

**Scorekeepers, Game Players and Political Action:
Normativity and Practical Reasoning of Brazil and India in
International Politics**

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30 January 2017

Abstract

What are the conditions under which and the processes through which political actors settle practical matters in international politics, make some actions authoritative, and marginalize alternative discourses? This thesis argues that some political action becomes contingently authoritative through the game of giving and asking for reasons. Drawing from recent advancements in critical constructivist International Relations scholarship and analytical pragmatists' philosophy, particularly the works of Robert Brandom, I provide a fresh conceptual perspective on practical reasoning in international politics by showing that discursive practice is deontic where members keep track of one's own and others' normative commitments and entitlements – participants are thus deontic scorekeepers. While engaging in the game of giving and asking for reasons, political actors not only make claims; they attribute, acknowledge, and undertake different commitments and entitlements, keep scores on each other and work within the proprieties of deontic scorekeeping network. Crucially, different types of norms that arise in the networked interaction-in-context lead to different patterns of practical reasoning for action. Thus, political actors through practical reasoning make several inferences concomitant to the norms that underwrites interactions, justify their moves to scorekeepers, and intentionally judge and act and marginalize alternative discourses.

I analyze this distinct form of practical reasoning of actors in international politics on the issue of humanitarian crisis abroad in two broad historical case studies. The first study examines India's military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971. The Indira Gandhi administration's military intervention was not inevitable, as there were well-entrenched discourses in Indian political topography since the early twentieth century in the form of non-intervention, diplomatic criticism, rebel support, and enlisting the support of Great Powers to manage humanitarian crises abroad. I will show that the interaction-in-context among multiple scorekeepers on the

East Pakistan crisis triggered an *instrumental norm type* with implications on patterns of inferences and on what reasons interlocutors accepted as good reasons for action. Through the game of giving and asking for reasons, the Indira Gandhi administration judged that securitization of refugees is the proper completion of its practical reasoning, normatively trapped other interlocutors, marginalized competing alternatives, judged and acted on military intervention as an obligation arising from its premises on refugee resettlement. The second case study examines Brazil's intervention in Haiti in 2004. The Lula administration's humanitarian intervention was not inevitable, as there were three well-entrenched discourses in Brazilian political topography since the early twentieth century in the form of non-intervention, diplomatic mediation, and Chapter VI UN Peacekeeping missions. I show the interaction-in-context among scorekeepers on Haiti triggered an *institutional norm type*. The Lula administration through the game of giving and asking for reasons exhibited solidarity to a fellow Black-Brother country in the Hemisphere and utilized the practical inference of non-indifference to marginalize alternative discourses. Here the scorekeepers endorsed Brazil's claims on solidarity and non-indifference in Haiti not as transcendental values, but as good reasons for action offered by a bona fide player in the region.

The thesis will have implications for critical constructivist IR through explicating the micro mechanisms that political actors use in situational games and in specifying the deontic processes through which interests become meaningful and can thus serve as the basis for action. Instead of engaging in a retrospective reading of history or asserting that the boundaries of acceptable discursive practices can be established in advance of the interaction-in-context, one has to foreground the normative conditions under which and deontic scorekeeping processes through which some actions become contingently authoritative against competing discourses.

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At CEU, my thinking on questions concerning political action and agency in international politics came to be shaped by a number of people, importantly of my two mentors Paul Roe and Xymena Kurowska. Paul has been a constant source of both intellectual inspiration and support in connection with this project. If not for his patience, generous comments and constructive criticisms on several early drafts, this project would not have seen its completion. Having agreed with me that my previous drafts needed tremendous improvements, Paul taught me the need for careful reading of the existing literature. This is important because, in the early years of my Ph.D., I went around presumptuously and unashamedly to knockdown the existing literature – oh, this argument wrong; ah, that evidence is bad; oh, this theory is terrible! Paul was a great example to show academic humility with creativity and open-mindedness and vital in enabling me to “learn” something important rather than carry a hammer around. Moreover, by insisting that I should write clearly, Paul also gave me my first lessons in academic writing. If the thesis still has problems with clarity, which it undoubtedly has, it is despite his best efforts and suggestions.

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Dedicated to

Mother – Sivapackiyam
Father – Shanmuga Sundaram
Brother – Vasant

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List of Abbreviations

ABC	Argentina, Brazil, Chile
BD	Bangladesh Documents
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CPI (M-L)	Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
CREDN	Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional (Commission of External Relations and National Defence, Brazil)
DC§	Doxastic Commitment
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
FUNAG	Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation
IAPF	Inter-American Peace Force
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGSS	Indira Gandhi Selected Speeches, Ministry of External Affairs, India.
IIRSA	Iniciativa para a Integração da Infra-estrutura Regional Sul Americana (Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	Indian National Congress
Mercosul	Mercado Comum do Sul (Common Market of the South— Mercosur is the Spanish acronym)
MIF	Multilateral Interim Force (Haiti specific)
MNF	Multi National Force (Haiti specific)
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MRE	Ministério de Relações Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OAS	Organization of American States
PC§	Practical Commitment
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PLO	People's Liberation Army
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Social Democratic Party of Brazil)
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party)
SAFTA	South American Free Trade Area
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

Note on Citation

The thesis consistently follows the International Organization citation style (*IO* style). Under the *IO* style, I cite sources in footnotes using an abbreviated author/date form that refers to a corresponding entry in the reference list. It has specific page number when quoting from or referring to a particular passage. For newspaper or magazine article, I include full relevant information in the footnote without an entry in the reference list. For primary sources, I include full relevant information both in the footnote and make an entry in the reference list. Some footnotes also include brief comments that help the readers understand the source's value or viewpoint.

1. Introduction

This thesis is concerned with a seemingly straightforward problem: in practical matters when decision makers face several and contradictory policy discourses how does a certain “action” become contingently authoritative? In other words, what are the conditions under which and the processes through which political actors settle practical matters and marginalize alternative policy discourses? We can make sense of this problem, by looking at some diverse examples from different periods of international history. In the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, the French Convention in 1792 were asked to consider requests from Limburg and Mainz to liberate them from “despots.”¹ The Convention faced three competing policy alternatives: ignoring the request for liberation, offering French protection, or merely guaranteeing the liberty of the neighboring people. The Convention leaders decided to act by offering protection and settled the problem with the momentous decrees of November 19 and December 15, 1792. It was to lead to war with England, which feared France’s judgment and action as tantamount to a universal declaration of war against all thrones.²

In the diplomatic history of the United States, arguably, the most important and perhaps widely discussed choice problem among political actors is the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Kennedy administration was caught between competing alternative discourses: do-nothing, commence air strikes, initiate a naval blockade of Cuba, or engage in a full-scale invasion to take Cuba away from Castro.³ President Kennedy chose the option of a naval blockade on October 22, 1962, and changed the meaning of the pivotal moments of superpower confrontation during the Cold War.

¹ All details on this example is from Vincent 1974, 67.

² Ibid

³ Scott and Hughes 2015; Also see Weldes 1999.

In contemporary politics, the George W. Bush administration, in the immediate aftermath of September 11, faced several policy discourses between do nothing, pursue containment strategies against terrorist-sponsoring states combined with a continued inspection regime, and declaring war. The Bush administration's "War on Terror" with a distinct evangelical eschatology fundamentally changed the contours of the global order.⁴ This action has undoubtedly created more problems and tensions in international politics. We have been worrying about it every since.

Until very recently, choice problems of non-Western and postcolonial states in international politics appeared insignificant because they were considered throughputs of the system anyway.⁵ However, following the brutal genocide by the Pakistani army on its own Bengali populace in East Pakistan, the Indian policymakers faced several competing alternative policy discourses: non-intervention in the internal affairs of Pakistan, diplomatic criticism to stop the slaughter of innocent Bengalis, providing support to Bengali rebels and guerrilla movements fighting for self-determination, or enlisting the support of Great Powers against Pakistan's military policies. The Indira Gandhi administration in India chose to engage in military intervention in East Pakistan in December 1971. This action at once led to the creation of the large and populous state of Bangladesh, tilted the balance of power in the region in favor of India, intensified strategic rivalry that drove Pakistan to get nuclear weapons, the consequence of which continue to stalk the subcontinent.⁶

Similarly, in the immediate aftermath of civil war and violence in Haiti, the Brazilian government in 2004 was asked by states as diverse as the United States, Canada, and France to consider some

⁴ See for example, Krebs and Lobasz 2007.

⁵ See for example, Krasner 1985.

⁶ For these details see Raghavan 2013, 4; Also see Bass 2013.

form of engagement in stabilizing Haiti. The Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (hereafter Lula) administration faced three competing policy discourses: resort to the well-established Latin American tradition of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, exercise the professional role of its proud foreign service in diplomatic mediation, or engage in a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping mission in Haiti. The Lula administration marginalized these alternative discourses, judged and acted on a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation in Haiti. Brazil's humanitarian intervention in Haiti is unprecedented and extremely controversial in its diplomatic history.⁷ Some continue to accuse Brazil of doing the “dirty job” of the United States in the Caribbean region.⁸

A central element in each of these examples is the active agential aspect of political actors both in exercising characteristic judgment to settle practical problems and in marginalizing competing alternative discourses. So persuasive is the particular action of France, the United States, India, and Brazil that the political actors faced several competing alternative discourses to settle the problems appear to many as utterly insignificant. With the momentous consequence of the French Convention, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the War on Terror, and humanitarian interventions, it may seem less important to wonder that competing policy discourses dominated public debate and that alternative worlds could have emerged. However, the starting point of this thesis is to avoid such retrospective reading of history. Political actions that appear momentous are a product of the actors' transaction in the contingent social world where nothing is inevitable or given by logical necessity.⁹ The humanitarian military intervention was not a foreordained choice of the Indian decision makers. Although many observers suspected that Indians seized the opportunity to dismember Pakistan and cut its arch enemy down to size, the Indira Gandhi

⁷ Ekström and Alles 2012.

⁸ Referred in, Kenkel 2013b, 5–6.

⁹ Guzzini 2000; Jackson and Nexon 1999; Also see Jackson 2006a.

administration's triumph with regard to the choice of military intervention was not inevitable in the face of competing, less costly, alternatives. Brazil's action in Haiti was also not foreordained and there were efficient alternatives to legitimize its quest for a permanent seat in the United Nations than to hold down the Haitians by the jackboot.

If a political action is not inevitable in international politics, then this raises a serious research question: what are the conditions under which and the processes through which political actors choose one course of action as authoritative and marginalize competing alternative discourses? To be sure, one cannot provide a grand theory of political action or establish once and for all, those "determinants" of political action against alternative options; however, one could open up the processes of political agency in important ways. Given the significance of political actions and the momentous consequences, they bring about, the lack of attention devoted to opening up the processual aspects of political agency is surprising. As Risse-Kappen has argued, "decision makers are always exposed to several and often contradictory policy concepts" yet most research fails "to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside."¹⁰ This observation is important because it starkly shows an important theoretical gap in International Relations (IR) scholarship.

Existing explanations in IR that aim to shed light on the problem falls into two broad categories. Mainstream rationalist approaches argue that a specific action against competing alternatives results from the dynamics of national interests, societal preferences, the autonomous role of ideas or due to the structuring force of established norms of international society.¹¹ At the most

¹⁰ Risse-Kappen 1994, 187.

¹¹ The literature on realist, liberal, and liberal-constructivist account is enormous. For representative realist accounts of political agency see, Kaufmann and Pape 1999; Snyder 2011. For liberal and liberal constructivists accounts see, Finnemore 1996; Moravcsik 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen and Ropp 1999; and Risse 2000.

basic level, these approaches assume that choice processes and evaluation of alternatives by political actors are grounded in clear and identifiable means-end reasoning that arise out of objective international reality or in the subjective beliefs of actors. They resort to some form of psychological reductionism in action-explanation that does not give a coherent account of the obligatory conditions that arise in interactions. Further, all try to avoid recognizing the importance of meaning and intentionality that political actors bring to bear in exercising judgment over a particular course of action. I reject these theories because they cannot explain the value-considerations that actors bring to bear in evaluating alternative options and thus fail to preserve the central role of human agency in practical matters.

A second approach belongs to critical constructivist methodology in IR and this thesis is very much located within this existing body of literature. Specifically, securitization theory within the Copenhagen School, ontological security, and rhetorical coercion model work within the language-focused mechanisms of political influence and posit that the processes through which political agents represent, construct, rhetorically impress, and legitimize issues are politically significant for the emergence of an authoritative action.¹² There are three, or at least three important and common assumptions within these research programs that I draw upon for substantive research in this thesis. First, all these theories understand the emergence of political action in the face of competing alternatives as a power-laden process where claim making practices of political agents in the interactions are constituted by contestations, criticisms, and challenges by multiple interlocutors. Second, political action is intelligible only against the background of rules, which give meaning to this action. In other words, evaluating alternative discourses and exercising judgment are characteristic meaning-making processes, which one

¹² I will deal with this body of literature extensively in Chapter 2. However, for some representative examples on recent advancements in securitization theory, rhetorical coercion model, and ontological security, see e.g. Balzacq 2005; Jackson 2006a; Krebs and Jackson 2007; Roe 2008; Steele 2008.

cannot reduce to mere behavioral input-output strategies. Third, all three research programs establish that the emergence of one political action in the face of competing alternatives is a contingent process where the human agency, autonomy, and judgment play the role they do. With these assumptions, the three research programs make important conceptual claims: securitization process of fixing something as a security issue gives particular meaning to security; rhetorical coercion shows that the power of skillful argumentation itself has the ability to marginalize other discourses; and ontological security claims that Self regarding behavior in terms of identity is an important motive for action in the face of competing alternative discourses.

In keeping with these assumptions, I also make two much-needed explications on this critical constructivist literature. The first is to show that actors and discourses are constituted by the process itself and thus one cannot establish the boundaries of acceptable discursive practice in advance of the interaction-in-context. This is not in any way a new claim and many critical constructivists have identified this gap and in this thesis I explore avenues to fill that gap. The second explication I make in this thesis is to maintain an overriding emphasis on normativity in the claim making practices of political agents. This enables us to appreciate how norms are constantly negotiated in social interactions and that they cannot be separated from meanings actors attach to them in interactions.¹³ These two explications are important for further opening the processes of political agency in important ways. However, explicating that discursive practices are constituted by the processes of interactions itself requires rethinking on discursive practices in international politics. Similarly, explicating that normativity seems to acquire overarching importance in such interactions requires elucidating what normativity is at issue? How does it operate? How is it different from the transcendental normative content that we are so used to in IR scholarship? And what effects might it produce? In order to address these

¹³ Hofferberth and Weber 2015, 76.

questions, I develop an elaborate analytical framework drawing from recent advancements in critical constructivist IR and analytical pragmatist philosophy.

The central argument of this thesis is that political actors engage in a distinct form of practical reasoning to bring about an action in the face of competing alternative discourses. To begin with, “practical reasoning” means reasoning directed towards action where rational agents take certain statements as premises and, if all goes well, reach practical conclusions, which have those premises as its grounds.¹⁴ A most basic and simple piece of practical reasoning is of the form:¹⁵

Major Premise: I want to α

Minor Instrumental premise: I believe that β -ing is a means of α -ing

Conclusion: I shall / should / ought to/ must β

Drawing on recent advances in pragmatist philosophy, particularly the works of Robert Brandom, I will argue that in the practical reasoning of political actors one’s own and others’ normative commitments and entitlements are at issue.¹⁶ Discursive practice is *deontic* where members keep track of their own and others’ normative commitments and entitlements through the game of giving and asking for reasons. Here members examine whether the asserter is “correct” in seeking particular entitlements to belief or action from their commitments, how appropriate is the “contextualized obligation” that arise in such assertional performances, what “inferences” follow from political claims, and how the asserter “justifies” the responsibility associated with entitlements.¹⁷ Thus, participants are deontic scorekeepers.¹⁸ A score is just the normative commitment and entitlement associated with each actor and every time a member of the conversation undertakes, acknowledges, attributes a commitment or entitlement, it changes

¹⁴ Alvarez 2010.

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ It is characteristically an inferential expressivist account of “meaning normativity” based on the works of Brandom 1994; Brandom 2009; Maher 2014; Levine 2015 which I will elaborate in Chapter 3.

¹⁷ Brandom 1994, 179.

¹⁸ Brandom 1994; Also see Brandom 2010.

the deontic score.¹⁹ This normativity thesis involves an understanding that there are *correctness* and *prescriptivity* conditions that arise in claim making practices and scorekeepers keep track of these conditions. The pragmatic practical reasoning shows how one might be entitled to the practical commitment by giving and taking reasons with other scorekeepers in the deontic scorekeeping space. Conceived in this way, some actions become contingently authoritative in practical matters, when decision-makers through reasoning with deontic scorekeepers judge what it is to act based on such reasoning and thus marginalize competing alternative discourses that are incompatible with the deontic score of the game.

But in the deontic scorekeeping practice, there is not one but different patterns of practical reasoning depending on the normativity that underwrites interactions between interlocutors.²⁰ Most notably, depending on the interactional situation and the norm it generates, decision-makers and their scorekeepers take some practical inferences as right and others as wrong, some reasons as good and other reasons as bad, and change the deontic scores accordingly. In other words, the boundaries of acceptable reasons in the game are not knowable in advance but are endogenously emergent in the interaction-in-context and through the ongoing practices in which scorekeepers and game players are embedded. The upshot, as Brandom puts it:

There is no *a priori* reason to assimilate all such ‘ought’s to any one form – for instance the prudential (Humean totalitarianism), as rationality-as-maximizing theorists (such as Gauthier) do.”²¹

This means one pays attention to different obligatory conditions that arise in different interactional settings based on the norm-type that underwrites the situation, acknowledge that securing entitlement to one’s commitment through practical reasoning is a contentious practice of giving and asking for reasons, not preordained, and systematically reasoned through public justifications within the deontic scorekeeping space.

¹⁹ Brandom 1994, 181; Also see Scharp 2005, 208.

²⁰ Specifically see, Brandom 1998, 134.

²¹ Ibid., 135.

Viewed this way the emergence of an action in international politics is intentional and constructed. How political actors reason with and against each other has tremendous implications for the emergence of one action in the face of competing alternatives. This practical reasoning is not instrumentalist means-end reasoning where agents figure out how to achieve their pre-given desires by way of beliefs about how to satisfy them. Instrumentalism does not stand alone but rests on a normative basis.²² Clearly, normativity, as conceived here, is in line with the critical constructivist approach in IR where norms are constituted by and constitutive of specific uses by actors.²³ In other words, norms are both structuring and constructed by actors through social practice. This normativity thesis is also distinct in the sense that following expressivist accounts in analytical pragmatist philosophy, I claim – words express judgments – in international politics and thus there are “correctness” and “prescriptivity” conditions linked to claims’ meaning through social practices and other scorekeepers keep track of it in important ways in the game of giving and asking for reasons. With this framework, we can retain the critical and explanatory themes of the three research programs taken up here, but also provide more nuanced tool for the analysis of the processes of political agency.

This thesis develops this argument in detail, explaining why some actions become contingently authoritative through distinct form of practical reasoning in the deontic scorekeeping space, and how it is that the actors’ reasoning process can marginalize alternative policy discourses based on the deontic scores of the conversation. The rest of this introduction will set the scope conditions for this analysis. In Section 1.1, I will elaborate the significance of humanitarian military intervention issue in world politics and show why it provides a strong analytical purchase for empirical investigation in this thesis. Section 1.2, offers justifications for studying India’s humanitarian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 and Brazil’s intervention in Haiti in 2004 and

²² See Korsgaard 1997.

²³ See Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989; Fierke 2002; Wiener 2009; Kurowska 2013; Wiener 2014.

discusses the research design employed in the thesis. In Section 1.3, I will summarize the broad argument of the empirical investigation and the contribution of the thesis to processual aspects of political action. In Section 1.4., I place the contribution of this thesis within the recent advancements of critical constructivist IR. Finally, in Section 1.5, I outline a roadmap of the thesis.

1.1. The Importance of the topic on Humanitarian Intervention

The topic of humanitarian intervention has generated one of the most heated discussions in international relations over the past decade; the choice problem of political actors when they face a humanitarian crisis abroad pervades social and political life. Clearly, the policy on humanitarian military intervention is not preordained as the failures of decision-makers to address the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan (1960), Rwanda (1999), Srebrenica (1995), Somalia (1995) and Darfur since 2003 show. Yet, on some occasions, actors did choose the policy of humanitarian intervention against competing alternatives like the cases of the US-led intervention in Haiti (1994), NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999), Australian-led intervention in East Timor (1999) among others. Thus, agency attains center stage on the issue of humanitarian crisis abroad. Yet it also has an uneasy relationship, as Jennifer Welsh puts it, with both the major schools of thought in IR, and the behavior of states, international organizations, and non-governmental actors.²⁴ Thus, analytically the research question is straightforward: when faced with a serious humanitarian crisis how do political actors choose the policy of military intervention in the face of competing discourses such as non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, diplomatic criticism, imposing economic sanctions, arming rebel groups or enlisting the support of Great Power for coercive deterrence?

²⁴ Welsh 2004, 1.

There are three, or at least three, reasons why analyzing humanitarian intervention action can contribute to a better theoretical understanding of choice problems in international politics. First addressing the humanitarian crisis and mass atrocity crimes abroad is a practical issue in international politics where decision-makers *act* to do or not to do something and they do not merely behave. It is not an issue that is beyond the control of human agency but one that involves deliberations for figuring out what to do. Thus, when the world confronts a serious humanitarian crisis, as in Rwanda in 1994, Kosovo in 1999, and Darfur since 2003, decision-makers face an important dilemma: what they should do about this problem. In his Millennium Report to the UN in 2000, Kofi Annan put this dilemma in stark terms:

[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? We confront a real dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defense of humanity and the defense of sovereignty are principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell us which principles should prevail when they are in conflict.²⁵

Given that there are no well-established leading candidates for humanitarian intervention, recent debates in political theory have focused on who should intervene thereby, further reinforcing the need to study the choice problems, agency, and intentionality of decision-makers.²⁶ James Pattison puts it very well in the realm of philosophy of ethics, “Having a stronger sense of the agency issues for humanitarian intervention will also help in identifying what is needed to *improve* the abilities of potential interveners, so that in the future we will have more – and better – interveners from which to choose.”²⁷ However, IR theory has to take a step back because any list of potential interveners is inert until agents intentionally *take* the list to be eligible and be moved accordingly. On the issue of humanitarian intervention, agents pursue goals, share meanings, criticize assertions and engage in several public justification practices that offer a fertile ground for investigating how decision-makers wrestle with multiple well-entrenched discourses, for

²⁵ Annan 2000, 48.

²⁶ Miller 2001; Kok Chor 2006; Pattison 2010.

²⁷ Pattison 2010, 9. Emphasis original

example, non-intervention and diplomatic criticism, to find solutions to the practical problem of humanitarian crises abroad.

The topic of humanitarian intervention is also an interesting object of analytical study because the present theoretical debates in IR scholarship on the topic are not directly concerned with why and how decision-makers choose to engage in humanitarian intervention action in the face of competing alternatives. In this thesis, I want to fill this important theoretical lacuna.

Predominantly, accounts inspired by legalistic analysis focus on treaties, conventions, and formal sources in order to stop powerful states from using the pretext of humanitarianism to engage in a war.²⁸ The focus is on examining under what legal conditions political actors can intervene in the name of humanity. However, legalistic accounts leave open the question of how decision-makers give distinct meaning to legal rules and legitimize their actions. The case in point is that neither NATO nor the United States, which led the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, put forward a formal legal justification for action.²⁹ Yet most agree, even if reluctantly, that the military intervention was legitimate even though it was not legal. Thus, I wish to avoid too legalistic an analysis by profiting from the wider set of questions which IR scholarship such as securitization theory, ontological-security, and the rhetorical coercion model has placed on the agenda of humanitarian actions.³⁰ I also aim to build on such approaches through a nuanced specification of the linguistic mechanisms involved in the processes of political agency by foregrounding the deontic aspects of practical reasoning.

²⁸ For representative accounts see, Franck and Rodley 1973; Henkin 1979. For comprehensive account see International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001.

²⁹ Brooks 2014, 165.

³⁰ Some of the representative examples are Wheeler 2001; Crawford 2002; Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003; Finnemore 2004; Steele 2005; Contessi 2010; Hayes 2012.

Finally, the long history of the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention and the continued opposition to it from certain members of international society seems particularly well suited to understand how contestations influence the way agents to give and take reasons on humanitarian intervention. The global norms relating to humanitarian intervention are not settled; yet, at the same time, there has been a shift towards an alternative conception of sovereignty based on responsibility.³¹ Indeed, as Rosa Brooks points out:

when we think about norms related to humanitarian intervention or the Responsibility to Protect, if anything what we have seen has been a process of reaction, counter-reaction, counter-counter-reaction and counter-counter-counter reaction. We are still going through that cycle.³²

Thus, multiple interlocutors exercise their perspectival attitude on the issue of humanitarian intervention and bring to bear their challenges, acknowledgments, endorsements, and attributions in important claim-making practices. Here traditions, historical experiences, past cases, identities, ideologies etc., become very important in the game of giving and asking for reasons thereby strongly influencing discursive competition on humanitarian actions. To examine the chain reaction of assessments by multiple interlocutors in international relations and their role in the emergence of an authoritative action, the topic of humanitarian intervention fulfills this function very well.

1.2. Case Selection and Research Design

For the purpose of this study, case selection was necessary and it had to respond to two methodological expectations. First, it should allow for the investigation of the analytical framework based on the practical reasoning in deontic scorekeeping space developed in the thesis (Chapter 3). Hence, the selection needed to include cases where decision-makers engaged

³¹ On this latter development, the reports by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 2001, UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in 2004, and the endorsement of over 160 heads of state in the 2005 UN World Summit that there exists a universal responsibility to protect populations.

³² Brooks 2014, 162.

in a diverse game of giving and asking for reasons with striking variation in the *explanandum*. Second, since the analysis would focus on an agent's distinct practical reasoning and *not* as a comparison of one's practical reasoning with another, the selection needed to include cases where the networked interactions between interlocutors in different situations led to the emergence of different types of norms.³³ This will enable us to evaluate the different processes through which actors exercise judgment and how different types of norms led to different patterns of practical reasoning.

The cases selected were those of India's humanitarian military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 and Brazil's humanitarian military intervention in Haiti in 2004. By focusing on the non-Western postcolonial states who take up the issue of the predominantly White-Western idea of humanitarian intervention, I aim to bring out the public legitimating reasons and contestations of largely understudied choice problems of political elites in the periphery. This is important and Gary Bass puts it very well:

The legal and political debates about humanitarian intervention usually focus on cases of major Western powers going to war, which can be dismissed as neoimperialism...But India's brief for saving Bangladeshis [and I would add Brazil's efforts to save Haitians] provides a crucial opportunity to hear the legal and moral voices of non-Westerners.³⁴

Thus, the substantive significance of India and Brazil can hardly be overstated: these cases are perhaps the quintessential examples of postcolonial states exhibiting explicit paternalistic meaning making of the crisis, carrying "the White man's [*sic*] burden," in East Pakistan and Haiti respectively, and implicitly exhibiting ideas of *la mission civilisatrice*. Humanitarian intervention action in East Pakistan and Haiti are therefore of immense historical and contemporary

³³ Kratochwil already pointed out that there is a contingent relation between type of situation and norm-type. Kratochwil 1989, 15.

³⁴ Bass 2015, 228–229.

significance. The effect of this action continues well into the recent debates on the changing nature of international society, manifested in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) debates and in the continuing unrest in South Asia and South America as briefly mentioned in the opening paragraphs.

Beyond their substantive significance, there are two principal methodological reasons guiding this case selection as well. First, both India and Brazil's action are "hard cases" for practical reasoning on deontic scorekeeping framework of this thesis because material interests such as India-Pakistan rivalry and Brazil's quest for a permanent seat in the United Nations would appear to provide a ready explanation for the choices made by the policymakers. Thus, there seems to be an intuitive explanation for action and if the analytical framework of this thesis is to be convincing, it must adequately demonstrate that humanitarian intervention as a contingent outcome, was not simply the inevitable product of material interests. Crucially, unlike the military intervention of other non-Western postcolonial states such as Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia (1979), Tanzania's intervention in Uganda (1979), or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)' intervention in Sierra Leone (1997), the cases of Brazil and India's intervention is laced with strong materialist explanations concomitant to their international ambitions and thus well suited as hard cases for evaluating the explanatory payoffs of the analytical framework of this thesis that qualifies the role of these fixed material interests in political agency.

Second, with careful historical reconstruction, these cases in different time-periods of international history represent different interaction-in-context that foregrounds different norm-types and diverse processes of contestation among scorekeepers in the game of giving and asking

for reasons. In other words, both cases exhibit striking variations in both the *explanans* and the *explanandum*. The choice situation of India in 1971 at the height of the Cold War and in adversarial relations with Pakistan led to an instrumental norm-type in interactions on East Pakistan crisis where mutual role-taking of the interlocutors did not go beyond the immediate pursuit of temporary advantage. The international community thus classified India's action as a unilateral military intervention. In the choice situation of Brazil, on the other hand, interactions between South American states since the 1990s set distinct institutions to overcome economic and political problems, which led to an institutional norm-type in interactions on the crisis in Haiti that played a major role in overcoming choice problems in social situations. Here the international community classified Brazil's action as a multilateral peacekeeping mission. Thus, for offering a nuanced understanding of the *different processes* involved in political agency and for showing how an emphasis on practical reasoning in deontic scorekeeping terms explicates – in more nuanced terms the accounts of securitization, rhetorical coercion, and ontological security – the cases of Brazil and India are useful.

My argument here is that while both Brazil and India are not unproblematic in terms fitting into the instrumental and institutional norm-type in interactions among interlocutors. However, taken together they highlight how the processes of political agency exercised in the Indian case can be distinguished from the processes of political agency exercised in the Brazilian case both in terms of the role of scorekeepers keeping track of one another, the nature of contestations, and the dynamic game of giving and asking for reasons in interaction process.

The analytical framework developed in this thesis also enables one to form warranted expectations on sort of discourses waiting for dominance and for the delimitation of

scorekeepers while conducting actual empirical case studies in international politics. As stated earlier, different patterns of reasoning correspond to different sort of norms that underwrites interactions among interlocutors. In this thesis, I elaborate on two types of normativity that underwrites interactions among interlocutors in international politics. These types are not exhaustive but representative varieties utilized to show the different processes of political agency. An instrumental normativity in interactions can be said to occur when political actors, in their interactions, fail to find a practical solution to the problem or the solutions offered is entirely incompatible with the premises of others. Here sanctions and punishments dominate self-interested interlocutors. Thus, game players will face several competing discourses where *revolutionary* alternatives come to the forefront. However, under the institutional norm type that underwrites interactions the scorekeepers and game players may very well disagree with each other on the best way to solve the problem; however, there still exists a common denominator in terms of finding a solution through utilizing existing or new institutional safeguards. Here game players will face several competing discourses where well-entrenched *evolutionary* alternatives come to the forefront.

Similarly, the analytical framework developed in this thesis enables us to reasonably delimit the scorekeepers in the game. Different scorekeepers attain distinct importance under different types of normativity that underwrite interactions. Under the instrumental norm-type, game players will treat some agents as “scorekeepers” whose claims they cannot avoid responding with impunity. However, under the institutional norm type, game players will treat some agents as “scorekeepers” who hold the same social-institutional status and work with intersubjective convergence to make moves in the game.³⁵

³⁵ I will elaborate this delimitation of scorekeepers in Chapter 3 and in each empirical analyses. For preliminary details on my way of delimiting the scorekeepers see Brandom 1998, 134-135.

Thus, with the Indian case under the instrumental normativity that arose in interactions between interlocutors on the East Pakistan crisis, the Indira Gandhi administration faced four competing alternative discourses: non-intervention, rebel support to the Bengali self-determination movement, diplomatic criticism, and enlisting the support of Great Powers to exercise coercive deterrence against Pakistan. Some of these alternatives were revolutionary in the sense that – rebel support for Bengali self-determination movements or seeking the support of USSR being a non-aligned country –were not common conventions for the Indian policymakers to deal with crises in the neighborhood. Similarly, under the instrumental normativity in the interactions on East Pakistan crisis, the Indira Gandhi administration treated some actors such as the United States, the USSR, Pakistani Army, members of the Awami League, and the Global Publics, as “scorekeepers” because India could not ignore their political claims with impunity.

On the other hand, with the Brazilian case under the institutional normativity that arose in interactions between interlocutors on the Haitian crisis, the Lula administration faced three competing alternative discourses: non-intervention, diplomatic mediation, and engaging in Chapter VI peacekeeping mission in Haiti. Some of the alternative discourses were evolutionary in the sense that – the policy of diplomatic mediation and Chapter VI peacekeeping operations– were gradual developments to the situations in the Western hemisphere that the Brazilian policymakers could incrementally adapt to the interactions. Similarly, under the institutional normativity in the interactions on Haitian crisis, the Lula administration treated some actors such as the Brazilian domestic public, ABC Group (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), the United Nations, and the United States as “scorekeepers” because these members occupied particular socio-institutional status in the Western hemisphere and worked with a distinct intersubjective convergence to find practical solution to the burgeoning crisis in Haiti.

The empirical investigation relies on what Stefano Guzzini calls interpretivist process tracing.³⁶

The explanatory burden requires the analyst to open up the ‘black box’ of deliberation and interactions, yet the theory intertwines with empirics. It is an interpretivist research project because the aim is to understand the meaning-making processes of interlocutors engaged in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Here the meaning is not limited to actor itself, - in the spirit of double hermeneutics – but it also “comprise[s] the significance given to it by other actors, and also observers.”³⁷ These two aspects of (thin) interpretivism that I subscribe – following Guzzini – is important.

First, the project is interpretive because it opens up how agents *make sense* of events, interrogates the official discourse to see what specific normativity that underlies the claim-making processes of agents, and evaluates the “correctness” and “prescriptivity” conditions brought to bear by scorekeepers and game players in the game of giving and asking for reason in the empirical cases. Thomas Fossen shows this interpretivist rubric of deontic scorekeeping very well:

To take someone’s assertion to be meaningful is to take a stance towards her, treating her as a participant on whom score can be kept, and holding her responsible for living up to her commitments and answerable to her entitlement to those commitments. Similarly, in taking participants in social practice to be deontic scorekeepers, an interpreter adopts a scorekeeping perspective towards them. In adopting such a stance, the interpreter takes the interlocutors being interpreted to be *committed* to keeping score according to specific patterns.³⁸

Second, the project is interpretive in the spirit of double hermeneutics. Thus, the analytical framework of this thesis based on deontic scorekeeping is not a matter of production of a certain list of countable scores – indeed perhaps the relevant kind of deontic scores is not a numerical matter at all. The scorekeepers are not actively adding or deleting one’s own and others’

³⁶ Guzzini 2012, 47; Also see Guzzini 2011. The research method follows recent advancements in interpretivist research in IR reflected in the works of Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006; Jackson 2006; Oren 2007; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012; and Lynch 2014.

³⁷ Guzzini 2000, 161.

³⁸ Fossen 2011, 377-78.

commitments and entitlements to their list, but we theorists take interlocutors to have a list of deontic scores.³⁹ Kevin Scharp puts this point very well:

We, the theorists who are trying to get a better understanding of what it is the participants are doing when they engage in conversation, keep the list. We have a list of the commitments A has undertaken; or better, we have a list of the commitments B has attributed to A. We keep the list and pretend that B is keeping it... Thus, when Brandom says that B adds *p* to a list of commitments, what he means is that we, the theorists, in an attempt to understand what B and A are doing, keep a hypothetical list of the commitments B has attributed to A, and we hypothetically write the sentence token corresponding to the one A uttered on this list, and we pretend that B did this.⁴⁰

Thus, the data generation and argumentation analysis of the practical reasoning of India and Brazilian political actors and their multiple scorekeepers is rooted in double hermeneutics, which foregrounds the political and power-laden processes of meaning-making that lurk behind the seemingly natural.

Similarly, the research design is interpretive *process tracing* because we aim to understand the multilayered processes and dynamics involved in the game of giving and asking for reasons, rather than assuming a single linear development. This process tracing is not a series of small-range covering-law explanations because such a strategy as Guzzini puts it, “seems to reduce mechanisms – and hence process-tracing – to a sequence of intervening variables.”⁴¹ Rather, as I conceive it here, interpretive process tracing of practical reasoning of the Indian and the Brazilian administration with their respective scorekeepers starts with how multiple agents hold one another to account from their socially situated viewpoint. The agents and their scorekeepers come with their own situated *deontic attitudes* on an understanding of the issue of humanitarianism and not as *tabula-rasa* to seek entitlements for action.

³⁹ Scharp 2005, 211. Emphasis original

⁴⁰ Ibid Emphasis original

⁴¹ Guzzini 2011, 332.

Towards this goal, I engage with multiple primary and secondary documents to examine how decision-makers in both India and Brazil engage in claim-making practices and providing publicly justifying reasons in evaluating alternative discourses of action. In the India case, I engage with Parliamentary debates from the Upper and Lower houses, Prime Minister's statements and debates in the Parliament, publicly presented press reports, statements made in the UN and triangulate these claims through some officially declassified documents. Similarly, in the Brazil case, I engage with Congressional debates, Presidential statements, reports made at the Organization of American States (OAS), media reports, and triangulate these claims on officially published documents by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty). I also consult extensive secondary documents published as books and articles on the deliberations of these leaders. Since no attempt is made to examine the deep and inner motives of decision-makers, the claims, and assertions that were not publicly justified are ignored for empirical scrutiny.⁴²

1.3. Argument and Point of Departure

As we saw, the central concern of this thesis is to understand the processes through which one action becomes contingently authoritative in the face of competing alternative policy discourses. The aim is to open up the processes of political agency rather than to offer a grand theory of political action. The guiding analytical question focused on the humanitarian military intervention of India and Brazil is, therefore: when faced with a serious humanitarian crisis abroad, how military intervention action becomes contingently authoritative against competing alternative discourses. The central theoretical argument of this thesis, to reiterate, is that some actions become contingently authoritative when political actors engage in practical reasoning with deontic scorekeepers. In the game of giving and asking for reasons, one's normative

⁴² Jackson 2006b.

commitments and entitlements are at issue –and actors judge what it is to act and marginalize competing alternatives incompatible with the deontic score of the game. Now, on the analytical issue of this thesis, the central arguments are set out below.

In keeping with the theoretical claim that different types of norms lead to different patterns of practical reasoning, my argument on India's military intervention in East Pakistan rests on three important points. First, I maintain that the Indira Gandhi administration's triumph with regard to humanitarian intervention in East Pakistan was not inevitable because there were well-entrenched competing policy discourses in Indian political topography, at least since the early twentieth century, in the form of non-intervention, diplomatic criticism, rebel support, and enlisting the support of Great Powers to address humanitarian crises abroad. Second, I show that the administration fixed the meaning of humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan by securitizing the Bengali refugees camped in Indian Territory escaping persecution, which enabled India to wage a war against Pakistan and marginalize competing alternatives discourses. Third, and this is crucial, this securitization of refugees came about through – and not prior – to India's practical reasoning with other scorekeepers. In distinct stages of the game of giving and asking for reasons, multiple scorekeepers kept track of India's normative commitments but withheld its entitlement for action in East Pakistan. The interaction-in-context triggered an *instrumental norm type*. Here the gap between normative commitments acknowledged and entitlements precluded to find a solution to the East Pakistan crisis enabled the administration to trap several scorekeepers into claims that they might otherwise have rejected. Indira Gandhi administration judged that securitizing the refugees is the proper completion of its reasoning to fulfill the contextual obligation of refugee resettlement. In other words, a judgment that one has to securitize the refugees and bring about a humanitarian military intervention action was a product of India's practical reasoning in the deontic scorekeeping space with multiple interlocutors.

Similarly, my argument on Brazil's humanitarian military intervention in Haiti rests on three important points. First, I maintain that the Lula administration's triumph with regard to humanitarian intervention in Haiti was not inevitable because there were well-entrenched competing policy discourses in Brazil's political topography since the early twentieth century in the form of non-intervention, diplomatic mediation, and UN peacekeeping operations. Second, I show that the successful legitimization of military intervention in Haiti was possible due to the administration's effective fixing of the meaning of the crisis in Haiti in terms of Brazil's responsibility and exercising diplomacy of solidarity and non-indifference in the region. Third, and this is crucial, judgment on responsibility came about through Brazil's practical reasoning with other scorekeepers. In distinct stages of the game of giving and asking for reasons, multiple scorekeepers kept track of Brazil's normative commitments and entitlements. The interaction-in-context triggered an *institutional norm type* where scorekeepers did not take Brazil's claims on solidarity and non-indifference as transcendental values, but as good reasons for action offered by a bona fide player in the region. In other words, a judgment that one has to exercise responsibility in the region and engage in multilateral humanitarian military intervention in Haiti was a product of Brazil's practical reasoning in the deontic scorekeeping space.

The explanatory purchase and the sort of payoff in examining the cases of Brazil and India's humanitarian intervention through the analytical framework of practical reasoning and deontic scorekeeping are evident, three of which are most relevant. First, the analytical framework developed in this thesis seems better equipped to account for the value-based considerations of the Indian and Brazilian policy makers in their evaluation of alternative courses of action that the mainstream rationalist accounts cannot explain in detail. For India, the value of human rights and ensuring the safety, dignity, and honor of Bengali refugees was important in its reasoning than the mere means-end nexus. Similarly, for Brazil, its responsibility in the Western

hemisphere as a country with a significant number of black population and the value of extending solidarity to those suffering masses was important in the game of giving and asking for reasons than instrumental criteria to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Second, the role of norms that underwrite interactional dynamics among interlocutors in the case of India and Brazil show how norms are constantly negotiated in social interactions and thus cannot be separated from meanings actors attach to them in interactions. Certainly, the existing accounts based on securitization, rhetorical coercion, and ontological security are helpful but, I feel, if one explicates the deontic aspect of claim-making practices then we understand how one's own and others' commitments and entitlements play the role they do in the game of giving and asking for reasons. The Indira Gandhi administration securitized the refugees in the Indian soil. However, this performativity of securitization was possible only because the Indian political agents normatively trapped its scorekeepers by highlighting the gap between commitments acknowledged (that the situation in East Pakistan in a case of mass-slaughtering) and entitlements precluded (that there is no political solution to the problem in the offing). This means that there is a contingent relation between norm entrapment under instrumental normativity, rhetorical coercion, and securitization. In other words, one can rhetorically coerce the opponent by normatively trapping them and some form of instrumentalist interactions among interlocutors seems important both for rhetorical coercion and securitization moves in the game. Similarly, the Brazilian policymakers made important identity-based arguments in claiming its solidarity with the Black-republic in the Western hemisphere. However, this is not essentialized ontological security claims but a distinct subject position that arose in the interaction and the reasons made explicit with its scorekeepers.

Finally, the explanatory payoff of the analytical framework developed in this thesis to examine the case of Brazil and India's humanitarian intervention moves the focus of political agency away from teleological criteria of action to the fundamental importance of the *distinct type* of normativity that underwrites interactions instead. The value of this typology of normativity – which is not exhaustive – is that it provides a more nuanced way for the analysis of political agency and the game of giving and asking for reasons. On the one hand, it avoids the lumping together of all action that is not done via rationalist belief-desire typology into some form of post-positivist approach to agency based on attention to interactions among agents. On the other hand, it enables a theoretical engagement with the different processes of interactions and the normativity that underlies them that a pure interactionist perspective might well fail to capture. Here I follow Kratochwil who claimed, “there is a contingent relationship between types of situation and the types of norms”⁴³ and I elaborate it with more detailed processes through which Indian and Brazilian policymakers exercised their authoritative choice on intervention in the face of competing alternatives.

1.4. Contributions to Critical Constructivist IR

The implications of this study also contribute to the advancements of critical constructivist IR by opening up the processes in human agency in two ways. First, I show that giving and taking reasons by keeping track of one's own and others' normative commitments and entitlements through deontic scorekeeping underlies securitizing moves, identity narratives, or rhetorical coercion. In other words, the boundaries of acceptable discursive practices in the game are not knowable in advance but are endogenous to the norms that arise in the interaction-in-context. This focus on the deontic aspects of international dynamics retains the critical and explanatory

⁴³ Kratochwil 1989, 15.

themes of critical constructivist IR and at the same time offers a more nuanced conceptual tool for the analysis of political agency.

For problems of how and why some action becomes contingently authoritative, I think the emphasis on practical reasoning is a natural enough approach. However, it is a controversial move in IR. Hume expressed his famous skepticism about practical reason by concluding that, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”⁴⁴ In other words, reason does not have an autonomous role and our desires ultimately determine what we do. Similarly, some might see my emphasis on a *distinct* pragmatic form of practical reasoning as not obligatory. Instrumentalism holds that all practical reasoning is means-end reasoning and there is (could be) nothing distinctive about practical reasoning even if we agree that claims express judgment. By showing why such arguments are mistaken, I advance better ways to understand the processes involved in political action important for critical constructivist IR.

The second contribution of the thesis is equally important. If human action is meaningful only in the background of rules, norms, social conventions, and practices as brilliantly shown by Kratochwil, Onuf, Wiener, and Fierke,⁴⁵ then the present thesis probes into the dynamics of such meaning-making processes through practical reasoning and keeping deontic scores in the game. It suggests that actor’s understanding and attributing meaning to issues in international politics is exhibiting a deontic attitude where attributing, acknowledging, endorsing, and challenging one’s own and others’ commitments are at issue. Thus existing critical constructivist accounts in IR agree that meaning is not something idiosyncratic to be studied through empathy,

⁴⁴ Hume 2008; For a brilliant challenge to this Humean argument see Korsgaard 1997.

⁴⁵ Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989; Fierke 1998; Fierke 2002; Wiener 2009; Wiener 2014.

and this thesis, *prima facie* establishes that meaning and intentionality of actors in international politics is normative.⁴⁶ It will be the task of Chapter 3 to give theoretical precision to the pragmatic ideas of deontic scorekeeping discursive practice outlined above in a cursory fashion. At appropriate points during the empirical investigation in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7, I will also show how this pragmatic practical reasoning builds on and elaborates from critical constructivist IR and thus offers a nuanced way of understanding the processes involved in political agency against competing alternative discourses.

1.5. The Road Ahead

Over the next six chapters, I will provide theoretical precision and empirical substantiation that are required to add more clarity both to the problem and to the central argument. Chapter 2 engages with existing explanations in IR theory on the problem. I locate the thesis within the critical constructivist works of securitization theory, ontological security, and the rhetorical coercion model – those research programs that enumerate the linguistic mechanisms through which political actors make certain interests meaningful. I elaborate on the significant overlap between these theories and draw on the strengths of their contribution to the problem.

Crucially, I also explicate certain important ideas in the critical constructivist oeuvre that is especially important to make sense of the processes of political agency in the face of competing alternative discourses. The objective of this chapter is to use these explications to set the stage for a distinct analytical framework to address them.

Chapter 3 serves as the core of the thesis – the analytical framework – that elucidates the pragmatic practical reasoning drawing upon the recent advancements in analytical pragmatist

⁴⁶ Some representative example from the philosophy of action debates, Whiting 2007; Gibbard 2012; Fennell 2013.

philosophy. This type of philosophical inquiry is important because I do not aim to develop some form of middle-range theory, operationalize it, and apply to a set of cases in the form of empirical tests. Rather, I aim to provide a more principled analysis of the problem that concerns this thesis and show the payoffs of a distinct pragmatist approach to examine the processes of political agency. Thus, this chapter follows some systematic steps.

Firstly, I will show the importance of practical reasoning for addressing the problem of this thesis. Immediately, it is important to clear some ground to show why one must not reduce practical reasoning to traditional instrumental means-end reasoning or practical reason reduced to belief-desire typology. Thus, in this manner, I set the stage for a distinctively pragmatic way of understanding the practical reasoning. The move to pragmatism entails understanding how analytical pragmatists conceive of discursive practices. In keeping with an expressivist account of normativity, the discussion on normative pragmatics, inferential semantics, and an example of deontic scorekeeping in international relations is meant to throw some light on this pragmatic way of understanding discursive practices in international relations. Thirdly, I will show the features of pragmatic practical reasoning within this deontic scorekeeping space and elucidate the importance of practical inference, justificatory responsibility, and intentionality in the emergence of one action as contingently authoritative in the face of competing alternatives. Finally, I will foreground the idea that different types of norms lead to different patterns of pragmatic practical reasoning and justify this move. In all the stages, I detail every step with examples from international relations without assuming any prior knowledge on the philosophy of pragmatism on the part of the reader.

Chapter 4 marks the beginning of empirical and case study material. Together with Chapter 5, it deals with the applicability of pragmatic practical reasoning in the case of India's military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971. Specifically, Chapter 4 maps the competing policy

discourses in India since the 1900s on the meaningful ways of dealing with humanitarian crisis abroad. Chapter 5 shows the practical reasoning of the Indira Gandhi administration in an instrumental deontic scorekeeping space for addressing the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan and shows how military intervention became contingently authoritative in the face of the competing alternative discourses. Chapters 6 and 7 follow the same structure as the previous two. This time, though, I emphasize the institutional norm-type that underwrite interactions on the Haitian crisis in 2004 and the practical reasoning of Lula government. Specifically, Chapter 6 first looks at the competing alternative discourses in Brazil and Chapter 7 specifically, foregrounds the practical reasoning of the Lula administration that led to the multilateral humanitarian military intervention in Haiti. In the conclusion, I revisit the theoretical contribution of the thesis by looking at the deontic rules and language-based mechanisms of political influence and its relevance for international politics. I also show the limitations of the study and avenues for further research.

2. The State of the Field

2.1. Introduction

This chapter builds on the discussion from the Introduction on the importance of the question how some action in international politics becomes contingently authoritative. It does so by specifically exploring the strengths and limitations of the existing scholarship in the field of International Relations (IR). The literature that aims to address this problem falls into two broad categories: rationalist approaches and critical constructivist approaches to the processes of political agency. In this chapter, my purpose is essentially threefold: first, to briefly show the limitations of rationalist approaches to the political agency by specifically foregrounding what these approaches could not explain about the cases of humanitarian military interventions. Second, to draw on the strengths of critical constructivist accounts, elaborate on their assumptions on the linguistic mechanisms of political influence, and situate my thesis within this body of scholarship.

Third – and crucially, I explicate two ideas in the existing critical constructivist literature for detailed inquiry. One, I focus how security and foreign policy is always contingent on any given context and thus actors' evaluation and choice of alternative discourses are constituted by the process itself. Thus, one cannot establish the boundaries of acceptable discursive practices in advance to the interactions-in-context. Two, I maintain an overriding emphasis on normativity in claim making practices of agents. Consequently, I argue that explicating the discursive practices and importance of normativity that underwrite interactions-in-context could open up the nuanced processes through which political actors exercise agency and marginalize alternatives. In

this way, I set the stage for a fresh conceptual apparatus on the pragmatic practical reasoning in the next chapter.

2.2. Rationalist Theories of Action and its Limits

Many rationalist theories that explore why some actions become authoritative are rooted in the assumption that the objective international reality guides choice – the perceived world enters the mind of policymakers as through an open door, or the action derives its authority from intrinsically motivating desires or preferences. This essential nature of objective international reality or subjective beliefs of actors account for why policymakers evaluate alternative options in the way they do. The task for the theorists thus becomes explaining why the policymakers perceived the reality correctly or incorrectly or in reconstructing the inner motives of political actors. In such evaluations, these scholars subscribe to an instrumentalist version of the rational choice theory of action based on probabilities and utilities assigned to the possible state of affairs. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to revisit the well-worn debates between realists, liberal, and liberal-constructivist theories of political action and rehearse the well-known limitations and shortcomings of such instrumentalist approaches to political agency in IR.¹

For the most part, on the analytical issue of humanitarian military intervention, these rationalist accounts fail to provide convincing explanations of political agency in the face of equally plausible alternative options. Realists are wont to find that humanitarian interventions are

¹ For the limitations of realist account of political agency, some important works include Schroeder 1994; Kratochwil 2003; Legro and Moravcsik 1999. For a good critique of liberal and liberal constructivist account see Laffey and Weldes 1997; Jackson and Nexon 2002; Goddard and Krebs 2015, 6-7; Hansen 2006; . For a good critique of liberal constructivist position see Hofferberth and Weber 2015. For the normative dope problem see Kratochwil 2006, 2013.

irrational in workings of true national interest.² Yet, it is an empirical fact that states have used humanitarian rationales for their actions.³ For liberals, political agency on humanitarian crisis abroad is the result of the role of socially differentiated individuals who act through pre-defined preferences independent of politics.⁴ Yet, this radical separation of political from preference formation disregards the question of how and why certain preferences “win-out” over others. This is important on the issue of humanitarian intervention where other alternatives such as economic sanctions could equally have strong preferences among elites.⁵ Similarly, liberal-constructivist accounts are based on how already legitimate norms drive persuasion, learning, and socialization of actors in making choices on humanitarian action.⁶ Yet, such accounts rely on concepts such as norm diffusion or the role of changing norms of international society within a universal narrative of progress, which are empirically inaccurate.⁷ Thus, despite paying attention to decision-making processes these rationalist frameworks fail to explain many aspects of political agency involved in the humanitarian intervention. Erik Ringmar captures the problem with such theories in a very interesting way:

Thus, while their theories do indeed concern the people who make decision, they have surprisingly little to say regarding matters of actual empirical substance. The focus is always on the hardware of the decision-making process, as it were, not on matters of software: it is not what people think about their worlds – how they give it meaning – which concerns them, but instead how they go about making decisions. It is the fact *that* people have interests and they act in terms of them that is crucial, not what any particular interests *are*.⁸

Critical constructivist scholarship has been set up in challenging this instrumentalist conception of political agency by opening up the aspects of meaning, intentionality, and the contextual processes through which political actors exercise agency. Such attempts to understand and explain action is very much focused on language-based mechanisms through which interests

² See Mearshierner 2001, 47; Or, on a realist consequentialist account of humanitarian intervention see Snyder 2011, 33. On the problems of true national interest in realist and rationalist framework see Kratochwil 1982; Weldes 1999.

³ Welsh 2004, 58.

⁴ Nardin 2006.

⁵ Reus-Smit 2001.

⁶ Finnemore 2004.

⁷ Hansen 2006. For a good account of the empirical inaccuracy and subsequent problem of liberal-constructivist accounts of humanitarian action see Hofferberth and Weber 2015.

⁸ Ringmar 1996, 39. Emphasis original

become meaningful and can thus serve as the basis for action. This thesis is very much located within this body of literature. It is to the enumeration of these linguistic mechanisms that we turn now.

2.3. Language Focused Mechanisms of Political Influence: New Approaches

There are a number of literature that one might use within critical constructivist IR to understand the linguistic processes through which political actors rule some courses of action acceptable and others unacceptable. For this thesis, three clusters of literature⁹— securitization theory within the Copenhagen School, ontological security model, and rhetorical coercion model — ¹⁰ are important for substantive and methodological reasons. It should be stated at the outset that in this chapter, I focus primarily on works that apply these frameworks, and I leave aside the growing literature that explores the ontological practices of political agency. It is unreasonable to address all aspects of the literature within the scope of this chapter.

There are three, or at least three, reasons to focus on these works that explore the processes of political agency in important ways. First, all the three theories are among the prominent “new” approaches to the study of political action in critical constructivist IR, and thus warranted further attention. They share sufficient affinity with the linguistic turn in hermeneutical philosophy and give importance to meaning, interpretation, and context of the social agents engaged in practical problems. Indeed, all three theories focus on political actors’ enormous struggles over meaning in strategic interactions and thus differentiate their works from other non-traditional

⁹ I will use theories, school, and models here interchangeably nothing substantive will come out of this. I use the notion of cluster because there is growing literature with the Copenhagen School, Ontological Security, and Rhetorical Coercion model, and it is impossible to address all aspects of this literature within the scope of this thesis.

¹⁰ The works in these three theories are enormous, some important examples are Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998; Balzacq 2005; Balzacq et al. 2014; Steele 2008; Mitzen 2006; Krebs and Jackson 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 2007.

approaches.¹¹ Second, scholars working on securitization theory, ontological security, and rhetorical coercion model open up the processes of political agency in important ways with their distinct emphasis on actor's "legitimization strategies" through detailed case studies (as we shall see later). These works make a significant contribution to our understanding of, among others issues, military intervention and how political actors rule some courses of action acceptable and others unacceptable and thus warrant concerted attention.¹² Lastly, member affiliated with these frameworks explicitly engage with, and incorporate, key insights from each other, again suggesting that these frameworks remain as one of the few sites of productive interactions creating important avenues for theory building.¹³

Before elaborating on the linguistic mechanisms in the processual aspects of political agency conceptualized by these approaches, it is important to understand the definition and constitutive elements of securitization theory, rhetorical coercion, and ontological security. Drawing from debates on John Austin's Speech Act Theory, Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, and Jaap Wilde introduced the idea that security is a speech act where the very utterance of it by political actor realizes specific action and marginalizes alternatives – it is "performative" as opposed to "constative" that simply describes the state of affairs with truth or falsity tests. They define securitization as a speech-act move where a securitizing actor uses the rhetoric of existential threat on an issue and intersubjectively takes it out of normal politics in order to deal with it effectively. As Buzan et.al make clear:

If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization."¹⁴

¹¹ Collective 2006; 2007.

¹² Calhoun 2004; Devetak 2007; Watson 2011; Hayes 2012; Heinze and Steele 2013.

¹³ For productive interactions between these three frameworks see Goddard 2009; Croft 2012; Browning and Joenniemi 2016.

¹⁴ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998, 25.

Therefore, the theory of securitization insists that securityness is not the result of objective threats or subjective perception of policymakers but the intersubjective making between actor and audience of an existential threat that legitimizes some action using extraordinary means. This early conceptualization of securitization rested firmly on the performativity of “panic politics.” The securitizing actor defines an exceptional threat, makes a claim for speedy decision-making process, and members outside this elitist circle accept the circumvention of normal politics because “if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant.”¹⁵

Proponents of the so-called sociological view of securitization problematized this early conceptual move by highlighting the role of contextually situated securitizing actor, the importance of audience accent to the securitizing move, and intersubjectivity in the securitizing process.¹⁶ In other words, the sociological view of securitization emphasize a *process*-based understanding of securitization where both securitizing actor and the relevant audience are equally important to prompt a securitizing move and thus for ruling out some courses of action acceptable and others unacceptable. Thierry Balzacq provides an important definition of securitization as:

an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilised by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customised policy must be immediately undertaken to block it.¹⁷

¹⁵ Ibid, 24

¹⁶ Important authors with this move among others are Hansen 2000; Balzacq 2005; Huysmans 2006; Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008; Vuori 2008.

¹⁷ Balzacq 2011, 3.

In brief, the processual or a sociological view of understanding securitization emphasizes the role of the audience, context, and the focus on relations between actors to shift from the question what security *is* to what it *does*.¹⁸ As Balzacq puts it:

Indeed, to study securitization is to unravel the process by which a securitizing actor induces an audience to agree with a given interpretation of an event or a set of events. Thus, a study of securitization blends questions of persuasion and linguistic competence to place the issue of agency at the center of discourse analysis.¹⁹

Consequently, important advancements in second generational securitization studies rest firmly on elucidating what exactly constitutes audience acceptance,²⁰ the role of several audiences and their impact on securitizing moves,²¹ and how threats can function despite the lack of moral support from some important audiences.²² Similarly, the exploration of how securitizing moves differs from one context to another and if securitization follows a unique logic despite contextual variations and in different power relations between actors have opened up the processes of political agency in important ways.²³ Despite ongoing differences among securitization scholars, as Watson puts it, “securitization scholars have mostly moved away from a decisionistic, act based understanding of securitisation towards a theory that emphasizes the processes through which security and security threats are brought into being in particular social contexts.”²⁴

Rhetorical coercion model overlap in numerous ways with securitization theory – as we shall see through an emphasis on framing – and conceptualize the linguistic mechanisms in the political world in strikingly similar ways. Building on language-focused mechanisms of political influence, Krebs and Jackson build a model of rhetorical coercion as a political strategy adopted by agents to win over opponents through the skillful use of argumentation. Firmly resting on the process

¹⁸Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 501.

¹⁹ Balzacq 2005, 187.

²⁰ Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008; Salter 2008; Jackson 2006.

²¹ Salter 2008; Léonard and Kaunert 2011.

²² Roe 2008.

²³ See Balzacq 2005, 2011, 2015; Vuori 2008, Ciută 2009; Wilkinson 2011, Klüfers 2014.

²⁴ Watson 2012, 284.

of political legitimization strategies of the claimant (C), against the opposition (O) in the view of the public (P), they outline the processes of political agency in the following way:

Rhetorical contestation consists of parties attempting to maneuver each other onto more favorable rhetorical terrain and thereby to close off routes of acceptable rebuttal. Rhetorical coercion is successful when C's rhetorical moves deprive O of materials out of which to craft a reply that falls within the bounds of what P would accept. In the end, O finds itself, against its better judgment, endorsing (or at least acquiescing in) C's stance *regardless* of whether O has been persuaded or believes the words it utters. The alternatives – enduring the punishment at the hand of P or investing significant resources in creating new terms of debate – would be prohibitively costly and time consuming. In our model of rhetorical coercion, neither the motives nor the sincerity of the parties is particularly relevant.²⁵

Therefore, the model of rhetorical coercion insists that political agency in the face of competing alternative discourses rests firmly in the power of certain rhetorical maneuvering without aiming to persuade or change the deep inner motives of the opponents or other interlocutors. However, it is not the mindless use of words in strategic interactions either. Rhetorical coercion model relies on distinct legitimization processes of actors who use “topological resources” or “commonplaces” that are in general circulation in the public sphere and deploy it in skillful ways to achieve the outcomes. Patrick Jackson elaborates this processual aspect of rhetorical coercion in important ways:

Specific articulations in the course of a public debate take these more general notions already in circulation and link them to particular policies, legitimating those policies and attributing them as actions to some particular actor. The analysis of legitimization must take into account both of these levels – the general rhetorical commonplaces present among the target audience and the specific deployment of those commonplaces in such a way to link them to a particular policy.²⁶

Scholarship within the rhetorical coercion model expands on elucidating the processes through which certain discourses when deployed by political actors have the ability to marginalize alternative options.²⁷ Specifically, some scholars interrogate the processes of rhetorical coercion by elaborating on Aristotle's epideictic rhetoric. As Krebs and Lobasz puts it,

Epideictic rhetoric is then the rhetorical mode through which meaning is imparted and circumstances defined: only secondarily does it seek to articulate a rational policy response. It is also a rhetoric of identity, invoking the community's shared values and affirming the elements that bind community, but also seeking

²⁵ Krebs and Jackson 2007, 45.

²⁶ Jackson 2006, 28.

²⁷ Krebs and Lobasz 2007; Goddard 2009.

to shape these values and to educate the community and its members so that they may imagine and participate in a vibrant public and civic debate.²⁸

The idea is that if one pays attention to the processes through which actors deploy rhetoric then one also witnesses crucial identity elements in argumentation and contestation where fixing the meaning of circumstances and events takes first priority over finding solutions in a rational manner. Identity drives interests and makes some actions meaningful in rhetorical contestations.

