Realism, Power, & the Third Wheel

The EU Mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Presented to the Department of Political Science at the Central European University

In partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Master's degree in Political Science

By

Avraham (Apo) Sahagian

Supervisor: Robert Sata

June 2017

Budapest, Hungary

ABSTRACT

The focus of this thesis is two-fold: firstly, to understand the realist conception of power in the 21st century and secondly, to observe that power in play. The importance of understanding what power entails is to understand how actors utilize it in the international system. To observe the utilization of power, I employ mediation because it provides a forum wherein actors have interests and power to safeguard those interests. I trace the conceptual evolution of the realist school of thought regarding the international system. Subsequently, I establish that in the 21st century, the conceptions of realism must accommodate a structured regionalized international system that includes valid non-state actors that possess smart power resources. Smart power is the effective utilization of diverse resources and leverages an actor possesses. I build the theoretical model of conflict mediation as a forum to observe power at play. I argue that smart power is effective for a mediator because it provides the mediator with a diverse set of tools to influence the mediation and the disputant parties. The directive strategy to influence the substance of negotiations is the most suited for a mediator utilizing smart power. In the 21st century, mediation is often multiparty, and thus while the participation of other mediators can cause inconvenience for the prime mediator, the possession of smart power suggests that it can bypass the difficulties of the mediation and influence the disputant parties in other ways. My empirical case is EU mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict one of the best studied cases of international relations. My inquiry into EU's smart power and mediation strategies leads to the following conclusions: 1. The EU's lack of a united foreign policy interest undermines its utilization of hard-smart power such as disincentive leverages 2. The EU's lack of direct communication with a primary disputant (ie Hamas) prevent it from utilizing smart power resources in a more directive strategy 3. The US-led mediation rounds limit the affordability of the EU to utilize its smart power resources, and imposes the EU to settle on short-term interest such as short-term stability. Nonetheless, due to its smart power resources, the EU is able to bypass the difficulties of the mediation and still assert action for its strategic interest of long-term stability. Accordingly, the EU persists in building a network of NGO's and civil society projects in Israel-Palestine to influence the outcome of the conflict. Additionally, the EU maintains its normative power, which the disputant parties take into consideration as a source of legitimacy.

TABLE OF CONTENT

LIST OF TABLES & FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

In the colloquial lexicon of the 21st century, a third wheel is referred to a person who tags along on another couple's date. The character of the third wheel, at worst, lacks power, and at best, does not utilize power. Power is the key in this situation, which we can encounter not only in dating relations but very often in international affairs as well. The world is abound in two country relations that often tag along a third wheel (if not more) that often fails to interact with the other two. This puzzle of the third-wheel scenario in the world of international relations occurs more often than not to have a proper understanding of what is behind it. We start by asking ourselves what is power in the 21st century? And how can we see power at play?

Throughout the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the European Union has been involved in two main capacities. Firstly, it has been one of the several mediating actors that have attempted to resolve the conflict through many rounds of mediations. Secondly, the European Union has poured in billions of euros in aid money for the primary purpose of building a Palestinian state to be established alongside Israel- as according to the principles of the international community.

However, the European Union has been investing and loosing large parts of its aid money with each round of violence between the disputant parties. Its mediation efforts have not put an end to the conflict, or even addressed the strategic interest of the EU to have long-term stability in the Mediterranean region. This makes the EU be a third wheel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, seemingly without much effect on what goes on. Yet, the EU continues to invest in its support programs despite its losses and its apparent inability to effect the peace process, a puzzle that is not easy to solve.

Trying to resolve this puzzle, it is important to understand the dynamics of the international system to understand the EU's strategy. To understand what power is in the 21st

century, I engage with the theories of realism regarding the international system. Why realism? Firstly, realists have claimed that realism can explain "the essence of international politics."[1] For them, the international system's main drive is power; all states struggle for power and that is the simplest nature of global politics. Secondly, realism and its subsequent conceptions- *structural realism, neo-classical realism*- offer necessary insights to how the international system has been evolving up and into the 21st century.

To engage with international system and the capacities of actors within, I re-conceptualize realism to fit the global system of the 21st century and I subsequently formulate a mediation theory accordingly to have the necessary analytical tools to engage with this empirical puzzle. These conceptualizations offer us perspectives on what the international system has become, how actors have gained capacity in them, and how the role of power has evolved as well. The interaction between all is illustrated in mediation of an international conflict (ie Israeli-Palestinian conflict).

Power:

The different realist conceptions define different roots of the conflict prevalent in the international system. Classical realists claim it to be human nature[2]; the structural realists point to the anarchy of the world system[3]; while neo-classical realists assert that to understand the root of conflict one must understand human nature in the international system[4]. But all conceptions agree that the conflict is due to interest, and to safeguard interest an actor needs power.

[1] (M. J. Smith 1986) p1
[2] (Morgenthau 1954)
[3] (Waltz 1979b; Mearsheimer 2001)
[4] (Berenskoetter and Williams 2007)

For classical realists, power was assessed in the most human way: psychology. If A has psychological influence on B, to the point that B will do whatever A insists on even to the dislike of B, then that reflects power of A. For structural realists[5], power itself was understood to mean arms, military, and warfare, especially with structural realists. A powerful state did not experience the degree of fear stemming out of the anarchy; a violation against it could be met with a fierce response. The neoclassical realists espoused an approach to power that combined both the military-resources factor with a relational factor[6]. Thus, not only was the military strength important for power but also how the personalities of the statesmen running the state affected policy, and the relationship between the state and society. Consequently, all strands of realism understood power to mean hard power- military, force, coercion.

However, with the changing international system and introduction of global institutions, stronger actors began co-opting smaller states through non-military means. Instead of using military to scare the target into cooperating, a state could show off its economy, or culture, or ideology to sway the target to voluntarily cooperate. This brand of power is known as soft power[7].

Smart power is the 21st century adaptation of hard power and soft power[8]. In its broad sense, it can host military power and diplomatic power; war and economy; social media and mainstream media. Moreover, it is a testimony of how the international system has transformed and states are re-prioritizing which sections of their infrastructure to focus on. The military has not lost its relevance; it has lost its dominance. Simply put, smart power is the effective use of hard power and soft power.

[5] (Schmidt 2007)
[6] (Schmidt 2007)
[7] (Lukes 2007)
[8] (Gallarotti 2015, 2011)

Thus, since a question of power needs a theory of power, realism offers that theory through many conceptions. But to discuss what power is and is not, is not the same as seeing power at play. One can claim power but it is still important to see how one utilizes that power. A fitting approach to see power play is in conflict mediation.

Power Play:

To mediate a conflict between parties, the mediator must be perceived at least to hold power and influence over the conflicting parties[9]. Meaning, it is a good signifier of how power is at play. If, as realists claim, the international system is about one state influencing the other, then a mediator should always aspire to influence by utilizing its power.

I engage with literature that debates about key components of successful mediation. Firstly, I propose in my theoretical model that a mediator by default has interest and that is why it becomes involved in the mediation- to safeguard that interest. Consequently, I treat the mediator as biased and suggest that a biased mediator is more likely to use its power for its mediation goals[10].

Hypothesis 1: A mediator is biased towards its interest and will conduct the mediation accordingly

Secondly, I expand my theoretical model to make the case for smart power, which in my thesis is the bundle of diverse resource at the mediator's disposal. While there are multiple mediation strategies that are presented in literature, I propose a directive strategy[11] that sees the mediator's direct role in the substance of what is being negotiated over.

[9] (Bercovitch 1992)
[10] (Siniver 2006)
[11] (O'Donnell 2017)

Hypothesis 2: The use of a mediator's smart power is conducive for the mediation

Thirdly, due to the context of the 21st century and the expanding influence of the international community, my theoretical model includes multiparty mediation [12] and the challenges it poses. While certain scholars see benefit in multiparty mediation, I treat multiparty mediation as posing challenges to a biased mediator's interest.

Hypothesis 3: Multiparty mediation is challenging for a biased mediator's interest

Empirical Case:

To realize 21st century power at play, I use the empirical case of the European Union (EU)'s capacity in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one the best known ongoing conflicts, involving major world players, and it highlights the outstanding theoretical questions of realist logic by "[looking] for where the power is, what the groups' interests are, and to the role power relationships play in reconciling clashing interests."[13]

I concentrate on three events throughout the very recent history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which the European Union played a mediating role: The Road Map during the Second Intifada of 2001-2004; the Israeli-Gaza war of 2008 also known as Operation Cast Lead; and the Israeli-Gaza war of 2014 also known as Operation Protection Edge. The three events provide us with adequate analysis to understand why the EU, being the largest trading partner for Israel and the largest donor for the Palestinian Authority, finds its difficult to utilize its power it has over the disputant parties.

[12] (O'Donnell 2017)
[13] (S. Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2012) p33

Regardless of the difficulties the EU experiences in the mediation, due to the diverse usages of smart power, the EU maintains its influence through NGO's and civil society in Israel and Palestine that focus on a non-military solution. Moreover, the EU maintains its relational and normative power over the disputants. This indicates that the EU does not lose sight of its strategic interests and employs diverse smart power to achieve it.

Arrangement:

The first chapter will discuss the evolution of realism from the 20th century to the 21st. I engage with literature to map out how classical realists, structural/neo-realists, and neoclassical realists perceive the roots of the international system, the conception of power, and actors in international relations. The chapter lays out the first part of the theoretical framework- to have a relevant comprehension of power in the 21st century. This includes highlighting the structured and regionalized international system of the new millennia, in which non-state actors such as the EU have significant capacity. Additionally, I also emphasize on the concept of smart power, which includes in it diverse soft and hard power and the effective utilization of it.

The second chapter will discuss the expectation of a powerful actor in mediation. Having defined in the first chapter of what power an actor possesses, the second chapter is to connect it to how the actor applies that power in mediation. I emphasize on a mediator's bias towards its interest, the use of smart power resources to achieve that interest, and the dynamics of multiparty mediation.

The third chapter is the empirical analysis of the role of the European Union in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. I try to trace the process of negotiations and mediations as my methodology, and my unit of analysis are the mediations leading up to the halt of violence in

the cases I selected. I start the chapter with brief overview of the conflict to establish the conflict interests of the parties, while my main aim is to devoted to studying the Road Map, the cessation of the Gaza War of 2008 also known as Operation Cast Lead, and the Gaza War of 2014 also known as Operation Protective Edge.

Last but not least, a concise Conclusion section will conclude the thesis.

Chapter One

REALISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: Roots, Power, & Actors

In international relations, realism has been perceived as the theory for the cold-hearted, for those whom see others only through the lenses of security and warfare. As one critic of realism claims, "realists emphasize that power has been and will long remain a central part of international relations[14] ." For the critic, if international politics is bound to the realist logic, then conflict is evermore. But for realists, the dynamics of international politics is a different discussion than one of a simple fear or loathing of the international system. It is safe to say that in the discussion, even realists argue with each other.

It was Gilpin who wrote that realism can be treated as a "philosophical disposition[15]", understood as a broad outlook on how the world operates. But that broad outlook is contested by Donnelly who goes on to contend that realism is rather diverse and not a "theory defined by an explicit set of assumptions and propositions[16]". Thus, we can see that the theory does not need to be set in stone but can instead revolve around particular themes. As mentioned in the previous chapter, when it comes to realism "look for where the power is, what the groups interests are, and to the role power relationships play in reconciling clashing interests[17]." Hence, the particular themes include power and influence. In that sense, a broad outlook or a specific insight should both direct to the source of contention and how the conflicted deal with the contention.

[14] (Donnelly 2000) p2
[15] (R. G. Gilpin 1984) p304
[16] (Donnelly 2000) p6
[17] (S. Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2012) p33

Roots:

What are the origins of this constant tug of power? It is a question realists claimed to have an answer to. One of the first answers was provided by Morgenthau, who is credited as having brought realism into the intellectual-academic circles. In his book, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Morgenthau writes that "political realism believes that politics...is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature[18]". It denoted that what transpired in politics was simply a reflection of humanity itself. Humans had an inherent configuration that caused contention amongst themselves. Accordingly, the struggle for power in the international system was the same configuration at play albeit on a much grander scale.

By definition, the idea that the roots of international politics were embedded in human nature struck- and still strikes- a provoking chord. Classical realism not only set out to explain the origins of international conflict, but it went further more by maintaining that it would remain as such due to the "constraints on politics imposed by human nature[19]." Even long before Morgenthau's claims, the ancient Greek Thucydides made similar claims in his take on the Polynesian Wars in which power politics was an essence of human behavior. "The drive to amass power and dominate others is held by classical realists to be a fundamental aspect of human nature[20]."

To critiques, classical realism- which Morgenthau and Thucydides are attached to- was seen as unnecessarily and disproportionately absorbed in human nature rather than more tangible components, such as war and security. Donnelly reserves realism for those with "Egoist passions[21]" since for him the theory is significantly entrenched in ego and power; and

[18] (Morgenthau 1954) p4
[19] (Donnelly 2000) p9
[20] (Berenskoetter and Williams 2007) p45
[21] (Donnelly 2000) p10

classical realism was the epitome of the egoist-passions approach which pinpointed to the human lust for power. For this reason, Thucydides and Morgenthau asserted that "the biological drive of human beings[22]" explains the persistence of power-seeking. Undeterred by critics, classical realists still claim that human nature provides insight as to why international politics is infused with power politics.

But to counter the criticism faced by classical realists, contemporary realism made a move away from explanations of the human nature. Instead, they focused on the material credentials of the international system and how it was linked to contention. Subsequently, Kenneth Waltz, one of the pillars of realist thought, advocated "what he called 'third image', a realism that does not rest on the presumed iniquity of the human race- original sin in one form or another- but on the nature of world politics as an anarchic realm[23]." This interpretation shifted the focus from the composition of human nature to the composition of the international system, which it claimed was an unregulated landscape of power and survival. In this interpretation, the international system was seen as the structure; and the source of conflict was structural. For Waltz, "the structure explains patterns of state behavior, since states determine their interests and strategies on the basis of calculations about their own positions in the system[24]." Therefore, most states and their positions in the structure determined how they would act to safeguard their interests.

This version of realism- *neo/structural realism*- focused on the "systemic forces" that instigated the "continuous struggle for power" in international politics[25]. If the structure of international politics did not have a supreme authority to govern it, then the system was anarchic. An encroachment by state A on state B did not mean state A would have to answer

[22] (Schmidt 2007) p46
[23] (Viotti et al. 1999) p192
[24] (Viotti et al. 1999) p193
[25] (Schmidt 2007) p46

for its actions. State B was left to defend itself on its own. And in such an anarchic system, every state would be out for itself which "prevents states from entering into cooperative agreements to end the state of war[26]".

Therefore, for Waltz and neo-realists, anarchy, and not human nature, was the root of power struggle. Although states would only have to gain by cooperating with each other, in a vacuum of reassurances, each state would rather settle for the short-term benefits instead of the possibility of a long-term rewards through collaboration[27].

However, one must not mistake anarchy with chaos. Rather, "anarchy may be consistent with order, stability, and regulated forms of interaction between independent units[28]." In international relations specifically, anarchy- according to the neo-realists- denoted that states were interacting in a sphere that did not have a predominant '*superordinate authority'* which of course would lead to insecurities and security dilemmas for most states involved. But the lack of the superordinate authority did not automatically indicate chaos. It simply indicated an international system wherein security is not guaranteed.

The issue of security and anarchy in the international realm brings us to Waltz's thoughts on hegemony and hierarchy. His strand of realism is immersed in the idea that anarchic systems have non-hierarchy, meaning that the "order is not imposed by higher authority but arises from the interactions of formally equal political actors[29]." Consequently, equal political actors do not have a higher address to turn to once one of them violates the boundaries/interests of the other. To safeguard against a possible violation, equal political

[26] (Schmidt 2007) p46
[27] (K. J. Holsti 1964) p6
[28] (K. J. Holsti 1964) p5
[29] (Donnelly 2000) p17

actors will have to amplify their capabilities. In doing so, they might take the non-hierarchy reality towards a reality of hegemony.

This is in reference to the hegemonic stability theory. While the orthodox understanding of the theory regarded only one hegemon in the international system, a different understanding of the theory allows "powerful states tend to seek dominance over all or parts of any international system, thus fostering some degree of hierarchy within the overall systemic anarchy[30]." For example, the equal political actors amplify their capabilities to safeguard against each other, then they establish themselves as hegemons within their own spheres of influence in the international system. The United States and the Soviet Union, according to this logic, dominated parts of the international system and brought a degree of balance. Hence, though anarchy still persisted in the highest level, there was a set of hierarchy in the lower levels. Therefore, similar to the balance between the equal political actors, the stability of the system is dependent on how power is distributed and commanded by authority[31].

But Waltz, whose theories were set in the Cold War era, maintained that "1. The international system is anarchic rather than hierarchic 2. It is characterized by interaction among with units with similar functions[32]." He did not necessarily subscribe to the idea that there was a degree of hierarchies in the lower level by the competing hegemons. As his second point clarifies, for Waltz, the international system was constructed in a way to keep states in a constant race to power and security.

