

Explaining Intra-Party Democracy (IPD) in the Orient

A case study of political parties in Pakistan

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Abstract

Political parties have long been recognized as a necessary component of modern democracy. However, intra-party democracy (IPD) has failed to gain a similar consensus amongst academics and practitioners alike. Some posit that it is essential for state wide democracy whereas others think otherwise. More significantly, few also espouse the view that it is non-existent or in a general decline across political parties. Notwithstanding, recent research shows that contrary to these standpoints IPD varies across political parties and within them overtime. Robin T. Pettit, in his work shows that five party specific factors (age, origin, ideology, style of democracy and government ambition) are central in explaining the variation in IPD. Moreover, Ingrid Van Biezen and Daniela Romee Piccio in their work on IPD in post-war European democracies show that state laws also require political parties to adopt IPD. It is important to note that all the existing scholarship has focused primarily on established democracies found in the West whereas new democracies (except for East European) in the Asian world have been largely overlooked. This research attempted to explore IPD variation in the Asian world by delving into the case study of political parties in Pakistan. Both the legal regulation of IPD at state level and party specific factors of eight political parties were evaluated. Through the research it was discovered that the state of Pakistan like other European countries also regulates IPD through legal mechanisms. Likewise, the application of Pettitt's model also yielded important findings. The model successfully works for all parties except the Islamic political parties, a party family unique to the Muslim world. The research identified key features of Islamic political parties which can be pursued for further research. Lastly, based on the evidence obtained the study also suggests that the party specific factors can exert disproportionate impact on IPD. Lastly, further research using advanced techniques and larger sample of political parties from Asia can be used to substantiate the model's applicability to new democracies in the region.

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Introduction

Political parties have long been recognized as a necessary component of modern democracy. Academics have time and again reiterated the importance of “parties as key institutions for a healthy democracy, highlighting their roles in the recruitment of candidates, the providing of linkages between government and civil society, the organization of legislatures and the structuring of election campaigns”.¹ Similarly, scholars have also emphasized the role political parties play in stimulating political participation.² A large volume of research can be found which explores the aforementioned functions of political parties. More significantly, recent scholarship on political parties has underscored their internal structures. Researchers, based on the organizational structure, have identified different party types which include the mass party, cartel party, catch all party and business firm party among others.³ In the same vein, intra party democracy (IPD) has also attracted a lot of academic interest lately. To a great degree, this rise in interest has been a response to the party decline hypothesis which gained currency in the “study of advanced democracies”, with the former being considered a likely solution.⁴ The present literature on political parties and particularly IPD has focused on established democracies. Albeit the wave of democratization that struck Eastern Europe prompted theorization for new democracies, there is little or no scholarship exclusively theorizing the internal structures of parties in the new democracies of Asia. It is noteworthy that literature on IPD is still in its incipient stages and scholars hold different opinions with regards to its desirability and utility. Some posit that it is integral to statewide democracy whereas others affirm the contrary. Furthermore, there is a strand

¹ Cross and Katz, *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*, 2.

² Scarrow, “Parties and the Expansion of Direct Democracy,” 342.

³ Cross and Katz, *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*, 7.

⁴ Bolleyer, “The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy. Edited by William P. Cross and Richard S. Katz. New York.”

of thought which argues that IPD in political parties is empirically impossible or at a general decline, nonetheless, recent research shows that in contrast to these possibilities IPD varies across parties and within them overtime. Consequently, explanations for IPD variation have been formulated but like other literature on political parties, these concepts and theories have focused on established democracies or new democracies of Eastern Europe. There is a clear gap in existing literature in that IPD scholarship does not cover political parties in Asian democracies.

This study seeks to explore the variation of IPD levels in Asia by delving into the case study of Pakistan. The research question that drives this research is: What explains the variation of IPD levels in Pakistan? In order to answer this question, the research endeavors to apply existing concepts and models developed for advanced democracies to the case of Pakistan which is a new democracy. The study is of an exploratory nature and can make a rich contribution to current literature on IPD, by examining if existing concepts that were generated for established democracies also apply to the new democracies in Asia. Positive results can contribute to theory development whereas negative results can also help in identifying areas for theory refinement and further knowledge accumulation.

The paper opens with a recapitulation of the existing literature on political parties and IPD, with an exclusive focus on the explanations for IPD variation. It will then shed light on the research design and methodology that the study uses along with a mention of the challenges encountered during this research. Subsequent sections will elaborate on the case study of Pakistani political parties and present an analysis of the findings. The paper will conclude by commenting on the strengths and weaknesses of the existing models in explaining IPD variation in Pakistan as well as identifying avenues for further research.

Chapter 1 - Existing Literature and Theoretical Framework

This section of chapter one aims to introduce the existing literature on political parties, identifying the main concepts and functions that have been attributed to them in a democracy. First, it will recapitulate the discourse which political parties have hitherto attracted vis-a-vis the democratic milieu. Second, an attempt will be made to provide a minimalist and rudimentary definition of political parties which has underlined the extant literature alongside identifying the main functions that have been attributed to them. Third, it will provide a fleeting overview of the main typologies which have been developed overtime to theorize political parties. Lastly, the section will identify the key limitations and challenges which confront contemporary scholarship on political parties. It is important to provide such an introduction because the debates and the edifice of scholarship on IPD have been predicated on these theoretical foundations.

1.1 Discourse on Political parties: Then and Now

The importance and prominence of political parties for democracy has been time and again reiterated by academics since as early as the beginning of the 20th century. James Bryce in 1921 emphasized that “parties are inevitable. No free large country has been without them. No one has shown how representative government could be worked without them”⁵ Similarly in 1941, E. E. Schattschneider famously remarked that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties...the parties are not therefore merely appendages of modern government; they are in the center of it and play a determinative and creative role in it”⁶ Contemporary academics also highlight the indispensability of political parties in providing the basic mechanism through which various democratic institutions could work.⁷ For instance, Giovanni Sartori, a notable political

⁵ Quoted in: Müller and Strøm, “Party Governance and Party Democracy,” 1.

⁶ Schattschneider, *Party Government*, 1.

⁷ Müller and Strøm, “Party Governance and Party Democracy,” 2.

scientist remarks “those parties that are parts (in the plural) have found their essential *raison d’être* and their non-replaceable role in implementing representative and responsive government”⁸ Notwithstanding, contrary to this celebratory view of political parties, a decline hypothesis also emerged in the 1970s which posited that parties as a form of political organization faced an existential threat.⁹ This thought was prompted by the declining membership of political parties in the advanced industrial democracies of the West, primarily the United States of America, where party membership suffered a sharp decline.¹⁰ However, subsequent research showed that the decline hypothesis was limited to party membership and although the general populace is less predisposed to trusting political parties than in the past, an overwhelming majority affirms that political parties are an essential part of democracy.¹¹ Anathema to the complete disappearance of political parties, theorists do agree that recent changes in the political landscape of advanced democracies have admittedly altered the role they traditionally played.¹² Their traditional monopoly over representation has been significantly undermined by the rise of political intermediaries like interest groups.¹³ Similarly, the growth of mass media has emerged as an alternate source of disseminating political information.¹⁴ In addition, contrary to the decline hypothesis which have affected the electoral grounding and mass organization of political parties, it has been demonstrated that the functions they discharge in public office (in parliaments or governmental role) have been immune to deterioration.¹⁵ Lastly, the transitions unraveled by the third wave of democratization further substantiate the continued importance political parties have

⁸ Quoted in: Ibid.

⁹ Svåsand, “Party Development in the Old World: And in the New,” 254.

¹⁰ Ibid., 253.

¹¹ Ibid., 255.

¹² Dalton and Wattenberg, *Parties Without Partisans*, 3.

¹³ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Svåsand, “Party Development in the Old World: And in the New,” 255.

in a democracy – profusion of political parties in these new democracies.¹⁶ Despite all the evidence against the decline hypothesis, it is conceded that parties today are not as strong as they once used to be.¹⁷

1.1.1 What are political parties and what do they do?

As indicated by the title, this section seeks to provide a minimalist definition for political parties which could guide this study. For this purpose, the study will hinge on to the minimalist definition offered by Giovanni Sartori, who defines them as “any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free), candidates for public office”.¹⁸ Literature on political parties has predominantly hinged on a functionalist standpoint when studying and defining political parties. As opposed to the consensus on the importance of political parties there is little consensus on what roles they assume.¹⁹ An influential catalogue of functions was articulated by Anthony King in 1969. According to him the first and foremost function that a party performs is “structuring the vote” i.e. the minimal definition entails that political parties run for elections.²⁰ Second, parties under “integration and mobilization” mobilize people and render them with a reliable voice in the domain of politics.²¹ Third, they are responsible for the “recruitment of political leaders” at all levels from local to national.²² Fourth, parties are responsible for the “organization of government” i.e. the organized control of majority party over all branches of the executive and the legislative.²³ Fifth, for a party to influence public policy it must hold public office and the public policy must embody the

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Müller and Strøm, “Party Governance and Party Democracy,” 4.

¹⁸ Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, 56.

¹⁹ Müller and Strøm, “Party Governance and Party Democracy,” 2.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

ideological predispositions of the party.²⁴ Lastly, he asserts that a party must perform “interest aggregation.”²⁵

1.1.2 Typologies of political Parties

Typologies are frequently used in the study of political phenomenon to insinuate order in the universe of cases – facilitate comparison and formulate theories. Subsequently, existing literature on political parties has also endeavored to classify political parties into comparable categories. These typologies have been formed based on two fundamental subsets, the party label (party family) and the organizational structure they proffer.²⁶

In a relatively recent contribution to the concept of party family literature Peter Mair and Cas Mudde evaluate four approaches that have been frequently used to classify political parties across time and space.²⁷ Namely, i) origin and sociology, ii) transnational links, iii) policy and ideology and iv) party name. They conclude that the central idea behind all these categories is to classify parties based on a common underlying goal.²⁸ However, they contend that some of these approaches fail to reveal the actual identities of political parties and thereby make any classification misleading. For instance, the criterion of transnational links is impaired because it is frequently observed that the acceptance of parties into transnational federations is lax which undermines ideological homogeneity.²⁹ Therefore, they suggest that two approaches should be used in tandem with each other i.e. the genetic approach and the ideology approach.³⁰ The former

²⁴ Ibid., 3.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Svåsand, “Party Development in the Old World: And in the New,” 258.

²⁷ Mair and Mudde, “THE PARTY FAMILY AND ITS STUDY.”

²⁸ Ibid., 226.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., 225.

is more suited for a diachronic analysis whereas the latter is more well poised for a synchronic comparison of political parties.³¹

Similarly, another basis according to which political parties are classified is the organizational features they acquire. These characteristics revolve around the disparate forms of association that parties embody for example the relationship between party elites and the members, the party and its electorate at large and the interaction between party organization and the elected party representatives.³² Based on the studies of established democracies, scholars suggest that party development mirrors a dialectical process i.e. one party type engenders a response that nurtures a new party type.³³ Accordingly, studies have brought forth different party types based on the organizational model which include the mass party, catch all party and cartel party. Notwithstanding, several other typologies have also been formulated but the typologies referred to have been the most salient ones.

1.1.3 Limitations and Challenges

The main limitation which concerns the current research is that most of the existing scholarship on political parties has been based on the study of established democracies. Moreover, since these have been concentrated in the West present literature has not substantially incorporated political parties in the Asian world. The limitations were pronounced when attempts were made at theorizing the new democracies that emerged in the third wave of democratization. Although political parties germinated profusely in the new democracies, theorists admitted that they were not the same as found in established democracies.³⁴ Unlike their western counterparts, political

³¹ Ibid.

³² Svåsand, "Party Development in the Old World: And in the New," 260.

³³ Katz and Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy," 6.

³⁴ Svåsand, "Party Development in the Old World: And in the New," 257.

parties in new democracies lacked the “routinized organizational structure”.³⁵ They usually emerged from a top down process which causes a symbiotic relationship with the leaders - lacking strict adherence to rules and a firm grounding in the society. It is argued that Central and East European countries due to democratization and integration into the European Union are not as different as those in the established democracies.³⁶ However, the reliance on existing models has faced a lot of challenges in studying political parties elsewhere.³⁷ That being said studies also hint at a few similarities in parties of new and established democracies these include decreasing trust in parties, waning of party ideologies and the advent on informal network in party organization.³⁸ Thus, for these reasons the reliance on existing models for studies of new democracies cannot be completely dismissed and instead it can positively contribute towards their further development.

1.2 Discourse on Intra-Party Democracy

This section endeavors to provide a literature review for the existing scholarship on IPD. First, the differing normative standpoints which surround IPD will be brought forth and then the divergent views which exist regarding its empirical viability will be elicited. IPD in simple terms refers to the means through which party members can be encompassed in the internal decision making and functioning of a party.³⁹ Notwithstanding, different approaches have been proposed to measure and operationalize IPD which emphasize certain values others (participation, representation, competition and so forth), however, this is not the subject of the present study.⁴⁰

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., 258.

³⁷ Ibid., 257.