Despite the profound differences in the conceptualization of identity, this emphasis on identity processes in the language-focused mechanisms of political influence attains much importance in the ontological security model. Since the introduction of ontological security to IR theory, many scholars have explored the link between ontological security, framing, rhetorical coercion, and how securitized issue can be brought back to normal politics.²⁹ At its most basic level, ontological security is wanting to maintain a consistent sense of Self and to pursue actions that are in consonance with values and norms on which the state's identity is based.³⁰ Steele defines ontological security very well:

While physical security is (obviously) important to states, ontological security is more important because its fulfillment affirms a state's self-identity (i.e. it affirms not only its physical existence but primarily how a state sees itself and secondarily how it wants to be seen by others). Nation-states seek ontological security because they want to maintain *consistent self-concepts*, and the "Self" of states is constituted and maintained through a narrative which gives life to routinized foreign policy actions. Those routines can be disrupted when a state realizes that its narrated actions no longer reflect or are reflected by how it sees itself. When this sense of self-identity is dislocated an actor will seek to re-establish routines that can, once again, consistently maintain self-identity.³¹

In sum, the model of ontological security insists that political agency in the face of competing alternative discourse rests firmly in the sense of Self that states as actors bring in international politics and this self-regarding behavior is important to understand action as it with regard to physicality. As Flockhart puts it, "To be ontologically secure is to possess answers to

²⁸ Krebs and Lobasz 2007, 433.

²⁹ See Goddard 2009; Rumelili 2015; See Flockhart 2016, 804.

³⁰ Some important works are Mitzen 2006; Huysmans 2006; Steele 2008; Zarakol 2010.

³¹ Steele 2008, 2-3 Emphasis original.

fundamental and existential questions and to have basic trust which can limit anxiety to a manageable level.”³² Some like Steele above elaborate on the autobiographical narrative of the State as essential to understanding political outcomes and others such as Mitzen elaborate on the interactional processes with the Other.³³ However, both the elaboration of the processes of ontological security asserts that narrative composition is essential to understanding discursive practices. Identity is not pre-given but as Flockhart shows, “it is continuously constituted in processes of identification in complex and interlinked processes of agents’ identity and narrative constructions and their performance through practice and action.”³⁴

One could see how inspired by the linguistic turn and with the emphasis on language-based mechanisms of political influence, the second-generation securitization theory, rhetorical coercion model, and ontological security model overlap in opening up the processes through which political actors exercise their agency and make certain interests meaningful. For securitization theory, the linguistic-grammatical composition of political actors and the relations with relevant audiences in particular context is an essential process to understanding political outcomes. The rhetorical coercion model asserts the importance of rhetorical skills and the processes through which political agents trap opponents, talk them into a corner, and compel them to endorse a stance they would otherwise reject.³⁵ Finally, ontological security model emphasizes the processes of narratives and interactions through which states perform an action in order to underwrite “who they are.”³⁶ Before elaborating on what scholars specifically argue about the process and what cases they use to highlight their arguments including the avenues for improvement, it is important to elaborate on those assumptions of the frameworks that will be utilized for this thesis.

³² Flockhart 2016, 804.

³³ Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008.

³⁴ Flockhart 2016, 813.

³⁵ Krebs and Jackson 2007, 36.

³⁶ Zarakol 2010, 3.

2.4. Meaning-Making Action and Meaningful Action: Core Assumptions

There are three relevant assumptions within second-generation securitization school, rhetorical coercion model, and ontological security model that are important for substantive research in this thesis. These assumptions are not exhaustive in any sense but crucially useful in this thesis for the examining the processes of political agency against competing alternative discourses in important ways.

The first assumption is that the emergence of political action in the face of competing alternatives is a power-laden process where contestations, criticisms, and claim making of multiple interlocutors in a network of interactions are the norm, not the exception. All three theories – securitization theory, ontological security, and rhetorical coercion model – see the distinct importance of power-laden political process in the emergence of one action in the face of competing alternative discourses. A distinctive *political* work is required to wrestle some choices around into authority in the face of competing alternatives. When the Copenhagen School coined the term ‘securitization’, it provided the next step to understand ‘security’ by emphasizing the performative power of speech-acts where political actors wrestle to lift an issue out of normal politics. As Buzan et al., put it,

...in concrete analysis...it is important to be specific about who is more or less privileged in articulating security. To study securitization is to study the power politics of a concept.³⁷

³⁷ Buzan et al., 1998, 32.

Securitization foregrounds the power-laden process in discursive politics between securitizing actor and their audience both in the identification of the threat and the mobilization of extraordinary means to deal with it.³⁸

Compare this importance placed on politics and power-laden processes in the emergence of authoritative action within the ontological security and rhetorical coercion models. Challenging the argument that states are concerned only about protection of territory and governance structure in international relations, scholars advance the argument that states also strive to protect their self-identity through time. Some actions become possible because of the notion of “who we are” and indeed Brent Steele characteristically asks, “Is there anything *more* political in social life than the struggle over identity.”³⁹ However, identity claims do not always guarantee results and political leaders have to provide a narrative and wrestle a comforting story in times of increased ontological insecurity and existential anxiety.⁴⁰ Similarly, in keeping with the language-focused mechanism of political influence, the rhetorical coercion model foregrounds rhetorical contestation and strategic use of public language to achieve political outcomes. Rhetoric is a political and power-laden process that relies on what actors say, to what audience, in what context and in what mode to coerce opponents in the political game.⁴¹ As Krebs and Lobasz emphasize in the power-laden processes of meaning-making, “Organizing discourses not only open political possibilities as constructivists often emphasize, but also discipline and repress, narrowing the space for contestation.”⁴²

³⁸ Roe 2008, 619.

³⁹ Steele 2008, 5.

⁴⁰ Delehanty and Steele 2009, 524.

⁴¹ Krebs and Lobasz 2007, 414; Also see Jackson 2006.

⁴² Krebs and Lobasz, 2007, 414.

The second assumption of the critical constructivist IR that is relevant for this thesis is that political action is intelligible only against the background of rules, which give meaning to this action.⁴³ Evaluating alternative discourses and judgment to act are characteristic meaning-making processes, which one cannot reduce to mere behavioral input-output strategies. For the Copenhagen School, the meaning of security is what security does. When securitization scholars moved away from a decisionistic act based understanding based on politics of exceptionality towards a theory that emphasizes processes they also endorsed a dynamic meaning-making aspect of securitizing moves. As Stritzel puts it, “an actor cannot be significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an impact on social relations without a situation that constitutes them as significant. It is their embeddedness in social relations of meaning and power that constitutes both actors and speech acts.”⁴⁴

Similarly, in ontological security, identity claims orders relations and political actors fix the meaning of state identity in a particular way. The meaning of narration, autobiography, or interaction is how proponents put it to convey a sense of coherence to the Self and it is not merely an information tool. This assumption on meaning-making practices is also evident in the rhetorical coercion model. As Krebs and Jackson put it:

Politics may entail coercion or distribution, but at the same time it involves the struggle over meanings. Meanings, however, cannot be imposed unilaterally or through the exercise of material power alone. They are, by their very nature, intersubjective, and the effort to forge shared meaning implicates some audience in the process.⁴⁵

Finally, the emergence of one political action in the face of competing alternatives is a contingent process with multiple forks in the road. In practical matters, nothing preordains the outcome.

For all three theories – securitization, ontological security, and rhetorical coercion model –

⁴³ Kratochwil 1989, 11.

⁴⁴ Stritzel 2007, 367.

⁴⁵ Krebs and Jackson 2007, 45.

contingency in the social world does not mean that everything is random, arbitrary or impenetrable or beyond the realm of knowledge but one, which emphasizes the principled importance of human agency, autonomy, and judgment in an uncertain social world. For the Copenhagen School, a security issue is something that requires priority over all others but it is not preordained. This is because, even when securitizing actor claims, “if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant” it is still contingent, as Balzacq puts it, on the discursive resources of the securitizing agent, on the question of actor-audience relations, and on the external context of securitizing moves.⁴⁶ In other words, the emergence of an authoritative action that legitimizes exceptional measures to handle threats, therefore, is only one realization in the many possible worlds. Audiences might reject the securitization moves, as Matt McDonald shows when Australian Prime Minister Rudd defined climate change as a national security threat, which the Australian mainstream audience rejected.⁴⁷ Alternatively, the audience might accept the ‘securityness’ of an issue but disagree with extraordinary measures proposed. Paul Roe shows how in the case of Britain’s decision to join the USA in the war against Iraq in 2003, the British public at large agreed that Saddam Hussein’s regime posed a threat but did not agree to the use of military force for invading Iraq and deposing Saddam.⁴⁸ The success of Britain’s security policy was contingent on the Parliament or when the external context that acts as a catalyst for securitization moves or changes. The upshot is what Ned Lebow in another context shows, “The concatenation of particular leaders with particular contexts, and of particular events with other events is always a matter of chance, never of necessity.”⁴⁹

For the rhetorical coercion model, threat representations need not lead to any inevitable political outcomes and much depends on how political actors rhetorically maneuver their claims against

⁴⁶ Balzacq 2005, 174.

⁴⁷ McDonald and Merefield 2010.

⁴⁸ Roe 2008.

⁴⁹ Lebow 2000, 592.

one another. Deploying a particular rhetoric in a particular way does not automatically ensure the success of one claim over the other either. Much depends on how actors capitalize on *topoi* or rhetorical commonplaces. As Krebs and Jackson put it, “These commonplaces are not fully predetermined, already decided distinctions, but weakly shared notions that can be expressed or formulated in different ways in different, concrete circumstances.”⁵⁰ In other words, cleverly deploying rhetoric also requires attention to the mode in which rhetoric is presented and leader’s institutional position as we saw how the Bush administration was able to rhetorically coerce democrats to accept the administration’s claims to the invasion of Iraq.⁵¹

Similarly, ontological security model has shown that identity discourse does not automatically privilege one compelling option over the other. Brent Steele captures this contingency of identity discourse very well. He states, “while it is vital for nation-states to engage in their sense of Self, self-interrogative reflexivity does *not* always lead to a progressively ‘better’ subject.” Quoting Petr Drulak he states, “reflexivity, which is often viewed as a positive move that improves the human condition, does not have to be treated in that way. Contingency works either way and social innovations can be both good and bad.”⁵² Others who work on the relations between identity and foreign policy choices show that self-identity of states is grounded in multiple and sometimes competing narratives and only in a contingent manner one becomes authoritative.⁵³

Thus, three important assumptions: power-laden processes in the emergence of political action, meaning-making processes in discursive practices, and the contingency of the success of one action in the face of competing alternatives serve as a substantive commitment for this thesis

⁵⁰ Krebs and Jackson 2007, 45.

⁵¹ Krebs and Lobasz 2007.

⁵² Steele 2008, 150.

⁵³ Guzzini 2012, 9–73.

aimed at understanding how some discourse becomes authoritative. With these assumptions, critical constructivism has fruitfully shaped the contours of IR theory by foregrounding the central role of human agency. It has moved beyond the all-too-narrow understanding of action in the traditional rational-choice paradigm. Still, there are at least two areas where the core concepts of these frameworks could be explicated further in order to capture the nuanced processes through which political actors evaluate alternative options and exercise their judgment and action. By careful dissection of what some scholars argue about the processes of political agency and what cases and contexts they use to highlight their arguments, I will foreground the avenues for further explication. Thus, the next section aims to supplement not supplant the existing insights and advancements brought to light by securitization theory, rhetorical coercion, and ontological security model.

2.5. Building on Critical Constructivist IR

In keeping with the theories examined in the previous section, I explicate two crucial ideas that are already present in the critical constructivist oeuvre to open up the processes through which political actors exercise agency and marginalize alternative discourses. First, some works within this body of literature unusually assert that one could establish the boundaries of acceptable or unacceptable discursive practices in advance of interaction games-in-context. My argument is that this form of *ex ante* establishment of context for political action is not essential to the study of how some action is more authoritative than the other alternatives. In other words, by acknowledging that authoritative discourse in the face of competing alternatives is constituted by the processes of interactions itself we can retain the important advancements brought to bear by critical constructivist scholarship and build on the explanatory themes of the research program. Second, I maintain an overriding emphasis on normativity in claim making practices of political agents. In process-based accounts of political agency, paying attention to the normativity of political claims and the sequential forms of relationship between multiple interlocutors through

the game of giving and asking for reasons brings out the complex relations between actors and foreground how they evaluate alternative options in a nuanced manner.

To begin with, some versions of critical constructivist approaches adopt a two-ply model of action where boundaries of acceptable or unacceptable discursive practices are established in advance and then the interactions, speech-act claims, rhetoric, or identity narratives of political actors are examined to search for a “fit.” What if the question of what role interactions play and what are the boundaries of acceptable discursive practices are two sides of one coin, needing to be addressed together?

A key aspect of securitization is the *context* in which the securitizing actor presents an issue as a threat to win the assent of the audience, which enables the securitizing actor to use whatever means appropriate to deal with the threat. Within second-generation securitization theory, Balzacq explores in detail the different kinds of context by building on the works of Schegloff and Wetherell:

- (i) The proximate context includes the sort of occasion or genre of interactions the participants take an episode to be (e.g. a meeting, an interview, a summit). To a certain extent, the proximate context relates to what Salter (2008) calls, following Goffman, “setting.”
- (ii) By contrast, the distal context focuses on the sociocultural embeddedness of the text. The distal context has strong *recursive effects*, meaning that persuasive arguments operate in cascade (e.g., people are convinced because friends of a friend are convinced, etc.). It refers to ‘things like social class, the ethnic composition of the participants, the institutions, or sites where discourse occurs, ecological, regional, and cultural environments.’⁵⁴

In other words, Balzacq argues that for a process-oriented or sociological view of securitization, one cannot merely accept that the “speech act” of security modifies the context merely through an illocutionary force; but, how the proximate and distal contexts specify patterns of engagement

⁵⁴ Balzacq 2011, 37.

is every bit relevant to win the assent of audience to the unfolding external reality. This enumeration of contexts is a welcome addition to securitization theory that other scholars like Wilkinson problematize it by showing that if one seriously takes the idea that “the success of securitization is contingent upon a perceptive-external-environment” then one rightly focuses on local interpretations of security and not reproduce a universalist and state-centered meaning of security.⁵⁵ Similarly, Stritzel calls for understanding securitization processes in their broader discursive context,⁵⁶ and Vuori examines many different contexts and concludes, “even if the function of security varies from one context to another, security is tied up to the same fundamental preoccupation, namely the necessity to safeguard legitimacy. In other words, despite contextual variations, securitization follows a unique logic.”⁵⁷

However, if we accept foreign and security policy is processual to a given context, that the interactions itself constitute the acceptable and unacceptable discourses, then one does not need to subscribe to the idea of an independent external reality that is uniquely accessible to the audiences. However, Balzacq unusually claims this “perceptible external reality” while at the same time subscribing to a *process*-oriented understanding of securitization moves. As he puts it:

For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would *determine* its essence. For instance, what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence. The consequence of this position, which would require a deeper articulation, is that some security problems are the attribute of the development itself. In short, threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language. Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments, affect securitization.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Wilkinson 2011, 98-99.

⁵⁶ Stritzel 2007, 359-6.

⁵⁷ Balzacq et.al 2016, 503; Vuori 2008.

⁵⁸ Balzacq 2005, 181.

In sum, Balzacq aims to provide universal contexts within which speech action functions in relation to the audience. Thus, he could claim that an external context exists independently from the use of language, which audiences have a unique access to – they only have to “look around in order to identify the conditions (the presumed threats) that justify its articulation” and the securitizing actor must concur with this perceptible environment in order to exercise agency and marginalize alternative discourse.⁵⁹ However, my claim is that being consistent with the process-oriented approach to securitizing moves entails relaxing the *ex ante* specification of context – that language independent reality – for political action so that one does not conflate audience acquiescence with support.⁶⁰ This has important implications for empirical research.

To understand the tension better, let us take a recent work of Jarrod Hayes who uses securitization theory to understand U.S. intervention against India’s humanitarian action in East Pakistan in 1971.⁶¹ The problem he tries to understand is why the Nixon administration could not forcefully securitize India’s military action in East Pakistan, even though the administration perceived India’s “humanitarian” action as a threat to the geopolitical interests of the United States. Drawing on the ideas of audience-securitization link in the Copenhagen School, he argues that the American public would not accept democracies as threats, based on democratic peace theory, and thus held favorable views on India. In other words, the external and independently existing reality of “democratic India” did not activate the securitizing move on the part of the United States because the American public regardless of the unfolding situation and the use of language in interactions could rest on this objective democratic essence of India and withhold assent to any securitizing move. As Hayes puts it:

⁵⁹ Balzacq 2005, 182.

⁶⁰ On this point see Watson 2012, 285.

⁶¹ Hayes 2012.

Clearly, anticipation of public refusal to securitize India was strong enough to cause Kissinger to harbor concerns about the political backlash should the U.S. move to threaten India.⁶²

Nixon's and Kissinger's anticipation of public backlash arising from democratic identity was a brake on the ability of political leaders to claim that external democracies pose an *existential* threat. As long as leaders are convinced that they operate in a domestic environment characterized by joint democratic identity, they will be careful in constructing a fellow democracy as an existential security threat.⁶³

The Nixon administration sent the USS *Enterprise* Aircraft carrier to coerce India “completed unannounced” with a fabricated rationale for “the evacuation of U.S. citizens.”⁶⁴ Thus, he claims to have tested democratic peace theory and argues, “In democracies, securitization fails when the object is also generally regarded as a democracy”⁶⁵ because of “public democratic identity dynamics.”⁶⁶

The problem with such an account is that scholars establish the external context – democracies do not fight against each other – and then essentialize “democracy” and “publics” for what they want to do. Clearly, members of the State Department in the U.S. labeled India as the “main aggressor” against Pakistan and does this mean they do not belong to the American public that held the general view that democracies are not a threat to the United States? Further, as other advancements on the audience in securitization theory show, the meaning of security plays out differently to different audiences and the securitizing move is not the same in all contexts.⁶⁷ This is similar to Bigo's claim that new security issues and modern forms of governance have led to different security practices in different bureaucracies that are heterogeneous and are in competition with each other.⁶⁸ One just need not first essentialize “the public” or “the audience” in order to second show the success or failure of securitization. The fact that Hayes is compelled

⁶² Ibid., 86.

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Ibid, 64

⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶ Ibid, 65

⁶⁷ Specifically see Stritzel 2007; Salter 2008; Balzacq 2010. The best treatment of the question of “context” in securitization is Ciută 2009.

⁶⁸ Bigo 2014.

to do it is because he *ex ante* establishes the boundaries of acceptable discourse within the democratic peace theory and goes about testing it.

Addressing this tension requires prioritizing the interaction processes between interlocutors and take “contextual factors” as a hypothesis for detailed examination rather than fix it through a definitional fiat.⁶⁹ For example, in certain cases of external military aggression, some audiences such as the military and the legislature will be important in post-Westphalian international politics. It is the onus of the researcher to treat these distal contexts as hypotheses for investigation in order to explore how, through interactions and legitimation practices, these interlocutors shift the boundaries of acceptable discourse. Here Jackson’s suggestion is illuminating:

Legitimation is a crucial aspect of boundaries, not only in the sense that an actor is permitted to act legitimately only within its boundaries, but also in that the establishment of those boundaries in the first place is an act of legitimation. An actor performs or considers performing an action and offers reasons to justify the action; these reasons constitute the action as the action it is, and they simultaneously serve to draw and redraw the boundaries of the actor itself.⁷⁰

If we agree that boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable discourse are constitutive of the processes of interactions among interlocutors itself, then the intersubjective process of eliciting the assent from the audience is central to political claim making practices. This is what Balzacq asserts when he states:

either we argue that securitization is a self-referential practice, in which case we forsake perlocution with the related acquiescence of the audience... or we hold fast to the creed that using the conception of security also produces perlocutionary effect, in which case we abandon self-referentiality.⁷¹

However, in their model, Krebs and Jackson precisely repeat the problem of “internalists” in securitization, albeit in a different way, and argue that rhetorical coercion is skillful framing of issues by political actors; however, at the same time resorting to a brute understanding of language in argumentation, which dislodges intersubjectivity completely. In other words, they

⁶⁹ Ciută 2009.

⁷⁰ Jackson 2006, 25.

⁷¹ Balzacq 2005, 177-78.

treat rhetorical coercion as an exercise of brute power. Similar to Plato's *Gorgias* or Thrasymachus view, they see "rhetoric's power is like that of a strong wrestler or a magic spell or a violent enemy: it produces its result without needing to render that result in any sense proper."⁷² It is a brute understanding of political argumentation because it resorts to the mechanical and non-normative view of rhetoric. As they put it:

We cannot observe directly what people think, but we can observe what they say and how they respond to claims and counter-claims. In our view, it does not matter whether actors believe what they say, whether they are motivated by crass material interests or sincere commitment. What is important is that they can be rhetorically maneuvered into a corner, trapped into publicly endorsing positions they may or may not, find anathema. Rhetoric affects political outcomes even when all actors are cynical operators with little interest in genuine deliberation. The resolution of political issues through public debate need not imply any significant level of intersubjective consensus.⁷³

In other words, in the model of rhetorical coercion one focuses on clever maneuvering of actors in the political game and disregards mining for inner beliefs and motives that are potentially undiscoverable. Although not searching for inner motives and beliefs is a welcome move to examine political agency; however, holding to this position of rhetoric does not automatically entail dislodging intersubjectivity in the process. If intersubjective consensus does not play any role in contestation, then it begs the question of under what conditions audience evaluation in the rhetorical coercion model tilts the success of contestation in one way rather than the other. How does the power of rhetoric have a *grip* on others? That is, how does rhetorical trap function as "traps" among interlocutors? Mere skillful framing is not enough as framing scholars show that "audience do not passively accept elite frames" and "the presence of a frame in a communicating text does not guarantee that it will influence the audience."⁷⁴ Furthermore, the advocates of the rhetorical coercion model hold to an Aristotelian conception of the rhetorical interplay between interlocutors, and thus dislodging intersubjectivity and normative view of rhetoric is inconsistent. Here the normativity of rhetoric that Aristotle propounds is not transcendental but based on norms that underwrite social practices, particularly on how well a

⁷² Dow 2016, 8.

⁷³ Krebs and Jackson 2007, 42.

⁷⁴ Graber 1984; Entman 1989; Entman 1993.

power of rhetoric convinces other actors. As Jamie Dow puts in his interpretation of Aristotle's rhetoric:

For Aristotle, the sense in which rhetorical expertise gives the orator power over listeners is that it gives him an ability to show them that *by their own lights* they do well to be convinced. The power he has is limited by the extent to which he can show them this. Thus, at one level, Aristotle will have no objection to the use of comparisons with wrestling and physical force. In defending the usefulness of rhetoric at 1355a19-b7, he argues *a fortiori* from the acceptability of being able to defend yourself with bodily force to the acceptability of doing so with argument. But at another, these metaphors are used by Gorgias and Thrasymachus to express a conception of rhetoric that is very much at odds with Aristotle's. On this view, rhetoric is an ability to influence listeners by producing in speech things that *should* bring about convictions in them. On theirs, rhetoric is an ability to influence listeners by producing in speech things – indeed *anything* that *actually will* bring about.⁷⁵

In sum, it is the view that either rhetorical claims are treated as skillful framing without acknowledging the role of normativity that underwrites interaction or the role of intersubjectivity that aims to influence others, in which case we disregard the differences between audience support, their acquiescence, or the different degree of assent. Or we acknowledge the role of normativity – the correctness and prescriptivity conditions that arise in the claim making practices and thus foreground not background the role of norms. It is my argument that the rhetorical coercion model with the use of concepts such as “topoi” and “rhetorical commonplaces” are precisely engaged in workings of normativity in claim making practices; however, they background these ideas in their model. In this thesis, I explicate the role of this normativity and foreground it.

With recent advancements in rhetorical coercion model, scholars already emphasize the role of normativity in rhetorical claims of political actors. For example, in explaining Britain's decision to confront Germany in late 1938, Stacie Goddard resorts to *inter alia* rhetorical coercion model and argues that “when revisionist can justify their actions as legitimate, as consistent with

⁷⁵ Dow 2015, 20 Emphasis original.

prevailing norms and rules in the international system, appeasement is the probable response.”⁷⁶

She explicates the role of norms in rhetorical claims as follows:

To be resonant, a legitimation strategy must incorporate the language of accepted norms and rules within the international system. This means that while politicians may use rhetoric strategically, they may not pull language from thin air to justify their interests: the content of their claims must invoke existing rhetorical commonplaces in order to *resonate*, and content that strays from dominant norms, in contrast, is likely to be dismissed as illegitimate.⁷⁷

It is important to note that these norms are not already fully structured and transcendental norms à la Finnemore and Sikkink but are endogenously emergent in interactions through meaning-in-use. The following account of Wiener shows the force of such norms in rather stark terms:

Instead of taking norm stability as the central analytical strength and working with an ontological concept of norms...[critical constructivist approach conceives norms as bearing] a dual quality: that is, they are both structuring and socially constructed through interaction in a context. While stable over particular periods, they always remain flexible by definition. It follows that normative quality is generated through the social practice of re-/enacting structures of normative meaning-in-use. In the process, normative meaning is contested based on individually held “background experience,” which informs a range of distinct cultural validations of normative meaning, pending on the range of socio-cultural contexts that is brought together in a given inter-national interaction.⁷⁸

In sum, the normativity that underwrites claim-making practices is generated through interactions and (re)enacting meaning-in-use. In IR theory, Kratochwil and Onuf emphasize such norm-governed aspects of communicative action, and other scholars like Fierke, Wiener, and Kurowska make good of the notion of meaning-in-use.⁷⁹ As Kratochwil put it

Norms are therefore not only ‘guidance devices,’ but also means which allow people to pursue goals, share meaning, communicate with each other, criticize assertions, and justify actions.”⁸⁰

To put it differently, when political actors utilize rhetorical commonplaces, foreground narratives of identity, or deliberate emergency measure a certain kind of norms are in force in conversation that the interlocutors interrogate through the game of giving and asking for reasons.

⁷⁶ Goddard 2015, 97.

⁷⁷ Goddard 2015, 110.

⁷⁸ Wiener 2014, 27.

⁷⁹ Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989; Fierke 2002; Fierke 1998; Wiener 2008; Kurowska 2013; Wiener 2014.

⁸⁰ Kratochwil 1989, 11.

To further understand the processes of normativity of claim-making, let us take a recent work of Goddard who uses ontological security and rhetorical coercion to understand Prussian intervention in Denmark in 1864.⁸¹ Goddard illustrates the importance of language-based mechanisms of political influence with reference to Prussian war with Denmark in 1864. The puzzle of this intervention is the alleged absence of balancing behavior against Prussia by other great powers such as Britain, France, Russia, and Austria. For Goddard, the successful Prussian war over the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein (which resulted in fundamental challenge to the foundations of European order) was dependent not on power or interest of Prussia, particularly Kaiser or Bismarck, but also on the rhetorical legitimization strategy of Prussian leaders with multiple interlocutors such as Britain, France, Russia, and Austria. Here Goddard notes that a “rising power’s rhetoric is likely to be successful under three conditions: if it signals constraint; if it ‘rhetorically traps’ opposing states; and if it threatens a state’s ontological security.”⁸² Bismarck used both nationalist and conservative principles – what she calls multivocal rhetoric – to trap opponents. Specifically, Prussian leaders framed issues and pursued creative legitimization strategies that signaled constraint to Austria, set rhetorical traps for Britain and France, and persuaded Russia that Denmark’s liberalism threatened Russia’s ontological security.⁸³ Taken together, Goddard asserts, language-focused mechanisms, particularly, legitimization strategies are fundamental to power politics.

Crucially, she emphasizes that rhetorical legitimization strategies belong to a particular form of reasoning where the force of norms plays an important role in political agency. Returning momentarily to the Prussian war with Denmark in 1864, it is apparent that Bismarck succeeded in persuading Austria and rhetorically trapped Britain, France, and Russia. These interlocutors were unable to provide a meaningful rebuttal. However, rhetorical traps were normative (not in

⁸¹ Goddard 2009.

⁸² Ibid., 123.

⁸³ Ibid., 128

any transcendental sense) and prior to these traps, the context of interaction among interlocutors of European politics constituted the members of discursive practices with a set of normative baseline for the participants in the game. It was through negotiating these norms that Prussia was able to hold Britain to its normative commitments to the Treaty of London of 1852, hold Napoleon to his commitments to nationalist principles, and show that Russia was entitled to ontological security vis-à-vis the West. Therefore, it is by making rhetorical claims through these norms that Bismarck was able to judge and act for the intervention in Prussia in 1864.

In sum, both the explications I offered in this section (1) understanding that boundaries of acceptable or unacceptable discourses are constituted by the processes of interaction itself; and the (2) role of norms through meaning-in-use that underwrite political claim making practices, builds on the recent advancements in critical constructivist scholarship and thus aims to open up the processes of political agency in important ways. Although these explications are not novel, it certainly needs a fresh conceptual apparatus to bring in bear upon empirical research. It foregrounds a process-oriented conception of political agency throughout the entire episode and thus prioritizes the political interactions among interlocutors and their boundary drawing practices on acceptable discourse in their claims and counter-claims. To capitalize on this explication requires a rethinking of our conventional ways of understanding discursive practices international politics. Similarly, explicating the normativity of claim making practices entails rethinking how norms work in interaction processes and what sort of role expressive reasons plays in the entire episode.

Let us take another example to highlight the importance of these two explications for understanding political action in the face of competing alternatives. Steele examines why British policymakers remained neutral in American Civil War despite geopolitical benefits that would result from keeping America divided and the economic benefits of ensuring continued cotton supply by the Confederacy to the British textile industry. For Steele, the British neutrality in

American Civil War was dependent not on these external factors, but on the “reflexive monitoring” of British self-identity that served to change its behavior from pro-intervention to non-intervention in the Civil War. Here Steele notes two important factors: first, the Emancipation Proclamation of President Abraham Lincoln in late 1862 that subsequently became law on 1 January 1863 changed the meaning of American Civil War in the eyes of British policymakers from “Northern Aggression” to “liberation.” Second, the issue of slave liberation in the Emancipation Proclamation served Britain’s ontological security needs and this reflexive identity factor influenced its decision for non-intervention. Taken together Steele asserts, “What drove Britain’s considerations was not a liberal affinity for abolition, nor changing coalitions which engendered ‘moral’ action, but a reflexively oriented policy that would serve Britain’s ontological security needs.”⁸⁴

However, if we explicate the ideas presented in this section we could foreground nuanced processes through which some action becomes authoritative in the face of competing alternative discourses. Returning momentarily to the British neutrality in American Civil War, it is apparent that several competing policy alternatives strove for dominance: (1) the policy of non-intervention, which was historically institutionalized and had been referred “an axiom of British politics since the accession of the House of Hanover.”⁸⁵ As R.J. Vincent notes, “A British tradition of non-intervention, however ill-defined, had at least to be taken account of in the formulation of foreign policy, and departure from it required justification before a Parliament which was in part the guardian of the tradition.”⁸⁶ (2) the policy of intervention in civil conflicts to prevent political tyranny such as British intervention in Holland against Phillip II, in Portugal against Spanish tyranny, and Belgium against Holland. (3) Then, there was also British policy of arbitration of disputes at least since the great Lord Salisbury. As Richard Langhorne shows,

⁸⁴ Ibid., 521.

⁸⁵ Vincent 1974, 71.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 102.

“There was already a body of arbitration experience derived largely from Anglo-American relations beginning with the Jay Treaty of 1794 and proceeding successfully through thirty-two arbitrations up till 1850, with only two serious failures. The prevalence of boundary questions in Anglo-US relations, as well as the very conservative general interests of the British Empire, helps to explain this.”⁸⁷ If we do not specify the boundaries of acceptable discourse *ex ante* then these competing alternative discourses become important factors to reckon with in empirical analysis.

Clearly, British policymakers’ concern for neutrality was not *a priori* based on ontological security, if we take these competing alternative discourses into account. However, if we foreground the interactions between agents then we examine the very process of giving and taking reasons through which some course of action made sense for Britain’s ontological security. In other words, the idea of multiple autobiographical narratives becomes relevant and offering practical reasons against multiple competing policy discourses, the choice situation becomes clear. Steele admits as much and later shows that

For a while, states do structure a Self-identity grounded in narrative ‘stories’ about who they are – and while these stories become most important during times of ontological insecurity by fastening a conception of Self which provided meanings for action – multiple autobiographical narratives are also present. These narratives mutually contest for the dominant fixation of the Self during moments of crisis.⁸⁸

Thus, to understand how British ontological anxiety over slavery rather than what John Owen calls Britain’s liberal sympathy for the American Union resulted in neutrality in the Civil War, one has to make competing alternatives explicit and examine the game of giving and asking for reasons where the interactive processes creates the mobilization of action in the national political game. In other words, the two explications following critical constructivist scholarship highlighted in this chapter are every bit useful for examining how some voices becomes authoritative in the face of competing alternative discourses. However, it entails establishing a

⁸⁷ Langhorne 2002, 48.

⁸⁸ Delehanty and Steele 2009, 524.

clear analytical framework in order to provide a more nuanced conceptual tool for the analysis of political agency. It is the task of the next chapter to provide this analytical framework.

2.6. Conclusion

In sum, how is it possible that some actions become contingently authoritative in the face of competing alternatives? In many ways, the traditional rationalist theories of action in IR has set the goals too high and offer instrumentalist accounts of action based on national interests, preference or the autonomous role of ideas with the aim to have a cross-cultural generalization of political action. In this chapter, I showed why this quest for a science or a grand theory of action has been unsuccessful and rejected those theories that easily disregard the notions of meaning that constitutes the social world.

Drawing on the advancements in critical constructivist IR, I firmly located the thesis within the assumptions of the securitization theory, ontological security, and rhetorical coercion model that seeks a principled way to address how some actions become contingently authoritative. I elaborated on the assumptions of these theories and its substantive importance for this thesis. Crucially, though, I also explicated two ideas within this critical constructivist oeuvre that needs attention for a nuanced analysis of the processes of political agency. The first is to avoid establishing boundaries of acceptable discursive practice in advance to the interaction-in-context among interlocutors. The second is to show the distinct force of normativity in argumentation, deliberation, and rhetoric and how actors must refer to these rules and norms to make a choice. In keeping with these explications located within the existing critical constructivist scholarship, I provide an analytical framework in the next chapter that offers a new way of opening up the process of political agency looking at contestations by political actors in international relations when they aim to settle practical matters.

3: Analytical Framework: Practical Reasoning in a Network of Deontic Scorekeeping Space

3.1. Introduction

In the last chapter, I argued that constructivist theories in IR that emphasize language-focused mechanisms of political influence such as securitization theory, ontological security, and the rhetorical coercion model provide important insights into the problem of how some actions become contingently authoritative in the face of competing alternative discourses in international politics. A cardinal advantage of these theories over rational-choice counterparts is the importance placed on meaning-generating subjects, the contingency of the social world, and social practices of actors that make intelligible the power-laden processes in the emergence of action. By explicating the importance of conceiving of discursive practices as constitutive of interactions itself and on the importance of norms that underwrites such interactions, I set the stage to provide a fresh conceptual perspective on the problem. This chapter provides that analytical framework.

In figuring out what to do in practical situations, I propose that political agents engage in a distinct form of *practical reasoning* for action that shows how some actions become authoritative in the face of competing alternatives in international politics. Drawing on the recent advancements in pragmatist philosophy, particularly the works of Robert Brandom, in this chapter, I will argue that in the practical reasoning of political actors one's own and others' normative commitments and entitlements are at issue.¹ These norms are not exogenous to interactions but arise through

¹ Some of the important works in this analytical pragmatist tradition are: Brandom 1994; Brandom 1998; Sellars, Scharp, and Brandom 2007; Brandom 2009; Fossen 2014; Levine 2015.

interaction among interlocutors.² Here discursive practices are *deontic* where members keep track of one's own and others' normative commitments and entitlements by asking whether the claim-maker is "correct" in seeking entitlements for beliefs or actions, what sort of "contextualized obligations" arise in particular commitments and what inferences rightly follows from the reasons. Participants in the game are thus deontic scorekeepers.³ At a given moment in interaction, a deontic score is just the commitment and entitlement associated with each participant and each time one participant undertakes, acknowledges, or attributes a commitment or entitlement it changes the deontic score.⁴ Practical reasoning is thus seeking normative entitlements to one's practical commitments by giving and taking reasons with other scorekeepers in the deontic scorekeeping space. Although actors choose their reasons strategically, what reasons other interlocutors accept as good reasons for actions depends on the "norm-type" that underwrites the interaction-in-context.⁵ Conceived in this way, some actions become contingently authoritative when decision makers, through practical reasoning, judge what it is to act on the basis of reasoning under the norm-type that underwrites interactions and marginalize competing alternative discourses that are incompatible with the deontic scores of the game.

The structure of this chapter is straightforward. In the second section, I will show the importance of practical reasoning for addressing the problems that concern this thesis. Here I also dispel the reigning orthodoxy that politics is in the realm of power and therefore practical reasoning in the realm of argumentation and deliberation has no role in political action. Third, I will show a distinctively pragmatic way of thinking about discursive practices in order to move beyond our accustomed ways of thinking about practical reasoning. Here I elaborate the

² Fierke 1996; Also see Wiener 2009; Kurowska 2013; Wiener 2014.

³ Brandom adopts this scorekeeping vocabulary from Lewis 1979.

⁴ Brandom 1994, 141–198; Also see Scharp 2005, 208.

⁵ Brandom 1998, 134.

technical aspects of Brandom's normative pragmatics and inferential semantics and then illustrate the deontic scorekeeping practice on the humanitarian crisis in Somalia in 1992. This illustration will shed light on how multiple interlocutors keep track of one's own and others' normative commitments and entitlements on the humanitarian crisis and the network of deontic scorekeeping space that arise in interactions. With a basic pragmatic theory of discursive practice in place, thereafter in the fourth section, I will present the mechanisms of the distinct practical reasoning in the network of deontic scorekeeping space. Here I will elaborate on the role of practical inferences, justificatory responsibility, and intentionality of actors engaged in practical reasoning. These features give us the tools, if you like, to open up the processes of political agency and acknowledge that practical reasoning is not a one-size fit all approach and the game depends on the norms that underwrite the interactions-in-context.

In the fifth section, I will elaborate on the different sort of norms that arise in interactional situations. Here I will present with examples on two types of norms and the different patterns of practical inferences, justificatory responsibility, and endorsements it sets off in interactions. These types of norms are representative varieties and not an exhaustive list. However, it shows that one need not assimilate all action explanation under the Humean model of efficient causality or treat all practical reasoning as instrumental means-end reasoning. Thus, the types of normativity that underwrite interactions and the expressive game of giving and asking for reasons is every bit relevant for understanding the processes through which some actions become contingently authoritative in the face of competing alternative discourses. In the conclusion, I elaborate the interpretive research design for the detailed case studies that follows from this analytical framework. Crucially, in keeping with the analytical framework, I will present the criteria for the delimitation of scorekeepers, the warranted expectations on the competing alternative discourses that come to the forefront based on the normativity that underwrites interactions and thus set the stage for empirical investigation.

3.2. Constructing Authoritative Actions: The Role of Practical Reasoning

Practical reasoning is reasoning directed towards action. More generally, a theory of practical reasoning is a theory of how to figure out what to do. Anscombe puts it very well, “Of course ‘I ought to do this, so I’ll do it’ is not a piece of practical reasoning any more than ‘This is nice, so I’ll have some’ is. The mark of practical reasoning is that the thing wanted is *at a distance* from the immediate action, and the immediate action is calculated as the way of getting or doing or securing the thing wanted. Now it may be at a distance in various ways.”⁶ Unsurprisingly, the structure and content of good practical reasoning is the subject of intense debates among philosophers.⁷ In arguing that practical reasoning has tremendous importance for examining practical questions in international politics, my argument in this section will selectively engage with these debates.

To begin with, a simple piece of practical reasoning has the following structure:⁸

Major Premise: I want to ϕ

Minor Premise: I believe that ψ -ing is a means of ϕ -ing

Conclusion: I shall / should / ought to / must, ψ

In international relations terminology, the same basic structure can be elaborated from an example of Bismarck’s reasoning for initiating war over the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864:

Major Premise : I want to uphold European equilibrium and improve the reputation of Prussia within the German Confederation

Minor Premise : With the current crisis in Denmark, I believe that military intervention into the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein is a means of upholding European equilibrium and improving Prussia’s reputation within German Confederation

Conclusion: I ought to militarily intervene in the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein.

⁶ Anscombe 1978, 45 Emphasis original.

⁷ For the diversity see Millgram 2001; Audi 2004; Millgram 2005.

⁸ Alvarez 2010, 356.

These considerations lead to a unique view of practical reasoning for action. Robert Audi makes clear of practical reasoning in the following way:

The major (broadly motivational) premise can surely be taken to represent a goal, even if the goal is not indicated by an expression of, say, a desire or intention, but only implicit in S's [agent's] commitment to a rule, for instance that one must place religious obligation above legal obligation if they conflict. The minor (broadly instrumental) premise clearly represents a belief that indicates how S sees the action in relation to the goal, say as necessary or as sufficient for realizing it. The conclusion is the most difficult to characterize...ranging from judgment of what one should do, to the optative (and artificial) 'Let me A.'⁹

Crucially, there are three, or at least three important features of practical reasoning that are very relevant for addressing the problem that concerns this thesis. First, practical reasoning involves intentional deliberation – one deliberates with relevant premises to conclude about practical problems. It is concerned with practical as opposed to theoretical thinking on the subject matter. Of course, theoretical reasoning is also an active process but it is concerned with reasons for believing, figuring out how facts stand, and in some sense points towards truth rather than action.¹⁰ Practical reasoning, however, is concerned with action, figuring out what to do, deliberating how to arrive at conclusions to the problems that we care about. It is an active process in the sense that practical reasoning is intentional, self-conscious, and self-directing activity. It is 'dialectical' in Aristotelian sense that reasoning is from generally accepted opinions rather than 'demonstrative,' which proceeds from premises that are scientific and true.¹¹ Likewise, the practical in practical reasoning is concerned with problems that we care about, which are contingently within our control. As Kratochwil shows, "About things which either by necessity are the way they are, or are beyond our control, nobody deliberates."¹²

Second, actors engage in practical reasoning by making several abductive inferences where value considerations matter more than the means-ends nexus. This is an important point because an

⁹ Audi 2006, 67.

¹⁰ Audi 2004, 1.

¹¹ Kratochwil 1989, 215.

¹² *ibid*

inductive or a deductive way of presenting practical argumentation might be unhelpful. In the above example, Bismarck's inference from the major to the minor premise is not deductive because there is no rule of *modus ponens* $(p \ \& \ (p \rightarrow q)) \rightarrow q$ operating here.¹³ In other words, nothing – other than value consideration – logically forces him to make the move for a military invasion of the Duchies from the major premise that there is a rule to uphold European equilibrium and improve the reputation of Prussia. If we do not take this value consideration seriously, then like Achilles with the tortoise in Lewis Carroll's paradox, one runs into infinite regress if we “just write all that [inferences] down.”¹⁴ Similarly, neither is practical reasoning inductive. One cannot take the conclusion of the Prussian War with Denmark in 1864 (known fact) to trace Bismarck's major premise (unknown fact) because it could easily lead from true premises to false conclusions. Therefore, scholars talk about abductive or conductive argumentation in solving practical problems.¹⁵ According to Kratochwil, “Practical reasoning not only deals with issues of action but also investigates the formal properties of arguments which satisfy neither the condition of induction nor those of deduction, and in which value-considerations figure prominently beyond the ends-means nexus of instrumental rationality.”¹⁶

It is here that the normativity of practical reasons in the game becomes very relevant. Christine Korsgaard's account of the properties of practical reason is important for this discussion: “(1) They are normative, that is they make valid claims on those who have them. (2) They are motivating, that is, other things equal, the agents who have them will be inspired to act in accordance with them. And (3) they are motivating in virtue of their normativity, that is, people are inspired to do things by the normativity of the reasons they have for doing them, by their

¹³ If P then Q, and P is true, therefore Q

¹⁴ Carroll 1895; The best treatment is Searle 2001, 18–19.

¹⁵ For abduction in IR see Fierke 2000; Also see Bickenbach and Davies 1997; Govier 1985.

¹⁶ Kratochwil 1989, 12.

awareness that some consideration makes a claim on them.”¹⁷ In other words, practical reasons for action play an important role in the practical reasoning by normatively motivating agent’s choices in one way rather than other. Clearly, norms here are not ontologically defined *à la* Sikkink and Finnemore version in IR theory but generated through the social practice of meaning-in-use *à la* Wiener and Fierke.¹⁸ As Wiener puts it: “normative quality is generated through the social practice of re-/enacting structures of normative meaning-in-use. In the process, normative meaning is contested based on individually held ‘background experience,’ which informs a range of distinct cultural validations of normative meaning, pending on the range of socio-cultural contexts that is brought together in a given inter-national interaction.”¹⁹

Finally, practical reasoning is concerned with legitimate inference patterns on arriving at a decision or intention to act. Sentence-tokens could take many different forms and a practical argument could work *enthymematically*, that is, one need not state for each proposition a sentence expressing that proposition. Audi’s example highlights the role of enthymeme very well: “If S says, ‘That river is swift enough here to carry me away, so I’ve got to find another crossing,’ S has expressed practical reasoning even though S leaves tacit an instrumental premise (which S could formulate if necessary) to the effect that finding another crossing is required to avoid getting carried away.”²⁰ In international relations, *enthymeme* need not be treated as hidden premises but as *topos* – or shared interpretation of actions based on practical experiences.²¹ An example from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* makes it clear: “Dionysius is aiming at a tyranny, because he asks for a bodyguard, one might say that Pisistratos before him and Theagenes of Megara did the same, and when they obtained what they asked for, made themselves tyrants.”²² Here the relation

¹⁷ Korsgaard 2015, 207.

¹⁸ Fierke 2002; Wiener 2009.

¹⁹ Wiener 2014, 27.

²⁰ Audi 2006, 69.

²¹ Kratochwil 1989, 217; On *topos* in international politics see Jackson 2006.

²² Quoted in Kratochwil 1989, 217.

between having a bodyguard and engaging in tyranny is a shared judgment, *topos*, among actors in the society based on practical experiences with tyrannous leaders and their bodyguards in the past.

In sum, these three features – intentional deliberation, the role of practical reasons, and legitimate inferences – show the importance of understanding issues of “action” through foregrounding the role of practical reasoning. The relation between action and goal in practical reasoning can take different schemata, which is widely debated among philosophers. Some argue that a good piece of practical reasoning is one where the means function as a necessary condition to achieve the agent’s goal.²³ Others take it that some actions can be sufficient condition for realizing the goal.²⁴ On the other hand, it could be of the form that the agent *took* certain action as a reasonable way to achieve the goal even if it is not sufficient or necessary. Still, others rely on rule schemata, which represent the agent taking an action to realize the goal to be required by a particular rule.²⁵ Before defending a pragmatic way of looking at actions, it will be useful to examine the importance of practical reasoning in politics. The emphasis on the practical reasoning for problems of action is a natural enough approach; however, it is controversial. Hume expressed his famous skepticism about practical reason and action, which inspires many IR scholarship, by concluding that, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”²⁶ It might, therefore, be useful in the next section to refute this position before turning into a systematic exposition of a pragmatic way of thinking about the practical reasoning for political action.

²³ Wright 1963.

²⁴ Schroeder 2008.

²⁵ See Millgram 2001 for all these different positions on practical reasoning.

²⁶ Hume 1978, 415.

3.2.1. Politics and Arguments: Practical Reasoning Writ Large

The criticism that politics is in the realm of power and therefore practical reasoning predominantly in the realm of argumentation and deliberation has no role to play in politics is seriously misplaced. Practical reasoning is pervasive in international relations and foreign policy where political agents constantly deliberate and come to conclusions about practical problems.²⁷ When Hitler wanted *lebensraum* – a ‘living space’ for the German nation to expand (major premise), he believed that military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1938 under humanitarian rationale is best means (minor premise) to attain the goal and thus concluded that Germany must annex Sudetenland.²⁸ That is, Hitler, engaged in some form of practical reasoning for action. Certainly, this is a very simplified presentation of the problem and it is quite clear that Hitler’s practical reasoning aimed at barbarous ends and multiple interlocutors “kept track” of Hitler’s actions in numerous ways. However, the upshot of this radical example is that there does not seem to be a contradiction in the link between practical reasoning and power. In an attempt to bring practical reasoning to Critical Discourse Analysis, Fairclough and Fairclough rebut the criticism against practical reasoning in an important way:

Politics – the argument often goes – is not the realm of argumentation and reasonableness; decisions are actually taken much of the time on the basis of *who has the power* rather than on the basis of reasoning. This is, of course, not a valid objection to the claim that argumentation (and practical reasoning) is a fundamental part of politics, and seems to spring from a confusion between argumentation and democratic deliberations: because a lot of what goes on in politics is *not* democratic deliberation, then – allegedly – it is not argumentation either. It should be clear that, in whatever way a claim about what should be done is reached (behind closed doors, through democratic public deliberation or by manipulating public opinion), *as long as normative claims and decisions are justified by reasons* (even by ‘bad’ reasons, e.g. unacceptable, irrelevant, or insufficient reasons) [similar to the Hitler’s example above], practical reasoning (and argumentation more generally) constitutes an integral part of political discourse.²⁹

²⁷ Some representative literature that foregrounds practical reasoning in IR includes, Tuathail and Agnew 1992; Owen 2002; Fairclough and Fairclough 2011.

²⁸ For a good treatment of Hitler’s legitimization strategy see, Goddard 2015.

²⁹ Fairclough and Fairclough 2011, 244. Emphasis original.

Thus, the view that deliberation and practical reasoning of political actors do not exist in power politics is mistaken. As long as political agents act for a reason and when one asks the question what items count as reason for action, whether reasons arise from goals achieved through action or from other properties of action (consequentialism versus deontology), and how agent's reasons and justifications are related to action is already to move towards the problems of practical reasoning. Nicholas Wheeler's observation on Hitler's action in Czechoslovakia is interesting in this regard: "Hitler claimed that in protecting ethnic Germans, he was acting in conformity with the minority rights provision of the League of Nations. These justifications were treated as bogus by most states, but Hitler could only make them because there existed a regime for the protection of minority rights."³⁰ In other words, even Hitler justified his actions, made military intervention authoritative in the face of competing alternatives, exhibited a particular *attitude* towards the minority regime of the League and radically differed on the norms that bind Germany, which enabled others to evaluate and sanction him in multiple ways.

Despite the direct relevance of practical reasoning for action and concomitantly in addressing the problem of how some actions become authoritative, the reigning orthodoxy in IR either resorts to means-end instrumental reasoning or relegates the theoretical apparatus of practical reasoning and instead relies on its units such as rhetoric and topoi – these developments are unfortunate. Even Fairclough and Fairclough who redeem practical reasoning for critical discourse analysis fall into the instrumentalist trap:

We adopt an instrumentalist approach to practical reasoning, which regards all reasons for action as *means-end* reasons. Instrumentalism rests on a mental ontology of beliefs and desires: figuring out what to do is a matter of determining how to achieve one's goals or satisfy one's desires. Reason's role in the process is *instrumental* (to inform us about available means towards our goals, about what is possible in the context, etc.) – but not to evaluate or choose the goals as such: in any context of reasoning about what to do, our goals (desires) are *given*. However, an instrumentalist view is not incompatible with reasoning *about* goals or ends: *in a different context*, governed by a different goal, it is possible to question how and whether any previously *given* goal fits in with or serves this other goal.³¹

³⁰ Wheeler 2001, 30. He makes this observation in fn39; Also see Goddard 2015.

³¹ Fairclough and Fairclough 2011, 246.

Similarly, Krebs and Jackson redeem rhetoric and the role of topoi in international relations yet they background the normative force of rhetoric, reject intersubjectivity, and thus resort to a brute understanding of the role of language in politics – a language that is devoid of judgment.

Rhetoric affects political outcomes even when all actors are cynical operators with little interest in genuine deliberation. The resolution of political issues through public debate need not imply any significant level of intersubjective consensus. Thinking about public rhetoric in this fashion avoids the crudeness of vulgar materialism, the reductionism of ideational approaches, and the heroic optimism of persuasion.³²

Both these developments in IR theory disregard the “normativity of instrumental reason” – to use Korsgaard’s phrase.³³ This limitation is explicit in the account presented by Fairclough and Fairclough and implicit in the account of Krebs and Jackson. Instrumentalist approach to practical reasoning that relies on the famous belief-desire typology cannot stand-alone but it must rely on normativity; as Korsgaard shows, instrumental principles must depend on prior constitutive norms that are self-given laws, grounded in our autonomy. As she puts it, “The instrumental principle, because it tells us only to take the means to our ends, cannot by itself give us a reason to *do* anything. It can operate only in conjunction with some view about how our ends are determined, about what they are.”³⁴ Similarly, rhetorical reasoning that fails to make explicit the normativity of topical commonplaces and the duties, obligations, and permissions, which come to fore among several interlocutors in the game of giving and asking for reasons unnecessarily limits linguistic practices of political agents to an artificially bounded realm. Given the increasing incoherence, it might be useful to take a pragmatic stance on discursive practice in order to rethink the issue of practical reasoning and action and shed light on the problem that concerns this thesis.

³² Krebs and Jackson 2007, 42.

³³ Korsgaard 1997.

³⁴ Ibid., 223.

3.3. Pragmatic Theory of Discursive Practices

The above discussion made clear – at least in a preliminary fashion – the importance of examining practical problems and actors’ choice situation in the face of competing alternatives from the perspective of practical reasoning. In this section, I will present a distinctive pragmatic perspective on the discursive practice of agents in order to add some theoretical precision to the ideas outlined above. Specifically, I will hook the content of this discussion to analytical pragmatism and it is particularly indebted to the philosophy of language developed by Brandom and his inferential expressivist account of discursive practice. A pragmatic perspective is not obligatory and in this section, I will show what sort of payoffs and analytical purchase one gets by relying on such an account by contrasting it with some (not all) alternative accounts. In discussing the technical aspects of pragmatist philosophy, I will provide empirical illustrations from international relations in support of the arguments. I will begin by clarifying the current tensions claiming “reasons for action” and then elaborate how practical reasoning conceived in a pragmatic way can absolve such problems by focusing on interactions-in-context.

3.3.1. What are reasons for action?

At first look, it is clear that practical reasoning for action takes practical reasons as central for figuring out what to do about problems but the question of what a practical reason is and what it is we mean when we take that someone acts for a reason remain unclear. The philosophical and social science literature conventionally distinguish reasons between normative, justifying and explanatory reasons.³⁵ However, in most cases, these reasons take hybrid form. A brief but not uncontroversial example from international relations will make the tension clear. In 2003, United

³⁵ Audi 2004, 120–122.

States waged a war against Iraq because George W. Bush administration thought Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). An elementary practical reasoning for action is evident:

Major Premise: After September 11 terror attacks on the US, I want to engage in a War on Terror

Minor Premise: Saddam Hussein in Iraq has a finger on September 11 attacks and Iraq possesses WMD therefore overthrowing Saddam Hussein will achieve (one of the goals of) War on Terror

Practical Conclusion: I should launch a war against Iraq

By engaging in this form of practical reasoning, the Bush administration marginalized competing alternatives options and made military intervention contingently authoritative. Now the question is what are the reasons for action here?³⁶ Clearly, Saddam Hussein did not have a finger on September 11 attacks and Iraq did not possess WMD, there is no reason that justified the invasion: no normative reasons – those reasons, which show a given action as appropriate or called for. Yet, the Bush administration acted for this reason. Now, the Bush administration is motivated to invade Iraq by a certain belief-desire combination that Iraq has WMD, and these are the agent's reasons for action.³⁷ If the Bush administration's reason for the invasion was that Iraq possessed WMD, but Iraq did not possess WMD, then the agent's own reason is false and crucially in such psychological explanations, reasons play limited or no role at all. According to Nagel, "Rather, we are caused to act by desires and beliefs, and the terminology of reason can be used only in a diminished sense to express this kind of explanation."³⁸

The agent's own reasons are sometimes false but it still explains an action. For example, Iraq possessed WMD is a reason that explains why Bush administration invaded Iraq. However, that is not the reason that motivated the administration. Perhaps the motivation was in, President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney's links to the oil industry, the influence of

³⁶ Based on Hieronymi 2011.

³⁷ This is the famous reasons as causes of Davidson 1963.

³⁸ Nagel 1986, 142.

neoconservative cabal or to support Israel's position in the Middle East. We can understand the distinction between motivating and explanatory reasons if we see that WMD is a reason that explains why the Bush administration invaded Iraq but it is not the reason that motivates action. That distinction is acting for a reason and acting with a reason. Thus, these tensions indicate that in analyzing actions one cannot just say the agent acted for a reason and marginalized alternative options. Clearly, one needs to fill in more details.

Furthermore, norms that arise in interactional situation play an important role in all three types of reasons for action. First, the normative reasons that give reasons the good-making properties do not automatically percolate to the agent's reasoning for action. The agent must recognize the normative force, be moved by it, and acknowledge the good or appropriateness-making properties.³⁹ When multiple normative or justifying reasons compete, the problems are practically resolved by taking a particular normative attitude towards competing norms. The fact that a joke is funny in social occasion may be a normative reason to tell it, but the fact that I will embarrass my friend may be a reason not to tell it.⁴⁰ The adjudication between these competing normative forces is based on one's practical attitude towards these norms and the norms implicit in social practice adjudicated by other interlocutors. Similarly, resorting to psychology – beliefs and desires – to understand how agents exert a certain uptake on norms in practical reasoning is problematic. After all, the contrast between true and false beliefs, acceptable or unacceptable desires are normative and emerge only in the context of social interpretation. This means that we need a better perspective – pragmatic perspective – on discursive practice in order to address the current tension on norms, reasons, and practical reasoning.

³⁹ Korsgaard 1997; Korsgaard 2015.

⁴⁰ Alvarez 2016.

3.3.2. Pragmatism of reasons for action: Brandom's Solution

Here Brandom's pragmatic theory of discursive practice is particularly instructive. He divides his theory into two parts: semantics and pragmatics. The animating idea of his project is that semantics should answer to pragmatics, which is a descendant of Wittgenstein's formidable idea that meaning should be explained in terms of use. The primacy of practice is not new in philosophical literature in general and IR theory in particular. However, Brandom's pragmatism foregrounds the content of concepts on reasoning and shows that beliefs, assertions, and intentionality are the result of the game of inferentially giving and asking for reasons in a normative (deontic) space. I will address Brandom's pragmatic and semantic theories in turn and then enumerate the payoffs of the pragmatic way of looking at reasons for action for the problem that concern this thesis. The idea is that with the tools of normative pragmatics (discussed below in Sections 3.3.3) and inferential semantics (discussed in Section 3.3.4) we could understand the deontic way of looking at discursive practices. These discussions will enable us to grasp deontic scorekeeping action (discussed in Section 3.3.5) and the significance of all these for understanding a distinctively pragmatic practical reasoning to open up the processes of examining political agency against competing discourses.

3.3.3. Normative Pragmatics: Deontic Status and Deontic Attitudes

For Brandom, a pragmatic way of thinking about discursive practice is to think of it in a specific *deontic* form where one's own and others' normative commitments and entitlements are at issue. Here commitments are similar to obligation and entitlements are similar to permissions. It is a characteristic Kantian idea that judgment and action are to be understood in terms of how we are *responsible* for them.⁴¹ We do not just behave or merely respond to environmental stimuli like

⁴¹ Brandom 1994, 8 Emphasis original.

a thermometer responding to variation to temperatures but we judge and act. Brandom shows that our judgments and actions are characteristically normative:

They express *commitments* of ours: commitments that we are answerable for in the sense that our *entitlement* to them is always potentially at issue, commitments that are *rational* in the sense that vindicating the corresponding entitlements is a matter of offering *reasons* for them.⁴²

These *deontic statuses* of commitment and entitlements are not natural properties, arising out of nowhere, but are products of human activity instituted in our *deontic attitude* of taking, treating, or responding to someone as committed or entitled. There are several different kinds of commitments – *doxastic commitments* one that corresponds to beliefs, *inferential* commitments one that corresponds to reasons, and *practical commitments* one that corresponds to action.⁴³ For Brandom, these commitments are products of our deontic attitude. In other words, the deontic statuses of commitments and entitlements rest on our deontic attitudes of attributing, acknowledging, and endorsing those statuses in our social world. Again, it is a characteristic Kantian idea that we, social agents, do not act according to a rule like stones falling down according to the rule of gravity but instead we act according to our *conception* of the rule based on our attitude toward it. As Brandom shows:

What makes an act as we do is not the rule or norm itself but our *acknowledgment* of it. It is the possibility of this intervening attitude that is missing in the relation between merely natural objects and the rules that govern them.⁴⁴

In sum, Brandom's pragmatic theory takes the notion of *deontic status* and *deontic attitude*. Statuses come in two ways: *commitments* and *entitlements*; and, there are three types of deontic attitudes: *attributing*, *undertaking*, and *acknowledging* one's own and others' deontic statuses. In a discursive practice, members attribute, undertake, and acknowledge various commitments and entitlements and such practical attitude is an ongoing process in the social world. The underlying assumption

⁴² Brandom 1998, 128 Emphasis original.

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ Brandom 1994, 31 Emphasis original

here is methodological phenomenalism, where deontic statuses are explained in terms of deontic attitudes.⁴⁵ To put it simply, norms are in the eye of the beholder. Now, the crucial question is how members in the social world assess discursive performance – if norms are what one takes it to be, is not my attitude towards norms as good as any others, the set of deontic commitments that Hitler acknowledges in military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1938 as good as the attitude of Churchill and Roosevelt? Is not the perspectival attitude on norms turn into some form of relativism among members of discursive practice in the social world? How do members assess some performance as right and others wrong, some reasons as good reasons for action and others as wrong reasons? It is here that the Wittgensteinian thrust of Brandom's work becomes evident.

In discursive practice, deontic statuses and one's practical attitude towards it are governed by *social practices*, and members keep track – *keep scores* – on one's own and others' normative statuses and attitudes based on the norms implicit in social practices. At a given moment in a conversation, a score is just the commitment and entitlement associated with each participant and members change these scores in response to claims (speech-acts) in systematic ways. This is *deontic scorekeeping practice* and I will elaborate it with an example in Section 3.3.5. Suffice here to note that it is the social practices and the implicit norms in the interaction-in-context that governs our practical attitude towards deontic statuses. There is no universal law or an Archimedean point for interrogating one's own and others' normative statuses and attitudes; similarly, not everything is up for grabs and whatever seemed right to an agent's attitude cannot be right.⁴⁶ To put it in simple words, to treat some performance as correct or incorrect, some reasons as good and others as bad reasons, and acknowledgment of commitments as one that rightfully leads to some entitlements and not to others is intelligible only in the context of norms

⁴⁵ Scharp 2003.

⁴⁶ Levine 2015, 252.

implicit in social practice. Based on implicit social practices, members keep track of one another. Thus, based on the social practices of international politics, members such as Churchill and Roosevelt kept deontic scores on Hitler's normative attitudes and based on the norms implicit in practices could sanction his beliefs and action as incorrect, bad, and barbarous.

Mastering this sort of norm-instituting social practice is a kind of practical know-how – a matter of keeping deontic *score* by keeping track of one's own and others' commitments and entitlements to those commitments, and altering that score in systematic ways based on the performances each practitioner produces. The norms that govern the use of linguistic expressions are implicit in these deontic scorekeeping practices.⁴⁷

To summarize, the normative pragmatics in Brandom's theory of discursive practice has three layers: deontic statuses, deontic attitudes, and sanctions based on social practices. First, linguistic practices and the norms implicit in it are deontic – the “*authority* on which the role of any claims in communication depends is intelligible only against the background of a correlative *responsibility* to vindicate one's entitlement to the commitments.”⁴⁸ Second, deontic statuses are functions of our practical attitudes expressed in acknowledging, attributing, or undertaking the significance of normative statuses. Finally, our practical attitudes to take and treat normative statuses are governed by norms implicit in social practices and explained in terms of keeping scores on one's and others' commitments and entitlements in discursive practices. Even keeping scores can be done correct or incorrectly and thus, for Brandom, it is norms all the way down.