Notwithstanding this debate, the world has come a long way from Waltz's days. In the globalized world of 2017, we have to entertain the idea that Waltz was possibly short-sighted in not accommodating the possibility of hierarchy. Nowadays, not only is the US considered

[30] (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008) p142
[31] (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008) p142
[32] (Viotti et al. 1999) p193

the dominant global power but also, order in the global system is imposed on by the US and the international community.

If states "interact with one another over the question of power[33]" then it can be argued that that question of power has a present answer in the global context. The dominance of one superpower of the international system lays to rest- for a time- the question. But that does not exclude the possibility of regional hierarchies or hierarchies regarding particular international issues. For example, the European Union's emphasis with European issues such as the 2015 refugee crisis, the UN focus on health and poverty in Africa, and the US involvement with global security issues such as ones in the Middle East and in Far East Asia. These examples relate back to efforts to establish complete or partial authority in the international system, which result in hierarchy within the anarchy, rendering anarchy in its classical comprehension[34].

Yet, it is also possible that if we were to agree that anarchy still persists within the international system, then we'd also have to admit that that anarchy is more contained, more structured, and compartmentalized[35]. This modification to Waltz's theory should not come as a surprise, especially when "the main characteristic of the contemporary global system is its interdependence[36]." Interdependence would negate the classic anarchic nature of affairs. While in the past actors voluntarily refused to cooperate, nowadays it is compulsory on the same actors to cooperate. Therefore, even if the US is not the foremost commandeer of the globalized world, then it surely does commandeer a large segment of it while other powers such as Russia (and China) commandeer other segments of it.

Thus, we can assess the present global system in two different yet complimentary ways. The first approach states that anarchy is no more because the international system runs on the

[33] (Sullivan 1990) p9
[34] (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008) p142
[35] For more on regionalization: (Solingen 1998)
[36] (K. J. Holsti 1964) p9

regulations built by the US dominance, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Every actor, whether friend or foe, feels obligated to work within the regulations. The US might not be the supreme authority but the system it built *is.* This indicates that if a lesser actor feels violated by another, at least the former can address the said grievances to the overarching system. Whether the system rectifies the violations or not is not that important here. The importance lies in the interaction of hierarchy: the lesser recognizes the bigger.

The second approach acknowledges the effects interdependence and regionalization has had on the anarchic system. In this neo-anarchy, the international system is made up of interacting sub-orders. It is no accident that regionalization is seen as "part of a process which aims at creating order when the old order, based on bipolarity and the balance of power, has vanished. Yet we must remember that the pursuit of order still remains; the difference being that instead of one overarching order there seems to be a tendency towards various smaller 'sub-orders'[37]." Even Waltz's anarchy has had to accommodate the processes of regionalization. There are spheres of influence. And within a globalized world of sub-orders/spheres of influence, it is common to see cooperation on several issues between friendly actors and actors not so friendly to each other. The more global the world becomes, the costlier it is not to cooperate.

I would like to briefly note the interpretation of neoclassical realists. They combined elements from both schools to state that the roots of the international system were not only human behavior but international structure. The neoclassical realists "do not discount the importance of the structure of the international system, in fact they argue that it is a key determinant of a state's foreign policy, but they argue that a plausible theory of international politics must include unit-level attributes[38]." However, since the neoclassical interpretation

[37] (Lähteenmäki and Käkönen 1999) p204
[38] (Berenskoetter and Williams 2007) p58

focuses on the individual and not the system itself, it does not completely serve the aim of my thesis.

Accordingly, it is credible to claim that today's international system is less anarchic than the initial perceptions of the structural realists. Simultaneously, two patterns have emerged in the international system: hierarchy, especially regarding international topics, and regionalization.

Power:

But throughout the three main schools of realism, the roots are intended for one purpose: *power*. Realists do not shy away from the idea that indeed international relations are all about power and interest, wherein "states seek to maximize their security or their power[39]. For realists in general "power is the decisive determinant in the relations among separate political communities[40]." Meaning, the stronger the state, the more space it has to enforce its interests in relation to weaker states. Whether the interest is security or power, a state has to expand its capabilities to assert its position. The need for power is necessary for each state in "order to ensure [a state's] own survival and security[41]. A state that does not follow this logic is prone to insurmountable challenges.

Accordingly, a state's interest is relative to its position in the system since "the state's interest provides the spring of action[42]." That 'action' is understood to mean how a state sees fit to achieve its interest. Scholars have underlined two main approaches states use to apply power for interest. First off is the rationality assumption that claims "world politics can be analyzed as if states were unitary rational actors seeking to maximize their expected utility[43]".

[39] (Frankel 1996) p xiv-xvii
[40] (Schmidt 2007) p43
[41] (Schmidt 2007) p45
[42] (Waltz 1979b) 117
[43] (Keohane 1986) p164

It denotes that idea that a state cannot have multiple contradictory interests because it would then lead to dysfunction at worst or an ineffective action at best. Moreover, a state would be wise to formulate interests that are up to par with its capabilities. For example, a superpower, like the US, should not host interests whose scales are similar to Micronesia's interests. A superpower must have grand interests due to its grand power. On the same note, Micronesia should not over-reach and set upon itself interests of a superpower. Best have interests relative to Micronesia's small utility.

The other approach is the power assumption which claims that "states seek power and they calculate their interests in terms of power[44]." In practice, then, a state's permanent goal is to accumulate and enlarge its capabilities. The increase of capabilities will make a state re-assess its interests correspondingly. The implication can also mean that as the state strengthens its position in the international system, its interest would be to maintain power.

However, power is measured differently by different scholars. For a concept constantly cited by realists, the term power ironically lacks a concrete agreed-upon definition. Therefore, a realist will demand a state to have power but would not be able to exactly specify what that power is, or the definition would depend on which strand of realism the person ascribes to.

For classical realists, "political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised[45]." It makes sense that human nature and human situations are referred to. As to where political power derives from, Morgenthau[46] explains that it comes from three sources:

"Expectation of benefit, the respect or love for men or institutions, and the fear of disadvantages. Only in the latter source of political power does physical violence play any part

[44] (Keohane 1986) p165
[45] (Sleat 2013) p54
[46] (Morgenthau 1954)

and even then it is only the threat of it that counts as political: using actual violence will be abdicating political power for military power[47] *."*

He indicates a hierarchal relation between the strong and the weak. This leads us to a similarly abstract description of power in the international system which is "central to international politics because it means bigness and bigness means influence, and influence means affecting other nations[48] ."

Therefore, the influence sought out by states is "primarily for achieving or defending other goals, which may include prestige, territory, souls, raw materials, security, or alliances"[49]. The acquisition of these goals is intended to maintain and expand the position of a state.

However, power remains an elusive concept. For structural realists[50], there are two dominant traditions which analyze power with the intention of giving it substance: "elements of national power approach, which depicts power as resources, and the relational power approach, which depicts power as an actual or potential relationship[51]".

Carr, as reviewed by Schmidt, seemingly agrees with the national power approach. For him, "power was indivisible, yet he claimed that for purposes of discussion it could be divided into three categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion[52]." But the most important category was military power since the 'ultima ratio' of power is warfare, subsequently casting significant emphasis on a strong military[53].

Schmidt goes on to review Waltz[54] who also declines to give a refined definition of power. Rather, he "endorses the elements-of-national power approach and equates power with

[47] (Sleat 2013) p58
[48] (Sullivan 1990) p76
[49] (K. J. Holsti 1964) p118
[50] (Glaser 2003)
[51] (Schmidt 2007) p47
[52] (Schmidt 2007) p49
[53] (Schmidt 2007) p49
[54] (Waltz 1979a)

the possession of material resources[55]". In agreement with him is Gilpin[56]- as quoted by Schmidt- who states that "power refers simply to the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states[57]". But although a description of state capabilities or how they can be assessed is provided by neither Waltz nor Gilpin, the former does refer to capabilities as "the sum total of a number of loosely identified national attributes[58]" and in international politics, those capabilities (in essence, power) is "roughly equivalent to military might[59]."

The discussion of power divides structural realists in two: offensive and defensive. The division is over "the question of how much power states want[60]." While defensive realists argue states want to maximize security, offensive realists argue states want to maximize power. Therefore, it is the offensive sub-branch of structural realism that goes deeper into the deliberations of power.

John Mearsheimer[61], seen as a stalwart offensive realist, formulates "five basic assumptions about the international system: it is anarchic; all great powers possess some offensive military capability; states can never be certain about the intentions of other states; survival is the primary goal of states; and states are rational actors[62]. Consequently, states thus only think about power maximization.

Schmidt also quotes Mearsheimer, who like Waltz, also adopts the national power approach and considers power as "the specific assets of material resources that are available to a state[63]." Yet dissimilar to Waltz, Mearsheimer differentiates between two types of power:

[55] (Schmidt 2007) p53
[56] (R. Gilpin 1983)
[57] (Schmidt 2007) p54
[58] (Schmidt 2007) p54
[59] (Schmidt 2007) p54
[60] (Schmidt 2007) p55
[61] (Mearsheimer 2001)
[62] (Schmidt 2007) p56
[63] (Schmidt 2007) p56

military power and latent power. As he understands it "the essence of a state's effective power is its military power, based largely on the size and strength of the army[64]" in relative terms to other states and their armed forces. Why is the military power essential? Because Mearsheimer, along with offensive realists, center force as the "ultima ratio of international politics[65]". As for the latent power, Mearsheimer defines through 'socio-economic ingredients' that contribute to the development of the military power. Taking into account the state's wealth and demographics, "the ability of a state to build a powerful army[66]" is the purpose of its latent power.

Yet, having the capability of national power and resources does not guarantee power since as even Merisheimer admits "states have had different levels of success in translating latent power to military power, which makes it impossible to equate wealth with military might[67]." While structural and offensive realists remain on the national power, there is a lack of spotlight on power as an issue of perception.

Subsequently, it is the neoclassical realists that give equal weight not only to the military power but also the perception-relational power[68]. The neoclassical group describes international politics as a "continuous struggle for power[69]." And while they do not negate the importance of structure in the international system, they "argue that a plausible theory of international politics must include unit-level attributes[70]" such as the influence statesmen have through their personal behavior, the relationship between state and society, and the priorities of the state itself.

[64] (Schmidt 2007) p56
[65] (Schmidt 2007) p56
[66] (Mearsheimer 2001) p57
[67] (Schmidt 2007) p57
[68] (Rasler and Thompson 2001; Schweller 2004)
[69] (Schmidt 2007) p57
[70] (Schmidt 2007) p58

Therefore, power for neoclassical realists is a combination of material, elements-of-national power, and domestic factors. Schweller[71] gives a three-set criteria of power for neoclassical realism: Military, meaning the forces at hand; industrial, meaning the ability for warfare; and demographics, meaning the capability a state in the act of staying a power and boosting warfare.

Moreover, the neoclassical group emphasizes on the decision-maker as well. A leader's perception on the distribution of power is central to understanding a state's power, although for neoclassical realists "there is [no] direct link between systemic constraints and unit-level behavior[72]." Their argument is that 'systematic pressures' must be understood at the unit level. Therefore, they bring more agency within the structure on one hand. On the other hand, they focus on the different interests of the state and how the state can obtain resources from within the society and transfer it to the foreign policy front.

The obtaining and application of resources for state interest is tied to how a state can develop its capabilities. With the development and increase of capabilities, a state can acquire "greater influence and control of the external environment[73]." If a state does not utilize its resources effectively, it can expect its "interests and ambitions [to be] scaled back accordingly[74]."

Overall, the different strands of realism (classical, structural, and neoclassical) assert their definitions of power around the "possession of material resources[75]". However, the neoclassical realists do add in relational approaches, which is an appropriate bridge unto the discussion of soft power. Because while hard power was the classical intonation of power

[71] (Schweller 1998) p26-27
[72] (Schmidt 2007) p59
[73] (Schmidt 2007) p60
[74] (Schmidt 2007) p60
[75] (Schmidt 2007) p61

within realist thought, Neoliberal and Constructivist thinkers highlighted soft power as equally relevant in international relations forums.

Although some might claim that there is a wide gap between the advocates of hard power and those of soft power, yet both schools of power are equally dispersed in their definitions of power. For examples, advocates of soft power define "power as the ability to shape the preferences and behavior of others[76]". Therefore, there is an element of coercion, although some soft power advocates will disagree.

As quoted by Lukes, Joseph Nye, whom is usually attached to the soft power concept, begins off by arranging power as a "threefold schema of coercion, inducement (both of them hard power)[77]" and what he calls *soft*. For Nye, soft power is the capacity to "shape the preferences of others" and "getting others to want the outcomes that you want[78]". Soft power is signified through co-opting and not coercing. To co-opt, an actor must have the "ability to attract" and that attraction subsequently will result in the target complying. A soft power actor will utilize its attraction – whether it is through "culture, ideology, [or] institutions[79]." The attractiveness of the actor can frame its actions as legitimate in the eyes of other actors which in turn increases the attractiveness and the soft power of the former[80].

But other scholars of soft power see it as another conception of coercion. Because if hard power is 'physical coercion' then soft power can be seen as 'sociolinguistic coercion'. Thus, though soft power is not understood as classical hard power, it is still rooted in hard power thought since it does try to coerce through attraction and representational force. Representational force is a sociolinguistic concept that defines power as operating through the

[76] (Schmidt 2007) p61
[77] (Lukes 2007) p90
[78] (Lukes 2007) p90
[79] (Lukes 2007) p91
[80] (Ilgen 2016) p26

"structure of a speaker's narrative representation of 'reality'[81]". If the target actor does not submit to the narrative and demands of the more powerful actor, then non-physical harm is still possible. Their "participation in communication[82]" is not optional; it is necessity. For instance, superpowers such as the US and Russia can employ representational force on the smaller states within their spheres of influence. If the target states do not comply, the superpowers can, for example, halt necessary military or economic aid until the target states comply. No violence is used in the process, but coercion is the obvious game at play.

Gallaroti, for his part, presents a more complex argument. He agrees that hard power does coerce "compliance principally through reliance on tangible power resources[83]". This entails making states do something that they would otherwise not do. In regards to soft power, he explains that it stems out of "policies, qualities, and actions that make nations attractive to other nations[84]". This then entails states do something voluntarily- but Gallaroti continues further to highlight certain nuances on the differentiations. For example, a positive image can acquire a state a degree of security guarantees and can contribute to its hard defenses. At the same time, the use of force by a state in times of war- especially in humanitarian causes- may help in gaining a positive image. These examples by Gallaroti show that hard power may have a soft power's result and vice versa. Subsequently, this indicates that hard power should not exclusively be linked to 'tangible resources' and soft power to 'intangible resources'. Rather, the differentiation between the two- and power, in general- is in "the context of its use[85]".

Of course, while the debate regarding the (un)attached nature of soft power vis-a-vis hard power continues, literature on power has become more familiar with a recent term: smart

[81] (Berenskoetter and Williams 2007) p99
[82] (Berenskoetter and Williams 2007) p109
[83] (Gallarotti 2015) p250
[84] (Gallarotti 2015) p250
[85] (Gallarotti 2015) p256

power[86]. The introduction of smart power in modern politics is the result of: the high cost states would pay in a possible nuclear exchange; the spread of democratic practice around the world; modernization and the interdependent global socioeconomic system which reduces the efficacy of hard power; the increased expanse of international organizations which has fixed states "more firmly in networks of cooperation[87]".

In light of these global changes, smart power has made an entry due to its relevant utility as it combines the "necessity of a strong military, but also [heavy investment] in alliances, partnerships, and institutions[88]" to assert influence and legitimacy.

Hence, the rise of smart power indicates the following: firstly, the international system has been changing and the theories of the 20th century must change as well. Gallarotti writes that "understanding smart power is especially important in a world that is changing at a historically unprecedented pace[89]" that has in its wake already produced a "hazy power space[90]". And the new power space demands new methods to understand power and its "changing role in world politics[91]".

This means that theories have to adjust to how state capabilities are weighed in the 21th century. Nowadays, certain assumption regarding wars is that they are becoming obsolete. Therefore, the measurement of strength for the greater part of the 20th century is no longer the primary yardstick to measure strength and power. If warfare was the ultimate ratio to assess a state's power, then how can that be reconciled with a world which puts less emphasis on the quantity of military troops and more emphasis on the quality of drones and cyberwarfare?

[86] For more on smart power: (Gallarotti 2015, 2011; Lackey 2015; Wilson 2008; Armitage and Nye, Jr 2007)

[87] (Gallarotti 2015) p253

[88] (Armitage and Nye, Jr 2007)

[89] (Gallarotti 2015) p247

[90] (Gallarotti 2015) p247

[91] (Gallarotti 2015) p247

Additionally, why would a state located in a peaceful 'regionalized' region need to care for military? Japan, Iceland, and Panama host excessively limited armies but still host relative economic might. Consequently, and theoretically, are the superpowers of the 20th century- the superpowers of Morgenthau, Waltz, Nye, Mearsheimer- still superpowers in the 21th century? And if so, what are the new capabilities necessary for superpowers today?