³⁸ Ibid., 270.

³⁹ “Methods of Promoting Internal Democracy in Political Parties —.”

⁴⁰ Cross and Katz, *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*, 5–6.

1.2.1 Intra-party Democracy: Good or Bad?

Insofar as the importance of IPD is concerned, it is contested. Unlike the consensus on the indispensability of political parties to democracy, academics proffer differing views regarding the utility of intraparty democracy to state wide democracy.⁴¹ On the one hand there are scholars who ascribe to the view that IPD contributes to state wide democracy whereas on the other hand there are scholars who deem it to be unimportant and at times unhealthy for democracy. Those who posit that IPD is an essential component of state level democracy, claim that for a polity to be genuinely democratic it is imperative that all institutions of society including political parties are themselves democratic.⁴² Notwithstanding, there are scholars who do not attribute the same importance to IPD. This section endeavors to briefly regurgitate the main arguments put forth by both the standpoints.

1.2.1.1 IPD an asset

Those who view IPD as having positive implications for state wide democracy, wrest their case on several reasons. They affirm that IPD fosters a democratic political culture⁴³, enhances the legitimacy of a democratic rule by granting citizens a degree of political influence⁴⁴ and more generally it may further political participation thereby precluding political alienation.⁴⁵ In addition, the proponents of IPD argue that in its absence, parties may fail to effectively perform two of their main functions i.e. interest representation and aggregation.⁴⁶ Since parties represent a range of interests and groups, lack of IPD can prevent groups from being heard.⁴⁷ Furthermore, it is

⁴¹ Rahat and Shapira, "An Intra-Party Democracy Index," 85.

⁴² Cross and Katz, *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*, 5.

⁴³ Rahat and Shapira, "An Intra-Party Democracy Index," 85.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

contended that IPD is also crucial for the welfare of parties because undemocratic parties, ultimately become stagnant, stymying future change.⁴⁸

1.2.2 IPD a liability

On the contrary those skeptical of IPD either consider it unnecessary or think it has negative implications for state wide democracy. For instance, Giovanni Sartori makes a strong assertion that state wide democracy is not necessarily a sum of many smaller democracies.⁴⁹ In simpler terms, this strand of scholarship postulates that “democracy is free choice among parties, rather than direct participation within parties”.⁵⁰ They posit that proper realization of state wide democracy is immune to undemocratic activity within parties.⁵¹ Furthermore, work along these lines also demonstrates the negative dimension of IPD, wherein the latter seems to disrupt state level democracy. Studies suggest that extremely democratic candidate selection, lead to legislatures which are both less inclusive and representative.⁵² In tandem with this, a recent research on political parties in Israel, concludes that inclusive participation, competition and representation, all of which are core democratic values are unlikely to be optimized in one institution.⁵³ It demonstrates that these values share a non-linear or even negative relationship.⁵⁴

1.2.2 Empirical Viability of IPD

The differing views on IPD are not just limited to the normative realm, in fact, they are pervasive when it comes to the empirical possibilities. Many theorists affirm that democracy in the internal

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Cross and Katz, *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*, 5.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Rahat and Shapira, “An Intra-Party Democracy Index,” 86.

⁵² Cross and Katz, *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*, 5.

⁵³ Rahat, Hazan, and Katz, “Democracy and Political Parties,” 676.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

structures of political parties is close to inconceivable whereas others assert its viability. This section will briefly recapitulate both the standpoints and the arguments put forth by each camp.

1.2.2.1 IPD: a mirage?

The proponents of the idea that political parties cannot be democratic build their case by drawing onto the classic mass party model proposed by Duverger in 1954.⁵⁵ He in his influential contribution to the study of political parties identified two disparate types of parties: i) cadre and ii) mass party. The cadre parties are essentially elite parties (constitute of parliamentarians) wherein leaders are driven by their own electoral interests with little incentive to form an extensive extra-parliamentary structure.⁵⁶ Since this party type is devoid of an organized membership, IPD is irrelevant for them.⁵⁷ Mass parties are the polar opposite of cadre parties in terms of organization and for them membership is of central importance.⁵⁸ Their extensive membership is the sole determinant of party behavior and requires a more elaborate organizational structure.⁵⁹ Therefore it is evident, that the genesis of a mass party is indicative of a democratic organization. However, Duverger holds that mass parties are vulnerable and ultimately fall prey to Michel's law of oligarchy and accordingly avert the possibility of intraparty democracy.⁶⁰ Katz and Mair as discussed earlier, argue that the classic mass party was replaced by the catch all party which entailed a decreased role of the party member, thereby undermining its democratic character as was initially espoused by the mass party.⁶¹ Further, they affirm that the prospects of intraparty democracy have descend into oblivion due to the rise of the cartel party which replaced the catch

⁵⁵ Pettitt, "Exploring Variations in Intra-Party Democracy," 632.

⁵⁶ Carty, "Are Political Parties Meant to Be Internally Democratic?," 13.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 14.

⁶¹ Katz and Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy," 8.

all party. The cartel party smudges the distinction between party members and nonmembers and entails a centralization of operations.⁶² The nature of participation is changed from collective to individualistic which prevents members or supporters from a collective action.⁶³ In essence, this inhibits the role of IPD to mere formality which reinforces the control of party leadership rather than constraining them.⁶⁴ In the same vein, researchers posit that even when parties adopt IPD, all the democratic values themselves cannot be maximized simultaneously.⁶⁵

1.2.2.2 IPD: a fact

Contrary to those who believe IPD is a mere impossibility and democracy in political parties is bound to a gradual decline, there are also scholars who think otherwise. They assert that membership influence in political parties varies across parties and in parties over time.⁶⁶ As is suggested by R K Carty in his franchise party model, the relationship between the individual franchises and the central organizations can vary substantially and this may not be uniform for franchises in an organization.⁶⁷

Recent research reiterates the viability of IPD in political parties, capturing variability across time. Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik and Wolfgang C Muller in their recent work, study the impact of IPD on the survival of party leaders.⁶⁸ They examine the case of Austria over the time-period from 1945-2011 and conclude that regardless of the salience of political performance, intra-party factors (leadership selection procedures, support and so forth) provide insights with strong explanatory power.⁶⁹ For the purpose of their study they rely on statistical analysis and their findings add

⁶² Ibid., 21.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Carty, "Are Political Parties Meant to Be Internally Democratic?," 19.

⁶⁵ Rahat, Hazan, and Katz, "Democracy and Political Parties."

⁶⁶ Pettitt, "Exploring Variations in Intra-Party Democracy," 633.

⁶⁷ Carty, "Parties as Franchise Systems," 10.

⁶⁸ Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, "Intra-Party Democracy, Political Performance and the Survival of Party Leaders."

⁶⁹ Ibid.

credence to the claim put forth. Likewise, Karl Loxbo in an interesting article, impugns the popularly held belief that IPD has slumped since the erosion of the mass party and the rise of cartel parties.⁷⁰ He contends that such claims are exaggerated and lack empirical evidence.⁷¹ The author demonstrates it by evaluating the case of Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) over two different time periods (1950s and 1990s); engaging in a comparative analysis of two internal policy making procedures within the party.⁷² The study illustrates that over the aforementioned time period, contrary to the decline hypothesis, IPD has increased in the selected case. In the same vein, research also shows that IPD qualifies as one of the goals for many political parties.⁷³ This claim was further buttressed by the study of Helene Helboe Pedersen, who reinforces the incorporation of party goals and internal politics in the study of political parties – he also found that intra party democracy is one of the goals that is frequently espoused by political parties.⁷⁴

1.3 Explanations for Variations in IPD

The previous section has established that IPD varies across parties as well as within them overtime. Where on the one hand, scholarly work has shown that political parties display variation in IPD levels, research has also been directed at explaining this variation. This section will elicit the factors which have been used to explain IPD variation in political parties of established democracies. Factors which are endogenous or specific to political parties will be discussed before elaborating upon the legal regulation of IPD at the state level.

⁷⁰ Loxbo, “The Fate of Intra-Party Democracy.”

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid., 549.

⁷³ Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 271.

⁷⁴ Helboe Pedersen, “What Do Parties Want?,” 905.

1.3.1 Party specific factors

A recent study by Robin T. Pettitt elicits a catalogue of five party specific factors which account for the variation in IPD levels.⁷⁵ He compares the UK Labor Party, the Danish Socialist's People's Party (SPP) and the Danish Social Democrats (SD) to explain the influence of the five factors on IPD. The five party specific factors that he identifies based on existing explanations are: origin, ideology, age, government ambition and the type of democracy i.e. consensus or majoritarian. Insofar as the origin of the party is concerned, he alludes to Duverger's work, who asserts that parties which have an extra parliamentary origin (mass parties) tend to show greater membership influence on the parliamentary group; exemplifying greater membership influence.⁷⁶ Similarly, literature affirms that parties which fall left of the ideological spectrum tend to proffer greater levels of IPD.⁷⁷ As predicted by Michels, political parties overtime (particularly those on the left) assume an oligarchic character, Pettitt identifies age as inversely related to IPD.⁷⁸ Government ambition refers to how ambitious a party is in attaining government power as opposed to ideological dogma and according to Pettitt has a negative influence on the level of IPD in a party.⁷⁹ Lastly, the type of democracy or more precisely the institutional constellation under which parties operate also tend to have an impact on the level of IPD in a political party. He posits that majoritarian forms of democracy have a proclivity of generating two party systems wherein acquiring a plurality of votes is the only feasible means of policy influence.⁸⁰ Therefore, the drive to perform well electorally prods a party to form efficient internal structures which compromise

⁷⁵ Pettitt, "Exploring Variations in Intra-Party Democracy."

⁷⁶ Ibid., 634.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 635.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 636.

internal democracy whereas in a consensus model of democracy (electoral success is important but it is not integral to policy influence) parties are more amenable to IPD.⁸¹

1.3.2 Legal Regulation of Intra Party Democracy

A recent study by Van Ingrid Biezen and Daniela Romee Piccio illustrates that legal regulation of internal organizational procedures of political parties is a consistent feature across all (33) European postwar democracies.⁸² However, they affirm that this has been a recent manifestation because historically in the European context political parties had been conceived as “private and voluntary organizations”.⁸³ Consequently, state regulation had been limited to the realm of elections and in some countries aimed at the purge of anti-system parties. The authors maintain that lately, the state has demonstrated a persistent predisposition towards the legal regulation of both internal and external functioning of political parties. They hold that the harbinger of this trend was the introduction of public funding for parties which was reinforced by the regulations on access to public media.⁸⁴ But recently what has prompted more elaborate forms of state intervention in the internal organizational structures and mechanisms of political parties is the growing prevalent discontent vis-à-vis political parties. Subsequently, several laws have been promulgated predicated on various normative presumptions of the internal and external demeanor of political parties that would enhance their ability to perform the functions attributed to them in a democracy.⁸⁵ Biezen and Piccio analyze the legal regulation of internal functioning of political parties with a primary focus on IPD.

⁸¹ Ibid., 636–37.

⁸² Biezen and Piccio, “Shaping Intra-Party Democracy.”

⁸³ Ibid., 27.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 27–28.

Party law in its simplest and broadest understanding refers to all the various laws that impact political parties.⁸⁶ Consequently, for any polity party law is an assortment of an array of distinct public laws i.e. law on political parties, laws pertaining to public funding, electoral laws and the code of conduct among others.⁸⁷ The post war era has also been marked by the constitutionalization of parties, accordingly, the authors assert that the constitution must also be treated as a source of party law.⁸⁸ Since Biezen and Piccio are concerned with the legal regulation of internal dimension of parties and IPD in particular, for their analysis, they focus on two sources of law most likely to cover these domains i.e. constitutions and party laws.

The former is referred to as the basic law and the latter alludes to the exclusive law on political parties in a polity; delineating “party activity, organization and behavior”.⁸⁹ Insofar as the basic law is concerned they find that the constitution either explicitly (German) stipulates IPD whereas others make an implicit (Italian) obligation for parties to adopt democracy in internal affairs. Notwithstanding, in the former case state intervention in internal structures is inhibited under the broad requirement of IPD while in the latter cases more extravagant details regarding internal functioning have been delineated even though an explicit requirement is not pronounced.⁹⁰ With regards to party law, the authors confirm that party laws constitute greater details regarding the internal organization and functioning of political parties.⁹¹ Germany pioneered in this sphere by introducing party law in 1967 which has since then been viewed as a model for fresh democracies emerging in the third and fourth waves of democratization – although with varying emphasis on

⁸⁶ Ibid., 29.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 30.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 34.

⁹¹ Ibid.

IPD.⁹² In order to explore the variation the authors use quantitative and qualitative analysis. For quantitative analysis, they classify provisions into different categories of regulation (see Table 5), stressing the regulation of ‘extra parliamentary party’ because this constitutes of aspects of internal functioning and organization that are quintessential to IPD.⁹³ For qualitative analysis, they appraise the content of laws with the view to identify and evaluate the nature of stipulations for IPD (Table 6) – focusing on the formal recognition of IPD; nature of regulations imposed on relevant procedures (candidate selection, selection of party leadership, party policy and so forth) as well as procedures for dispute resolution and intra party elections.⁹⁴ Based on the framework formulated by the authors the party law that is prevalent in Pakistan will be analyzed.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 38.

