA, Ragin, 2014). In the pages that follow, I present the data and operationalization of variables into sets, followed by the mediation analysis under QCA, and discussion of results. These show that, while corruption/bad governance and elite collusion are indeed alternative paths to explaining the success of populism, only the first set of conditions (corruption) is realized into populism through the mediator of eroding political trust.

3.2 fsQCA and Data

Fuzzy Set QCA treats conditions and outcomes as sets, to which a case has a degree of membership or, conversely, non-membership. After classifying all cases in each set, fsQCA uses Boolean algebra to minimize the combinations of conditions that are associated with

the presence of the outcome.[4] An innovation in this study is that I use this approach to test a hypothetical causal chain, or mediation, to which QCA has not yet been applied.[5] In short, it works by running three separate QCA tests: a) if the causal condition is sufficient for the outcome; b) if the causal condition is sufficient for the mediator; and c) if the mediator is sufficient for the outcome. Therefore, I test whether bad governance and elite collusion indeed can explain populism *and* lack of trust, and if lack of trust can explain populism. If that is so, we have evidence in support of a causal chain between these factors.[6]

3.2.1 The Electoral Success of Populists

Units of analysis are country-elections, and the outcome of interest is the electoral success of populism. Data on this outcome comes from the content-analysis study presented in chapter 2. Manifestos from 146 parties in 28 democracies, and candidate speeches for all parties in 20 of those countries, were coded on a scale of how populist they are, using human-based content analysis. Even though not all countries had candidates' speeches coded, I decide for including data from those that had, since they give important information and reduce measurement error for those cases. To produce then a final aggregated party score, the average scores for the leader or candidate speeches are averaged with the party manifesto score.[7]

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[4]For more technical details, see Ragin (2006, 2014), Rihoux and Ragin (2009), and Schneider and Wagemann (2012).

[5]The three closest options are Coincidence Analysis (CNA, Baumgartner, 2013), which is completely agnostic about the causal structure in the data except for specifying what is the ultimate outcome and which ones are potential causes, therefore more appropriate for exploratory research; fuzzy-set process tracing (Mikkelsen, 2015), applied to single or small-n case studies; and two-step QCA (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012), in which we do not hypothesize nor test a causal connection between remote and proximate conditions.

[6]A detailed and formalized explanation for this approach is in Appendix C.

[7]Results for the analysis using only manifesto scores are in Appendix D. For most countries, scores do not change substantively. Only four get across the cross-over point at 0.5: Argentina and Canada become members of the populist set (0.6 and 0.7 membership scores) while Peru and Spain leave it (0.4 and 0.3 membership scores). The combination of conditions leading to populist success remains similar.

Table 3.1: Definition of the "Populist Success" Set.

Condition	Membership	Cases
A party ≥ 1.5 was first or second	1.0	Bolivia, Greece, Venezuela
A party ≥ 1 was first	0.9	Ecuador, Switzerland
A party ≥ 1.0 was second, OR ≥ 1.5 got more than 10%	0.8	–
A party ≥ 0.75 was first or second, OR ≥ 1 got more than 15%, OR ≥ 1.5 got more than 10%	0.7	Austria, Mexico, Peru
A party ≥ 1.0 got more than 10%, OR ≥ 0.75 got more than 15%	0.6	Netherlands, Spain
A party ≥ 1.0 got more than 5%, OR ≥ 0.75 got more than 10%, OR a party ≥ 0.5 was first or second	0.4	Argentina, Canada, Germany
A party ≥ 0.5 got more than 10%	0.3	Chile, France
The first or second party is ≥ 0.35 and < 0.5	0.2	U.S., Italy
A party with ≥ 1 got more than 1%	0.1	Brazil
A party with ≥ 0.5 got more than 1%	0.05	Belgium, Colombia, Paragua, Portugal, UK, Uruguay
No party coded received more than 0.5	0	Australia, Ireland, Norway, Sweden

In fsQCA, cases' membership in sets is continuous and ranges from 0 to 1, denoting the uncertainty around their classification. There are three important cutpoints: at 0 a case is considered fully out; at 1 it is considered fully in, and at 0.5 is the crossing-point where it is considered more in than out. The rules for converting the data from speeches and manifestos into country set-membership rates are in Table 3.1, along with which cases fall in each category.

In total, there are ten cases above 0.5, which count as successes of populist parties, and seventeen below 0.5. At the top, no surprises, with Venezuela-2013, Bolivia-2014, and Greece-2015 – meaning, the victories of Nicolas Maduro, Evo Morales, and SYRIZA. It is hard to imagine a stronger case of populist success than those. This classification takes into account a trade-off between the strength of populism and the electoral success

of parties. It considers, for example, that 15% of the votes for a party whose manifesto has the necessary elements of populism (meaning, a grade ≥ 0.75), or at least 10% to a stronger populist (with a score ≥ 1.0) are the minimal requirements for considering that populists were successful in that election. To give examples, Spain and the Netherlands are right above the cutoff line, with set-membership scores of 0.6. In the Spanish case, the score is attributed due to Podemos, which has a populism score of 0.78 and received more than 20% of the popular vote, coming in third. In the Netherlands, the successful party had a stronger populist discourse (1.25), but received only 10.8% of the national vote. Right below the line we see Germany. In the 2013 elections, two parties received fairly high scores: Die Linke, with 1.3, and the NPD, with 1.4. Both put together, however, still fell short of a 10% mark in the popular vote – and the NPD did not even make it into parliament. Therefore, while close to being a successful election for populism, this is considered a bit below the necessary.[8]

3.2.2 Explaining Populism – Operationalization of Sets

Ideational Approach

Bad governance. This concept is represented by two sets, following factors suggested in the theoretical part: high corruption and ineffective government. For corruption, I use the country score in the Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International, from the year prior to the election[9]. Looking at the data distribution, there is a gap between 45

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[8]Previous QCA studies of populist parties' emergence have followed similar lines. van Kessel (2015, 76-8) defines an election as a member of the set of populist success when the combined vote-share of populist parties exceeds 10%, and fully member when the combined vote-share exceeds 20%. In Hanley and Sikk (2016), which studies anti-establishment reform parties (some of which are populists), full membership in the set of these parties' electoral success is defined at a combined 30% of votes, and the crossing point into more-in-than-out (0.5) is set at 7%.

[9]Available at: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. Only data from after 2012 are used, even for countries where the election coded happened earlier, because the TI changed its methodology for calculating the index in 2012, and results from the two stages should not be compared. Country scores show little variation on the short term, and therefore using data from years after the election should not

and 60 (where higher numbers mean less corruption), and several countries clustered above or below these marks. 59 is taken to represent the 0.5 cutpoint. Government performance is assessed with one dimension of the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators – namely, the Government Effectiveness dimension (Kaufmann et al., 2010). It takes into account several indicators of how governments perform their roles, including the quality of infrastructure, public and social services, bureaucracy, and civil service[10] – but not indicators of corruption that would overlap with the TI's index on Corruption Perceptions. It ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, where higher values mean higher effectiveness. In the sample at hand, there is a leap between 0.5 and 1, where the cut for membership in this set is placed. A case is fully out at the upper end, above 1.5, and fully in at the bottom end, below -1.

Elite collusion. To assess the second main factor in the ideational approach, whether voters might perceive a lack of real options in the political system, I create a set of grand coalition, informed by whether the government in place before the elections coded included a coalition with both right- and left-of-center parties. In cases of "grand-coalitions", when the two (or more) main parties in a political system are allied in government, voters might consider that voting for one or the other does not make a difference. The calibration is as follows: if the two mainstream center-left and center-right parties are together, the membership is 1. There are three such cases. If a major party has as junior partner a smaller party from the other side, it is 0.6. For example, in Brazil the center-left Workers' Party (PT) headed the government having, among its coalition partners, smaller conservative parties such as the Brazilian Republican Party (PRB) and the Progressive Party (PP), but not the mainstream center-right. This is the case in four countries. If there is a coalition of a centrist and a center-left or center-right party, it is a 0.1 (as in the CDU-CSU-FDP coalition in Angela Merkel's second cabinet). Single-party governments and ideologically coherent coalitions (left-left, or right-right) are fully out, and make the majority of the

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pose major problems.

[10]Data available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx, accessed on February 5, 2016.

sample, with 17 cases.

The Mediator

Low political trust. The perceived legitimacy of political actors is measured with data from the Global Competitiveness Report, from the World Economic Forum. I use one question in which executives are asked, on a scale from 1 to 7, how they think the public sees the ethical standards of politicians, from very low to very high.[11] The choice for this indicator, instead of mass surveys, is because this is the only yearly source of data on perception of public legitimacy of politicians that covers all countries in this sample. Numbers extracted from different surveys (for instance, combining Latinobarometro/Americas Barometer with Eurobarometro or European Social Survey) would have the added problems of country averages which should not be compared across surveys, as well as different question wordings in each survey. Further, we may expect that respondents give an approximately accurate perception of levels of public trust in politicians for their country. On calibration, the question is asked on a 7-point scale, and the middle point, 4, is defined as the 0.5 cross-over point in the set. Countries with a higher mean – more trust than the middle – have lower set membership scores in "distrust", while those with lower means have higher membership scores. There are 8 countries with scores below 0.5 in the distrust set, and 19 above, what indicates a general trend of distrust in politicians across countries.

Institutional Accounts

Proportional electoral system. This comes from the "housesys" variable of the Database of Political Institutions (DPI, Beck et al., 2001, updated in 2012), which indicates what regime is used to elect the majority of members of the lower house – proportional representation or plurality. Calibration is done as follows: if all seats are allocated with PR, a case

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[11]Data available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2014-15/GCI_Dataset_2006-07-2014-15.xlsx, accessed on February 5, 2016.

is 1. If it is a mixed system with PR defining the majority, 0.75; if the system is mixed with majoritarian rules defining the majority, 0.25; and if all are through majoritarian rules, 0. The majority of cases (20) is a member of this set, by deciding either all or most of their parliamentary seats through PR rules.

Presidentialism. Presidentialism is classified based on the "system" variable of the DPI. The sample is comprised of 12 presidential, 14 parliamentary, and 1 (France) semi-presidential systems. All presidential countries are coded as 1, and France as 0.6 – this seems the sensible choice given the large powers held by the president in current French politics (see Doyle and Elgie, 2016, for a cross-national assessment of presidential powers). Parliamentary systems with a directly elected president who holds little power are a 0.2, and parliamentary systems with presidents that are not directly elected are a 0 (as well as parliamentary systems with no president at all, naturally).

Young democracy. To test whether the age of democracy makes a difference, I create a set of young democracies. Data comes from the Polity IV index (Marshall et al., 2010), and a country is considered democratic if it scores 6 or above in it – meaning, democratization is considered to have happened when a country gets a score of 6 for the first time. Membership is assigned based on the decade of democratization: if it is the 2000's, set-membership is 1. For the 1990's, 0.9, for the 1980's, 0.8, and for the 1970's (the earlier third-wave democracies of Greece, Portugal, and Spain), 0.6. France, which got back to > 6 in the 1960's, receives a 0.2, and older democracies a 0. Three exceptions to this coding are: a) Germany, given that part of the country democratized in the late 1940's and the other in 1990, is a 0.4; and b) Ecuador and Venezuela, which have Polity scores below 6 in the electoral year, receive a 1.

Table 3.2: Causal Sets and Their Content.

Set	Meaning	Short
Ideational Approach:		
High corruption	High perception of corruption in the Transparency International index.	COR
Ineffective government	Low scores in the Government Effectivenesss dimension of the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators.	INEF
Elite collusion	Presence of a cross-ideological coalition in government before the election coded.	COAL
Institutional accounts:		
Proportional system	PR rules are used to elect members of the lower house.	PR
Presidentialism	Presidential political system.	PRES
Young democracy	Third and fourth-wave democracies.	YD
Economic Approaches:		
Unemployment increase	Net increase in unemployment rate in the three years leading to the election.	UNMP
Recession	Negative or zero GDP growth in the year before the election.	REC
Durkheimian Approach:		
Socially global	High score int the social dimension from the KOF Globalization Index.	GLOB
Mediator:		
Low political trust	Perception of low public trust in politicians.	TRST

Western Hemisphere today.

In sum, there are ten causal conditions analyzed in the following pages. They are summarized, with the respective short forms used, in Table 3.2.

Table 3.3: Step 1: Most Parsimonious Solution Formula Explaining the Success of Populism.

	Path	Cons.	R. Cov.	U. Cov	Typical Cases
1.	COR*YD*rec*coal +	0.77	0.50	0.14	Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela
2.	PR*YD*coal*rec*unmp	0.79	0.41	0.05	Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Spain, Venezuela
3.	COAL*pres*rec +	0.80	0.29	(0.28)	Austria, Greece, Netherlands, Switzerland
4.	COAL*GLOB*rec	0.76	0.29	(0.28)	Austria, Greece, Netherlands, Switzerland

Notes: Sufficient paths for the electoral success of populism. Consistency of the solution formula: 0.76, coverage: 0.83. *Cons.*: consistency; *R. Cov.*: raw coverage; *U. Cov.*: unique coverage. Row dominance was applied to the prime implicants' chart to remove redundant ones.

3.3   Analysis of Mediated Sufficiency

3.3.1   Step 1: Conditions Explaining Populism

The first step in a mediation analysis is testing whether elite collusion and/or bad governance are indeed sufficient for the presence of strong populist parties, even when taking alternative explanations into account.[15] This part, therefore, is an analysis of what conditions are sufficient for populism including all factors listed in the previous section, except for the mediator (trust in politicians). Minimizing the truth table into a most parsimonious solution results in a solution formula with three alternative paths leading to populism, depicted in Table 3.3.[16]

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[15]Another form of QCA analysis, often done together with sufficiency analysis, is that of necessity. It aims at identifying necessary conditions for the occurrence of the outcome. I do not perform one because all theories outlined frame the arguments in terms of sufficiency. None proposes a relation where, in the absence of X, there is no populism. Rather, they all say that X leads to succesful populists (a sufficiency relation in set-relational terms).

[16]All analyses done with the packages QCA(GUI) (Dusa, 2007, 2016) and SetMethods (Medzihorsky et al., 2016) for R.

The last two paths in this table are technically equivalent, and explain the exact same cases. For this reason, the minimization algorithm suggests both as alternatives to one another and cannot minimize further. The first reads "Elite collusion in non-presidentialist countries not in a recession is sufficient for populism". An English translation of the second is "Elite collusion in globalized countries that are not in recession is sufficient for populism". We see that both share two conditions, differing only on whether the third should be presence of social globalization or lack of presidentialism. They confirm the ideational theory's argument that, in developed countries, elite collusion might be a trigger of populism by causing voters to lose trust in political institutions. In this case, we also see that *not being* in a recession was a necessary part of this path, going against economic explanations of populism. Further, the combination of elite collusion with lack of presidentialism makes perfect sense from the following perspective: in presidentialist countries, regardless of possible large legislative coalitions, it is easier for voters to identify a single party (or, the president) with the government and as the one to blame for any problems (Carlin and Singh, 2015). Dissatisfaction can be more easily targeted at the incumbent instead of the system.

The very first path in Table 3.3 reads "being a highly corrupt young democracy, not in recession and without a grand coalition is sufficient for populism". This path identifies high corruption as a necessary factor along with the lack of grand coalitions. That also supports the idea of them being functional equivalents, depending on other contextual factors in developing and developed countries – indeed, corruption is jointly necessary with being a young democracy. This path also features the lack of recessions as necessary for populism, once again challenging economic accounts.

Only one case is uniquely explained by the second path: Spain. It states that "being a PR young democracy with no increase in unemployment, no recession, and no elite collusion

is sufficient for populism".[17] This is the only path to include the presence of an institutional facilitator: PR rules, used both in Spain and much of Latin America. Further, it delivers another blow at economic explanations, even with the Spanish caveat. It is important to notice, however, that Spain – the only case uniquely explained by this path – is also the only one which cannot be accounted for by either of the proposed macro-level factors from the ideational theory: this path includes the absence of elite collusion, against the trend in other European cases, and does not have corruption, what differentiates Spain from Latin Americans.

Putting all paths together, we observe support for the ideational theory: from a range of alternative explanations to the success of populists, I find that elite collusion is a necessary condition within the path explaining European cases[18], while high corruption is important for Latin American ones. Of the alternative explanations, being a young democracy appears to matter in conjunction with corruption, while economic arguments, according to which populism is a reaction to economic crises, fare poorly: lack of recession was a common factor in all four paths, explaining all cases of populism success. Increase in unemployment also does not appear to be relevant for this outcome.[19]

3.3.2   Step 2: Explaining the Mediator

After confirming the importance of factors which erode public perceptions of legitimacy in political institutions to explain populism, I turn to whether the theorized causal chain is in

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[17]Reminding the reader that unemployment increase is defined in relation to the three years prior to the elections, and recession refers only to the electoral year. Given these indicators, Spain was not classified as in an economic crisis in 2015.

[18]Technically, an INUS condition, or an insufficient but necessary condition that is part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition.

[19]The truth table in this step was minimized with a minimal consistency threshold of 0.75. Having a stricter one, at 0.8, yields the very same first two paths in this solution formula, and then two equally good alternatives for explaining Greece alone: COR*UNMP*YD or COR*UNMP*rec. Austria, Switzerland, and Netherlands are not accounted for anymore, due to belonging to truth table rows with a consistency for the outcome below 0.8.

Table 3.4: Step 2: Most Parsimonious Solution Formula Explaining Low Trust in Politicians.

	Path	Cons.	R. Cov.	U. Cov	Typical Cases
1.	REC +	0.91	0.27	0.03	Belgium, Italy, Paraguay, UK
2.	UNMP*coal +	0.85	0.47	0.14	France, Ireland, Mexico, Portugal, Sweden, UK, Uruguay
3.	COR	0.96	0.62	0.30	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela

Notes: Sufficient paths for low public trust in politicians. Consistency of the solution formula: 0.88, coverage: 0.88. *Cons.*: consistency; *R. Cov.*: raw coverage; *U. Cov.*: unique coverage.

place. In other words, do these same factors lead to lower levels of public political trust? I produce a truth table including all causal conditions from the previous step, except for those from the institutional account. Institutions are said to facilitate the rise of populism because they make it easier for outsiders to win. However, nowhere are they credited with eroding public trust in themselves as an explanation as to why an electoral or political system could lead to populism. For all others, either implicitly or explicitly distrust is perceived as a mediator: people first get dissatisfied with the political system for one of the many reasons brought up, and then vote for populists. After producing the truth table, the minimization process results in the most parsimonious solution formula in Table 3.4.

First, we note that there are many more cases of low political trust than there were of populist success. Low trust can be explained, alternatively, by economic hardship (either recession or increase in unemployment) or corruption. This suggests that economic troubles, while not leading to the success of populism, still do cause people to be dissatisfied with political institutions. As for the factors from the previous step, while corruption is indeed associated with lower trust, that is not the case for having a grand coalition: the only time this set figures in the solution, it is its negation, in the second path. Elite col-

Table 3.5: Step 3: Most Parsimonious Solution Formula Explaining the Success of Populism.

	Path	Cons.	R. Cov.	U. Cov	Typical Cases
1.	YD*TRST*rec*unmp +	0.80	0.51	0.33	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Spain, Venezuela
2.	PRES*YD*TRST*rec +	0.69	0.47	(0.07)	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela
3.	YD*TRST*rec*glob	0.70	0.46	(0.07)	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela

Notes: Sufficient paths for the electoral success of populism. Consistency of the solution formula: 0.73, coverage: 0.81. *Cons.*: consistency; *R. Cov.*: raw coverage; *U. Cov.*: unique coverage. Row dominance was applied to the prime implicants' chart to remove redundant ones.

lusion does not seem to matter much for lowering political trust. Therefore, only one of the antecedent conditions theorized by the ideational approach does lead to lower political trust, the theorized mediator.

3.3.3 Step 3: Is It Really a Mediator?

The third step in testing the ideational theory minimizes a truth table in which all causal conditions are present, including political trust, but we exclude those associated with that theory: corruption, elite collusion, and ineffective government. The outcome is again populist electoral success. The solution is in Table 3.5. Once again, we obtain two equally good paths (2 and 3), which uniquely explain only one case: Mexico.

In this step, only left-populists are explained, including all from Latin America plus Spain. Lack of trust combined with being a young democracy not in recession are necessary conditions in all paths. The fourth necessary condition for all paths vary between lack of unemployment (1), presidentialism (2), or lack of globalization (3). It means that, when

the antecedent conditions of corruption, inefficient government, and elite collusion are left out, and trust is included, corruption is replaced by low levels of trust: in Step 1, the first path from Table 3.3 had a combination of corruption, young democracy, and lack of recession, explaining Latin American cases. Conceptually, therefore, this sequence of three steps confirms that lack of trust in political institutions is either a functional equivalent or a mediator between high levels of corruption and the success of populist parties *for young democracies*,[20] which in this sample are basically developing countries in Latin America.

However, without using those three conditions – and specifically elite collusion –, it was not possible to find a combination of conditions able to explain European populists. In this truth table, Netherlands and Switzerland share a row (meaning, have the same combination of causal conditions) with Sweden, which has no successful populists, while Austria sits at the same row as Norway, a round zero on populism. Greece, on its turn, is in the same row as Portugal. Because there are contradictory cases of (non)success given the same causal conditions, the combinations of causal conditions in these three rows are not considered sufficient for the outcome, and they are left unexplained.

For all three rows, the difference between success and not of populists in the first step was the presence or not of elite collusion. In Norway and Sweden there were no grand coalitions at the time of the elections, as opposed to Austria, Netherlands, and Switzerland. This was the single condition in which Austria differed from Norway, and Swizerland/Netherlands from Sweden. That is also a difference between Portugal and Greece – no cross-ideological alliances in Lisbon, but one in Athens.[21] This suggests that the emergence of populist parties – as opposed to non-populist radical right and left ones like we see in Sweden, Norway, and Portugal –, is indeed led by elite collusion, and the perception by some voters of no real alternatives in the political system.

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[20]Chapter 6 tests the direction of causality between low trust and populism to check whether trust is a mediator or functional equivalent to other contextual factors.

[21]Greece and Portugal also differed on the presence of an inefficient government and high corruption (both in Greece).

3.4 Chapter Discussion

The mediation analyses in this part identified two main contextual causes of populist success: elite collusion, in Europe, and corruption, in Latin America. However, in only one we observe a causal mechanism including lower trust in political institutions: corruption. Elite collusion is not associated with low trust in this sample and, when excluded from the possible causes for populism, the cases it did explain in step 1 cannot be accounted for anymore.

There are two possible ways to understand these findings: first, that elite collusion drives populist success without actually decreasing trust in political institutions. There would be a different mechanism through which one turns into the other. Perhaps, for example, populists were the only challengers available for someone who wanted an actual opposition vote. Therefore, voting for such parties is not a reflex of buying their discourse, but simply of it being the only real alternative. If we think of the Austrian example, where conservatives and social-democrats have been together in grand coalitions for much of the post-1945 period, a voter who is simply dissatisfied with the government might not be willing to vote for the main opposition if that is currently the coalition's junior partner. More so if knowing that in the event of her chosen party winning, the party currently heading the government is likely to retain cabinet seats. If the only alternative to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the government is a populist third-party, then be it. Even if this voter is not dissatisfied with the entire political system at large.

A second possibility is to consider that the success of populists in these countries is formed with a smaller vote share than that of populists in developing and, mostly, presidential countries. For populists to be successful in Latin America, where elections to define the head of the executive are majoritarian, parties need more votes to succeed. Looking back at those Latin American cases with highest membership in the populism set, in Bo-

livia, Ecuador, and Venezuela populists got more than 50% of the vote in the first round of presidential elections, while those in Peru and Mexico got both around 32%. In Switzerland and Spain, populists stayed within the 20-30% range, while reaching only 10% and 18% in the Netherlands and Austria, respectively.

Therefore, it is possible that elite collusion did drive dissatisfaction with the entire political system up, but for a smaller part of the electorate, so that when looking at the general public perception we do not see it as distrusting political institutions. The smaller share of people for whom the collusion did erode trust might be behind populists, but it was just not a large enough group to characterize the general electorate as distrustful. This is a limitation of testing such a causal chain and theory at the country-level, and reason why the argument is evaluated again among individuals in Chapter 4.

A note must be added regarding economic explanations for populism: there is absolutely no supporting evidence for this approach in this chapter. At the country level, a *lack* of indicators of economic crisis was partially necessary for populist success. However, I do find a host of countries for which economic crisis predicts lower trust in political institutions – most of which without cases of populist success. This is puzzling, and a first venue of further research. What it now seems is that people who have low satisfaction with institutions due to economic hardship are not supporting populists but might, if protesting, be supporting other kinds of outsider parties (or just not participating at all). Dissatisfaction due to material problems seems to lead to a different kind of reaction than that due to perceptions of political failures. More research is needed to show if that is in fact the case.

Another venue is explored in Chapter 6, and it is to confirm that populism and trust in institutions indeed have a causal connection with one another, as much of the literature suggests. Methods used in this chapter strictly can only find associational evidence, which is interpreted with causal directions due to theory. However, as argued previously (and by Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2016), populism might not only be

a consequence of lower political trust but also a cause. That is the subject explored in Chapter 6.

Chapter 4

Attitudinal Causes and Consequences of Populism

Analyses so far have concentrated at the macro level. I first identified populist parties across countries, and used that data to find under what context those actors are more successful. This chapter moves to the individual level, looking at populism both as a dependent and independent variable. Among individuals, why is it that some support more populist parties? And, also for individuals, what consequences can we identify of supporting populists? These are the two questions tackled in this chapter.

If across countries the best predictors of populism are factors expected to lower public confidence in the legitimacy of political institutions, a question immediately follows: does it actually hold at the individual level? Or are we perhaps looking at an ecological fallacy scenario, when making inferences about people's attitudes based on aggregate information about countries? Moreover, what about those cases of old democracies left unexplained by lack of trust? In the following pages I address this issue, by modeling the behavioral and attitudinal causes of support for populists.