Secondly, smart power symbolizes the symbiosis of hard power and soft power. Because there is not yet a concrete definition of smart power- and seeing how there isn't one for hard or soft power, we should not expect one- scholars refer it with elements of both hard and soft power. This in turn might make the previous debate between soft and hard power elapsed- in the sense of the absolute either-or approach long entrenched in international politics. With smart power in the mix, the absolute either-or approach is open to incorporate the national power and the elements of power; the military angle and the relational angle.

Smart power maintains the military/national power angle through the conventional means of arms as well as new technologies such as drones and cyberwarfare. On the other hand, the relational/elements of power angle is maintained not only through the personalities of statesmen and the attraction of a state, but also the utilization of soft power resources to "change the hearts and minds[92]" of the adversary. Interestingly, we can see similar patterns to the neo-classical realist understanding of power but with a lot more input of "diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-effective and have political and social legitimacy[93]." Nonetheless, at the end of the day, smart power will be dependent on the decision-maker's "abilities to appreciate and exploit the benefits of diversification among hard and soft power[94]"

[92] (Gavel 2008)
[93] (Crocker 2007) p13
[94] (Gallarotti 2015) p273

Therefore, the understanding of power seems to be contextual and defined in the times. And an evolution then is necessary and also inevitable. From the hard power to soft power to smart power- there has been adjustment and additions to what power should entail. However, it is important to note that the discussion of hard to soft to smart is a discussion of power's presence. Yet, the function is still the same: influence. Whether that influence is seen as coercive or voluntary, the function of power is to achieve one's preferences over an other's. And this brings us to who is the realists' legitimate actor in world politics.

Actors:

If we considered realist world politics to be a game of power, we have so far discussed the roots of the game and the utility of the tools within it. Let us now examine the actors.

States are seen to be the traditional actors for conventional realists. Their logic is the following: the international system is "made up of sovereign states that interact with other sovereign states in pursuit of their foreign policy goals[95]." Moreover, that pursuit of goals may be peaceful or otherwise but states are aware that the possibility of conflict is constant. And if conflict does arise, states are first and foremost concerned with their survival and thus will use any means to repel the threat.

It is worthwhile to note that realism considers states and nations interchangeably. These must be recognized as a solidified political unit which includes a *unitary nature* and a *territorial integrity* to it. However, just as the understanding of power has evolved through the century to incorporate new elements from a changed- and changing- world, so must the understanding of actors in international politics.

[95] (Sullivan 1990) p9

Therefore, if the criteria for a legitimate actor requires "states to represent the key unit of analysis, whether one is dealing with ancient Greek city-states or modern nation-state[96]", then we would need to take the statement further into evolution. If an evolution from Greek city-states to modern nation-state is accepted, then an evolution from modern nation-state to new forms of actors, such as multi-state unions, should also be considered. Of course with each evolution come the initial questions. For example, are multi-state unions, such as the European Union, unitary and territorially fixed?

In the understanding of international relation, the unitary nature of the state is most observed when it comes to its foreign policy. That uniformity would indicate that all units of government and authority (i.e. *sub-units*) are aligned towards the same goals, interests, and policies of the political unit they are part of. A violation of those set of interests or policies is a violation against their political unit. And once a violation occurs, a response is to be expected. This process would confirm indeed that the political unit, with all its sub-units, stand as one and have a clear *modus operandi*.

A multi-state federation such as the United States of America has a unified foreign policy. All states and sub-units confer to the strategies and policies dictated by the federal government in Washington D.C. States can execute individual policies but any foreign policy initiative of a state must go through and be confirmed by the federal government. Furthermore, a violation against a US interest is not only seen as a violation against Washington D.C or the federal government alone. Rather, it is seen as a violation against the entire political unit that unites all the states and sub-units. Hence, the task of responding to the violation is relatively uncomplicated since the federal government does need to gain the approval of all the states. This clearly demonstrates the unitary nature of the United States.

[96] (Viotti et al. 1999) p5

Where we see a lack of a unitary nature is with multi-state unions. The European Union, despite having the word union, does not benefit from the same unitary nature as the United States. The EU lacks a unified foreign policy. Every member, considered a sovereign state, has its own foreign policy and interests. Subsequently, the activities of the European External Action Service (EEAS/EUEA) is contained within the limits of the superior executive EU Commission which is itself reined in by the countless number of different foreign policy preferences of the 28-member bloc. This poses a contention for realists since for them "the state is said to be unitary because any differences of view among political leaders or bureaucracies within the state are ultimately resolved so that the state speaks with one voice [and] exceptions are dealt with within the government[97]." But the EU cannot speak with one voice when its foreign policy- which in itself is inherently contested- is violated. Furthermore, if the EU Commission has a certain viewpoint regarding an international issue, it is possible that more than one member-state will have opposing views and will consequently not agree to the foreign policy preferences of the EU Commission. This would then mean that a response by the entire European Union is unlikely, which clearly demonstrates the lack of a unitary nature.

Nevertheless, an argument can be made that despite not having a uniform foreign policy among the 28 member-states, the European Union still conducts foreign policy on issues where there is a consensus on. That fact, within itself, negates the inexorability of the unitary nature requirement.

Another aspect realists underline is that a state should be territorially fixed. One can claim that this need for territorial consolidation is rather ambiguous and unsound. The ambiguity is in the lack of a clear definition of what is a territorially fixed state. For instance,

[97] (Viotti et al. 1999) p6

France and Denmark have territories in different continents; the US has island territories that enjoy a lesser status than a state; and Russia has the exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea. In all cases there is the want of territorial continuity, in geography and status. Would it then mean that France, Denmark, Russia, and the United States are not legitimate actors in the international system because of their dispersed territories?

But, the question of territorial continuity is tied to the question of how important is for a state to be territorially fixed. Since the dawn of international and regional politics, states have been expanding and shrinking. Consequently, borders have not remained fixed over time. With this insistence of territorial fixation, one can argue then that most states are not legitimate actors since they have most likely gone through border modification throughout history.

For persons set on power and security, whether their state's territory is fixed or not is irrelevant. The raison d'être of their political unit is to maximize resources, thus the borders of today may not be the same as tomorrow's. Additionally, states that believe they have been historically wronged can be expected to not settle for their current territorial boundaries. Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan are only a few examples of states whom claim to have their borders violated by their neighbors and their territories occupied. Even more exceptional are states or societies that espouse a Greater map of their country, usually having to do with historical partitions of the state. Hungarians, Armenians, and Albanians are only a few examples of peoples that entertain the ideas of a Greater Hungry, Greater Armenia, and Greater Albania, respectively.

Nonetheless, the post-Cold War world has given a partial answer to the question of territorial consolidation. Perhaps to the chagrin of hardline realists, international norms did become international law and the international community indeed demanded and still does demand states to follow accordingly. With globalization, interdependence, and the presence of

international law, the relevance of territorial integrity can be challenged. For example, Norway and Finland can entertain the idea of giving back a mountain from the former to the latter[98]. Belgium and the Netherland can comfortably have municipalities in each other's territory and have a café as its border. What would have been most unimaginable for early 20th century folks is the idea of borderless Europe, where a person can freely drive from France into Spain and then jettison to Estonia as he or she pleases. These cases illustrate a different conception of territorial integrity, one that is rooted in the solidification of regionalized cooperation and links. A European state in 2017 can afford not fretting about its borders or territorial integrity; the international system has promised, *and so far*, delivered in maintaining the borders.

The promise of the international system to respect a state's borders and demand other states to respect them as well is not limited to Europe. Even states in regions that do not possess the regional cooperation of Europe still cite international law when they deem their borders to have been unilaterally breached by a neighbor. The South China Sea is a prime example of how smaller Far East states fear the sustainability of their respective borders as a rising China makes its moves. One can also argue that the international community's routine criticism of Israeli's settlement construction in the West Bank is a reflection of the international system's promise to maintain borders. With Israel crossing the Green Line into Palestinian territory, it is also crossing the undertaking of the international system.

More importantly, if conventional realists insist that "the most important actors in the world are territorial organized entities[99]", then where would a multi-state union, such as the European Union, fit? An obvious fault-line in the EU's territorial integrity is both its possible expansion into new members and also possible secession from it by member-states. Hence, we

[98] (Henley 2016)
[99] (Viotti et al. 1999) p190

are technically looking at a multi-state union that can possibly change shape at the whim of an individual member-state.

But, if we are to invite the idea that the conception of territorial integrity has changed with the current international system, then the European Union fits quite well in. In a world wherein territory is becoming more loosely defined and marked, multi-state unions can still be and function as organized entities. Additionally, the European Union itself is seen as a pillar of the international system and the changing world. So, instead of looking to the international community to uphold its promise on borders, the European Union is itself the one to make the promise.

Nevertheless, we are left with only partial answers to the questions of a unitary nature and territorial integrity. While the two aspects can be considered as desirable for an actor, they do not seem to be necessary to become an actor for realist politics. A realist of the old caliber would understandably disregard any actor that could not fulfil these two characteristics. But does the lack mean that the arena of international politics is still limited only to states?

The study of international relations and foreign policy have come around to recognize that "actors other than nations are now exerting impact on international politics[100]." With the changed geopolitics of the post-Cold War world, these non-state actors gained spotlight for good and bad deeds- from terror groups to multi-national corporations. Their entry into the international system was recognized even in 1990 "in the Middle East, [as] the UN, a non-state actor, [was] the fourth highest initiator of actions and the third most salient target of other actor's behaviour[101]."

[100] (Sullivan 1990) p22
[101] (Sullivan 1990) p23

If a non-state actor can initiate action in the international system, consequently it is necessary to consider that non-state actor as possessing power. Organski claims that "one of the most important characteristics of a nation is its power[102]." Evidently, an entity that exercises power is a legitimate player in the game of international politics. But while the conventional realist understanding of an entity meant nations and states, it is now palpably necessary for the definition to take into account that power can also reside in non-state actors which would thus make a non-state actor a legitimate player as well.

The requirement of power is necessary because it is a "major determinant of the part that the nation will play in international relations[103]." In the 21st century, we have many examples of non-state actors having more presence in the international system than states themselves. Terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State, can shape other countries' foreign and defense policies through their action. Meanwhile, small states, such as Moldova or Bhutan, hardly make a dent in international politics. Therefore, if an action that has a direct result is power, then terrorist groups that have made an impact on the international system cannot be *disregarded*. The fact that superpower states make an effort to combat them signifies that they are very much so *regarded*.

Non-state actors have also been exercising power by imposing on states. For states that do not have vast resources or financial means, approaching the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund is common practice. In return, the states have to abide by the regulations and dictations ordered by these large non-state actors. This asymmetry contradicts the assertion that "[although] multinational corporations...other transnational and international organizations are

[102] (Organski 1968) p101
[103] (Organski 1968) p101

frequently acknowledged by realists", non-state actors remain secondary in importance since "states are the dominant actors[104]."

However, it is obvious that the dominancy of states in the international system has been challenged by non-state actors. Besides the aforementioned examples of terrorist groups or the IMF, non-state actors such as the United Nations and the European Union have major roles in the international system. Through its different departments, the UN has expanded to all corners of the world where it assists in development or in peacekeeping. In return, states not only seek a seat at the UN but also utilize the General Assembly forum to their interest. And if a state manages to get a seat at the UN Security Council, then its perceived importance (i.e. power) increases accordingly.

Similarly, an indication of the European Union's wider international portfolio is it's inclusion in the P+5 Iran Nuclear Deal of 2015. On the other hand, European countries outside of the EU, such as those in the Balkans and the Caucasus, openly state their ambitions to become an EU member. To do so, they heed the EU's word.

Hence, as illustrated by the UN and the EU, non-state actors have gained dominancy in the international system. Furthermore, they can offer dominancy to states through their forums. Of course, the power of non-state actors is not monolithic. Each has a different degree of power. Terrorist groups employ hard power to capture attention and make demands; the intergovernmental organizations employ soft power incentives to capture the consent of states; and others such as the UN have the means of both. The fact of the matter remains their dominancy and presence in the international system.

Non-state actors can no longer be disregarded. In the 21st century, a legitimate actor in the international system is not only limited to states. And because realism 'purports to be a

[104] (Viotti et al. 1999) p6

general theory explaining the essence of international politics' (cite), then it will have to naturally incorporate non-state actors into the fold. It is a natural evolution from Greek city-states to modern nation-states to non-state actors.

Centurial Realism:

So, why is realism still relevant in a changed world that has challenged many of its foundations? Simply because the core of realism has remained constantly exact regarding the international system. It's all about influence; influence is power and power is influence. Whether we assess a hard power actor such as the Russian Federation and its politics in Georgia and Ukraine, or if we assess a soft power such as the European Union in the Balkans- they have a common denominator: to influence processes. And that is why realism has not been negated. It has had the inherent task of evolving.

The realist school of thought has been through many changes throughout the years. It began in its classic interpretation wherein humans were naturally driven by their desire for power. That was simply the way the world worked and would supposedly work. The root of conflict was human nature itself. Survival was a constant concern, and to overcome that concern, one had to maximize power.

The same classic logic was applied onto the international system. By the simple virtue of nature, states would be locked in conflict for power and survival. No state could depend on the other for its own survival. Hard power was the tool and was used as the state saw fit.

Eventually, structural/neo-realists revised this line of thought. Conflict originated in the structure of the world and not human nature. To them, the international system was anarchy. The states did not have a higher authority to turn into in times of trouble which meant that they had to fend for themselves. But structural realism did not shy away from the idea that indeed

international relations was all about power and interest wherein "states seek to maximize their security or their power[105]."

A division occurred within structural/neo-realism. Those who advocated that states simply wanted to maximize security were considered defensive realists. And, those who advocated that states wanted to maximize power were considered offensive realists. Regardless of the state's intentions, both sides focused on the hard power of the state.

Power was seen in terms of military and resources. A state with a large army and a large industry to support it was professed to possess power. Those that did not built commendable militaries were perceived as eventual targets easy to defeat. In times of warfare, the state would utilize the might of its power to establish prominence in the international system.

Eventually, neoclassical realists arrived and added that not only are militaries and resources important to assess a state's power but also the statesmen, society, and domestic affairs were as important too. They introduced a semi-relational approach to the understanding of power. Nonetheless, they too deemed power to be the act of coercion.

But coercion was what the advocates of soft power challenged. In a post-WWII reality, when nuclear superpowers assured mutual destruction, new power tools were used to attract smaller states into a superpower's sphere. Through ideology, economy, and positive imagery, soft power was used as the other side of the coin vis-à-vis hard power.

The orbiting of states around one center (i.e. superpower) signaled the beginning of regionalization. That though while there were semblances of anarchy in the international system, there were pockets of regionalized hierarchy negating the assumption that "no structure of power or authority stands above [states] to mediate their conflicts[106]."

[105] (Frankel 1996) p xiv-xviii
[106] (M. J. Smith 1986) p1

With the end of the Cold War and the advancement of technologies, both hard power and soft power had to adjust into the new world. Consequently, states were presented with smart power: a combination of both with the acute exploitation of the various instruments of hard and soft power.

Simultaneously, the international system not only experienced a new kind of power but also a new kind of actors. Actors, besides states, became a force in international relations. They amassed power, presence, and influence vis-à-vis other states. To still claim that "states are the only major actors[107]" is void and detached from reality.

Therefore, as a result of the changes in the international system, realism today stands once more at a crossroads: to adapt or remain fixed. Based on the decades-long work of scholars and the transformations of the international system, I propose a realism that is more apt for the 21st century.

Centurial realism integrates the following modifications: 1. The origins of conflict in the international system are structural 2. Regardless of whether anarchy is total or not, regionalization has been established through regionalized hierarchies. 3. Power is not understood only through hard power or soft power; rather, power is the effective utilization of tools of influence. As those tools have evolved from military to economy to diplomacy to technology, it would be preferable to keep the definition of tools broad enough to incorporate other specific means of influence/power to arise in the future. 4. Non-state actors are legitimate actors in the international system. There is surely the possibility that different forms of politic units may join the international system, but for now, I prefer to work with the political units the international system is familiar with, namely states and intergovernmental organizations.

[107] (M. J. Smith 1986) p1

Yet, even with the modifications, the core of realism is constant. For actors in the international system, the focus is, as Waltz said, their "capability, not function[108] ." An actor's capability determines its influence to achieve its interests. Leverage and power are still available to shape an outcome based on the actor's preferences. In brief, realism maintains that *actors achieve their interests through the power to influence processes vis-à-vis other actors*.