Chapter 2 - Research Design and Methodology

The aim of this chapter is to acquaint the readers with the research design and methodology that has been used for this study, elaborating upon the nature of the case study and the considerations which underpin case selection. Moreover, it will also elucidate on the main research question that guides this research alongside the variables and the hypotheses which the research draws onto. It will also expand on data collection and the methodological tools that were used to process and analyze the data. Lastly, this section will shed light on the challenges which surfaced during the research and the limitations which ultimately circumscribe the findings.

By way of introduction, the present research is grounded in the findings of empirical research on IPD in major political parties of Pakistan carried out by the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT); as part of the ‘Democracy and Governance Programme’ which is supported by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Government of Denmark.⁹⁵ PILDAT has been publishing annual reports on IPD for the past three years since the publishing of the first report in 2014, however, the current research focuses on the latest report published in January 2017 and seeks to explain the variation of IPD that exists in the major political parties of Pakistan in 2016. In doing so, this research attempts to use the existing concepts developed for established democracies to explain the case of Pakistani political parties which find themselves in an arguably fresh and newly democratized polity. In methodological terms, it can be claimed that the research is engaging in conceptual traveling as articulated by the famous political scientist, Giovanni Sartori, i.e. the application of concepts to new cases.⁹⁶ Broadly

⁹⁵ PILDAT, “Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan 2016,” 7.

⁹⁶ Collier and Mahon, “Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited,” 845.

speaking, it is a case study on IPD in Pakistan and seeks to contribute to the existing scholarship and knowledge on IPD which has predominantly displayed a bent towards developed democracies.

2.1 Nature of Case Study

In methodological parlance the nature of this case study corresponds to that of a plausibility probe which refers to “a stage of inquiry preliminary to testing...involves probing the ‘plausibility’ of candidate theories”.⁹⁷ Accordingly, when hypothesis are generated they are not immediately tested and the purpose of a plausibility probe is to ascertain whether the potential validity of the former is sound enough to justify the costly process of testing.⁹⁸ In principle, a plausibility probe is similar “to a pilot study in survey or experimental research” which allows for the improvement of the proposed hypothesis or theory, refinement of variable operationalization and measurement and last but not least to check the appropriateness of a case as a test for a theory – lest the actual costs of testing are borne.⁹⁹ This study aims to apply the existing explanations for IPD to a new democracy, which is beyond the original scope of the theoretical precepts i.e. they were designed for established democracies. Therefore, before engaging in a comprehensive study of IPD in new democracies in Asia or elsewhere, it will be useful to validate such a study by doing a plausibility probe of a representative case i.e. Pakistan.

As suggested by Eckstein plausibility probes can serve as “cheap means of hedging against expensive wild-goose chases, when the costs of testing are likely to be very great”.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, plausibility probes are usually oriented to be nomothetic, since the researcher enlightens wider theoretical propositions by delving into the details of a particular case.¹⁰¹ Notwithstanding, there

⁹⁷ Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” 141.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 23.

⁹⁹ Levy, “Case Studies,” 6.

¹⁰⁰ Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” 142.

¹⁰¹ Levy, “Case Studies,” 6.

are scholars who do not treat plausibility probes as a distinct type of case study and argue that it should be treated as a distinct research goal (as opposed to theory building, testing and modifying) that falls between exploratory and confirmatory research.¹⁰² They maintain that it is difficult to distinguish between a plausibility probe and a conventional hypothesis testing case study and that the latter undermines its importance and utility.¹⁰³ To sum up the discussion, one can reiterate by using Arend Lijphart's typology of case studies that plausibility probes are an intermediary step which are located at a cross of hypothesis generation case studies and theory confirming/infirming case studies - following the former and preceding the latter.¹⁰⁴

2.2 Case Selection

Methodological and pragmatic considerations underpin the selection of Pakistan for the present case study. Methodologically speaking, the broad research goal which drives the present research is to probe if concepts and theoretical precepts originally designed for advanced democracies of the West can be effectively used to account for IPD variation in the new democracies of Asia in general and South Asia in particular. Given this consideration, the case of Pakistan qualifies as a typical case which embodies "a typical set of values" that are representative of the wider population of South Asian democracies.¹⁰⁵ Like many other Asian democracies it has recently democratized (2008), has a colonial heritage, a history of military rules, two party dominant multiparty system, a majoritarian electoral system, weak political institutions, political dynasties and a political culture which is unique to this part of the world. Additionally, Pakistan provides a case with rich variation since it has parties from different party families i.e. leftist, Muslim

¹⁰² Rohlfing, *Case Studies and Causal Inference*, 222.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 691.

¹⁰⁵ Gerring and Seawright, "Techniques for Choosing Cases," 91.

democratic/right wing conservative, regional parties and most importantly distinct kinds of Islamist parties which proffer a unique relationship with IPD. Furthermore, with regards to case selection strategies the study is mindful of the tradeoffs involved in a single case study, most notably, the tradeoff between internal and external validity. Whereas it has the benefit of internal validity; a single case study has serious limitations vis-à-vis external validity and unlike a cross case comparison is less representative of the population of interest.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, the causal insight that a case study embodies is concerned with the mechanism rather than the effect that relates the variables under study.¹⁰⁷ In the same vein, greater depth of the scope of proposition in case studies whereas cross case comparisons allow for a more broad generalization.¹⁰⁸ Lastly, literature on case studies suggests that case studies are useful when studying strong causal relationships because the latter can be of limited utility when confronted with a weak causal relationship.¹⁰⁹

The pragmatic reasons for the selection of Pakistan include area familiarity (history, politics and language) and accessibility.¹¹⁰ It is firmly believed that area expertise will allow for the generation of high quality IPD research on Pakistan.¹¹¹ Furthermore, area expertise provides the added advantage of a profound understanding of the local dynamics as well as better access to information and interpretation of qualitative research. More significantly, another impelling reason behind case selection is that IPD scholarship hitherto displays a western bias. Almost all academic work on IPD has focused on western societies so far and Asian societies have been overlooked. It can be postulated that since IPD emerged as a response to party decline in advanced democracies, IPD is a phenomenon which is considered more pertinent to consolidated democracies.

¹⁰⁶ Goodin and Gerring, *The Case Study What It Is and What It Does*, 1144.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 1145.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 1148.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 1152.

¹¹⁰ Maiyo, "Political Parties and Intra-Party Democracy in East Africa," 25.

¹¹¹ Ennsner-Jedenastik and Müller, "Intra-Party Democracy, Political Performance and the Survival of Party Leaders," 934.

Nevertheless, it is well observed that due to increasing globalization, there has been an ever-rising increase in exchange of ideas and emulation of political phenomenon. Therefore, studying IPD in an Asian society can provide some useful insights with regards to state wide democracy in the chosen country. This study will be one of the first of its kind and will undoubtedly make a rich contribution to IPD corpus.

2.3 Research Question and Variables

The main research question that guides this exploratory research is the following:

What explains the variation in IPD levels in the major political parties of Pakistan?

As the question suggests, this research seeks to provide an explanation for the variation in IPD levels that is demonstrated by the major political parties of Pakistan. Previous sections have deliberated in detail on the paucity of academic scholarship and subsequent dearth of literature on political parties in new democracies, particularly those in the Asian world. Therefore, this research hinges onto existing models and explanations (formulated for established democracies) to answer the research question. Consequently, the variables that will be considered for this research have been drawn from the theoretical precepts and models discussed in the previous section. Since the level of intraparty democracy in the political parties is to be accounted for, ‘level of IPD’ is the dependent variable for this research whereas the factors which have been considered to influence the ‘level of IPD’ are to be treated as the independent variables. Since the research seeks to test and probe the efficacy of existing models, it is working with the assumption that the model will work. Therefore, for all the independent variables the null hypothesis (H_0) will be their impact as determined by previous works. The table below provides a summary of the variables that the research uses.

Table 1: Variables and Hypotheses

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	Impact & Hypothesis (H₀)
Level of IPD in Political Parties	Legal Regulation	Positive
	Age	Progressively Negative
	Origin	
	Parliamentary	Negative
	Extra-Parliamentary	Positive
	Ideology	
	Right-wing	Negative
	Left-wing	Positive
	Government ambition	
	High	Negative
	Low	Positive

Source: Pettitt, “Exploring Variations in Intra-Party Democracy”, 637. and Biezen and Piccio, “Shaping Intra-Party Democracy.”

2.4 Data Collection and Methodological Tools

The research relied heavily on qualitative data collection methods even though quantitative methods were also sporadically used to gather data. The qualitative methods used include textual or content analysis whereas quantitative methods were used in the form of descriptive statistics. The predominant use of qualitative research methods can be attributed to the exploratory nature of the research design as well as the use of secondary data sources. Due to constraints of time and funding the research did not use primary data (except for legal regulation of IPD) sources and

secondary data was attained from existing published research in the form of journal articles, newspaper articles, think tank publications, books and country reports.

2.4 Measurement of variables

To ascertain and analyze the legal regulation of IPD in Pakistan, the study engaged in content analysis of the constitution and party law using the framework used by Biezzen and Piccio in their analysis of European countries. With regards to party specific factors, the study relied on secondary sources. For age, origins and party ideology existing literature was used in light of the theoretical framework formulated by Robin Pettitt in his study. Accordingly, government ambition of each party was measured by viewing their electoral history and the willingness to form government or coalition government. For new parties which failed to secure sufficient seats in the parliament, their political demeanor was also considered.

2.5 Limitations and Challenges

The study confronted several challenges which limit the scope of the findings. First, the literature on political parties in Pakistan is not well-developed in that existing literature is devoid of theoretical concepts that have been developed for political parties in the established democracies. Moreover, there is a severe dearth of exclusive literature on political parties which was circumvented by alluding to general political science literature on Pakistani political system. This challenge was most pronounced when variables for National Party were to be measured (continuous crisis in the form of separatist movements and counter-insurgencies has prevented the generation of academic literature). Secondly, since the ‘Manifesto Project’ and other relevant databases do not cover Pakistan, existing literature had to be relied upon because the constraints of time and space precluded the possibility of engaging in an independent coding exercise. Thirdly,

since the IPD scores used in this study were taken from an independent source, there is a chasm in the methodology used by the former and Pettit (membership influence on formal policy-making process at annual conference) which can be a major source of limitations for this study. However, the study posits that different strategies in measuring IPD should not preclude a probe of the model's applicability beyond its scope conditions and more importantly the method used by the survey is more comprehensive which adds to the rigor of the plausibility probe.

Chapter 3 – The Case of Pakistan

3.1 Political landscape of Pakistan

The independent state of Pakistan emerged as an independent country on the world map in the aftermath of the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The states of India and Pakistan both were a culmination of British colonialism in India. Even though both the countries attained independence simultaneously, the future trajectories which both embarked upon have been starkly dissimilar. The former although there have been moments of uncertainty, has maintained a strong commitment to democracy whereas the latter's attempts at democratization have been time and again thwarted by repeated spells of military rule. Pakistan has embodied a capricious political system which has switched ends between civilian and military rules.¹¹² The country in its brief history of seventy years has hitherto undergone three military rules which if combined account for almost half of its existence (34 years out of 70).¹¹³ Nevertheless, developments in the past decade have restored hope amongst political observers and reinvigorated life into the country's democratic aspirations. The year 2008 brought forth a series of watershed advances towards democratization which began with the ascent to power of a democratically elected government that completed its term of five years – a rarity in Pakistani politics wherein military takeovers had marred the successful completion of all previous democratically elected governments.¹¹⁴ This was preceded by an end to the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf who resigned from army earlier in 2007. Although the completion of term by an elected government was a seminal achievement it was followed by yet another momentous accomplishment i.e. the smooth transition of power to a

¹¹² Yamin, "Pakistan," 4.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

new democratically elected government following the 2013 elections.¹¹⁵ In addition, another promising feature has been the relative fairness of both the elections which were generally considered free and fair by international observers and the results were also widely accepted by political parties, notwithstanding, there were irregularities and some evidence of rigging.¹¹⁶ More importantly, the voter turnout in 2013 elections stood at an impressive 55% compared to 45% in 2008.¹¹⁷ These trends complemented with the absence of military rule have rendered some stability and strength to the frail attempts at democratization which commenced with its restoration in late 2007.