3.3.4. Inferential Semantics: The game of giving and asking reasons

The next step is to show the relation between deontic statuses and deontic attitudes and for Brandom, a characteristic way of thinking about such discursive practice is the *inferential* game of giving and asking for reasons. By virtue of discussions on inferentialism, we are entering into the terrain of semantics; however, if we recall the very Wittgensteinian thrust of Brandom theory is

⁴⁷ Brandom 1994, xiv Emphasis original.

⁴⁸ Ibid., xii.

to show that semantics must answer to pragmatics. In this section, I will elaborate on Brandom's semantic inferentialism and show how it answers to normative pragmatics above. It is instructive to use Brandom's illustration here:

The parrot does not treat 'That's red' as incompatible with 'That's green,' nor as following from 'That's scarlet' and entailing 'That's colored.' Insofar as the repeatable response is not, for the parrot, caught up in practical proprieties of inference and justification, and so of the making of further judgments, it is not a conceptual or a cognitive matter at all. What the parrot and the measuring instrument lack is an appreciation of the significance their response has as a reason for making further claims and acquiring further beliefs, its role in justifying some further attitudes and performances and ruling out others. Concepts are essentially inferentially articulated. Grasping them in practice is knowing one's way around the proprieties of inference and incompatibility they are caught up in. What makes a classification deserve to be called *conceptual* classification is its *inferential* role.⁴⁹

Two themes here deserve further elaboration. First, there is the issue of the inferential articulation of concepts in the game of giving and asking for reasons. We can train a parrot to respond in a very reliable manner to the offer of red apples with a squawk: "That's red." Yet this parrot cannot be said to have undertaken any sort of normative commitments. In other words, for the parrot, the propositional content "That's red" does not serve and stand in need of any reasons. Unsurprisingly, for us humans, claims play the role they do because they stand in need of reasons. Our rationality qualifies us to *inferentially* reason from a claim "That's red" to "Red is a color," it is incompatible with "That's green" and after seeing a red apple one can seek a *prima facie* belief or doxastic commitment to a further claim 'the apple is ripe' subject to the experience or endorsement by other scorekeepers. In making these inferences, one appeals to implicitly normative linguistic social practices of a community. Further, engaging in such inferences is grasping concepts. Meaning is relational and the content of an expression (or belief) consist in its relation to other expression (or belief). As Fossen shows, "Semantic inferentialism implies a holistic view of meaning, because concepts have their content only with respect to other concepts; one can only have one concept if one has many. Consequently, committing oneself to

⁴⁹ Ibid., 89 Emphasis original.

one thing is committing oneself to a lot of other things as well.”⁵⁰ Clearly, this is not the case with the parrot.

Second, engaging in inferential articulation is being ready to offer justifications for our claim. When a rational being makes a claim (assertion), there are certain default commitments and entitlements and it sets off a chain reaction of scorekeeping practices. A parrot’s squawk “That’s red” is not a license for another parrot sitting nearby to eat the fruit for example. However, in the social world, successful assertions are present for public consumption: other members of the conversation can acknowledge, challenge, endorse, and attribute commitments and entitlements in social practice.⁵¹ Again, norms implicit in social practices play an important role in what Brandom calls as “reason-mongering” practice.⁵² If norms implicit in social practices are the key, then one does not have to subscribe to a rigid or formalist strategy in thinking about inferences. This nonformalist approach is what Brandom calls as ‘material inferences’ borrowing ideas from Wilfred Sellars. Examples of material inferences that Brandom provides are of the form, ‘today is Wednesday’ to ‘tomorrow will be Thursday,’ from ‘it is raining’ to ‘the streets will be wet,’ and from ‘lightening is seen now’ to ‘thunder will be heard soon.’⁵³ The upshot is that these material inferences in our social world are valid inferences to make even if it is not in a specific logical form.

Thus, in keeping with Wittgensteinian ideas, Brandom’s semantic inferentialism answers to normative pragmatics in characteristically two important ways.⁵⁴ First, inferences in discursive practices are explained in terms of commitments and entitlements. To put it very simply, the

⁵⁰ Fossen 2014, 377.

⁵¹ Scharp 2005, 209; Also see Rosenberg 1997.

⁵² Brandom 1994, 173.

⁵³ For more details on inferentialism see Brandom 2001.

⁵⁴ Scharp 2005, 208.

game of giving and asking for reasons is always the game about inferentially interrogating one's own and others' commitments and entitlements. There are three types of inferential relations in discursive practice: committive or commitment-preserving inferential relation, permissive or entitlement-preserving inferential relation, and incompatible relations.⁵⁵ A commitment preserving inference is one where if one is committed to its premises, then one should be committed to its conclusion as well (or at least the scorekeepers take it in that way). Similarly, if one is entitled to the premises of a permissive inference, then one should be entitled to its conclusion too (again in the eyes of scorekeepers). Two claims are incompatible if the commitment to one precludes entitlement to the other. It is through these inferential relations that members keep scores on one another.

Second, when a member of discursive practice makes an assertion (speech-act), it sets off a chain reaction of scorekeeping actions based on implicit norms in social practice. In this way, every scorekeeper changes the deontic scores of the conversation in a systematic way. As Kevin Scharp puts it:

When a person makes an assertion, she sets off a chain reaction of scorekeeping action by each member of the conversation. Three important features of assertions govern these scorekeeping actions. First, when someone makes an assertion, she acknowledges a doxastic commitment. She also undertakes the commitments and entitlements that follow from the one acknowledged. Second, a successful assertion (i.e. one in which the asserter is entitled to the commitment acknowledged) entitles others [*vis*] members of the conversation to undertake the same commitment. Successful assertions present commitments for public consumption. Third, the asserter takes responsibility to justify the assertion by giving reasons for it should the need arise. In general, assertion displays a *default and challenge structure* in which many assertions carry default entitlement that another member of the conversation can challenge.⁵⁶

The idea is that discursive practices set off a dynamic process of scorekeeping based on norms implicit in practices. The details of it will be clearer in the example of deontic scorekeeping that I will present in the next part.

⁵⁵ Brandom 1994, 168–172.

⁵⁶ Scharp 2005, 209.

To summarize, the inferential semantics conceived as engaging in an inferential game of giving and asking for reasons works very closely with the normative pragmatics conceived as deontic statuses and attitudes. One gives and asks reasons, inferentially, in order to keep track of one's own and others' commitments and entitlements. In making claims or assertions, norms implicit in social practices guide, if you like, the inferential relations of members engaged in discursive practices. This pragmatic way of thinking of semantics' answerability to pragmatics is to treat meaning in terms of its use.

In IR theory, critical constructivist scholars like Kratochwil, Onuf, Fierke, Jackson, Wiener, and Kurowska have taken over the Wittgenstein's idea of meaning-in-use to draw important insights on the role of norms in international relations in general and choice situations in particular.⁵⁷ In keeping with these developments, the explanatory power of Brandom's pragmatism provides a principled way of showing the deontic mechanisms involved in the role of norms in social practice. As Fossen puts it, Brandom's theoretical framework "provides fertile soil for a social-pragmatic approach to social and political philosophy that is neither necessarily positivist nor conservative."⁵⁸ To see this fresh look, we need to examine the role of deontic norms, attitudes, inferences, scorekeeping practices in an empirical example in international relations. It is to this we now turn.

3.3.5. Deontic Scorekeeping: Combining Normative Pragmatics and Inferential Semantics

In the light of above discussions on normative pragmatics and inferential semantics, what follows is an account of deontic scorekeeping with an example on the discursive practices of

⁵⁷ Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989; Fierke 2002; Jackson 2006; Wiener 2009; Kurowska 2013; Wiener 2014.

⁵⁸ Fossen 2014, 372.

multiple agents on the humanitarian crisis in Somalia in 1992.⁵⁹ The use of Somalian case is merely *illustrative*.⁶⁰ The idea is that this simple example should enable us to grasp the preceding philosophical discussions with more clarity. Of particular importance is to shed light on what normative commitments and entitlements are at issue in discursive practice, how members exhibit a particular deontic attitude by attributing, acknowledging, and undertaking various commitments and entitlements, how members acquire doxastic commitments (beliefs), what sort of inferential processes functions in normative claims and what sort of norms underwrites interaction-in-context. Thus, the brief elucidation of the Somali example is meant to illustrate the pragmatic theory of discursive practice.

In the early summer of 1992, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) authoritatively reported that 95 percent of the Somali population was malnourished and 70 percent in imminent danger of death by starvation.⁶¹ This assertion set off a chain reaction of scorekeeping practices among multiple interlocutors, particularly within the George H.W. Bush administration. Political agents within the administration – the President, the military, members of the Congress, US Agency for International Development – understood the significance of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, engaged in some basic discursive practices on their role in addressing the humanitarian crisis in general, and deliberated on the crisis in Somalia in particular. In the process, they kept and changed scores on one another. Let us recall, a score at any given moment is just the commitment and entitlements associated with each participant and members change the score in systematic ways, based on norms implicit in social practice and in response to the performance. It was clear that humanitarian crisis is a problem in many parts of

⁵⁹ For a detailed case study on scorekeeping practice in international relations and in the cases of India and Brazil see Chapters 4 through Chapter 7.

⁶⁰ It draws on Hutchinson 1993; Western 2002.

⁶¹ “Emergency Plan of Action-Somalia,” International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland/Nairobi, Kenya, 21 July 1992.

the world such as Angola, Chad, Liberia, Mozambique, Yugoslavia, Southern Sudan and the assertion of ICRC in Somalia now set the stage for a move in the language game.

The discursive practices of the Bush administration count as deontic scorekeeping because they exhibit a particular deontic attitude towards the situation in Somalia and instantiate, *inter alia*, a suitable structure of *defaults*, *challenges*, and *vindications* by several scorekeepers.⁶² The military under the leadership of General Colin Powell acknowledged the humanitarian crisis in Somalia but did not endorse an entitlement for US military intervention. The military reasoned that the violence in Somalia is the result of ancient hatred and interclan conflict and any US involvement will be an entry into a “bottomless pit.”⁶³ Importantly, the Bush administration and senior members of the White House staff *deferred* to the military’s deontic attitude towards the crisis. On the other hand, members of US Agency for International Development (USAID), specifically Andrew Natsios *challenged* the administration’s doxastic commitment (belief) to do-nothing in Somalia. The reasons brought to challenge the default commitment of the administration were the death of 300,000 civilians and that only the US possessed the capabilities to tackle the crisis. The beliefs of members of USAID were based on their reliable perceptions in Somalia as well as *testimony* in the field from ICRC and other NGOs. For them, the commissive consequence of do-nothing commitment in the humanitarian crisis in Somalia is moral indignation of the United States.

Already these members inferentially kept track of each other’s beliefs on the role of the US in Somalia and kept scores on what *ought* to be done, what would be proper, and what entitlements follow from one’s doxastic commitments (beliefs). However, the deontic attitude of two more

⁶² Rosenberg 1997, 180.

⁶³ Quoted in Don Oberdorfer, ‘The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy We Could Do Something About,’ Washington Post, 6 December 1992, p. A1. Western 2002, 113.

political agents is important to note before highlighting the dynamic aspect of this scorekeeping practice.

First, the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali aimed to mediate the conflict between the warring factions in Somalia and failed but on 22 July 1992, he asserted that 1 million Somali children were at immediate risk of death by starvation and more than 4 million people needed food assistance urgently.⁶⁴ Members of the US Congress particularly Senators Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas) and Paul Simon (D-Illinois) conducted a fact-finding mission in Somalia in June and July and in the process acknowledged the UN report, gave testimony to its findings, reported the horrific conditions, and challenged the Bush administration's attitude with regard to Somalia.

Another important scorekeeper in the process is the US media, particularly *CNN* and *The New York Times*, which briefly but effectively covered the crisis in Somalia along with reports on the crisis in Bosnia and compelled the administration to justify its reasons for its current stance on this grave humanitarian crisis. Crucially, the ICRC requested *New York Times* correspondent Jane Perlez to visit Somalia and her reports demonstrated the appalling condition in the country, which *vindicated* ICRC and *The New York Times*' challenge to the administration's default commitment of inaction.⁶⁵ Further, a cable by the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone Jr. entitled "A Day in Hell" about the appalling conditions in Somalia leaked to the press bringing to bear further chain reaction of changing scores.


It is important to highlight the constitutive role of interlocutors in the game and the normativity that underwrite specific interactions-in-context. With the crisis in Somalia, the interactional situation with the series of UN resolutions worked through several bona fide players who

⁶⁴ Seth Faison, 'U.N. Head Proposes Expanded Efforts for Somalia Relief,' *New York Times*, 25 July 1992, p. 1. Ibid.

⁶⁵ Jane Perlez, "Deaths in Somalia Outpace Delivery of Food," *New York Times*, 19 July 1992.

occupied important socio-institutional status and who legitimately converged to interact about the crisis in systematic (not idiosyncratic) manner, thus underwriting a specific institutional normativity in interactions.⁶⁶ In Section 3.5, I will elaborate on the different norm types that underwrite interactions and the warranted expectations it provides to delimit the scorekeepers and competing alternative discourses in the game. Suffice here to understand how scorekeepers and game players come together and keep track of each other based on one's own and others' normative commitments and entitlements.

Figure 1.1. Interaction-in-context between Game Players and Scorekeepers on Humanitarian crisis in Somalia⁶⁷



What is dynamic about members of discursive practice keeping track of one's own and others' commitments and entitlements is that inferences are normative, in the sense that deontic statuses are at issue, and the deontic scores relationally constrain and enable further commitments in important ways. Thus, the USAID challenged one of the Bush administration's assertions, "Somalia is a bottomless pit" by asserting "one must avert a humanitarian catastrophe." Some

⁶⁶ Lyons and Samatar 1995.

⁶⁷ See Appendix for details on the Standard Network Analysis, data, coding, basic measures, and node set.

scorekeepers such as the legislators and other NGOs inherited the beliefs from USAID, assessed what entitlements *ought to* follow from the administration's commitment, performed incompatibility checks, and challenged the military. Now the military offered reasons, "the desert terrain, although open, would create enormous operational and tactical difficulties (because of dusty conditions) for close air support for troops on the ground."⁶⁸ Now other scorekeepers kept track of military's commitments in new ways and reasoned that the military could deploy troops outside Mogadishu for humanitarian relief and distribution. It failed to change the commitments of the military in the summer of 1992. However, the reasons offered by the military changed the attitude of other scorekeepers. The U.S. Ambassador to Somalia James Bishop would later claim that "Hell, we had just fought a massive war in the Persian Gulf desert with lots of helicopters. I was evacuated from Mogadishu in January 1991 in a Marine Corps helicopter that operated just fine. But that was their [military's] attitude."⁶⁹ By keeping multiple scorebooks, each scorekeeper assesses the performance of multiple actors, some "subtracted" the entitlements of the military, some vindicated their challenge, and others kept track of new commitments that follow from the new reasons.⁷⁰ Thus, the changed score at a given moment in a discursive practice affects the propriety of performance and one's beliefs. On July 26, the UNSC passed an emergency Resolution 767 authorizing emergency airlift and on 15 August, Bush ordered U.S. Air Force to airlift supplies to famine victims. This changed the commitments of many scorekeepers and again new stage of scorekeeping began.

The chain reaction of changing scores on one's own and others' deontic statuses (commitments and entitlements) could go on forever but the upshot of this small illustration is to show how the previous discussions on normative pragmatics and inferential semantics come together in the

⁶⁸ Western 2002, 116.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 125.

⁷⁰ As pointed out in previous chapters, the actors are not going around with a scorebook but in the spirit of double-hermeneutics, it is we the theorists who are trying to understand what the participants are doing keep the scores.

game of giving and asking for reasons. The deontic scorekeeping is not mere actor-audience relations *à la* the second-generation securitization school or the rhetorical coercion model in IR theory. Clearly, multiple interlocutors in the Somali case reasoned from claims to claims, the premise of one becomes the premise of others in a highly networked manner, and each scorekeeper kept track of one's own and other's commitments and entitlements rather than as top-down passage of information. Similarly, not one essential identity but multiple subject-positions are evident among scorekeepers in the Somali case. The ontological security school in IR theory has to accommodate this legitimate multiple subject positions that come to the foreground of claims in different stages of conversation. Further, even if the actors rhetorically coerced one another, they did so by checking the incompatibilities with the norm-types that arise in the interactions-in-context. The upshot of this entire section is to show the cash-value of a pragmatic perspective of discursive practice based on Brandom's inferential-expressivist account that provides the apparatus, if you like, for a clear grip on understanding what is going on in the social world. It is meant to show the utility of examining the practical reasoning of actions (next section) through the deontic scorekeeping network of agents.

3.4. Pragmatic Practical Reasoning and Action in Deontic Scorekeeping Network

Now that I have presented the heart of a pragmatic theory of discursive practice, it will be useful to examine how this apparatus enables us to examine practical reasoning for action and further open up the processes in the emergence of contingently authoritative action in the face of competing alternatives for some practical problems in international politics. As stated previously, the perspective on pragmatic practical reasoning is not intelligible without the apparatus of normative pragmatics, inferential semantics, and deontic scorekeeping action; but, one still needs

to fill in the details. This is asking the question, given that our discursive practices are thoroughly normative in a deontic scorekeeping space how is it that in practical situations some actions becomes authoritative in the face of competing alternatives?

To begin with, let us first delineate what is practical reasoning in the deontic scorekeeping understanding of discursive practice. Practical reasoning is an intentional activity of seeking *entitlement to practical commitment* through rational justifications by engaging in the game of giving and asking for reasons in deontic scorekeeping terms. According to Brandom:

Exhibiting a piece of practical reasoning *rationalizes* the practical commitment or intention that is its conclusion. It displays reasons for that intention, offers a rational justification for it, shows how one might become rationally entitled to it. Accepting a practical inference as entitling someone to a practical commitment in this sense requires endorsing the *inference* permissively good (and so only a proving a *prima facie* case for commitment to the conclusion, defeasible by incompatible commitments) for the agent whose conduct is being assessed.⁷¹

Three important themes here deserve further elaboration with examples from international relations. First is the issue of practical inferences in scorekeeping terms, which is concerned with the transition from beliefs to actions. In pragmatist terms, the idea of practical inferences is concerned with moving from doxastic commitments (beliefs) to practical commitment in the scorekeeping space. Second, the question of specific justificatory responsibility of the agent engaged in practical reasoning. Finally, the province of intentionality and its relation to the practical reasoning for action deserves attention. I will elaborate on these three themes in order to show what is distinctive about practical reasoning in pragmatic (scorekeeping) terms and the manner in which the account presented here opens the processes of political agency in important ways.

⁷¹ Brandom 1994, 253 Emphasis original.

3.4.1. Practical Inference and Practical Reasoning

In order to move from beliefs to action – from doxastic commitment to practical commitment – one exhibits a piece of practical reasoning by making several inferences in order to secure entitlement to a practical commitment to do something. In this light, beliefs are premises from which one reasons. What is distinctive about practical inference as opposed to doxastic inferences is that practical inferences have practical commitments as their conclusion. Thus, there is a symbiotic relation between doxastic commitment and practical commitment – the latter stands in inferential relations both among themselves and to doxastic commitments.⁷²

Let us put this idea on practical inference in simple words by revisiting the example from Bush administration's deontic attitude towards Somalia discussed in the previous section and highlighting the two species of discursive commitments: the doxastic and practical. In the example presented above, inferences of all the political agents were in the realm of doxastic commitments (beliefs). The scorekeeping practices were assessments on what counts as reasons for one's belief "Somalia is a bottomless pit," what else it commits the game players and scorekeepers to, for example, some sought further entitlement to the belief that "Humanitarian intervention in Somalia is not in our national interest." Some others challenged the commitments through testimony, deferral, and vindications, and some others inherited these beliefs and added or subtracted the entitlements that follow from one's own and others' beliefs and in this way changed the deontic score based on their perspectival take on norms that underwrites interaction-in-context.

⁷² Ibid., 234.

Importantly, on 25 November 1992, President George H.W. Bush ordered US forces for humanitarian military intervention in Somalia. This is “making-true” of Bush’s doxastic commitment or taking a practical commitment to *do* something – to act. However, if we recall the Bush administration and the military held a doxastic commitment for non-intervention in Somalia. Unless one claim that Bush’s decision is accidental or impulsive it is clear that Bush engaged in some sort of practical inferences and practical reasoning for action. Let us examine how it came about and start from Bush’s doxastic commitment (belief) that he inherited from the military in the summer of 1992.

DC§ Somalia suffers from deeply historic inter-clan conflicts that are unresolvable through humanitarian intervention

First, for President Bush as a game player to have a doxastic commitment (belief) DC§ is to have practical mastery over the inferences that is involved in it. For example, “Inter-clan conflicts are not resolvable from outside,” to “One will not be able to get out of such conflicts after intervention,” and as following from, “humanitarian intervention should not take sides on clan conflicts” and entailing, “Humanitarian intervention in Somalia is not in our national interest.” Having a particular doxastic commitment such as DC§ is responding differentially to the circumstances of the application of the concepts of “inter-clan conflict” or “humanitarian intervention” and the consequences of the application of these concepts. Such practical mastery over the inferences is based on norms implicit in practices and scorekeepers, as we saw, keep track of one’s own and others’ doxastic commitments. Here President Bush is taken to have the DC§ because he could give reasons for it and offer justification when challenged.

The second species of discursive practice is the practical commitment to act. It is concerned with moves from beliefs to intention, that is transitioning from beliefs to having reasons *to do* further

things and avoiding others. Beliefs serve as a premise for practical commitment or as Brandom puts it, “practical discursive commitment is not autonomous but presupposes that of doxastic ones.”⁷³ In order to have a practical commitment that follows from DC§ one must engage in practical inference and similarly have practical mastery over the reasons to *do* further things and avoid others. Now President Bush held the following practical commitment:

PC§: Only militarily intervening in Somalia one can provide food and medical supplies to the starving Somali population, so
I will order US troops to intervene in Somalia

Exhibiting a practical commitment to act also stands in inferential relations both to themselves as well as to the doxastic commitments. For Bush to have the practical commitment of the sort PC§ is to have practical mastery over the inference both in the circumstance of the acquisition of PC§ and in the consequence of acquiring the practical commitment.⁷⁴ Both the inferences are guided by the norms implicit in social practices. Similarly, scorekeepers will keep track whether President Bush’s practical commitments rightfully follows from his doxastic commitments, what sort of inferences follow from the practical commitment to act and whether Bush is entitled to such practical commitments given the deontic scores in the discursive practice. Clearly, there is a huge gap between DC§ and PC§ along with changing scores in the deontic scorekeeping space. The filling of this gap by suitable altering one’s beliefs, giving and taking reasons for the alterations, inferentially keeping track of one’s own and others’ commitments and entitlements to seek entitlements for practical inference is what practical reasoning is all about. The idea that there is propriety of practical inferences from DC§ to PC§ and different types of norms leads to different patterns of practical reasoning will be exploited in next section to guide the case studies of this thesis.

⁷³ Ibid., 243.

⁷⁴ *ibid*

The important point is justifying a practical commitment by exhibiting *practical reasoning*, which is rationalizing the practical commitment to act in a suitable way. Let us recall that scorekeepers keep track of entitlements and systematically alter the scores, therefore exhibiting a piece of practical reasoning is being sensitive to the deontic scores in discursive practice and suitably reasoning one's way towards securing entitlements for action. Now Bush has to provide reasons for the change in his doxastic commitment because without a change in beliefs DC§ he cannot be entitled to commitment PC§ as the scorekeepers will take this to be incompatible. He has to offer reasons for his claims, show inferences it entails and justify its links to the practical commitment to send troops to Somalia by seeking entitlement for his commitments from scorekeepers. Tracing these changes, changing deontic scores, changing beliefs and proprieties of performance, assessments of proprieties of inference from beliefs to practical commitments and justifying entitlement requires historically detailed investigation of the Somalian case, which is beyond the scope of this illustration.⁷⁵ The upshot is that in contrast to traditional accounts, particularly ones based on instrumental means-end reasoning, the important feature of practical reasoning here is that it is thoroughly normative, not dependent on Bush's psychological conditions but works within the deontic scorekeeping network. How President Bush justifies his practical commitment to act is based on offering reasons, justifying inference from DC§ to PC§ to scorekeepers based on the norms the underwrite interaction-in-context and that scorekeepers would take or (not take) as good reasons for action. In the dense web of deontic scorekeeping network, one cannot just offer any form of practical inference to justify action but seek entitlement through a normatively governed game. Now the question is what sort of specific justificatory responsibility is involved here in understanding the practical reasoning in deontic scorekeeping terms? It is to this idea that we turn next.

⁷⁵ However, I engage in detailed case studies on two other cases – India and Brazil – in the next two chapters.

3.4.2. Justificatory Responsibility in Practical Reasoning

In order to show that one is rationally entitled to the practical commitment – the commitment to act and “making-true” of the beliefs – one takes up a specific justificatory responsibility. In this light, justifying one’s practical commitment is the core of practical reasoning. As Brandom puts it, “Only against the background of a general capacity to comprehend and fulfill such a justificatory responsibility – to assess and produce reasons for practical commitments – can what one does have the significance of an acknowledgment of a practical commitment, that is, the significance of acquiring or expressing an intention.”⁷⁶ The aspect of intentionality will be taken by in the next part, for now, let us examine the distinctive features of this justificatory project in practical reasoning.

Let us put this idea on justificatory responsibility in simple words by revisiting the example of Somalia and Bush’s practical commitment to engage in humanitarian intervention by highlighting the dual aspect of justification that the agent takes it as meaningful and the justificatory responsibility the scorekeepers takes as proper. In the example presented above, the practical commitment PC§ involved a claim that “Only militarily intervening in Somalia one can provide food and medical supplies to the starving Somali population; I will order US troops to intervene in Somalia.”⁷⁷

First, Bush has to comprehend the inferential consequences of the claim in order to comprehend the justificatory responsibility involved in the reasoning. For example, inferentially justifying that

⁷⁶ Brandom 1994, 245.

⁷⁷ “Mission To Somalia; Transcript of President’s Address on Somalia”, The New York Time, 5 December 1992. See the full text <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/world/mission-to-somalia-transcript-of-president-s-address-on-somalia.html> accessed on 15 April 2016

“Providing food and medical supplies involve fighting the warlords” might be good justification by some scorekeepers but it might be incompatible with military’s attitude on the desert terrain of Somalia. Now, Bush will keep track of military’s commitment, show the U.S. military’s exceptional performance in the Gulf War, for example, reason the inconsistencies, and subtract military’s entitlement to a commitment not to fight in Somalia. Other scorekeepers might take it that “Military intervention in Somalia is a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation” as a good justification. Those scorekeepers who attribute this justification to Bush will keep track of the administration’s commitment to UN principles and keep track of the entitlement to this justification. One need not aim to find justifications with a common denominator to satisfy all the scorekeepers – the famous “reasons that all could accept” à la Habermas.⁷⁸ In the practical sense, one aims to justify entitlement only to those scorekeepers who challenge the practical entitlement to act. Here justifications to the military, the White House staff, and other scorekeepers who inherited the belief that humanitarian intervention is not in the national interest of the U.S. that is the most important.

Second, President Bush has to reason what rational justifications in the current deontic scorekeeping space will enable him to secure the entitlement for his practical commitment to act. To secure entitlement from challengers one might offer a suitable piece of justification; however, whether these justifications will go through depends on, among others, what these scorekeepers attribute and endorse as proper justification for the commitment to act. In this light, the norms that underwrite the interactions-in-context is relevant even if in international politics there is a hierarchy of scorekeepers and normative endorsement of some is more important than others. In other words, even in a hierarchy of scorekeepers, endorsements are governed by norms that underwrite interactions and the proprieties of scorekeeping actions. Thus, just because the

⁷⁸ For an excellent critique, see Bohman and Richardson 2009.

discursive practice has established the military – in the context of Somalia – as an important scorekeeper does not mean the military could step outside the bounds of normativity to endorse or challenge the justification. Other scorekeepers will keep track of military’s endorsement and the commissive and permissive consequences of the performance.

Thus, publicly justifying reasons offered by the agent, the scores that are compatible with it, and scorekeepers who endorse or challenge the justification is important in practical reasoning. In this light, President Bush publicly justified the need for intervention to provide food for the starving population.⁷⁹ The military who kept track this commitment lost its entitlements for inaction, found Bush’s reasons as good justification for action and *prima facie* endorsed the justification. Thus, “On December 9, 1992, 1,300 U.S. Marines landed in Mogadishu, and within weeks, more than 25,000 U.S. soldiers were on the ground in Somalia.”⁸⁰ In international relations, this shows that some scorekeepers are more important than others and securing entitlements from them seem more important in practical reasoning. Clearly, these scorekeepers cannot endorse, acknowledge, or challenge the claims to please their fancy but work within the normativity that underwrites interactions. Now, one cannot *a priori* establish who the most important scorekeepers in the game. It is a contextual factor and an empirical question. In the case of Somalia, particularly after the end of the Cold War, the military’s role as important scorekeeper is only a contingent development in the discursive practice of Bush administration. However, by securing the endorsement of entitlement from the military, the Bush administration’s “Operation Restore Hope” marginalized competing alternatives thus making humanitarian intervention an authoritative action for settling humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

⁷⁹ “Mission To Somalia; Transcript of President’s Address on Somalia”, The New York Time, 5 December 1992. See the full text <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/world/mission-to-somalia-transcript-of-president-s-address-on-somalia.html> accessed on 15 April 2016

⁸⁰ Western 2002, 116.

It is the central idea of this section that in order to analyze this action done for a reason, one has to examine Bush's justificatory responsibility in practical reasoning and show how other scorekeepers endorsed, challenged, acknowledged, and deferred to Bush's entitlement for action within the network of deontic scorekeeping space. Absent this way of analysis, the move from the initial belief that "Somalia is a bottomless pit" to practical commitment to that "some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations" might seem mysterious.⁸¹

3.4.3. Intentionality and Practical Reasoning

The final point on pragmatic practical reasoning is its links with intentionality – the moves from doxastic commitment to practical commitment and justification of practical commitment to secure entitlement are all socio-intentional activity. In Brandom's terms elucidated in the discussions on the pragmatic theory of discursive practice above, intentionality is a thoroughly normative concept where the question is what sort of commitments and entitlements are at issue for an intentional agent. According to Brandom, "Intentional explanation illuminates what was done by showing why the intentional agent was *committed* to acting in that way."⁸² Instead of reducing intentionality to psychological mental processes, the analytical pragmatist account of Brandom presented in the previous sections elaborates intentional states as deontic statuses (commitments and entitlements) and intentional interpretation as deontic scorekeeping (assessments of one's own and others' commitments and entitlements) both on beliefs and practical commitments. Therefore, even if for analytical purposes, I treat the notions of practical

⁸¹ Mission to Somalia; Transcript of President's Address on Somalia. Full text <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/world/mission-to-somalia-transcript-of-president-s-address-on-somalia.html> accessed on 15 April 2016.

⁸² Brandom 1994, 268.

inference, justification, and intentionality separately, the idea is that intentionality forms the core of practical reasoning for action.

In order to understand the significance of intentionality in pragmatic practical reasoning, it is important to appreciate Brandom's account of social nature of human action.⁸³ Intentionality is the crucial factor that differentiates action from mere behavior. However, this intentionality is rooted in the ability of agents to engage in the game of giving and asking for reasons and open oneself to justifying actions to secure entitlement in systematically rational ways. Thus, intentionality is not innate inside the head of agents but a socio-practical affair existent in the game of giving and asking for reasons. As Levine puts it, "In showing how our intention follows from these reasons we rationalize our intention, show how we are rationally entitled to it, how the action that results from it is expressive of *our* rational agency."⁸⁴ In other words, the content of intentions is not a psychological matter at all but a characteristically social matter in the realm of giving and asking for reasons. This sociality of intentionality is important to appreciate the distinct sort of practical inferences from beliefs to further beliefs, from beliefs to practical commitments, and seeking entitlements for action through justification. One has to be intentional to make these moves, not in the sense of being aware but being able to give reasons based on norms implicit in social practices.

The social dimension of intentionality is also a symbiotic relation – one does not exist without the other – and there are two sides to the relations.⁸⁵ On the one hand, there is the first-person deliberation of third-person assessment and on the other hand, there is only third-person assessment without an avowed intention. This is what Levine calls the subjective and objective side of the dependence of sociality on intentionality. As he puts it:

⁸³ For an excellent discussion, see Levine 2015.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 250.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 253

On the subjective side, we can say that the very possibility of making assessments in one's deliberation about what intention one ought to acknowledge and what one ought to do based on that acknowledgment, depends on the internalization of the normative patterns of assessment that have been negotiated interpersonally in the social lifeworld... [And] On the objective side, the very ability of an agent to internalize the patterns of normative assessment and propriety that articulate the contents of their practical commitments depends on there being socially conferred norms in the first place.⁸⁶

Let us put this idea in simple words by revisiting the example of Somalia and deontic game on humanitarian military intervention. First, for President Bush the very possibility of making assessments on the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, an intention he ought to acknowledge and what he ought to do in crisis situation based on that acknowledgment crucially depends on the internalization of his scorekeeper's assessments and intentions. That is he will deliberate how third-person for example USAID, UN, ICRC or the New York Times would assess his commitments and entitlements. That is he will attribute intentionality to these scorekeepers, not by looking inside their heads, but by what intentions they *ought to* have in the normative space of reasons. Similarly, the ability of Bush to make these attributions of intentionality rests on the norms that underwrite interaction-in-context. Even if there are no avowed reasons it is the presence of these socially conferred norms that enable scorekeepers to assess the normative pragmatic significance of the action. Thus, according to the deontic scorekeeping model, one can have intentions without explicit reasons and reasons without entertaining an intention.

For example, members of USAID might take it that Bush is entitled to a practical commitment to humanitarian intervention in Somalia because of the mandate under Chapter VII UN peace enforcement mission, even though Bush would not justify it this way. Or, the UN would undertake that Bush with this humanitarian intervention is also committed to rebuilding Somalia's defunct state institutions. Bush might not recognize what he is committed to in acknowledging the intention on the practical commitment for the US to supply food and medical

⁸⁶ Ibid

relief to starving Somali population. In other words, in analyzing action one need not take acting intentionally and acting for a reason as the same thing.⁸⁷ One might have a deontic practical commitment to do something but the scorekeepers might not endorse the entitlement for action. One might still act, but most scorekeepers might treat it as irrational, unwarranted, or plainly stupid. In the same vein, one might have reasons but the scorekeepers might attribute intentions that one might not entertain. It is governed by the different sort of norms implicit in social practice and the norm type that underwrites interaction-in-context, which I will deal in the next section.

To summarize, these three aspects of pragmatic practical reasoning – engaging in practical inferences, exercising justificatory responsibility, showing how one might be entitled to a practical commitment though displaying reasons for intentions – enable one to grasp why and how some actions becomes authoritative in the game of giving and asking for reasons. While engaging in practical reasoning, the agent has to make sense of the deontic scores, keep track of the changes in deontic attitudes among multiple scorekeepers based on the expressive role of reasons, seek entitlements from scorekeepers, and make several practical inferences based on normativity in interactions. In this way of inferences, how agents are able to weave justifications to scorekeepers is important. This also means there is no one way of engaging in inferences. Different types of norms that underwrite interaction-in-context lead to different patterns of inferences. It is to this idea that we will focus now.

⁸⁷ Rosenberg 1997, 254.

3.5. Different Types of Norms & Varieties of Practical Reasoning

In this section, I will expand on this idea to show that different sort of norms leads to different patterns of practical reasoning. By placing my discussion in this manner, I want to achieve two objectives. First, I want to provide nuance to the notion of pragmatic practical reasoning of actors. If we take the idea that discursive practices are deontic and different patterns of practical reasoning correspond to different sorts of norms, which underwrites interactions among interlocutors, then we open up the diverse processes of the game of giving and asking for reasons in different interactional settings. Crucially, this categorization of normativity also dispenses with a grand theory of political action and at the same time move beyond the parochial instrumental reasoning of actors. Second, with this elaboration on the types of normativity, I also set the stage case studies in the subsequent chapters that go into the details of deontic scorekeeping discursive practice and varieties of practical reasoning of agents in international relations. In this way, I aim to show the explanatory payoff of this analytical framework on the actual empirical problem in international relations of why and how some action becomes authoritative in the face of competing alternatives.

3.5.1. Types of Norms and different patterns of Practical Inferences

For different types of norms that underwrite interaction-in-context, scorekeepers and game players take some reasons are good reasons for action, engage in different patterns of practical inference from beliefs to intentions, and keep track of these inferences in characteristically distinct ways. Therefore, we cannot just assimilate all inferences from beliefs to practical commitments as rational utility maximization-pattern. Some prudential norms, institutional norms, regional norms, custom, local conventions, or moral norms that underwrite interaction in

a context lead to different patterns of reasoning and different scorekeeping practices. Thus, according to Brandom:

There is no *a priori* reason to assimilate all such ought's to any one form – for instance the prudential (Humean totalitarianism), as rationality-as-maximizing theorists (such as Gauthier).⁸⁸

In other words, elaborating on the idea that different norm-types lead to different patterns of practical reasoning involves acknowledging that differently situated political actors engage in different games of giving and asking for reasons. With this understanding, one could make warranted assumptions about the role of scorekeepers in differently constituted situational games. There is no *a priori* reason to consider that similar scorekeepers will make similar inferences and engage in any uniform pattern of giving and taking reasons for belief and action. Let us recall that for Brandom practical inferences need not take a strict logical form. The inference “It is raining,” to “The streets will be wet,” is a good material inference and sets off a chain reaction of scorekeeping practices. Thus, different normativity that underwrites interactions lead to different patterns of material inferences and different reasons accepted in the game as good reasons for action.

Let us examine the relations between norm types and practical inferences with two examples taking the instrumental norm and the institutional norm that underwrites interactions in international relations.⁸⁹ These two norm-types are only representative (not exhaustive) to articulate the different patterns of practical reasoning and the next section deals with the issue of norm types in IR theory in detail. Consider the following bits of practical reasoning on the two different types of norms that underwrite interaction-in-context.

⁸⁸ Brandom 1998, 135. Emphasis original.

⁸⁹ This section draws heavily on Brandom's patterns of practical reasoning in deontic scorekeeping terms but situated within empirical example in international relations.

PR α : Only invading Afghanistan will keep the US a safe place after 9/11, so
I shall invade Afghanistan

PR β : We have a UN mandate to address humanitarian crisis in East Timor, so
Australia shall militarily intervene in East Timor to end violence⁹⁰

Scholars working within formal inferences will consider that the above bits of practical reasoning as enthymemes with missing premises and therefore incomplete. In other words, traditional approach will insist that the inference above will not go through unless one fills in the premises in the following manner on the types of norms:

- a) I want (prefer, desire) to keep the US safe from terrorists responsible for 9/11
- b) Under UN mandate, Australia is obliged (required) to end violence in East Timor

Let us recall that practical inference in the pragmatist order of explanation we have seen so far does not treat an inference as good or bad solely in virtue of its logical form. As Brandom puts it, “We need not treat all correct inferences as correct in virtue of their form, supplying implicit or suppressed premises involving logical vocabulary as needed. Instead, we can treat inferences such as that from ‘Pittsburgh is to the West of Philadelphia,’ to ‘Philadelphia is to the East of Pittsburgh,’ or from ‘It is raining,’ to ‘The streets will be wet,’ as *materially* good inferences – that is inferences that are good because of the content of their *nonlogical* vocabulary.”⁹¹ In this insight, the practical reasoning in PR α and PR β are good inference and it can rightfully set off a distinct chain reaction of scorekeeping practices and practical inferences.

As we already saw, Bush’s practical commitment has to follow from his doxastic commitment (beliefs) – practical commitments are not autonomous but presuppose doxastic ones. In this

⁹⁰ With explicit UN authorization or host-state consent, there are nine cases: Northern Iraq (1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-5), Somalia (1992-3), Rwanda (1994), Haiti (199), Albania (1997), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Kosovo (1998-9), and East Timor (1999)

⁹¹ Brandom 1998, 131. Emphasis original.

light, President Bush seeks an entitlement to wage a war against Afghanistan, he takes his beliefs, for example, Osama bin Laden is a terrorist, as a premise and engages in a practical inference to seek entitlement for his practical commitment to invade Afghanistan. Now distinct scorekeepers come to assess Bush's practical reasons under the instrumental norm type that underwrites such interactions. Specifically, Bush as the game player will treat some actors as "scorekeepers" whose political claims he cannot ignore to respond with impunity. This is because, under the instrumental normativity that underwrites interactions, such indifference invites punishment and sanctions with implications on the game player not securing entitlement for action. The scorekeepers who assess Bush's practical reasons under the instrumental norm type will make the following inferences:

PR α^* : Terrorists like Osama bin Laden make the US unsafe place to live and therefore, only by invading Afghanistan we can make the US a safe place.

PR α^{**} : Terrorists like Osama bin Laden kill innocent lives and escape with impunity therefore, the United States will bring him to justice by invading Afghanistan

and a host of similar inferences in order to assess if President Bush is entitled to his commitment to act. In engaging in such inferences, multiple scorekeepers are assessing the instrumental norm type that underwrites interactions and the commitments that follow from it. Note that the scorekeepers need not take Bush's reasons as good reasons and in this way could challenge his practical inference. Therefore, when scorekeepers find the inference made by Bush as not entailing him a practical commitment to invade Afghanistan because they find the norms implicit in social practice does not warrant an invasion of another sovereign state, they will challenge Bush to demonstrate entitlement. Bush can still invade Afghanistan, but these scorekeepers will take such actions as irrational. As Brandom puts it:

In the deontic framework, such irrational actions are *intentional* in that they are acknowledgments of practical *commitments* (or arise from the exercise of reliable noninferential dispositions to respond differentially to them), and they are irrational in that the practical commitment in question is not the one the agent is *entitled* to by a good practical inference from premises that the agent is committed and entitled

to – either because one has *no* reason or because one has an overriding reason to do something incompatible with what one is fact does.⁹²

Therefore, in the instrumental norm type, one sees a different pattern of practical inferences. In the above case, President Bush is implicitly stating a preference to maintain the US as a safe country, engages in a host of examinable inferences (bringing terrorists to justice), and the scorekeepers express a characteristic attitude towards each other and assess Bush's performance based on the instrumental norm type that underwrites interaction-in-context. By virtue of Bush's practical reasoning in the deontic scorekeeping space, he fixed the meaning of US safety and security in the face of competing alternatives and set off a chain reaction of scorekeeping actions.

Let us contrast this pattern of practical reasoning with the institutional norm type exhibited in PR β . The inferential pattern here is different from the one above because the institutional norm mandated by UN underwrites different inferential patterns from both the game players and scorekeepers. Game players will treat some actors as "scorekeepers" who occupy the important socio-institutional position and with whom there is some intersubjective convergence to find practical solutions to the problem. Scorekeeper might make the following inference:

- PR β^* : Australia is going into East Timor under UN mandate, so
It shall not occupy any territory in humanitarian military intervention
- PR β^{**} : Australian action is based on UN Resolution, so
It shall ensure peacekeeping operations
- PR β^{***} : Australia is going into East Timor under UN support, so
It shall adhere to the principles of *jus in bello* (just conduct in war)

The practical inference associated with institutional norm type is different from PR α in two important ways. First, the inferences are based on Australia having a certain status – the UN

⁹² Brandom 1994, 244 Emphasis original.

mandate – and scorekeepers will take PR β as good inference and assess the commitments and entitlements based on this institutional status. There is no need to attribute desire, want, or preference on the part of Australians because the norms implicitly underwriting the inference are associated with having the institutional status. Even if Australia does not appreciate the implications of working under the UN mandate, other scorekeepers will evaluate its practical inference based on this status, attribute, acknowledge, and endorse its commitments, and change the deontic score systematically. Thus, if Australia's practical reasoning for action aims to exercise hegemony in East Timor then the scorekeepers can take it as wrong, unacceptable, or incompatible reason by virtue of the institutional norm type that underwrites interactions-in-context. As Brandom puts it: "This pattern, where what matters is the scorekeeper's undertaking of a commitment to A's [in our example, Australia] occupying the status, rather than A's acknowledgment of that commitment, corresponds to an *objective* sense of 'good reason for action' (according to the scorekeeper)." ⁹³ Second, scorekeepers who are associated with same social institutional status license the practical inferences and keep track of the game player. Whether one has reasons to intervene in East Timor depends on whether or not one works with the UN institutional mandate (the status) in question that other scorekeepers with the same social-institutional statuses keep track in important ways. Inferences of members who are not part of the socio-institutional status network might play a limited role in changing the deontic scores in the discursive practice.

Therefore, in the institutional norm type, one sees a different pattern of practical inferences and the emergence of an authoritative action is conditioned by how members associated with same social-institutional status attribute entitlement to an agent's practical commitments in the deontic scorekeeping space. In the above case, members of the UN took Australia's reason as good

⁹³ Brandom 1998, 135.

reasons for action and jointly conversed on the way forward to address the humanitarian crisis in East Timor.

The upshot of this brief discussion on the two types of norms and the different patterns of practical inference is to show the nuances in the emergence of an action through pragmatic practical reasoning. These two norms are not exhaustive and scholars within IR theory have cataloged a wide variety of norm-types. If the discussion on the varieties of practical reasoning is of any importance, then mere ad-hoc categorization of norms is not useful unless one evaluates the different patterns of practical reasoning associated with each norm. Let us then examine the types of norms in IR theory to reinforce this point.

3.5.2. Types of Norms and IR Theory

We saw that norms play an important role in practical reasons, examined two different norm types and the different pattern of practical reasoning, but it is also unsurprising that in international relations there is not just two but multiple norms that are implicit in social practices. In IR scholarship, this variety of norms is already well recognized although there is no consensus on the classificatory scheme for differentiating various types of norms or in its relation to practical reason.⁹⁴ Some theorists discuss fundamental norms as those that form the very fabric of international politics drawing inspiration from literature in jurisprudence. Here peremptory norms (*jus cogens*) and obligation applicable to the international community as a whole (*ergo omnes*) are seen as fundamental in the sense that it gives meaning and structure to international life.⁹⁵ In a similar vein, Hart talk about primary and secondary rules in international politics⁹⁶ and Mervyn Frost argues that there are settled and unsettled norms in the international

⁹⁴ Raymond 1997.

⁹⁵ Fastenrath 1993.

⁹⁶ Hart 1961.

realm.⁹⁷ Settled norms are those that are recognized as such and violation of it requires special justification and unsettled norms are ones that can be overridden without such justification.

Dissatisfied with the broad vertical typologies of norms in international relations, particularly because it is quite difficult to settle on such neat hierarchy for example between fundamental and secondary norms, others have resorted to a focused classification of norm types in the international realm. Kratochwil differentiates between instruction-type rules, coordination-norms such as directives, customary norms and rights, tacit and explicit norms in international relations, conventions, decrees, and precepts. He argues that certain norm-types are designed to overcome choice problems in recurrent social situations and instructively shows that there is a contingent relation between types of situation and the types of norms.⁹⁸ Similarly, Raymond Cohen differentiates between formal and informal norms. Formal norms help coordinate the behavior of states in routine situations but informal rules of the game may occur when states aim to manage acute crisis.⁹⁹ Wiener differentiates between fundamental norms, organizing principles, and standardized procedures and addresses the specific conditions of compliance, contestation, and potential conflict in international politics.¹⁰⁰ Gregory Raymond shows that norms in international relations also differ in the domain of applicability. He shows, “Some norms pertain to all states; others only bear upon a subset of that population. Among the many possible subsets are members of an international bloc such as the Group of 77; participants in regional political (for example, the South Pacific Forum), economic (for example, the Latin American Integration Association), or sociocultural (for example, the Islamic Conference) organization; and countries such as the United States and Canada that claim to have a special relationship. Each of these

⁹⁷ Frost 1996.

⁹⁸ Kratochwil 1989, 15.

⁹⁹ Cohen 1981; For specific empirical application see, Miller 1992.

¹⁰⁰ Wiener 2014.

subsets may develop its own partner-specific norms.”¹⁰¹ The upshot of this discussion is to show that there are varieties of normativity that underwrites interactions among actors in international politics.

Although these multiple typologies of norms are relevant in international politics, one has to investigate the game of giving and asking for reasons that are specific to these norm-types in social situations and examine the scorekeepers who come together to “keep track” of the inferences based on the norm type. Otherwise, any broad typology of norms will turn out to be ad-hoc and without sufficient empirical payoff. Kratochwil puts this point elegantly, “Since rule-following does not involve blind-habit (except in limiting cases) but argumentation, it is through *analyzing the reasons which are specific to different rule-types that the intersubjective validity of norms and thus their ‘deontic status’ can be established.*”¹⁰²

In other words, any conceptualization of norm type has to carry the explanatory burden to show what reasons are given for this norm by actors in discursive practice, what actors take the role of “scorekeepers,” as those guardians of norms that underwrites interactions, how other interlocutors evaluate the reasons and inferences in the game. The previous section showed a pragmatic way of carrying out such an investigation. The second part of this thesis (Chapter 4 through 7) will offer empirical depth to this pragmatic understanding that different types of norms lead to different patterns of practical reasoning for action and concomitantly show the payoffs of this perspective for understanding choice problems in international politics. The following discussion serves as a brief account of the “operationalization” of interpretivist research design in order to gear towards detailed empirical analysis.

¹⁰¹ Raymond 1997, 225–226.

¹⁰² Kratochwil 1989, 97 Emphasis original.

3.6. Summary and Operationalization for Case Studies

3.6.1. Summary

In this chapter, crucial for my argument was the clarification of the assertion that practical reasoning is important to examine the problems on how some actions become contingently authoritative in the face of competing alternative discourses. While such an assumption does not exclude other ways of understanding the emergence of authoritative action, it *does* show that examining the problem through practical reasoning has important methodological advantages. In particular, when agents try to settle practical matters in international relations, where deliberation plays the role it does, practical reasoning is a useful way to think about how political agents exercise their agency and intentionality to solve practical problems.

However, one of the traditional ways of understanding reasoning process in IR scholarship is to conceive it as instrumental means-end reasoning. After showing why means-end instrumentalism or skepticism of practical reason à la Hume is essentially mistaken, I set the stage for a principled understanding of practical reasoning in pragmatist terms. The resort to pragmatism was not arbitrary as it naturally follows from the recent advancements in critical constructivist scholarship in IR and the linguistic turn.¹⁰³

To take a fresh look at the practical reasoning for action requires one to have a sharp understanding of how pragmatists conceive of discursive practices. Drawing on analytical pragmatist work particularly the work of Brandom, Sellars, Levine, and Scharp, I elaborated the idea that discursive practices are deontic scorekeeping practices where agent's normative commitments and entitlements are at issue. The detailed elaboration of normative pragmatics,

¹⁰³ See Owen 2002; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009; Hellmann 2009.

inferential semantics, and deontic scorekeeping was meant to throw a fresh and illuminating look at discursive practices in international relations. This view already transcends the teleological and psychologicist explanation schemes of discursive practices preferred among reigning rational-choice advocates in IR theory for explaining behavior.

Figure 1.2 Map of the Analytical Framework of Pragmatic Practical Reasoning

No.	Conceptual Moves
1	Practical reasoning is important to examine how some actions become authoritative ¹⁰⁴
2	Practical Reasoning of traditional means-end instrumentalism is limited ¹⁰⁵
3.	Thus, we need a new conceptual perspective on practical reasoning ¹⁰⁶
4.	I take the Analytical Pragmatists route of understanding practical reasoning ¹⁰⁷
5.	Entails understanding how pragmatists conceive of discursive practices ¹⁰⁸
6.	Discursive practices are deontic - commitments and entitlements are at issue ¹⁰⁹
7.	Deontic scorekeepers keep scores on each other based on interaction-in-context ¹¹⁰
8.	Pragmatic practical reasoning occurs within this network of deontic scorekeeping space
9.	Pragmatic practical reasoning is inferential, justificatory, & intentional to scorekeepers ¹¹¹
10.	Different norm-type that underwrites interactions triggers different practical reasoning ¹¹²
11.	Some actions become authoritative through the deontic game of giving and asking for reasons

Within this deontic scorekeeping discursive practice, the issue of practical reasoning was taken with renewed rigor. I showed how practical reasoning is an intentional activity of seeking entitlement to practical commitment through rational justifications by engaging in the game of giving and asking for reasons in deontic scorekeeping space. Among the deontic scorekeepers, history, ideology, past practices, identity, customs, and conventions matter in how they keep

These are representative not exhaustive literature. For full account, see the Chapter details.

¹⁰⁴ Kratochwil 1989; Fernandez 2016.

¹⁰⁵ Korsgaard 1997.

¹⁰⁶ Brandom 1998; Fairclough and Fairclough 2011.

¹⁰⁷ Brandom 1994; Sellars, Scharp, and Brandom 2007; Scharp 2005; Levine 2012; Fossen 2014.

¹⁰⁸ Brandom 1994; Levine 2015.

¹⁰⁹ Brandom 1994; Brandom 2001.

¹¹⁰ On scorekeeping, Brandom 1994, 180–198; On language games Fierke 2002; On interaction-in-context Wiener 2014.

¹¹¹ Brandom 1998; Fernandez 2016.

¹¹² Brandom 1998, 134; Kratochwil 1989, 15.

scores on those agents engaged in practical reasoning. Thus, the emergence of an action is inherently a contentious and constructed process. However, one seeks entitlement to practical commitments only within and among the deontic scorekeepers and according to the norm-type, which underwrites interaction-in-context. The elaboration of practical inference, justificatory responsibility, and intentionality intended to show how we make sense of political agents engage in practical reasoning in the face of competing alternatives. The following discussion aims to make explicit the interpretivist research design for the upcoming empirical analysis.

3.6.2. Cases

To examine the pragmatic practical reasoning in a network of deontic scorekeeping space, the following chapters explore two cases of humanitarian military intervention action. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the case of India's military intervention action in East Pakistan in 1971. Chapters 6 and 7 examine the case of Brazil's military intervention action in Haiti in 2004. In the Introduction chapter, I already elaborated in sufficient detail the substantive and methodological reasons for the selection of these two cases therefore here I only offer brief sign points. At a substantive level, these two cases represent non-Western postcolonial states taking up the issue of the predominantly White-Western idea of humanitarian intervention with the explicit paternalistic meaning making of the crisis. At the methodological level, both India's and Brazil's actions in East Pakistan and Haiti respectively are "hard cases" for practical reasoning because material interests would appear to provide a ready explanation. Further, the cases exhibit striking variation both in the *explanans* and the *explanandum*. With an instrumental norm-type that underwrites interactions in the case of India in East Pakistan crisis and an institutional norm-type that underwrites interactions in the case of Brazil in the Haitian crisis we grasp the myriad processes involved in how military intervention became authoritative in the face of competing alternative discourses.

3.6.3. Research Method, Data, and Delimitations of Scorekeepers and Competing Discourses.

The empirical investigation relies on what Stefano Guzzini calls interpretivist process tracing and I discussed this method in detail in the Introduction chapter, thus here I will only again provide some sign points.¹¹³ Under interpretivist process tracing, the explanatory burden requires the analyst to open up the ‘black box’ of deliberation and interactions through double hermeneutics meaning-making processes. The scorekeepers and game players analyzed in the empirical cases do not go around with a scorecard in a well-run conversation; it is we, the theorists, in an attempt to understand what Indian and Brazilian policymakers are doing with their interlocutors keep a list of commitments and entitlements. As Kevin Scharp puts it, we are doing it in order to get a better understanding of what it is the participants are doing when they engage in the game of giving and asking reasons.¹¹⁴

The analytical criteria for the selection of scorekeepers and the multiple competing alternative discourses follow from the conceptual framework elaborated in this chapter. First, let us examine the criteria to delimit the scorekeepers in an actual empirical analysis of the cases. Based on the conceptual framework, different scorekeepers attain distinct importance under different types of normativity that underwrites interaction in the context in the deontic scorekeeping game. Thus, under the instrumental norm-type that underwrite interactions, the game players will treat some agents as “scorekeepers” whose claims they cannot avoid responding with impunity. In other words, under instrumental normativity the game player will treat interlocutors whom they cannot ignore in an interactional dynamics as important scorekeepers to whom reasons have to be

¹¹³ Guzzini 2012, 47; Also see Guzzini 2011. As mentioned previously, the work relies on recent advancements in interpretivist research methods and the work of Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006; Jackson 2006; Oren 2007; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012; and Lynch 2014 is very much relevant.

¹¹⁴ Scharp 2005, 211.

offered, claims elaborated, and crucially whose doxastic commitments must be reasoned towards change so as to bring about a practical solution to the problem. On the other hand, under the institutional norm-type that underwrites interactions, the game players will treat some agents as “scorekeepers” who hold the same social-institutional status and with work with intersubjective convergence to make moves in the game.¹¹⁵ In other words, under institutional normativity, the game player will treat interlocutors with whom they have established shared practices with specific intersubjective links as important scorekeepers to whom reasons have to be offered, claims elaborated, and crucially whose endorsements and testimony are important to bring about a practical commitment to the problem.

Similarly, the criteria to delimit the competing alternative discourses also follow from the analytical framework developed in the thesis. Based on the conceptual framework, different universe of alternative discourses attain distinct importance under different types of normativity that underwrites interaction-in-context in the deontic scorekeeping game. Thus, under the instrumental norm-type that underwrite interactions, the game players will face several incompatible and potentially divergent alternative discourses that come to life as it entrenched and reproduced in the political topography. In other words, under instrumental normativity, the game players will face several discourses where *revolutionary alternatives* come to the forefront. On the other hand, under the institutional normativity that underwrites interactions, the game players will face alternatives that are equally well entrenched in the political topography but not radically divergent against each other. In other words, under institutional normativity, the game players will face several discourses where *evolutionary alternatives* come to the forefront. These set of delimitations will help reduce the complexities in actual empirical analysis and focus on the

¹¹⁵ I will elaborate this delimitation of scorekeepers in Chapter 3 and in each empirical analyses. For preliminary details on my way of delimiting the scorekeepers see Brandom 1998, 134-135.

universe of scorekeepers and discourses that are contingent on the norm-type that underwrites interactions-in-context.

Where should we see evidence of practical reasoning of both India and Brazil? For each of the cases here, data was collected over a defined historical period. For the case of India and Brazil, the Chapters (4 & 6) that deals with the competing alternative discourses on humanitarian crisis abroad rely on secondary historical literature based on recently declassified historical accounts of the events. It relies on a post-colonial historiography to map how multiple discourses consolidated and reproduced over time. Further, Chapters (5 & 7) that deal with how military intervention became contingently authoritative in the face of competing alternative discourses relies on both on primary and secondary resources. In the India case, I engage with Parliamentary debates from the Upper and Lower houses, Prime Minister's statements and debates in the Parliament, publicly presented press reports, statements made in the UN and triangulate these claims through some officially declassified documents. Similarly, in the Brazil case, I engage with Congressional debates, Presidential statements, reports made at the Organization of American States (OAS), media reports, and triangulate these claims on officially published documents by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty).

From these multiple sources, it is only necessary to look and see the game of giving and asking for reasons. If reasons, justifications, and claim making did not play any role and if the administrations in both India and Brazil was not preoccupied with how their intervention was portrayed as with the actual intervention itself then my argument will be "falsified." In keeping with the analytical framework, the reader will have to judge from my chapters – particularly 5 and 7 – whether I have elaborated the practical reasoning of India and Brazil in sufficient detail.

In order to provide a robust explanation, I have to show three things. First, that the military intervention action was not preordained and the administration engaged in the game of giving and asking for reasons and held several interlocutors accountable to their normative commitments and entitlements. Second, particular norm-type underwrite interactional situation and the change in India's and Brazil's policy towards intervention contingently relates with the game of giving and asking for reasons and the deontic scores held by other scorekeepers. The account based on deontic practical reasoning should shed light on important processes and mechanisms than alternative explanations based on material factors, or mere securitization, rhetorical coercion, and ontological security. Thus, even if the outcome is predicted by other explanations the process of arriving it through practical reasoning makes all the difference – after all, anyone who sees a dead body must be concerned whether it was a manslaughter, suicide, or death by hit-and-run in a highway traffic. One cannot merely say the outcome is the same and thus the processes do not matter.

3.6.4. Roadmap to empirical chapters

This thesis devotes four empirical chapters to understanding humanitarian military intervention action in India and Brazil. The historical background chapters for these cases – Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 – show the multiple competing alternative discourses and argue that humanitarian military intervention is not in any way an inevitable or preordained option for the policymakers. After this, I apply the analytical framework of pragmatic practical reasoning to the cases to understand how among these competing alternative discourses the humanitarian military intervention action became contingently authoritative. Chapter 5 specifically take up the question of how among these competing alternative discourses the Indira Gandhi administration, in the wake of the serious humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan in 1971, settled on humanitarian military intervention action. Similarly, Chapter 7 specifically takes up the question of how among these

competing alternative discourses the Lula administration, in the wake of the serious humanitarian crisis in Haiti in 2004, settled on humanitarian military intervention action.

Each of these chapters analytically foregrounds the idea that military intervention was not inevitable and pragmatic practical reasoning in deontic scorekeeping network was every bit relevant for wrestling one action as authoritative in the face of competing alternative discourses. In the conclusion, I revisit the implication of this thesis upon critical-constructivist IR and the general pragmatic wave that sweeps the IR theoretical terrain. Here I show the importance of analytical pragmatist account, the deontic rules and language-based mechanisms of political influence and its relevance for international politics. I also show the limitations of the study and avenues for further research.

4: India and the Universal Humanity: Competing Discourses on Humanitarianism (ca. 1900-1970)

4.1. Introduction

In these next four chapters, I turn to case studies and practical application of the analytical framework developed in the previous chapter. My first case concerns India's humanitarian military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 and is today an independent Bangladesh; the applicability of the framework of practical reasoning in deontic scorekeeping space in explaining India's action in the face of multiple competing alternative discourses. This chapter provides a historical overview that enables us to understand the alternative discourses available for Indian policymakers on managing humanitarian crisis abroad. In doing so it brings to the fore those competing alternatives which, in the early 1970s, Indian political elites faced against the burgeoning humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan.

Specifically, by early 1970s four discourses served as important alternatives for Indian policymakers concerned with humanitarian crisis abroad: diplomatic criticism against states engaged in mass atrocity crimes, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, rebel support for fighting the humanitarian crisis and, enlisting the support of Great Powers. In keeping with the analytical framework of this thesis and the warranted expectations on the revolutionary alternative discourses that come to the forefront under instrumental normativity that underwrites interactions, these four alternative discourses competing for dominance for Indian policy makers does find some corroboration. Considering the abundance of other discourses on humanitarianism in India, and, in a more abstract sense, discourses on India's diplomatic responsibility abroad, these four alternatives elaborated in this chapter are not necessarily exhaustive. Yet these discourses persisted and reproduced over time with elaborate

institutional structures that by 1970s Indian policymakers could not ignore these while considering a policy for addressing humanitarian crises abroad.