The second part of this chapter moves forward by placing populism as an explanation, looking for what are its potential attitudinal consequences. The focus is on individual-level consequences, because impacts of populism on country-level outcomes have been more extensively studied. How populism affects individuals, however, is a novel enterprise. I test whether supporting populists has an impact on five specific attitudes. First, previous findings show that populism has an impact on political trust (Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2016). This is the first hypothesis tested here. I also test effects of populism on increasing political participation, as theorized by Rovira Kaltwasser (2012)[1], on extremism,[2] on intolerance against out-groups (Matthes and Schmuck, 2017; Schmuck and Matthes, 2015), and on preference for a democratic political system.

4.1 Explaining Populism

This part takes into account the three main sets of explanations for populist support: ideational, Durkheimian, and economic theories (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, forthcoming). The first one, confirmed in Chapter 3 at the country level, now uses individual-level indicators of trust in institutions. The second focuses on cultural changes and post-material values, while the third proposes that populism is a reaction by individuals to difficult material conditions.

4.1.1 Methods and Data

For all models I use data combining the World Values Survey (WVS), waves 5 and 6 (WVS, 2010, 2015), and the European Values Study (EVS), wave 4 (EVS, 2011). Not all countries coded in Chapter 2 and studied in Chapter 3 have been in these surveys. Bolivia and Paraguay were not included in the three most recent waves of the WVS, and Venezuela's

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[1]Not confirmed at the country-level by Huber and Schimpf (2015).
[2]Following that populism increases mass-level polarization (Castanho Silva, 2017a).

last participation was in 2000, 13 years before the coded elections and when the socio-political landscape was entirely different. Greece has also not featured in the most recent WVS, and is not included. The last possible source of data was prior to 2008 (EVS), again with a completely different scenario. Further, I remove Ecuador from the sample because, of the remaining cases, it is the only one with a populist heading the executive at the time of survey and elections coded. As discussed previously, we should expect that explanations for supporting populists are different depending on whether they are in power or opposition. Also for this reason, Ecuador is given more extensive attention in a case study in Chapter 5. The list of countries, sources of data, and sample sizes is in Table 4.1.

Combining datasets always requires caution with certain aspects. First, I do not use post-stratification weights provided by the surveys in any analyses in this thesis. They are calculated differently in each survey and could bias the results. Since all models control for demographic characteristics, that should not lead to biased estimates. Second, only questions with the exact same wording and response categories across surveys are included in the models. This avoids a few possible methods biases.

Indicators and Variables

For the dependent variable, support for populism, I recoded respondents' party choice with the populism score of that party from Chapter 2.[3] This is taken as the individual level of populism. For example, all those who reported they would vote for the *Front National* in France had their vote-choice recoded for 0.575 – the FN's populism score.[4] This imperfect measure of preference for populism is the reason for treating it as a single-indicator latent variable, what takes measurement error into account (Westfall and Yarkoni, 2016).

To capture the concepts in the ideational theory, I use variables that measure both

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[3]In case the party of choice had not been coded, the response is set as missing and the observation removed. The party scores are attributed to the parties also when interviews happened before the elections in question. The assumption is that levels of populism in political parties remain stable over a few years.

[4]This approach was also used in Rooduijn et al. (2016).

Table 4.1: Countries Included and Data Sources.

Country	Election coded	Mean populism	Survey (wave)	Survey year	N
Argentina	2011	0.375	WVS (6)	2013	1030
Australia	2013	0.2	WVS (6)	2012	1477
Austria	2008	0.206	EVS (4)	2008	1510
Belgium (Flanders)	2014	0.044	EVS (4)	2008	789
Belgium (Wallonia)	2014	0.116	EVS (4)	2009	720
Brazil	2014	0.299	WVS (6)	2014	1486
Canada	2006	0.437	WVS (5)	2005	2164
Chile	2013	0.304	WVS (6)	2011	1000
Colombia	2014	0.018	WVS (6)	2012	1512
France	2012	0.123	EVS (4)	2008	1501
Germany	2013	0.219	WVS (6)	2013	2046
Great Britain	2010	0.073	EVS(4)	2009/10	1561
Ireland	2011	0.148	EVS (4)	2008	1013
Italy	2013	0.338	EVS (4)	2009	1519
Mexico	2012	0.247	WVS (6)	2012	2000
Netherlands	2012	0.204	WVS (6)	2012	1902
Norway	2013	0.0	EVS (4)	2008	1090
Peru	2011	0.209	WVS (6)	2012	1210
Portugal	2011	0.115	EVS (4)	2008	1553
Spain	2011	0.306	WVS (6)	2011	1189
Sweden	2014	0.134	WVS (6)	2011	1206
Switzerland	2011	0.422	EVS (4)	2008	1272
United States	2012	0.272	WVS (6)	2011	2232
Uruguay	2014	0.034	WVS (6)	2011	1000

Mean populism: each respondent is assigned the party populism score of the party (s)he reports voting for, and the country mean score is calculated. WVS is the World Values Survey, data from waves 6 (WVS, 2015) and 5 (WVS, 2010); EVS is the European Values Study, wave 4 (EVS, 2011).

individuals' general levels of trust and their confidence in political institutions. Institutional trust is modeled as a latent variable with three indicators: confidence in parliament, parties, and the government. Responses range from 1 (A great deal) to 4 (None at all), meaning that higher values indicate *lower* trust in political institutions, and therefore it should be positively related to populism. Social trust is modeled separately with two indicators: a binary question on whether "most people can be trusted" (or "you have to be careful when dealing with people"), and on whether "most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance" (from 1 = people would try to take advantage, to 10 = people would try to be fair). These two help understand if an association between populism and political trust is not a manifestation of more fundamental distrust sentiments.[5]

Durkheimian arguments are tested with a model similar to Inglehart and Norris (2016). Individuals' left/right self-placement, with higher values being more right-wing. Two questions on nationalism: first, a simple "how proud are you to be [national]", from 1 (very proud) to 4 (not at all proud), and one on whether jobs should be reserved for nationals when they are scarce (1 = agree, 2 = neither, 3 = disagree). Next, one question on authoritarian tendencies (indicated by preference for a strong leader in power who does not have to bother with parliaments and courts), with four categories from "very good" to "very bad". The last is intolerance, modeled as a latent variable with two indicators from the question on which groups the respondent would not like to have as neighbors: people of a different race, and immigrants/foreign workers. These questions capture much behind contemporary "post-material values", to which Durkheimian arguments paint populism as a reaction.

Economic arguments are tested with two indicators: the first is general life satisfaction, a reliable measurement across countries (Diener et al., 2013) correlated with personal wealth and other indicators of material well-being (Diener et al., 2010; Minkov, 2009).

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[5]The full list of independent variables used from these data, and response categories, are in Appendix E.

Responses go from 1 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). Second I also include a dummy for whether the respondent is unemployed (taking the value of 1 if yes). Only these two are used due to the lack of other comparable income and/or economic situation questions across the WVS and EVS.

As controls, I include demographics (gender, square root of age,[6] and highest level of education obtained) and attitudinal. First is political interest (from 1 = very interested to 4 = not at all). Extremism is a binary recoding of ideological self-placement, where at the two most extreme options at each side (1,2,9,10) are 1, and the remaining are zero. Last is general efficacy, measured as how much control one believes to have over his or her own life. Personal efficacy is associated with political efficacy (Littvay et al., 2011), the lack of which is conceptually close to populist anti-establishment attitudes (Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016).

Model

Five models are fit sequentially to the data: first a baseline with demographic and attitudinal controls. Model (b) has controls plus economic predictors, model (c) controls plus Durkheimian predictors, and model (d) controls and ideational predictors. The last model (e) includes all predictors and controls. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered at countries. The reliability of the populism single-indicator latent variable is set to 0.7 in all.[7] Models (a) and (b) are estimated with a Maximum Likelihood Robust estimator, while Models (c), (d), and (e), which have latent variables with cat-

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[6]The square root is used because otherwise age is in a very different scale from all other variables in the model. Taking the square root has two advantages: it is computationally easier for model estimation, and coefficients are on a scale closer to that of other independent variables.

[7]This means that populism is modeled as a latent variable with a single indicator, with a variance fixed to 1 where measurement error is assigned as 0.3. Results, available in Appendix F, do not change substantively when moving the reliability between 0.6 and 1. Reliability is the total variance (1) minus the fixed parameter ρ representing measurement error. If reliability is 1, measurement error is zero and the variable is modeled as observed. Modeling observed variables in such a way reduces biases stemming from measurement error (Hayduk and Littvay, 2012; Westfall and Yarkoni, 2016).

egorical indicators, are fit with a Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV) estimator. Both use full information for dealing with missingness (Graham, 2003). All structural equation models in this thesis are fit with the statistical software Mplus 6.12 (Muthén and Muthén, 2010).

4.1.2 Analysis and Results

Table 4.2 presents results of the five models fit sequentially. All have good fit, with very small RMSEA (root mean squared error of approximation) and SRMR (standardized mean squared residual). CFI (comparative fit index) and TLI (Tucker-Lewis Index) are above the recommended .95 and .90, respectively, in all.[8] For the first three, even the χ^2 test of model fit is not statistically significant. This is the most strict of all, in which it is difficult to achieve good fit with large samples (Kline, 2016). On results, we first notice that none of the demographics is either a strong or significant predictor of support for populism. Education and age, which have been found as predictors of specific kinds of populist parties, are not so once looking at a cross-regional, cross-ideological sample. Attitudinal controls have higher coefficients. Personal efficacy has a standardized coefficient around .10 in all models, which is high but not significant due to large standard errors. Political interest is also not significant, and always negatively related to populism.[9]

In model (b), incorporating only economic predictors, we find that life satisfaction is a significant negative predictor of populism ($\beta = -.08$). People more satisfied with their lives are less likely to vote for highly populist parties. Employment status, on the other hand, has no effect on supporting populists. Model (c) incorporates Durkheimian predictors.

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[8]These are model fit indicators typical of structural equation modeling, which measure how far a model-implied covariance matrix is from the observed covariance matrix. For further description and explanation of how these indices are calculated, as well as reference on suggested values, the reader is referred to tze Hu and Bentler (1999).

[9]Appendix F has results for all models where the reliability for the populism single-indicator latent variable was set to values between 0.6 to 1. Estimates remain the same to the second or third decimal, significant coefficients remain significant in all specifications, and the same for non-significant.

Table 4.2: Stepwise Models Explaining Support for Populism.

	Model a	Model b	Model c	Model d	Model e
Age	−.03	−.02	−.03	−.02	−.02
Education	−.02	−.01	.00	−.01	.00
Female	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.01	−.01
Efficacy	.09	.11	.10	.09	.10
Interest	−.01	−.02	−.01	−.06	−.05
Extremism	.06	.06	.06	.05	.05
Economic					
Life satisfaction		−.07*			−.04
Unemployment		.02			.02
Durkheimian					
L-R ideology			−.10		−.09
Intolerance†			.10		.09
Proud of nation			.02		.00
Jobs for nationals			−.05		−.04
Strong leader			.02		.02
Ideational					
Political trust†				.15**	.13**
Social trust				.04	.03
Take advantage				.01	.02
Model fit					
$\chi^2(df)$	1.083(7)	0.999 (9)	18.995 (20)	50.640 (26)	91.015 (63)
RMSEA	.00	.00	.00	.007	.005
SRMR	.01	.01	−	−	−
CFI	1.00	1.00	1.00	.994	.992
TLI	1.00	1.00	1.00	.985	.976

† Modeled as a latent variable.

Notes: Dependent variable: support for populism, modeled as a single indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.7. Estimator: Maximum Likelihood Robust for models (a) and (b), Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances Adjusted (WLSMV) for models (c), (d), and (e). N = 18,199, with 24 clusters. Standardized results. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors and two-tailed tests: $^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$.

Coefficients are rather small and none has a significant impact. Intolerance, nationalist pride and authoritarian tendencies, usually associated with European right-wing populists, do not seem to matter once we take a larger variety of populists into consideration.

Model (d) includes trust predictors, and it starts confirming ideational approaches: political trust is significant and has the largest coefficient across the board, at .15. General trust, in both measurements, does not perform so well, and has small non-significant coefficients. The last model, which includes all predictors, reinforces the central role of political trust: life satisfaction is not significant, and has a smaller coefficient in relation model (c). Political trust, on its turn, has a slightly smaller coefficient, but still larger than all other coefficients in all models and still statistically significant.

Results in Table 4.3 are from model (e) applied separately to one sample composed of respondents from old democracies, and another including only those from young ones. In Chapter 3 results were that distrust is only associated with populism in young democracies, and two alternative explanations were provided: either the two are indeed not correlated in older democracies, or it was an aggregation problem, in which the two factors are associated at the individual level but the relation is not captured when looking at countries. Coefficients in Table 4.3 show the second to be the case. In both samples, lack of political trust is the strongest predictor of populism after controlling for all alternative explanations.

For the young democracy group, where most strong populists are from the left, we now observe several other significant predictors. First, there is a strong effect of ideology: -.14, where higher values mean more right-wing. There are also significant effects for two demographic controls: in accordance with previous findings, being male makes one more likely to support populists (Harteveld et al., 2015). Contrary to previous results, however, having higher levels of education appears as a significant predictor of populist support. Political interest also has a significant effect, whereby individuals more interested

Table 4.3: Explaining Populist Support in Young and Old Democracies.

	Model e (OD)	Model e (YD)
Age	-.03	.02
Education	-.02	.06**
Female	.00	-.05*
Efficacy	.14	.08
Interest	-.03	-.09***
Extremism	.05	.05
Economic		
Life satisfaction	-.05	-.02
Unemployment	.02	.04**
Durkheimian		
L-R ideology	-.08	-.14*
Intolerance†	.07	.09
Proud of nation	.00	.03
Jobs for nationals	-.06	.02
Strong leader	.04	-.05
Ideational		
Political trust†	.11*	.17**
Social trust	.03	-.02
Take advantage	.01	.03
Model fit		
χ^2 (df)	82.093 (63)	80.880 (63)
RMSEA	.005	.008
CFI	.995	.972
TLI	.984	.915

† Modeled as a latent variable.
Notes: Dependent variable: support for populism, modeled as a single indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.7. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). For old democracies, N = 13,657. For young democracies, N = 4,542. Standardized results. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

in politics are more likely to support populists.[10] Last we also observe a significant impact of being unemployed on prospective voting for populists. As most populists in this sample are left-wing, we observe a model that explains therefore not only support for populism writ large, but more specifically for this variety.[11]

That is not the case for old democracies, where results follow closely those of model (e) from Table 4.2 when all countries are included. The only significant predictor of support for populists is political trust. In this sample, the ideology of populist parties is more varied. Most are European countries, plus U.S., Canada, and Australia. As the analyses in Chapter 2 show, populism is evenly spread among left and right in Europe – being associated only with extremism of political parties. However, in this sample, we observe no impacts of extremism on populism.

Discussion of Individual Level Explanations

Individual-level results confirm findings from the cross-country analysis. Populism comes with the erosion of political institutions' legitimacy. This happens both in developed and developing countries. Populist support is not associated with specific demographics (as sociological readings suggest), with economic hardship (as popular economic theories have), nor with cultural modernization, a popular explanation for right-wing populists in Europe. This last point, for which there was only a weak proxy in the cross-country analysis, is re-tested with several indicators. None is strongly related to populism. It also does not appear to be a manifestation of a general sense of distrust towards others, but only a lack of political trust. Moreover, we see a (not-significant) association with personal efficacy: in this analysis, respondents' perception of having a great deal of choice and control over

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[10]The variable is measured from 1 (Very interested) to 4 (not at all).

[11]Tables F.5 to F.8 in Appendix F contain estimates with varying levels of reliability for the single indicator dependent variable. When it is modeled as observed (or, reliability = 1.00), neither ideology nor gender have a significant effect among young democracies. The remaining significant estimates remain the same.

their own lives is positively correlated with supporting more populist parties.

Splitting the sample between young and old democracies shows some emerging patterns. For young democracies, where most populists are left-wing, we start observing a few of other significant predictors of support for these parties. In old democracies, which still have strong populist parties from both sides of the ideological spectrum, political trust remains the sole variable associated with populist preferences.

These findings suggest that, when we strip the thick ideological components out of populism, and look for explanations that cut across cultures, the only factor we are left with is lack of trust in political institutions. Alternative explanations that have been proposed in the literature seem better at explaining correlates of populism in the specific cases they cover rather than populism itself. This confirms how appropriated is the ideational approach, in isolating those components of populist attitudes that are most particular to the core dimensions of populism itself, instead of thick ideological add-ons.

The next section turns the arrow around, and looks at attitudinal consequences of populism. While the only identifiable cause of support for populists across cases seems restricted to political trust, it is possible that this discourse has impacts in other attitudes as well. This is investigated in the following pages.

4.2 General Impacts of Populism

Given the small number of theories regarding potential attitudinal impacts of populism, this section contains largely exploratory work. The first point on which populism is expected to have an impact is political trust, following the "fueling discontent" thesis (Rooduijn et al., 2016), according to which being a follower of someone inveighing against the political establishment should make individuals have even lower confidence on institutions. A second potential theorized impact is on political participation (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Populism

is expected to mobilize sectors of society that might have been marginalized or apathetic, and drive political participation up. While this has not been confirmed in country-level analyses (e.g. Huber and Schimpf, 2015), whether it does happen among individuals remains to be seen. Third, the good-versus-evil and us-versus-them aspect of populism is expected to drive up intolerance for out-groups. Fourth, I check whether populism has any impact on making individuals value more (or less) having a democratic political system. Last, I test if supporting populists makes individuals more extreme ideologically.

4.2.1   Model and Operationalization of Variables

Figure 4.1 presents the model tested.[12] It follows standard SEM notation, where circles indicate latent variables, rectangles are for observed variables, and unidirectional straight arrows are causal relations, including factor loadings. It contains the five potential consequences, four of which modeled as latent variables: intolerance (INTOL), participation (PART), political trust (P.TRST), and preference for a democratic system (DEMO). Political trust and intolerance are modeled with the same indicators as in the previous section: for the first, confidence in government, parties, and parliament. For the second, whether the respondent mentioned "immigrants/foreign workers" or "people of a different race" among groups s/he would not like to have as neighbors. Both are coded as binary (1 = mentioned, 0 = not mentioned). Participation is based on whether the respondent has ever signed a petition (Pet), joined a boycott (Boyc), or attended a peaceful demonstration (Dem). Responses are in three categories: 1 = have done; 2 = Might do; and 3 = Would never do. Therefore, lower values indicate higher levels of political participation.

Preference for democracy is based on three items from the question "I'm going to

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[12]The reader might wonder why I do not follow the same structure as Chapter 3 and start with a QCA analysis of country-level outcomes. First, because of the focus on attitudinal responses instead of country-level consequences. Second, because while QCA is well suited for situations of complex causal structures, it is less so for analyses with multiple outcomes.

describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country": "having the army rule" (Army), "having a democratic political system" (demsys), and "having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" (strg). Responses are in a 4-category scale, from 1 (very good), to 4 (very bad). Higher values in the latent variable denote more democratic preferences for a political system, because its variance is fixed to that of the indicator *strg*. It means higher responses think that having a strong leader that does not bother with elections is "very bad". The fifth potential consequence is extremism (extr), taking the value of 1 if the ideological self-placement is one of the most extreme categories (1,2,9,10), and 0 if any other.

Figure 4.1: Model of Consequences of Populism.

Variables: *GTRST2*: Others would take advantage if had the chance; *INTER*: political interest; *UNMP*: unemployed; *EDUC*: highest degree obtained; *AGE*: square root of age; *FEM*: female; *POP*: populism score of chosen party; *LSAT*: Life satisfaction; *NAT*: Pride of nation; *NAT2*: Jobs should be reserved for nationals; *IDEO*: left-right self-placement; *GTRST*: General trust; *EFFIC*: personal efficacy. Latent variables indicators: *Dem*: Democracy is the best system of government; *Strg*: Good to have a strong leader in government; *Army*: System of government: have the army rule; *Race*: Would not like to have people of other race as neighbor; *Imm*: Would not like to have immigrants/foreign workers as neighbor; *Pet*: Signed a petition; *Boyc*: Joined a boycott; *Prot*: Joined a peaceful demonstration (protest); *Tpart*: Trust in parties; *Tgov*: Trust in government; *Tparl*: Trust in parliament. Dependent variables: *INTOL*: Intolerance; *PART*: Participation; *EXTR*: Extremism; *DEMO*: Preference for a democratic political system; *PTRST*: Political trust.

Populism is once again modeled as a single indicator latent variable, with reliability of 0.7, but tested at 0.1 intervals between 0.6 and 1.[13] The other controls are general efficacy, social trust (GTRST, whether most people can be trusted), left-right self-placement (IDEO), pride in belonging to one's nation (NAT), if when jobs are scarce nationals should receive priority (NAT2), life satisfaction (LSAT), political interest (INTER), whether others would try to take advantage of you if they had the chance (GTRST2), a dummy for unemployment (UNMP), age (square root), female (FEM), and highest degree obtained (EDUC).

4.2.2 Results

The model in Figure 4.2 has good fit, according to all indicators but the χ^2 test, which is the most sensitive to large samples. To ease visualization, only the coefficients of populism are reported numerically, and the gray lines show which coefficients of control variables are statistically significant.[14] Populism appears as a significant predictor of two theorized outcomes: participation and trust in political institutions. In the first, lower values indicate respondents who did those actions more often, so a negative coefficient means that participation goes up with higher levels of populism. Regarding trust, we observe a coefficient of very similar size to that seen when trust was explaining populism: around .13. Populism appears to predict lower confidence in political institutions. For the other three, populism is not a significant predictor of either intolerance/xenophobia, extremism, or democratic values.

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[13]Results in Appendix H, Tables H.1 to H.4.
[14]Full results in Table G.1, Appendix G.

Figure 4.2: Results: The Consequences of Populism.

Notes: Standardized coefficients. Variables: *GTRST2*: Others would take advantage if had the chance; *INTER*: political interest; *UNMP*: unemployed; *EDUC*: highest degree obtained; *AGE*: square root of age; *FEM*: female; *POP*: populism score of chosen party; *LSAT*: Life satisfaction; *NAT*: Pride of nation; *NAT2*: Jobs should be reserved for nationals; *IDEO*: left-right self-placement; *GTRST*: General trust; *EFFIC*: personal efficacy. Latent variables indicators: *Dem*: Democracy is the best system of government; *Strg*: Good to have a strong leader in government; *Army*: System of government: have the army rule; *Race*: Would not like to have people of other race as neighbor; *Imm*: Would not like to have immigrants/foreign workers as neighbor; *Pet*: Signed a petition; *Boyc*: Joined a boycott; *Prot*: Joined a peaceful demonstration (protest); *Tpart*: Trust in parties; *Tgov*: Trust in government; *Tparl*: Trust in parliament. Dependent variables: *INTOL*: Intolerance; *PART*: Participation; *EXTR*: Extremism; *DEMO*: Preference for a democratic political system; *PTRST*: Political trust. Light gray arrows indicate significant coefficients from control variables. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variance Adjusted (WLSMV); N = 18,199. Model fit information: $\chi^2 = 331.100, df = 148, p < .001$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .954, TLI = .907. Significance levels: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, using clustered robust standard errors.

Next I split the analysis once again into two samples: old and young democracies, to see if populism has different kinds of effects in developed and developing countries, much like its causes varied across the two. Results in Figure 4.3 focus only on populism and the dependent variables, but the models were identical to that in Figure 4.1 – full results in Tables G.2 and G.3, in Appendix G. In both, we observe populism still has an effect on lowering political trust. However, this time in neither sample does it increase participation (the p-value among young democracies is .051). This suggests that the significant result in the aggregate analysis might be an artifact of a large sample size (coefficient sizes remain very similar, but standard errors increase). Moreover, populism still has no impact on intolerance, democratic preferences, or extremism.

The third split looks at the effects of populism interacting with ideology. I construct an interaction between the populism individual indicator and ideological self-placement. First I create a variable that takes the value of -1 for those whose ideological self-placement is to the left of center (below 6), and 1 for those right of center (above 5). The populism individual indicator is multiplied by this new variable. Therefore, right-wing individuals supporting more populist parties have higher values, left-populists have lower negative values, and those supporting non-populists are closer to the center.

Results in Figure 4.4 show that right-wing populism is associated with higher intolerance, where general populism has no impact. When it comes to participation and political trust, the populism indicator maintains its explanatory power, while the new interaction has no effect on both.[15] Therefore, these two consequences are associated with populism at large, and not a specific ideological kind, while the relation between populism and intolerance, as suggested before, is restricted to right-wing populism. This confirms the experimental findings according to which advertisements by radical right-wing populists increased anti-immigrant attitudes among the less educated youth (Schmuck and Matthes,

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[15]Full results in Table G.4, in Appendix G. Full results with reliability between 0.6 and 1 in Tables H.13 to H.16 in Appendix H.

Figure 4.3: Attitudinal Impacts of Populism across Old and Young Democracies.

Parts of the model from Figure 4.1, fit to a subset of observations formed with respondents of either young or old democracies. Standardized regression coefficients. Variables modeled as latent: *Intol*: Intolerance; *Part*: Participation; *Demo*: Preference for a democratic system; *Ptrst*: Political trust; *Pop*: Support for populism. *Extr*: extremism is modeled as observed. Model fit for Old Democracies: N = 13,657, $\chi^2 = 356.030, df = 148, p < .001$, RMSEA = .010, CFI = .950, TLI = .900. Fit for Young Democracies: N = 4,542, $chi^2 = 186.793, df = 148, p = .017$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .949, TLI = .896. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). Significance levels: [*] $p < .05$, [**] $p < .01$, using clustered robust standard errors.

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Figure 4.4: Attitudinal Impacts of Populism Interacted with Ideology.

Notes: Part of model from Figure 4.1 including an interaction between populism and ideology. Standard-ized regression coefficients. Variables modeled as latent. *Intol*: Intolerance; *Part*: Participation; *Demo*: Preference for a democratic system; *Ptrst*: Political trust; *Pop*: Support for populism; *Rwp*: right-wing populism. *Extr*: Extremism is modeled as observed. Model fit: N = 18,199, $\chi^2 = 337.544, df = 155, p < .001$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .954, TLI = .904. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). Significance levels: $^* p < .05$, $^{**} p < .01$, using clustered robust standard errors.

