

**SECURITIZING ENERGY:
FROM GEOPOLITICS TO ENERGY DEMOCRACY
THE CASE OF GERMANY, POLAND & UKRAINE**

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Submitted to

Central European University
Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy and International Relations

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Budapest, Hungary
2016

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. The thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where the appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

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May 31, 2016

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing this dissertation was one of the most challenging and rewarding tasks that I have undertaken so far. Its successful completion would not have been possible without the help of many people, whom I have encountered during this journey.

I would like to thank my supervisor Xymena Kurowska, for her continuous encouragement, critical feedback and strategic advice throughout this experience. Without her support from the very beginning of the project, writing and completing this research would not have been possible.

I am grateful to Paul Roe and Matteo Fumagalli for all of their comments, suggestions and critiques over the years, which helped me to steer my research toward the right path and not to lose the larger picture of the phenomenon studied. I am thankful to Felix Ciută for academic inspiration in the initial stages of my project. I am also grateful to Olexiy Haran for facilitating my interviews and for providing academic support during my research stay in Kyiv.

I would like to thank a number of interviewees in Germany, Poland and Ukraine. Conversations with them not only proved to be the most insightful and valuable parts of my thesis, but also inspired me to think differently in a way that will guide my future professional choices.

My warmest thanks go to a number of friends in Budapest without whom I cannot imagine the last few years of my life. I would like to especially thank Erna Burai, Katalin Varga, Zbigniew Truchlewski, Joanna Kostka, Renata Kralikova, Artak Galyan, Beata Grzebieluch and Jose Reis Santos for all the shared moments, laughs and struggles. Surviving the last year of intensive dissertation writing would also be much harder without the friendship and encouragement of Renira Corinne Angeles, Asli Karaca, Anita Halasz, Carl Nordlund and Giorgi Chikhladze. I would also like to thank my friends outside of Budapest for their continuous support, especially Alicja Szreder, Aleksandra Pytlos and Donata Petrukaityte.

Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my family – especially to my mother Maria Surwiłło. Her constant love, patience and belief in me have always been a source of enormous strength. Without the strength provided by my mother, facing new challenges would be unimaginably harder.

ABSTRACT

Confronted with the undertheorized, conceptually polymorphous and economic-centred energy studies literature on the one hand, and the highly theory oriented security studies on the other, this thesis takes up an interdisciplinary quest into the logics that guide energy security dynamics across different empirical contexts. The adopted contextual approach merges the analysis of energy security with theoretical insights from the critical security studies and interpretivist methodology grounded in hermeneutics to uncover multiplicity of security logics in the energy sphere. Similarly to the analyses of climate change or protection of critical infrastructure, the thesis defies the logic of exception as the dominant and universal logic of security. Instead, it illustrates that not only the logic of risk, war and subsistence shape local energy security agendas, but the emerging logic of emancipation increasingly plays a role in different national settings. Characterized by the gradual democratization of energy systems, individuals as the referent objects of security, the rhetoric of social empowerment/liberation and reflexive security practice - the energy security logic of emancipation marks yet another mutation of the meaning and practice of energy security. Since the emancipatory logic in the energy realm cannot be easily confined to any of the existing definitions of emancipation, the analysis of its 'transformative' nature leads to a number of analytical insights and empirical contributions. The research shows that the emerging emancipatory agenda: 1) further complicates domestic energy contexts and has important policy implications for the local citizens' energy initiatives; 2) leads to an alternative conceptualization of the logic of emancipation that deviates from the critical security studies approach, immanent critique and emancipation/desecuritization argument; 3) challenges the analytical frameworks based on a single logic approach and the existing typologies of security logics; 4) provides new insights and conceptual clarity to the conventional energy security studies that remain focused on the state level technocratic energy policy analysis. The emancipatory logic of energy security also mutates across empirical contexts. Whereas it is present both in the rhetoric of social empowerment/liberation and in the energy practice as illustrated by diverse citizens' energy initiatives in Germany, the Polish and Ukrainian cases point to its dual transformative impact on the energy contexts in the former Soviet space. The transformation of energy systems not only leads here to civic empowerment via the diffusion of energy production, but that societal empowerment can translate into further democratization of the CEE region and gradual transformation of the entire socio-economic models.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BEB – Citizens Energy Cooperative Berlin
 BEE – German Renewable Energy Federation
 BDEW – Federal Association of the Energy and Water Industry
 BDI – Federation of German Industry
 CDU – Christian Democratic Union of Germany
 CEE – Central and Eastern Europe
 CS – Copenhagen School
 CSU – Christian Social Union in Bavaria
 EC – Energy Community
 FDP – Free Democratic Party (Germany)
 GIZ - German Society for International Cooperation
 HBF – Heinrich Böll Foundation
 IEA – International Energy Agency
 INES – International Nuclear Event Scale
 LNG - Liquefied natural gas
 MP – Member of Parliament
 NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 NECU – National Ecological Centre of Ukraine
 NERC – National Electricity Regulation Commission
 NGO – non-governmental organization
 NPP – Nuclear Power Plant
 NYER- National Agency for Effective Use of Energy Resources
 SPD – Social Democratic Party of Germany
 SWP - German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Energy security is like a Rorschach inkblot test – you can see whatever you want to see in it.

- Professor David Victor, Stanford University quoted in Sovacool (2010)

...the more that the term “energy security” is invoked, the less clear it is just what is being “secured”.

- (The Corner House: Hildyard; Lohmann & Sexton)

INTRODUCTION

In the increasingly interconnected world where the combined challenge of climate change and diminishing fossil fuels further complicate the questions of economic growth, sustainability or political and social stability – the concept of energy security re-emerges in the public discourse with a striking frequency and intensity. While politicians largely avoid any categorizations, energy experts focus on economic indicators, and the literature on the subject provides over forty-five different definitions of energy security¹ – various societal actors are continuously involved in the everyday usage and practical redefinition of the concept. This complexity in practice is not reflected in the literature on the subject,² which tends to focus on the local and global market forces and narrowly defined economic indicators for operationalizing energy security. Moreover, the mainstream research is primarily conducted

¹ Benjamin K. Sovacool, *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security* (Routledge, 2010), 3.

² E.g. Didier Houssin, ‘Security of Energy Supplies in a Global Market’, in *Speech by IEA Director Office of Oil Markets and Emergency Preparedness to 2nd Energy Forum, Prague*, 2007, 4–6; Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, *Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy* (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 2005); Antonio Marquina and Antonio Marquina Barrio, *Energy Security: Visions from Asia and Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, ‘Introduction: The Militarization of Energy Security’, *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management*, 2009, 2–4; Barry Naughten, ‘Asia’s Rising Complex Energy Interdependence’, *International Journal of Global Energy Issues* 29, no. 4 (2008): 400–433; Michael Wesley, *Energy Security in Asia*, vol. 3 (Routledge, 2007); Daniel Yergin, *Energy Security and Markets* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Press and John Hopkins University Press, 2005); Richard Youngs, ‘Europe’s External Energy Policy: Between Geopolitics and the Market’, *CEPS Working Documents*, no. 278 (2007).

from a limited methodological perspective that often relies on economic modeling, but rarely includes qualitative data that would give more consideration to the multiplicity of local actors, agendas and perspectives.³

Energy security means different things in different places and its multidimensional character makes it ‘...inherently slippery because it is polysemic in nature, capable of holding multiple dimensions and taking on different specificities depending on the country (or continent), timeframe or energy source to which it is applied’.⁴ What it means, however, goes much deeper than the scope of potential indicators that can be either omitted or added to its multiple definitions. Combining such polymorphous notions as ‘energy’ and ‘security’ results in a variety of rationales that drive multiple actors towards different types of energy sources and diverse policy solutions for ensuring energy access. This process also reflects the deeply rooted understandings of energy security phenomenon itself – as different actors define, categorize and hierarchize its multiple dimensions and practices differently - with all its normative and policy implications. Such understandings range from the militarized competition over energy resources, through the fulfillment of the diverse functional needs or risk scenarios to holistic approaches, which highlight the broad character of energy security that cuts through multiple sectors of human activity – environmental and societal included. Energy security constitutes the field in which both individual and collective security practices are continuously produced and contested and where calls for establishing ‘energy NATO’ or risk analyses of the future supply trends mesh with common concerns about ‘keeping the lights on’ or individual desire to produce one’s energy.⁵ The complexity of this phenomenon makes it difficult to grasp

³ Benjamin K. Sovacool, ‘Diversity: Energy Studies Need Social Science’, *Nature* 511, no. 7511 (30 July 2014): 529–30,

⁴ Lynne Chester, ‘Conceptualising Energy Security and Making Explicit Its Polysemic Nature’, *Energy Policy* 38, no. 2 (2010): 887.

⁵ Sovacool, *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security*; David G. Victor and Linda Yueh, ‘The New Energy Order’, *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 1 (2010): 61–73; Nicholas Hildyard, Larry Lohmann, and Sarah Sexton, ‘Energy Security For Whom? For What?’ (The Corner House, February 2012).

empirically, conceptually and theoretically, yet simultaneously the broad and in flux energy sphere opens up the analysis to new insights – in all of these dimensions.

Energy security escapes any established categorizations and its constant re-conceptualization happens according to diverse rationales and security logics in practice.⁶ Therefore, its contextual analysis might not only enrich the undertheorized and economic-centred energy studies literature, but also crystallize a number of dilemmas in the wider security studies. The latter include the discipline's dominant rationale regarding theorization of security, the problems of the securitization approach, the liminality of the policy/theory sphere and the logics through which certain security issues emerge, operate and become legitimized.

Whereas securitization theory focused prominently on how the logic of exception leads to emergency measures that curtail 'normal' democratic politics,⁷ the debate has since shifted towards the exploration of what other security logic(s) might be at play.⁸ The analysis of energy security conducted in this thesis - similarly to the analyses of climate change or protection of critical infrastructure⁹ - defies the logic of exception as the dominant and universal logic of security and instead shows a multiplicity of security logics in the energy sphere. Moreover, it reveals the diversity of logics that go beyond the existing inclusive frameworks or typologies.¹⁰ It is not only the logic of risk, war and subsistence that shape local energy security agendas. This research shows that the emerging logic of emancipation increasingly plays a role in different national contexts. The emancipatory logic that leads to the gradual democratization of

⁶ Felix Ciută, 'Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?', *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 2 (2010): 123–144.

⁷ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

⁸ Ciută, 'Conceptual Notes on Energy Security'; Maria Julia Trombetta, 'Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21, no. 4 (2008): 585–602; T. Balzacq, 'Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics', 2014; Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'Immigration and the Politics of Security', *Security Studies* 8, no. 2–3 (1998): 71–93.

⁹ E.g. Susan P. Williams, Catherine A. Hardy, and Janine A. Holgate, 'Information Security Governance Practices in Critical Infrastructure Organizations: A Socio-Technical and Institutional Logic Perspective', *Electronic Markets* 23, no. 4 (2013): 341–354; Trombetta, 'Environmental Security and Climate Change'.

¹⁰ E.g. Ciută, 'Conceptual Notes on Energy Security'; Olaf Corry, 'Securitisation and "riskification": Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change', *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 40, no. 2 (2012): 235–258.

the energy systems - through societal participation and regaining control over energy production and consumption by individuals - ultimately marks yet another mutation of the meaning and practice of energy security.

The very term ‘energy democracy’ has been recently developed by some NGOs, civil society groups and think tanks to either refer to the dual challenge of decarbonisation and energy transformation or to describe the on-going bottom-up initiatives focused on the development of citizens’ energy.¹¹ Whereas the existing definitions of energy democracy emphasize justice, fairness, access to energy, redistribution of energy production and consumption and environmental sustainability,¹² the democratization of energy sphere in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region has far-reaching consequences that imply much more than the technical redesign of the centralized energy systems. More specifically, in the CEE states with traditionally centralized political authority and Soviet legacy of separating societal actors from the management of resources, the democratization of energy is often seen as a mechanism for the profound transformation of the entire political and socio-economic models into ones where people ‘have a say’.¹³ Thanks to their scalability and distributed character, renewables not only enable the individuals, cooperatives and local communities to invest and benefit from their development,¹⁴ but through shifting the responsibility for energy production to citizens – to empower them to bring about widely defined socio-political change as societal actors realize the power of their political agency.

From the empirical point of view, the emerging emancipatory agenda in the energy sector further complicates the analysis of energy security contexts as highlighted by the case

¹¹ C. Kunze and S. Becker, *Energy Democracy in Europe. A Survey and Outlook* (Brussels: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2014); D. Szwed and B. Maciejewska, *Demokracja Energetyczna* (Warsaw: Zielony Instytut, 2014), 19.

¹² Kacper Szulecki, Andrzej Ancygier, and Dariusz Szwed, ‘Energy Democratization? Societal Aspects of de-Carbonization in the German and Polish Energy Sectors’, *Environmental Studies and Policy Research Institute: Wroclaw*, 9 March 2015, 9.

¹³ Dariusz Szwed, Interview, 27 May 2013; Chancellery of the Sejm, Interview, 7 June 2013; SGGW, Interview, 12 June 2013; demosEUROPA, Interview, 24 May 2013; Greencubator, Interview, 30 October 2013.

¹⁴ Szulecki, Ancygier, and Szwed, ‘Energy Democratization?’

studies of Germany, Poland and Ukraine. These three empirical cases serve as an analytical background against which the slippery notion of energy security and the multiple logics that govern its dynamics are investigated. In the process the thesis aims to answer a number of research questions:

1. What security logics are at play across different energy contexts and what are the mechanisms of their diffusion and interaction?
2. How do competing security rationales in the national and global energy sector influence domestic energy policy agenda?
3. What do energy security logics and their interaction tell us about the nature of security more broadly?

To answer the above questions, the thesis follows the calls for contextualization of security analysis.¹⁵ It agrees with the statement that 'we learn to know the meaning of security through the practices which embody a particular interpretation of it'¹⁶ and the claim that actors 'speak security'¹⁷ is taken seriously. The debates over the meaning of energy security are seen as a site of contestation where multiple visions and rationales interact and compete – to different outcomes. While acknowledging that vastly different energy policy solutions and agendas derive as much from the material constraints as from the deeply rooted understandings of actors on the ground, the analysis pays special attention to the latter and allows the situated actors to contribute their definitions, understandings and to elaborate on their energy security rationale.

Acknowledging the diversity of local voices helps to unpack broader energy security dynamics in a given setting and opens up the analysis to new insights. Simultaneously, the

¹⁵ Felix Ciută, 'Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitization Theory', *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (2009): 301–326.

¹⁶ Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 21

¹⁷ Ole Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 55.

contextualized approach alleviates the risk that the concept of energy security will be stretched endlessly and lose its significance – as all its meanings, understandings and practices are bound to and limited by local settings from which they emerge. With context operationalized here in an intersubjective manner within the triangle of *distal factors*, the *embeddedness of security mechanisms* and a *constellation of actors*,¹⁸ the analysis focuses on uncovering security logics that operate in-between these three elements. A special attention is given here to the interaction of diverse rhetoric and practices of energy security across logics: levels in which they intertwine or compete; aspects of energy security that they prioritize or reject; congruence of factors that brings them to the dominant public agenda or hinders their development; constellations of actors that uphold the status quo or shift in relation to different energy sources. Such an approach allows to sketch a broader picture of the fluid energy security dynamics and to shed light not only on the mainstream debates and practices, but also on the alternative voices and policy approaches that might be of a lesser scope and influence in some of the analyzed cases. As such, not only the current ‘state of affairs’ can be explained, but the analysis additionally points to the potential future scenarios and trajectories of discursive and policy development. Ultimately, adopting such an approach helps to address the multi-faced challenges of energy security analysis more efficiently and to make significant empirical, theoretical and conceptual contributions.

Most crucially, the analysis uncovers the energy security logic of emancipation and scrutinizes its contextual mutations across the cases. The emancipatory logic appears then to be fully embraced in the German context as it manifests both in the rhetoric of social empowerment/liberation and in the practices of various local citizens’ energy initiatives. The German case illustrates not only the multi-layered dynamics of the emancipatory agenda in the energy sector, but also its cosmopolitan character – as through the transnational network of

¹⁸ See discussion in Chapter I.

actors and NGOs the emancipatory logic permeates into the Polish and Ukrainian contexts. A combination of historical (Soviet legacy) and socio-economic factors determine that the emancipatory logic is currently more visible in the political rhetoric in Poland and Ukraine. Moreover, the Polish case illustrates its dual transformative character as the decentralizing tendencies of energy production can both remodel domestic energy system and empower its citizens to implement further democratic changes beyond the energy sector. Although the Ukrainian context could present the similar potential for the systemic and socio-economic transformation, some obstacles hinder the development of the emancipatory logic in the Ukrainian energy sphere. Therefore, the local calls for civic involvement in the energy affairs remain marginal, albeit the incremental changes in attitudes among certain population groups indicate that the prospects for the development of the prosumers culture might become viable in Ukraine in the future.

The discovery of the emancipatory logic across cases adds an even greater complexity to the analysis of the diverse energy security logics. Since the way in which the notion of energy security is perceived, approached and exercised will continue to have wide political, economic, environmental and societal consequences, the thesis makes a significant empirical contribution as it unpacks multiple rationales driving domestic energy security agendas in Germany, Poland and Ukraine. Although working definitions of energy security are frequently established for the purpose of pressing public policy issues, understanding the dynamics and far-reaching implications of diverse energy security logics requires going beyond neat conceptual clarifications or mainstream definitions. As this thesis illustrates, giving voice to the diversity of local actors not only provides a wide range of definitions of energy security, but those definitions often go far beyond a set of 'dry' economic indicators – towards perspectives that mirror contemporary dilemmas regarding the nature of 'security' more broadly. Therefore, the answers given differ in all dimensions: starting from what constitutes energy security, how to

prioritize its various aspects, in what way to fulfill them, with the involvement of which actors, through which channels and on what levels. My fieldwork research reveals a multiplicity of energy security logics, both anticipated ones – that revolve around the rationale of survival, sustenance or prevention, and the emerging ones – that call for social emancipation in the energy sphere and for the gradual change of energy security status quo from within. Such diverse logics of energy security have vastly different normative implications and are linked differently to their respective policy and practice. Tracing and understanding these linkages is key to understanding current and future trends, including how given logics uphold centralized energy systems or lead to diffused participatory models; facilitate international co-operation or trigger confrontation; aid in prioritizing local economic and political interests or global environmental agenda.

Secondly, the thesis makes a double theoretical contribution. Since the research conducted relates to the critical security studies debate on the nature of security and its logics – the analysis not only shows how a multiplicity of security logics depicted in the literature play out in the energy realm, but it additionally identifies the energy security logic of emancipation to be operative in different empirical contexts. This finding runs counter to the intuitive analytical guesses: given its usual ‘hard security’ standing it would seem that energy security does not lend itself as easily as some other ‘soft security’ issues (e.g. environment) to the alternative understandings and interpretations of security. The emergence of emancipatory logic in the energy sector is therefore puzzling. It provides new insights into the conventional energy studies which largely reject such option as well as adds a new quality to critical security studies which tend to deal with emancipatory issues within the ‘soft security’ or ‘societal sector’.

Thirdly and consequently, the analysis makes a twofold conceptual contribution. On the one hand, it uncovers a wide variety of conceptualizations of energy security – as depicted in local rhetoric and as framed in semi-structured interviews by the situated actors. On the other

hand, the emancipatory agenda discovered in the energy sector leads to an alternative conceptualization of the logic of emancipation. Although marked by individuals as the referent objects of security, the rhetoric of social inclusion/liberation and reflexive security practice - the energy security logic of emancipation cannot be easily confined to any of the existing definitions of emancipation. As opposed to Booth's depiction of 'security' as means and 'emancipation' as ends,¹⁹ the energy sphere indicates a reversed dynamic – as it is through emancipatory practices (removal of intermediaries, co-ownership of energy infrastructure and production of one's energy) that individuals achieve energy security. Moreover, although the logic of emancipation is certainly bound to social empowerment, it diverges from some of the most prominent calls for 'empowering security' in the literature and their respective normative agendas.²⁰ If some scholars propagated the use of immanent critique as an emancipatory tool for freeing up space for dialogue and inclusion of marginalized voices to 'speak security',²¹ the sphere of energy constitutes a case of 'emancipation without emancipator'. Namely, the emancipatory processes happen organically in the contextual interchange between bottom-up individual practice and the promoted emancipatory agenda. As such, emancipatory rhetoric and practice appear to be already at play in different energy contexts and do not require discursive empowerment or the figure of emancipator to be brought about. Therefore, the emancipatory logic of energy security is primarily characterized not so much by its 'empowering', but rather by its 'transformative' nature. It also leads to a profound two-step transformation: firstly, the democratization of the energy sector shifts the agency back to the individual users and further transforms the practice and meaning of energy security; secondly and consequently, the social empowerment in the energy sphere has a potential to transform the entire socio-economic models.

¹⁹ Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 115.

²⁰ E.g. Matt McDonald, *Security, the Environment and Emancipation: Contestation over Environmental Change* (Routledge, 2011).

²¹ Ibid., 41; Matt McDonald, 'Emancipation and Critical Terrorism Studies', *European Political Science* 6, no. 3 (2007): 252–259.

Moreover, this research shows that democratization of energy does not equal de-securitization of the issue either. If some scholars would link ‘emancipation’ with ‘democratic politics’ and put it at the opposite end of the securitization spectrum,²² the sphere of energy indicates that it is precisely through ‘energy democracy’ that energy security can be achieved – albeit within a different kind of a paradigm. In other words, democratizing energy does not lead in this case to the ‘unmaking’ of security,²³ but on the contrary – energy security conceived in the reflexive and positive terms appears to be ‘made’ in the process.

In reaching these empirical, theoretical and conceptual contributions the research undertakes an interdisciplinary approach, as it merges the analysis of energy security phenomenon with theoretical insights derived from the critical security studies and interpretivist methodology grounded in hermeneutics. Since the hermeneutical sense making implies the collapse of the facts/values dichotomy, my hermeneutical reformulation of the logic of emancipation in the energy realm is also marked by a certain normative bend. In other words, although this thesis is neither fully placed in the critical theory nor does it employ an immanent critique, it is normatively grounded in the ‘transcender logic’ as described by Booth and Wheeler.²⁴ This means that it considers both possible and desirable to have the meaning and practice of security transformed into a positive and inclusive one. The narrative and structure of the thesis reflect this approach.

The first chapter conducts a critical literature review which grounds the theoretical argument of the thesis within the wider debate on security logics.²⁵ Similarly to numerous voices in this debate, the argument starts from reviewing the insights and pitfalls of the

²² Claudia Aradau, ‘Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation’, *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7, no. 4 (2004): 388–413.

²³ Thierry Balzacq, Sara Depauw, and Sarah Leonard, ‘The Political Limits of Desecuritization: Security, Arms Trade, and the EU’s Economic Targets’, in *Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics* (Routledge, 2015), 107–8.

²⁴ Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, ‘The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics’, 2011.

²⁵ Ciută, ‘Conceptual Notes on Energy Security’; Trombetta, ‘Environmental Security and Climate Change’; Balzacq, ‘Contesting Security’; Doty, ‘Immigration and the Politics of Security’.

theoretical framework that sought to account for the contextual construction of security issues – the Copenhagen School securitization theory.²⁶ The thesis scrutinizes different critical re-engagements with the framework to tease out some of its inherent tensions - most prominently its reliance on a single security logic and problems with the contextualization of analysis. In particular, the calls for the consideration of ‘*embeddedness*’ of security mechanisms,²⁷ *distal context*²⁸ and ‘*setting*’ of a securitization²⁹ are utilized for the operationalization of the thesis’ intersubjective approach to contextual analysis. The chapter moves, then, to some existing typologies of security logics/grammars³⁰ in its search for an adequate analytical point of departure for the contextual analysis of energy security. Notably, Ciută’s classification of the energy security logics³¹ is taken as a starting point for the empirical stage of the research. The fieldwork in Germany, Poland and Ukraine is then conducted with the view to uncover security logics operating in the European energy sphere and to account for the channels of their diffusion and interaction as well as policy relevance in the given domestic settings. In doing so, the research follows an abductive logic of inquiry and combines discourse analysis (of media coverage, parliamentary debates, national energy policy strategies and domestic literature on energy security) with semi-structured interviews (with energy experts, politicians, ministerial representatives, NGO workers and environmental activists) as primary research methods.

The three empirical chapters that follow, take the reader through an in-depth case-by-case analysis of the German, Polish and Ukrainian energy contexts. Employing the methodological approach that hinges on the logic of subsistence - marked by the multiplicity of actors and meanings of energy security³² – as the *de facto* main site of contestation, each

²⁶ Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, *Security*.

²⁷ Holger Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and beyond’, *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (2007): 359–60.

²⁸ Thierry Balzacq, *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (Routledge, 2010), 17.

²⁹ Mark B. Salter, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’, *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11, no. 4 (2008): 321–349.

³⁰ Corry, ‘Securitisation and “riskification”’; Ciută, ‘Conceptual Notes on Energy Security’.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Ciută, ‘Security and the Problem of Context’.

empirical chapter starts with an analysis of the competing definitions and understandings of energy security in a given context. The security logics behind those understandings are then unpacked further as manifested by the rhetoric and practice related to a number of ‘trigger events’ in the European energy sector in the last decade. The latter include the Ukrainian gas crises, the development of the Nordstream project, the nuclear accident in Fukushima and the European debate on the Energy and Climate package. With attention being paid not only to the mainstream discourse, but also to the debates taking place at the sub-state level among a variety of societal actors, the analysis maneuvers between meanings and understandings of energy security embraced in the theory, policy and practice to uncover a number of security logics in the energy sphere. As a result, the energy security logics of subsistence, war, risk and emancipation are exposed, and the existing linkages between them highlighted. An intersubjective operationalization of context allows to account for the interplay between distal factors (historical, political and socio-economic), shifting constellation of actors and the degree to which certain security mechanisms/channels are likely to be utilized in a given setting. As such the thesis unpacks complex contextual dynamics that either favors or hinders the emergence of given security logics in each empirical case. The commonalities, as well as differences in the nature of the energy security logics, are then analyzed.

Therefore, whereas the war and risk logics appear to rise and fall suddenly mostly triggered by external events, the contestation over the meaning and priorities of energy security within the logic of subsistence tends to pull in two opposite directions. On the one hand, prioritization of the fulfillment of societal needs and continuous economic growth within given definitions, understandings and practices of energy security – often at the expense of the environmental agenda, points to a strongly economic orientation that characterizes the subsistence logic. On the other hand, once this hierarchy reverses and environmental concerns start to shape the frame of the energy security debate – other dimensions not only go down in

the hierarchy, but become transformed in the process: sustenance is replaced by the idea of sustainable development while the emphasis on economic growth is minimized. Once that happens, a favorable frame for the further diffusion of the centralized energy system is established. The shift itself – upheld by the rhetoric of social empowerment in the energy sphere and dismantling of energy monopolies, starts to embrace a distinct security logic of emancipation.

The final chapter constitutes an in-depth summary of the theoretical and empirical findings of the thesis. *A priori* consulted typologies of security logics that served as a blueprint for analysis are revisited vis-à-vis empirical material derived from the three case studies. The added value of a contextual approach to security analysis is then made clear as it is illustrated how an intersubjective operationalization of contexts not only allowed to grasp a variety of security logics and their shifting interactions but also uncovered the energy security logic of emancipation. Since due to the specificity of the energy security phenomenon the emancipatory logic manifests uniquely in the energy sphere, it is conceptualized against the background literature on emancipation and the thesis' analytical input to the debate on the nature of 'security' is made more explicit. All energy security logics uncovered in the empirical stage of the research are then juxtaposed to illustrate their key characteristics and interdependencies. Together with a comparison of the logics' empirical manifestation across the cases, the analysis points to the existing patterns and their respective normative and policy implications. The chapter concludes by providing some final remarks regarding the study's theoretical contribution to the broader security studies. Firstly, the research conducted shows that security is indeed a contextual phenomenon and that one-fits-all frameworks or approaches will inherently miss the nuances that can be only discovered in the process of contextualized analysis. Secondly, the realist logic of security appears to be merely one of security logics at play and there is nothing certain about its dominant position or endurance. As the analyses of

the energy sector show, it might be challenged by other logics that emerge from the areas of contestation or rise triggered by the external events – and that come to the fore of public discourse and policy agenda. Thirdly, positive conceptualizations of energy security and reflexive individual practices of energy production coupled with the rhetoric of social liberation indicate the emergence of the energy security logic of emancipation. This finding challenges both theoretical frameworks geared on a single security logic as well as some of the existing typologies of security logics/grammars. From the empirical side, it problematizes contemporary mainstream analysis of energy security and adds new conceptual clarity and analytical quality to the interdisciplinary research on energy security as well as to the future energy policy approaches, which will increasingly have to account for the multi-faceted and cross-sectoral nature of energy security.

CHAPTER I

ENERGY & SECURITY:

THE PURCHASE AND CHALLENGE OF CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

The first chapter conducts a critical literature review, which grounds the theoretical argument and analytical framework of the thesis within a wider critical security studies debate on the nature of security and its logics.³³ To highlight the analytical benefit of linking energy studies with the broader security studies literature, the narrative draws parallels between conceptual dilemmas in both fields. It is then illustrated, how theoretically - oriented security studies provide a useful analytical lens for the contextual research on energy security, and how in turn more practice - oriented energy sphere constitutes a good terrain for addressing some broader dilemmas of the critical security analysis. Once those links are established, the chapter takes Copenhagen School securitization theory³⁴ as a starting point in its search for a suitable analytical approach. Since the CS securitization framework constituted a genuine advancement in the discipline as it sought to account for the mechanism of security issues' construction, the chapter reviews some critical re-engagements with the framework – in particular those tackling its problematic adherence to the Schmittian logic of security and the consequential obstacles with the contextualization of analysis.³⁵ By teasing out some of the framework's inherent

³³ Felix Ciută, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 2 (2010): 123–144; Maria Julia Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21, no. 4 (2008): 585–602; T. Balzacq, "Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics," 2014; Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Immigration and the Politics of Security," *Security Studies* 8, no. 2–3 (1998): 71–93.

³⁴ Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, *Security*.

³⁵ Claire Wilkinson, "The Limits of Spoken Words: From Meta-Narratives to Experiences of Security," in

tensions, the chapter identifies the elements that should be incorporated into the contextual approach to energy security analysis: ‘*embeddedness*’ of *security mechanisms*,³⁶ *distal context*³⁷ and “*setting*” of a *securitization*.³⁸ Having utilized these three elements for an intersubjective operationalization of context, the narrative moves to some of the alternative approaches and typologies of security logics and grammars.³⁹ The latter aid in going beyond the Copenhagen School framework and inform the fieldwork stage of the research. In particular, Ciută’s typology of the energy security logics⁴⁰ and Corry’s classification of the security grammars⁴¹ are utilized to establish an analytical blueprint to be contrasted and verified during the fieldwork stage of the research. Subsequently, the chapter sets the frame for the contextual analysis of energy security to be conducted within an interpretivist methodology and intersubjectively oriented research practice grounded in hermeneutics. It concludes by outlining the case selection strategy for the identification of multiple security logics driving energy security agenda in three key cases of the European energy context: Germany, Poland and Ukraine.

ENERGY & SECURITY

ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPTS & EMPTY LABELS

When approaching the analysis of energy security dynamics from a broader perspective, it quickly turns out that the analytical and conceptual tools for doing so are very limited. A number of disciplines deal with this phenomenon - energy studies, public policy, traditional

Understanding Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (Routledge, 2010), 95.

³⁶ Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and beyond,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (2007): 359–60.

³⁷ Thierry Balzacq, *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (Routledge, 2010), 17.

³⁸ Mark B. Salter, “Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11, no. 4 (2008): 321–349.

³⁹ Olaf Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification’: Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change,” *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 40, no. 2 (2012): 235–258; Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security.”

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification.’”

political science focused on the state level policy analysis or different strands of political economy. However, they all have a natural tendency to either largely simplify their respective theoretical and analytical frameworks or to increase the number of predominantly economic indicators incorporated to the definitions of energy security at the most.⁴² Energy security continuously slips away from such simplifications⁴³ and – similarly to the concept of *security* – proves to be rather ambiguous.⁴⁴ In fact, there exist some parallel conceptual dilemmas in relation to the notions of ‘security’ and ‘energy security’ respectively. These dilemmas, when looked upon in a wider perspective, point to the trajectories of re-conceptualization of both phenomena that either intertwine or differ in the ways that bring mutually beneficial analytical insights to the fields of energy studies and security studies.

More specifically, both *security* and *energy security* initially followed similar paths of conceptualization: from the realist-informed definitions towards widening of their respective agendas to include new issues and indicators, ultimately to the point where both notions have been called ‘ambiguous’ catch-all phrases.⁴⁵ Tracing back these similarities is important for two reasons. Firstly, it shows how the wider conceptual security dilemmas and rationales are mirrored in the energy sphere – hence making it a suitable ‘testing ground’ for some of our preconceptions regarding the nature of security issues more broadly. Secondly, since, as opposed to security studies, the practical reformulation of the energy security concept is continuously taking place in its practice, it not only challenges the often assumed primacy of the theoretical constructs over the practical meanings,⁴⁶ but also opens up security analysis to

⁴² Scott Victor Valentine, “The Fuzzy Nature of Energy Security,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security* (Routledge, 2011), 56–73.

⁴³ Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security.”

⁴⁴ *International Energy Security: Common Concept for Energy Producing, Consuming and Transit Countries* (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2015), 10, http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Thematic/International_Energy_Security_2015_en.pdf.

⁴⁵ David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 5–26; *International Energy Security: Common Concept for Energy Producing, Consuming and Transit Countries*, 10.

⁴⁶ Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security.”

new insights.

To start with, the initial conceptualizations of *security* and *energy security* heavily relied on the internal logic of the state and often saw external factors as the major source of insecurity. In the case of *security*, for the most of the 20th century its concept was locked up in the realist-informed understanding,⁴⁷ which equated it with an absence of threat⁴⁸ and bound to the military rationale that saw the international scene as a system of competing, self-reliant state units motivated by national interest.⁴⁹ In comparison, since the initial conceptualizations of energy security derived largely from the energy studies literature,⁵⁰ the ‘security’ aspect of energy was often linked to the global market forces determining energy supply trends within given geopolitical context and its mechanisms.⁵¹ Therefore, in-line with the realist logic of security that perceives security/insecurity as the outcome of states' power struggles within the international system, traditional energy security studies would see energy security/insecurity as an outcome of the inescapable market forces.⁵²

Not surprisingly, in both cases the ‘power over definition’ belonged to the chosen few – statesmen and a narrow circle of theorists respectively. As McSweeney put it in his *Security, identity and interests*:

⁴⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, “Politics among Nations (1948),” *NY et Al: McGraw-Hill*, 1993.

⁴⁸ Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43.

⁴⁹ Kenneth Waltz, “Theory of International Relations,” *Reading, Mass.: Addison-Webley*, 1979, 111–114.

⁵⁰ Dag Harald Claes, “Global Energy Security: Resource Availability, Economic Conditions and Political Constraints,” *Panel: Contextualizing Energy Security and Transition. Concepts, Framing and Empirical Evidence SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference* 9, no. 11.9 (2010): 3.

⁵¹ Didier Houssin, “Security of Energy Supplies in a Global Market,” in *Speech by IEA Director Office of Oil Markets and Emergency Preparedness to 2nd Energy Forum, Prague*, 2007, 4–6; Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, *Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy* (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 2005); Antonio Marquina and Antonio Marquina Barrio, *Energy Security: Visions from Asia and Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, “Introduction: The Militarization of Energy Security,” *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management*, 2009, 2–4; Barry Naughten, “Asia’s Rising Complex Energy Interdependence,” *International Journal of Global Energy Issues* 29, no. 4 (2008): 400–433; Tsutomu Toichi, “Energy Security in Asia and Japanese Policy,” *Asia Pacific Review* 10, no. 1 (2003): 44–51; Michael Wesley, *Energy Security in Asia*, vol. 3 (Routledge, 2007); Daniel Yergin, *Energy Security and Markets* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Press and John Hopkins University Press, 2005); Richard Youngs, “Europe’s External Energy Policy: Between Geopolitics and the Market,” *CEPS Working Documents*, no. 278 (2007).

⁵² Pierre Noël, “Challenging the Myths of Energy Security,” *Financial Times* 10 (2008).

“(...) A nation can only be mobilized for national security in peacetime if the majority of the people identify the state and its enemies as the highest expression of their own personal security and fear. But what drives the security project, and defines its content and appropriate instruments, is the internal logic of the state. In the name of the people, and of a philosophical conception of human nature rooted in a human ideal of liberty, solidarity and order, security was appropriated by the state and operationalized by its theorists and specialist agencies”.⁵³

In a similar way, the conceptualizations of energy security, since often linked to the geopolitical power plays, were appropriated by a narrow circle of analysts working from the limited theoretical perspective. The fact that this trend is still apparent today has been noted in a recent study, which conducted a content analysis of 2502 papers by 5318 authors in the three leading energy journals. The study revealed that the majority of authors had been male, based in North America, having a background in science or engineering, and being affiliated with university or research institute.⁵⁴

This narrowness of conceptual and analytical focus did not go unnoticed and the piling criticisms led to the re-conceptualization attempts within both fields. In the case of *security*, it was the end of the Cold War that enabled other paths of reasoning and led to the ‘broadening’, ‘widening’, ‘sectorization’ and constructivist critique of the traditional security studies agenda. Although as early as in 1952 Wolfers depicted ‘national security’ as an ambiguous symbol,⁵⁵ it was only in the post-Cold War context that the constructivist claim of security meanings emerging in the ‘intersubjective’ processes was voiced. Simultaneously, the narrowly-defined concept of security was subjected to the ‘widening’ (new security dimensions) and ‘deepening’ (from state to human security) moves – both conceptually and in relation to the national policy agenda.⁵⁶ Subsequently, security studies started to incorporate ‘new’ issues such as

⁵³ Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 21. Emphasis added.

⁵⁴ Anthony Louis D’Agostino et al., “What’s the State of Energy Studies Research?: A Content Analysis of Three Leading Journals from 1999 to 2008,” *Energy* 36, no. 1 (2011): 508–519.

⁵⁵ Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (1952): 481–502.

⁵⁶ Karen Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security* (Cambridge Polity, 2007).

environmental degradation, economic well-being, migration or population.⁵⁷

Interestingly, energy security also re-emerged on this ‘new’ security agenda, albeit in a new form – as its traditional conceptual underpinnings similarly began to be questioned. Therefore, the attempts at re-conceptualization of energy security aimed at more inclusive definitions that would incorporate new energy sources, more economic indicators and various ‘qualitative’ aspects. Firstly, energy security started to focus on energy sources other than oil, such as biofuels, nuclear energy or renewables. Secondly, not only a wider range of economic indicators was taken into consideration, but many definitions were broadened to encompass various ‘qualitative’ dimensions of energy security (e.g. sustainability) or went beyond purely economic rationale.⁵⁸ Thirdly, the multiplicity of actors - and consequently meanings - of energy security, was gradually acknowledged, which led to the development of more complex analytical frameworks.⁵⁹

This conceptual stretching led to numerous critiques, which pointed to the resulted analytical challenges and potential practical difficulties within both disciplines. It is worth noticing though that given the opposite orientations of the two fields - with security studies being more theory-oriented and energy studies more policy-oriented - the concerns voiced

⁵⁷ E.g. Monica Tennberg, “Risky Business: Defining the Concept of Environmental Security,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 30, no. 3 (1995): 239–258; Theodore H. Moran, “International Economics and National Security,” *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 5 (1990): 74–90; Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World,” *Bioscience* 43, no. 11 (1993): 752–761; Brad Roberts, “Human Rights and International Security,” *The Washington Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (1990): 65–75; Myron Weiner, “Security, Stability, and International Migration,” *International Security* 17, no. 3 (1992): 91–126.

⁵⁸ E.g. *Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy* (Brussels: European Commission (EC), 2006); Benjamin K. Sovacool and Marilyn A. Brown, “Competing Dimensions of Energy Security: An International Perspective,” *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 35 (2010): 77–108; J. R. Kessels, S. J. A. Bakker, and BJHW Wetzelaer, “Energy Security and the Role of Coal,” 2008, <https://www.ecn.nl/publications/BS/2008/ECN-B--08-010>; Bert Kruyt et al., “Indicators for Energy Security,” *Energy Policy* 37, no. 6 (2009): 2166–2181; *Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Energy* (London: The Stationery Office: UK Department of Trade and Industry, 2007); *Fact Sheet: Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007* (White House, 2007), <http://georgewebush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071219-1.html>; *Factsheet: Increasing Our Energy Security and Confronting Climate Change* (White House, 2008), <http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=24873062-2BF8-454FB7A8-902BD1976383>; Benjamin K. Sovacool and Ishani Mukherjee, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Energy Security: A Synthesized Approach,” *Energy* 36, no. 8 (2011): 5343–5355.

⁵⁹ Benjamin K. Sovacool, *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security* (Routledge, 2010), 2.

implied different sort of ‘remedies’. As further analysis shows, it is the cross-application of these diverse responses that could address the conceptual struggles within the two disciplines most effectively.

When it comes to the notion of security, the criticisms raised over the years were often voiced from the position of defending the theoretical and conceptual rigor in the discipline. It was claimed that utilizing the ‘security’ label for strictly policy purposes runs a risk of distorting its conceptual clarity further, while security analysis becomes increasingly conducted for the political rather than scientific goals.⁶⁰ Such stances were echoed later, when some scholars expressed their discontent with the main focus being kept on redefining policy agendas of nation-states rather than on the concept of security itself.⁶¹ Others pointed to a straightforward challenge to the traditional vision of the referent object of security caused by such redefinitions.⁶²

The responses to the above dilemmas varied since the early 1990-ties, and included calls for maintaining an analytical focus on the military and political dimension of security, adhering to the standard canons of scientific research,⁶³ ⁶⁴ or establishing a common ground for the diversity of new understandings of security. It was claimed, that such a common ground could be established by the identification of a number of questions regarding security⁶⁵ and the use of Oppenheim’s criteria for the explication of concepts⁶⁶ as a toolbox for various conceptualizations.⁶⁷

⁶⁰ Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 213.

⁶¹ Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” 5.

⁶² Keith Krause, “Critical Theory and Security Studies The Research Programme of Critical Security Studies,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 33, no. 3 (1998): 309; Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 46.

⁶³ E.g. ‘careful and consistent use of terms’, ‘unbiased measurement of critical concepts’;

⁶⁴ Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” 223.

⁶⁵ Security for whom? Security for which values? How much security? From what threats? By what means? At what cost? In what time period? (Baldwin: 1997, pp. 12-17)

⁶⁶ Operationalization, definitional connections, factual connections, not precluding empirical investigation, ordinary language;

⁶⁷ Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” 7.

However, these suggestions did not rise to the theoretical expectations of the discipline. Disentangling the analysis of security from its empirical and normative dimensions risked becoming a context-detached exercise in conceptualization, where any established conceptual clarifications would inevitably remain *definitional givens*. In other words, the analysis could resemble ‘scaling’ of the security concept along the ‘widening/deepening spectrum’ – but with no deeper insight of how the resulted definitions reflect contextual security practices and understandings. Consequently, even if redefining *security* on some common grounds was possible, its practice could easily slip away from such definitions – making the concept look increasingly like an empty label. Therefore, security scholars faced a certain dilemma, as they could either “... follow critical security studies approach, (...) stand outside the state-centric security definition, offer its critique, denaturalize existing discourses of security and open up space for alternative definitions; or to take realist concept seriously and to examine its dynamics”.⁶⁸ Given the limitations of the latter approach in accounting for the nuances of contemporary security issues, a number of critical security scholars⁶⁹ chose to focus on the ‘background assumptions and discourses belonging to a culture from which threats are defined’⁷⁰ to allow for the new ways of reasoning and a better contextualization of analysis. Following the rationale that ‘we learn to know the meaning of security through the practices which embody a particular interpretation of it’,⁷¹ the critical research agenda began to challenge the state-centric traditional definitions of security by focusing on its context-dependent discourse and practice.

The re-definition of energy security – due to its high policy standing – followed an

⁶⁸ Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 103.

⁶⁹ E.g. David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Study of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Jutta Weldes et al., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Jef Huysmans, Andrew Dobson, and Raia Prokhovnik, *The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency* (London: Routledge, 2006).

⁷⁰ Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 102.

⁷¹ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 21.

entirely different trajectory. Energy studies incorporated diverse aspects of the energy security rationale that already existed within the mainstream policy approaches, and since the former often acquired meaning through a ‘series of assumptions regarding the linkage between growth, sustenance and the environment’,⁷² the resulted definitions broadened the scope of conceptual stances within the discipline. However, this process was not unproblematic either, as energy security became a rather elusive concept that started to function as an ‘umbrella term’ for heterogeneous scales, frames and policies.⁷³ Moreover, neither the various working definitions and indicators of energy security provided for the broader understanding of this phenomenon, nor the major pieces of legislation⁷⁴ answered the conceptual dilemma of ‘*what does energy security mean?*’.⁷⁵ As Valentine put it:

“Some analysts have attempted to address the fuzzy nature of energy security by creating aggregate indices that conflate a number of different energy security criteria. Unfortunately, approaching energy security analysis through the application of multiple indicators does not lead to the “broader understanding” that some colleagues purport; rather, adding more indicators to an energy security assessment simply serves to enhance intellectual discord by introducing contentious debate over the weighting of multiple indicators and inveigling academic tantrums over criteria that was unfairly omitted or thoughtlessly added to the assessment. Comprehensive indices or methodologies for measuring energy security merely represent more complex mobilization of ideological bias.”⁷⁶

It seems then, that the respective attempts of re-conceptualizations of ‘security’ and ‘energy security’ respectively appeared problematic, yet for different reasons. The former sought to

⁷² Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security.”

⁷³ Ibid., 126; Benjamin K. Sovacool and Tai Wei Lim, “Conclusion: Exploring the Contested and Convergent Nature of Energy Security,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security* (Routledge, 2011), 414.

⁷⁴ Christian Egenhofer et al., ‘European Energy Security: What Should It Mean? What To Do?’, vol. Working Paper no.23 (European Security Forum, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006); Paul Gallis, ‘NATO and Energy Security’, in *Congressional Research Service Report RS22409*, 2006, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22409.pdf>; Gal Luft, ‘Energy Security: What Does It Really Mean?’, in *Energy Security and Security Policy: NATO and the Role of International Security Actors in Achieving Energy Security*. (Oberammergau: NATO School, 2007); Sebastian Mallaby, ‘What Energy Security Really Means’, *Washington Post* 3 (2006),

http://50.57.111.125/revenuewatch_archive/training/Mallaby%20-%20What%20Energy%20Security%20really%20means.doc; Pierre Noël, ‘Is Energy Security a Political, Military or Market Problem?’, *Financial Times*, 17 January 2008; Daniel Yergin, ‘What Does “Energy Security” Really Mean’, *Wall Street Journal* 11 (2006): A12.

⁷⁵ Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security,” 127.

⁷⁶ Valentine, “The Fuzzy Nature of Energy Security,” 56.

approach empirical reality in a top-down manner (from *a priori* theoretical constructs to definitions), whereas the latter held highly empirical focus yet did not sufficiently contextualize the analysis (hence the criticisms regarding the inadequacy of the chosen indicators). As a result, on the one hand, there emerged fears in both disciplines that the concepts would be stretched endlessly and ultimately lose their meaning and significance. On the other hand, the established conceptualizations were criticized either for being ‘definitional givens’ or for reflecting ideological biases – with both disciplines failing to bring about a greater understanding of the studied phenomena.

Arguably, however, the very differences in focus between critical security studies and the energy security field also signify, that the two hold each other’s analytical keys to their respective conceptual dilemmas. Whereas critical security studies provide theoretical insights and an analytical toolbox developed in the discipline’s own search for the broader approach to security analysis, the practice-oriented field of energy security opens up the analysis to the new lines of reasoning about security. Energy studies struggle with the conceptualization of energy security – as its contextual dynamics is ‘marked by such a diversity of uses and understandings that it poses a difficulty of establishing any categorical or political boundaries to delineate it’.⁷⁷ The fact that the practical reformulations of the energy security concept take place in the ‘liminal’ sphere between its theory, policy and practice,⁷⁸ makes this field more attuned to serve as an analytical testing ground for tracing the variety of mechanisms of conceptual formation, legitimation and proliferation of security issues more broadly. The question of ‘how certain ideas about security develop, enter the realm of public policy, and become dominant and legitimated in public discourses’, whereas other do not,⁷⁹ is one of security studies’ most important, yet least understood ones to date. The multidimensional sphere of energy security

⁷⁷ Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security.”

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *On Security* (Columbia University Press, 1995).

poses a challenge to security studies' drives aimed at establishing an 'essence' of security.⁸⁰ Simultaneously, it allows to approach from a different angle the discipline's dominant rationale regarding the theorization of security by exploring the liminality of the policy/theory sphere. And it is in this sphere that the multiplicity of actors, understandings, definitions and practices of energy security are formed and interact. Attaching the very tangible aspect of 'energy' (in the form of energy resources, their supply and use) to 'security' (dimensions and practices), means that both the broadening moves (incorporation of various 'new' dimensions to energy security definitions by actors on the ground) and the deepening moves (from states and large energy companies to smaller sub-state collectives and individual consumers), happen organically in everyday practice of energy security. Consequently, the multiplicity of energy sources and actors who utilize them means that neither the expert community has a monopoly on defining the notion of energy security nor are the current energy systems solely homogenous centralized entities in the hands of nation states and energy companies. In fact, the discrepancy in basic beliefs and attitudes towards energy security between energy consumers and energy experts, as well as between energy 'thinkers' (such as university experts and civil society stakeholders) and energy 'doers' (such as businesspersons and government officials), have been highlighted by a number of studies.⁸¹ It is also for this reason that the analysis and definitions of energy security that do not pay sufficient attention to contexts in which energy policies are shaped and various conceptualizations formed prove unsatisfactory.⁸² And it is at this point that critical security studies can aid contextual analysis of energy security – as they not only allow for the adoption of more inclusive analytical frameworks, but also problematize the very phenomenon of 'security' – regarding its logics, practices and mechanisms of diffusion and operation. As such,

⁸⁰ Ciută, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security."

⁸¹ E.g. Stephen Ansolabehere and David M. Konisky, "Public Attitudes toward Construction of New Power Plants," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2009.

⁸² Valentine, "The Fuzzy Nature of Energy Security"; Lynne Chester, "Conceptualising Energy Security and Making Explicit Its Polysemic Nature," *Energy Policy* 38, no. 2 (2010): 887–895; Ciută, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security."

whereas critical approaches to security provide means for unpacking some 'boxed' understandings and inclusion of other perspectives to the contextual analysis of energy security, energy security provides an analytical ground, where the preconceptions regarding the essence of security can be tested in the liminal sphere between its theory, policy and practice.