3.1 Nature of Regime

As mentioned earlier, the changes unveiled in 2008 brought an end to the authoritarian regime (since 1999) wherein elections are used by a strong military to legitimize itself.¹¹⁸ The election of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in 2008 and its electoral defeat at the hands of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML N) in 2013 meant that the democratic forces have not only regained power but relayed power.¹¹⁹ For the first time in the country's history, the electorate voted out a democratically elected government after the successful completion of its term.¹²⁰ Moreover, the general agreement on the transparency of elections coupled with the smooth transfer of power granted Pakistan the category of an 'electoral democracy' by Freedom House in 2014.¹²¹ However, given the influence military still inflects in the political sphere has raised scruples among analysts and subsequently Pakistan qualifies as an important case in the literature on hybrid regimes - it has

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 5.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Adeney, "How to Understand Pakistan's Hybrid Regime," 119.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

engendered a lot of literature on the hybridity that the political system has on offer.¹²² Recent contributions include the works of Saira Yamin, Kunal Mukherjee and Katherine Adeney. It is posited that the current return to democracy is different from the earlier decade long attempt at democratization in the interregnum between military dictatorships of General Zia ul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf (1998-1999). A major distinguishing factor is the “increased commitment of its civilian politicians to the democratic process”, however, the institutional imbalance wherein military and bureaucracy cripple the frail civilian political leadership push Pakistan in a grey zone that is marked by a combination of democratic elements and deficits.¹²³ Since the sole focus of this research is the study of IPD, it treats Pakistan as a new democracy without delving deep into the exact nature of the regime.

3.2 Political System of Pakistan

The Constitution of Pakistan provides for a parliamentary form of government with a bicameral federal legislature known as the Majlis – e – Shoora – lower house referred to as the national assembly and the upper house called the senate.¹²⁴ The national assembly constitutes of 342 seats out of which 272 are for elected representatives, 60 and 10 are reserved for women and non-Muslims respectively. The number of seats are proportional to the population each province (Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Baluchistan and Sindh), Federal Capital (Islamabad) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is home to. Whereas the senate comprises of 104 members who are elected for a six-year term, the allocation of seats is such to redress the influence of bigger provinces.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Szajkowski, *Political Parties of the World*, 455.

3.3 IPD in the major political parties of Pakistan

The main goal of this section is to elicit the variation in IPD of the major political parties in Pakistan which the present research seeks to explain. As brought forth in earlier sections, this study relies on the findings published by PILDAT in their work on IPD in Pakistan. Before presenting their findings, it is imperative that the methodology that the survey uses is briefly touched upon because operationalizing IPD as seen in chapter 1 is not a homogenous process and different forms have been proposed time and again.

3.3.1 Case Selection and IPD Measurement

The study analyzed the internal functioning of eight political parties. Five of the political parties (PML N, PPP, PTI, MQM and JUI-F) were selected due to their salience as the five largest political parties in the current National Assembly (NA) for the duration 2013-2018.¹²⁵ The three additional parties were selected to represent the smaller provinces of Baluchistan (NP) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (ANP) and include a unique pattern of IPD in the form of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI).¹²⁶ The following table illustrates the composition of all the political parties under study in the present National Assembly of the country.

Table 2 Composition of Political Parties in the National Assembly

Party	PML N	PPP	PTI	MQM	JUI F	JI	ANP	NP
No. of seats in NA	189	47	33	24	13	4	2	1
Percentage of Seats	55.59%	13.82%	9.71%	7.06%	3.82%	1.18%	0.59%	0.29%

¹²⁵ PILDAT, "Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan 2016," 9.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

Source: National Assembly of Pakistan website, (www.na.gov.pk).

To measure the level of IPD, the framework of assessment used to assign score to each political party comprised of eleven parameters which aimed at eliciting information on particular aspects of IPD such as the institutional constellation, decision making process, the internal structure and so forth.¹²⁷ To enhance the accuracy and objectivity of the results, these eleven parameters were further split into sub-parameters for instance the principal parameter ‘regular and competitive party elections’ was further divided in the sub-parameters of ‘regularity and periodicity’, ‘competitiveness’ and ‘elections at various levels’ which in turn were determined through specific indicators.¹²⁸ In a very recent work, Rahat and Shappira, propose an IPD index which examines IPD on five dimensions i.e. participation, representation, competition, responsiveness and transparency.¹²⁹ To see whether the method used by PILDAT also covers the aforementioned dimensions an effort was made to assign dimensions to each of the eleven parameters. Table 3 below shows the results obtained. Although the results would have been more telling if the sub-parameters were also included in the analysis, nevertheless, such a tabulation suggests that the method to measure IPD used by the survey is comprehensive in that it is inclusive of all the main dimensions usually attributed to democracy and its manifestation within political parties. Unfortunately, due to the constraints of time and space further discussion regarding the weights assigned to each dimension will not be pursued and are left for discussion elsewhere.

Table 3 Dimensions of IPD Measured

Dimension	Parameters
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¹²⁷ Ibid., 15.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 15–17.

¹²⁹ Rahat and Shapira, “An Intra-Party Democracy Index.”

Participation	Regular change in party leadership; A democratic decision-making process Discouragement of dynastic leadership
Representation	Active participation of women, youth and minorities in the party affairs
Competition	Regular and competitive party elections
Responsiveness	Tradition of annual general meetings or conventions; Effectiveness of intra-party structures; Regular meetings of parliamentary parties
Transparency	Tolerance of dissent within the party; Democratic character of the party constitution; A broad funding base and credible party accounts

Source: Dimensions for tabulation were adapted from Rahat and Shapira, “An Intra-Party Democracy Index,” 89.

For data collection, the study made use of both qualitative and quantitative methods which were applied to primary and secondary sources.¹³⁰ Primary sources included party officials whereas secondary sources constituted of party constitutions and published research articles.¹³¹

3.3.2 IPD scores

Based on the methodology presented, the PILDAT report published the following findings:

¹³⁰ PILDAT, “Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan 2016,” 15.

¹³¹ Ibid.

Table 4 IPD variation in Pakistan

Sr. no.	Party	IPD score
1	Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	80%
2	National Party (NP)	69%
3	Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)	61%
4	Awami National Party (ANP)	61%
5	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam – Fazal (JUI-F)	59%
6	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)	46%
7	Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)	42%
8	Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML N)	40%

Source: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency (PILDAT), “Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan 2016,” 10.

Chapter 4 - Explaining IPD in Pakistan (Findings)

This chapter seeks to systematically present the findings this research obtained by applying the concepts and theoretical explanations identified in the initial chapters to explain the varying levels of IPD in the political parties of Pakistan. First, a detailed examination of the country's law on political parties will be elicited to demonstrate the legal regulation of IPD that exists in Pakistan. Second, a profile of each political party will be presented to situate them on the catalogue of party specific variables.

4.1 Legal Regulation of IPD in Pakistan

This section will present and analyze the legal provisions in the basic and party law of Pakistan. An attempt will be made to replicate Biezen and Piccio's analysis of party law in Europe, on the case of Pakistan. First the basic law will be discussed and then the party law will be analyzed using the qualitative and quantitative framework used by the former two authors. In accordance with the findings of Biezen and Piccio, the basic law of Pakistan also sparsely regulates the internal political parties, however an exclusive provision explicitly constitutionalizes political parties in the country.

4.1.1 Basic Law

Article 17 of the constitution titled 'Freedom of Association', in the chapter on fundamental rights constitutionalizes political parties in the country.¹³² Clause 2 of the article entitles every citizen (not a government employee) the right to form a political party which will be subject to all laws which ensure the sovereignty and integrity of the country. The constitutional provision does not formally call for the regulation of internal functioning of political parties except for the transparency in funding. Similarly, neither is there an explicit obligation for the parties to be

¹³² National Assembly of Pakistan, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 11.

internally democratic. In addition to this, there are other provisions concerning political parties but they do not seek to regulate the internal functioning of political parties for instance articles 51 and 63 under the chapter on parliament make a cursory reference to political parties concerning the allotment of reserved seats (women and non-Muslim) and disqualification of candidates respectively. These conform to the category of ‘electoral party’ (see table 6) which includes provisions that regulate the party in its electoral capacity (composition of legislature, candidate recruitment and selection and distribution of parliamentary seats).¹³³

4.1.2 Party Law

The Political Parties Order of 2002 was promulgated through an executive order issued in 2002. This qualifies as the party law of Pakistan, comparable to those studied by Biezen and Piccio in their work on post-war European democracies. Unlike the constitutional provisions which are broad and more generic in scope, the order covers in detail the external and internal functioning of political parties in the country. The order begins with a formal recognition of IPD as an important internal value for political parties based on the rationale that “practice of democracy within the political parties will promote democratic governance in the country for sustaining democracy”.¹³⁴ First a qualitative analysis will be carried out based on the categories used by Biezen and Piccio. The table below shows that the law in Pakistan like several other European democracies makes a formal recognition of IPD. Similarly, the law makes it obligatory for parties to ensure membership involvement in candidate selection (article 8), leadership selection (article 11) and the election of party organs at various levels of organization (local, provincial and federal level). However, it is important to note that the law does not prescribe any role for members vis-à-vis policy formation

¹³³ “The Party Law Database » Party Law in Modern Europe.”

¹³⁴ Government of Pakistan, The Political Parties Order, 2002.

and even in the case of Europe only six countries ascribe to this in their respective party laws. Additionally, the law makes a brief mention of dispute resolution but covers in detail the voting procedures.

Table 5 Qualitative Analysis of Party Law

Aspects of IPD	Party Law	Biezen and Piccio's findings (number of countries)
Formal principle of internal party democracy	Yes	12
Member role in candidate selection	Yes	17
Member role in leadership selection	Yes	9
Member role in policy formation	No	6
Member role in selection of organs of representation	Yes	6
Right to dissent/internal arbitration body	Yes	14
Voting procedures	Yes	16

Source: Adapted from Biezen and Piccio, “Shaping Intra-Party Democracy.”, 39.

In contrast, Table 6 presents a quantitative thematic analysis of the law and it is evident that a predominant part of the provisions regulates the extra-parliamentary party (30.9% of the provisions) i.e. the internal organizational structures and functioning of parties – aspects closely linked to the IPD. Similarly, external oversight also accounts for 17.9% of the provisions whereas party finance constitutes 16.7% of the total provisions. It can be concluded that the party law prevalent in Pakistan in similarity with European democracies, predominantly deals with the extra-parliamentary party, external oversight and party financing. The percentages are comparable with minor variation except for ‘external oversight’ which is comparatively given less weight in

Pakistan. It is important to note that the database on party law when coding extra-parliamentary party in addition to the extra-parliamentary organization also includes provisions dealing with the organizational structure of the parties as well as those concerning IPD.¹³⁵ Therefore, it is evident that legal regulation of internal functioning of political parties also accounts for IPD in political parties of Pakistan.

Table 6 Quantitative Analysis of Party Law

Area of regulation	Magnitude for Pakistan (%)	Biezen and Piccio's Findings (%)
Extra-parliamentary party	<i>30.9</i>	<i>33.0</i>
External oversight	<i>17.9</i>	<i>31.7</i>
Party finance	<i>16.7</i>	<i>20.9</i>
Rights and freedoms	<i>3.6</i>	<i>0.9</i>
Secondary legislation	<i>2.4</i>	<i>6.3</i>
Electoral party	<i>3.6</i>	<i>0.7</i>
Democratic principles	<i>4.8</i>	<i>1.4</i>
Identity and programme	<i>5.9</i>	<i>1.4</i>
Media access	<i>0</i>	<i>0.5</i>
Activity and behavior	<i>2.4</i>	<i>3.0</i>
Parliamentary party	<i>3.6</i>	<i>0.1</i>
Governmental party	<i>0</i>	<i>0.1</i>

Source: Adapted from Biezen and Piccio, "Shaping Intra-Party Democracy.", 35.

¹³⁵ "The Partylaw Database » Party Law in Modern Europe."

4.2 Party Profiles

Pakistan at present can be classified as a multiparty system with a total of 337 parties registered with the Election Commission of Pakistan. However, due to the availability of IPD data on the eight political parties identified above, this study has focused on them. Even though Pakistan in its current state qualifies as a multiparty democracy, the political canvass has been dominated by a few parties. The 1990s saw a burgeoning two party system which persisted up until 2010 - politics was dominated by PML N and PPP. The religious parties have been a perennial feature of Pakistani politics especially the JI and JUI-F which hark back to pre-independence era. Similarly, regional parties have also surfaced in the provinces like MQM in Sindh, ANP in KPK and NP in Baluchistan. In a more recent development PTI has risen to popularity as the second most popular party in the 2013 elections. This section will elaborate on each political party in relation to the party specific factors which have an influence on IPD.

4.2.1 Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML N)

Pakistan Muslim League originally came into being in 1906 in Dhaka (now in Bangladesh) as part of United India under the name of All-India Muslim League (AIML).¹³⁶ The AIML was at the forefront of the independence struggle and subsequently turned out to be the first ruling party of the country. Due to its origin and organizational structure, the party since its inception had been plagued by internal division and factionalism which eventually resulted in its splitting into factions after independence.¹³⁷ Hitherto, in the country's history of almost seventy years the Pakistan Muslim League has had as many as nine factions with each registered as an independent political party with the Election Commission of Pakistan and each claiming to be the real successor.¹³⁸ At

¹³⁶ PILDAT, "Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan 2016," 60.

¹³⁷ Szajkowski, *Political Parties of the World*, 459.