2015; Matthes and Schmuck, 2017).

4.2.3   Discussion of Attitudinal Consequences

This section investigates the potential attitudinal impacts of populism. Much like its causes, when looking at populism in general, the only effect found consistently is on lowering individuals' levels of political trust. This evidence seems to confirm the 'fueling dissatisfaction' hypothesis, according to which populism not only is caused by low trust, but has a reinforcing effect on it (Rooduijn et al., 2016). There is a smaller effect on political participation, but that is sensitive to alternative model specifications. Moreover, when looking at the interaction between populism and ideology, we observe a significant effect of this on increasing individuals' intolerance. The effect, however, is particular of a specific

variety of populism, and is more likely attributable to the radical right-wing ideology than populism itself.

4.3   Conclusions

This chapter presents, for the first time in the literature, a cross-regional investigation into individual-level causes and consequences of supporting populists. I find that, once the populist discursive component is isolated from other ideological factors, its strongest and virtually only predictor is political trust. Across Europe and the Americas there is no other stable demographic or attitudinal correlate of supporting populist parties. These findings suggest that prior results in the literature, which identify a host of sociological, political, and economic predictors of support for populism are explaining, in large part, the specific ideological associate of populism in the region or country studied. In this sense, the ideational approach, with its emphasis on the role of political trust, is the only one to give a satisfactory account of causes for populist support.

These findings also recommend caution with some contemporary readings of the democratic world going through a populist wave. Especially on explanations provided and recommendations. If there is little in common to explain support for populist actors across countries, treating such a "wave" as a monolithic phenomenon is unadvised. Different factors give rise to various kinds of populists, and this variety within populists seems larger than commonly assumed. While we can still talk of "populism" as a meaningful concept and analytical category, in itself it perhaps should not be the main focus for those trying to understand – and counter – phenomena like Donald Trump, the Five Star Movement, Podemos, and Chavismo.

Populism also seem to have some attitudinal effects. The most relevant is that on lowering political trust, but a smaller impact can be found on increasing participation.

Here, it seems as well that varieties of populism might have consequences that are more of their host-ideology than populism itself. That is observed with the impact of right-wing populism on increasing intolerance. The most deleterious theorized consequences of populism, therefore, might be also highly context dependent.

Confirming the ideational theory, the strongest association of populism, both as cause and consequence, appears to be with political trust. The next two chapters focus on this relation. Chapter 5 explores what happens when populists are in power. How do individuals square anti-elitism, distrustful attitudes, with supporting the ruling party. Chapter 6 delves into the direction of causality between the two, with more strict tests to evaluate the causal relation between support for populism and political trust.

Chapter 5

Exploring Populism in Power

One of the main findings in Chapters 3 and 4 is a strong relationship between support for populists and (dis)trust in political institutions. Theoretically, this relation is expected to hold while populist parties are in opposition, and appear as an alternative to mainstream politics. However, once they get to power and become the establishment, it seems illogical that individuals who despise political elites would still support such an appeal. This chapter investigates this relation in two countries where populists are in power, and tests how the connection between low trust and populism behaves under this circumstance.

As suggested in Chapter 1, we may expect this relationship to continue existing due to partisanship and individuals' drive for consistency: if someone is an anti-elitist who supports a populist party, once this party gets to power they have three options: a) abandon the party, and continue to oppose the establishment (as supposedly a Mexican anarchist once said, *"If there's a government, I'm against it"*)[1]; b) leave behind their anti-elitism to continue supporting the party now in government; or c) keep both support and attitudes alive, by re-framing who is the political establishment.

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[1] In Spanish, *Si hay gobierno, soy contra.*

We know from previous studies that populist leaders have no trouble in finding new enemies against whom to fight once in power (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Once Viktor Orbán returned to office in 2010, he started targeting not anymore the corrupt Socialist Party, but the corrupt EU. Latin American populists are masters in creating coalitions between the local opposition, independent media, and Washington who want to take over the country. This is all well-documented in studies of supply-side populism. However, it has not yet been tested whether populist supporters do buy this change. Is it the case that voters who hold populist attitudes towards politics simply shift their views of who composes the political establishment, so that they can continue being anti-elite and pro-government at the same time? Or their continued support for governing populists comes not from ideological agreement, but from other explanations for preferring incumbents, such as good economic performance? The impacts of populists' elections on trust in political institutions, and whether this re-framing happens in reality, are the topics of this chapter.

The analysis proceeds in three steps: first, I look qualitatively into both Evo Morales and Rafael Correa as populist governing leaders, and how the two maintained a strong populist appeal throughout their terms. Reading through those presidents' speeches, it is possible to identify what elites were their preferred targets once in power, and confirm their reiterated use of populist discourse. The second part tests whether voters also make this distinction between different kinds of elites once their party is in power, and how that affects partisan support. The hypothesis is that only distrust of specific groups, namely those targeted by the populist leader, should be associated with support for him. To account for alternative explanations for incumbent and populist support, models also include factors such as egotropic and sociotropic economic perceptions, along others. The last part focuses specifically on political institutions. Given the personalistic character of populism, enhanced by a presidential system in those two countries, I test whether

supporters of Morales and Correa do dissociate their office (federal government) even from other state powers (legislative or judiciary). This test confirms that the populist leader, once in power, is indeed not seen as part of the political establishment by their supporters.

5.1   The Supply Side

The two governing populist movements studied in this section are the Movement Towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS), headed by Evo Morales in Bolivia, and the Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance (Alianza PAIS) created by Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Both won electoral victories by large margins, in 2005 and 2006 respectively, and have remained in power for over a decade after.[2] Further, both movements came to power riding on a left-populist ideology mixing defense of indigenous peoples' rights and 21st Century socialism, and rose in a moment of instability when older parties and political leaders were falling from grace. The initial conditions were favorable to a discourse dividing society between people and elites. One of the most important differences between the two is that MAS was already a reasonably well-structured party upon winning elections in December 2005, while Correa's Alianza PAIS was created by him shortly before the presidential elections in 2006, and elected no MPs of its own. The next pages give some context about these parties' rise.

5.1.1   MAS in Bolivia

Evo Morales's discourse may be summarized as a radical left ideology associated with indigenous struggle, drawing most of his support from this portion of the population (Madrid, 2008). MAS was established in 1999 as a dissidence from another indigenist party. It gath-

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[2]Rafael Correa, after three terms, decided not to run for a fourth one in the February 2017 general elections, and helped elect his successor Lenín Moreno. At the time of this writing (May 2017), Evo Morales is still considering running for a fourth term in 2019.

ered social movements that had been defending indigenous peoples and *cocaleros* (coca leaves farmers) for at least a decade before that (Van Cott, 2003). The political scenario in Bolivia in the early 2000's was chaotic, after a period of relative stability between 1985 and 2000 (Weyland, 2009, 153-4). President Hugo Banzer resigned in April 2001, following a political crisis caused by violent clashes between demonstrators and the police in Cochabamba. Vice-president Jorge Quiroga finished Banzer's five-year term, and was able to stabilize the country until elections in 2002 (Singer and Morrison, 2004). In that occasion Evo Morales made his breakthrough with 20.9 per cent of the popular vote, coming second to Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who won a plurality of 22.5 per cent. After weeks of negotiation, Lozada finally managed to get a fragile majority to support his bid, and was invested President.[3] The political crisis continued, and violent clashes between government forces and social movements eroded the frail support keeping the president in power. By October 2003, Lozada stepped down in favor of his vice-president Carlos Mesa, who promised to call early elections. At first, Morales and MAS gave Mesa their support, defending a constitutional solution to the crisis (Postero, 2010). By 2005, confrontations had started again, and Mesa was also forced to resign (Singer, 2007). Elections were called that year, and Morales got more than 50 per cent of the vote, avoiding the need for a congressional runoff.

Morales' campaign drew heavily on a mixture of populism, socialism, and defense of indigenous peoples. It pleaded the end of neoliberalism, the recognition of Bolivia as a multinational state, and the party manifesto already included the full text of a law project for calling a constitutional assembly. In 2005 he managed to unify most votes from the indigenous electorate, which had been divided in 2002 between him and Manfred Reyes Villa. Not only MAS counted with the backing of several social movements, but the party was

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[3] The electoral system in Bolivia at the time determined that, if no candidate reached 50% of the votes, the new president would be selected by Congress through an indirect election between the most voted candidates.

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evolving into being an institutionalized structure at the same time that traditional parties collapsed. In 2004 it elected 28.6 per cent of the local councilors, becoming the largest party in this respect. MAS got a majority in Congress in the 2005 legislative elections, coming close to one in the Senate. The MAS-dominated Congress quickly implemented the project of calling elections for a constitutional assembly, which were held in June 2006. Morales' party achieved a majority also in this body, and the text resulted very close to what MAS had called for, even though some concessions were made to the opposition. The new constitution was ratified in a referendum in January 2009, and new elections, under the new constitutional order, were called for December that year. Morales won with an even larger vote share than in 2005, MAS increased once more its congressional basis to 100 out of 137 seats, and this time reached a Senate majority.

Throughout his term Morales has managed to keep two things: a tight grip onto power based on an increasingly institutionalized party, and a very populist discourse (de la Torre, 2013b). MAS is based on a wide network of social movements, which most of the time rally behind the president and support his proposals, but have also demonstrated on the streets against the government in some occasions (Crabtree, 2013). The basis of support for the party has also become increasingly stable, both at local and national level (Rice, 2011). Even though he is completing twelve years in power, the populist appeal still seems credible, as government approval remains high and he was easily reelected for another term in October 2014.

5.1.2 Anti-elitism in Morales' Discourse

First, it is important to confirm that Evo Morales continued to use populist rhetoric throughout his time in office. Figure 5.1 shows a graph with the level of populism in speeches by year, after his election in December 2005. Two speeches from each year were

Figure 5.1: Populism in Evo Morales' Speeches.

Notes: Each dot is a speech, and the line connects yearly averages.

coded following the same holistic grading method from Chapter 2.[4] While there is certainly variance on the levels of populism in individual speeches, interestingly a variance that increases as we move later on in his administration, we observe a consistent average of populism between 0.5 and 1 for the period. It is clear, therefore, that Morales did remain a populist in office. The next question is, who were the targets of his anti-elitism?

Table 5.1 contains all speeches coded (used to produce Figure 5.1), and a check on what social groups or actors were characterized as an elite in each. Reading through all, we find broadly four social groups that are presented as oppressing elites, in a populist understanding, over the texts:[5] they are opposition parties, the United States, international corporations, and a more vague ethnic elite. The latter is never really called out by

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[4]Speeches were selected according to availability (not many can be found from before 2013) and to combine different kinds of occasions and audiences, such as campaign, international, or celebrating national holidays.

[5]Coding speeches for populism with holistic grading requires a few general comments for each, at the end, in which the coder should specify what actors are constructed as "people" and "elite". That is the source of identifying the actors presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The empty rubric used is in Appendix A and an example filled rubric is in Appendix I.

name, but often Morales simply says that a certain "they" were oppressors of *mestizos* and indigenous peoples. When the us-versus-them populist division is made in these ethnic terms, the box is marked.

Table 5.1: Elites in Evo Morales' Speeches.

Date	Place	Type	Populism	Opposition	United States	Intl Companies	Ethnic
22/01/2006	La Paz	Inauguration	0.4	■	■	■	■
03/05/2006	Carapari	National holiday	0.8	■	■	■	
25/01/2007	–	International	0.3				
04/10/2007	New York	International	0.9				
10/08/2008	La Paz	Campaign	0.6				
10/10/2008	Guatemala	International	2.0	■			■
17/01/2009	La Paz	Other*	0.0				
13/09/2009	Leganes	International	1.0	■	■		
24/04/2010	Cochabamba	International	1.6	■	■	■	
22/01/2010	La Paz	Inauguration	0.7	■	■		
06/08/2011	Sucre	National holiday	0.8	■	■		■
30/06/2011	Córdoba	International	1.0	■	■		
12/03/2012	Vienna	International	0.0				
21/06/2012	Rio de Janeiro	International	1.5	■	■		
01/05/2013	La Paz	National holiday	1.6	■	■	■	
09/08/2013	Totora	Ribbon-cutting	0.2		■		
09/02/2014	Cochabamba	Campaign	1.5	■	■		■
15/09/2014	La Paz	Ribbon-cutting*	0.0				

* These speeches could also be classified as campaign, since it was delivered around one month before the presidential elections.

Notes: Gray cells are marked for whether that actor has been referred to as an elite in the speech.

Opposition and Former Rulers.

The first "elite" to feature consistently in Morales' speeches are opposition parties – mostly the right and/or those who had been in power before his arrival. These groups are identified as a continuation of colonial powers, through all the dictatorships over most of Bolivia's independent life, until the 25-years of "neoliberal rule", as he calls the time right before his victory. In his words, during a speech in Guatemala City in 2008,

> *[...] These groups who permanently enslaved our families during colonial times, the republic, and the neoliberal era, they are still grouped in a few families, resisting me.*[6]

A constant identity reference made by Morales is his own indigenous ascent. Indigenous populations have been marginalized for most of Bolivian history, and Morales emphasizes this identity when defining the "people" in his discourse. This division also helps target the opposition as elites: most of Morales's support comes from coca-growing and peasant regions in the Eastern highlands, which are also poorer and where most of the indigenous populations live. The opposition, on the other hand, is stronger in the Western departments, especially Santa Cruz, which are wealthier and mostly white (García Linera, 2006). Since before 2005, but ever more after it, these areas are strengthening their demands for autonomy or even outright secession (Eaton, 2011). In 2013, violent demonstrations in the region brought back scenes from the social unrest experienced in the early 2000s. With this configuration, where Morales' opposition is concentrated in wealthier and whiter areas, it becomes more credible for him to claim that they are merely representatives of the old rich white elites who had, for centuries, oppressed the rest of the population (*ethnopopulism*, as Madrid (2008) referred to it). We can see that in the following quote from the same speech quoted above:

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[6] *[...] esos grupos que permanentemente esclavizaron a nuestras familias durante la colonia, la república y en la época del neoliberalismo, siguen agrupados en algunas familias, resistiéndome.*

> *To protect its power and privileges, and avoid the change that's happening, landowning oligarchs from the Crescent [n.t. media luna, how the Western region is known] use provincial autonomy and divide the national unity, lending themselves to Yankee's interest in stopping Bolivia's refoundation.*[7]

Nevertheless, not always opposition forces are depicted openly in ethnic terms, as we see in Table 5.1, where the first column is checked double the times of the last. While Morales consistently uses the indigenous identity to define the people, elites not always receive an ethnic connotation. The stronger association of the opposition, however, are the next main elites in his discourse: powerful interests of international capitalism, embodied in two main figures: transnational corporations, and the United States.

Foreign Elites

Often enough, such as in the last quote, Morales frames previous governments as puppets at the hands of international powers. Speaking on May 1st 2006, when Bolivia nationalized all its gas and oil reserves and infrastructure, he talks about how *"previous governments have used the Armed Forces at transnational corporations' service"*, and that, with nationalization, the *"looting of natural resources by international and transnational oil corporations is over"*. Natural gas is the main source of income in Bolivia's economy, and prior to 2006 gas reserves were mostly explored by international companies. In Morales' discourse, these companies and previous governments formed a greedy alliance to explore and profit from what is, naturally, property of all the Bolivian people.

We must notice also how his first four speeches coded included references to transnational companies, what became less frequent afterwards. This is due to the nationalization in 2006. Once foreign oil and gas exploring corporations were out of the country, there was

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[7] *Para resguardar su poder y privilegios y evadir el proceso de cambio, las oligarquías latifundistas de la llamada media luna se encubren en las autonomías departamentales y la división de la unidad nacional, prestándose a los intereses yanquis de acabar con la refundación de Bolivia.*

little point in talking them up as some sort of threatening group. Those later references, for example, do not target specifically this industry (as the earlier speeches did), but more broadly talk about global capitalist powers, ill-defined international companies, and how they threaten life and the environment.

American interference in Bolivia is the second of Morales' foreign targets, and consistent throughout time. A common topic is the DEA's actions (Drug Enforcement Administration), which operated widely in Bolivia trying to curb cocaine production and trafficking. During a speech in Córdoba, Argentina, in 2011, Evo states that

> *"the DEA doesn't fight drug trafficking, but controls it for political purposes.*
> *When it has to do some operation, it can frame anti-imperialist leaders and*
> *authorities. I have been a victim of the DEA. For me, there is no fight, by*
> *the United States, against drug trafficking, but they use it to accuse leaders,*
> *authorities, if we don't accept imperialism and capitalism."*[8]

and this is how Evo announced that USAID was being expelled from Bolivia in 2013

> *"Some parts of the American Embassy continue to conspire against this process*
> *[of social change] and the government. Using the chance of this May 1st cele-*
> *bration, I want to inform that we have decided to expel USAID from Bolivia."* [9]

While there are other actors which eventually figure among the elites in Evo's speeches, they are minor. The press takes its share: *"we are submitted by some journalists and media vehicles to a media terrorism, as if we were animals, as if we were savages"* (from his

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[8] *la DEA no lucha contra el narcotráfico, sino que lo controla para usarlo con fines políticos. Cuando tiene que hacer algún operativo, puede hacerlo para implicar a dirigentes y autoridades antiimperialistas. Yo he sido víctima de la DEA. Para mí, desde Estados Unidos no hay ninguna lucha contra el narcotráfico, sino que lo usan para acusar a dirigentes, autoridades, si no compartimos con el imperialismo y el capitalismo.*

[9] *Algunos organismos de la Embajada norteamericana siguen conspirando contra este proceso y contra el gobierno. Aprovechando esta concentración y el Primero de mayo, quiero informarles que hemos decidido expulsar a USAID de Bolivia.*

2006 Inauguration speech). At the same time, developed countries are accused of crafting environmentalist concerns so they can keep colonizing the Southern peoples (address to the Rio+20 UN Conference, in 2012) and, veering to the comic, of possibly bringing the foreign disease of baldness to indigenous peoples (speech in Cochabamba, April 24, 2010):

> *The West each time brings more poison: something interesting about baldness, and I'm sorry my European fellows. Even though it seems normal, it is a disease. In Europe, almost everyone is bald, and that is because of the food they eat. Among indigenous peoples no one is bald, because we don't eat the same food. You can see my case [pointing to his vast, dark hair].*[10]

We can see, therefore, that Morales retains a list of enemies after being in government, which are described as, first, a malicious coalition of different powerful actors (old elites, foreign powers), conspiring to bring about an end to his popular government. They were used to oppress the people before, and want to get that status back. These descriptions fit the populist idea of elites, and not surprisingly Morales' speeches continue to be fairly populist after he takes office. The government, therefore, is now an instrument of popular sovereignty and "the consciousness of the people", as he often says. It is not, by any means, part of a political establishment. What remains to be seen is if individual supporters of Morales make the same distinction and stop considering his government as part of the establishment. First, however, we look at Rafael Correa's discourse in power.

5.1.3 Correa's Rise in Ecuador

Rafael Correa came from being almost unknown economist two years before the 2006 elections to achieve an outstanding performance when the ballots were counted, running for

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[10]*[...] el occidente cada vez nos trae más veneno, algo interesante sobre la calvicie y perdonen los hermanos europeos, la calvicie que parece normal es una enfermedad en Europa, casi todos son calvos, y esto es por los alimentos que comen, mientras que en los pueblos indígenas no hay calvos, porque no comemos esos alimentos, pueden verme a mí por si acaso.*

a party, Alianza PAIS, that he created months before the presidential race. He campaigned promising a new constitution, and drew heavy support from those dissatisfied with the *partidocracia* (partidocracy), as the system of government with oligarchical ruling parties was then called (Conaghan, 2007). The country had a long experience of political turmoil, and the first years of the 2000s were not different. The three presidents elected between 1996 and 2002 were ousted before finishing their mandates, two being forced into exile. Correa decided that his party should not present any congressional candidates for the 2006 general elections. Because he deemed the constitution illegitimate and promised a new one, he said that his allies should only run in the elections for a constitutional assembly he would call (Bowen, 2010). In the elections, Correa got to the second round against billionaire Alvaro Noboa, and won with 56.7 per cent.

Right at the beginning of his term, the newly elected president set to fulfill the promise of calling a constituent assembly. However, his lack of partisan support in congress led to an early showdown with the legislature. Correa's ousting, given the recent Ecuadorean tradition, came close to happening had not two surprising moves happened: first, former president Lucio Gutierrez's party (PSP), one of the main forces in the legislature, decided to support Correa's call for a new constitutional assembly. Second, the Supreme Electoral Court, which at first denied the request, suddenly revised its position and authorized the public consultation (Conaghan, 2008). The assembly was approved in a referendum in April 2007, and members elected in September. Correa's Alianza PAIS got 80 out of 130 seats. In 2008 the draft constitution was subjected to a new popular consultation and approved. As a result, new parliamentary and presidential elections were called for 2009, under the auspices of the new constitutional order. Correa was reelected with 52 per cent of the votes. His party also got the majority of seats in congress (59 out of 116).

Ecuador had the first well established Latin American indigenous party, the Pachakutik Movement of Plurinational Unity (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik –

MUPP) (Madrid, 2005), with congressional representation already in 1998. However, because of its initial support to Gutierrez's presidency (2002-2005), it became associated by the public with the partidocracia. That left a void in representation of indigenous peoples at the national level (Rice, 2011), to be filled by Correa's populism. He thus capitalized on indigenous votes without leading a strong indigenous movement (Madrid, 2008). His vote intentions spiked on the 2006 electoral race after announcing that the party was running no congressional candidates, what made him stand out as a true outsider willing to fight the system (Conaghan, 2007). During his campaign, therefore, established political parties and the government (the *partidocracia*) were the illegitimate elite that needed to be taken down. Along with ethnic lines, the 'us-versus-them' divide also played well with the internal divisions in Ecuadorean politics, between the poorer highlands and the more developed coastal line, where the opposition is stronger (Eichorst and Polga-Hecimovich, 2014).

The scenario was thus favorable to keeping an electoral and anti-establishment tone after the ballots were counted. Ecuador was a divided country, and there were political groups easily identified with old elites. Correa retained the specialists who conducted his campaign in 2006 – innovative for the use of social media and appeal to young voters –, to conduct a 'permanent campaign' style of governing afterward (Blumenthal, 1982; Conaghan and de la Torre, 2008). For that to be effective, however, he resorted to a style of plebiscitary presidency (Conaghan, 2008). The president had two points to his advantage: his popular backing and oil rents to finance generous redistributive programs (Mazzuca, 2013). His 'plebiscitary presidency' worked by putting important decisions to be voted in referenda, calling early elections, and framing each one as a pivotal moment in the country's history. The constitutional assembly vote was called the 'mother of all battles' (Conaghan, 2008, 46), where one choice would bring the country forward towards the end of exploitation by old elites, while the other side would bring back a rule by oligarchies.

Figure 5.2: Populism in Rafael Correa's Speeches.

Notes: Each dot is a speech, and the line connects yearly averages.

Therefore, even in government, Correa maintained a campaign political style and discourse, and was not in shortage of potential elites against whom to rally his supporters. This was important, since Ecuadorians went to polls for national elections no less than six times between 2006 and 2009. After his reelection in 2009, what followed was a period branded 'technocratic populism' (de la Torre, 2013a). Technocratic experts filled the most important positions in government, and Correa presented himself as an expert who could save the nation and operate a great change – always keeping the charismatic style. The need for maintaining a populist mobilization diminished, since now there was a governing circle and a developed party structure, approval rates were high, and the opposition was shattered.

5.1.4   Correa's Bellicose Discourse

Populism scores in Rafael Correa's speeches as president have a higher variance than in Morales'. We observe in Figure 5.2 that they tend to be either very populist, above 1.5,

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or very non-populist, often close to zero. That amounts to an average over the years also between 0.5 and 1, but with higher peaks and lower bottoms. Looking at the speeches and the reason why they score so low, one notices that it is not a lack of elites; rather, Correa often uses a discourse with little to no references to 'the people' or a general will, central components of populism. Nevertheless, almost all speeches coded included very strong language against one or more groups identified as a powerful oppressive minority. Sometimes, he even presents a laundry list of an evil coalition, as *"the same enemies: the corrupt press, a fundamentalist part of Church leaders, all kinds of economic powers, and the de facto powers"*.[11] The press and economic powers, embodied in bankers and the central bank, are his two most frequent targets, as we can see in Table 5.2.

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[11] *[...] los mismos enemigos: la prensa corrupta, cierta cúpula fundamentalista de la iglesia, los poderes económicos omnímodos, los poderes fácticos.* Speech in Quito, May 24, 2011.

Table 5.2: The Elite in Rafael Correa's Discourse.

Date	Place	Type	Populism	Press	Bankers	Parties	Justice	Foreign
15/01/2007	Quito	Inauguration	1.4	■				■
29/10/2007	Quito	Ribbon-cutting	0.1					
24/09/2008	Guayaquil	Campaign	1.7	■	■	■		■
11/04/2008	Mexico City	International	0.4	■	■	■		
24/05/2009	Quito	National holiday	1.2		■	■		■
09/12/2009	Quito	Ribbon-cutting	0.6		■	■		■
12/11/2010	New York	International	0.1		■			
03/11/2010	Buenos Aires	International*	0.4		■			
24/05/2011	Quito	National holiday	1.8	■	■		■	■
05/12/2011	Quito	Ribbon-cutting	0.6	■	■			■
14/02/2012	Taura	Ribbon-cutting	0.2		■			■
14/01/2012	Cuenca	National holiday	1.3					■
26/12/2013	Quito	Ribbon-cutting	0.3	■				■
24/05/2013	Quito	Inauguration	1.8	■				■
27/01/2014	Havana	International	0.4	■				
11/12/2014	Quito	Ribbon-cutting	0.3		■			

* Given in international setting, but can also be classified as ribbon-cutting
Notes: Gray cells are marked for whether that actor has been referred to as an elite in the speech.

Correa does not focus as much as Morales on foreign powers. He does talk about the power of the United States and especially the IMF prior to his government, but that is always in association with local elites. His later speeches, which take up the topic of foreign powers once again, refer more broadly to imperialism and neocolonialism as enemies to be fought against. These are mostly associated with international financial corporations or international organizations, and very few times with the U.S.