In search of more precise analytical tools and insights for the contextual analysis of energy security, the next section turns to the theoretical framework that sparked the debate on the contextual analysis of security issues' construction – the Copenhagen School securitization theory. This framework has been profoundly challenged since its establishment – with the debate moving onto an exploration of other approaches to the contextual analysis of security and other security logics.⁸³ However, teasing out some of its inherent theoretical tensions, especially its problematic single logic approach and the resulted problems with accounting for context, provides much insight into the possible direction in which contextual analysis of energy security should be heading.

CONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY: THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL FRAMEWORK

Copenhagen School & the practice of security

The Copenhagen School framework constituted a genuine advance in security theory and its relative success meant that the theory had often been referred to as a shorthand for the construction of security.⁸⁴ If some voices within critical security studies suggested focusing on how 'security is *used*... [and] examine it as a field of practices, including how it typically works',⁸⁵ the CS attempted to account for the *process* of security issues' construction. That was supposed to be achieved by focusing on the mechanisms through which security, which 'is

⁸³ E.g. Ciută, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security"; Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change"; Balzacq, "Contesting Security"; Doty, "Immigration and the Politics of Security."

⁸⁴ Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 563–587.

⁸⁵ Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 103.

typically about survival and about an existential threat to a particular object',⁸⁶ enters the national policy agenda in relation to diverse issues through the 'speech act' mechanism.⁸⁷ As such, it sought to tease out a major tension between traditional and critical approaches to security, by accommodating the realist-informed understanding of security focused on 'existential threats' with the critical claim of social constructedness of security issues - within a single theoretical framework.⁸⁸ Moreover, in addition to answering the 'who, what, where and how' of security, it allowed for the potentially new interpretations of what security actually *means*.⁸⁹ It also brought a 'greater nuance to constructivist argument that security is not an objective condition but an outcome of a specific kind of social process, susceptible to criticism and change'.⁹⁰

Despite its key insights, CS securitization theory has been extensively criticized on the conceptual, theoretical and normative grounds.⁹¹ The analysis here specifically focuses on two interconnected criticisms of the theory – one related to framework's ability to account for context,⁹² and the other, to its single security logic approach.⁹³ The 'contextual' problem category is particularly important to consider as, like Ciută noticed, it embraces the normative, epistemological and conceptual dilemmas of the framework 'at the moment when securitisation

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, *Security*.

⁸⁸ Felix Ciută, "Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitization Theory," *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (2009): 306.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 103.

⁹¹ Claudia Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7, no. 4 (2004): 388–413; Claudia Aradau, "The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words: Risk and Pity in the Securitisation of Human Trafficking," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 33, no. 2 (2004): 251–277; Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 171–201; Balzacq, *Securitization Theory*; Lene Hansen, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 29 (June 2000): 285–306; Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization"; Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (2003): 511–531; McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security"; Bill McSweeney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School," *Review of International Studies* 22, no. 1 (1996): 81–93.

⁹² Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization"; McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security"; Ciută, "Security and the Problem of Context."

⁹³ Doty, "Immigration and the Politics of Security"; Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change." Ibid.

theory delivers its answer to the primordial question... *what is security?*'.⁹⁴ Tracing the roots of both of the above problems aids the search for an adequate approach to the contextual analysis of energy security.

Copenhagen School & the problem of context

To start with, securitization theory contextualizes at two levels: process-specific and region – specific. The former relates to the analysis of the speech act and its accompanying facilitating conditions that determine which issues are securitized and how different actors act and interact with their audience. The latter combines the cross-sectoral dynamics of security with a regional level of analysis – a result of which is the regional security complex theory.⁹⁵ However, this two-level contextualization does not solve the problem of context within the framework, which is a more profound one and has been depicted by a number of scholars from different angles.

McDonald, for example, distinguished three characteristics of the framework's theoretical design that have problematic implications for context. Firstly, the *form* of the act of constructing security was defined narrowly, with the focus on the speech of dominant actors. Secondly, the *context* of the act was defined narrowly, with the focus only on the moment of intervention. And thirdly, the *nature* of the act was defined solely in terms of the designation of threats.⁹⁶ The respective limitations of these shortcomings imply that non-discursive representations and voices of less empowered actors are entirely excluded from the analysis, whereas 'the potential for security to be constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations is not addressed' at all.⁹⁷ Therefore, as Wilkinson argued: "Not

⁹⁴ Ciută, "Security and the Problem of Context," 314. Emphasis added.

⁹⁵ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, vol. 91 (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁹⁶ McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," 563.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

only is the securitization framework likely to produce a version of events that has been “edited” to ensure chronological order and a linear and step-wise progression (from actor to speech-act to audience to outcome), but the final analysis is likely to erase the local knowledge that can be generated by fieldwork even if empirical details are included”.⁹⁸ Moreover, the preoccupation with existential threats ‘ignores the central importance of the way in which security - as a normative goal or expression of core values - is understood in particular contexts’.⁹⁹ In this light – a mere consideration of the ‘facilitating conditions’ present at the moment of the ‘speech act’ is insufficient to contextualize the analysis.¹⁰⁰ The latter point, which seems to lie at the core of the CS’s problem with context, was elaborated further by Ciută in his ‘hermeneutical critique’ of the framework.¹⁰¹ The critique highlighted that the default definition of ‘security’ within the CS theory is dual and contradictory: firstly, ‘discursive’ (security as a speech act), and secondly equated with ‘survival in the face of existential threats’.¹⁰² Moreover, these two definitions are put in the hierarchy that favors the second understanding of security and, as a result, eliminates contextualization from the CS framework.¹⁰³ From the more practical side, such hierarchical relation ‘locks-in the *meaning* of security and insulates it from conceptual variation or practical reformulation’.¹⁰⁴

The roots of this dilemma seem to go back to the Copenhagen School’s initial argument that security studies should adopt an understanding of the ‘duality’ of security - a combination of state security concerned with *sovereignty* and societal security concerned with *identity*.¹⁰⁵ This dual approach proves problematic once its elements become uneven, as downplaying the ‘societal’ aspect of security ultimately means that in the CS security acquires meaning only as

⁹⁸ Wilkinson, “The Limits of Spoken Words: From Meta-Narratives to Experiences of Security,” 96.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” 563.

¹⁰¹ Ciută, “Security and the Problem of Context.”

¹⁰² Ibid., 306–15.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 307.

¹⁰⁵ Ole Wæver et al., ‘Identity Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe.’ 1993, 25.

long as it is fixed in a Schmittian *logic* based on exclusion and exception.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, securitization theory seems to be torn between its aim to establish the ‘essence’ of security, and its claim that security is ‘what actors make of it’.¹⁰⁷ The impossibility of eliminating this contradiction results in both the logic of security and its definition remaining relatively ‘fixed’ and politically conservative in the Copenhagen School’s approach.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, this ‘fixedness’ seems to translate into an indirect assumption that security has an unchanging essence, which in turn largely explains why CS attempts to unproblematically apply its framework to various contexts, without exploring *how* and *why* the instances of securitization could have taken place in these contexts in the first place. In Wæver’s view, the application of the same logic to different areas meant that while remaining true to the classical meaning of security we could ‘show how these old elements operate in new ways and new places’.¹⁰⁹ This kind of inquiry runs contrary to a broader understanding of the inter-subjective processes through which security is constructed in different contexts. Moreover, as Doty noticed, such approach implies that the logic of securitization is the same in all realms of security, and that this is the only logic worth considering – an assumption that would eliminate from analysis ‘...other important logics which do not fit within the classical security logic but might be operative’.¹¹⁰ As Nunes pointed out, ‘the assumption of an exclusionary, totalizing or violent logic of security can be seen as an essentialization and a moment of closure’ whereas:

“To be faithful to itself, the politicization of security would need to recognize that there is nothing natural or necessary about security – and that security as a paradigm of thought or a register of meaning is also a construction that depends upon its reproduction and performance through practice. The exclusionary and violent meanings that have been attached to security are themselves the result of social and historical processes, and can thus be changed”.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” 579.

¹⁰⁷ Ciută, “Security and the Problem of Context,” 303.

¹⁰⁸ Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security,” 125; McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” 579.

¹⁰⁹ Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, 51.

¹¹⁰ Doty, “Immigration and the Politics of Security,” 79–80.

¹¹¹ João Nunes, “Reclaiming the Political: Emancipation and Critique in Security Studies,” *Security Dialogue* 43, no. 4 (2012): 350.

Yet, as Nunes suggests, this tendency to perceive security as inherently linked to exclusion, totalization or violence is widespread in the critical security studies, with e.g. Aradau writing about ‘the exclusionary logic of security’ that upholds and legitimizes ‘forms of domination’,¹¹² or Van Munster describing ‘the logic of security’ as one based on ‘political organization on the exclusionary basis of fear’.¹¹³

To Balzacq, the discussion whether security has a ‘logic’, or none, or multiple ones that depend on context, traces back to a choice between the critical and traditional approaches to security, between ‘security as a given’ and ‘security as a construct’, and between security that is immutable and security that is variable.¹¹⁴ Some scholars see the evidence for the existence of security logic in a specific social order that is produced by it¹¹⁵ - yet, there is no unanimous stance within the discipline, whether such logic/s exist at all. However, the fact that establishing the Copenhagen School securitization framework upon a single logic of exclusion and exception vastly limited its ability to account for the contextual dynamics of security issues’ construction, hints at the different direction of analysis. Especially, that further research on securitization highlights the diversity of security logics at play.

For example, Trombetta in her analysis of securitization of the environment showed that the process of securitization in the environmental realm does not follow a single logic: ‘The problem is that the approach suggested by the CS tends to essentialize a specific logic of security and the practices associated with it. This is problematic because the possibility of exploring any transformation in the logic and practices of security is precluded, and this is

¹¹² Claudia Aradau, *Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 72.

¹¹³ Rens Van Munster, “Review Essay: Security on a Shoestring: A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Critical Schools of Security in Europe,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 42, no. 2 (2007): 239.

¹¹⁴ Balzacq, “Contesting Security.”

¹¹⁵ Jef Huysmans, “Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (1998): 226–255.

particularly problematic within the environmental sector'.¹¹⁶ Therefore, the environmental sector transforms existing security practices and this process is a part of a '...a broader re-articulation of the spaces in which a *logic of security* based on *emergency and contingency* is legitimated and those in which a *logic of prevention and management* prevails'.¹¹⁷ Therefore, as she argues: "(...) the transformation of an issue into a security issue can follow different modalities and different logics, which eschew the confrontational logic of the national security model suggested by the [Copenhagen] School. Through the appeal to security, other logics, which characterize different contexts, can be brought into existence and new actors can gain relevance in security policies."¹¹⁸ Trombetta's study illustrates Doty's point about the possibility of multiple security logics operating in different security areas, and consequently stresses that contextual analysis of security and its mechanisms should be able to account for them. However, although Trombetta argues that the securitization of environmental issues can reorient security logics and practices¹¹⁹, by taking the CS securitization framework as a primary point of reference, she similarly favors discursive mechanisms of security issues' construction. As she points out: 'In the literature there is a debate about whether and how security language transforms the method of dealing with an issue, (...) but there is little on the reverse process or on the implications of using environmental language for the definition and governance of security'.¹²⁰ Therefore, Trombetta considers how 'by securitizing nontraditional sectors, alternative security logics are evoked and practices associated with securitization are challenged and transformed'.¹²¹ As such, a rather linear progression is indicated: from the discursive securitizing moves towards the transformation of the security practice. Although energy

¹¹⁶ Maria Julia Trombetta, "Rethinking the Securitization of Environment: Old Beliefs, New Insights," in *Understanding Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (Routledge, 2010), 148.

¹¹⁷ Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change," 585. Emphases added.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 589.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 587.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 589.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 585.

security similarly to environmental security might be seen as a ‘total’ field, its highly practice-oriented character warrants an analytical approach that would employ even ‘thicker’ contextualism. Such analysis would be more likely to avoid the pitfalls of the CS approach, as it would allow for the possibility that it is the practice itself that can transform the meanings, understandings and logics of security. Therefore, while acknowledging the criticisms of the CS, which among other things, call for the inclusion of multiple meanings, actors, mechanisms and logics into the analytical approach, this thesis does not simply depart from the critique of the framework, but rather utilizes the latter for a more profound operationalization of its contextual approach to energy security analysis.

The CS securitization accurately stresses the social constructedness of security issues and the fact that they might ‘come about’ via diverse processes and mechanisms. It is also useful in highlighting the importance of ‘facilitating factors’ and context in the analysis. Despite this, its conceptual scaffolding that ultimately relies upon a single security logic, limits its analytical purchase. Could then some insights of the CS framework be incorporated to the contextual analysis of energy security? To answer the above question, the following sections look at some attempts of practical reformulations of securitization theory as well as at some alternative approaches to security analysis.

Rethinking the Copenhagen School framework

McSweeney noted that the CS framework’s focus on the state’s political elites was justified on the methodological rather than substantive grounds as ‘to pursue individual security as a subject in its own right would take one deeply into the realms of politics, psychology and sociology’.¹²² Indeed, the criticisms of the framework that attempted to embrace the diversity

¹²² Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Hemel Hempstead, 1991), 324; McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 57.

of situated actors and contextual factors within the analysis of security more effectively, focused on establishing more 'sociological' approaches to securitization.

The most prominent example here is Balzacq's appropriation of the framework. Noticing that the role of the 'speech act' led to under-theorization of audience in the CS theory and diminished its ability to account for the construction of security as an inter-subjective endeavor, Balzacq articulated a sociological theory of securitization that focuses on strategic action rather than discourse.¹²³ As such, he approached securitization as a more complex intersubjective process that could be 'discursive and non-discursive, intentional and non-intentional, performative, but not an *act in itself*'.¹²⁴ The 'sociological' reformulation of the theory made a number of valid points. It highlighted how the focus on 'illocutionary' led CS to skirt the distinctive role of audience, how the emphasis on textualism became an obstacle in accounting for context, how the CS framework overstated the 'rule-governed' use of concepts (indicating that these can often be rule-altering) and, most importantly, how securitization should be rather seen as *practice*.¹²⁵ However, whereas the 'sociological' approach resigned completely from the innovative parts of the CS framework (role of the speech act and the structured mechanism of security construction), it addressed the CS problems mostly by imposing philosophical solutions. As a result, the sociological reformulation of the securitization theory seems not only unconvincing, but also diverges from the original framework so much, that it raises the question why not to propose a looser approach geared on the contextual construction of security instead. More specifically, starting with the CS securitization, Balzacq sought to tease out the tension between 'security as a speech act' and 'security as survival in the face of existential threats' by altering the function of the first. However, even with the proposed 'performatives' it is unclear how the constructivist claim that

¹²³ Balzacq, *Securitization Theory*; McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security."

¹²⁴ Balzacq, *Securitization Theory*.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

‘security is what actors make of it’ would be practically accounted for, especially that the ‘sociological’ framework – similarly to the CS approach – falls into the trap of defining security mainly in the realist notion of threats. Despite making a distinction between ‘institutional’ (products of communicative relations between agents) and ‘brute’ (hazards to human life) threats, Balzacq, similarly to Waeber, defines securitization as being related to ‘the critical vulnerability of a referent object (...) investing the referent subject with such an unprecedented aura of threatening complexion that policy must be implemented ‘immediately’.¹²⁶ Therefore, similarly to the CS securitization framework, the understanding of security within the ‘sociological’ approach is defined a priori to analysis and then sought among policies, discourses and practices of the situated actors.

It might be then the case that the inherent conceptual tensions within the CS framework are too problematic to be successfully worked out – even within the most inclusive of approaches. One possibility would be to see the securitization framework as one of the analytical tools for uncovering a certain type of security dynamics – a state-centric one that is geared on threats and confrontation. Guzzini,¹²⁷ for instance, saw the CS framework as just one of the mechanisms of security issues’ construction. Drawing on Elster’s definition of security mechanisms,¹²⁸ he recognized that securitization framework could be understood as one of the causal mechanisms at play.¹²⁹ The causality was understood here in a non-positivist manner as such mechanisms could be ‘contingent in their prompting or indeterminate in their effect’ and highly dependent upon history and ‘circles of recognition’ for the collective identities of a country.¹³⁰ This stance seems to be in line with the arguments about the potential multiplicity

¹²⁶ Ibid., 5.

¹²⁷ Stefano Guzzini, “Securitization as a Causal Mechanism,” *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (2011): 329–341.

¹²⁸ Jon Elster, “3. A Plea for Mechanisms,” *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, 1998, 45; Jon Elster, *Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 36.

¹²⁹ Guzzini, “Securitization as a Causal Mechanism,” 5.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

of security logics. It also points to the importance of context, as it states that it is the congruence of contextual factors that are decisive for the securitizations to occur.¹³¹ However, if we want to broaden our analysis of security to the point where the multiplicity of such mechanisms could be accounted for, then an even more accommodating and contextualized approach is needed.

Some hints could be obtained here from some critical engagements with the CS securitization framework that tackled, among others, its contextual dilemma. Three of such re-engagements are particularly worth considering here. Firstly, it was argued that the analysis of securitization should embrace its “embeddedness” as “security articulations need to be related to their broader discursive contexts from which both the securitizing actor and the performative force of the articulated speech act/text gain the power”.¹³² Secondly, as Salter pointed out, the “setting” of a securitization should be taken into account, since the latter “reflects the complex constitution of social and political communities and may be successful and unsuccessful to different degrees, in different settings, within the same issue area and across issues”.¹³³ Thirdly, Balzacq distinguished between two types of context in relation to securitization - proximate context and distal context.¹³⁴ Whereas the first type applied to the setting of a securitizing move, the distal context referred to the broader socio-cultural context in which securitizing moves were embedded, for example, matters of social class and ethnicity, regional and cultural settings, and the sites of discourse.¹³⁵ Certainly, a proper consideration of such socio-cultural factors would be crucial to open-up the analysis and, as Huysmans previously noticed, a “cultural-historical interpretation of the rhetorical structure would reduce a tendency to universalise a specific logic of security”.¹³⁶

¹³¹ Guzzini, “Securitization as a Causal Mechanism.”

¹³² Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization,” 359–60.


¹³³ Salter, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 324.

¹³⁴ Balzacq, *Securitization Theory*, 17.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Jef Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 4 (1998): 501.

All of the above insights should be incorporated into the analytical framework. The contextual approach should embrace not only the socio-cultural background, but also the level of ‘embeddedness’ of security mechanisms and pay attention to the ‘setting’/‘constellation of actors’ within which such mechanisms play out. Moreover, since it is not possible to evaluate which of these elements would carry more weight a priori to analysis, they should be seen rather in a relational and intersubjective manner (See Graph 1).



Graph 1: The proposed operationalization of context.

On the one hand, approaching context in such way would mean that the specific socio-political conditions might enable or hinder certain security rationales – including mainstream and marginal definitions, policy approaches and debates. On the other hand, since these rationales interact and compete in the public sphere via diverse mechanisms and within shifting constellations of actors, they ultimately have the power to influence the very socio-political factors from which they arise. The intersubjectivity of context would be then sought in this in-between sphere of cross-interaction. Such an analytical stance would also ease the way in which to maneuver between the theory and practice of security. As Wilkinson pointed out:

“...consideration of the distal context of securitizing moves is vital if we are to avoid simply replicating the normative understandings of security inherent in theoretical approaches and instead uncover local understandings of security and how they are created. This is largely the domain of ‘local knowledge’ that is, in contrast to so-called ‘expert knowledge’, experimental, context-specific, tacit, everyday and practice-based”.¹³⁷

Therefore, the aim here is not “about challenging scholars to choose between either unhesitatingly imposing their theories upon other people or utterly deconstructing them”, but rather that local understandings constitute “a corpus of knowledge and experience that might inform our own”.¹³⁸ Indeed, one of the very critiques of the CS grounded in hermeneutics proposed to focus on the contextual meaning of security, while recognizing the embodiment of security in the understandings of theorists and their subjects alike.¹³⁹ Ultimately, as it was put: “The construction of security must (...) be understood as practice (whose result is the meaning of security) that contextually constitutes other practices (thereby known as security policies), which contribute themselves to the continuous construction, sedimentation, and re-negotiation of *what security means*”.¹⁴⁰

An intersubjective operationalization of context makes the uncovering of this ‘local knowledge’ - and its interaction with the ‘expert knowledge’ - more viable and beneficial, as it is the very dynamics of security mechanisms operating within given constellation against the background conditions that can fully feed in security analysis with a wider empirical focus. Ultimately, to analyze context would mean to analyze the very interaction of the competing practices and discourses of security, which might be rooted in theoretical constructs and local understandings alike. It is to give voice to diverse actors and – having in mind their relative standing in a given constellation and local factors that shaped their rationale – to trace the

¹³⁷ Wilkinson, “The Limits of Spoken Words: From Meta-Narratives to Experiences of Security,” 99.

¹³⁸ Alexandra Kent, “Reconfiguring Security: Buddhism and Moral Legitimacy in Cambodia,” *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 3 (2006): 347.

¹³⁹ Ciută, “Security and the Problem of Context,” 304.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 309. Emphasis added.

dynamics of their discourse and practice vis-à-vis other discourses and practices, which enter that interaction.

Contextual analysis understood as such, would enable to sketch the broad picture of the fluid security dynamics in the given region and to shed light not only on the mainstream agendas, but also on the alternative voices, which are currently of a lesser scope and influence. It would aid in explaining the current ‘state of affairs’, but also point to the existing linkages and emerging approaches that might change such dynamics in the near future. Crucially, such approach seems to be also the best analytical fit for the contextual analysis of the liminal energy security phenomenon.

BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Implications for energy security analysis

In the field of energy security, where established definitions continuously clash with actors’ understandings and highlight the problematic relationship between energy security theory and practice as well as question both ‘...their separation and the usually assumed primacy of theoretical constructs over colloquial usage’,¹⁴¹ tracing the dynamics of security issues emerging from these contextual interactions becomes possible. As it embraces a number of sources (oil/gas, nuclear, renewables) and dimensions, which touch upon diverse security aspects in a cross-sectoral manner (political, economic, environmental and social), and which operate according to diverse logics in the ‘liminal’ sphere between theory, practice and policy¹⁴² – energy security can open up the analytical space to alternative approaches. Since the concept of energy security escapes any established categorizations, its analysis might also address a number of dilemmas in the contemporary security studies: the discipline’s dominant rationale

¹⁴¹ Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security,” 127–29.

¹⁴² Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security.”

regarding theorization of security, the liminality of the policy/theory sphere and the mechanisms behind the rise and legitimization of security issues.

Moreover, whereas some of the critiques of the CS theory strongly suggested that an alternative approach to contextual security analysis is needed, energy security additionally challenges the CS framework. Firstly, it questions the sectoral design of the securitization approach, as energy that permeates and upholds all sectors of activity cannot be confined to a single 'economic sector'. As Schumacher noticed already in the late 1970-ties "...energy is not just another commodity, but the precondition of all commodities, a basic factor equal with air, water and earth".¹⁴³ As such, it escapes both the simplified attempts of its conceptualization and sectorization. Secondly, although actors indeed often 'speak security', the sphere of energy, similarly to the analysis of securitization of climate and environment,¹⁴⁴ shows a great multiplicity of 'securitizing' actors. The latter include political actors and state bureaucrats, but also media, civil society, academia, 'green energy' propagators or various experts and analysts. Lastly, whereas the above points make CS's intrinsic problem of context even more explicit, energy sphere additionally questions securitization framework's conceptual design, which was built upon a single socio-political logic and the rhetorical structure linked to the survival rationale.

As further argument shows in detail, there are multiple security logics operating in the energy sphere. The liminality of energy security implies that these logics reflect an entire security dynamics of the intersubjective contexts from which they arise - from diverse 'distal factors', through the constellation of various actors, to mechanisms that they embrace to reach the mainstream debate and policy agenda. Hence, since 'even inductivists start from somewhere',¹⁴⁵ streamlining an analytical lens to focus primarily on these logics in approaching

¹⁴³ Geoffrey Kirk, *Schumacher on Energy: Speeches and Writings of E. F. Schumacher* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977).

¹⁴⁴ Corry, "Securitisation and 'riskification,'" 249; Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change."

¹⁴⁵ Corry, "Securitisation and 'riskification,'" 241.

empirical contexts might be the best strategy for sharpening the analysis. Considering that both practices of security and its conceptual understandings cluster around - and operate within - certain security logics,¹⁴⁶ would allow not only to uncover contextual meanings of security vis-à-vis its practice that corresponds to these logics, but also to analyze the interaction between different security logics themselves. Therefore, following the critique of the CS framework, the opening-up of the analytical agenda to focus on logics other than the ‘logic of emergency’,¹⁴⁷ would be a good starting point for research. Such move would simultaneously avoid locking the meaning of security into an essentialized notion. The next sections focus on fine-tuning this analytical approach.

Security & its logics

The logics of security might certainly differ across time, across contexts as well as across issue areas. As Fierke noted:

'...security is always political, defined in historical context and redefined as contexts change.(...) But context itself can be bounded in different ways.(...) [Therefore] On the one hand the logic we associate with Cold War security was not constant, even within this period, but continually transformed in response to political events. On the other hand, the Cold War can be embedded in a longer historical pattern constituting the primacy of forceful interactions between states, as distinct from the shift since its end to the relationship between state and non-state actors'.¹⁴⁸

Fierke's depiction of security dynamics during the Cold War is in line with the intersubjective approach to contexts. She points to socio-political and historical background ('distal context'), 'embeddedness' of security patterns within the background factors as well as to the specific constellation of state actors that determined the dynamics of these security patterns at the time. Simultaneously, the possibility of the existence of several security logics during the Cold War

¹⁴⁶ Ciută, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security."

¹⁴⁷ Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Crossroads of Death," *The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 3–24; Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change"; Ciută, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security."

¹⁴⁸ Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 35. Emphasis added.

is acknowledged, as she suggests that they could resurface on the policy arena at different times, yet it is the state-centric realist logic that largely prevailed in the long term. As the Cold War came to an end, some non-state actors became more prominent and their engagement transformed the dynamics of security. It is in the post-Cold War period that 'new' security issues were given more attention and analysts noticed that the security rationale emerging across different issue areas often has little to do with the realist logic, which was typical for the foregone era. The critical re-engagements focused then on the processes of '... contextual meaning-production rather than [on] carbon-copying a singular and conventional logic of security onto reality'.¹⁴⁹

Similarly to the contemporary studies, which show the variation and mutation of security logics among 'new' security issues,¹⁵⁰ some conceptual analysis hinted at a multiplicity of security logics in the energy sector.¹⁵¹ However, as Balzacq noticed '...before we start enumerating the number of logics that would underpin security, a basic, that is, preliminary inquiry has to be undertaken: what do we mean when we say that security has “a” logic?’¹⁵² Despite under-specification of the concept in the literature, some scholars hint at its possible characteristics. According to Huysmans, the logic of security is 'an ensemble of rules that is immanent to security practice and that defines the practice in its specificity'.¹⁵³ This understanding of the security logic as parasitic upon security practices is further undertaken by Balzacq, for whom 'the logic of security is always already the logic of a concept as expressed by, or engraved in various practices'.¹⁵⁴ Balzacq delineates two constitutive features of the “logic of security practices”: the “rule or grammar of the practice,” and the “conditions which

¹⁴⁹ Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification,’” 241.

¹⁵⁰ E.g. Trombetta, “Environmental Security and Climate Change.”

¹⁵¹ Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security.”

¹⁵² Balzacq, “Contesting Security.”

¹⁵³ Huysmans, “Security! What Do You Mean?,” 232.

¹⁵⁴ Balzacq, “Contesting Security.”

make the practice both possible and vulnerable”.¹⁵⁵ In this light, the realist-informed understanding of the security logic would indicate that ‘...military rules inform the characteristic grammar of security practices and the concept of “existential threats” provides the background condition, which enables the different components of security practices to operate in a distinctive way’.¹⁵⁶ However, whereas Balzacq’s first criterion could be a good indicator for distinguishing different security logics, it seems that his notion of ‘background conditions’ is, similarly to the CS, defined rather narrowly. In the example given, equally important as the existence of ‘existential threats’ are factors, which determine that the latter are considered as such, and that certain actors can act upon this recognition. The uncovering of these factors would require a more profound inquiry into security contexts, which brings us back to the shortcomings of the securitization approach. What could be derived from the above is that the ‘rules or grammar of the practice’ together with the widely defined contextual conditions, which either favor or inhibit given security practices, could be seen as two thresholds against which the security logics could be identified.

This task is certainly challenging as far as the analysis of energy security is concerned – due to the multiplicity of actors and meanings that need to be taken into consideration. It does not mean however, that possibilities are endless here. As Trombetta pointed out: ‘Suggesting that different security logics interact and coexist does not mean that they can be freely chosen or that other logics, like those based on risk management are without problems’.¹⁵⁷ On the contrary, similarly as ‘we cannot conceptualize a de-contextualized security’,¹⁵⁸ and the notion of ‘security’ will not be stretched endlessly if contextualized, the logics of security that arise from given contexts are limited by the very conditions that let them thrive in the first place. In other words, whereas the contextual thickness of security practices undermines Waever’s logic

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Trombetta, “Rethinking the Securitization of Environment: Old Beliefs, New Insights,” 149.

¹⁵⁸ Ciută, “Security and the Problem of Context,” 303.

of security practices,¹⁵⁹ it simultaneously indicates that 'both the rules and circumstances that hold security practices are contextually bound'.¹⁶⁰

Taken this into account, the contextual analysis of energy security could resemble a two-step approach. Firstly, it would focus on how diverse meanings of energy security cluster around, and how its practices operate within, different logics of security - according to repeatable patterns in the given intersubjective contexts. Such approach would provide for a more structured 'analytical skeleton', while remaining open enough not to impose any strict categorizations that could distort empirical findings. Secondly, once the diverse energy security logics were identified, the analysis could shift the focus to the interaction of the logics themselves – and trace greater nuances of the local energy security dynamics, which involves both dominant and less mainstream actors and voices. Unpacking these dynamics would shed more light on *how* and *why* certain energy security logics become dominant, whereas others do not, and what are the mechanisms of their diffusion and sedimentation. Ultimately, the analysis should simultaneously problematize conceptualisations of energy security, trace security practices that embody various understandings of it and stay open to the possibility of different security logics that might be operative. A lot of insight into the possible variety of energy security logics could be gained here from Ciută's and Corry's typologies.¹⁶¹

Energy security & its logics

Based on the analysis of the main trends and debates in the field of energy studies, Ciută argued that in the case of energy security one could distinguish among three main security logics, which are currently at operation: the logic of war, the logic of subsistence and the total security logic.¹⁶² According to this typology, these distinct logics '...carry different meanings

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 311–14.

¹⁶⁰ Balzacq, "Contesting Security."

¹⁶¹ Ciută, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security"; Corry, "Securitisation and 'riskification.'"

¹⁶² Ciută, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security."

of energy and security, embed political hierarchies, and have distinct vocabularies, policy vehicles and normative consequences'.¹⁶³

The first of them, the logic of war, which relates to the patterns of international politics, brings the vocabulary and rationale of conflict to energy security as energy becomes a resource influencing the distribution of capabilities in the international system.¹⁶⁴ The logic of war is therefore characterized by the presence of military planning in the management of natural resources and by the rationale of 'hardening, securing and protecting' that permeates the whole domain of energy.¹⁶⁵

The second logic, the logic of subsistence, shifts energy security concerns closer towards the public policy agenda.¹⁶⁶ It is characterized by the segregation of energy (type of resources, actors, sectors of activity), multiplication of actors and the rationale of 'survival' being replaced by the functional demands of the diverse sectors of activity. Hence, the logic of subsistence implies that 'different actors invest to varying degrees political, economic or environmental issues into energy security, and attach different policy instruments to it'.¹⁶⁷ As the typology points out, the policy preferences within the logic of subsistence might '... signal the hierarchies that govern the interaction between the local and the global (global warming versus cold home versus human security), and broad political orientations (domestic deregulatory versus global deregulatory)'.¹⁶⁸

Finally, the total security logic rests upon the notions of *totality* and *reflexivity* of energy, which stem from the assertion that 'energy affects everything, everything affects energy, and, ultimately, everything *is* energy'.¹⁶⁹ The latter implies blurring of the distinction between

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 130.

¹⁶⁵ Ciută, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security."

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 131–32.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 131–34.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 133.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 135.

threatening actors and referent objects, as ‘all the myriad of actual and potential actors acquire simultaneously all possible security roles: they are the same time referent objects, subjects, threats, vectors and agents of security’.¹⁷⁰ Since ‘security is everywhere’ and energy becomes a security problem due to our own actions, the ‘meaning’ or ‘essence’ of security become increasingly blurry.

The above typology raises a number of interesting points. Firstly, it is based on an underlying assumption that ‘categories and practices of security cluster contextually according to different meanings produced by situated actors’.¹⁷¹ Since in the energy security realm the multiplication of actors involved in the energy security agenda is taken to the extreme, the resulted diversity of energy security uses, understandings and practices, marks the difficulty of establishing any categorical or political boundaries to delineate energy security.¹⁷² As such, the above approach builds upon the explicitly 'liminal' character of energy security as a 'between theory and practice' category and outlines the variety of energy security logics. This ‘liminality’ of energy security and its cross-sectoral character also underpin this dissertation’s argument that energy security might constitute a testing ground for some of our preconceptions about the phenomenon of *security* more broadly. Interestingly, the fact that Ciută’s typology mirrors other classifications of security in the wider security studies seems to give some validity to that claim.

Corry, for instance, while similarly departing from the Copenhagen School framework, attempted to categorize the existing mechanisms of security issues’ construction and in the process distinguished among three 'grammars of security': securitization, riskification and politicization.¹⁷³ Whereas securitization would be marked by the construction of scenario of direct harm (an existential threat) to a valued referent object, riskification would mean construction of conditions of possibility of harm (risk) to a governance-object, and

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 136.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 125.

¹⁷² Ibid., 127.

¹⁷³ Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification,” 247.

politicization the construction of object as governable.¹⁷⁴ The ‘plan of action’ would then include defense against threat in the case of securitization, increased governance in the case of riskification and maximization of utility in trade-offs with other goods in the case of politicization.¹⁷⁵ Consequently, the ‘performative effects’ that follow would imply the legitimization of exceptional measures aiming for survival, legitimization of precautionary measures and legitimization of trade-offs in relation to other goods respectively.¹⁷⁶

If to contrast the two typologies, it appears that – although they tackle analytical areas of different scope - they also exhibit many similarities on the line: securitization/logic of war, riskification/total security logic and politicization/logic of subsistence. Teasing out the elements of both classifications that are relevant to the analysis of energy security contexts is therefore beneficial for two reasons. Firstly, they provide an analytical blueprint for fieldwork research as they sketch out the security logics that might be at play across different energy contexts. Secondly, they highlight how energy security logics follow similar trajectories to the security logics more broadly, and consequently, how the analysis of energy security could shed light on the dynamics of a wider security phenomenon.

The two typologies are then contrasted to establish a more detailed analytical scheme for researching energy security logics – including their underlying rationale, accompanying rhetoric, related practices of the situated actors, possible manifestations as well as the nature and value of security within each logic.

Establishing analytical blueprint

To start with, Corry’s depiction of securitization is close to Ciută’s energy security logic of war. The logic of war is consistent with the realist-informed understanding of security

¹⁷⁴ Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification.’”

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification.’”

(focused on the use of force, war and conflict) and with its preoccupation with survival in the face of existential threats. In fact, if to assume that each security logic has a single underlying rationale – understood as a primary imperative around which it operates, then survival underlies the logic of war in the energy sector. Here we have state actors as the objects and subjects of energy security and the centralized state control over energy resources – mostly fossil fuels. Since energy is treated as a resource, which affects the distribution of capabilities in the international system, the confrontation and competition over depleting resources often prevail. That can manifest in many forms and range from resource wars in Africa to conflicts around pipeline politics in a geopolitical context. What the different manifestations of the war logic have in common is the ‘grammar of conflict’ present in the rhetoric of weapons, battles, fear, economic dominance, or lately also in the narrative of the ‘new Cold War’. The very conflict can be framed in terms of a ‘zero-sum’ game. In line with the realist thinking it is always ‘us’ versus ‘others’ - and we either win and ensure the energy supply key to our economic and political survival or we lose. There is no space for half-measures. Ultimately, as far as this logic is concerned security equals either the ‘absence of war’ or in the case of conflict with an external adversary it is dependent upon ‘winning the war’. Security within the war logic is therefore exclusive and of a negative value. It is exclusive as we deal here with an external threat in a game, where one’s win equals another’s loss. It is of a negative value as it is conceived in a threat-based modality and consistent with the realist conceptualization of it.

Given the urgency of the matter, the logic of war might easily translate into energy policies that are put on the immediate political agenda. Corry noted that in the case of securitization a plan of action for defense against threat would be followed by the legitimization of exceptional measures aiming for survival, such as secrecy, no-holds-barred action, no trade-offs with security.¹⁷⁷ In the case of the war logic in the energy sector such exceptional measures

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 249.

could go as far as getting involved in the actual military conflict over energy resources. More frequently though, they would focus on implementing measures aiming at energy security understood in its traditional terms as the security of supply. The urgency of this political imperative would trump all the other policy and security considerations at the time – economic, political, societal and environmental. In this sense the logic of war would come close to the Copenhagen School securitization mechanism. However, it remains to be seen how its actual dynamics plays out in the local energy contexts. The analysis should then focus not only on the rhetoric of conflict in the energy sphere, but to investigate to what extent such rhetoric is followed/accompanied by the relevant political actions of the state actors ([See Table 1](#)).

The second energy security logic included in Ciută's typology is the logic of subsistence, which corresponds closely to Corry's depiction of the logic of 'normal' politics. The logic of subsistence is marked by the multiplication of actors and meanings of energy security. Crucially, the underlying rationale of 'survival' from the logic of war is replaced here by the primary imperative of 'sustenance'. Therefore, we have multiple stakeholders, whose different interests and agendas compete to come to the fore of energy policy within domestic sites of contestation. The former might include political elite, energy companies, expert community, media, environmental groups and civil society. Depending on the context, the relative power standing of different actors within given constellation might differ – as there are always more mainstream and marginal voices. Consequently, the control over different aspects of energy security is unequally shared among stakeholders and there might be power shifts in relation to various energy security debates and policies. This contesting of energy security within public policy agenda mirrors Corry's politicization, where pros and cons '...are weighed more or less evenhandedly so that no-holds-barred and precautionary politics is dropped and marginal utility becomes the dominant logic: will plan A or B do more good than harm?'. In 'normal' politics goals can be traded off against each other to maximize the overall utility, e.g. health care versus

education or road-building to be optimized according to preferences.¹⁷⁸ Within the subsistence logic different goals and dimensions of energy security are similarly weighed against alternatives, but the analytical implications of this process are different here. Namely, Corry listed ‘politicization’ in his classification in a typical move to contrast it with ‘security’ and ‘risk-security’ categories. As such ‘politicization’ implies going back to normal politics and de facto de-securitization of an issue. However, the logic of subsistence is still a security logic, as based on the claim that security is contextual, the assertion that actors ‘speak’ security¹⁷⁹ is taken seriously. Hence the contextualized interpretivist analysis has to treat the local conceptualizations and understandings of ‘energy security’ accordingly – as a security issue. Consequently, if actors ‘speak energy security’ in a context of everyday politics this process should be analyzed on par with other security logics. Such ‘thick’ contextualism also implies that although the logic of subsistence operates within ‘normal’ politics the definition of ‘political’ is greatly extended here to include less dominant voices of collective and individual actors. Ultimately, the logic revolves around uncovering contextual meanings and understandings of energy security in the shifting constellations of actors. Although sustenance is an underlying rationale here, it can be achieved in a number of ways as ‘different actors invest to varying degrees political, economic or environmental issues into energy security, and attach different policy instruments to it’.¹⁸⁰ Corry’s claim that it is the utility of trade-offs between different policy options that is decisive might be a case in point. Different energy security dimensions could be hierarchized within domestic definitions and policy approaches by the situated actors based on their perceived utility/importance vis-à-vis other options. Crucially though, as the security logics are contextual so is the perception of what constitutes a justifiable choice. As such the analysis of the subsistence logic is likely to take us deeper into the specifics of local

¹⁷⁸ Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification.’”

¹⁷⁹ Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, 55.

¹⁸⁰ Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security,” 131–34.

energy contexts where aspects of energy security are constantly being re-negotiated in line with the functional needs of the society and current local agendas. Once the outcomes of these contestation processes become sedimented enough, the established understandings and priorities of energy security can be seen across its local policies and definitions.

Security within the subsistence logic is therefore simultaneously ‘exclusive’ and of a ‘positive’ value. It is ‘exclusive’ as we have multiple actors and agendas within domestic sites of contestation and not all energy security dimensions, perspectives and interests would be equally valid at all times when formulating a policy approach. It is not the type of exclusion that we find in the logic of war though. In the logic of subsistence, the main goal – fulfillment of functional needs of the society in the energy sector, will be met. The exclusionary practice applies then to the extent to which the diverse competing visions are incorporated into the mainstream debate and policy approach to energy security. Security here is of a positive value – as at its core lies sustenance. Therefore, the hierarchies might shift, priorities change over time, but the main goal of fulfilling societal needs in the sphere of energy security remains unaltered.

The last energy security logic in Ciută’s classification is the ‘total security logic’, which corresponds to Corry’s grammar of riskification. Whereas Ciută’s depiction of the logic in the energy sector bears a close resemblance to Beck’s world risk society argument,¹⁸¹ Corry’s mechanism of riskification is an attempt to ‘theorize ‘risk logic’ at the same level as securitization theory: as an ideal type for rules of action found *across* contexts’.¹⁸² Therefore, Corry reviews two main strands of risk literature: one connected to Becksian risk society, which now lives in a ‘second modernity’ and is ‘increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that it itself produced’,¹⁸³ and the other inspired by French thinkers Foucault

¹⁸¹ Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992).

¹⁸² Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification,’” 241.

¹⁸³ Ulrich Beck, “Living in the World Risk Society” (Hobhouse Memorial Public Lecture, February 15, 2006), <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/sociology/pdf/Beck-LivingintheWorldRiskSociety-Feb2006.pdf>.

and Bourdieu, which sees risk as a particular rationality of government that works to legitimate certain technologies of power.¹⁸⁴ Based on the perceived similarities between the two schools, Corry outlines a mechanism of ‘riskification’, which ‘posits risks (understood as conditions of possibility for harm) to a referent object leading to programmes for permanent changes aimed at reducing vulnerability and boosting governance-capacity of the valued referent object itself’.¹⁸⁵ A number of elements in Corry’s approach could be helpful in tracing risk in the energy sector. However, two points should be kept in mind here. Firstly, although ‘riskification’ does depict another security logic it is operationalized in the same manner as the CS securitization framework and as such falls into similar analytical pitfalls – such as problems with accounting for context. Secondly, the all-encompassing nature of ‘energy security’ might indeed, similarly to the ‘environmental security’, make it a ‘total’ security category as Ciută argues, and as such brings us closer to the risk society dynamics.

Beck first outlined his risk society argument in a direct response to the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986. According to Beck, we currently live in ‘reflexive modernity’, where societies attempt to prevent and manage risks that they themselves manufactured¹⁸⁶. Therefore, societal actors continuously monitor themselves while developing new technologies and de facto producing new risks to their own existence. Moreover, an advancing globalization makes such risks de-localized and incalculable with potentially catastrophic consequences for the entire humanity. Hence, as Beck argues, in the ‘second modernity’ marked by reflexivity and global risks produced by technological change ‘the very

¹⁸⁴ Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” *Alternatives* 27 (February 1, 2002): 63–92; Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU* (Routledge, 2006); Salter, “Securitization and Desecuritization”; Mark B. Salter, “Imagining Numbers: Risk, Quantification, and Aviation Security,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 2–3 (April 1, 2008): 243–66; Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 89–115; Stefan Elbe, “AIDS, Security, Biopolitics,” *International Relations* 19, no. 4 (December 1, 2005): 403–19.

¹⁸⁵ Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification,’” 248.

¹⁸⁶ Beck, “Living in the World Risk Society.”

ideas of controllability, certainty or security – so central to first modernity – collapse’.¹⁸⁷ Reflexivity implies that societies can try to assess the level of risks that are produced and attempt to mitigate them, yet the idea of controlling uncertainty is in the Becksian view rather an illusion. Although reflexive retrospection might result in e.g. increased regulation of the nuclear power industry or ideas of sustainability to be developed, the attempts of control cannot guarantee security in the global risk society.

The risk logic in the energy sector as depicted by Ciută comes close to the above picture. His ‘total logic of energy security’ points to the ‘totality’ and ‘reflexivity’ of energy:

“The totality of energy is inherent in its three key dimensions of growth, the environment and sustenance: energy affects everything, everything affects energy, and, ultimately, everything *is* energy. (...) the reflexivity of energy security draws on the fact that the intersection of the three dimensions makes energy a security problem because of our own actions, rather than, for example, the actions of some threatening actor. To paraphrase Rasmussen (...), when faced with the problem of energy, we are facing ourselves”.¹⁸⁸

Therefore, in the total security logic, similarly as in the risk society, energy becomes a security issue due to our own actions, which means that we can ourselves manufacture future energy security risks. Consequently, the distinction between threatening actors and referent objects becomes blurred and since in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world ‘energy is everywhere’ the scope of such manufactured risks is also likely to be global.

In practical terms this could mean that energy security embraces multiple risks connected to the regional and global energy infrastructure and supply chains – including terrorism, war, brigandage, and natural disasters.¹⁸⁹ Policy manifestations of dealing with such risks could indeed be mostly in line with Corry’s mechanism of ‘riskification’. Even assuming that energy security is of ‘total’ and ‘reflexive’ character and that harms can come from virtually

¹⁸⁷ Ulrich Beck, *World Risk Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹⁸⁸ Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security,” 135.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

everywhere in the energy field, in whichever way to address such risks the underlying rationale would revolve around prevention. The rhetoric invoked would then center on calculation and precaution and actors on the ground would be preoccupied with developing strategies for risk alleviation. Given the above examples, the latter could include improvement of technological solutions (e.g. new generation of nuclear power plants), additional safety measures for the transport of energy resources or changing the unstable energy suppliers altogether. Attempting to prepare for the possibilities of harm to the energy governance object would then mean to attempt to gain control over the conceivable future ‘bads’ connected to its production, transportation, exploitation and storage. It is conceivable that situated actors would in many instances conclude that no amount of precautionary measures could alleviate the perceived risks. However, the totality and reflexivity of energy security would similarly imply here that there is no escape from the global risks. For instance, despite modern advances in the nuclear technology it is not possible to guarantee 100 percent reliability of the nuclear power plants, as e.g. technical accidents, environmental disasters or terrorist attacks on the nuclear infrastructure could never be fully ruled out. The actors could then conclude that nuclear energy is uncontrollable and opt for alternative energy source. The policy change itself would serve as a strategy for risk mitigation, but the interconnectedness of global risks would mean that the same actors could be still adversely affected e.g. by the nuclear catastrophes happening elsewhere. Therefore, although security within the total logic of energy security is still about the manageability of risk, the latter more often than not becomes an unattainable goal. The degree to which energy security risks are perceived as ‘controllable’ is therefore likely to be highly context-dependent. Regardless of the motivation or scope of the risk mitigation strategies, once the precautionary measures and rhetoric are in place we can point to the clear manifestation of this logic in the empirical cases. It could be then argued that the risk logic manifesting in the energy sector is inclusive and of a negative value. It is inclusive as risks are of reflexive nature.

It is all of us in the face of risks manufactured through our own agency. As we reflect on the resulted possibilities of harm, the risks could be either managed or they are incalculable and uncontrollable. Such security-risk is also of a negative value, as although we move away from the ‘existential threat’ towards a ‘possibility of harm’ the security mechanism operates here in a similarly antagonistic manner: it is us against adversities that might hit us back from the multiple directions.

The below table summarizes a blueprint for analyzing energy security logics across empirical contexts based on the insights derived from both typologies:

Table 1: Energy security logics – a blueprint for analytical departure

	Underlying rationale	Rhetoric	Control	Action	Manifestation	Nature of security	Value of security
Logic of war	Survival	Grammar of conflict	Centralized	Policy moves above ‘normal politics’	‘Zero-sum’ energy game	Absence of war/ winning the war	Exclusive negative
Logic of subsistence	Sustenance	Utility of trade-offs	Unequally shared among stakeholders	Hierarchizing energy security dimensions	Establishment of energy security priorities	Fulfilment of needs	Exclusive positive
Risk logic	Prevention	Calculation & precaution	Lack of control/ attempting control	Strategies for alleviating risk	Precautionary measures in place	Manageability of risk	Inclusive negative

This blueprint could serve as an analytical point of departure for the fieldwork stage of research – both in its preparatory, theory-based and in the investigative phases. The field research would be then informed by themes and initial analytical hunches developed in the above discussion, as they would be contrasted and re-evaluated vis-à-vis empirical reality of different energy

security contexts. This would aid in systematically narrating the cases in a two-fold manner. Firstly, the contextual analysis would trace different logics of energy security along various debates and policy developments in the energy contexts. Given how the logics might manifest, their intensity would be evaluated based on the occurrence of elements contained in the analytical blueprint, but the analysis of the liminal sphere would simultaneously provide space for other contextual manifestations of energy security logics. Secondly, the mechanisms of interaction between the logics themselves would be analyzed.

As Ciută pointed out, although energy security logics might operate in different or within the same contexts, it is often the case that they are ‘simultaneously present in policy documents, academic analyses and business briefs, and their coexistence is marked by a *perpetual politics that organizes them hierarchically*’.¹⁹⁰ Given the discussed parallels between the phenomena of ‘energy security’ and ‘security’ more broadly, unpacking this ‘hierarchical politics’ could shed light on the broader mechanisms of diffusion, contestation and legitimation of security issues as well as on the political and normative implications of divergent security logics. Here, the logic of subsistence, which constitutes the main site of contestation could be utilized to approach the energy contexts ‘from within’.

As it was argued, the logic of subsistence operates around the three dimensions of growth, sustenance and environment, which drive policy preferences that might “... signal the hierarchies that govern the interaction between the local and the global (global warming versus cold homes versus human security), and broad political orientations (domestic deregulatory versus global deregulatory)”.¹⁹¹ If to go one step further, it could appear that the logic of subsistence is not solely confined to the public policy agenda, but goes beyond policy preferences and in a broader sense constitutes an analytical sphere, in which all the energy security logics are reflected. The subsistence logic that is marked by the multiplication of actors

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 125. Emphasis added.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 133.

and meanings of energy security and replacement of the ‘survival’ rationale by the functional demands of the diverse sectors of activity – is the ultimate liminal sphere where the actual hierarchization processes of different energy security dimensions take place. It is within this sphere that the renegotiation processes of what energy security means, as well as the development of rhetoric that is conducive for other security logics to emerge, take place. Especially, that the broad understandings of energy security, both those underpinning the war logic and those corresponding to the risk logic, are likely to be rooted in the contextual dynamics of the situated actors. In this sense, the logic of subsistence could be seen as an ‘intermediary logic’ or *modus operandi* in the analytical space, where the competing contextual meanings of energy security are mediated and where its diverse logics interact. The analysis of each empirical case could then start from unpacking such domestic sites of contestation in order to uncover a broader picture of energy security dynamics.