This chapter has two main sections. In the first section, I provide a brief chronological overview of India's engagement with the issue of humanitarianism. Given the colonial origins of India's foreign policy making and the Indian freedom movement that stood for the oppressed and downtrodden people against imperialism, the natural starting point is the early twentieth century that is roughly three decades before India became independent from the yolk of British Empire. It was during this time that India gained a quasi-international status¹ and Indian nationalists engaged in several political and civil society debates in the struggle for Independence thereby triggering important discursive formations on humanitarianism that endured over time. In a way, this chronological account responds to a recent claim by Skinner and Lester on examining the links between anti-colonial resistance and humanitarian impulse.² Unsurprisingly, the links are diverse as much as competing and contested. Thus, in the second section, in keeping with the analytical framework of this thesis, I dissect four competing discourses on addressing humanitarian crises abroad and subject it to critical analysis. With the enumeration of these alternatives and competing discourses on managing humanitarian crisis abroad, my objective is to show that the situation faced by Indian policymakers in the early 1970s was by no means inevitable, and alternative worlds could have emerged.

A brief note on historiography is important at this point. Much of what follows – at least indirectly and without wanting to claim comprehensiveness or completeness – is situated within the scholarship on postcolonial studies and revisionist writings of India's diplomatic history.

¹ See Poulouse 1970; Thakur 2014, 59.

² Skinner and Lester 2012, 739.

Postcolonial historiography aims to critique and transcend the structures supportive of Western colonialism and its legacies.³ In IR, Itty Abraham puts this strand of scholarship very well, it is “very much about the travails of these new states entering an international order where the rules were already established and the reception from established states was less than warm and welcoming.”⁴ Yet, it also shows how Indians exercised certain autonomy on issues affecting international order that set into motion distinct discourses with important continuities and changes between colonial and postcolonial ways of thinking and acting across foreign policy domains.

4.2. Humanitarianism and India: A Chronological Sketch

From the mid-nineteenth century onward, references to India’s responsibility for the oppressed and downtrodden struggling against the forces of colonialism and imperialism surface in the emerging Indian public sphere.⁵ From the beginning of the twentieth century, these slowly engage with and against the ideas of what Michael Barnett calls “The Age of Imperial Humanitarianism” and later with “Neo-Humanitarianism.”⁶ That the high noon of colonialism⁷ from 1858 systematically “impoverished” India did not stop the newly assertive Indian nationalists of different strands and affiliations in the early twentieth century from creating more tangible networks and initiatives on humanitarianism.⁸ Importantly, these initiatives, ranging from the fairly rudimentary invocation of India’s links with “universal humanity” to highly articulate political projects based on Universal human rights, cut across the full spectrum of political debates in the subcontinent.⁹ Let us see the chronological overview of India’s political

³ Go 2012.

⁴ Abraham 2014, xv.

⁵ See Baruwā 2004; Abraham 2014; Fischer-Tiné 2007.

⁶ See Barnett 2011.

⁷ The idea of high noon of colonialism is from Bose and Jalal 2011, 78–85.

⁸ On the impoverishment of India, the classical text during this period is Naoroji, 1962.

⁹ See specifically Bhagavan 2012.

engagement with humanitarian projects before understanding the emergence, consolidation, and reproduction of four distinct discourses on addressing humanitarian crises abroad.

4.2.1. Early Humanitarianism: Setting the Stage (1858-1919)

The imagining of a unified Indian nation in the critique of colonialism was the first step towards forging a political project on humanitarianism and transnational solidarity.¹⁰ In other words, there is a close link between Indian thinkers' anti-colonial claims for sovereignty, territory, and a unified Indian nation and the emergence of political humanitarianism projects.¹¹ It is an early humanitarian impulse in the sense that the focus was neither exclusively on what Barnett calls 'alchemical' or progressive humanitarianism aimed at removing the causes of suffering nor 'emergency' humanitarianism of providing relief only in times of particular crisis.¹² Instead, the animating ideas were concerned with constructing the "Indian nation" during this period by establishing a rudimentary yet conscious link with universal humanity.

Early modern Indian nationalist struggle witnessed an ascending idea of the autonomous national-self that needed Independence from the British Empire, which in turn, gave rise to a concern with universal humanity to delimit this national-self. On the nationalist imaginings of India as spatially delimited national economic space, India's middle-class intelligentsia, most notably Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), Romesh Chunder Dutt (1848-1909) and Mahadev Govind Ranade (1842-1901) pointed out the impoverishment of the Indian nation as a

¹⁰ This is not to say that there was no idea of cosmopolitanism or compassion before the nationalist politics. The notion of *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam* (The world is one family) is present in Indian philosophy particularly in The Upanishads since the 6th B.C. and the Mahayana and Hirayana schools within Buddhist philosophy is concerned with humanity and compassion in more encompassing terms. However, the political manifestation of these religious discourses arose in the wake of modern nationalism of the mid nineteenth-century.

¹¹ See Framke 2016, 64; Abraham 2014.

¹² Barnett 2011, 19–46.

dependent colonial economy and demanded *Swaraj* (self-rule, independence).¹³ This period gave rise to a concern with universal humanity in order to claim equal development opportunity for both the colonizer and the colonized. Indian anti-colonialists also sought an absolute space of economic sovereignty to realize this goal of universal humanity. According to Manu Goswami, “The demand for an autonomous national state that would fulfill the universally legitimate promise of development was made by the Indian National Congress on the basis of ‘a universal humanity’ and the concrete existence of a territorially delimited common economic collective.”¹⁴

Indian nationalists did not yet wrestle a distinct political project on humanitarianism. Mohandas Gandhi who was working as a lawyer in South Africa formed an Indian Ambulance Corps for assisting wounded soldiers in an 1899 war between Britain and the two Boer republics, Transvaal and Orange Free State.¹⁵ He also engaged in extensive humanitarian initiatives in the form an Indian Field Ambulance Training Corps to assist Indian victims in Europe in the First World War.¹⁶ Further, the British Red Cross Society and Indian St John Ambulance provided help to prisoners of war.¹⁷ These initiatives, important as they are, did not have any radical political significance until anti-colonial nationalists weaved a political project around humanitarianism in the interwar years.

4.2.2. Humanitarianism for Anti-Colonialism (1920-1945)

Specifically, India’s anti-colonial nationalists in the inter-war years were formulating their ideas against the backdrop of Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the seminal catastrophe of the First World War that radically challenged the popular discourse on

¹³ See Goswami 1998.

¹⁴ Ibid., 629.

¹⁵ Framke 2016, 64.

¹⁶ Ibid., 65.

¹⁷ Framke 2016.

Western Civilization as one that represents highest goals of humanity¹⁸ and colonialism that has to do with benevolent compassion.¹⁹ This along with the emergence of Wilsonian self-determination moment²⁰ and new international linkages in the network of humanitarianism and Left solidarity gave rise to, as we shall see, a distinct understanding of humanitarianism as a political project to convey India's status and morality in the international community.

Arguably, the first important platform for transnational solidarity was the World Congress of Oppressed Peoples held in 1927 in Brussels, which founded the League Against Imperialism. Jawaharlal Nehru represented the Indian National Congress at Brussels where he encountered anti-imperialists all over from Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. It offered a unique forum for representatives of anti-imperialism to understand and empathize with each other's struggles. At the same time, it was a space for new international linkages in the network of Left solidarity. Nehru enthusiastically subscribed to the Marxist ideas in the League that aimed to "lead the struggle against capitalism, imperialist rule, in support of national self-determination and independence for every people."²¹ The commonality of anti-imperial struggles enabled Nehru to translate sympathy into action by supporting nationalist movements and calling for the removal of the causes of suffering. It also enabled him to construct a unity of Indian nation against imperialism and seek independence from the British raj without qualifications. Although, Nehru would not abandon his conciliatory dealings with the British in 1928-1929 and the Communists of the League expelled him;²² still, the transnational linkages that emerged from the League held strong for fashioning a political project on the Indian nation against imperialism.

¹⁸ Duara 2001.

¹⁹ On benevolence and compassion see Barnett 2011, 60.

²⁰ Manela 2007.

²¹ Words of Munzeberg quoted in Petersson 2014, 50.

²² Power 1964, 265.

The stance of Nehru and some other members of the Indian National Congress on the humanitarian assistance to Spanish Civil War in 1936-1939 further brought out into open the political dimension of these anti-colonial nationalists' humanitarian projects. As Maria Framke shows, some Indian nationalists extended their modest humanitarian aid and support to the cause of Spanish Republic. "In doing this as well as by organising a Spain Day in different Indian cities in August 1936, the Congress Socialists took a pioneering stance in displaying their solidarity with the Spanish Republic. Furthermore, the newly established foreign department exchanged information about the conflict with international organisations, such as the World Committee against War and Fascism."²³ These humanitarian causes intertwined with nationalist ambitions as well.²⁴ As Nehru put it in a press statement in November 1938:

By sending food to Spain we help indirectly our own cause and enhance the prestige and position of India in the world. By the help we have sent to [...] Spain we have compelled the attention of the world and made it clear that our sympathies and policy are not those of the British Government. [...] Thus not only for humanitarian reasons but for considerations of self-interest and the growing international status of India, we have to help the Spanish people with food.²⁵

Other instances of even unsuccessful humanitarian projects still carried a clear political message on Indian nationhood and its quest to identify with anti-imperialist struggles. Thus, in 1927 Indian National Congress condemned the British use of Indian troops in the Chinese nationalist revolution and decided to send an ambulance corps to China.²⁶ The British raj refused to grant the necessary passport fearing that the "Indian medical mission would serve political purposes by being used as a demonstration against the British policy in China."²⁷ Similarly, Indian National Congress aligned with Abyssinia in the Italian-Abyssinian war 1935 and expressed its solidarity with its African brethren in distress.²⁸ Nothing much materially came out of these solidarity

²³ Framke 2016, 67.

²⁴ Framke 2016.

²⁵ Ibid., 71.

²⁶ Prasad 1962, 73–74.

²⁷ Keenleyside 1966, 319.

²⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Observance of Abyssinia Day – Statement to the Press, May 05, 1936,' referred in Framke 2016.

claims. However, the idea that only if there is a coherent national self any imagining of humanitarianism outside the national body politic is possible became deep rooted.

It was precisely in challenging this nation-state boundary making practices to express solidarity and humanitarianism that Mahatma Gandhi made his quite momentous contribution in India.²⁹ Since it was part of Mahatma's extraordinary political genius that he identified the suffering *body* of the colonized in need of justice and exposed that colonizers can be from within the political realm as much as from outside the constructed boundaries. Thus, his non-violent fight against the practices of untouchability in India, his support for Hindu-Muslim unity in the face of fractious political struggle and his challenge to utilitarian ideas of liberal democracy is humanitarianism in a non-traditional sense that he put the suffering human body at the center of politics. As Sean Scalmer puts it:

For the [traditional] humanitarian, the suffering colonial was defined by weakness and passivity: they were the playthings of forces beyond their control. For Gandhi, those who *voluntarily* suffered were defined by force of will, bravery, and strength, as well as love. This was 'Soul-Force' and 'Truth-Force,' to use two of Gandhi's favoured descriptors. Humanitarian politics reacted to suffering with the provision of limited aid, not the restructuring of power relations. By contrast, Gandhi believed that the willing sufferer had the capacity to transform the evildoer and thereby to elicit genuine transformation. Suffering, according to this view, contained a capacity much more 'potent' than 'physical strength.'³⁰

In this way, the Gandhi found no contradiction in extending his support to the Indian Khilafat movement that aimed to save the crumbling Islamic ummah after Balkan Wars of 1912-13. In the age of imperial humanitarianism, Gandhi's justification for India's non-violent humanitarian intervention, if you like, is especially noteworthy. He wrote:

Let Hindus not be frightened by Pan-Islamism. It is not – it need not be – anti-Indian or anti-Hindu. Mussalmans must wish well to every Mussalman state, and even assist any such state, if it is undeservedly in peril. And Hindus, if they are true friends of Mussalmans, cannot but share the latter's feelings. We must,

²⁹ Brown 1989; Parekh 1989.

³⁰ Scalmer 2016. Para 7

therefore, cooperate with our Mussalman brethren in their attempt to save the Turkish empire in Europe from extinction.³¹

In the wake of a widening rift between Hindus and Muslims with a series of communal violence that culminated in the gory partition of the Indian subcontinent, Gandhi's non-violent humanitarianism found its lowest ebb. However, now Nehru as Mahatma's apprentice would briefly take up a project of 'world federation' and offer a political call for the interdependence of 'universal humanity' in what Barnett calls the age of neo-humanitarianism (1945-1989).

4.2.3. Nehruvian Ideals and High Tide of Humanitarianism 1947-1970

The Second World War brought to fore series of problems in the hitherto taken for granted assumptions since the end of the First World War in the organization of the humanitarian order. The League of Nations paternalistically claimed that the colonial powers will have a "sacred trust" to prepare the colonial people for independence but could not prevent the rise of fascism and Nazism. Wilson's principle of self-determination transformed the norms of international relations by establishing nation-state as the only legitimate political form throughout the globe,³² but it gave rise to boundary-making actions that divided majorities and minorities.³³ As Itty Abraham put it, "'Majority' nation-state insecurity based on the fear of minority irredentism thus also became a consequence of the norm of national self-determination, due to the prevailing practice of territorial overinscription [*sic*]."³⁴ Yet, states disregarded the international refugee regime and Jews and other persecuted population that tried to flee Nazi Germany had nowhere to run.³⁵ The anti-imperial solidarity among Afro-Asian and Latin American leaders veered into

³¹ Quoted in Bose and Jalal 2011, 113.

³² Manela 2007, 5.

³³ Abraham 2014.

³⁴ Ibid., 52.

³⁵ Barnett 2011, 101.

debating societies, Japan turned into intra-Asian colonial power while the League Against Imperialism ceased to function by 1929.

It is in these profoundly uncertain times, when discussions of “international community” were in the offing, that Nehru offered an ambitious proposal of “a world federation” based on respect for individual rights and freedom.³⁶ As Manu Bhagavan brilliantly shows, it was on the issue of human rights regime within the UN that Nehru placed the hope of solidarity: “Nehru saw in the UN, and specifically the HRC [Human Rights Commission], the possibility of a progressive global body whose reach would supersede that of sovereign nation-states.”³⁷ Nehru expressed this starkly:

[T]he Human Rights Commission is meeting Our representatives are there. The conception today is that there are common individual rights which should be guaranteed all the world over What is the U.N.O.? It is developing into a world republic in which all States, independent States, are represented and to which they may be answerable on occasions, for instance South Africa over the South Africa Indians’ question, even though this was a domestic question because Indians are South African citizens.³⁸

The reference to South African Indians’ question is important because, under the leadership of Prime Minister Smuts, the South African state passed the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act that segregated Indian community in South Africa and denied them basic rights and privileges. In the very first session of the UN in 1946, Nehru’s sister Madame Vijaya Laxmi Pandit acting as Indian head of the UN delegation raised the issue of Indians in South Africa, with few compunctions about interfering in the internal affairs of another country. She appealed to the issue of human rights, won a two-thirds majority on the South African question, and thereby rejected South Africa’s contention that the matter was within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa. Although India’s victory did not mean much in the face of the

³⁶ On the role of international community in general see Ignatieff 2001; On India specifically see Rao 1941, 843.

³⁷ Bhagavan 2010, 328. He quoted Nehru saying, “We have to put an end of the national state [sic] and devise a collectivism which neither degrades nor enslaves.”

³⁸ Bhagavan 2010 Emphasis removed.

larger development of South African apartheid, placing the suffering human body at the center of the humanitarian project became a new tool in India's foreign policy. In other words, by placing human rights at the center of a solidarist vision of the "One World," many Indian nationalists aimed to live to the ideals that Mahatma so strongly advocated and gave humanitarian thought in India a completely new direction. Of course, contestations were not eliminated and the next part of this chapter deals with multiple competing discourses on humanitarianism in more detail.

Crucially, India's engagement with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) presents the rise and fall of solidarist humanitarianism. In the first two decades after the end of the Second World War, Indian leaders spearheaded the solidarity discourse with Afro-Asian states with a view to remaining outside superpower blocks and using their collective power to shape outcomes at the United Nations.³⁹ In a famous joint statement in June 1954, India and China endorsed the principles of peaceful coexistence, known as the Panchsheel Agreement. Further, the new Afro-Asian solidarity discourse⁴⁰ primarily in Bandung Conference in 1955, aimed at transcending civilizational worldview and placed the suffering human body at the center of the emerging transnational solidarist order.⁴¹ Clearly, Asia and Africa was the focus of superpower contestation and there was a need for concerted action. After all, the emancipation of Afro-Asian brethren was a humanitarian quest in the broadest sense.

³⁹ Abraham 2008, 211.

⁴⁰ Already in March 1947, Indian nationalists under the leadership of Nehru and boycotted by the Muslim League organized the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi bringing together 200 delegates representing some 28 Asian countries. It was a civilizational discourse aimed towards Asian cooperation and replete with sentiments of Asian unity, Asian brother-hood, and common bonds between Asia's past and present. See Stolte 2014.

⁴¹ Asian Relations Conference 1948.

However, those at the Afro-Asian conferences were meeting against the backdrop of an emerging superpower competition, which changed the meaning of humanitarianism through a geopolitical discourse. As Barnett shows, powerful states were integrating humanitarianism into their foreign policies, “erasing the distinction between themselves and aid agencies.”⁴² Thus, mutual obligations and moral responsibilities based on transnational solidarity clashed with immediate national interest and securing humanitarian aid for uplifting their population. Pakistan joined the newly formed Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) promoted by the United States for the containment of Soviet Union. China waged a successful war against India in 1962 and fundamentally changed the solidarity dimension between these Asian powers. Other members of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) opposed Soviet and Chinese imperialism but were also afraid of Indian hegemony in South and Southeast Asia. Further, well before the Belgrade Conference of non-alignment in 1961, Nehru earned a bad reputation by criticizing British and French aggression causing the Suez Crisis but remaining reticent in the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956. Therefore, the lines had been drawn and humanitarianism and transnational solidarity suffered at the altar of geopolitics and immediate national interest.

In spite of the increasing superpower contestation and the dilemma of Indian leaders, the link between Afro-Asian solidarity, human rights, and humanitarianism, found impetus in India’s reaction to the growing crisis in Southern Rhodesia in 1966. After Nehru’s death, this time, his daughter and the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi spoke against the racist regime in Rhodesia. With few compunctions on interfering in the internal affairs of other states, Indira Gandhi urged Britain, the colonial power, to wage war against the “illegal racist minority regime.”⁴³ Eventually, this spirit of humanitarianism having swept the Indian leaders during the interwar period and immediately after India’s independence found expression in Indira Gandhi’s

⁴² Barnett 2011, 124.

⁴³ See Bass 2015, 247.

rhetorical action. India aspired to take a leading part in this humanitarian spirit of newly developing states and made important strides in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and in the idea of New International Economic Order (NIEO).

4.3. Humanitarianism and India: Competing Discourses

Having presented this brief chronological outline of the development of the humanitarian project in India until the early 1970s, I now turn to explore four competing discourses in India on humanitarianism in more detail. In keeping with the analytical framework and different patterns of alternatives discourse that come to the forefront under the instrumental normativity, we should expect some revolutionary alternative discourses for the Indian policymakers. Thus, I analytically show diplomatic criticism against humanitarian crisis abroad, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, rebel support to a humanitarian crisis, and enlisting the support of Great Powers as four important competing alternative discourses in India for addressing serious humanitarian crisis and mass atrocities abroad. Corroborating the warranted expectations from the analytical framework, the discourse on providing rebel support to Bengali self-determination movements and enlisting the support of Great Powers as a non-aligned country, are not common conventions for the Indian policymakers to deal with the crisis in the neighborhood. These competing alternative discourses (should) challenge any teleological assumptions towards understanding Indian ways of addressing mass atrocities abroad. Crucially, it also shows the alternative paths present for policymakers and that any one choice is not inevitable. These four discourses are not exhaustive but sufficiently in-depth, which developed in the subcontinent in the tumultuous years between 1919 and 1970, and all have an important influence on the policymakers.

4.3.1. Diplomatic Criticism Against Humanitarian Crisis Abroad

In the history of India's engagement with humanitarian crisis abroad, particularly between 1919 and 1970, diplomatic criticism of political actors engaged in mass atrocities registers as an important discourse to put pressure on the aggressor and for upholding morally valuable international conduct. Diplomatic criticism was dominant in the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles of the interwar years and reproduced in the post-War period, particularly through the NAM, to position India's moral superiority on the international stage despite its relatively weak material capabilities. It was part of the larger tradition of India's resistance to imperialism and colonialism, which centered on the twin concept of cosmopolitanism and willingness to bear the burden of "fighting" for the oppressed and the downtrodden in the unequal international system.

Although one cannot provide a precise definition of diplomatic criticism, it is part of naming and shaming the perpetrators of mass atrocities, challenging their reputation, legitimacy, and international standing in such way that it stops the aggression or opens the avenue for further actions such as military intervention or economic sanctions.⁴⁴ According to James Pattison, "if we accept that states care about the loss of legitimacy, and that diplomatic criticism is important for leading to such a loss, states will sometimes be keen to redress the situation at hand in response to diplomatic criticism, or under the threat of such criticism."⁴⁵ He presents three important reasons for engaging in diplomatic criticism of mass atrocities abroad: one is its efficacy. Diplomatic criticism puts pressure on the aggressor and in a very cost-effective manner sometimes, it leads to change in certain states' behavior. Two, by publicly criticizing others, states

⁴⁴ Pattison 2015.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 938.

reinforce certain morally valuable international norms and laws and show that one is not complicit in such mass atrocity crimes. Finally, diplomatic criticism can punish the aggressor state by explicitly rejecting their policies in the global public sphere and undermine their reputation through international opprobrium.⁴⁶ Indian anti-colonial leaders within the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League employed diplomatic criticism for their own specific agendas on humanitarian crisis abroad, as did Gandhi.

We can understand the functioning of the discourse of diplomatic criticism against humanitarian crisis abroad by examining India's engagement with two cases – South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. First, in the situation of colored people in South Africa, Jan Smuts, the South African premier and architect of white settler nationalism, had an uneasy relationship with Gandhi in the early twentieth century in the latter struggle for the rights of South African Indians. Gandhi criticized the treatment of Indians in South Africa and engaged in civil disobedience campaigns.⁴⁷ It led to the Indian Relief Act of 1914 that abolished a Natal head tax of £ 3 on non-indentured Indians, removed the term 'Asiatic' from immigration laws, accepted the principle of voluntary registration, legitimized marriage according to non-Christian rites, and allowed some educated Indian to enter South Africa.⁴⁸ However, when Gandhi left South Africa, the government passed series of anti-Indian legislations again in 1919, 1923, 1924, and in the later years. It led to virulent criticisms against South Africa by several Indian anti-colonial nationalists.

The diplomatic criticism against Jan Smuts by Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit in the first session of UN in 1946, as briefly mentioned in the above section, is noteworthy both for its demanding from of cosmopolitanism as well as the specific way in which it reproduced in India's concern

⁴⁶ Ibid., 937–941.

⁴⁷ See du Toit 1996.

⁴⁸ All details from Power 1969.

with human rights violation abroad. Pandit criticized South Africa for its treatment of Indian minority and the UN General Assembly backed India's demands and forced South Africa to justify its policies.⁴⁹ Clearly, through diplomatic criticism, India even before formal independence, exerted an influence that is much greater than its material capabilities. "Pandit especially targeted Britain's attorney general by pointing out that only a very clever, unscrupulous lawyer could prosecute Nazis at Nuremberg one day and come here and defend Nazi method the next."⁵⁰ India won a moral victory in the UN through diplomatic criticism. However, as Jan Smuts had reportedly told Pandit "you have won a hollow victory. This vote will put me out of power in our next elections but you will have gained nothing."⁵¹

Certainly, the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act that led to racist atrocities against Indians turned into apartheid but India's diplomatic criticism, at least for a while, repudiated South Africa's reputation, reinforced the norm of equality, and rightfully interfered in the internal affairs of other countries for humanitarian reasons. Mark Mazower puts the effect of India's criticism in a very sharp manner:

The General Assembly's support of the Indian delegation shocked the South Africans and suggested that the new world organization contained within it – however embryonically – the potential to become a very different organization from that envisaged by the wartime great powers...Neither the Americans nor the British had wanted any criticism of the South Africans; nonetheless, caught between competing international constituencies, they were unable to prevent it.⁵²

Diplomatic criticism reproduced itself in a number of ways particularly through the NAM and its anti-colonial calls and Indira Gandhi was highly receptive to such a discourse, which heralded India's fierce engagement in the international system. Jawaharlal Nehru endorsed a military intervention to overthrow Colonial Portuguese in Goa in 1961⁵³ and the fierce diplomatic

⁴⁹ Mazower 2013, 25.

⁵⁰ Ankit 2015, 582.

⁵¹ Pandit 1979, 211.

⁵² Mazower 2013, 26.

⁵³ The Portuguese were ruling small enclaves of Goa, Daman and Diu in the Indian subcontinent from 1510 to 1961.

criticism against Portugal's colonial rule in Angola, Mozambique, and in what was called Portuguese Guinea and challenged the legitimacy of Portugal in the international system. Indira Gandhi took over this anti-colonial stance for engaging in diplomatic criticism of human rights violations by colonial powers. As Richard Fontera shows, "The records of the [UN] Assembly sessions are filled with India's criticism of colonial rule and her insistence that the UN take a more active role in promoting the peaceful transfer of power in the colonies."⁵⁴

Secondly, India's diplomatic criticism in the humanitarian crisis in Southern Rhodesia in 1966 is especially noteworthy to understand the reproduction of the discourse on diplomatic criticism. By publicly criticizing the white-supremacist regime in Southern Rhodesia, Indira Gandhi upheld its position on the human rights norms but also sought active support for rebels fighting against white supremacy. Gary Bass puts India's position very eloquently:

India wanted every state to break off all political and economic ties to Southern Rhodesia, and urged international backing for the rebels fighting against white supremacy. In 1968, the Indian government promoted a draft Security Council resolution condemning the execution of prisoners as a "threat to international peace and security" – the well-known Chapter VII standard for involving the Security Council – and urged a reluctant Britain "to take urgently all necessary measures including the use of force." In March 1968, when Southern Rhodesia executed three people, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had India's Parliament stand for a minute of silence for them as martyrs, declaring, "The illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia has committed a grave and heinous crime against humanity." She bluntly added that Indian supported "helping the freedom fighters militarily."⁵⁵

In response to such diplomatic criticism from India and many other anti-colonial states, the UNSC acting under Chapter VII condemned the "illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia." It also reaffirmed the primary responsibility of UK to "enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right to self-determination," and more importantly condemned "political repression, including arrests, detentions, trails, and executions, which violate fundamental freedoms and rights of the

⁵⁴ Fontera 1960, 430.

⁵⁵ Bass 2015, 247.

people of Southern Rhodesia.”⁵⁶ Clearly, it was a diplomatic victory for India even when South Africa and Portugal were continuing their support for Southern Rhodesia.

By early 1970s, diplomatic criticism of humanitarian crisis and mass atrocities abroad was well entrenched in India and indeed it was the best alternative for this less materially capable state, which aimed to secure a moral high ground in the international system. Achieving results through diplomatic criticism is often less costly and morally uplifting, which resonated very strongly with Indian leaders. Further, by mobilizing the international community for humanitarian action, it was an important alternative policy discourse for India compared to war. In addition, diplomatic criticism against mass atrocities also upheld India’s cosmopolitan spirit and as the illustrations against South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia showed, it aimed to transcend the parochial India-Pakistan or Sino-Indian rivalries.

4.3.2. Non-Intervention

In the history of India’s engagement with humanitarian crisis abroad, another important discourse is the non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. It was dominant in the post-independence period where some Indian elites aimed to safeguard their hard-won freedom and not let externally defined criteria of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as yardsticks for any neo-imperialist endeavors. Again, it was part of the larger Indian tradition, which emphasizes moral persuasion and peaceful solution to international problems, including to humanitarian crisis abroad, through methods of negotiations and conciliation rather than resort to the use of force or “paternally” interfere in another state’s internal affairs.

⁵⁶ UNSC Resolution 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970

To understand the emergence, consolidation, and reproduction of the discourse on non-intervention we have to examine the central political debates in India on three issue areas: the construction of sovereignty as authority, the geopolitical necessity of maintaining ties with Communist China, and Indian policy on UN peacekeeping missions abroad. It is through the engagement with these issues that the discourse on non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states even in the face of mass atrocity crimes became firmly entrenched in India.

By the end of the 1920s, an influential Asian-discourse spearheaded by members of the *Greater India Society* established India as the “bringer of civilization” to Southeast Asia.⁵⁷ It was based on a radical idea that an oriental-federation of states was feasible to challenge the Western Civilization because Indian imperialism in the past had only uplifted these colonized areas. To put it in today’s parlance, it was the view that India had a sovereign responsibility for citizens abroad where its culture has found immense influence, particularly in Southeast Asia. As Stolte and Fischer-Tiné show, the idea of Greater India “was especially popular with the supporters of Hindu nationalist parties and organizations. The Hindu Mahasabha party, for instance, took up the rhetoric of an Indian civilizing mission and decided at its 1932 meeting to send Indian cultural delegations to neighboring countries, to ‘relive the feeling of the fundamental unity of Asia.’”⁵⁸ Similarly, as early as 1918, Ismaili Muslims under the leadership of Aga Khan III proposed the creation of South and West-Asian Union given that India had strong ties with the Muslim world too.⁵⁹

The precise manner in which Indian elites refused to identify with the idea of *Greater India* or Pan-Islamic West-Asian union firmly established the conception of Indian sovereignty authority

⁵⁷ Nag 1926; Stolte and Fischer-Tiné 2012, 82.

⁵⁸ Stolte and Fischer-Tiné 2012, 84–85.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 72; Also see Aydin 2007.

and arguably initiated the first step towards non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Although the idea of *Greater India* was compatible with the radical Indian nationalist agenda, it also created immense insecurities among small states in the region. Specifically Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Malay witnessed anti-Indian attitudes and pogroms against Indians living in these countries.⁶⁰ In contrast to the racist human rights violations in South Africa, the atrocities against Indians in Southeast Asia arose largely through the own making of Indians' paternalist attitude thereby triggering fears of Indian "civilizing" missions in the region. Similarly, ideas of Pan-Islamism and notions of India's responsibility for Muslims abroad created a distinct religious fervor, which threatened the construction of secular India. Thus, pragmatically Nehru "emphasized the need for overseas Indians to identify themselves with the people and countries in which they had settled."⁶¹ It was reinforced in the Asian Relations Conference 1946 and Bandung Conference in 1955⁶² with a firm articulation of India's responsibility to its own citizens through disowning responsibility to its diaspora or engaging in civilizing missions abroad. In making the same point, but not in terms of the principle of non-intervention, Itty Abraham offers a sharp assessment:

An independent India led by Indians finally unconstrained from defining its own national interests was now publicly distancing itself from its longstanding concerns over the condition of its diaspora. Faced with the anxieties expressed by delegates to the Asian Relations Conference and seeking to establish friendly ties with them, India would reterritorialize itself unambiguously. By turning away from its diaspora, India's national boundaries were being redrawn to exclude any Indians who did not already live within its new territorial borders. Territorial identity now emphatically trumped national identity.⁶³

The second step in the consolidation of the discourse on non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states emerged in India's engagement with Pakistan and China. In the wake of the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the princely states of Kashmir, Junagarh, and Hyderabad could not decide whether to accede to the new dominion of India or Pakistan.

⁶⁰ Keenleyside 1966, 327–331.

⁶¹ Ibid., 313.

⁶² See specifically Acharya 2008.

⁶³ Abraham 2014, 70.

Kashmir specifically was an important issue of contestation, although the Kashmir ruler Maharaja Hari Singh approved Kashmir's accession to India, debates on the terms of accession persisted. These issues are well known and I will not restate them here.⁶⁴ However, the important point is that a large number of tribesmen invaded Kashmir from Pakistan's North-West Frontier and a bloody war ensued between the newly independent India and Pakistan. Crucially, on January 1, 1948, India invoked Article 35 of the UN Charter, lodged a complaint against Pakistan's aggression against India. Pakistan, in turn, filed countercharges against the Government of India on January 15, 1948. Among other things, it specifically charged India as engaged in "extensive campaign of genocide" in Kashmir.⁶⁵ The UN temporarily halted the conflict in 1949 by calling for a ceasefire. However, the lines were already drawn and India and Pakistan were drawn into a bloody geopolitical rivalry and the discourse on non-intervention enabled India to prevent Kashmir issue become a bone of contention in the Cold War competition of superpowers

Non-intervention discourse also stabilized in the pattern of India's engagement with China against this changing geopolitical situation in South Asia particularly to avoid Pakistan from taking advantage of the situation. Specifically, some members of the Indian National Congress, including the Communists and Socialists aimed at the prudential building of ties with Communist China, even acquiescing its human rights violations in Tibet. Thus, when the Communist troops marched against Tibet in early 1950s, with the ostensible object of wiping out British and American influence in Tibet, the Indian government remained silent against Chinese genocidal attempt "to destroy the national, ethnical, racial and religious group of

⁶⁴ See Ganguly 2001; Schofield 2010.

⁶⁵ U.N. Document S/646, January 15, 1948, pp.8-9

Tibetans...,”⁶⁶ only in order to maintain good relations with China. Further, sections of Indian Communists supported China’s action in Tibet, praised Chinese action for leading Tibetans from “medieval darkness,”⁶⁷ and pressured the government towards non-intervention. These debates reinforced the newly independent India’s view to consolidating its sovereignty within by disowning the conception of sovereignty as responsibility outside.

In 1954, India and China signed a Trade Agreement, established “The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence” and firmly articulated the importance of non-intervention in the internal affairs of each other.⁶⁸ With the increasing Chinese killing of Tibetans and the repressive policies of Chou En-lai, the Dalai Lama visited India from November 1956 to March 1957 and sought for political sanctuary. However, Nehru persuaded the Dalai Lama to return, promising to use his good offices in Peking.⁶⁹ India’s direct influence in China over Tibetan questions remains unclear but India would not sponsor any appeal by Tibet to the international community for outside intervention, prefer the UN not to discuss such an appeal, and persuade the United Kingdom and the United States to ignore Tibetan appeal to the Security Council.⁷⁰ With the increased repression, the Dalai Lama fled Tibet and sought asylum in India in 1959. India offered sanctuary, moral support, and material sustenance to the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetan refugees in India. The tension in India’s strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention, the asylum of the Dalai Lama in India, and Communist China’s interpretation of India’s non-

⁶⁶ For the claim that these acts constitute the crime of Genocide under the Genocide Convention of the United Nations of 1948, see Press Release, International Commission of Jurists, Tibet – Summary of Report on Tibet, Shri Purshattom Trikamdas, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of Calcutta, para 27 (June 5, 1959). Available at <http://www.icj.org/summary-of-a-report-on-tibet-submitted-to-the-international-commission-of-jurists-by-shri-purshottam-trikamdas-senior-advocate-supreme-court-of-india/> accessed on 18 July 2016.

⁶⁷ Stern 1965, 68.

⁶⁸ The Five principles called as Panchsheel included: (1) Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) Mutual non-aggression; (3) Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; (5) Peaceful co-existence.

⁶⁹ Patterson 1960, 94.

⁷⁰ Tsering Shakya 1999, 54.

intervention in the Tibetan question led to the disastrous Sino-War of 1962. As John Garver puts it,

...Chinese leaders concluded that India was colluding with U.S. covert operation to support the Tibetan insurgents. Mao became convinced that the United States and India, along with (increasingly) China's erstwhile ally the USSR, were all working together against China. India was inciting Tibetan resistance and supporting it via its tolerant policies towards the Dalai Lama's "government in exile" and Tibetan refugees... Forceful blows were necessary to foil this anti-China conspiracy, Mao concluded.⁷¹

Paradoxically, the Sino-Indian War of 1962 reinforced the Indian discourse on non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. The simmering discontents and conflicts in Kashmir, the rise of separatist movements in the North-East of India, armed struggle by the communists in the Telangana region of India in 1946, and the Communist inspired Naxalite movement aimed at land-redistribution launched in 1967 challenged the Indian state from multiple quarters. The discourse on non-intervention thus enabled the Indian state from precluding other states supporting self-determination movements within India or holding the Indian state accountable for its mass atrocities and human rights violations within its own bounded realm.

Finally, India's participation in UN peacekeeping missions further reinforced and reproduced the discourse on non-intervention in novel ways. As we already saw, Nehru strongly criticized British, French and Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956 and thus sections of members from the Congress approved the UN Emergency Fund set up to supervise the withdrawal of troops from Egypt. It was part of the larger cosmopolitan tradition witnessed in the wake of Korean War where India sent humanitarian aid to Korea comprising field ambulance unit and took a lead in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whose task between August 1953 and March 1954 was to assume custody of prisoners of war. Thus, when Dag Hammarskjöld began the process of institutionalizing peacekeeping as an extension of UN diplomacy, Nehru and

⁷¹ Garver 2002, 57.

members of the ruling elite readily approved the policy. However, it also affected India's reputation as a supporter of anti-colonial struggles.⁷²

For example, India's peacekeeping operations in Congo created immense suspicion on India's liberal paternalism among conservative African states.⁷³ In Congo, India played an important role in UN Congo Operation (ONUC) between July 1960 and June 1964 and sought more assertive peace enforcement operation.⁷⁴ With the assassination of Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba in February 1961, India renewed its emphasis on strengthening ONUC mandate for combat operations. It roused the suspicion of conservative African states on India's intention in UN peacekeeping. They accused India of partisanship, which led to the resignation in June 1961 of an Indian envoy, Rajeshwar Dayal, who was briefly UN special representative in the Congo. The suspicion of conservative African leaders arose earlier with India's liberal attitudes particularly in its non-recognition of Algerian government-in-exile and in its general reservations against Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya. Thus, India's stance in Congo operations only reinforced this suspicion. As a result, India withdrew its troops in Congo by March 1964 and its troop contribution or participation in UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and in West Irian (Indonesia) in UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) remained marginal.

Thus, when Indira Gandhi came to power in 1966 the discourse on non-intervention was firmly entrenched in the Indian political settings. She already faced the tension with multiple competing discourses in the fragile South Asian security architecture. India's Afro-Asian solidarity and NAM summits pulled the policy choices in the direction of diplomatic criticism against the continuation of imperial and colonial policies. However, the changed geopolitical situation with

⁷² James 1994.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ All details from ibid

Pakistan and the bitter defeat in the Sino-Indian War pulled the decision makers towards the discourse on non-intervention. India's engagement in UN peacekeeping operations certainly improved the nation's cosmopolitan spirit but created bitter tensions with conservative African states.⁷⁵ Further, the rivalry with Pakistan that resurfaced again in a short war in 1965 created immense skepticism in the minds of Indian leaders on UN's ability to resolve the problems in Kashmir. The cosmopolitan Nehru took the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations, but it remained overridden with superpower competition. Thus, when Indira Gandhi came to power, the thorny issue of Kashmir plebiscite came up on her visit to Washington. She replied:

It is now too late to talk of a plebiscite. The second invasion of Kashmir by Pakistan last autumn has destroyed whatever marginal or academic value the old United Nations resolution might have had. Kashmir is also vital now to the defense of India in Ladakh against China. Any plebiscite now would definitely amount to questioning the integrity of India. It would raise the issue of secession – an issue on which the United States fought a civil war... we cannot and will not tolerate a second partition of India on religious grounds.⁷⁶

The stability of the non-intervention discourse is built on a firm articulation of sovereignty as authority particularly in the wake of changing geopolitical situation in South Asia. As this section showed, the non-intervention discourse was a historically contingent development. This discourse was specifically influential to that part of political entrepreneurs who aimed to strengthen India's relative position in South Asia with less concern about responsibility for genocide or mass atrocity crimes abroad. As the next example will show, even rebel support for solving humanitarian issues abroad were accepted in certain political circles in India because of the inherent tensions in the current ways of understanding India's role towards addressing the situation of oppressed and downtrodden.

⁷⁵ James 1994.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Frank 2001, 297.

4.3.3. Rebel Support for Humanitarian Cause

While the discourses on diplomatic criticism and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, through its consistent emphasis on governance of activities designed to improve humanity, still partly drew on the larger understanding of action beyond borders, the third kind of discourse on humanitarianism to be explored here focuses on the long-term goal of eliminating the causes of suffering. Members of the Indian Communists movement and the revolutionary Indian socialists were the most important prophets of arming rebels for fighting exploitation and slavery. This Left-wing radicalism and Socialism, all but forgotten today, wielded considerable pressure in India's post-Independence period and had a significant impact on the policies on rebel patronage of the ruling elites themselves. The evolution of the option of rebel patronage in India and the resonance of it for addressing humanitarian crisis abroad deserves detailed examination.

The option of arming rebels where there are severe oppression and exploitation is a revolutionary alternative, which emerged both among radicals inspired by Communist ideology and among ruling elites inspired by Socialism. The Communist Party successfully emerged as the country's leading opposition party after India's second General election in 1957 and thus rebel patronage became an important foreign and domestic policy goal. In the wake of the Chinese invasion of Tibet, the "pro-Chinese" wing of the Communist Party supported the Chinese goal of liberating Tibet. According to Robert Stern, "A Communist Party statement of March 31 [1959] praised the Chinese for leading the Tibetans from 'medieval darkness,' and blamed the rebellion on Tibetan 'serf-owners' backed by Indian reactionaries and Western imperialists."⁷⁷ However, after Sino-Indian War of 1962, sections of Indian Communists, notably the Chairman of the Communist Party, S.A. Dange, condemned the Chinese and offered full support to

⁷⁷ Stern 1965, 68.

Nehru's policies. This, in turn, led to a split in the Indian Communist Party and lines were drawn between "revisionists" and "dogmatists" in which the attitude towards China was the major issue.⁷⁸

Crucially, Communist China supplied arms to the newly created splinter group of Indian Communists (Marxist-Leninist) and advocated violent armed struggle to overthrow the Indian state.⁷⁹ It also offered a detailed strategy to the rebel movement. As Bhabani Sen Gupta shows, "The increasingly detailed spelling-out of the Maoist line for India appears to be an entirely new development in international communism."⁸⁰ Chinese communists also offered rebel patronage to national self-determination struggles within India such as in Kashmir, Telangana region in the heart of India and the Nagas and Mizos in Eastern India. The revolutionaries who sought the support from China aimed to overthrow the State and remedy the ultimate cause of suffering of the Indian people.

Crucially, the direction of rebel patronage was not unidirectional and the ruling Indian elites found arming rebel groups engaged in removing the cause of suffering as a preferable strategy to engaging in direct war; however, unlike left-wing radicalism the reigning faith was on

⁷⁸ A number of Communist leaders, including E.M.S. Namboodripad, A.K. Gopalan, P. Sundarayya, B.T. Ranadive, and Jyoti Basu, organized a left faction which in November 1964 was reconstituted into Communist Party of India (Marxist). A further split within the newly constituted Communist Party of India (Marxist) arose between those members who supported Communist China and opted for road of armed struggle and those members who wanted careful planning among peasantry. China offered support to those who advocated armed struggle, known as Naxalites – a name derived from the group started an armed uprising in Naxalbari area in West Bengal. Thus there was the original Communist Party of India (CPI), the first splinter group Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM), which was not ideologically aligned either with China or the Soviet Union, and the extremist faction led by Charu Mozumdar that broke away from CPM and established a third communist party on April 22, 1969, as Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) or CP(ML).

⁷⁹ On the broader Chinese strategy see Chen 2006.

⁸⁰ Gupta 1968, 13.

Socialism.⁸¹ The socialist legacy of this rebel patronage led to a distinct emphasis on the individual rather than the community and as a tit-for-tat proportionate strategy in order to ensure that rebels are likely to fight for a just cause. As Bhikhu Parekh puts it:

Nehru remained a socialist all his adult life and entertained the same broad view of it. For him socialism was not just an economic doctrine, not just a form of social organization, but a 'new civilisation' based on radically transformed 'humanity.' It was classless, democratic, provided the material and moral conditions necessary for the fullest development of the human potential, and encouraged co-operative and nonacquisitive impulses... His socialism was basically aesthetic and liberal, concentrating on the individual rather than the community and stressing self-expression, individuality, social justice and human creativity.⁸²

On this Socialist legacy, India armed rebels to realize its foreign policy goals in Tibet, Kashmir, and as we saw previously even in the overthrow of White dominance in Southern Rhodesia. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to illustrate all the example of India's rebel patronage. Let us take the example of India's rebel patronage in Tibet.

In the immediate aftermath of the Chinese invasion of Tibet and its genocidal campaigns against Tibetans, the Nehru government covertly aimed to undermine China's rule in Tibet. First, India offered sanctuary to the Dalai Lama, offered material and moral support to the thousands of Tibetan refugees in India and turned a blind eye to CIA activities among those refugees.⁸³ Crucially, India also supported guerilla activities in Tibet with the understanding that arming rebels is the only feasible way to stop the Chinese mass killings of Tibetans. India's defeat in the Sino-Indian War in 1962 and Mao's continuous rebel patronage to self-determination movements reinforced the reason to arm rebels. As Garver shows:

The 1962 war produced an abrupt change in Indian policy. Frank talks quickly began between CIA and [India's] Intelligence Bureau (IB) about cooperation against China in Tibet. India agreed to support the creation of a 5,000 man force of Tibetans trained in guerrilla warfare, commanded by Indian general Sujan Singh Urban, and designated Establishment 22. Simultaneously, the CIA would foster Tibetan resistance

⁸¹ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate the ethical issues including the similarities and differences surrounding rebel patronage based on Communist or Socialist ideologies. The crucial point is the popularity of arming rebels as foreign policy option for India's ruling elites themselves.

⁸² Parekh 1991, 37.

⁸³ Knaus 1999.

inside Tibet...Tibetan leader Gyalo Thondup is reported as recounting that Intelligence Bureau head B.N. Mullik in December 1962 told him that India had now adopted a policy of supporting the eventual liberation of Tibet.⁸⁴

The upshot is that when Indira Gandhi came to power in India, the discourse on arming rebels to realize foreign policy goals was covertly but firmly entrenched in the Indian political settings. The fierce role of Indian Communist parties and the strength of socialists particularly its card-carrying leader Jayaprakash Narayan, Dr. Ram Mahohar Lohia, and J.B. Kripalani from the early 1960s ensured the reproduction of the discourse on rebel patronage in several ways. Indeed, by mid-1960s, prodded by the “Young Turks,” Indira Gandhi moved radically socialist in political orientation and proposed a series of domestic reforms such as bank nationalization, state trading, and the abolition of privy purses (pensions) for the Indian princes.⁸⁵ On issues of violent human rights abroad, arming rebels was less costly for the Indian state in terms of the lives of military personnel and financial resources and importantly India’s action did not immediately come under the scrutiny of the international community. As Indira Gandhi’s condemnation of the humanitarian crisis in Southern Rhodesia and her explicit acknowledgment in the Indian parliament of support of rebels in the fight against “the White imperialists” shows, the option of rebel patronage was alive as an important alternative.

4.3.4. Enlisting the Support of Great Powers

With India’s fierce engagement in the international system as an independent nation, another small but an influential discourse articulated the pragmatic force of enlisting the support of Great Powers and in this manner cut across the political debates on non-alignment and anti-communism in important ways. This discourse with roots in India’s struggle for independence remained latent in the towering presence of Nehru and the dominant discourse on non-

⁸⁴ Garver 2004, 176.

⁸⁵ Fickett 1973, 830.

intervention and non-alignment articulated by members of Indian National Congress in the immediate post-independence period. Yet, after the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the discourse on enlisting the support of great powers centered on the key question of hurdles in India's engagement in the international system and thus acquired a new force. Indeed, it certainly was an unstable discourse utilized by a motley group of right-wing nationalists within the Swatantra Party, Bharatiya Jan Sangh, and even among radical right-wingers of the Congress Party. Thus, its scope on India's humanitarian actions remained indirect until Indira Gandhi came to power to modify the discourse in creative ways to manage the humanitarian crisis in the neighborhood.

The discourse on India enlisting the support of Great Powers has a long history. The early manifestation of this discourse centered on mobilizing the United States for the cause of India independence, specifically in engaging with Woodrow Wilson and his rhetoric of self-determination.⁸⁶ Erez Manela brilliantly shows how the Indian nationalists engaged the Great Power, "after Wilson announced that the United States would declare war on Germany in the name of democracy, popular government, and 'the rights and liberties of small nations.'"⁸⁷ Crucially, the Indian nationalist leader Lala Lajpat Rai traveled across the U.S. wrote numerous books, pamphlets, and articles and held important contacts with the *Nation's* editor Oswald Garrison Villard, presidential advisor Walter Lippmann, and engaged with anti-imperialist lawmakers like Democratic Speaker of the House, Champ Clark, and Republican Congresswoman Jeanette Rankin.⁸⁸ Similarly, in the interwar years, Nehru and other Indian nationalists within the Congress looked to President Franklin Roosevelt as a powerful supporter of India's freedom from the British Empire. The British Viceroy designated Agent-General in Washington Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai played an important role in discussions about how the

⁸⁶ Manela 2007, 77–98.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 77.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 89.

United States could assist India in the production of war goods in the fight against Nazis.⁸⁹

Crucially, Krishnalal Shridharani, a friend of Gandhi, living in the United States impressed upon the U.S. to settle the question of Indian independence. Roosevelt's Office of Coordinator of Information (OCOI) would write, the U.S. "is in an excellent position to 'help India unite behind the war and behind a democratic peace. By intervening to secure these goals, the United States 'will do a service to herself, to Asia and to the world.'"⁹⁰

In the post-Independence period, the discourse on enlisting the support of Great Powers worked within food aid, trade, and economic and technological development programs and at the same time distancing from the geopolitics of superpower competition through the discourse on non-alignment. India obtained a large amount of economic assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union and by mid-1950s it began to receive major military commitments from the Soviet Union when Pakistan began to receive U.S arms through military pacts. Nehru's Fabian Socialist ideas and the pro-Soviet tilt worked in tandem with caution in relying solely upon one superpower. The policymakers put the discourse on non-alignment to creative use in order to enlist the support of Great Powers for India's economic and social development. However, the disastrous Sino-Indian War of 1962 created new possibilities for some right-wing sections of Indian political establishment to use the discourse on enlisting the support of Great Powers in a creative manner.

In the post 1962 period, the discourse on enlisting the support of Great Powers was clear in the use of representations that emphasized India's tense security environment and the problems of grand narratives centered on humanitarianism, universal human rights, or world peace when the

⁸⁹ Kux 1992, 3–46.

⁹⁰ Clymer 1988, 277.

very fabric of the Indian nation is under threat from Pakistan and China. As already mentioned, this discourse centered on a motley group of right-wing pundits thus remaining unstable and to some extent limited in scope. Yet, the latent power of this discourse was significant. The Indian Communist party condemned it as “forces of dark, right reaction” and Nehru categorized the discourse of Swatantra party as belonging to “the middle ages of lords, castles and zamindars and becoming more and more Fascist in outlook.”⁹¹ Yet, the discourse on enlisting the support of great powers consolidated and reproduced in important ways.

Members of the Swatantra Party, such as C. Rajagopalachari, N.G. Ranga, and M.R. Masani had roots in India’s independence struggle, united in their opposition to communism, and formulated a marked concept of classical liberal policy for India that aimed at minimum interference of the State in all areas. After the Sino-Indian War of 1962, members of Swatantra Party openly advocated defense agreement with other Asian countries, including Pakistan, and called for an alliance with the non-Communist West.⁹² The crucial point in this discourse is that if India could get economic and technological assistance for social development, there is nothing wrong in seeking military aid and enlisting the support of the United States as a deterrent on geopolitical issues.⁹³ According to Howard Erdman:

The [Swatantra] party holds that great power backing is also required, and it insists that the USSR has neither the resources nor the will to guarantee such backing. Hence, “there is only one power bloc to align with, the Western democracies.” However, as is abundantly obvious, “Pakistan and Kashmir are hurdles in India’s relations with America and other countries in the west...” Thus, in addition to the more strictly regional imperative dictating a Kashmir settlement, there is another, based on the need for western aid [sic].⁹⁴

⁹¹ Erdman 1963, 394.

⁹² Ibid., 404.

⁹³ Erdman 1963.

⁹⁴ Erdman 1966, 8.

Similarly, members of another Indian political party, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh established shortly after Indian general elections in 1951-52, were descendants of militant Hindu groups again united in their opposition to communism and formulated a marked concept of India's tense security environment. However, they remained fearful of neoimperialist endeavors of both the US and USSR ⁹⁵ and thus modified the discourse on enlisting the support of Great Powers to attain nuclear guarantees as part of India's defense needs.

Thus, it [Bharatiya Jana Sangh Party] generally does not want to meddle where India is not directly involved (although it does give general support to the UN); it is far more concerned about Indians than about all non-caucasians, hence it worries little about Angola and much more about Indians in Burma and Ceylon; it thinks more about Indian *grandeur* than about Asia (or Afro-Asia) as a third force; and needless to say, it has nothing but most venomous contempt for any suggestion that non-violence is the best policy.⁹⁶

Thus, by mid-1960s the discourse on enlisting the support of Great Powers for India's political and strategic project remained strongly influential, particularly with the growing threat of China to India's security. Nehru and the cosmopolitan leaders of the post-independence India distanced themselves from these ideas but the Sino-Indian War of 1962 brought to fore the latent force of this discourse. It encountered eager audiences at every turn, depending on the way the discourse was utilized for articulating India's national interest, and when Indira Gandhi confronted the serious humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan in the early 1970s, the discourse seemed adequately amenable for distinct political ends.

4.4. Summary and Conclusion

Sixty years ago, the American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars wrote, "Clearly human beings could dispense with all discourse, though only at the expense of having nothing to say." The above analysis of humanitarianism in the political debates in India showed there were four or at least four multiple competing discourses, which consolidated and reproduced over time that one

⁹⁵ Ibid, 10

⁹⁶ Erdman 1966, 15 Emphasis original.

could not dispense these discourse in any analysis of the choice situation of Indian policymakers on humanitarian crisis abroad. If one dispenses these multiple competing discourses, certainly there is nothing to say on India's military intervention against humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan except as an inevitable consequence of the situation of mass atrocity crimes in the neighborhood. It is precisely to avoid this shortsightedness that the present chapter took a longer time-frame to show that alternative worlds could have emerged and it need not have called for military intervention. It will be the task of next chapter to show how the Indira Gandhi administration marginalized the alternative discourses and acted upon the situation in a different manner.

The four discourses I have discussed, despite their considerable overlap and mutual borrowings, ultimately put forward a distinct alternative course of action against humanitarian crisis abroad. Diplomatic criticism against political actors engaged in mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations is certainly a cost-effective alternative, which as we saw in the illustration of India's engagement with South Africa, Portugal, and Southern Rhodesia, achieved some important results. By mobilizing the international community and impressing upon some change in the behavior of states engaged in mass atrocity crimes, Indian leaders secured a high moral ground and upheld a cosmopolitan spirit. However, the discourse on non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states directly competed with the discourse on diplomatic criticism. With the high tide of UN activism on non-intervention in the post-Second World War period, the discourse had a certain pragmatic value for a post-colonial country like India facing issues of self-determination, secession, and challenges to state authority from multiple quarters. The illustration of India's non-intervention discourse even against China's genocidal campaign in Tibet is meant to throw some light on the consolidation and reproduction of this discourse in India's foreign policy. Similarly, the discourses on arming rebels engaged in struggles against

mass atrocity crimes as illustrated in India's covert guerrilla engagement in Tibet against Chinese occupation, embedded in the postulate of exceptional situation of helping rebels overthrow an oppressive regime, did partly compete with the discourse on enlisting the support of Great Powers. And both to some extent are concerned securing India's national interest with the former endorsing covert means and the latter unconcerned about humanitarian crisis abroad that does not have immediate practical relevance for India.

Taken together, with the four competing discourses, one must conclude that humanitarianism during this seventy years period was like any other broad signifier, as Stolte and Fischer-Tiné argue on the idea of "Asia," like a container to be filled with meaning when a particular agenda so required.⁹⁷ Now using the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3, we will see how among these multiple competing discourses, one action – the humanitarian military intervention – becomes contingently possible.

⁹⁷ Stolte and Fischer-Tiné 2012, 91.

5: India's Practical Reasoning For Action in East Pakistan

5.1. Introduction

The previous chapter showed multiple discourses on humanitarianism in political and intellectual debates in India – diplomatic criticism, non-intervention, rebel-support, and enlisting the support of Great Powers – that have consolidated and reproduced in several ways at least since the early twentieth century. These discourses are rich and powerful within the Indian foreign policy games. In other words, the four discourses I have discussed, despite their considerable overlaps and mutual borrowings, put forward very distinct articulation of policy for the Indian political actors facing humanitarian crisis and human rights violation abroad.

The specific purpose of this chapter is to show how military intervention action actually became possible for India in the face of these competing alternative discourses. The two approaches discussed in Chapter 2 produce possible explanations for India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971. For some scholars, India's military intervention was the result of hidden desires of the Indira Gandhi administration to cut its adversary to size and exercise hegemony in South Asia.¹ For some, it was an effort to rescue victims of mass murder.² Others discuss the pressure of liberal norms and institutions on the choice of Indira Gandhi administration.³ Still, others subsume the action as an inevitable consequence of flawed cartographic arrangements and geopolitical architecture of post-partition South Asia.⁴

¹ Marwah 1979; Sisson and Rose 1991; Kux 1992, 289–307; Salehyan 2008; Cordera 2015.

² Wheeler 2001, 55–77; Finnemore 2004, 75.

³ The argument is that liberal states can be driven towards humanitarian interventions and India is the least likely case that still shows the impact of liberal norms and institutions, Bass 2013.

⁴ Ganguly 2001; Umar 2006.

Overlooked in these debates, however, is that in the months preceding the intervention in East Pakistan, the Indian administration abandoned the aim to resolve the problem multilaterally by enlisting the support of Great Powers and embraced the option of securitizing the Bengali refugees in the Indian soil and pursued a policy of confronting the Pakistani state. By highlighting the threat of refugees to India's national security, the Indira Gandhi administration swiftly marginalized the alternative discourses for addressing humanitarian crisis abroad. Thus, military intervention in East Pakistan was not inevitable and the administration wrestled a particular political project preoccupied with how the action was portrayed as with the intervention itself.

How can we explain India's humanitarian intervention in East Pakistan in the face of competing alternative discourses? This oversight is not only historically significant; India's action raises broader questions about the conditions under which and the processes through which some actions become contingently authoritative in the face of alternative discourses. Yet conventional IR scholarship discussed in Chapter 2 provides little insights into the crucial processes involved in bringing about the outcome and resort to claims of power, interest, historical inevitability, or the percolation of liberal norms in institutions and practices. Critical constructivist scholars have not paid sufficient attention to the processes of securitization of Bengali refugees by the Indira Gandhi administration for humanitarian military intervention action and the account by Jarrod Hayes reviewed in Chapter 2 problematically merges democratic peace theory and securitization and resorts to some reductionist account using Social Identity Theory to explain events in East Pakistan.⁵

⁵ Hayes 2012.

In this chapter, I argue that it was a distinct form of practical reasoning of the Indira Gandhi administration in India – the deontic scorekeeping game of giving and asking for reasons – that enabled the administration to securitize East Pakistani refugees in India and marginalize competing discourses. In keeping with the analytical framework developed in this thesis, the way in which agents engage in the game of giving and asking for reasons is critical. The situational interaction-in-context on East Pakistan crisis between several interlocutors triggered an instrumental norm-type in interactions. Thus, the Indira Gandhi administration considered some actors as “scorekeepers” whose claims India cannot avoid responding with impunity in aiming to secure entitlements for action in East Pakistan. However, in the game of giving and asking for reasons, the Indira Gandhi administration trapped several scorekeepers by highlighting the gap between their acknowledged normative commitments on the mass slaughtering by the Pakistani military in East Pakistan and the precluded entitlements to find an immediate political solution to the problem. Thus, the Indira Gandhi administration judged that securitizing the refugees is the proper completion of its reasoning. In other words, a judgment that one has to securitize the refugees and humanitarian military intervention action is a product of India’s practical reasoning in the deontic scorekeeping space. Specifically, the Indira Gandhi administration claimed that refugees are a threat to India’s security, shifted from its earlier stance on finding a multilateral solution to the crisis and embraced a policy to confront Pakistan, but the link between securitization of refugees and military intervention came about only through the game of giving and asking for reasons.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The second section provides a brief overview of the crisis in East Pakistan, which led to the general concern of humanitarian crisis by 1971 and interactions-in-context among several interlocutors. In the third section, I foreground the analytical framework developed in this thesis, delimiting the scorekeepers and game players in the crisis

based on the specific instrumental norm-type resulting from the interactions-in-context. The fourth section of the chapter shows the practical reasoning of the Indira Gandhi administration in three distinct stages from December 1970 to December 1971. The focus is on the one-year period from the beginning of the massive victory of the Awami League Party of East Pakistan in the general election of December 1970 to the massive crackdown of this victory through a bloody genocidal extermination by the Pakistani military and a colossal refugee influx, which led to India's military intervention on 3 December 1971. Finally, I conclude with implications of this argument for critical constructivist IR theory.

5.2. From Election to Ethnic Cleaning: Humanitarian Crisis in East Pakistan (December 1970 to December 1971)

To begin with, the crisis in East Pakistan can be traced to the political constructions of geopolitical space in the Indian subcontinent and precisely to the boundary-drawing practices and performance in the partition of India in 1947. In the violent partition of India and the creation of Pakistan on 14-15 August 1947, roughly, two-thirds of the Muslim majority territory of Bengal in the east of India was carved out to create the province of East Bengal in Pakistan separated by more than 1500 kilometers from West Pakistan (See Figure 1.1. and 1.2. below). In the West, roughly fifty-five million people spoke Urdu as the official language compared to roughly seventy-five million people in the East who spoke Bengali.

Already on 21 May 1947, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the father of Pakistan also called the great leader – *Quaid-i-Azam* – asked for a “corridor” through India connecting the two halves of Pakistan.⁶ The corridor never came but calls for a stronger link between West and East Pakistan grew into a campaign for a greater role for East Pakistan in national affairs including “full

⁶ Jalal 1994, 277.

autonomy” of East Pakistan leaving only defense, foreign affairs, and currency under the central government.⁷ After all, the unity of Pakistan and India as sovereign entities in the post-partition period rested on maintaining a fine balance between respecting local sentiments and at the same time constructing geopolitical boundaries of inside versus outside.



Figure 1.3. India and Pakistan 1947⁸



Figure 1.4 East Pakistan 1947⁹

⁷ For the Twenty One points of the United Front Party see Umar 2006.

⁸ Chatterji 2007, 62.

⁹ Ibid., 58.

The immediate context for the crisis in East Pakistan lies in the geopolitical imaginations of Pakistan by the military elites, which took local sentiments including provincial traditions, Bengali culture, and language for granted. This is not to say that the ruling Indian elites were any better. In the 1960s, the fissiparous activities orchestrated by the United Liberation Front of Assam within India could have easily turned the tables and placed India in a similar dilemma as Pakistan. However, for the mainly Punjabi army facing powerful India, any sloganeering on “local traditions” or “complete autonomy” only frustrated their attempts to establish a truly strong Muslim nation. Thus, the United Front government that legitimately came to power in East Pakistan provincial assembly election under such calls for autonomy was summarily dismissed and General Ayub Khan imposed martial law in Pakistan in 1958. However, the “golden decade” of development under the military regime only increased social inequalities: mere twenty-two families controlled 66 percent of Pakistan’s industrial wealth and 87 percent of banking and insurance.¹⁰ As West Pakistan became industrialized, the absolute number of impoverished people between 1963 and 1968 rose from 8.65 million to 9.33 million and the economic and social discrimination by the military regime spawned increased popular protests.¹¹

Throughout the 1960s, the series of urban popular upsurge and student protests shook the Pakistani state that compelled the new Military President and Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) General Yahya Khan, to hold a perfunctory first national election in Pakistan based on the universal adult franchise in December 1970.¹² The decision to hold elections – regardless of the military regime’s ulterior motives – certainly became a turning point in the history of Pakistan. In East Pakistan, the victory went to the Awami League, under the leadership of charismatic Shiekh Mujibur Rahman. More importantly, the Awami League campaigned on maximum autonomy but not separation and won so decisively, with 160 of 162 seats, that it

¹⁰ Raghavan 2013, 16.