The Bourgeois Press

While Evo Morales targeted the press only a few times, and most often associated with other actors, Correa attacks the press on a regular basis. He calls it his mission to spend as many years as necessary to, in his words,

> .[...] unveil one of the biggest problems of our America: the rule of the bourgeois press, converted in a new opium to our peoples, that turns Constitutional States into Opinion States, where they illegitimately rule, I insist, based on their own interests". [12]

The press is accused of lying about the accomplishments of his government and of hiding wrongful actions by previous administrations. As made clear in the quote, for Correa the press is a strong group on its own, but can also be associated with other big interests, being called *"a direct voice of the powerful, instrument at the service of bastard interests, that has always acted behind the people's back, a captive people whose ears it seized and who believes in it."* [13] Not to leave any doubts regarding its status as a powerful elite, Correa says that

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[12] *[...] dedicaré durante y después de mi Presidencia los años que sean necesarios para develar uno de los mayores problemas de nuestra América: el dominio de la prensa burguesa, convertida en el nuevo opio de nuestros pueblos, que transforma los Estados de Derecho en Estados de Opinión, donde gobiernan ilegítimamente, insisto, en función de sus intereses.*

[13] *"[...]voz directa de los poderosos, instrumento al servicio de intereses bastardos, que actúan y siempre han actuado a espaldas del pueblo, del público cautivo al que le han secuestrado los oídos, que todavía les cree." (Campaign speech in Guayaquil in 2008).*

"Besides its dubious ownership, at the hands of elites that silenced at the face of dictatorships and have always dominated our countries, private media play a political role. They frequently define themselves as the counterweight to political power. In this case, we must ask: What legitimacy can there be in a democracy for a political actor whose only virtue is to have enough money to buy a printer? And if they like counterweights so much, what is the counterweight to the strongest de facto power in our America: the press?"[14]

Not surprisingly, his administration has made many moves to curb press freedom in the country, with multi-million libel accusations against critical journalists and media vehicles (de la Torre, 2013b; Levitsky and Loxton, 2013). Internally, there were few other options left: while Correa does continue talking about the "partidocracy" after being in power, as he admits himself in a later speech in 2014, old parties are in shambles and have no more relevance. The "old powers", including those who attempted a coup in 2010, are often not named and generally ill-defined in his speeches. Much of the economy is nationalized or found a working relationship with the regime, so accusations against an economic elite are also usually very vague (except for bankers, as seen in the next section). The one group that posed more consistent resistance to his administration has been, from the start, the press. Therefore, with a history of conflict between the two, it came to fit perfectly the role of the most important internal elite.

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[14] *Además de su dudosa propiedad, en manos de élites que callaron ante las dictaduras y dominan desde siempre nuestros países, los medios de comunicación privados juegan un rol político. Ellos mismos frecuentemente se definen como el contrapoder del poder político. En ese caso, cabría preguntarse, ¿qué legitimidad puede tener en democracia un actor político, cuya única virtud ha sido el tener dinero para comprarse una imprenta? Y si les gusta tanto el equilibrio de poderes del que siempre hablan, ¿cuál es el contrapoder del mayor poder fáctico de nuestra América: la prensa?.* 2014 Inauguration speech.

Economic and Political Powers

A second enemy often named by Correa are bankers. Central Bank autonomy was branded as a form of corruption already in his 2007 inauguration speech. Technocrats in the Central Bank in Ecuador, and other bankers, are constantly charged with manufacturing crises and bank holidays in the country for profits. Bankers are accused of *"imposing legislation with their political power"*, while the central bank was *"not responsive to democratic controls, but to international organizations"*. Not surprisingly, Correa moved quickly to change the central bank status, so that it worked "for the Citizen Revolution", but he still refers back to powerful bankers time and again even in more recent speeches, as we see in Table 5.2.

Other groups are more amorphous, and Correa most often refers to them with abstract terms, not pointing fingers directly. They are the *de facto* powers (*poderes fatícos*), "those of always", the "big interests", and "all kinds of economic powers". Externally, he might point fingers sometimes at international financial organizations, mostly the IMF, but usually in association with local bankers. Since Ecuador lacked a minimally established party system prior to Correa's administration (contrary to Bolivia, where three major parties had dominated politics for decades), he does not have many specific internal political actors that can function as elites against whom to speak. Almost all politicians had been ephemeral forces, forgotten as quickly as they emerged, with a few exceptions (such as former president Lucio Gutierrez) who, nevertheless, never came close to actually threatening Correa electorally. Even after the coup attempt in 2010, Correa's speeches do not identify responsible politicians or parties by name, but rather talk about "an immoral opposition", in coalition with a "nefarious press and corrupt judges".

Importantly, in both cases of Correa and Morales, elites' offensives against the government are equated with attacks on the people. Both had electoral victories with impressive margins, and consider that as a broad mandate to represent the people's will and interest. Therefore, when the press is critical, it is a direct attack on the people, of which their

respective (popular) governments are just an embodiment. Considering how they go to lengths to dissociate the government from an idea of an establishment, it remains to be seen whether supporters also make this distinction.

5.2 The Demand Side

While populists target several actors as elites in their discourse, there are multiple other reasons why voters might support them. This section tests whether individuals' perception of those actors identified as elites in Presidents Morales' and Correa's speeches influences their support for both leaders, beyond alternative explanations. For that, I use data from the Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2015) from waves of surveys conducted after the two came to power. Latinobarómetro surveys were run every year in all Latin American countries, from 1996 until 2011, and then again in 2013 and 2015, covering social and political topics. Samples are around 1,000 respondents per country, in face-to-face interviews.

5.2.1 Methods and Variables

For each country, I build a model predicting electoral support for either Correa or Morales. The dependent variable is based on vote intention ("If elections were this Sunday,..."), where support for either of them takes a value of 1, and support for any other candidate, or an option for casting an invalid ballot, take the value of 0.[15] General predictors of support for populists and incumbents included in both models are: life satisfaction, measured from 1 (Very satisfied) to 4 (Not satisfied at all); egotropic economic perception, measured as respondents' evaluation of their economic condition and that of their families, from 1 (Very good) to 5 (Very bad). Sociotropic economic perceptions are also included in

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[15]Such null votes are considered 0's, instead of missing data, because they mean respondents who would still go vote and make a conscious decision of not choosing any candidate. This is, therefore, considered as not-voting for the populists. Not knowing, and not voting, are considered missingness.

both models, measured with three questions: in general, how the respondent considers the current economic situation of the country, from 1 (Very good) to 5 (Very bad), whether she considers it better than 12 months before (from 1 = 'Much better' to 5 = 'Much worse'), and whether she thinks that it will be better 12 months later (also from 1 = 'Much better' to 5 = 'Much worse'). Since corruption plays an important role in the success of Latin American populists (Hawkins, 2010), there is also a control for how much progress the respondent thinks there has been in reducing state corruption over the past two years, from 1 (A lot) to 4 (None). Last, given the importance of anti-Americanism in Latin American populism (Remmer, 2011), a question on one's general opinion about the United States (1 = Very good, 4 = Very bad) is also included. Last, I control for gender, age (square root), education, and ideological self-placement (where 0 is the left and 10 is the right).

As the main hypotheses tested, each model includes two latent variables indicating confidence in various actors. One focuses on state institutions, expected to have a positive association with support for populism, due to partisanship and the known boost in political confidence seen among government supporters. The second focuses on actors depicted by Morales and Correa as elites in their post-election speeches, coded in the previous section. Because the set of actors changes in each case, the indicators for the latent variables follows suit.

In the Bolivian models, confidence in state institutions is measured as a latent variable with four indicators: parliament, parties, judiciary, and the army. To capture the notion of elites from Morales' discourse, I use two groups: newspapers and private companies. One of his main targets is the United States, which is included in the model with other predictors. For Ecuador, only two state institutions are considered: federal government and parliament, since Correa struggled with many of the others for several years after coming to power. His elite coalition includes indicators for newspapers, political parties, banks, and

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private companies. The Latinobarómetro did not include 'private companies' and 'banks' in the list of organizations on the confidence question in 2013. Therefore, in this year, the variable for confidence in elites is measured only with confidence in newspapers for Bolivia, and with newspapers and political parties for Ecuador.

The models described above are fit separately to data from four Latinobarómetro waves for Ecuador (2008, 10, 13, and 15), and five for Bolivia (2006, 08, 10, 13, 15). The goal is to see if any explanatory power of elites perception remains over time, or whether populist rule becomes routinized, and support for populist incumbents can be explained by more traditional factors such as economic performance evaluation.

5.2.2 Results

Table 5.3 presents results for models predicting support for Evo Morales. The five models have good fit. Only one time RMSEA is slightly above .05 (at .052, in 2008), and twice TLI is below .900, but only at the third decimal (2006 and 2008). On the main effects tested, we observe higher trust in state institutions is strongly associated with support for Morales throughout the years. That is expected. Individuals tend to have a better perception of state institutions when their party is in power. On the other side, there is a significant effect of lower confidence in those elite actors targeted by Morales for almost the entire period. Having no confidence in newspapers and private companies is associated with voting for Morales all years from 2006 to 2013, and holding more negative opinions of the United States has a strong and significant association with support for Morales in every wave.

These findings confirm two things: first that, indeed, populist leaders' discourse against specific elite actors resonate with their electorate even years after they have been in power. Holding negative attitudes towards certain groups still explains support for governing populists even when material issues are controlled for. Second, there is a split on who consti-

Table 5.3: Support for Morales during his Term.

	2006	**2008**	**2010**	**2013**	**2015**
Distrust – State	-.19*	-.35***	-.29**	-.44***	-.26**
Distrust – Elites[1]	.19*	.42**	.20*	.14**	.10
Life satisfaction	.02	-.08	-.15**	.07	-.03
Own economic sit.	.00	.00	.05	.08	.03
Country economy	.00	-.12	-.01	-.16**	-.12*
Country worse (past)	-.13*	-.17*	-.25***	-.13*	-.10
Country worse (future)	-.13**	-.12	-.17**	-.13*	-.06
No corruption reduction	-.13**	-.08	-.16**	-.18***	-.09
Negative U.S. opinion	.24***	.23***	.13*	.13*	.17**
Right-wing ideology	-.29***	-.28***	-.09	-.15**	-.25***
Female	-.01	.15**	.05	.05	.10
Education	-.22***	-.07	-.28***	-.13*	-.16**
Age (square root)	.01	.08	-.01	.00	.02
Model fit:					
$\chi^2(df)$	135.133(66)	161.265(67)	117.268(67)	121.069(53)	81.775(53)
RMSEA	.038	.052	.039	.046	.030
CFI	.956	.955	.978	.972	.982
TLI	.899	.897	.950	.928	.955
N	715	518	495	597	595
Morales support R^2	.44	.79	.66	.59	.33

[1] In 2006, 2008, and 2010, latent variable with two indicators: confidence in newspapers and private companies. In 2013 and 2015, observed variable with a single indicator: confidence in newspapers.

Notes: Dependent variable: Vote intention for Evo Morales (binary). Standardized estimates reported. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). *Trust – elites*: Latent variable composed of four indicators: confidence in parties, judiciary, parliament, and army. Significance levels (two-tailed tests): * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

tutes the elite, whereby state institutions apparently are not part of it any longer. When it comes to populists in power, low political trust is not anymore associated with support for such actors – but the opposite. Partisanship exerts a stronger effect.

There are also strong effects of sociotropic evaluations on support for Morales: on all waves, either having a more positive perception of the economy, believing it improved recently, and thinking it will improve in the future, is a strong predictor of supporting the populist ruling party. Egotropic evaluations, on the other hand, have little explanatory power. This confirms the results by Anduiza and Rico (2016), who find that sociotropic evaluations are stronger predictors of populist attitudes then egotropic ones in nine European countries.

Supporting Morales also has other expected associations. Individuals are more likely to vote for him if they think there has been reduction in corruption recently, if they have a more left-wing ideology, and are less educated. Once again, Morales draws his support mostly from indigenous and poorer populations, and education levels here capture also this income dimension. Last, it must be noted that a large amount of variance in support is explained by these models. The lowest R^2 for Morales support is .33, in 2015, reaching .79 in 2008.

Table 5.4 has results with support for Rafael Correa between 2008 and 2015. All models have good fit, with RMSEA below .05, CFI always above .95, and TLI always above .90. Confidence in state institutions is a strong and significant predictor of more support for him in every wave. Lack of trust on the elite coalition he paints, however, has fading effects over the years. Strong in the first two waves, but weaker and not significant later (the p-value for 2013 is .051). That is when de la Torre (2013b) points out that his government took a technocratic turn, and constant campaigning for elections and referenda were left aside. While we still see attacks against elites in his speeches, such a discourse appears to have lost importance on voters' evaluation on whether to vote for him. In those years,

Table 5.4: Support for Correa during his Term.

	2008	**2010**	**2013**	**2015**
Distrust – State	-.68***	-.89***	-.82***	-.47***
Distrust – Elites[1]	.23*	.67***	.17	.05
Life satisfaction	-.09	-.11	.09*	.10*
Own economic sit.	.03	.10	-.12**	.04
Country economy	.01	.10	-.03	-.21***
Country worse (past)	-.03	-.01	-.15**	.01
Country worse (future)	-.14*	-.08	-.01	-.20**
No corruption reduction	-.12*	.00	.00	-.13**
Negative U.S. Opinion	-.03	.07	-.06	-.04
Right-wing Ideology	.08	-.06	.00	-.24***
Female	.00	-.13*	-.06	-.04
Education	-.01	-.02	-.05	-.07
Age (square root)	.01	-.08	-.11*	.01
Model fit:				
$\chi^2(df)$	112.888(67)	163.061(66)	75.682(36)	132.259(67)
RMSEA	.034	.050	.037	.041
CFI	.979	.970	.988	.983
TLI	.953	.931	.961	.962
N	594	591	817	597
Correa support R^2	.45	.39	.75	.59

[1] In 2008, 2010, and 2015 latent variable with three indicators: confidence in newspapers, banks, and private companies. In 2013, observed variable with a single indicator: confidence in newspapers.

Notes: Dependent variable: Vote intention for Rafael Correa (binary). Standardized estimates reported. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). *Trust – elites*: Latent variable composed of two indicators: confidence in parliament and government. Significance levels (two-tailed tests): * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

sociotropic perceptions become more relevant, after not being significant predictors in the first years. This suggests that Correa's rule got routinized, and he was evaluated based on more traditional voting behavior variables rather than attitudes against elites.

The last wave is also the only one in which ideology plays a role in support for Correa. Prior to that, coefficients of ideological self-placement are very low and not significant. Contrary to Bolivia, there is no effect of educational levels, suggesting Correa is able to draw support for various social groups within the Ecuadorean population. Also distinct to Bolivia, there is no effect of a negative opinion about the United States on support fo him. While Correa does attack imperialism and the IMF constantly, he actually has in general a positive discourse about the U.S., where he lived and made his studies. Last, we also observe these models have high explanatory power, with R^2's going from .39 (2010) to .75 in 2013.

5.3   The Political Establishment

The first section in this chapter shows that Evo Morales and Rafael Correa have continued to use populist, and therefore anti-elitist, discourse years after being in power. The second has found that their appeals resonate with voters for at least a few years after their respective elections, with supporters having more negative attitudes towards groups framed by the two as elites. This part explores specifically whether there is a change in supporters' view of the political establishment.

I have found that, after populists are in power, their supporters have higher confidence in state institutions. That is explained by partisanship, and is common in other countries and circumstances. Also, they have negative views of specific, non-state elite groups. However, populism is still inherently connected to lower political trust at the theoretical level. Therefore, not only should we expect a dissociation from different kinds of elites in general,

but the populist leader should also not be seen as part of the political elite. If populist supporters are indeed different from other partisans, due to their inherent attitudinal anti-elitism, then the whole idea of their leader being part of a political establishment should be anathema. That is tested in this section.

5.3.1 Method and Variables

To test individuals' conception of political institutions, I use confirmatory factor analysis on data from the Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2015). One latent variable of institutional trust is formed by six indicators: confidence in government, armed forces, parliament, police, judiciary, and political parties. The generic model tested is specified as follows: first, data from two waves of the survey are taken, the one right before an election won by a populist (Bolivia in 2005 and Ecuador 2006),[16] and the one right after (Bolivia 2006 and Ecuador 2007). Then, each data set is split into two groups: one with populist supporters, and one with those who do not support that party. In each the factor analysis model with a single latent variable representing institutional trust is fit. If populist supporters do not consider the elected leader as part of the political establishment once their party gets to power, the hypothesis is that they will not associate their trust in government with their trust in other state institutions anymore. Formally, among the group of populist supporters after the election, the factor loading of confidence in government for the institutional trust latent variable should be significantly lower than for the group of populist supporters before the election, and for the groups of non-supporters both before

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[16]The Latinobarómetro fieldwork in Ecuador happened in October-November 2006, with all interviews conducted between the two rounds of the presidential election. This might be problematic, since individuals' perceptions are expected to be highly influenced by their expectations regarding who will win. However, data from 2005 cannot be used because Correa was not a party leader or candidate, and therefore his name was not present in the vote intention question. While data from between the two rounds might pose a problem, all interviews were still conducted before the vote, and polls predicted a tight contest, giving an advantage to Correa's opponent for most of the time before the runoff.

and after the election.[17]

This test is known as invariance testing, and I proceed in two ways: first, with classical multi-group CFA (Jöreskog, 1971). In this test, three sequential models are fit. In the first, all parameters are allowed to vary freely across groups. That is, effectively fitting four separate models, one for each group, each with their own factor loadings, residuals, etc. The second model constrains factor loadings to be the same across groups. For example, the factor loading of trust in the armed forces on institutional trust is forced to be the same for populist supporters before the elections, after the elections, and for both groups of non-supporters. If all groups understand political trust the same way, factor loadings should be similar in any case and constraining them to be equal should not result in a significantly worse model. The formal test is therefore done with model fit information: if the model with equal loadings (also referred to as that with *invariant* loadings) does not have a significantly worse fit than that with free parameters, it can be accepted, and the measurement is said to be invariant across groups.[18] The last model constrains both factor loadings and intercepts to be the same across groups, and repeats the procedure of testing whether that produces a significantly worse fit.

This approach has been criticized for being too strict: it indicates noninvariance (meaning, different loadings) even with small deviations (Davidov et al., 2015). Therefore, alternatives have been presented that are more tolerant of slight non-invariance. One of which, used in the second part of this analysis, is the alignment method (Asparouhov and Muthén, 2014). It works by applying a rotation matrix to the parameters, in a process similar to rotation in exploratory factor analysis, to produce the "alignment" of factor loadings and intercepts. This method has the advantage of indicating which indicators

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[17]The focus on government is explained by the presidential system in these countries, in which there is a clear distinction between legislative and executive, and also between a president and his party. In Parliamentary contexts, the expectations regarding associations might be different.

[18]The test is based on the χ^2 difference between the two models. The difference in χ^2's is χ^2 distributed, with degrees of freedom as the difference in the number of free parameters in each model. Based on that, one can check if the difference between the two χ^2's is statistically significant (Jöreskog, 1971).

have non-invariant loadings, and for which groups. Therefore, it allows us to test whether indeed it is populist supporters that change their perception of political institutions.

5.3.2 Invariance Test – Bolivia and Ecuador

Table 5.5: Strict Measurement Invariance Tests.

Model	χ^2	*df*	χ^2 **diff.**	*p*
Bolivia				
Configural model	84.475	36		
Invariant loadings	152.132	51	58.697	$< .001$
Invariant intercepts	372.051	66	217.574	$< .001$
Ecuador				
Configural model	116.68	36		
Invariant loadings	143.48	51	22.06	.106
Invariant intercepts	666.67	66	535.34	$< .001$

Chi-square test of model difference using the Satorra and Bentler (2010) correction for robust estimation.

Table 5.5 show the results of invariance testing for both CFA models. It contains the most conservative test of invariance, using multigroup CFA. The configural model is one in which all factor loadings are allowed to vary across all four groups. *Invariant loadings* means that we fix factor loadings of each indicator to be the same across the four groups. If an indicator is indeed measuring a same construct, the same way, across different groups, fixing its loading to be the same across these groups should not bring problems. We see that the model with fixed (invariant) loadings is significantly worse than that with free loadings in Bolivia. The χ^2 difference test indicates the second model has a significantly worse fit (a significantly higher χ^2) than the configural model. In this case, we can conclude that these six indicators are not measuring trust in political institutions the same way across groups of supporters and non-supporters of populists, before and after the elections. However, in Ecuador this test suggests the measurement is invariant, and works similarly across groups.

Figure 5.3: Four-groups CFA – Bolivia.

Supporters before election (n = 220)   Non-supporters before election (n = 363)

Supporters after election (n = 325)   Non-supporters after election (n = 386)

Notes: Four group Confirmatory Factor Analysis with factor loadings free to vary across groups. Standardized estimates. Estimator: Maximum Likelihood Robust. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 74.362$, $df = 36$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .057 (90% CI: .040–.075), CFI = .961, TLI = .934.

There is no significant difference between the first two models.

Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the four-group CFA models for Bolivia and Ecuador with loadings free to vary across groups. In both we see that the latent variable is well predicted by most indicators, across all groups, with the notable exception of trust in government for the group of populist partisans after the elections. In Bolivia, the standardized factor loading drops to 0.11 among 2006 Morales supporters, in comparison to .59, .65, and .41 in the other groups. This indicates very little covariance between trust in government and trust in other political institutions for his voters. In Ecuador the drop is also substantive, with a factor loading at 0.15 for Correa's supporters in 2007, contrasted to .73, .62, and

Figure 5.4: Four-groups CFA – Ecuador.

Supporters before election (n = 201)

Non-supporters before election (n = 701)

Supporters after election (n = 455)

Non-supporters after election (n = 252)

Notes: Four group Confirmatory Factor Analysis with factor loadings free to vary across groups. Standardized estimates. Estimator: Maximum Likelihood Robust. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 108.834$, $df = 32$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .077 (90% CI: .062–.093), CFI = .961, TLI = .927.

Table 5.6: Pairwise Factor Loading Invariance Comparison for Trust in Government Across Groups.

Group 1	Group 2	Loading 1	Loading 2	Difference	p-value
Bolivia					
1	2	.548	.428	.120	.237
1	4	.548	.349	.199	.135
2	4	.428	.349	.079	.469
1	3	.548	.093	.454	.002
2	3	.428	.093	.334	.006
3	4	.093	.349	-.256	$p < .001$
Ecuador					
1	2	.438	.399	.039	.350
1	4	.438	.487	-.049	.371
2	4	.399	.487	-.088	.064
1	3	.438	.169	.269	$p < .001$
2	3	.399	.169	.230	$p < .001$
3	4	.169	.487	-.319	$p < .001$

Notes: **Group 1** and **Group 2** refer to the two groups being compared in each line. Values: 1: Populist supporters prior to election; 2: Non-supporters of populists prior to election; 3: Populist supporters after the election; 4: Non-supporters of populists after the election. **Loading Group 1** and **Loading Group 2** is the factor loading of *trust in government* in each group from the Confirmatory Factor Analysis model in Figures 5.3 and 5.4.

.53 for the other three groups. .15 is also usually considered very weak and suggests that that indicator does not capture the same underlying dimension as others. Even though the strict invariance test did not show a significant difference, we observe a sensitive drop on the amount of information that this indicator contributes to the latent construct of political trust.

Table 5.6 shows the result of testing if this difference in the "trust in government" factor loading is indeed significant. It is obtained with the alignment method, and compares this loading across groups. This is the only indicator which is non-invariant across groups. The first line reads that the factor loading of trust in government for group 1 (0.548, supporters before the election) and for group 2 (0.428, non-supporters before the election), has a

difference of 0.12, which is not statistically significant ($p = 0.237$). Therefore, invariance holds across these two groups for this indicator in measuring political trust. At the table we observe that the only significant differences ($p < .05$) are those involving group 3 (supporters after the elections), compared to every other group – the loading for group 3 is significantly smaller than the rest. It confirms that, for populist supporters, once their parties are in power, the government is dissociated from other political institutions.

Is It not just Partisanship?

A fair objection at this point is that such change might not be restricted to populist supporters. In all cases, once a party gets to power, its partisans might dissociate their evaluation of the government from that of other political institutions. It would therefore be solely a partisanship effect, and not a result of populists trying to square their anti-establishment with the fact of supporting a ruling party. To evaluate that, I applied the same six-indicators CFA model to all instances in Latin America, between 1995 and 2015, in which there was a shift in power following a presidential election[19] – meaning, the newly elected president was neither from the same party nor supported by the incumbent. This yields a total of another six elections: Bolivia 1996, Chile 2009, Mexico 2012, Paraguay 2007, Peru 2005, and Peru 2010.

Figure 5.5 has the factor loading of *trust in government* from CFA models applied to all eight elections – the six plus Bolivia 2005 and Ecuador 2006. Group 3, the solid dot, is always that of supporters of the winning party after the election. In none of the other cases we observe such a sensitive difference between post-election winning supporters and the other three groups. In Peru 2005 this group is the lowest, but a factor loading of around 0.4 still indicates a high amount of correlation between trust in government and other indicators of political trust. In Paraguay 2007 the loading is small, around 0.25, but this

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[19] With the exception of cases between 1998 and 2004: in 1999 there was no wave of the Latinobarometro, and between 2000 and 2004 there was no question on prospective voting or party preference.

Figure 5.5: Trust in Government as Part of Trust in Political Institutions.

Group 1: Supporters of the winning party before the elections; Group 2: Non-supporters of the winning party before the elections; Group 3: Supporters of the winning party after the elections; Group 4: Non-supporters of the winning party after the elections. Results from a multiple group confirmatory factor analysis with one latent variable and six indicators of trust: political parties, judiciary, police, parliament, government, and Armed Forces. Values on the Y-axis are standardized factor loadings for trust in government.

also happens for non-supporters after the election, suggesting it was not a change restricted to partisans. In the others, supporting a recently elected party does not make respondents less likely to dissociate their confidence in government from that in other institutions.