Having established analytical framework, a critical look back at the two typologies that aided in its design should make one wonder to what extent are they helpful in opening up analytical space and facilitating alternative ways of thinking about security issues. The explicit similarities between Ciută’s and Corry’s classifications might raise a question whether they do not simply reflect the established theoretical and analytical approaches within the discipline. As such, certain doubts could also be raised regarding the scope and depth of their potential explanatory power. Valentine, in his criticism of the current state of energy security analysis, used Plato's Allegory of the Cave to suggest that:

'...the assumptions upon which energy security analysis is conducted [shall be taken] out from the ontological caves inhabited by energy security analysts and into the light of day' as '...most energy security assessments fail to meet acceptable standards of academic rigor because the studies fail to acknowledge critical assumptions that skew or bias the findings'.¹⁹²

Given the unique nature of energy security, which – although mirrors some wider patterns of

¹⁹² Valentine, “The Fuzzy Nature of Energy Security,” 70.

security dynamics – is also likely to open up our boxed understandings of security more broadly, it is tempting to similarly ask here: Are we out of the ontological cave yet?

This question can be only fully addressed in the process of contextual analysis. The above discussion outlined the theoretical orientation of the thesis and an analytical approach geared towards security logics. Before moving into an in-depth case-by-case analysis of the empirical material, the next section unpacks in detail the contextual approach of the thesis that is brought about through the interpretivist methodology.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Given the specificity of energy security and acknowledging analytical insights derived from the critical studies literature, the analytical framework is operationalized against two hallmarks: the liminality of energy security sphere and the intersubjectively defined context that embraces ‘distal factors’, ‘embeddedness’ of security mechanisms and a constellation of actors within the local settings. At the outset, both points are largely addressed by the contextual approach that adheres to interpretivist methodology grounded in hermeneutics. As further analysis illustrates, such research practice allows not only to account for the multiplicity and dynamics of energy security logics, but also to remain open enough to account for other possible manifestations of energy security logics.

To start with, as Wilkinson, who conducted a contextual analysis of security dynamics in Kyrgyzstan noticed:

“Moving the local to the foreground of a study permits us to focus on the specificities of, ambiguities in, and disjunctures between theory, method and the field. For the study of inherently situated and context-dependent social phenomenon such as security, this approach is likely to produce a more nuanced account, since it actively seeks to consider multiple perspectives and interpretations rather than focusing on commonalities between empirical cases.”¹⁹³

¹⁹³ Cai Wilkinson, “Not Just Finding What You (Thought You) Were Looking for: Reflections on Fieldwork Data

This interpretive methodological approach, which focuses on meaning-making in context by situated actors, is in line with the iterative character of hermeneutic sense-making, where researchers ‘initial analytical hunches are continuously contrasted and reassessed vis-à-vis field reality’.¹⁹⁴ As such, hermeneutics provides ‘an interpretive epistemology rooted in the potential for multiple possible meanings of language, acts or physical artefacts’ that allows the researcher to access multiple sources in any given context.¹⁹⁵ Consequently, both ‘theory-based’ and ‘practice-based’ knowledge is given high importance as the analysis maneuvers between them in the recursive and reiterative process.¹⁹⁶ The latter implies that the logic of inquiry is not simply inductive (reasoning that begins with observations of the particular phenomenon from which general laws are drawn), but an abductive one – where the researcher is ‘simultaneously puzzling over empirical materials and theoretical literatures’.¹⁹⁷ ¹⁹⁸ Such mode of inquiry continues throughout the entire research process as the theory-informed and fieldwork-informed data generation and analysis are ongoing and intertwined in search of differences, specificities and patterns in/between empirical contexts.¹⁹⁹ This approach is also perfectly suited for the analysis of the liminal energy security sphere. Unpacking the analytical ground ‘in-between’ energy security theory, policy and practice requires a framework that allows for the established theoretical definitions to be continuously contrasted and re-evaluated vis-à-vis the multiplicity of local understandings and practices. Since multiple meanings of energy security,

and Theory,” in *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn* (Routledge, 2013), 396.

¹⁹⁴ Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Dvora Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes* (Routledge, 2013), 53.

¹⁹⁵ Dvora Yanow, “Interpretive Political Science: What Makes This Not a Subfield of Qualitative Methods,” *APSA Newsletter*, 2003.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Following Schwartz -Shea and Yanow other characteristics of an abductive logic of inquiry include: bottom-up, *in situ* concept development, constitutive understandings of causality, the relevance of researcher identity in accessing sites and archives, the need to improvise in response to field conditions and data co-generation in field relationships (*Ibid.*; p. 99).

¹⁹⁸ Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 27.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 56.

more often than not, hide in its everyday practice - such inquiry has the potential to enrich theoretical constructs and frameworks or even challenge them entirely. When analyzed together, the ‘experimental knowledge of the field’ and the ‘abstract knowledge of theory’²⁰⁰ aid in uncovering a fuller picture of contextual energy security dynamics. What appears quite challenging for its operationalization though, is that in a hermeneutic sense-making circle there is no a fixed starting point for an inquiry, but the latter begins ‘...wherever the individual “is” in her understanding at that moment, with whatever grasp of things she has at that time’.²⁰¹ How then to account for the liminal sphere and start ‘from the middle’?

Having in mind the discussion on energy security and its logics in this chapter, the thesis utilizes here the energy security logic of subsistence for analytical purposes. As it was argued earlier, it is the ultimate area of contestation where the re-negotiation processes of what energy security means and where the development of rhetoric that is conducive for other security logics to emerge or manifest are taking place. As such, the logic of subsistence could be seen as a peculiar *modus operandi* in the sphere of energy security – and approaching it in this way gives the study significant analytical, conceptual and substantive leverage.

To start with, such approach provides insight into the intersubjectively operationalized context and junctures between its three respective elements. Firstly, identification of multiple relevant actors in a given local setting and their cross-references (actors referring to each other in the debates and semi-structured interviews) shed light on the existing constellations against the background factors (‘distal context’). The way in which actors refer to each other also illustrates their relative power/stance within given constellation and additionally point to the existence of transnational networks of actors and their perceived influence in the domestic energy sphere. Secondly, the attention is paid to the multiple meanings of energy security –

²⁰⁰ Wilkinson, “Not Just Finding What You (Thought You) Were Looking for,” 401.

²⁰¹ Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 30.

both in theory and in practice (local literature and official documentation on the subject and as defined by situated actors). As such, the conceptual analysis is problematized as it points to a key difference between ‘definition’ of energy security versus its ‘conceptualization’. Namely, as opposed to the context-detached definitions based on a set of pre-established indicators, the study uncovers how energy security is conceptualized while entrenched in its empirical and normative dimensions. In this case ‘starting from the middle’ means adhering to *a* key hermeneutic point that ‘lay actors are concept-bearing beings, whose concepts enter constitutively into what they do’.²⁰² As McSweeney put it: ‘[it is] a practical implication for professional observers that social science concepts are parasitic on those of the actors under observation. To discover what an actor does logically requires knowing what an actor knows’.²⁰³ Consequently, allowing local actors to provide their conceptualizations of energy security takes the contextual analysis further as the latter often reflect and include: 1) different hierarchies and priorities of energy security aspects; 2) the significant ‘distal factors’ in a given context; 3) the underlying energy security rationales. When considered together, the identified ‘constellations of actors’ and local conceptualizations jointly aid in the exposure of ‘security mechanisms’ and logics embedded in a given setting.

Therefore, utilizing the energy security logic of subsistence not only allows to analyze the empirical cases ‘from within’ contexts, but also to explore the liminal sphere of energy security most effectively: 1) conceptually, as local conceptualizations reflect the intertwining of practice-based and theory-based understandings; 2) analytically, as such an approach helps to operationalize contextual interactions between actors (what constellations are in place? Do they change in relation to different energy security debates/sources/issues?), meanings (Does rhetoric change over time? Are the hierarchies of energy security dimensions shifting?), and

²⁰² Anthony Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies* (Hutchinson, 1982), 13.

²⁰³ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 146.

logics (Do they originate/are reflected in/around the subsistence logic?); 3) substantively, as empirical cases differ in terms of dynamics within the logic of subsistence – across their areas of contestation over the meaning and rationale behind energy security. Hence, analysis framed from this angle sheds light on the diverse empirical energy contexts.

This operationalization of the approach is strengthened in practice by adhering to a set of principles for an interpretive inquiry: the mapping techniques for exposure and intertextuality.²⁰⁴ Firstly, mapping for exposure aims at ‘maximizing research-relevant field encounters that will provide the researcher with the wide variety of meanings as expressed by situated actors or written records’.²⁰⁵ In this case – since the thesis employs discourse analysis (of materials from 2004 to 2013) and semi-structured interviews (conducted between 2012 and 2013) as its primary research methods, it aims at the selection of diverse written and non-written sources as well as a wide range of interviewees across local energy contexts. The former take into account media outlets, parliamentary debates, official policy documents and public debates. The latter, depending on the possibilities of access, aim to open up the analytical space and to include interviewees among: ministerial officials, energy experts, think tank analysts, employees of energy companies, representatives of the green energy movements and NGO-s. Moreover, the semi-structured interviews follow the criteria of an interpretivist mode of interviewing as outlined by Soss: 1) prioritization of scepticism about shared meaning (questioning assumptions that particular words, objects, people or events have self-evident or widely shared meanings); 2) placing actors' understandings and sense-making efforts at the forefront of empirical investigation; 3) and treating construction of a coherent account of participants' understandings as a prerequisite for adequate explanation.²⁰⁶ As such, the

²⁰⁴ Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 79.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. 85.

²⁰⁶ Joe Soss, “Talking Our Way to Meaningful Explanations,” *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, 2006, 161.

interviewees are asked to provide their conceptualizations of energy security, list and prioritize its multiple dimensions, and point to key events that in their view had an impact on energy security rationale in a given context. Subscribing to the interpretivist methodology, which holds that there are multiple, intersubjective social realities in which the researcher (as well as the researched) is also an interpreter – it is foreseen that the interviewees might provide a variety of answers.²⁰⁷ However, since empirical cases are not equivalent and even within the same contexts there often exist profound differences in interpretations - it is precisely those differences that might point to what is perceived as significant or meaningful in a given setting.²⁰⁸ Consequently, it is only through cross-examination of information gathered from such interviews/documents/observations,²⁰⁹ that the study is ultimately able to paint a broader picture of competing meanings, understandings and agendas of energy security in a given context. And here mapping for intertextuality is equally - if not more - important.

The latter aims at 'reading across' a number of sources in an intertextual fashion in order to reveal how 'different types of data draw on ("cite") material from other kinds of data, such that the researcher can "read across" them in interpreting meaning' and see "intertextual" links across data sources in ways that contribute to...[their] interpretation (...)'.²¹⁰ Mapping for intertextuality is therefore well-suited to further exploration of intersubjectively defined contexts. Firstly, it allows to draw links between diverse meanings, rhetoric and agendas and to identify unique elements as well as commonalities in reasoning about energy security across sources and empirical cases. Secondly, it pays further attention to cross-referencing between actors during the interviews. Lastly, the patterns identified are then seen through the prism of a wider contextual dynamics.

²⁰⁷ Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 41.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn* (Routledge, 2015), 152.

²¹⁰ Ibid. 86.

It is worth highlighting, however, that both techniques of mapping for exposure and intertextuality are employed to uncover the main areas of ‘contestation’ over the meaning of energy security within particular contexts. In other words, the analysis focuses on the public sphere where multiple understandings are voiced and on actors that - to a greater or lesser extent – visibly enter this area of interaction. Consequently, the sources that embrace the topic of energy security, but do not enter the public debate or do not influence energy security rhetoric and policy to a significant degree (such as legal documents or agendas of insurance companies) are omitted. The entire process is also conducted in a flexible and reflexive manner. Flexible, as an abductive logic of inquiry signifies that ‘maps’ for exposure and intertextuality, which are informed by the researcher’s prior knowledge are likely to be revised during the fieldwork stage.²¹¹ And reflexive, as interpretivist research requires that the researcher constantly checks on her own sense-making until the very completion of the project.²¹²

The choice of the methodological approach and its operationalization is similarly reflected in the narrative structure of the three empirical chapters. Each chapter starts with a short review of the local conceptualizations of energy security and the rationale behind them is then unpacked further throughout the analysis of a number of debates in the areas of pipeline politics, nuclear energy and renewables. The intersubjective contexts are then explored ‘from within’ those debates. Starting from the logic of subsistence, the latter is utilized to show the main areas of contestation and to illustrate mainstream security understandings operating within typical constellations of actors in a given context (since the latter might shift in relation to other energy issues and logics). The ‘bargaining’ over the priorities of energy security shows different domestic hierarchies of its respective elements (e.g. subsistence vs. sustainable development vs. environment) and as such, it often appears to point into different directions as far as the

²¹¹ Ibid. 88.

²¹² Ibid.

conditions conducive for other energy security logics to manifest are concerned. However, since the cases are not equivalent, the subsistence logic is analyzed around different debates in different national settings: ‘Energiewende’ in Germany, EU Climate and Energy package in Poland, and Energy Strategy 2030 in Ukraine. Apart from paying attention to the local interactions around the subsistence logic, the study focuses on some ‘trigger events’ in the European energy sphere in the years 2004-2013 that sparked domestic debates on energy security in many European states. These include the Ukrainian gas crises, development of the Nordstream project, accident at the Japanese Fukushima NPP or the expansion of the EU Climate agenda. Following an abductive logic of inquiry, the analysis also leaves space for the situated actors and sources to point to other developments that were crucial for reasoning about energy security in a given context, yet which developments could not be easily identified by the researcher *a priori* to the fieldwork stage. As a result, the empirical narratives include a mixture of debates: those provoked by the same international incidents and those unique for the domestic setting under consideration. Regardless of the expected cross-case differences, such narratives allow to make comparisons across: significant ‘distal factors’, channels through which particular energy security understandings spread, domestic responses to the ‘trigger events’, dynamics of the main areas of contestation (how are the dimensions of energy security hierarchized?), and most crucially – manifestation of the diverse energy security logics in all studied contexts.

CASE SELECTION

The interpretivist research design and methodology also inform the case selection strategy. As opposed to the positivist mode of research, where cases are chosen with a view of building a general theory (and as such often do not have value in and of themselves), an interpretivist mode of research that aims to unpack meaning-making processes in the given

contexts indicates that the choice of cases and access are often intertwined.²¹³ The above has two important consequences. Firstly, the focus on the ‘meaning-making’ ultimately means that the research inquiry is more concerned with the *how* rather than *why* questions and with accounting for the *processes* rather than *outcomes* of the phenomenon under study. Secondly, the dependency of cases on the empirical access aids in narrowing down the selection to those cases that appear most relevant.

In this particular instance the case selection includes accessible national settings that are most likely to shed light on the processes of energy security meaning-formation – including sites with diverse ‘distal contexts’ and constellations of actors – yet ones that are analytically close enough to share a number of reference points.²¹⁴ The latter include aspects such as geographical proximity that make particular contexts prone to be influenced by the same set of events or developments in the regional energy sphere. Given the nature of the interpretivist approach, the dilemma regarding which cases are the most meaningful here is difficult to determine *a priori* to the analysis and largely relies on the initial analytical hunches. However, the fact that the study aims to uncover diversity of energy security logics in the contemporary European sphere, and as such its empirical focus oscillates around the debates on pipeline politics, nuclear energy and renewables, makes this choice easier.

Namely, Germany, Poland and Ukraine constitute the cases, which promise a complex dynamics of security logics resulted from a mixture of diverse ‘distal factors’ and constellations of actors within their domestic sites. These three energy contexts are also close enough to react to the same ‘trigger’ events – and as such the cross-case comparison and conceptualization of the diverse energy security logics becomes more viable.

From the policy perspective, if the challenges of the energy-climate nexus are likely to

²¹³ Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 70.

²¹⁴ For a similar strategy of analysing cases, where the ‘argument and context are misaligned’ yet enhance the analytical/normative agenda see e.g. Cristina G. Badescu and Thomas G. Weiss, “Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative Spiral?,” *International Studies Perspectives* 11, no. 4 (2010): 354–374.

be one of the top priorities of the European and global policy agenda for decades to come, then apprehending the mechanisms that shape national energy policies is crucial for addressing them effectively. German, Polish and Ukrainian energy contexts are key for understanding the complexities of the contemporary European energy security – as they present a puzzling mix of vastly different policy approaches across a number of energy sources. Germany with its ambitious project of energy transition coupled with the denuclearization of its energy portfolio could be a single most important European energy context to study. It is therefore the more perplexing that its policies on renewables, nuclear energy and pipeline politics are all contradicted by the energy policies of the CEE states such as Poland and Ukraine. Whereas ‘Energiewende’ aims to achieve a goal of 80% of electricity from the renewable energy sources by 2050 and cut its overall energy consumption in half by the same date²¹⁵, the policy approaches in the same issue areas in Poland and Ukraine are either stagnant (energy efficiency measures) or show an opposite trend (renewables). Even more strikingly, while Germany committed to a full phase-out of its nuclear energy, the plans for building first nuclear power plants are currently under way in Poland, while Ukraine aims to expand its share of nuclear energy despite its legacy of the Chernobyl catastrophe. The above picture is complicated further by the divergent policies in the area of pipeline politics. The conflict-prone relations on the line Warsaw-Moscow and Kyiv-Moscow in the area of gas supplies become even more tense as a result of the German - Russian co-operation, as the development of projects such as Nordstream with the omission of the CEE states strains the prospects for the efficient regional collaboration in the energy field further.

This complexity of energy policy approaches often results in frustration and lack of understanding on the level of policy makers. It might be then difficult to fully grasp for

²¹⁵ Jan Berst, “German Shift to Wind Power Slams Neighboring Grids,” *Smartgridnews.com*, 2012, http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/Technologies_DG_Renewables/German-shift-to-wind-power-slams-neighboring-grids-4373.html#.UPRPO-SZnao.

Germany why its eastern neighbors support nuclear instead of renewable energy, while German pipeline politics is likely to be perceived as insensitive in the CEE region. Whereas official documents or national energy strategies can shed light on the justification of domestic energy portfolios, they do not provide a deeper insight into the root causes of the energy policies. And the latter are likely to be heavily entrenched in the ‘distal’ context and influenced not only by the economic, but also political, societal and environmental factors.

Therefore, as this thesis departs from a double challenge of conducting a contextual analysis of energy security with the analytical toolbox derived from the security studies, the chosen case selection greatly aids in that process. On the one hand, the complex and contradictory energy policy approaches in Germany, Poland and Ukraine are likely to uncover a variety of energy security logics and their divergent contextual dynamics – feeding wider theoretical debates in the security studies. On the other hand, an adopted analytical approach that unpacks and scrutinizes in detail empirical contexts in which energy policies are formed can provide a fuller picture of the reasoning behind local energy policy agendas. Such in-depth analysis is both highly timely and relevant to the regional and European policy makers. Understanding the local barriers to the adoption of Energy Community regulations, adhering to the EU climate protection goals or co-operating in the area of regional pipeline projects is crucial for finding viable policy solutions. The next chapters analyze then these three cases that are of particular interest for both conceptual and policy reasons – starting with the case of Germany.

CHAPTER II

GERMANY:

TOWARDS A NEW ENERGY SECURITY PARADIGM

INTRODUCTION

The first of the three empirical chapters traces the roots of the multiple meanings and understandings that drive energy security agenda in Germany. The contextual approach operationalized on the intersubjective interaction between distal context, the embeddedness of security mechanism and a constellation of actors, is utilized to analyze the variety of energy security logics that are of importance in the German domestic setting. After briefly consulting dilemmas related to the local conceptualizations of energy security, the chapter analyzes German response to some key ‘trigger’ events in the European pipeline politics that sparked vivid debates in many countries of the CEE region. As the impact of the Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009 and the development of the Nordstream project highlight the specificities of the policy approach typical for the German context, the developments in the aftermath of the nuclear accident at the Japanese nuclear power plant Fukushima illustrate how the dynamic of that context changes. Therefore, while both the logic of war (in relation to gas politics) and the risk logic (in relation to nuclear energy) periodically rise in Germany triggered by major developments in the global energy arena, their domestic repercussions differ vastly. The interplay of distal factors (historical, sociological and economic), and a constellation of actors (that is marked by different power dynamics depending on the type of energy source to which it relates) either favor or hinder security mechanisms that would put given energy issue on the top of the policy agenda. After scrutinizing the dynamic nature of these two energy security

logics, the narrative moves to uncovering the main area of contestation over the meaning, priorities and direction of energy security in Germany – analyzing it at the example of ‘Energiewende’. Starting ‘from within’ the logic of subsistence marked by a multiplicity of actors and understandings, the chapter traces incremental processes that lead to the gradual re-hierarchization of energy security priorities. It is then demonstrated how putting the ‘environmental’ aspect at the top of the hierarchy changes the frame of the economic-centred energy security debate – and sets the ground for the gradual diffusion of the centralized energy system. The latter developments, often accompanied by the rhetoric of social liberation and empowerment in the energy sphere – signify the emergence of a distinct security logic: the energy security logic of emancipation.

NOTIONS OF ENERGY SECURITY

To start with, the evolution of energy security concept and its priorities did not follow a single trajectory in the German context, but - similarly to many other places - turned out to be a complex and continuous process. As one of the leading energy experts noticed, although the need for ‘widening’ of the security agenda to incorporate other than military dimensions of security was clearly felt in Germany and Europe alike in the 1990s, it proved especially difficult in Germany to operationalize non-militarized meanings of security and to embrace their impact on the concrete security policy and practice at the national and international levels.²¹⁶ Regarding energy security it translated into the lack of ‘security understanding’ of the concept in a global context and lack of the comprehensive and cross-departmental strategies.²¹⁷ The issue of security of supply was for the most of the 1990s and 2000s left to the private sector energy companies concerned with profits rather than nationwide crisis management in case of

²¹⁶ Frank Umbach, ‘Deutsche Außenpolitik Und Energiesicherheit’, in *Deutsche Außenpolitik* (Springer, 2007), 354–73.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

emergency.²¹⁸ Energy security was seen as a ‘settled issue’ before 2005 - with the debate framed around nuclear phase-out, climate change and price stability.²¹⁹ The Ukrainian gas crisis of 2006 changed those dynamics and caused that the questions regarding energy security were raised in Germany for the first time.²²⁰ It was also at that time that the German Foreign Ministry expressed the belief that energy security is a key issue not only on the 21st century global economic and environmental policy agenda, but also on the security policy one.²²¹ The above developments meant that security of energy supply gained prominence at that time, which fact was reflected in the mainstream definitions of the concept.

Therefore, according to many German energy experts, energy security is consistent with its classical meaning,²²² as they often point to its cost and supply dimension²²³ and perceive energy security as achievable through increasing dependencies, energy efficiency and European market.²²⁴ These definitions mirror the fact that energy policy is still understood mainly as a part of the economic policy in Germany. Although it has linkages with numerous other policy areas, such as: environment and climate, foreign and security policy as well as with development, transport, housing and social or technology policy - the majority of these interrelated issues are considered to be of secondary importance.²²⁵ Consequently, the dynamic developments, long-term risks and (possible) threats are addressed only marginally in the official German energy policy.²²⁶

Having said that, a look at the wider debates indicates that in the post-2006 period not only the importance of security of supply was highlighted, but that period was also marked by

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview, 31 October 2012.

²²⁰ The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview, 31 October 2012.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² SWP II, Interview, 16 November 2012.

²²³ Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interview, 1 November 2012.

²²⁴ The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview; SWP, Interview, 13 November 2012.

²²⁵ Caroline Mükusch, ‘Vernetzte Energiesicherheit–Mehr Chancen Für Deutschlands Zukunft’, *Zeitschrift Für Außen-Und Sicherheitspolitik* 5, no. 3 (2012): 425–444.

²²⁶ Ibid.

the proliferation of multiple understandings of energy security and its aspects. Firstly, ‘broader’ conceptualizations have emerged as, for example, Caroline Mukusch pointed out: “...energy policy is a social policy. A competent dealing with the challenge of ‘energy security’ therefore requires a values-based and interest-based energy security policies as well as holistic and integrated approaches that combine economic, ecological and socially viable and sustainable development”.²²⁷ Secondly, the German energy policy trilemma of security of supply, efficiency and environment started to take a new form.²²⁸ Just a few years ago the official energy security discourse in Germany followed the EU-level discourse in emphasizing three key dimensions of energy security: energy efficiency, sustainable development and environmental protection.²²⁹ That trend has recently altered with more emphasis being put on the ‘environmental’ aspect and some attempts to find a compromise between different dimensions of energy security and different actors in the German society.²³⁰ In this respect German ‘Energiewende’, which steers the country away from fossil fuels and atomic energy towards increasingly high reliance on renewable energy, was both accelerated by the alternative views on energy security within the German society and is continuously influencing them further. Within the new frame of the debate the perception of energy security shifts away from the reliance on the energy market and puts more emphasis on how the access to different energy resources is guaranteed.²³¹ The role of media and government in shaping public attitudes towards various energy security aspects (e.g. energy efficiency) is also more appreciated,²³² while the strong interest and involvement of the German society in ‘Energiewende’ became a decisive factor in this project’s very success.²³³ The multiplicity of actors involved in the ongoing energy security debate also marks

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ SWP II, Interview.

²³⁰ SWP II, Interview.

²³¹ The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview.

²³² SWP, Interview.

²³³ BMUB, Interview, 5 December 2012.

the multiplication of its understandings. Moreover, the very energy revolution - ‘Energiewende’ - means different things to different groups of actors. Whereas for the public it is largely synonymous with the ‘exit from nuclear and shift to renewables’, the industry follows the cost dimension of the project and a number of complex debates on climate protection, energy efficiency and various aspects of security take place in the background.²³⁴ According to many experts the often simplified approaches to current energy security debate illustrate that ‘the debate is too complex, and normal people and even politicians don’t have a good understanding of [it]’.²³⁵ Indeed, multiple competing understandings interact within different constellations of actors, including energy companies, government, media, energy experts, environmental groups and the general public. These constellations of actors and their relative importance change depending on the energy source to which they relate at any particular moment, with the debates on fossil fuels, nuclear energy and renewables representing different dynamics and following diverse security logics that ultimately influence energy policy developments.

This chapter unpacks this complexity in greater detail – paying special attention to how different notions and logics of energy security play out within the intersubjective context across a number of issue areas and debates sparked by some key ‘trigger’ events in the energy sector: Ukrainian gas crises, Nordstream project, nuclear accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant or the on-going debates on the German energy transition.

PIPELINE POLITICS & THE GRAMMAR OF CONFLICT

The developments in the pipeline politics, especially the security of gas supply from Russia, certainly served as one of the most prominent triggers for the issue of the traditionally understood ‘energy security’ to be brought about in the public debates and policy agenda of

²³⁴ SWP II, Interview.

²³⁵ Freie Universität Berlin, Interview, 21 November 2012.

numerous European states. Germany not only was not an exception here, but the Ukrainian gas crisis of 2006 sparked the most profound debate on German energy security to date. Similarly to many states in the CEE region, the gas cut-off episode raised the grammar of conflict and vocabulary very much in line with the realist ‘logic of war’²³⁶ in the official rhetoric. However, as opposed to some states of the CEE region, the crisis did not lead to putting gas routes’ diversification plans on top of the national security agenda. The combination of the distal factors (historically determined perceptions of Russia) and the constellation of actors typical for the German energy context (that gives leverage to energy companies and their economic interests) meant that the change in rhetoric did not translate into ‘securitization’²³⁷ of the issue of gas supply. A closer look at this dynamic highlights why it was the case and why the German context is not conducive for the logic of war to thrive in it.

Ukrainian gas crisis 2006

The immediate aftermath of the 2006 gas crisis led to a realization that Ukraine is a really important transit state²³⁸ and caused that the questions regarding energy security were raised in Germany for the first time.²³⁹ If before 2005 the debate on energy security oscillated around the issues of nuclear phase-out, climate change and price stability, the Ukrainian gas crisis deteriorated the reputation of Ukraine.²⁴⁰ It also slightly damaged Germany’s perception of Russia as a reliable partner – although as some German experts admit, it was hard to comprehend the actual role of Gazprom in the crisis fully.²⁴¹ Crucially, the gas crisis shifted the so far debate on energy security and this change in rhetoric was especially visible among the mainstream media, which started to publish opinions and analyses in line with the ‘logic of

²³⁶ Ciută, ‘Conceptual Notes on Energy Security’.

²³⁷ With ‘securitisation’ understood here not in line with the CS framework and its linear mechanism, but simply as putting certain issue permanently on the national security agenda.

²³⁸ Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interview.

²³⁹ The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

war'. It was therefore noticed that: Putin and his advisers demonstrated a will to use raw materials as a political weapon and engage in energy geopolitics;²⁴² that more than half of the Leviathan [Gazprom] belongs to the state – which obviously understands energy war as the continuation of politics by other means, as: 'Where Khrushchev once rattled missiles, the Kremlin today turns the gas tap';²⁴³ and that Gazprom holds a place of honour in the new superpower conception of Russia as Kremlin seeks a status of energy superpower that will use the harsh law of supply and demand to re-organize relations in the post – Soviet space.²⁴⁴ In light of what happened in Ukraine, it was also argued that Russian strategy could be seen as a reformulation of Lenin's slogan of "socialism in one country" into "energism in one hand".²⁴⁵ Importantly, some analysts also pointed out that whereas energy resources were recognized in Russia as the new currency of power already in the late 1990-ties (when it was recommended to use gas supplies as a political weapon), these developments were not of interest to the German side prior to the 2006 gas crisis – with the exception of a few analytical outlets.²⁴⁶ In light of this general approach the gas cut-off in January 2006 was seen as a 'wake-up call' - with some accompanying questions raised at the time: For how long would it be fine to stay so tightly bounded to such an authoritarian regime?; How vulnerable is the country?; And what are the alternatives?²⁴⁷ Such analyses were limited in number and time-scope and it was a general perception that the German media did not report much about the actual 'threat from Russia'.²⁴⁸ Low politicization of the issue also meant that the German debate on Gazprom in the aftermath of the Ukrainian gas crisis was largely an inter-expert debate (as opposed to the multi-faced

²⁴² Walter Mayr, 'RUSSLAND Duell Ohne Leiche', *Der Spiegel*, 9 January 2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45280058.html>.

²⁴³ 'Leitartikel: Moskauer Gasmanöver', *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Politik, http://www.zeit.de/2006/02/01_leit_1_02_06.

²⁴⁴ 'Energiestreit: Moskaus Rohrkrepierer', *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Politik, <http://www.zeit.de/2006/02/Ergas>.

²⁴⁵ 'Leitartikel: Moskauer Gasmanöver';

²⁴⁶ 'Energie: Viel Wärme von Allen Seiten', *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Politik, http://www.zeit.de/2006/03/Ressourcen_Headline.

²⁴⁷ Frank Dohmen et al., 'ENERGIE Das Ist Ein Weckruf', *Der Spiegel*, 9 January 2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45280014.html>.

²⁴⁸ SWP, Interview.

debate on nuclear energy).²⁴⁹ Some important expert analyses highlighted how the Ukrainian gas crisis enhanced the importance of security of supply in the target triangle with cost effectiveness and environment, and how numerous unquestioned assumptions in the German energy and foreign policy were demystified as its result.²⁵⁰ The latter included the beliefs that oil and gas are purely economic and non-strategic assets - therefore security of supply is irrelevant and can be left to the private energy companies and market rules; that Russia will always be a reliable energy partner for Europe; and that there is a strong and growing interdependence between Europe and Russia in the energy sphere.²⁵¹ Especially the latter assumption of ‘mutual dependence’ promoted by the former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was questioned. Some pointed to the lack of reciprocal behavior on the Russia’s side - as it was gaining access to the European customers via Nordstream, while denying the opening of its energy market to the European companies and increasing exports of energy resources to other geographical regions.²⁵² It is worth highlighting though, that the analyses like the ones above were rather in the minority, as the majority of German energy experts continuously saw ‘Russia as more dependent on Europe than vice versa’ even in the aftermath of 2006 gas cut-off episode.²⁵³ As such, there was also a split between German expert community and the general public that perceived its country as overtly dependent on the Russian supplier.

The perception of Russia as a reliable partner was certainly shaken in the eyes of the public, but this fact alone did not have significant repercussions as neither the majority of analysts nor crucial energy businesses shared this view. In the opinion of the representative of the German BDEW (Federal Association of the Energy and Water Industry) the reputation of Russia did not suffer as the energy businesses did not perceive Russia as trying to put pressure

²⁴⁹ DGAP, Interview, 23 October 2012.

²⁵⁰ Umbach, ‘Deutsche Außenpolitik Und Energiesicherheit’, 362–63.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² ‘Energie: Viel Wärme von Allen Seiten’; Ibid.

²⁵³ SWP, Interview.

on the German market, but saw the gas cut off episode as a sole result of Russia's conflict with Ukraine.²⁵⁴ The situation was therefore dealt with in a calm manner, as a representative of E.ON put it in an interview: 'We have clearly analyzed this crisis and also consulted this with our Russian partners to say: look it should not happen again'.²⁵⁵

The above perceptions point to an important difference between Germany and many states of the CEE region when it comes to putting the blame on either side of the 2006 gas conflict. Whereas the latter saw the 2006 gas cut-off episode largely as a Russian dictate, analyses in Germany appeared much more balanced. On the one hand, many voices asked whether Russia, which tried to remotely control the democratically elected government in Kyiv by a gas value and discredit the government of President Yushchenko shortly before the parliamentary elections in March, became an unreliable supplier.²⁵⁶ Kremlin's decision to put at stake its reputation of a blameless energy provider since the end of the Soviet Union for the sake of a small additional Gazprom revenue was questioned.²⁵⁷ Some also suggested that Russia's reputation was indeed irreparably damaged.²⁵⁸ On the other hand, it was pointed out that both parties of the conflict resorted to irresponsible threats: with Ukraine yielding an increase in transit fees for Russian gas to Western Europe and the Russian rent for the naval port of Sevastopol in Crimea, and with Russia threatening to put a stop to the transit of Turkmen gas to Ukraine.²⁵⁹ Moreover, some media outlets highlighted 'ridiculously low' former gas prices for Ukraine while suggesting that:

'the Ukrainians will have to learn now not to regulate the temperature of their overheated rooms in the old Soviet style: by opening a window' and that it is hard to blame the Russian Finance

²⁵⁴ BDEW, Interview, 4 December 2012.

²⁵⁵ E.ON, Interview, 4 December 2012.

²⁵⁶ 'Energie', n.d.; 'UKRAINE Teure Gasrechnung', *Der Spiegel*, 2 January 2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45168958.html>.

²⁵⁷ Walter Mayr, 'RUSSLAND Duell Ohne Leiche';

²⁵⁸ Roland Götz, 'After the Gas Conflict Economic Consequences for Russia, Ukraine, and Germany' (SWP, March 2006).

²⁵⁹ 'Energiestreit: Moskaus Rohrkrepierer';

Minister for saying that ‘...the times when we almost made our relations with neighboring countries through subsidies come to an end’.²⁶⁰

The response to the gas crisis in the German context was therefore to a large extent a matter of perceptions. Although the whole event shook Germany’s trust in Russia, as opposed to many CEE states, many non - media voices in Germany put a lot of blame for the crisis on Ukraine.²⁶¹ Consequently, any damage done to the image of Russia as a supplier was short-lived and did not lead to any significant repercussions from the German side. A number of interconnected factors also contributed to this lack of response. Firstly, Germany, due to its more than seventy days of gas reserves, was well covered during the gas cut off episode and therefore not harmed by the crisis.²⁶² As an official from one of the four big energy companies in Germany E.ON stated: ‘It was of course not an amusement for the gas industry...’, but ‘in essence nothing really happened in Germany for the gas customers, because we had enough storage’.²⁶³ Secondly, the distal context played a role (historically determined perceptions), as in the view of different energy experts Germany had a good experience with gas transits from Russia, with the latter having proved to be a reliable supplier even during the Cold War period.²⁶⁴ Thirdly, the majority of Germans did not perceive Russia as a danger at the time, but rather as a small country due to its small economy.²⁶⁵ Therefore, even with Vladimir Putin as a president (or formerly also Prime Minister) Germany was ‘not afraid at all’.²⁶⁶ Even though the majority of the public saw their country as excessively dependent on a single supplier, the impact of this perception was diminished by the fact that Germans think of import dependency more in the economic than security terms.²⁶⁷ The aspects of energy security related to fossil

²⁶⁰ ‘Leitartikel: Moskauer Gasmanöver’;

²⁶¹ SWP II, Interview; DGAP, Interview.

²⁶² Freie Universität Berlin, Interview; SWP II, Interview; BMUB, Interview.

²⁶³ E.ON., Interview.

²⁶⁴ DGAP, Interview; E.ON., Interview.

²⁶⁵ SWP, Interview.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ BMUB, Interview.

fuels are then seen through the prism of increasing global gas and oil prices rather than in terms of dependency on supplies from Russia in general.²⁶⁸

The above contextual dynamics was even more explicit as far as the developments around the Nordstream project are concerned.

Nordstream

Already in 2005, while writing about the Baltic pipeline project, Cerstin Gammelin from *Die Zeit* noted how the deal was made to please the German corporations.²⁶⁹ With German E.ON/Ruhrgas holding 6, 5% of Gazprom and with Wintershall aiming at closer ties with the Russian energy monopolist, Nordstream was a clear manifestation of energy companies' interests. However, given that establishing the Baltic pipeline was neither in line with the rule of open competition nor with the lowest possible prices, the newspaper boldly asked: 'Why do these developments do not interest anybody in Germany?'²⁷⁰

A closer look at the constellation of actors in the German pipeline politics provides an answer to this question. The establishment of Nordstream was initially set up by a strong alliance between Russia and Germany based on the involvement of two key political figures: former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The key players on the German side were energy company E.ON and Economic Ministry, which pushed forward their economic agenda.²⁷¹ However, the German government did not consult any neighboring states at the early stage and even the general public was not well aware of the project until the actual deal was signed.²⁷² Moreover, the political opposition was silent on the issue²⁷³ and some analysts explain this general lack of political debate on Nordstream by the

²⁶⁸ BMUB, Interview.

²⁶⁹ 'Energie: Die Erdgas-Connection', *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Politik, <http://www.zeit.de/2005/51/Erdgas>.

²⁷⁰ 'Energie: Wenn Putin Gas Gibt | ZEIT ONLINE', n.d., <http://www.zeit.de/2005/37/Energieprojekte>.

²⁷¹ The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ 'Energie: Wenn Putin Gas Gibt | ZEIT ONLINE';

fact that ‘Energiewende’ with its shift to renewable energy became a new slogan whereas it started to be ‘politically unpopular to talk about pipeline politics’.²⁷⁴ With a lack of sufficient information in media there was also no debate on the project in the German strategic community.²⁷⁵

The project appeared therefore as an economically driven ‘business as usual’ – conducted largely away from the scrutinizing eye of the German media and the general public, and not highly politicized. The project’s smooth introduction was enhanced not only by the close links between German Social Democrats and Russian politics, but also Gerhard Schroeder’s personal and more ‘behind the scenes’ style of politics that enabled undertaking of the North European pipeline plans,²⁷⁶ while avoiding much public discussion. After the signing of the deal, Schroeder was criticized for the insensitivity to the Eastern neighbours, but a general feeling was that a lot of criticism of his close connections to Russia derived rather from the general critical stance towards Russia and its internal problems (such as respect for human rights), rather than towards the Nordstream pipeline itself.²⁷⁷ Therefore, although it was admitted that not consulting eastern neighbors (mainly Poland) at the early stage was a mistake,²⁷⁸ and that the entire handling of the situation showed a general lack of sensitivity to the issue of energy security,²⁷⁹ in the end there was a consensus that Nordstream is good for Germany. Many in Germany also see the Baltic pipeline project as a very nationalistic undertaking, whereas others (both energy experts and the actual key players) perceive it more as a European venture.²⁸⁰ As one of the Germany’s energy experts put it ‘Germany is part of Europe and we are thinking about European security (...), Germany doesn’t have any important

²⁷⁴ DGAP, Interview.

²⁷⁵ The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview.

²⁷⁶ SWP II, Interview.

²⁷⁷ DGAP, Interview; The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview; SWP II, Interview.

²⁷⁸ E.ON., Interview.

²⁷⁹ The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview.

²⁸⁰ Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interview; E.ON., Interview; Freie Universität Berlin II, Interview, 21 November 2012.

energy security questions’.²⁸¹ And further: ‘...most scientists when they think about Germany they think about the government, but here the important decision makers are energy companies, which are multinational and they work with other European countries’, therefore - ‘there is no national interest, the national interest is the European interest’.²⁸² Going a step further, a representative of E.ON stated that Nordstream was not only a European undertaking, but a potential way of closer integration with Russia in general: ‘People in Western Europe feel too much paranoia vis-à-vis Russia, because [it] tries to come to Europe, [but] (...) they really need us to modernize [their] country’, therefore there is ‘a need to water down the prejudices to each other (...) and that requires concrete projects’.²⁸³ Against this general trend, opinions that Germany acts like a rich ‘energy-egoist’, as it creates mistrust among its eastern neighbors for the sake of closer ties with Russia and refuses solidarity clause in a crisis that could help weaker EU states, were in the minority.²⁸⁴

Interestingly, the 2006 Ukrainian gas crisis, which closely followed initial developments around the Nordstream project, served to justify the venture further. In the opinion of different energy experts the successful finalization of the project was rooted in the fact that gas crisis of 2006 showed the instability of Ukraine and Belarus and need for alternatives, whereas Russia was still seen as a good, reliable partner - therefore the North European pipeline would provide Germany with ‘more than less security’.²⁸⁵ In the words of the representative from BDEW the project illustrated a big trust of Germany in Russia, with the first ending up to be ‘more secure, because Russians will deliver and no-one will interrupt the supply’.²⁸⁶ This rhetoric was also eagerly repeated among the representatives of the German corporations involved in the project, as CEO of E.ON Wulf Bernotat stated in an interview with *Der Spiegel* in 2006: ‘The pipeline

²⁸¹ Freie Universität Berlin II, Interview.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ E.ON., Interview.

²⁸⁴ Umbach, ‘Deutsche Außenpolitik Und Energiesicherheit’.

²⁸⁵ The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interview; SWP II, Interview.

²⁸⁶ BDEW, Interview.

is a piece of security of supply’, while similarly suggesting that bypassing transit countries like Ukraine might be not so wrong in light of the recent developments.²⁸⁷

Further gas disputes between Russia and transit states in the following years did not change the dynamics of the German pipeline politics, despite some critical media analysis. The media articles repeatedly referred to Gazprom as Putin’s gas weapon that he uses to re-establish world power.^{288 289} The rhetoric expressed was also clearly in line with the war logic, as it highlighted its ‘zero-sum’ game dynamics by embracing phrases such as ‘Gas Putin’, ‘Moscow power games’ or cover titles like “The state Gazprom: Putin’s Energy-Empire”.²⁹⁰ In the aftermath of the next big gas cut-off episode in 2009, *Die Zeit* also rhetorically asked whether Russia is a ‘false friend’?²⁹¹ While others pointed out that since the 2006 Ukrainian gas crisis Germany did nothing to improve the diversification of its gas supplies.²⁹² However, media articles had little if no impact on the ongoing energy debate and their voices were countered by the opinions coming from the political and corporate spheres. Aside from Gerhard Schroeder, who was stating from the start that Nordstream enhances European energy security and is essentially a Russian-European project, a number of executives of the German main energy companies were continuously reassuring that Gazprom is not easy ‘but always a reliable partner’. Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier even called for the strategic partnership with Russia because of ‘energy security’.²⁹³ With an ongoing argument about ‘mutual dependency’ playing out in the background, and disengagement of other non-corporate actors, the nature of German pipeline politics remained unaltered.

²⁸⁷ Frank Dohmen, ‘Die Pipeline Ist Ein Stück Sicherheit’, *Der Spiegel*, 9 January 2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45280015.html>.

²⁸⁸ Erich Follath and Matthias Schepp, ‘Der Konzern Des Zaren’, *Der Spiegel*, 5 March 2007, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-50746908.html>.

²⁸⁹ Ralf Beste et al., ‘ENERGIEPOLITIK Die Waffe Gas’, *Der Spiegel*, 12 January 2009, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-63546812.html>.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.; ‘Der Staat Gasprom: Putins Energie-Imperium’, *Der Spiegel*, 5 March 2007.

²⁹¹ Frank Dohmen, ‘Die Pipeline Ist Ein Stück Sicherheit’;

²⁹² Beste et al., ‘ENERGIEPOLITIK Die Waffe Gas’.

²⁹³ ‘ENERGIE UND MACHT: “Gegenseitig Abhängig”’, *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Wirtschaft, http://www.zeit.de/2008/02/Gegenseitig_abhaengig; Ibid.

Therefore, the aftermath of the Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009 and the developments around the Nordstream project highlight the specificities of the German context. It is characterized by the ‘business-like’ character of pipeline politics²⁹⁴ and the constellation of actors, where energy companies enjoy much leverage and push forward their own economic agenda. Politicians rarely take a strong stance on the developments in the area of security of gas supply, while media and expert analysis are not strong enough to shift the energy debate or the policy course. The words of the representative of E.ON illustrate well this dynamics: ‘there is still strategic discussion of course how to diversify sources (...) which I personally don’t like, because there are always some politicians who say ‘we have to be less dependent on Russia’, well... [it is not up to] the politicians to make this diversification of gas supplies’.²⁹⁵ This constellation of actors is upheld by a number of distal factors – such as historically determined perceptions of Russia, domination of economic concerns in the gas politics and general social disengagement from the issue of gas supplies. When considered together, these contextual elements determine that the ‘grammar of conflict’ is not ‘picked-up’ in the wider debate and although the control over energy resources is centralized it de facto lies in the hands of big energy monopolies not the political elite. Ultimately, the rationale around German pipeline politics does not revolve around survival and the context itself is not conducive for the logic of war to fully manifest in it. Change in the German political leadership, and a more ‘transparent’ style of conducting politics by Angela Merkel, did not drastically change these dynamics either, as one policy analyst noticed: ‘Chancellor Merkel never liked the Nordstream project, but will follow whatever is good for economic interests in gas/oil’.²⁹⁶ Speaking as of autumn 2012, a number of German analysts also noted that even given the general disillusionment with the pace and direction of political reforms in Russia, and the perception that the country might ‘switch

²⁹⁴ DGAP, Interview.

²⁹⁵ E.ON., Interview.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

to chaos',²⁹⁷ the business-like nature of dealing with gas supply routes is likely to stay unaltered.

However, as further analysis shows, although the above dynamics seems to be 'typical' for the German context of energy security - understood in the traditional terms of security of supply within the geopolitical constraints - the distal factors play out differently in relation to other energy sources and shift both the domestic constellations of actors and the degree to which different security mechanisms are utilized.

GERMAN NUCLEAR ENERGY DEBATE & THE RISK LOGIC

Whereas the events in the area of pipeline politics were not able to move the issue of gas dependency on Russia to the higher security agenda, the accident in the Japanese nuclear power plant Fukushima in March 2011 served as a powerful 'trigger' for the domestic debate on nuclear energy and further policy developments in Germany. A post-Fukushima 'moratorium' given by Chancellor Angela Merkel took seven oldest of Germany's 17 nuclear power plants off the grid. This decision was quickly followed by the plan agreed between Merkel's Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Free Democrats (FDP) to shut down all the remaining nuclear plants between the year 2021 and 2022.²⁹⁸ This sudden political move took place in the shifted constellation of actors - where the government's representative, under the immense public pressure fueled by the vivid media debate, made a U-turn policy decision²⁹⁹ without consulting key energy businesses. As such, it reversed the typical power dynamics within the German energy sphere.

The analysis of this section investigates how the interplay of distal context and constellation of actors brought about the changes in the dynamics of the domestic setting, which

²⁹⁷ DGAP, Interview; SWP, Interview.

²⁹⁸ Jan Berst, 'German Shift to Wind Power Slams Neighboring Grids', *Smartgridnews.com*, 2012, http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/Technologies_DG_Renewables/German-shift-to-wind-power-slams-neighboring-grids-4373.html#.UPRPO-SZnao.

²⁹⁹ After prolonging the lifetime of Germany's nuclear power plants just a few months before Fukushima.

is highly conducive for the risk logic to play an important role in it. In the process it is highlighted how the rhetoric of calculation and precaution is brought up much more readily in Germany than in the other two contexts studied.

Background of the German nuclear energy debate

No other country fought so bitterly against the nuclear industry and in no other country the anti-nuclear movement was as strong as in Germany.³⁰⁰ As a representative from BDEW put it: ‘Germany is the only country in the world where nuclear energy is such a controversial issue and has been such a controversial issue for over 40 years now’.³⁰¹ The contextual analysis points to a number of distal factors that shed more light on this phenomenon.

It seems that one of the main explanations is the anti-nuclear movement, which as opposed to other states has been continuously strong in Germany ever since the 70ties.³⁰² Moreover, the character of this movement was both societal and political³⁰³ - with the very fight against nuclear power serving as the founding myth for the Green party (since the 80ties).³⁰⁴ The roots of the movement itself and the rise of the Greens could be attributed to the public distrust in media (badly covered lies) and the social system itself at the time.³⁰⁵ In the view of an analyst from the Berlin-based SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) people from Eastern Germany were sceptical towards governmental statements, therefore they believed that there is a need ‘to go to the streets’, whereas in Western Germany the legacy of Nazi regime could have played a role – as with a history of being ‘lied to’, there was a general belief that ‘you can be completely betrayed by the state’.³⁰⁶ This general distrust meant that - even before the rise of

³⁰⁰ Philip Bethge et al., ‘Energie Krise Kernkraft - Ja Bitte?’, *Der Spiegel*, 7 July 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-57970883.html>.

³⁰¹ BDEW, Interview.

³⁰² BMUB, Interview.

³⁰³ FDP, Interview, 27 November 2012; SWP II, Interview.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ SWP II, Interview.

³⁰⁶ SWP, Interview.

the Green movement – the statements of the government had been questioned by the German media already from the 60ties and 70ties.³⁰⁷ Additionally, some policy analysts specifically link the debate on nuclear power that fueled the fear of nuclear disaster to the German-speaking media at the time, as similar debates were taking place in Switzerland, Austria and even German-speaking parts of Belgium.³⁰⁸

The role of media in shaping the debate on nuclear safety could be traced ever since – especially in the face of big nuclear accidents, such as Chernobyl. The Chernobyl accident contributed to the erosion of trust in science and to the disappearance of technological optimism in Germany, which ultimately led to the political re-orientation and decision to phase-out nuclear energy by the red-green government in early 2000.³⁰⁹ As the 2008 article from *Der Spiegel* stated: “The Chernobyl disaster (...) confirmed the suspicion. Now the fear had a real basis. Thousands of people died in Ukraine, some parts of Germany were slightly contaminated...It was a bad feeling that the doubts about the promised safety of this technology were entitled”.³¹⁰ The rhetoric invoked in the German media was therefore in line with Becksian risk society as nuclear energy turned out to be uncontrollable and no precautionary measures could completely alleviate its risks. Consequently, the only conceivable strategy was a policy change. The widely discussed nuclear disaster at the Ukrainian power plant in 1986 directly led to the founding of the first environment ministry in Germany and stopping the plans for building any new nuclear power plants.³¹¹ Later on, it also contributed to the introduction of the first feed-in-tariffs in 1990 – the long-term, guaranteed payments for small-scale renewable energy, which ignited the renewables boom two decades later. Moreover, since Chernobyl the rhetoric, which highlighted the ‘totality’ and unmanageability of nuclear risks in the global age could be

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.; SWP II, Interview.