¹³⁸ PILDAT, "Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan 2016," 60.

present, PML N along with All-Pakistan Muslim League which is a coalition of PML -Q [Quaid], PML-J [Junejo] and PML – F [Functional] are the two largest factions.¹³⁹ Even though both the factions coalesced at one point, regional and ethnic clashes separated them again.

PML N emerged as the largest and the strongest faction in 1992, led by the current Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who had become its undisputed leader as early as 1988.¹⁴⁰ It was pivotal in forming the Islami Jamhoori Itehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance, abbreviated as IJI) in 1990 elections which was successful in securing a majority in the assembly and giving Nawaz the office of the Prime Minister. PML N was the central opposition party in the PPP led 1993 government and turned the tables in 1997 elections by winning a two thirds majority making Nawaz Sharif the prime minister once again.¹⁴¹ During the 1997 government the party crumbled and began to split into factions. After the removal of Nawaz Sharif in the military coup of 1999, yet another faction PML Q (Quaid) rose to power in the 2002 elections held under General Pervez Musharraf. Consequently, PML N's strength in the parliament was reduced to a small opposition with its leadership in exile. The end of military rule in 2007 brought back the civilian leadership of the two main political parties in the country (PPP and PML N). PML N featured well in the 2008 elections and emerged as the second largest party assuming the role of opposition against the PPP government. Finally, in 2013 general elections after a five-year stint in opposition PML N yet again emerged as the largest party nationwide and formed government at the center. Currently, it is the ruling party and its term will end in 2018.

Origin

¹³⁹ ULLAH, *Vying for Allah's Vote*, 63.

¹⁴⁰ Kazmi, "Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz."

¹⁴¹ Szajkowski, *Political Parties of the World*, 459.

Based on Duverger's framework, the origin of AIML can be classified as parliamentary as opposed to an extra-parliamentary origin. Haroon K. Ullah in his recent book on Islamic political parties in Pakistan observes that AIML was formed by the social elites, labor union leaders, wealthy industrialists who united in order to safeguard their interests... since its inception Muslim League was a tool of the elite and reflected elite aspirations".¹⁴² He holds that since it sought to further the interests of the elite and maintain their social and economic status it proffered a parochial and highly centralized form of internal organization.¹⁴³ This entailed membership that was not open to public instead was strictly guided by the social and economic power structure – 'thin and clientelistic' in the vocabulary of Gunther and Diamond. Moreover, such a structure of the party precluded mass mobilization because the party was "alliance of convenience among elites who were economically, religiously and socially distinct from the larger population".¹⁴⁴ Stephen Cohen also echoes similar views when he opines "the original Muslim League...it was an elite party with an undemocratic structure".¹⁴⁵

Ideology

In its current form and orientation, academics and analysts alike regard PML N as a right of center political party. It is posited that since its ascent to power in the 1980s and 1990s to the present time it has transformed from a semi-Islamic right wing party to a centre-right ideological outfit.¹⁴⁶ Since its two short stints in power in the 1990s and a decade of struggle against the dictatorial regime of General Pervez Musharraf, the party has assumed a more moderate and democratic ideology –

¹⁴² ULLAH, *Vying for Allah's Vote*, 54.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 55.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 56.

¹⁴⁵ COHEN, "Political Pakistan," 133.

¹⁴⁶ Paracha, "Political Parties in Pakistan."

seeking to obviate itself from the initial Islamist image of the late 1980s and 1990s.¹⁴⁷ Insofar as its take on religion is concerned, the party espouses a moderate outlook in the realm of politics but is socially conservative.¹⁴⁸ With regards to the economic policy, it has pursued a liberal economic policy since the onset (opposing PPP) and Sharif who himself has an industrial background is dubbed as “friend of the Pakistan’s businessmen”.¹⁴⁹ The literature on party family classifies PML N as a ‘Muslim Democratic’ party that is a distinct party type unlike the Islamists. Vali Nasr, who has extensively studied Islamic political parties postulates that Muslim Democratic parties (closely resemble Christian Democratic parties) unlike Islamist’s are practical and “do not seek to enshrine Islam in politics, though they do wish to harness its potential to help them win votes”.¹⁵⁰ He continues that such parties offer right of center platforms which are formed by combining “Muslim values and moderate Islamic politics...beyond exclusively religious concerns...can appeal to broad cross section of voters”.¹⁵¹ The Turkey’s AKP, Bangladesh’s BNP and the UNMO in Malaysia are considered to belong to the same party family.

Government Ambition

Based on its track record and past performance, it seems fair to claim that PML N has a ‘high’ government ambition. It formed government the third time in the latest elections of 2013 and when not in government it has been the most central opposition party. Appendix A summarizes the party’s electoral ventures and the corresponding result.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ ULLAH, *Vying for Allah’s Vote*, 65.

¹⁵⁰ Nasr, “The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy,’” 14.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

4.2.2 Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

The PPP was founded in 1967 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and has been one of the most powerful political forces in the country since then.¹⁵² It came out as the most popular party in West Pakistan in 1970 elections and after the separation of East Pakistan formed a government in the former. It called for Islamic socialism, democracy and encouraged a non-aligned foreign policy.¹⁵³ In 1977, General Zia ul Haq, overthrew a PPP government and the military regime that ensued eventually executed Bhutto in 1979. Party leadership was then assumed by his widow begum Nusrat Bhutto which was eventually transferred to their daughter Benazir Bhutto. Following the death of General Zia in a plane crash, PPP emerged as the single largest party in 1988 and 1993 elections, notwithstanding, both the governments were dismissed before completion by the then Presidents (on charges of corruption). Subsequently, Benazir Bhutto went in exile after 1997, leading the party from abroad and did not return until 2007. Her assassination while campaigning for 2008 elections preceded the party's return to power under the leadership of her husband Asif Ali Zardari (co-chairman). The government completed its term of five years, nevertheless, the 2013 elections reduced its influence to one province (Sindh). Recent times have seen the proactive involvement of Benazir's son Bilawal Bhutto Zardari (party chairman) as opposed to earlier period wherein Asif Ai Zardari was the voice of the party.

Origin

PPP's ascent to popularity at the onset can admittedly be attributed to its extra-parliamentary origin. Contrary to other parties of that time which lacked strong organizational roots, PPP had

¹⁵² Bray, "Pakistan at 50: A State in Decline?," 320.

¹⁵³ Szajkowski, *Political Parties of the World*, 459.

strong roots in West Pakistan, particularly in the provinces of Sindh and Punjab.¹⁵⁴ Stephen Philip Cohen observes that Bhutto and Mujib-ur-Rehman, leader of the Awami League and his counterpart in East Pakistan, pioneered mass politics in Pakistan which had until then been kept at bay.¹⁵⁵ Bhutto after resigning as the foreign minister in Ayub Khan's military rule subsequently turned against him - spearheading a popular movement against him.¹⁵⁶ Both Jaffrelot and Cohen, highlight that unlike the Muslim League, a band of leftist and progressive intellectuals was instrumental in the formation of PPP who approached Bhutto when he quit the Ayub government.¹⁵⁷ The formation of the party formalized the beginning of a movement that prodded protests and rallies until Ayub's retreat in 1969.¹⁵⁸

Ideology

PPP like the PML N has also undergone ideological transformation but a more drastic one when compared to the latter. At present, it is classified as a centre-left party which has a national outreach and a support base in both rural and urban segments of the population.¹⁵⁹ However, in 1967 PPP kicked off with a socialist ideology (referred to as Islamic socialism to evade opposition from the Islamists) and "seemed strongly anchored to the left".¹⁶⁰ Later when Benazir took control in 1985, the party abandoned Bhutto's "left wing radicalism in favor of social democracy" and contrary to nationalization policies she favored privatization – a major change in the party's political stance.¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, the party has ardently called for the redressal of social and income disparity by

¹⁵⁴ COHEN, "Political Pakistan," 138.

¹⁵⁵ Cohen, "State Building in Pakistan," 197.

¹⁵⁶ COHEN, "Political Pakistan," 135.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.; Jaffrelot, "Impossible Democracy or Impossible Democrats," 212–13.

¹⁵⁸ Jaffrelot, "Impossible Democracy or Impossible Democrats," 222.

¹⁵⁹ Gazdar, "Pakistan's Precious Parties," 8–9.

¹⁶⁰ Jaffrelot, "Impossible Democracy or Impossible Democrats," 221.

¹⁶¹ Bray, "Pakistan at 50: A State in Decline?," 320; Haider, "Pakistan Peoples Party."

reliance on public-sector expenditure.¹⁶² Insofar as the parties stance on religion is concerned it is predominantly secular but not completely anathema to religion – in fact it is flexible enough to make room for certain aspects of political Islam associated with the Sufi and modernist reformist traditions.¹⁶³

Government Ambition

PPP has arguably been the most successful party in the country forming government at the centre a record four times and therefore can be said to have a ‘high’ government ambition.¹⁶⁴ Although it has always been a strong contender in elections on occasions when it failed to form a government the party has been at the forefront in the opposition. See Appendix B for a summary of the party’s electoral history and the corresponding outcome in terms of government formation.

4.2.3 Pakistan Tehrik – e – Insaf

Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice) was founded in April 1996 by Imran Khan, a cricketing legend and former Pakistan team captain - has always been a popular figure in the country. Compared to its counterparts PTI is a young force in the political milieu of Pakistan and suffered from a period of stagnation that lasted for over a decade until the party’s rise to popularity in 2011.¹⁶⁵ Imran Khan, at the parties founding declared that the main aim of the party was to foster change in the country by striving for justice and honesty.¹⁶⁶ The party contested its first elections in 1997, a year after its formation which proved to be disappointment, failing to secure any seats in both the National Assembly and any of the Provincial Assemblies. A poor show at the polls continued in the 2002 election when the party won only one seat to the National Assembly

¹⁶² Al Jazeera, “Explainer: Pakistan’s Main Political Parties - Al Jazeera English.”

¹⁶³ Paracha, “Political Parties in Pakistan.”

¹⁶⁴ PILDAT, “The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan.”

¹⁶⁵ Abro, “Pakistan Tehrik-I-Insaaf.”

¹⁶⁶ Szajkowski, *Political Parties of the World*, 459.

and that too won by Imran himself.¹⁶⁷ The party boycotted the 2008 elections due to participation in the ‘Restoration of Judges’ movement that demanded the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, who had been deposed by the then military ruler General Pervez Musharraf.¹⁶⁸ Although Imran Khan has been a popular figure in the country due to his cricketing background and always attracted attention, PTI’s fortune did not augur well until the year 2011 when a public gathering in Lahore marked its rise to prominence in Pakistani politics. Consequently, considering past performances the party has featured well in the latest elections of 2013 emerging as the second most popular party in the country (third largest in terms of NA seats).¹⁶⁹ PTI at present happens to be one of the most influential parties in the country, particularly sidelining PPP in its opposition to PML N.

Origin

PTI made it to the political landscape in an era wherein mass politics had been well rooted in the Pakistani society – embodying extra-parliamentary origins. Imran Khan, due to his past as a cricketer and philanthropist had popular appeal prior to entering politics but his movement for justice as the party name connotes took long to gain currency in the country. The party gained traction in 2011 by capitalizing on two themes: threat to national sovereignty from drone strikes and US incursion and corruption.¹⁷⁰ The party successfully mobilized the urban middle class, particularly the youth and draws its main support from it.¹⁷¹ It is pertinent as Marie Lall notes that over 67 percent of Pakistan’s population is under 30 it is an important constituency for political parties to focus on. Since then the party has organized several rallies and gatherings across the

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Abro, “Pakistan Tehrik-I-Insaaf.”

¹⁶⁹ PILDAT, “Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan 2016,” 48.

¹⁷⁰ Jaffrelot, “Impossible Democracy or Impossible Democrats,” 280.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 279.

country which have brought it national and international attraction – such a notable engagement was the peach march towards South Waziristan to express discontent against US drone strikes.¹⁷² Lastly, PTI unlike other political parties actively engages its members and frequently launches membership campaigns.

Ideology

PTI like other parties has also experienced mild changes on the ideological front. It is postulated that the party started off as a right wing conservative party but since the initial years it has consolidated itself as right of center.¹⁷³ Haroon K. Ullah amongst other scholars classify PTI as a ‘Muslim Democratic’ party similar in ideological orientation to PML N.¹⁷⁴ Akbar Zaidi, a veteran political scientist from Pakistan, affirms that PTI and PML N exude moderation on religion and adhere to right wing technocracy with respect to economy which makes them members of the same party family.¹⁷⁵

Government Ambition

A close perusal of the brief history and demeanor of PTI suggests that the party demonstrates a high government ambition. It has been an active force in politics since 2011 and has frequently subjected the PPP and PML N to criticism in the massive rallies and gatherings that it has been convening since then and subsequently it emerged as the third largest force in the 2013 elections. Despite its brief history it has generated popular appeal and upset the party system which had hitherto been dominated by the former two old parties. Even in opposition it has maintained its distinctness and distance from PPP, however, it also formed a regional government in KPK with

¹⁷² Abro, “Pakistan Tehrik-I-Insaaf.”