[108] (Waltz 1979b) p107

CHAPTER TWO:

POWER AT PLAY: MEDIATION, LEVERAGE, AND EXPECTATIONS

Talking about what power is not the same as the demonstration of that power. As the previous chapter showed, it is challenging to even concretely define what power is. It must be noted that even in the available literature, there is difficulty of measuring third party power. However, to see power at play I suggest looking at mediation. Why? Mediation represents a forum of power by a third actor on the disputants. It is within this forum that the third actor can exercise its influence. By applying our example of the third wheel on a date- two mothers-in-law, mediation focuses on how each mother approaches the couple to sort out an issue. Moreover, we can expect the following on the mediator's part: power, interest, and means. What I mean by interest is that a mediator enters the mediation due to pre-ascribed interests that are related to the conflict between the disputant parties. As for power, this regards to the leverages the mediator possesses vis-à-vis the disputant parties. When it comes to means, this illustrates how the mediator exercises the power it has to attain its interest.

Negotiations:

To understand what is required out of mediation, we need to understand what negotiations are. Mediations are negotiations with the added player of a mediator that conducts or at least communicates between the disputant parties at the heart of the negotiations.

The prequel stage of mediation are negotiations, which can be described as the communication between two or more parties (governments) "in seeking to achieve objectives, realize values, or defend interests[109]"

According to literature, governments can use negotiations for the following intent: firstly, to agree on issues of minimal or no contention with other governments that are on friendly terms with each other. These minor issues include "to convince other governments that certain actions, such as attending a conference, lowering tariffs, or proffering diplomatic support on a particular international issue would be in their interest[110]."

In the second scenario, negotiations can be a simple ruse by one of the governments for "stalling or creating the illusion" that the government in question is interested in finding a solution. In the third scenario, a government may participate in negotiations not to necessarily find a solution but to advertise its position and narrative on the issue in the hopes of discrediting or diluting the positions of the opponent.

The second and third scenarios of negotiations can lead to a dead-end, with the disputant parties not agreeing to a resolution. It is then that a third party is introduced in the forum to mediate between the conflicting interests to firstly maintain communication and secondly bring a resolution to the front. This forum of negotiations-mediations involving a conflict necessitate the usage of power by the third party.

The inclusion of a non-disputant party displays intention of assisting the conflicting parties to reach a "mutually satisfactory agreement[111]". The importance of mediation rests in

[109] (K. J. Holsti 1995)
[110] (K. J. Holsti 1995) p139
[111] (Schellenberg 1996) p13

the perceived power of the mediator. For the non-disputant inclusion, the disputants "must accept the role and functions of the third party[112]."

Therefore, the mediator is seen to have the capabilities to enter the negotiations and influence the outcome. The mediator can impose a solution if its powers allow it; the mediator can also provide a solution which will be considered by the disputants. However, the present literature lays the success of the mediator on the shoulders of the disputants. Meaning, the disputants need to be influenced. But my focus is not on the possibility of the mediator finding a solution to the contention but on how it conducts the process of mediation to safeguard its interests; and hence, mediation success for my thesis depends on the process vis-à-vis the mediator and not the outcome.

Participation (A Question of Impartiality and Interest):

The inclusion of a non-disputant party raises the question of who is this new party and why has it been allowed to participate in the negotiations. Not every actor can join the roundtable; in a sense, the player must have a threshold of power to join the table. Subsequently, an actor on the table is automatically assumed to have passed that threshold. Moreover, in the context of this thesis, the actor does not only prove that it can join in but that it can also shape the process of the game itself.[113]

Literature on the mediator's participation is nuanced regarding its interest and impartiality. However, before getting into that debate, it should be settled that all differing views converge on the assertion that the mediator is "accepted by the parties[114]" since it can influence the process and possibly an outcome. It is not a guarantee that the disputants will

[112] (K. J. Holsti 1995) p352
[113] (Zartman and Touval 1985) (O'Donnell 2017)
[114] (Zartman and Touval 2010) p1

agree to the mediator's participation or ideas for a solution. But the concerns of the disputants are trumped by the mediator's weight and influence. This relates to the perception- regardless of its veracity- that the mediator yields power conducive to the negotiation process, since the "triadic structure" of the mediation, including the preferences of the parties involved, is "mediated through its capability to foster achievement of the overall goal of producing a settlement between the two sides[115]."

Even if we were to concede the proposition that the mediator does not automatically guarantee an agreed upon outcome, the mediator is still welcomed according to another proposition claiming that the parties will not find a solution by themselves[116]. In our example, it would mean that the mothers-in-law get their seat at the table because their input is perceived to be necessary in the process of finding a solution to the issue between the couple.

Yet, just because the disputant parties recognize the role of the mediator does not necessarily mean that the mediator was unanimously invited. The mandate of the mediator can vary. Either one or all the disputant parties invite the involvement of the mediator or the international community offers the involvement to a certain international actor- this latter scenario would mean that the mandate of the mediator derives from outside the conflict zone and conflicted parties. This international mandate can also be a result of the globalized world of the 21st century, wherein institutions and non-state actors have also contributed in designing the international system[117]. Bercovitch and Schneider contend that an international mediator's mandate does not derive due to its effectiveness[118]. Rather, the mandate derives from the mediator's status. The authors claim that it usually falls on the permanent members of the UN Security Council to intervene in conflict mediation, most especially the US due to its global

[115] (Bergmann and Niemann 2015) p958
[116] (Fridl 2009) p76
[117] (Woodwell 2004; Neukirch 2001; Weller, Metzger, and Johnson 2008)
[118] (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000)

hegemony. This indicates once more that the participation of the mediator is related to its power and influence.

Nonetheless, there is the debate regarding a mediator's impartiality. Certain literature claims that impartiality is an important component of a successful mediator. If both parties perceive the mediator as not favoring the other, then they would be more willing to work with the mediator. But the counter literature argues that a mediator perceived as biased might find it easier to persuade the disputant to which it is biased for to agree on a settlement. Therefore, we must entertain the idea that just because a mediator is not directly involved in the conflict does not mean it is not indirectly involved. The proximity to one or more of the parties, or to the conflict itself, can make the mediator more conducive for participation. Since the mediators are third parties intervening to influence and enable the disputants to find a settlement to their issue, they are not necessarily absolved from having incentives to be included[119]. They can influence the disputant party by manipulating the relationship between them. If that relationship involves rewards, the mediator can offer additional rewards if the disputant party acts accordingly. On the other hand, due to the relationship, the mediator can demand and impose the disputant party to act accordingly lest the mediator holds back the benefits of the relationship. Consequently, I suggest a theoretical model that treats a mediator with interest as a biased mediator.

As mentioned, one incentive can be a supposed tie to one of the disputants, raising the issue of impartiality- if the mediator is going to be favorable to one party over the other. To this end, literature makes a distinction between a neutral mediator and a principle mediator. The former are said to lack direct interest in the dispute and therefore are coveted for their impartiality; the latter "are accepted not on the basis that they are impartial, but rather on their

[119] (Siniver 2006) p807

ability to push the disputants towards an agreement by rewarding or depriving of certain resources[120]". We would surely expect the mothers-in-law to be impartial to one side respectively one way or the other, since being bias "can be useful…to deliver the acquiescence of the party toward which it is partial[121]." However, this claim does not take into consideration the different formats that a mediation bias can have. For example, it is plausible to imagine a mediation in which the mediator's interests are related to one party's favorable outcome and not the other's; how could we guarantee a settlement advantageous to all disputant parties with this sort of partiality?

For this reason, the impartiality debate is connected to the discussion of interest- whether or not the mediator has an interest in seeing the conflict resolved in a specific manner, or an interest aligned with one of the disputants. In my theoretical model, a mediator's interest makes him biased towards the interest. And being biased to the interest renders the supposed impartiality in general.

As mentioned above, it can be that a mediator can consider one of the disputants more important to achieving its own interests, and thus the mediator would tilt the negotiations towards that disputant's favor. Think of the mothers-in-law pushing an agenda that helps out their respective child.

Fridl presents a theoretical framework, in his work on mediations regarding Kosovo, in which the mediator is "rarely indifferent to the terms being negotiated" and therefore will try to hammer out an agreement that serve's its own interests[122]. He defines two kinds of interests that come out during the mediation: defensive and offensive.[123]. Defensive interest relates to a situation wherein the conflict between the parties threatens the interests of the mediator. To

[120] (Siniver 2006) p813
[121] (Fridl 2009) p76
[122] (Fridl 2009) p72
[123] (Fridl 2009) p77

assure the security of its interest, the mediator participates to repel any harm to its interests. Offensive interest relates to the mediator's desire to expand its influence, and therefore participation in the mediation contributes to that end.

Subsequently, we must also entertain the assumptions then that: Firstly, a mediator that is interest-sensitive during the negotiations will be interest-sensitive before it as well- meaning, it enters the negotiations with a set of interests and the ways to achieve them. That might include tipping the negotiations to one or the other disputants. Secondly, a mediator's level of impartiality is connected to its interests. There is merit to this proposition since "few parties to a conflict would be likely to accept intervention by an outsider if they perceived that party to hold views on the nature and sources of the conflict greatly at variance with their own.[124]" However, because the mediator's mandate may derive from either the international community or sheer strength, the disputant party's concern do not affect the mediator's proximity to its vested interest.

Hypothesis 1: A mediator is biased towards its interest and will conduct the mediation accordingly

Mediator Effectiveness (A Question of Leverage):

But participation in itself is not enough of a yardstick to measure power. Mediator effectiveness is as important, because it's not enough that a mediator is involved- what is equally important is how the mediator operates the conflict mediation to its own interest.

Scholars define a few tools such as incentive and threats as being effective in bringing the parties to the table- both seen as instruments of power play. For example, the promise of

[124] (K. J. Holsti 1995)p352

financial aid can incentivize one of the disputant parties to agree to meet with the other side; the threat of withholding necessary financial aid can also induce the disputant party to join talks. The insistence of bringing the parties to the table is also related to the mediator's interest, because it "allows for the integration of more subjective dimensions, such as attainment of the mediator's goals into the framework[125]." Therefore, this links the mediator's power in the conflict resolution with its pre-ascribed interests.

For a mediator to be effective, leverage is an important hand to play at. Leverage is seen as the "resources and instruments the [mediator] can bring to the negotiation table to spur an agreement between the disputants".[126] The more powerful the mediator is, the more resources it has at its disposal to direct the parties[127]. The leverage is a necessity for mediator effectiveness since it provides influence over the conflicting parties[128]. That influence can be used either to bring the party to the table or to direct the party during the negotiations[129] since "a mediator can only credibly employ manipulative strategy when s/he possesses the necessary resources and instruments to offer positive incentives or threaten the use of coercive force[130]." Bluntly put by Bercovitch "without resources a mediator cannot move the parties nor can he or she exercise any influence on the proceedings[131]"

In my theoretical framework, the resources of a mediator, then, are connected to its smart power. To be able to use rewards or ultimatums voluntarily suggests that the mediator has diverse tools at its disposal and can exercise them whenever it sees fit. Smart power, in this case, offers the more diverse set of leverages, which can enhance the mediator's ability to shape

[125] (Bergmann and Niemann 2015) p958
[126] (Bergmann and Niemann 2015) p962
[127] (Siniver 2006) p811
[128] (Bergmann and Niemann 2015) p962
[129] (Siniver 2006) p811
[130] (Bergmann and Niemann 2015) p964
[131] (Bercovitch 1992) p108

the mediation process to its benefit and interest. Therefore, I suggest a theoretical model that treats a mediator using smart power in the mediation.

Hypothesis 2: The use of a mediator's smart power is conducive for the mediation

The form of mediation strategy is also influenced by the kinds of leverages the mediator holds[132]. Literature sees many kinds of power at play during the mediation. Jeffery Rubin highlights reward power, coercive power, and referent power among others[133]; Touval and Zartman highlight deprivation and gratification among others[134] ; on the other hand, Bercovitch highlights strategies based on communication-facilitation, procedural, and directive[135]. Of course, these can all be encapsulated into smart power and its diverse manifestations.

I propose to compartmentalize a mediator's smart power through the following leverages:

Recompense leverages: this would include the reward power and gratification. A mediator can offer economic or military aid to one or both disputant parties once they agree to an agreement. The mediator can also effectively leverage other tools from its smart power hat to offer the conflicting parties, such a referent power which would see the disputant party wanting to win the admiration of the mediator for cultural purposes. Think of non-EU Eastern Europeans wanting to become European and thus aspiring to be European by the EU.

[132] (O'Donnell 2017) p4
[133] (Rubin 1992)
[134] (Zartman and Touval 1996)
[135] (Bercovitch 2009)

Disincentive leverages: this would include the coercive power and deprivation. While incentives are to reward, disincentive[136] can withhold necessary aid or lucrative deals from one or both disputant parties until they agree on a proposition accepted by the mediator.

If I apply the two categories to Bercovitch's three strategies, then it is clear that leverages can be properly conveyed and utilized only through the directive strategy (except for the referent power which can be conveyed through communications, facilitation, and procedural). Since the directive strategy is the most interventionist and expects the mediator to iron out the substance of the talks; and since recompense and disincentive leverages necessitate the mediators' demands to be taken seriously- it then establishes the link between a mediator's interest and the mediator's involvement in the mediation. Meaning, if leverage is being used then there should be interest; if there is interest, then leverage should be used.

It is no coincidence that mediation effectiveness is driven by power effectiveness, since power is the cornerstone of the mediation conduct.[137] [138] Therefore, smart power raises the likelihood of a more effective mediation process. In the following empirical chapter, it will be important to also see which type of leverages is the most effective.

Multiparty Mediation (In Conclusion):

In attempting to see its interests through, the theoretical expectations suggest that a mediator will utilize the smart power that it has to adjust the disputants' manner to be more conducive for a settlement. That smart power is a toolbox of different leverages. Because if we are to accept that a mediator's mandate can originate in the international community due to the

[136] (Lovatt and Toaldo 2017) p5
[137] (Carnevale 2002) p25-40
[138] (Siniver 2006) p812

21st century international system, then it would also mean that the mediator is recognized as a power within the 21st century international system, and that recognition entails that the mediator that be possesses smart power resources. International community mediators can rely on leverages such as membership- or revoking of it- in international organizations; or international investment in the said country; and to a hard power degree, sanctions or armed intervention. Regardless of the nature of the leverage, the function is still power, and the disputant parties take it into consideration.

Thus, power at play is showcased through a third party's involvement in the mediation of a conflict that it is not part of. The third party's mediating involvement can be solicited or enforced; meaning that its mandate can derive from the disputant parties or by the international community as a result of a more globalized world in the 21st century. The mediator's involvement is a signal that it too holds interest that are directly or indirectly connected to the conflict. As mentioned above, a mediator's interest can be hurt or undermined by the ongoing conflict; or the meditator might seek to expand its external influence and thus involve itself in the mediation.

On another note, Hugh O'Donnell points out an important component of European Union mediation which can be extended to other mediations of the 21st century, and that is multiparty mediation[139]. So far our mediation model treated mediation as having only one mediator. However, in the real world, it is possible to find mediation processes that involve more than one mediator. This is related to the structured-regionalized international system of the 21st century, wherein stronger states have vested interests and positions in certain regions. The inclusion of more than one mediator can result in two scenarios: cooperation or challenge.

[139] (O'Donnell 2017) p5

Cooperation is expected in multiparty mediation because the mediators know helping each other out will work in both of their favors and produce positive outcomes that would be difficult if each mediator did as they pleased[140]. Cooperation can also offer the mediators a chance to coordinate their different strategies of leverages to create a conducive situation of incentives that would be difficult if the mediation was run by a single mediator[141]. And lastly, cooperation is important to decide who throughout the different stages of the mediation will take the lead while the other plays a secondary role[142].

Nonetheless, I propose to look at the challenges of multiparty mediation, in relation to the hypothesis I have laid out above. I have established that a mediator that joins a mediation process has direct or indirect interest in seeing the conflict resolved, and that interest does not necessarily have to align with the interests of the disputant parties. As such, a mediator that has interests would not necessarily have interests aligned with another mediator's in case of a multiparty mediator. This would mean that the mediators have two different sets of interests. Relating back to Bercovtich and Schneider's claim that a mediator gets involved due to status, especially the permanent members of the UN Security Council. In the Security Council, it is common to see to disagreements and diverging interests between the permanent members. For example, when it comes to the Syrian Civil War, Russia and the US tend to vote in opposition, suggesting different interests. It also suggests how disunited multiparty forums can be challenging for a single party's interest.

Secondly, a mediator with interest is biased, and that bias can lead the mediator to favor one disputant over the other, to acquire its interest. A challenge can be faced when the other mediator in the multiparty mediation is biased and favoring the other disputant. And thirdly, a

[140] (Zartman and Touval 2010) p1
[141] (Vuković 2012) p269
[142] (O'Donnell 2017) p6

mediator with interest would not- at least in the theoretical model I have proposed- subscribe to a secondary role in the mediation. That would undermine its interest. Due to these challenges in the face of multiple mediators, I suggest a theoretical model that treats multiparty mediation as inconvenient for a biased mediator.