³⁰⁹ ‘Kernenergie: Von Der Angst Verstrahlt’, *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Politik, http://www.zeit.de/2006/17/01_leit_1_17.

³¹⁰ Philip Bethge et al., ‘Energie Krise Kernkraft - Ja Bitte?’;

³¹¹ Freie Universität Berlin, Interview.

spotted even more clearly across media pieces and expert analysis. On the one hand, there were media articles providing detailed stories about the fate of the local population and workers that took part in eliminating the effects of the Chernobyl disaster, including their radiation-related diseases and continuously harsh living conditions.³¹² On the other hand, nuclear risks were highlighted throughout the debates on the German future energy mix, as SPD thinker Erhard Eppler stated in 2008 while commenting on a new energy consensus that aimed at the extension of nuclear power plants' operating time: 'in a century when states and their monopoly over power decay, while violence is privatized and commercialized and often takes form of the globalized terrorism, nuclear energy is 'lethal carelessness'.'³¹³

Moreover, even prior to the accident in the Japanese Fukushima some analysts spotted how both the German politicians and the German media invoked on a number of occasions the rhetoric of risk for their own purposes. One of such examples was the analysis that reconstructed events of the fire accident in the German nuclear reactor Krummel in 2007, with the authors arguing that the regulators played a double game and the incident was 'a lesson on the manipulation of public opinion and about opportunism and temptation to engage in the policy of fear'.³¹⁴ The fire at Krummel provided the SPD Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel with the evidence that nuclear energy is a 'risk technology' that needs to be abolished as soon as possible, as he called it a "threat reactor" and questioned the reliability of the nuclear industry as a whole.³¹⁵ This opinion was echoed by his Parliamentary Secretary Michael Mueller, who put the incident in Krummel at the same level with the Chernobyl catastrophe, as he stated: 'In no scenario this incident was obviously intended, and this shows that such accidents can happen

³¹² Walter Mayr, 'KERNKRAFT Pompeji Des Atomzeitalters', *Der Spiegel*, 15 April 2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46637177.html>.

³¹³ Roland Nelles, 'Energie Krise Ein Paar Jahre Länger', *Der Spiegel*, 7 July 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-57970884.html>.

³¹⁴ Jan Fleischhauer and Roland Nelles, 'ATOMKRAFT Der Störfall', *Der Spiegel*, 22 October 2007, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-53364516.html>.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

not only in the Third World or Eastern Europe, but also in a highly developed country'.³¹⁶ However, later analysis showed that what happened in the German nuclear power plant would be classified - according to the worldwide standard established by the International Atomic Energy Agency - as 0 on INES scale³¹⁷ - meaning an 'event with little or no safety significance'.³¹⁸ The newspaper investigation also described in greater detail how the incident had been purposely exaggerated along the way, directly affecting energy company Vattenfall that owned the plant and causing other energy companies to give up hope that nuclear phase-out decision could be put once more up for the discussion. Therefore, the 'riskification' of the incident in Krummel shifted the debate from the climate change agenda back to the nuclear phase-out and the debate on nuclear energy back to the point where 'it has always been after the Chernobyl disaster', while ensuring that the majority of Germans were once again against nuclear power in the opinion polls.³¹⁹

Ironically, once the political mood changed again and Chancellor Angela Merkel tried to extend the operating time of the German nuclear reactors in 2008, *Die Zeit*, referred to the very Ulrich Beck's argument about the risk society, while criticizing Merkel for 'trying to hide the risks of nuclear energy in order to save the climate'.³²⁰ Speaking of the 'competition of major risks' it suggested that the incalculable risks posed by climate change compete with incalculable risks associated with nuclear power plants, therefore:

'Many decisions on major risks are not about choosing between safe and risky alternatives, but of choosing between different risky alternatives', yet since 'such considerations are not up to today's forms of scientific and public discourse'...'Merkel and the CDU/CSU succumb to the temptation of an oversimplification to present the relevant decision as a choice between safe and risky alternatives by displacing the uncertainties of nuclear energy while bringing the risk of the oil crisis and the climate crisis into the center of attention'.³²¹

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ International Nuclear Event Scale – a 7 point scale that categorizes failures in nuclear power plants, from “1 disorder”, “2 Incident” to “7 major accident”;

³¹⁸ Fleischhauer and Nelles, 'ATOMKRAFT Der Störfall'.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ 'Atomdebatte: Wollen Wir Tschernobyl Wirklich Vergessen? | ZEIT ONLINE', n.d., <http://www.zeit.de/2008/28/Risikogesellschaft>.

³²¹ Ibid.

As a consequence, *Die Zeit* argued, whoever – like the Greens – denies the revival of nuclear power sins against preventive climate policy, yet this tactic is a ‘frivolous game played with the security interests of the population’, as not all risks are considered equally important in different contexts. Therefore, the Chernobyl experience is valued differently in Germany than in France or Britain and different contexts represent different ‘risk cultures’.³²²

Both examples point to the relative easiness with which elements of the risk logic are brought up in the German rhetoric for strategic purposes. Although the mechanism itself could be seen here as mostly in line with Corry’s ‘riskification’, the ultimate reasoning in both cases brings us closer to the totality of global risks that are out of control. Consequently, the only rational precautionary measure is the policy change and nuclear phase-out. Whereas the favorable distal factors determine that this rhetoric is likely to be influential in Germany, the developments in the aftermath of the nuclear accident at Fukushima additionally illustrate that it has the power to shift the ‘typical’ constellation of actors in the German energy sphere.

Fukushima & its aftermath in Germany

The 2011 accident in the Japanese NPP Fukushima reshuffled the power dynamics between different actors in the German energy context as well as gave new impetus to the anti-nuclear debate. The rhetoric invoked for the most part resembled the dynamics of the global risk society, where the uncontrollable and incalculable risks materialized. With the hourly updates and detailed analysis of the newest developments from Fukushima, German media focused on how helplessly the technologically advanced Japan responded in the immediate aftermath of the accident.³²³ Issues such as, advice for Japanese citizens to stay home and put

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ralf Beste et al., ‘Fukushima Ist Überall’, *Der Spiegel*, 14 March 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-77435293.html>; Philip Bethge et al., ‘Der Stromausfall’, *Der Spiegel*, 21 March 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-77531668.html>.

damp cloths over their mouths, illustrated the state of affairs that got out of control. Additionally, German media resorted to strong rhetoric. With the articles and cover titles declaring ‘the end of nuclear age’,³²⁴ ‘Japan’s lesson for the world’³²⁵ and ‘the end of the atomic dream of mankind that has become a nightmare’³²⁶ – it was “the very existence of millions” at stake that was challenged in Fukushima.³²⁷ Therefore, the nuclear risk materialized in a different way than what is happening in the coal-mining areas, gas fields or oil platforms – it was ‘invisible’, ‘inescapable’, ‘the curse’.³²⁸ The lesson from the Fukushima could only be one – ‘the eleventh commandment for the modern citizen: Thou shalt not play poker – the stakes are too high, too many people are affected’.³²⁹ In fact, the very idea that the nuclear energy could be made safe turned out to be a ‘megalomaniac lost bet, with which humanity challenged the forces of nature and physics’ and an ‘arrogant self-assurance’.³³⁰ As one journalist put it: “Never again will anyone dare to spread the myth of the safety of reactors with impunity. It proved to be a lie. The reactors were not safe and they will never be’.³³¹ With the frequently repeated argument that if a disaster like this could happen in Japan, then it could also happen in Germany given the appropriate chain of fatal circumstances,³³² German media grandly declared: “Fukushima is everywhere”.³³³

Given specificities of the domestic context, the impact on the German nuclear energy policy was immediate. Even if the accident did not seal the fate of the nuclear industry

³²⁴ Ibid.;

³²⁵ ‘Atompolitik: Japans Lehre Für Die Welt | ZEIT ONLINE’, n.d., <http://www.zeit.de/2011/12/japan-kernenergie-leitartikel>.

³²⁶ Fritz Vorholz, ‘Energiepolitik: Schluss, Aus’, *Die Zeit*, 2011, sec. Wirtschaft, <http://www.zeit.de/2011/12/DOS-Atomausstieg>.

³²⁷ Gero von Randow, ‘Energiepolitik: In Eine Falle War Ich Getappt’, *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Politik, <http://www.zeit.de/2011/13/Neudenken>.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ ‘Atompolitik: Japans Lehre Für Die Welt | ZEIT ONLINE’;

³³⁰ Bethge et al., ‘Der Stromausfall’; Beste et al., ‘Fukushima Ist Überall’.

³³¹ Vorholz, ‘Energiepolitik: Schluss, Aus’.

³³² The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview; Freie Universität Berlin, Interview; BMUB, Interview; ‘Climate Protection and Growth: Germany’s Path into the Renewable Energy Age’ (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2011), 10.

³³³ Bethge et al., ‘Der Stromausfall’; Beste et al., ‘Fukushima Ist Überall’.

elsewhere, as some analysts had initially predicted, it surely was the case in Germany. In light of the shifting debate Chancellor Merkel stated that the meltdowns proved that even a technologically advanced country like Japan had been unable to shut out the risk of disaster entirely, therefore ‘Germany must (...) rethink and hasten to secure a good and sensible energy supply without atomic power’.³³⁴ Many saw that decision as ‘Merkel’s nuclear awakening experience that sealed the fate of nuclear energy in Germany as her scientific mind of a quantum chemist - which told her that according to all the rules of probability nuclear power is a viable energy – has been challenged’.³³⁵ The extension of modern nuclear power plants’ operating time was suddenly seen as irresponsible, whereas the renaissance of the old ones was simply a ‘dangerous game’.³³⁶ In the words of one magazine analysis: ‘Fukushima should now stand for the end of the dream of the controllable nuclear power, for the admission: over this energy we have no control’.³³⁷ The heated nuclear debate shaped by media and a number of politicians illustrated Germany’s deeply rooted ‘fear of nuclear’ and began an unprecedented race in the German politics with the parties competing over ‘who wants to get out of this form of energy even faster and more consistently than the other’ and even the former pro-nuclear party FDP turning into its opponent.³³⁸ Similarly, even the so far supporters of nuclear power among the German population were largely turning against it.³³⁹ In a survey for ARD conducted after Fukushima accident 71% of Germans declared that they are against nuclear energy (as compared with 51% in the autumn the previous year).³⁴⁰ ³⁴¹ However, as many analysts pointed out, Germany presented rather a ‘reaction’ to Fukushima than a rational action – with the

³³⁴ G. Rueter, ‘Clean Power Benefits from Nuclear Phase out’, *Deutsche Welle*, March 2012, <http://www.dw.de/clean-power-benefits-from-nuclear-phase-out/a-15790686>.

³³⁵ Dohmen et al., ‘Das War’s!’

³³⁶ Beste et al., ‘Fukushima Ist Überall’; Bethge et al., ‘Der Stromausfall’.

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Frank Dohmen et al., ‘Das War’s!’;

³³⁹ BMUB, Interview.

³⁴⁰ And 80 % additionally agreeing with the moratorium imposed by the government for the old nuclear reactors.

³⁴¹ Ibid.;

nuclear debate been highly emotional and – indeed irrational.³⁴² As a politician from the FDP (Free Democratic Party) noticed, at that time ‘people in Germany spoke more about that catastrophe [at Fukushima nuclear plant] than about the tens of thousands of people who had problems or died because of [tsunami]’.³⁴³ The ‘theme of irrationality’ was also undertaken on the part of energy businesses, as a representative from E.ON stated: ‘In my view this [accelerated nuclear phase-out] is not so rational, Mrs Merkel is a physicist so normally I would say she appears to be a very rational person...’.³⁴⁴ Similarly, the CEO of RWE Juergen Grossmann saw the German debate as irrational, while pointing out that German nuclear energy is produced according to the highest safety standards, which still can be reviewed and improved if needed after the analysis of accident in Japan.³⁴⁵ However, this view of energy businesses regarding what would count as a sufficient precautionary measure to alleviate nuclear energy risks was not shared among other societal actors.

The perceived ‘irrationality’ on the part of the rest of the society could have several causes, largely determined by a distal context. Apart from the already mentioned historical factors, some pointed to the possible ‘psychological aspect of nuclear power’ and the need ‘to be in control’.³⁴⁶ After all, as even the energy business actors noted, the accident in Fukushima showed that: ‘At the end of the day we as human beings can clearly see, we are not the master of nature...’.³⁴⁷ This fear of the ‘uncontrollable’ was directly linked to the prevailing logic in the German context that ‘every nuclear reactor adds more risk’.³⁴⁸ Therefore, although the transition from nuclear power to renewables is expensive – in the words of a politician from FDP: ‘it is of course a question of risks, and if you can afford it - better if there aren’t too

³⁴² Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interview; DGAP, Interview.

³⁴³ FDP, Interview.

³⁴⁴ E.ON., Interview.

³⁴⁵ Götz Hamann, ‘Atomenergie: “Wir Können Nur Hoffen”’, *Die Zeit*, sec. Wirtschaft, accessed 9 March 2016, <http://www.zeit.de/2011/12/Atomenergie-Grossmann>.

³⁴⁶ DGAP, Interview.

³⁴⁷ E.ON., Interview.

³⁴⁸ SWP, Interview.

many'.³⁴⁹

For that reason, many German NGOs working on the issues of environment and climate protection oppose the nuclear energy. The narrative over the last fifteen years in Germany created the belief that nuclear energy will not solve the climate issues, as emissions from nuclear are higher than commonly assumed, therefore the nuclear power is not environmentally friendly (although more so than coal).³⁵⁰ This rhetoric came to the very fore of the debate on nuclear energy after Fukushima's accident. With German population afraid of the nuclear waste, radioactivity leading to cancer, environmental protection and safety of nuclear power plants³⁵¹ – the debate highlighted multiple security concerns related to nuclear energy in the German context. However, whereas some questioned the argument that nuclear phase-out 'is driven by hysteria, hypochondria and self-pity, in a word - *German Angst*', while arguing that the green German exceptionalism became an incredible success story resulting in a better, healthier nature,³⁵² others compared German 'nuclear fear' to the religion, as 'faith has nothing to do with facts – unless these facts support the faith'.³⁵³ Therefore, even if the possibility of harm caused by a nuclear accident is significantly lower in Germany than Japan (due to its geographical location), this fact ultimately does not matter as 'nuclear fear' appears to have numerous deeply rooted causes, which make the German context unique. The specifics of this context also largely explain why it is hard to understand from the German perspective a totally different character of debates on nuclear power in the neighboring Poland or Ukraine. As Hans Josef Fell from the Greens put it: '[there are] areas in Belarus and Ukraine that have been completely destroyed by radioactivity...it is completely crazy to go on with this'.³⁵⁴

³⁴⁹ FDP, Interview.

³⁵⁰ SWP, Interview.

³⁵¹ Fell, Interview.

³⁵² Bernd Ulrich, 'Atomkatastrophe: Ein Land Bleibt Cool', *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Politik, <http://www.zeit.de/2011/13/German-angst>.

³⁵³ 'Atomausstieg: "German Angst" | ZEIT ONLINE', n.d., <http://www.zeit.de/2011/24/P-Zeitgeist-German-Angst>.

³⁵⁴ Fell, Interview.

Accelerated nuclear phase-out

The favorable distal factors caused that the anti-nuclear rhetoric exerted a strong impact on the German context. Hence, as opposed to the developments in the pipeline politics when the grammar of conflict was invoked - but without further policy actions of the state actors, the role of media in the aftermath of the Japanese nuclear accident was much more prominent. Not only did the vivid debate further mobilize anti-nuclear sentiments, but various societal actors appeared to have more leverage to influence policy course vis-à-vis energy companies.

The nature and severity of the post-Fukushima nuclear debate in Germany caused that Chancellor Merkel, who had always been a supporter of nuclear energy - under a huge public pressure and with the elections in mind – made the decision of the accelerated nuclear phase-out.³⁵⁵ Crucially, this decision was taken in what could be seen as a great power reshuffle within the German energy sphere. The policy U-turn was made by the government, driven by the public agenda, backed by the environmental movements and fueled by a vivid debate in the German media, yet quite strikingly, the big four energy companies (E.ON, EnBW, Vattenfall and RWE) were not consulted on that decision.

The more interesting then seemed a broad social dialogue launched by the federal government on the issue of the potential nuclear phase-out, which ‘...in a process involving the Ethics Commission on a Safe Energy Supply, reviewed the *risks* posed by nuclear power’.³⁵⁶ Klaus Topfer, the chairman of the Ethics Committee – an energy - ethical council of experts, trade unionists, thinkers and churchmen, stated that Chernobyl was both a disastrous event and an opportunity to move away from a path of destruction, and that the committee wanted to work in that direction ‘out from the heart of the society’.³⁵⁷ However, some argued that Merkel chose

³⁵⁵ DGAP, Interview.

³⁵⁶ ‘Climate Protection and Growth: Germany’s Path into the Renewable Energy Age’, 10. Emphasis added.

³⁵⁷ Christian Schwägerl, ‘KERNENERGIE Im Töpfer-Kurs’, *Der Spiegel*, 28 March 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-77745552.html>.

such a solution to, in fact, bypass the debate that could have taken place in the Parliament or within wider society instead.³⁵⁸ Regardless of the motivation, that move showed a significant shift in the German constellation of actors. Whereas the representatives of Church or academia were asked for an opinion on the issue of accelerated nuclear phase - out as part of this dialogue, the key energy businesses were not - although they were the ones most hit by the change.

Before an accident in Fukushima nuclear companies fully supported 'Energiewende', but with the extension of the working time for the nuclear power plants.³⁵⁹ Yet, 'The Japanese nuclear disaster at Fukushima and the subsequent debate about nuclear safety have plunged Germany's energy industry (...) into a hitherto unimaginable crisis' with the big four's profits drastically decreasing and many customers turning into their environmentally friendly rivals – such as Lichtblick and Naturstrom – that offer electricity free of nuclear or coal sources.³⁶⁰ Moreover, despite the shutdown the companies had to continue to pay a nuclear-fuel tax of around 2.3 billion euro a year until 2016.³⁶¹ In response to these developments E.ON and RWE, concerned about damage to their competitiveness, filed cases with the federal constitutional court claiming that the abrupt closure of nuclear plants is tantamount to expropriation.³⁶² Additionally, the Economics Ministry – under pressure from the Federation of German Industry – set up an independent process to 'monitor' the policy change, with a view to possible course corrections.³⁶³

Many energy businesses saw the companies' moves as necessary steps for protecting their stakeholders' interests, which should not in themselves inhibit the big four energy giants'

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interview.

³⁶⁰ SPIEGEL ONLINE, 'Business Model at Risk: Nuclear Phaseout Could Spell Disaster for German Energy Giants', June 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/business-model-at-risk-nuclear-phaseout-could-spell-disaster-for-german-energy-giants-a-766095.html>.

³⁶¹ Berst, 'German Shift to Wind Power Slams Neighboring Grids'.

³⁶² Ibid; Frank Dohmen and Alexander Neubacher, 'ENERGIE Toter Markt', *Der Spiegel*, 11 June 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-78954510.html>.

³⁶³ Ibid.

relations with the German government.³⁶⁴ However, the accelerated phase-out clearly weakened the energy companies while highlighting the role of other actors in shaping the debate on what the future of the German energy mix should look like. With the customers willing to pay more for ‘clean’ energy,³⁶⁵ and with the idea of ‘green economy’ becoming a prevailing way of thinking in the German context, the companies had no choice, but to change their future investment plans. As Oliver Krischer from the Greens stated: ‘the big energy utilities had ignored that the world was changing for too long’ and their losses ‘were the result of misguided energy policy’ and ‘the logical consequence of an outdated business model that relies on environmentally damaging coal and dangerous nuclear power plants’.³⁶⁶

In general terms, many policy analysts and energy experts would agree that accelerated nuclear phase-out was a purely political decision on the part of Angela Merkel.³⁶⁷ With the government trying to ensure its credibility after Fukushima and with 2011 elections in mind, where CDU could lose large votes to Conservative Party (anti-nuclear), Merkel ‘understood that she could not win’ otherwise.³⁶⁸ The initial decision about the nuclear phase-out taken just a few months before the accident in Fukushima was also important here. Given a strong public support for it - there was also a strong public opposition (70%) to the extension of the period of operation for nuclear power plants as reflected by numerous demonstrations at that time.³⁶⁹ As one energy expert put it: ‘prolonging the phase-out created a strong anti-nuclear resistance so it was a big mistake, because it was only in favour of those four operators,³⁷⁰ all the other utilities were against it because it also took their chance in covering other power stations on the

³⁶⁴ E.ON., Interview; BDEW, Interview.

³⁶⁵ Already in 2010 more than half of Germans declared that they would be prepared to pay 10% more for electricity from renewables (even among people with low household income of 1000-1500 EUR); source: Marc Brost, ‘Umfrage Atomausstieg: Schon Wieder Ärger Mit Dem Volk’, *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Politik, <http://www.zeit.de/2010/30/Atomausstieg>

³⁶⁶ Andreas Becker, ‘German Energy Firms in Crisis’, *Deutsche Welle*, 15 March 2012, <http://www.dw.com/en/german-energy-firms-in-crisis/a-15809494>.

³⁶⁷ SWP, Interview; The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview; SWP II, Interview; E.ON., Interview.

³⁶⁸ SWP II, Interview; The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview.

³⁶⁹ The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview; BMUB, Interview; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interview.

³⁷⁰ The four big energy companies in Germany: RWE, E.ON., Vattenfall and EnBW

grid ...and in the public there was a big revival of the anti-nuclear movement'.³⁷¹ Apart from party politics, some noted that the disaster in Fukushima created a unique political momentum for a U-turn policy change to be made within such a short period.³⁷² Since the issue of the future of nuclear energy had always divided the German society, it was an opportunity to bring all the different society groups together.³⁷³ Therefore, although the decision was indeed rushed it was still 'worth doing it' and perhaps could not be done slower, as similarly to the German reunification in the past, the expectations were for certain measures to take place immediately.³⁷⁴ Moreover, since such a conversion of an industrial society did not previously exist, it was also the national effort comparable to the efforts of German unification that was needed.³⁷⁵ As one member of the Ministry for the Environment put it: 'The reason why Germany shifted so fast to the renewables was driven by a huge public support' as the 'political agenda regarding those issues in Germany is very much driven by a public agenda' – 'now energy companies are coming to terms with that decision'.³⁷⁶

The question why energy companies were not consulted is less clear. It was due to the power of big four energy giants that the German government managed to redo the initial phase-out plans - with Merkel having talks with the big four while 'the public was wondering why'.³⁷⁷ This constellation has drastically changed after Fukushima. In some opinions the companies were not consulted because the government wanted to start nuclear phase-out as quickly as possible.³⁷⁸ Others suggested that Chancellor Merkel decided the policy change on the spot without consulting it with anybody except for a coalition partner as she might have thought that consulting companies would not change anything,³⁷⁹ or that the Chancellor had a new 'hammer'

³⁷¹ Freie Universität Berlin, Interview.

³⁷² BMUB, Interview; FDP, Interview.

³⁷³ FDP, Interview.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Frank Dohmen et al., 'Das War's!';

³⁷⁶ BMUB, Interview.

³⁷⁷ SWP, Interview.

³⁷⁸ Freie Universität Berlin, Interview.

³⁷⁹ BDEW, Interview.

in her hand for dealing with the companies after Fukushima.³⁸⁰ Those who followed the energy businesses – government debate closer, also pointed to another reason: not a very diplomatic stance of the former CEO of RWE Jürgen Grossmann. Grossmann, a former CEO of the Germany's second-largest electricity producer with an enormous responsibility toward both his company and its 70,000-strong workforce,³⁸¹ made some confrontational statements while commenting on the governmental energy policy plans. At the meeting in Düsseldorf he declared that 'neither the German government nor Chancellor herself could divert him from his nuclear plans'.³⁸² At another meeting with a group of executives aligned with Merkel's CDU he stated that 'government's energy policies were wrong and that Germany is now facing an "environmental dictatorship"', while also declaring that he needs at least 20 more years for the nuclear power plants to operate.³⁸³ Such declarations created an uneasy atmosphere.³⁸⁴ In the view of one policy analyst, such statements could be seen as of a 'blackmailing' nature – a perception that could not go well with Merkel's personal style of politics and a potential contributor to a further lack of dialogue on the line energy businesses – government.³⁸⁵

Regardless of the ultimate motive, such policy move highlighted the weakened position of German energy 'four' vis-à-vis other actors. Not consulting energy companies possibly made them also more resistant to cooperate with the government on future investments. That only added to the mounting problems of the policy U-turn, such as insufficient energy grids (with the renewable energy being produced in the north while nuclear in the south), energy market based on fossils, or the increasing cost of the transition and the issue of electricity prices.³⁸⁶ As such, although the question regarding the operating time of nuclear power plants in Germany

³⁸⁰ SWP, Interview.

³⁸¹ SPIEGEL ONLINE, 'Business Model at Risk: Nuclear Phaseout Could Spell Disaster for German Energy Giants', n.d., <http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/business-model-at-risk-nuclear-phaseout-could-spell-disaster-for-german-energy-giants-a-766095.html>.

³⁸² ; Ibid.

³⁸³ ; Ibid.

³⁸⁴ ; Ibid.

³⁸⁵ SWP II, Interview.

³⁸⁶ The Nature Conservancy in Europe, Interview.

was not ‘if’ but ‘how long’ for nearly two decades, the rushed transition into renewables created numerous critics.³⁸⁷ Some have argued that ‘government accelerated nuclear phase-out and now does not know what to do’,³⁸⁸ while the public and even political debate on the transition is simplified and ‘nobody has solutions to the problems’.³⁸⁹ Given the multiple resulted dilemmas it is the more significant that the U-turn policy shift took place at the time. The acceleration of the nuclear phase-out highlights therefore how the congruence of factors within intersubjective context (favorable distal context, shifted constellation of actors that gives leverage to societal actors and ‘prevention’ as the main driving rationale that gave rise to the extreme precautionary measures) was able to influence the course of energy policy. These developments also show that whereas both the logic of war and the risk logic might periodically rise in the German context – often triggered by external events, it is ultimately the contextual dynamics that determines whether given logic will lead to any tangible outcomes: a significant change in the mainstream rhetoric or policy course.

Having said that, the fact that in the aftermath of Fukushima the risk logic overshadowed economic agenda of the big energy businesses owes a lot to the incremental processes happening in the background. These processes mark the contestation over the meaning of energy security and prioritization of its diverse aspects that takes place within the logic of subsistence. The next section looks at these processes in greater detail at the example of “Energiewende”, to illustrate how competing views pull towards two opposite directions: energy security concerned with economic sustenance versus new energy policy agenda conducted within environmental limits and with the involvement of the entire society.

³⁸⁷ SWP, Interview; SWP II, Interview.

³⁸⁸ DGAP, Interview.

³⁸⁹ FDP, Interview.

THE TRANSFORMING SUSTENANCE RATIONALE

If the discussion in the first chapter argued that the logic of subsistence can be treated as an analytical *modus operandi* – since marked by the multiplicity of actors and meanings of energy security it constitutes an area of contestation over its conceptualizations and priorities, then the developments around “Energiewende” highlight these dynamics in the German context most effectively. The ambitious energy transition is uneasy as it often requires trade-offs and strategies for balancing out different competing dimensions of energy security, and as it embraces all levels of actors: from the state to the individual. This section unpacks the intertwining - interaction of actors and hierarchizations of energy security dimensions that were either put in place or challenged over the last years. Tracing these processes of contestation highlights how the environmental aspect of energy security gradually overshadowed economic agenda and ultimately paved the way for another security logic to emerge in the German energy sphere: the logic of emancipation.

Energiewende: the energy transformation

The first book with the slogan ‘Energiewende’ was published in 1980, but it was not until recently that the term acquired political prominence. ‘Energiewende’ – the energy transformation – gained a new impetus after the decision of the accelerated nuclear phase-out was made, with ‘wende’ standing for a sharp turn towards renewable energy. Within the shifted constellation of actors, and with the German public being hostile not only to nuclear power but also ‘virtually ruling out fracking for shale gas or capturing and burying emissions from fossil fuel plants, renewables and energy efficiency were almost the only options left’.³⁹⁰ Following this reality, the project of energy transformation aims to cut overall energy consumption in

³⁹⁰ Berst, ‘German Shift to Wind Power Slams Neighboring Grids’.

Germany by 50% by 2050 and electricity consumption by 25%, while planning to produce 80% of its electricity from renewables by the same date.³⁹¹ Despite such ambitious goals, which constitute a big challenge for the German society, many analysts consider ‘Energiewende’ a good strategy for the future. On the one hand, being a forerunner in the project at this scale enables Germany to develop innovation and technology that would give it leverage in the future energy market.³⁹² On the other hand, the support for renewables strengthens the support for the traditionally understood notion of energy security, as it decreases Germany’s dependency on import of fossils.³⁹³ As Milan Nitzschke, CEO of the German Renewable Energy Federation (BEE) put it: ‘Renewable energy and energy efficiency are the only way out of the price trap of dependency on oil and gas’.³⁹⁴ Similarly, Hans Josef Fell from the Greens stated: ‘We cannot reach energy security with fossil resources - it already happened that Putin closed the pipeline for a few days’, however, whereas pipeline connections might be uncertain in the future ‘the wind will always blow through Germany’.³⁹⁵

Arriving at this reasoning did not happen ‘overnight’, but took significant reshuffles between numerous political players as well as bargaining over the course and priorities of the future energy transition.

Energiewende: the interaction of actors

Many changes in the course of energy policy and commitments to climate protection goals were made in Germany between 1998 and 2002 due to the strength of environmental actors within domestic environmental policy arena at that time.³⁹⁶ It was also in 2002 that

³⁹¹ Ibid.

³⁹² BDEW, Interview.

³⁹³ Fell, Interview; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interview.

³⁹⁴ ‘Energie: Gasprom Droht Der EU’, *Die Zeit*, n.d., <http://www.zeit.de/online/2006/17/Gasprom>.

³⁹⁵ Fell, Interview.

³⁹⁶ Helmut Wiesenhal, ‘Klimawandel Der Umweltpolitik? Oder: Energiekonzepte Als Identitätskrücke’, in *Ökologische Aufklärung* (Springer, 2010), 173–202.

Schroeder's government took an initial decision about nuclear energy phase-out.³⁹⁷ Moreover, as some analysts argued, the facts established in that period changed the field of climate and energy policy so effectively that a termination of the chosen path by the next government would have caused serious problems of legitimacy.³⁹⁸ It could also damage the reputation of the political actors who would try to give up the policy of continuity in the context of climate agenda.³⁹⁹ Equally important was the change in the political leadership. It was made clear right from the beginning of Merkel's time in office that the social 'red rounds' of her predecessor Gerhard Schroeder were finally the past and that energy policy will no longer be made in any back rooms, but by the federal government.⁴⁰⁰ Therefore, even though the industry executives at the time⁴⁰¹ resisted ambitious environmental protection plans, warned of job losses and threatened to emigrate, their sharp criticisms did not have far reaching impact.⁴⁰² Hence, BASF CEO Juergen Hambrecht complained that 'the policy is constantly making new unrealistic targets', E.ON CEO Ulf Bernotat claimed that 'the government lacks balance, reason and realism', Vattenfall CEO Klaus Rauscher stated that 'the energy policy of this government is an anti-energy policy' and the Federation of German Industry (BDI) raised a question of the "creeping deindustrialization" in one of its papers – all largely in vain.⁴⁰³ The very next year CEOs of RWE and E.ON were regularly traveling to Berlin for talks with economics and environment ministers and the Chancellor and "A clean, safe and affordable energy supply" became the new motto of the energy bosses – one that could be only achieved 'with and not against each other'.⁴⁰⁴ The energy 'big four' were therefore especially harmed by the U-turn

³⁹⁷ David Buchan, 'The Energiewende - Germany's Gamble' (The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, June 2012).

³⁹⁸ Wiesenral, 'Klimawandel Der Umweltpolitik?'

³⁹⁹ Wiesenral, 'Klimawandel Der Umweltpolitik?'

⁴⁰⁰ Frank Dohmen, 'ENERGIEPREISE Missbrauchte Macht', *Der Spiegel*, 25 June 2007, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-52032613.html>.

⁴⁰¹ Wulf Bernotat (E.ON), Harry Roels (RWE), Utz Claassen (EnBW) and Klaus Rauscher (Vattenfall).

⁴⁰² Alexander Jung et al., 'ENERGIEPOLITIK Der Klima-Handel', *Der Spiegel*, 2 July 2007, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-52109094.html>.

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Frank Dohmen, 'ENERGIE Jahr Der Entscheidung', *Der Spiegel*, 28 January 2008,

policy shift that happened despite their willingness to co-operate. From the point of view of energy companies this decision raised too many doubts. As a representative of E.ON put it, even in the post-Fukushima context to ‘...say look you have to step out so quickly without answering the question how can we substitute so quickly certain kinds of (volumes) and electricity system - for me it’s an open question, hopefully it will work...’.⁴⁰⁵ Therefore, left with no choice the big energy companies attempt to be a ‘constructive part of Energiewende’ by investing in off-shore energy, although they started to make those investments rather late, as ‘business was going too well’.⁴⁰⁶ In general terms, the developments since the early 2000-ties show that - aside from the area of pipeline politics - traditional energy businesses lost much of their voice to new actors and agendas in Germany. Although this multiplicity of voices does not make the energy transition any smoother, it shows that “Energiewende” constitutes an intense area of contestation – with various actors entering the debate over the course of energy policy and its priorities.

Starting at the institutional level, the management is split between the often warring ministries of economics (in charge of conventional energy supply, energy efficiency and energy market arrangements) and the environment (responsible for renewable energy and, through health and safety issues, for the nuclear sector).⁴⁰⁷ The two ministries hold different opinions on the rationale of the policy shift and cannot agree on targets on climate change and energy saving, differently evaluate the technique of cogeneration and disagree on the promotion of renewable energy - with the first supporting and the latter questioning it.⁴⁰⁸ This innate tension is additionally strengthened by the fact that in Germany’s habitual coalition governments the ministers are usually from different parties, which makes for policy-making that is 'openly

<http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-55593295.html>.

⁴⁰⁵ E.ON., Interview.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.; BDEW, Interview.

⁴⁰⁷ Buchan, ‘The Energiewende - Germany’s Gamble’, 33.

⁴⁰⁸ Fritz Vorholz, ‘Erneuerbare Energien: Die Energiewende Zu Babel’, *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Wirtschaft, <http://www.zeit.de/2012/10/Energiewende>.

messy⁴⁰⁹ and creates some uncertainty for the energy industry.⁴¹⁰ Some have even raised concerns that if ‘framing of Germany’s energy security is a part of an *instrumentalisation process* - the governing CDU lost its frame’.⁴¹¹ Indeed, it has been argued that the ‘current German energy policy is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation, selective intervention and addition of inconsistent and often contradictory aspirations in retail’ that takes place within uncoordinated parallel work in different departments and the ‘government-parties-business’ triangle of power, that due to structural deficits often work only informally, and is insufficient.⁴¹² Moreover, the growing decentralization of ownership and operation of Germany’s energy system complicates the transition further and has far reaching consequences. It is therefore not only the energy policy that is becoming decentralized, but the entire political context, as ‘the generation of political and social norms is no longer primarily provided by the state, but increasingly requires a political contribution of other actors such as the economy and the society’.⁴¹³

Indeed, ‘Energiewende’ relies on and is driven by the huge public support. What dominates the public debate is the idea that there will be 100% renewables at some point, however, other aspects are a bit neglected as the debate on current energy shift appears to be too complex.⁴¹⁴ Therefore, ‘Energiewende’ means different things to different groups of actors as the public sees it as the ‘exit from nuclear and shift to renewables’, the industry is concerned about the costs of the transition, whereas a number of complex debates on climate protection, energy efficiency and various aspects of security take place in the background.⁴¹⁵ Given that this complexity implies that not only the public, but also many politicians often lack a good

⁴⁰⁹ Buchan, ‘The Energiewende - Germany’s Gamble’, 33.

⁴¹⁰ BMUB, Interview.

⁴¹¹ SWP II, Interview.

⁴¹² Mükusch, ‘Vernetzte Energiesicherheit–Mehr Chancen Für Deutschlands Zukunft’.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

⁴¹⁴ SWP II, Interview; BMUB, Interview.

⁴¹⁵ SWP II, Interview.

understanding of all the nuances of the transition,⁴¹⁶ it is worth pointing out the role of media and political lobbyists here. In the opinion of some actors from the ‘Green’ side, the traditional energy businesses try to exert an influence on German politicians and mainstream media, which in turn protect the interests of big companies by campaigning against renewables, while the pro-environmental debate takes place largely through the Internet and smaller broadcasters.⁴¹⁷ In the opinion of others, the lobby of the companies based on the renewable energy sources is even stronger than that of the traditional businesses.⁴¹⁸ These conflicting perceptions show the continuous struggles between different actors in setting the priorities of energy transition project. However, the complexity of issues and multiplicity of interests involved also create certain contradictions in attitudes – especially on the side of the societal actors. Firstly, whereas there is a need for the reconstruction of the power grid for transporting electricity from the wind-rich north to industrial south it is often inhibited by public resistance to new transmission lines in their neighborhoods.⁴¹⁹ Secondly, the fact that despite the shift the energy bridge will be needed in the transition from fossils and nuclear energy to renewables was initially largely ignored in the public debate.⁴²⁰ Thirdly, the rising electricity prices make the ‘Energiewende’ project increasingly expensive and as an official from the Economic Ministry warned ‘a tipping point will come when consumers refuse to pay more for new renewables’.⁴²¹ Higher electricity prices are a social problem and the government fears the debate on justice and the risk of poverty that could produce social losers.⁴²² Moreover, German public complains about expensive

⁴¹⁶ Freie Universität Berlin, Interview.

⁴¹⁷ Fell, Interview.

⁴¹⁸ FDP, Interview.

⁴¹⁹ U. Hessler, ‘RWE Stops Windfarm Projects amid Energy Policy Dispute’, *Deutsche Welle*, February 2012, <http://www.dw.de/rwe-stops-windfarm-projects-amid-energy-policy-dispute/a-15745965>; SWP II, Interview; BMUB, Interview.

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ Damian Carrington, ‘Germany’s Renewable Energy Revolution Leaves UK in the Shade’, *Theguardian.com*, 30 May 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/may/30/germany-renewable-energy-revolution>.

⁴²² ‘Energiewende: Öko Oder Sozial? | ZEIT ONLINE’, n.d., <http://www.zeit.de/2012/24/01-Energiewende>; ‘ENERGIEWENDE: Abgeklemmt - DER SPIEGEL 23/2012’, n.d., <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-86109220.html>.

energy efficiency regulations⁴²³ whereas as some point out - it still consumes too much energy itself thus not 'behaving too exemplary'.⁴²⁴

Whereas the above issues might be of concern to the German government, the 'Greens' are rather of an opinion that one must make financial sacrifices for the "ecological transformation of the society".⁴²⁵ It is therefore no longer strictly economic agenda and fulfillment of societal energy needs at the lowest cost that is a priority, but a higher aim of societal transformation that embraces and protects its own habitat. The fact that the majority of Germans subscribe to this opinion implies, that despite the current vivid discussion on increasing prices and many public mood swings, the public support for the project remains strong and 'even with the ups and downs is not likely to vanish'.⁴²⁶ Especially, since the supporters of the Green movement in Germany largely belong to the part of the society that is financially better-off.⁴²⁷

However, this change in reasoning was not a sudden one and even given favorable distal context (e.g. history of the Green movement) the changes in the mainstream rhetoric that pointed towards more 'environmentally' oriented energy security agenda could be traced over the years.

Energiewende: competing dimensions & changing hierarchies

The competing dimensions of energy security and changes in the prioritization of its different aspects within the debate on Energiewende point to the contestation processes within the logic of subsistence. Interestingly, in this particular case some policy analysts would see different dimensions of energy security as partly competing and partly complementary –

⁴²³ SWP II, Interview; BMUB, Interview.

⁴²⁴ 'Zeit Für Eine Revolution - DER SPIEGEL 7/2007', n.d., <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-50503709.html>.

⁴²⁵ 'ENERGIEWENDE: Abgeklemmt - DER SPIEGEL 23/2012';

⁴²⁶ SWP II, Interview; BMUB, Interview.

⁴²⁷ FDP, Interview.

especially as ‘Energiewende’ requires a systemic change as ‘renewables cannot be simply added to the old system’.⁴²⁸

Therefore, whereas some energy business reports point to the various aspects of energy transition – highlighting its potential positive effects on the environment and energy security and negative on the issue of competitiveness, technology and prices,⁴²⁹ others point to the potential conflicts.⁴³⁰ In the words of a representative from BDEW: ‘you have these conflicts: nature protection versus building up more capacities for the renewables ...you have the conflict of people living in their villages not wanting these new grids to be put up in their backyards’.⁴³¹ Moreover, accelerated nuclear phase-out adds to the trade-offs involved in the energy revolution. As Michael Vassiliades, trade union leader and a member of the ethics committee for nuclear power, put it: “I think it is possible to rename the conflicting goals of energy policy very clear. This allows us to signal to politics and society that hard decisions must be made. (...) Nuclear energy is cheap – but associated with a significant residual risk. Natural gas is relatively environmentally friendly – but must be largely imported. Emissions trading helps the climate – but perhaps sells energy intensive industries”.⁴³²

However, what seemed crucial for the initial stages of energy transition was a quite common belief that ‘Energiewende’ might in the end bring together and successfully address multiple – and often competing – aspects of energy security better than other options.⁴³³ Moreover, according to some, it should also hold true for other national contexts – with the speed of achieving the multidimensional energy security depending on different governments.⁴³⁴ In Germany, as the ministerial publication on ‘Energy concept’ stated, the

⁴²⁸ SWP II, Interview.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interview.

⁴³¹ BDEW, Interview.

⁴³² ‘Energiepolitik: “Einen Soli Für Das Klima” | ZEIT ONLINE’, n.d., <http://www.zeit.de/2011/14/Energiepolitik-Interview-Vassiliadis>.

⁴³³ Freie Universität Berlin, Interview; BMUB, Interview; Fell, Interview.

⁴³⁴ Fell, Interview.

‘objectives of energy, climate and budget policy must be harmonized’.⁴³⁵ In the words of Chancellor Merkel: ‘we want security, affordability and environmental acceptability and I believe we can have all three, as well as creating jobs’, and although ‘Energiewende’ might be ‘a Herculean task...we all can work together on this project to combine future ethical responsibilities with economic success’.⁴³⁶ Similarly, expert analyses, such as those prepared by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, saw the triangle of climate change, energy and economy as one in which all the aspects can support the project of ‘Energiewende’.⁴³⁷ However, as an analyst from KAS noticed, although there is no need for conflict between those three dimensions there is still no ready solution to their harmonization either - with all the so far and future attempts being ‘experimental’.⁴³⁸

This ‘experimenting’ has been taking place within the energy logic of subsistence: in a changing constellation of multiple actors that hold diverse understandings of energy security and give different importance to its various aspects. In the shift of ‘Energiewende’ ‘everybody is involved the federal government, the regional governments, the states, the industry, the consumers’.⁴³⁹ According to some, there are even ‘too many voices’⁴⁴⁰ – especially, that different actors understand the current energy transformation differently.⁴⁴¹ Crucially, a certain trend emerged from this process over the recent years – and that trend points to a changing energy security priorities in the German context.

Just a few years ago the EU-level discourse on energy security, which emphasized its dimensions of sustainable development and environment (in that order), was ‘replicated’ in the

⁴³⁵ *Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply* (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety & Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2010), <http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/energy-concept,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf>.

⁴³⁶ Becker, ‘German Energy Firms in Crisis’; Rueter, ‘Clean Power Benefits from Nuclear Phase out’.

⁴³⁷ Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interview.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ BDEW, Interview.

⁴⁴⁰ E.ON., Interview.

⁴⁴¹ SWP II, Interview.

German national context.⁴⁴² However, that trend gradually started to change with more emphasis being put on the ‘environmental’ aspect of energy.⁴⁴³ The shift certainly did not happen overnight and its signs could be spotted years before. For instance, as early as in 2007 German energy industry in a joint statement with the Federation of German Industry (BDI) denounced the completely one-sided energy policy that became subordinated to the ‘dictates of ecology’, while other important issues such as security of supply in Germany suddenly played no role.⁴⁴⁴ One year later the Environment Minister Gabriel presented a ten page paper that described ‘the thin line on which climate change, nuclear phase, affordable electricity prices and security of supply could match’.⁴⁴⁵ The report presented to the Advisory Council on the Environment of the federal government two years later went a step further with its headline: “Climate compatible, reliable, affordable”.⁴⁴⁶

Prioritizing environmental aspect of energy security could also be traced in the more recent official governmental documents as well as in the opinions of different policy analysts and politicians. Therefore, in the joint publication of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety and the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology from September 2010 titled ‘Energy concept’ one could notice the hierarchization of different energy security aspects. As the document stated that the German energy policy aim should be to ‘... ensure an energy supply that is both environmentally sound and at the same time economically viable and secure in the long run, in the interests of industry and consumers alike’.⁴⁴⁷ Similarly, speaking of the nuclear phase-out plans the publication argued that: ‘A

⁴⁴² Ibid.

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Frank Dohmen, ‘ENERGIEPREISE Missbrauchte Macht’;

⁴⁴⁵ Ralf Beste et al., ‘ENERGIEPOLITIK Auf Schmalem Grat’, *Der Spiegel*, 14 April 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-56574276.html>.

⁴⁴⁶ Kim Bode et al., ‘Öko Um Jeden Preis’, *Der Spiegel*, 20 September 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73892376.html>.

⁴⁴⁷ *Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply.*, 6

limited extension of the operating lives of existing nuclear power plants makes a key contribution to achieving the three energy policy goals of climate protection, economic efficiency and supply security in Germany within a transitional period'.⁴⁴⁸ The changes made to the document after Fukushima strengthened the above hierarchy even further with 'the role assigned to nuclear power in the energy concept [being] reassessed'.⁴⁴⁹ Another document by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety published already in the post-Fukushima context and authored by the former Minister for the Environment Peter Altmaier, presented a 10-point program for Germany's future energy and environmental policy. In this document titled 'Moving forward with renewed energy' Altmaier stated that: 'Today, environmental protection is of greater importance to most people in Germany than ever before. This applies both to solving global environmental problems and also to people's way of dealing with nature and the environment'.⁴⁵⁰ Moreover, noticing two years later that ecological aspect moved down on the political agenda due to the debt crisis – despite increasing social awareness – he saw the ongoing debate on energy transition 'as an opportunity to bring the ecology forward again'.⁴⁵¹

A number of analysts noticed this hierarchization of energy security dimensions that prioritizes environmental aspect. According to an expert from SWP in Germany the 'societal hierarchy of needs' in relation to energy security puts the issue of the environment in the first place, followed by economic competitiveness and security of supply.⁴⁵² In a similar manner Hans Josef Fell – a parliamentarian and a spokesman for the energy politics from the Green Party, stated that energy security is primarily about 'protecting our climate' and then about

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid, 15

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁰ Peter Altmaier, 'Moving Forward with Renewed Energy' (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2012), 5.

⁴⁵¹ 'Energiewende: "Coole Aussage, Herr Altmaier" | ZEIT ONLINE', n.d., <http://www.zeit.de/2012/31/Energiewende-Interview>.

⁴⁵² SWP II, Interview.

securing energy system independent from rising fossils or nuclear energy prices.⁴⁵³ Therefore, despite numerous arguments behind ‘Energiewende’ (such as import dependency) many believe, similarly to a representative of BDEW, that ‘the major reason [behind the transition] is ecological’ and related to the goals of climate protection and reduction of CO₂ emissions.⁴⁵⁴ As the ministerial publication on ‘Climate protection and growth’ from October 2011 stated: ‘An ambitious climate and energy policy is also a strategy for innovation and growth. It establishes the conditions that *must be in place* for economic modernization towards a green economy’.⁴⁵⁵ That statement also points to another important aspect of energy revolution: an attitude towards economic growth. If ‘growth, sustenance and environment’ are the key dimensions of energy security logics,⁴⁵⁶ then it appears that Energiewende not only reverses this hierarchy and prioritizes environmental aspect, but also transforms the other two. Firstly, ‘sustenance’ takes a form of ‘sustainable development’ in the environmental discourse. Secondly, the attitude to economic growth is revisited. As *Die Zeit* argued already in 2004: “The energy revolution is crucial for the stabilization of energy costs and for Germany to be modernized ecologically. (...) Economic development can be drastically decoupled from energy consumption” - and every member of the society has to feel responsible for it to work.⁴⁵⁷ Similarly, *Der Spiegel* notices in 2011 that such a conversion of an industrial society: “... is also the departure from the growth model of the past decade. This model was based on cheap money and cheap energy. It consumed resources that will be lacking in the future, it left a mountain of debt, destroyed the environment and left nuclear waste that will emit for the thousands of years on”.⁴⁵⁸ The argument of decoupling economic growth from energy consumption is typical for the

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ BDEW, Interview.

⁴⁵⁵ ‘Climate Protection and Growth: Germany’s Path into the Renewable Energy Age’. 28, Emphasis added.

⁴⁵⁶ Ciută, ‘Conceptual Notes on Energy Security’.

⁴⁵⁷ ‘Energie’, n.d.

⁴⁵⁸ Frank Dohmen et al., ‘Das War’s!’

environmental discourse and at the extreme can even call for a 'zero-growth economy'.⁴⁵⁹

What emerges then from the above is the rhetoric that departs from the subsistence logic and moves towards energy security that is subdued to the 'higher ethical' constraints. Indeed, many Germans regard clean energy as a sort of moral philosophy and this way of thinking seems to permeate the entire German context. As Chancellor Merkel explicitly linked financial debt and environmental damage while saying: 'just as we must break even with our finances, so we must [break even] with nature'.⁴⁶⁰


This marks an important shift in thinking about energy security in Germany, and from the analytical point of view, it signifies the re-hierarchization of energy security dimensions that took place within the logic of subsistence (See Graph 2).