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Choudhury 1972; Sisson and Rose 1991; Umar 2006; For an excellent analysis upon which much of thesis relies on is Raghavan 2013.

could control both the wings of the country. The other party, Pakistan's People Party (PPP), under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto only managed to get 81 of 138 seats in West Pakistan.

Each was the biggest party in each of the wings and rather than taking the role of the leader of opposition Bhutto, with the support of the military regime, nefariously claimed that Punjab and Sindh (in West Pakistan) are the bastions of power in Pakistan and "majority alone does not count in national politics."¹³ However, Awami League rightfully contended that they had a clear electoral mandate "and was competent to frame the constitution and form the government with or without any other party."¹⁴ The military regime already shocked with the electoral verdict and the stunning rise of Awami League reveled in this party politics and postponed the convening of the National Assembly several times. Indeed as Srinath Raghavan points out, the shock of the electoral results says much about the attitude of Pakistani military towards democratic Pakistan:

The military leadership had expected that the electorate would result in a splintered verdict. Such a fractured National Assembly, they believed, would render the task of constitution-making within 120 days nigh impossible, and so necessitate a fresh election. 'This process, they hoped,' recalled a member of the martial law administration, 'would go on indefinitely, allowing martial law to remain in force.' Or, alternatively, compel the politicians to come to terms with the military with regard to the future political dispensation.¹⁵

After a series of failed negotiations with the members of Awami League, the Pakistani military regime decided to come down with devastating force against Bengalis in order to "save" Pakistan from its enemies. At 11:30 pm on 25 March 1971, it began an offensive military action under the code name Operation Searchlight. With ominous swiftness, the Pakistani Army marched into Dhaka with automatic machine guns, rocket launchers, and modern tanks to "save" Pakistan from its "internal enemies" and hold the country together.¹⁶ Storming the hotel where Awami League champion Mujib Rahman stayed, the Pakistani military arrested the man who had won a

¹³ Quoted in Raghavan 2013, 37.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 34.

¹⁶ Brigadier A.R. Siddiqi 2004, 81–95.

massive victory in the recently concluded elections. Further, as Gary Bass notes, in the Operation Searchlight “any Bengali alleged to be a rebel or Awami Leaguer was ‘sent to Bangladesh’- the euphemistic ‘code name for death without trial.’”¹⁷ In a radio address to the people on 26 March 1971, General Yahya Khan asserted that Mujibur Rahman and his political party – the Awami League – in the East are enemies of Pakistan because they wanted to break away completely from the country and “this crime will not go unpunished.”¹⁸

Operation Searchlight was the beginning of a massive genocidal campaign in East Pakistan where the Pakistani army butchered, raped, mutilated, and massacred hundreds of thousands of rebellious Bengalis and the supporters of Awami League, which on some account was far bloodier than Bosnia and similar to Rwanda.¹⁹ The debate on the actual number of people who died in East Pakistani does not deny the beastly scale of killings or the selective genocide against the Hindu population in East Pakistan.²⁰ In April 1971, the Pakistani military regime took eight Pakistani journalists on a government-sponsored trip to East Pakistan to rubbish all false claims and suppositions that were going around the Pakistan’s pacification campaign. Anthony Mascarenhas a respected Pakistani journalist was trembling in East Pakistan when he saw the ‘great job’ the Pakistani Army was doing to hold the country together. He stated unequivocally that this is genocide conducted with amazing casualness. Secretly escaping Pakistan, he wrote a bone-chilling account of his visit to East Pakistan in the *Sunday Times* on 13 June 1971 with the headline “Genocide.” He reported that:

The Government’s policy for East Bengal was spelled out to me in the Eastern Command headquarters in Dacca. It has three elements:- (1) The Bengalis have proved themselves ‘unreliable’ and must be ruled by West Pakistanis; (2) The Bengalis will have to be re-educated along proper Islamic lines. The ‘Islamisation of the masses’ – this is the official jargon – is intended to eliminate secessionist tendencies and provide a

¹⁷ Bass 2013, 53.

¹⁸ Dawn [Karachi], 27 March 1971

¹⁹ See Bass 2015.

²⁰ See David Bergman, “The Politics of Bangladesh’s Genocide Debate,” *New York Times*, 5 April 2016

strong religious bond with West Pakistan; (3) When the Hindus have been eliminated by death and flight, their property will be used as a golden carrot to win over the under-privileged Muslim middle-class. This will provide the base for erecting administrative and political structure – in the future. This policy is being pursued with utmost blatancy.²¹

Although the Pakistani military regime was the very epitome of authoritarianism, the killings were cruel and inhuman carried out with demonic discipline. Sometimes the military would kill rebel Bengali Muslims and Hindus alike in their villages, sometimes they will convert a warehouse into a prison and shoot the people point blank and sometimes crops were burnt and the impoverished people were killed en mass and pushed into the river. By December 1971, about three million Bengalis were killed and about 400,000 women were raped and imprisoned in camps and subjected to sexual assaults a day.²² General Niazi, the West Pakistani commander in East Bengal, referred to Bangladesh as “a low lying land, of low lying people.”²³

The genocidal policies of the Pakistani military regime evicted some 10 million people who trailed towards the neighboring territory of India in utterly wretched conditions – it precipitated India’s concerns and its search for policy options. Some of the members in the top leadership of the Awami League escaped the Pakistani military dragnet and crossed over to India at the end of March 1971. Specifically, the General Secretary of Awami League Tajuddin Ahmad and a lawyer of the party Amirul Islam met India’s senior Border Security Force (BSF) and emphasized their determination to resist the Pakistani Army and secure independence.²⁴ Tajuddin Ahmad secretly met Prime Minister of India Mrs. Indira Gandhi on 3 April 1971 and provided an eyewitness account of the genocide. With the silent and secret acquiescence of India, Syed Nazrul Islam took guard of honor on 17 April across the Indian border and they formally proclaimed the

²¹ Antony Mascarenhas, *Sunday Times*, London, 13 June 1971

²² Beachler 2007, 479.

²³ For the gory details, see Rummel 1994, 335.

²⁴ Raghavan 2013, 62.

government of Bangladesh.²⁵ India did not accord immediate recognition to the new state but provided arms and ammunition support to the guerrilla movement led by the Awami League. Thus, by arming rebels, the relations between Pakistan and India became worse than at any time because the guerillas targeted the railroads, bridges, and other logistical installations in East Pakistan.²⁶ Crucially, this also increased the refugee influx into India.

While the guerrillas were trying to break through the enemy lines, the restive military leaders in Pakistan attacked India and on 3 December 1971 and launched a formal war. However, unbeknownst to the Pakistani military generals, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi already gave orders for a full-scale attack on East Pakistan for 4 December 1971. Pakistan's attack came a day ahead but Indian military machine moved swiftly to knock out the Pakistani resistance. The attitude of Indian policymakers uncertain up to the last minute strengthened and on 4 December 1971, India recognized Bangladesh, fought a bloody war, and after fourteen days emerged victorious. The Pakistani army surrendered and India took about 93,000 Prisoners of War. It led to the creation of the new state of Bangladesh.

As we saw in the previous chapter, there were clear but competing discourses on the policy options in India on humanitarian crisis abroad and declaring war was not the sole, inevitable, logical consequences of humanitarian crisis abroad. The newly elected Indira Gandhi administration had the option of engaging in fierce diplomatic criticism against Pakistani military regime, tightening the screw through international community in such a way to stop and rollback the genocidal actions. Alternatively, the Indira Gandhi administration could have chosen non-intervention and accommodated the refugees inside India. It is the pursuit of a similar policy of her father Jawaharlal Nehru after the wake of mass refugee crisis during the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. After all, nearly 80 percent of the refugees were Hindus, and only

²⁵ Ibid, 64

²⁶ For details on guerrilla operations, see Sisson and Rose 1991.

20 percent were Muslims. Or there was the option of merely continuing the rebel support and cutting the arch rival to size in a long-drawn-out guerrilla warfare. It is cost-effective with relatively less international opprobrium. Finally, Indira Gandhi had the choice of enlisting the support of Great Powers, either the US or USSR, in order to persuade Pakistan to change its course of action and stop the mass atrocity crimes. In this light how can we explain India's intervention action in the face of competing alternative discourses?

5.3. Scorekeepers and Game players in the Humanitarian Crisis in East Pakistan

It is here that the elaborate analytical framework on the practical reasoning of agents developed in Chapter 3 is useful. As we saw, discursive practices are deontic and drawing on the recent advancements in analytical pragmatist philosophy of Robert Brandom we also saw that members keep track of one's own and others' commitments and entitlements in the social world through the game of giving and asking for reasons. The boundaries of discursive practice are endogenous to interaction-in-context and the norm type that underwrites the interactions. On the East Pakistan crisis, the claims, contestation, and challenges by multiple scorekeepers established a distinct deontic scorekeeping network with "instrumental normativity" underwriting interactions among interlocutors. One cannot separate the scorekeepers from the type of normativity underwriting the interactions; however, for analytical reasons first I delimit the scorekeepers – those actors the Indian policy makers could not ignore in interactions with impunity – and then elaborate the significance of instrumental normativity in interactions. In other words, before one can examine the practical reasoning of the Indira Gandhi administration we have to "look and see" the norm-type and delimit the scorekeepers in the situational interactions on the East Pakistan crisis.²⁷

²⁷ For the same point but different research strategy based on metaphors see, Fierke 1998, 473.

With the burgeoning crisis in East Pakistan since March 1971, several important scorekeepers kept track of each other's normative commitments and entitlements. The claims and assertions, particularly the deontic attitudes – the attributions, endorsements, challenges, and acknowledgments – of nine important interlocutors set the rules of the game in important ways. Based on the warranted expectations from the analytical framework developed in this thesis and with a contextual analysis of the instrumental normativity in interactions in East Pakistan crisis, we could delimit nine important interlocutors that the Indira Gandhi administration treated as “scorekeepers” in the game. Thus the discursive practices of (1) members of the Awami League; (2) Pakistani Army; (3) Indira Gandhi administration; (4) Indian Military and Domestic audience; (5) The United States; (6) USSR; (7) China; (8) United Nations; and (9) Global Public opinion through investigative journalism count as deontic scorekeeping practices. All these actors exhibited a particular deontic attitude by attributing, acknowledging, and undertaking various commitments and entitlements and in this manner kept scores on each other. In aiming to secure entitlements for action in East Pakistan, the Indira Gandhi administration cannot avoid responding to these scorekeepers with impunity.

First, let us examine the relations between agents and their default entitlements that other scorekeepers can challenge. The discursive practices of members of the Awami League who escaped to India and set up a rebel government of Bangladesh count as deontic scorekeeping practice because they exhibited a particular deontic attitude towards the Pakistani military regime: independence. As we already saw, with Shiekh Mujibur Rahman under arrest, Syed Nazrul Islam made a fundamental sort of the move in the game by proclaiming the government of Bangladesh with a passionate plea to the international community for assistance and recognition.²⁸ Members

²⁸ See Letter of April 24, 1971 from Syed Nazrul Islam, Acting President of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the President of India in India and Bangla Desh, Selected Speeches and Statements, Government of India, 1972, 180. [Hereafter IGSS] See [IGSS] in the reference list.

of Awami League *inter alia*, offered suitable structures of challenging reasons to the Pakistan's genocidal campaign, endorsed the guerrilla campaign, supported an independent East Pakistan, and deferred to India's support for their cause.


The Pakistani military regime challenged the assertions of Awami League and exhibited a characteristic deontic attitude towards them as "enemies" and "subversives" of Pakistan. In challenging the assertions of Awami League and concomitantly the League's endorsement of India, the Pakistani military sought closer engagement with the United States and offered reasons drawing upon the norms of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Crucially, the Nixon administration with the advice of Henry Kissinger deferred to the Pakistani military. From the very beginning of the crisis, the US made the case to support Pakistan in all ways, ensure the supply of arms, which came with the US \$50 million worth of replacement aircraft and some 300-armed personnel carriers already in October 1970,²⁹ and later on challenged India's plea to stop mass-atrocity crimes in East Pakistan.³⁰ The deontic attitude of the Nixon administration was based on non-interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Similarly, with the new China-US rapprochement through Pakistan, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai acknowledged and endorsed Pakistan's action in East Pakistan as an internal affair.³¹ Although, this is a preliminary network, already we see a distinct relational space emerging in the contestations between the Awami League, the Pakistani military, the United States, and China on the crisis in East Pakistan (See Figure 1.3.).

²⁹ Raghavan 2013, 84; For more details see Kux 1992.

³⁰ Blood 2002; Bass 2013.

³¹ MacMillan 2007.

Figure 1.5 Interaction-in-context among Scorekeepers and Game players on Humanitarian Crisis in East Pakistan 1971³²



The discursive practice of the next three scorekeepers – the Indira Gandhi administration, Indian military and domestic audience, and the USSR count as deontic scorekeeping because they systematically exhibited their commitments and entitlements to addressing the genocide in East Pakistan and in important ways these actors acknowledged, attributed, endorsed, and challenged the claims of other scorekeepers. The Indira Gandhi administration as early as 31 March 1971 strongly criticized the Pakistani military regime and asserted that its action amounted to “genocide.”³³ India sought an entitlement to a commitment to ensure that the refugees go back to East Pakistan under safe conditions and by secretly supporting the freedom movement of Bangladesh it secured an entitlement from Awami League to speak on behalf of the suffering population of East Pakistan. Given the stable civil-military relations in India and the substantial majority commanded by the Indira Government in the Indian Parliament, the Indian military

³² See Appendix for details on the Standard Network Analysis, data, coding, basic measures, and node set

³³ Resolution adopted unanimously by both Houses of Parliament on March 31, 1971.

and public opinion largely deferred to the Indian policymakers and acknowledged and endorsed India's commitments against Pakistan's genocidal campaign against Bengali population. In this relational space, the Indian administrators were able to secure the support of USSR. Specifically, the Kosygin administration, aware of Pakistan's alliance with the United States, acknowledged India's commitments but withheld any entitlement of India for a fire-fighting role in the region.³⁴ The relational space emerging in this game of giving and asking for reasons enmeshed in the ties between Pakistan and the United States.

Finally, the discursive practices of United Nations exhibited by the UN Secretary General U-Thant and the media reports of the Global public opinion explicated through investigative journalism such as in the *New York Times* and the *Sunday Times* count as deontic scorekeeping because they kept track of the crisis in East Pakistan in several ways.³⁵ These institutions kept track of rules and practices on genocide, self-determination, and non-intervention and changed how members in the game of giving and asking for reasons would keep track of each other. Since rules are lived rather than consciously applied, the formal rules enshrined in the treaties and rulebooks undertaken by the United Nations were in contestation with the lived practice of the norms in actual situations in East Pakistan as reported by the global media through investigative journalism. Figure 1.4 above provides a graphical representation of the multifarious relations between actors concerned with the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan.


With the mapping of the relations between actors by looking and seeing what deontic attitude multiple actors exhibited in the context of the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan in March 1971 one also sees the different positions that actors occupied in the deontic scorekeeping space –

³⁴ Raghavan 2013, 108–130; Also see Selvage 2007.

³⁵ For the collection of all press and media statements from which this interpretation is made by the author see *Bangladesh Documents* Volume 1:33-41; 50-63; 117-130; 223-236. See Government of India, 1972 in the reference list.

their default commitments and entitlements. The interactions, contestation, and challenges by these multiple scorekeepers establish a distinct deontic scorekeeping network with regard to the crisis in East Pakistan and the interactions-in-context underwrites a larger instrumental norm-type among interlocutors.

Figure 1.6. Instrumental Norm Type in the Network of Interaction-in-context on East Pakistan Crisis³⁶



There are at least two reasons why the interactional situation between the scorekeepers underwrites an instrumental norm-type. First, in the larger Cold War game among actors, the mutual role-taking of interlocutors in April 1971 did not go beyond the immediate pursuit of temporary advantage.³⁷ Thus, for the United States, Soviet Union, and China enmeshed in the demands of the Cold War, the suffering and deaths of hundreds of thousands of Bengali population amounted to nothing but statistical figures. At this stage, none of these Great Powers ratified the Genocide Conventions and thus for them, Pakistan's killing spree had no identifiable content other than understanding it as an internal affair. However, for the Indian administration, Pakistan's military policies that resulted in a massive influx of refugees into the Indian Territory

³⁶ See Appendix for details on the Standard Network Analysis, data, coding, basic measures, and node set.

³⁷ See for instance, McMohan 1994; Malone 2004; Westad 2005.

were not an unintended consequence but a purely idiosyncratic preference of the military regime and its selfish calculations to eliminate Hindu population from East Pakistan.³⁸ For Indian policymakers, just five years after an all-out war with Pakistan in 1965 and merely nine years after a humiliating defeat against China in 1962, the situation in South Asia did not provide any predictable environment in which foreign policy choice have to be made. Even for members of the Awami League engaged in the guerrilla campaign, resisting Pakistan and securing independence became a prime objective rather than establishing institutional or moral questions involved in Pakistan's mass atrocity crimes.³⁹ Thus, the Machiavellian ploy among multiple actors who defined their interests with total disregard for restraint led to an instrumentalist baseline with scant regard for the need to consider customs, conventions, rights, and opinions of most scorekeepers in the game.

Second, the concatenation of scorekeepers in polar opposite positions undermined the ties needed to properly communicate interests, make amends for past mistakes, and jointly examine the expertise necessary to bring about a solution to the East Pakistan crisis. Thus, the United States, China, and Pakistan concatenated in one direction in the Cold War game against the members of the Awami League, the USSR, and the Indira Gandhi administration. Without a common minimum denominator among interacting actors, it was possible for scorekeepers to assert contradictory claims and neglect resolution of East Pakistan crisis with impunity. In the Cold War politics, superpowers undermined the authority of the UN at several levels and viewed every event in international politics in general and South Asia in particular in beggar thy neighbor perspective. Nicholas Wheeler sums up the interaction in stark terms: "The cold-war line-up, with the USA and China, aligned with Pakistan and the Soviet Union supporting India, prevented effective pressure being brought to bear on the growing conflict. According to U

³⁸ See Brigadier A.R. Siddiqi 2004, 96–112; Also see Bass 2015.

³⁹ Dixit 1999, 64–65.

Thant's memoirs, the major powers did not even discuss the matter. Given what the Secretary General called in his memoirs the extraordinary apathy of the Security Council, he had to restrict himself to organizing an international aid programme."⁴⁰

Thus, the relations between scorekeepers and deontic scorekeeping space (shown in Figures 1.4. and 1.5.), delimitation of scorekeepers, provides the boundaries to otherwise disparate assertions of actors in the East Pakistan crisis and shows the pattern of instrumental norm-type which guides the inferential relations and the practical reasoning of actors. With this, we have set the stage to understand India's practical reasoning for action. The upshot of the instrumental norm in the relational between actors is that in keeping with the norm, scorekeepers will take some reasons are good and others as bad reasons for action and will keep track of the practical inferences and change the deontic scores in a systematic manner. The next section will elaborate on the practical reasoning of the Indira Gandhi administration to change the boundaries of the deontic space and account for how India sought the entitlements to act in order to stop the massive refugee inflow into the Indian Territory.

5.4. India's Practical Reasoning for Humanitarian Action

Given the networked relations between multiple scorekeepers with regard to the crisis in East Pakistan and the broadly instrumental nature of the normative context between interlocutors, how did the Indira Gandhi administration deliberate and come to conclusions about addressing this humanitarian problem? This question becomes all the more important given the default normative commitments of the multiple scorekeepers who acknowledged Pakistani's arguments about sovereignty, endorsed the claims of territorial integrity and attributed normative

⁴⁰ Wheeler 2001, 59.

entitlement to Pakistan on military action against Bengalis as a matter of internal affairs of Pakistan.⁴¹ Then what kind of the game of giving and asking for reasons that the Indira Gandhi administration engaged in and what role the competing alternative discourses on humanitarianism play in the deliberations? In a way, India's contestations were ill-suited in a shared grammar of the Cold War based on the norms of non-intervention in general and the adversarial position occupied by India and Pakistan in already polarized South Asian balance of power game. Thus, the reasoning of the Indira Gandhi administration is a "hard case" for bringing about a conclusion to a practical problem because material interests and India-Pakistan rivalry would appear to provide a ready explanation for the choices made by the Indian policymakers.

Taking the reasons and justifications offered by the Indira Gandhi administration, I will present India's practical reasoning in three stages. The stages serve two functions. First, they break up the deliberation and interaction among scorekeepers – the game of giving and asking for reasons – into distinct periods of deontic scores. Second, they represent the shifts in the locus of action. In stage one, I examine the claims and assertions of the Indian administration between 31 March 1971 and 24 October 1971, the period when India aimed to persuade Pakistan through other scorekeepers to stop mass-atrocity crimes and create safe conditions for the return of nearly six million refugees camped in India. In stage two, I examine the contestations and changing deontic scores between 25 October 1971 and 15 November 1971, the period when Indira Gandhi toured a series of World capitals from Brussels, Vienna, London, Washington, to Paris and Bonn to seek the support of Great Powers to address the mass-atrocity crime in India's immediate neighborhood. It is in these two stages that India puts to test its competing alternative discourses on addressing humanitarian crisis abroad and set normative traps for scorekeepers in important ways. As we shall see, scorekeepers acknowledged India's normative commitments but precluded

⁴¹ Bass 2015, 237.

entitlements to the Indira Gandhi administration. It is in the crucial gap between deontic commitments acknowledged and entitlements-precluded that India demonstrated the incompatibilities to the scorekeepers and trapped some interlocutors in important ways.

In stage three, I shift the attention to the crucial period between 15 November 1971 and 22 December 1971. This stage is crucial when the Indira Gandhi administration reasoned on the imminence of danger through the securitization of the refugee crisis, changed India's normative commitments and entitlements that altered relations between actors and their deontic scores. Although the administration aimed to take autonomous control of the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan its justificatory responsibility to scorekeepers deserves important attention. The analysis draws upon multiple primary and secondary sources including debates in the Indian parliament, public statements and press interviews by Indira Gandhi, declassified reports from India and the United States and on the burgeoning secondary scholarship on India's intervention in East Pakistan.

5.4.1. Stage One: Refugee Resettlement with Safety, Dignity, and Honor

In the period between 31 March 1971 and 24 October 1971, at the height of Pakistan's crackdown of hundreds of thousands of Bengalis, which led to nearly ten million refugees into India in one of the largest refugee flows in history, the Indira Gandhi administration directed its practical reasoning towards refugee resettlement back to East Pakistan with safety, dignity, and honor. Indira Gandhi made this the goal of India and rather quite explicitly:

The refugees are prepared to undergo all this discomfort and deprivation here [in India] because in their own land they face a brutal threat to their lives and honour. We are trying our best to give some relief to these suffering millions. We told them and we told the world as well, that we will be able to keep them here *only for a short period*. No country can afford to absorb [*sic*] or maintain such a large mass of people from another country. It is not possible for us, and we shall never agree to it. We have made it very clear to the world community.⁴²

⁴² Public address delivered at India Gate, New Delhi, 9 August 1971, IGSS, 32. Emphasis added.

In order to achieve this goal, the Indian administration offered several reasons – those minor instrumental premises in practical reasoning – with series of practical inferences in the deontic scorekeeping space to seek normative commitments and entitlements for action. Here value considerations played an important role more than, as we shall see, the means-end nexus of instrumental rationality. Two important reasons that the Indian administration offered to attain the goal of refugee resettlement and bringing a political solution to the problem require close attention: (1) the crisis in East Pakistan is not an internal problem of Pakistan, and (2) the crisis is not an India-Pakistan problem. Other scorekeepers kept track of the practical reasoning of the Indira Gandhi administration and changed their deontic scores, as we shall see, in systematic ways. The default-commitments of other actors, which endorsed Pakistan's claims on sovereignty and non-intervention and the contestation of the game of giving and asking for reasons created a process of undermining the practical aspect of addressing the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan.

To begin with, the major premise of the Indian administration at this stage – the broadly motivational goal – in seeking refugee resettlement in East Pakistan was not the result of formal properties of Hindu-Muslim ratios in South Asia but value considerations based on democracy, human rights, and human dignity.⁴³ Clearly, the sudden influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees in just a few days posed a massive financial and security burden upon India. Given the history of such massive migrations during the Partition of the Indian subcontinent and after the 1950s communal conflicts that led to the famous Liaquat-Nehru Pact, a bilateral treaty between India and Pakistan for safe settlement of refugees from East Pakistan to West Bengal, the Indian Gandhi administration could have accepted the situation as *fait accompli*.⁴⁴

⁴³ Bass 2015.

⁴⁴ For other refugee crisis and the pact see, Raghavan 2010.

However, the administration clearly chose to avoid such things and couched its diplomacy on values of human rights and democracy. The intentional inhumane treatment of Bengalis by the Pakistani military reigned largely in India's calculations. Indira Gandhi stated that Mujibur Rahman and the larger East Pakistani population stood for values such as democracy, secularism, and socialism, those values which Indians "cherish"⁴⁵ and thus the administration cannot remain indifferent to the "macabre tragedy being enacted" close to its border. Further, the claims of human rights violations, genocide, and social disintegration aimed to convince the Western publics of the need to address this humanitarian problem immediately and bring out a political solution.⁴⁶

Given the non-binding nature of norms on human rights and fundamental freedom in the 1970s, the administration gave two innovative reasons in the first stage to change the default commitment of non-intervention of the scorekeepers and attain the goal of peaceful refugee resettlement. With the first move in the game of giving and asking reasons, the Indira Gandhi administration aimed to impress upon the scorekeepers that the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan is not an internal affair of Pakistan. Indira Gandhi categorically stated, "one cannot but be perturbed when fire breaks out in a neighbour's house."⁴⁷ More precisely, she asserted:

What is happening in Bangla Desh has many-sided repercussions on our internal affairs. That is why I have said that this cannot be considered merely as an internal problem of Pakistan. It is an Indian problem. More, it is a world-wide problem. The international community must appreciate the very critical character of the situation that has now developed. Any failure to do so may well lead to disastrous consequences. For what is happening in Bangla Desh is not just a political and economic problem. It is a problem of the very survival of the people of that whole area, the people of Bangla Desh.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Rajya Sabha Debate, 27 March 1971, IGSS, 11

⁴⁶ The administration passed a Resolution to this effect, which was unanimously adopted by both Houses of Parliament, March 31, 1971.

⁴⁷ From the speech at the luncheon given by Mr. A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Moscow, September 28, 1971.

⁴⁸ Reply to discussion in Lok Sabha, May 26, 1971, IGSS, p.20

In several platforms, Indian policymakers reiterated its claim that the crisis in East Pakistan is not an internal affair of Pakistan but affects India, South-East Asia, and the entire world.⁴⁹

Indian intelligence services cautioned Indira Gandhi that Maoist revolutionaries were fomenting upheaval in the refugee camps.⁵⁰ Further, the mass influx of refugees with the onset of monsoon led to serious health problems including six thousand deaths from cholera alone by September⁵¹ and fear of social disintegration because India's meager help to refugee might foment dissatisfaction among the already impoverished local populace who might "consider refugees to be better off than them."⁵² Thus, publicly criticizing Pakistan, Indira Gandhi reasoned, "We are, therefore, entitled to ask Pakistan to desist immediately from all action which it is taking in the name of domestic jurisdiction, and which vitally affect the peace and well-being of millions of our citizens. Pakistan cannot be allowed to seek a solution of its political or other problems at the expense of India and on Indian soil."⁵³

Through this, the administration reasoned that the crisis in East Pakistan is a worldwide problem because the Pakistani military regime is engaged in genocide and massive human rights violations. Indians branded Pakistan's crackdown as action contrary to fundamental international norms and law and equated Pakistan with Nazi Germany engaged in the holocaust against Bengalis.⁵⁴ From the start, the administration pleaded that the international community must stop the aggravation of the situation in East Pakistan and made a unanimous assertion – across party lines – that Pakistan's action amounted to genocide and mass atrocity crimes that are

⁴⁹ It is not Pakistan's internal problem was made in several platforms. See in the Reply to discussion in Lok Sabha, May 26, 1971. Also See Indira Gandhi Meeting with Economic Editors Assembled in New Delhi, June 17, 1971. All in IGSS pp.30-31

⁵⁰ Jayakar 1992; Bass 2015, 269.

⁵¹ Bass 2013, 133.

⁵² Raghavan 2013, 76.

⁵³ Indira Gandhi, Statement in Lok Sabha, May 24, 1971.

⁵⁴ Bass 2015, 253.

inimical to the community of states.⁵⁵ By bringing in the “neustic”⁵⁶ force of genocide in the game of giving and asking for reasons, a forceful diplomatic criticism against Pakistan’s military action became possible and by calling upon the international community to act, the Indian administration crucially marginalized the discourse on non-intervention. In simple words, the power of the discourse on non-intervention, at least for India, flew in the face of mass-atrocity crimes and genocide committed by Pakistan. Indira Gandhi reasoned with Nixon, “Would the League of Nations Observers have succeeded in persuading the refugees who fled from Hitler’s tyranny to return even whilst the pogroms against the Jews and political opponents of Nazism continued unabated?”⁵⁷ Thus, the practical inference is clear, the world community must intervene to overthrow Yahya Khan and create credible “guarantees for the future of [refugee’s] safety and well-being” in Pakistan.⁵⁸

The second move of the Indira Gandhi administration in the game to ensure peaceful refugee resettlement was to reason with the scorekeepers that the crisis in East Pakistan was not an India-Pakistan problem. In other words, just because the crisis is not an internal affair of Pakistan does not mean that it is an India-Pakistan dispute either. This is important because multiple scorekeepers, particularly United States, China, including to some extent USSR at this stage suspected that India aimed to cut its archenemy to size and thus remained skeptical of the genuine humanitarian aspect of India’s claims on the human rights violations of the Bengali populace. However, Indira Gandhi reasoned:

The military regime in Islamabad is isolated from its people and is waging war against them. That is why it seeks to divert the attention of the people of Pakistan, as well as of the rest of the world, from the agony of Bangla Desh by attempting to give an Indo-Pakistan complexion to the problem.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ See resolutions passed in the Indian Parliament Government of India, 1972.

⁵⁶ For the neustic force, Kratochwil 1989, 32.

⁵⁷ Quoted in, Bass 2015, 254.

⁵⁸ Statement in Lok Sabha, May 24, 1971, IGSS, p.15

⁵⁹ Prime Minister Indira Gandhi interview with the Secretary-General World Peace Council, published on August 26, 1971, IGSS, p.40

In several platforms, Indian policymakers reasoned with and against the scorekeepers to look at the crisis as the result of malicious intentions of the military regime in Pakistan and not as an India-Pakistan dispute. Indians were swift to show that the Bengalis settled in squalid camps in India not out of their own choice but as, “victims of war who have sought refuge from military terror”⁶⁰ that had “nothing to do with communal problem” between India and Pakistan.⁶¹

Scorekeepers remained unconvinced. During this stage, Nixon and Kissinger were secretly using the support of the thoroughgoing loyalist General Yahya Khan to open new diplomatic relations with China. Thus, publicly the United States deferred to Pakistan’s normative commitments on non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. However, in June 1971, *The New York Times* ran a full public story on the official US shipment of arms to Pakistan, which starkly showed the geopolitical calculations in the US-Pakistan alliance and the American refusal to accept the humanitarian crisis as one beyond India-Pakistan dispute.⁶² Other scorekeepers from Western Europe inherited this geopolitical imaginary based on superpower competition much to the disappointment of Indian policymakers.⁶³

To change the default normative commitments of scorekeepers and show that the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan is not an India-Pakistan problem, the Indira Gandhi administration made *three* important moves in the game of giving and asking for reasons that set off a chain reaction of scorekeeping action. First, the Indian Gandhi administration refused the United Nations observers because of the doxastic commitment that the crisis is not an India-Pakistan problem.

⁶⁰ Lok Sabha, May 24, 1971, IGSS, p.15

⁶¹ Address to the ruling party’s parliamentary committee on Communalism 2 July 1971, IGSS, p.32

⁶² Tad Szulc, “U.S. Military Goods Sent to Pakistan Despite Ban,” *New York Times*, 22 June 1971

⁶³ For example, Britain, France, including Canada remained committed to the view in this stage that the issue is an India-Pakistan problem.

Indira Gandhi fiercely reasoned that any UN action that does not aim to change the political situation is a worthless bureaucratic endeavor. Part of India's skepticism with regard to the UN was because of the way the institution handed the historical Kashmir dispute and engulfed it within the broader superpower rivalry of the Cold War. Practically, Indira Gandhi wanted to avoid all that:

What is the purpose of their [UN personnel] coming here? It is said that they will come and see why the refugees are not returning. Now it seems to me a rather ridiculous question when everyday 35,000, 40,000, 42,000 are coming...So, the first thing for the United Nations, if it wants to do anything is to see that conditions are created within Bangla Desh which will guarantee the return of the refugees in safety and dignity. Then is the next step, when they could approach us and say: Look, we have done this, will you allow us to come and persuade your refugees! At that stage, certainly the matter can be considered.⁶⁴

At this stage, most important scorekeepers such as the United States, USSR, China, including some sections of the Global Media knew that Indian administration armed rebel groups inside East Pakistan⁶⁵ and that India refuses UN observers in order to guard its secret support to the guerrilla campaign. For those scorekeepers who practically inferred that the humanitarian crisis could be "solved" if India and Pakistan could have a genuine conversation, India's reasons for refusing the role of UN were not good reasons for solving the humanitarian crisis.

Second, and in continuation of India's normative commitments against UN observers, the administration also refused Third-Party mediation. Indira Gandhi fiercely cut down the proposal of Yugoslavia's mediation: "On what subject will any country mediate? This is what I have not been able to understand. There is a liberation struggle in Bangla Desh. What is the point of mediation with us [India and Pakistan]? That problem has to be solved there. We are only concerned because of the struggle, because of the atrocities; 13 percent of the population of

⁶⁴ Press Conference at New Delhi, October 19, 1971, IGSS, p.44

⁶⁵ See report of Sydney H. Schanberg, "Bengalis Form a Cabinet as the Bloodshed Goes On," *New York Times*, 14 April 1971;

Bangla Desh is now on Indian soil.”⁶⁶ This reasoning further reinforced the idea, among scorekeepers that India aimed to dismember Pakistan and use the humanitarian situation in East Pakistan as a ploy for its larger geopolitical goals.⁶⁷

The third and the most drastic public move of the Indira Gandhi administration, at least as perceived by other scorekeepers, was the Indo-Soviet Treaty of “Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” signed on 9 August 1971. For India that pronounced the very principle of non-alignment in the international system, the treaty generated many questions on India’s grand strategy in the Cold War. Yet, Indira Gandhi utilized the discourse on enlisting the support of Great Powers and maintained that the treaty actually strengthens the forces of non-alignment “and it will discourage adventurism on the part of countries which have shown a pathological hostility towards us [India].”⁶⁸ Foreign Minister Swaran Singh reasoned that with the security provisions of the treaty, the Soviet Union is “not entitled to make military supplies to Pakistan” and by inference, it prevents further massacres of the Bengalis.⁶⁹

However, for the Russians, the Indo-Soviet treaty was only a deterrent for India against aggression from Pakistan and China⁷⁰ so that the Indira Gandhi administration could peacefully find a political solution to refugee resettlement in East Pakistan. In other words, the Soviet Union had its suspicions about India’s intentions and made it clear that the treaty did not provide a *carte blanche* on India’s entitlement for action.⁷¹ Regardless of the true motives of the Indian and Soviet policymakers, scorekeepers such as the United States, Pakistan, UN, and China

⁶⁶ Indira Gandhi, Press Conference at New Delhi, October 19, 1971 in IGSS, p.45

⁶⁷ See for instance Qutubuddin Aziz 1973.

⁶⁸ Indira Gandhi’s public remark at the Foreign Press Association, IGSS, p.40. Also see importantly, Indira Gandhi’s replies to questions from Shri Romesh Chandra, Secretary-General of the World Peace Council, August 26, 1971, IGSS, p.40

⁶⁹ Defense Minister Swaran Singh Speech at the All-India Congress Committee Session at Simla, October 9, 1971.

⁷⁰ Raghavan 2013, 123.

⁷¹ Ibid.; Parthasarathi 2011.

became skeptical about the normative commitments of the India in East Pakistan. Clearly, during this stage, India could neither secure deontic acknowledgments and endorsements to its commitments nor attain any entitlements for action.

Given the instrumentalist nature of the normative context in the deontic scorekeeping space, the India Gandhi administration also quite tactfully used its practical reasons to trap the interlocutors and compel a change in deontic scores thus not easily giving in to the pressures of superpowers unilaterally fixing the meaning to the humanitarian crisis situation in East Pakistan. Thus, its reasons that the crisis in East Pakistan is not an internal affair of Pakistan enabled India to press the issue of Pakistan's human rights violations at a session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Despite Pakistan's protestation, Nixon and Kissinger were unable to stop India.⁷² The head of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations George H.W. Bush argued, "silencing India would be contrary to [the] tradition which we have supported that [the] human rights questions transcend[s] domestic jurisdiction and should be freely debated."⁷³ Thereafter, the Indian delegation came down with the full force of diplomatic criticism against Pakistan's violation of human rights. It changed the normative commitments of several interlocutors most crucial of which is the Soviet Union. Despite its own human rights record, the Soviet Union "demanded that Pakistan end its repression, respect election results, and uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."⁷⁴ Such a dynamic shift in the relations between actors at least showed the possibility that a more tactful engagement with interlocutors by showing them the "truth" could secure normative commitments and entitlements for India. Thus, Indira Gandhi set out a world tour to persuade other scorekeepers.

⁷² Bass 2015, 250.

⁷³ Ibid,

⁷⁴ Bass 2015, 250–51.

To summarize, during the first stage of practical reasoning, from 31 March 1971 and 24 October 1971, the Indira Gandhi administration was concerned about achieving the goal of peaceful resettlement of ten million refugees back to East Pakistan. One cannot merely feed the refugees back to the jaws of the genocidal military regime and thus the administration's broad motivational premise in the practical reasoning was to engage with other scorekeepers to seek credible guarantees for refugee resettlement and the future safety, dignity, and well-being of those refugees. Towards this objective, the administration offered two reasons: (1) the crisis in East Pakistan is not an internal affair of Pakistan, and (2) the crisis in East Pakistan is not an India-Pakistan dispute. This course of reasoning led to a chain reaction of scorekeeping actions by multiple interlocutors, which paradoxically created immense problems in India's normative commitments and entitlements to action. Further, the competing alternative discourses on humanitarianism in India such as diplomatic criticism, rebel-support, non-intervention, and enlisting the support of Great Powers did not secure the attainment of its goal of resettlement of ten million Bengalis back to East Pakistan. The three other moves in the game (1) India's refusal of UN involvement; (2) India's refusal of Third-Party mediation; and (2) India-Soviet Treaty only reinforced some scorekeepers' inferences – particularly Pakistan, US, China and the UN – on India's malicious intention to dismember Pakistan and cut its adversary to size. At this juncture, the Indira Gandhi administration stepped to the next stage of practical reasoning to bilaterally impress upon intransigent scorekeepers the urgency of the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan.

5.4.2. Stage Two: Please Focus on the People of Bangladesh

The practical reasoning of the Indira Gandhi administration in Stage Two, between 25 October 1971 and 15 November 1971, is closely connected to Stage One in the sense that India aimed to reason meaningfully about the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan and impress upon the scorekeepers to change their default normative commitments and entitlements on the issue. Its

normative commitment was that Pakistan cannot seek solutions to its problems in the Indian soil and if only the Great Powers and the world community could understand the gravity of the genocidal campaign of the Pakistani military regime, India could be a partner in bringing about a political solution to the problem through peaceful resettlement of the refugees. Some scorekeepers attributed to India, quite unreasonably as seen by the Indira Gandhi administration, a commitment to dismember Pakistan and thus the Indian policymakers aimed to remove such misgivings with renewed force. The instrumental premise was to secure the support of members of the international community by showing them the “truth” of the humanitarian crisis. In this stage, the administration engaged with multiple competing alternative discourses in addressing the humanitarian crisis and Indira Gandhi personally toured a series of World capitals from Brussels, Vienna, London, Washington, to Paris and Bonn to seek the support of the international community to address the genocidal campaign in India’s immediate neighborhood.

Although Indira Gandhi maintained in several international meetings that she traveled abroad with no goal or end in view but merely to reciprocate the long-standing invitations, the broad premise was clearly to bring about a change in the normative attitude of the members of the international community and particularly those interlocutors in the deontic space. Indira Gandhi asserted in a public interview in Washington:

In various capitals I have visited on this tour I have been asked what solution India would like. The question is not what we would like, or what one or other of the big powers would like, but what the people of East Bengal will accept and what solution would be a lasting one. I would like to plead with the world not to press me for a solution which leave out the people of East Bengal. It is an illusion to think that the fate of a country can be decided without reference to its people...If democracy is good for you, it is good for us in India, and it is good for the people of East Bengal. The suppression of democracy is the original cause of all the trouble in Pakistan. The nations of the world should make up their minds who is more important to them, one man and his machine or a whole nation [*sic*].⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Indira Gandhi remarks at the National Press Club, 5 November 1971, IGSS, p.64

In order to achieve this goal, the Indian administration aimed to nail its already articulated reasons – crisis in East Pakistan is neither an internal affair of Pakistan nor an India-Pakistan dispute – with renewed vigor to the scorekeepers and advanced several practical inferences to remove the misgivings against India’s normative commitments in East Pakistan. Two important practical inferences that the Indian administration offered to the international community require close attention: (1) members supplying arms to the Pakistan military regime directly contributes to its genocidal campaign in East Pakistan, and (2) securing the release of Mujibur Rahman will ensure the speedy political solution to the problem. As we shall see, these two practical inferences functioned as normative traps for other scorekeepers. Specifically, those who accepted these practical inferences could not accuse India of having malicious intentions in dismembering Pakistan and at the same time, it brought to light the geopolitical game played by US-Pakistan-China triangle to the crisis. The interactions set off a chain reaction of scorekeeping actions.

To begin with, in all the world capitals Indira Gandhi visited – Brussels, Vienna, London, Washington, Paris, and Bonn – she nailed the claim that the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan is neither an internal problem of Pakistan nor an India-Pakistan dispute. Many scorekeepers did not take these reasons as good reasons for intervening in Pakistan to stop its genocidal campaign and ensure peaceful resettlement of the ten million refugees. Yet Indira Gandhi asserted, “The occasion is too serious for the scoring of propaganda points.”⁷⁶ In an exasperated statement, she noted:

We are for any solutions that is viable and lasting. Nothing, however, will work if people continue to equate India with Pakistan. We are tired of this equation which the Western world is always making: it does not matter what Pakistan does; India and Pakistan are equal. We are *not* equal and we are not going to stand for this kind of treatment.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Government of India 1972, vol. 2 Volumes, 263.

⁷⁷ Foreign Policy Association Luncheon in London, November 1, 1971, IGSS, p.63 speeches; Emphasis added

Now to ensure the support of international community and to change to already titled deontic scores against India – as discussed in the previous section – the Indira Gandhi administration made two important practical inferences on the default normative commitment of the scorekeepers. First, the unreasonable indifference to the situation by the scorekeepers means that they would continue to supply arms and ammunition to Pakistan, which the regime will use against India and also further its genocidal campaign in East Pakistan. The focus was on US supply of arms to Pakistan but Indira Gandhi couched it with such diplomatic finesse that other scorekeepers acknowledged India's normative commitment against human rights violations in Pakistan.⁷⁸ If we remember, the discussion of *enthymeme* in the analytical chapter on how one could infer Dionysius is aiming at a tyranny because of the shared *topos* among actors based on their practical experience with tyrannous leaders and their bodyguards in the past, one finds several such *enthymematic* discussions on US arms sales to Pakistan. See the discussion between Henry Kissinger serving as Assistant to President Nixon on National Security Affairs and P.N. Haksar, the Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi:

Kissinger: I must say that the question of arms sales is the worst example of bureaucratic muddle. When I read about it in the *New York Times*, I myself taken aback, we are having it thoroughly investigated...India should not really worry too much about these arms sales [to Pakistan]. Taking the overall position, these supplies are only of marginal significance. There is also the consideration that we have to have some leverage with Yahya Khan...

Haksar: But when you argue that it is of marginal significance, I personally do not agree. Also, you cannot explain the arms supply as a bureaucratic muddle and yet argue that such supply gives you leverage. There is some contradiction in this... You are aware that between 1954 and 1965, the United States, ignoring all protests from India, pumped into Pakistan \$2 billion worth of military hardware...Despite the assurances given by President Eisenhower that American arms supplies will not be used against India, they were used exclusively against India...⁷⁹

In several platforms, Indian policymakers reiterated its *enthymematic* inference that arms supplied to Pakistan would directly affect India and the situation in East Pakistan. Indira Gandhi was

⁷⁸ For example, after this Japan, West Germany, France, Canada, including Israel acknowledged India's normative commitments and cut down aid to Pakistan. See 1971:162

⁷⁹ Record of the meeting between the Kissinger and Haksar, 6 July 1971, File Number: 0590, Tag: Secret (Declassified), p.1395 Bhasin 2012, vol. I–X.

more forthright in her world tour and specifically in a public press interview with the *BBC* in London, she reasoned in the following way:

Question: Prime Minister, it has always been India's point of view in this present crisis over refugees, that other countries should put pressure on Pakistan to ameliorate the situation in East Pakistan so that the refugees can go back. What sort of pressure do you envisage that other countries could put on Pakistan?

Indira Gandhi: Well, Pakistan has been getting help, military and economic, from other countries and I think that had this been made clear at the beginning that they would not get support in this adventure or misadventure that they are indulging in Bangla Desh, this matter would never have gone so far.⁸⁰

The world became starkly aware of Bangladesh and Pakistan's genocidal pogrom not least because of the great concert organized in Madison Square Garden by Ravi Shankar and the Beatles where George Harrison and Eric Clapton thrilled the audience, among other hits, with "While my Guitar Gently Weeps" to the thunderous uproar of the New York crowd.⁸¹ Thus, Indira Gandhi's visit came at a very important time when the deontic scores of the Global Public Opinion favored India. As Srinath Raghavan shows, Canada, Japan, Britain, France, and "The governments of Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands also bowed to public opinion that had grown censorious of Pakistan, and they suspended further economic aid. The only countries that bucked this trend were Italy and Spain."⁸² Other scorekeepers, particularly, members of the Non-Aligned movement were particularly opposed to India. As Gary Bass shows:

India was particularly hurt by its near-total abandonment by the Non-Aligned Movement, particularly Indonesia and Egypt. Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait pressured Egypt to be even more pro-Pakistan. While India did get some donations for the refugees, the total sum was, senior officials noted, miserably inadequate. In Parliament, the Prime Minister was accused of "taking a begging bowl to other countries. As India's ambassador in Paris reported, "The problem really is of India, and the world in general is not directly affected."⁸³

The implication is clear, some scorekeepers acknowledged and endorsed India's and the international community's normative commitments to the mass atrocity crimes in East Pakistan

⁸⁰ Public Interview on BBC World Service 1 November 1971, IGSS, p.55

⁸¹ Raghavan 2013, 143.

⁸² Ibid., 162.

⁸³ Bass 2015, 278.

but other remained intransigent to change their deontic scores in response to India's inferences on the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan.

The second practical inference of the Indira Gandhi administration was to show to the scorekeepers that their shared interpretation of the malicious intentions of India to cut Pakistan to size actually provides room for Pakistan's military regime to put Mujibur Rahman on the secret trail and ignore the results of free and fair elections in East Pakistan. Already, U.S. senator Ted Kennedy directly called Pakistan's military action as genocide when the Indian government brought him directly to the border to show him the pliable conditions of the suffering refugees.⁸⁴ Kennedy had publicly remarked it was a "travesty" and "the only crimes the Mujib is guilty of is winning an election."⁸⁵ In her world tour, Indira Gandhi categorically stated that "If Sheikh Mujibur Rahman could be released and he would be willing to talk over these matters we would certainly not stand in the way."⁸⁶ The practical inference of seeking the release of Mujibur Rahman is to show that India is committed to finding peaceful political solutions to the problem and thus attributing any malicious intentions upon India by scorekeepers specifically such as the United States but also Pakistan, China, or the UN is "to take a very short-term view" of the entire situation.⁸⁷

These two practical inferences of the Indira Gandhi administration functioned as crucial normative traps set by the Indira Gandhi administration to shape the narrative of the crisis in important ways and seek acknowledgments and endorsements for India's normative commitment and entitlements in East Pakistan. Specifically, those interlocutors who endorsed

⁸⁴ See Chapter 15, Bass 2013.

⁸⁵ Sydney H. Schanberg, "Kennedy, in India, Terms Pakistan Drive Genocide," *New York Times*, 17 August 1971.

⁸⁶ Indira Gandhi's public remarks at Britain-India forum, 1 November 1971, IGSS, p.54,

⁸⁷ On Indira's accusation of United States's short term view, see her remarks at Foreign Press Association luncheon in London, November 1, 1971, IGSS, p.59

these practical inferences were compelled to endorse India's reasons as good reasons for action otherwise, one would just be acquiescing a Hitlerite regime in Pakistan. For example, when a reporter in BBC publicly asked if India is contributing to the refugee problem by arming the Bengali guerrillas and if India should stop supporting them to quieten the crisis, Indira Gandhi went on a rhetorical fury. "May I ask you: when Hitler was on the rampage why didn't you say that let's keep quiet, let's have peace in Germany, and let the Jews die, let Belgium die or let France die?...This would have never happened if the world community woke up to the fact when we first drew attention to it."⁸⁸ Similarly, in the United States, Indira Gandhi invoked the ideals of the American nation to compel the Nixon administration to endorse stance that they might otherwise ignore. At a banquet hosted by President Nixon in Washington, Indira Gandhi asserted, "We are paying the price of our traditions of an open society. Of all peoples, surely those of the United States should understand this. Has not your own society built of people who have fled from social and economic injustices? Have not your doors always been open?"⁸⁹ The upshot is that the Indira Gandhi administration carefully chose the practical inferences to persuade the intransigent interlocutors to acknowledge and endorse India's normative commitments and entitlements for some form of action in East Pakistan.

However, the broader instrumental nature of the deontic scorekeeping space enabled interlocutors to hold multiple positions with impunity and the competing discourses on humanitarianism in India could not enable a clear policy alternative for the Indira Gandhi administration. These two points require some elaboration. Some scorekeepers like Pakistan, United States, and China did not acknowledge India's normative commitments - India has no

⁸⁸ The interviewer was the BBC's Micheal Charlton, 1 November 1971, IGSS, p. 62

⁸⁹ Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's speech at banquet by President Nixon in Washington, 4 November 1971, in *Bangladesh Documents* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1972), 1:263

business interfering in the internal affairs of other states.⁹⁰ Others like the USSR, UN, Global Public Opinion acknowledged and endorsed India's normative commitments in East Pakistan crisis but withheld India's entitlements for action. UN Secretary General Thant proposed observers from UN High Commission for Refugees to manage the situation in East Pakistan, which as we say was completely unacceptable bureaucratic whitewashing by India. Now, these actors became important scorekeepers because India aimed to change their doxastic commitments and crucially could not ignore their political claims in interactions with impunity. Other scorekeepers such as the Indian domestic opinion and members of the Awami League who acknowledged and endorsed both India's deontic commitments and entitlements to action were less important at this stage of practical reasoning. These multiple positions of scorekeepers in the deontic scorekeeping space and the instrumental norm-type in interactions led to a panoply of inferences that inhibited a clear policy undertaking by the Indira Gandhi administration to address the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan. Echoing the present debates on R2P, Indira Gandhi asked, "Will the world be concerned only if people die because of war between two countries and not if hundreds of thousands are butchered and expelled by a military regime waging war against the people? We cannot draw upon precedents to deal with this unprecedented variety of aggression."⁹¹ The upshot is that the competing alternative discourses on humanitarianism in India – the precedents – are quite unhelpful to bring a solution to the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan.

Specifically, the competing alternative discourses in India on handling humanitarian crisis abroad were quite unhelpful in bridging the gap between deontic commitments acknowledged and entitlements sought for action. In September 1971 Yahya Khan explicitly stated in a public interview, "if the Indians imagine they will be able to take one morsel of my territory without

⁹⁰ Bass 2015, 197-253.

⁹¹ Remarks at National Press Club, Washington, November 5, 1971. Speeches, IGSS, p.64

provoking war, they are making a serious mistake. Let me warn you and warn the world that it would mean war, out and out war.”⁹² The discourse on diplomatic criticism, particularly Indira Gandhi’s fury over Pakistan in several platforms, had an impact on other scorekeepers but the practical commitment of translating this diplomatic criticism to tactful action to actually address the practical problem remained.

The discourse on rebel support, on the other hand, enabled India to address the mass-atrocity crimes in East Pakistan in a tactful manner but at the cost of losing the normative commitments secured from other interlocutors. None of the scorekeepers who challenged India’s normative commitments and those who withheld entitlements for action was ready to offer a public approval and endorsement of India’s support to guerrilla campaign in East Pakistan. Similarly, the “neustic” force of genocide in East Pakistan displaced the discourse on non-intervention but the discourse on enlisting the support of great powers did not offer an entitlement preserving intervention inside Pakistan. The result in this stage of India’s practical reasoning, despite the normative traps the Indira Gandhi administration set for scorekeepers, was a profound inability of India to provide good inferences for action that could secure entitlements for action. This set the next stage of inferences on humanitarianism crisis in East Pakistan.

To summarize, during the Second Stage of practical reasoning, from 25 October 1971 to 15 November 1971, the Indira Gandhi administration engaged in direct bilateral interactions with several scorekeepers and members of the international community to remove the misgiving about India’s intentions in the East Pakistan crisis. Towards this objective, the administration reinforced its reasons for action – the crisis in East Pakistan is not an internal affair of Pakistan

⁹² President Yahya Khan’s interview with *Le Figaro*, Paris, September 1, 1971, in *Bangladesh Documents*, 1:136

and the crisis in East Pakistan is not an India-Pakistan dispute – with renewed vigor. It also engaged in offering *enthymematic inferences* on the links between arms supply and the continuation of Pakistan's genocidal pogrom in East Pakistan and the links between the Mujibur Rahman's lockdown in the secret military prison and the inability to bring about a political solution to the problem.

This course of reasoning led to a chain reaction of scorekeeping actions by multiple interlocutors, which led to the concatenation of scorekeepers with different positions in the deontic space. Some scorekeepers, Pakistan, the US, and China, did not acknowledge India's commitments and they disregarded any public pressure. Others like the USSR, UN, Global Public Opinion through investigative journalism, acknowledged and attributed a normative commitment to India with regard to the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan but withheld any entitlements for action. The broader instrumental norm-type in interactions led scorekeepers to free ride on the deliberations and contestation of language games. Finally, some other scorekeepers like the Indian domestic opinion and the Awami League endorsed, acknowledged, and attributed both normative commitments and entitlements for action on the part of India. The competing alternative discourses on humanitarianism in India did not offer a suitable policy understanding outside this problem of the multiple positionalities of different scorekeepers. At this juncture, the Indira Gandhi administration stepped to the next stage concluding practically that an action is to be done by acting in accordance with India's reasoning.

5.4.3. Stage Three: Concluding practically that an Action is to be done

In the period between 15 November 1971 and 22 December 1971, when the deontic scores tilted against India and the competing alternative discourses on humanitarianism in India did not enable a clear policy option, the Indira Gandhi administration concluded practically that an

action is to be done which is in accordance with its practical reasoning and inferences. In order to achieve the goal of bringing about a political solution in East Pakistan, the Indira Gandhi administration judged to engage in a war with Pakistan. Many scorekeepers claimed India's practical commitment to solving the crisis in East Pakistan through war is incompatible with state practices in the contemporary global order. However, for the Indira Gandhi administration not acting this way is incompatible with its own reasons and crucially incompatible with the practical inferences made explicit in the previous two stages. In other words, Indian policymakers saw the war as "committive"⁹³ inference that follows from its practical reasons offered in the previous two stages. Crucially, the tension between scorekeepers acknowledging India's normative commitments in searching for solutions to the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan and withholding India's entitlements for action, which enabled the Indira Gandhi administration to securitize the refugee situation and wage war against Pakistan. This raises a crucial theoretical question if rhetorical coercion could function only when instrumental norms underwrite interaction-in-context. I will take up this point in the conclusion.

By examining the justifications offered by the Indira Gandhi administration one can comprehend how humanitarian military intervention in Pakistan became a commissive inference from the game of giving and asking for reasons with and against its scorekeepers and as an important policy in the face of other alternative discourses for action. As we saw in the analytical framework of this thesis, undertaking a practical commitment involves demonstrating entitlement to it and this takes the form of a specifically justificatory responsibility. According to Brandom, "Only against the background of a general capacity of comprehend and fulfill such a justificatory responsibility – to assess and produce reasons for practical commitments – can what one does have the significance of an acknowledgment of a practical commitment, that is, the

⁹³ On the discussion on inferences see the analytical framework of this thesis

significance of acquiring or expressing an intention.”⁹⁴ Clearly, Indira Gandhi’s justifications for military intervention did not arise from anywhere but systematically followed from the practical reasons, inferences, and the deontic scores India and other scorekeepers kept on each other.

To begin with, by early November, most scorekeepers crucially acknowledged the normative commitments of India and the international community to the mass atrocity crimes in Pakistan but they also withheld any normative entitlements for India to bring about political solutions to the problem. Crucially, as we saw, the United States, Pakistan, and China did not acknowledge, attribute, or endorse both the normative commitments and entitlements of India. After her engagement with these scorekeepers, elaborated in State One and Stage Two, Indira Gandhi’s normative judgment is rather explicit:

All these countries agree that conditions must be created inside Bangla Desh to stop the further influx of refugees and to facilitate the return to their homeland in safety and dignity of those now in India. *Having said this I must make it clear that we cannot depend on the international community, or even the countries which I visited, to solve the problems for us.* We appreciate their sympathy and moral and political support, but the brunt of the burden has to be borne by us and by the people of Bangla Desh who have our fullest sympathy and support. So far as the threat to our security is concerned, we must be prepared – and we are prepared – to the last man and woman, to safeguard our freedom and territorial integrity...⁹⁵

The judgment that the international community cannot solve the problems of East Pakistan crisis for India is understandable only against the deontic scores, practical inferences, and the game of giving and asking for reasons among scorekeepers rather than intelligible antecedently and prior to India’s practical reasoning. This is important because India’s premise, as we saw, was to ensure that the international community and the Great Powers endorse India’s reasons – the crisis is not an internal affair of Pakistan and the crisis is not an India-Pakistan dispute – as good reasons for action and will impress upon intransigent Yahya Khan and bring a political solution to the problem. The Indira Gandhi administration’s deep inner motives do not matter

⁹⁴ Brandom 1994, 254.

⁹⁵ Statement by Indira Gadhi in the Indian Parliament, 15 November 1971, IGSS, p.105 Emphasis added

here because of the interactions through publicly articulated reasons, as Skinner shows, already constraints and enables action in important ways.⁹⁶ Further, the instrumental norm that guided the endorsements and challenges of India's practical inferences placed scorekeepers in distinct positions in the deontic scorekeeping network, which guided the moves of Indian policymaker rather than in any *a priori* fashion. In other words, India's judgment was contingent on the deontic scores of the game and on how the scorekeepers accepted or rejected the practical inferences of the Indira Gandhi administration rather based on foreordained beliefs and desires.

This also means that the judgment and action – military intervention in Pakistan – of the Indira Gandhi administration was not mere *post hoc* rationalization or excuses given to scorekeepers but specific commitments that are conclusions of its practical reasoning. In other words, India's military intervention was an intentional action, fit to enter into the rational order of deontic scores governing the interactions among scorekeepers. Similarly, the marginalization of alternative discourses is a result of India's normative commitment claimed to answer what is it to act on the basis of its practical reasoning in the deontic scorekeeping space. Only by taking India's justificatory responsibility seriously, we can understand how its judgment and action were commissive inferences that follow from the concatenation of deontic scores of the conversation. Take, for example, India Gandhi's justification for India's military action in the middle of the India-Pakistan War, specifically on the 12 December when the UN Security Council was taking India to task for aggression and violation of the sovereignty of Pakistan:

We are facing this danger not because it is a sport, not because we want the territory of another nation or we want to destroy any nation. We do not want anybody's territory. We never wanted that any nation which is our neighbour, or any other, should be destroyed. But we knew fully well that what had happened in Bangla Desh – the voice of freedom of its people, the demand for freedom, the flame which had sprung from the hearts of the freedom-loving people of Bangla Desh – could not be suppressed. We also knew that if that voice of freedom was suppressed, our own independence would be seriously threatened and

⁹⁶ Skinner 1988, 117.

this blow to our freedom would mean a blow to our basic principles. That is why we are fighting today, and, as I said earlier, we are not fighting to acquire anybody's territory or to destroy any other nation...⁹⁷

In a couple of day after this speech, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wrote a letter to U.S.

President Nixon and had the following claims:

War could have been avoided, if the power, influence and authority of all the States, and above all of the United States, had got Shiekh Mujibur Rahman released... Lip service was paid to the need for a political solution, but not a single worthwhile step was taken to bring about... The fact of the matter is that the rulers of West Pakistan got away with the impression that they could do what they liked because no one, not even the United States, would choose to take a public position that while Pakistan's integrity was certainly sacrosanct, human rights, liberty, were no less so and that there was a necessary inter-connection between the inviolability of States and the contentment of their people.⁹⁸

In several platforms, Indian policymakers justified its India's military intervention as an action aimed to bring about a political solution to the crisis in East Pakistan and the administration made, *inter alia*, two important moves in its justificatory responsibility, which shows this conclusion was indeed commissive inferences from its practical reasoning since March 1970. First, the administration justified its unilateral intervention because of the inability of the international community and the UN to bring about a practical solution to the problem. The Minister of Defense for India, Swaran Singh, for example, argued in the UN Security Council debate that, "It is a matter of grief for us that a military confrontation has come about. We believe that it has occurred because of the failure of the international community to act upon the realities of the situation as it developed and meet it with objectivity and promptness in a manner which would have prevented it from deteriorating into this present stage."⁹⁹ In several other public platforms, the Indian Government justified its actions as the result of the failure of international community and the UN to bring about a political solution to the mass atrocity crimes in East Pakistan.