Hypothesis 3: Multiparty mediation is challenging for a biased mediator's interest

CHAPTER THREE:

The EU Mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Before we dive into the European Union's mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we must ask ourselves an important question: is the EU a 21st century smart power? No doubt, the EU has proven itself to be a major economic actor in the international system. An IMF report in 2016 put the size of the EU economy to 16.5 trillion euros[143]. Therefore, if taken as one country, the EU stands as the second largest economy in the world.

More importantly to our topic, the EU also claims to be the biggest donor in the world, with 50 billion euros a year to tackle humanitarian challenges and develop better governance globally[144]. In 2016 alone, the EU and European donors provided more than 15 billion euros to- just to name a few- Afghanistan, India, and the Syrian Arab Republic. As for the Palestinian Territories, the EU provided more than $800,000,000 worth of aid in 2015 alone for humanitarian causes, civil society, and governance.

Therefore, there is very little argument to be made against the insurmountable evidence of the EU's economic dominancy. But since smart power is the effective use of both soft and hard power, we still need to explore the European Union's hard power instruments.

Though the European Union is frequently perceived as an economic union, it has also undertaken more politic-military initiatives. Although NATO is the main protector of Europe- and to a certain degree the EU still subscribes to that expectation- since 1999, with the failure of European action during the Bosnian war, the EU began to develop military forces

[143] ("Report for Selected Country Groups and Subjects" 2016)

[144] ("EU Aid Explorer - About - European Commission" 2017, "EU Aid Explorer - EU Aid Overview - European Commission" 2017)

independent of NATO[145]. Through its Common Security and Defense Policy, the EU created "permanent political and military structures" that include the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS)- which answers to the High Representative from the EEAS- and the so-called EUFOR (European Force) operations. EUFOR operations have been conducted in Macedonia (EUFOR Concordia)[146], in Libya (EUFOR Libya)[147] and an ongoing unarmed peacekeeping mission in Georgia (EUMM)[148].

Lastly, the European Union also possess normative power, which derives from its economic might, freedom of movement, and emphasis on civil liberties. This is demonstrated by non-EU European countries- in central and eastern Europe- which began accession talk into the EU and European integration. For many post-Communist countries that lacked the privileges enjoyed by the EU, the aspiration to belong to Europe and become part of it speaks demonstrates the normative gravitas of the European Union.

Therefore, per the realist model proposed in the first chapter, the European Union does seem to fit the smart power paradigm; however, it is important to analyze what and how to acts in the international domain to see if that is really the case. Moreover, as an international player involved in international matters, it has adopted the 'Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities'[149] which offers the framework of the EU's mediation actions.

Two elements from the Concept are important for my analysis. Firstly, the EU describes four mediation strategies:

1. Promoting mediation: due to its reputation for human rights and the rule of law, the EU regards itself as experienced enough to be a credible spearhead for mediation. It is

[145] ("CSDP Structure, Instruments, and Agencies - Eeas - European Commission" 2016)
[146] ("European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | CONCORDIA/FYROM" 2017)
[147] ("European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | EUFOR Libya" 2017)
[148] ("EUMM Georgia - Home" 2017)
[149] ("Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities" 2009)

related to Bercovitch's communication-facilitation strategy, which sees the mediator acting as an aiding medium between the disputants. As a locus on international norms, the EU in fact is in the best position to facilitate mediation for any type of conflict.

2. Leveraging mediation: It is the leveraging mediation which involves the mediator's direct intervention. In the Concept, the EU recognizes having "political weight and financial resources" that can be leveraged in "fields of trade, development, and crisis response"[150]. This is related to Bercovitch's directive strategy that sees the mediator's direct involvement in the substance of what is being negotiated. This strategy, per my theoretical model, suggests that the EU will have interests in conflict mediation and thus will use its smart power-leverages to achieve it.
3. Supporting mediation: This strategy relies on building capacities for the mediation and giving it logistical support. The EU does not suggest direct involvement into the substance of what is mediating. Thus this relies on soft smart power elements and also relates to Bervocitch's communication-facilitation strategy and procedural strategy, which sees the mediator not directly involving itself with the content of the negotiations but simply organizing and guiding the forum.
4. Funding mediation: This EU strategy relies mostly on financially supporting official and nonofficial/Track-2 talks, which usually include informal forums between civil society activists and governmental officials from both sides.

Overall, the EU strategies demonstrate the largely diverse resources the EU has to involve itself with conflict mediation. The strategies also demonstrate the smart power resources the EU possesses. From leveraging mediation to funding mediation, it shows how the EU can utilize different power resources to have influence over the mediation.

[150] ("Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities" 2009) p6

Secondly, the Concept provides the EU's own value of a successful mediation, stating that the primary goal of a mediation is "to prevent or end violence through cessation of hostilities or cease-fire agreements.[151]" But it also mentions that for a long-term stability, the mediation should address the root causes of the conflict. Meaning, it must encapsulate a broader strategy when bringing the hostilities to an end.

Hugh O'Donnell and Nathalie Tocci have made commendable contribution to studying the European Union mediation in the Middle East Peace Process, and have researched the EU mediation in Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge, two wars that pitted Israel against the Palestinian militant group Hamas. Therefore, I do use their research to apply to my empirical case and apply it to the theoretical model of my thesis. Moreover, the re-use of Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge is simply the fact that there are not many cases of direct EU mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

To test out whether we can see the EU as a successful mediator employing smart power in the real world, I look at three specific events to analyze how the EU utilized its power for its interests. Firstly, I will look at the Second Intifada, especially the events leading up to the Road Map, a peace proposal meant to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Second intifada was an uprising by Palestinians from 2000-2005, which experienced record-violence by both sides and derailed the post-Oslo peace process.

Secondly, I will look at Operation Cast Lead which pitted Israel against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Also known as the Gaza War of 2008, this was the first of three Israeli military campaigns against Palestinian militant groups in Gaza, especially Hamas in recent times.

[151] ("Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities" 2009) p3

Thirdly, I consider, Operation Protective Edge which once more involved Israel and Hamas in the Gaza war of 2014. It lasted for almost a month and witnessed tremendous human casualty and an expansive destruction of Gaza's infrastructure.

Each of these events saw a European Union becoming more involved and evolving in its mediation. The cases also illustrate how the theoretical expectations I laid out can be used to demonstrate the EU's mediating role on the one hand and the perceived *third-wheelness* on the other. More precisely, with the three cases I have chosen, I will show the problematic aspects of EU mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:1. Internal European disunity on interests 2. Lack of smart power utilization 3. Being a secondary player in a multiplayer mediation.

Historical Overview:

With the expectation that the British were close to ending their mandate over Palestine, the UN in 1947 passed a resolution suggesting to partition Palestine into two states- one for the Jews, and one for the Arabs. With the British gone in 1948, the Arab countries, opposed to the UN resolution, attacked the Jewish forces whom were already in a half-year civil war with local Palestinian forces. The 1948 war ended with a newly established Israel on most of the territory originally highlighted in the UN resolution; on the other hand, most of the remaining territories designated for the Arab state in the UN resolution came under Jordan- the West Bank and East Jerusalem- and Egypt- the Gaza Strip[152].

In June 1967, fearing an impeding attack, Israeli forces launched a preemptive attack on Syrian, Egyptian, and, later, on Jordanian forces. Within six days, Israeli territory expanded into East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Sinai, and the Golan Heights. This in turn

[152] (Morris 2011; Sayigh 1997)

caused the Palestinians not to put their trust in other Arab forces. As a result, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) began its decades-long fight against Israel whom they saw an occupier of Palestinian land[153].

European policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict crystalized in the Venice Declaration of 1980. In the statement, the EU "recognized the right to security and existence for all states in the region including Israel, and the need to fulfill the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people[154]."

In 1993, after five years of the first intifada (Palestinian uprising), the PLO and the Israeli government signed what became known as the Oslo Accords, which the EU supported fully. The signing of the Oslo Accords on the White House lawn heralded a new era for the Middle East. Thus, the EU became the biggest donor of the Palestinian Authority, expanded trade relations with Israel, and worked on regional associations and economic integration for the Mediterranean region[155].

Per the Oslo Accords, the PLO set up the Palestinian Authority (PA) for self-governance in parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip designated as Area A and B. Israel would retain control of Area C since most Israeli settlements are in that area. However, the agreement was also seen an interim agreement which would ultimately lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State as it was expected of Israel to gradually withdraw from the entire West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and bring the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories to an end[156].

[153] (Sayigh 1997)
[154] ("Middle East Peace Process - Eeas - European Commission" 2017)
[155] (Isma'i 2011)
[156] (Kittrie 2003)

But, for the next decade, the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians hit too many hurdles- the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the growth of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and Palestinian terrorism led by Hamas[157]. In the meanwhile, the EU maintained its aid to Palestinian state development.

However, a second intifada erupted which created more mistrust among the disputant parties, since the violence hit a record peak. Palestinian militant groups increased their suicide bombing campaigns; the Israeli army re-occupied Areas A and B and almost brought complete collapse to the Palestinian Authority[158].

At this critical juncture, the EU along with the international community mediated between the Israelis and the Palestinians to bring a cessation of hostilities. The round of mediations resulted in the Road Map, which I discuss further in the third chapter.

In 2007, after a complete Israeli pullout from the Gaza Strip, Hamas- a Palestinian militant group designated as a terrorist organization by the EU and the US- wrestled control of the strip from the Palestinian Authority. In return, Israel blockaded the Gaza Strip, a blockade which continues until today. In 2008, 2012, and 2014, Israel and Hamas were involved in three wars, two of which I discuss further in the third chapter.

[157] (Shlaim 2005)
[158] (Brown 2003; Allen 2008)

Second Intifada:

The EU's role in mediation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was boosted by the attempts to end the Second Intifada. Seeing that the Israeli army had gone back into the West Bank and had almost destroyed the Palestinian Authority's administrative institutions, the international community set about re-igniting the peace process talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The preparations for the Road Map represented the first time wherein the US asked for the EU to take the lead and pen out a draft for the peace talks - to compensate for the US's much criticized unilateral war on Iraq[159].

However, the EU draft was never released and thus there is no way to know what it included. Moreover, the EU's insistence of publishing the final version of the Road Map in December 2002 was initially delayed[160] until the eventual publication in April 2003.

Ultimately, the EU presented the Road Map as a member of the Quarter, along with the US, UN, and Russia. Yet, this briefly shows how the EU's directive strategy since it was directly involved with the content of what was being bargained.

In short, the Road Map demanded the Palestinian Authority to strengthen its actions against Palestinian terror groups, and focus on building a state and society based on liberal principles and tolerance. On the other hand, Israel had to cease military operations in the Palestinian territories and ensure the development of the Palestinian state. Lastly, both sides were to accept bilateral talks[161].

[159] ("The Road Map" 2003) p84

[160] ("Road Map - Quartet Principals Meeting, Statement (20 December 2002) - Non-UN Document (20 December 2002)" 2002)

[161] (Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information 2017)

Interests and powers:

But what were the EU interests during the Second Intifada? Ever since the signing of the Oslo Accords, the EU became the biggest donor for the Palestinian Authority, essentially becoming the main sponsor for the Palestinian state-to-be[162]. Table 1 shows how much the EU had given to the Palestinians between 2000-2002 alone, while a press release from the EU Commission states that from 1994-1999, EU grant assistance to the Palestinian Authority amounted to 137 million euros[163]. This gave the European Union significant leverage over the Palestinians.

Table 1 EU aid to Palestinians in 2000-2009



Source: Fanack.com Chronicle of the Middle East and North Africa

With Israel, the EU had at its disposal the Association Agreement between them signed in 1995[164]. It included the free movement of capital and commerce and the liberalization of services. Therefore, it was in the EU's interest to see the growth of relations between itself and

[162] ("Paying for Palestinian Survival" 2010)

[163] ("European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - How Is the European Commission Responding to the Needs of the Palestinians" 2007)

[164] ("European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | Agreements" 2017)

Israel. It also means that the EU had asserted smart power resources through the Association Agreement- but as we will see, it did not use it.

The violent situation on the ground did mean the waste of all that the EU had been working on since 1994. Therefore, giving up on the Palestinian statehood enterprise was not an option the EU, or the international community of donors, were willing to take; rather, it was in their interest to see through the goals of their aid and contribution[165]. That meant, the EU had to save the fledging Palestinian-statehood building and salvage what EU aid money had built until then. This had to be done not only to justify the years-long aid to the concern of European taxpayer's money, but also to see through EU strategic interest of long-term stability in the Mediterranean, which necessitated a Palestinian state,

Moreover, the EU's interest in the Road Map was due to its supposed "important stabilizing factor for the entire region[166]". This has been a constant European strategic interest for decades: starting from the 1970's the European Community marked the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a "key European interest[167]". Even in 2016, the EEAS saw the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a "fundamental interest of the EU"[168].

This fundamental interest was stressed by the former EU foreign policy chief Javaier Solana as vital to the European Union's own security[169], the same foreign policy chief involved with the Road Map. Consequently, the EU began showing additional interest in having a "direct political role in the management and resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict[170]". This

[165] (Youngs 2014) p3

[166] ("European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - European Commission Welcomes Quartet's Presentation of the Middle East Road Map" 2003)

[167] (Yacobi and Newman 2008) p173

[168] ("Middle East Peace Process - Eeas - European Commission" 2017)

[169] (Miller 2011) p9

[170] (Newman and Yacobi 2004) p4

signals Bercovitch's directive strategy for the EU, since the EU is directly involved with the content that is being negotiated according to its interests.

Challenges:

Accordingly, the EU's mediating efforts were undermined by the following: the fact that it was not the only mediator; and the lack of a coherent EU interest.

From the onset, the EU was sidelined by the United States, which resulted in the exclusion of essential EU principles regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The EU's approach to the Road Map was to have a "realistic political perspective" that included benchmarks and phases to be effective[171]. But, the US excluded principles that had long-been enshrined in the EU's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. One principle was the recognition of the 1967 borders as points of departure. The other principle was the need for benchmarks so as not to render the Road Map susceptible. This indicates that the EU interests- of wanting a Road Map that emphasized on the 1967 borders and targeted a broader process- were undermined by US-led multiparty mediation.

Additionally, the EU's interest was challenged by internal EU disunity. During the preparations of the Road Map and after, certain member states initiated their own peace process tracks: the French floated around an idea of an interposition force in 2002 while the British government hosted a conference for the reformation of the Palestinian Authority in 2003[172]. On the other hand, Germans and the Dutch shied away from criticizing Israel. Collectively, these separate initiatives created a mixed European response. This in turn disabled the EU from utilizing its smart power, due to the fact there was a collective incoherency.

[172] (Ortega and Asseburg 2003) p56

The disunity on interest was related to the "lack of effective CSDP mechanisms[173]" which meant that the EU could not take a more "determined" approach and could not "apply" solutions[174]. A resolute approach would have been to use ultimatums from their smart power resources to pressure the sides. However, the disunity and lack of a proper approach further meant that the smart power resources the EU held during the Second Intifada could not be employed, despite the decision by the European Parliament on April 10 2002 to exert economic sanctions and an "arms embargo[175]" [269 votes to 208 with 22 abstentions] on both parties and thus pressure them to a solution. Without having a clear set of interest, the EU was unable to clearly utilize its smart power resources.

Thirdly, the Road Map did not receive the follow-up necessary for its success. The violence between the Palestinians and Israelis continued, although in a much lower scale. Eventually, the Road Map lost its significance with little or no comment on it from the EU, as is seen on the EU Commission press releases website; the last press entry regarding the Road Map is from December 17 2007. Without addressing the conflict in a broader strategy of ceasing the hostilities, the EU fell short of its own success value.

Conclusions:

Per my theoretical models, the Road Map mediation necessitate two remarks. First is the EU's lack of a coherent approach. While the EU held smart power resources, such as economic instruments to utilize vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the Israelis, the EU lacked a clear-cut interest and direction. As seen by the individual acts of member-states during the mediation, the EU sent mixed signals and could not use its smart power properly. Consequently,

[173] (Ortega and Asseburg 2003) p47
[174] (Ortega and Asseburg 2003) p57
[175] ("Texts Adopted - Wednesday, 10 April 2002 - Situation in the Middle East - P5_TA(2002)0173" 2002)

Hypothesis 2- *the use of a mediator's smart power is conducive for the mediation* - is diluted in this case since the actor did not have a unitary approach to the conflict.

The second remark relates to the EU's challenges in multiparty mediation. Due to the US-led mediation, EU's interests in having benchmarks in the negotiations were excluded. Also, the EU's insistence on having negotiations on the 1967 borders was also excluded. These omissions indicate that the EU could not uphold its interests in the mediation. Moreover, smart power would not be effective in the case of multiparty mediation since it would be counterproductive if the mediators began utilizing leverages against each other rather on the disputants. Consequently, Hypothesis 3- *multiparty mediation is challenging for a biased mediator's interest* - is upheld in this case.