If environment, sustenance and growth are three dimensions of energy security reflected across all its logics,⁴⁶¹ and if the logic of subsistence - with its multiple actors and agendas - is the ultimate area where the hierarchies between energy security dimensions and policy preferences are formed, then prioritizing environmental aspect suggests certain departure from the underlying sustenance rationale that centres on the fulfilment of the societal needs. This reversal of energy security priorities and policy course does not in itself change the nature of the subsistence logic - which remains a site of contestation where further re-hierarchization processes might follow. However, just as the replacement of 'sustenance' with the 'survival' rationale in the logic of war overshadows other aspects of energy security and points to a distinct security logic on the rise, similarly prioritization of the environmental aspect and the consequent transformation of other dimensions (sustenance into sustainable development, and growth into a balanced growth), set the ground for a different security logic to emerge in the energy sphere.

⁴⁵⁹ Eduardo Porter, 'Imagining a World Without Growth', *The New York Times*, 1 December 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/business/economy/imagining-a-world-without-growth.html>.

⁴⁶⁰ Buchan, 'The Energiewende - Germany's Gamble'.

⁴⁶¹ Ciută, 'Conceptual Notes on Energy Security'.



Graph 2: Competing energy security dimensions within the logic of subsistence.

In the German context this shift in hierarchies is accompanied by the decentralization of the energy system (based on renewables) and a rhetoric of social liberation and empowerment in the energy sphere. When seen in a broader picture this changing understanding of energy security into a ‘positive’ and ‘inclusive’ one, based on the individual practices of energy production, points to the emerging emancipatory logic in the energy sector. The next section looks at this phenomenon.

ENERGIEWENDE: FROM THE LOGIC OF SUBSISTENCE TO EMANCIPATION

The all-encompassing German energy transition is underpinned by the ecological thinking and multiplicity of actors – from state to individuals. As the former Minister of the Environment put it in his *Moving forward with renewed energy*:

‘The transformation of our energy system (...) is the greatest economic policy challenge since post-war reconstruction and the greatest environmental policy challenge ever for the Federal Republic of Germany’, ‘Environmental protection is a principle to be applied across government departments. It is important for all areas of society and policy’.⁴⁶² And further: ‘We now have the great opportunity to make the transformation of our energy system a common project that people identify with’, ‘(...) organizing and implementing the transformation of our energy system is a prime responsibility for all of the government and all of the society...’.⁴⁶³

This emphasis on the societal actors highlights how ensuring energy security within the energy transition project shifts the focus towards the level of each individual user.

Indeed, Energiewende has been a great societal project from the start and this re-orientation towards individual citizens was partially enabled by a favorable distal context as – like some analysts pointed out - the seeds of this ‘people power’ revolution lie deep in the soil of German society with its long tradition of collective civic action.⁴⁶⁴ This tradition could be traced back to Germany's pre-20th-century structure as a collection of city-states as well as to rural cooperatives that brought electricity to the countryside, and it has more recently manifested itself in the form of anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s and 1980s.⁴⁶⁵ As opposed to Denmark, where an interest in cooperatives has waned despite encouraging legislation and to the UK, where government resources failed to stimulate a major cooperative movement – Germany stands as an example of ‘people power’ in practice, where the renewable lobby could

⁴⁶² Altmaier, ‘Moving Forward with Renewed Energy’, 5–8.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Buchan, ‘The Energiewende - Germany’s Gamble’, 8.

⁴⁶⁵ Buchan, ‘The Energiewende - Germany’s Gamble’.

bring thousands of people out into the streets – and to some political effect.⁴⁶⁶ As Josef Göppel, a former Bavarian forester and a member of the governing CDU/CSU described it: ‘The new energy system has a social dimension and if you don't bring it to the people it will not happen’.⁴⁶⁷ Similarly, the spokeswoman for the Citizens Energy Cooperative Berlin (BEB) that wanted to buy the Berlin power grid, commented in April 2012 that ‘the design of our future energy system is not just a matter of politics and energy, but a societal problem’.⁴⁶⁸

Some see this emphasis on the societal dimension of the transition as 'an instance of the unmistakable ethical element in the German clean energy policy' and as a 'strong moral streak in Germany's cooperative movement, which sometimes involves Protestant Evangelical churches'.⁴⁶⁹ In this context, the agency clearly shifts towards many local actors and the energy transition became in the words of H.J. Fell more of ‘a grassroots movement in Germany, which is being supported by politics’ and ‘a bottom-up strategy that will come in the next years more and more by positive examples and not influenced by government or the politicians’.⁴⁷⁰ Such opinions do not seem to be challenged even by the growing costs of *Energiewende*, as Lower Saxony Prime Minister David McAllister commented on the cost of the energy revolution: “The energy transition corresponds to the will of the people of Germany. It was based on a cross-party consensus. Now we need to lead them to success together. That this does not work for free was clear to all participants from the outset”.⁴⁷¹ It is therefore an intersubjective interaction of the grassroots movements and political leadership that is meant to bring about the transformation of the energy system – yet ultimately it is the societal actors that play more prominent role in this process. Many groups in the German society have benefited from the

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., 14.

⁴⁶⁷ Carrington, ‘Germany’s Renewable Energy Revolution Leaves UK in the Shade’.

⁴⁶⁸ Buchan, ‘The *Energiewende* - Germany’s Gamble’, 14.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Rueter, ‘Clean Power Benefits from Nuclear Phase out’; Fell, Interview.

⁴⁷¹ Peter Müller and Michael Sauga, ‘ATOMAUSSTIEG Nörgeln Ist Keine Tugend’, *Der Spiegel*, 7 April 2012, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-84789654.html>.

renewable energy – and many among the middle class with the solar panels on their roofs or farmers with their biomass now support the development of the new system.⁴⁷² In the words of an official from the Ministry of the Environment: ‘Out of a sudden you have all those various groups in a society that traditionally wouldn’t support the Green agenda, but now they do, because it is in their own personal interest’ - ‘it is becoming a very bottom-up societal project that people develop their ownership for’.⁴⁷³

The growing activism of municipal energy companies (Stadtwerke) and citizens’ energy cooperatives (Energiegenossenschaften) drive this project, which is also in line with the federal government’s goals.⁴⁷⁴ According to some analysts, many decision makers in public utilities and their supervisory bodies have thereby overcome a tangible mental barrier regarding their former opinions about the technical and economic superiority of fossil fuels and nuclear energy.⁴⁷⁵ As such, they enabled all the potential shareholders to become potential winners of energy transition: the farmers and forest owners, craft shops, planners, energy consultants, sustainably-oriented monetary investors etc..⁴⁷⁶ Speaking in more technical terms, only between 2007-2012 some 450 new energy cooperatives were formed both to provide generation and to run local grids.⁴⁷⁷ An increasing number of the German local authorities is also continuously trying to develop community wind farms, followed by mini-grids.⁴⁷⁸ By the year 2012, with the aim to become more independent from RWE and other leading energy companies, approximately 900 municipal works (which constitute the biggest customers of the big energy providers), started the process.⁴⁷⁹

Such local initiatives very often have a strong economic dimension, as some debt-ridden

⁴⁷² BMUB, Interview.

⁴⁷³ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁴ Buchan, ‘The Energiewende - Germany’s Gamble’, 8.

⁴⁷⁵ Bene Müller, ‘Erneuerbare Energien Und Regionale Wertschöpfung’, in *Energiewirtschaft in Europa* (Springer, 2010), 47–51.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷ Buchan, ‘The Energiewende - Germany’s Gamble’.

⁴⁷⁸ Berst, ‘German Shift to Wind Power Slams Neighboring Grids’.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

communities, such as Prötzel in Brandenburg, try to modernize with wind turbines by starting a local company that deals directly with the wind power operators.⁴⁸⁰ ⁴⁸¹ Others are more advanced, such as the 1000 inhabitant town of Dardesheim, which tries to serve as an inspiration to the entire Harz region with its eco-concept.⁴⁸² Named as “The City of renewable energies”, it produces 40 times its own annual electricity needs and transfers the excess energy into the public power grid of E.ON Avacon for a lucrative compensation.⁴⁸³ Certainly, the fact that the inhabitants of Dardesheim realized the economic benefits involved helped the venture, as the town's Mayor noted: 'Without the population we couldn't put such project on its feet'.⁴⁸⁴ With around 50 such projects of “decentralized energy” being at different stages of development in Germany as of 2007, some asked already back then whether “Energy-autonomous cities” are the future of the German energy supply.⁴⁸⁵ Moreover, the individual actors take part not only in the energy production, but the participation model is sometimes encouraged also in other cases - to lower local resistance. For example, in Schleswig-Holstein the network operator Tennet offered the citizens to participate for the first time in the construction of a 150 km power line, and some wondered whether it would soon become a model for the entire country.⁴⁸⁶ The participatory solutions meet with greater social acceptance, as citizens are 'more willing to accept the argument for more pylons and pipes if it comes from local companies and authorities rather than from a distant private utility'.⁴⁸⁷

Crucially, the decentralization of the energy system and increase in individual's self-reliance through participation in energy production are often accompanied by the rhetoric of

⁴⁸⁰ And according to their own calculation, with 30 to 40 turbines the community could get rid of the debt.

⁴⁸¹ Alexander Osang, 'ENERGIEWENDE Durch Den Wind', *Der Spiegel*, 21 November 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-81933540.html>.

⁴⁸² 'Erneuerbare Energien: Die Harzer Stromrebelln', *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Wirtschaft, <http://www.zeit.de/online/2007/44/Dardesheim>.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁶ 'Energiewende: Wenn Anlieger Zu Anlegern Werden', *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Wirtschaft, <http://www.zeit.de/2013/11/Buergerbeteiligung-Stromtrassen-Schleswig-Holstein>.

⁴⁸⁷ Buchan, 'The Energiewende - Germany's Gamble'.

social liberation and empowerment in the energy sphere. Therefore, the underlying rationale behind many of these projects is that of empowering people and becoming independent not only from oil and gas, but also from the domestic energy companies.⁴⁸⁸ As Josef Göppel from the CDU/CSU described a situation in his local region: ‘The majority of the population in Bavaria have invested in renewables, so you cannot move back on it now’, ‘They want to be independent in my village, they say *I want to control my own energy*’.⁴⁸⁹ In the words of an official from the Ministry of the Environment: ‘The main revolution now is when we are going away from the system where there are only four energy providers to a system where a lot of people produce energy themselves and it is becoming more decentralized’.⁴⁹⁰ The decentralization of the energy system means that the number of actors involved in and responsible for energy production immensely multiplies and changes the overall dynamics of this system. As Hans Josef Fell from the Greens described the change: ‘We are in Germany more progressive, because energy is now not only a business of some big mineral oil, gas, nuclear, coal companies it is now a business of millions of people (...). We have new cooperatives, societies which make the energy investment in renewables (...). People who invested money in the local cooperatives, see it is a *chance for us not a chance for some big companies*’.⁴⁹¹ Indeed, the Mayor of Munich Christian Ude stated that the big energy corporations are only the “four occupying powers”.⁴⁹² Munich Stadtwerke, which makes direct investments in the projects like the drilling in the Norwegian North Sea for gas, has been compared to a ‘kind of a Gallic village, which still continues to expand its independence from the energy giants’, and which tries to serve as a model for many other municipalities.⁴⁹³ As it strives to become the first major German city in which households can be supplied with green electricity produced in its own facilities, its Mayor stated in one

⁴⁸⁸ ‘Erneuerbare Energien: Die Harzer Stromrebelln’;

⁴⁸⁹ Carrington, ‘Germany’s Renewable Energy Revolution Leaves UK in the Shade’. Emphasis added.

⁴⁹⁰ BMUB, Interview.

⁴⁹¹ Fell, Interview. Emphasis added.

⁴⁹² ‘Energie: Das Gallische Dorf | ZEIT ONLINE’, n.d., <http://www.zeit.de/2009/37/Stadtwerke>.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

interview: '[Formerly] we would only be able to read in the newspaper that a profit-driven company decides [on something] and how much is the price of electricity',⁴⁹⁴ therefore, they decided to invest in their own generating capacity: 'We did not want to be just the gas station attendant who is abused by motorists, when gasoline prices rise... We wanted to be ourselves oil sheiks who earned the right money'.⁴⁹⁵ This shift in the design of the energy system inherently implies regaining control over energy by local users, which process gradually leads to breaking up of the big energy monopolies.

In this new context 'private citizens, who know they will get a fixed price for electricity off a solar panel on their roof or a wind turbine on their land, are driving the change, together with municipal power utilities'.⁴⁹⁶ The latter not only owned more than half of the low-voltage distribution grid as of 2012, and were bidding for more, but they were also trying to bring local grids, which they had leased to private operators, back under their own management.⁴⁹⁷ In light of these developments, energy corporations lose some of their former influence. In fact, it has frequently been repeated that the 'big four' have so far 'failed' to play their part in *Energiewende*, but now have a chance to 'redeem' themselves in the technically challenging area of offshore wind.⁴⁹⁸ Despite their efforts, the ownership structure of the German energy system changes gradually. Whereas the 'big four'⁴⁹⁹ own 80% of the conventional power electricity generation (fossil fuel and nuclear) and all of the high-voltage transmission system,⁵⁰⁰ more than half of the 860 low-voltage distribution system operators already belonged to *Stadtwerke* in 2012.⁵⁰¹ Moreover, 40% of the electricity grid in the area of renewables⁵⁰² was owned by private individuals and cooperatives as compared to only 7% owned by the main

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ Rueter, 'Clean Power Benefits from Nuclear Phase out'.

⁴⁹⁷ Buchan, 'The *Energiewende* - Germany's Gamble'.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ E.ON, RWE, EnBW, Vattenfall

⁵⁰⁰ 'Big Four' TSOs include: TenneT, Amprion, 50Hertz, Transnet

⁵⁰¹ Buchan, 'The *Energiewende* - Germany's Gamble', 8.

⁵⁰² Except for pumped storage.

energy companies.⁵⁰³ In 2012 roughly 350 Stadtwerke were generating 10% of German electricity and there were around 900 energy Stadtwerke, of which 860 owned and ran electricity distribution grids.⁵⁰⁴

Therefore, the great changes in the transformation of Germany's energy landscape slowly become clearer – not only for the 200000 people who work at the four major utilities, but also for 850000 employees in agriculture and forestry.⁵⁰⁵ The latter see themselves more and more as energy farmers ('Energiewirte' as opposed to the so far 'Landwirte'), and for the millions of consumers for whom the cost of electricity became a serious factor in the household budget.⁵⁰⁶ This system is also seen as guaranteeing Germany's future energy security. As Ulrich Kelber from the Social Democrats stated: 'Many cannot imagine that a decentralized energy system is as secure as a centralized one, yet we are all hooked on a decentralized system called the Internet: that's what we need to do in energy policy'.⁵⁰⁷ Decentralization based on renewables simultaneously means a low-carbon economy that protects the environment and "...no more fear of the Arab oil weapon, no problems with the vagaries of Russian gas supplier [and] no fear of nuclear accidents".⁵⁰⁸ Ultimately, energy security achieved via such systemic redesign transforms also the meaning of the concept into a positive one – as ensuring energy access no longer depends on struggles for energy supply within the geopolitical context, but is reliant upon diffused individual energy practices on a wider scale.

On a deeper level, the mixture of the above developments – changing priorities of energy security dimensions, focus on the individual users as the referent objects of energy security, and diffusion of the energy system accompanied by the rhetoric of social liberation and

⁵⁰³ Other owners: farmers 11%; financiers and project developers 14%; all energy companies 13, 5%; banks and investment funds 11%; commercial companies 9%; Ibid.

⁵⁰⁴ With further 600 doing the same in gas; Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵ Data from 2010; Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ Bode et al., 'Öko Um Jeden Preis'; Berst, 'German Shift to Wind Power Slams Neighboring Grids'.

⁵⁰⁷ Berst, 'German Shift to Wind Power Slams Neighboring Grids'.

⁵⁰⁸ Kim Bode et al., 'Öko Um Jeden Preis';

empowerment (as individual prosumers regain control over their energy production and consumption) - all point to the emergence of a distinct energy security logic of emancipation. Within this new paradigm the systemic transformation is largely carried out by the local actors who call for the dismantling of energy monopolies, inclusive solutions, 'freeing' from the oppressive system and empowerment through 'taking the control over energy back'. As the local actors start to engage in the reflexive practices of energy production also their understanding of energy security transforms, as the latter starts to materialize through their own agency. Since the individuals become more self-reliant and independent in the process, the power of their acquired agency can have far-reaching consequences for other than 'energy' or 'economic' sectors. Whether and how profoundly this transformation continues will depend on numerous factors.

As for now, having reached a consensus that the shift to renewables is a 'right decision' with the 2050 prospect in mind, Germany became preoccupied with its national development. The downfall of this focus might be that the project of this type has to be to some extent coordinated with other European states (e.g. the question of grids), yet Germany has no European strategy for the EU-level 'Energiewende'.⁵⁰⁹ As opposed to the debate on climate change, where Germany played a key role in shaping the European discourse on climate protection, energy security poses a bigger challenge for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the issue of energy security remains within the sole power of individual member states. Secondly, given the economic crisis the current conditions are not favorable towards triggering deeper debates on EU-level energy security issues. Therefore, although German government might try to shape the European discourse on energy security together with the EU Commission through the environmental dimension (as it is much harder to do that 'through energy'),⁵¹⁰ it seems that the main 'strategy' on the German part is to live up to its ambitious goals of 'Energiewende'. By

⁵⁰⁹ E.ON., Interview; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interview.

⁵¹⁰ SWP II, Interview.

putting the environmental issues high on its energy agenda while developing a green economy based on renewables – it aims to become a ‘success case’ for other states to follow.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the analysis of the chosen energy security debates and policy developments in Germany proves that energy security is a multidimensional and cross-sectoral phenomenon that involves multiple actors and meanings and that comes about to the fore of the public policy agenda through different security logics. In particular, tracing the developments in pipeline politics, nuclear energy debate and national project of energy transition, highlighted some specificities of the German context. Firstly, it was illustrated how the interplay of distal context (historically determined perceptions of Russia) and the traditional constellation of actors in the area of gas politics (that gives leverage to big energy businesses) determine that this context is not conducive for the logic of war to play an important part in it. Although the ‘grammar of conflict’ re-appears in media coverage in the times of crisis it does not translate into policy moves that would treat the security of energy supply as an emergency issue. German context of pipeline politics is then marked by a lack of the survival rationale or ‘zero-sum game’ reasoning, as even when faced with the conflictual developments the energy policy is conducted here in a business-like manner. Secondly, the risk logic – that similarly to the logic of war periodically rises and falls in Germany – plays a visible role in the nuclear energy policy and the mainstream debate. The mechanism through which the risk logic is invoked is often in line with Corry’s ‘riskification’ framework. However, the actual reasoning here reflects the ‘totality’ and ‘reflexivity’ of risks in the global energy sector. As such the underlying rationale of prevention is taken to the extreme in the German energy context as nuclear energy appears to be uncontrollable and the only valid strategy for alleviating that risk is nuclear phase-out. The aftermath of Fukushima in Germany also showed that the risk logic is powerful enough not

only to change the policy course, but also to re-shuffle a typical constellation of actors in the domestic energy sector. Consequently, giving more leverage to societal actors as opposed to big energy businesses gave new impetus to the re-hierarchization of energy security dimensions within the domestic site of contestation. Therefore, although the concept of energy security is largely understood in Germany in the traditional terms, which resonate around the sustenance rationale, there is a growing opposite trend, which emphasizes environmental aspects of energy security among its other dimensions. The reversal of hierarchies where environmental concerns start to set the frame for other developments in the energy sector – paves the ground for the emergence of a distinct security logic. Namely, the decentralization of the energy system within the national project of ‘Energiewende’ – that leads to a diffusion of control over energy and that is accompanied by the rhetoric of liberation and social empowerment through reflexive practice of energy production and consumption – signifies the gradual rise of the logic of emancipation in the German energy sphere.

From the analytical point of view, the contextual analysis of diverse energy security logics in the German context showed that their occurrence and interaction are not only grounded within an intersubjective context, but also largely determined by inner dynamic of the logics themselves. In other words, the logics of subsistence and emancipation appear to be closely linked and 'evolutionary' in character, as they rely on the continuous re-negotiation of what energy policy and energy security should be all about. On the other hand the war and the risk logics occasionally rise and fall triggered by key developments in the regional/global energy arena.

The next two chapters conduct a similar analysis of the Polish and Ukrainian cases to illustrate how different energy security logics play out across different energy contexts of the CEE region.

CHAPTER III

POLAND: ENERGY & SOCIETY AT THE CROSSROADS

INTRODUCTION

Having in mind findings of the German case as well as an analytical blueprint of energy security logics developed in the first chapter, this chapter analyzes energy security dynamics in Poland. Starting from the multiplicity of energy security definitions in the Polish context, the analysis traces the roots of divergent understandings expressed by situated actors across a number of domestic debates and policy developments related to: the EU Climate and Energy package, nuclear energy plans in the pre- and post- Fukushima context, renewable energy and country's pipeline politics. Despite the fact that all four energy security logics identified in the German case are present also in the Polish one – their manifestation and contextual dynamics differ due to the combination of distal factors and a specific constellation of actors. Whereas the debate on the EU Climate and Energy package and the nuclear debate highlight the dominant character of the subsistence logic in the Polish context, the rationale of sustenance is periodically overshadowed by the rise and fall of the logic of war. As opposed to the German case, the war logic manifests in Poland in its full spectrum and is not only present in the explicit ‘grammar of conflict’ in the official rhetoric, but the issue of energy supply is put on the immediate security agenda and trumps all other policy considerations at the time – economic included. The political actors assume then full control over the immediate course of the national energy policy as they operate in the ‘survival’ mode while the logic is on the rise. The debate around the renewable energy sources also illustrates that although the energy security logic of

emancipation is present in the Polish setting, the context determines that it is currently present more in the rhetoric than wide scale energy practices of the grassroots movement. Moreover, due to the distal factors (most importantly Soviet legacy in the area of resource management and centralized political authority), the emancipatory logic is marked by a double transformative character in the CEE region. As such, it can not only lead to the democratization of the domestic energy systems, but through social empowerment of the so far 'silenced' actors – to the democratic transformation of the entire socio-economic model.

BACKGROUND OF THE POLISH CONTEXT

Similarly to the analysis of the German case, the Polish energy context is approached 'from within' the intermediary logic of subsistence that is marked by the multiplicity of actors and meanings of energy security. It is within this site of contestation that kernels of other security logics, together with the conditions needed for their emergence, are reflected and formed. Going beyond what the CS securitization framework would see as the level of 'politicization' of the energy agenda, the attention is also paid to the less 'political' voices that 'speak energy security' in the liminal in-between theory, policy and practice sphere.

Notions of energy security

To start with, the multiplicity of energy security understandings in Poland could be most easily spotted among its many definitions. In the Polish energy studies literature, one could point to the dominant tendency to frame energy security in its narrow, economic dimension. Whereas some see energy security as a part of the broader economic security,⁵¹¹ others try to establish objective and measurable criteria for evaluating and comparing energy security levels

⁵¹¹ A. Chmielewski, *Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne Państwa: Geopolityczne Uwarunkowania* (Wydawnictwo MM, 2009). p.8

across different states and time frames.⁵¹² Still others define its multiple dimensions in the typically hierarchical order: price affordability, security of supply and environmental protection.⁵¹³ An increasing number of analysts seem to be also more aware of the growing subjectivity in defining contemporary threats and security policies by the diverse actors.⁵¹⁴ This subjectivity is partly reflected in the Polish energy studies literature itself - as energy security becomes defined in much wider terms, therefore reflecting a recent trend of widening moves in relation to the concept. Bartodziej and Tomaszewski,⁵¹⁵ for instance, distinguish among numerous energy security dimensions, which they divide into basic (e.g. sustainable energy balance, diversification of energy sources, access to infrastructure, storage and distribution of fuels), and additional (including economic, ecologic, technological and information security, immunity to intentional and accidental threats). The wider approaches also embrace at times the analyses of actors, who impact energy security dynamics on multiple levels (micro, mezo and macro)⁵¹⁶ - reflecting the multiplication of both actors and meanings within the energy field.

The contextual understandings of energy security seem to be less diverse among the Polish ministerial - level officials and energy experts. A number of them has consecutively framed energy security through the hierarchization of its various dimensions along the traditional line: different economic aspects (security of supply, diversification, economic competitiveness, price affordability, energy independence) followed by ecologic concerns.⁵¹⁷

⁵¹² J. Świątkowska (ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne Państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Jak Zmieniają Się Relacje Energetyczne W Europie* (Kraków: Instytut Kościuszki, 2011).

⁵¹³ M. Lasoń, 'Polska Wobec Wyzwań Bezpieczeństwa Energetycznego', in *Międzynarodowe Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne W XXI Wieku* (Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2008), 242. p.235;

⁵¹⁴ P. Mickiewicz and P. Sokołowska, *Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Dolnośląska Szkoła Wyższa, Instytut Bezpieczeństwa i Spraw Międzynarodowych, Toruń, 2010. p.23;

⁵¹⁵ G. Bartodziej and M. Tomaszewski, *Polityka Energetyczna i Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne* (Wydawnictwo 'Nowa Energia', 2009).p. 73;

⁵¹⁶ Z. Łucki and W. Misiak, *Energetyka a Społeczeństwo: Aspekty Socjologiczne* (Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2010); T.Z. Leszczyński, *Teoretyczny Wymiar Bezpieczeństwa Energetycznego* (Warsaw: Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki, Zarządzania i Administracji, 2012), 27.

⁵¹⁷ Sobieski Institute, Interview, 22 May 2013; Independent energy expert, Interview, 16 May 2013; Ministry of Economy, Nuclear Energy Department, Interview, 16 May 2013; Ministry of Economy, Renewable Energy Department, Interview, 23 May 2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview, 7 June 2013.

This hierarchy seems to reflect the official stance of the Polish government, which defined energy security as a ‘...state of the economy which covers present and prospective demand for fuels and energy, in a technically and economically justifiable manner, while taking the necessary environmental protection precautions’.⁵¹⁸ This hierarchization, which gave priority to the security of supply, and economic and technical aspects before environmental security was further confirmed in a single most important document on the subject: *Polish energy policy until 2030*.⁵¹⁹ If to move away from the ministerial and governmental agenda to the political scene, the disparities in the understandings of what constitutes energy security grow.

In a number of parliamentary debates over the last decade – especially those triggered by the Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009, many politicians attempted to define energy security in the Polish context. The definitions reflected a wide spectrum of understandings. Most commonly energy security was framed in the economic terms, as security of supply at affordable prices (former Economic Minister Waldemar Pawlak),⁵²⁰ as a component of the wider economic security (Joanna Fabisiak),⁵²¹ or as security of supply with the maximum use of the domestic energy resources and diversification of the supply routes (Jan Kamiński).⁵²² Still others reflected entirely different understandings with energy security framed as a matter of Polish self-sufficiency and complete independence from the foreign energy companies

⁵¹⁸ A. Płecha, ‘Powiązania Handlowe Z Rosyjskim Sektorem Paliw Płynnych i Gazu Ziarnnego W Świetle Bezpieczeństwa Energetycznego Polski’ (Studium Magisterskie, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie, 2006), 56, <http://www.cire.pl/praca/pracedyplomowe/praca6/AnnaPlechaPracamagisterska.pdf>.

⁵¹⁹ Where the hierarchization of energy security dimensions followed: energy efficiency, increasing security of energy resources supply, diversification of electricity sources through the development of the nuclear energy, development of the renewable energy sources (biofuels), development of the competitive fuel and energy markets, limiting the negative impact of power industry on the environment.

⁵²⁰ Waldemar Pawlak, ‘Speech given at the 33rd Parliamentary Session’, 9 January 2009, <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter6.nsf/main?OpenForm>.

⁵²¹ ‘Presentation by the Prime Minister of the Action Plan of the Council of Ministers with a Request for a Vote of Confidence at the 2nd Parliamentary Session, Day 1’, 23 November 2007, 318, <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata6nsf/91668423b136667cc12573930043a099/c2f0913296a12fedc12573ad0041f851?OpenDocument>.

⁵²² ‘6th Term of Office, 80th Parliamentary Session, 3rd Day; Informacja Rządu O Aktualnej Sytuacji i Perspektywach Polskiej Energetyki.’, 16 December 2010.

(Zygmunt Wrzodak),⁵²³ Polish *raison d'état* (Anna Sobecka),⁵²⁴ or a matter of reversing the dependency, where Poland - being energy self-sufficient - could make other states dependent on its own energy resources (Jan Szyszko from the Law and Justice).⁵²⁵ At the extreme, and in line with the logic of war, energy security was compared to the military security of the Polish state, where the economic aspects of energy (such as price) matter little in the face of national survival. In the words of Jarosław Sellin from the Law and Justice Party: "Of course, we have to move within the limits of common sense, but sometimes we have to prepare – also psychologically – that when it comes to prices, we will bleed – but it will pay off in the end" (Jarosław Sellin).⁵²⁶ Interestingly, some conceptualizations also aimed to incorporate the environmental aspect of energy security by pointing to the need for wider use of the 'green energy' (Andrzej Olechowski),⁵²⁷ protection of the natural environment (former Prime Minister Donald Tusk),⁵²⁸ or responsibility to leave environmentally sound habitat for the future generations (Ryszard Zbrzyzny).⁵²⁹ However, the latter definitions could be seen rather as a footnote to the entire parliamentary debate on country's energy security priorities. Given the general lack of public debate on the subject, it is worth mentioning a number of actors outside of the official political spectrum, who continuously attempt to involve the wider public in the discussion on the Polish energy security and to shift the debate towards a different path.

Therefore, an entirely different view on energy security was presented by a number of

⁵²³ 5th Term of Office, 41st Parliamentary Session, 4th Day; 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych O Zadaniach Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej W 2007 R.', 11 May 2007.

⁵²⁴ 5th Term of Office, 34th Parliamentary Session, Day 2; 'Sprawozdanie Komisji Gospodarki O Stanowisku Senatu W Sprawie Ustawy O Zapasach Ropy Naftowej, Produktów Naftowych i Gazu Ziemnego Oraz Zasadach Postępowania W Sytuacjach Zagrożenia Bezpieczeństwa Paliwowego Państwa i Zakłóceń Na Rynku Naftowym', 15 February 2007.

⁵²⁵ 'Presentation by the Prime Minister of the Action Plan of the Council of Ministers with a Request for a Vote of Confidence at the 2nd Parliamentary Session, Day 1', 318.

⁵²⁶ '6th Term of Office, 33rd Parliamentary Session, 3rd Day; Informacja Prezesa Rady Ministrów Na Temat Bezpieczeństwa Energetycznego Polski W Związku Z Przerwaniem Dostarczania Gazu Ziemnego Z Rosji Przez Terytorium Ukrainy.', 9 January 2009.

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

⁵²⁸ 'Presentation by the Prime Minister of the Action Plan of the Council of Ministers with a Request for a Vote of Confidence at the 2nd Parliamentary Session, Day 1'.

⁵²⁹ '6th Term of Office, 80th Parliamentary Session, 3rd Day; Informacja Rządu O Aktualnej Sytuacji I Perspektywach Polskiej Energetyki.'

environmental activists and analysts such as Dariusz Szwed, a former leader of the Polish political party ‘Greens 2004’.⁵³⁰ Szwed defined energy security by distinguishing its three priorities: public participation, competitive energy market and security of state’s own energy production.⁵³¹ By promoting the development of renewable energy sources and a culture of prosumers (simultaneous producers and consumers of energy), Szwed justified his prioritization of the societal participation among other energy security dimensions:

“It is quite unusual approach to this issue, but I would put it as the first priority. Participation might have nothing to do with energy, but it has a lot in common with all other sectors. (...) [there is a need for] public participation both at the level of setting the priorities of the state’s energy policy, but also at the level of the benefits of its implementation. Society must become a shareholder”.⁵³²

Similarly, speaking of the sole definition of energy security, Szwed pointed to the importance of state’s own energy production, as only the latter could simultaneously provide for ‘ecological, societal and economic security’.⁵³³ This wide, cross-sectoral approach to energy security was echoed by a number of other actors in the Polish context. An environmental activist and scholar from the Warsaw University of Life Sciences pointed to energy efficiency and development of renewable energy sources based on the culture of prosumers as two key ways of ensuring Poland’s energy security.⁵³⁴ In his view economic and environmental dimensions of energy security are coherent rather than contradictory.⁵³⁵ A similar opinion was expressed by a former director of the Warsaw office of the Berlin-based think tank Heinrich Boll Foundation, as he stressed the importance of all economic, ecological and societal aspects in ensuring energy security of the Polish state.⁵³⁶

⁵³⁰ ‘Greens 2004’ has not succeeded in being elected to the Polish lower chamber of parliament in any of the parliamentary elections so far.

⁵³¹ Szwed, Interview.

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ Ibid.

⁵³⁴ SGGW, Interview.

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

⁵³⁶ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Warsaw, Interview, 3 June 2013.

The above inclusive approaches stand in stark contrast to the official definitions, with the latter proving to be similarly diverse. The disparities between conceptualizations reflect not only the multiplicity of meanings of energy security in the Polish context, but also the 'liminality' of energy security that indeed functions between theory and practice, as its established definitions in the official documents and analyses continuously clash with the contextual meanings on the ground. The prioritization of different energy security dimensions by different actors also highlights that whereas there does not exist one unambiguous definition of energy security in the Polish context – its diverse meanings indeed often derive from a 'series of assumptions regarding the linkage between growth, sustenance and the environment'.⁵³⁷ From the analytical point of view, it appears that these conceptualizations either differently hierarchize economic and environmental aspects of energy security or give priority to new dimensions – such as social participation. Since different approaches have different normative consequences it is worth asking at this point: what underpins those diverse understandings of energy security and where do they lead us logically regarding the present and future energy security agenda in the Polish context?

AROUND THE SUBSISTENCE LOGIC

This chapter analyzes a number of key debates on energy security in order to trace the roots of its different logics in the Polish context. Starting 'from within' the logic of subsistence – as the 'intermediary logic' within which other energy security logics either originate or are reflected and mediated, its dynamics is analyzed at the example of the debate on the EU Climate and Energy package and the introduction of nuclear energy plans that followed. Both developments illustrate the dominance of the subsistence logic in Poland, which operates within quite inflexible constellation of actors and specific distal context, where historical and socio -

⁵³⁷ Ciută, 'Conceptual Notes on Energy Security', 127.

economic factors play a crucial role.

EU Climate & Energy Package

The EU Climate and Energy package with its famous “20-20-20” targets⁵³⁸ was widely criticized in Poland. In the words of a senior official from the Ministry of Environment: “EU's climate policy has several objectives and, unfortunately, also a few side-effects. In our case what we do not like are the rising costs of energy from coal, which makes our economy less competitive. (...) A sustainable climate policy should take into account the starting point of each state”.⁵³⁹ Many voices expressed much stronger opinion than this. Prof. Szyszko from the Law and Justice Party, a former Minister of the Environment, stated that the EU policy ‘is boycotted by the entire world’ and aimed merely at ‘making its member states dependent on its technologies’.⁵⁴⁰ Krzysztof Kilian, a chairman of the Polish Energy Group stated at the Economic Forum in Krynica that ‘the climate policy in the times of crisis is a whim, for which the customers will pay’.⁵⁴¹ Both views were reflected in the opinion of an energy expert from the conservative think tank *Sobieski Institute*.⁵⁴²

“Professor Staniszkis⁵⁴³ once talked about *structural violence* or *unbalanced development* ... I think that it is exactly what we have to deal with now: the French want to sell us the nuclear, Germany wants to sell us fans and other elements of the turbine, the same situation is with Danes, who use ‘ecological’ tools as a way of performing their own economic interests ... – and we are quite passively accepting all these 3 x 20 and other whims – I myself question these decisions”.⁵⁴⁴

⁵³⁸ 20% reduction in EU greenhouse emissions, raising the share of EU energy consumption from renewables to 20% and 20% improvement in the EU's energy efficiency.

⁵³⁹ Ministry of Environment, Interview, 13 June 2013.

⁵⁴⁰ Law and Justice, Interview, 21 June 2013.

⁵⁴¹ PAP, ‘Kilian: Polityka Klimatyczna W Czasie Kryzysu? Fanaberia’, *Wprost*, September 2012, <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/346167/Kilian-polityka-klimatyczna-w-czasie-kryzysu-Fanaberia/>.

⁵⁴² Think-tank connected to the Law and Justice Party.

⁵⁴⁴ Sobieski Institute, Interview.

If above voices highlight some doubts of the Polish side regarding the prioritization of environmental concerns over economic interests, a wider debate on the EU package that took place in the Polish Sejm and governmental agencies in 2008 additionally reflected three main themes of the political rhetoric at the time. Firstly, there were concerns regarding the ability of the fast-growing Polish economy to deal with the commitment of CO₂ emissions' reduction in the times of economic crisis. Secondly, some asked to what extent is the EU Climate and Energy package a result of the ideologization and dogmatization of the approach to climate issues and what could be its true impact on the reduction of the global CO₂ emissions. And thirdly, it was questioned whether the governmental stance on protecting domestic coal industry is a right one and whether some alternative energy sources should not be developed instead.⁵⁴⁵

Overall, one could point to a predominantly economic focus of the debate on EU Climate and Energy package in Poland. This focus - together with the accompanying economic fears - was additionally fueled by some energy experts' predictions made at the time. Following the report by 'Energys' – ordered and financed by the members of the association for coal energy and electricity – which predicted that the adoption of the EU Climate and Energy package would lead to 300% energy price rises, some energy experts started to make similar claims.⁵⁴⁶ Big lobbying efforts and predicting emissions rights' prices at the level of 100 euro (whereas the actual price in 2012 turned out to be 5 euro), succeeded in setting the frame of the public debate in Poland that prevails ever since. It became then a common belief that the EU climate and energy policy will bring losses to Poland and benefit only a few EU states,⁵⁴⁷ that it will create a barrier for Poland's development and destroy Polish industry, force the change of the so far energy mix, and ultimately, contribute to the energy price rises and increased unemployment.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁵ H. Wylizgała, 'Polska a Pakiet Energetyczno-Klimatyczny Unii Europejskiej', in *Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne Europy Środkowej* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2010), 225.

⁵⁴⁶ SGGW, Interview.

⁵⁴⁷ Mainly Germany and Denmark.

⁵⁴⁸ demosEUROPA, Interview; SGGW, Interview.

Consequently, the EU policy found supporters neither among the Polish government nor the political opposition.

Equally important, the debate on the EU Climate and Energy package was not of a public interest either. The majority of the debates that took place occurred among the politicians and energy experts as well as some research centers and non-governmental organizations dealing with ecology and sustainable development.⁵⁴⁹ The general public itself did not take a significant part in debating the future of the Polish energy policy approach. This fact raised some postulates for a change of thinking about the issues of national energy and the environment as well as some calls for a more profound public education in these matters.⁵⁵⁰ Some therefore asked, why is the issue of ‘CO2 emissions’ that affects the daily functioning of every human being and that started to function as a slogan on its own (and as such embody all the energy and environmental problems in Poland), treated only as a problem of industry and the government.⁵⁵¹ To many it looked like a missed opportunity. As an analyst from the Warsaw-based think tank demosEUROPA noticed:

“...both EU package and other internal and external factors compel us to a slightly different line of thinking about the way in which we want to produce energy, from what we want to produce it, how we want to distribute it (...) [they also have] a very positive influence on thinking about the social model in Poland (...) as society has never really been involved in the decisions on the national energy mix”.⁵⁵²

Despite some signs that the social awareness about the issues of climate and energy is rising, continuously low social participation in the debates on the subject upholds the centralized character of the decision-making processes in the long run. As an official from the Ministry of the Environment noted:

⁵⁴⁹ Wylizgała, ‘Polska a Pakiet Energetyczno-Klimatyczny Unii Europejskiej’, 224–25.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., 225

⁵⁵² demosEUROPA, Interview.

“It is a big problem for us as it seems that there is no need for a debate in the society. It seems that [these matters] do not constitute a problem for the Polish citizens that they slip from their agendas. [Therefore] it is hard to establish a negotiating stance or a position of the Polish government if we have no one to talk to. Because of that the governmental position often results from other policies: economic policy, security policies”.⁵⁵³

He also pointed further to the hierarchization of energy security dimensions in the Polish context that could explain the above phenomenon: “The awareness of the [environmental] problems is certainly increasing, while the acceptance of the climate policy falls, because people see other problems – such as economic. (...) Climate policy is high in the Maslow’s pyramid while Poland is still in the development stage, therefore people cannot afford the climate policy to constitute some sort of an ‘issue’ to them”.⁵⁵⁴

The debate on the EU Climate and Energy package highlights the specificities of the Polish energy context: strong impact of the distal factors (low environmental awareness), which in turn determines the constellation of actors (with low mobilization of the society and centralized decision-making), with both of these elements leading to the prioritization of purely economic agenda within the logic of subsistence. From the analytical point of view, giving priority to economic factors could be interpreted here as aiming at 'sustenance' in its most basic form – affordable access to energy for the society coupled with a high concern for the domestic businesses. It is certainly the most common energy security logic generally speaking. The Polish debate on the EU Climate and Energy package shows that in this case the economic agenda prevails, and the preferable means of attaining it are based on a traditional way of thinking and a centralized energy model. The voices that point to alternative solutions are not strong enough to compete with the official agenda and big industry lobbyists, whereas the remaining part of the society remains detached from the debate - which as some have pointed out - is also lacking.

⁵⁵³ Ministry of Environment, Interview.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

Moreover, Polish economic interests in the energy sector are contrasted here with the 'ideologized' and 'dogmatized' – and therefore 'irrational' EU agenda. In this light the EU agenda only becomes rational when it is seen as upholding economic interests of its richest and most economically developed states. Consequently, a feeling of being coerced or even taken advantage of, through the invasion of foreign energy technologies, emerges here - a reasoning that is quite typical for the Polish context as it appeared across other issue areas also in the past (e.g. on the eve of Poland's membership in the EU). It is also from within this feeling of coercion that the Polish debate on nuclear energy emerges. The EU Climate and Energy package was then used to frame that debate by justifying the development of nuclear energy plans with the EU climate protection goals.

THE NUCLEAR ENERGY DEBATE

The nuclear energy debate and its triggers, underlying arguments and policy implications are one of the best examples of the key differences in reasoning about energy security in Poland and Germany – and connected to that manifestation of different security logics in both contexts. Whereas after the nuclear accident in the Japanese Fukushima the highly mobilized pro-green German society exerted enormous pressure on the government that led to the acceleration of Germany's nuclear energy phase-out plans and continuation of the more environmentally friendly⁵⁵⁵ project of Energiewende, different logic emerged in the Polish context. Not only Fukushima did little regarding societal attitudes towards nuclear energy – despite some short-lived debate in media in its aftermath – but the actual debate on the introduction of the national nuclear energy program and its policy implications were triggered by the EU-level developments – mainly the EU Climate and Energy package.

The prospects for the development of the nuclear energy in Poland have been considered

⁵⁵⁵ At least in principle, since recent energy sector developments in Germany look less optimistic.

since 2005 by all the subsequent governments. However, only in the aftermath of the debate on the implications of the EU Climate and Energy package the resolution about starting the Polish nuclear energy program was passed on 13th January 2009 by the Council of Ministers.⁵⁵⁶ The Commission for the Nuclear Security and Radiological protection was then created – together with the accompanying commissioner office.⁵⁵⁷ Given the ambitious goals of CO₂ emissions’ reduction, the crucial decision of introducing nuclear energy was justified in the ‘Polish Energy Policy until 2030’ as motivated by the security concerns, environmental protection (emphasizing the aspect of CO₂ emissions’ ceilings) and independence from the ‘typical ways of energy production’.⁵⁵⁸ It is worth emphasizing that the already mentioned justification of the decision hierarchized different energy security dimensions on the line: economic security (security of supplies, prices and diversification of fuel base); environmental aspects (limiting CO₂ emissions); and aspects connected to the broader benefits of nuclear energy program linked to growth and development (e.g. new employment places, new university degrees, development of Polish businesses, and development of regions).⁵⁵⁹ The above hierarchy of priorities once again points to the dominance of the sustenance rationale in the energy policy agenda focused on the fulfillment of functional needs. Interestingly, although the ecological aspects were given more attention here (taking into account specificities of the Polish context), this development was not echoed in the wider nuclear energy debate in Poland – even among the arguments of the environmental activists.

The very arguments ‘in favor’ and ‘against’ government’s nuclear energy plans differed vastly. Among the propagators of the nuclear energy program one could point to some energy

⁵⁵⁶ Dariusz Materniak, ‘Energia Nuklearna W Polsce’, *Portal Spraw Zagranicznych*, 15 April 2011, <http://www.psz.pl/119-energia/energia-nuklearna-w-polsce>.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁸ I. Przybojewska, ‘Energetyka Jądrowa W Polskiej Polityce Energetycznej – Uwarunkowania Prawne i Faktyczne’, in *Polska Polityka Energetyczna – Wczoraj, Dziś, Jutro* (Warsaw: Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki, 2010), 64.

⁵⁵⁹ Przybojewska, ‘Energetyka Jądrowa W Polskiej Polityce Energetycznej – Uwarunkowania Prawne i Faktyczne’; Rafał Zasuń, ‘Dlaczego Energia Jądrowa?’, *Elektrownia-Jadrowa.pl*, n.d., <http://elektrownia-jadrowa.pl/Dlaczego-energia-jadrowa-.html>.

experts (e.g. Teluk; Strupczewski; Kielbasa; Reński), who supported the development of the nuclear plans in public debates.⁵⁶⁰ Both their arguments and prioritization of energy security aspects largely mirrored the official governmental stance. It was therefore noticed that the growing demand for electricity makes nuclear energy economically justifiable; that the development of the nuclear technology after 1986 makes the repetition of the Chernobyl accident impossible (highlighting the ‘irrationality’ of such fears); and that apart from the economic benefits nuclear energy would be environmentally-friendly (reflecting the hierarchy of energy security priorities).⁵⁶¹ Some energy experts also highlighted the EU context of the Polish decision – ‘EU policy signifies that Poland has no alternative other than development of the nuclear programme’⁵⁶² – while suggesting that if that policy was not in place it could be better to either invest in other energy sources or to continue to rely on the Polish coal.⁵⁶³ As an exception to the rule here one could see the justification for nuclear energy program given by an expert on nuclear and radiological safety from the Polish Energy Group:⁵⁶⁴ “It is not that we cannot afford renewable energy so we should not follow the German example. The argument here should be rather that the nuclear energy is *green energy*, as it meets all the EU requirements regarding CO2 emissions”.⁵⁶⁵ On a similar line, in the opinion of an official from the Ministry of the Environment the nuclear energy program is mainly “... a guarantee for decarbonisation and diversification of the energy production portfolio that would help to introduce a new sector of the economy”.⁵⁶⁶ Interestingly, some of the energy security reports and analyses also pointed to either competing or complementary character of different dimensions of energy security. For

⁵⁶⁰ Jacek Wierciński, ‘Energia Nuklearna W Polsce? Debata Polskiej Racji Stanu’, *wybrzeze.24.pl*, 11 April 2011, <http://wybrzeze24.pl/aktualnosci/energia-nuklearna-w-polsce-debata-polskiej-racji-stanu>.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.; Patrycja Batóg, ‘Polskie Elektrownie Jądrowe Będą Bezpieczne’, *Elektrownia-Jadrowa.pl*, 26 April 2010, <http://elektrownia-jadrowa.pl/235.html>.

⁵⁶² Independent energy expert, Interview.

⁵⁶³ Sobieski Institute, Interview.

⁵⁶⁴ PGE Energia Jądrowa – an energy company that is responsible for the development of the nuclear energy programme in Poland; a part of the bigger Polish Energy Group.

⁵⁶⁵ PGE, Interview, 21 May 2013.

⁵⁶⁶ Ministry of Environment, Interview.

instance, the *Polish energy security report* from 2006 stated that whereas there are inherent trade-offs between the use of cheap energy from coal and the environmental protection, other energy security aspects might be complementary in achieving multidimensional energy security (e.g. with the nuclear energy being presented as simultaneously economically justifiable, enabling future growth and environmentally friendly).⁵⁶⁷ It could be argued that framing the debate in this way sought to eliminate the need for the creation of such hierarchies in the first place - and as such serve as a strategy for alleviating public fears.

While the arguments of energy experts largely mirrored governmental stance, a number of actors criticized that decision. Firstly, the entire economic rationale behind the nuclear energy plans was questioned. Secondly, it was argued that the development of nuclear energy would result in a triple dependency (building and montage of the nuclear power plants and imports of Uranium from Russia) – therefore not contributing to the enhancement of energy security.⁵⁶⁸ Thirdly, the aspect of further centralization of the Polish energy system was highlighted.⁵⁶⁹ Fourthly, it was argued that financial resources are being wasted on the nuclear program instead of being invested in the more prospective renewable energy. Here one could point to some criticisms regarding Polish traditionalism in the matters of energy, as one prominent environmentalist noted: “I think that the Prime Minister and his surrounding are very skeptical towards renewables. They still haven’t changed their conviction that renewables are merely a hobbistic solution rather than something that could build Polish energy security. In our context 19th-century thinking still dominates”.⁵⁷⁰ Fifthly, the ethical aspect of leaving the nuclear waste to the future generations was questioned.⁵⁷¹ Finally, some voices also criticized the predictions made in the *Polish energy policy until 2030* document - for its lack of precision and concrete

⁵⁶⁷ Monika Biernat, Patrycja Mackowicz, and Kinga Seremak-Sęk, ‘Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne Polski’, in *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, 1–2006/1 (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, n.d.), 26–27.

⁵⁶⁸ Wierciński, ‘Energia Nuklearna W Polsce? Debata Polskiej Racji Stanu’.

⁵⁶⁹ Chancellor of the Sejm, Interview; Szwed, Interview.

⁵⁷⁰ SGGW, Interview.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid.; Szwed, Interview.

data and lack of evaluation of the environmental impact of the nuclear power plants' building and exploitation.⁵⁷²

This multiplicity of criticisms – most of which never addressed by the governmental side – reflects an uneasy dynamics of the Polish nuclear debate or, as many have pointed out, the lack of it. In the words of an analyst from demosEUROPA: “What Poland still did not have is a profound public discussion (...) about what nuclear energy is, what its costs are, its impact on the environment. (...) without the involvement of the civic society it is still various lobbying groups that have the strongest voice, but not the public interest in mind”.⁵⁷³ Similarly, Szwed points out that in a given constellation of actors, where different sides have different power, it is not possible to hold an honest pro-democratic and pro-social debate.⁵⁷⁴ Subsequent developments in the context of the Polish nuclear policy seem to confirm some of such criticisms. Firstly, even before the decision of the development of nuclear energy was taken, it had been argued that articles in the daily press aim to manipulate Polish public opinion by their biased propagation of nuclear energy.⁵⁷⁵ Secondly, the very decision of introducing nuclear energy program was adopted in the *Polish energy policy until 2030* – and only then put on hold for three months for some public discussion to take place.⁵⁷⁶ Thirdly, the governmental information campaign on nuclear energy focused solely on its benefits and did not allow for the alternative voices to be heard or alternative opinions to be fully confronted. Interestingly though, the campaign was not criticized in the public debate for its explicit one-sidedness, but rather for its low visibility and not sufficiently demagogic character.⁵⁷⁷ Given the above frame, it does not seem surprising that the accident in the Japanese Fukushima did not significantly

⁵⁷² Wierciński, ‘Energia Nuklearna W Polsce? Debata Polskiej Racji Stanu’; ‘Ocena Projektu Polityki Energetycznej Polski Do 2030 R.’, *Greenpeace*, March 2009, <http://www.greenpeace.org/poland/Global/poland/report/2009/3/polityka-energetyczna-brief.pdf>.