5.4 Discussion

This chapter explores the relation between populism and political trust in two cases where populist leaders are in power: Ecuador, under Rafael Correa, and Bolivia, under Evo Morales. First we observe how both have remained populists in office, using this kind of discourse consistently throughout almost a decade. Second, by looking at their speeches it was possible to get a glimpse of how these leaders depict elites once they are themselves part of the establishment. In general, old enemies are retained, but not anymore associated with the state: opposition parties and former governments, companies, the press, economic and foreign powers are but a few targets of their populist rants.

Next, I find that the public follows suit for a while, and negative attitudes towards those groups painted as elites by populists in power are strong predictors of support for populist leaders for some years after they have been in power. Later, however, other considerations start to take precedence, and despise for those elites loses explanatory power on support for populist governments. Last, we observe that populist supporters, once their party wins the election, not only dissociate political institutions from other elites, they also do not consider the government headed by their leader as part of the political establishment any longer. While an increased confidence in political institutions in general by government supporters is explained by partisanship, the last test shows that this split between the government and other state institutions is particular to populists coming to power. It likely reflects a psychological attributional change of which actors compose the political elite.

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These findings cast light on a few issues that had not yet been fully explored by researchers: first, the apparent puzzle of anti-establishment government. While it was clear that the range of elites by populists could go much beyond national governments, it had not yet been investigated if individuals did go as far as not considering their own government a part of the establishment anymore. Thinking of implications and extensions to other contexts, one is immediately reminded of Donald Trump's successful bid to be a champion of common people while being a billionaire with an entire life within powerful circles. Actors in power positions are apparently able to credibly attribute the position of real elites to other groups. In which specific cases that is successful, however, should be subject of future studies.

Further, this chapter also weighs on recent findings regarding the relation between populism and dissatisfaction. In fact, we observe that populist supporters become more satisfied with the political system once their party gets to power, following findings on the effects of partisanship on satisfaction. While this should not come as a surprise, it gives some perspective to claims that populism is caused by (and cause of) lack of trust in political institutions. That does seem to hold, but only for supporters of populism in opposition. A consequence of populists' election, therefore, is actually an increase in political satisfaction among supporters.

Perhaps most important, these findings also consolidate the idea of populism and dissatisfaction being attitudes or psychological dispositions. It seems that populist individuals, first, have a disposition to continue having their despise for elites as an important component of their political attitudes, also when their party is in power. It takes years before other, material, considerations overtake the explanatory power of anti-elitist attitudes. Second, that is the reason why said supporters are quick in shifting their view of who composes the political establishment itself, what is not observed among partisans of other outsiders who come to power. This finding confirms the theory that, for someone

with anti-establishment attitudes, their preferred candidate winning an election generates a situation of cognitive dissonance. And the solution to it is simply to stop considering the federal government as part of the political establishment.

Confirming that populist attitudes and dissatisfaction are associated at a deeper psychological level leads naturally to the question of whether there is a causal connection between the two. And, if there is, what is the direction of causality. That is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 6

Populism and Trust

Chapters 3 and 4 identify causes behind support for populism. Across countries, those are high corruption in young democracies, and elite collusion in older ones. At the individual level, the best predictor of support for more populist parties is low trust in political institutions – which is higher in countries with more corruption, completing the full picture of how a country-level factor may lead individuals to support more populist parties. In Chapter 4, I also identify that populism seems conducive to even lower levels of political trust, confirming the "fuelling dissatisfaction" hypothesis (Rooduijn et al., 2016). Moreover, in Chapter 5, I find that the association between distrust and populism continues even after populists win power, with individuals redefining their views of the political establishment.

This chapter explores in depth, at the individual level, the relation between support for populists and political trust. At the psychological level they are very close to one another: for instance, two statements in a widely used populist attitudes scale read "Elected officials talk too much and take too little action" and "The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions" (Akkerman et al., 2014) . Both are so close to the idea of distrust of political institutions that one might claim that is what they are

measuring.[1]

Nevertheless, causal arguments have been made in both directions. Better established is the idea of lower trust driving populist support (Kriesi, 2015). More recently the "fueling dissatisfaction" hypothesis emerged, proposing that supporting populist parties, and thus consuming their discourse, might lower even more one's trust in political institutions (Rooduijn et al., 2016). Even if the two concepts, at the attitudinal level, are hard to distinguish, that is a sensible proposition. If one's perception of politics is shaped by actors who despise the political system, their view of said system should be expected to get even more negative. The connection, therefore, is the following: having a more distrustful attitude towards politics leads one to support populists; and consuming populist discourse makes one even more distrustful.

The problem is that, from a statistical point of view, all the tests performed so far about this relation (in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis and those by Hooghe and Dassonneville (2016) and Rooduijn et al. (2016)) are not able to distinguish between a dual direction of causation and a spurious correlation. It is entirely possible to get the same results that all studies found if both are caused by a common third factor, unaccounted for. Substantively, if we think of populism and distrust as attitudes or psychological characteristics, it would be as if they are manifestations of some more fundamental personality trait, such as a general dislike for authority figures. Once that is activated, both support for populism and distrust go up; but increasing only one would not change the other. The goal in this chapter is to tackle this issue.

With that in mind, I first replicate the cross-lagged model with panel data used by Rooduijn et al. (2016), and re-specify it so that omitted variable bias is accounted

for. In the specification that includes an unknown common antecedent cause for both populism and distrust, all signs of causal relations between the two disappear. I next replicate these findings with panel data from Germany and Mexico, which also indicate no direct causal relation between populism and distrust. This is followed by testing the direction of causality with a non-recursive model on the cross-sectional EVS/WVS data used in Chapter 4. Results are once again consistent with the spuriousness hypothesis. Last follows an experimental test on data collected with online surveys in nine countries, which finds no impact of populism on political trust. All evidence, therefore, suggests a non-causal relation between these close concepts.

6.1 Existing Evidence

Two studies currently exist that try to disentangle the causal direction between support for populist parties and political trust: Hooghe and Dassonneville (2016) and Rooduijn et al. (2016). They both do so by resorting to panel data, from Belgium and the Netherlands respectively. They find evidence for significant relations in both directions: supporting populists leading to lower political trust, and also low trust increasing odds of populist support. Only Rooduijn et al. (2016), however, uses a cross-lagged model to test, simultaneously, the direction of causality.[2] In the following pages, I introduce cross-lagged models and argue that the specific one tested by Rooduijn et al. (2016) does not take into account the possibility of omitted variable bias. Next, I respecify it to include a control for an unobserved confounding factor, which results in no direct connection between populism and trust.

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[2]Hooghe and Dassonneville (2016) test the two relations separately in two models, similar to what has been done in this thesis, and find significant coefficients in both directions. This, however, is still presenting only correlational evidence.

Figure 6.1: Example Cross-lagged Model.

6.1.1 Cross-lagged Models with Panel Data

Cross-lagged models are those in which an X1 at time t is used to predict an X2 at time $t+1$, while X2 at time t predicts X1 at time $t+1$. It requires panel data, where the same observations are measured in at least two points in time. It is widely used to identify the direction of causal effects, since it is possible to test whether a previous variation on a variable is associated with a later variation on another, overcoming a limitation of models on cross-sectional data (Allison, 2009; Finkel, 1995). Its basic specification can be better visualized as a graph, drawn in figure 6.1, in which ϵ_1–ϵ_4 are the residual variances of the dependent variables. These residuals must be correlated, as well as the two variables at the first point in time, to account for potential unobserved variations particular to specific moments of measurement which could affect responses to both variables in a wave (Finkel, 1995, Ch. 3).

This modeling strategy, however, assumes a fully specified model and no omitted variables (Allison, 2009; Finkel, 1995; Hamaker et al., 2015). It is not able to differentiate between cross-lagged effects and spurious correlations between $X1$ and $X2$. Various alternatives have been proposed to correct that (see Hamaker et al., 2015, for a recent review). The most straightforward is modeling the unobserved confounder as a latent variable that

Figure 6.2: Example Cross-lagged Model with Omitted Variable.

affects both $X1$ and $X2$ at all points in time except for the first (Dwyer, 1983). In a simple specification with three waves, it is depicted in Figure 6.2.

Z is a latent variable that predicts $X1_{t+1}$, $X2_{t+1}$, $X1_{t+2}$ and $X2_{t+2}$. In each wave, the loading is constrained to be the same for both variables, meaning that the factor loading of $X1_{t+1}$ and $X2_{t+1}$ on Z is the same, β_1. The restrictions are often suggested due to identification problems, and can be relaxed as the number of waves (and therefore of observed variables) increases (Finkel, 1995, Ch. 5). The "phantom" variable Z captures the covariance between variables in the cross-lagged path that is due to unobserved factors, meaning that remaining cross-lagged effects between them are more reliable estimates of actual causal effects (Dwyer, 1983; Finkel, 1995; Newsom, 2015).

Re-specifying Existing Models

Rooduijn et al. (2016) use a model similar to that in Figure 6.1 to test the direction of effects between populism and political trust, reproduced in Figure 6.3. It is applied to a six-wave panel study with data collected online in the Netherlands, the Longitudinal Internet Studies

for the Social Sciences (LISS) panel administered by CentERdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands).[3] Surveys were conducted once a year, between 2008 and 2013, and included several questions related to political views and preferences.

Political trust is defined as an additive index based on three questions, each with two answer categories: "that is true" (1), and "that is not true" (0). The statements were "Parliamentarians do not care about the opinions of people like me", "Political parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion", and "People like me have no influence at all on government policy". Summing up individual answers for each, therefore, results on a 0–3 political trust indicator.

Populism is operationalized in two ways, based on respondents' prospective vote choice. Rooduijn et al. (2014) has coded electoral manifestos of parties in the Netherlands on how populist they are, coding each individual paragraph on whether it presented anti-elitism and/or people-centrism. Paragraphs containing both were classified as populist, and the proportion of populist paragraphs in a manifesto defines the party populism score. Rooduijn et al. (2016) replaced respondents' vote intention with the populism score of that respective party.[4] A second definition of this variable takes populism as a binary, and recodes vote intentions for the Socialist Party (SP) and for Geert Wilders' PVV as 1 – both are recognized as the most populist parties in the country –, while supporting other parties is recoded as 0.

The model tested is depicted in Figure 6.3. Besides cross-lagged and autoregressive effects (attitudes being predicted by themselves at $t-1$), Rooduijn et al. (2016) also make attitudes be predicted by themselves at $t-2$ and $t-3$, in order to improve model fit.

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[3]The LISS panel is a representative sample of Dutch individuals who participate in monthly Internet surveys. The panel is based on a true probability sample of households drawn from the population register. Households that could not otherwise participate are provided with a computer and Internet connection. A longitudinal survey is fielded in the panel every year, covering a large variety of domains including work, education, income, housing, time use, political views, values and personality. More information about the LISS panel can be found at: http://www.lissdata.nl.

[4]Party scores used: CDA: 0; D66: 2.64; PvdA: 0.61; VVD: 0; PVV: 23.08; SP: 1.43.

Figure 6.3: Cross-lagged Model from Rooduijn et al. (2016).

Notes: P_t refers to populism measured on year t, while T_t is institutional trust on year t.

Note that only the two variables on the first wave are correlated with one another, but not residuals at later waves. That would be essential to control for random time effects that might affect measurement of two variables in a given wave (Finkel, 1995; Kline, 2016; Newsom, 2015).

Table 6.1 reproduces Table 2 from Rooduijn et al. (2016), with the results from the path model under that specification. We observe stronger effects early on, between 2008 and 2010, on both measures of populism and both directions.[5] On the fueling discontent logic, there seem to be strong effects also between 2012 and 2013. We observe good model fit in both cases, on all fit indicators except for the χ^2 test, which is significant.

Figure 6.4 contains the respecification of the cross-lagged model from Rooduijn et al. (2016) with the "phantom" variable Z that accounts for omitted variable bias. The variance of Z is fixed to 1, and it is correlated with populism and trust at the first time point. The influence of Z on populism and trust is constrained to be the same for each wave after the first (β_1 to β_5 in the Figure). I also correlate the residuals (ϵ_1 through ϵ_{10}) for each wave, to control for wave-specific effects. This specification follows the recommended by Finkel (1995, ch. 5), based on Dwyer (1983). Following the original model, all variables at time

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[5] One must notice that most effects are only statistically significant due to the use of $\alpha = .10$ and one-tailed tests, less conservative than standard accepted significance levels.

Table 6.1: Results from Rooduijn et al. (2016).

	Model 1	Model 2
Expressing Discontent		
Discontent 2012 → Populism 2013	-.006	.021
Discontent 2011 → Populism 2012	-.014	-.026
Discontent 2010 → Populism 2011	.016	.047*
Discontent 2009 → Populism 2010	.075*	.047*
Discontent 2008 → Populism 2009	.061*	.037†
Fueling Discontent		
Populism 2012 → Discontent 2013	.149**	.072**
Populism 2011 → Discontent 2012	.011	.003
Populism 2010 → Discontent 2011	-.028	.036
Populism 2009 → Discontent 2010	.117**	.158**
Populism 2008 → Discontent 2009	.075*	.106**
χ^2 (df)	45.782 (31)	61.759 (31)
RMSEA	.028	.040
CFI	.995	.994
TLI	.989	.987

Notes: Reproduction of Table 2 from Rooduijn et al. (2016). Standardized estimates from a cross-lagged model. **Model 1:** Populism treated as continuous, using party populism scores; **Model 2:** Populism treated as binary. Only cross-lagged paths are presented. N = 629. Significance levels, following the original: † .10, * .05, ** .01, in one-tailed tests.

Figure 6.4: Re-specification of the Cross-lagged Model in Rooduijn et al. (2016).

Note: Every variable at time t is also regressed on itself at $t-2$ and $t-3$, but these paths are omitted to reduce clutter.

t are regressed on themselves at $t-1$, $t-2$, and $t-3$.

Results of the re-specified model are in Table 6.2. The models fit even better than the originals: in both cases the χ^2 test is not significant at $p < .05$. In model 1, where populism is a continuous variable defined based on manifesto scores for each party, only one estimate is statistically significant: discontent in 2012 leading to support for a *less* populist party in 2013. The relation is on the opposite way of that originally theorized and found. In model 2, with populism defined as a binary, again we see two significant negative estimates, contrary to expectations, connecting discontent to populism. A single one, populism in 2009 fueling discontent in 2010, is significant on the expected direction. That is too little to consider as evidence of any actual causal effect between these two variables.

Table 6.2: Results from the Respecified Rooduijn et al. (2016) Model with a Phantom Variable.

	Model 1	Model 2
Expressing Discontent		
Discontent 2012 → Populism 2013	-.085*	-.078†
Discontent 2011 → Populism 2012	-.025	-.098*
Discontent 2010 → Populism 2011	.100	.030
Discontent 2009 → Populism 2010	-.021	-.030
Discontent 2008 → Populism 2009	-.058	-.395
Fueling Discontent		
Populism 2012 → Discontent 2013	.068	-.004
Populism 2011 → Discontent 2012	-.018	-.048
Populism 2010 → Discontent 2011	.074	.069
Populism 2009 → Discontent 2010	-.006	.174*
Populism 2008 → Discontent 2009	-.094	-.240
χ^2 (df)	16.367 (19), $p > .10$	29.389 (19), $p > .05$
RMSEA	.000	.029
CFI	1.00	1.00
TLI	1.00	.999

Notes: Standardized estimates from a cross-lagged model. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). **Model 1:** Populism treated as continuous, using party populism scores; **Model 2:** Populism treated as binary. Only cross-lagged paths are presented. N = 629. Significance levels: † .10, * .05, ** .01, in two-tailed tests.

6.1.2 Replications in Germany and Mexico

To test if the absence of causal relations between trust and populism is not particular of one Dutch sample, in this section the results are replicated with panel data from Germany and Mexico. As we have seen in Chapter 2, both have strong examples of populists. In Mexico it is Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), runner-up in the presidential elections of 2006 and 2012, and his (at the time) Party of the Democratic Revolution, whose 2012 manifesto received an average of 0.95. Germany hosts two of the three most populist parties in Europe in the sample coded here: the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), with a 1.4 populism score, and The Left (Linke), with 1.3, both with manifestos coded from the 2013 elections.

Germany and Mexico are also good cases for trying to replicate previous findings due to the characteristics of populism in these countries. In the first there are strongly populist parties both left and right, with the left-wing version being more electorally successful – contrary to the Netherlands, where Wilders' PVV is both more populist and more electorally successful than the left-populist Socialist Party. Mexico, on its turn, can inform us about this relation in the Latin American context, where dissatisfaction with political institutions is much higher than in Germany or the Netherlands, and where electoral support for populism is also stronger than in the two European cases – AMLO received 35.15% of the votes in the first round of the 2006 presidential elections, and 31.59% in 2012. SP and PVV in the Netherlands got together a bit short of 20% in 2013, while The Left and NPD in Germany barely reached a combined 10% in elections that same year.

Data and Method

For Mexico I use data from the Mexico Panel Study 2006 (Lawson et al., 2007), conducted by MIT. It has three waves: two before the elections, and one after.[6] In total, 1379 respondents completed all three surveys out of an initial 3105. I operationalize individuals' level of populism as a binary of voting intention (or reporting to have voted for, in wave 3) for López Obrador. Dissatisfaction is measured with the question "Do you think that Mexico is a democracy or is not a democracy", with 0 for "Yes, it is" and 1 for "No, it is not". From the questions available in all three waves, this is the one that gets closest to the idea of dissatisfaction, or low trust.

Data for Germany comes from the Long-term Panel 2005-2009-2013, part of the German Longitudinal Election Study (Rattinger et al., 2016). Interviews took place shortly after each general election (2005, 09, 13), and a total of 396 respondents participated in all three waves. Support for populism is recoded as the party list vote choice,[7] where support for Die Linke and the NPD is recoded as 1, and for other parties as 0. Dissatisfaction is measured with a question on how satisfied the respondent is with how democracy works in the country.[8]

Contrary to the Dutch models, I do not estimate one with party scores as individual populism levels. In Germany, the scores for Die Linke and the NPD are very close (1.3 and 1.4, respectively), while for all other parties it is 0 or close to (0.2 for the Greens). The distribution of this variable would be very close to that of a binary. Mexico is in the same situation: López Obrador's PRD has a 0.95, while the other two major parties are 0.05

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[6]The 2012 Mexico Panel study has only two waves, precluding the use of cross-lagged models with phantom variables as those used in this Chapter.

[7]The survey includes two recall vote choice questions, one for the district-candidate party, and one for the party list. Party list options, which are aggregated with a PR system, are more likely to better represent voters' ideology and preferences than the candidate votes.

[8]Responses from the 2005 wave had to be recoded. Responses were collected on a 6-categories scale, while in 2009 and 2013 the survey used 5-categories response scales. The two middle categories in 2005 were merged.

(and one last small party is 0). Neither should be treated as a continuous variable, and a clear binary option is the most parsimonious modeling solution.

In each I estimate two models: first the one from Figure 6.1, that does not control for an omitted variable, and then that of Figure 6.2, with the "phantom" latent variable. Due to the smaller number of waves in relation to the Dutch data – three, as opposed to six –, it is necessary to impose some equality constraints on the model with the "phantom" variable. In both cases, the autoregressive effects for each variable are constrained to be the same, what means that the coefficient of $P_t \rightarrow P_{t+1}$ is the same as that of $P_{t+1} \rightarrow P_{t+2}$, while the coefficient of $T_t \rightarrow T_{t+1}$ is the same as that of $T_{t+1} \rightarrow T_{t+2}$. In the German model, all four paths between the phantom variable Z and the endogenous variables in the cross-lagged models are constrained to be the same. For the Mexican model, following the Dutch, the paths for endogenous variables at the same wave are constrained to be the same, but not for all four. Moreover, on the Mexican data the correlations between Z and P_t and between Z and T_t, are constrained to be the same.

Results

Results of cross-lagged paths are in Table 6.3. Model 1 refers to that without a phantom variable, meaning we are not controlling for omitted variable bias. In Germany and Mexico we observe strong and statistically significant relations in both directions, with the exception of one coefficient in the Mexican data. It would seem that the dual direction is confirmed: supporting populists leads to lower satisfaction with democracy over time, and having a more negative view of the political system leads to a higher likelihood of supporting populists. In both samples the model 1 fits well in CFI and TLI, and have χ^2 tests that are not statistically significant (at $p < .01$ for Germany, and $p < .05$ for Mexico). RMSEA in the German sample is higher than the recommended maximum, though, while the Mexican is well below.

Table 6.3: Cross-lagged Models in Germany and Mexico.

| | Germany | | Mexico | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Expressing Discontent				
$Discontent_t \rightarrow Populism_{t+1}$	.240***	.019	.067*	-.243***
$Discontent_{t+1} \rightarrow Populism_{t+2}$	.176*	.042	.037	-.073
Fueling Discontent				
$Populism_t \rightarrow Discontent_{t+1}$	.215***	.117	.088*	-.264**
$Populism_{t+1} \rightarrow Discontent_{t+2}$	.273***	.162	.262***	.061
χ^2 (df)	7.103 (2)	6.682 (3)	4.492 (2)	10.049 (3)
RMSEA	.080	.056	.030	.041
CFI	.991	.993	1.00	.999
TLI	.929	.966	.998	.995

Notes: **Model 1:** Cross-lagged model not controlling for an omitted variable; **Model 2:** Cross-lagged model with a Z phantom variable. Standardized coefficients. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). German sample: N = 396; Mexican sample: N = 1377. Significance levels: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$, two-tailed tests.

When controlling for spuriousness, however, those causal relations disappear. No coefficient in the German sample is statistically significant, and the model fits even better. The size of coefficients also sensitively shrinks once a Z variable is included. The Mexican case is even more extreme: the two coefficients connecting trust and populism at the first wave to one another at the second become significant on the *opposite* direction. Those who consider Mexico a democracy in the first wave were more likely to say they would vote for AMLO in wave 2, while those who reported an intention to vote for AMLO in wave 1 were more likely to consider Mexico a democracy in wave 2. Such a change is also observed in two coefficients on the Dutch sample. This model also fits the data on all indices.

These results replicate what was found in the previous section. In models that do not control for unobserved confounders, it appears that populism and dissatisfaction have a reinforcing relation with one another. However, once we test a model that controls for that

possibility, the apparent causal connection between the two disappears. In some cases, it even reverses signs. This lends strength to the hypothesis that this connection is, in fact, due to a shared antecedent factor instead of being of a causal nature. In the following section I test another kind of model, with cross-sectional data from the 23 countries from Chapter 4, to test whether the causal findings there should indeed be interpreted as such.

6.2 In a Non-recursive SEM Setting

Figure 6.5: An Example Non-recursive SEM.

Non-recursive models are designed to identify the direction of causation between two variables measured at the same time[9]. The model includes what is referred to as a "feeback loop", and for its identification it requires that each endogenous variable involved in the loop has at least one exclusive exogenous variable predicting it. These exogenous variables are called *instrumental variables* and have as conditions that they should a) be a strong predictor (not only significant) of the endogenous variable, b) not be a predictor of the other endogenous variable in the loop, and c) they should be correlated with one another (Kline, 2016). It assumes that causal effects between the two variables are in *equilibrium*, meaning that the causal process from one to the other is not just starting (it does not mean, however, that the process is static, as explained by Kline, 2006). Figure 6.5 presents an example of

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[9]As opposed to cross-lagged causal analyses involving longitudinal data.

the most simple non-recursive model. $X1$ and $X2$ are the variables which we are interested in decomposing the direction of causation, and both paths of one to the other are estimated simultaneously. Each one has an IV, correlated to one another, and the same for residuals ϵ_1 and ϵ_2.

Due to the higher number of assumptions, which are hard to meet in practice, non-recursive models with cross-sectional data are considered a sub-optimal alternative to cross-lagged models to determine the direction of causality (Kline, 2006; Maruyama, 1998). Nevertheless, considering the null results in the previous section with cross-lagged models, it is important to see if, using a larger sample and with more countries, we also do not observe a causal connection between populism and trust.

6.2.1   Methods and Data

This test uses the merged WVS and EVS data from Chapter 4. At that point, political trust appeared as a significant predictor of support for populism, while populism in turn predicted lower political trust, after controlling for alternative explanations. Based on results from those analyses, I select as instruments those variables which showed large coefficients as predictors of either populism or trust in political institutions. For political trust the instrument is *political interest*, which had a standardized coefficient of .25. Two instruments are used to predict populism: personal efficacy and left-right self-placement. Their standardized coefficients for predicting populism in model (e) from Chapter 4, where all dimensions are controlled for, were respectively .12 and .08. Together, they have an explanatory power close to that of interest on political trust, and should be enough to identify the direction of causation (if any) between populism and trust.[10]   Once again, political trust is formed by three indicators – trust in parliament (Tparl), government

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[10]With an IV we are interested in using substantively strong predictors which can account for a large amount of variance, and not statistically significant ones.

(Tgov), and political parties (Tpty), while populism is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.7, where party populism scores replace respondents' party choice on a prospective voting question.[11]

Results

Figure 6.6: Populism and Trust: Non-recursive Model.

Notes: N = 18199. Clustered robust standard errors estimated. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). Standardized results. Model fit: χ^2: 36.031, $df = 12, p < .001$, RMSEA = .010, CFI = .996, TLI = .993. Dashed arrows denote not-significant regression coefficients. *** $p < .001$.

Results in Figure 6.6 confirm the findings from the previous section: neither is populism a significant predictor of trust, nor is (lower) trust a predictor of populism. The standardized coefficients, moreover, are very small (.02 and -.04) which, coupled with the large sample, suggests it is not a matter of low power. Moreover, the correlation between the residuals of these two variables is .16, similar to the size of the regression coefficients on the models in Chapter 4. This also suggests that the association between trust and pop-

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[11]Full results with reliability ranging from 0.6 to 1 in Appendix J, Tables J.1 to J.4.

ulism is due to an unobserved factor, and is not of a direct causal nature. These estimates come from a well-fitting model, with very low RMSEA, and high CFI and TLI.

The two kinds of test so far have given no support to the idea of populism and political trust being causally connected – a cornerstone of populism studies. Models using panel data from three countries show that an unobserved variable is capable of explaining away what, at first, looked like reinforcing effects between the two. A non-recursive model places most of the association as a correlation between their residuals – meaning, between unobserved factors – and not as direct causal links. These models, however, based as they are on observational data, are still sub-optimal alternatives to causal inference. For this reason, the last section in this chapter tests this relation with an experimental design.