Operation Cast Lead/ Israel-Gaza War of 2008

The second case under examination involves a brief war in 2008 between the Israeli army and the Palestinian militant group Hamas which took control of the Gaza Strip from the Palestinian Authority in 2007. In what began as an Israeli incursion into the Gaza Strip, "allegedly in order to destroy a tunnel under construction[176]", soon escalated into Hamas rocket fires landing into Israeli territory and an Israeli military offensive named Operation Cast Lead that began on December 27 2008. When the offensive ended in January 17 2009, more than 1400 Gazans were killed, 5,300 wounded, and 90,000 left homeless, while on the other side 13 Israelis were killed [177].

[176] (Tocci and (EMHRN) 2009) p34
[177] ("Gaza's Unfinished Business" 2009) p1

Interests and powers:

Let us now lay out the power/resources the EU had at its disposal to be utilized for mediation in this case. Until 2008, the EU expanded its smart power resources vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority, focusing on economic and hard power instruments. The EU remained the largest single donor to the Palestinian Authority- a feat that it has kept up to the present. And not only did the EU afford the PA 352.8million euros [178] through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument [ENPI], it also gave the Palestinian "free-duty access" to EU markets through the interim Association Agreement[179].

Simultaneously, in 2006, the EU began the European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support [EUROPOL-COPPS] with the aim of creating a police organization that adhered to a legal transparent framework[180]. The EU also launched a second mission called

ODA (gross disbursement, USD: current prices) to Palestinian Territory, Occupied for 2008

OVER 100,000,000			
1	EU+MS	EU INSTITUTIONS + EU MEMBER STATES	1,323,025,630
2	US	UNITED STATES	490,587,704
3	UNRWA	THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY	255,210,400
4	AE	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	150,240,000
5	NO	NORWAY	115,781,933
10,000,000 - 50,000,000			
6	CA	CANADA	45,011,631
7	JP	JAPAN	30,297,317
8	AU	AUSTRALIA	26,820,257
9	TR	TURKEY	20,180,000
10	CH	SWITZERLAND	18,332,112
2,000,000 - 10,000,000			
11	ISDB	ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK	9,180,000
12	UNDP	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	4,096,506
13	UNICEF	UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND	3,680,000
14	UNCF	UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND	3,676,000
15	WFP	WOLRD FOOD PROGRAM	3,468,890
16	KR	KOREA, REPUBLIC OF	2,409,356
UNDER 2,000,000			
17	UNFPA	UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND	1,710,000
18	UNPF	UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND	1,708,684
19	IS	ICELAND	1,460,000
20	AFESD	ARAB FUND FOR ECONIMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT	1,073,501
21	NZ	NEW ZEALAND	728,296
22	IL	ISRAEL	510,000
23	UNTA	UNITED NATIONS REGULAR PROGRAMME FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE	70,000
24	IAEA	INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY	60,000
TOTAL			2,509,318,217

Table 2 EU Aid to the Palestinians in 2008

Source: OECD

[178] ("European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - How Is the European Commission Responding to the Needs of the Palestinians" 2007) ("Eastern Partnership: problems of implementation and potential consequences" 2009)

[179] ("Palestine - Trade - European Commission" 2017)

[180] (O'Donnell 2017) p11

the European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah [EUBAM-RAFAH] on the Gaza-Egypt border[181].

These significant projects by the EU with the Palestinian Authority testify to the consistency of the EU's strategic interest of a stable neighboring region. Moreover, it means that the EU enjoyed smart power over the Palestinians- both recompense and disincentive leverages if need be. This indicates that to procure it's interest, the EU had a diverse set of resources to utilize to that end.

On the other hand, the EU grew its trade relations with Israel, becoming Israel's largest trading partner, to the degree that it cannot be "realistically replaced by Israel's main ally, the USA"[182]. Due to the need of economic trade and the fact that the EU is much closer to Israel than the US, the EU enjoyed a certain position vis-à-vis Israel in this regionalized global system.

Moreover, Israel enjoys membership and participation in multiple European organizations of culture, sports, and science[183]. This economic and cultural integration speaks to the Israelis' aspirations of seeing themselves "as belonging to a western and European" world and not as part of the Middle East[184] , a clear reference to the referent-relational power.

The different relations that the EU enjoys with Israel speak of the diverse smart power resources the EU possessed over Israel in 2008. As seen above, it included economic and relational resources.

[181] (Biscop 2008) p7
[182] (Tocci 2009) p5
[183] (O'Donnell 2017) p11
[184] (Newman and Yacobi 2004) p13

Challenges:

But, while the EU is the largest donor to Palestine, being the largest trading partner for Israel means that the money goes both ways, and this is where the EU's leverage is usually undermined. Because of Israel's large trade deficit, EU member states circumvent EU demands and treat themselves in profitable relationships with Israel[185].

To do this, member-states "compartmentalize" the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the EU relations with Israel, meaning to detach politics from economics when dealing with Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict[186]. These actions by member-states reflect the larger disunity of the European Union's foreign policy interest. They also attest to the inability of the EU to form a clear united direction to utilize its smart power resources, more specifically its economic influence. Meaning, if the EU decided to use disincentive leverages on Israel, member-states would disagree fearing harm to their own separate trade profits with Israel.

Other challenges faced by the EU in this specific mediation case are related to Bercovitch's communication-facilitation strategies. The Palestinian side of the war was Hamas, and the EU could not contact them since the former was labeled as a terrorist organization. Without having direct access to the disputant, the EU was unable to clearly utilize its leverages. Instead, the EU employed Egypt as a front but that still meant that the EU was relegated to a communication-facilitation strategy. Without having the directive strategy, the EU missed out on utilizing its smart power resources despite claiming to be "very active in the mediation[187]".

Another challenge the EU faced was its rotating presidency that occurred during the war. The change in bureaucracy brought also a change of approach; while the out-going French presidency aspired for a more responsive direction, the incoming Czech presidency opted for

[185] (O'Donnell 2017) p11 (Miller 2006) p656
[186] (O'Donnell 2017 p12; Tocci and (EMHRN) 2009)
[187] (O'Donnell 2017) p12

a hands-off Israel-friendly direction- and this disconnection undermined the power of the EU. The Czech reaction "described Israel's actions as self-defense" [188] and put the blame of the war on Hamas.

France maintained its involvement in the conflict resolution which further diluted a single European approach. Finally, internal EU institutions did not keep on a shared message, since the External Relations Commissioner comments resounded a bit more critically on Israel than did the Council's or the Presidency's[189]. The confusion peaked in early January 2009 when three different European delegations arrived to the region and spoke on behalf of Europe[190].

Nonetheless, despite the internal EU confusion and lack of direction- which I will come back to later- the EU did employ "coercive tactics"[191], demonstrating the diverseness of its smart power. Regardless of the Israeli trade leverages over it, the EU did threaten to thwart an upgrade of relations with Israel including a new Action Plan and other developments within the European Neighborhood Policy [192]. The EU also canceled EU-Israel subcommittee meetings and conditioned the resumption of the meetings and upgrade on Israeli's commitment to the peace negotiations.

While these threats pushed Israel to an eventual ceasefire and then further deepening of trade relations with the EU, it demonstrated the EU's readiness to utilize disincentives leverages from its smart power resources. Moreover, it showed that using disincentive leverages (ie smart power in a coercive way) does yield results with Israel, considering that as I explained above, Israel's trade with Europe is lucrative both ways.

[188] ("European Reactions to Israel's Gaza Operation" 2017)
[189] (O'Donnell 2017) p9-10
[190] (Tocci and (EMHRN) 2009) p57
[191] (O'Donnell 2017) p13
[192] (Musu 2010) p135

This relates back to my theoretical model of a partial and impartial mediator. The literature debates as to which mediator can be more effective. In this case, the Czech-run EU presidency which was more Israeli-friendly was part of the EU that flexed its power and utilized disincentive leverages over Israel. Meaning, a biased mediator- or at least perceived as bias- can be successful because it can afford to set an ultimatum to the side it supposedly favors. Therefore, a biased mediator is more conducive to a successful mediation since it can afford to use its hard-smart power over the party it favors

An additional component of the EU's 2008 mediation was the lack of the US. Since the Bush administration was on its way out and the Obama administration coming in, the US did not have to formulate a plan. This meant that the EU, which was long used to being a secondary mediator, missed its chance to be the only powerful mediator, it yet managed to use Egypt and conclude a ceasefire agreement.

Notwithstanding, the EU failed to address the root causes of the conflict, which per the EU can be alleviated by the ending of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel with a capital in East Jerusalem. Without addressing the conflict in a broader strategy of ceasing the hostilities, the EU fell short of its strategic value of long-term stability. The Gaza Strip remained under blockade by Israel, Hamas maintained its grip over the area, and the region suffered two more wars in the coming years. Thus, for the mediation, the EU was successful only in ceasing the hostilities in that specific round of violence.

Conclusions:

Per my theoretical models, the Operation Cast Lead mediations demonstrates, firstly, the EU's use of diverse smart power resources, mainly disincentive leverages, to pressure Israel into a cessation of hostilities. Due to its various smart power resources, the EU was able to

choose economic disincentives even though it did not have hard power/military disincentives. This demonstrates the effectiveness of having diverse leverages of influence.

However, Hypothesis 2- *the use of a mediator's smart power is conducive for the mediation* - is slightly problematic. The EU still emitted a sense of disunity regarding its approach towards the conflict. The interests and policies of member-states overshadowed the strategic interest of the EU, as was seen with the Czech's separate policy during the war. This lack of unity/continuity undermined the use of the smart power for the EU's strategic interest of long-term stability. Additionally, by using the communication-facilitation strategy vis-à-vis Hamas, the EU missed out on using its smart power resources over a very important disputant. It is very difficult to achieve long-term stability without direct contact with one of the primary parties to the conflict.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that the perception of bias from the EU and the threat of disincentive leverages occurred simultaneously. This gives credence to my Hypothesis 1- *a mediator is biased towards its interest and will conduct the mediation accordingly* - since it make it affordable for the mediator to exert pressure on the party it favors.

Moreover, this round of mediation lacked the US, hinting that my Hypothesis 3- *multiparty mediation is challenging for a biased mediator's interest* - stands correct. The EU was better positioned to use its smart power resources- as it did- when it was deemed as the strongest party in the mediation. Despite not achieving its strategic interest of long-term stability, it did contribute to the cessation of hostilities between the disputants.

Operation Protective Edge:

This last case of war erupted on July 7 2014 as a result of the kidnapping and killing by Hamas affiliates of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank and the later kidnapping and immolation of a Palestinian teenager in Jerusalem by a group of extreme Israeli Jews. Subsequently, Israel began the offensive to uproot Hamas' military structure in the Gaza Strip; while Hamas entered the fight to change the status quo since the previous war[193]. By the time the warring sides reached a cease-fire on August 26 2014, more than 2000 Palestinians and 71 Israelis were killed.

In the interim period between Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge, the EU foreign policy went through a change. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU established the EEAS which expanded the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). Also, it was now that the EU adopted the 'Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities' intended to give the EU the know-how to "play a more active role in this area".[194] The Concept, as explained earlier, layouts different ways and different resources through which the EU can involve itself in mediation.

With the EEAS in place, the EU was offered better "coordination and increased coherency" in its foreign policy[195]. This meant that it no longer would face the debacle of 2008 when 3 different European delegations showed up in the region. On a similar note- O'Donnell contends that the Lisbon Treaty positively changed the way the EU could use its resources. However, I would like to show through my analysis of Operation Protective Edge that the EU's smart power resources were weakened.

[193] (Bouris 2015) p1
[194] ("Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities" 2009) p1
[195] (O'Donnell 2017) p16

Interests and powers:

The leverage field of the EU vis-à-vis the Israelis and the Palestinians did not change much. If anything, it only deepened EU economic and financial ties. Figures 1,2, and 3 show that not only was the EU making billions off trade with Israel but that from 2013-2014 it also poured in a billion-euro worth of money into Palestinian development.

Beneficiary | Top donors

ODA contributions to Palestinian Territory, Occupied for 2014, gross disbursement (EUR)

OVER 100,000,000			
1	EU+MS	EU INSTITUTIONS + EU MEMBER STATES	510,308,026
2	US	UNITED STATES	277,999,491
10,000,000 - 50,000,000			
3	AU	AUSTRALIA	37,860,303
4	CA	CANADA	29,699,087
5	NO	NORWAY	23,289,719
TOTAL			**1,610,996,521**

Data source: **IATI Registry** (International Aid Transparency Initiative)

Figure 1 EU Aid to Palestinian Territory in 2014

Beneficiary | Top donors

ODA contributions to Palestinian Territory, Occupied for 2013, gross disbursement (EUR)

OVER 100,000,000			
1	EU+MS	EU INSTITUTIONS + EU MEMBER STATES	501,404,971
2	US	UNITED STATES	412,881,738
10,000,000 - 50,000,000			
3	AU	AUSTRALIA	36,419,082
4	CA	CANADA	27,847,045
5	NO	NORWAY	13,250,406
TOTAL			**1,710,372,896**

Data source: **IATI Registry** (International Aid Transparency Initiative)

Figure 2 EU Aid to Palestinian Territory in 2013

EU-Israel: Trade in goods

Trade in goods 2014-2016, € billions

Year	EU imports	EU exports	Balance
2014	13.3	17.0	3.7
2015	13.4	18.9	5.6
2016	13.2	21.1	7.9

EU-Israel: Trade in services



Figure 3 EU-Israeli Trade in goods 2014-2016. Source EU Commission Trade Website

During Operation Protective Edge, there does seem to be more coherence between the member-states, at least normatively, with the European Union which stated that while "recognizing Israel's legitimate to defend itself[196]", it called on both sides to cease fire with occasional mentions of Israel's apparent use of disproportionate force. Similarly, the Czech whom were pro-Israeli during Operation Cast Lead agreed that "while recognizing the right of Israel to take appropriate measures to protect its population[197]", it urged Israel to restrain its

[196] ("EU@UN - EU Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process" 2014)
[197] ("Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Situation in Gaza" 2014)

disproportionate attacks. Additionally, France and Germany both agreed with Israel's want of protecting its citizens while warning against the escalation of violence and rising of casualties[198]. For my theoretical purposes, this suggests that the EU had more unity as an actor regarding its interests, and therefore theoretically would find it easier to agree on action of power.

Challenges:

However, the coherence does not translate to better use of smart power. Even O'Donnell admits that the "main strategy that the EU used was to support and facilitate the mediation process led by Egypt[199]." This seems to be the case since in a EEAS working report from March 2015 clearly states that the EU "fully supported Egyptian efforts to broker a ceasefire" and offering to re-launch Border Assistance missions between Egypt and Gaza while also offering naval "escorts and controls" in the open waters bordering Gaza. However, neither suggestions saw the light of day.

This is the result of the communication-facilitation strategy the EU employed back in 2008. Again, it was removed from Hamas, the disputant party considered a terrorist group, and thus could not employ smart power resources to pressure it directly to cease hostilities.

The better use of the EU during these rounds of mediations seems to have been to involve the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank since the latter were proposed to return to the Gaza Strip and supervise the borders[200], seeing that Hamas was shunned from the international community. A EU Parliament motion for a resolution from July 15, 2014 reflects this overlooking of Hamas while conveying the resolution itself to the Palestinian Authority (motion), while the EEAS report from March 2015 states that the EU "engaged extensively

[198] ("France, Germany 'Strongly Condemn' Rockets on Israel" 2014)
[199] (O'Donnell 2017) p17
[200] (Al-Mughrabi and Baker 2014)

with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and offered to contribute significantly to a comprehensive solution, including through Common Security and Defense Policy missions on the ground[201]". This indicates that the EU was offering to diverse its utilization of smart power by tapping into hard power such as CSDP operations. We can deduce then that a more coherent unitary EU is an EU more comfortable with using diverse means of smart power. Despite the initiatives not going forward, it does speak to the resources the EU is ready to utilize for its strategy interest.

However, the abovementioned approach undermines the EU's efforts since it did not give the opportunity for the EU to activate its directive strategy; it also relegated the EEAS and the HR to the backroom to simply facilitate the mediation but not to lead it. By supporting the mediation of Egypt on the one hand and speaking only to the Palestinian Authority on the other, the EU seems to have removed itself far off the mediation process. Without having direct access to one of the disputants, the EU was unable to clearly utilize its leverages

The US, unlike Operation Cast Lead, did intervene in the mediation process, by supporting Egypt and encouraging Israel to agree to the ceasefire. This once more means that the EU was caught in a multiplayer mediation wherein it was not the only powerful player with leverages. The US convened meetings in Paris with the EU to outline their support for the Egyptian mediations[202]. While the EU possessed smart power resources and more coherency, it did not utilize them during the mediation. This indicates firstly that the US plays a far more effective game in multiplayer mediation than does the EU since the EU's strategic interests were not addressed or satisfied through this round of mediation. Secondly, the EU did have smart power resources but did see a better use of them.