⁵⁷³ demosEUROPA, Interview.

⁵⁷⁴ Szwed, Interview.

⁵⁷⁵ L. Tomiałojć, ‘Energetyka Obywatelska, Czyli Od Kopalń Do Wiatru I Słońca’, *Czysta Energia* 80, no. 6 (2008): 20–23.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Ministry of Economy, Nuclear Energy Department, Interview.

impact this constellation of actors or the prevailing logic in the Polish context.

Accident in Fukushima & Polish nuclear debate

Similarly to Germany, the nuclear accident at the Japanese nuclear power plant caused by the 2011 tsunami received wide media coverage in Poland. Moreover, the Polish media largely exaggerated its scale and impact. In the words of an employee from the Public Relations and Communications office of the Polish Energy Group:⁵⁷⁸

“After the accident in the Japanese Fukushima the information about the hundreds of thousands of casualties have been reproduced across Polish media. This number did not apply to the victims of the nuclear power plant, but to the victims of the tsunami. And despite the fact that this error has been corrected many times – it is continuously reproduced, which highlights the sensational character of this information (...).”⁵⁷⁹

Indeed, this search for ‘sensational’ news resulted in the immediate comeback of the ‘Chernobyl narrative’. One week after the catastrophe in Japan Polish Radio stations, internet news services and TV stations were picking up and highlighting any information about even the slightest changes in nuclear radiation levels in Japan.⁵⁸⁰ The press and digital media were saturated at the time with phrases and formulations such as: ‘nuclear catastrophe’, ‘radiation sickness’ or ‘radioactive cloud’.⁵⁸¹ One commentator of the weekly magazine *Polityka* even compared this coverage to the ‘nuclear show’ with the ‘reports from Japan resembling reports from the ‘battlefield’, where the fate of the humankind is being decided’.⁵⁸² The extent to which accident in Fukushima dominated information in media at the time was also reflected in the fact that other key issues – mainly the effects of the tsunami itself or bombing of Kadafi’s Libya – were

⁵⁷⁸ Responsible for the introduction of nuclear energy programme in Poland.

⁵⁷⁹ PGE II, Interview, 21 May 2013.

⁵⁸⁰ Marcin Rotkiewicz, ‘Gdzie Ta Apokalipsa?’, *Polityka*, 28 March 2011, <http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/nauka/1514220,1,media-a-sprawa--elektrowni-w-fukushimie.read>.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

moved to the second plan.

This state of affairs led some to argue that Polish democracy is populist-hysteric in character and based on emotions and the atmosphere of fear – fueled by some environmental groups and underpinned by media.⁵⁸³ It should be noticed however, that although the rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima accident indeed depicted uncontrollable risk of nuclear energy that would resemble the reality of the Becksian risk society, the elements of the risk logic were not as strong as in the German context and they were immediately matched with a counter-narrative. It was then highlighted that the rational discussion should not be grounded in the antinuclear phobia,⁵⁸⁴ but that it should take place on a completely different ground - far more technical and substantive rather than emotional.⁵⁸⁵ Some also pointed out – referring to the earlier analysis of the nuclear supporters - that although ‘Chernobyl was primarily a psychological catastrophe as the accident caused a relatively small amount of casualties’ its myth is functioning still nowadays.⁵⁸⁶ However, not all media sources were equally biased. Quite interestingly, while one of the tabloids *Fakt* was publishing false information about the radioactive cloud coming to Poland, its competitor *Super Express* published at the same time a calming interview with one of the energy security experts.⁵⁸⁷ Such examples illustrate some of the diversity of media voices at the time that served as the diffused centers of legitimacy – formulating their own, often competing rhetoric and constructing the agency of the chosen actors – by providing space for selected voices to be heard.

The governmental plans and priorities were also not shaken by the crisis in Fukushima. The nuclear energy project started to be framed though as a policy option that is based on sound calculations and that is going to be implemented with adequate precaution. A

⁵⁸³ Rotkiewicz, ‘Gdzie Ta Apokalipsa?’

⁵⁸⁴ Polska Agencja Prasowa, ‘Polska Nie Zrezygnuje Z Programu Nuklearnego’, www.forbes.pl, (12 April 2011), <http://www.forbes.pl/artykuly/sekcje/Wydarzenia/polska-nie-zrezygnuje-z-programu-nuklearnego,13663,1#>.

⁵⁸⁵ PGE, Interview.

⁵⁸⁶ Batóg, ‘Polskie Elektrownie Jądrowe Będą Bezpieczne’.

⁵⁸⁷ Rotkiewicz, ‘Gdzie Ta Apokalipsa?’

number of statements issued by the government at the time reflected that rhetoric, which aimed to reassure the Polish society. It was then stated that the ‘Polish nuclear power plant will be secure and that security aspects will be one of the major criteria taken into account while choosing technological solutions for its construction and operation’.⁵⁸⁸ The possibility of natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks was also acknowledged,⁵⁸⁹ as the nuclear energy commissioner Trojanowska put it: ‘...the government takes responsibility for protecting the public from eventual negative consequences and for minimizing the risk of accidents. We have to double our efforts not to let nature exceed the boundaries of our imagination’.⁵⁹⁰ The nuclear energy started to be then presented as a ‘rational’ choice – and by default contrasted with the supposedly ‘irrational’ fears of the large part of the public and environmental groups. A number of themes could be detected here. Firstly, the ‘rationality’ of the nuclear energy option highlighted its economic justification (coal cannot meet future demands and there is no economic alternative to nuclear energy), which fell on fertile ground in the Polish context dominated by the subsistence logic. Secondly, as opposed to the German context where in the aftermath of the accident in Fukushima it became a dominant theme that ‘if such a nuclear disaster could happen in the technologically advanced Japan it could happen everywhere’ – the voices in Poland pointed rather to the older generation of Japanese nuclear reactors and the specific seismic region, which made this kind of catastrophe unlikely to occur elsewhere.⁵⁹¹ Fifty years of the worldwide exploitation of nuclear energy and the fact that six of Poland’s neighboring states had nuclear power plants was quoted as proof that nuclear energy is a sensible policy option.⁵⁹² Interestingly, the implication was that even though the nuclear energy

⁵⁸⁸ Polska Agencja Prasowa, ‘Niemieckie “nie” dla Polskich Elektrowni Atomowych’, *Www.wprost.pl*, 15 March 2011, <https://www.wprost.pl/swiat/235768/Niemieckie-nie-dla-polskich-elektrowni-atomowych.html>.

⁵⁸⁹ Materniak, ‘Energia Nuklearna W Polsce’.

⁵⁹⁰ Polska Agencja Prasowa, ‘Polska Nie Zrezygnuje Z Programu Nuklearnego’.

⁵⁹¹ Chancellery of the Sejm, Interview.

⁵⁹² Materniak, ‘Energia Nuklearna W Polsce’; Polska Agencja Prasowa, ‘Polska Nie Zrezygnuje Z Programu Nuklearnego’.

is safe enough its risks are ‘total’, as in the case of an accident in the CEE region Poland would be similarly affected – hence it is still rational to invest in nuclear energy. Moreover, it was emphasized that since the aspects of nuclear waste are regulated by the EU, a certain level of security is guaranteed.⁵⁹³ The Polish governing elite was therefore self-portrayed as capable of preventing and managing potential risks of nuclear energy. The whole process could be seen here through the prism of Corry’s riskification, as expressing the rhetoric of calculation and precaution the political actors concluded that they have sufficient control to manage possibilities of harm connected to nuclear energy. As such, adhering to technological safety standards and implementing modern technologies were considered as satisfactory precautionary measures. Although it was admitted that the possibilities of harm due to natural disasters or terrorism do exist and might pose risks that are ‘total’ in character, the underlying rationale of prevention did not go as far as to consider the policy change.

It would be hard to evaluate the immediate impact of the governmental stance on the public at the time. If to put the stance of the Polish public opinion in a wider perspective, then it becomes clear that since 1990 when due to the numerous protests of environmental groups and a public referendum (in which 86% of respondents voted against nuclear energy plans) the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki stopped the nuclear power plants in Żarnowiec,⁵⁹⁴ the public support for nuclear energy program in Poland has been gradually and steadily growing. Moreover, in the last decade the number of nuclear energy supporters has been growing in Poland at the highest rate as compared to other EU states and was much higher than the European average.⁵⁹⁵ The percentage of supporters of nuclear energy for the first time outnumbered its opponents in 2010, yet this trend was shortly reversed after the accident in Fukushima the next

⁵⁹³ PGE, Interview.

⁵⁹⁴ Cezary Łazarewicz, ‘Atom Przechowany W Świerku’, *Polityka*, 19 November 2009, <http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/spoleczenstwo/1500635,2,energia-atomowa-w-polsce.read>.

⁵⁹⁵ PAP, ‘Polacy Szybko Nabierają Zaufania Do Energetyki Jądrowej’, *Wiadomosci.wp.pl*, 12 May 2010, <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,24915,title,Polacy-szybko-nabieraja-zaufania-do-energetyki-jadrowej,wid,12229612,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=116c16>.

year.⁵⁹⁶ The survey conducted after Fukushima accident revealed that the shift in perceptions occurred due to the increased fears: with 54% fearing a nuclear accident, 26% recalling the consequences of Chernobyl and 15% pointing to the security risks linked to the nuclear waste storage.⁵⁹⁷ This trend proved to be very short-lived. Studies conducted in the two following years showed results similar to the pre-Fukushima context. The Polish Energy Group conducted one of such surveys, and as one of its employees noted: “We got a surprising result, which showed that the nuclear accident did not change much in public attitudes towards nuclear energy in Poland. Those who were ‘pro-nuclear’ remained its supporters, and those who were anti-nuclear remained its opponents”.⁵⁹⁸ In search of the reasons that motivate persistent opponents of the nuclear energy in Poland, a government official from the Department of Nuclear Energy in the Ministry of Economy distinguished four such groups: environmentalists; anarchists (motivated by the idea of green capitalism); patriots (against foreign technology or jobs for foreigners); and local communities (expressing mostly economic fears).⁵⁹⁹ However, as he noted, in the Polish context it is not the environmental concerns that fuel most of the opposition towards nuclear energy, but rather the general feeling that Poland ‘will not manage’ to succeed in these plans – therefore pointing to the economic dimension of the project.⁶⁰⁰ This lack of public trust underpinned by the economic fears reflects a wider phenomenon of the prioritization of the economic agenda in the Polish context. Also for this reason, in both the debate on EU Climate and Energy package and the nuclear debate, the ‘green energy’ actors tend to appeal rather to the economic dimension of the alternative path of green energy. In the words of one environmentalist: „I think that it is much better to use economic rather than

⁵⁹⁶ Polska Agencja Prasowa, ‘CBOS: Większość Polaków Przeciw Budowie Elektrowni Atomowej’, *Www.pb.pl*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.pb.pl/2416832,63230,cbos-wiekszosc-polakow-przeciw-budowie-elektrowni-atomowej>.

⁵⁹⁷ Materniak, ‘Energia Nuklearna W Polsce’.

⁵⁹⁸ PGE III, Interview, 21 May 2013.

⁵⁹⁹ Ministry of Economy, Nuclear Energy Department, Interview.

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid.

environmental arguments in the public debate – especially in Poland, because Poland is not a country of people sensitive enough to be ready to protest from the point of view of their threatened environmental interests”.⁶⁰¹

It appears then that the nuclear energy debate in Poland takes place within the same constellation of actors as it was the case in the debate on EU Climate and Energy package: marked by centralized decision-making and general social disengagement. Although in the post-Fukushima context Polish media did play a role in feeding the debate with the fear-filled analysis of the developments in Japan, their long-term impact was very limited. It could be then said that the risk logic plays out within the Polish context similarly to the logic of war in the German one: the rise of the respective rhetoric stirs an intense, albeit short-lived, debate in media, but no further policy moves follow. In both cases the risk and war logics were overshadowed by the sustenance rationale and the prioritization of economic interests of the dominant actors. Similarly in both cases, the distal context played a crucial role – as it ultimately determined the degree of embeddedness of security mechanisms. However, as the Polish example illustrates – since distal context includes diverse factors, such as historical, political or socio-economic - their impact also varies. Although it could seem that historical background and legacy of Chernobyl would find a fertile ground in Poland with respect to the risk logic, the more current economic concerns overshadowed that possibility – ironically both among the supporters of nuclear energy (who see it as a good source of affordable energy), and many of its opponents (who question Polish nuclear energy plans not due to the perceived risks involved, but the feasibility of the economic dimension of the project).

Nuclear energy is also regarded by many of its supporters as 'green energy' due to low CO₂ emissions. Hence, many environmental activists in Poland who oppose it, point either to safety concerns related to the operation of nuclear power plants or hint at the alternative

⁶⁰¹ SGGW, Interview.

solutions altogether. Their premise often builds upon the German example of green social movements and ‘Energiewende’. Moreover, they aim at the development of renewable energy sources not only as means of providing energy security while supporting the climate protection agenda, but also as a way of changing the socio-economic model of the Polish society. This reasoning originates within the logic of subsistence and similarly to the German context leads to the reversal of energy security priorities. Such reversal sets the ground for the security logic that has a strong emancipatory character. The next section looks at these dynamics.

THE RENEWABLE ENERGY DEBATE

The case of reversed hierarchies

If fulfilling functional needs of the society lies at the core of the energy security logic of subsistence, then prioritizing any other dimension of energy security would already hint at ongoing changes in the underlying sustenance rationale – although the basic nature of the logic as a main site of contestation would remain the same. The analysis of the German case showed such gradual reversal of hierarchies and how it results in much more than a mere alteration of the public policy agenda. Having in mind the dynamics of the Polish context, as illustrated by the response to the EU Climate and Energy package and the nuclear debate that followed, it seems that such shift would be highly unlikely to occur in Poland. However, the local voices that call for an alternative way of thinking about country's energy security are already in place – especially among environmental activists and Warsaw-based NGOs. This emerging agenda gives more weight to the environmental concerns, which not only become one of the policy prerogatives, but which start to set the entire energy security framework. A discussion on the priorities of energy security by a Polish environmental activist Prof. Andrzej Kassenberg reflects that point:

“First of all, a distinction must be made between energy policy and climate policy. The former involves a traditional way of thinking – that *we need to fulfill the needs* – while the latter is based on the concept of *sustainable development*, where carrying capacity is a starting point. The guiding idea behind strategic documents on energy policy has been to meet the existing requirements (...), such as providing a required level of production capacity or ensuring a high degree of fuel and energy security. Within this approach, the question of resource management and nature conservation is confined to increasing resource productivity and minimizing the environmental impact. And the environmental constraints (...) are all but ignored. But when the concept of *sustainable development* is embraced and the global extent of man-made impact is taken into account, the need arises for incorporating these constraints into strategic documents being drafted. The environmental constraints should then set the framework for energy sector development, thus leading to much increased interest in energy demand management and development of renewable energy sources.”⁶⁰²

The above discussion points to the energy - climate nexus, yet it reverses the prevailing sequence of priorities within the vast majority of energy security definitions, where environmental protection is put at the bottom of the hierarchy. Pointing to the fact that energy policies are mostly driven by the need to fulfill the functional needs of the society - while putting environmental aspects aside - signifies the energy security logic of subsistence. Many definitions of energy security as framed by actors in the Polish context reflect that particular understanding. Theoretically speaking, given that multiple actors attach different meanings to energy security within the subsistence logic, the hierarchy where environmental concerns overthrow economic agenda is also conceivable. However, as the analysis of the German case showed, and as Kassenberg similarly implies here, once the environmental aspect is prioritized – the remaining dimensions of energy security are not only pushed down on the list of priorities, but transform too. With the environmental agenda topping the list – the 'sustenance' transforms into 'sustainable development', while 'growth' becomes a 'balanced growth' or even gets closer to the 'zero growth' argument.

Whereas the analysis of the German context showed that reversal of typical hierarchies of energy security dimensions within the subsistence logic sets the ground for the incremental

⁶⁰² Andrzej Kassenberg, ‘Climate Policy and Energy Policy: Convergence or Contradiction? The Case of Poland’, in *Energy Security and Climate Change* (Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2009), 153. Emphases added.

processes that lead to the development of the emancipatory logic in the energy sphere, the elements of this logic can also be traced in the Polish context. Moreover, the close cooperation of many ‘green’ actors from the German and Polish sides – with the frequently organized public debates, expert consultations and translation of German language sources on the topics related to energy transition – point to a significant knowledge transfer and the cosmopolitan character of the emancipatory agenda. However, the logic of emancipation manifests differently in Poland as: firstly, it is currently more present in the rhetoric than practice; secondly, the specificity of the Polish context due to its post-Soviet legacy implies that the emancipatory agenda in the energy sector has potentially more far-reaching consequences.

To start with, it is worth pointing out that Polish actors who call for change in the dominant approach to energy security – often refer to the German example of ‘Energiewende’. Kassenberg’s emphasis on the development of renewable energy sources strongly suggests that it is the decentralized and participatory energy system that would take the prioritization of the environmental agenda to its logical conclusion and bring about the change in the way in which we conceptualize and think about energy security.

Some energy security definitions given by the environmental actors in Poland similarly reflect that shift in reasoning. Firstly, many of them point to the cross-sectoral approach to energy security that in their opinion could be realized by the development of renewables. Therefore, Dariusz Szwed from the ‘Greens 2004’ suggested that only state’s own energy production based on renewables could simultaneously provide for ‘ecological, societal and economic security’.⁶⁰³ Similar opinions were expressed in some environmental and academic circles – as energy efficiency and development of renewable energy sources, based on the culture of prosumers, were pointed to as two key ways of ensuring Poland’s energy security that would also make the economic, societal and environmental dimensions of energy security

⁶⁰³ Szwed, Interview.

compatible.⁶⁰⁴

Apart from wider conceptualizations, many actors raised the issue of social participation in the energy production that derives from the diffused energy model. A number of NGOs and environmental groups have even coined a term ‘energy democracy’ – to highlight the scope of the potential systemic transformation and its underlying logic, where individuals stop being merely the object of the technocratic energy policy and become its subject and sovereign.⁶⁰⁵ This idea has been vividly propagated by some actors, most prominently by Dariusz Szwed from the 'Greens 2004' who claimed: “We are promoting an entirely different model of energy system... We are building a grassroots movement for the Polish energy transformation... Energy companies take energy away from us... renewable energy will free energy for all the Poles”.⁶⁰⁶ Such rhetoric, which depicts the democratization of the Polish energy sphere, contains a number of elements that similarly to the German context point to the emerging logic of emancipation. First of all, we are moving away from the state’s centralized control over energy resources (the logic of war), and away from the complex contestation processes within public policy agenda (the logic of subsistence) towards the level of individual users. Here, through the reflexive practice of energy production the understanding of energy security transforms into a ‘positive’ and ‘inclusive’ one. Secondly, this shift is accompanied by a rhetoric of social liberation and empowerment via participation in the energy system, which system stops to be ‘oppressive’ once the power of the energy monopolies breaks down and the control over energy becomes diffused. Thirdly and crucially, in the opinion of a number of environmental actors in Poland, its development not only would end Polish state’s omnipotence in the sphere of energy by shifting the responsibility for energy production to citizens,⁶⁰⁷ but also transform the entire

⁶⁰⁴ SGGW, Interview; Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Warsaw, Interview.

⁶⁰⁵ Szulecki, Ancygier, and Szwed, ‘Energy Democratization?’

⁶⁰⁶ Szwed, Interview.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid.; SGGW, Interview.

socio-economic model.⁶⁰⁸ In other words, thanks to their scalability and distributed character, renewables not only enable the individuals, cooperatives and local communities to invest and benefit from their development,⁶⁰⁹ but social empowerment in the energy sector could lead to further democratization of the entire system – as citizens would become aware of the power of their political agency to bring about the desired changes. This is especially the case in the CEE region, where centralized political power is additionally strengthened by the Soviet legacy of keeping a strict division between the management of resources and societal relations – which impacts both the energy and environmental sectors.⁶¹⁰ For this reason, the introduction of the decentralized energy model based on the renewable energy sources is seen by many as Poland's step into the 21st century – as opposed to the 'outlived' centralized model that developed mostly in the 19th century.⁶¹¹

From the analytical point of view, it could be then said that the emancipatory logic would manifest within the Polish context as strongly transformative on two levels. Firstly, a growing percentage of prosumers (within shifted constellation of actors where they "have a say") would engage in reflexive practice of energy production (that blurs the lines between referent objects and subjects of security) and lead to the democratic transformation of the energy system (with democratization as the ultimate security mechanism). Secondly, once that happens the empowered citizens could bring about further changes and transform the entire socio-economic model ('distal context'). Simultaneously, given the intersubjectivity of the above elements, the changed distal context would further enhance embeddedness of security mechanism (democratization of the energy sphere), and strengthen given constellation of actors (that empowers individual prosumers). Therefore, such system would resemble one of the two

⁶⁰⁸ demosEUROPA, Interview; SGGW, Interview; Chancellery of the Sejm, Interview.

⁶⁰⁹ Szulecki and Westphal, 'The Cardinal Sins of European Energy Policy'.

⁶¹⁰ Robbins, *Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction*; Jehlička and Smith, 'Out of the Woods and into the Lab: Exploring the Strange Marriage of American Woodcraft and Soviet Ecology in Czech Environmentalism'.

⁶¹¹ Szwed, Interview; SGGW, Interview.

main models of the energy systems' development: 'democratic, participatory and based on the environmentally friendly energy', as opposed to the elitist, centralized energy system that 'does not need a large public participation, but...can be realized by a strong central government in collaboration with several large organizations - a view that reflects the traditional industrial thinking'.⁶¹²

The advantages of the diffused energy system were highlighted by a number of Polish actors, who claimed that such system would be more certain in terms of ensuring energy security,⁶¹³ have minimal impact on the natural environment due to its reliance on the micro-energy installations,⁶¹⁴ and make it extremely hard to carry out a terrorist attack on the national energy infrastructure.⁶¹⁵ Other arguments present in the debates stressed once more the elements that would ultimately show the emancipatory character of such model. It was then noticed that it would lead to the distribution of profits from the energy production among the prosumers – as opposed to a few energy companies - and de-monopolize Polish energy sector,⁶¹⁶ modernize the Polish society and lead to its further democratization,⁶¹⁷ increase social awareness regarding the environmental and energy issues,⁶¹⁸ or even contribute to the minimization of the areas of social exclusion.⁶¹⁹

Such energy system would be compatible with the 'high energy culture', as described in the literature on the subject.⁶²⁰ According to the latter, the energy culture 'signifies a humanistic approach to energy issues, both on the part of its producers and consumers, which approach enables solving the social problems'.⁶²¹ In this understanding 'the less impact on the

⁶¹² Henrik Lund, 'Choice Awareness: The Development of Technological and Institutional Choice in the Public Debate of Danish Energy Planning', *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning* 2, no. 3 (2000): 249–259.

⁶¹³ Ministry of Economy, Renewable Energy Department, Interview; Szwed, Interview.

⁶¹⁴ SGGW, Interview.

⁶¹⁵ Ministry of Environment, Interview.

⁶¹⁶ Szwed, Interview; Chancellery of the Sejm, Interview.

⁶¹⁷ Szwed, Interview; SGGW, Interview; Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Warsaw, Interview; demosEUROPA, Interview.

⁶¹⁸ Ministry of Environment, Interview.

⁶¹⁹ Szwed, Interview; Chancellery of the Sejm, Interview.

⁶²⁰ E.g. Łucki and Misiak, *Energetyka a Społeczeństwo*.

⁶²¹ Ibid., 44–45.

environment and the smaller the energy loss, the higher the energy culture'.⁶²² ⁶²³ High energy cultures are therefore characterized by a high degree of decentralization of the energy systems (dismantling of monopolies), and a highly conscious approach to the issues of energy on the part of the consumers (signifying energy efficiency and reflexive character of energy itself).⁶²⁴ Most importantly, the process of changing the energy culture from 'lower' to 'higher' seems to correspond well to the hierarchization processes that take place among multiple actors within the logic of subsistence. In the words of Łucki & Misiak: "This process takes place in different social spheres that could have an impact on it. These include, among others: scientists, parliament, government agencies, the public, NGOs, investors, energy suppliers, local communities, energy consumers, etc. It is necessary to think in terms of multiple domains and different actors at different levels of scale".⁶²⁵

The emancipatory logic seems counter-intuitive in the Polish context, as it faces both regulatory and mental barriers, as well as the constellation of actors that aims at maintaining the status quo. Firstly, the possibility of prioritizing the environmental aspect of energy is hindered by low public awareness of the environmental issues. As an official from the 'Office for parliamentary analysis'⁶²⁶ stated: "Environmental concerns are not perceived as a major problem by Poles. Still more important are the job places and other economic concerns", and further: "As for those who would be potential beneficiaries of the shift to the green economy, they are either not well organized, or do not know about these benefits, or do not perceive of this shift as a potential benefit".⁶²⁷ Therefore, whereas issues like 'CO2 emissions are not of the

⁶²² The ingredients of the energy culture include: 1) decarbonisation of human activity; 2) improving the efficiency of processing of the primary energy; 3) improving the efficiency of energy use; 4) energy conservation by users; 5) providing for cheaper and reliable energy (Łucki & Misiak: 2010)

⁶²³ Łucki and Misiak, *Energetyka a Społeczeństwo*, 44–45.

⁶²⁴ Ibid., 71.

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

⁶²⁶ Biuro analiz sejmowych – an office preparing the analysis and reports for the members of the Polish lower chamber of parliament: Sejm.

⁶²⁷ Chancellery of the Sejm, Interview.

public interest',⁶²⁸ it is the economic rationale that guides the general attitudes towards energy in Poland. In this sense, many energy experts doubt that Poles would be willing to 'pay twice as much for energy just to have it from the renewable sources'.⁶²⁹ Secondly, there exist technical and bureaucratic barriers to the development of renewables at the large scale, as the adequate energy infrastructure is lacking, while there are numerous institutional obstacles for individual actors, who would like to become energy prosumers.⁶³⁰ Therefore, many local attempts of creating the mini prosumers' cultures often encounter such barriers and result in conflict.⁶³¹ Thirdly, there exist traditionally strong links between energy companies and the political sphere in Poland – with the Polish government protecting strong economic interests of the main energy businesses. Moreover, the big energy companies themselves appear highly conservative and avoid innovation. As an analyst from the think tank demosEUROPA, noticed: "there is a tendency among energy companies in Poland to do the necessary minimum, but not to expose oneself to the radical changes, not to take risks, not to introduce innovative solutions, because the reward that comes with success is relatively small in comparison to a lack of success".⁶³² This rationale reflects wider conservatism typical for the Polish context. Even more important than this conservatism seems to be a deeply-rooted conviction among the Polish political elite that it is the state that should define the course and goals of energy security and energy policies. Finally, there are some distal factors specific to the Polish domestic setting. In the words of a prominent Polish environmentalist and scholar:

"I think that Germany is one generation ahead of us. I think that when it comes to us two important factors play a role. One is the aspect of a certain conservatism of the Polish society. The Polish society is in large part a society with rural roots, for whom the environment is something to be transformed, something to be changed, something to be subdued – therefore it is not necessarily seen as something to be admired. – Although, of course farmers know that they need to use it in a sustainable way, because if they transform it too much they will not be

⁶²⁸ Ministry of Economy, Nuclear Energy Department, Interview.

⁶²⁹ Sobieski Institute, Interview.

⁶³⁰ demosEUROPA, Interview; Chancellery of the Sejm, Interview; Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Warsaw, Interview.

⁶³¹ Ibid.

⁶³² demosEUROPA, Interview.

able to use it in the long run. On the other hand, there exist a right-wing approach additionally reinforced by the Catholic Church - 'let us make the earth subjected' – and this voice is much stronger than what John Paul II was saying about the environmental protection (...). [Additionally]...I think that there is a certain belief...that environmentalists and pro-green energy movements are some sort of a leftist conspiracy – that they are not true Poles and true patriots (...)"'.⁶³³

All the above contextual factors contribute to a certain constellation of actors when it comes to Poland's energy transformation prospects. On the one hand, there is the general public – neither much engaged nor interested in the issues of environment and alternative energy sources, but used to the fact that 'these issues are not widely discussed since - given the monopolies - there is not much choice anyway'.⁶³⁴ Some argue that this low public engagement translates into the lack of awareness of one's own best interests and a lack of political representatives that would make the issue of green energy one of their political programs' flagships.^{635 636} On the other hand, there is Polish government – with the continuously changing strategic energy plans and big energy companies' interests always in mind. This lack of the political power on the part of green energy movements entails, that many environmental activists try to appeal to other than environmental values – since the latter are not especially convincing in the Polish socio-political context. Therefore, Dariusz Szwed talks not so much about the ecologic aspects, but about the societal, democratic and economic ones. In his words: "What are we doing? We are building a grassroots movement for Poland's energy transformation. And why will we win? Because, people will make a profit out of it".⁶³⁷ The fact, that the above might indeed be the only viable strategy is confirmed by observations made by one Polish environmentalist and researcher: "I know from the research that I conduct in the rural areas that the prosumers' policy will have a chance to succeed there, because it will be

⁶³³ SGGW, Interview.

⁶³⁴ demosEUROPA, Interview.

⁶³⁵ Since *Greens 2004* political party is not in the Polish Sejm.

⁶³⁶ Szwed, Interview; Chancellery of the Sejm, Interview; demosEUROPA, Interview.

⁶³⁷ Szwed, Interview.

perceived not as an instrument of the climate protection or environment, but as an enhancement of one's own material status".⁶³⁸

This strong prioritization of the economic aspect of energy security is taken even further in the opinions of some energy experts. For instance, an analyst from the *Sobieski Institute* sees the ecological discourse in Poland as premature:

"Poland lags behind western countries when it comes to the issues of security, energy consumption, prosperity, affluence scale ... this eco-friendly European project, which is being implemented, would be in my opinion suited for Poland in 20, 30 years – nowadays we cannot afford it", and further: "This [ecological] aspect is at the moment quite abstract to me, and all those demands that come from the European Commission, Germany or Scandinavian countries have nothing to do with the situation in which Poland is today (...)".⁶³⁹

From the analytical point of view, the specificities of the Polish context indicate that the ultimate strength of the economically underpinned sustenance rationale also changes the discursive strategies of actors who call for the 'green' transformation of the energy system. Appealing to other than environmental issues serves then as a certain 'shortcut' that is necessitated by the contextual dynamics: unfavorable distal factors (e.g. low environmental awareness), and a traditional constellation of actors (that gives leverage to big industry interests). This dynamic also implies that - as opposed to the German context – the emancipatory logic in the Polish energy sphere is so far present more in the rhetoric than in the practices of the wide-scale grassroots movement. Having said that, despite all the obstacles the prosumers culture in Poland has been steadily growing in the recent years.⁶⁴⁰ However, even with the local citizens' energy initiatives – the energy system is not likely to become diffused anytime soon.

⁶³⁸ SGGW, Interview.

⁶³⁹ Sobieski Institute, Interview.

⁶⁴⁰ Andrzej Ancygier and Kacper Szulecki, 'Die Polnische Energie- Und Klimapolitik in Der Verantwortung von PiS' (www.laender-analysen.de, 2 February 2016), http://www.laender-analysen.de/polen/pdf/PolenAnalysen175.pdf?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Polen-Analysen+Nr.+175.

Hence, some actors advocate either staying with the centralized energy system⁶⁴¹ or aim at the hybrid - leaving the centralized system and developing some additional renewable energy sources as a part of widening the energy portfolio. The latter view was especially popular among Polish ministerial officials working within the departments of renewable energy and the government of Donald Tusk.⁶⁴² Maintaining high centralization of the energy system has its advantages as it provides for a greater stability and a better evaluation of the resource capabilities in case of the energy crisis.⁶⁴³ On the other hand, the continuous concentration of power and decision-making among few actors (government and big energy companies), is non-democratic and not always economically or environmentally superior to the socio-economic model based on diffused energy.

Theoretically speaking, although the relative status quo in the Polish energy context highlights once more the dominance of the subsistence logic, the latter might be periodically overthrown by one specific logic of energy security: the logic of war.

PIPELINE POLITICS & THE LOGIC OF WAR

Whereas the emancipatory logic appears to emerge in the energy sphere through the incremental processes of contestation and wide scale bottom-up citizens' initiatives, the logic of war was triggered in the Polish context in the specific period of time by a combination of domestic factors and the developments in the European pipeline politics.⁶⁴⁴ The favourable dynamics of the Polish context, such as the traditional constellation of actors (with centralized decision-making and specific political leadership at the time), and conducive distal context

⁶⁴¹ Sobieski Institute, Interview.

⁶⁴² Ministry of Environment, Interview; *ibid.*

⁶⁴³ demosEUROPA, Interview.

⁶⁴⁴ At least in the European context where it raises mainly in relation to pipeline politics. On the other hand, if considered in line with the original typology it may apply also to events like resource wars. In both cases however, its rise is triggered by the events largely independent of actors affected, for example, the diminishing energy resources in certain parts of the world that lead to wars over these resources.

(socio-historical factors) due to which the notion of 'energy security' is equated with 'energy sovereignty' - made the rise of the war logic in the Polish energy sphere more likely.

If to consider historical developments it is clear that the Polish distal context was not always favorable for the survival rationale to emerge in its energy affairs. If to trace energy sector developments since the early 1990-ties one could notice the predominantly economic reasoning in Poland's energy relations with Russia.

To start with, the very issue of energy dependency was not politicized during the Soviet era – as contracts on gas and oil imports were part of the casual relations between states locked within the same economic system. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the need of renegotiating these contracts, which resulted in signing the agreements on building the infrastructure for the gas imports from Russia in 1993 (Yamal pipeline) and on the gas imports in 1996.⁶⁴⁵ The latter was later harshly criticized for its striking carelessness, as the Polish side contracted more gas for the next 25 years than its expected domestic consumption levels, and agreed to a very unfavorable 'take or pay rule', which additionally did not allow Poland to re-export its gas surpluses.⁶⁴⁶ Trying to explain this lack of caution one could distinguish between two main factors here: firstly, centralized decision-making, which meant that the 1996 agreement was not subjected to public scrutiny; and secondly, the Polish side's preoccupation with maintaining economic ties with the Russian monopolist at any cost. Indeed, replying to some criticisms two years after, Janusz Zgórzyński - the director of Public Relations office of the Polish Energy Group that signed the 1996 agreement, stated: "We have to act not only according to the security of supply, but also according to the economy, because we cannot afford the kind of diversification that takes place in the rich countries of Western Europe. Russian gas is the cheapest, and now there is no reason for concern about the security of supply from

⁶⁴⁵ K. Fischer, 'Dywersyfikacja Kierunków Dostaw Gazu Do Polski W Latach 1997-2007' (Studium Magisterskie, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie, 2008), 10–12.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

Russia”.⁶⁴⁷ However, the unfavorable 1996 agreement led to some politicization of the energy supply diversification attempts in Poland. Additionally fuelled by the Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s explicit statement in the mid-90ties, that: “In the light of its limited military potential Russia has to use its energy resources as a foreign policy tool”,⁶⁴⁸ the subsequent Polish governments started to consider alternative routes of gas supply, work to re-negotiate the already-signed contracts with Russia and elude the building of the new gas transit system.⁶⁴⁹ The multiplicity of different diversification plans introduced by the subsequent cabinets (of Jerzy Buzek, Leszek Miller, Marek Belka and Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz) lacked consistency and proved to be ineffective in the long-run. Different governments were coming out with different diversification ideas, while criticizing their predecessors and continuously changing the course of the Polish energy policy.⁶⁵⁰ To mention just some of the projects, governmental plans included various diversification routes from: Denmark, Norway, Germany, Central Asia, Ukraine, the building of the LNG Terminal or linking Poland to the Nabucco pipeline.⁶⁵¹ However, despite this variety of efforts it was not until 2005 when Kaczyński’s Law and Justice Party won the parliamentary elections that the logic of war started to manifest itself in the Polish context.

The rise of the logic of war

Following his election for the presidential office in December 2005, and the Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2006, Lech Kaczyński stated the main priorities of his forthcoming

⁶⁴⁷ Grzegorz Pawelczyk and Piotr Kudzia, ‘Skazani Na Gazprom’, *Wprost*, 1998, <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/6589/Skazani-na-Gazprom/?pg=0>.

⁶⁴⁸ Fischer, ‘Dywersyfikacja Kierunków Dostaw Gazu Do Polski W Latach 1997-2007’, 13.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.; Maria Chekaleva–Demidovskaya, ‘Russian-Polish Relations: Need for New Strategic Approach’, *Fellowship Program for Young Russian Policy and Opinion Makers*, 2005, 6.

⁶⁵⁰ Fischer, ‘Dywersyfikacja Kierunków Dostaw Gazu Do Polski W Latach 1997-2007’, 13; Andreas Heinrich, *Poland as a Transit Country for Russian Natural Gas: Potential for Conflict* (Koszalin Institute of Comparative European Studies (KICES), 2007), 24.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

presidency:

“Recent Russian moves against Ukraine – and partly also Poland – clearly show that the issue of providing Poland with alternative energy sources is absolutely essential to the national interest. (...) Poland should take urgent steps in three directions: firstly, the construction of the LNG terminal; secondly, the diversification of supply; and thirdly, the increase in gas production from the domestic sources. ... One of my first political initiatives as President will be to initiate the adoption of the National Security Act by the Parliament. The Act will be mostly concerned with the issue of energy security”.⁶⁵²

Kaczyński also took further steps towards expanding the role of the President in the state’s energy security policy. The preparation of energy security analysis and action projects became the responsibility of the - subordinate to the President - National Security Agency, a special working group on energy security was established, whereas the issue of energy security itself was included in the National Security Strategy of the Polish Republic, adopted on 13 November 2007.⁶⁵³ Kaczyński’s approach derived from the factors, which made it possible for the logic of war to occur: centralized decision-making, the Polish state as a main actor – with energy companies playing a subordinate role, and equating ‘energy security’ with ‘energy sovereignty’, which had further repercussions for the national security as a whole.

The logic of war was then set in motion and the policy moves that lifted energy security to the level of the national security agenda were accompanied by the ‘grammar of conflict’ in the official political rhetoric. Therefore, the Polish President on numerous occasions referred to the use of oil and gas by Russia as an ‘energy weapon’ and its energy policy conduct as imperialistic.⁶⁵⁴ This military rhetoric was echoed by other political actors, who similarly cited ‘energy weapon’ phrase, compared the Nordstream project to the infamous Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, or proposed the ‘European energy solidarity’ project under the slogan of ‘energy NATO’.⁶⁵⁵ Sharpening of the rhetoric was not confined to the political sphere only, as for

⁶⁵² Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, ‘Miotacz Gazu’, *Wprost*, 2006, <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/85836/Miotacz-gazu/>.

⁶⁵³ Lasoń, ‘Polska Wobec Wyzwań Bezpieczeństwa Energetycznego’, 238–45.

⁶⁵⁴ Heinrich, *Poland as a Transit Country for Russian Natural Gas*, 23.

⁶⁵⁵ Ariel Cohen, ‘The North European Gas Pipeline Threatens Europe’s Energy Security’, *The Heritage*

instance one Polish newspaper commented on the Nordstream pipeline: “Radosław Sikorski is right. Moreover, the comparison of the Russo-German gas pact to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact looks rather unfavorable for the Putin-Schroeder couple. The gas agreement is in fact more aggressive than the treaty of 1939. (...) Besides, the objectives of the two documents are the same - to share the influence over the area between Russia and Germany”.⁶⁵⁶ The general atmosphere of the energy ‘Cold War’ could also be spotted across the titles of many newspaper articles on energy security at the time, which drew parallels to some historical events, e.g.: *Gas Blitzkrieg*?⁶⁵⁷, *Pipes of War*⁶⁵⁸, *Energy annexation*⁶⁵⁹, *Geopolitical leash*⁶⁶⁰, *Gas encirclement of Poland*⁶⁶¹. Even more important than the rhetoric though, were the further policy implications of the above logic.

The new government, supported by the President, already at the end of 2005 announced its intention to sign the ‘irreversible’ agreements on gas supplies from non-Russian sources.⁶⁶² These declarations were followed by consistent efforts at diversification of energy supply – particularly from Central Asia. Favoring that geographical direction motivated Poland to resign from the economically beneficial straight pipeline connection with Germany in order to pursue the much more complicated Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk project.⁶⁶³ Another important decision was the rejection of the Yamal 2 gas pipeline offered by Russians, which would enable Poland to

Foundation 26 (2006): 7, <http://www.massbach-world.de/media/116800689f529cf2ffff831aac144225.pdf>; L. Parnes, ‘Lęk Przed Pustą Rurą’, *Wiadomosci.polska.pl*, 15 July 2007, http://wiadomosci.polska.pl/specdlapolski/article,Lek_przed_pusta_rura,id,285019.htm; Heinrich, *Poland as a Transit Country for Russian Natural Gas*, 83.

⁶⁵⁶ Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, ‘Energetyczna Zimna Wojna’, *Wprost*, 2006, <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/90039/Energetyczna-zimna-wojna/>.

⁶⁵⁷ Mychail Gonchar, ‘Gazowy Blitzkrieg?’, *Wprost*, 2006, <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/88038/Gazowy-blitzkrieg.html>.

⁶⁵⁸ Dariusz Baliszewski, ‘Rury Wojny’, *Wprost*, 2006, <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/86453/Rury-wojny/>.

⁶⁵⁹ Jan Piński, ‘Zabór Energetyczny’, *Wprost*, 2006, <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/97179/Zabor-energetyczny/>.

⁶⁶⁰ Ariel Cohen, ‘Geopolityczna Smycz’, *Wprost*, 2006, <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/96425/Geopolityczna-smycz/>.

⁶⁶¹ Piotr Woźniak, Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, and Grzegorz Sadowski, ‘Gazowe Okrążenie Polski’, *Wprost*, 2005.

⁶⁶² Heinrich, *Poland as a Transit Country for Russian Natural Gas*, 25.

⁶⁶³ Agnieszka Łakoma, ‘Polska Sama Musi Zadbać O Gwarancje Dostaw Surowców’, *Rzeczpospolita*, 13 December 2007, <http://www.rp.pl/artukul/9211,76410.html>.

transit all the purchased gas.⁶⁶⁴ The inconsistency of the Polish policy-making towards Russia, and its efforts at reducing the co-operation, was also one of the reasons why Russia decided to negotiate the Baltic pipeline project with Germany in the first place.⁶⁶⁵

The above policy developments show a changed hierarchization of energy security dimensions quite unusual for the Polish context – with the economic concerns being pushed down in the hierarchy and replaced with the survival rationale in the energy policy sphere. Neither Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk project, nor the rejection of Yamal 2 by Poland had a strong economic justification. The latter was justified mainly by the solidarity with Ukraine, whose interests as a transit state to Western Europe could be threatened.⁶⁶⁶ One could argue that it was not the economic situation of Ukraine *per se* that bothered Poland, but rather its geopolitical situation - and a will to remain Ukraine's ally in disputes with Russia. The fact that economic factors were pushed down in the list of energy priorities and that energy companies started to be treated as the mere executors of the state's will, was also reflected in Kaczyński's decisions regarding diversification of gas supply from Norway and plans for building the LNG terminal. As some commentators noted:

“The projects of the gas pipeline [from Norway] or LNG terminal are already a foregone conclusion, although experts haven't finished researching the projects' economic and technical feasibility yet. (...) The same situation applies to the LNG terminal. Prime Minister Kaczyński not only treats this project as a 'done deal', but he has even already chosen its location. (...) Meanwhile, the heads of the PGNiG assure that the works on the project's feasibility are in progress”.⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶⁴ A. Kubacki, 'Nord Stream, Czyli Jak Nie Robi Się Biznesu', *Newsweek*, 9 November 2009, <http://www.redakcja.newsweek.pl/Tekst/Polityka-Polska/533090,Nord-stream-czyli-jak-nie-robi-sie-biznesu.html>.

⁶⁶⁵ Chekaleva–Demidovskaya, 'Russian-Polish Relations', 6.

⁶⁶⁶ Kubacki, 'Nord Stream, Czyli Jak Nie Robi Się Biznesu'.

⁶⁶⁷ Adam Grzeszak and Marek Ostrowski, 'Taniec Na Rurach', *Polityka*, 2006.

Neither of the above projects has materialized so far. On the contrary, the logic of war started to wane after the Law and Justice's defeat in the 2007 parliamentary elections. In their aftermath many politicians started to distance themselves from the energy policy of their predecessors, while many energy experts criticized the implications of these policies.

Therefore, a new Minister of the Economy Waldemar Pawlak, stated that any further diversification plans would be verified based on their economic rationale rather than political concerns.⁶⁶⁸ Similar rhetoric was expressed a few years later by his successor Donald Tusk: "The gas is there to be burned for warming. The government's policy is there to make sure that this gas is not lacking in the case when critical events occur. (...) Gas should indeed flow from Russia, should not be too expensive and should not become a tool of a political fight".⁶⁶⁹

On the other hand, the energy policy choices of the Law and Justice 'era' were criticized for their political and ideological rather than pragmatic motivations and focus on the reduction of the relations with Russia rather than potential economic benefits.⁶⁷⁰ It was then argued that this lack of political pragmatism derived from the Polish foreign policy being formulated in the historical-ideological frame, underpinned by the 'mythologized historical politics'; that the Polish-Russian relations started to resemble a 'Hobbesian state of nature' where the permanent crisis in the mutual relations became a normality; and that the gas investments looked like country defence preparations with 'politicians deciding everything, while economic matters being taken off the immediate agenda'.⁶⁷¹ Many also pointed to the long-term consequences of such an approach: Poland's undermined position in the energy relations with Russia for years

⁶⁶⁸ Lasoń, 'Polska Wobec Wyzwań Bezpieczeństwa Energetycznego', 252.

⁶⁶⁹ Piotr Naimski and Jan Staniłko, 'Gazowa Porażka Polskich Negocjatorów', *Rzeczpospolita*, 10 June 2010, <http://archiwum.rp.pl/artykul/954103-Gazowa-porazka-polskich-negocjatorow.html>.

⁶⁷⁰ Stanisław Bieleń, 'Deficyt Realizmu W Polskiej Polityce Zagranicznej', *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, no. 3/4 (t. 38) (2008): 21–22; Kubacki, 'Nord Stream, Czyli Jak Nie Robi Się Biznesu'.

⁶⁷¹ Bieleń, 'Deficyt Realizmu W Polskiej Polityce Zagranicznej'; Grzeszak and Ostrowski, 'Taniec Na Rurach'.

to come, continuous lack of alternative supply routes, and big financial burden for the entire Polish energy sector caused by the investments in the LNG terminal.⁶⁷² Consequently, further voices that called for diversification grounded their opinions rather in the economic market rationale: higher than average prices for the Russian gas paid by Poland and need to lessen the dependence on an energy monopolist.⁶⁷³

Does that mean that the occurrence of the logic of war in the Polish context was a one-time event? Arguably, no. The contextual factors that favor the rise of this logic are still in place. An interesting example here is the parliamentary debate that took place in the Polish Sejm in the aftermath of the Ukrainian gas crisis in 2009. The profound analysis of the parliamentary speeches from that debate showed the continuously dominant realist logic in the framing of energy security issues with: firstly, repetitive use of phrases such as ‘survival’, ‘national interest’ and ‘security’; secondly, state-centric perspective that treats EU and energy companies as secondary actors subordinate to the state’s interests; thirdly, only a few voices pointing to the need of relying on the economic rationale in the matters of energy policy; and finally, even fewer voices noticing the importance of individual citizens in the debate on energy security – as opposed to the state only.⁶⁷⁴

One could therefore conclude that the rise and fall of the logic of war in the Polish context could be easily repeated in the future. Not only the centralized energy system and low public engagement create an environment that is conducive for the survival rationale to reappear in the Polish energy sphere, but the same could be said about the distal context (socio-historic factors), which causes the notions of ‘energy security’ and ‘energy sovereignty’ to be confused

⁶⁷² Bieleń, ‘Deficyt Realizmu W Polskiej Polityce Zagranicznej’, 13–14; Andrzej Szczęśniak, ‘O Co Chodzi Unii W Sporze Gazowym Między Polską a Rosją?’, in *Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne – Rynki Surowców i Energii* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Bezpieczeństwa, 2011), 43.

⁶⁷³ Tomasz Wojciech Kaźmierczak, *Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne - Implikacje Uzależnienia Polski Od Importu Gazu Ziemnego: (Zarys Problemu)* (Warszawa: Promotor, 2008), 89; Independent energy expert, Interview; Sobieski Institute, Interview.

⁶⁷⁴ W. Kazanecki, ‘Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne W Polskiej Debacie Publicznej W Okresie 21.10.2007 – 9.01.2009 R. W Świetle Debat Parlamentarnych’, in *Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne Europy Środkowej* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2010), 259–63.

and used interchangeably.

Energy security versus energy sovereignty

The confusion of the reasoning that underlies these two notions in the Polish context was spotted by one of the academics and propagators of citizens' energy in Poland - Professor Żmijewski. Żmijewski suggested to purposely introduce the term 'energy sovereignty' to the public and expert debate on energy security - as one best describing the political and emotional aspects of the energy security problem in the Polish context.⁶⁷⁵ 'Energy sovereignty' could be then described as the ability to independently shape and implement energy policy, including the freedom to shape the foreign purchases' portfolio.⁶⁷⁶ A conscious introduction of this term to the debate on energy security could, in his opinion, lead to the rationalization of that debate and recovering of the energy security's original meaning. The latter has been allegedly distorted by the Polish media, which by drawing the parallels to distant historical events, have continuously presented various energy security issues as a matter of Poland's independence and *raison d'état*. As a result, the possible violation of the Polish state's sovereignty by the energy blackmail from Russia became a strong argument in the Polish domestic politics and foreign policy alike.⁶⁷⁷ However, as Żmijewski pointed out, in all the media coverage of energy security issues it is the sovereignty of the decision that is questioned and highlighted rather than 'energy security' *per se*, as: 'Contrary to fears spread by the media a complete loss of state's control over the energy sector does not automatically mean the danger to energy security. Yet, it means a symbolic loss of energy sovereignty'.⁶⁷⁸

Żmijewski's observation grasps one of the key features underlying the dominant

⁶⁷⁵ Bartodziej and Tomaszewski, *Polityka Energetyczna i Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne*, 129.