¹⁷³ Paracha, “Political Parties in Pakistan.”

¹⁷⁴ ULLAH, *Vying for Allah's Vote*, 67.

¹⁷⁵ Zaidi, “The Old and the New in Naya Pakistan,” 3.

its conservative ally JI. PTI also staged a 126-day long sit-in in Islamabad protesting electoral irregularities and demanding electoral reforms. All these engagements are indicative of a high government ambition. See Appendix C for the party's electoral history.

4.2.4 Jamiat Ulema -e- Islam (F)

JUI F along with JUI S (Sami) are two factions of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Organization of Islamic Scholars) that was formed in 1945, an Islamist party, adherent of the Sunni confession.¹⁷⁶ JUI itself grew from the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (Organization of Indian Scholars), which was established in 1919 by the foremost Deobandi scholars to back the Khilafat (Caliphate) Movement.¹⁷⁷ At the time of partition, JUH sided with its longtime ally the Indian National Congress (INC) and opposed the creation of Pakistan but nonconforming clerics in the party formed the JUI under the leadership of Maulana Shabbir Usmani also a member of AIML.¹⁷⁸ In the post-independence period JUI and JI initially worked together, notwithstanding the former's ideological affinity with socioeconomic reformation brought it closer to the leftist PPP.¹⁷⁹ Subsequently, the party in the 1970s also allied with the secular ANP to form a coalition government in KPK although direct electoral participation was not a priority from independence through to the 1970s.¹⁸⁰ The party under the leadership of Mufti Mehmood opposed Ayub Khan's military rule who was succeeded by his son Maulana Fazlur Rehman in 1980.¹⁸¹ Under his premiership, the party formed part of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) against Gen Zia and since then has swayed between disparate positions – sometimes siding with the PPP

¹⁷⁶ Szajkowski, *Political Parties of the World*, 458.

¹⁷⁷ ULLAH, "ISLAMIST PARTIES: Origins and Characteristics," 90.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 94.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 91–93.

¹⁸¹ Abro, "Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam – Fazl."

led governments and on other occasions siding with PML N.¹⁸² These alliances led to the splitting of JUI and JUI F (named after Fazl ur Rehman) has been the stronger faction since then and emerged as the most successful party in the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United council for Action, a right-wing electoral alliance of Islamist parties) – stronghold remains the Pahstun constituency in Baluchistan and KPK with limited support in Sindh.¹⁸³

Origin

The origins of JUI are embedded in the Islamic revivalist movement in the Indian subcontinent which began with the establishment of Dar ul-Ulum (House of Knowledge), a seminary built at Deoband (Uttar Pradesh, India) in 1866.¹⁸⁴ The seminary continues to be amongst the most notable Islamic seminaries and after its establishment became the centre of Islamic revival in the subcontinent. The movement in its initial years remained apolitical until the creation of JUH in 1919 which allied itself with the INC and using nonviolent means sought to end British colonialism in India.¹⁸⁵ This is indicative of the extra-parliamentary origins of the party and is further substantiated by Haroon Ullah Khan in his comprehensive study of Islamist parties that “JUI is a religious movement that turned to politics in order to safeguard its interests – that is, the primacy of Deobandi Ulema in the future state of Pakistan”.¹⁸⁶

Ideology

JUI F espouses a right-wing ideology as opposed to the more moderate Muslim democratic political parties like PML N or PTI.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, JUI F has been an important source of religious

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ PILDAT, “Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan 2016,” 40.

¹⁸⁴ ULLAH, “ISLAMIST PARTIES: Origins and Characteristics,” 76.

¹⁸⁵ Abro, “Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam – Fazl.”

¹⁸⁶ ULLAH, “ISLAMIST PARTIES: Origins and Characteristics,” 93.

¹⁸⁷ Abro, “Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam – Fazl.”

activism in the post-independence period alongside other religious parties, particularly the JI. During his brief term as the Chief Minister of KPK from 1972-73, he launched an “aggressive Islamization program” and previously he also sided with JI in successfully pressurizing the federal government to declare Ahmaddiyas (religious community) as non-Muslims.¹⁸⁸ Likewise, the party has fervently opposed US led drone strikes in the country and also boycotted parliamentary sessions on ‘domestic violence’ on grounds that the party stood opposed to westernization. More importantly, it has also endorsed the idea of granting India, the status of the ‘Most Favored Nation’ citing that it would help the country’s businessmen.

Government Ambition

JUI F since the onset has shown a predisposition toward political alliances and consequently a high government ambition. More surprising, has its been alliance with PPP which happens to be a left-wing secular political party.¹⁸⁹ Similarly, JUI F also formed a coalition government in KPK with ANP in the 1970s which is diametrically opposed to it in terms of ideology. The trend continued in the 1990s wherein JUI F was part of almost every ruling alliance including the more recent elections of 2008 and 2013.¹⁹⁰ Appendix D offers a summary of its electoral endeavors and participation in various governments overtime.

4.2.5 Muttahida Quami Movement (United National Movement)

MQM was founded as Muhajir Quami Movement in 1984 by Altaf Hussein and Azeem Ahmed Tariq. The central aim of the party was to represent and safeguard the interests of ethnic muhajirs (Muslim emigrants from India in the aftermath of partition in 1947) in Sindh which was a response

¹⁸⁸ ULLAH, “ISLAMIST PARTIES: Origins and Characteristics,” 95.

¹⁸⁹ Abro, “Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam – Fazl.”

¹⁹⁰ “JUI-F Joins Federal Govt, Bags 2 Ministries | Pakistan | Dunya News.”

to the steady decline in their political and economic status that began in the 1960s.¹⁹¹ Policies introduced by PPP-led government in 1970s contributed to the grievances of the Muhajirs, in particular the rural/urban quota (for government jobs and admission in educational institutions) and the elevation of Sindhi language as an official language of the province alongside Urdu.¹⁹² The emergence of MQM was the result of ethnic mobilization which had begun in the late 1970s and the All Pakistan Muhajir Student's Association (APMSO) formed by Altaf Hussein in 1978 was a precursor of the party.¹⁹³ However in 1997, in an attempt to expand its political scope, it changed its name to Muttahida Quami Movement and since then has sought to transform itself from a regional party to a national party.¹⁹⁴ It is believed by many that the party has indeed made the transformation into a national party, however, few deny that its popularity is largely limited to urban areas of Sindh.¹⁹⁵ The party has maintained its popularity in these areas and continued to perform well (particularly in Karachi) since its first electoral endeavor in 1988. In the 1990s it was the third most influential party in the parliament and has partook in several coalition governments up till now.¹⁹⁶

Origin

The extra-parliamentary origins of MQM are evident in the APMSO and the ethnic movement it had generated in the late 1970s. According to Muhammad Waseem, "[MQM] has led the most strident and mass based ethnic movement in the country's history after the 1971 Bangladesh movement in East Pakistan".¹⁹⁷ With regards to the extra-parliamentary structure, John Bray, in

¹⁹¹ Haq, "Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization," 992.

¹⁹² Ibid., 992–93.

¹⁹³ Waseem, "Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM," 625.

¹⁹⁴ Szajkowski, *Political Parties of the World*, 458.

¹⁹⁵ PILDAT, "Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan 2016," 32.

¹⁹⁶ Bray, "Pakistan at 50: A State in Decline?," 322.

¹⁹⁷ Waseem, "The MQM of Pakistan: Between Political Party and Ethnic Movement," 177.

his analysis of the party postulates that MQM in some respects is one of the most modern political parties.¹⁹⁸ He asserts that its high literacy levels, tightly organized structure and a party for and operated by urbanized workers distinguished it from its counterparts.¹⁹⁹

Ideology

The party in its present shape and form espouses a left of center political ideology. More precisely, it has a liberal and secular orientation but adheres to conservatism on economic matters.²⁰⁰ Its commitment to secularism has been tenacious, maintaining a clear stance against radical Islamic groups and subsequently becoming a frequent target.²⁰¹ The party in its initial days championed a progressive agenda which went hand in hand with the non-elite and humble backgrounds of its leaders which greatly legitimized its claim to be a party of the poor.²⁰² Nonetheless, existing literature suggests it has been a pro status quo party with an obscure ideology that makes it policy-neutral.²⁰³

Government Ambition

MQM has over the years exhibited a high government ambition. It has never lost popularity in urban Sindh – its stronghold. It has formed coalition governments on every occasion except for 1993 (when it boycotted NA elections) and in 2013. Appendix E summarizes its electoral history and the corresponding details regarding government formation.

¹⁹⁸ Bray, “Pakistan at 50: A State in Decline?,” 328.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Al Jazeera, “Explainer: Pakistan’s Main Political Parties - Al Jazeera English.”

²⁰¹ Haider, “Muttahida Qaumi Movement.”

²⁰² Waseem, “Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM,” 625.

²⁰³ Ibid., 625–26.

4.2.6 Awami National Party (ANP)

ANP emerged as an independent party in 1986 following the merger of several left-wing groups including the National Democratic Party (NDP).²⁰⁴ It is essentially a regional party with support base in Pashtun areas – primarily Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and despite its meagre electoral strength it has frequently contributed as a coalition partner in national governments in 1990s and 2008 since the reinstatement of democratic rule in the country. At the provincial level the party has formed government several times and is in fact a successor to the leftist National Awami Party (NAP) formed in 1957. NAP was the country's largest leftist party until the advent of PPP in 1967 and it formed coalition governments in KPK and Baluchistan after obtaining a majority in each province in the 1970 election. However, the straining of relations with the PPP government at the centre resulted in the dismissal of NAP rule in Baluchistan and prompted a resignation from KPK government in protest – party was banned by the federal government in 1975.²⁰⁵ In an attempt to revive the NAP, Baloch, Sindhi and Pashtun leaders formed the ANP, however, with the demise of Zia regime, Baloch and Sindhi leaders left to create their own parties, imparting ANP a Pashtun nationalist orientation.²⁰⁶ Khan Abdul Wali Khan became the party's first President in 1986 and his retirement from politics brought Ajmal Khattak (a poet and senior leader) who reigned until leaving the party in 1999. Following his departure, Wali's son, Asfandiyar Wali Khan came to the helm of affairs in 1999 and continues to hold the office after being elected for the fifth time in August 2014.²⁰⁷ Electorally, the party has witnessed ups and downs, flourishing in the 1990s but failing in the 2002 election.²⁰⁸ It rose to popularity again in the 2008 election forming a provincial

²⁰⁴ Szajkowski, *Political Parties of the World*, 457.

²⁰⁵ Paracha, "Political Parties in Pakistan."

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ PILDAT, "Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan 2016," 36.

²⁰⁸ Cross, "Awami National Party - Pashtun Party Seeks National Role."

government in KPK and a coalition government at the center, however, its support waned in the last election.

Origin

The origin of ANP is traced back to the Khudai Khidmatgar or Red Shirts Movement of the 1930s, led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan also known as the Frontier's (KPK was previously named as NWFP) Gandhi because of his views and affiliation with the Indian National Congress (INC).²⁰⁹ This was a leftist, anti-imperialist and secular movement, however, with the creation of Pakistan in 1947 Khan tried to expand the movement beyond KPK and subsequently was arrested along with his son Wali Khan.²¹⁰ As examined by Amna Mahmood, the formation of NAP in 1957 was the second step in the evolution of ANP which becomes more evident in the breakaway of Wali Khan with a Pashtun faction in 1972.²¹¹ Notwithstanding, the extra-parliamentary origins of the party are apparent.

Ideology

Like other political parties of Pakistan and elsewhere, ANP has also undergone ideological transformation overtime. It started off an ardent left-wing party and analysts affirm that the ANP's ancestors were heavily predisposed towards Marxism.²¹² In fact its predecessor as observed by Rashiduzzaman noted in 1970, the NAP was the first political party in Pakistan to have an overtly leftist agenda.²¹³ At present, ANP is considered to be a left of center party with a progressive social and economic policy.²¹⁴ Although its commitment to leftist programme has largely become a

²⁰⁹ Mahmood, "Regional Political Parties," 23.

²¹⁰ Abbasi, "Awami National Party."

²¹¹ Mahmood, "Regional Political Parties," 23.

²¹² Abbasi, "Awami National Party."

²¹³ Rashiduzzaman, "The National Awami Party of Pakistan," 394.

²¹⁴ Mahmood, "Regional Political Parties," 26.

victim to pragmatism, it has maintained its commitment to secularism and consequently borne the brunt of extremists attacks by radical Islamic groups who have frequently targeted its leadership.²¹⁵

Government Ambition

A glance at the party's history suggests that ANP has displayed a high government ambition. It is further pronounced when the party despite its leftist leanings formed an alliance with the right-wing Islamic Democratic Alliance (IIJ) in the 1990s.²¹⁶ Appendix F captures the electoral history of ANP as well as its participation in coalition governments.