⁹⁷ Indira Gandhi Speech, at Ramlila Ground, Delhi, 12 December 1971, IGSS, p.137

⁹⁸ Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's letter to the U.S. President, 15 December 1971, *Bangladesh Documents*, 1:302-303

⁹⁹ Speech by Swaran Singh in the UN Security Council, 12 December 1971, in *India's Speeches in the United Nations* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1972), 1:2

Clearly, the normative judgment on the inability of the international community and the UN to solve the humanitarian crisis came for India through the marginalization of discourses in India on non-intervention and referring the limits of the discourse on diplomatic criticism. In the course of war, on 6 December 1971, India officially recognized Bangladesh and emphasized that India does not have any intention to occupy the territory of East Pakistan. One has to intervene for the cause of human rights, democracy, and freedom and merely arming rebels is contrary to India's public support of these causes. Further, India understood the limits of the discourse on diplomatic criticism, "Our hopes that the counsels of reason would prevail there [in Pakistan] were, however, not fulfilled. The consequence is the conflict that we face today."¹⁰⁰ To be sure, other scorekeepers did not accept India's practical inferences and its completion of its practical reasoning through military intervention. Yet, these inferences were not accidental or *post hoc* rationalizations and excuses for India's action either but one that follows from the constellation of deontic scores against India.

The second important move in India's justification for military intervention aimed to bring about a political solution to the crisis in East Pakistan was in showing the contradiction in the commitments acknowledged by the scorekeepers but entitlements precluded for India – thus enabling the Indian administration to securitize the refugee situation in India. Ambassador Sen argued that Pakistan had committed a crime of "refugee aggression." As he put it, "If aggression against another foreign country means that it strains its social structure, that it ruins its finances, that it has to give up its territory for sheltering the refugees... what is the difference between that kind of aggression and other type, the more classical type, when someone declares war, or something of that sort."¹⁰¹ This securitization of refugees was not a single bombshell event but a

¹⁰⁰ Speech by Swaran Singh in the UN Security Council, 12 December 1971, in *India's Speeches in the United Nations*, 1:2

¹⁰¹ UN Security Council Official Records, 1606th Meeting, 4 Dec 1971, p.15

policy of gradual change with the growing disenchantment with scorekeepers withholding India's normative entitlement to action in East Pakistan. The performatives of "refugee aggression" only makes sense within the larger game of giving and asking for reasons and the changed deontic scores evident in Stage Two. As Indira Gandhi justified:

We repeatedly drew the attention of the world to this annihilation of a whole people, to this menace to our security. Everywhere the people showed sympathy and understanding for the economic and other burdens and the danger to India. But Governments seems morally and politically paralysed. Belated efforts to persuade the Islamabad regime to take some step could lead to a lasting solution fell on deaf ears.¹⁰²

To put it simply, with the changed deontic scores particularly with the acknowledgment and endorsement of India's normative commitments by the USSR, Indian domestic public, the Indian military, and members of the Awami League, India sought an entitlement to action and securitization of refugees became possible. Without the constellation of the normative commitments and entitlements, India's securitization of refugees would be incompatible even to those scorekeepers who deferred to India like the Indian public, the Indian Military, and the members of the Awami League.

Clearly, there were several other points of justifications for engaging in war with Pakistan interspersed in India's reasoning with claims on respecting the rights and freedom of the Bangladesh people, humanitarianism involved in rescue operations, self-defense against Pakistan's aggressions, including positions on vindicating India's arguments against genocide in Pakistan. All these justifications followed from India's normative judgments that arose in the interactions with scorekeepers and as practical inferences of India's position in the game. To be sure, not all endorsed India's deontic attitudes. Henry Kissinger for example still argues that Indira Gandhi started the war because she was concerned that Pakistan was moving towards a political settlement in East Pakistan with the support of the United States and any such solutions

¹⁰² Indira Gandhi's Statement in Lok Sabha, 4 December 1971, in *IGSS*, p.130

would deprive her of exercising hegemony in South Asia.¹⁰³ However, such self-serving arguments come to a naught if we see that India's justifications to engage in a war were a demonstration of deontic entitlements to military action and follows through its material inferences based on the scores of other interlocutors. It was not mere *post hoc* rationalizations as described by Kissinger. As we saw, India did conclude practically that an action is to be done, India's military intervention is in accordance with its practical reason and inferences, and its judgment and action are one single act. It is the instrumental nature of the normative context that both inhibited some scorekeepers from endorsing India's inferences and that enabled Indian policymakers to disregard their deontic scores and conclude its practical reasoning.

To summarize, during the third stage of practical reasoning, from 15 November 1971 and 22 December 1971, the Indira Gandhi administration came to a normative judgment that the international community would not solve India's problem and securitized the refugee situation to secure entitlement to action. The practical reasons and inferences in the two other stages of the conversation positioned multiple scorekeepers in distinct positions in the deontic scorekeeping space. Clearly, Pakistan, the US, and China challenged India's normative commitments and entitlements to action. Others like the Global public opinion, the UN, and the USSR acknowledged India's normative commitments but withheld its entitlements for action. Still others like members of the Bangladesh liberation movement particularly the Awami League, the Indian public, and the Indian military deferred to the Indira Gandhi administration and crucially both acknowledged and endorsed India's commitments and entitlements to action. Given the instrumental nature of normative context, India concluded practically that military intervention is a practical inference to the deontic scores of the conversation and the inference rightly follows from its practical reasons. In other words, the judgment that the international community cannot

¹⁰³ Kissinger 1979, 880.

solve the problems of East Pakistan crisis for India is understandable only against the deontic scores, practical inferences, and the game of giving and asking for reasons among scorekeepers rather than intelligible antecedently and prior to India's practical reasoning

The competing alternative discourses on humanitarianism in India – nonintervention, diplomatic criticism, rebel support, and enlisting the support of Great Powers – came to a naught in India's practical reasoning to reach a political solution to the crisis in East Pakistan. Crucially, actions that rightfully follow from these alternative discourses went against the practical reasons and the deontic scores of the conversation. A full thrust of the discourse on diplomatic criticism failed to elicit a change in Pakistan's behavior and the neustic force of genocide that the Indian government brought to bear to criticize Pakistan made nonintervention incompatible. Further, arming rebels went against the grain of its public legitimizing reasons based on India's support for democracy, human rights, and freedom. Hence, the very process of practical reasoning with multiple interlocutors to bring a change in their normative attitude towards Pakistan marginalized the competing alternative discourses. With the normative judgment on the inability of the international community to bring a political solution to the problem, military intervention is a practical commitment that the Indian administration saw as acting in accordance with its own reasoning.

5.5. Conclusion

Focusing on the game of giving and asking for reasons in the deontic scorekeeping space, this chapter showed why and how military intervention as an important action became possible for the Indian administration in the face of other alternative discourses on addressing humanitarian

crisis abroad. Analytically, I followed a series of steps in order to show the distinct pattern of India's practical reasoning and the marginalization of alternatives. In keeping with the analytical framework developed in this thesis, the instrumental normativity on the interactions on East Pakistan crisis enabled a warranted delimitation of the scorekeepers, their deontic scorekeeping attitudes, and the default challenge structure of these interlocutors. This set the stage to understand how India played the game of giving and asking for reasons. Here I divided India's interactions with multiple scorekeepers into three stages to elaborate on the practical reasons, inferences, changing deontic scores, and the maneuvering space available to the Indian Gandhi administration at distinct points of the conversation. In each stage, I showed how the Indira Gandhi administration kept track of its own and others' commitments and entitlements for bringing about a political solution to the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan, trapped scorekeepers based on the gap between their commitments acknowledged and entitlements precluded for any sort of political action in East Pakistan crisis, and judged to securitize the refugees in the Indian territory. Military intervention was the conclusion of its practical reasoning, which started with a major premise of refugee resettlement.

Crucially, Indira Gandhi did securitize the refugees, set traps for interlocutors, and found the plight of refugees and the genocidal campaign of the Pakistani military regime as an affront to its ontological security. However, I showed that these moves were thoroughly normative and interrogated only within the game of giving and asking for reasons, which cannot be explained without understanding how the deontic scores on India's commitments and entitlements changed in the process of practical reasoning. Successful legitimation of war with Pakistan was made possible by the practical inferences that the Indira Gandhi administration drew from the deontic scores attributed, acknowledge, endorsed, and challenged by other scorekeepers in the conversation. Similarly, the administration did not antecedently displace other competing

alternative discourses on humanitarianism but concluded practically that the actions prescribed by these discourses did not follow from its own public legitimating reasons offered to the scorekeepers. In short, Indian administration played within the instrumental normativity of the deontic scorekeeping space and with the support of some interlocutors but not others was able to conclude its practical reasoning by engaging in a war with Pakistan.

6: Brazil and its Responsibility in South America: Competing Discourses on Humanitarianism (ca.1900-2004)

6.1. Introduction

In these next two chapters, I further explore the practical reasoning of states in humanitarian action, this time where the norm-type that underwrites interaction-in-context is not instrumental but institutional. Thus my second case concerns Brazil's humanitarian intervention in Haiti through the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) in 2004; the applicability of the framework of practical reasoning in deontic scorekeeping space in explaining Brazil's action in against competing alternative discourses. This chapter provides a historical overview that enables us to understand the alternative policy discourse available for Brazilian policymakers on managing humanitarian crisis abroad. In doing so it brings to the fore those competing alternatives which, in early 2004, the Brazilian political elites faced against the burgeoning humanitarian crisis in Haiti.

In keeping with the analytical framework of this thesis and the warranted expectations on the evolutionary alternative discourses that come to the forefront under institutional normativity that underwrites interactions, three important discourses served as important alternatives for Brazilian policymakers. These were evolutionary alternative discourses because all options were part of the common conventions in the Western hemisphere that were incrementally adopted to suit the situation. Thus, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, diplomatic mediation with the powerful legacy of the Brazilian Foreign Service (Itamaraty), and engaging in Chapter VI UN Peacekeeping Mission abroad served as important alternative discourses facing the Lula administration. Similar to the competing discourses examined in the Indian case, these three alternatives are not necessarily exhaustive. Yet these discourses persisted over time with

elaborate institutional structures for addressing humanitarian crisis abroad that any Brazilian policymaker could not ignore while considering a policy for addressing humanitarian crises abroad.

This chapter and the next follow the same structure as the previous two. In this Chapter, I first provide a brief chronological overview of Brazil's engagement with the issue of humanitarianism. Given the colonial background and to some extent as an isolated Portuguese speaking state among Spanish-speaking states in the Latin American region, the Brazilian leaders aimed to carve a distinct sense of Brazilian identity in the region and thus the natural starting point is the early twentieth century when elites concentrated on what Jeffrey Needell calls, "the domestic civilizing mission."¹ It was during this time that Brazilian elite imposed European institutions and cultural modes upon a nation of color and constructed Brazil's stature as a maturing nation in the comity of states. This construction of Brazilian-Self triggered important discursive formations in coming to terms with the United States and Spanish-speaking republics in the Western Hemisphere and thus the issue of humanitarianism or concern with universal humanity filtered through Brazil's twists and turns in its relationship between states in the Western hemisphere. Unsurprisingly, the links are diverse as much as competing and contested and in some periods of Brazilian history, particularly during the military regime, the links fractured with distinct discourses on Brazil's responsibility both abroad and in the domestic settings.

Thus, in the second section of this chapter, I analytically dissect three competing discourses in Brazil on addressing humanitarian crisis abroad and subject it to critical analysis. Similar to the Indian case study, with the enumeration of these discourses, I aim to show that Brazil's

¹ Needell 1999.

humanitarian action in Haiti in 2004 was by no means inevitable, and alternative worlds could have emerged. In keeping with the analytical framework and different patterns of alternatives discourse that come to the forefront under the instrumental normativity, we should expect some evolutionary alternative discourses and their consolidation for the Brazilian policymakers. The same emphasis on post-colonial historiography and revisionist writings of Brazil's diplomatic history apply here.²

6.2. Humanitarianism and Brazil: A Chronological Sketch

There are four, or at least four, distinct stages in Brazil's political engagement with humanitarian projects. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, roughly after the period of independence in 1822 and the reign of second monarch Dom Pedro II, Brazilian elites wrested a unique vision of the Brazilian state and engaged with the comity of White Western states in the international system. It had an important impact on Brazil's paternalistic vision of its role in the region. Thus, from the beginning of the twentieth century to the time of the Second World War, the Brazilian elites first engaged and then contested with the United States and its grand ideas of Monroe Doctrine, Pan-Americanism, and Manifest Destiny. With these contestations, the next stage, from the end of the Second World War until the drift into a military dictatorship in 1964 brought about a profound impact on Brazil's concern with global humanity, humanitarianism, and its responsibility in the world order. The third stage between 1964 and 1985 marked a sharp fall in Brazil's engagement with humanitarian ideas abroad; partly, due to the military regime's priorities at the domestic level but it also created, as we shall see, important discourses on Brazil's responsibility abroad. In a way, the rupture brought about by the military regime on humanitarian projects abroad also consolidated an important view that Brazil would stay clear of

² For overview of postcolonial historiography in Brazil see Weinstein 2012.

imperial projects on addressing mass atrocity crimes or promotion of human rights abroad.

Thus, in the last stage between 1985 and 2004 important but competing discourses on humanitarianism cut across the full spectrum of political debates in Brazil.

6.2.1. Early Humanitarianism: Setting the Stage (1900-1945)

The political history of Brazil after independence from Portugal in 1822 until 1945 is organized in two stages: the first stage is set in terms of First Reign 1822-1831, Second Reign 1840-1889, and Old Republic 1889-1930 and the second stage after the Revolution of 1930 marks the Vargas Era under the dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas until 1945. During the first stage, the imagining of a unified Brazil through European, specifically French ideas and institutions, was the first step in forging a political project on establishing Western ideals of civility and creating new possibilities of enlightened progress in Brazil. However, this selective appropriation of European and later North American experience also silenced the role of natives and African voices in the state notwithstanding the fact that Brazil was the last country to abolish slavery in the West in 1888. Thus, early humanitarian ideals came at a heavy cost. Jeffrey Needell calls this “the domestic civilizing mission” where the Afro-Brazilian cultures “were actively repressed as shameful, corrupting, and backward. The state, in other words, not only imposed a culture and an identity tied to imperial Europe, it negated a congeries of native cultures in that same process of imposition.”³ There was little remorse because the animating ideas were concerned with constructing a maturing Brazilian nation during this period.

³ Needell 1999, 8.

One of the first Brazilian leaders to construct a marked idea of Brazil as maturing nation and thus redefined the role of the state in the Western hemisphere was the genius Foreign Minister and reformer José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior or Baron of Rio-Branco. In his long tenure as foreign minister between 1902 and 1912, Rio-Branco and his foreign ministry – popularly now called Itamaraty – effectively placed Brazil as an indispensable partner with the United States for the maintenance of peaceful order in the Western hemisphere.⁴ The justice of this depiction can be understood in terms of Rio-Branco's genius settlements of four-hundred years old boundary disputes between Portuguese-speaking Brazil and other Spanish-speaking South American states. As Bradford Burns argues, "The 'Golden Chancellor' delineated nearly nine-thousand miles of frontier and bloodlessly won for his country approximately 342,000 square miles of territory, an area larger than France."⁵ Brazil's diplomatic victories with Argentina (1895), Bolivia (over Acre in 1903), British Guiana and Ecuador (1904), Venezuela (1905), Colombia (1907), Uruguay, and Peru (1909) went deeper in Brazilian leaders' understanding of sovereignty that moved the state from its shadowy engagements with the Spanish-American states into an institutionalized one based on negotiations, arbitrations and legal settlements. Indeed, Brazil at that time recognized that only 'responsible' republics could engage in any negotiations over disputes *qua* institutionalized legal settlements and arbitrations. Therefore, Brazilians elites implicitly worked with the goal of privileging stable and responsible governments in Latin America as shown in its rumination in overthrowing irresponsible republics – such as Paraguay in 1905.⁶

Even still, it was not the mere border settlements of genius Rio-Branco that made the difference but the distinct political project on the relationship with the United States and its ideas on Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, and Pan-Americanism that Brazilian elites viewed their

⁴ The best account of Rio-Branco is Burns 1966.

⁵ Burns 1967, 197.

⁶ Burns 1966, 153–169.

responsibility in the Western hemisphere. Monroe Doctrine in its original form synthesized the ideas of anti-colonialism, opposition to European imperialism in the Western hemisphere, and the “manifest destiny” of the United States.⁷ For Brazil engaged in its own domestic civilizing missions, the U.S. occupation of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Cuba was welcome. Further, the US-led Monroe Doctrine and its Roosevelt corollary prevented European imperialism and the irritation of irresponsible republics in the Western hemisphere.⁸ It was a double-victory on a constellation of regional order. However, the U.S. enforcement of Platt Amendment (1901) in Cuba, the occupation of the Panama Canal (1904) and Dominican Republic (1914-1926) also showed the stark truth of other Latin American states’ drumbeat on the U.S. hegemony in the region regularly articulated in the Pan-American Conferences.⁹

Thus, carefully weaved U.S. and Brazil relations – the policy of approximation – during the time of Baron Rio-Branco, important as it was, did not last long. After the First World War, the Brazilian elites starkly came to terms with the idea that the Americans would use their civilizing cards to discipline and marginalize Brazil. The discriminatory treatment meted out to Brazilians by victorious powers in the League of Nations and Peace Conferences starkly showed the hierarchical nature of international politics and the negative opinion of the politico-diplomatic mores of Brazil’s neighbors including Argentina.¹⁰ Although Brazilian elites could think of Brazil as a civilized state among “barbarous” Spanish American republics,¹¹ but in the comity of White Western nations, Brazil remained uncivilized and unstable.

⁷ Sexton 2011.

⁸ Bradford Burns argues that Brazil’s own situation in La Plata area led to its support for military interventions through the corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. “Frequent political chaos in Paraguay and Uruguay embarrassed Brazil, which saw the South American and more specifically its own, image abroad sullied by much misbehavior. Exasperated by the turmoil in Paraguay in 1905, Rio-Branco suggested that the United States dispatch several warships to Asuncion to help restore order. When Rio-Branco admitted that the United States intervention in Cuba in 1906 was ‘necessary,’ he possibly was wishing Brazil could do the same under similar circumstances in Paraguay and Uruguay.” Burns 1966, 152

⁹ The Conferences were held in Washington D.C. (1889-90); Mexico City (1901-02); Rio de Janeiro (1906); Buenos Aires (1910); Santiago (1923); Havana (1928); Montevideo (1933); Lima (1938); Bogota (1948); Caracas (1954).

¹⁰ Hilton 1980, 342.

¹¹ Bethell 2010, 461.

In this racialized international politics, according to Stanley Hilton, two themes dominated Brazil's assessment of international relations: national vulnerability and its diplomatic isolation in South America.¹² Thus, the focus was on improving Brazil's relative capabilities by resisting the imperial humanitarian ideals of the United States and its Manifest Destiny and avoiding diplomatic isolation. The efforts of leading American international lawyers such as Alejandra Álvarez (Chile), Luis María Drago (Argentina), and Baltasar Brum (Uruguay) in multi-lateralizing the Monroe Doctrine came in handy for Brazilian policymakers to join the Latin American calls for equality.¹³

The fifteen years between the Revolution of 1930 that brought Getúlio Vargas to power and the military coup of October 1945 that ended Vargas's *Estado Novo* were, according to Leslie Bethell, a watershed in the political, economic and social history of Brazil. Many Brazilians came to see nationalism as offering a special access to asserting Brazil's role in regional and international order. Crucially, by early 1930s the United States also embarked on the so-called Good Neighbor Policy and expressed its commitment to stop intervening in the Americas.

Out of this gap grew Brazilian (false) optimism. On 30 June 1944, Brazil sent an expeditionary force to fight for Allied cause in Italy. With an autonomous decision to support the allied cause, the animating 'geopolitical ideas' of 'living frontiers' and the sense that Brazil will now play her rightful role in defending the American continent in the post-Second World War order would form the nucleus of the state's engagement at the regional and international levels during the

¹² Ibid, 346

¹³ Scarfi 2014.

Cold War.¹⁴ It is fitting to conclude on the ideas of the two phases between 1900 and 1945 with the remarks of Jeffrey Needell:

Under the first phase of Brazilian state formation, the monarchs and their presidential successors had explicitly used the European notion of Civilization to construct a national culture...Now, under Vargas's regime, the state did not engage in the civilization of the nation, as it had; it engaged in the nationalization of the nation. The state cultivated and imposed a view of Brazilian history and popular culture which was usefully and possibly sincerely understood as undergirding the state's nationalist mission...Both presumed an elitist and authoritarian relationship to the Brazilian people.¹⁵

Thus, the period until the end of 1945 was important in Brazil's own conception of its Self and the beginning of thinking on Brazil's relations with the universal humanity abroad. This period provided the main convectors of discussion among several actors on what role, if any, Brazil had on issues of anti-colonialism and anti-hierarchical international order.

6.2.2. Anti-Colonialism, Humanism and High Ideals of Brazil (1945-1964)

After the end of the Second World War, Brazil's aim to earn a rightful place in the American continent still came to naught. Thus, the divergence between Brazil and the United States on the questions of regional order enabled Brazilian elites to articulate ideals of humanitarianism such as anti-colonialism, self-determination, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

In the main, Brazilian leaders envisaged a joint role in hemispheric defense with a great power status and Brazil's military strategists propounded the geopolitical idea to fulfill Brazil's destiny as continental and world power."¹⁶ As Hilton notes:

Brazil's record of service during the war, especially when compared with that of Argentina, which followed an obstructionist, even pro-Axis, policy after 1940, justified and indeed guaranteed, in the view of Brazilian policy makers, a postwar intensification of American aid. Such assistance seemed all the more vital in the

¹⁴ Child 1979.

¹⁵ Needell 1999, 11–12.

¹⁶ Child 1979.

turbulent environment of the Cold War, which, in Brazilian eyes, threatened to degenerate into a military clash at any moment.¹⁷

However, United States' competition with the Soviet Union changed the boundary conditions of its network with Latin America in general and Brazil in particular. Many Brazilians felt deceived that as an allied power Brazil was excluded from the Allied Reparation Council, Bretton Woods Conference and from a permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. In other words, Brazilian elites not only perceived a loss of bargain vis-à-vis the United States but also came to stark terms (once again) with the hierarchical international order.¹⁸ This disenchantment with the United States and the Great Power politics enabled Brazilian policymakers to think outside the box and the contemporary discourses on anti-colonialism, non-intervention, and self-determination in the wake of decolonization came in handy.¹⁹

In order to understand this process, it is important to first examine the multilateral arrangements in the Latin American region and then reflect on the onset of divergent socio-cultural interactions of Brazilians within this multilateral network. Two important institutions deserve attention: First, was the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed in 1947 – famously called the Rio-Treaty – that aimed at mutual defense of American republics. The heart of the treaty was the idea that “an armed attack by any state against an American state is to be considered as an armed attack against all American states and, consequently, each one of the ... Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack.”²⁰ The second was the Organization of the American States (OAS), established in 1948 designed in the form of an inter-American collective security system to maintain political stability in the Americas as well as

¹⁷ Hilton 1981, 600.

¹⁸ Hurrell 1986, 43.

¹⁹ Castro 1972.

²⁰ Kunz 1948, 115.

to exclude Communism from the hemisphere. The OAS was an important institutional arrangement that was framed within the Article 51 of the UN Charter to act in collective self-defense *without* Security Council authorization.²¹ These multilateral arrangements reflected the unity of Americas with the concerted goal to prevent inter and intrastate conflict in the hemisphere. The Secretary General of the new OAS Alberto Lleras called it “the most perfect instrument of its kind that has ever existed between sovereign nations.”²²

As with previous American-led initiative in the hemisphere, these multilateral arrangements were an object of suspicion for Spanish-speaking Latin American states. Resentment to past US military intervention and occupation of Nicaragua (1912-1933); Haiti (1915-1934); and Dominican Republic (1916-1924) placed non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states a top priority for Pan-American solidarity.²³ Although Portuguese-speaking Brazil under the changed conditions of post-Second World War period moved away from its unqualified acquiescence to US military intervention in the hemisphere, it also sensed a special opportunity in the evolving US engagement in the region.²⁴ First, within the Rio-Treaty Brazilian elites aimed to create a hedge against Argentina’s geopolitical goals and curb its expanding arms industries; and, second, within the OAS it aimed to extricate a ‘Marshall’s Plan for Latin America’ and in effect initiate plan of industrialization and economic development.²⁵ With the unrelenting American hegemony in the Western hemisphere, both aims of Brazil came to a naught.

²¹ Akehurst 1967, 176.

²² “The Bagota Conference,” *Bulletin of the Pan American Union*, Vol.LXXXII, No.6 (Washington, June, 1948), p.302

²³ Two examples are case in point on the principle of non-intervention: First, the outright rejection of Larreta Doctrine proposed by Uruguay in October 1945 that suggested multilateral inter-American military intervention in Argentina to restore human rights and democratic institutions in the state; second the suspicion against the United States’ Blue Book About Argentina, which showed the pro-Axis influence of Peron in order to bring about Peron’s defeat in the election. See Whitaker 1951, 132-133.

²⁴ Brazil obliged, out of a sense of obligation to the cause of ‘Christian democracy’ and its need for US capital and goodwill to sustain its economic development. There was no practical alternative to dealing with the United States, although Brazil tried in the 1950s to increase its trade with Africa and Asia, and reestablish the commercial links with the Soviet-bloc states broken in 1948. Weis 2001.

²⁵ Kunz 1948; Herz 2008.

In the early 1950s, the United States awarded \$125 million loan to Argentina – “almost the same amount that Brazil received during the entire Dutra administration.”²⁶ This changed Brazilian interpretation of Rio-Treaty and showed that the priorities of US’ Latin American policies were based on a standardized military aid program that could wrest primacy of Brazilians in the region.²⁷ Similarly, the US administration categorically rejected any ‘Marshall Plan for Latin America.’²⁸ In other words, the US hegemony in Western hemisphere – even within institutional relations – became a significant factor for the Brazilians to reckon with.

By early 1950s, many Brazil leaders slowly came to regard an autonomous foreign policy to increase the bargaining advantage vis-à-vis the United States as the best way forward. It is through this emphasis on autonomy that Brazilian elites defined their positions on global humanitarian order. The nationalist Vargas government that returned to power in 1951 recognized these circumambient difficulties with the United States and from the first – through the non-participation in Korean War for example – attempted to equip itself with the means of pragmatic engagement at the regional and international arenas.²⁹ However, in these respects as well the real breakthrough came with the administration of Juscelino Kubitschek (1955-1960) and Jânio Quadros and João Goulart administration (1960-1964).

President Kubitschek launched *Operação Pan Americana* (OPA) to create a pan-American alliance for the economic development³⁰ and famously said, while “Brazil wished to align itself with the West, it did not wish to constitute its proletariat.”³¹ He also initiated a major transformation in

²⁶ Hilton 1981, 606.

²⁷ Rabe 1974, 145.

²⁸ Hilton 1986, 292.

²⁹ Haines 1989; Also see Hurrell 1986, 52.

³⁰ Weis 2001, 325.

³¹ Selcher 1974, 16.

Brazil's network with the other states notably the Soviet Union, West Germany and the developing world. Crucially, the divergent interpretation of the question of Cuban Revolution and Brazil's support for Castro irritated the Americans but created solidarity with other Latin American states. Kubitschek saw the links between national security and economic backwardness and he took care not to heed to the cut and dried methods of national and regional security prescribed by the Americans.

Thus, when the new government stepped in – President Quadros (January-August 1961) and after his resignation President Goulart (September 1961-March 1964) – it marked a watershed in Brazil's independent foreign policy.³² The government explicitly propounded the policy of *politica externa independente* (independent foreign policy) to encourage economic development from diverse sources and worked with the maxim of 3Ds – disarmament, development, and decolonization to demonstrate greater diplomatic independence and engagement with Afro-Asian nations. Brazil demonstrated its independent foreign policy in multiple ways, the most important of which is its solidarity with oppressed nations particularly Cuba but also the states in Africa and Asia.³³ Indeed, as President Quadros himself points out, it was Brazil's new foreign policy.³⁴ The political ramification of interpreting and reinterpreting this new policy would be immense in the subsequent decades. However, acting in the name of avoiding the dangers of communism for national security, a military revolution assisted by the CIA overthrew the Goulart government. A military dictatorship was in place in Brazil for the next two decades.

³² Quadros 1961.

³³ Hurrell 1986, 57–64.

³⁴ Quadros 1961.

6.2.3. Military Regime and Waning Ideals on Global Humanity (1964-1985)

This third stage in the chronological overview of Brazil's engagement with humanitarian ideals abroad marks the period of military dictatorship in the state. In these twenty years, Brazil rose and fell, quite for the first time, as a national security state with an emphasis on power politics and geopolitical thinking and brought to fore series of problems in the hitherto taken for granted assumptions on Brazil's engagement with anti-colonialism and other humanitarian ideals. Until the reversal of Brazil's support for Portuguese colonialism initiated by President Ernesto Geisel and his Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira – through the policy of “Responsible Pragmatism” – the military regime stepped back from engaging with the world of neo-humanitarianism in important ways. However, the actions and inactions of the military regime on this issue had profound implications both on the consolidation of discourses on Brazil's humanitarian policy abroad as well as on Brazil's conception of its role in the subsequent democratic period.³⁵ To put it in simple words, the twists and turns during the military regime provided *prima facie* understanding of Brazil's rejection of imperial projects for humanity in the subsequent decades.

The first twist in Brazil's engagement with the high ideals of humanity begins with the first President Dictator Castello Branco (1964-1967). He articulated fierce anti-communist policies and thereby prioritized the national security state against any ideas of regional integration.³⁶ Two real manifestations of Brazil's solution to regional order occurred during the period of Brazil's close alliance with the United States that produced Spanish-American antipathy to Brasilia. The first sprang from Brazil's close collaboration with the United States in the latter's military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Brazil's support significantly led to an

³⁵ Geisel administration had the intention of paving way for democracy see, Skidmore 1990, 163.

³⁶ Ibid., 29.

unprecedented move to create an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) within the OAS and to a dispatch of the largest contingent of Brazilian troops to the Dominican Republic. Unsurprisingly, numerous Latin American states – notably Mexico, Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador and Peru that voted against the IAPF – looked at Brazilian action and American anti-Communist cover as a unilateral flouting of the principle of non-intervention in the region.³⁷

The next serious trouble sprang from Brazil's skepticism towards developing countries that were demanding international economic reforms through the newly acquired institutional force of UNCTAD. For the early military regime, the notion of Third World solidarity was a dangerous illusion. Thus, the Branco administration opposed regional economic markets or developments efforts that sidelined the United States.³⁸ As Skidmore points out, "The Castelo Branco government also thought a rapprochement with foreign investors would help convince the United States government and the international agencies – IMF, World Bank (IBRD), and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) – that Brazil was once again committed to the 'free world' economy."³⁹ This policy not only rejected the suffering colonial bodies due to unequal economic order⁴⁰ but the commitment to free-market policies after a short boom created severe domestic political and economic crisis for subsequent military governments.

Thus, the turn towards humanitarian ideals came back to Brazil as a face-saving measure to safeguard the legitimacy of the military regime. During the Presidency of Costa e Silva (1967-69) and Garrastazú Medici (1969-74), "Brazil became notorious worldwide for its high industrial potential coupled with low standards of health, education, and housing – factors which measure

³⁷ Slater 1969.

³⁸ Hurrell 1986, 83.

³⁹ Skidmore 1990, 36.

⁴⁰ The best work on the decision making processes in fragmented consensus is Pinheiro 2013.

a nation's quality of life.”⁴¹ Itamaraty also witnessed the growing trends in the international system – US’ pragmatism with Latin America; France’s withdrawal from NATO in 1966; the worsening of Sino-Soviet split; Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; Willy Brandt’s *Ostpolitik*; Third World non-alignment and their concerns about neoliberal economic policies; and the outbreak of hostilities between Arabs and Israelis. The military regime recognized these events as diplomatic opportunities to further its legitimacy and developmental priorities at the regional, hemispheric, and international levels.⁴² By 1971, Brazil aimed to be the leader of the developing world and initiated a foreign policy of expressing solidarity for the oppressed. It was clearly *volte-face* from its earlier policy. Foreign Minister Barbosa stated in the UN that:

To the extent of its capabilities, Brazil is prepared to take up its responsibility towards the least developed among developing countries, bilaterally as well as multilaterally. And we are naturally moved to do so by reason of the solidarity that links us to these countries, and also because we consider it to be an ethical imperative.”⁴³

However, the international oil crisis of the 1970s hit Brazil hard, it is in this context that President Giesel and his Foreign Minister Silveira aimed to reorient Brazil’s international engagement and thus its concern for decolonization in Africa in order to legitimize military rule in Brazil.⁴⁴ Thus, the idea that only if the state is able to express solidarity to the weak and oppressed nations, any imagining of a coherent and legitimate national self within the body politic became deep rooted.

Thus, with the foreign policy of “Responsible Pragmatism,” the Geisel government aimed to increase Brazil’s foreign trade, access to raw materials, and modern technology. Leticia Pinheiro puts it very well:

⁴¹ Fausto 1999, 295.

⁴² Bond 1981.

⁴³ See the Speech of Minister Mario Gibson Barboza, XXVI Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations

⁴⁴ On the ritualistic aspects of Geisel administration see Góes 1978.

By 'Pragmatism' was implied a policy without commitments to any ideological principles which would hold back the search for Brazilian national interests, whatever they were...As for 'ecumenical', it was intended to describe a universal foreign policy that would take into account all global possibilities in the argumentation of Brazil's international relations. Finally, the adjective 'responsible' constituted a key word and it was particularly addressed to the immediate constituency of the regime.⁴⁵

The third twist to Brazil's engagement with the high ideals of humanity begins when Brazil discontinued automatic alignment with the United States and opposed Washington's, particularly the Carter administration's, stance on human rights violations in Brazilian territory. Further, Brazil under Geisel administration articulated solidarity with Latin American, African, and Asian countries.⁴⁶ It abstained in the momentous vote on lifting sanctions against Cuba, but recognized Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, and strengthened contacts with Nigeria and Algeria⁴⁷ and recognized the People's Republic of China. Brazil's reversal of its previous support for Portuguese colonialism and reversal its historical opposition to African decolonization is noteworthy. It changed Brazil's relations with African countries and firmly established its rejection of imperial projects on humanitarianism abroad.⁴⁸

In the Central American and Caribbean region, the traditional sphere of American influence, Brazilian elites opposed crusading overtures of any powers. Specifically, dominant sections of the military regime and Itamaraty rejected the attempts by the United States to reinvigorate the idea of IAPF for intervention in Nicaragua to save the Somoza regime (1936-1979) and they later opposed Argentina's plan for joint military action against communism in Central America.⁴⁹ In other words, both the major actors in Brazil's foreign policy, Itamaraty and the military, concluded that the country needs to diversify its engagement at the regional and international

⁴⁵ Pinheiro 2013, 121.

⁴⁶ In Latin America it led to the famous Amazon Cooperation Treaty in 1978, which included Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guiana, Peru, Surinam, and Venezuela Bond 1981.

⁴⁷ Selcher 1974; Anglarill 1980.

⁴⁸ Although Pinheiro does not discuss Brazil's rejection of imperial projects the best treatment of Brazil's policy on Cuba and Angola is Pinheiro 2013.

⁴⁹ Hurrell 1986, 254.

levels. Consequently, the issues of managing communist menace largely took less order of priority.

Clearly, these twists and turns in Brazil's engagement with humanitarian ideals provided the main convectors of discussion on the rejection of imperial projects for humanity in the subsequent decades. Thus, when João Figueiredo (1979-1985) ruled Brazil, his solution to the economic and political difficulties was to transcend the regional differences, uniting the foreign and security policies behind the banner of universalism and diversity. The most dramatic event under the personalized leadership of Figueiredo was Brazil-Argentina rapprochement in 1980 over Itaipu hydroelectric project and over the nuclear program that established the foundation for later Presidents like José Sarney (1985-1990) and Collor de Mello (1990-1992) to resolve nuclear rivalry between the states. As Stanley Hilton remarks, the rapprochement marks "the most significant development in the agitated history of the contest between the two nations for supremacy in the Southern Cone of South America, indeed, for continental hegemony, in this century."⁵⁰

Similarly, Brazil initiated new cooperative policies with Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru and Chile in keeping with its Latin American identity. The leadership construed this universalism along the lines of sovereignty and non-intervention that radically challenged the new Reagan administration that came into power in 1981 to assert American hegemony in the hemisphere. Therefore, in the 1982-83 Falkland adventure, Brazil reinforced its (implicit) support of Argentina's national interest, leased military aircraft to Buenos Aires and criticized American sanctions against Argentina.⁵¹ Similarly, it refused a UN invitation to be part of a multilateral peace force for Namibia and Lebanon and preferred a low-key engagement with international security issues.

⁵⁰ Hilton 1985, 27.

⁵¹ Ibid., 51.

As with previous arrangements, Brazil's prioritization of development and growth in the face of severe economic crisis and its opposition to the United States' hegemony in the region was an object of resentment for the Americans and Spanish-speaking neighbors alike. Clearly, the twists and turns in this period created a lot of tensions on Brazil's role in the humanitarian order. The Americans were angry with Brazil's ideological neutrality and found themselves without any special relationship in the region to counter communism. The other Latin-American republics were unhappy that Brazil's rhetoric on cooperation with its floundering economic growth could not do much for the region. During this time, the military regime deferred negotiations with the IMF for debt restructuring. With the fall of the military rule in 1985 came by far the toughest negotiation period, on both economic and security issues, at the regional and international levels.

6.2.4. Institutional Interactions and return of Humanism (1985-2003)

Brazil's new democratic leadership were formulating their ideas on foreign policy against the backdrop of the broader discourse on human rights, the rule of law, economic and political liberalization that radically challenged the hitherto "low-key" approach that the Brazilian elites maintained on issues relating to humanitarianism. This along with the emergence of the Western campaign to extend and deepen international liberalism and the new UN activism on human security and violence within states – that started with *An Agenda for Peace*⁵² – gave rise to, as we shall see, distinct Brazilian interpretations of humanitarianism as a political project to display status and morality abroad. It was a distinct Brazilian idea that recoiled at the very thought of the United States and other White Western nations holding the baton for a highly invasive "liberal" peace building projects.

⁵² United Nations (UN), 1992. 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping'. Report of the Secretary-General. UN Doc. A/47/277, 31 January.

Thus, in the period following the end of the military regime – and even before the end of the Cold War – the Brazilian administrators proudly proclaimed their unique vision of the regional order that had a tremendous impact in the age of what Micheal Barnett calls liberal humanitarianism. President José Sarney in his *Foreign Affairs* article characteristically wrote, “The road to salvation for Latin American passes through growth, and this will not be possible without the assistance of the United States.”⁵³ However, he also made it very clear that Brazil’s sovereignty is not negotiable: “No one should expect Brazil, with its riches, with its potential, with its determination, to be a second-rate country. We have a different vision of ourselves, and we expect the United States to share that vision.”⁵⁴ This construction of Brazil’s vision in the post-Cold War period by the elites led to important claims on humanistic ideals but it also rejected imperial humanitarian projects abroad.

Certainly, the new actions and goals of the United States and other White Western liberal nations with the dawn of liberal humanitarianism had an impact on Brazil’s own position on the issue. In 1989 the American troops engaged in large-scale invasions of Panama on an issue that was “unrelated to the Cold War” – the purported irresponsibility of Panama’s head of state Manuel Antonia Noriega for engaging in criminal drug operations.⁵⁵ The dawn of new security issues changed the way Brazil and other Latin American republics viewed their interactions at the regional and international levels. Further, the immediate end of the Cold War witnessed the most severe crisis of democracy and human rights violations in the Latin American region but found no sympathy with Brazilian elites for interventionism.⁵⁶ There were coups in Haiti (1991) and Peru (1992), and coup attempts in Venezuela (1992 and 1993) and Guatemala (1993) that led to genuine concerns about prospects for democracy and human rights in the hemisphere. Crucially,

⁵³ Sarney 1986, 116.

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Gilboa 1995, 539.

⁵⁶ For details see Schnably 1994.

the OAS reinvented itself in the post-Cold War period and in June 1991 adopted the “Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System” in order to ensure a new means of existence away from historical entrenchment within the Cold War mandates of the U.S. However, OAS’ reinvention moved closer to a more activist and interventionist posture towards military coups, and as Stephen Schnably argues “the Santiago Commitment and proposed Charter amendments can be seen as evidence of an emerging right to democracy, and of a corresponding weakening of the OAS’ prohibition against intervention in state’ domestic affairs.”⁵⁷

Brazilian elites viewed these developments with a characteristic caution and moderation. The sudden ascendance of a human right centered discourse *without* a concomitant rejection of the utility of military force did, the Brazilian elites believed, more harm than good. The recent experience with the military regime and Brazil’s long-standing reluctance to use military force abroad to achieve political solutions led to growing unwillingness to support ambitious humanitarian projects.⁵⁸ Therefore, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-1998 and 1999-2002) came into power he consolidated the ideas enumerated by earlier Presidents such as José Sarney (1985-1990), Collor de Mello (1990-1992) and Itamar Franco (1992-1994) on Brazil’s responsibility in the region. Second, and importantly, under the Cardoso government, Brazil strongly institutionalized its role in the Latin American region that had a tremendous impact on Lula’s foreign policy priorities in the region.

The new government under Cardoso articulated an activist position on sovereignty, regional institutionalization, multilateralism and peacekeeping missions but with distinct Brazilian

⁵⁷ Ibid., 403.

⁵⁸ Stuenkel and Tourinho 2014.

characteristics in the age of liberal humanitarianism. It took series of policies aimed to place the Brazilian state as a “global trader” and consequently the site of political legitimacy began to shift away from concerns about national security to economic and cultural projection.⁵⁹ There are marked differences in scholars’ assessments of this new foreign policy paradigm of Brazil. Some argue that Cardoso’s policies marked a significant shift from Brazil’s position as a Latin American nation to a South American nation in order to amplify its image with creditors and investors and consequently to exercise a consensual hegemony, on Gramscian terms, in the region.⁶⁰ Others claim that at the regional level, the administration maintained its unique power differentials while projecting a Grotian approach in the global arena.⁶¹ In any case, Brazil under Cardoso revitalized its engagement in regional and international multilateral organization in several ways.

For example, Brazil took initiatives for institutionalized engagement within Mercosur – common market of South American states initially composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. It played a lead role in trade and interregional agreements between Mercosur, Andean Community and the European Union, consolidation of integrated infrastructure matrices in South America and articulated a grand vision in Brasilia Summit 2000 of a South American Community of Nations.⁶² At the international level, Brazil integrated with the institutionalized regimes of global governance particularly to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Missile Technology Control Regime, and World Trade Organization. Cardoso proudly claimed, “The Brazil that is entering the twenty-first century is a country whose primary

⁵⁹ The tenures of Luiz Felipe Lampreia (1995-2000) and Celso Lafer (2001-2002) at the Ministry of Foreign Relations were characterized by resolving difference through rule of law, reducing the allure of power politics and aggression. See, Abdenur 1994.

⁶⁰ Burges 2008.

⁶¹ See for example, Pinheiro 2000a.

⁶² Soares De Lima and Hirst 2006; Burges 2006.

objectives for internal transformation and development are in harmony with values universally disseminated on the international level.”⁶³

That one of the universal values currently in circulation was humanitarian intervention with important actions in the 1991 Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Rwanda were not lost in the official discourse of the administration; yet Brazil remained skeptical. Challenging UN authorized French *Operation Turquoise* in Rwanda, Brazil’s permanent representative Ronaldo Sardenberg asserted:

As a principle, Brazil has repeatedly maintained that the Council should do its utmost to avoid invoking the extraordinary powers conferred upon it by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In this connection, it strikes us that the Security Council has avoided placing the humanitarian mandate given to UNAMIR under that Chapter.⁶⁴

The combination of a growing awareness of Brazil’s role in the neoliberal international order and the skepticism to specific imperial projects of democracy promotion or humanitarian intervention led to Brazil’s own contribution to crisis management in the region. When neighbors faced crises, Brazilian leaders stepped in a distinctive way: between 1995 and 1998, Brazil mediated a territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru, in 1997 it threw its weight against the coup plotters in Paraguay, and in 2002 Brazil once again mediated a solution to a coup attempt against President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. According to Mathias Spektor:

To the extent that Brazil’s regional activism has occurred, it can be traced back to the 1980s, gaining momentum in the late 1990s and the 2000s. Over the years Brazilian political elites consciously set out to revamp regional strategy and recast policy priorities for their vicinity. After several generations of neglect, the region now sits at the heart of Brazil’s international posture.⁶⁵

⁶³ Speech of Henrique Cardoso in the Brazilian Center for International Relations, 2000. Palestra do Senhor Presidente da República, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, no Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, Rio de Janeiro, September 14.” <http://ftp.unb.br/pub/UNB/ipr/rel/discpr/2000/2929.pdf> accessed on 12 June 2014.

⁶⁴ Quoted in Stuenkel and Tourinho 2014, 384.

⁶⁵ Spektor 2010, 192.

Clearly, after the end of the Cold War, the Brazilian state faced a new network of relations and commitments at the regional and international levels. Institutionalized interactions also enabled a proactive crisis management in the region foregrounding democratic principles and values. However, as we saw it was also a solution aimed at augmenting Brazil's economic and political development and rejecting imperial solutions to local problems.

6.3. Humanitarianism and Brazil: Competing Discourses

Having presented this brief chronological outline of the development of humanitarian principle and practice in Brazil until the early 2000s, I now turn to explore three competing discourses in Brazil on humanitarianism in more detail. In keeping with the analytical framework and different patterns of alternatives discourse that come to the forefront under the institutional normativity, we should expect some evolutionary alternative discourses for the Brazilian policymakers. Thus, I analytically show non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, diplomatic mediation, and Chapter VI UN Peacekeeping Operation as three important competing alternative discourses in Brazil for addressing humanitarian crises and mass atrocities abroad. Based on the institutional normativity in interactions, these alternative discourses were evolutionary in the sense that all of it were part of the common convention of the Western hemisphere and incrementally adapted by the Brazilian policymakers in the foreign and security policy engagements. These competing alternative discourses (should) challenge any teleological assumptions towards understanding Brazil multilateral humanitarian intervention in Haiti. It shows the alternative paths present for the Lula administration and that any one choice is not inevitable. These three discourses are not exhaustive but sufficiently in-depth, which developed in Brazil's relations with Latin American states and the United States in the long years after its independence, and all have an important influence on the policymakers.

6.3.1. Non-Intervention

Conjuring up the principle of non-intervention has a long history with origins in the debates among Latin American international lawyers since the end of the nineteenth century. Latin American lawyers, politicians, and thinkers particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay utilized the principle of non-intervention as the counterweight first to the interventionist claims of European creditor states in Latin America and later to American interventionism based on the Monroe Doctrine. Carlos Calvo of Argentina as early as 1868 pronounced an absolutist version of non-intervention principle where he denied the right for any state to employ force in Latin America in the pursuit of private claims of pecuniary nature. Later in the early twentieth century Luis M. Drago, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic slightly narrowed this absolutist principle and denounced armed intervention as a legitimate or lawful means of collecting public debts.⁶⁶ Drago's claim attracted widespread attention in Europe, United States, and Latin America because it came when the military forces of Great Britain, Germany, and Italy imposed a blockade on Venezuela to force settlement of private financial claims of their citizens. However, the United States already asserted its leadership in the Americas. Secretary of State Richard Olney (1895-97) proclaimed, "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law."⁶⁷ Thus, in one swoop the United States replaced European threat to Latin America with its own hegemony and control.

It is in this context that Brazilian leaders fell back on non-intervention principle but offered their distinct interpretations that remained on close terms with the United States until the First World War. Thus, the Brazilian jurist Clovis Blevilaquia argued that the Monroe Doctrine is an "affirmation of the fact that nations of this hemisphere should be considered equally free and sovereign by the Powers of the Old World and that their territory can not be acquired by the

⁶⁶ For this comparison see, Hershey 1907.

⁶⁷ Quoted in, Scarfi 2014, 7.

latter under any pretext nor temporarily occupied.”⁶⁸ At the same time, following the close approximation of Brazil and the United States under the direction of the famous Minister of Foreign Affairs Baron Rio-Branco, Brazil also accepted that the United States could use the Monroe Doctrine to correct the wrongdoings of states in Central America and the Caribbean. Thus, when Theodore Roosevelt offered his Corollary, he found a sympathetic audience among Brazilian elites. Roosevelt’s legitimization of U.S. police power in Central America just two years after Drago’s claim is important to note:

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence to the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.⁶⁹

In response to the concern of American expansionism in Central America and the Caribbean, Baron Rio-Branco stated:

If those countries do not know how to govern themselves, if they do not possess the elements necessary to avoid continual revolutions and civil wars that follow one another ceaselessly, they do not have a right to exist and ought to give up their place to a stronger, better organized, more progressive, and more virile nation.⁷⁰

As we saw, this policy of close approximation came to a naught after the First World War. In subsequent foreign policy crisis in the neighborhood and beyond, Brazilian elites intentionally chose the policy of non-intervention thus consolidating an understanding of Brazil’s independent and autonomous role in the region. In other words, Brazil’s adherence to the principle of non-intervention was in part due to how Brazilian statesmen and elites specifically the Military and Itamaraty – interpreted the rule, acted in accordance with it and the general utility of the principle of non-intervention to legitimize the political regime. For Vargas (1930-45; 1951-54), the non-intervention principle was to avoid American pressure for political liberalization in

⁶⁸ Quoted in, Tourinho 2015, 85.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Scarfi 2014, 14.

⁷⁰ Quoted in Burns 1966, 152.

Brazil and he used the rule to sustain his dictatorship, refuse participation in the Korean War and modernize Brazil's armed forces to manage Argentina's military superiority.⁷¹ For President Juscelino Kubitschek and his bold multilateral proposal on *Operação Pan-Americana* (Pan-American operations) and Presidents Quadros (January-August 1961) and Goulart (September 1961-March 1964) emphasis on *política externa independente* (Independent Foreign Policy), the principle functioned to legitimize Brazil's autonomy. That is, it enabled Brazil to emphasize Latin American unity, forge new links with Third World countries and the Non-Aligned Movement, and manage the hegemony of the US in Latin America.⁷² In 1960, the principle of non-intervention would appear formally in Brazil's speeches in the United Nations although Brazil would not join the Non-Alignment Movement.⁷³

During the period of dictatorship (1964-1985), Brazil under Castello Branco briefly strayed from the principle of nonintervention through a wholehearted support for Washington's anti-communist intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 under the aegis of the OAS. Yet, the policy to legitimize the military regime through support for American interventionism remained short-lived because of, as we shall see in the next section, the strong role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Now, the discourse of non-intervention enabled legitimization of the military regime, build ties with other Latin American and other developing countries, and crucially avoid attributions of being subservient to Great Power politics. It was in the policy of 'Responsible Pragmatism' of President Geisel (1974-1979) and his Foreign Minister Antonio Azeredo Silveira, that Brazil re-engaged in an activist and assertive foreign policy to forge 'universal' and 'multidimensional' links with other states at the international level without any ideological constraints – here the discourse on non-intervention came in handy. Thus, Silveira could argue in the UN that non-intervention is the “incalculable heritage” of the countries of the Latin

⁷¹ Hilton 1985; Hurrell 1986, 52.

⁷² Hurrell 1986.

⁷³ Ministry of External Relations 2013, 192.

American region and use the discourse to discuss Brazil's support for the self-determination of Angola, Algeria, and forge links with communist China.⁷⁴

However, the discourse on non-intervention goes both ways and on the question of Cuba's readmission to the Inter-American System, Brazil exaggerated Cuba's interventionist policies, which is "against the tradition of non-interventionism in the region" and refuse Cuba's readmission to the Inter-American System. As Leticia Pinheiro argues, the government instrumentally used the principle to represent Cuban interventionism to legitimize and ensure the survival of the military regime in Brazil.⁷⁵ Crucially, the discourse on non-intervention consolidated over time and remained as the fulcrum to assess imperial projects of the Great Powers. Thus, in the General Assembly session in 1980, Minister Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro strongly asserted:

Equality meaning equality, sovereignty means sovereignty and non-intervention mean non-intervention. It is necessary for those basic principles to be observed in their entirety by all members of our community, for quibbling about their implementation means adding new and serious threats to already tense international relations. That means that no country, however strong, can presume to legislate to the world, as if it were a kind of overlord. That means that matters which affect everyone must be decided by all, and those which relate to the life of only one country must be decided by that country alone. That means that the international system must not be vertical and centralizing, that the international decision-making process regarding issues of global interest need to be opened to the wide and representative participation of the community of nations.⁷⁶

With the end of the military regime and Fernando Cardoso's liberal international agenda, the departure from the principle of non-intervention required justification before the Congress and selective but attentive publics, which were the guardians of this tradition. Brazil affirmed its commitment to human rights but did not accept liberal-humanitarian projects. The characteristic issue, by the irony of history, is Brazil's policy of non-intervention in the burgeoning crisis in

⁷⁴ Ibid., 441.

⁷⁵ Pinheiro 2013, 173.

⁷⁶ Speech by Minister Ramiro Saraiva Guerrero in General Assembly of the UN 1980. See Ministry of External Relations 2013, 479.

Haiti in 1994. Aligning itself with another 32 countries, Brasilia opposed military intervention and agreed only to a peacekeeping force after the fall of Haiti's military force.⁷⁷ Celso Amorim stated in the UN

We consider it disturbing that the principles of non-intervention and self-determination are the object of interpretation that are incompatible with the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The gravity of the Haitian crisis and the urgency of the need to solve it do not make us unable to see the inherent risks of a situation that evokes traumas and scars that are still very vivid in the memory of Latin America. Once the legitimate Government is re-established, it will be responsibility of the international community to provide Haiti with assistance in the daunting task of national reconstruction.⁷⁸

The period of major UN activity on the principle of non-intervention (1965-1985) and the institutionalization of non-intervention in the new Brazilian Constitution (1988)⁷⁹ also acted as an external constraint further encouraging Brazil's adherence to the principle that also withstood the end of the Cold War and even the recent debates on the norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

6.3.2. Diplomatic Mediation

The second discourse on diplomatic mediation is rooted in the professional expertise of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, popularly known as Itamaraty. The consolidation of the Brazilian state in the early twentieth century – refer the discussions on “domestic civilizing mission” in the first part of the chapter – under the genius Minister of Foreign Affairs, the celebrated Baron Rio Branco ensured that the diplomatic establishment promoted Brazil's stature as a maturing nation in the international system. A great deal of literature points out that the role of Baron from 1902 to 1912 played an important role in the emergence of Itamaraty as

⁷⁷ Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009, 48.

⁷⁸ Speech by Minister Celso Amorim in the General Assembly of the UN, 1994. See Ministry of External Relations, 2013, 703.

⁷⁹ Article IV of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution firmly establishes the principle of non-intervention as a guiding principle of Brazil's international action. See Federal Constitution of Brazil, 1988.

an ideologically homogeneous, professionally expert, and intellectually elite institution in Brazil.⁸⁰ It started with Baron who promoted Brazil's European image abroad "by recruiting men who he handpicked for their European, aristocratic appearance, style, and cultivation for the most important diplomatic positions."⁸¹ In subsequent decades, Itamaraty carved an autonomous space for its growth, what others refer to as bureaucratic insulation and corporatism, and reproduced its role even with the onset of the plurality of actors in foreign policy and occasions of presidentially led diplomacy.⁸²

In order to understand the consolidation and reproduction of the discourse on diplomatic mediation in Brazil, we have to examine the role of Itamaraty in the national political game in actually influencing Brazilian politicians on 'how to go on' in the international system. To put it differently, we have to focus on the specific ways through which Itamaraty made sense of Brazil's position in the international system, selectively focused on certain details and attributed meaning to it, and positioned itself in the ongoing national game.

There are three, or at least, three ways in which Itamaraty's moves in the game since the early twentieth century set the stage for the consolidation of the discourse on diplomatic mediation. First, Itamaraty saw Brazil as an important link between North-South and East-West debates; second, diplomatic elites impressed upon Brazilian politicians on a peaceful solution of foreign and security problems; and finally, Itamaraty became an important arbitrator of Brazil's national interest through emphasizing autonomy and independence. It is through these moves that the discourse on diplomatic mediation on political crisis abroad became firmly entrenched in Brazil.

⁸⁰ Castro 1983; Zairo 1984; Barros 1986; Lima 2000; Pinheiro 2000b; De Faria, Lopes, and Casarões 2013.

⁸¹ Needell 1999, 6.

⁸² Barros 1986.

These three ideas require detailed elaboration to grasp the consolidation of the discourse on diplomatic mediation in Brazil.

Firstly, the elites in the Brazilian diplomatic establishment saw Brazil as an important pivot in international politics and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as particularly crucial in situating Brazil in the game. In early twentieth century, Itamaraty wrote about “three Americas” – Anglo-Saxon America, Hispanic America, and Luso-America and saw Brazil’s national role as a mediating bridge between the United States and the Hispanic-American nations.⁸³ Here diplomacy attained a specific technocratic importance differentiating from the “beggar thy neighbor” approach to Argentina or other Latin American countries. As Bradford Burns writes, “The foreign office helped to mediate the conflict between Peru and Ecuador, found a solution over the Alsop claims threatening Chilean-United States relations, and urged the United States to send a permanent diplomatic representative to Paraguay.”⁸⁴ This early start with mediation is perhaps the result of Brazil’s commitment to arbitration of disputes and the specific diplomatic victories it brought about in border negotiations with Brazil’s neighbors. Differences were not eliminated and in the aftermath of the First World War, the growing military competition with Argentina made Brazilian representatives wary of Spanish-American encirclement of Brazil.⁸⁵ Yet the elitist character of Itamaraty enabled Brazil to diplomatically face the rivalry in the Latin American region rather than resort to armed conflicts.

In the post-World War period, Itamaraty functioned as a mediating bridge between the First and the Third World that was consistent since the 1950s. Three important reforms in the inter-war years set the stage for the process. The Mello Franco Reform in Brazil (1931) put the Foreign Service together with the State Department, Consular Service, and Diplomatic Service; the

⁸³ Tyson 1975, 227-28.

⁸⁴ Burns 1967, 198.

⁸⁵ See Hilton 1985.

Oswaldo Aranha Reform (1938), institutionalized these services; and, the founding of the Rio Branco Institute (1945) for a thorough diplomatic training ensured that Brazilian diplomacy takes a structured shape.⁸⁶ Thus, Itamaraty defended a nationalist position and took priority in defining Brazil's national interest. When Brazil failed to obtain a permanent seat in the League of Nations or a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, Itamaraty developed a clear-cut Third Worldist approach to foreign policy while at the same time managing its Western Christian civilizational narrative. The developments of Brazil's independent foreign policy (*politica externa independente*) and the claims on Three D- Disarmament, Development, Decolonization were powerful tools to strengthen Brazil's national interest, which in turn would strengthen Itamaraty's institutional position in the national game. Thus, the discourse of Brazil serving as the link between First and the Third World consolidated well before the onset of the military regime. As President Quadros stated, "Brazil's history, geography and racial mix would enable it to play a crucial role as the link between the Third World as the West."⁸⁷

The second process through which the discourse on diplomatic mediation consolidated in Brazil was in Itamaraty's pivotal role in the program of consensus creation and reducing disagreements among other republics in the Latin American region.⁸⁸ It played an important role in Central America through the Contadora Support Group to promote negotiated settlement of conflicts. It mediated territorial disputes such as between Ecuador and Peru between 1995 and 1998 and mediated a solution to a coup attempt against President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. Further, Itamaraty played an important role in the reorientation of Brazil's regional strategy towards Southern Common Market (Mercosul) and in 2000 sponsored a fusion between Mercosul and Andean Community of Nations to launch a South American Community of Nations. This

⁸⁶ De Faria, Lopes, and Casarões 2013, 2–3.

⁸⁷ Hurrell 1986, 57.

⁸⁸ Spektor 2010.

economic dimension of Brazilian diplomatic mediation might not be surprising if we understand that as the early 1950s, foreign trade became integrated into the core of Itamaraty's interests.⁸⁹

Similarly, the diplomatic elites impressed upon Brazilian politicians on a peaceful solution of foreign and security problems and thus consolidated its role against the bureaucratic competition with the armed forces of Brazil. The general absence of external military threat to Brazil further reinforced Itamaraty's role in defining Brazil's national interest. President-dictator Vargas used the professional Itamaraty to engage in bargaining with the United States over industrialization and Brazil's economic development and the subsequent military regime relied on the same institution for building nationalist projects and hoped to project Brazil's as a great power abroad.⁹⁰ Thus, when the Castelo Branco took power as the first military dictator, he would advise the young diplomats, "In order to worthily represent Brazil abroad, you need to have nothing more before you than the teachings of Rio-Branco."⁹¹ It was during the period of President-dictator Geisel (1974-1979) and his Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira that nationalist assertiveness on foreign policy issues such as previous refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and assertion of a Brazilian claim to a 200-mile maritime zone transformed into a multidimensional activist approach.⁹² In all these instances, Itamaraty worked as an important institution to manage disagreements among several interlocutors and cushion pressures from Great Powers.

Finally, another important process through which the discourse on diplomatic mediation consolidated in Brazil lies in the central role of Itamaraty in defining Brazil's national interest emphasizing autonomy and independence. During the high growth period of the military regime

⁸⁹ For details see De Faria, Lopes, and Casarões 2013, 3.

⁹⁰ Barros, 1977.

⁹¹ Quoted in Burns 1967, 196.

⁹² Pinheiro 2000b.

(the 1970s), the idea of Brazil as a Great power (*Brasil Potência*) gained enough traction and practical purport among many actors that foreign policy was used for domestic political purposes. This also meant the highly professional and isolated bureaucratic establishment such as the Itamaraty would play the game without being buffeted by the political twists and turns. Thus, diplomacy not military force would take precedence in the national game. A case in point is Medici's National Integration Program (*Programa de Integração Nacional*) for the military regime's expansion in the Amazon basin. The Venezuelan administration of Carlos Andres Perez in 1976 openly opposed Brazil's inroads into the Amazon basin, remained critical of West Germany nuclear technology deal with Brazil and supported United States' human rights policies.⁹³ In turn, Itamaraty attempted to ensure a complete respect for its national sovereignty and promoted the idea of an agreement for joint development of the Amazon Basin in 1976 that led to the famous Amazon Pact with eight nations on July 3, 1978.⁹⁴ Although, the process was not smooth with usual suspicions of Brazilian hegemony among Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela who feared the impact of an Amazonian agreement on the Andean Common Market,⁹⁵ diplomatic mediation rather than armed conflict took precedence.

Thus, in the political history of Brazil, the discourse of diplomatic mediation of Brazil consolidated and reproduced due to the active role of Itamaraty in the national affairs. In the post-Cold War period, Brazil's activism in mediating territorial disputes in the region during the regime of Cardoso (1995-1998 and 1999-2002) further reinforced the central role of Itamaraty. Thus, when Lula came to power the discourse on diplomatic mediation remained firmly in place. Given the enabling power of the discourse, Lula took an unprecedented step to express explicitly Brazil's willingness to participate as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. The stability of the discourse on diplomatic mediation was surely a historically contingent development. The

⁹³ Ware 1980.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid

plurality of actors in foreign policy and occasions of presidentially led diplomacy did not manage to break the bureaucratic isolation of Itamaraty until recently. This discourse was specifically influential to that part of political entrepreneurs in Brazil who aimed to strengthen Brazil's reputation as a peaceful power. As the next section will show, the discourse on UN Peacekeeping Operations under the Chapter VI mandate was accepted to be part of this larger discourse on diplomatic mediation and the emphasis on peaceful resolution of conflicts.