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid., 131.

understanding of the energy security concept in the Polish context. This understanding – although most visible during Kaczynski's presidency – has been deeply rooted in the Polish mentality for years. A number of statements that refer both to the contemporary and historical developments in Poland's energy policy are a case in point here, as lifting the issue of energy security to the level of national sovereignty matter was visible across many policy decisions and their underlying rhetoric over the years. For instance, the 'contract of the century' to supply gas from Russia, signed by PGNiG⁶⁷⁹ and Gazprom, was termed after a closer scrutiny as a 'threat to the national energy security...and even to the sovereignty of the Republic'.⁶⁸⁰ Several years later Poland did not accept Russia's help in developing its nuclear energy project – as similarly to the gas supply, the idea was perceived as a 'Russia's dictate'.⁶⁸¹ Later decision to start the works on building the LNG terminal in Gdynia was made by the National Security Agency itself – a development that was compared by some to making an investment in the country's defense system.⁶⁸² Most recently still, the Law and Justice Party promised to 'tear the Polish shale gas out from the foreign hands and make it a national treasure and a true guarantor of energy security' that could 'change the geopolitical balance in this part of Europe'.⁶⁸³ Polish 'energy sovereignty' rationale also had wider implications as far as the EU energy policy is concerned. Therefore, although Poland has long been a loud advocate of the 'energy solidarity' clause among the EU member states, it had been simultaneously protecting its domestic monopolies and blocking the entry of other European players on the Polish energy market.⁶⁸⁴ As one energy expert noted, it is an ultimate reflection of the Polish 'ideological dogma that only the state-controlled monopoly PGNiG can ensure our security of gas supply'.⁶⁸⁵

⁶⁷⁹ Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo – Polish Oil and Gas Company.

⁶⁸⁰ Grzegorz Pawelczyk and Piotr Kudzia, 'Nabici W Rurę', *Wprost*, 1999, <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/5295/Nabici-w-rure/>.

⁶⁸¹ Chmielewski, *Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne Państwa*, 81.

⁶⁸² Adam Grzeszak and Tomasz Walat, 'Port Zamiast Rury', *Polityka*, January 2006.

⁶⁸³ Adam Grzeszak, 'Świeczki Nie Gaście', *Polityka*, 2011, <http://archiwum.polityka.pl/art/swieczki-nie-gascie,432925.html>.

⁶⁸⁴ Szczęśniak, 'O Co Chodzi Unii W Sporze Gazowym Między Polską a Rosją?', 42.

⁶⁸⁵ Adam Grzeszak, 'Gaz Zasmucający', *Polityka*, 13 October 2009,

Having in mind these developments over the years, the assumption that a conscious introduction of ‘energy sovereignty’ term to the public debate could alter that contextual understanding seems questionable. Although indeed there is a vast discrepancy between Polish scientific and technical energy studies - which describe energy security by various measurable parameters⁶⁸⁶ - and the media rhetoric as well as the political elite's understandings that often confuse the notions of ‘energy security’ and ‘energy sovereignty’ - the *raison d'état* thinking is deeply rooted also among multiple other actors in the Polish context. Right-wing political scene aside, the arguments repeated by the green energy movements in Poland and the views held by the general public seem to show similar patterns. Firstly, the idea of ‘freeing’ Poland from the dependency on Russia has been eagerly repeated also by the propagators of the green economy – with the exception that it is the renewable sources that would make Poland self-sufficient.⁶⁸⁷ Secondly, similarly the general public seems to identify ‘energy security’ with ‘energy sovereignty’. Public surveys conducted by GfK Polonia for a Polish daily *Rzeczpospolita* in two consecutive years showed that Poles consider the aspect of energy sovereignty as Poland’s top priority in energy affairs. The first of the surveys was conducted after the Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2009 and in its aftermath 62 percent of the respondents saw Poland’s dependency on Russia as a threat to the national sovereignty.⁶⁸⁸ Even more importantly, 55 percent of the respondents claimed that they would be willing to pay higher gas prices if it would help Poland to become independent from Russia regarding energy supplies.⁶⁸⁹ The latter response is especially surprising given the Polish context, in which society is usually motivated mainly by the economic factors. According to Jacek Kucharczyk, a program director at the Institute of Public Affairs in Warsaw, this response shows that the gas crisis has changed

<http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/rynek/269459,1,zima-wraca-temat-gazu.read>.

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁷ Szwed, Interview; SGGW, Interview; Marcin Popkiewicz, Interview, 10 June 2013.

⁶⁸⁸ Bernadeta Waszkielewicz, ‘Droższy Gaz, Byle Nie Z Rosji’, January 2009, <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/249551-Drozszy-gaz--byle-nie-z-Rosji-.html>.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid.

something in the mentality of the Poles.⁶⁹⁰ However, if to consult opinion polls data from the years preceding 2009 crisis, then a similar long-term pattern emerges. Therefore, Russian gas cutoffs to Ukraine in 2006 and conflicts in the Eastern neighborhood in the states that have been considered by Poland as the potential alternative transit routes (Ukraine in 2004 and Georgia in 2008), similarly accelerated public fears.⁶⁹¹ A look at some of the data gathered by the Institute of Public Affairs shows that as high as 62 percent of the Polish population in 2005, and 69 per cent in 2008, feared the economic threat from Russia.⁶⁹² Having in mind that the economics of energy supplies from Russia was often linked to politics, it might be worth highlighting that the perception of the political threat from Russia among Polish population was equally high at both times (63 and 66 per cent respectively).⁶⁹³ Given the on-going Russian-Ukrainian conflict that started in 2013, those historically-grounded perceptions of the Poles are only likely to strengthen further. In fact, the domination of the ‘energy sovereignty’ rationale could be recently spotted in the public views on the Polish nuclear energy program. The prioritization of the national sovereignty over economic aspects was reflected in a survey concerned with the arguments ‘pro’ and ‘against’ development nuclear power plants, as 66 percent of the respondents pointed to energy sovereignty as the main argument in favour of the development of nuclear energy in Poland and only 15 percent to its economic benefits.⁶⁹⁴

The findings of the above discussion have several analytical implications. Firstly, the traditional constellation of actors marked by low social mobilization of the Polish society coupled with traditionally centralized energy system and decision-making as well as specific distal factors (socio-historical), which contribute to the notion of ‘energy security’ to be equated

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁹¹ Cohen, ‘The North European Gas Pipeline Threatens Europe’s Energy Security’, 3.

⁶⁹² Institute of Public Affairs, ‘Ocena Dążeń Rosji I Konfliktu Rosyjsko-Gruzińskiego’, 2008, 3, <http://www.isp.org.pl/files/13327689280252247001221053324.pdf>.

⁶⁹³ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁴ Magdalena Kozmana, ‘Polacy Chcą Debaty O Projekcie Atomowym’, *Rzeczpospolita*, October 2010, <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/554249-Polacy-chca-debaty-o-projekcie-atomowym.html>.

with ‘energy sovereignty’, make the Polish context highly conducive for the logic of war to periodically rise in it. When that happens, even the deeply embedded subsistence rationale that aims at the fulfillment of energy needs at the lowest cost possible is overthrown by the military logic in the energy sphere. As such, the logic of war in Poland – similarly to the risk logic in Germany – can be rapidly brought about via congruence of contextual factors and not only influence the mainstream debate, but the emergent ‘survival’ mode can lead to the policy moves that put the issue of energy supply on the immediate national security agenda.

CONCLUSION

The Polish case brings further theoretical and empirical insights to the analysis of energy security and its logics. Tracing the origins of different conceptualizations of energy security across a number of debates also illustrated certain specificities of this particular context. Firstly, the logic of subsistence – with its multiplicity of actors and meanings that nevertheless always aim at the fulfillment of the functional needs of the society and prioritize economic dimension of energy security – constitutes the dominant logic in the Polish context. The dominance of this logic was clear in relation to EU climate goals, nuclear energy plans and prospects for the development of renewables in Poland. In the case of the risk logic – despite a short-lived debate in the Polish media in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident – its impact was not as profound as in Germany. The risk logic played out here mostly in line with the ‘riskification’ mechanism as the political actors used the rhetoric of calculation and precaution to ensure the Polish society about the manageability of risks connected to the national nuclear energy program. Although the ‘total’ character of potential risks was acknowledged, the rhetoric invoked did not go as far as to paint the gloomy reality of the Becksian risk society. On the contrary, the underlying rationale of prevention materialized in the policy focus on finding the best technological solutions as a strategy for the nuclear energy risk alleviation. Hence, this logic neither had a

further impact on the domestic constellation of actors nor the long-term nuclear energy plans. When it comes to the renewable energy – although the sustenance rationale also dominates in this area, a number of actors attempt to change the nature of the Polish debate on energy security and their rhetoric constitutes a case of reversed hierarchies of energy security dimensions (where priority is given to the ‘environmental’ aspect and other ‘wider’ issues such as social participation). Moreover, such rhetoric embraces many elements of the emancipatory logic – as it calls for social empowerment and liberation from energy monopolies via regaining control over energy by individual citizens. Although emancipation in the Polish energy sphere is currently more visible in the rhetoric rather than in the practices of wide-scale grassroots movements – the latter are increasingly growing. Therefore, despite the fact that the emancipatory agenda in Poland is marked by foreign influences (e.g. links with Germany on multiple levels), it is ultimately the intersubjective interaction between local actors who promote the ‘green’ goals and the bottom-up citizens’ initiatives that will determine the local trajectory of the energy security logic of emancipation. Crucially, a number of actors in the Polish context also expresses the hope that the civic empowerment in the energy sector could translate into further democratization of the entire socio-economic model in Poland – hence pointing to this logic’s transformative nature. However, since, as opposed to Germany, the constellation of actors does not change significantly in relation to various energy debates in Poland, the very same distal factors that hinder the calls for ‘energy democracy’ also make the Polish context conducive for the logic of war to rise in it. Most importantly, the centralized decision-making and distal context, due to which the notion of ‘energy security’ is confused with ‘energy sovereignty’, make it highly probable that the war logic will be periodically brought about through the congruence of factors to the mainstream policy agenda – and temporary overshadow even the deeply-embedded sustenance rationale. Lastly, from the analytical point of view, the energy security logics’ dynamics in the Polish context confirm the

findings of the German case. The logics of subsistence and emancipation appear to be closely linked and 'evolutionary' in character, whereas the logic of war and the risk logic occasionally rise and fall triggered by key developments in the regional and global energy sector.

CHAPTER IV

UKRAINE: ENERGY POLICY WITHIN GEOPOLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

INTRODUCTION

The final empirical chapter unpacks the energy security dynamics of the Ukrainian case. The analysis is conducted around some debates and developments that illustrate the specificities of the Ukrainian context, such as the preparation of the Ukrainian Energy Strategy 2030, the debate on renewables and energy efficiency measures, nuclear energy development plans and the debates triggered by the gas cut-off episodes of 2006 and 2009. Starting from some definitions and understandings of the concept of energy security, the chapter devotes significant space to the analysis of the contestation over the policy direction and priorities of energy security that take place in the liminal space within the logic of subsistence. The developments around the Ukrainian Energy Strategy 2030 are particularly useful here in pointing to the multiplicity of local and foreign actors whose agendas compete within an uneasy domestic constellation dominated by oligarchic interests and marked by a lack of societal dialogue. Having considered how the often non-transparent policy process emerges from within such interaction, the chapter shows how the logic of subsistence not only illustrates the specifics of the Ukrainian energy context most effectively, but also sheds light on the variety of factors that hinder the emergence of the emancipatory logic in the local energy system. Therefore, although the emancipatory rhetoric is currently found only in the marginal voices in the Ukrainian context, the analysis of the latter greatly aids in the conceptualization of the energy security

logic of emancipation.

The combination of the specific constellation of actors and distal context that contribute to the dominance of the sustenance rationale is visible also in the nuclear energy debate in Ukraine. Despite the legacy of Chernobyl, the risk logic does not play any significant role here, as the emphasis on ‘energy sovereignty’ and general societal disengagement steers the energy policy course back to its traditional trajectory. On the contrary, the rise of the logic of war has a visible impact on both the framing of the energy security debate and on the Ukrainian policy agenda. Moreover, the ‘grammar of conflict’ not only emerged in the aftermath of the gas crises, but became deeply embedded in the mainstream debate – especially as it is often intertwined with the general Ukrainian foreign and security policy.

Notions of energy security

Similarly to the German and Polish contexts, definitions of energy security in Ukraine vary, as depending on the actors who frame them, different aspects come to the fore of the energy security agenda. Not surprisingly, given current pressing problems of the Ukrainian energy sector, the majority of actors point either to energy efficiency,⁶⁹⁵ or energy market reforms that would lead to increased competitiveness and transparency,⁶⁹⁶ as main priorities in ensuring Ukraine's energy security. The first aspect is important not only for the Ukrainian companies that need to modernize in order to save energy, but also for the Ukrainian communal branch, where old water systems and heating devices - and often the entire buildings - should be reconstructed. Further aspects of energy security definitions in Ukraine include: diversification of energy supply, investment in Ukraine's own fossil fuel resources and

⁶⁹⁵ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview, 22 November 2013; EU Commission Delegation in Kyiv, Interview, 26 November 2013; Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview, 10 October 2013; The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview, 17 October 2013; International Finance Corporation, Interview, 19 November 2013.

⁶⁹⁶ Dixi Group, Interview, 19 October 2013; NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview, 21 October 2013.

development of better extraction technologies, increasing sustainability of the domestic coal sector, consolidation of energy networks,⁶⁹⁷ increase in innovative activity of energy companies, increase of reserves of energy fuels or climate mitigation policy and development of renewables.⁶⁹⁸

It is worth highlighting that most of these aspects, together with diversification proposals for investing in the LNG terminal, shale gas, nuclear energy or calls for the wider use of affordable domestic energy resources (such as coal and wood), have an underlying rationale of limiting Ukraine's energy dependence on Russia to the absolute minimum. This points to the fact that – similarly to the Polish context – the notions of 'energy security' and 'energy sovereignty' are often confused in Ukraine. Such understanding contradicts the more market-oriented approaches to energy issues that were typical for the German context. In the words of an analyst from the Kyiv branch of the Heinrich Boll Foundation (HBF): 'I think it is a very bad strategy to think of energy security as some one-land solution, focused only on local resources – [while]... everything abroad is insecure. Because there are a lot of countries in the world – [that] have no energy resources, but... are secure in [terms of] energy consumption'.⁶⁹⁹ Although some Ukrainian energy experts indeed would agree that Ukraine's energy security problems are overemphasized – as the country has all the reasons not to be energy vulnerable,⁷⁰⁰ it is rather a minority view. It is generally acknowledged that maintaining good cooperation with Russia regarding the gas supplies is strategically important for Ukraine.⁷⁰¹ The economic and political costs of overdependence on a gas monopolist constitute, nevertheless, a primary security concern for many⁷⁰² – especially given the post-2013 political developments between

⁶⁹⁷ Consolidation that would make these networks work more efficiently as a part of the Ukrainian energy system rather than a part of the former USSR transit system.

⁶⁹⁸ Andrian Volodymyrovych Prokin, *Harantuvannya Energetychnoi Bezpeki: Mynule, Sohodenn* (Lviv, 2011), 102–3.

⁶⁹⁹ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview, 5 November 2013.

⁷⁰⁰ Ukrainian Institute for Public Policy, Interview, 25 October 2013.

⁷⁰¹ The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview.

⁷⁰² National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview.

the two states.

The definitions of energy security in the Ukrainian context also point to a typical hierarchization – where the economic aspects are put ahead of issues such as environmental acceptability or social stability – with the latter, more often than not, being omitted altogether.⁷⁰³ Calls for adopting a wider approach to energy security that would incorporate environmental or societal aspects are rare and confined mostly to the ‘green’ actors. As a representative of the Kyiv office of the HBF put it: ‘I think that the Ukrainian government should think a little bit broader (...). It should develop a modern solution for the country's energy mix – regarding all factors: economic, ecological, climate...political and so on (...).’⁷⁰⁴ However, as opposed to the German context, where factors such as security of energy supply and environmental protection are often seen as complementary, in Ukraine they are perceived as mostly contradictory goals. Some studies even explicitly argued⁷⁰⁵ that aspects of energy security such as ecological impact, physical accessibility of resources, the economic value of energy resources and efficiency of use of energy resources, are in fact conflictual. More inclusive approaches are marginal in the Ukrainian context. For example, some analyses highlight the link between energy security and the possibilities of sustainable development and - among the areas that require special focus - list not only the reduction of energy dependence and improvement of energy efficiency, but also environmental and social stability.⁷⁰⁶ Similarly, some environmental actors, such as a co-founder of the Ukrainian green energy think-tank ‘Greencubator’, would point to the development of the ‘inclusive energy market’ as Ukraine's main priority in terms of energy security, followed by shifting financial resources from subsidizing utilities to subsidizing energy efficiency, diversification of gas supply routes and only then development of

⁷⁰³ Prokin, *Harantuvannya Energetychnoi Bezpeki: Mynule, Sohodenn*, 13–15.

⁷⁰⁴ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁰⁵ Prokin, *Harantuvannya Energetychnoi Bezpeki: Mynule, Sohodenn*, 14.

⁷⁰⁶ A.I. Shevtsov, *Energetyka Ukrainy Na Shlyakhu Do Evropeyskoi Integratsyi* (Dnipropetrovsk: Natsionalny Instytut Stratehichnykh Doslidzhen, 2004), 71.

renewables.⁷⁰⁷ In his view making the energy market more inclusive would mean redefining the model of how state talks to people, and incorporating people into it: 'I'm 150% sure – when you are adding people to that mechanism, to the system, when you are adding people into the equations, the system efficiency improves'.⁷⁰⁸

The above views mirror similar trends emerging in the neighboring Poland, yet their impact is less prominent in the Ukrainian context, which fact is reflected in the main focus of the Ukrainian energy security debates.

The frequency and intensity of these debates are generally very low.⁷⁰⁹ An energy expert from the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting in Kyiv distinguishes among three energy topics that are vividly discussed both in the Ukrainian government and mass media. Firstly, the topic of subsidized tariffs for heat and electricity for the population, which the government tries to preserve for as long as possible – mostly due to the high salience of the issue and its high politicization. Secondly, an issue of the fossil fuels industry in Ukraine (especially coal industry and thermal power generation)⁷¹⁰ and its lobbying efforts at the governmental and ministerial levels to set the development of coal/fuel generation as a priority. And thirdly, a debate on shale gas extraction and current developments in this area (including involvement of foreign investors or exploration works).⁷¹¹

These debates and mainstream definitions of energy security highlight specificities of the Ukrainian energy context: a prioritization of the sustenance rationale in a centralized energy system dominated by big industry interests, where attempts at diversifying energy portfolio aim at increasing energy independence from Russia. This first glance at the Ukrainian context does

⁷⁰⁷ Greencubator, Interview.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁹ International Finance Corporation, Interview; Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁷¹⁰ There is a high concentration in the traditional fossil fuels market in Ukraine, with a special role played by a large industrial group DTEK, which is a vertically integrated holding that concentrates almost all thermal power generation and steel/coal.

⁷¹¹ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

not fully explain though, why energy efficiency measures or the development of renewables are not given enough attention, or why the domestic constellation of actors does not allow for certain voices to be heard. The next section looks therefore at the workings on the Ukrainian Energy Strategy 2030, which further highlight these dynamics.

UKRAINIAN ENERGY STRATEGY 2030

Around the subsistence logic

The 'Energy Strategy 2030' was supposed to replace the outdated energy strategy from 2006. The latter, after 1-2 years of preparation with the help of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, which wrote its first draft, became public and was heavily criticized for its unrealistic forecasts of economic growth and energy demand.⁷¹² The strategy from 2006 shifted the focus towards nuclear energy and coal market, while practically not including alternative energy sources. The public consultations, conducted by the Ukrainian government at the time, took place after the document had been already approved.⁷¹³ Between 2011 and 2013 the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy was developing a new version of the strategy - and the latter was promulgated by the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry in February 2014.

The process of preparation of this draft highlights the uneasy constellation of actors within the Ukrainian context: a lack of coordination between Ukrainian governmental bodies, which have diverse visions of the energy security agenda, oligarchic interests that permeate all levels of the decision-making process, and a communication gap between state officials and wider civil society organizations. These factors together signify that in the Ukrainian context the dominant logic of energy security oscillates around the sustenance rationale, which is upheld

⁷¹² National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview; Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview; Dixi Group, Interview.

⁷¹³ Ibid.; Alla Dubrovyyk, 'Povazhayte Alternativu', *Den*, 20 April 2010, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/povazhayte-alternativu>.

by the idea of energy sovereignty and sought in the use of domestic energy resources.

Although different agencies responsible for the Ukrainian energy affairs are responsible for different aspects of energy portfolio, not only do they lack inter-institutional coordination, but they are also heavily influenced by external pressures. One could distinguish among three types of agencies here: the Ministry of Energy, which develops general framework for energy strategy and works with the electricity, gas and coal markets; the National Agency for Effective Use of Energy Resources (NYER), which mainly tackles the issue of energy efficiency and renewables; and the National Electricity Regulation Commission (NERC), which regulates electricity and gas markets.⁷¹⁴ Despite the division of energy policy areas, each of the agencies appears to follow in practice a separate energy strategy, as one analyst noted:

‘...the Ministry of Energy supports traditional fossil fuel generation, while the other two agencies support renewables, but each of them understands what is to be done in a different manner – with NYER being heavily influenced by the government and supporting only a few costly segments of renewables – wind and solar, despite the fact that Ukraine has big potential also in the field of bioenergy...’.⁷¹⁵

There are also competing interests within different departments, such as in the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy.⁷¹⁶ Although this lack of coordination is not unusual, the situation in Ukraine is additionally complicated by strong industry groups and lobbyists, which are highly influential in the sphere of energy policy. As a member of the EU Delegation to Ukraine noticed, the inter-agency ministerial co-operation is usually difficult in most countries: ‘...but I would say it is particularly bad here in Ukraine. (...) Very informally I would call it a bit of a clan thinking. (...) That is something that hinders Ukrainian progress’.⁷¹⁷ Similarly, some local energy experts suggest that Ukrainian state agencies that serve the interests of concrete oligarchic groups

⁷¹⁴ But also deals with a number of related regulatory procedures, such as setting the green tariffs for renewables.

⁷¹⁵ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁷¹⁶ EU Commission Delegation in Kyiv, Interview.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid.

constitute the main problem of the state governance – as they lead to a deficit of cooperation between agencies that represent different oligarchic interests.^{718 719} As an analyst from the NOMOS center stated: “During previous years these oligarchic groups provided their 'human resources' to those agencies. Many bureaucrats who are in the chairs of concrete departments, deputy ministers, minister chairs – they are interest-keepers of...[these] oligarchic groups”.⁷²⁰ The Ukrainian oligarchic system also further complicates the already uneasy and non-transparent decision-making process, as the gas, oil and renewables industries have their direct representatives in the ministries and agencies, whose representatives do not agree on many issues 'to the very end'.⁷²¹ Workings on Ukraine's 'Energy Strategy 2030' are a prominent example of such dynamic and its consequences – including the lack of a meaningful dialogue with green and societal actors.

Not surprisingly, the actors who took part in the preparation of the very document were heavily influenced by the main business lobbyists. The Ukrainian government ordered a draft of energy strategy from the Ministry of Energy, which asked the private foundation of Akhmetov for support in its preparation.⁷²² The latter had in turn consulted McKenzie – and its team from Moscow, which did not know much about Ukrainian energy sector, studied it at the time.⁷²³ As a local energy expert noticed, the resulting draft of the ‘so-called energy strategy integrated some wishes of different business lobbyists and put the main emphasis on the coal scenario – followed by further nuclear energy development plans’.⁷²⁴ Although the Akhmetov Foundation for Effective Governance (owned by a key oligarch in the Ukrainian coal sector),

⁷¹⁸ NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

⁷¹⁹ Among the most prominent oligarchs in the Ukrainian energy sectors one should mention: Rinat Akhmetov (number one in coal, mining, steel production), Dmytro Firtash (gas sector) or Ihor Kolomoyskyi (oil sector), although in recent years different sectors became more and more occupied by the 'family' – people close to the former president Victor Yanukovich (Ibid.).

⁷²⁰ NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

⁷²¹ The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview.

⁷²² NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

⁷²³ Ibid.

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

which prepared the draft organized a public hearing of the strategy together with the Ukrainian government at the time, the impact of this hearing was none. First of all, the very rationale for conducting the consultations was motivated by the EU funds that Ukraine had received under the condition that the public consultations would take place.⁷²⁵ Additionally, the fact that the draft was prepared by the highly qualified, Western-educated personnel from the Akhmetov Foundation could have played a role, as their professional and academic background favored such an initiative.⁷²⁶ However, the consultations did not have any significant impact and the whole process lacked transparency.⁷²⁷ A number of non-governmental organizations working on energy issues prepared their comments, suggestions and criticisms of the document (including national NGOs, experts and international organizations such as IEA, World Bank or European Energy Agency) – yet none of these was taken into account.⁷²⁸ The comparative analysis of the revised draft of the Energy Strategy 2030 (from March 2013) and the draft presented for the public discussion (in July 2012) pointed only to minor corrections – mainly in the area of coal.⁷²⁹ As Akhmetov controlled almost all the coal sector, some analysts highlighted a clear conflict of interests here – when a big industrial group develops the main energy document of the country.⁷³⁰

The strength of the coal lobby also meant that although the new energy strategy puts an emphasis on both coal and nuclear, the coal sector is prioritized. As an analyst from the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting noted, while a choice in Ukraine is to construct either new nuclear blocks or blocks that work on coal, the nuclear power stations belong to the state, whereas the coal power stations belong to a private company (DTEK).⁷³¹ As such, the

⁷²⁵ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview.

⁷²⁶ Ibid.

⁷²⁷ *Energy [R]evolution: Analytical Note* (Kyiv: National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, 2013), 1.

⁷²⁸ Ibid.; Dixi Group, Interview; National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview.

⁷²⁹ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview.

⁷³⁰ Ibid.

⁷³¹ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

private owner is more interested in the modernization of his own objects, while no private investors show interest in the modernization of nuclear power plants.⁷³²

The emphasis on energy from coal - and partially also from the NPPs - could be then explained by a mixture of factors: main industry interests, cheap coal and nuclear energy for the consumers, political importance of the coal regions and their short-term interests, or reluctance to introduce expensive technologies for the modernization of energy sector.⁷³³ Critics of this approach point to higher than assumed costs of nuclear energy once all expenditures incurred in its production are taken into account, high death tolls in the Ukrainian coal-fired stations, or the inevitable need to modernize Ukrainian energy sector in the future.⁷³⁴ Less critical voices call for the coal industry to start meeting environmental standards, limit CO₂ emissions and use coal in a more efficient manner.⁷³⁵

Different voices aside, it is necessary to stress that this shift in energy strategy towards coal has another important underlying rationale – Ukrainian energy sovereignty. It is, then, a common perception in Ukraine that coal should be favored and developed as an alternative to expensive gas, which is imported from a single supplier and distributed in the highly non-transparent Ukrainian market.⁷³⁶ The strength of this rhetoric signifies that, similarly to the Polish context, 'energy sovereignty' often replaces the 'energy security' rationale in Ukraine – and this understanding is common not only among the propagators of the domestic fossil fuel resources, but also among actors from the environmental and green energy movements. The latter often point to the importance of Ukraine's self-sufficiency in ensuring its own energy security. In the words of a representative of the local branch of the *Movement 350*: 'I would say

⁷³² And although a draft energy white paper titled 'Energy Strategy of Ukraine through 2035: Security and Competitiveness' published in March 2015 puts more emphasis on nuclear energy, given the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict and Ukraine's reliance on Russian expertise and fuel for its NPPs suggest that the emphasis on coal will not change in practice.

⁷³³ Dixi Group, Interview.

⁷³⁴ Greencubator, Interview.

⁷³⁵ EU Commission Delegation in Kyiv, Interview.

⁷³⁶ International Finance Corporation, Interview; NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

that this is still a good argument: the independence from Russia, because everyone knows that Russia really tries to influence all its buyers politically. People think that it would be good to be a country that relies on its own resources (...).⁷³⁷ Similarly, environmental activists from the HBF office in Kyiv pointed out:

'There are a lot of alternatives, but the government does nothing and tries to maintain the status quo until 2030. It is a very simple strategy: we use local resources, everything that we have – mostly nuclear - but not really because uranium has to be taken to Russia first [to be enriched] - coal and natural gas (...). The strategy wants to use local resources to provide energy security in Ukraine, and *energy security in Ukraine is local resources*'.⁷³⁸

A combination of the industry interests, centralized and non-transparent decision-making and the energy sovereignty rationale means that voices that call for a higher share of renewables and societal involvement are not fully considered. More strikingly still, not only does energy strategy say little about prospects for renewable energy, but similarly little attention is given to the pressing and more widely debated topic of energy efficiency. Although, in comparison to the energy strategy from 2006, the new draft puts more emphasis on developing energy efficiency measures, it does not go into depth of the potential action plans – so it is unclear whether the stated goals for 2020 or 2030 could be met.

As of autumn 2013 there existed already three working drafts of Energy Strategy 2030 and the ongoing progress was ambiguous, as it was unclear whether the final draft had been adopted or not.⁷³⁹ In the words of an analyst from NECU: 'We sent a document asking for clarifications, the government said it approved it, but sent it for further corrections - by whom? Nobody knows, (...) but there are rumors that those corrections are connected to renewables – because of Ukraine's obligations within Energy Community'.⁷⁴⁰ Such bad practice of

⁷³⁷ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁷³⁸ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview. Emphasis added.

⁷³⁹ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

implementation could be largely attributed to the conflictual dynamics of the Ukrainian energy sector, which is marked by great multiplication of actors within the logic of subsistence. As an energy expert from the Nomos Centre put it while commenting on this practice: 'We have many debates, discussions, roundtables, but no results. Different views between different political factions, interest groups, business groups, lobbyists etc. I don't know what is possible or how long it will take for the members of the parliament'.⁷⁴¹

The fact that some revisions were taken into consideration seems to owe to Ukraine's membership in the Energy Community, which is one of the few factors that slowly influence the pace of its domestic energy sector reforms. This is also an example of the transnational actors that shape Ukrainian domestic energy dynamics and that are often a source of different pushes and pulls in the conceptual vision of Ukraine's energy security.

Around the logic of subsistence: the foreign influence

Apart from the multiplicity of actors in the Ukrainian energy context, their domestic constellation is often additionally influenced by a range of supra-national players and transnational networks that promote different policy solutions.

On the very basic level, Ukrainian multi-vector policy, which allowed it to maneuver between the West and the East, was also reflected in its energy policy approach for many years. The workings on the Ukrainian Energy Strategy 2030 showed such competing influences. As a local energy expert pointed out - different sources of external pressure contributed to two main stances on energy policy in Ukraine. One that is more linked to the EU agenda and promotes wider use of renewables with the contraction of nuclear and fossil fuels, and the other that is more Russia-oriented and favors more gas and nuclear in the energy mix - with little concern

⁷⁴¹ NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

for environmental issues such as CO₂ emissions.⁷⁴² From this perspective, the initial draft of Ukrainian Energy Strategy 2030 was closer to the latter stance. Not only more gas in the energy mix meant higher dependence on Russia, but given that half of electricity in Ukraine comes from the Soviet-designed NPPs that work on nuclear fuel from Russia – the same logic applied here. Especially that the previous attempts of diversification of nuclear fuel supply failed due to the aggressive policy of Russian Rosatom in Ukraine.⁷⁴³

The Ukrainian-Russian conflict that started in late autumn 2013 changed this policy orientation, as Ukraine shifted its focus towards alternative gas supply routes and closer integration with the European energy market. However, different foreign influences during the preparation stage of the initial draft highlighted the contextual complexity and multiplicity of voices among which crucial energy policy decisions are taken in the Ukrainian context. Therefore, Russia attempted to pull Ukraine away from the Energy Community when in November 2011 Gazprom proposed cheaper gas for the Ukrainian side in exchange for its exit from it.⁷⁴⁴ Ukraine did not give in to these proposals at the time, as it was commonly perceived that the pressure from Moscow is not a ‘fair play’ and that Gazprom’s proposition might not be realized, but rather constitutes a ‘promise to *consider* the idea for cheaper gas’.⁷⁴⁵

On the other side of the spectrum, Ukraine’s membership in the Energy Community might have been one of the most important factors influencing its changing policy on renewable energy. Despite some local NGOs working on this topic, the general Ukrainian public did not perceive it as an important one – and as one analyst stated ‘as for today it is purely ‘imported’ effect’.⁷⁴⁶ The issue of renewable energy only emerged after Ukraine joined the Energy Community – as the membership served as a significant incentive to start the workings on the

⁷⁴² Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁷⁴³ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview.

⁷⁴⁴ NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid. Emphasis added.

⁷⁴⁶ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

national action plans for renewables and energy efficiency.⁷⁴⁷ Ukraine has been developing renewables more intensely since 2012 and it was planned that by 2016 solar energy will constitute 60% of all renewable energy.⁷⁴⁸ However, these numbers account for less than one percent of all energy produced in Ukraine and prospects that this percentage will increase exist mainly due to Ukraine's obligations within the EC, as it is obliged to reach 12% of renewables in its primary energy mix.⁷⁴⁹ Ukraine has also started to implement various EC directives and obligations gradually – although there is a consensus that more should have been achieved – especially about the electricity market law.⁷⁵⁰

It is worth noticing, though, that the Ukrainian side initially perceived the very membership in the Energy Community as a factor that could allow it to improve its strategic maneuvering between the Western and Eastern influences. Many observers then argued that some of Ukraine's expectations regarding the effects of joining EC were unrealistic, as it hoped that the latter would help it with some disputes with Russia.⁷⁵¹ As an independent energy expert stated: 'When Ukraine entered EC it expected that EC would adopt an active stance on Ukraine's relations with Russia, support and promote Ukrainian interests, and [since that did not happen]... the relations between Ukraine and EC became colder over the last years'.⁷⁵² The view from the other side differed greatly. As a member of the EU Delegation to Ukraine noted, there was a clear mismatch of expectations – with Ukraine hoping that the EC will help it to 'deal with Russia' and to create investment in Ukraine, whereas EC is a rules-based system aimed primarily at market integration.⁷⁵³

The issue of investment funds for modernization of the domestic energy system was

⁷⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁸ The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview.

⁷⁴⁹ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁷⁵⁰ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview; International Finance Corporation, Interview; Dixi Group, Interview; NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁵¹ Ukrainian Institute for Public Policy, Interview.

⁷⁵² The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview.

⁷⁵³ EU Commission Delegation in Kyiv, Interview.

indeed popular in Ukraine and it was expected that EC should support Ukraine in obtaining these funds.⁷⁵⁴ A lack of EC's support for the reversed gas flow from Slovakia was another issue – as the second energy package required all the companies to have access to the gas pipeline from Slovakia, yet Slovakia had a contract with Gazprom, which did not allow for that. Similarly, Ukraine assumed that EC would support the founding of a consortium with Gazprom – with potential partners such as E.ON and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. However, Gazprom opposed these plans to avoid a consortium with companies that it could not control.⁷⁵⁵

All these developments not only showed the obvious strength of the Russian side in influencing Ukrainian energy policy agenda at the time, but also highlighted how the involvement of foreign actors additionally complicated the domestic bargaining over the course and priorities of energy policy. If the latter is taking place around the subsistence logic in the liminal space between the theory, practice and policy of energy security, then for many years all these areas have been further impeded by the multiplicity of competing agendas coming from both domestic and foreign actors. These dynamics was also clearly visible in the developments in renewables and energy efficiency measures.

*Around the logic of subsistence: transnational actors in the field of
renewables & energy efficiency*

Whereas the membership in the Energy Community has been a crucial factor influencing Ukrainian approach to renewables and energy efficiency measures, a number of foreign stakeholders similarly exerted an impact on Ukraine in this area. A closer look at this dynamic sheds light on the type of foreign actors involved as well as on the interaction of the promoted 'green' agenda and the Ukrainian distal context – with its technical and socio-historic factors

⁷⁵⁴ The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview.

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid.

that hinder the development of the emancipatory logic in the local energy sector.

The local environmental agents acknowledged that even the limited plans for the increase of the share of renewables and energy efficiency measures in Ukraine would probably not be in place without some sort of pressure from the international stakeholders such as the EU, EC, US Embassy or the World Bank – even if it is hard to evaluate the actual strength of their influence on key decisions.⁷⁵⁶ Some related projects were also supported by the American government, British, Swedish, Austrian and German funding as well as corporate funding⁷⁵⁷. Germany clearly stands out among the multiple foreign actors in terms of intensity of involvement and the variety of projects supported in those areas. However, an uneasy German-Ukrainian cooperation also highlighted the obstacles to the ‘green’ agenda in the Ukrainian context.

To start with, Germany has been one of the most active countries in Ukraine – especially concerning the involvement of Ukraine into the new conceptual vision of the European energy security.⁷⁵⁸ As such, Germany proposed several projects in the area of energy efficiency and shared its expertise in the field of clean coal technology and renewables.⁷⁵⁹ GIZ, a technical aid program of the German government, included projects on the isolation of public buildings, assisted in organizing training on the municipal and urban levels for energy managers to increase energy efficiency, and supported some initiatives in public transport in the big Ukrainian cities.⁷⁶⁰ Some projects on the Azov Sea and the Crimean Peninsula were also realized with the participation of the Austrian and German companies and experts.⁷⁶¹

However, the German – Ukrainian co-operation faced some obstacles due to the

⁷⁵⁶ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview.

⁷⁵⁷ Greencubator, Interview; Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁵⁸ NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁵⁹ Viktoriia Skuba, ‘Energoefektyvnist Myslennia’, *Den*, 9 February 2011, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/energoefektivnist-mislennya>.; NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁶⁰ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁶¹ NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

competing visions of energy security among their respective governmental agencies and a lack of the inter-institutional co-ordination so prevalent in the Ukrainian context. Initially the German Ministry of Agriculture had aimed to transfer some German experience to Ukraine on the level of policy-makers (in the area of energy solutions). Once the project was transferred to the German Ministry of the Environment the policy framework changed as well – and the focus shifted towards the establishment of several pilot projects in Ukraine (mainly in the field of bioenergy).⁷⁶² As one analyst noted, the attempts at co-operation between the FNR (German renewable energy agency) and the Ukrainian side (mainly the Ministry of Agriculture) were not very successful.⁷⁶³ Although the Ukrainian side tried to find the beneficiary of the support among its other governmental agencies working on renewables, the process turned out to be difficult due to a lack of their co-operation and a lack of the united energy strategy.⁷⁶⁴

Similarly, the promotion of the environmentally friendly energy agenda by the transnational actors on the level of NGOs was not particularly successful. The Ukrainian office of the Berlin-based Heinrich Boll Foundation, which is one of the most active green energy NGOs in Kyiv, has been organizing public debates on issues such as energy efficiency – yet their frequency and impact were in the opinion of local actors very limited.⁷⁶⁵ In the words of its representative:

‘We are trying to create some kind of public pressure as well as political education for everyone on the topics of energy efficiency, climate change and so on and so forth; (...) we try to support local initiatives and organizations, we are cooperating with NGO Eco-club from Ryvna, National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, youth organizations like the Movement 350 and some other (...). We try our best, but of course we are very small and the country is so big (...).’⁷⁶⁶

Limited resources decrease the overall impact of NGOs such as HBF on the Ukrainian energy

⁷⁶² Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁷⁶³ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁵ International Finance Corporation, Interview; Kyiv Post, Interview, 19 October 2013.

⁷⁶⁶ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview.

context. However, given how little is happening regarding societal involvement, the non-governmental organizations still exert some impact, especially when it comes to framing the debate on energy issues and providing financial support. As an NGO worker from 'Movement 350' put it:

'In terms of civil society, of course Western Europe has influence – mostly because of funds, but also because of the expertise, because basically all funds for the civil society organizations here come from abroad. We don't really have donations, we don't really have government's support. And of course, they do frame the debate somehow, they are providing their priorities, they are giving money, but again their influence (...) [is] not a major influence'.⁷⁶⁷

Whereas international funding agencies are the most active players in the area of renewables, the high number of foreign investors causes the impression that there are many donors around and not enough movement on the governmental side, which itself can be problematic. Moreover, some local actors highlight the need for Ukraine to become more self-reliant in its energy affairs – renewable energy and energy efficiency solutions included. As the representative of the 'Greencubator' described the situation:

'There are two sides: good and bad. The good side is that a lot of projects were enabled by international donors. So, we in our history, for example, have done several projects without any [state] funding and we wouldn't be able to do that without donors. But there is [also] another aspect - I think that every country has to develop at some moment some *self-resiliency in terms of growing its own protective structures*. In this case the NGOs, the authorities need stronger focus. I don't believe in NGOs that care about election rights one day, gender rights the next day, and energy the third day. It is not going to work (...). There are some efficient projects, and there are many institutions that are wasting a lot of [resources] (...). I can't evaluate projects, but I think we should grow our internal pool of resources, crowdfunding, corporate support, different types of support for NGOs and just develop this culture of NGOs. It's not a problem [that money comes from abroad] - it's a good thing. The not so good thing is on our side, those who are taking money are not necessarily the right institutions for implementing [such projects]'.⁷⁶⁸

The extent of foreign involvement coupled with a weak local NGO sector also contributes to the heightened sensitivity on the part of transnational actors, which prefer to focus on

⁷⁶⁷ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁶⁸ Greencubator, Interview. Emphasis added.

mobilizing local communities rather than taking on the leading role. For example, the youth organization ‘Movement 350’, which works globally to support grassroots climate movement, tries to build a local base of environmental activists and educate young Ukrainians about the ongoing global climate debates through organized events and online communication. As one of its coordinators stated: ‘We are not a political power here, we are trying to influence people so they become active, because we are an NGO based in the US, we do not feel that we should lead here. – It is more of the support, to provide some tools’.⁷⁶⁹ Some other local NGOs, most importantly the ‘Greencubator’, similarly focus on innovative initiatives to reach the local population. For example, Greencubator’s ‘energy camps’ include very informal activities and discussions on energy-related topics, programs for children, and co-operation with a number of public and private actors to promote green innovation programs – e.g. energy-efficient universities. However, activities like these are rather an exception, as the Ukrainian NGO sector suffers from a number of limitations.

Firstly, in general terms Ukrainian NGOs are not very effective in engaging governmental or societal actors. As a member of Greencubator noticed: ‘This is a very niche thing, in western states we have 5-10 percent of the population engaged... [In the broadly defined environmental/energy agenda], here we have like 0.2 percent of the population concerned about this (...). It takes a lot of efforts to educate the community. [And] in Ukraine there are no efforts on the state level’.⁷⁷⁰ This lack of interaction on the NGO-society line is caused by both public disengagement and the way in which local NGOs operate on daily basis. As local activists point out, the majority of Ukrainian NGOs work in a very closed circle and do not have much connection to the general public, but rather work on a mode: ‘we know what to do, we analyze politics, we lobby’.⁷⁷¹ Secondly, many of them work on the narrowly defined

⁷⁶⁹ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁷⁰ Greencubator, Interview.

⁷⁷¹ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

issues, but lack a wider vision of where the country should be heading regarding its energy agenda. As an analyst from the DixiGroup noticed:

'As a part of our project we tried to contact different NGOs and 80% of them are not really aware what the policy on renewables is or should be, so they work very generally: “we have to stop shale gas development”, “we have to abandon nuclear power plants”; (...). They are also not constructive with the government – they criticize a lot, but they do not propose anything; [And]... since our government is still living in some post-Soviet era, at least some of us should show them in which way we should go'.⁷⁷²

Thirdly, in the opinion of some energy experts many NGOs often use their media exposure more to promote themselves during the air time than to promote energy sectors such as renewables.⁷⁷³ Finally, NGOs in Ukraine often function rather like private businesses than typical NGOs – as private persons, who want to earn some money by receiving a grant from abroad open their own NGOs.⁷⁷⁴ All this dynamics contributes to the fact that neither foreign funding channeled through the local NGO sector nor the local non-governmental organizations themselves are effective in promoting alternative energy solutions.

It could be then said that the specific constellation of actors operating within the Ukrainian context (marked by strong industry interests and weak societal actors) determines that the dominant sustenance rationale is underpinned by the centralized decision-making and focused on traditional energy sources. Many characteristics of this domestic setting also hinder the development of the emancipatory logic in the Ukrainian energy system. The next section analyses these factors in greater detail.

Around the subsistence logic: obstacles to the emancipatory agenda

The above analysis showed how the weakness of the local ‘green’ actors, ill-organized and coordinated domestic NGO sector, and a lack of governmental support coupled with low

⁷⁷² Dixi Group, Interview.

⁷⁷³ The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview.

⁷⁷⁴ International Finance Corporation, Interview.

public awareness create an uneasy environment for the development of alternative energy solutions in Ukraine. Whereas in the neighboring Poland the emancipatory agenda was similarly sparked by the ideas and debates ‘imported’ from abroad by local actors, the same process appears more marginal in the Ukrainian context. The influence of transnational actors promoting ‘green’ and participatory approaches in the sphere of energy security is low here. On the conceptual level such differences are most easily spotted in the hierarchization of different energy security dimensions by local actors. Definitions of energy security that call for inclusive solutions are extremely rare in Ukraine and do not surface the mainstream policy agenda, which remains very conservative. As such the reversal of hierarchies that would give more priority to the environmental impact of energy use and sustainable development, rather than sustenance, is unlikely, whereas more progressive ideas such as the decouplement of the economic growth from energy consumption are not familiar at all.⁷⁷⁵ As one analyst from the Institute for Eco-development stated: ‘What we see nowadays in the framework of governmental anti-crisis solutions contradicts the idea of sustainable development (...) When it comes to resources to encourage stimulation of environmental technologies among small businesses – we see here growing tax burdens and repressions (...)’.⁷⁷⁶ Moreover, if the analysis of the German and Polish cases showed that democratization of the energy sphere happens as the increasing number of individuals regains control over their own energy production and consumption, the Ukrainian distal context is less conducive for such processes to occur on a large scale. Namely, there exist both technical barriers and socio-historical factors that hinder the development of renewables and the implementation of energy efficiency measures by individuals.

⁷⁷⁵ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview.

⁷⁷⁶ Vitalii Kniazhanskyi, “‘Ozelenennia’ ekonomiki”, *Den*, 21 December 2010, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/ozelenennya-ekonomiki>.

Distal context: the technical barriers

The multiplication of actors in the Ukrainian context and their uneasy interaction in the liminal sphere is a major factor. For instance, the slow development and implementation of the regulation on renewables greatly owed to the lack of co-ordination between the Ukrainian energy agencies and their competing interests. As some local NGO actors noticed, despite good initial dynamics regarding the renewables (and interest from the side of energy businesses) a significant conflict between the Ministry of Energy and the State Agency on Energy Efficiency over the percentage of renewables to be included in the energy strategy of Ukraine⁷⁷⁷ during the years preceding its adoption in late 2013 caused certain damage. As a member of the DixiGroup noted in autumn 2013: ‘So there was a serious fight for a year and maybe the fact that this energy strategy is not published yet is due to the fact that this fight continues now’.⁷⁷⁸

A similar conflict could be detected in the area of energy efficiency. Given that the latter is frequently debated on the local, regional and national levels, it might be hard to comprehend why so little is happening in this direction. However, governmental bodies directly responsible for the promotion of energy efficiency solutions do not have an easy task. Firstly, the Energy Efficiency Agency, which should actively propagate alternative solutions, has very low capacities to lobby its interests due to the dominance of other industrial lobbyists (gas, coal, nuclear) that influence government as they aim to maintain the status quo.⁷⁷⁹ And secondly, the political parties that are in government are mainly pro-coal and pro-nuclear and the opposition could block any moves of the parliamentary committee working on energy efficiency.⁷⁸⁰ Speaking as of October 2013 an analyst from the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting pointed out:

⁷⁷⁷ With the Ministry insisting on around 5-6 percent and Energy Efficiency Agency on at least 11-12 percent.

⁷⁷⁸ Dixi Group, Interview.

⁷⁷⁹ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview; Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁸⁰ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

'Energy efficiency plans are not coordinated with the Ministry of Energy, they have completely different views on the problem and as a result they cannot submit this joint document to the Energy Community Secretariat. And now they decided to submit this document independently, so it's a bureaucratic game... They submitted it to the Secretariat as a draft'.⁷⁸¹

Moreover, as the previous analysis of the workings on the Ukrainian Energy Strategy 2030 showed, in the constellation of local actors it is not only the inter-governmental discoordination and competing visions that are problematic, but also the lack of communication between government and other societal actors. Therefore, many local actors working on the promotion of renewables and energy efficiency measures complain not only that the Ukrainian government does not devote enough efforts to both issues, but also that it does not consider multiple societal voices that call for change. In the words of an energy expert from the Ecological Centre of Ukraine, which has been working on promoting energy efficiency and renewables for 22 years:

'I think that everybody knows what to do on the level of experts, and state agencies, think tanks and NGOs – they know what to do, but those in parliament and the government, like ministries – they live in a parallel world, they don't connect with other people and cannot feel the feedback from them and the expert community'.⁷⁸²

And further, while commenting on the public consultations on the law on the efficient use of energy resources:

'... everybody tried to improve it - people from NGOs, think-tanks, independent experts, there were round tables, conferences, meetings that tried to make that law better, but in the end the final version is very poor. I'm not sure if it will help a lot in this sector. (...) It disappoints me, and we are all tired of trying to speak to them - it is always like knocking on the closed doors'.⁷⁸³

This specific constellation of actors translates into regulations that serve as a tangible barrier to the development of effective energy efficiency measures and renewables on a large scale.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid.

⁷⁸² National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview.

⁷⁸³ Ibid.

Firstly, high subsidies for energy prices provide very low incentives for consumers to implement some energy efficiency measures, thus creating a lot of instabilities regarding national energy security.⁷⁸⁴ Moreover, due to the central heating systems in the majority of Soviet-style municipal buildings insulating one's own apartment would not benefit the individual economically.⁷⁸⁵ Secondly, introducing energy efficiency measures is also problematic in the Ukrainian industry sector – despite a number of stakeholders who can offer loans here (such as World Bank, IFP, and other European institutions), businesses do not invest in saving energy due to political instability and uncertainty about the future of their enterprises. The subsidizing model also incurs huge losses for the national gas monopoly and is a big factor of degradation for the industry - as it provides opportunities for corruption for the energy companies.⁷⁸⁶ Thirdly, the resulted prices for electricity are in fact so low that - as an activist from the Movement 350 pointed out: 'People don't count them in their budget, but if they were to invest in renewables...the period when they get their money back would be still quite long. (...) Unless the prices for electricity would drastically increase'.⁷⁸⁷ Additionally, as a member of the Dixi Group noticed:

'The problem in Ukraine is that government doesn't think how to stimulate people to work with renewables; especially if you don't live in the city ... you should have some program that would allow you to install your solar panels, make some electricity and partially free those energy grids (...). Whether Ukrainians will use such programs if they appear – I think that in the suburbs it might work, not in the city but in the cottage towns, maybe not as fast as in Germany, because we have low tariff on electricity, but once prices start to increase, when people start to see the effectiveness of such programs – they will use it'.⁷⁸⁸

Other technical obstacles to the development of renewable energy in Ukraine include huge energy losses on grids (11-12%), lack of basic capacity and technology to support shift towards renewables on the grids, lack of effective green tariffs for individuals and lack of individuals'

⁷⁸⁴ Greencubator, Interview.