4.2.7 National Party

The National Party is the youngest of all political parties that have been included in the study due to its salience as a regional party from Baluchistan. The party came to the political scene in 2003 following the merger of Baluchistan Democratic National Party (BNDP) led by Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo and a middle-class based nationalist party, Baluchistan National Movement headed by Dr. Abdul Hayee Balooch.²¹⁷ Pressures from Baloch nationalist workers obliged the two parties to set aside their differences and launch a united struggle for the protection of Baloch rights and resources.²¹⁸ Both the parties had independently participated in the 2002 elections and combined accounted for four seats in the provincial assembly – assumed the role of opposition until the completion of term in 2007.²¹⁹ Since the party was a member of the All Parties Democratic Alliance (APDM), it boycotted the elections in 2008 and continued its struggle against extra-judicial killings and abductions of political workers during the PPP rule both in the province and

²¹⁵ Abbasi, "Awami National Party."

²¹⁶ Paracha, "Political Parties in Pakistan."

²¹⁷ Ali Shah, "National Party."

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

the centre.²²⁰ The party contested in the 2013 elections and emerged as the third largest political party in the Baluchistan assembly.

Origin

The origin of the political party can be considered extra-parliamentary since pressures from workers of both the constituent parties culminated in their merger and the eventual formation of the party. Both the parties unlike other Baloch nationalist parties are not tribal chiefs and in fact the party draws its support from the Makran division and coastal areas where tribal structures do not run strong.²²¹ An educated and non-tribal membership bolsters the party's stance against the sardari (tribal) system. Moreover, National party's Dr. Abdul Malik became the first Chief Minister of the province who hails from Makran with a modest background, rising from the ranks of ordinary political workers.²²²

Ideology

The central aim of the National party has been to achieve greater provincial autonomy and in doing so it has adopted a liberal and progressive ideology maintain commitment to parliamentary politics and democratic framework as opposed to other parties who have often supported armed insurrections.²²³ The merger of the two parties resulted in a social democrat centre-left party.²²⁴

Government Ambition

Since the party's formation there have been two national elections in 2008 and 2013. The party boycotted the previous elections whereas in 2013 it emerged as the third largest party in the

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan," 10.

²²² Shahid, "Dr Malik Baloch — a Profile."

²²³ Akbar, *The Redefined Dimensions of Baloch Nationalist Movement*, 115.

²²⁴ "History"; Malik, "Profile of Senator Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo National Party – Official News Pakistan."

Baluchistan Assembly, becoming part of both the coalition governments - province and the center.²²⁵ Based on this it can be argued that the party has a high government ambition which is evident in its forming a coalition government at the center with only one seat in the assembly. Appendix G provides a summary of its electoral history and corresponding result in terms of government formation.

4.2.8 Jamaat -e- Islami (JI)

Formed in 1941 by Abdul A'ala Maududi, a Muslim theologian and socio-political philosopher, JI is an Islamist political party that calls for the establishment of a democratic form of government circumscribed by the principles of Islam.²²⁶ It happens to be the oldest religious political party in the country.²²⁷ Since the creation of Pakistan, the JI has been a prominent political force and proactively partook in oppositional politics for three decades until the military coup of General Zia in 1977.²²⁸ Nevertheless, JI was at the forefront of the Islamization program that was launched by General Zia in the 1980s and later on also featured in the IJI in 1988, withdrawing in 1992 on grounds that the alliance had failed in actualizing its goals.²²⁹ JI is considered to be the most well organized political party in the country although it has time and again failed to translate its organizational strengths into popular vote – vote has ranged around 5% but declined to 2% in 2013.²³⁰ As part of the Islamist Alliance (Muttahida Majlis e-Ammal, abbreviated as MMA) it achieved its best electoral performance in 2002, reclaiming some of the lost ground from MQM.²³¹ In Sindh, JI stood out as one of the most organized political party and since the onset deemed

²²⁵ Ali Shah, "National Party."

²²⁶ ULLAH, "ISLAMIST PARTIES: Origins and Characteristics," 79.

²²⁷ Abro, "Jamaat-I-Islami."

²²⁸ Kumar, "The Role of Islamic Parties in Pakistani Politics," 272.

²²⁹ Szajkowski, *Political Parties of the World*, 457.

²³⁰ PILDAT, "Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan 2016," 22.

²³¹ Szajkowski, *Political Parties of the World*, 458.

Karachi to be its foothold, drawing widespread support from the Muhajirs.²³² The rise of MQM in the 1980s which also laid a claim to this constituency, weaken JI's control in Karachi until the 2002 elections. The party draws most of its support from the “urban intellectual, professional and business classes [and] the JI is foremost amongst the religious parties in organizational, financial and media skills, and has indeed been described as the best organized political party in Pakistan”.²³³

Origin

As mentioned earlier for JUI F, Muslim revivalist movements amidst British colonial had surfaced in the late 19th and early twentieth centuries. Deobandi movement which had remained apolitical for long became political after a split that was caused by the beginning of demands for partition, Maududi, the founder of JI also attended Dur ul-Ulum (the epicenter of Deobandi movement) for some time until the sudden death of his father. The creation of JI was a response prompted by multiple developments: the secular AIML who had also demanded a separate state for Muslims, Hindu revivalist movements and the Indian National Congress's (INC) growing Hindu orientation.²³⁴ As early as 1939, Maududi established the Daru'l-Islam (abode of Islam), a religious and educational institution with the view that it will foster Muslim political power.²³⁵ But upon his arrival in Lahore, he was convinced that the situation was too severe for such long-term solutions and accepted a teaching job at the Islamiyah College in Lahore before quitting in 1940 – explicitly political lectures made him popular.²³⁶ Afterwards, in 1941 he eventually formed the JI whose origins as can be seen from the brief discussion are rooted in extra-parliamentary developments.

²³² Kumar, “The Role of Islamic Parties in Pakistani Politics,” 273.

²³³ Szajkowski, *Political Parties of the World*, 458.

²³⁴ ULLAH, “ISLAMIST PARTIES: Origins and Characteristics,” 79.

²³⁵ Naṣr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*, 17.

²³⁶ Ibid.

Ideology

Political observers and analysts identify JI as an Islamist party adhering to the right of the political spectrum different from the more moderate Muslim democratic parties.²³⁷ The formation of a state in consonance with Shariah law is at the heart of its mandate and it positions itself against western values, particularly secularism and the economic constellations offered by capitalism and socialism.²³⁸ Despite its poor electoral performance it has been at the forefront of religious activism which was elicited in its active role in the anti-Ahmaddiya communal ferment as early as 1953.²³⁹ Likewise, it vehemently opposed the Family ordinance of 1961 and also did not approve of the sharia ordinance enacted by General Zia in 1988. In addition to domestic matters, JI has also fostered transnational ties with the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and vigorously protested the trial of Bangladeshi JI leadership for the war crimes that transpired in 1971 conflict.²⁴⁰

Government Ambition

Regardless of its street power, JI has performed poorly in elections save for the elections of 2002 wherein it contested in the right-wing alliance of religious parties Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA).²⁴¹ Even though it emerged as a potent force after the 2002 elections, it only formed coalition governments in KPK and Baluchistan and not the center. More significantly, its boycott of elections and ideological dogma are indicative of the low government ambition that the party embodies.²⁴² See Appendix H for an electoral history of JI for the national assembly.

4.3 Analysis and Comments

²³⁷ Nasr, "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy.'"

²³⁸ Abro, "Jamaat-I-Islami."

²³⁹ Kumar, "The Role of Islamic Parties in Pakistani Politics," 272.

²⁴⁰ Abro, "Jamaat-I-Islami."

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² ULLAH, "ISLAMIST PARTIES: Origins and Characteristics," 83.

This section endeavors to present and interpret the results achieved from the party profiles in the previous section based on the catalogue of four variables i.e. age, origin, ideology and government ambition. More significantly, the purpose is to assess the effectiveness of existing concepts in explaining the variation and likelihood of IPD in the political parties of Pakistan – a developing democracy. The table below summarizes the findings for each political party.

Table 7 Results for all parties

Party	Age (Years)	Origin	Ideology	Government Ambition	Expected level of IPD	IPD score
PML N	110	Parliamentary	Centre-Right	High	Low	40
PPP	50	Extra-Parliamentary	Centre-Left	High	Moderate	42
PTI	21	Extra-Parliamentary	Centre-Right	High	Moderate	46
JUI F	72	Extra-Parliamentary	Right	High	Low	59
MQM	33	Extra-Parliamentary	Centre-Left	High	High	61
ANP	31	Extra-Parliamentary	Centre-Left	High	High	61
NP	10	Extra-Parliamentary	Centre-Left	High	High	69
JI	76	Extra-Parliamentary	Right	Low	Moderate	80

A cursory look at the findings suggests that the factors identified in the work of Pettitt, Pedersen and others fail to work in the case of Pakistani political parties with the Islamist political parties clearly being deviant cases here. However, first the results for other political parties excluding the Islamists will be analyzed because it is evident that the latter do not conform to the explanations formulated for established democracies and will be discussed separately afterwards.

Disregarding the Islamists parties, a general glance at the results suggests that the actual level of IPD in the six political parties (PML N, PPP, PTI, MQM, ANP and NP) is in line with the level anticipated based on the independent variables. It is assumed (in consistency with Pettitt's framework) that each variable has an equal influence on the level of IPD. PML N which is an old party rooted in parliamentary origins, espouses a centre-right ideology and has a high government ambition should have a low level of IPD since these features impede internal democracy in a party. PML N's tally of 40% substantiates the claim put forth by Pettitt. Likewise, PPP which is an old party (younger than PML N), has extra-parliamentary origins and adheres to a centre-left ideology with a high government ambition has a score of 42% which is slightly more than PML N but moderate as predicted by the model. For PTI, the model expects a moderate level of IPD and arguably the tally of 46% is instructive. More promising are the cases of ANP and MQM, for which the model forecasts a high level of IPD and it is noteworthy that the parties have almost identical values on the four independent variables. Accordingly, the parties have an identical actual score of 61%. The NP is ranked second in the IPD ranking of Pakistan and here too the model predicts an elevated level of IPD.

Furthermore, a closer look at each of the variables in isolation is imperative to evaluate the strength of the model. As articulated by Pettitt, who alludes to Michels' 'law of oligarchy', age of a party is inversely related to the level of IPD in a political party. In the case of Pakistan, it can be observed that there is a general trend of young political parties to be more internally democratic. PML N which is more than a century old party happens to have the least IPD score whereas the NP which is thirteen years old has the highest level of IPD. Notwithstanding, PTI which is almost two decades old has a rather low level of IPD when compared to its older counterparts. Its juxtaposition with the cases of MQM and ANP is informative, the latter two parties share a high government

ambition and extra-parliamentary origins with PTI but are almost a decade older and in terms of ideology are centre-left as opposed to PTI. Despite a higher age, they are more democratic (61% and 46%) based on the evidence this suggests that ideology apparently has an influence on IPD that is greater than the impact resulted by age. This observation is reinforced when PPP is compared to PTI, wherein PPP despite its age of fifty years has an IPD level which is not too low from PTI's (42% percent and 46% respectively). Thus, it can be inferred that ideology has an impact on IPD that is perhaps greater than a small difference in the age of a party, however, it requires further research and empirical testing.

With regards to origin, there is insignificant variation in the pool of parties (excluding Islamists) with only PML N evolving from a parliamentary origin and the rest featuring extra-parliamentary origins. Although PML N holds the lowest IPD score and it is in accordance with the relationship that the model predicts, the limited variation on origins restricts the research from making more inferences. Furthermore, the model forecasts that left-wing parties tend to be more democratic than right-wing political parties. The results for Pakistan suggest that right-wing political parties (excluding Islamists) have an average IPD score of 43% whereas parties on left of the political spectrum have an average IPD score of 58.25%, substantiating the relationship projected by the model. In similarity to the case with party origin, it is difficult to comment conclusively on the explaining power of the variable 'government ambition' since every party apart from JI has a high government ambition.

Now that the general trends and variable specific patterns have been delved into, the deviant cases of Islamist political parties will be deliberated upon. The two parties which largely misfit the model are JUI F and more importantly JI. Based on the model, JUI F should score low whereas JI should have a moderate level of IPD. In sharp contrast to the expectations both the parties have high levels

of IPD, JUI has a score of 59% whereas JI has a score of 80%, ranked 4th and 1st respectively. Contrary to the model's expectation, both parties are old and right-wing as opposed to the centre-right Muslim democratic parties (PML N and PTI). Notwithstanding, both have extra-parliamentary origins but JI has a low government ambition in dissimilarity from JUI F. Based on this one could argue that government ambition has a high degree of influence on IPD than other factors since the IPD score for JI is disproportionately higher than JUI F and other political parties in the sample. Furthermore, the cases of these Islamist parties can also be used to gauge the strength of effect party origin has on IPD. JUI F and JI are right wing political parties whereas PML N which is a centre-right party and has parliamentary origin is the least internally democratic party, suggesting that extra-parliamentary origin may also have a disproportionate impact on IPD whereas minor differences in ideology (centre-right and right or left and centre-left) cause insignificant variation. However, it must be acknowledged that further research perhaps with advanced statistical techniques and a larger sample size is necessary to substantiate the inferences drawn. Based on the evidence a comparison of the two parties reveals that government ambition has a strong influence on IPD since JI because of a low government ambition is significantly more democratic than JUI F. However, the cases of Islamist parties warrant a deeper analysis and explanation.