6.3   Experimental Evidence

This section tests one path in the theorized causal connection between trust and populism: the fueling dissatisfaction hypothesis. An experimental design is employed, where respondents are primed to think about politics in a populist way. Afterwards they receive a battery of questions to measure their confidence in political institutions. If populism does lower institutional trust, we should observe lower levels of confidence among those who receive the treatment.

The treatment is in fact simple: two batteries of questions were presented in a survey: one asking individuals about their confidence in a list of political institutions (parliament, political parties, politicians, the government, courts, and the police), and the other is a 21-item battery measuring the three core components of populist attitudes: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichaean outlook of politics (Castanho Silva et al.,*forthcoming*). Reading a battery of 21 statements designed to measure populism is akin to priming individuals by making them think about how much they agree with sentences like "I'm

proud to be an ordinary person" or "big corporations accumulate wealth by exploiting the people". After 21 of such items, if an individual has latent populist attitudes, we expect they were flared up. Therefore, randomizing the order these two batteries of questions appear leads, in effect, to a controlled-trial design in which individuals in the treated condition are primed with populist cues. Given a causal relation, that would lead them to have lower trust in political institutions.[12]

Data and Method

Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics of Online Samples.

Country	N	Age	Female	Education	Income	Ideology	Survey time
U.S.	505	32	55%	2-year college	5th	4.2	24'
Brazil	285	28	19%	15 years	4th	5.5	15'
France	222	31	28%	14.5 years	4th	5.5	12'30
Greece	310	31	26%	15 years	3rd	5.2	12'
Ireland	186	31	41%	15 years	4th	5.35	11'
Italy	270	36	47%	15 years	4th	5.06	12'30
Mexico	281	28	23%	16 years	7th	4.9	15'
Spain	278	33	26%	17 years	6th	4.4	12'
UK	219	31.5	41%	15 years	4th	5.11	10'

Notes: **Age:** median age; **Education:** for American sample is the median ordered category of highest degree achieved. For the others, median number of years completed of formal education; **Income:** median income decile; **Ideology**: mean left-right self-placement on a 1-9 scale, where 1 is the left; **Survey time**: median completion time for those who finished the survey.

Data for this study comes from online samples collected in nine countries: United States, Brazil, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The American sample was collected through Amazon's Mechanical Turk on November 08, 2016[13], while the rest was collected using the crowdsourcing platform CrowdFlower between

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[12]The full list of the 21 items is in Appendix K.

[13]That was the day before the 2016 presidential elections.

November 2016 and March 2017.[14] Surveys were administered on the respective official languages of those countries, and participants targeted to have a national IP address.[15] Table 6.4 has descriptive statistics for each sample and survey.

Online samples have known distortions in relation to national representativeness. Respondents tend to be better educated and younger. As we can see from Table 6.4, for most CrowdFlower samples there is also a strong gender imbalance. There is no evidence, however, of strong ideological skeweness, and income distributions are close to the middle. These samples, therefore, are still preferable to convenience samples, and give a diverse enough pool of respondents (Berinsky et al., 2012; Simons and Chabris, 2012). Behavioral experiments done with online samples from these two platforms replicate results from both student and representative ones (Peer et al., 2017).

According to a calculation of statistical power, a sample size of 697 is required to have a power of 0.8 to identify a standardized effect of 0.15 significant at the conventional 5% level. A standardized effect of 0.15 is on average what was observed between populism and trust on the models in Chapter 4, and it is close to the correlation between their residuals in the feedback loop model from Figure 6.6. Therefore, power is not an issue when pooling all samples together, even if effects are relatively small.[16]

The estimation of effects is done with a structural equation model: Trust is built as a latent variable with four indicators: trust in politicians, parliament, political parties, and federal government, measured on a 5-point scale. The latent variable is regressed on the binary treatment indicator, for whether the respondent received the populism battery before trust or not. I also estimate a confirmatory factor analysis model with trust and populist attitudes, to explore the correlation between these constructs. Populism is measured in

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[14]100 respondents for the Irish sample were collected through Qualtrics, due to the small number of CrowdFlower users in the country.

[15]With the exception of the Greek sample, which was open to Greeks living abroad after failing to reach a high number of respondents from Greece itself in a month of data collection.

[16]Even if estimating standard errors clustered on countries might reduce the actual power, the total sample size is above 2,000 respondents.

Table 6.5: Experimental Results and Correlation Matrix.

| | Experiment Treatment | Correlation Matrix after CFA | | | | |
		Trust	People	Anti-elitism	Manichaean	Populism
Trust	-.03 (.03)	1.00	.42	.55	-.09	.36
People			1.00	.64	-.67	.76
Anti-el.				1.00	-.38	.78
Manichaean					1.00	-.06
Populism						1.00

Notes: Model 1 (Experimental results): N = 2504. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis. Standardized estimates. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 10.466, df = 4, p = .033$, RMSEA = .025 (90% CI: .007–.045), SRMR = .013, CFI = .988, TLI = .970. Model 2: CFA Model, with maximum likelihood robust estimation. N = 2511. Fit statistics: $\chi^2 = 705.647, df = 139, p < .001$, RMSEA = .040 (90% CI: .037–.043), CFI = .926, TLI = .909, SRMR = .047. All variables reported are latent variables with multiple indicators. People, anti-elitism and Manichaean are the three populism dimensions from Castanho Silva et al. (forthcoming), including a method factor for positive-worded items that is not correlated with all other latent variables. Populism is the single-dimensional populism scale by Akkerman et al. (2014).

two ways: first, the nine-item scale from Castanho Silva et al. (*forthcoming*), which splits populism into three dimensions measured separately with three indicators each: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and Manichaean outlook of politics.[17] The second is the six-item scale by Akkerman et al. (2014).[18]

6.3.1 Results

Reading a battery of populist statements did not have an effect of lowering individuals' trust on political institutions. The standardized estimated treatment effect is on the first cell of Table 6.5: -.03. Respondents who were primed with populism were not less confident on political institutions than those who were not. The experiment confirms that, at least in this direction, the connection between the two is not of a causal nature.

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[17]Not all of the total 21 items used as treatment are part of the final scale used to measure these three constructs. The recommended measurement uses only three for each.

[18]All items asked on likert disagree-agree scales, with 7-points for the Castanho Silva et al. (*forthcoming*) battery, and 5-point for the Akkerman et al. (2014) one.

Nevertheless, we still observe a strong correlation between low trust and populism (higher values on the *trust* latent variable indicate lower political trust). With the populist attitudes scale by Akkerman et al. (2014), the correlation is 0.36. With the dimensions from Castanho Silva et al. (2017), $r = .42, .55$, and $-.09$ for people-centrism, anti-elitism, and Manichaean outlook respectively. Except for the last dimension, populism and political trust are strongly correlated among individuals. Just not, apparently, on a causal way.

6.4   Discussion

A few findings in this thesis and the literature have suggested that lack of political trust explains support for populist parties and actors (e.g. Doyle, 2011; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Recently, some have argued that populism also leads to even lower levels of political trust among its followers (Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2016), in a reciprocal relationship. This chapter, however, uses more strict methods for causal inference and finds no evidence for the existence of such causal relation. Using three different methods, with data from multiple countries and various kinds of populist parties, there seems to be no causal connection between trust and populism once unobserved confounders are accounted for.

These findings suggest that populist attitudes (and voting for populists) and political trust are strongly correlated with one another, but not causally, meaning they are likely manifestations of a same attitude or latent disposition. Psychologically, it would mean a certain trait or more fundamental disposition which, when triggered, affects both one's trust in political institutions and their populist attitudes, as well as their preference for a populist politician when available. As a consequence, findings in Chapter 3 should be interpreted as suggesting that, indeed, support for populism is associated primarily with a loss of legitimacy on political institutions, over alternative explanations. However, both are

likely triggered by a similar antecedent factor, which the QCA study suggests is perception of corruption and elite collusion.

Conclusion

Today, the most powerful man in the world is a populist. For a long time, many treated populism as a secondary issue. Its true successes were to be found only in problematic peripheral democracies. Western European (right-wing) populists were marginal, causing frenzy the few times their vote intentions reached double digits. Things changed fast in recent years. Populist have been part of government in important EU democracies, and countries that seemed immune to it are seeing the rise of such parties, like Germany or the United Kingdom. Populists are among the top two forces in several European democracies, challenging the post-war liberal democratic establishment and the ideals of European integration. All these facts lead us to ask: when do populists rise, and what happens when they do? Broadly, these two questions guided this thesis. In the following pages, I review the most important findings, assess their contribution, acknowledge limitations in the present study, and suggest venues for future research.

Review of Findings

I start by adopting an ideational view of populism: it is to be found in the realm of ideas (but is not an ideology), and has three main components. First, populist discourse glorify common people and its values, as a unified and homogeneous morally superior group. Second, it opposes the people to an elite, also unified and homogeneous, who is powerful

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and intent on exploiting the people. Third, populism sees political divisions as moral: the us-versus-them entails that we, the people, are good and they, the elite, are adamantly evil. With this definition in hand, the next step is looking at political parties to identify which ones have discourses fitting the description.

Populism in Europe and Americas

Chapter 2 uses human based content analysis to identify levels of populist discourse in political parties' electoral manifestos and candidates' speeches. By applying the same method to 146 parties in 28 countries, the first contribution from this thesis is the assessment of how populism is distributed in the Americas and Western Europe today. I confirm what Latin Americanists already thought: populism is a much stronger force in that region than elsewhere (e.g., Hawkins, 2010). The discourse is more intense, it is used by a larger number of actors and, most important, by a substantively larger number of governing parties. Populism is common currency in much of the subcontinent, and moderate populists by Latin American standards use as much of this discourse as some (usually considered) strong, or prototypical, Western European ones.

Second, I also investigate how European populism is related to ideology. For long, it was essentially associated with right-wing parties. In common parlance, right-wing populism and simply populism are almost synonymous in European circles. Recent research (e.g. Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015) has started to challenge this view, along with the emergence of strong left-wing (SYRIZA, Podemos) and ideologically amorphous parties (like the Five Star Movement). I find that, indeed, populism is spread across left and right in general terms, and that the discursive focus of each kind of party is different: right-wing populists are called so for being on the right in social-cultural issues, while left-populists are on the left primarily on economic issues. The one thing that populism does not sit well with is moderation: centrist parties (left and right) display the lowest levels of this discourse.

First, these findings confirm that the concept of populism, and its manifestations, do travel well across very different regions. There is something common in the discourses of actors as diverse as the NPD in Germany and Evo Morales in Bolivia. Second, they also show that populism is not as widespread as one might feel when reading the news. Most parties classified as such are far from positions of power, and many typically considered examples of populism do not present that much of this discourse. While their ideology might still be troubling due to other aspects, populism is not necessarily one of them. Still, the natural questions that followed were how to explain the variation in populists' success across countries.

What to Make of Populism and Trust?

In general the results in this thesis first seemed to confirm a reinforcing relationship between populism and political trust. In Chapter 6 I test this proposition, and find that in fact there is little evidence for a causal connection between the two. They do correlate strongly, but not because one leads to the other. A most likely alternative is that populist attitudes and low political trust are manifestations of a same antecedent attitude or trait. Moreover, the behavior of actually voting for more populist parties seems to be a simple manifestation of an attitude of low trust – much like voting for anti-immigrant parties is a simple consequence of holding anti-immigrant views.

The majority of studies on populism to date assume, or interpret their results, with a causal connection between low political trust and the emergence of populist leaders. Citizens would get dissatisfied and in turn vote for such a candidate, promising to do away with the entire political establishment. This structure was presented in Figure 3.1, early in Chapter 3. As it turns out, it should be updated into the one in Figure 6.7. Political trust is not a mediator between those contextual factors and electorally successful populists, but rather a co-occurrence.

Figure 6.7: The Updated Model.

At the individual level the picture is more complex. The ideational theory correctly predicts that populism is primarily associated with lack of trust in political institutions. Indeed, that is the only strong and significant association to emerge once we look at a large and diverse set of cases. However, if the two are not causally connected, there is little left besides contextual factors affecting both. At this point, it seems that populism might be too thin of a concept, or phenomenon, to be of relevance in itself. Stripping out its ideological associations leads to a point where populism alone cannot be explained by attitudinal or demographic factors, nor explain a few other attitudinal consequences.

This thesis starts arguing that it is meaningful, conceptually and analytically, to treat populism as a coherent phenomenon manifested across different regions and periods. From a theoretical standpoint, that remains valid. However, the findings suggest that doing so can only bring us so far. Much of what accounts for populists' success appears to be very context dependent, and driven by specific characteristics of various populist parties in each

country or region. While there might be talk about a "populist explosion" (Judis, 2016) in the world, it becomes clear that this is multifaceted phenomenon that should not be treated as a single, coherent set of events. The fact that populism is anti-pluralist (Müller, 2016) and often associated with extremist discourses makes it an important issue to be studied. But the most relevant explanations and troubling consequences appear to emerge out of the radical associations taken by populist actors.

Populism as an Attitude

At the attitudinal level, findings strengthen the idea of populism as a deep-seated psychological characteristic. Even after populist leaders have been in power for years, certain anti-elitist attitudes are key to explaining support for them by the public beyond general ideological attachment and evaluations of their performance in office. Their election, in fact, generates a scenario of cognitive dissonance among their supporters which has to be quickly resolved. This is also in accordance with the ideational view, in which populism is perceived as a latent disposition that individuals might hold about politics and the world (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, forthcoming).

However, it is still necessary to find the Z that explains both populist attitudes and low institutional trust. We know what it is not: poor material conditions, general interpersonal trust, or a sense of efficacy are some which can be discarded based on the results from Chapter 4. It is possible that it refers to the idea of what is called "deceptive officialdom", or the fundamental belief that any action by authorities are necessarily deceptive, a worldview at the root of belief in many conspiracy theories (Wood et al., 2012). This is a point to be picked up by future studies on the psychology of populist support.

Contributions

The first contribution of this study is of a practical nature: it presents the first comparative data set classifying political parties across 28 democracies on how populist they are. This is the most comprehensive of its kind, and will allow researchers of populism (and, of course, other political phenomena) to use valid, comparative measure in their studies, going beyond the two most common alternatives today: consulting experts, and classification based on literature reviews. Research into the topic can certainly advance when scholars use a single ruler to define parties as populist or not. Much of the disagreement existing today around causes of populism, for example, exist only because almost each study uses a different classification of what parties to include, naturally leading to different conclusions.

Next, findings give substantive contributions to our understanding of contemporary populism. First, a mapping of its geographical and ideological spread in the Americas and Western Europe. And second, a comparative assessment of the causes behind populists' electoral success. Explanations provided up to date have suffered from the limitation of being tested with cases from a single kind of populism, or single regions. This is the first test that looks at cases as diverse as the Movement Towards Socialism in Bolivia and the Swiss People's Party, and include both in an attempt to identify the combinations of conditions leading to the rise of populism.

A third contribution is reevaluating the nature of the relationship between populist support and political trust. If they reinforced each other, a hypothesis that has been gaining traction, that would be bad news for democracies, as they would enter a spiral of ever lower trust, and ever higher support for populists. However, findings here suggest that not to be the case. Populism and political trust do go hand-in-hand, but they seem to manifest a same sense of distrust, or dissatisfaction, and do not fuel one another. Therefore, if the apparent root causes of both are addressed – which, contextually, appear to be corruption and elite collusion –, it is theoretically possible to revert back from a scenario of distrust

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and high populism.

The last contribution is confirming that, among individuals, populism is better understood as an attitude, or a psychological characteristic. That is suggested by the findings about supporters of populists in power. Instead of simply having a more trustful view of establishment groups – what happens only with political institutions –, they retain a distrustful attitude, shifting the composition of the enemy to fit that suggested by the populist leader. It shows that populism is constantly polarizing and antagonizing social groups, what is reflected even when that is not a campaign requirement. It appears as a disposition towards confrontational politics, and this has potentially troubling consequences for those interested in how to deal with such parties in power.

Limitations

As any academic work, this thesis has limitations which must be acknowledged. First of all, while the classification of parties section has the broadest coverage in the literature so far, it is still rather limited in space and time. In space, since Central and Eastern Europe, essential cases in the rise of populism in recent years, are completely absent. Where we observe clear distinctions between Latin America and Europe, we might expect other sets of explanations to account for post-socialist European cases. Second, the limited time-frame of early 2010's elections does not allow for studying the development of populist discourse over the course of several electoral cycles. It is not possible to observe its actual rise, how other parties might react, and when it is that populists actually lose their appeal.

Second, due to the nature of the data, behavior and attitudes are often conflated in the analyses. Voting for a party with strong populist discourse might be motivated by a variety of reasons besides actually holding a populist attitude. Modeling individuals' preferences for parties that have populist discourse as a proxy for their attitudinal populism, therefore, has the risk of overlooking these important differences and treating the causes of

a behavioral outcome – supporting populists – as those of an attitude – seeing politics on a populist way. Before scales designed to measure populism are applied in cross-national surveys, and perhaps show the extent of the disparity between attitudes and behavior, this limitation cannot be overcome. Introducing a measurement error component into the populism indicator is expected to help with avoiding overconfident estimates, but the ultimate conflation of the two remains.

A third limitation is that, in the absence of experimental evidence, any causal claims must be taken with a grain of salt. As Chapter 6 has shown, even methods that are supposedly rigorous in identifying causal directions with observational data might be unable to rule out spuriousness. Therefore, findings on the causes at populism (both at country and individual levels) and of its attitudinal consequences might be subject to the same issues: wrong direction of causation, or spurious correlation. While each test is dictated by theory and what we should expect, stricter causal inference is necessary to ensure the validity and reliability of these findings.

Future Studies

A first venue for future studies is continuing the data collection on parties' level of populism, expanding the dataset coverage to other countries and going further back in time. Moreover, this is an area ripe for applications of automated text analysis – in identifying populist topics and scaling documents on this dimension. Future studies can take advantage of these set of scores to apply modern methods of supervised learning, for example, and use that as a way of expanding the data set coverage in further studies.

A second possibility, addressing one of the limitations raised, is using experiments to determine with more certainty what are the attitudinal consequences of populism. Questions such as whether supporting these parties do make individuals participate more, or if right-wing populism does have the effect of increasing xenophobic attitudes, are prone

to experimental investigation. Given the rise of populists in the world today, the most important area of studies from a policy perspective is exactly trying to understand the consequences of populism. What are they, how bad can it be, and what are effective counter-measures to contain its appeal or side-effects are some of the questions with which researchers will have to engage in the near future.

On a more general tone, as populist actors become ever more prominent in international politics, opportunities for research on the topic are also at their height. The international cooperation among European populists today, which had never been seen before in this context but that has been common among Latin American left-populists for a decade, is one of the new developments that can only benefit from cross-regional research. Trump's presidency, if indeed he confirms the first moves as a typical populist leader, is the first chance to observe the clash between a strong populist president and centuries-old political institutions in a developed democracy. Whether the path will be similar to the authoritarian drifts of several less consolidated democracies under populists is a fundamental question that concerns anyone who cares about the future of liberal democratic values.

Appendix A

Rubric for Coding Populism

Country:
  Name of candidate:
  Year of election:
  Title of speech:
  Grader:
  Date of grading:

  Final Grade (delete unused grades):

2 A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist.

1 A speech in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers them by including non-populist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion of the people and the idea of a unified popular will (indeed, it must in order to be considered populist), but it avoids bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy.

0 A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a manifesto expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

Populism	Pluralism
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong", "good" or "evil") The implication– or even the stated idea–is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered.	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal.	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will". The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic.

Populism	Pluralism
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy", but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism.	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low.
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections.	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony".
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.

Overall comments (just a few sentences):

Appendix B

Full Results of Coding

Table B.1: Populism in Party Manifestos and Candidates' Speeches.

Country	Year	Party	Manifesto	Speeches	Party score	Party score 2
Argentina	2011	FAP	0.2	0.25	0.225	0.23
Argentina	2011	FpV	0.5	0.25	0.375	0.33
Argentina	2011	FP	0.25	0.7	0.475	0.55
Argentina	2011	UCR	1.3	0.2	0.75	0.57
Argentina	2011	CF	0.1	1	0.55	0.7
Australia	2013	ALP	0	0.25	0.125	0.167
Australia	2013	Lib	0.05	0.5	0.25	0.35
Austria	2008	SPÖ	0.1		0.1	0.1
Austria	2008	ÖVP	0		0	0
Austria	2008	FPÖ	1		1	1
Austria	2008	Grünen	0.1		0.1	0.1
Austria	2008	BZÖ	0.2		0.2	0.2
Belgium-WL	2014	cdH	0.05		0.05	0.05
Belgium-WL	2014	Ecolo	0		0	0
Belgium-WL	2014	FDF	0		0	0
Belgium-WL	2014	MR	0		0	0
Belgium-WL	2014	PP	0.55		0.55	0.55
Belgium-WL	2014	PS	0.15		0.15	0.15
Bolivia	2014	MAS	1.55		1.55	1.55
Bolivia	2014	PDC	0.3		0.3	0.3
Bolivia	2014	UD	0.25		0.25	0.25

Country	Year	Party	Manifesto	Speeches	Party score	Party score 2
Brazil	2014	PSDB	0	0.15	0.075	0.1
Brazil	2014	PSB	0.075	0.15	0.1125	0.125
Brazil	2014	PSOL	1.1	1.65	1.375	1.47
Brazil	2014	PT	0	0.65	0.325	0.43
Canada	2006	BQ	0.75		0.75	0.75
Canada	2006	Cons	0.8	0.15	0.48	0.37
Canada	2006	Green	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Canada	2006	Lib	0	0.05	0.03	0.03
Canada	2006	NDP	0.3	0	0.15	0.15
Chile	2013	PS	0.7	0.15	0.425	0.33
Chile	2013	UDI	0	0.025	0.0125	0.017
Chile	2013	PRO	0.3	1.15	0.725	0.87
Chile	2013	Parisi	0	0.45	0.225	0.3
Chile	2013	IGUAL	2	2	2	2
Colombia	2014	CD	0.35	0.15	0.25	0.22
Colombia	2014	C	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Colombia	2014	PDA	0.1	1.45	0.78	1
Colombia	2014	PVC	0.1	0.2	0.15	0.17
Colombia	2014	U	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Ecuador	2013	CREO	0.6	0.1	0.35	0.27
Ecuador	2013	Pais	1.7	0.95	1.325	1.2
Ecuador	2013	PRIAN	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.33
Ecuador	2013	PSP	0.1	0.75	0.425	0.53
France	2012	FG	0.9	0.25	0.575	0.47
France	2012	FN	0.4	0.75	0.575	0.63
France	2012	MoDem	0		0	0
France	2012	PS	0.1	0	0.05	0.03
France	2012	UMP	0	0.25	0.125	0.17
France	2012	Verts	0.15		0.15	0.15
Germany	2013	CDU	0		0	0
Germany	2013	Grüne	0.2		0.2	0.2
Germany	2013	FDP	0		0	0
Germany	2013	SPD	0		0	0
Germany	2013	AfD	0		0	0
Germany	2013	CSU	0		0	0
Germany	2013	Linke	1.3		1.3	1.3
Germany	2013	NPD	1.4		1.4	1.4
Greece	2015	ANEL	0.55	1.7	1.13	1.32
Greece	2015	ND	0.45	0.63	0.54	0.57
Greece	2015	PASOK	0.1	0.05	0.075	0.067
Greece	2015	GD	0	0.28	0.14	0.18

Country	Year	Party	Manifesto	Speeches	Party score	Party score 2
Greece	2015	SYRIZA	1.45	1.83	1.64	1.7
Greece	2015	KKE	0.4	1.15	0.78	0.9
Greece	2015	POTAMI	0.45	0.38	0.42	0.4
Ireland	2011	FF	0.025		0.025	0.025
Ireland	2011	FG	0.25		0.25	0.25
Ireland	2011	Lab	0.3		0.3	0.3
Ireland	2011	SF	0.325		0.325	0.325
Italy	2013	M5S	0.1	0.65	0.375	0.47
Italy	2013	LN	0.1	0	0.05	0.05
Italy	2013	PD	0.6	0.3	0.45	0.45
Italy	2013	PdL	0	0.35	0.175	0.23
Italy	2013	SC	0	0	0	0
Italy	2013	RC	0.4	1.5	0.95	1.13
Italy	2013	SEL	0.1	0.35	0.23	0.27
Mexico	2012	PAN	0.1	0.05	0.075	0.67
Mexico	2012	PRI	0.05	0.175	0.113	0.13
Mexico	2012	PRD	0.95	0.55	0.75	0.68
Mexico	2012	PNA	0.05		0.05	0.05
Netherlands	2012	CDA	0.05		0.05	0.05
Netherlands	2012	D66	0		0	0
Netherlands	2012	PvdA	0		0	0
Netherlands	2012	PVV	0		0	0
Netherlands	2012	SP	0.2		0.2	0.2
Netherlands	2012	VVD	0		0	0
Norway	2013	A	0		0	0
Norway	2013	FrP	0		0	0
Norway	2013	H	0		0	0
Paraguay	2013	APA	0	0.1	0.05	0.05
Paraguay	2013	AP	0.2	0.8	0.5	0.5
Paraguay	2013	PC		0.05	0.05	0.05
Peru	2013	AGC	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Peru	2013	F11	0	0.05	0.025	0.034
Peru	2013	PNP	0.55	1.3	0.925	1.05
Peru	2013	PP	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Peru	2013	SN	0	1.6	0.8	0.8
Portugal	2011	BE	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.27
Portugal	2011	CDS-PP	0.05		0.05	0.05
Portugal	2011	PCP	0.7	0.65	0.675	0.667
Portugal	2011	PS	0	0.05	0.025	0.03
Portugal	2011	PSD	0.05	0.1	0.075	0.083
Spain	2015	Cs	0.15	0	0.075	0.05

Country	Year	Party	Manifesto	Speeches	Party score	Party score 2
Spain	2015	IU-UP	1.15	1.325	1.24	1.28
Spain	2015	PNV	0	0	0	0
Spain	2015	PP	0.2	0	0.1	0.067
Spain	2015	PSOE	0.15	0.075	0.113	0.1
Spain	2015	DL	1	0.55	0.78	0.7
Spain	2015	ERC	0.7		0.7	0.7
Spain	2015	Podemos	0.65	0.9	0.78	0.82
Sweden	2014	M	0	0.1	0.05	0.05
Sweden	2014	C	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Sweden	2014	FP	0.05	0.1	0.075	0.075
Sweden	2014	KD	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Sweden	2014	MP	0	0.65	0.325	0.4
Sweden	2014	SAP	0	0.25	0.125	0.13
Sweden	2014	SD	0.1	0.15	0.125	0.17
Sweden	2014	V	0.2	0.45	0.325	0.37
Switzerland	2011	BDP	0.05		0.05	0.05
Switzerland	2011	CVP	0.1		0.1	0.1
Switzerland	2011	FDP	0.1		0.1	0.1
Switzerland	2011	GPS	0		0	0
Switzerland	2011	SP	0.3		0.3	0.3
Switzerland	2011	SVP	1		1	1
UK	2010	BNP	0.5	1.4	0.95	0.95
UK	2010	Lab	0.25	0.05	0.15	0.117
UK	2010	LibDem	0	0	0	0
UK	2010	C	0.05	0	0.025	0.017
UK	2010	UKIP	0.15	0	0.075	0.075
UK	2010	SNP		0.65	0.65	0.65
Uruguay	2014	FA	0.05	0.2	0.125	0.15
Uruguay	2014	PC	0	0.15	0.07	0.1
Uruguay	2014	PI	0.15	0.3	0.225	0.25
Uruguay	2014	PN	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Uruguay	2014	UP	1.2	0.25	0.725	0.57
US	2012	R	0.25	0.05	0.15	0.12
US	2012	D	0.45	0.3	0.375	0.32
Venezuela	2013	PSUV	1.85	1.6	1.725	1.68
Venezuela	2013	MUD	0.8	1.9	1.35	1.53

Notes: Full names of parties can be found in the List of Abbreviations. **Party score** refers to the average between manifesto and average speeches scores (manifesto plus average speeches divided by two). **Party score 2** is the average of all documents coded.