[201] ("Implementation of the Europen Neighborhood Policy in Israel Progress in 2014 and Recommendations for Actions" 2015)

[202] ("FMs in Paris Call for Extending 12-Hour Gaza Truce" 2014)

ODA (gross disbursement, USD: current prices) to Palestinian Territory, Occupied for 2015			
Over 100,000,000			
1	EU+MS	EU Institutions + EU Member States	838,987,152
2	UNRWA	The United Nations Relief and Works Agency	452,810,400
3	US	United States	256,759,301
50,000,000 - 100,000,000			
4	NO	Norway	78,430,810
5	JP	Japan	66,468,581
10,000,000 - 50,000,000			
6	CH	Switzerland	31,694,221
7	TR	Turkey	29,830,000
8	AU	Australia	28,912,972
9	CA	Canada	25,008,201
10	AE	United Arab Emirates	22,562,922
11	IL	Israel	16,933,900
2,000,000 - 10,000,000			
12	OFID	The OPEC Fund for International Development	7,179,620
13	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund	5,340,000
14	UNCF	United Nations Children's Fund	5,338,781
15	KR	Korea, Republic of	5,047,658
16	IFfAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	2,651,570
17	IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	2,650,000
Under 2,000,000			
18	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	1,798,404
19	WFP	Wolrd Food Program	1,682,455
20	ILO	International Labour Organisation	1,443,390
21	UNPF	United Nations Population Fund	1,360,609
22	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund	1,360,000
23	WHO	World Health Organisation	1,053,781
24	GF	Global Fund	871,390
25	NZ	New Zealand	756,829
26	IS	Iceland	728,633
27	IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	315,918
28	AFESD	Arab Fund for Econimic and Social Development	49,867
Total			**1,888,027,365**

Figure 4 EU Aid to Palestinians in 2015: Source: European Commission EU AID Explorer

Firstly, the strategic interest for a stable Mediterranean was not met. During a visit to Gaza by the EU Heads of Mission in November 2016, the EU "called for all parties to take swift steps to produce fundamental change to the political, security, and economic situation"[203] and touched upon the ongoing closure of the Gaza Strip.

Secondly, the EU increased its aid money to the Palestinians considering the destruction left behind by Israel in the Gaza Strip- as can be seen in the table. Moreover, the international

[203] ("Local Statement on Israeli Demolitions and Confiscations of Palestinian Structures in Area C - Eeas - European Commission" 2016)

community pledged $5.4 billion assist with the reconstruction of Gaza[204]. However, the EU did not only increase funding for Gaza's reconstruction but also has had to face the destruction of its EU-funded projects in the West Bank, which obviously challenge its interest to procure stability. Estimates given in December 2016 by the EU office in Jerusalem claim that "humanitarian structures provided by the EU and EU member states worth approximately EUR 536,000 have been either destroyed or confiscated[205]". The European commissioner for enlargement and neighborhood policy admitted in March 2012 during a session in the European Parliament that the EU and member states had suffered EUR 29.4 million for the past decade due to Israeli damages on developmental projects[206].

Disincentive leverages did not work possibly due to the post-Lisbon EU. Because pre-Lisbon EU had different institutions, such as the Presidency, it would have allowed to show different faces simultaneously to the different disputant parties. While one head could be partial, the other could be impartial. This does explain why the EU was willing to use disincentive leverages in 2008 and not in 2014. And the case for the effectiveness of disincentive leverages increase in 2014. The US, long seen as an ally to Israel, halted the shipment of military arms to Israel[207] and banned American flights from flying to Israel as the war was ongoing[208]. This played a factor in Israel ceasing the military campaign and thus concluding the war. The US decisions then indicate that a biased mediator- as the US is long considered to be- has more leeway to use disincentives leverages.

[204] ("Pledged Reconstruction Aid for Gaza Must Materialize, Secretary-General Tells Security Council, Saying 'Clock Is Ticking' | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases" 2017)

[205] ("Local Statement on Israeli Demolitions and Confiscations of Palestinian Structures in Area C - Eeas - European Commission" 2016)

[206] (Politico 2012)

[207] (Ravid 2014)

[208] (CNN 2017)

Conclusions:

Per my theoretical models, the Operation Protective Edge meditation demonstrates that the EU had better coherence and had gained more smart power resources through the growing donations to the Palestinians and larger trade relations with Israel. However, it was unable to translate those resources to effective power play (see following points). Consequently, my Hypothesis 2- *the use of a mediator's smart power is conducive for the mediation* - does not stand.

Also, the EU did not utilize disincentive leverages over Israel due to the symmetric trade relations between them. Employing hard-smart power would hurt the trade benefits of member-states.

On the same note, the EU did not utilize disincentive leverages due to the lack of directive strategy vis-à-vis Hamas. Being removed from direct contact with the disputant makes smart power ineffective.

The US leading involvement in this round of mediation do not seem to undermine the EU efforts and interests because the EU did not utilize smart power resources to begin with and the interests were short term- mainly, the cessation of hostilities. Therefore, my Hypothesis 3- *multiparty mediation is challenging for a biased mediator's interest* - is not upheld.

The US's use of ultimatums to Israel does show once again that smart power, such as disincentive leverages, provide results. Since the US is considered biased towards Israel, this does seem to give credence to my Hypothesis 1- *a mediator is biased towards its interest and will conduct the mediation accordingly*

Summary of Analysis:

Hypothesis 1. Regarding the debate as to whether a successful mediation depends on the impartiality of the mediator, from the cases I elucidated, we see that expectations have been met that a biased mediator is better positioned to use smart power on the condition that the mediator utilizes disincentive leverages and not recompense leverages. This is seen both during Czech-run EU presidency during Operation Cast Lead and the US's perceived bias during Operation Protective Edge. In both cases, the mediator was presumably biased and used ultimatums to pressure Israel. I do not repudiate the possibility that a biased mediator can also be successful through recompense leverages. However, according to the three cases in this thesis, recompense leverages do not give enough incentive to the favored disputant party to compromise or agree to an agreement with the other disputant. The increased chance of success for a biased mediator I argue is connected to the mediator's proximity to the disputant party that it intends to pressure. Due to the proximity, which would logically be a result of years-long alliance, there is sufficient familiarity that the mediator can take advantage of without causing irreparable damage to the relationship with the disputant party.

Hypothesis 2. Regarding the debate of using smart power for a mediator's interests, I conclude that the usage of specific smart power tools such as disincentive leverages depend on: *A*- the context of the mediation itself. In a directive strategy, the mediator is better positioned to utilize diverse smart power whereas the other strategies of Bercovitch do not demand such power utilization or direct interest from a mediator. *B*- the dynamics between the mediator and the disputants, which mainly regards on the relationship and the leverages the

mediator has with the disputant parties. *C*- the coherence of the mediator. Coherence reflects a clear set of interests and strategies that are employed accordingly.

Yacobi and Newman claim that the EU does not have strong 'sticks and carrots' in at its disposal to "which it can exercise vis-à-vis the two conflicting parties[209]". There is merit to that statement, considering that Israel does not aspire to become a full member of the EU and already has lucrative trade relations that run both ways, it can afford to disregard EU insistence.

At the same time, the EU possesses smart power resources and thus can decide to only focus on the *sticks* and not the carrots. Per to the cases above, Israel does respond to disincentives, as is seen when an EU report threatened to the Israeli research and development community[210] and an Israeli government report warned that 'a deterioration of EU-Israeli relations would cause serious economic and political damage to Israel[211]. Thus, the expectations for Hypothesis 2 have been met.

Hypothesis 3. Regarding the debate whether multiplayer mediations are more conducive to successful mediation, I conclude that from the perspective of a mediator with interests, the multiplayer framework presents challenges in procuring those interests. This seems to be particularly the case for the EU which has played a 'subordinate role[212]' behind the US at the expense of its strategic interests, which has caused some Europeans to call for a stronger EU diplomatic presence due to EU leverages as well[213]. We should also note that when the US was not involved in the meditation of the 2008 war, the EU was more successful using smart power, such as disincentive leverages. Thus, the expectations for Hypothesis 3 have been met.

[209] (Yacobi and Newman 2008) p174
[210] (Enserink 2013)
[211] (Yacobi and Newman 2008) p188
[212] (Hunter 2012) p127
[213] (Miller 2011) p10

EU's persisting smart power:

Let me further elaborate on the negotiation strategies and the EU's success rate. Firstly, I conclude that the EU's stance on not contacting Hamas is disadvantageous to the EU's long-term interest because it disables the EU from utilizing its leverages and removes the EU from having a directive strategy vis-à-vis the key actors of the conflict. Of course, the norm of the international community is to not negotiate with groups labeled as terrorists. But since a part of the EU aid to the Palestinian Authority is sent to Gaza for infrastructure and administration purposes, the EU is justified to have a more direct role in the mediations.

The problem of the communication-facilitation strategy in the specific cases of Hamas is connected to the strained relations between Hamas on one side and the Palestinian Authority and Egypt on the other side. Meaning, the EU's communication-facilitation strategy does not have much of a chance to be effective due to the many hurdles it must overcome. A directive strategy would offer easier access to the disputant party and thus better chances at safeguarding the mediator's interests throughout the mediation. The EU has still avoided contact with Hamas though "why after all refuse to speak with Hamas because it does not recognize Israel, while simultaneously negotiating with Iran, the President of which has declared he would like to see Israel destroyed?[214]".

Secondly, I conclude that EU mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has so far been successful only in short-term stability. The mediations have been successful in ceasing the specified round of violence. But the flipside includes repeated rounds of violence wherein EU border security is threatened and EU aid money is wasted.

[214] (Biscop 2008) p14

However, the EU has still utilized other forms of smart power resources to remain on the ground through a "connective influence[215]", meaning that the actions of the mediator still have consequences throughout the society of the disputant parties. Firstly, by supporting a collective of NGO's and civil society projects[216] in Israel and Palestine, the EU compensate for the power they are not able to exercise fully during the mediations.

Another smart power resource of the EU has been its normative-relational power. That is seen when the disputant parties "consider it very important how the EU votes in international fora" and are ready to "invest diplomatic and political capital to influence the EU voting pattern, considering the EU's position as a source of legitimacy." To maintain the legitimacy and relevance of the EU for the disputants, the EU must then maintain a "meaningful relationship with both sides and a minimum of public respect and credibility of the EU in the public opinion on both sides."[217]

Moreover, despite the destruction of EU-funded projects in the Area C of the West Bank, the EU's persistence in building there attests to the EU "seeing through its strategic interests (presence and protection of Palestinians in Area C which is the land reserve of a future Palestinian state) even if this means that a certain percentage of the investment is subject to demolitions."[218] This showcases that the EU's smart power resources include its economic strength and affordability to continue funding the Palestinian-state to be since it aligns with EU strategic interest.

In the first chapter, we gave credence to the proposition that non-state actors are also credible players within the international system and that they have effect over it. Therefore, by the EU's smart power utilization through NGO's, its normative power, and persisting funding

[215] (Yacobi and Newman 2008) p191
[216] (Steinberg 2016)
[217] (Interview with official in the EU office of Jerusalem 2017)
[218] (Interview with official in the EU office of Jerusalem 2017)

of Palestinian-state building projects, credence should be given to the proposition that non-governmental bodies can also play within the international system and have affect over the outcome of a conflict. I therefore conclude that smart power is conducive for a mediator's interest in a conflict resolution.

Conclusion: The European Union in Centurial Realism:

My aim in this thesis was to understand why the European Union was playing the third wheel role in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU not only allocated billions of euros to the Palestinian statehood enterprise; it not only increased its trade with Israel to become the largest trading partner for the small country- but, the EU also participated in mediations with the intention of resolving the conflict and getting a few steps closer to the EU's strategic interest of long-term stability in the Mediterranean region.

Due to the international dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the mediations have primarily been internationally mediated. This suggests the importance of understanding the international system, especially in the 21st century, to understand how the EU has interacted with the axis of the conflict mediation and EU interests.

I re-conceptualized realism into the 21st century to better understand the role of power in the international system. Accordingly, I establish that the international system is structured with certain regionalization as well. For our case, this would mean that the proximity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the EU is due to the structured-regionalized international system. I also establish that non-state actors have gained primacy similar to conventional nation-states within the international system. This of course affirms that the EU is a valid actor in international relations. Most importantly, I establish that the concept of smart power, which basically includes diverse soft and hard power and the effective utilization of it.

On the theoretical level, the EU fits the centurial realist model. Starting with the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities and recognizing the prevalence of the US's role in the international system, the EU appreciates the structural nature

of the international system and, moreover, appreciates its own weight within the international system. To this end, the EU is "solicited by the international community[219]", implying to a possible superpower status. As such, the EU has taken steps to have bigger role in the international system[220]. The respective mediations of the Road Map, Operation Cast Lead, and Operation Protective Edge demonstrate an EU role that increased- with ups and downs, of course. The point though is at the fact that with each round, its smart power resources had grown as well, despite not using them effectively. The increase of resources suggests an increased role in the international community.

The EU is also essential to the regionalized international system of the 21st century, and that it witnessed in the EU's strategic interest in the Middle East Peace Process, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that solidifies EU's role in the region[221], and the post-Lisbon establishment of the European External Action Service's activities through in the Middle East.

Likewise, The European Union is the ideal non-state actor that has significant presence and influence in the international system and moreover can decide which political units can join the international system. It's refusal of communicating with Hamas for example illustrates how the EU can exclude other political units from the international system.

Correspondingly, the EU is a primary example of a centurial realist actor with smart power and its various strategies for utilization for that power. Due to its economic, political, and relational power, the EU employs relational and economic recompense leverages to initiate European integration, domestic government reforms, and mediation between disputant countries. In Libya and other parts of Africa, it employs/ed military operations to resolve a

[219] (Biscop 2008) p5
[220] (Matlary 2009) p40
[221] ("Euro-Mediterranean Partnership - Trade - European Commission" 2017)

conflict. With Israeli in Gaza war of 2008 Operation Cast Lead, the EU employed disincentive leverages to pressure Israel into agreeing for a cessation of hostilities.

To see power at play, I proposed theoretical frameworks for mediation. In my mediation model, if a mediator used a directive strategy then this implied that the mediator had pre-ascribed interest in the situation and thus opted for a direct role in the negotiations. This also implies the mediator is biased towards its interest and will conduct the mediation accordingly. The EU's strategic interest of a stable neighborhood- and interests of seeing the result of its aid money- propelled it to play a role in the mediations. However, though it did address its interests, the lack of supplementing these with a directive strategy was one of the obstacles to fulfilling those interests (more below).

I also applied smart power into the mediation by treating smart power as conducive for the mediation and the mediator's interests. Due to the diverse nature and utility of smart power, it gives the mediator various avenues through which to employ its resources and leverages on the disputants. The EU possesses economic and normative power over the Israelis and the Palestinians. However, due to the symmetric relation with Israel through lucrative trade, and the various interests of EU member states, the EU has been unable to maximize on its smart power resources.

The outstanding centurial realist concern for the EU is its frequent inability to procure its long-term strategic interests. EU power is undermined due to internal disunity, especially when "member states' economic interests are almost totally divorced from the EU's normative political stance[222]". Running a 27-member state union with 27 different foreign policy and economic agendas is bound to cause difficulties. The internal disunity not only undermines the attainment of a specific EU strategic interest but it can also underplay the smart power that the EU possesses over another actor. Therefore, "the key question is whether member states are

[222] (Gordon and Pardo 2015) p266

ready to let the EU speak with one voice and give the EU the kind of space that would allow it to use its leverage most effectively[223]."

Correspondingly, due to the international system of the 21st century, I proposed multi-party mediation as being challenging for a biased mediator. This suggests that the different set of interests by different mediators would create inconveniences for themselves. Although there is no ample evidence to suggest that the US's lead in the mediations are directly undermining EU interest, our cases demonstrated an EU that is better positioned to utilize power when the US is absent.

EU power is additionally undercut by the international system it plays in. Within that international system, the EU repeatedly reminds itself and is reminded of its "complementary role"[224]. Until the EU rises above the impediments that keep it to a secondary position, I expect EU strategic interests to be overlooked in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

But as mentioned above, the EU's persistence of its interest is illustrated in its use of smart power. By building up networks of NGO's and projects in Israel and Palestine and maintaining a relevant normative power, the EU circumvents the difficulties of the mediation, all the while adhering to its strategic interests. Therefore, while the EU is the third wheel mother-in-law on the dinner table, it is simultaneously prepping up her grandchildren back home to do her will, and that is smart.

[223] (Interview with official in the EU office of Jerusalem 2017)
[224] (O'Donnell 2017) p7

Bibliography

Allen, Lori. 2008. "GETTING BY THE OCCUPATION: How Violence Became Normal during the Second Palestinian Intifada." *Cultural Anthropology* 23 (3): 453–87. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1360.2008.00015.x.

Al-Mughrabi, Nidal, and Luke Baker. 2014. *What's in the Gaza Peace Deal*. Reuters.

Armitage, Richard L, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2007. "CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America." https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf.