6.3.3. UN Peacekeeping under Chapter VI Mandate

Finally, the Brazilian elites in opposition to a pernicious liberal interventionism and hegemonic projects of great powers defined Brazil's role in global governance solely within the institution of multilateral Chapter VI peacekeeping missions. Brazil's participation in UN peacekeeping dates back to 1956 in the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Sinai Peninsula, between 1948 and 1972, it participated in six out of the ten UN peacekeeping operations established during the period, and in post-Cold War period (1990-2002), Brazil participated in 20 out of 42 then established UN peacekeeping operations.⁹⁶ Historically Brazilian elites emphasized the intrinsic value of national autonomy, economic and political sovereignty and preferred a developmental ideology for promoting a prominent international role for the country - therefore the discourse on the peaceful settlement of disputes with the consent of the host nation is not surprising.

Three important developments within Brazil were especially influential in both consolidating Chapter VI missions and *bête noire* for peace enforcement operations. First is the deeply entrenched skepticism in Brazil towards military solutions to international security challenges.⁹⁷ Even the military regime was concerned with managing domestic radicalization, upholding domestic order and promoting economic development rather than on exercising any sort of

⁹⁶ See Velázquez 2010; Santos and Cravo, 2014.

⁹⁷ For a good discussion see Stuenkel and Tourinho 2014.

Hobbesian domination in the international system in general.⁹⁸ Further, in the absence of direct military threat to Brazil's survival since the end of the Paraguayan War (1864-70) – where Brazil emerged victorious – the rationale of “old professionalism” of the military doctrine geared to external threats moved toward a “new professionalism” aimed at guerrilla threats, internal security and national development since the 1950s.⁹⁹ This military organizational culture shaped the Brazilian military's choice towards defensive doctrines that largely mediated the policymakers' beliefs about military's role in a strategic environment. Moreover, the autonomous role of Itamaraty as seen in the previous section worked with clear bureaucratic interests on bargaining that aimed to increase its role and reduce that of the military. It is evident in the fragile institutional structures of the newly created Ministry of Defense in the late 1990s.¹⁰⁰

Second, Brazil's emphasis on multilateralism and its specific interpretation that unilateralism is the return of colonial attitudes towards global governance created a strong consensus towards collective legitimization of peacekeeping not peace enforcement missions abroad. Here Brazil has argued over several years to add social welfare and economic development to issues concerning international peace and security.¹⁰¹ It is the result of concatenation of antecedent conditions such as its own colonial past, reactions against Brazil's own opportunistic support for colonialism during the major part of the military regime and Brazil's position within the general contributions of Latin American governments, social movements, and regional organizations to the idea and practice of international human rights.¹⁰² Further, the perceived failures of militaristic agenda and peace enforcement strategies in delivering expected outcomes in Somalia,

⁹⁸ Hurrell 2010, 133.

⁹⁹ Stephan 1973.

¹⁰⁰ Zaverucha 2005.

¹⁰¹ Soares De Lima and Hirst 2006, 27–28.

¹⁰² Sikkink 2014.

Rwanda (with the French *Operation Turquoise*) and in Bosnia led to Brazil's unease with Chapter VII mandates.¹⁰³

Finally, immediate political considerations influenced Brazil's consensus towards multilateral Chapter VI type peacekeeping operations, especially Brazil's emphasis on participatory intervention that appreciates the perception of community and groups at the grass root level as key in designing meaningful approach to conflict resolution. For Brazil, the cultural, linguistic, and social ties of the intervening state matters along with seeking consent to international deployment from a sovereign government. Therefore, its peacekeeping engagement has mainly concentrated in Portuguese-speaking countries such as Mozambique, Angola, and East Timor and with adherence to Chapter VI mandates in other areas. It is the view among the Brazilian elites that the extraordinary powers of Chapter VII operations provide no scope for such participatory interventions.

6.4. Summary and Conclusion

The above analysis of humanitarianism in the political debates in Brazil showed there were three, or at least three, competing discourses, which consolidated and reproduced over time on responding to humanitarian crisis abroad. One cannot simply dispense these discourses in any analysis of the choice situation of Brazilian policymakers. The first prominent discourse of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states was a reaction against what Brazil understood of American unilateralism against Latin American multilateralism in the Western hemisphere. The second institution of diplomatic mediation showed Brazilian political actors a way forward for a rational and not objectionably anti-American policy; and, finally, the third institution of

¹⁰³ Stuenkel and Tourinho 2014.

Chapter VI peacekeeping operations was defined by oppositions to pernicious liberal interventionism and hegemonic projects of great powers abroad. Thus, when Lula came to power in 2003 it was not preordained that he would embark on a humanitarian military mission under Chapter VII mandate in Haiti. It will be the task of the next chapter to show how the Lula administration marginalized the alternative discourses and acted upon the humanitarian crisis in Haiti in a characteristically different manner.

7: Brazil's Practical Reasoning for Action in Haiti

7.1. Introduction

The previous chapter showed multiple discourses on humanitarianism in the political debates in Brazil – non-intervention, diplomatic mediation, and Chapter VI UN peacekeeping operations – that have consolidated and reproduced in several ways at least since the early twentieth century. These discourses are rich and powerful within the Brazilian foreign policy games. In other words, these discourses, despite their considerable overlap and mutual borrowings, enable and constrain distinct policies for the Brazilian actors facing humanitarian or political crisis abroad.

The specific purpose of this chapter is to show how the action of Chapter VII humanitarian military intervention in Haiti became possible for Brazil in the face of these alternative discourses. The two approaches discussed in Chapter 2 produce possible explanations for Brazil's intervention in Haiti in 2004. For some scholars, Brazil's military intervention was the result of the immense institutional authority enjoyed by the assertive Brazilian President.¹ For others, it was the result of Brazil's quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.² Still, others counter that the military action is the result of Brazil's new role as an emerging power in contemporary international politics.³

Overlooked in these debates, however, is that in the months preceding the intervention in Haiti, the Lula administration portrayed its humanitarian concern in Haiti as an exercise of

¹ Ricupero 2010; Ekström and Alles 2012; Villa and Viana 2010.

² Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007; Diniz 2007; Velázquez 2010.

³ Kenkel 2010; Kenkel 2013.

responsibility in the region conceived as diplomacy of solidarity exercised through the principle of non-indifference to a fellow Black-brother country. By highlighting the suffering black population in Haiti and Brazil's own significant black population, the Lula administration swiftly made crucial moves on race, social justice, and Haitian reconstruction and marginalized competing alternative discourses. Thus, humanitarian military intervention in Haiti was not inevitable and the administration was nearly preoccupied with how the action was portrayed as with the humanitarian intervention itself.

How can we explain Brazil's humanitarian military intervention in Haiti in the face of competing alternative discourses? Brazil's action in Haiti raises broader questions about the conditions under which and the processes through which some action become contingently authoritative in the face of alternative discourses. Yet conventional IR scholarship discussed in Chapter 2 provides little insight and resorts to claims of inevitability through a retrospective reading of history or resorts to claims of hidden desires or the percolation of liberal humanitarian norms in the post-Cold War period. Specifically, some scholars argue that humanitarian intervention in Haiti was, at best, a quest for a permanent seat in UNSC – the Lula administration understood the bargain with Western liberal states *very well* before the crisis and were already preparing to act. Others disregard that there were well-established discourses, such as non-intervention, that the Lula administration marginalized. They merely locate the explanation in the assertive policies of Lula. As Monica Hirst puts it, “As a part of growing responsibility assumed by Brazil in PKOs [Peace keeping Operations], the presence in Haiti stands out as an example of Brazilian [*sic*] more audacious diplomacy in Latin America.”⁴

⁴ Hirst 2007, 7–8.

In this chapter, I argue that it was a distinct form of practical reasoning – the deontic scorekeeping game of giving and asking for reasons – that enabled the Lula administration to articulate its “responsibility” and “non-indifference” in the region; marginalize alternative discourses; and, judge on a multilateral military intervention in Haiti. In keeping with the analytical framework developed in this thesis, the way in which agents engage in the game of giving and asking for reasons is critical. Unlike the Indian case where the interaction-in-context on the crisis related to East Pakistan triggered an instrumental norm type, here in the Brazilian case, the interaction-in-context among several interlocutors on the crisis in Haiti triggered an institutional norm type that governed the patterns of practical inferences among agents. Thus, the Brazilian administration took some actors as “scorekeepers” who occupied the institutional status on deliberating on Haitian crisis. Their political claims were important for the Lula administration in the game of giving and asking for reasons to establish important intersubjective convergence on the crisis and secure an entitlement for action. The Lula administration consistently portrayed its humanitarian concern in Haiti as an exercise of responsibility in the region and the link between responsibility and military intervention came about through the game of giving and asking for reasons with the scorekeepers. Crucially, in lieu of the institutional norm-type that underwrites interactions, scorekeepers accepted Brazil as a bona fide player in the Haitian crisis and did not attribute desires of hegemony on the part of Brazil. In other words, scorekeepers took Lula’s practical inferences on non-indifferences and solidarity to the suffering black population in Haiti as good reasons for action and not as transcendental values. This endorsement enabled Brazil to engage in Chapter VII peace enforcement mission in the face of competing alternatives.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The second section provides a brief overview of the crisis in Haiti, which led to the general concern of humanitarian intervention in the state by early 2000s

and interactions-in-context among several interlocutors. In the third section, I analyze existing explanations of Brazil's intervention in Haiti, asking what light each might shed on Brazil's action in Haiti. Following this discussion, in the fourth section, I foreground the analytical framework developed in this thesis, delimit the scorekeepers in the crisis and the specific institutional norm type resulting from the interactions-in-context. The fifth section of the chapter shows that practical reasoning of the Lula administration in two distinct stages from 1 January 2003 to 31 May 2004. The focus is on the period from the beginning of the Lula administration, which already faced the issue of massive crimes against humanity in Haiti to the departure of Brazilian troops to participate in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on 31 May 2004. Finally, I conclude with the implication of this argument for critical constructivist IR theory.

7.2. From Coup to Civil Wars: Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti (May 2000 to May 2004)

Haiti has been in the throes of political instability since the nineteenth century, only seven of its forty-four presidents have served their terms, and there have been only two peaceful transitions of power in the state since the beginning of the republic in 1801.⁵ The United States first feared the threat of emancipated blacks in Haiti to the interests of its southern slave owners; and, then resorted to gunboat diplomacy in the Caribbean countries to protect its national security, which spelled a catastrophe for political stability in Haiti. As Robert Fatton puts it: "The contradictions of the plantation system [in Haiti], the hostility of western imperial forces, and the class aspirations of Haitian leaders created a historical fissure between militaristic state of the few and the wider society of the many."⁶

⁵ Fatton, Jr. 2006, 15.

⁶ Ibid.



Figure 1.7. Haiti in 2004⁷

Yet the notoriously brutal Duvalier dynasty ruling Haiti between 1957 and 1986 created a specter of animal cunning in domestic politics that haunts Haiti until today. François Duvalier was popularly known as ‘Papa Doc’ came to power in Haiti in 1957 based on the election campaign of economic equality and improvement of the devastated infrastructure.⁸ The US occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934 failed to provide any meaningful governance system in the country and the subsequent economic fragility of the state offered a political window for dictators. The heart of Papa Doc’s politics was repression and brutal violence to continue the dictatorship. On the one hand, he kept a personal militia, the ‘Volontaires de la Securite Nationale-VSN’ or the Tonton Macoutes that engaged in grisly violence and butchered non-conformist Haitians with impunity. Crucially the Tonton Macoutes worked as a parallel institution to keep the armed forces of Haiti divided and under the strict dictatorial control of Papa Doc. On the other hand, he slowly consolidated his relations with the United States based on anti-communism –

⁷ National Online Project, Haiti http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/haiti_map.htm [Accessed on 22 April 2016]

⁸ Podur 2012, 15.

promulgated through the Anti-Communist Law of 28 April 1969 that delighted the Americans but further reinforced torture, killings and massive human rights violence in the state. When Papa Doc died in 1971, after naming himself President-for-life in 1964, his nineteen-year-old son Jean-Claude Duvalier popularly known as ‘Baby Doc’ took over the dynasty and continued the mass atrocity crimes in the state.⁹ However, some groups within Haiti showed signs of resisting authoritarianism and massive violence in the state.

This political mobilization coalesced around a charismatic young Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide (hereafter Aristide), who was a partisan of liberation theology that engaged in a public critique of Baby Doc and the brutality of the Tonton Macoutes. Aristide’s efforts, *inter alia*, ended twenty-nine years of Duvalier rule in Haiti and Baby Doc fled the country and obtained asylum in France on 7 February 1986.¹⁰ Thereafter, the church-based civil society movement under Aristide gathered steam and organized into a strong political group called *Lavalas* – the Haitian Creole word for ‘flood’ aiming to stop violence, ensure economic reform and create space for democratic governance.¹¹ For a brief period beginning from 16 December 1990, Aristide and his *Lavalas* party legitimately occupied the office. However, in a coup planned by the Haitian armed forces another three years long massacre of innocent Haitians continued under General Raoul Cedras and his Front pour l’Avancement et le Progrès d’Haiti (Front for the Advancement of Progress in Haiti, FRAPH).

With the wave of liberal humanitarianism in the post-Cold War period, the United States with other powers such as France and Canada took an active interest in the restoration of democracy

⁹ See Ferguson 1987; Also see Fatton, Jr. 2007.

¹⁰ Podur 2012, 16.

¹¹ Hallward 2008.

in Haiti and in establishing the groundwork for peacekeeping operations.¹² After a series of failed political negotiations with the military regime, prodded by these powers, the UNSC adopted Resolution 940, authorizing a US-led multinational force (MNF) under Chapter VII peace enforcement mission to create “secure and stable environment” in Haiti. Brazil abstained from the Resolution 940 because it felt that action in Haiti should be Chapter VI peacekeeping– and not Chapter VII peace enforcement – operation.¹³ Yet the MNF deployed smoothly as “Operation Restore Democracy” and Aristide returned to power in Haiti on 17 October 1994.¹⁴

In a tense and frequently bloody reconstruction of Haiti, Aristide’s successor René Préval failed to consolidate democratic progress, faced massive violation of human rights, and brutal killings in the streets and thus in January 1999 he dissolved the legislature in order to rule by decree. “The achievements of ‘Operation Restore Democracy’ seemed to be lying in ruins.”¹⁵ It was in this tense political climate that Aristide was reelected as president of Haiti for a second time in November 2000 in what was widely debated as a flawed method of calculating the election results.¹⁶ Immediately the United States called for aid freeze and the Bush administration pressured the Inter-American Development Bank to cancel more than \$650 million in development assistance. This money, as Justin Podur puts, was slated “to pay for safe drinking water, literacy programmes and health services, and had serious economic consequences.”¹⁷ In the darkest hours of economic paralysis, the slaughter of thousands of Haitians by those groups who supported and opposed Aristide’s election continued with impunity. Dead bodies littered all over the main locales in Port-au-Prince and Cité Soliel. Yet Aristide aimed to restore hope in the state and began his political project in late 2000.

¹² Farmer 2011, 150; Dupuy 1997.

¹³ Diniz 2007, 101.

¹⁴ For good summary see Einsiedel and Malone 2006, 156.

¹⁵ Ibid., 158.

¹⁶ Cited in Hallward 2008, 78.

¹⁷ Podur 2012, 25.

The period between Aristide reelection in 2000 and his ultimate overthrow in 2004, is certainly crucial, not only because it set the context for Brazil's intervention in a new multilateral peace enforcement operation in Haiti, but also to understand great power dictates on state building missions.¹⁸ Indeed, massive human rights violations engulfed Haiti that found new justifications based on the ideology of anti-Aristidism. The United States and France supported a violent opposition group called Groupe des 184 to challenge the legitimacy of Aristide and the Fanmi Lavalas.¹⁹ The *volte-face* of the Americans has to do with *inter alia*, Aristide's opposition to neoliberal economic policies of the Western industrialized states.²⁰ The violent practices and paramilitary insurgencies of Groupe des 184 along with arsons committed by another US-funded group Convergence Démocratique led to increased casualties in Haiti.²¹ Aristide on his part tried to intimidate the opposition with his young thugs, known as the chimères, with the power of violence similar to Tontons Macoutes of the Duvaliers time. For reasons unknown, the chimères turned against Aristide when a chimères leader of Gonaïves region in Haiti, Amiot Metayer was murdered. This led to the creation of a "Cannibal Army" led by Metayer's brother, who swore to overthrow Aristide. As Robert Fatton Jr. shows "When former soldiers and death squad leaders of the disbanded army joined forces with the Cannibals, Aristide's fate was virtually sealed. The United States and France and, to a lesser degree, Canada gave the final push that led to his fall."²²

Disregarding the fact that Aristide and his party, Fanmi Lavalas, won a democratic election in Haiti in 2000 with 89 of 115 mayoral positions, 72 of 83 seats in the Legislature and 18 of the 19 Senate seats, the US and France forced Aristide to step down. The White House categorically stated that:

This long-simmering crisis [in Haiti] is largely of Mr. Aristide's making. His failure to adhere to democratic principles has contributed to the deep polarization and violent unrest that we are witnessing in Haiti today.

¹⁸ Paul Farmer, "Who Removed Aristide?" *London Review of Books*, April 2004.

¹⁹ Podur 2012, 45, 61.

²⁰ Ibid., 26–27.

²¹ Ibid., 41–42.

²² Fatton, Jr. 2006, 21.

His own actions have called into question his fitness to continue to govern Haiti. We urge him to examine his position carefully, to accept responsibility, and to act in the best interest of the people of Haiti.²³

Ominously it also stated, “The United States is preparing to support a multinational interim security force in the context of a sustainable political solution in Haiti.”²⁴ In other words, Washington was now ready to overthrow Aristide and install a new regime as a political solution to the problem. The prospect of another peace enforcement operation in 2004 led by the United States turned the wheel, back to the situation before 1990, when interference in internal affairs of other states was the American way of security governance in the hemisphere – but now within a facade of multilateralism.

On 29 February 2004, Aristide was overthrown by forceful exile by Western powers on a US aircraft bound for the Central African Republic.²⁵ The same night the UNSC passed Resolution 1529 that authorized the deployment of 3000-strong Multinational Interim Force (MIF) comprised of American, French, Canadian, and Chilean troops for three months to support the new Haitian President Alexandre Boniface’ “request” for international assistance to promote and protect human rights.²⁶ On 30 April, the UN Security Council announced that the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) starting in July would replace MIF. Thereafter, UN Security Council Resolution 1542 on 1 June 2004 formally established MINUSTAH.

In a very surprising and important foreign policy move Brazil, under the leadership of Lula, voted *for* both the UN resolutions (1529&1542) and committed to contributing troops in accordance with Resolution 1542 for intervention in Haiti. As we saw in the previous chapter, there were clear but competing discourses on the policy options for Brazil on political and

²³ White House Statement on Haiti, 28 February 2004. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/30043.htm> accessed on 1 February 2016.

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Podur 2012, 54–55.

²⁶ See UN Security Council Resolution 1529. 4919th Meeting (Night), SC/8015.

humanitarian crisis abroad and engaging in Chapter VII multilateral military intervention was not the sole, inevitable, logical consequence of the political game. The newly elected Lula administration had the option of exercising the age-old Latin American tradition of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. It is also Brazil's constitutional prerogative since 1988 as we saw in the previous chapter and thus stand up to the pernicious liberal interventionist hegemony of Western Powers. Alternatively, the Lula administration could have utilized the powerful legacy of Itamaraty to mediate the situation in Haiti and bring out a solution similar to Brazil's successful mediatory efforts in the past with Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. It was cost-effective with a successful record of accomplishment. Finally, the Lula administration had the choice of pressing for Chapter VI peacekeeping mission instead of acceding to a Chapter VII peace enforcement mission. In this light, how can we explain Brazil's action in the face of competing alternative discourses?

7.3. Evaluating Existing Explanations for Brazil's Action in Haiti

Before offering my arguments, it is important to evaluate alternative explanations in order to show how the approach based on the practical reasoning in deontic scorekeeping network does a better job accounting for Brazil's action. First, some correctly note that Presidents in Brazil enjoy enormous authority on foreign and security policies.²⁷ The professionalism of Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter Itamaraty) and its bureaucratic insulation further reinforces the executive's control over foreign affairs.²⁸ Further, the Brazilian Constitution (1988) only establishes an *ex-post* action to Congress for 'resolving indefinitely' any issues in treaties, agreements, and international acts.²⁹ Thanks to this institutional prerogative, Lula in one phone

²⁷ Figueiredo and Limongi 2000.

²⁸ Zairo 1985; Lafer 2000; Pinheiro 2003; De Faria, Lopes, and Casarões 2013.

²⁹ 1988 Constitution, Article 49, Section I

call with President Chirac on March 4, 2004, had reportedly said that he had “1,100 available troops” that could participate in the future intervention in Haiti.³⁰

However, attributing Lula’s success to his institutional position alone fails to distinguish between arbitrary subjective preferences and national interest arguments that require agents to give reasons for their claims.³¹ Lula clearly did not legitimize Brazil’s intervention in Haiti because it happened to please his fancy. On several occasions, the administration engaged in reasoning the claims, justifying the decision, and making an explicit assessment of the impact of military intervention upon community values both at home and the region.³² Attributing Lula’s success to his institutional position alone overstates the president’s power and undermines the game of giving and asking for reasons imperative in national interest claims. In short, the bully pulpit’s influence in Brazil is exaggerated.

Second, many others presume humanitarian intervention in Haiti would be the pathway for Brazil obtaining a permanent seat in the UNSC.³³ If these scholars were right, Brazil’s quest for UNSC seat through the principle and practice of humanitarian military intervention would almost never meet with inconsistencies and problems. However, the reasons for Brazil’s resistance and reticence to a general norm of humanitarian intervention are long. For example, in the post-Cold War period, Brazil abstained from several votes in the UN on the question of humanitarian intervention in Haiti in 1994, challenged the UN authorized French *Operation Turquoise* in Rwanda, opposed NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, remained skeptical of recent multilateral intervention in Libya and Syria and prematurely aborted its idea of ‘Responsibility

³⁰ Martha Beck and Eliane Oliveria, “Brasil pode comandar missao no Haiti,” *O Globo*, 5 March 2004, 38; Tania Monteiro, “Brasil deve comandar forca de paz no Haiti,” *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 5 March 2004, A-14.

³¹ See specifically Kratochwil 1982.

³² Congress plays an important role too, see Diniz and Ribeiro 2008.

³³ Diniz 2007; Velázquez 2010; Kenkel 2013.

While Protecting.³⁴ At least for Brazil, the path of UNSC seat does not lie in carrying the baton of humanitarian interventionism.

Specifically, on the humanitarian intervention in Haiti in 2004 the inconsistency is stark. On 29 February 2004, Haitian President Aristide “resigned” and on the same night, the UNSC passed Resolution 1529 that authorized the deployment of a 3000 strong Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to secure and stabilize Haiti.³⁵ Brazil voted in favor of the Resolution but refused to participate in the MIF. It was only in a later Resolution 1542 of 30 April 2004, which established the MINUSTAH that the Brazilian administration agreed to lead the humanitarian intervention. Given that both MIF and MINUSTAH were both Chapter VII peace enforcement operations, the question why Brazil concerned about the UNSC seat, did not contribute troops to MIF but to MINUSTAH, is unanswered in the existing accounts.

Third and closely related, Kai Kenkel has observed that Brazil as an ‘emerging power’ acceded to participate in Haiti because of status, and the costs of breaking with the regional traditions for the first time outweighed the benefits of humanitarian intervention in Haiti.³⁶ This basic cost-benefit calculus of an emerging power can explain the administration’s campaign for action. The problem here is that the explanation is a theoretical fiat on the role of emerging powers rather than a careful evaluation of the context and contingencies of Brazil’s military intervention in Haiti. In most cases, especially in international relations, such a simple instrumental relationship between contemporary emerging powers and breaking regional traditions does not exist.³⁷

³⁴ Stuenkel and Tourinho 2014.

³⁵ UNSC Resolution 1529

³⁶ Kenkel 2010; Kenkel 2013.

³⁷ Relations are based on institutional bargain Ikenberry 2005.

To put it boldly, pronouncing Brazil is an emerging power thus its intervention in Haiti is intelligible is a parochial way to understanding the action. Two reasons suffice to show why this is so. One, representing Haitian crisis as one that has the stakes of Brazil's status required significant interpretive labor. The empiricist assumption that Haitian civil war is an 'irrepressible natural facts' out there for Brazil to act ignores this interpretive work. It does not even ask, what made it possible for Haiti to be understood as an area of prestige in the first place. Similarly, breaking from cultural traditions is usually the result of incremental choices and not a result of deliberate cost-benefit calculations in a particular venture, as in economic theory. It also requires justificatory responsibility to multiple interlocutors. Here demonstrating cost-benefit calculations might be one among many justifications offered for action. Two, the presumption of some Newtonian laws like demands placed by the international system on an emerging power in the area of humanitarianism undermine the agency of actual decision makers as discussed in Chapter 2. Actors communicate intentions, make claims, criticize options, justify choices and dynamically involve with normative structures of international politics. To ignore these agential practices is to ignore the whole "politics" behind decisions to intervene.

Finally, some scholars suggest that the post-Cold War bureaucratic partnership between Itamaraty and the Brazilian Military of Defense is an important pragmatic factor that enabled the state to expand its presence in global security affairs in general and peacekeeping operations in particular.³⁸ It also extends to show the mission in Haiti was an opportunity to improve the operational-logistical knowledge of the armed forces and offer an innovative political approach to UN-led interventions.³⁹ That foreign and security policy institutions in Brazil are undergoing a transformation, that the administration claimed a 'Brazilian way' of peacekeeping in Haiti, and also that the operational-logistical knowledge of Brazilian armed forces has been replicated in the

³⁸ Hirst and Nasser 2014.

³⁹ Sotomayor Velázquez 2014.

pacification of *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro is beyond much doubt. Yet, it is not clear that such policy pragmatism was critical in the legitimization process. There was enough information publicly available to demonstrate that involvement in Haiti's protracted violent rebellion is not strategically advantageous.⁴⁰ If there was a pragmatic approach to peacekeeping due to greater coordination between the ministries then Haiti was clearly to avoid. What becomes puzzling is why the administration's claim on creating a 'Brazilian way' of peace enforcement in Haiti carried the day over credible and publicly available evidence to the contrary. Further, all these accounts ignore the well-entrenched discourses on non-intervention, diplomatic mediation, or Chapter VI peacekeeping operation that served as important alternative options for the Lula administration. In sum, conventional explanations of how the Lula administration made humanitarian intervention contingently authoritative against competing alternatives face tremendous limitations.

7.4. The Scorekeepers and Game players in the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti

It is here that the elaborate framework of practical reasoning developed in Chapter 3 is useful. Drawing upon recent advancements in analytical pragmatist philosophy, particularly the works of Brandom, we saw that discursive practices are deontic and members keep track of one's own and others' commitments and entitlements in the social world through the game of giving and asking for reasons. The boundaries of discursive practice are endogenous to interactions-in-context and the norm-type that underwrites the interactions. On the Haitian crisis, the claims, contestation, and challenges by multiple scorekeepers established a distinct deontic scorekeeping network with "institutional normativity" underwriting interactions among interlocutors. One cannot separate the scorekeepers from the type of normativity underwriting the interactions; however, for analytical reasons first I delimit the scorekeepers – those actors the Brazilian policy makers took

⁴⁰ See series of Human Rights Watch, Haiti Country Report 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002 before the decision.


as “scorekeepers” as those occupying important socio-institutional status in finding a practical solution to the crisis – and then elaborate the significance of institutional normativity in interactions. Thus, before one can set out to examine the practical reasoning of the Lula administration, we have “look and see” the scorekeepers and game-players and the broader norm-type that underwrites the interactions between the interlocutors.

Based on the warranted expectations from the analytical framework developed in this thesis and with a contextual analysis of the institutional normativity in interactions in the Haitian crisis, we could delimit nine important interlocutors that the Lula administration treated as “scorekeepers” in the game. Thus, the claims and assertions, particularly the deontic attitudes – attributions, endorsements, challenges, and acknowledgments – of nine important interlocutors set the rules of the game in important ways. The discursive practices of (1) Western liberal interventionists – United States and France and to some extent Canada; (2) Argentina; (3) Chile; (4) Caribbean countries institutionalized as Caribbean Community CARICOM; (5) the Aristide administration; (6) Brazil’s domestic public; (7) the Lula administration; (8) the Global Media; and (9) the United Nations, count as deontic scorekeeping practice. These scorekeepers exhibited a particular deontic attitude and kept track of each others’ normative commitments and entitlements on the crisis in Haiti.⁴¹ Crucially, some of the members occupied important socio-institutional status who acknowledgment, endorsement, and concurrence Brazil required in order to secure entitlement for action in Haiti. A preliminary uptake of their deontic attitudes of these scorekeepers will shed light first on their situated interactions, second on the deontic scorekeeping space in the network, and finally bring the norm-type that arises in such interactions.

⁴¹ Certainly there were other scorekeepers too but these were the most important and the following discussions on their deontic attitudes and their institutional position in addressing the crisis will further highlight the importance of these scorekeepers.

First, let us examine the relations between agents and their default entitlements that other scorekeepers acknowledge or challenge. The discursive practices of the United States, Canada, and France grouped as White Western liberal interventionist powers here count as deontic scorekeeping practice because they had historical connections with Haiti and exhibited a particular deontic attitude of establishing democracy by overthrowing the legitimately elected Aristide from power. As we already saw, with the end of the Cold War and the dawn of the age of liberal interventionism, the United States with the support of France as the former colonizer of Haiti undertook important steps to negotiate with the military regime and bring Aristide to power in the mid-1990s. These states offered important reasons for democracy, stability, and liberal market economy in the Caribbean and influenced the UNSC in multiple ways for their ‘Operation Restore Democracy.’ Similarly, these states made a fundamental sort of the move in the game in late 2000 by challenging Aristide’s election in Haiti and crucially sponsored rebel groups within the state to overthrow the government.

Figure 1.8 Interaction-in-context among Game players and Scorekeepers on Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti 2004



Some other scorekeepers acknowledged and endorsed the claims and the deontic attitudes of these liberal interventionist states. Specifically, the United Nations endorsed the assertions of these Western liberal interventionist states and approvingly passed several Resolutions in the Security Council in order to restore democracy and bring stability to Haiti. Similarly, Chile was the first Latin American state to endorse the deontic attitude of the liberal interventionist policies of the Great Powers. The US Secretary of State Colin Powell called the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs in the wee hours of crisis in Haiti to find out whether Chile was willing to send troops. Chile accepted the invitation and deployed a sizeable military force to the MIF for mopping up operations in Haiti.⁴² The Lula administration also acknowledged the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, as witnessed in its votes in Resolution 1529 and 1542 and endorsed the need to address the problem in a multilateral manner. The chain reaction of these deontic endorsements by these interlocutors is important in itself to see the configuration of these actors in the relational space.

However, the Aristide administration challenged the assertions of the Western liberal interventionist states and exhibited a characteristic deontic attitude towards the ouster of Aristide by calling it a “coup.” As we already saw, in early 2004 Aristide was sent to the Central African Republic in an American aircraft and the Western liberal states quite humbly labeled it as Aristide’s “resignation” from power. Aristide strongly challenged this claim and stated that “During the night of the 28th February 2004, here was a coup d’état. One could say that it was a geo-political kidnapping. I can clearly say that it was terrorism disguised as diplomacy.”⁴³ The Global Media particularly the reports from Amy Goodman’s *Democracy Now*, reports from the *Black Commentator*, Harvard Human Rights Report, and BBC reports challenged the claims of the


⁴² See Heine 2006.

⁴³ Quoted in Podur 2012, 55–56.

liberal interventionist states.⁴⁴ The Caribbean nations (CARICOM), Brazil's domestic public that included members of the opposition to the Lula administration, and Argentina also challenged the overthrow of Aristide and the reigning spirit of liberal interventionism in the region. These scorekeepers, *prima facie*, challenged the deontic commitments and entitlements of liberal interventionists and broadly endorsed the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Haiti.⁴⁵ The relation between these interlocutors is presented in Figure 1.8 above.

The interactions, contestations, and challenges by these multiple scorekeepers establish a distinct deontic scorekeeping network with regard to the crisis in Haiti in 2004 it underwrites a larger institutional norm-type among interlocutors in the Haitian crisis.

Figure 1.9. Institutional Norm-Type in International-in-context among scorekeepers and game players in Haiti 2004



⁴⁴ Ibid., 29–40.

⁴⁵ The best treatment is Hirst 2007.

There are at least two reasons why the interactional situation between the scorekeepers and game players underwrites an institutional norm type. First, all scorekeeper including those who challenged and offered important contestations against interventionism in Haiti worked within the authority structure of the United Nations despite acknowledging the role of power politics and the connivance of White Western liberal states in the UNSC Resolutions on Haiti. The United States for the first time in its diplomatic history in the Western hemisphere sought the legitimacy of the United Nations in its engagement in Haiti, particularly in the adoption of Resolution 940, which authorized a US-led multinational force in Haiti in 1994.⁴⁶ The mandate for further intervention in Haiti in ten years also came from the authority of the UNSC both through UNSC Resolutions 1529 and 1542, which established MIF and MINUSTAH.

Further, other interlocutors such as Chile, France, and Canada including those who challenged the intervention such as Argentina, CARICOM, and the Brazil's domestic public accepted the authority of the United Nations, worked within its institutional mandate, and rejected any possibility of unilateral humanitarian intervention in Haiti. The CARICOM also relied on the institutional support of the OAS and submitted a formal request to the UN to end the violence in Haiti and restore the political position of Aristide.⁴⁷ Similarly, important opposition groups in Brazil deferred to the UN Secretary General Report on Haiti in challenging and seeking reasons from the Lula administration.⁴⁸ This has to do with the general UN activism and an intense period of international involvement in Haiti since the 1990s along with the role of OAS in institutionalizing regular interactions.⁴⁹ Showing that Haiti is one important case of

⁴⁶ Einsiedel and Malone 2006, 156.

⁴⁷ Haiti's interim prime minister asks for OAS election support', Caribbean Net News, 7 May 2004 Howland 2006, 470; Bravo 2005.

⁴⁸ See UN Secretary General, Report on Haiti, UN Doc. S/2004/300 (16 April 2004); UN Secretary General, Report on Haiti, UN Doc. S.2004/698 (30 August 2004)

⁴⁹ The UN was involved in Haiti under UNMIH (United Nations Mission in Haiti), from September 1993 to June 1996. The Second was UNSMIH (United Nations Support Mission in Haiti) from July 1996 to June 1997. The third was UNTMIH (United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti), from August 1997 to November 1997. And the last,

institutionalized interactions among actors who demonstrated both political will and technical assistance, Einsiedel and Malone argue that:

The [Haitian] case offers the first, and to date only, instance of the Security Council authorizing the use of force to effect the restoration of democracy within a member state. Unlike in a number of other situations, democratic processes were not seen as a means of national reconciliation, nor were elections seen as a mechanism to anchor fragile peace agreements. Rather, democratic rule was asserted as the goal in and of itself.⁵⁰

Brazil's own endorsement of the UN as *the* important body for the collective legitimization of major political functions in the international society in the post-Cold War period changed how other interlocutors assessed Brazil's moves in the game.⁵¹ The concern about the legitimate authority of UN and convincing the rightness of collective legitimization by Brazilian policymakers gained importance as part of general uncertainty over the hegemony of the US in the post-Cold War period and *inter alia* specific confidence over Brazil-Argentina rapprochement over (nuclear) security issues that involved cooperative verification schemes and arms control agreements. The latter arose from a mutual sense of vulnerability – that the budding democracy was fragile and regional peace is crucial to civil-military relations at home.⁵² Therefore, UN and the power of legitimacy it offered enabled Brazilian leaders to offer approval and disapproval of actions at the regional and international levels and subject US' action to rule-governed order in the Western Hemisphere. In this sense, the argument confirms the power-oriented character of Brazilian politics in the post-Cold War period. As Inis Claude put it: "Power and legitimacy are not antithetical, but complementary. The obverse of the legitimacy of power is the power of

before MINUSTAH, was MIPONUH (United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti), from December 1997 to March 2000. Einsiedel and Malone 2006, 154.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Although Brazil was the founding member of the UN and opens the General Assembly debate every year, in the early days Brazilian policymakers trended the thin line between legality and legitimacy, predominantly preferring the former.

⁵² Hurrell 1998, 536.

legitimacy; rulers seek legitimization not only to satisfy their consciences but also to buttress their positions.”⁵³

The second reason why the interactions among scorekeepers underwrite an institutional norm-type is because scorekeepers did not proceed in terms of a “beggar thy neighbor” approach and utilized the existing institutional constraints (Mercosur) and sanctions mechanisms (UN & OAS) to find a negotiated solution to the political crises in Haiti. Even those scorekeepers, who initially opposed the intervention like Argentina, Brazilian domestic public, and the CARICOM states aimed to find a negotiated solution, changed their claims, as we shall see, in the reasoning process, and did not proceed to worsen the relative situation of others. Monica Hirst presents the institutionalized interactions among states in the Southern Cone:

The efforts made in the last two decades by the Southern Cone countries to advance in the structuring of a regionalization process that combines economic integration, democratic rule and security cooperation peace has generated also new international capabilities. In South America, despite eventual setbacks the Southern Cone countries, South America has become an area of greater stability than the Andean Community. It is worth mentioning the participation of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile three countries in multilateral arenas and initiatives, namely the UN Security Council and UN peacekeeping missions. In South America, the three countries have become more flexible regarding their anti-interventionist beliefs, accepting expanded political roles in Latin American affairs with the aim of containing the securitization of the regional agenda.⁵⁴

This institutional commitment came through both past shared practices and also through the situation interactions with regard to Haiti. The role of ABC countries in the commitment to Mercosul treaty for a common market and the Brazil’s leadership in Brasilia Summit in late August 2000 to save Mercosul, in the wake of the sharp economic crisis of Argentina, established important ties between actors on the common concern for economic and political stability in South America. It established a predictable environment upon which discussions on crises in the region could be held. Thus, Brazil’s leadership in Ecuador-Peru peace process and Paraguay’s

⁵³ Claude 1966, 368.

⁵⁴ Hirst 2007, 2–3.

democratic transition meant that concerns of stability could provide grounds upon which to reach political agreements despite differences. The regular interactions between members in the OAS and the joint endorsement among Latin American, Caribbean, and North American states of the June 1991 OAS declaration, the “Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System,” put institutionalized interactions at the forefront. These shared practices of the past created incentives for weaker and secondary states to establish patterns of interactions on issues that does not translate into risks of arbitrary domination by some. Thus, on the situational interactions on Haiti, even the United States, France, and Canada did not assume unilateral powers but skillfully engaged with the existing institutional structures within UN and OAS and negotiated with the Latin American countries for the first time in a UN operation in the Western Hemisphere. Thus, the shared practices in the Latin American region and concern for the existing institutional baseline with regard to addressing the crisis in Haiti made sure that there were clear mechanisms in play to set constraints on state power institutionally.

Thus, the interactions among deontic scorekeepers (shown in Figures 1.7 and 1.8) provided the boundary to otherwise disparate assertions of actors in the Haitian crisis. It also shows the institutional norm-type that underwrites the deliberation and contestations of actors. With this, we have set the stage to understand Brazil’s practical reasoning for action in Haiti. The upshot of the institutional norms in the situation – in contrast to the instrumental norm type examined in the Indian case previously – is that scorekeepers evaluate practical inferences based on the status of actors in question and change the deontic scores in a systematic manner commensurate with the institutional rules of the game. The next two sections will elaborate on the practical reasoning of the Lula administration and provide an account of how Brazil secured the entitlement from scorekeepers to address the humanitarian crisis in Haiti.

7.5. Brazil's Practical Reasoning for Humanitarian Intervention

Given the networked relations between multiple scorekeepers with regard to the crisis in Haiti and the broadly institutionalized relations between interlocutors predominantly through the UN and also through other institutional forums in Latin America such as the OAS and CARICOM, how did the Lula administration deliberate and come to conclusions about addressing the humanitarian crisis? This question becomes all the important given that the default normative commitment of scorekeepers, who initially challenged Brazil – such as Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Caribbean states, and members of the Brazilian domestic public –relied on the well-established discourse on non-intervention in the internal affairs of Haiti. Then what kind of the game of giving and asking for reasons that the Lula administration engaged in and what role the competing alternative discourses on humanitarianism play in the deliberations?

Taking the reasons and justifications offered by the Lula administration seriously, I will present Brazil's practical reasoning in two stages. Similar to the Indian case examined previously, the stages serve two functions. First, they break up the deliberations and contestations among scorekeepers into distinct periods of deontic scores. Second, they represent the shift in the locus of action. In stage one, I examine the claims and assertions of Brazil between 1 January 2003 and 29 February 2004. It is the period from the beginning of the Lula administration in 2003 to Brazil's controversial vote in the UNSC Resolution 1529, which authorized the deployment of 3000 strong MIF in Haiti. In stage two, I examine Brazil's practical reasoning in the crucial period between 29 February 2004 and 31 May 2004. It is when the Lula administration changed its major premise from exercising general responsibility in the region to specific state building and reconstruction projects in Haiti, evaluated the competing alternative discourses and marginalized them, and secured the normative entitlement for a military operation in Haiti from

other scorekeepers. The analysis draws upon multiple primary and secondary sources including debates in the National Congress, public speeches of the policymakers in the Lula administration, press reports, public interviews, and a burgeoning secondary scholarship on Brazil's military intervention in Haiti.

7.4.1. Stage One: Regional Solutions through Responsibility

In the period between 1 January 2003 and 29 February 2004, when massive crimes against humanity engulfed Haiti, which led the United States, France, and Canada support rebel groups to overthrow the elected government of Aristide, the Lula administration instead directed its objective to exercise responsible leadership in South America. Thus, Lula asserted in his inaugural ceremony in the National Congress that:

The main priority of my Government's foreign policy is to construct a South America that is politically stable, prosperous and united, based on democratic ideals and on social justice. (...) We will also take care of the social, cultural, and scientific-technological dimensions in the process of integration... *Several of our neighbors are today facing difficult situations. If called up, and with the means that are available to us, we will contribute towards finding peaceful solutions to resolve these situations of crises, based on dialogue, democratic principles and on the constitutional precepts of each country.*⁵⁵

In order to achieve this goal of responsible regional leadership, the Lula administration offered several reasons – those minor instrumental premises in practical reasoning – with series of practical inferences in the deontic scorekeeping space to seek normative entitlements for leadership in the region. Here once again value considerations rather than cost-benefit calculations played an import role in the claims. Two important reasons that the Brazilian administration offered to its scorekeepers to secure entitlement for responsible leadership in South America deserve close attention: (1) Brazil is democratic and politically stable state in contrast to several of its neighbors that are facing political and economic crisis; and (2) Brazil

⁵⁵ Speech by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at his Inaugural Ceremony, National Congress - Brasília, January 1, 2003. Brazil Foreign Policy Handbook, Ministry of External Relations, Brazil 2008, 43. Emphasis added.

supports solidarist diplomacy without pretensions of unilateralism. Other scorekeepers kept track of Brazil's objectives and changed their deontic scores, as we shall see, in systematic ways. At this stage, the default-deontic commitments of other actors, which endorsed the principle of non-intervention and kept track of Brazil's commitments created immense skepticism on Brazil's claim for responsible leadership in South America.

To begin with, the major premise of the Lula administration— the broadly motivational goal — at this stage was to assert its responsible leadership in South America and did not direct this objective specifically at addressing mass atrocity crimes in Haiti. With the warming of relations with neighboring states since the end of the 1990s, particularly under the Cardoso administration through important economic projects such as Mercosul and the strengthening of security ties with Argentina on nuclear issues, the subsequent Lula administration took the regional projects of the previous administration with renewed assertiveness.⁵⁶ Clearly, Brazil acknowledged the importance of regional states for its global aspirations and thus delimited its regional ambit from Latin America to a more delimited South America.

By substituting this [South America] for Latin America, Brazil tacitly recognized that it was unable to exert a significant influence on the whole continent and was thereby ready to focus on a smaller area, in accordance with two objectives: first, Mexico – the other Latin American giant and potential rival – was left out; and second, the countries included in the newly defined region were less dependent on the United States than those excluded, which gave Brazil broader room to maneuver.⁵⁷

With the objective of regional leadership couched in values such as democracy, peace, economic development and stability, the new Lula administration aimed to influence several scorekeepers to accept Brazil's position in the South American region. In his first United Nations address, Lula characteristically stated, "Peace, security, development and social justice are indivisible. Brazil has endeavored to practice with utmost consistency the principles for which it stands. The

⁵⁶ Diniz 2007, 98.

⁵⁷ Malamud 2011a, 6.

new relationship we are forging with our South American neighbors is founded on mutual respect, friendship and cooperation.”⁵⁸

Given the contested nature of any leadership claims, the administration gave two innovative reasons in the first stage to secure entitlement to exercising regional leadership. With the first move in the game of giving and asking for reasons, the Lula administration aimed to impress scorekeepers that Brazil exercising responsible leadership is important because Brazil is a democratic and politically stable state in contrast to several of its neighbors that are facing political and economic crises. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim categorically stated:

Several of our neighbors are experiencing difficult situations or even moments of crisis. The democratic process of change that Brazil is presently going through under the Lula Government may serve as an element of inspiration and stability to the whole of South America. We earnestly respect the principle of non-intervention, in the same way that we defend our right to be respected by others. But *we will not balk at making our contribution towards finding solutions of conflict, provided that we are invited to do so and only when we believe that we may play a useful role, taking into account the primacy of democracy and constitutional principles.* A South America that is politically stable, socially just and economically prosperous is an objective worth pursuing, not only as a normal expression of solidarity, but also because it is a means to ensure our own progress and welfare.⁵⁹

In several platforms, Brazilian policymakers reiterated its claims on Brazil’s political and economic stability, which can bring about solutions to the political instability and economic problems in the region. It came with renewed doxastic commitment (belief) that, “Brazil is not a submissive nation” and cannot “passively watch the suffering of the poor,”⁶⁰ or “Peace is not a moral objective. It is also an imperative for rationality...Preserving national interest is not

⁵⁸ President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s address at the LIX Regular Session of the UN General Assembly. Ministry of External Relations 2013, 833.

⁵⁹ Speech given by Minister Celso Amorim during the ceremony on taking office as Minister of External Relations – Brasília, January 1, 2003. Ministry of External Relations 2008, 43–44. Emphasis added.

⁶⁰ Speech by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the National Congress - Brasília, January 1, 2003. See Ministry of External Relations 2008, 25.

incompatible with cooperation and solidarity.”⁶¹ Thus, publicly Lula administration asserted its political and economic stability as the baseline for exercising responsible leadership in the region.

The second move of the Lula administration at this stage in the game to secure entitlement from scorekeepers on its claim on exercising responsible leadership was to reason that Brazil supports solidarist diplomacy without pretensions of unilateralism. In other words, not only Brazil has strong economic and political stability to steer responsible leadership but also it will exercise its leadership through solidarity and multilateralism.

At the level of international relations, multilateralism represents an advancement comparable to that of democracy in national terms. To recognize its value is an obligation of all nations committed to the progress of civilization, irrespective of their economic dimensions and political and military weight.⁶²

This emphasis on solidarist multilateralism is important because other actors in the region particularly Argentina, Mexico, or Venezuela did not display such a commitment both to multilateralism and solidarity similar to the Lula administration.⁶³ As we already saw, after the end of the Cold War, Brazil joined several liberal regimes and multilateral institutions to demonstrate its commitment to play by the rules of the game, but now under Lula government, the commitment to solidarity and multilateralism fused in an important way. As Lula would argue in the World Economic Forum in Davos, “We must recognize that poverty, hunger and misery are very often the cultural broth in which fanaticism and intolerance are developed. Preserving national interest is not incompatible with cooperation and solidarity. Our national program is not xenophobic; it is universalistic.”⁶⁴ Similarly, in the United Nations he went on to argue, “Every nation that is committed to democracy internally must also ensure that, outwardly,

⁶¹ Speech by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the 33rd World Economic Forum - Davos, January 26, 2003. See Ministry of External Relations 2008, 18.

⁶² Speech by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva during the extended talks at the G-8 Summit, June 1, 2003. See Ministry of External Relations 2008, 33.

⁶³ Burges 2006.

⁶⁴ Speech by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the 33rd World Economic Forum - Davos, January 26, 2003.

decisive procedures are transparent, legitimate and representative. The tragedies of Iraq and the Middle East will only be resolved within a multilateral process, in which the United Nations plays a central role.”⁶⁵ This mix of solidarity and multilateralism is certainly new with the Lula administration. As Lima and Hirst put it, “the government’s fight against poverty and unequal income distribution at home and its assertive and activist foreign policy can be viewed as two sides of the same coin.”⁶⁶

However, several scorekeepers remained unconvinced. They acknowledged that Brazil is a politically and economically stable state in Latin America in general and South America in particular, acknowledged Brazil’s emphasis on multilateralism, but crucially did not endorse its entitlement for exercising responsible leadership in the region. A close and important contender of Brazil’s leadership in the region is Argentina and in the 2000s it rejected Brazil’s reasons as good reasons for exercising regional leadership. The relation instead is *primus inter pares* rather than responsible leadership by any one state.⁶⁷ Buenos Aires negotiated its association with NATO as an extra-regional ally in violation of the Mercosur agreement and as Spektor shows, “By late 1999, the arguments were firmly in place for the expansion of MERCOSUR with the view of diluting Argentina’s relative power within the bloc.”⁶⁸ Thus, by inferentially taking Brazil’s leadership claims as seeking entitlements for a firefighting role in the region, Argentina challenged the normative commitments of Brazil.

Similarly, Chile did not defer to Brazil’s leadership and in the wake of Haitian crisis became the first country in South America to contribute troops to the multilateral military operation under

⁶⁵ President Lula’s address in the 58th session of the UN, 2003. See Ministry of External Relations 2013, 832.

⁶⁶ Soares De Lima and Hirst 2006, 21.

⁶⁷ Russell and Tokatlian 2003; Margheritis 2010; Malamud 2011b.

⁶⁸ Spektor 2010, 198.

UNSC Resolution 1529 to overthrow Aristide. Further, the liberal interventionist powers such as the United States, France, and Canada were initially skeptical of the strong leftist sentiments of the Lula administration and its claims on solidarity. Market operators feared “Brazil Risk” in inflation, exchange rate parity, and its negotiations in foreign debt bonds.⁶⁹ The general reluctance to acknowledge and defer to Brazil’s responsible leadership in South America at this stage was not confined to big powers alone. Stephen Burges shows that “the former Uruguayan ambassador to the WTO, Carlos Pères del Castillo, noted, Brazil was simply not playing the leader’s role: ‘If a country wants to be a leader, it must involve itself in regional problems.’”⁷⁰ Thus, at this stage, the deontic scores of a majority of interlocutors publicly precluded any entitlement for Brazil to exercise leadership in the region.⁷¹

Within the institutional norm-type that underwrites the interactions among interlocutors in the deontic scorekeeping space, the Lula administration also took efforts to systematize its role in the regional problems. An important way in which Brazil sought to demonstrate its commitment to regional leadership and secure deontic entitlements from other scorekeepers was in the burgeoning crisis in Haiti. On 29 February 2004, Aristide was overthrown by forceful exile and on the same night, UNSC passed Resolution 1529 that authorized the deployment of 3000-strong MIF. Crucially, Brazil voted in favor of this resolution – that is “making true” of Brasília’s doxastic commitment or taking a practical commitment to *do* something – to act.

⁶⁹ Almeida 2009, 168.

⁷⁰ Burges 2009, 165.

⁷¹ For the challenge offered by Latin American states on Brazil’s leadership in general and Haiti in specific see J.Tokatlian, “Intervención en Haití, Misión Frustrada. Una Crítica de América Latina” [“Intervention in Haiti, Mission Frustrated. A Criticism of Latin America”], *FRIDE*, 9 October 2005; A. Loakimedes, “Brazil’s Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti: Doing God’s or Washington’s Work?” Washington: Council on Hemispheric Affairs (Accessed on 01 July 2016); A. Sánchez, “Peacekeeping and Military Operation by Latin American Militaries: Between Being a Good Samaritan and Servicing the National Interest,” Washington: Council on Hemispheric Affairs. www.coha.org [Accessed on 1 July 2016].

First, as we already saw, the objective of Brazil under the Lula administration at this stage was to exercise responsible leadership in South America and thus political crises of its “neighbors” entered as an important premise to seek entitlements from scorekeepers. When the Lula administration made the fundamental sort of the move in the game by claiming, “Several of our neighbors are experiencing difficult situations” and “if invited Brazil will contribute to finding peaceful solutions,” Brazilian policymakers undertook a commitment to the inferential consequences of these claims. Second, the Lula administration became answerable to the scorekeepers (and to itself) on inferences such as identifying *which* countries in the neighborhood is facing crisis; *what* constitutes its regional ambit; to *whose* invitation will it respond; *how* it would respond to crises and what constitutes its *resolution*; and *how* to fix the meaning of political stability.

In this light, Brazil’s vote in favor of the UNSC Resolution 1529, which authorized military operations, is an undertaking of the inferential consequence of the Lula administration’s responsibility in the region. Once Brazil claimed that it would “not balk” at contributing to solutions to regional crises, it cannot reject the UNSC Resolutions on regional instability without being (or take it to be) deontically sanctioned by other scorekeepers. Thus, Lula would later claim in the UN, “We do not believe in interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries, but neither can we condone omission and indifference in the face of situations that affect our neighbors.”⁷² It set off a chain reaction of scorekeeping actions.

Although the vote in favor of the UNSC Resolution 1529 is a part of Brazilian deontic commitments to exercising responsible leadership and the inferential consequences of such a

⁷² President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva speech at LIX Regular Session of the UN General Assembly Ministry of External Relations 2013, 848–49.

claim, the incompatibilities were stark. In the main, the crisis occurred in the Caribbean that did not – without additional interpretative efforts – count as Brazil’s neighborhood. Further, members of the Caribbean community of states institutionalized as CARICOM had already questioned the conditions under which Aristide was forced to leave by the liberal interventionist powers. CARICOM planned to exercise its own “prominent role” in addressing the problems in Haiti, proposed its own action plan including sending peacekeeping troops and dealing with refugees.⁷³ Venezuela claimed that Brazil is displaying a pro-US sentiment and Haiti would transform into American military foothold after Ecuador rescinded the lease for the US military base at Manta.⁷⁴ Similarly, Argentina remained committed to the principle of non-intervention was not fully convinced of committing troops to MIF.⁷⁵ Similarly, neither the UN nor the general populace of Haiti extended an invitation to Brazil to respond to the crisis. In fact, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell called Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Soledad Alvear to find out whether Chile was willing to send troops.

Thus, most scorekeepers took Brazil’s claims as incompatible both with the inferential consequences of its assertions and the deontic scores of the game that precluded entitlements to Brazil exercising a regional leadership role. Thus, despite voting in favor of UNSC Resolution 1529 that deployed MIF to Haiti, Brazil did not participate in the military operations. Simply put,

⁷³ See “CARICOM leaders to hold emergency summit on Haiti,” *Caribbean Net News*, 2 March 2004.

⁷⁴ Buxton 2013, 180.

⁷⁵ Academic criticism against Argentina’s participation in the military operation in Haiti was consistent, see See, e.g., Luis Tibiletti, ‘Haiti en diez aciertos’ [Haiti in Ten Hits], *Página/12* (Buenos Aires), 16 June 2004, at: <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/36786-12890-2004-06-16.html>; Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, ‘El desacierto de enviar tropas a Haití’ [The Misstep of Sending Troops to Haiti], *Página/12*, 13 June 2004, at: <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-36679-2004-06-13.html>; Oscar Raúl Cardozo, ‘Misión de paz a Haití: un debate mal barajado’ [Peace Mission to Haiti: A Bad Debate Shuffled], *Clarín* (Buenos Aires), 24 June 2004, at: <http://old.clarin.com/diario/2004/06/24/elmundo/i-02103.htm>; Juan Gabriel Tokatlia ‘Para que seguir en Haití?’ [Why go on in Haiti?], *La Nación* (Benos Aires), 19 Sept. 2007, at: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=945297; Juan Gabriel Tokatlin, ‘Haití, el peligro de un neoprotectorado’ [Haiti, the Danger of a Neo-protectorate], *La Nación*, 18 Jan. 2006, at: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=773148; Ernesto Lopez, ‘Diplomacia sin indiferencia’ [Diplomacy without Indifference], *Clarín*, 27 Aug. 2005, at: <http://old.clarin.com/diario/2005/08/27/opinion/o-03902.htm>. All accessed on 1 June 2016.

its non-participation in the military operations in February is the result of the deontic scores stacked against Brazil in this first stage of practical reasoning – Brazil failed to secure the entitlement from scorekeepers on its leadership in the region.

Thus, one does not have to rely on any heroic assumptions on Brazil's deep inner motives to explain why Brazil voted for MIF but refused to participate in the military operations in Haiti. Diniz, for example, argues Brazil did not agree to participate in MIF 'apparently' because the resolution was a peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁷⁶ To be sure, he mentions that the Resolution 1542 was also a Chapter VII operation and the Brazilian government offered a nuanced interpretation for this inconsistency (that will be discussed later). Although Diniz's view is partly right, he also notes, "not accepting the leadership or not agreeing to participate in MINUSTAH could perhaps deal a deadly blow to Brazil's desires to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council."⁷⁷ This begs the question why Brazil that was concerned about UNSC seat did not contribute to its troops to MIF but to MINUSTAH? Instead of such assumptions on Brazil's hidden desires, by understanding that the practical inferences of Brazilian policymakers did not go through among scorekeepers who precluded deontic entitlements for Brazil's leadership quite clearly shows why Brazil refused participation in MIF. In other words, the inconsistency lies in Brazil's position in the relations between scorekeepers.

To summarize, during the first stage of Brazil's practical reasoning, from 1 January 2003 to 29 February 2004, the Lula administration was concerned about exercising responsible leadership in the region. As Stephen Burges shows, Celso Amorim suggested, "the United States would like to

⁷⁶ Diniz 2007, 92.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 101.

see Brazil serving as some sort of a centralized spokesperson for Latin America.”⁷⁸ Towards this objective Brazil aimed to secure deontic entitlements for its leadership from other scorekeepers and offered two reasons – (1) Brazil is a democratic and politically stable state in contrast to several of its neighbors that are facing political and economic crises, and (2) Brazil supports solidarist diplomacy without pretensions of unilateralism. This course of reasoning led to a chain reaction of scorekeeping actions by multiple interlocutors. Crucially, scorekeepers acknowledged Brazil’s commitments but precluded any entitlements for Brazil’s leadership in the region. The biggest challenge came from Argentina, Venezuela, and CARICOM. One important way to demonstrate Brazil’s commitment to regional leadership was to show the inferential consequence of its deontic commitments to responsibility by exercising a favorable vote on the multinational military operation (UNSC Resolution 1529) in Haiti. Yet, this move created more incompatibilities among its scorekeepers who found Brazil’s own reasons as incompatible with the deontic scores of the interaction-in-context. Further, without an additional game of giving and asking for reasons, Brazil’s vote in UNSC 1529 only reinforced the gap between commitments acknowledged and entitlements precluded by scorekeepers. At this juncture, the Lula administration stepped to the next stage of practical reasoning.

7.4.2. Stage Two: Regional Concordance and Humanitarian Action

The practical reasoning of the Lula administration in Stage Two, between 29 February 2004 and 31 May 2004, is an important process in the sense that the Lula administration reasoned meaningfully about the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, secured entitlement from its scorekeepers, and proceeded to send its troops to engage in Chapter VII multilateral military intervention in Haiti. This stage is both continuity and a break from the previous stage because Brazil changed

⁷⁸ Burges 2009, 163.

its major premise from an all general aspect of exercising responsible leadership in the region to specific objective of exercising responsibility in Haiti through development and reconstruction. Some scorekeepers precluded entitlements to Brazil for exercising responsible leadership in the whole region, quite unreasonably as seen by the Lula administration, and at this stage, the policymakers aimed to engage with those interlocutors through the game of giving and asking for reasons. Importantly, at this stage, the Lula administration engaged with the multiple competing alternative discourses for addressing humanitarian crisis abroad and marginalized them through its practical reasoning.

In the period after 20 February 2004, the most comprehensive practical reasoning of the administration occurred in the meeting of Committee of Foreign Affairs and National Defense.⁷⁹ The reasoning here is important because the President sent a message to Congress on 5 May 2004 expressing the interest of the administration to engage in humanitarian intervention in Haiti and thus seeking authorization from the National Congress to that effect. Taking the justificatory responsibility of the administration seriously, one could understand the intentions and the reasons upon which the policymakers acted irrespective of their hidden inner motives. Therefore, any challenge that the Lula administration reasons for action are empty rhetoric when Brazil already connived with liberal interventionist powers for a Permanent Seat in UNSC is mistaken. As Steven Levine puts it, “One meets this justificatory responsibility by being able to exhibit, even if after the fact, the practical reasoning that results in the intention upon which one acts. In other words, one justifies what one does by showing that the intention upon which one acts suitably follow from the premises that inform one’s practical reasoning. These premises,

⁷⁹ Specifically in Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional, 52nd Legislature, 2nd Session, 12 May, 2004. <http://www.camara.leg.br/internet/ordemdodia/integras/216676.htm> accessed on 1 June 2015. [Hereafter CREDN]. It is the Eighth Extraordinary Meeting of Foreign Affairs Committee and National Defense of the Federal Senate and Eighth meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee and National Defense of the Chamber of Deputies, the Second Session of the Legislative Meeting of the Fifty Second Legislature held jointly on 12 May 2004. All translations from Portuguese to English are by the author. See Congresso Nacional in the reference list.

which can be both beliefs and other practical commitments, are the reasons from which one does what one does.”⁸⁰ Thus, Krebs and Jackson advocate IR scholars to avoid the search for “true motives and to focus instead on what actors say, in what contexts, and to what audiences.”⁸¹

Before proceeding to the details of practical reasoning at this stage, we have to note an important institutional change that will change the attitude of several scorekeepers: Brazil and Chile were elected as Non-Permanent members of the UNSC. Although the election of Brazil and Chile strategically connived by the United States, France, and China aimed to bring a façade of regional solutions to regional problems but for all practical purposes, the power of collective legitimacy offered by this institutional position enabled Brazil to challenge interlocutors by deferring to the institutional power of the United Nations. Further, in late 2003, Brazil invited Argentina to join the Brazilian delegation to the UNSC (Argentina would do the same in 2005), thus reducing Argentina’s challenge to Brazil’s role in the region. In other words, the configuration of Brazil’s political stability in the Latin American region, its quest for regional responsibility and its institutional position in UNSC set into motion novel set of commitments attributed and undertaken and distinct pattern of scorekeeping actions by several interlocutors – that was made explicit in Brazil’s justification of its policy of humanitarian intervention in Haiti.

After the positive vote for UNSC Resolution 1529 that approved a temporary military operation in Haiti, the Lula administration changed its major premise of practical reasoning to aim for Haitian reconstruction, development, and state-building as a form of exercising Brazilian responsibility in the region.⁸² In order to achieve this goal, the Lula administration nailed its

⁸⁰ Levine 2015, 250.

⁸¹ Krebs and Jackson 2007, 36.

⁸² Important closed-door negotiations took place between Brazil and several other interlocutors between the Resolutions 1529 and 1540 i.e. between February 2004 and April 2004 when the United Nations established MINUSTAH for deployment on 1 June 2004. Much of the discussions remains classified or off the record and in

already articulated reasons on the political and economic stability of Brazil as providing a unique vantage point for exercising responsible leadership in the region with a commitment to multilateralism. In the course of the game of giving and asking for reasons, the Lula administration would make two more important and interrelated practical inferences: (1) the principle of non-intervention is not equal to non-indifference to the mass atrocity crimes and suffering of the people in the region, and (2) diplomacy of solidarity is the pathway for Haitian reconstruction. These two practical inferences would go a long way in securing deontic entitlement from scorekeepers for military intervention in Haiti. Let us see how the process unfolds.