Appendix C

Mediation Analysis with fsQCA

Figure C.1: A Causal Chain.

Figure C.1 depicts a simple causal chain where X causes M, and M causes Y. Translating into set-theoretic terms, if we hypothesize that M is a mediator in the causal relation $X \rightarrow Y$, this implies three statements of sufficiency: a) $X \rightarrow Y$, b) $X \rightarrow M$, and c) $M \rightarrow Y$. a) is true because, if X is not sufficient for Y, there is no causal relation between the two and it makes no sense to talk about it being mediated. Under perfect consistency, $X \rightarrow Y$ logically follows from the other two: if M is a subset of Y, and X is a subset of M, by definition X is a subset of Y. However, given inconsistency in practical applications, this relation must be always tested and confirmed.

b) states that X has to be causally connected to M. A mediator is a condition that is triggered by the antecedent and leads to the outcome. If $X \rightarrow M$ is false but the others hold, then we have only $X + M \rightarrow Y$ instead of $X \rightarrow M \rightarrow Y$. c) defines that we are indeed observing a mediator: if M is not sufficient for Y, then it cannot be the path through which X leads to Y. The causal relation is simply $X \rightarrow Y$.

A perfect mediation would be one where all sufficiency statements are fully consistent and with full coverage. If we think in terms of Venn diagrams, the three circles would be perfectly overlapping. This way, all cases of X trigger M, and all cases of M lead to Y[1]. Under this scenario, only one truth table row would have cases with the outcome, $X * M \rightarrow Y$, and that would be the minimal solution. Given social sciences data, however, this is virtually never the case, and we might expect to see pictures as in Figure C.2. In Panel 1, the consistency of the sufficiency statements $X \rightarrow M$, $X \rightarrow Y$, and $M \rightarrow Y$ is 1.00. However, the minimized QCA solution given by a QMC algorithm is only $M \rightarrow Y$,

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[1]In this case, the justification for whether X leads to M or M leads to X would have to come from the theory or, alternatively, temporal antecedence.

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because the truth table has the rows $X * M \rightarrow Y$ and $x * M \rightarrow Y$, which would be minimized to $M \rightarrow Y$. In an agnostic take of the causal structures in the data, X would not be identified as a sufficient condition for the outcome.

Figure C.2: Set Mediation as Venn Diagrams.

Panel 1   Panel 2   Panel 3

A second possibility, which might be more realistic, may be found in Panel B of Figure C.2. There, a QCA minimization would yield the result $X + M \rightarrow Y$, based on the respective truth table rows: $X * M \rightarrow Y$, $X * m \rightarrow Y$, $x * M \rightarrow Y$. While X is not a perfectly consistent subset of M, it would pass a threshold as the usual 0.8, and satisfy the three conditions for mediation. In the case of Panel 3 in Figure C.2, QCA would minimize the truth table to the solution $X * M \rightarrow Y$, based on the rows $X * M \rightarrow Y$, and given that $X * m \rightarrow Y$ and $x * M \rightarrow Y$ do not pass a consistency threshold.

In all three cases, the three sufficiency statements of a mediation hypothesis are fulfilled under a high consistency threshold: $X \rightarrow Y$, $X \rightarrow M$, and $M \rightarrow Y$. However, not only the solution given by a QCA minimization would be different in each, in one of the cases (Panel 1) X would not even be included in the final solution. For this reason, therefore, it is necessary to establish specific rules for testing separately the hypothesized causal chain.

To run a mediation analysis in QCA in practice, three truth tables should be constructed and minimized sequentially:

- First, one with X and Y;

- Second, one with X and M;

- Third, one with M and Y.

They establish whether the three sufficiency statements necessary for a causal chain are confirmed. In case any fails, the relation being tested is not one of mediation. One might ask why not run once with X, M, and Y. However, given that the solution from this, under a mediation structure, could be of several forms, a fourth step with all conditions is superfluous to evaluate the mediation hypothesis.

Appendix D

QCA Results Using Only Manifestos' Populism Scores

The following two tables are a repetition of Steps 1 and 3 from Chapter 3 using only manifestos' populism scores to define cases of success of populism.

Table D.1: Step 1: Most Parsimonious Solution Formula Explaining the Success of Populism – Manifestos Only.

	Path	Cons.	R. Cov.	U. Cov	Cases
1.	COR*YD*rec*coal +	0.74	0.45	0.23	Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela
2.	COR*UNMP	0.78	0.38	0.07	Greece, Italy, Mexico
3.	COAL*pres*rec +	0.80	0.29	(0.20)	Austria, Greece, Netherlands, Switzerland
4.	COAL*GLOB*rec	0.76	0.29	(0.20)	Austria, Greece, Netherlands, Switzerland

Notes: Sufficient paths for the electoral success of populism, using only manifesto scores. Consistency of the solution formula: 0.75, coverage: 0.80. *Cons.*: consistency; *R. Cov.*: raw coverage; *U. Cov.*: unique coverage. Row dominance was applied to the prime implicants' chart to remove redundant ones.

Table D.2: Step 3: Most Parsimonious Solution Formula Explaining the Success of Populism – Manifestos Only.

	Path	Cons.	R. Cov.	U. Cov	Cases
1.	pr*glob +	0.79	0.19	(0.19)	Bolivia, Chile, Mexico
2.	YD*pr	0.82	0.23	(0.23)	Bolivia, Chile, Mexico

Notes: Sufficient paths for the electoral success of populism. Consistency of the solution formula: 0.79, coverage: 0.20. *Cons.*: consistency; *R. Cov.*: raw coverage; *U. Cov.*: unique coverage. Row dominance was applied to the prime implicants' chart to remove redundant ones.

Appendix E

List of Variables from WVS and EVS

Table E.1: List of WVS and EVS variables.

Concept	Question wording	Response categories
Life satisfaction	All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?	1 (Completely dissatisfied) – 10 (Completely satisfied)
Unemployment	Are you employed now or not?. If yes, about how many hours a week?	1 = Unemployed; 0 = other answers;
L-R Ideology	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	1 (Left) – 10 (Right)
Race	On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?	1 = Mentioned "People of a different race"; 0 = did not mention
Immigrants	On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?	1 = Mentioned "Immigrants/foreign workers"; 0 = did not mention
Proud of nation	How proud are you to be [Nationality]?	1 = Very proud; 2 = Quite proud; 3 = Not very proud; 4 = Not at all proud
Jobs for nationals	When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants.	1 = Agree; 2 = Neither; 3 = Disagree
Strong leader	I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? – Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	1 = Very good; 2 = Fairly good; 3 = Bad; 4 = Very bad

Table E.1: List of WVS and EVS variables.

Concept	Question wording	Response categories
Trust in government	I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?: The government (in nation's capital)	1 = A great deal; 2 = Quite a lot; 3 = Not very much; 4 = None at all
Trust in parliament	Parliament	1 = A great deal; 2 = Quite a lot; 3 = Not very much; 4 = None at all
Trust in parties	Political Parties	1 = A great deal; 2 = Quite a lot; 3 = Not very much; 4 = None at all
General Trust	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	1 = Most people can be trusted; 2 = Need to be very careful
Take advantage	Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?	1 = People would try to take advantage of you; 10 = People would try to be fair
Political interest	How interested would you say you are in politics?	1 = Very interested; 2 = Somewhat interested; 3 = Not very interested; 4 = Not at all interested

Table E.1: List of WVS and EVS variables.

Concept	Question wording	Response categories
General efficacy	Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "no choice at all" and 10 means "a great deal of choice" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out:	1 = No choice at all; 10 = A great deal of choice
Participation: petitions	Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it:	1 = Have done; 2 = Might do; 3 = Would never do.
Participation: boycotts	Joining in boycotts	1 = Have done; 2 = Might do; 3 = Would never do.
Participation: Demonstrations	Attending peaceful demonstrations	1 = Have done; 2 = Might do; 3 = Would never do.

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Appendix F

SEM Estimates with Different Reliability for Populism as DV

Table F.1: Stepwise Models (Table 4.2) Explaining Support for Populism – Single Indicator Latent Variable Reliability at 0.6.

	Model a	Model b	Model c	Model d	Model e
Age	−.03	−.02	−.03	−.02	−.02
Education	−.02	−.02	.00	−.01	.01
Female	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.01
Efficacy	.10	.12	.11	.10	.11
Interest	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.06	−.06
Extremism	.06	.06	.06	.05	.05
Economic					
Life satisfaction		−.08*			−.04
Unemployment		.03			.02
Durkheimian					
L-R ideology			−.11		−.10
Intolerance			.11		.09
Proud of nation			.02		.00
Jobs for nationals			−.06		−.04
Strong leader			.02		.02
Ideational					
Political trust				.16**	.14**
Social trust				.04	.03
Take advantage				.01	.02
Model fit					
χ^2 (df)	1.083 (7)	0.999 (9)	12.881 (20)	50.640 (26)	90.917 (63)
RMSEA	.00	.00	.00	.007	.005
SRMR	.01	.01	–	–	–
CFI	1.00	1.00	1.00	.994	.992
TLI	1.00	1.00	1.00	.985	.976

Notes: Dependent variable: support for populism, modeled as a single indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.6. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimator: Maximum Likelihood Robust for models (a) and (b), Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances Adjusted (WLSMV) for models (c), (d), and (e). N = 18,199, with 23 clusters. Standardized results. $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$.

Table F.2: Stepwise Models (Table 4.2) Explaining Support for Populism – Single Indicator Latent Variable Reliability at 0.8.

	Model a	Model b	Model c	Model d	Model e
Age	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.02
Education	−.01	−.02	.00	−.01	.00
Female	−.02	−.02	−.01	−.01	−.01
Efficacy	.09	.10	.10	.08	.10
Interest	−.01	−.02	−.01	−.05	−.05
Extremism	.05	.06	.05	.05	.04
Economic					
Life satisfaction		−.07*			−.04
Unemployment		.02			.02
Durkheimian					
L-R ideology			−.09		−.09
Intolerance			.09		.08
Proud of nation			.02		.00
Jobs for nationals			−.05		−.03
Strong leader			.02		.02
Ideational					
Political trust				.14**	.12**
Social trust				.03	.03
Take advantage				.01	.02
Model fit					
χ^2 (df)	1.083 (7)	0.999 (9)	12.883 (20)	50.640 (26)	90.918 (63)
RMSEA	.00	.00	.00	.007	.005
SRMR	.01	.01	−	−	−
CFI	1.00	1.00	1.00	.994	.992
TLI	1.00	1.00	1.00	.985	.976

Notes: Dependent variable: support for populism, modeled as a single indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.8. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimator: Maximum Likelihood Robust for models (a) and (b), Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances Adjusted (WLSMV) for models (c), (d), and (e). N = 18,199, with 24 clusters. Standardized results. $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$.

Table F.3: Stepwise Models (Table 4.2) Explaining Support for Populism – Single Indicator Latent Variable Reliability at 0.9.

	Model a	Model b	Model c	Model d	Model e
Age	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.02
Education	−.02	−.01	.00	−.01	.00
Female	−.02	−.01	−.01	−.01	−.01
Efficacy	.08	.10	.09	.08	.09
Interest	−.01	−.01	−.01	−.05	−.05
Extremism	.05	.05	.05	.04	.04
Economic					
Life satisfaction		−.06*			−.04
Unemployment		.02			.02
Durkheimian					
L-R ideology			−.09		−.08
Intolerance			.09		.08
Proud of nation			.02		.00
Jobs for nationals			−.05		−.03
Strong leader			.02		.02
Ideational					
Political trust				.13**	.12**
Social trust				.03	.02
Take advantage				.01	.02
Model fit					
χ^2 (df)	1.083 (7)	0.999 (9)	12.882 (20)	50.641 (26)	90.912 (63)
RMSEA	.00	.00	.00	.007	.005
SRMR	.01	.01	–	–	–
CFI	1.00	1.00	1.00	.994	.992
TLI	1.00	1.00	1.00	.985	.976

Notes: Dependent variable: support for populism, modeled as a single indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.9. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimator: Maximum Likelihood Robust for models (a) and (b), Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances Adjusted (WLSMV) for models (c), (d), and (e). N = 18,199, with 24 clusters. Standardized results. $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$.

Table F.4: Stepwise Models (Table 4.2) Explaining Support for Populism – DV Modeled as Observed.

	Model a	Model b	Model c	Model d	Model e
Age	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.02	−.02
Education	−.02	−.01	.00	−.01	.00
Female	−.02	−.01	−.01	−.01	−.01
Efficacy	.08	.09	.09	.08	.09
Interest	−.01	−.01	−.01	−.05	−.04
Extremism	.05	.05	.05	.04	.04
Economic					
Life satisfaction		−.06*			−.03
Unemployment		.02			.02
Durkheimian					
L-R ideology			−.08		−.08
Intolerance			.08		.07
Proud of nation			.02		.00
Jobs for nationals			−.05		−.03
Strong leader			.02		.02
Ideational					
Political trust				.12**	.11**
Social trust				.03	.02
Take advantage				.01	.01
Model fit					
χ^2 (df)	1.083 (7)	0.999 (9)	12.882 (20)	50.643 (26)	90.919 (63)
RMSEA	.00	.00	.00	.007	.005
SRMR	.01	.01	−	−	−
CFI	1.00	1.00	1.00	.994	.992
TLI	1.00	1.00	1.00	.985	.976

Notes: Dependent variable: support for populism. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimator: Maximum Likelihood Robust for models (a) and (b), Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances Adjusted (WLSMV) for models (c), (d), and (e). N = 18,199, with 24 clusters. Standardized results. $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$.

Table F.5: Explaining Populist Support in Young and Old Democracies (Table 4.3) – Reliability of Single Indicator Latent Variable at 0.6.

	Model e (OD)	Model e (YD)
Age	-.03	.03
Education	-.02	.07**
Female	.00	-.05*
Efficacy	.14	.09
Interest	-.04	-.10***
Extremism	.05	.05
Economic		
Life satisfaction	-.06	-.02
Unemployment	.02	.04**
Durkheimian		
L-R ideology	-.09	-.15*
Intolerance	.08	.10
Proud of nation	.00	.03
Jobs for nationals	-.06	.02
Strong leader	.05	-.05
Ideational		
Political trust	.12*	.18**
Social trust	.04	-.02
Take advantage	.00	.04
Model fit		
χ^2 (df)	82.239 (63)	80.924 (63)
RMSEA	.005	.008
CFI	.995	.972
TLI	.984	.915

Notes: Dependent variable: support for populism, modeled as a single indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.6. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). For old democracies, N = 13,657. For young democracies, N = 4,542. Standardized results. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table F.6: Explaining Populist Support in Young and Old Democracies (Table 4.3) – Reliability of Single Indicator Latent Variable at 0.8.

	Model e (OD)	Model e (YD)
Age	-.03	.02
Education	-.02	.06**
Female	.00	-.05*
Efficacy	.13	.08
Interest	-.03	-.08***
Extremism	.05	.05
Economic		
Life satisfaction	-.05	-.01
Unemployment	.02	.03**
Durkheimian		
L-R ideology	-.08	-.13*
Intolerance	.07	.08
Proud of nation	.00	.02
Jobs for nationals	-.05	.02
Strong leader	.04	-.04
Ideational		
Political trust	.10*	.16**
Social trust	.03	-.02
Take advantage	-.01	.03
Model fit		
χ^2 (df)	82.095 (63)	80.917 (63)
RMSEA	.005	.008
CFI	.995	.972
TLI	.984	.915

Notes: Dependent variable: support for populism, modeled as a single indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.8. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). For old democracies, N = 13,657. For young democracies, N = 4,542. Standardized results. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$.

Table F.7: Explaining Populist Support in Young and Old Democracies (Table 4.3) – Reliability of Single Indicator Latent Variable at 0.9.

	Model e (OD)	Model e (YD)
Age	-.03	.02
Education	-.02	.06[**]
Female	.00	-.04[*]
Efficacy	.12	.07
Interest	-.03	-.08[***]
Extremism	.05	.04
Economic		
Life satisfaction	-.05	-.01
Unemployment	.02	.03[**]
Durkheimian		
L-R ideology	-.07	-.12
Intolerance	.07	.08
Proud of nation	.00	.02
Jobs for nationals	-.05	.01
Strong leader	.04	-.04
Ideational		
Political trust	.10[*]	.15[*]
Social trust	.03	-.02
Take advantage	.00	.03
Model fit		
χ^2 (df)	82.133 (63)	80.922 (63)
RMSEA	.005	.008
CFI	.995	.972
TLI	.984	.915

Notes: Dependent variable: support for populism, modeled as a single indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.9. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). For old democracies, N = 13,657. For young democracies, N = 4,542. Standardized results. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table F.8: Explaining Populist Support in Young and Old Democracies (Table 4.3) – Dependent Variable Modeled as Observed.

	Model e (OD)	Model e (YD)
Age	-.03	.02
Education	-.02	.05**
Female	.00	-.04
Efficacy	.11	.07
Interest	-.03	-.07***
Extremism	.04	.04
Economic		
Life satisfaction	-.05	-.01
Unemployment	.02	.03**
Durkheimian		
L-R ideology	-.07	-.11
Intolerance	.06	.08
Proud of nation	.00	.02
Jobs for nationals	-.04	.01
Strong leader	.04	-.04
Ideational		
Political trust	.09*	.14*
Social trust	.03	-.01
Take advantage	.00	.03
Model fit		
χ^2 (df)	82.152 (63)	80.872 (63)
RMSEA	.005	.008
CFI	.995	.972
TLI	.984	.915

Notes: Dependent variable: support for populism. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). For old democracies, N = 13,657. For young democracies, N = 4,542. Standardized results. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Appendix G

Full Estimates from Chapter 4 Models

Table G.1: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.2.

	P. Trust	Intolerance	Democracy	Participation	Extremism
Populism	.13**	.09	.03	-.07*	.07
Life satisfaction	-.06***	-.06***	.00	.01	.05
Education	.03	-.11*	.22***	-.28***	-.10**
Female	-.02	-.04**	-.02	.02	-.01
L-R ideology	.01	.11***	-.14***	.15***	.01
Proud of nation	.11***	.05	.06	-.07**	-.02
Age	.02	.04*	.19***	.05	-.01
Jobs for nationals	-.08*	-.30***	.14**	-.06*	.00
Efficacy	.03	-.01	-.05	.07	.14*
Unemployment	.01	-.01	-.03	-.02	.03*
Interest	.24***	-.04	-.21***	.32***	-.09**
Social trust	.13***	.04	-.20***	.09***	.08**
Take advantage	-.06*	-.01	-.05	.02	-.03

Full standardized results from the model reported in Figure 4.2. The dependent variables *Political Trust, Intolerance, Democracy,* and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.7. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 18,199. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 331.300, df = 148, p < .001$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .954, TLI = .907. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table G.2: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.3 on Old Democracies.

	P. Trust	Intolerance	Democracy	Participation	Extremism
Populism	.11*	.06	-.06	-.06	.09
Life satisfaction	-.05**	-.06**	-.04	.01	.00
Education	.00	-.14*	.19***	-.25***	-.06
Female	-.02	-.05***	.04	.01	-.01
L-R ideology	.03	.10**	.14***	.19***	.01
Proud of nation	.12***	.10***	-.04	-.05**	-.01
Age	.04	.02	-.19***	.12***	.01
Jobs for nationals	-.11	-.39***	-.16*	-.06	.01
Efficacy	.05	.04	.02	.03	.09
Unemployment	.02	-.02	.02	.00	.01
Interest	.18***	-.03	.23***	.32***	-.14***
Social trust	.13***	.04	-.15***	.08**	.07**
Take advantage	-.07*	-.05	-.06	.04	-.02

Full standardized results from the model reported in Table 4.3 for old democracies (OD). The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.7. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 13,657. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 356.030, df = 148, p < .001$, RMSEA = .010, CFI = .950, TLI = .900. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table G.3: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.3 on Young Democracies.

	P. Trust	Intolerance	Democracy	Participation	Extremism
Populism	.17**	.12	-.06	-.08	.08
Life satisfaction	-.07*	-.05	.05	.06**	.09
Education	.04	-.10	-.18***	-.16***	-.12***
Female	-.00	.03	.01	.08***	-.03
L-R ideology	.07	.09	.30***	.10***	.04
Proud of nation	.07*	-.13***	-.09	-.03	-.05
Age	-.08**	.03	-.19***	.06*	.01
Jobs for nationals	-.04	-.04	-.09**	-.02	-.01
Efficacy	-.05	-.02	.02	-.03	.18
Unemployment	-.02	.01	.01	-.01	.02
Interest	.29***	-.04	.06	.33***	-.01
Social trust	.10***	.05	.10**	.03	-.01
Take advantage	-.09	-.05	.05	-.01	.01

Full standardized results from the model reported in Table 4.3 for young democracies (YD). The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.7. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 4,542. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 186.793, df = 148, p = .017$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .949, TLI = .896. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^*p < .05, ^{**}p < .01, ^{***}p < .001$.

Table G.4: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism and Right-wing Populism from Figure 4.4.

	P. Trust	Intolerance	Democracy	Participation	Extremism
Populism	.12**	.10	-.03	-.07*	.06
RW Populism	-.03	.11**	.00	-.03	.00
Life satisfaction	-.06***	-.06***	.00	.01	.04
Education	.03	-.11*	-.21***	-.28***	-.10**
Female	-.02	-.04**	.02	.02	-.01
L-R ideology	.03	.04	.15***	.17***	.01
Proud of nation	.11***	.05	-.06	-.06**	-.02
Age	-.02	.05*	-.19***	.05	-.01
Jobs for nationals	-.08*	-.28**	-.14**	-.08*	.00
Efficacy	.03	.00	.05	.07	.14*
Unemployment	.01	-.02	.03	-.02*	.03*
Interest	.24***	-.04	.21***	.32***	-.09**
Social trust	.13***	.05	-.20***	.09***	.07**
Take advantage	-.06*	-.02	.05	.02	-.03

Full standardized results from the model reported in Figure 4.4. The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* and *Right wing populism* modeled as single-indicator latent variables with reliability of 0.7. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 18,199. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 337.544, df = 155, p < .001$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .954, TLI = .904. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Appendix H

SEM Estimates with Different Reliability for Populism as IV

Table H.1: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.2 – Reliability of Populism Set to 0.6.

	P. Trust	**Intolerance**	**Democracy**	**Participation**	**Extremism**
Populism	.14**	.09	.03	-.08*	.09
Life satisfaction	-.06***	-.06***	.00	.01	.05
Education	.03	-.11*	.21***	-.27***	-.10**
Female	-.02	-.04**	-.02	.02	-.01
L-R ideology	.01	.11***	-.14***	.15***	.02
Proud of nation	.11***	.05	.06	-.07**	-.02
Age	.02	.05*	.19***	.05	-.01
Jobs for nationals	-.08*	-.28***	.15**	-.08*	.00
Efficacy	.03	-.01	-.05	.07	.14*
Unemployment	.01	-.02	-.03	-.02	.03*
Interest	.24***	-.04	-.21***	.32***	-.09**
Social trust	.13***	.05	-.20***	.09***	.07**
Take advantage	-.06*	-.01	-.05	.02	-.04

Full standardized results from the model reported in Figure 4.2. The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.6. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 18,199. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 330.996, df = 148, p < .001$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .954, TLI = .908. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.2: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.2 – Reliability of Populism Set to 0.8.

	P. Trust	**Intolerance**	**Democracy**	**Participation**	**Extremism**
Populism	$.12^{**}$	.07	.03	-.06	.07
Life satisfaction	$-.06^{***}$	$-.06^{***}$	.00	.01	.04
Education	.03	$-.11^{*}$	$.21^{***}$	$-.27^{***}$	$-.10^{**}$
Female	-.02	$-.04^{**}$	-.02	.02	-.01
L-R ideology	.01	$.10^{***}$	$-.14^{***}$	$.15^{***}$	.01
Proud of nation	$.11^{***}$	.05	.06	$-.07^{**}$	-.02
Age	.02	$.05^{*}$	$.19^{***}$	.05	-.01
Jobs for nationals	$-.08^{*}$	$-.29^{***}$	$.15^{**}$	$-.08^{*}$	.00
Efficacy	.03	-.01	-.05	.06	$.14^{*}$
Unemployment	.01	-.02	-.03	-.02	$.03^{*}$
Interest	$.24^{***}$	-.04	$-.21^{***}$	$.32^{***}$	$-.09^{**}$
Social trust	$.13^{***}$	.05	$-.20^{***}$	$.09^{***}$	$.07^{**}$
Take advantage	$-.06^{*}$	-.01	-.05	.02	-.03

Full standardized results from the model reported in Figure 4.2. The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.8. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 18,199. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 331.014, df = 148, p < .001$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .954, TLI = .908. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.3: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.2 – Reliability of Populism Set to 0.9.