Recent literature on the Islamic political parties of Pakistan affirms that Islamic parties are not a monolith rather they have diverse types. Haroon Ullah Khan, distinguishes them based on their organizational structures, classifying JI as a hierarchical party and JUI F as a network political party.²⁴³ M. Nazar building on this existing typology contends that Islamic parties of Pakistan not

²⁴³ ULLAH, "ISLAMIST PARTIES: Origins and Characteristics."

only differ in their organizational structures but also in their ideologies.²⁴⁴ He identifies JI as an ideological Islamist party whereas JUI F as an Islamic clerical party. Insofar as defining Islamist parties is concerned, all such parties endorse the “state enforcement of religious law and practice”.²⁴⁵ Based on these two typologies first the case of JI will be discussed with the aim of eliciting explanations for its high level of IPD.

JI is Pakistan’s oldest and the most eminent hierarchical Islamist party which proffers an organizational structure that gives it an elitist character like that of cadre based or vanguard parties.²⁴⁶ Even today, the JI is led by university-trained ulema (Islamic scholars) and conservative intellectuals which maintain tight control over the party.²⁴⁷ The amir (leader) is at top of the hierarchy under whom are the deputy amirs, the consultative council, the secretary-general and the secretariat – such an organizational structure is intended to establish discipline in the party, maintain the revolutionary fervor in the membership as well as “maintain a steep hierarchy among the membership”.²⁴⁸ Interestingly, the party’s membership categories created in 1954 have continued to date comprising of “three main levels of participation: arkan (core members); rukn (full voting members); muttafiq (affiliated men who carry out party work under the party’s supervision but are not voting members); and hamdard (sympathizers, or men who support the party’s mission but are not officially organized”.²⁴⁹ Furthermore, the party maintains high control over the recruitment of members at each level as well as their upward mobility in the party (it can take more than a decade for an arkan to become a rukn; membership alongside leadership is subject

²⁴⁴ Nazar, “Islamic Political Parties and the Nature of Politics in Pakistan.”

²⁴⁵ ULLAH, “ISLAMIST PARTIES: Origins and Characteristics,” 75.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 81; Nazar, “Islamic Political Parties and the Nature of Politics in Pakistan,” 248.

²⁴⁷ ULLAH, “ISLAMIST PARTIES: Origins and Characteristics,” 81.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 81–82.

to strict evaluation and a poor appraisal can lead to demotion).²⁵⁰ Nazar observes, that Islamist parties unlike clerical parties emerge as a response to external developments (colonialism) and foreign ideologies (socialism, capitalism, westernization and so forth), the primary reason for classifying them as ideological parties.²⁵¹ He maintains that such parties do not have a specific social base and are supra-sectarian in nature for instance II would have both Sunni and Shia members as well as membership from tribal and urban areas – urban middle and lower middle classes are attracted more.²⁵² Furthermore, he reiterates II's party discipline, use of modern recruitment and promotion methods and the formulation of party decisions by majority rule which makes them more amenable to internal democracy.²⁵³ Besides an elaborate structure and membership control another factor which seems to augment internal democracy in II is its commitment to the party vision and adherence to ideological dogma which has persisted despite limited electoral success. Leadership and members alike believe that with time people will acknowledge that II is only party capable of upholding Islam in earnest.²⁵⁴ This ideological fervor is further reinforced by the fact that II's party program (the most well-formulated) comes from Maududi's writings rather than a group of scholars.²⁵⁵ Similarly, another important aspect is the party's strong support base and membership coming from "university-educated technocrats and clerics, students and affiliates of academic institutions, urban middle class and lower-middle class faithful".²⁵⁶ The party espouses a "modernizing and pragmatic (but not modernist)" version of Islam which is bereft of cultural influences and since the onset it has maintained a close relationship with academics and intentionally directed efforts at recruiting from universities (it has

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 82.

²⁵¹ Nazar, "Islamic Political Parties and the Nature of Politics in Pakistan," 248.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ ULLAH, "ISLAMIST PARTIES: Origins and Characteristics," 83.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 80.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 84.

a very active student wing).²⁵⁷ Its organizational finesse is also demonstrated in the party's charity wing which was widely acclaimed for its work in the relief efforts following the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 floods in Pakistan.²⁵⁸ Recent research on JI also suggests that the party has borrowed the organizing tactics of left-wing parties and in recent times has seen a competitor for supporters in the form of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) which although has a historical association with JI (former member of JI is the founder of JuD) has proved to discount JI's support.²⁵⁹ Therefore, it can be argued that JI's organizational structure, membership hierarchy, intellectual affinity, modernizing orientation vis-à-vis Islam, support base in the form of educated urban middle class, leftist organizing tactics and lastly competing organizations contribute and reinforce internal democracy in the country.

Moving onto JUI F, it has been regarded as a network Islamic party based on its organizational structure and is not as internally democratic as JI. This can be primarily attributed to its flat and loose organizational structure which is based on a thick network of ethnic and tribal affiliations in its stronghold of KPK.²⁶⁰ Historically in this region there is a confluence of political and religious leadership and due to the autonomous nature of tribal groups the political decision making is carried out at local level.²⁶¹ A key feature of such parties is that power is spread widely across a large network of supporters in local seminaries and mosques with leadership resting in the hands of ulema (scholars) and clerics as opposed to JI.²⁶² However, an important aspect which can be considered to augment internal democracy is the leadership's lower and middle class backgrounds and prominent intellectual or religious status is not a condition for participation as in the case of

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 85.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 89.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 91.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid., 92.

JI.²⁶³ Unlike JI, JUIF is considered to be a party with high electoral ambition and it aims to promote the interests of the Deobandi sect with a membership criterion limited to this sect.²⁶⁴ Lastly, the two parties also differ in their understanding of Islam wherein JUIF adheres to a more traditionalist understanding of Islam with a local and particularistic outlook.²⁶⁵ The factors and differences elicited aid in understanding the differences in IPD levels of the two Islamic parties.

Based on the typology of Islamic parties, it can be argued that the Islamists or the hierarchical Islamist parties tend to be more internally democratic than network or clerical Islamic parties which are largely a local phenomenon found in Pakistan and India. In contrast, Islamist political parties are transnational in character and are also found elsewhere e.g. Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, JI of Bangladesh, Islamic Party of Malaysia and several other Muslim majority countries.²⁶⁶ Since JI belongs to the Islamist party family, it will be fruitful to see if similar trends with respect to IPD are demonstrated by Islamist parties in other Muslim majority countries. Likewise, the Muslim democratic parties (PML N and PTI) have exhibited low levels of IPD and it can be probed through future research if a similar trend is observed in other Muslim democratic parties of the Muslim world.

With regards to an overall assessment, it can be seen that Pettitt's model largely works to explain the case of political parties in Pakistan, nonetheless, it fails to account for the level of IPD in Islamic political Parties. In fairness to Pettitt, the Islamic political parties are particular to the Muslim world and not found in the established democracies, therefore, the application of the model beyond its scope conditions has arguably been successful. Moreover, the variable 'government

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Nazar, "Islamic Political Parties and the Nature of Politics in Pakistan," 250.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 250–51.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 249.

ambition' was successfully used to explain the IPD variation between the two Islamic political parties. The analysis above elicited that the assumption that each of the variables has an equal impact on level of IPD seems tenuous and from the evidence generated by this study one can claim that ideology, government ambition and extra-parliamentary origin can have an uneven influence on IPD. With regards to Islamic parties, the factors identified (organizational structure, ideology, approach towards Islam and so forth) provide avenues for future research.

5. Conclusion

This research attempted to explain the variation in IPD in Pakistan by using theoretical concepts and models that were formulated for established democracies. It was posited at the beginning that scholarship on political parties and particularly IPD has hitherto focused on developed democracies which are concentrated in the West. Although new democracies of Eastern Europe have been incorporated in the existing scholarship, those that have emerged in Asia have largely been ignored. In this regard, by pursuing the case of Pakistan the research endeavored to bridge the chasm in current literature. In addition to exploring IPD variation in a new democracy in Asia, it also tried to contribute to theory development by conducting a plausibility probe for current models of IPD scholarship. Since the models were applied in conditions beyond their original scope, the findings obtained contain useful insights which could direct future research and foster knowledge accumulation. The models that were used include the party specific factors as identified by Robin T. Pettit and the legal regulation of IPD as demonstrated by Van Ingrid Biezen and Daniela Romee Piccio in their study of post war European democracies.

Consequently, both the legal regulation of IPD at state level and the party specific factors of eight political parties were evaluated. Through the study it was discovered that in close resemblance to European democracies, Pakistani state also regulates IPD through legal mechanisms. More importantly, the pattern observed in the party law of Pakistan is similar to the findings of Biezen and Piccio. The law emphasizes the regulation of ‘extra-parliamentary organization’, ‘external oversight’ and ‘party financing’; the weight assigned to each of these categories is also almost consistent in two regions. This part of the research rendered the study an inter-regional dimension. The presence of legal regulation in the country is important in explaining the fact that there is a positive overall trend of IPD with almost all the parties under study showing some elements of

internal democracy. Further, the model proposed by Pettit also yielded important results. Overall, it can be argued that the model largely works in explaining the variation in Pakistani political parties but a major caveat surfaced in the form of Islamist political parties which do not conform to the model's expectations. In addition to this, based on the analysis of the evidence it was found that ideology and government ambition (in the case of Islamist parties) have a disproportionate impact on the level of IPD in a party. However, with respect to Islamist parties the study deliberated on the typology of Islamic parties and elicited that hierarchical/ideological parties tend to be more democratic than network/clerical Islamic parties based on the differences in organizational structure, ideology, membership criteria, organizing tactics, support base and competing organizations.

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier the research has certain limitations, First, due to a paucity of time and space the research could not use primary data collection methods and had to rely on secondary material. Second, the availability of literature on Pakistan was a big challenge since literature on political parties is not well-developed in the country. But when viewed in a broader context the research has identified several avenues for future research. This study has shown that intra-regional and inter-regional comparisons of IPD between Europe and Asia can provide useful insights. It has also opened the possibility of a rigorous test of the model across Asia by using a large pool of parties and advanced statistical techniques with the aim of forming broad generalizations. Moreover, with regards to Islamist political parties further cross case studies should be carried out to ascertain if Islamist parties elsewhere also tend to be internally democratic. Lastly, it also highlights the lack of party literature on Asia and hopes this effort will prompt others to contribute.

Appendices

Appendix A Electoral History and Government Ambition of PML N

Elections	1988	1990	1993	1997	2002	2008	2013
Seats Won	54	105	73	135	15	72	189
Government Formed	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Source: PILDAT, “The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan.” and National Assembly of Pakistan website (www.na.gov.pk)

Appendix B Electoral History and Government Ambition of PPP

Elections	1970	1977	1988	1990	1993	1997	2002	2008	2013
Seats Won	81	155	93	44	86	18	64	95	47
Government Formed	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No

Source: PILDAT, “The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan.” and National Assembly of Pakistan website (www.na.gov.pk)

Appendix C Electoral History and Government Ambition of PTI

Elections	1997	2002	2008	2013
Seats won	0	1	Boycott	33/230
Government Formed	No	No	No	No

Source: PILDAT, “The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan.” and National Assembly of Pakistan website (www.na.gov.pk)

Appendix D Electoral History and Government Ambition of JUI F

Elections	1970	1988	1990	1993	1997	2002	2008	2013
Seat won	7	7	6	4	2	41	6	13
Government Formed	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

Source: PILDAT, “The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan.” and National Assembly of Pakistan website (www.na.gov.pk)

Appendix E Electoral History and Government Ambition of MQM

Elections	1988	1990	1993	2002	2008	2013
Seats won	12	15	Boycotted	13	19	18
Government formed	Yes, but quit in 1990	Yes, but quit in 1992	No	Yes	Yes	No

Source: PILDAT, “The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan.” and National Assembly of Pakistan website (www.na.gov.pk)

Appendix F Electoral History and Government Ambition of ANP

Elections	1988	1990	1993	1997	2002	2008	2013
Seats Won	2	6	3	9	0	10	2
Government Formed	No	Yes	Yes	Yes, Quit in 1998	No	Yes	No

Source: PILDAT, “The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan.” and National Assembly of Pakistan website (www.na.gov.pk)

Appendix G Electoral History and Government Ambition of NP

Elections	2008	2013
Seats Won	Boycott	
Government Formed	No	Yes

Source: PILDAT, “The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan.” and National Assembly of Pakistan website (www.na.gov.pk)

Appendix H Electoral History and Government Ambition of JI

Elections	1970	1988	1990	1993	1997	2002	2008	2013
Seats Won	4	7	8	3	Boycotted	59	Boycotted	4
Government Formed	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Source: PILDAT, “The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan.” and National Assembly of Pakistan website (www.na.gov.pk)

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