To begin with, on 12 May 2004, Brazil's Minister for Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim and Minister of Defense José Viegas Filho provided the most comprehensive justifications for Brazil's humanitarian military intervention in Haiti in the National Congress. The focus was on securing a regional leadership status for intervention but the Ministers couched it with such diplomatic finesse on Haitian reconstruction, through expressing solidarity to a fellow black republic in the continent, the prize Brazil is willing to pay for securing peace in the region, along with Brazil's deferral to the authority of the United Nations. Thus, domestic scorekeepers who acknowledged Brazil's subject-position as a country with a majority of the black population in the region endorsed the administration's deontic attitude to help the third largest country with the black population. By making Brazil's responsible leadership in the region dependent upon on the reconstruction of a fellow "black-brother country" and the legitimacy of Haitian reconstruction, in turn, upon the legitimacy of the UNSC – the Lula administration foregrounded its identity in the region and made a fundamental sort of a move on its autobiographical narrative.

terms of the analytical framework of this thesis, the hidden inner motives of actors does not matter because public justifications, even if after the fact, through practical reasoning foregrounds the intentions upon which one acts. By late February 2004, Brazil already agreed with the great powers that it will contribute troops to MINUSTAH "within its own conditions" to stabilize Haiti. However, by looking at its justification practices later we could reconstruct the game of giving and asking for reasons.

Minister Celso Amorim asserted the following claims:

So, the first question that I mention is this: the spirit in which Brazil participates in it [Haiti]. It is a spirit to answer a call to a military security emergency not only to serve the interests of this or that country, but to serve, above all, an interest to participate effectively in Haiti's reconstruction process, the first independent country in Latin America with a history of suffering, of great political crises, and for which little has been done effectively.⁸³

The second point concerns a major problem in our region. As I said, Haiti is the longest independent country in Latin America and the third largest country in terms of black population in the Americas – the second and largest in Latin America is Brazil. In Brazil it has been often said, and frequently reiterated by the Government of President Lula, that we have to reach out to Africa [because of our strong cultural links with Africa]. It would be strange, then, if we do not extend our hands for a country with the secondary largest black population in Latin America and the third largest black population in the Continent – it is Haiti that searches for a chance to rebuild.⁸⁴

Clearly, the administration's claims did not through uncontested. See, for example, the reasoning between Senator Fernando Gabeira who challenged any cultural links between Brazil and Haiti questioning if it was right to intervene in an area of American, Canadian, and French influence, and the Minister Celso Amorim, who justified such solidarity:

Fernando Gabeira: All Haitian exiles are in the United States, Canada, or thirdly in France. We have no, no, no ties to Haiti, other than our responsibility with an American country, other than our responsibility as a member of an American organization. That being so, the decision to go there is neither the best way of seeking international prestige nor with the little money, we have at the moment.⁸⁵

Celso Amorim: [You] say that between Brazil and Haiti there is neither affinity nor concordance. Of course, there is not the same proximity between the Portuguese-speaking countries. It is a country of our continent, as Your Excellency has pointed out, it is the third largest country with a black population in the Americas, the second in Latin America. What occurs in that country will have repercussions in the Caribbean and, in turn, will reach almost our border indirectly. Although historically it was an area of influence of the US or other countries, I do not think– I could possibly be wrong – that Brazil should be indifferent to what happens in the Caribbean⁸⁶

In several platforms, Brazilian policymakers reiterated the links between Brazil's significant black population and its solidarist concern for the stability of another black republic in the region. The inference is that the Lula administration could not turn a blind eye to the sufferings of people in the region (non-indifference) particular when Brazil has strong racial links. The administration did not eliminate all the disagreements, as it is very unlikely that all political opponents would be

⁸³ Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, CREDN, 12 May 2004, p.10. [My translation]

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵ Senator Fernando Gabeira (S/Partido-RJ), CREDN, 12 May 2004, p.17. [My translation]

⁸⁶ Reply by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, CREDN, 12 May 2004, p.20 [My translation]

silenced. However, the administration's claims were not taken as unelaborated personal preferences of President Lula or Foreign Minister Celso Amorim but "responsibility" to the Black Republic as the reason that is rationally acceptable by other deontic scorekeepers for its military action in Haiti.

The administration creatively used the language of responsibility and reasoned that: "Peace is not a free good. When people say: why do we have to put ourselves here or there? [Because] Peace has a price, as we have a responsibility, especially within our region of the world; if we do not exercise this responsibility, others will."⁸⁷ Thus, the claims of the Lula administration came with a deontic component – if we value democracy, peace, and stability and if we value our significant black population then we cannot be indifferent to the sufferings of the Haitian population – that left domestic challengers without any meaningful rebuttal. Even Senator Fernando Gabeira (above) had to acknowledge that Brazil has a significant black population and one cannot be indifferent to their sufferings.⁸⁸

Crucially, only through the game of giving and asking for reasons that the Brazilian policymakers established the link between exercising responsibility, Haitian reconstruction, and the practical inferences on non-indifference and solidarity as entailing humanitarian intervention in Haiti. Particularly by engaging with four important criticisms against Brazil's intervention in Haiti in the game of giving and asking for reasons, the Lula administration secured an entitlement to act.⁸⁹ The first criticism focused on the nature of Aristide's withdrawal from Haiti. Many domestic interlocutors including Senators, press reports, and statements from the Caribbean nations criticized the role of Western liberal nations in the overthrow of the democratically elected

⁸⁷ Reply by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, CREDN, 12 May 2004, p.52 [My translation]

⁸⁸ See Senator Fernando Gabeira (S/Partido-RJ), CREDN, 12 May 2004.

⁸⁹ Hirst 2007, 6. The Vietnam references is in CREDN debate raised by Senator Luiz Carlos Hauly (PSDB), p.42 [My translation].

President of Haiti. Further, they challenged Brazil's participation on such hegemonic projects. The second controversy focused on the de-facto subordination to the US interests and the disregard of Brazil's autonomous foreign policy. The third criticism focused on the costs of military operation in Haiti and the ability of Brazil to manage it over a long period of time. Finally, some questioned if the mission could succeed and if Brazil is engaging in a "Vietnam" quagmire in Haiti.⁹⁰ By giving and taking reasons on these four challenges, the Lula administration negotiated the boundaries of discursive practice and marginalized alternative discourses.

Firstly, on the issue of Aristide's overthrow from Haiti, the administration acknowledged the role of Western liberal powers in Haiti but deferred to the legitimacy of the United Nations and to the reports of the UN Secretary-General on the governance crisis in Haiti in order to justify its stance.

(...) The UN Security Council – sure we can criticize the UNSC and consider it influenced, all this may be true – [but] it is the source of legitimacy for any international action, the legitimacy that we invoked to criticize action in Iraq, [at present the UNSC] has unanimously approved the need for an initial action through an interim force [MIF] and it returned to unanimously approve a resolution that created this stabilization force [MINUSTAH], which Brazil intends to participate. Under both political and legal point of view, I do not know where to look for more legitimacy for action.⁹¹

Through this deferral to the UN, the Lula administration demonstrated its deontic commitment to multilateralism and rule-based international order, placed the suffering Haitian population at the forefront, and reasoned with scorekeepers – who precluded entitlements to Brazil – to look at the crisis through the lens of non-indifference. Here, the administration deployed non-indifference not as a principle to address all mass atrocity crimes – à la African Union – but as a responsible move in its fight against social injustice and for the inclusion of the disadvantaged

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, CREDN, 12 May 2004, p.19

black people of Haiti in the international community.⁹² The commissive consequence of such assertions is that any criticism that Brazil subordinates its policies to the dictates of the United States does not hold because the hegemonic countries are not interested in issues of hunger, poverty, and social justice anyway. Therefore, deferring to the authority of the United Nations and at the same time holding solidarist claims on Haitian reconstruction enabled the administration to deflect such criticisms and marginalize the discourse on non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Thus, Lula would later justify the move towards intervention consistently in the following way(s):

(...) Brazil and other Latin American countries have responded to the call of the United Nations and are engaged in the stabilization efforts in Haiti. If we seek new paradigms in international relations, we cannot shirk our responsibility to address the concrete situations that emerge.⁹³

In Haiti, Latin America wants to prove that the United Nations is not condemned to merely clean up the wreckage of conflicts it could not prevent. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti [MINUSTAH] offers a new paradigm for responding to the challenges of conflict resolution and national reconstruction.⁹⁴

Brazil's role alongside other Latin American and Caribbean nations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti highlights our efforts to strengthen multilateral institutions. In Haiti, we are showing that peace and stability are built with democracy and social development.⁹⁵

Secondly, the Lula administration faced the two other criticisms based on the costs and eventual success of the mission with reasons based on Brazil's responsibility in the region for Haitian reconstruction. In the game of giving and asking for reasons, the administration impressed the view that intervention in Haiti is a joint military and diplomatic mission based on Brazil's responsibility with the objective of Haitian reconstruction. The practical inference here is that Brazil's concern with Haiti neither marginalizes the role of diplomatic mediation nor prioritizes the role of the Brazilian armed forces – it is undertaking a specific task responsibility to show

⁹² See de Lima 2005.

⁹³ Lula's address LIX Regular Session of the UNGA, 21 September 2004.

⁹⁴ Lula's address at the Summit Meeting of the United Nations Security Council 2005

⁹⁵ Lula's address at the LXII Regular Session of the UNGA, 25 September 2007

that the administration is entitled to its commitment for Haitian reconstruction address the crisis in a fellow black republic.

This [intervention in Haiti] is a democratic action, an external projection of Brazil's desire to help maintain peace and security in the Continent and contribute to the reconstruction of a brother-country.⁹⁶

Thus, for those concerned scorekeepers, both the Brazilian Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister jointly articulated the reasons for intervention in Haitian reconstruction in the National Congress:

Many Latin American countries are showing a willingness to participate in the force due to the Brazilian command, which gives legitimacy to this force. That would not happen if the command were Canadian or American, let's say. The fact that a Latin American country, the fact that a country like Brazil, with its characteristics, with its foreign policy - within, of course, the legal framework of the United Nations – gives a very great legitimacy to the operation.⁹⁷

Further, unlike previous Western operations in Haiti, Brazil's unique cultural and racial links with Haiti's black population would ensure the success of the mission through bringing better forms of democratic participation in Haiti. The Minister of Defense, José Viegas Filho would state, "It is important that we also participate not only as a military force but as a civilian force, which engages in the process of uplifting the social and economic conditions of the country [Haiti]."⁹⁸ Further, the administration fixed the meaning of its humanitarian intervention as a peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter even when UNSC clearly stated in its Resolution 1542 that the multidimensional stabilization mission will act under Chapter VII of the Charter to secure and stabilize Haiti.⁹⁹ Both the Foreign and Defense Ministers reasoned to the domestic public that this provision was necessary for the safety of Brazilian soldiers engaged in a risky environment even if Brazil would use force only for self-defense. The United Nations will

⁹⁶ Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, CREDN, 12 May 2004, p.11 [My translation].

⁹⁷ Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, CREDN, 12 May 2004, p.31 [My translation].

⁹⁸ Reply by Minister of Defense, José Viegas Filho, CREDN, 12 May 2004, p.33 [My translation].

⁹⁹ See UNSC Resolution 1542.

“reimburse the costs of operation” but we will put the life of Brazilian soldiers at risk if we blindly adhere to a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation in a dangerous environment.¹⁰⁰

Thus by engaging in the game of giving and asking for reasons with the Brazilian domestic public, the administration marginalized competing discourses. First, it deployed the reasons of non-indifference to marginalize the discourse on non-intervention and given the institutional norm type, that underwrites interactions, domestic scorekeepers took such interpretations as good reasons to be concerned about the suffering black population in the Hemisphere. Second, by emphasizing social justice and Haitian reconstruction through exercising responsibility, the Lula administration expressed a commitment that there is no marginalization of the diplomatic mediation but an undertaking of specific task responsibility where both the Ministry of External Relations and the Ministry of Defense would jointly work to help reconstruct Haiti. Finally, in taking responsibility for reconstruction, the administration asserted that making distinctions between Chapter VI and VII operations might put Brazilian soldiers at unnecessary risk. Not all contestations were silenced but the majority of domestic scorekeepers accepted Brazil’s reasons as good reasons for action and on 19 May 2004 the National Congress approved the intervention with the understanding that five Senators will go to Haiti in July 2004 to verify Brazil’s action in Haiti.

This course of reasoning with the Brazilian domestic public, after the positive vote for UNSC Resolution 1529 in February that approved MIF in Haiti, led to a chain reaction of scorekeeping actions by multiple interlocutors and changed the socio-institutional network with other scorekeepers. It is here that the institutional norm type that underwrites interactions among

¹⁰⁰ Multiple references in the debates in CREDN, 12 May 2004.

interlocutors on the crisis in Haiti finds its characteristic importance. The practical inferences made by the Lula administration on non-indifference towards Haitian reconstruction and solidarity to a black-brother country in the Western hemisphere led other scorekeepers to endorse a pattern of three related inferences. They are (1) Brazil does not aim to exercise hegemony in the Western hemisphere by intervening in Haiti; (2) Brazil is a bona fide player in the region that aims to exercise regional not unilateral responsibility in Haitian reconstruction; and (3) Brazil is going to Haiti with claims on solidarity and humanism, not as transcendental values but with clear concerns about social justice in Haiti. This pattern of inference licensed by others associated with same social institutional statuses such as Argentina, Chile, United Nations, and the United States enabled the Lula administration to secure the deontic entitlement for multilateral humanitarian military intervention in Haiti. Let us examine the tripartite inferences that underwrite the institutional norm type in more detail.

Firstly, Argentina and Chile examined Brazil's practical reasoning for action after its vote in UNSC Resolution 1529 and endorsed a pattern of doxastic inference that Brazil does not aim to exercise hegemony in the Western hemisphere by intervening in Haiti. As ABC group of South American states, they endorsed the Lula administration's claims on non-indifference and solidarity with the black population as good reasons for Haitian reconstruction and entailing intervention in Haiti. Importantly, it was not an acknowledgment of Brazil's leadership in Latin America; but, endorsing a pattern of good inference for anyone who is concerned with the peace and stability in the Western hemisphere. As already noted, Chile remained enthusiastic about intervening in Haiti and President Ricardo Lagos expressed his agreement even before the creation of MINUSTAH.¹⁰¹ Now occupying the UN Security Council as non-permanent members, Chile and Brazil agreed on a joint course of action. Thus, when Lula made important

¹⁰¹ Hirst 2007, 7.

practical inferences on exercising non-indifference in the region, Chile endorsed those inferences. For example, Chilean Foreign Minister Juan Gabriel Valdés appointed as the U.N. Special Representative for Haiti crucially endorsed Lula's inference by claiming, "concerns of officials in Chile and other Latin American countries is legitimate regarding the deterioration in the situation in the Caribbean island nation."¹⁰² Similarly, Argentina's Defense Minister Jose Pampuro would later claim that MINUSTAH operation is "a remarkable example of regional responsibility."¹⁰³ The institutional norm type that underwrites interactions among interlocutors on the crisis in Haiti enabled scorekeepers to inherit Brazil's practical inferences to its domestic public and endorse those inferences as one that does not aim at hegemony in the Western hemisphere.

Secondly, scorekeepers associated with the same social-institutional status evaluated the practical reasoning of the Lula administration and inferred that Brazil is a bona fide player in the region that aims to exercise regional not unilateral responsibility in Haitian reconstruction. As early as 17 October 2003, Brazil invited Argentina to nominate a diplomat to join the Brazilian delegation to the UNSC in 2004 and in reciprocity Argentina did the same in 2005. Similarly, by August 2003, Lula held talks with President Ricardo Lagos of Chile through the diplomacy of solidarity and agreed that it is necessary to update and revitalize the UN system. Thereafter in November 2004 at the 28th Presidential Summit of the Rio Group, Lula in his opening statement defended Latin-American solidarity towards Haiti and sought the presence of developing nations as a permanent member of the UNSC.¹⁰⁴ This earlier acknowledgment of solidarity principle in Haitian crisis by both Brazil and its scorekeepers such as Argentina and Chile enabled the Brazilian administration at this stage to demonstrate that there is no incompatibility between its

¹⁰² Haiti: Latin America-Led Peacekeeping Operation – A 'Mission Impossible', November 5, 2004.

¹⁰³ Marcela Valente, "Argentina: Rumsfeld Wants South American Troops to Remain in Haiti," *Inter Press Service News Agency*, 22 March 2005. <http://www.ipsnews.net/2005/03/argentina-rumsfeld-wants-south-american-troops-to-remain-in-haiti/>, accessed on 1 July 2016.

¹⁰⁴ Ministry of External Relations 2008, 108.

deontic commitments and exporting social justice to Haiti. In other words, through the game of giving and asking for reasons, the Lula administration shifted the boundaries of discursive practice and established Brazil as a bona fide player in the region. Inheriting the inferences, Argentina and Chile acknowledged that Brazil is entitled to a bona fide status in dealing with the crisis in Haiti. As Monica Hirst points out:

The ABC countries have perceived the MINUSTAH as an opportunity to deepen inter-state diplomatic and military coordination. To pursue this goal the Chilean Juan Gabriel Vales head of the UN Mission in Haiti collaborated closely with the Brazilian military command who relied upon an Argentinean official, the second military command and a Chilean official as Chief of Operations. This team spirit was strengthened by convergent foreign policy perceptions regarding the Haitian reconstruction process.¹⁰⁵

Similarly, the United States dug into the controversial Iraq War, eagerly endorsed Brazil's bona fide status in Latin America and its responsibility in Haiti. Already the Lula administration played an important role in a "group of friendly nations," including the United States to help Venezuela negotiate an end to a national strike aimed forcing Chávez from power.¹⁰⁶ Thus, in early 2004 Brazil's role in Haiti was important for the Bush administration, as one top-American official would state, "Brazil really did take a leadership role at a crucial moment, and that's a big deal."¹⁰⁷ The endorsements of the United States led to a chain reaction of acknowledgments from the United Nations and other White Western liberal interventionist states concerned with the crisis in Haiti. President Bush in a later occasion forthrightly remark:

I appreciate very much your leadership on Haiti. I appreciate the fact that you've led the U.N. Stabilization Force. We want to, of course, make sure that your efforts to bring security are followed up by opportunity for the people of Haiti. We don't want your forces to be there to simply stabilize, we want your force to leave – be part of a constructive future, which is precisely your vision. And we want to work with you very closely to achieve that end.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Hirst 2007, 6.

¹⁰⁶ Juan Forero, "Latin America's Political Compass Veers Toward the Left," *The New York Times*, 19 January 2003

¹⁰⁷ Larry Rohter, "Brazil is Leading a Largely South American Mission to Haiti," *New York Times*, 1 August 2004

¹⁰⁸ See President Bush Welcomes President Lula of Brazil to Camp David, 31 March, 2007. The White House Press Release. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070331-3.html> accessed on 1 February 2016. Also see US Congressional Records particularly House Resolution 651 on Expanding Strategic Relationship Between the United States and Brazil where the US "recognizes Brazil's role as a leader in the Western Hemisphere and commends its leadership of the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) in Haiti."

This endorsement by others scorekeepers with similar status further consolidated the institutional baseline of Brazil's practical reasoning for action. Thus the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, stated in unequivocal terms that support of Latin American countries (even if Venezuela and Cuba are different) provides an institutional legitimacy to Brazil's intervention in Haiti.¹⁰⁹

Finally, all scorekeepers evaluated the Lula administration's claims on solidarity and humanism *not* as transcendental values but with clear concerns about social justice in Haiti. Given the deprivation of the Haitian population, bringing social development and justice is not intervention in the internal affairs of Haiti. Members occupying the same social institutional status acknowledged and endorsed their normative commitment with a doxastic inference that – “after all Brazil has the huge Black population and they know to deal with racial relations.” Here the concatenation of Brazil's status as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, as a bona fide player in addressing the Haitian crisis, and the acknowledgment of Argentina, Chile, and the United States within the reigning deontic endorsements of regional responsibility for addressing the crisis in Haiti strengthened the institutional baseline of the game. Thus, the scorekeepers endorsed Brazil's bold practical inferences on solidarity for the poor, non-indifference in the region, and the racial and cultural links with Haiti as claims that arise because Brazil occupies the status in question and not because of hidden desires or machinations.

The rule that regional powers concerned about the crisis in Haiti will work together is what made Brazil's practical inferences on non-indifference and diplomacy of solidarity into reasons for military intervention in Haiti. Taking it there is such a deontic commitment among scorekeepers

¹⁰⁹ Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, CREDN, 12 May 2004, p.31-32 [My translation].

within same socio-institutional status – Argentina, Brazil, and Chile – also is an endorsement of a pattern of practical reasoning for any one regional state concerned about Haitian reconstruction. Thus, scorekeepers endorsed a pattern that Brazil's intervention in Haiti as a multilateral Latin American intervention in Haiti.¹¹⁰ Here it is important to note how the relational aspect of Brazil's practical reasoning with its domestic publics and its marginalization of the discourse on non-intervention, diplomatic mediation, or Chapter VI operation enabled other scorekeepers to inherit and evaluate commitments, attribute entitlements, and endorse new pattern of inferences. This relational inheritance within the institutional norm type in the interactions among interlocutors secured entitlements for Brazil and endorsement of its intervention in Haiti. Thus, in a ceremony to mark the departure of the Brazilian military to peace mission in Haiti, Lula could proudly claim the following without any opposition:

Peace and democracy are achievements which the governments and people of Latin American should be proud of. This encourages us to work on the promotion of peace on a global level. Instability, even when far away, ends up generating a cost for us all. Maintaining peace has its price, and this price is participation. When we express ourselves in the face of a crisis such as is occurring in Haiti, we are exercising our responsibility in an international context. In the case of Haiti, we believe that the conditions required of a United Nations operation have been complied with. As a member of the Security Council, Brazil seeks to reflect the concerns of our region and interpret the interests of the Haitian people and of the international community.¹¹¹

7.6. Conclusion

Focusing on the game of giving and asking for reasons in the deontic scorekeeping space, this chapter showed why and how multilateral military intervention as an important action became contingently possible for the Brazilian administration in the face of well entrenched alternative discourses on addressing humanitarian crisis abroad. Analytically, I followed a series of steps in order to show the how an institutional norm-type that underwrites the interactions among scorekeepers on the situation of Haiti enables and constraints Brazil's practical reasoning for

¹¹⁰ La Nación, Chile, 11 May 2004, La Nación, Chile 21 May 2004, La Nación Argentina, 06 May 2004, La Nación Argentina 09 May 2004. See Follietti 2005.

¹¹¹ Speech by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the ceremony to mark the departure of (Brazilian) military troops on a peace mission to Haiti - Brasília, May 31, 2004. Ministry of External Relations 2008, 86.

action. In keeping with the analytical framework developed in this thesis, the institutional normativity on the interactions on the Haitian crisis enabled a warranted delimitation of the scorekeepers, their deontic scorekeeping attitudes, and the default challenge structure of these interlocutors. This set the stage to understand how Brazil played the game of giving and asking for reasons. Here I divided Brazil's interactions with multiple scorekeepers into two stages to elaborate on the practical reasons, inferences, changing deontic scores, and the maneuvering space available to the Lula administration at distinct points of the conversation. In each stage, I showed how the Lula administration kept track of its own and others' commitments and entitlements for bringing about a political solution to the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, make claims based on its responsibility and non-indifference to the suffering Black population in Haiti, and secured entitlements from other members who occupied important socio-institutional status vis-à-vis the Haitian crisis.

Clearly, by claiming that Brazil has an important responsibility in the region, and this responsibility entails exercising a diplomacy of solidarity with the suffering Haitian black population was an identity narrative. However, only through the game of giving and asking for reasons, particularly with the domestic scorekeepers, the Lula administration made important practical inferences on non-indifference and exercising solidarity for Haitian reconstruction. The institutional ties between scorekeepers such as United States, Chile, and Argentina along with Brazil's status as a non-permanent member of the UNSC changed the rules of the game in important ways. Even when scorekeepers did not provide a deontic entitlement for Brazil to exercise regional leadership, these members recognized Brazil as one of the bona fide players in the Haitian reconstruction game. Thus, it led to endorsements of Brazil's practical reasoning and series of inferences that attributed, acknowledged, and endorsed Brazil's claims for Haitian reconstruction. The voices of Aristide administration in Haiti, the reports of Global Media, and

the challenges of CARICOM were crucially set aside by the so-called regional solutions to regional problems. Under the institutional norm type in interactions, these scorekeepers did not retain their socio-institutional status by the second stage of the game and thus Brazilians could easily dispense off with their inferences while securing entitlements to act.

It is important to note that the deontic processes involved in practical reasoning enable us to appreciate how rhetorical coercion and ontological security models come together as crucial forces driving Brazil to war. In the main, the Lula administration made important references to the ontological links between Haiti and Brazil in terms of racial subject position and common African heritage. However, such ontological security narratives did not immediately translate into military intervention in Haiti. Only through the game of giving and asking for reasons, the Lula administration judged that exercising responsibility in the region entails engaging in Haitian reconstruction and crucially this means securing entitlement among other scorekeepers for humanitarian intervention. Similarly, the Lula administration did not rhetorically coerce its scorekeepers – with the institutional norm-type such coercion was not acceptable – however, scorekeepers relationally inherited the practical inferences and subjected it to evaluation. In the game of giving and asking for reasons, the scorekeepers particularly those members occupying an important socio-institutional position in Latin America such as Argentina, Chile, and the United States did not attribute desires of hegemony on the part of Brazil and thus its inferences on non-indifference and solidarity went a long way in securing entitlement for intervention. In short, in the configuration of institutional ties in the deontic scorekeeping space the Brazilian administration was able to conclude its practical reasoning by resorting to a multilateral humanitarian intervention in Haiti.

8: Conclusions

The central theoretical concern of this thesis is how it is some action becomes contingently authoritative against competing alternative discourses. Although accounts of action have been central to most IR scholarship, it is only in recent years (following the writings of Kratochwil, Guzzini, Jackson, and Fierke) that critical constructivist accounts have taken the subject of “action” in its own right challenging the standards set by reigning rational choice advocates. This thesis sought to demonstrate what this critical constructivist perspective contributes to our comprehension of discursive practice and in what specific ways we could further advance this theoretical project to bring to bear novel ways of understanding action as opposed to describing the mere behavior of political actors in international affairs. This exposition began in Chapter 3 building on the assumptions of critical constructivist IR and drawing upon the strengths of recent advancements in analytical pragmatist philosophy. The topic of humanitarian intervention in international politics served as an important analytical issue to generate a sharp understanding of the problem by asking how humanitarian military intervention becomes possible for political actors in the face of competing alternative discourses such as non-intervention, diplomatic criticism, arming rebels, or enlisting the support of Great Powers.

In this thesis, I drew upon the recent advancements in analytical pragmatist philosophy, particularly from the works of Bandom, to advance three important points to address the problem. First, I have argued that practical reasoning is every bit relevant for understanding the process of political action and marginalization of alternatives in international politics. In other words, the game of giving and asking for reasons is critical to understand why some options become authoritative and others fall by the wayside. By bringing the idea of practical reasoning back to critical constructivist IR scholarship, I also challenged the taken for granted Humean

skepticism about practical reasons and the reigning orthodoxy that conceives all practical reasoning as means-end reasoning where it just matters to agents figuring out how to achieve their desires by the way of beliefs about how to satisfy them. In this discussion, I drew upon Christine Korsgaard's famous philosophical advancement on the "normativity of instrumental reason" to show the links between norms and practical reasoning.¹ This set the stage for an important argument that one cannot provide a grand theory in IR of how some actions become authoritative. Instead, one has to be thoroughly processual, examine seriously the processes through which political actors fix meaning to certain actions and evaluate alternative discourses.

Thus, in the second move, I showed that discursive practices are deontic and thus offered a refined conceptual apparatus based on Brandom's pragmatist philosophy to show a distinct form of practical reasoning for action where one's own and others' normative commitments and entitlements are at issue in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Here members examine whether the asserter is "correct" in seeking particular entitlements to belief or action from their commitments, how appropriate is the "contextualized obligation" that arise in such assertional performances, what "inferences" follow from political claims, and how the asserter "justifies" the responsibility associated with entitlements.² Thus, participants are deontic scorekeepers. At a given moment in a conversation, a score is just the commitments and entitlements associated with each actor and every time a member undertakes, acknowledges, or attributes a commitment or entitlement, it changes the deontic score.³ As Chapter 3 made it clear, the practical reasoning of political actors functions within the deontic scorekeeping space where agents aim to secure normative entitlements for action among scorekeepers by making several practical inferences, exercising justificatory responsibility, and rationalizing intentions for action. Thus, the game of giving and asking for reasons is a contentious and a constructed process.

¹ Korsgaard 1997.

² Brandom 1994, 179.

³ Brandom 1994, 141–198.

Crucially, different types of norms that arise in the networked interactions between agents correspond to different patterns of practical reasoning. By this way of setting up the analytical framework, this thesis brought a systematic understanding of the role of practical reasoning in scorekeeping terms in political deliberations, established warranted expectations on the discourses waiting for dominance under different norm types that underwrite interactions, and provided for the delimitation of scorekeepers in the game.

The third move is to actually go out and examine the functioning of practical reasoning for action through interpretive process tracing in the cases of India's humanitarian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 and Brazil's humanitarian intervention in Haiti in 2004. By focusing on the non-Western postcolonial states who take up the issue of humanitarian intervention, which I justified in Chapter 1, I aimed to bring out the public legitimating reasons and contestations of these political elites. Further, these cases starkly represented the pragmatic framework that different types of norms correspond to different patterns of practical reasoning in deontic scorekeeping terms. The interactional situation among multiple interlocutors on East Pakistan crisis in 1971 triggered an instrumental norm type in the Indian case, which enabled some revolutionary discourses to come to the forefront, delimiting distinct scorekeepers whose political claims the Indian administration could not ignore with impunity. Interactions on East Pakistan crisis set off distinct patterns of practical inferences and scorekeeping actions where Indian policymakers completed the practical reasoning by securitizing the refugee situation in India and brought about a military intervention in East Pakistan.

On the other hand, an institutional norm-type triggered in the interactions among interlocutors in the Brazilian case enabled some evolutionary discourse to come to the forefront and distinct

scorekeepers with important socio-institutional status whose endorsement that the Brazilian administration required to secure entitlement to act. Interactions on Haitian crisis led to distinct patterns of practical inferences on responsibility and indifference to the suffering Black population in Haiti where the Lula administration secured entitlement based on its bona fide status in the region.

In this concluding chapter, I consider the implications of my argument. First, I revisit the research question and reexamine the argument of this thesis by highlighting the implications of the findings for understanding political action in international politics. Second, I highlight some of the limitations of the arguments advanced in this thesis. Finally, I turn to the broader implications of my argument for critical constructivist IR and for studies of norms in IR generally and elaborate on the areas for future research.

8.1. Implications of the Arguments for understanding Action

The conventional view of the conditions under which and processes through which political actors authoritatively bring about an action, a policy articulation if you like, in the face of competing alternatives is that they are grounded in clear and identifiable interests that arise out of objective international reality or in the subjective beliefs of actors. In writing this thesis, I have hoped to cast doubts on these simplistic formulations of action explanations in international relations. What seems missing from these conventional accounts are how political actors fix meaning to issues and intentionally endorse or commit oneself to one course of action but not others. When *a priori* defined national interests, subjective ideas, the role of transnational elites, or global norms determine actions, such explanations resort to the claims of inevitability and to a retrospective reading of history.

A central feature of the cases here is that there is nothing inevitable in international politics and alternative worlds could have emerged and even in the issue of humanitarian crisis and mass-atrocity crimes abroad military intervention and war is not a sole, inevitable, or a logical consequence. It was not a given that India would embark on a military intervention in Pakistan in 1971; or, Brazil would lead a multilateral humanitarian intervention mission in Haiti in 2004. In keeping with the analytical framework and the importance of different types of norms that underwrite interactions, Chapter 4 showed, there were four, or at least four, discourses on responding to humanitarian crisis abroad, which was firmly entrenched in the India's political topography since the early twentieth century: non-intervention, diplomatic criticism, rebel support and enlisting the support of Great Powers. Some of these discourses – such as rebel support or enlisting the support of Great Powers – were revolutionary in the sense that they came to the foreground as a result of the instrumental norm type in the interactions among interlocutors on the East Pakistan crisis.

Similarly, as Chapter 6 showed there were three, or at least three, discourses on responding to humanitarian crisis abroad entrenched in Brazil's political topography since the early twentieth century that the Lula administration could not ignore with impunity: non-intervention, diplomatic mediation, and multilateral Chapter VI peacekeeping operations. In keeping with the analytical framework developed in the thesis and the importance of institutional norm type in interactions, these discourses were evolutionary in the sense that they were incrementally part of the common conventions of the Western hemisphere that the Lula administration had to reckon with other scorekeepers.

What these alternative discourses in both India and Brazil show is the contingency of the situation and the role of political judgment in action. One cannot dismiss these discourses as they offered important policy alternatives for the government and served as important convectors of any meaningful discussions of addressing humanitarian crisis abroad. What the conventional accounts of action miss are an account of how the administration effectively marginalized these alternatives to legitimate military intervention. In other words, the prevailing theories on national interests, the autonomous role of ideas, or good international norms do not even recognize the possibility that alternative worlds could have emerged.

Thus, I focused on the processes through which political actors settle practical matters and marginalize alternatives. The central claim in the cases here is that political actors arrive at an action through the game of giving and asking for reasons where normative commitments and entitlements are at issue in the political interactions. As Chapters 5 demonstrated, although the politics of the Cold War were contentious, Indian policymakers reasoned with several scorekeepers, made important practical inferences for solving the crisis in East Pakistan and kept track of their own and others' deontic commitments and entitlements in the process. The networked interactions of the Indira Gandhi administration with other scorekeepers such as the Pakistani military regime, the US, USSR, the UN, China, Global Public Opinion, Indian Public Opinion and the military, the Bangladesh Liberation movement represented through the Awami League were important in two ways. The interaction-in-context among several scorekeepers on East Pakistan crisis triggered an instrumental norm type, which set the proprieties of material inferences and acceptable reasons in the game. It was only through reasoning in the deontic scorekeeping space that the Indian political actors figured out what is it to act on the basis of reasoning and formed normative judgments and securitized the refugee situation as a proper completion of its practical reasoning.

Similarly, as Chapter 7 demonstrated, although the politics of post-Cold War period favored liberal interventionism, Brazilian policymakers reasoned with several scorekeepers, made important practical inferences on their role in South America and kept track of their own and others' deontic commitments and entitlements in the reasoning process. The networked interactions of the Lula administration with other scorekeepers such as Haitian leadership, the tripartite powers of US, Canada, and France, Brazilian diplomatic corps, Brazilian public, Argentina, Chile, the UN, and the Global Public Opinion was important in two ways. The interaction-in-context triggered an institutional norm-type, which governed the proprieties of material inferences and acceptable reasons for the Brazilian administration in the game. Crucially Brazil did not antecedently settle its decision to intervene in Haiti and then juggled the multiple discourses. It was only through reasoning in the deontic scorekeeping space the political actors asserted its responsibility in Haiti for a black brother republic and formed normative judgments that its self-narrative compels multilateral military mission of South American states in Haiti as proper completion of its practical reasoning.

In both India and Brazil, then, elites intentionally made choices through practical inferences in response to the deontic scores attributed, acknowledged, and endorsed by other scorekeepers. Yet the desire to intervene in particular political terms was not all along already functioning as an implicit premise. The elaboration of practical inferences of these actors in different stages showed how their reasoning was not *monotonic* but only in response to the moves and scores acknowledged and attributed by other scorekeepers.⁴

In making these claims, this thesis accepts many of the basic premises of the critical constructivist research in international relations, as the discussion in Chapter 2 showed, and

⁴ On monotonic and nonmonotonic reasoning see Brandom 1998.

further the agenda in important ways. By placing my discussion upon the present debates on the role of speech-acts, rhetoric, and narrativity in international politics within the securitization theory, the ontological security model, and the rhetorical coercion model, this thesis benefitted from their assumptions. Clearly, the emergence of an authoritative action is a power-laden process, imbued with meaning to make sense of the moves, and characteristically contingent in the face of competing alternatives. To make sense of political agency, however, I explicated two more ideas with the critical constructivist scholarship. First, the discourses are constituted by the process of interactions itself and thus one cannot establish the boundaries of acceptable discursive practice in advance. Second, norms play an important role in such interactions. This enables us to appreciate how norms are constantly negotiated in social interactions and that they cannot be separated from meanings actors attach to them in interactions.

In keeping with these two explications, the implications of the findings from Brazil and India allow us to appreciate three important aspects of political action. First, value-based considerations of the Indian and Brazilian policy makers in their evaluation of alternative courses of action are more important than mere means-end nexus based on fixed and firm material interests. In other words, only through interactions and the game of giving and asking for reasons some interest become meaningful and can serve as a basis for action. Second, the deontic aspect of claim-making practices in interrogating one's own and others' commitments and entitlements in the game of giving and asking for reasons show the role of judgments, inferences, and intentionality in political action. In other words, understanding political action requires attention to the deontic aspects of obligations, permissions, duties, and responsibilities of actors embedded in social actors. Finally, the different process of political agency exercised by Indian and Brazilian policy makers shows the important role of norm types that underwrites interactions. In other words, patterns of practical reasoning, the role of scorekeepers and their

inferences for action are contingent upon the normativity that underwrites interactions among interlocutors.

8.2. Limitations of the Study

The thesis is devoted – among other things – to show the emergence of political action by foregrounding the game of giving and asking for reasons and it is fitting that I address briefly the shortcomings of the thesis, in particular, some reifications made in the process. First and relatively easy to address is the questionable validity of treating securitization theory, ontological security, and rhetorical coercion model within the broader umbrella of critical constructivist IR. My justification for bringing them together rests on the larger debt of these theories to the linguistic turn and language-focused mechanisms of political influence (for detailed justifications for these theories, see Chapter 2). While neither I nor anybody else can deny that developments within these theories over time branched in multiple directions crucially in post-structuralist pathways, the simplifying assumption here is that the initial set-up is heuristically fruitful to addressing issues of agency in international relations and discovery of important new insights as the above reviews showed. Clearly, I bracketed the growing literature within theories, if obviously, it is unreasonable to address all aspects of the literature within the scope of this thesis.⁵

The second limitation is the inevitable reification of alternative discourses in the cases of Brazil and India. In this thesis, I established – through detailed historical reconstruction – four competing discourses on humanitarianism for the Indira Gandhi administration in India and three competing discourses for the Lula administration in Brazil. For some scholars, my claims

⁵ For recent advancements in Securitization see Balzacq et al. 2014; On the utility of deconstruction for IR see Arfi 2012; For limits of traditional ways of thinking of norms, identity, and order see Epstein et al. 2014.

about competing discourses such as “non-intervention,” “diplomatic mediation,” among others that come to the forefront based on the normativity that underwrites interactions might be on their face acceptable, but still extremely reified. In particular, they might rightly criticize me for not paying sufficient attention to the ruptures in the competing discourses, the power relations embedded in these discourses that make them competing alternatives by silencing other discourses in the first place and the seemingly innocent internal autonomy and coherence of these discourses that does not in fact exist. I believe this is a valid criticism. However, in my thesis, I focus not on the rise and fall of discourses but on how policymakers faced practical situations – exercised political agency – in the face of these competing discourses. Thus, some reification of alternative discourses was inevitable. Yet, these reifications were not arbitrary summaries but as any careful reader of Chapters 4 and 6 would say, are arrived after serious historical dissection through a postcolonial historiography of diplomatic engagements of Brazil and India since the early twentieth century. Further, despite the reifications, the fact that it also led to the discovery of important insights on how political actors give meaning to these discourses on the specific practical problem in the game of giving and asking for reasons should lessen, even if it does not eliminate, the wrath of this criticism.

Finally, some scholars might object that my interpretative research design that relies only on the publicly played game of giving and asking for reasons as unusually restrictive and not rigorous with mining important historical sources from private paper, detailed interviews, personal correspondences, declassified diaries of policymakers, and secret telegrams between scorekeepers. Analytically, these are two independent objections: one based on sources and other the other based on rigor. In line with the critical constructivist research program, I maintain that publicly deployed reasons already constrain and enable political actions in multiple ways.⁶ No

⁶ See Jackson 2006a; For a brilliant collection of interpretive research design see Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006.

rational policymaker could afford to take publicly justifying reasons for granted because these moves are social, kept track by several interlocutors as Chapter 3 showed, whereas private papers, as important it is, could go down the road of subjective opinions, and actors could distort ideas with impunity. Ultimately, this thesis is a reflexive double hermeneutics project with the understanding that it is interpretations all the way down. The reader has to judge whether my interpretations of Indian and Brazilian action were persuasive and meaningful. Having said this, any holding this thesis and the interpretations offered on the making-making practices of Indian and Brazilian policymakers accountable to standards of positivist objectivity and rigorousness misses the mark. Ido Oren puts it very well:

But what if the reader of our reflexive analysis – say, a person committed to the idea of political or social science *qua* science – does not ‘buy’ our argument? What if the reader ‘does not see the adequacy of our interpretation’? As Taylor pointed out, ‘we can only convince an interlocutor if at some point he [or she] shares our understanding of the language concerned. If he [or she] remains firmly committed to the positivist, empiricist conception of social science, if he [or she] does not come to share our reflexive orientation, then ‘there is no further step to take in rational argument; we can try to awaken these intuitions in him [or her], or we can simply give up’. Ultimately, there is no neutral, value-free way of adjudicating between textual readings or judgments.⁷

It is interpretation all the way down and another scholar will redefine the subject and challenge my interpretations of Indian and Brazilian action. Such multiple interpretive games are one that all can play. Clearly, Brandom’s pragmatism is not without limitations⁸ and engaging in a critical interrogation of my interpretation of practical reasoning for international politics through other ways of thinking about discursive practices is certainly important for a productive academic dialogue.

The particular emphasis on meaning and intentionality advanced in this thesis is normative and is based on an inferential-expressivist account from analytical pragmatist philosophy. It is a small step to move beyond the conception of norms and normativity in IR that is predominantly

⁷ Oren 2007, 226.

⁸ For limitations and problems in Brandom’s work see the collection of Weiss and Wanderer 2010.

understood in the terms set by Finnemore and Sikkink. Thus, the implicitly running thread in the entire thesis was the idea that meaning and intentionality is normative and it is fitting to conclude this thesis briefly explicating the meta-narratives that underpins such an uptake in this project.

8.3. Meaning and Intentionality is Normative: The Way Ahead

Meaning making is what differentiates humans from inanimate objects and constitutes the difference between ‘action’ and mere ‘behavior’. The ubiquity of meaning making practices is, perhaps, the characteristic feature of reflexive human beings and belongs to us both in individual and social engagement. Social action is indeed only a subcategory of meaningful action when individuals are oriented to ‘others’ and make sense of these ‘others’ intersubjectively in a meaningful way. The pervasiveness of meaning in the lives of human beings has an enigmatic quality that has captured social and philosophical debates for ages. As Charles Taylor shows, “We are in a sense surrounded by meaning; in the words we exchange, in all the signs we deploy, in the art, music, literature we create and enjoy, in the very shape of the man-made environment most of us live in; and not least, in the internal speech we rarely cease addressing to ourselves silently, or to absent others.”⁹ Even though meaning-making is central to human affairs, social theorists and philosophers have not agreed upon one particular theory of meaning. There are different sorts of theories of meaning as there are skeptics about any facts on the meaning of linguistic expressions.¹⁰

I believe that critical constructivist IR could significantly advance if we conceive that meaning and intentionality in international politics is normative in an expressivist sense. The notion that meaning is normative has a long tradition in philosophy and social theory. It marks a significant

⁹ Taylor 1985, 248.

¹⁰ See the sharp debates in Hattiangadi 2006; Ankersmit 2012; Gibbard 2012; Fennell 2013; Whiting 2015.

way of conceiving cognition and action of human beings most famously initiated by Kant and reflected extensively by Wittgenstein and Kripke.¹¹ Many modern philosophers and social theorists are also committed to this thesis and have made significant contributions to improving our understanding of meaning making in human affairs.¹²

The claim that meaning is normative is based on the reasoning that a certain kind of norms are in force whenever an agent makes sense of a content or whenever something is meaningful. A distinguishing feature of the normativity thesis is based on correctness and prescriptivity conditions of claims. Fennell elaborates this “correctness” and “prescriptivity” condition very nicely:

The idea is that given that a word has a particular meaning, it is correct to apply it to certain things and not others. For example, given that the word “green” in English means *green*, it is correct to apply it to green things (e.g., grass, basil leaves, etc.) and not to non-green ones (e.g., ripe Romas, lemons, etc.). Normativist claim that this a priori connection between a word having a meaning and there being conditions for its correct application provides a quick route to meaning normativity: since there is an internal link between meaning and correctness, and correctness is an intrinsically normative notion, meaning thereby is.¹³

The “prescriptive” reading of the normativity thesis is the claim that a word’s meaning *immediately* entails a prescription for how it ought to be used. The idea is that given that a word has a particular meaning, it immediately follows that we *ought* to apply it to certain things and not others. For example, given that the word “green” in English means *green*, we ought to apply it to green things (e.g. grass, basil leaves, etc.) and not to non-green ones (e.g., ripe Romas, lemons, etc.).¹⁴

In sum, it normativity thesis entails that words have conditions of their correct use and “claims” oblige one to do certain things and not others. Within the deontic scorekeeping frameworks of this thesis inspired from Brandom, other scorekeepers keep track of this “correctness” and “prescriptivity” conditions based on the norms that underwrite social practices. Clearly, the normativity thesis elaborated and used in this thesis is not the same *à la* Finnemore and Sikkink

¹¹ Kant 1999; Wittgenstein 2009; Kripke 1982.

¹² Baker and Hacker 1984; Boghossian 1989; McGinn 1991; McDowell 2001; Millar 2009.

¹³ Fennell 2013, 57 Emphasis original.

¹⁴ Ibid, 60.

in IR and the well-run mainstream trope of seeing norms as “causes.” In contrast, it is the understand that *expressions* are ‘governed by standards of correctness’¹⁵ and that if a speaker means something with the claim, she will not only do something in accordance with this standard but that she ought to do so. In this light, providing a descriptive account of words in claim making practices cannot provide the meaning of that term because this meaning is fraught with “ought conditions.” Therefore, what someone means by a term determines how she ought to use it because of the norm that is in force in social practices. In simple terms, it is the claim that an expression *means* something to speakers at a particular time only if a norm for that expression is in force for the speaker at that particular time. Other scorekeepers keep track of these claims in important ways.

This claim of meaning normativity is set up against the descriptivist account of meaning but also challenges naturalistic account of meaning that relies on other extra semantic provenances such as universal truth, morality or prudence. Although meaning making is a human process and conventional, they are not arbitrary, and as any normativist will tell us, they are not just idiosyncratic expressions, but an expression that are governed by rules and for which reasons can be asked and given. These rules of meaningful expression have correctness conditions and pragmatic significance that should also be specified in normative terms. It settles what *ought* to be done if a state is to be realized, the expression binds the agent with the norms in force and compels her to the correctness conditions. Still, there are possibilities of making mistakes. Indeed, the agent’s has all power within her to act outside this compulsion of normativity or fail

¹⁵ Rosen 2001 Where semantic correctness is essentially a normative standard. However, anti-normativists construe this correctness not as a normative standard and point to its non-normative usage. Needless to say, I argue that the correctness is a normative notion and there is a different between, as Rosen put it, correctness and correctness making feature. The former is normative while the latter (the feature) could be non-normative. The confusion arises when philosophers mix both these notions. Similarly, some philosophers argue that truth and rationality that emanates from the expression are forms of correctness. I agree with this notion. Here truth is a correctness condition in relation to the semantic relations and not in the form of extra-semantic provenance that exists a priori when the assertions or meaningful expressions are made. .

to act by the compulsion of the rules that bind the expression; yet any evaluation of that performance – asking or giving reasons for action – will only be possible through the normative force present in the meaningful expression. Brandom puts this latter point very well:

The state is to settle what *ought* to be done, what *must* be done if it is to be realized. What actually does or would happen is another matter...Being compelled in this sense is entirely compatible with failing to act as one ‘must’. Indeed, the physical or causal possibility of making a mistake, or doing what one is obliged, by what one means, intends, believes, and desires, not to do, *is essential* to the conception of such states and shows the essentially normative nature of their significance.¹⁶

Although, there are immediate contentions among anti-normativists that such “obligation” conditions do not exist.¹⁷ To be sure, obligation, as conceived here, is not a transcendental obligation *a la* Kant, but a more contextualized obligation that arises in the interaction setting. It is the set of obligation that would arise, for example, for a person who takes up the activity of sorting mails: “do not rip apart the mails.”¹⁸ The obligation “not to rip apart the mails” is a constitutive obligation that is part of the very activity of sorting mails. As Fennell puts it, this contextualized obligation is important because:

If one does not in general abide by this imperative, then one is simply not engaged in the activity of sorting mail but is doing something very different (and something that may interest the authorities). Thus, the general bindingness of this injunction to the practice of mail sorting is not contingent on having an optional desire that one could take or leave and yet still be engaged in the activity in question; rather, it is *constitutive* of this activity.¹⁹

Before making a connection between meaning normativity and action, it is important to consider Wittgenstein’s dilemma on this issue so as to remain cautious (but not quietist) in our approach to meaning normativity. If meaningful expressions have rules that bind the agent then we are immediately confronted with Wittgenstein’s paradox: “no course of action could be determined by a rule because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule”²⁰

¹⁶ Brandom 1994, 19 Emphasis Added.

¹⁷ See for example Hattingadi 2007.

¹⁸ Example is based on Fennell 2013.

¹⁹ Fennell 2013, 15 Emphasis original.

²⁰ Wittgenstein 2009, 201.

In other words, if every expression is made to accord with a rule, any violation can also be made to accord with the rule. Simply put, rules are indeterminate and if an expression can work both ways (for and against the rule) then there is no such thing as a meaningful expression. As Kripke puts it, in this way the whole notion of meaning-making endeavor “vanishes into thin air.”²¹ However, on the other hand, if we claim that the rule for an expression is based the *behavior* of the agent who gives meaning in usage in order to avoid the infinite regress problem, then Wittgenstein pointed out another dilemma: “How can use, which is finite, determine a potential infinity of applications?”²² The problem as Hattiangadi puts it is that “If the rules are to be evinced by the way that speakers *do* behave, the normativity of content seems to be lost. The problem, to begin with, is that any finite sequence of behavior is consistent with an infinite number of possible continuations of that behavior and thus an infinite number of rules with which that behavior may accord.”²³ In other words, if we claim that meaning-is-in use, then how can we also claim meaning normativity that argues that the force of the rules in meaningful expression determines its applicability?

It is here that Brandom’s expressivist pragmatism and deontic scorekeeping practices provide a useful step forward. Understanding that linguistic expressions and the use of language essentially is a characteristic form of deontology,²⁴ Brandom and many other philosophers of language argue that meaningful expressions manage to do what they do because it takes a specific *deontic* form instituted in scorekeeping practices.²⁵ This thesis is a small step in that direction to bring those ideas to international politics and although the groundwork has been laid for bringing meaning normativity back to IR theory – such a meta theoretical task will have to be taken up on another occasion.

²¹ Kripke 1982, 22.

²² Wittgenstein 2009.

²³ Hattiangadi 2003, 422.

²⁴ Searle 1997; Maher 2014; Brandom 2010.

²⁵ Also see Lewis 2002.

Appendix – Data and Basic Measure of Standard Network Analysis

Contents

1. On the basic illustration of Somalia and Standard Network Analysis (Figure 1.1)
2. On the interaction-in-context among Scorekeepers and Game players on Humanitarian Crisis in East Pakistan 1971 (Figure 1.5)
3. On Instrumental Norm Type in the Network of Interaction-in-context on East Pakistan Crisis (Figure 1.6)
4. On the interaction-in-context among Scorekeepers and Game players on Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti 2004 (Figure 1.8)
5. On Institutional Norm Type in the Network of Interaction-in-context on Haiti (Figure 1.9)

It must be stated at the outset that I use the graphs and representation from Standard Network Analysis models. However, I am concerned neither with the building formal network models nor even with the explanation of the heuristic power of network analysis and the measures. The use of graphs is merely illustrative and thus the persuasiveness of my argument therefore does not lie in the formal derivation of my conclusion from a set of network analysis. Thus, I intentionally set aside mentioning the measures of the nodes, density, Krackhardt efficiency, clustering coefficient measures among others.

The following is the coding pattern for computing the relations between scorekeepers and game players. For this thesis, I coded data for the commitments, entitlements, and relations between scorekeepers and game players in each interactional situation in binary terms $\{0,1\}$. Binary coding is not obligatory and one could assign different range of scores too. Each scorekeeper must separate commitments and entitlements associated with each other. Thus, thirty sets represent the score kept by nine-person conversation. See the data below for both India and Brazil, along with Somalia that is concerned only with the relations between interlocutors.

1. Somalia

1.1. Standard Network Analysis – Data Coded in terms of Positive, Negative and Neutral Relations

Source	Target	Relations = 3 positive, 2 negative, 1 neutral			
Somalia	Somalia	3			
Somalia	Global Public Opinion (Media, USAID, ICRC)	3			
Somalia	The Bush Administration	2			
Somalia	U.S. Military	2			
Somalia	U.S. Congress	1			
Somalia	United Nations	1			
Global Public Opinion	Somalia	3			
Global Public Opinion	Global Public Opinion (Media, USAID, ICRC)	3			
Global Public Opinion	The Bush Administration	2			
Global Public Opinion	U.S. Military	2			
Global Public Opinion	U.S. Congress	1			
Global Public Opinion	United Nations	1			
The Bush Administration	Somalia	2			
The Bush Administration	Global Public Opinion (Media, USAID, ICRC)	2			
The Bush Administration	The Bush Administration	3			
The Bush Administration	U.S. Military	3			
The Bush Administration	U.S. Congress	1			
The Bush Administration	United Nations	1			
U.S. Military	Somalia	2			
U.S. Military	Global Public Opinion (Media, USAID, ICRC)	2			
U.S. Military	The Bush Administration	1			
U.S. Military	U.S. Military	3			
U.S. Military	U.S. Congress	2			
U.S. Military	United Nations	1			
U.S. Congress	Somalia	3			
U.S. Congress	Global Public Opinion (Media, USAID, ICRC)	3			
U.S. Congress	The Bush Administration	2			
U.S. Congress	U.S. Military	2			
U.S. Congress	U.S. Congress	3			
U.S. Congress	United Nations	1			
United Nations	Somalia	3			
United Nations	Global Public Opinion (Media, USAID, ICRC)	3			
United Nations	The Bush Administration	1			
United Nations	U.S. Military	2			
United Nations	U.S. Congress	3			
United Nations	United Nations	3			


2. East Pakistan 1971

2.1. Interaction in context- Raw Data


Source	Target	Commitments Acknowledged	Commitments Undertaken	Entitlements Acknowledged	Entitlements Undertaken	Relations
United States	United States	1		1		
	Pakistan	1	1	1		1 Positive
	Awami League	0	0	0		0 Negative
	China	1	0	1		0 Neutral
	USSR	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Indira Gandhi Administration	0	0	0		0 Negative
	United Nations	1	0	1		0 Neutral
	Global Public Opinion	0	0	0		0 Neutral
	Indian Military and Domestic Opinion	0	0	0		0 Negative
	United States	1	1	1		1 Positive
Pakistan	Pakistan	1		1		
	Awami League	0	0	0		0 Negative
	China	1	0	1		0 Neutral
	USSR	0	0	0		0 Neutral
	Indira Gandhi Administration	0	0	0		0 Negative
	United Nations	1	1	1		0 Neutral
	Global Public Opinion	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Indian Military and Domestic Opinion	0	0	0		0 Negative
	United States	0	0	1		0 Neutral
	Pakistan	0	0	0		0 negative
Awami League	Awami League	1		1		
	China	0	0	0		0 Neutral
	USSR	0	0	0		0 Neutral
	Indira Gandhi Administration	1	1	1		1 Positive
	United Nations	1	1	1		1 Positive
	Global Public Opinion	1	1	1		1 Positive
	Indian Military and Domestic Opinion	1	1	1		1 Positive
	United States	0	0	1		0 Negative
	Pakistan	1	1	1		1 Neutral
	Awami League	0	0	0		0 Negative
China	China	1		1		
	USSR	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Indira Gandhi Administration	0	0	0		0 Negative
	United Nations	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Global Public Opinion	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Indian Military and Domestic Opinion	0	0	0		0 Negative
	United States	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Pakistan	1	1	1		1 Neutral
	Awami League	0	0	0		0 Negative
	China	1		1		
USSR	USSR	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Indira Gandhi Administration	0	0	0		0 Negative
	United Nations	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Global Public Opinion	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Indian Military and Domestic Opinion	0	0	0		0 Negative
	United States	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Pakistan	1	0	1		0 Neutral
	Awami League	0	0	0		0 Neutral
	China	0	0	0		0 Negative
	USSR	1		1		
Indira Gandhi Administration	Indira Gandhi Administration	1	1	0		0 Positive
	United Nations	1	0	0		0 Neutral
	Global Public Opinion	0	0	0		0 Neutral
	Indian Military and Domestic Opinion	1	0	1		0 Neutral
	United States	1	0	0		0 Negative
	Pakistan	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Awami League	1	0	1		0 Positive
	China	0	0	0		0 Negative
	USSR	1	0	1		0 Positive
	Indira Gandhi Administration	1		1		
United Nations	United Nations	1	0	1		0 Neutral
	Global Public Opinion	1	0	1		0 Positive
	Indian Military and Domestic Opinion	1	1	1		1 Positive
	United States	1	1	1		1 Neutral
	Pakistan	1	0	1		0 Neutral
	Awami League	0	0	0		0 Neutral
	China	0	0	0		0 Negative
	USSR	1	1	1		1 Neutral
	Indira Gandhi Administration	1	0	0		0 Negative
	United Nations	1		1		
Global Public Opinion	Global Public Opinion	1	1	1		1 Neutral
	Indian Military and Domestic Opinion	0	0	0		0 Negative
	United States	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Pakistan	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Awami League	1	1	1		1 Neutral
	China	0	0	0		0 Neutral
	USSR	0	0	0		0 Neutral
	Indira Gandhi Administration	1	0	0		0 Positive
	United Nations	1	1	1		1 Neutral
	Global Public Opinion	1		1		
Indian Military and Domestic Opinion	Indian Military and Domestic Opinion	1	0	0		0 Neutral
	United States	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Pakistan	0	0	0		0 Negative
	Awami League	1	1	1		1 Positive
	China	0	0	0		0 Negative
	USSR	1	0	0		0 Positive
	Indira Gandhi Administration	1	1	1		1 Positive
	United Nations	1	0	0		0 Neutral
	Global Public Opinion	1	1	1		1 Positive
	Indian Military and Domestic Opinion	1		1		

2.2. Instrumental Norm Type underwriting Interactions in East Pakistan


2.2.1. Commitment Acknowledged.




2.2.2. Commitment Undertaken



2.2.3. Entitlements Acknowledged



2.2.4. Entitlements Undertaken




CEU eTD Collection

Source	Target	Commitments Acknow	Commitments Undert	Entitlements Acknov	Entitlements Undert	Relations (3=positive, 2=negative, 1=neut
Western Liberal Intervent	Western Liberal Intervent	1		1		3
	Argentina	1	1	1	1	3
	Chile	1	1	1	1	3
	CARICOM	1	0	0	0	1
	Aristides	0	0	0	0	2
	The Lula Administration	1	1	1	1	3
	Brazil Domestic Public	1	1	0	0	1
	Global Public Opinion	1	1	0	0	1
	United Nations	1	1	1	1	3
Argentina	Western Liberal Intervent	1	1	1	1	3
	Argentina	1		1		3
	Chile	1	1	1	1	1
	CARICOM	1	1	1	1	1
	Aristides	0	0	0	0	0
	The Lula Administration	1	0	1	0	1
	Brazil Domestic Public	1	0	1	0	1
	Global Public Opinion	1	1	1	1	3
	United Nations	1	1	1	1	3
Chile	Western Liberal Intervent	1	1	1	1	3
	Argentina	1	0	1	0	1
	Chile	1		1		3
	CARICOM	1	0	1	0	1
	Aristides	0	0	0	0	2
	The Lula Administration	1	0	1	0	1
	Brazil Domestic Public	1	0	1	0	1
	Global Public Opinion	1	1	1	1	3
	United Nations	1	1	1	1	3
CARICOM	Western Liberal Intervent	1	0	0	0	2
	Argentina	1	0	1	0	1
	Chile	1	0	1	0	1
	CARICOM	1		1		3
	Aristides	1	1	1	1	3
	The Lula Administration	1	0	1	0	1
	Brazil Domestic Public	1	0	1	0	1
	Global Public Opinion	1	1	1	1	1
	United Nations	1	0	1	0	1
Aristides	Western Liberal Intervent	0	0	0	0	2
	Argentina	0	0	0	0	2
	Chile	0	0	0	0	2
	CARICOM	1	0	1	0	1
	Aristides	1		1		3
	The Lula Administration	0	0	0	0	1
	Brazil Domestic Public	0	0	0	0	1
	Global Public Opinion	1	0	1	0	1
	United Nations	0	0	0	0	2
The Lula Administration	Western Liberal Intervent	1	1	1	1	3
	Argentina	1	1	1	1	1
	Chile	1	1	1	1	3
	CARICOM	1	0	0	0	2
	Aristides	0	0	0	0	2
	The Lula Administration	1		1		3
	Brazil Domestic Public	1	1	1	0	1
	Global Public Opinion	1	1	1	1	3
	United Nations	1	1	1	1	3
Brazil Domestic Publics	Western Liberal Intervent	1	0	0	0	2
	Argentina	1	0	1	0	1
	Chile	1	1	1	1	1
	CARICOM	1	0	1	0	1
	Aristides	1	0	1	0	3
	The Lula Administration	1	0	1	0	1
	Brazil Domestic Public	1		1		3
	Global Public Opinion	1	1	1	1	3
	United Nations	1	1	1	1	3
Global Public Opinion	Western Liberal Intervent	0	0	0	0	2
	Argentina	1	0	1	0	1
	Chile	1	0	1	0	1
	CARICOM	1	0	1	0	1
	Aristides	1	0	1	0	1
	The Lula Administration	1	0	1	0	1
	Brazil Domestic Public	1	0	1	0	1
	Global Public Opinion	1		1		3
	United Nations	1	0	1	0	1
United Nations	Western Liberal Intervent	1	1	1	1	3
	Argentina	1	1	1	1	3
	Chile	1	1	1	1	3
	CARICOM	1	0	1	0	1
	Aristides	0	0	0	0	2
	The Lula Administration	1	1	1	1	3
	Brazil Domestic Public	1	1	1	1	1
	Global Public Opinion	1	0	1	0	3
	United Nations	1		1		3

3.2. Institutional Norm Type underwriting interactions in Haiti

3.2.1. Commitments Undertaken


Brazil_Commitments Undertaken



generated by CBA-NetVis

3.2.2. Entitlements Acknowledged

Brazil_Entitlements Acknowledged



generated by CBA-NetVis

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