	P. Trust	**Intolerance**	**Democracy**	**Participation**	**Extremism**
Populism	$.11^{**}$	$.07$	$.02$	$-.06$	$.07$
Life satisfaction	$-.06^{***}$	$-.06^{***}$	$.00$	$.01$	$.05$
Education	$.03$	$-.11^{*}$	$.21^{***}$	$-.27^{***}$	$-.10^{**}$
Female	$-.02$	$-.04^{**}$	$-.02$	$.02$	$-.01$
L-R ideology	$.01$	$.11^{***}$	$-.15^{***}$	$.15^{***}$	$.01$
Proud of nation	$.11^{***}$	$.05^{*}$	$.06$	$-.07^{**}$	$-.02$
Age	$.02$	$.05^{*}$	$.19^{***}$	$.05$	$-.01$
Jobs for nationals	$-.08^{*}$	$-.28^{**}$	$.14^{**}$	$-.08^{*}$	$.00$
Efficacy	$.03$	$.00$	$-.05$	$.06$	$.14^{*}$
Unemployment	$.01$	$-.01$	$-.03$	$-.02^{*}$	$.03^{*}$
Interest	$.24^{***}$	$-.04$	$-.21^{***}$	$.32^{***}$	$-.09^{**}$
Social trust	$.14^{***}$	$.05$	$-.20^{***}$	$.09^{***}$	$.07^{**}$
Take advantage	$-.06^{*}$	$-.01$	$-.05$	$.02$	$-.03$

Full standardized results from the model reported in Figure 4.2. The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.9. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 18,199. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 330.932, df = 148, p < .001$, RMSEA $= .008$, CFI $= .954$, TLI $= .908$. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.4: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.2 – Populism Modeled as Observed.

	P. Trust	Intolerance	Democracy	Participation	Extremism
Populism	$.10^{**}$	.07	.02	-.06	.07
Life satisfaction	$-.06^{***}$	$-.06^{***}$	.00	.01	.04
Education	.03	$-.11^{*}$	$.21^{***}$	$-.28^{***}$	$-.10^{**}$
Female	-.02	$-.04^{**}$	-.02	.02	-.01
L-R ideology	.00	$.10^{***}$	$-.14^{***}$	$.15^{***}$	.01
Proud of nation	$.11^{***}$	.05	.06	$-.07^{**}$	-.02
Age	.02	$.04^{*}$	$.19^{***}$	.05	-.01
Jobs for nationals	$-.08^{*}$	$-.29^{**}$	$.14^{**}$	$-.08^{*}$	.00
Efficacy	.03	-.01	-.05	.06	$.14^{*}$
Unemployment	.01	-.01	-.03	-.02	$.03^{*}$
Interest	$.24^{***}$	-.04	$-.21^{***}$	$.32^{***}$	$-.09^{**}$
Social trust	$.14^{***}$	.05	$-.20^{***}$	$.09^{***}$	$.07^{**}$
Take advantage	$-.06^{*}$	-.01	-.05	.02	-.03

Full standardized results from the model reported in Figure 4.2. The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as observed. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 18,199. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 331.165, df = 148, p < .001$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .954, TLI = .908. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.5: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.3 on Old Democracies – Reliability of Populism Set to 0.6.

	P. Trust	**Intolerance**	**Democracy**	**Participation**	**Extremism**
Populism	.13*	.07	-.06	-.08	.11
Life satisfaction	-.05**	-.06**	-.04*	.01	.01
Education	.00	-.13*	.19***	-.25***	-.05
Female	-.02	-.05***	.04*	.01	-.01
L-R ideology	.02	.10**	.13***	.19***	.01
Proud of nation	.12***	.10***	-.04	-.05**	.00
Age	.04	.02	-.19***	.12***	.01
Jobs for nationals	-.10	-.38**	-.16*	-.06	.01
Efficacy	.05	.04	.02	.04	.08
Unemployment	.02	-.02	.02	.00	.01
Interest	.18***	-.03	.23***	.32***	-.14***
Social trust	.13***	.04	.15***	.08**	.07**
Take advantage	-.07*	-.05	.06	.04	-.02

Full standardized results from the model reported in Table 4.3 for old democracies (OD). The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.6. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 13,657. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 356.105, df = 148, p < .001$, RMSEA = .010, CFI = .950, TLI = .900. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^*p < .05, ^{**}p < .01, ^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.6: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.3 on Old Democracies – Reliability of Populism Set to 0.8.

	P. Trust	**Intolerance**	**Democracy**	**Participation**	**Extremism**
Populism	.10*	.06	-.05	-.05	.07
Life satisfaction	-.05**	-.06**	-.04	.01	.00
Education	.00	-.14*	.19***	-.25***	-.06
Female	-.02	-.05***	.04*	.01	-.01
L-R ideology	-.03	.10**	.14***	.19***	.01
Proud of nation	.12***	.10***	-.04	-.05**	.01
Age	.04	.02	-.19***	.12***	.01
Jobs for nationals	-.11	-.39**	-.16*	-.06	.01
Efficacy	.06	.04	.02	.03	.09
Unemployment	.02	-.02	.02	-.01	.01
Interest	.18***	-.03	.23***	.32***	-.14***
Social trust	.13***	.04	.15***	.08**	.07**
Take advantage	-.07*	-.05	.06	.04	-.02

Full standardized results from the model reported in Table 4.3 for old democracies (OD). The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.8. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 13,657. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 356.050, df = 148, p <$ .001, RMSEA = .010, CFI = .950, TLI = .900. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.7: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.3 on Old Democracies – Reliability of Populism Set to 0.9.

	P. Trust	**Intolerance**	**Democracy**	**Participation**	**Extremism**
Populism	.10*	.05	-.05	-.05	.07
Life satisfaction	-.05**	-.06**	-.04	.01	.00
Education	.00	-.13*	.19***	-.25***	-.05
Female	-.02	-.05***	.04*	.01	-.01
L-R ideology	-.03	.10**	.14***	.19***	.01
Proud of nation	.13***	.10***	-.04	-.05**	.00
Age	.04	.02	-.19***	.12***	.01
Jobs for nationals	-.11	-.39**	-.15*	-.06	.01
Efficacy	.06	.05	.02	.03	.09
Unemployment	.02	-.02	.02	.00	.01
Interest	.18***	-.03	.23***	.32***	-.14***
Social trust	.13***	.04	.15***	.08**	.07**
Take advantage	-.07*	-.05	.06	.04	-.02

Full standardized results from the model reported in Table 4.3 for old democracies (OD). The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.9. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 13,657. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 356.088, df = 148, p < .001$, RMSEA = .010, CFI = .950, TLI = .900. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.8: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.3 on Old Democracies – Populism Modeled as Observed.

	P. Trust	Intolerance	Democracy	Participation	Extremism
Populism	.09*	.05	-.05	-.05	.07
Life satisfaction	-.05**	-.06***	-.04	.01	.00
Education	.00	-.14*	.19***	-.25***	-.06
Female	-.02	-.05***	.04*	.01	-.01
L-R ideology	-.03	.10**	.14***	.19***	.01
Proud of nation	.13***	.10***	-.04	-.05**	.01
Age	.04	.02	-.19***	.12***	.01
Jobs for nationals	-.11	-.39**	-.16*	-.06	.01
Efficacy	.06	.05	.02	.03	.09
Unemployment	.02	-.02	.02	-.01	.02
Interest	.18***	-.03	.23***	.32***	-.14***
Social trust	.13***	.04	.15***	.08**	.07**
Take advantage	-.07*	-.05	.06	.04	-.02

Full standardized results from the model reported in Table 4.3 for old democracies (OD). The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as observed. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 13,657. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 356.035, df = 148, p < .001$, RMSEA = .010, CFI = .950, TLI = .900. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.9: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.3 on Young Democracies. – Reliability of Populism Set to 0.6.

	P. Trust	**Intolerance**	**Democracy**	**Participation**	**Extremism**
Populism	.19**	.13	.07	-.09	.10
Life satisfaction	-.07**	-.04	.04	.06**	.10
Education	.05	-.10	-.18***	-.16***	-.13***
Female	.00	.03	.01	.08***	-.03
L-R ideology	.08	.09	.30***	.09***	.04*
Proud of nation	.07*	-.13***	-.09	-.03	-.05
Age	-.06**	.03	-.19***	.06**	.00
Jobs for nationals	-.04	-.04	-.09**	-.02	-.01
Efficacy	-.04	-.03	.03	-.02	.18
Unemployment	-.02	.01	.01	-.01	.02
Interest	.29***	-.03	.06	.33***	-.02
Social trust	.10***	.05	.10**	.03	-.01
Take advantage	-.08	-.05	.05	-.01	-.01

Full standardized results from the model reported in Table 4.3 for young democracies (YD). The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.6. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 4,542. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 186.268, df = 148, p = .018$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .949, TLI = .897. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05, ^{**}p < .01, ^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.10: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.3 on Young Democracies. – Reliability of Populism Set to 0.8.

	P. Trust	Intolerance	Democracy	Participation	Extremism
Populism	.14*	.09	.05	-.07*	.08
Life satisfaction	-.07**	-.05	.04	.06**	.11*
Education	.06*	-.09	-.18***	-.16***	-.13***
Female	-.01	.02	.01	.08***	-.03
L-R ideology	.07	.08	.29***	.10***	.04
Proud of nation	.08*	-.13***	-.09	-.04	-.05
Age	-.05*	.04	-.18***	.06**	.00
Jobs for nationals	-.04	-.04	-.09**	-.02	-.01
Efficacy	-.03	-.03	.04	-.02	.19
Unemployment	-.02	.02	.01	-.01	.03
Interest	.30***	-.04	.06	.33***	-.01
Social trust	.10***	.05	.10**	.03	-.01
Take advantage	-.08	-.06	.05	-.01	-.02

Full standardized results from the model reported in Table 4.3 for young democracies (YD). The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.8. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 4,542. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 185.918, df = 148, p = .019$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .950, TLI = .898. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^*p < .05, ^{**}p < .01, ^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.11: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.3 on Young Democracies. – Reliability of Populism Set to 0.9.

	P. Trust	**Intolerance**	**Democracy**	**Participation**	**Extremism**
Populism	.13*	.08	.06	-.06	.08
Life satisfaction	-.07**	-.05	.04	.06**	.09
Education	.05	-.09	-.18***	-.16***	-.13***
Female	-.01	.02	.01	.08***	-.03
L-R ideology	.07	.08	.30***	.10***	.04
Proud of nation	.07*	-.13***	-.09	-.03	-.05
Age	-.06*	.03	-.19***	.06**	.01
Jobs for nationals	-.04	-.04	-.09**	-.02	-.01
Efficacy	-.03	-.02	.03	-.03	.19
Unemployment	-.02	.02	.01	-.01	.02
Interest	.29***	-.04	.06	.33***	-.01
Social trust	.10***	.05	.10**	.03	-.01
Take advantage	-.08	-.05	.05	-.01	.00

Full standardized results from the model reported in Table 4.3 for young democracies (YD). The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as a single-indicator latent variable with reliability of 0.9. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 4,542. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 186.354, df = 148, p = .018$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .949, TLI = .897. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^*p < .05, ^{**}p < .01, ^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.12: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism from Figure 4.3 on Young Democracies. – Populism Modeled as Observed.

	P. Trust	Intolerance	Democracy	Participation	Extremism
Populism	.13*	.08	.05	-.06	.06
Life satisfaction	-.07**	-.05	.04	.06**	.10
Education	.06*	-.09	-.18***	-.16***	-.13***
Female	.00	.02	.01	.08***	-.03
L-R ideology	.07	.08	.30***	.10***	.04
Proud of nation	.08*	-.12***	-.09	-.03	-.05
Age	-.06*	.03	-.19***	.06**	.01
Jobs for nationals	-.04	-.04	-.09**	-.02	-.01
Efficacy	-.03	-.02	.03	-.03	.19
Unemployment	-.02	.01	.01	-.01	.02
Interest	.29***	-.04	.06	.33***	-.02
Social trust	.10***	.05	.10**	.03	-.01
Take advantage	-.08	-.06	.05	-.02	-.01

Full standardized results from the model reported in Table 4.3 for young democracies (YD). The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* is modeled as observed. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 4,542. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 186.167, df = 148, p = .018$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .949, TLI = .898. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^*p < .05, ^{**}p < .01, ^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.13: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism and Right-wing Populism from Figure 4.4. Reliability of Populism and RW Populism Set to 0.6.

	P. Trust	Intolerance	Democracy	Participation	Extremism
Populism	.14**	.13	-.03	-.09*	.10
RW Populism	-.02	.13**	-.01	-.05	.02
Life satisfaction	-.06***	-.05**	.00	.01	.05
Education	.02	-.10*	-.21***	-.27***	-.10**
Female	-.02	-.06*	.02	.02	-.01
L-R ideology	.02	.01	.15**	.18***	.00
Proud of nation	.11***	.07	-.05	-.06**	-.02
Age	-.02	.05**	-.19***	.05	-.01
Jobs for nationals	-.08*	-.28**	-.15**	-.09*	.00
Efficacy	.03	-.01	.05	.07	.13*
Unemployment	.01	-.02	.03	-.02	.02*
Interest	.24***	-.03	.21***	.32***	-.09***
Social trust	.13***	.05	-.20***	.09***	.07**
Take advantage	-.06*	-.02	.05	.02	-.04

Full standardized results from the model reported in Figure 4.4. The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* and *Right wing populism* modeled as single-indicator latent variables with reliability of 0.6. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 18,199. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 337.455, df = 155, p <$ .001, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .954, TLI = .904. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.14: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism and Right-wing Populism from Figure 4.4. Reliability of Populism and RW Populism Set to 0.8.

	P. Trust	Intolerance	Democracy	Participation	Extremism
Populism	.11**	.09	-.03	-.07*	.06
RW Populism	-.03	.09**	.00	-.03	.00
Life satisfaction	-.06***	-.06***	.00	.01	.04
Education	.03	-.11*	-.21***	-.28***	-.10**
Female	-.02	-.04**	.02	.02	-.01
L-R ideology	.02	.05*	.15***	.17***	.01
Proud of nation	.11***	.05	-.06	-.07**	-.02
Age	-.02	.05*	-.19***	.05	-.01
Jobs for nationals	-.08*	-.29**	-.15**	-.08*	.00
Efficacy	.03	-.01	.05	.06	.14*
Unemployment	.01	-.02	.03	-.02	.03*
Interest	.24***	-.04	.21***	.32***	-.09**
Social trust	.13***	.05	-.20***	.09***	.07**
Take advantage	-.06*	-.01	.05	.03	-.03

Full standardized results from the model reported in Figure 4.4. The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* and *Right wing populism* modeled as single-indicator latent variables with reliability of 0.8. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 18,199. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 337.677, df = 155, p < .001$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .954, TLI = .904. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.15: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism and Right-wing Populism from Figure 4.4. Reliability of Populism and RW Populism Set to 0.9.

	P. Trust	**Intolerance**	**Democracy**	**Participation**	**Extremism**
Populism	.11**	.08	-.02	-.06*	.07
RW Populism	-.03	.08**	.00	-.02	.00
Life satisfaction	-.06***	-.06***	.00	.01	.04
Education	.03	-.11*	-.21***	-.28***	-.10**
Female	-.02	-.04**	.02	.02	-.01
L-R ideology	.02	.06**	.15***	.16***	.01
Proud of nation	.11***	.05	-.06	-.07**	-.02
Age	-.02	.05*	-.19***	.05	-.01
Jobs for nationals	-.08*	-.29**	-.14**	-.08*	.00
Efficacy	.03	-.01	.04	.06	.14*
Unemployment	.01	-.01	.03	-.02	.03*
Interest	.24***	-.04	.21***	.32***	-.09**
Social trust	.13***	.05	-.20***	.09***	.07**
Take advantage	-.06*	-.01	.05	.03	-.03

Full standardized results from the model reported in Figure 4.4. The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* and *Right wing populism* modeled as single-indicator latent variables with reliability of 0.9. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 18,199. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 337.696, df = 155, p <$ .001, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .954, TLI = .904. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Table H.16: Full Results of Model on the Consequences of Populism and Right-wing Populism from Figure 4.4. Populism and RW Populism Modeled as Observed.

	P. Trust	**Intolerance**	**Democracy**	**Participation**	**Extremism**
Populism	$.10^{**}$	.08	-.02	$-.06^{*}$	.06
RW Populism	-.02	$.07^{**}$	.00	-.02	.00
Life satisfaction	$-.06^{***}$	$-.06^{***}$	.00	.01	.04
Education	.03	$-.10^{*}$	$-.21^{***}$	$-.27^{***}$	$-.10^{**}$
Female	-.02	$-.04^{**}$	.02	.02	-.01
L-R ideology	.02	$.07^{**}$	$.15^{***}$	$.16^{***}$	.01
Proud of nation	$.12^{***}$	.05	-.06	$-.07^{**}$	-.02
Age	-.02	$.05^{**}$	$-.19^{***}$	.05	-.01
Jobs for nationals	$-.08^{*}$	$-.28^{**}$	$-.15^{**}$	$-.08^{*}$	.00
Efficacy	.04	.00	.05	.07	$.14^{*}$
Unemployment	.01	-.01	.03	-.02	$.03^{*}$
Interest	$.24^{***}$	-.03	$.21^{***}$	$.32^{***}$	$-.09^{**}$
Social trust	$.13^{***}$	.05	$-.20^{***}$	$.09^{***}$	$.07^{**}$
Take advantage	$-.06^{*}$	-.01	.05	.02	-.03

Full standardized results from the model reported in Figure 4.4. The dependent variables *Political Trust*, *Intolerance*, *Democracy*, and *Participation* are multi-indicator latent variables. Extremism is observed. *Populism* and *Right wing populism* modeled as observed. Estimator: Weighed Least Squares Means and Variances adjusted (WLSMV). N = 18,199. Model fit: $\chi^2 = 337.426, df = 155, p < .001$, RMSEA = .008, CFI = .954, TLI = .904. Significance levels, with clustered robust standard errors: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Appendix I

Example Rubric Filled For one Morales'
Speech

Country: Bolivia

Name of candidate: Evo Morales

Date of Speech: May 3, 2006

Place: Carapari

Occasion: National Holiday Celebration

Grader: Bruno Silva

Date of grading: January 24, 2017

Final Grade (delete unused grades):

1 A speech in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers them by including non-populist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion of the people and the idea of a unified popular will (indeed, it must in order to be considered populist), but it avoids bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy.

Decimal: 0.8

Populism	Pluralism
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong", "good" or "evil") The implication– or even the stated idea–is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered. Quote example 1: "Como nuestros abuelos que fueron a la Guerra del Chaco para defender los recursos naturales, la participación de las Fuerzas Armadas el año 1937 y el año 1969, junto a Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, en la nacionalización de los recursos naturales y tanta lucha, últimamente en la ciudad de El Alto, en el Chapare, en los centros mineros, en los centros urbanos, de campesinos, de indígenas, de los movimientos sociales, de los intelectuales comprometidos con su país, de las Fuerzas Armadas que sienten y aman a su país, de todos los bolivianos patriotas que quieren a su país."	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.

Populism	Pluralism
Quote example 1 translated: *Like our grandfathers, who went to the Chaco War to defend natural resources. The participation of the Armed forces in 1937 and 1969, together with Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, in nationalizing natural resources. And so much struggle, recently in El Alto, Chapare, mining regions, urban centers, by peasants, indigenous peoples, social movements, intellectuals who have a commitment to their country, Armed Forces who love their country, and all patriotic Bolivians who love their country.*	
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. Quote example 2: "llegamos acÃą para la esperanza del pueblo boliviano y la propiedad de los hidrocarburos, del gas natural que pasan a partir de este momento a manos del Estado boliviano. Bajo el control del pueblo boliviano" Quote 2 example translated: *We came here to bring hope to the Bolivian people and for taking the property of oil and gas. Natural gas will go, from this moment, to the hands of the Bolivian state. Under control of the Bolivian people.*	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will". The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic.

Populism	Pluralism
Quote example 3: "Al pueblo de Bolivia, en este día también histórico, primero de mayo, un gobierno popular, un gobierno originario, un gobierno sobre todo que viene de tantas luchas indígenas originarias de más de 500 años, qué podíamos hacer al margen de la libre contratación, al margen del salario, el mejor regalo para los trabajadores del campo y la ciudad, para los profesionales e intelectuales que trabajan en nuestro país, el mejor regalo a los trabajadores es la nacionalización de nuestros recursos naturales, los hidrocarburos." Quote example 3 translated: *To the Bolivian people, in this historical day, May 1st, a popular government, an originary government [n.t., from the original American populations], a government that comes above all from the indigenous struggles for over 500 years. What could we do besides free hiring, besides salaries, the best gift to workers in the fields and in the cities, to professionals and intellectuals who work in our country, the best present to workers is the nationalization of our natural resources.* Quote example 4: "Si trabajadores expertos de las petroleras se suman a este cambio, bienvenidos, si no, el pueblo los juzgará." Quote example 4 translated: *If expert workers from oil companies join this change, welcome. If not, the people will judge them.*	
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy", but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism.	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low.

Populism	Pluralism
Quote example 5: "Una vez recuperado este recurso natural, generará fuentes de trabajo. Se acabó el saqueo de los recursos naturales por parte de las empresas petroleras internacionales, de las trasnacionales." Quote example 5 translation: *Once natural resources are recovered, they will generate jobs. The looting of natural resources by international and transnational oil companies is over.* Quote example 6: "si bien en anteriores gobiernos han usado a las Fuerzas Armadas al servicio de las trasnacionales, ahora las Fuerzas Armadas se suman por su país, por su nación, por su Patria" Quote example 6 translated: *If previous governments have used the Army to serve transnational companies, now the Armed Forces have come together with their country, their nation, their fatherland.*	
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections.	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony".
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.

Populism	Pluralism

Overall comments (just a few sentences): This speech is rather short, only 1000 words. Still, Morales' managed to include several points of populist discourse. The elites are mostly transnational companies, for whom previous governments and the military worked before his presidency. The Bolivian people, is an ideal of workers, rural and urban, and indigenous populations, who now controls natural resources and, as a people, will judge those employees of oil/gas fields who do not cooperate with the nationalization. Especially this passage depicts a "people" as a unified and homogeneous social actor. Nevertheless, because it is such a short speech, there is not more space to develop these themes.

Appendix J

Non-recursive Model with Different Reliability for Populism

Table J.1: Results from Figure 6.5 with the Reliability of Populism as 0.6.

	Populism	P. Trust
P. Trust	-.04	
Populism		.02
Efficacy	.11	
Ideology	-.10	
Interest		$.25^{***}$
Model fit:		
$\chi^2(df)$	$36.008(12), p < .001$	
RMSEA		.010
CFI		.996
TLI		.993
N		18,199

Notes: Standardized coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at countries. Estimator: WLSMV. Significance levels: * $p <$ .05, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table J.2: Results from Figure 6.5 with the Reliability of Populism as 0.8.

	Populism	**P. Trust**
P. Trust	-.03	
Populism		.03
Efficacy	.09	
Ideology	-.09	
Interest		$.25^{***}$
Model fit:		
$\chi^2(df)$	36.031(12), $p < .001$	
RMSEA	.010	
CFI	.996	
TLI	.993	
N	18,199	

Notes: Standardized coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at countries. Estimator: WLSMV. Significance levels: * $p <$ .05, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table J.3: Results from Figure 6.5 with the Reliability of Populism as 0.9.

	Populism	**P. Trust**
P. Trust	-.03	
Populism		.03
Efficacy	.09	
Ideology	-.08	
Interest		$.25^{***}$
Model fit:		
$\chi^2(df)$	36.029(12), $p < .001$	
RMSEA	.010	
CFI	.996	
TLI	.993	
N	18,199	

Notes: Standardized coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at countries. Estimator: WLSMV. Significance levels: * $p <$ .05, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table J.4: Results from Figure 6.5 with Populism Modeled as Observed.

	Populism	P. Trust
P. Trust	-.03	
Populism		.03
Efficacy	.08	
Ideology	-.08	
Interest		$.25^{***}$
Model fit:		
$\chi^2(df)$	36.033(12), $p < .001$	
RMSEA	.010	
CFI	.996	
TLI	.993	
N	18,199	

Notes: Standardized coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at countries. Estimator: WLSMV. Significance levels: * $p <$ .05, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Appendix K

Populist Attitudes Batteries

Items for the three-dimensional populist attitudes scale from Castanho Silva et al. (2017) For Table 6.5, only the first three in each dimension were used to construct the latent variables.

People-centrism

> Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people.
>
> Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job.
>
> The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics.
>
> It's important for a political leader to be like the people he or she represents.
>
> In a democracy, the will of the majority should prevail.
>
> I prefer politicians who tell it how it is.
>
> I take pride in being an ordinary person

Anti-elitism

> The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.
>
> Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives.
>
> Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked.

Politicians are actually interested in what people like me think.

Big corporations accumulate wealth by exploiting the people.

The government is currently run for the benefit of all the people.

Politicians are not really interested in what people like me think.

Manichaean Outlook

You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics.

The people I disagree with politically are not evil.

The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed.

I would never stop talking to a friend because of their political opinions.

The difference between me and those who support other parties is that I care about what's good for everyone.

Politics is Âăa struggle between good and evil.

I do not consider the people whom I disagree with my political enemies.

You can't tell if a person is good or bad just by knowing their politics.

Populist Attitudes Scale

Items from the scale by Akkerman et al. (2014):

The politicians in the Dutch Parliament need to follow the will of the people.

The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.

The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.

I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.

Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.

What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.

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