Bercovitch, Jacob. 1992. "Mediators and Mediation Strategies in International Relations." *Negotiation Journal* 8 (2): 99–112.

———. 2009. "Mediation and Conflict Resolution." *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, 340–357.

Bercovitch, Jacob, and Gerald Schneider. 2000. "Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management." *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (2): 145–65. doi:10.1177/0022343300037002002.

Berenskoetter, Felix, and Michael J. Williams. 2007. *Power in World Politics*. Routledge. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=vNK6Tisyl_8C&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=felix+berenskoetter&ots=mJ1L1PMNqW&sig=ssdYiDCCtVzLzRH-svarIx31LdA.

Bergmann, Julian, and Arne Niemann. 2015. "Mediating International Conflicts: The European Union as an Effective Peacemaker?" *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 53 (5): 957–975.

Biscop, Sven. 2008. "For a More Active EU in the Middle East." In *Transatlantic Relations and International Conflict Management*. https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/4255308.

Bouris, Dimitris. 2015. "The Vicious Cycle of Building and Destroying: The 2014 War on Gaza." *Mediterranean Politics* 20 (1): 111–117.

Brown, Nathan. 2003. *Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine*. University of California Press.

Carnevale, Peter J. 2002. "Mediating from Strength." *Studies in International Mediation*, 25–40.

CNN, By Marnie Hunter, Katia Hetter and Chelsea J. Carter. 2017. "U.S. Bans Israel Flights - CNN.com." *CNN*. Accessed May 17. http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/22/travel/israel-flights-suspended/index.html.

"Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities." 2009. *European Union External Action*. November. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/concept_strengthening_eu_med_en.pdf.

Crocker, Chester A. 2007. *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*. US Institute of Peace Press. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ehR5GCp10-0C&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=chester+crocker+leashing&ots=M1hWpqQelU&sig=3dAiRlNT9gLzWZ-iLau0QTWqYVo.

"CSDP Structure, Instruments, and Agencies - Eeas - European Commission." 2016. *European Union External Action*. July. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/5392/CSDP structure, instruments, and agencies.

Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs. 2017. "Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East: Israeli/Palestinian Reciprocal Action, Quartet Support." Accessed May 29. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/22520.htm.

Donnelly, Jack. 2000. *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge University Press. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=509idQ4icxIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=jack+donnelly+realism+and+international+relations&ots=O9-I8CupEe&sig=yXkpyLLEiC9bKZU6w7EIlEJ6NoU.

"Eastern Partnership: problems of implementation and potential consequences." 2009. CIS Committee, Council of Federation.

Enserink, Martin. 2013. "Diplomatic Flap Threatens EU-Israeli Research Ties." *Science* 341 (6148): 828–829.

"EU Aid Explorer - About - European Commission." 2017. Accessed May 15. https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/AboutAction.do.

"EU Aid Explorer - EU Aid Overview - European Commission." 2017. *European Comission EU Aid Explorer*. Accessed May 15. https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/AidOverview.do.

"EUMM Georgia - Home." 2017. Accessed May 24. https://eumm.eu/.

"Euro-Mediterranean Partnership - Trade - European Commission." 2017. Accessed May 17. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/euro-mediterranean-partnership/.

"European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - European Commission Welcomes Quartet's Presentation of the Middle East Road Map." 2003. *EUROPA - Press Releases*. April. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-03-612_en.htm.

"European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - How Is the European Commission Responding to the Needs of the Palestinians." 2007. *EUROPA - Press Releases*. December. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-589_en.htm.

"European Reactions to Israel's Gaza Operation." 2017. *Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs*. Accessed May 17. http://jcpa.org/article/european-reactions-to-israel%e2%80%99s-gaza-operation/.

"European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | Agreements." 2017. Accessed May 23. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/eu_israel/political_relations/agreements/index_en.htm.

"European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | CONCORDIA/FYROM." 2017. Accessed May 24. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/concordia/index_en.htm.

"European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | EUFOR Libya." 2017. Accessed May 24. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-libya/index_en.htm.

"EU@UN - EU Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process." 2014. European Commission. *European Union Delegation to the United Nations*. September 7. https://web.archive.org/web/20140907145918/http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_15300_en.htm.

"FMs in Paris Call for Extending 12-Hour Gaza Truce." 2014. *Middle East Eye*. July. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/paris-meetings-press-long-term-gaza-truce-313308926.

"France, Germany 'Strongly Condemn' Rockets on Israel." 2014. *Israel National News*. July. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/182721.

Frankel, Benjamin. 1996. "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction." http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636419608429274.

Fridl, Daniella D. 2009. “Kosovo Negotiations: Re-Visiting the Role of Mediation.” *International Negotiation* 14 (1): 71–93.
Gallarotti, Giulio M. 2011. “Soft Power: What It Is, Why It’s Important, and the Conditions for Its Effective Use.” *Journal of Political Power* 4 (1): 25–47.
———. 2015. “Smart Power: Definitions, Importance, and Effectiveness.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38 (3): 245–281.
Gavel, Doug. 2008. “Joseph Nye on Smart Power.” *Interview with Joseph S. Nye, Harvard Kennedy School Insight Interview* 3.
“Gaza’s Unfinished Business.” 2009. *Crisis Group*. April 23. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/israelpalestine/gaza-s-unfinished-business.
Gilpin, Robert. 1983. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=2iKL7zr3kl0C&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=gilpin+war+and+change&ots=W1Y2Ci3TWq&sig=tHgVFEp3iUw1hXs4DEoerPm51xo.
Gilpin, Robert G. 1984. “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism.” *International Organization* 38 (2): 287–304.
Glaser, Charles L. 2003. “The Natural and Necessary Evolution of Structural Realism’.” *Realism and the Balancing of Power (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003)*.
Gordon, Neve, and Sharon Pardo. 2015. “Normative Power Europe Meets the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” *Asia Europe Journal* 13 (3): 265–274.
Henley, Jon. 2016. “Norway Considers Giving Mountain to Finland as 100th Birthday Present.” *The Guardian*, July 28, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/28/norway-finland-move-mountain-halti-halditsohkka-highest-peak.
Holsti, K. J. 1964. “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations.” *Background* 7 (4): 179.
———. 1995. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ. http://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/clc/2063265.
Holsti, Kalevi Jaakko, and K. J. Holsti. 1995. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ. http://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/clc/2063265.
Hughes, James. 2006. “EU Relations with Russia: Partnership or Asymmetric Interdependence?” http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/651/.
Hunter, Robert E. 2012. “US–European Relations in the ‘Greater’ Middle East.” *American Foreign Policy Interests* 34 (3): 125–133.
Ilgen, Thomas L. 2016. *Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations*. Routledge. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8OwGDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=thomas+l+ilgen+hard&ots=sUNqBz5y2D&sig=0c1o8IQVHCTboI9adX4j1fSAEAE.
“Implementation of the Europen Neighborhood Policy in Israel Progress in 2014 and Recommendations for Actions.” 2015. *European Union External Action*. March. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/2015/israel-enp-report-2015_en.pdf.
Interview with official in the EU office of Jerusalem. 2017Apo Sahagian.
Isma’i, Mohammad Hisham. 2011. “The European Union’s Position toward the Palestinian Cause: 1993-2009.” *Doha Institute, Research Paper*. http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/Get/a9bdabe4-c661-4587-bf94-bfc0862ba199.pdf.
Keohane, Robert O. 1986. “Theory of World Politics.” *Neorealism and Its Critics*, 173.
Kittrie, Orde F. 2003. “More Process than Peace: Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo Accords.” Edited by Robert L. Rothstein, Khalil Shikaki, Moshe Ma’oz, Michael

Watkins, and Susan Rosegrant. *Michigan Law Review* 101 (6): 1661–1714. doi:10.2307/3595328.
Lackey, Douglas P. 2015. "Soft Power, Hard Power, and Smart Power." In *The Philosophical Forum*, 46:121–126. Wiley Online Library. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phil.12059/full.
Lähteenmäki, Kaisa, and Jyrki Käkönen. 1999. "Regionalization and Its Impact on the Theory of International Relations." *Globalism and the New Regionalism* 1.
"Local Statement on Israeli Demolitions and Confiscations of Palestinian Structures in Area C - Eeas - European Commission." 2016. *European Union External Action*. December. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/17114/Local Statement on Israeli demolitions and confiscations of Palestinian structures in Area C.
Lovatt, Hugh, and Mattia Toaldo. 2017. "EU Differentiation and Israeli Settlements." Accessed May 17. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/EuDifferentiation-final3.pdf.
Lukes, Steven. 2007. "Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds." *Power in World Politics*, 83–97.
Matlary, Janne Haaland. 2009. *European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest*. Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke. https://www.idunn.no/ip/2009/03/art14.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. WW Norton & Company.
"Middle East Peace Process - Eeas - European Commission." 2017. *Eeas*. Accessed May 17. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/337/Middle East Peace process.
Miller, Rory. 2006. "Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Israel." *Israel Affairs* 12 (4): 642–64. doi:10.1080/13537120600889894.
———. 2011. "Europe's Palestine Problem: Making Sure the EU Matters to Middle East Peace." *Foreign Aff.* 90: 8.
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1954. *Politics Among Nations. NY: Alfred A*. Knopf.
Morris, Benny. 2011. *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998*. Vintage.
Musu, Costanza. 2010. *European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Quicksands of Politics*. Springer. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=6JWGDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=constanza+musu&ots=wR_X9Y9mzf&sig=Dv_TKbCm5llORQnF4LBxQ0QrDAo.
Neukirch, Claus. 2001. "Russia and the OSCE-The Influence of Interested Third and Disinterested Fourth Parties on the Conflicts in Estonia and Moldova." *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 3. http://leader.viitorul.org/public/597/en/jemie07neukirch11-07-01.pdf.
Newman, David, and Haim Yacobi. 2004. "The Role of the EU in the Israel$\backslash$Palestine Conflict." *Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev*. http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/polsis/research/2006/eu-border-conflict/wp12-role-of-the-eu-in-the-israel-palestine-conflict.pdf.
O'Donnell, Hugh. 2017. "The European Union as a Mediator in Israel-Palestine: Operations Cast Lead and Protective Edge." Accessed May 17. https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-paper/edp_1_2016_odonnell.pdf.
Organski, Alfred FK. 1968. *World Politics. Alfred A*. Knopf, New York.
Ortega, Martin, and Muriel Asseburg. 2003. *The European Union and the Crisis in the Middle East*. Inst. for Security Studies, European Union.

"Palestine - Trade - European Commission." 2017. Accessed May 26. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/palestine/.

"Paying for Palestinian Survival." 2010. *Fanack Chronicle*. August 25. https://chronicle.fanack.com/palestinian-israeli-conflict/costs-of-israeli-occupation/paying-for-palestinian-survival/.

"Pledged Reconstruction Aid for Gaza Must Materialize, Secretary-General Tells Security Council, Saying 'Clock Is Ticking' | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." 2017. *United Nations Press Release*. Accessed May 16. https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11607.doc.htm.

Rasler, Karen, and William R. Thompson. 2001. "Malign Autocracies and Major Power Warfare: Evil, Tragedy, and International Relations Theory." *Security Studies* 10 (3): 46–79.

Ravid, Barak. 2014. "U.S. Halts Missile Transfer Requested by Israel." *Haaretz*, August 14. http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.610493.

"Report for Selected Country Groups and Subjects." 2016. *International Monetary Fund Report*. October. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=56&pr.y=8&sy=2016&ey=2016&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=001,998&s=NGDPD&grp=1&a=1.

Reus-Smit, Christian, and Duncan Snidal. 2008. *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Oxford University Press. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=a1z0DAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=the+oxford+handbook+for+international+relations&ots=ve-cfQgeUH&sig=UQxVryKbPrrioYDhhe_dlfxUtDE.

"Road Map - Quartet Principals Meeting, Statement (20 December 2002) - Non-UN Document (20 December 2002)." 2002. December. https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/UNISPAL.NSF/0/1217FD6D7731896385256C9B004CEC90.

Rubin, Jeffrey Z. 1992. "Conclusion: International Mediation in Context." In *Mediation in International Relations*, 249–272. Springer. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230374690_11.

Sayigh, Yezid. 1997. "Armed Struggle and the Search for State." *The Palestinian National Movement*.

Schellenberg, James A. 1996. *Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice*. Suny Press. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=XOH2aS_FjgoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=James+A+Schellenberg:+Conflict+Resolution:&ots=P_57j_uNDx&sig=m7tyS8nMUkNuzzDl7w9Rxg9HEKA.

Schmidt, Brian C. 2007. "Realism and Facets of Power in International Relations." *Power in World Politics*, 43–63.

Schweller, Randall L. 1998. *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest*. Columbia University Press.

———. 2004. "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing." *International Security* 29 (2): 159–201.

Shlaim, Avi. 2005. "The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process." *International Relations of the Middle East*, 241–261.

Siniver, Asaf. 2006. "Power, Impartiality and Timing: Three Hypotheses on Third Party Mediation in the Middle East." *Political Studies* 54 (4): 806–826.

Sleat, Matt. 2013. *Liberal Realism: A Realist Theory of Liberal Politics*. Oxford University Press. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=2IA8CwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1

&dq=Matt+Sleat:+Liberal+Realism&ots=zk3S_SM7O6&sig=ipxguBk_xOVqmWUnlvOVHvEJP10.

Smith, Michael Joseph. 1986. "Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger." http://philpapers.org/rec/SMIRTF-6.

Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne. 2012. *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford University Press. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=niSmwgGX5V8C&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=Steve+Smith+Amelia+Hadfield+Time+Dunne+Foreign+Policy&ots=Xp32w7DegI&sig=OoFrl8gujLMdL-IHgDG5wsxt9L8.

Solingen, Etel. 1998. *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy*. Princeton University Press. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KiIfVFoUEsIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=ETEL+SOLINGEN:+Regional+Orders+at+Century%27s+Dawn&ots=dsylzWtpwR&sig=2Cs2-2J7iAeidpuOvxn2TsV6nRc.

"Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Situation in Gaza." 2014. July. http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/issues_and_press/mfa_statements/x2014_07_15_statement_of_the_ministry_of_foreign_affairs_on_the_situation_in_gaza.html.

Steinberg, Gerald M. 2016. "EU Foreign Policy and the Role of NGOs: The Arab-Israeli Conflict as a Case Study." *European Foreign Affairs Review* 21 (2): 251–268.

Sullivan, Michael P. 1990. *Power in Contemporary International Politics*. University of South Carolina Press.

"Texts Adopted - Wednesday, 10 April 2002 - Situation in the Middle East - P5_TA(2002)0173." 2002. *EUROPA.EU*. April. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P5-TA-2002-0173.

"The Road Map." 2003. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32 (4): 83–99. doi:10.1525/jps.2003.32.4.83.

Tocci, Nathalie. 2009. "Firm in Rhetoric, Compromising in Reality: The EU in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict." *Ethnopolitics* 8 (3–4): 387–401.

Tocci, Nathalie, and Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN). 2009. *Active but Acquiescent: The EU's Response to the Israeli Military Offensive in the Gaza Strip*. Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN). https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/features/gaza/Gaza_report_May_2009.pdf.

Viotti, Paul R., Mark V. Kauppi, R. Viotti Paul, and V. Kauppi Mark. 1999. *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and beyond*. 327. Allyn and Bacon,. http://www.sidalc.net/cgi-bin/wxis.exe/?IsisScript=UCC.xis&method=post&formato=2&cantidad=1&expresion=mfn=114664.

Voice, European. 2012. "EU-Funded Projects in Palestine Destroyed by Israel." *POLITICO*. March 21. http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-funded-projects-in-palestine-destroyed-by-israel/.

Vuković, Siniša. 2012. "Coping with Complexity: Analyzing Cooperation and Coordination in Multiparty Mediation Processes." *International Negotiation* 17 (2): 265–293.

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979a. "Theory of International Politics." *Reading: Addison-Wesley*.

———. 1979b. "Theory of International Relations." *Reading, Mass.: Addison-Webley*, 111–114.

Weller, Marc, Barbara Metzger, and Niall Johnson. 2008. *Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice*. BRILL.

Wilson, Ernest J. 2008. “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (1): 110–24. doi:10.1177/0002716207312618.

Woodwell, Douglas. 2004. “Unwelcome Neighbors: Shared Ethnicity and International Conflict during the Cold War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (1): 197–223.

Yacobi, Haim, and David Newman. 2008. “The EU and the Israel-Palestine Conflict.” *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association*, 173–202.

Youngs, Richard. 2014. “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Action Without a Script.” *Carnegie Europe*. October. http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=56979.

Zartman, I. William, and Saadia Touval. 1985. “International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics.” *Journal of Social Issues* 41 (2): 27–45.

———. 1996. “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era.” *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, 445–461.

———. 2010. *International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism*. Cambridge University Press. https://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=cGf_bQpTxxgC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=zartman+touval+international+cooperation+&ots=bXE8bTdAek&sig=HRoq0SinEHLtwx2fk8YVFXC8mK0.