⁷⁸⁵ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview.

⁷⁸⁶ Greencubator, Interview; Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁷⁸⁷ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁸⁸ Dixi Group, Interview.

access to grids that would allow them to produce and sell their own energy on the market.⁷⁸⁹

Distal context: the socio-historical factors

Technical obstacles aside, the emancipatory logic could only manifest in the energy sphere if a sufficient number of individuals would be both *able* and *willing* to regain control over their own energy production and consumption – thus leading to the bottom-up democratization of the energy system. Some technical barriers described above indicate that such shift is already hard to implement in the Ukrainian context. Moreover, apart from the technical barriers there are some socio-historical factors that additionally hinder the rise of the logic of emancipation.

Some expert analyses point to the societal aspect of this challenge. They notice that Ukraine's problems with energy security require the efforts of the whole society as the directed actions and activities should be designed in relation to all branches of power and rely on the 'competent management of personnel, mutual trust of authorities and citizens and their willingness to *social participation* and to taking the *responsibility*'.⁷⁹⁰ Moreover, they emphasize that to improve energy efficiency, Ukrainian population should form the "national" attitude to consumption and payment for energy and other utilities.⁷⁹¹

However, regaining control over one's energy usage does not come easily in the Ukrainian socio-historical context. As a member of the Movement 350 pointed out: 'When you are taking control, you are also taking responsibility. But here in the post-Soviets, we have this thing with the responsibility: we don't really want to be responsible for anything'.⁷⁹² Similarly, some other local actors point to the Soviet legacy as a factor determining social disengagement from a number of important issues and consequently to the importance of social aspect in the

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid.; Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview; NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview; Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁹⁰ Shevtsov, *Energetyka Ukrainy Na Shlyakhu Do Evropeyskoi Integratsyi*, 71–111. Emphasis added.

⁷⁹¹ Ibid.

⁷⁹² Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

current design of energy policy. In the words of a founder of the local NGO Greencubator: 'Soviet legacy is one of the factors that is hindering [social involvement]'.⁷⁹³ And further when comparing Ukraine to Poland:

'In Poland, despite several decades of communist history, Poles were... [having] a sense of community and they never lost millions of population during the famine - we did. (...) So this is not the energy policy, this is not the renewable thing - this is *the social aspect*. And one great thing, which I see now are the changes that are brought about by millions. Those who don't remember the Soviet Union – they are a different kind of people'.⁷⁹⁴

Local actors also stress that social disengagement derives from the general feeling on the part of ordinary citizens that they cannot really decide on anything important regarding their country.⁷⁹⁵ In this regard, the civic protests at the Maidan Square were seen by some as signs of the awakening of the Ukrainian civil society and some experts even hoped for the potential evolution of Maidan (socio-political)⁷⁹⁶ into the socio-economic and environmental civic engagement.⁷⁹⁷ Hence, somehow inversely to the Polish context – where many local actors express the hope that it is through the civic empowerment in the energy sphere that the individuals will realize the power of their agency and transform the entire socio-economic model - in Ukraine they anticipate that it is political empowerment that could bring about changes in the energy and environmental sector. Yet, even these hopes seem overly optimistic at the moment.

On the one hand, interest in the energy-environmental agenda is currently higher than in the past – especially among young people. As a member of the Movement 350 noticed:

'From what I can judge it is mostly this culture of dedicated young people, mostly in the capital, but also in other cities. (...) I would say that people are very much in favour of green energy, because it is obvious that it is cleaner, better, but also there are a lot of concerns: people think that it is too expensive, maybe it is dangerous because windmills create bad vibration for birds,

⁷⁹³ Greencubator, Interview.

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid. Emphasis added.

⁷⁹⁵ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁹⁶ Here in relation to Orange Revolution.

⁷⁹⁷ Kniazhanskyi, ““Ozelenennia” ekonomiki”.

plus you can't rely fully on green energy'.⁷⁹⁸

Similarly, the co-founder of Greencubator stated: '...the starting point for us was in 2009 when we were promoting renewables and people were saying: '... this is never going to apply here'; and what we see now is a lot of changes in bioenergy, in solar and other sectors... businesses are starting to change their approach to energy management...So, there is a lot of interest in renewables'.⁷⁹⁹ However, as he further admits: 'We still lack the massive movements, engaging hundreds of thousands of people – (...) We should multiply, and multiply and multiply the successful projects – such approach should be everywhere: in every city, in every village, and people should coordinate and cooperate...'.⁸⁰⁰ This vision of wide societal engagement looks very distant, though, and the grassroots movements are still in the formative stages in Ukraine. Therefore, many local NGOs currently rely on young people educated in the West – which fact points to yet another layer of the transnational influence in this energy area.⁸⁰¹

The slow progress in promoting renewables/energy efficiency measures owes both to the state policies that favor traditional solutions and to the general lack of interest. A small number and low intensity of energy security debates in Ukraine reflect the fact that only a few topics interest the average Ukrainians. The most important of them is the subject of prices for heat and electricity – and as long as these are kept at the low-level general population is not interested in saving energy, developing renewables or protesting any developments in the direction of country's energy portfolio.⁸⁰² As the co-founder of Greencubator admits: 'People are pretty much new to new business models, they say: 'OK. We are paying 5-10 euro per month for electricity, why should we care?'.⁸⁰³ There is similarly low interest in acquiring available

⁷⁹⁸ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁷⁹⁹ Greencubator, Interview.

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁰¹ Ibid.; Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁸⁰² National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview; Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview; Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview; International Finance Corporation, Interview.

⁸⁰³ Greencubator, Interview.

information, as the director of the Kyiv-based HBS noticed: 'That is the problem with renewables: there are not many people who ask here about it; it is only some ecological organizations or partners, small groups...'.⁸⁰⁴ Yet, regulations and electricity prices that disincentivize society to invest in renewables are not the only explanation, and some failed attempts at not so expensive local projects in renewables suggest that the roots of social disengagement go deeper than the economic rationale. An example given by an activist from the Movement 350 illustrates that point:

'There is this project on solar collectors, solar water heaters, when they come to villages and they teach people how to do them, by themselves, really cheap 2-4 thousand UAH – it's the average monthly salary. And then you put it on the roof and try to save money on heating water. It is really easy, you don't have to be a technical expert – it is something a man could do in his garage. But even this is not really working that well. People are not that interested'.⁸⁰⁵

Therefore, as some local experts noticed – financing part of the big renewable energy projects might not be the best use of money in the long run as it does not necessarily lead to the behavior or policy change.⁸⁰⁶ And the prevailing behavioral patterns indicate an unwillingness to take responsibility and initiative in relation to one's individual circumstances as well as the closer and further habitat. For instance, according to one of the reports of Civicus Index Ukraine, the majority of the Ukrainian population considers the role of civil society in the preservation of the environment insignificant, limited or moderated and only 25% of respondents see it as essential.⁸⁰⁷ In the opinion of local observers Ukrainians are also not interested in environmental or climate issues related to energy production and consumption – despite the fact that local ecology in many Ukrainian large cities and industrial regions is threatened.⁸⁰⁸ Consequently,

⁸⁰⁴ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview.

⁸⁰⁵ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁸⁰⁶ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview; EU Commission Delegation in Kyiv, Interview.

⁸⁰⁷ Anastasia Leukhina, 'Stages of Development of Ecological Non-Governmental Organizations in Ukraine after Chernobyl Accident: Tendencies and Problems', in *Crossroads Digest*, 5, 2010, 76, http://www.ehu.lt/files/periodicals/Digest_5_2010%20small.pdf.

⁸⁰⁸ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview; Kyiv Post, Interview.

contrary to citizens in many EU states, Ukrainians are generally less hostile towards extensive use of their state's fossil fuels – even if such practices result in environmental hazards. In the words of one NGO worker:

'In Ukraine [there is this] thinking that country is rich in natural resources and that we should better manage them. And largely people still believe in coal. We were taught at school that we have good coal and should use it.(...) I also see how my colleagues – also from Mohyla Academy – support the argument of the shale gas – which will help Ukraine to become independent – even the environmentalists are divided (...) I think it is a matter of your very basic beliefs. What do you believe in, what do you value, what comes first: profit or the environment or social justice'.⁸⁰⁹

The above statement points to the contestation over different dimensions of energy security typical for the subsistence logic as well as to the significant distal factors. The former shows that environmental aspects of energy production and consumption are indeed at the bottom of the hierarchy in the Ukrainian context. The latter illustrate how the context-specific process of socialization coupled with the historically-determined perception of Russia favor the idea of energy independence and largely explain the widespread support for the use of domestic energy resources. Similarly to the Polish context, such approach suggests an 'island thinking' in the area of energy security as it is equated with energy sovereignty.

The issue with taking responsibility manifests not only in the area of renewables, but also when it comes to the pressing problem of energy efficiency. A project manager of energy efficiency for communal buildings program at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development office in Kyiv pointed to a certain mental barrier here:

'Similarly to Poland, also in Ukraine, the multi-family buildings were owned by the state and people were renting them out. However, as opposed to Poland where privatization in the 1990-ties meant buying the flats for some discount price – in Ukraine it was equal with receiving the rented flats free of charge by their tenants. Hence many people did not realize that since they became owners of the flats they also received both the rights of the owners as well as the responsibilities to maintain the estate that they received'.⁸¹⁰

⁸⁰⁹ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁸¹⁰ International Finance Corporation, Interview.

Moreover, as opposed to other countries in Central Europe, after privatization in Ukraine the new owners of the flats did not automatically become the owners of the common areas of the buildings.⁸¹¹ That coupled with the initial reluctance of the banks to grant loans to private individuals translated into a virtual lack of citizens' initiatives in this area. Currently, having in mind the experience of introducing similar programs in the CEE region, Kyiv-based energy efficiency programs do not appeal to energy economics, but to the comfort of living and the resulted increase in the value of the estate: '(...) I know what kind of arguments to use while talking to people – and it works. I don't want to use some myths about energy efficiency, because I understand that for the majority of the society it is not a thought with which they wake up in the morning. Of course it is important to increase this awareness, but perhaps that will take several generations'.⁸¹² Similarly, other actors point to the comfort factor, but it is also often stressed that due to the centralized heating in the buildings introducing energy efficiency measures in many cases does not lead to significant savings and “does not really give people *power over energy back*”.⁸¹³ Regaining that power would require necessary regulations and technical improvements in the municipal buildings as well as attitude changes. All of these goals are hard to reach currently. Moreover, if the emancipatory logic in the energy sphere depends upon slow dismantlement of energy monopolies, in Ukraine the design of the energy system makes such prospects even more problematic.

Monopolies & The obstacles to decentralization

Social disengagement and government's lack of will to initiate a serious dialogue with the society means that, similarly to other energy sectors, it is the businesses that influence

⁸¹¹ Ibid.

⁸¹² Ibid.

⁸¹³ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview. Emphasis added.

developments in the renewables in Ukraine. In the opinion of one independent energy expert it is not until common people will be able to get access to renewables that the NGOs will have much impact in this area.⁸¹⁴ However, renewables are currently being developed by big industrial groups – in the vast majority owned by Ukrainians with close to none strategic investors from Europe.⁸¹⁵ The specific dynamics of the Ukrainian energy sector also means that even if more people were engaged in producing their own electricity, the main benefits of this process would be still concentrated in the hands of a few actors. As analysts from the Kyiv office of HBF pointed out:

'People who want to produce electricity this way – due to the green tariff – have to buy those machines and technology from two Ukrainian oligarchs, because only 2 oligarchs have capacity here – Mr. Akhmetov – turbines, and in photovoltaics it is Mr. Kluiv, who has new plant near Nikolaev, which produces these photovoltaic cells; and it is not an easy situation also for us, because people have to buy from oligarchs and it is oligarchs who get really good money...'.⁸¹⁶

There are several important consequences of this market design. Firstly, the domination of the renewables market by a few industry groups limits the possibilities for the foreign strategic investors. Secondly, although oligarchs try to develop some bigger projects (such as wind farms) they also decide which kind of renewable energy is supported by their very active lobbyists. Thirdly and consequently, as opposed to many EU states the potential widespread use of renewables by individuals would not lead to the market de-monopolization, but would help to uphold the existing monopolies.⁸¹⁷ Developing renewables with private funds by big industry groups is therefore seen by many actors working in the area of green energy as one of the worst scenarios – as it hinders all the wide range of potential benefits of renewable energy for the

⁸¹⁴ The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview.

⁸¹⁵ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview; National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview.

⁸¹⁶ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview.

⁸¹⁷ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview; Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

average Ukrainians in favor of continuously narrow business interests.⁸¹⁸

The inclusion of the Ukrainian society in the energy production – and ensuring that eventually it also benefits from this change economically - is a necessary condition for the social empowerment in the energy sphere and shifting the agency to the level of an individual. As a co-founder of the Ukrainian Greencubator pointed out:

'The distributed generation model is very positive – it is like the Internet. The problem with the current energy model, the model from Eisenhower and Khrushchev time, is that energy consumer is considered to be a dumb terminal, but the energy 2.0, I would even say the energy 3.0 is a different thing; it is the energy sector, which is more Internet-like, because it can't have web server anymore, your smartphone can have web server because it can send some data, it has a lot of computing capacity, and the energy harvesting is the basic right for any human. And when the utilities and the government keep treating consumers like dumb terminals that means the degradation that means a limitation of the progress.'⁸¹⁹

Moreover, the highly centralized power generation not only implies huge losses during transmission, but also comes with the disconnected social attitude as citizens are not interested whether their outlet comes from the green, coal or hydro sources. Therefore, as an activist from the Greencubator stated: 'I can say that based on my country. I think that there are a lot of things that can be changed when smart energy is acquired'.⁸²⁰

However, given a growing monopolization trend in the energy sector, high subsidies and tariffs for non-renewable energy and connected to that lack of consumer behavior patterns or economic incentives that would favor a decentralized model, many local experts point to a perspective of several decades before a culture of prosumers could develop in Ukraine.⁸²¹ As an analyst from the HBF notices: 'The question is how to design the system; each country should find a system that suits the mentality of people and local conditions'.⁸²² Similarly, another

⁸¹⁸ Greencubator, Interview.

⁸¹⁹ Ibid.

⁸²⁰ Ibid.

⁸²¹ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview; Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview; The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview.

⁸²² Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview.

Ukrainian energy economist pointed out: 'Which model of the energy system is better depends on the economics of scale'.⁸²³ And given such local conditions and social attitudes some experts see some sort of a 'hybrid' system as a better alternative to the decentralized one. For instance, a member of DixiGroup distinguished between different aspects of energy sector here: 'When we talk about households and people – it should be more decentralized; when we talk about more serious projects: more centralized'.⁸²⁴ Some point to the urban-rural divide regarding energy capacities and suggest that the diffused system would work better in the countryside.⁸²⁵ Still others consider the current energy system to be the best solution after all, as one of the leading energy experts stated: 'It is more of a political question. When the state is politically strong it has means to control all the companies. When the state is weak there is a danger that there will be the lobby of companies, power struggle.(...) In Ukraine it is still better with monopolies. Safer at this moment'.⁸²⁶

Regardless of the opinion held a combination of the technical, institutional as well as socio-economic and historical factors create a distal context, where reshuffling the traditional constellation of actors and shifting the responsibility for energy affairs is extremely difficult. Neither the design of the energy system and its regulations nor the attitudes of individual citizens are currently conducive for the logic of emancipation to manifest on a larger scale in the Ukrainian energy sphere. Consequently, the main logic of energy security in the Ukrainian context resonates around the sustenance rationale. The latter overshadows even the energy security areas that could seem more prone to the influence of other security logics – such as the nuclear energy.

⁸²³ Ukrainian Institute for Public Policy, Interview.

⁸²⁴ Dixi Group, Interview.

⁸²⁵ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁸²⁶ The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview.

THE NUCLEAR ENERGY DEBATE

To start with, quite contrary to the initial analytical hunches, the Ukrainian energy context is marked by a surprising lack of impact of the Chernobyl legacy on the domestic nuclear energy policy and rhetoric, where the risk logic is largely absent. Although in the immediate aftermath of the 1986 nuclear accident the Green Party in Ukraine received a lot of votes and the environmental issues were high on the agenda, the history of this catastrophe not only has no impact on the current nuclear energy plans, but it is also not a concern for the general population.⁸²⁷

It is a common expert opinion in Ukraine, then, that the accident in Chernobyl was an example of the incompetence and irresponsibility of management at all levels of the totalitarian state – from political to the scientific research one – which implies that the tragedy was simply inevitable.⁸²⁸ As far as the public opinion is concerned, similarly to other places the Chernobyl disaster raised the awareness about the safety of nuclear power in general and nuclear power plants in Ukraine in particular – and as some analysis stated the emotional perceptions tended to prevail over the rational ones.⁸²⁹ However, these perceptions have shifted significantly in the Ukrainian context ever since. One of the opinion surveys that asked a question of ‘what are people most afraid of’ over the years, showed a steady decline in the declared fear of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster - from 47% in 1992 to only 16% in 2010.^{830 831} Moreover, the same data showed that the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe were ranked low among the Ukrainian population among other fears – albeit still at the 11th place.⁸³² They were preceded mostly by various economic concerns (an increase of prices,

⁸²⁷ Kyiv Post, Interview; Ukrainian Institute for Public Policy, Interview; Dixi Group, Interview.

⁸²⁸ Valerii Shvec, ‘Yenerhetycheskaia Bezopasnost Ukrainy — v Chem Ona’, *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 27 April 2012, http://gazeta.zn.ua/ECONOMICS/energeticheskaya_bezopasnost_ukrainy__v_chem_ona.html.

⁸²⁹ T. Kuzmenko, ‘Risk Society: Chornobyl Determinant’, in *Chornobyl I Sotsium*, vol. 12 (Foliant, 2006), 194.

⁸³⁰ Data from the Institute of Sociology HAH of Ukraine;

⁸³¹ T. Konoplytska, ‘Strah Pered Naslidkamy Avarii Na Chaes Ta Inshi Strahy Naseleennya Ukrainy: Dynamika Zmin’, in *Sotsialni Naslidky Chornobylya: Chas Vidrodzhennya* (HAH Ukrainy, 2011), 66.

⁸³² Ibid., 67.

unemployment, not being paid the salary), and issues such as an increase in crime, infection harmful for life, hunger, cold flat or disintegration of Ukraine as a state.⁸³³ Some local actors also pointed to both psychological factors and a lack of public debate on nuclear energy when explaining the relative non-importance of the Chernobyl legacy. As a member of the Movement 350 stated:

'Why is Chernobyl not an issue? I don't know. I think it is something psychological. I think people just tend to forget or are trying to forget about Chernobyl. And right now, that the nuclear blocks of the nuclear power stations are being discussed, people are not protesting, people are not blocking the sites of the construction – it is strange. Of course many people don't know about the plans, because they are not being discussed everywhere – these are decisions that are made in the closed circle'.⁸³⁴

Similarly, another energy expert pointed out: 'Nuclear energy is not discussed in public. Only professionals in the energy market discuss the situation. And if we look at the nuclear generation, the main call is for the government to provide subsidies for other segments. Because the government artificially sets the tariffs for nuclear energy and hydropower....'.⁸³⁵ Social attitudes towards nuclear energy in Ukraine are also heavily influenced by the effective promotion of this type of energy, which is portrayed as cheap, clean and secure: 'The government from time to time sends a message to the public: "OK, we have cheap nuclear, we will proceed further" – and nobody cares about the fact that it is outdated (...)'.⁸³⁶ Therefore, although the majority of the Ukrainian population realizes that there are alternatives to nuclear energy – they also subscribe to the current argument of the cheap electricity from nuclear.⁸³⁷ As a member of the Dixi Group noticed: 'It seems that a lot of people in Ukraine are not against using nuclear power ... so there is not much of the debate whether we should phase out our

⁸³³ Ibid., 67.

⁸³⁴ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁸³⁵ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁸³⁶ Ibid.

⁸³⁷ Dixi Group, Interview.

nuclear facilities; it seems like people agree on the status quo'.⁸³⁸ Some analysts also pointed to the fact that even if Ukrainians are afraid of nuclear energy – that fear is not necessarily strong enough to motivate them to take parts in the anti-nuclear initiatives.⁸³⁹ On the one hand, many people do not believe that their opposition could have any tangible effects. On the other hand, a lot of protests that took place in Ukraine so far were 'paid for' by different actors – and many people do not want to be associated with such protests.⁸⁴⁰ Moreover, the consequences of the nuclear accidents are sometimes used for ambiguous purposes in Ukraine – as people manipulate the case of Chernobyl for their own profit (e.g. government subsidies for the victims of catastrophe, with the number of the proclaimed victims still “increasing” nowadays).⁸⁴¹ Therefore, according to some Ukrainian observers the accident in Fukushima could serve as another tool for getting additional funds from the Ukrainian government for the projects dealing with the aftermath of Chernobyl.⁸⁴² Lastly, a lack of information hinders the debate, as one NGO worker noticed:

'We can't have any debates, because we don't have facts: what is going on in Chernobyl now, what is the level of people's health. Publications are made in the research centers, but they are not [easily available to the] public. The government also says that radiation in the Chernobyl zone is not so high, but the monitoring is quite general. At the moment we don't have any details of the contamination of the territory'.⁸⁴³

Given this general disengagement of the Ukrainian public from the issue of nuclear energy, the only non-governmental/business actors, whose voices are still visible in the public debate belong to a small network of NGOs. The latter – both foreign (e.g. Heinrich Boll Foundation in Kyiv) and domestic (e.g. Greencubator, National Ecological Centre of Ukraine) talk about nuclear energy issues, regularly protest against any plans for the prolonging of the

⁸³⁸ Ibid.

⁸³⁹ International Finance Corporation, Interview.

⁸⁴⁰ International Finance Corporation, Interview.

⁸⁴¹ Dixi Group, Interview.

⁸⁴² Ibid.

⁸⁴³ Ibid.

exploitation cycles of the existing nuclear power plants, call for their ultimate shutdown or try to organize some informational tours for the public.⁸⁴⁴ Many NGOs also use ‘Chernobyl’ to criticize different aspects of the current energy policy approach – including its focus on the shale gas and building new nuclear power plants.⁸⁴⁵ However, even the organizations that are united in their anti-nuclear stance and try to put pressure on the government to reduce the amount of nuclear energy produced for the domestic purposes are quite ineffective. Similar to the situation in the area of renewables or energy efficiency, they lose the battle with big industry lobbyists.⁸⁴⁶

An accident in the Japanese Fukushima did not change this context. Firstly, there was no political debate in Ukraine after Fukushima as the accident was discussed primarily at the level of NGOs and Ukrainian expert community.⁸⁴⁷ Secondly, the Ukrainian government itself – similarly as it was the case in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster - assured the Ukrainian population that additional tests of all of the Ukrainian nuclear power plants had been conducted and that they were safe.⁸⁴⁸ Thirdly, Ukrainian media reported on the developments in Japan in a non-emotional manner as the focus was clearly kept on the casualties and people missing as a consequence of an earthquake and tsunami rather than on the accident in the nuclear power plant.⁸⁴⁹ The tendency was to point to a chain of events and their unlikely accumulation that led to the nuclear leak rather than to the uncontrollability of nuclear energy *per se*.⁸⁵⁰ With the newspaper titles in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese catastrophe, such as “‘Fukushima

⁸⁴⁴ Tetiana Mamalyha, ‘U Centri Kyieva Zbuduvali Girku “yadernih Vidhodiv”’, *Den*, 21 September 2010, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-ukrayini/u-centri-kiieva-zbuduvali-girku-yadernih-vidhodiv>; Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview; Greencubator, Interview; National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview; Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁸⁴⁵ Dixi Group, Interview.

⁸⁴⁶ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview.

⁸⁴⁷ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁸⁴⁸ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview.

⁸⁴⁹ Naoto Kan, ‘Yaponiia Shliah Do Vidnovlennia’, *Den*, 27 April 2011, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-planeti/yaponiya-shlyah-do-vidnovlennya>.

⁸⁵⁰ Igor Maskalevych, ‘Fukusima Uroki Ekonomiki’, *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 22 April 2011, http://gazeta.zn.ua/TECHNOLOGIES/fukusima_uroki_ekonomiki.html.

-1” is not Chernobyl’, the Ukrainian media reported on the technical details of an earthquake and tsunami that were additionally ‘complicated’ by the damage made to the Fukushima nuclear power plant.⁸⁵¹ Simultaneously, the Ukrainian media quoted Japanese authorities that evaluated the probability of nuclear contamination as small and international expert opinions, which emphasized that the Japanese nuclear accident was much different from the catastrophes in Chernobyl or Three Mile Island, as it did not pose a serious threat to the health of people or natural environment.⁸⁵² The nuclear accident was therefore depicted as a historical precedent of a very limited impact – with no reported cases of the post-radiation disease.⁸⁵³ In light of this general rhetoric, the analyses that resembled a reaction to Fukushima in the German media - as they pointed to ‘a contemporary *Homo Economicus* occupied with the fulfilment of its endless needs through economic activity and technological advancement – a root cause of both Ukrainian and Japanese tragedies’ – were in a clear minority.⁸⁵⁴ It could be then said that only elements of ‘riskification’ of the nuclear energy appeared in the Ukrainian post-Fukushima context. Statements of the political actors that ensured the population of the safety of the existing power plants and additional testing certainly reflected an underlying rationale of prevention. However, the general rhetoric of calculation and precaution were lacking and the approach to nuclear energy was not about the manageability of risk, but rather ‘business as usual’.

The Japanese nuclear disaster also did not significantly influence Ukrainian attitudes towards nuclear energy. On the one hand, as the opinion polls mentioned earlier showed over the years - other pressing problems of the current social agenda (such as unemployment or

⁸⁵¹ Mykola Siruk, “‘Fukusima-1’ ne Chornobyl’, *Den*, 15 March 2011, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/panorama-dnya/fukusima-1-ne-chornobil>.

⁸⁵² Ibid.

⁸⁵³ Shvec, ‘Yenerhetycheskaia Bezopasnost Ukrainy — v Chem Ona’.

⁸⁵⁴ Yurii Tunytsia and Taras Tunytsia, ‘Chernobylskii Sindrom Otrazhaet Antyekologicheskuiu Suschnost Rynochnoi Ekonomiki’, *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 1 April 2011, http://gazeta.zn.ua/ENVIRONMENT/chernobylskiy_sindrom_otrazhaet_antiekologicheskuyu_suschnost_rynok_noy_ekonomiki.html.

salaries levels) overshadowed its relative importance.⁸⁵⁵ On the other hand, as one local NGO worker commented: 'After Fukushima there was news about the losses in Japan, but not really a huge debate whether we should continue with nuclear power. My only explanation is that people feel powerless, it's a very deep internalized feeling that you cannot change anything, so you better not worry (...)'.⁸⁵⁶

Crucially, the risk logic did not surface in the official rhetoric also because - similarly to other domestic energy sources - nuclear energy is seen in the Ukrainian political circle as a way of becoming more independent from Russia and is often presented as an option with no alternative.⁸⁵⁷ As one energy expert stated: "We have a moral right to think about our energy future, energy independence and security. We already have nuclear reactors. They will pose minimal risk, once we devote serious money to further development and improvement of nuclear technology and training".⁸⁵⁸ Yet, the expert opinions were also divided here - with some scientific circles seeing nuclear energy as a potential bridge to the newest technology or even a way of 'restoring the prestige of science and engineering professions' in the Ukrainian society,⁸⁵⁹ while others pointing to the outdated nuclear units and a critical dependence on Russia for nuclear fuel.⁸⁶⁰ However, even within the more 'green' oriented circles it was understood that the current high dependence on nuclear energy rules out the rapid shutdown of all nuclear reactors in Ukraine and that such process would need to be gradual.⁸⁶¹ As an analyst from the HBF put it: 'Of course we don't say everything should be stopped today, it is not possible, but the government should adopt some strategy how to switch off all of these reactors

⁸⁵⁵ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview; Konoplytska, 'Strah Pered Naslidkamy Avarii Na Chaes Ta Inshi Strahy Naseleण्या Ukrainy: Dynamika Zmin', 66.

⁸⁵⁶ Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁸⁵⁷ Yurii Starchevskiy, "'Zalezhnist'" i "dyversyfikatsiia": Chy Mozhe Pershe Buti Krashchim Za Druge', *Den*, 11 November 2008, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/zalezhnist-i-diversifikaciya-chi-mozhe-pershe-buti-krashchim-za-druge>.

⁸⁵⁸ Shvec, 'Yenerhetycheskaia Bezopasnost Ukrainy — v Chem Ona'.

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁰ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁸⁶¹ Greencubator, Interview.

in the next 10-20 years. - And to think seriously about some alternatives'.⁸⁶² Moreover, the aspect of the geopolitical pressure from Russia was raised here once again: '...we have Soviet-designed reactors, we have increasing pressure from Russia in all the aspects of energy, and now they are also trying to push their new design of reactors and sources of fuel'.⁸⁶³

Overall, it could be then said that the risk logic does not fully rise in the Ukrainian nuclear energy debate and policy due to the specificities of the domestic context. Firstly, the typical constellation of actors with big industry lobbyists, centralized decision-making and 'rational' media are not conducive for the rhetoric of precaution to emerge on the public agenda. Secondly, the distal context with the historically determined perceptions of Russia that puts the focus on domestic energy resources, as well as the specific socialization processes that result in societal disengagement (feeling of powerlessness), play a role. Thirdly, given such a setting, the logic of subsistence easily overshadows other security logics – as the attention is diverted to other economic concerns, while cheap electricity from nuclear appears to have no alternatives. It should be highlighted, though, that whereas pointing to energy independence from Russia is just one of the factors underpinning Ukrainian nuclear energy policy, the rationale of 'energy sovereignty' is at its peak as far as the country's pipeline politics is concerned.

PIPELINE POLITICS & THE LOGIC OF WAR

Similarly to many other countries in the CEE region, the gas conflicts with Russia in 2006 and 2009 sparked a vivid debate and reconsideration of the energy policy course in Ukraine. Despite not very successful diversification attempts, the logic of war played an important role here – especially that the grammar of conflict became entrenched in the

⁸⁶² Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview.

⁸⁶³ Ibid.

mainstream debate.

The rise of the ‘grammar of conflict’

The survival rationale was expressed most explicitly in Ukraine in the context of gas cut off episodes from Russia in 2006 and 2009. The incidents themselves were referred to as “gas attacks” on Ukraine prepared in the “Gazprom headquarters”.⁸⁶⁴ Most strikingly, a number of Ukrainian energy experts from different political camps considered the signing of the January 2006 gas agreements with Russia as the biggest defeat of the Ukrainian foreign policy in 2006, and compared it to the Pearl Harbor of the Ukrainian energy diplomacy.⁸⁶⁵ The Ukrainian-Russian gas conflict from January 2006 was also widely referred to as “gas war” in the numerous expert and media analyses in its aftermath.⁸⁶⁶ This rhetoric applied not only to the Ukrainian-Russian gas dispute, but also to the Russian-Georgian one that took place at the end of January 2006 - when Georgia accused Russia of energy blackmail and called it to restore gas supplies to Georgia. Ukrainian newspapers reported on the situation under the titles such as „Gas War 2” or „Gas in the Soviet blitzkrieg”.⁸⁶⁷ Similar rhetoric was used in relation to the 2009 dispute, with the Ukrainian media titles such as: “Gas War: new Cold War: nothing justifies Russian nostalgia for USSR”⁸⁶⁸ and politicians’ analyses that saw the “gas war” between Russia and Ukraine as a continuation of the Georgian conflict through “economic

⁸⁶⁴ Oleksii Savytskyi, ‘Gazovo Imperski Paraleli’, *Den*, 31 March 2009, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobici/gazovo-imperski-paraleli>; Ivan Vasylovych Diyak, *Gazova Promysovist I Energetychna Bezpeka Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Svit Uspikhu, 2009), 53–54.

⁸⁶⁵ Yurii Chornei, ‘Ocherednaia Gazovaia Ataka’, *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 19 January 2007, http://gazeta.zn.ua/ECONOMICS/ocherednaya_gazovaya_ataka_s_1_yanvarya_2007_goda_grazhdane_budut_platit_za_potreblennyi_gaz_po_novy.html; Vitalii Kniazhanskyi, ‘Navishcho Ukrayini Energetichna Strategiiia’, *Den*, 27 February 2009, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/nota-bene/navishcho-ukrayini-energetichna-strategiya>.

⁸⁶⁶ E.g. Akram Murtazaiev, ‘Monetizatsiia Liubovi’, *Den*, 17 January 2006, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/svitovi-diskusiyi/monetizaciya-lyubovi>; Vitalii Kniazhanskyi, ‘Prognoz Negativnyi’, *Den*, 18 January 2006, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/panorama-dnya/prognoz-negativnyi>; Diyak, *Gazova Promysovist I Energetychna Bezpeka Ukrainy*, 131–32.

⁸⁶⁷ Sergei Danylov, ‘Gazovyi Blitskryg Po-Sovetsky’, *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 27 January 2006, http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/gazovyy_blitskrig_po-sovetski.html; Sergii Solodkyi, ‘“Gazovi Viyni” - 2’, *Den*, 24 January 2006, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-planeti/gazovi-viyni-2>.

⁸⁶⁸ Ismail Kadare, ‘Gazova Viyna - Nova Holodna Viyna’, *Den*, 5 February 2009, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-planeti/gazova-viyna-nova-holodna-viyna>.

aggression”.⁸⁶⁹ Crucially, as opposed to other countries in the region – where the grammar of conflict periodically rose and fell triggered by policy developments in the energy sphere – in Ukraine it became entrenched in the mainstream debate. Therefore, subsequent analyses kept referring to the gas cut-off episodes as the “so-called gas war”,⁸⁷⁰ framed the potentially undesirable policy developments in relations with Russia in a similar manner (e.g. ‘New “gas war” on a horizon’)⁸⁷¹, referred to the prospects of new tariffs or a decrease in the amount of gas supply from Russia as „gas attacks”,⁸⁷² and further expressed the rhetoric typical for the logic of war over the years, as reflected in the newspaper titles containing phrases such as “gas hostage state”,⁸⁷³ “gas blitzkrieg”,⁸⁷⁴ or “gas blackmail”.⁸⁷⁵

Russian maneuvering in the energy sector was also depicted as a part of the conscious strategy for domination. Starting from January 2006 with media stories on the line: “Empire and us”⁸⁷⁶ the crisis was seen as a further extension of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict that existed from the dawn of the independence of Ukraine.⁸⁷⁷ The Russian side was perceived as having planned to create an international image of Ukraine as an unreliable partner in the transportation of natural gas to Europe, with one analysis referring to the head of Gazprom Alexey Miller and his spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov as ‘the most active propaganda heroes’

⁸⁶⁹ Olena Yahno, ‘Viacheslav Kyrylenko: Teperishnii Gazovyi Konflikt — Tse Prodovzhennia Konfliktu v Gruzii. Inshymy Metodamy’, *Den*, 17 January 2009, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-ukrayini/vyacheslav-kirilenko-teperishnii-gazoviy-konflikt-ce-prodovzhennia-konfliktu-v>.

⁸⁷⁰ Andrii Gaidai, ‘Zoriani Chas Mistsevoi Energopolityky’, *Den*, 18 March 2009, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/zoryaniy-chas-miscevoyi-energopolitiki>.

⁸⁷¹ Tomas Rozer, ‘Na Gorizonti - Nova “gazova Viyna”’, *Den*, 23 August 2006, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-planeti/na-gorizonti-nova-gazova-viyna>.

⁸⁷² Chornei, ‘Ocherednaia Gazovaia Ataka’; Vitalii Kniazhanskyi, ‘Gazova Ataka’, *Den*, 5 March 2008, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/panorama-dnya/gazova-ataka>; Mychail Gonchar and Maksim Alinov, ‘Gazovyi Natisk c Vostoka’, *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 1 July 2011, http://gazeta.zn.ua/ECONOMICS/gazovyy_natisk_c_vostoka.html.

⁸⁷³ Vitalii Kniazhanskyi, ‘Kraina Gazovyh Zarushnykiv’, *Den*, 12 September 2007, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/krayina-gazovih-zaruchnykiv>.

⁸⁷⁴ Gonchar and Alinov, ‘Gazovyi Natisk c Vostoka’.

⁸⁷⁵ Vitalii Kniazhanskyi, ‘Ukraina Pidigrue “gazovomu” shantazhu?’, *Den*, 11 April 2012, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/ukrayina-pidigrue-gazovomu-shantazhu>.

⁸⁷⁶ Stanislav Kulchytskyi, ‘Imperiia I My’, *Den*, 24 January 2006, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/cuspilstvo/imperiya-i-mi>.

⁸⁷⁷ Diyak, *Gazova Promyslova I Energetychna Bezpeka Ukrainy*.

who run the ‘reality show’ with their turning off of the tap at the Ukrainian border.⁸⁷⁸ However, as the analysis stated, „Russian imperialists” failed to achieve their main strategic goal – the establishment of full control over the Ukrainian gas system.⁸⁷⁹ The perception that the Russian side acted deliberately was visible also throughout the years, with the Ukrainian weekly *Zerkalo Nedeli* stating, for example, in 2011 that Russia started another propaganda campaign on a large scale and that it cannot be ruled out that it contains the script of the „third gas war”.⁸⁸⁰ Not surprisingly, the gas crises negatively impacted the perception of Russia as a reliable supplier.⁸⁸¹

The logic of war was also manifested in a widespread belief that gas conflicts with Russia are a zero-sum game. Therefore, the Ukrainian daily *Dzen* pointed to the increase in Gazprom revenues as a result of the January 2006 crisis and asked a rhetorical question: “Who won?”⁸⁸² The same month *Dzen* asked a number of international experts for the opinion on ‘which side won in the Ukrainian-Russian gas dispute’,⁸⁸³ while the subsequent analyses suggested that the “gas wars” were indeed lost.⁸⁸⁴ Similar rhetoric applied to reporting on the energy sector developments in the neighboring states. For example, in June 2010 the analysis titled “Dictatorship ‘Gazprom’” noted that the decrease in gas supplies to Belarus by 15% could proceed further if the latter does not repay its debt – which in fact means that ‘...the gas conflict entered a hot stage with no chances for Minsk of winning’.⁸⁸⁵ Most importantly, the zero-sum rhetoric entailed that in the gas conflicts with Russia it is not merely the gas supply at affordable prices that is at stake, but the very sovereignty of Ukraine itself. As President Yushchenko

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid., 50–54.

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁰ Gonchar and Alinov, ‘Gazovyi Natisk c Vostoka’.

⁸⁸¹ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview; Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁸⁸² Kniazhanskyi, ‘Prognoz Negatyvnyi’.

⁸⁸³ Varvara Zhluktenko, ‘Zdvig Po Gazu’, *Den*, 13 January 2006, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/panorama-dnya/zdvig-po-gazu>.

⁸⁸⁴ Vitalii Kniazhanskyi, ‘Zakony Tysku’, *Den*, 13 January 2009, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/zakoni-tysku>; Marina Petkova, ‘Volodymyr Semynozhenko: Nova Konstytutsiia - Test Dlia Starogo Uriadu’, *Den*, 8 February 2006, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobici/volodimir-seminozhenko-nova-konstituciya-test-dlya-starogo-uryadu>.

⁸⁸⁵ Yurii Raihel, ‘Dyktat “Gazpromu”’, *Den*, 23 June 2010, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-planeti/diktat-gazpromu>.

announced at the beginning of January 2006 in relation to “gas war”: “This is a real war for the independence of Ukraine”.⁸⁸⁶ On the expert level it was then claimed that since Ukraine already depends on Russia for hydrocarbons, Russian control over Ukrainian pipelines would transform Ukraine into ‘a sort of a colonial dominion’.⁸⁸⁷ Consequently, while Kremlin was seen as aiming for dominance of the European energy market, Ukraine tried to ‘retain its sovereignty in the very literal sense’.⁸⁸⁸ As a result, the gas dispute was seen as promoting the ‘nation-building’ efforts – especially in the western and central parts of Ukraine.⁸⁸⁹ Simultaneously, any developments that were seen as ‘pro-Russian’ were also considered unpatriotic at the time. Some media outlets were then criticized for keeping the Russian side in their coverage of the crisis and some Ukrainian politicians were accused of being willing to help Russia keep the Ukrainian people ‘on their knees’ – with a harsh critique falling especially on a number of MPs who were aiming to grant an official status to the Russian language ‘at the time when country was on the brink of the energy disaster’.⁸⁹⁰

The logic of war & ‘energy sovereignty’

Apart from the ‘grammar of conflict’ in the official rhetoric, the logic of war caused that the Ukrainian energy policy decision-making was moved to the top political levels and the diversification plans re-focused on the domestic energy resources. Both moves aimed at ensuring ‘energy sovereignty’ as opposed to ‘energy security’ only. Therefore, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine was reformed in the aftermath of the 2006 gas crisis to include a separate unit for dealing with energy security, as its Secretary Vitaliy Haiduk stated in February 2007: “...energy independence – this is the issue of state sovereignty. [And] we are

⁸⁸⁶ ‘Energiestreit’.

⁸⁸⁷ Diyak, *Gazova Promyslovist I Energetychna Bezpeka Ukrainy*, 59.

⁸⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 131–32.

⁸⁸⁹ ‘Energiestreit’.

⁸⁹⁰ Diyak, *Gazova Promyslovist I Energetychna Bezpeka Ukrainy*, 59.

paying great attention to [it] (...).⁸⁹¹ The Chief of the Ukrainian Security Service also warned later that year about the danger to Ukraine caused by the Russian political integration and a lack of transparency in the area of energy supply.⁸⁹² Similarly, in the aftermath of the 2009 gas dispute, the Ministry of Fuels and Energy promised to implement the decision of the Council of National Security and Defence from February 2009 regarding urgent means for ensuring energy security.⁸⁹³

In practical terms, it was the diversification of energy portfolio that was seen as a means of reducing ‘the temptation to use energy supplies by Russia to attack the sovereignty of Ukraine’.⁸⁹⁴ Therefore, diverse projects throughout the years that focused on domestic energy production were justified on the grounds of greater independence from Russia. This trend was most prominent in relation to gas market, with the Ukrainian newspapers announcing “‘The formula’ of gas independence”⁸⁹⁵ or with the chairman of the ‘Committee for energy independence of Ukraine’ seeing the “‘chance for energy sovereignty” in the formation of a nationwide public movement that could pressure the government to decrease its reliance on gas monopoly and focus on diversification and domestic energy resources.⁸⁹⁶ Similarly, a director of the National Investment Agency called November 26th “the Day of energy independence of Ukraine” while referring to plans of building a domestic LNG terminal.⁸⁹⁷ The same rhetoric applied to further nuclear energy development plans, as media noted how the latter decreases

⁸⁹¹ ‘Vitalii Gaiduk: Naigolovnishe -Tse Vlasna Energobezpeka’, *Den*, 2 February 2007, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/panorama-dnya/vitaliy-gayduk-naygolovnishe-ce-vlasna-energobezpeka>.

⁸⁹² Roman Olearchyk, ‘Golova SBU Zasterigaie pro Nebezpeku...’, *Den*, 12 June 2007, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-planeti/golova-sbu-zasterigaie-pro-nebezpeku>.

⁸⁹³ ‘Mintopenerg Obeschaet Vypolnit Reshenie SNBO I Obespechit Energobezopasnost Ukrainy’, *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 13 February 2009, http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/mintopenergo_obeschaet_vypolnit_reshenie_snbo_i_obespechit_energobezopasnost_ukrainy.html.

⁸⁹⁴ Diyak, *Gazova Promyslovishtva i Energetychna Bezpeka Ukrainy*, 63.

⁸⁹⁵ Mychail Gonchar, “‘Formula’ gazovoi Nezalezhnosti”, *Den*, 17 July 2008, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/formula-gazovoyi-nezalezhnosti>.

⁸⁹⁶ Vitalii Kniazhanskyi, ‘Shans Na Energetychnyi Suverenitet’, *Den*, 31 August 2011, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/panorama-dnya/shans-na-energetichnyi-suverenitet>.

⁸⁹⁷ Nataliia Bilousova, ‘Den Energetychnoi Nezalezhnosti Ukrainy’, *Den*, 27 November 2012, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-ukrayini/den-energetichnoyi-nezalezhnosti-ukrayini>.

Ukraine's dependence on a gas monopoly, while 'Freedom, [and] energy security are not measured in millions, ...[but] in the percentages of dependency or independency'. It was also argued that in the mentality of a growing number of Ukrainians, nuclear energy became linked to energy independence, reliability and the promising scientific and technological development of the country.⁸⁹⁸

The two gas disputes – especially the one in January 2006 – also raised the issue of energy saving measures. President Yushchenko called on the members of the government at the Cabinet meeting in January 2006: “In every ministry and department, I would like us to have a clear answer regarding the implementation of the new energy saving policy in the country”.⁸⁹⁹ As later years showed, this feeling of urgency to radically change the attitudes towards energy saving into more sustainable ones did not bring satisfactory results. However, some initiatives – such as the nation-wide competition for projects on energy saving and energy “Fair of Ideas” organized by the Alliance “New Energy” and the Ministry of Housing, are examples of attempts to influence public debate in this area.⁹⁰⁰ Not surprisingly, the rationale of energy independence was also behind the ideas of further exploration of the domestic ores of uranium and coal in the energy production as well as of the gradual development of the wind and solar renewable energy.⁹⁰¹

Generally speaking though, although different energy supply diversification plans were seen as politically justifiable at the time, the expert opinions regarding their economic rationale

⁸⁹⁸ Oleg Kylnytskyi, ‘Yuryi Nedashkovskiy: “V Ukraine Net Realnoy Alternatyvy Atomnoy Energetike”’, *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 24 February 2006, http://gazeta.zn.ua/ECONOMICS/yuriy_nedashkovskiy_v_ukraine_net_realnoy_alternativy_atomnoy_energetike.html.

⁸⁹⁹ Vitalii Kniazhanskyi, ‘Truba <vg> Istoriya Ta Isteriya’, *Den*, 13 January 2006, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/panorama-dnya/truba-istoriya-ta-isteriya>.

⁹⁰⁰ Volodymyr Skomarovskyi, ‘Kotelna Na Dahu’, *Den*, 18 January 2006, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/kotelna-na-dahu>; Oleksii Savitskyi, ‘Plan Energetychnogo Poriatunku’, *Den*, 16 December 2008, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/uspilstvo/plan-energetychnogo-poryatunku>.

⁹⁰¹ Ivan Nadeyn, ‘Alternativnaya Energetika: V Ukrainu Okolnymi Putyami Cherez Evropu’, *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 9 July 2010, http://gazeta.zn.ua/ECONOMICS/alternativnaya_energetika_v_ukrainu_okolnymi_putyami_cherez_evropu.html; Gaidai, ‘Zoranyi Chas Mistsevoi Energopolityky’; Vadym Ryzhkov, ‘Alternatyva Gazu Lezhyt Pid Nogamy’, *Den*, 18 March 2009, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/alternativa-gazu-lezhit-pid-nogami>.

varied.⁹⁰² Different energy experts evaluated the economic and technical viability of plans for the development of LNG terminal, extraction of shale gas, reversed gas flow from the West, or further development of NPPs differently.⁹⁰³ Some pointed to the high politicization of certain diversification projects – such as Odessa-Brody, when the terminal was built and only then a real search for the supplier started,⁹⁰⁴ whereas Ukraine did not have much problem with oil security in the first place.⁹⁰⁵ Interestingly, although the development of the Odessa-Brody project signaled high politicization of the issue of energy security during Yushchenko's presidency, more diversification attempts took place with Viktor Yanukovich in office.⁹⁰⁶ Yushchenko tried to realize the policy of energy independence, which as an energy expert from the Nomos Centre pointed out: "...was included in the state's schedule in the Yushchenko times, but without any concrete results, correct vision, correct ideas (...)"⁹⁰⁷ Moreover, the political life during Yushchenko's presidency was dominated by his conflict with Julia Tymoshenko, and only during the presidency of Yanukovych a number of projects under the slogan of 'energy independence' as well as the monitoring of economic reforms within the ministerial administration were implemented.⁹⁰⁸ Therefore, paradoxically, despite winning the elections based on the pro-Russian electorate, the unfavorable conditions at the time (high prices for the contracted gas from Russia and disillusionment with its energy policy) forced Yanukovich to look for alternative sources of energy supply (shale gas, reversed gas flow, LNG).⁹⁰⁹

⁹⁰² International Finance Corporation, Interview.

⁹⁰³ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Kyiv, Interview; The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview; Ukrainian Institute for Public Policy, Interview; Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview; International Finance Corporation, Interview; NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

⁹⁰⁴ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁹⁰⁵ Ukrainian Institute for Public Policy, Interview.

⁹⁰⁶ International Finance Corporation, Interview; National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview; The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview.

⁹⁰⁷ NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

⁹⁰⁸ International Finance Corporation, Interview; Movement 350 Kyiv, Interview.

⁹⁰⁹ National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview; The Institute for Energy Studies, Interview; NOMOS Centre Kyiv, Interview.

Ukrainian responses to the Nordstream project

As opposed to the gas cut-off episodes, the development of the Nordstream project did not invoke the ‘grammar of conflict’ in the Ukrainian context. On the one hand, given that Ukraine had spare capacities and could not see the justification for the bypassing project, there was a disappointment on the side of the Ukrainian government - with media pointing to the loss in revenues.⁹¹⁰ On the other hand, some experts highlighted that Nordstream pipeline would not have much impact on the Ukrainian gas transit due to its limited capacity. A former energy security commissioner of the President of Ukraine Bohdan Sokolovski even stated that such policy trend might be for the better as Ukraine should not rely so heavily on being a transit state – as the profits do not outweigh the political costs here.⁹¹¹

Therefore, although Nordstream was perceived as a certain manifestation of Russia’s power in relation to Ukraine (but also the Czech Republic and Slovakia), and – according to the former adviser to the President of Ukraine John Diyak its construction had even accelerated the energy conflict in 2009, where Russia used ‘horror stories’ to scare Europeans and to imply that Ukraine is not a reliable partner⁹¹² – its relative impact on the Ukrainian energy security debate was much lower than in the neighbouring Poland.

To summarize, the analysis of the logic of war in the Ukrainian energy context indicates that the gas cut off episodes served as its main triggers. The war logic was present not only in the rhetoric used, but also led to policy moves that put the issue of energy supply on the national security agenda. As such, the survival rationale overshadowed even the dominant subsistence logic (low economic viability of diversification plans). Moreover, the logic of war appears to be deeply embedded in the Ukrainian context and can be easily brought up by the congruence

⁹¹⁰ Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Interview.

⁹¹¹ Alla Dubrovyk, ‘Pro Golovnu intrygu “Pivnichnogo Potoku”’, *Den*, 9 November 2011, <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/pro-golovnu-intrygu-pivnichnogo-potoku>.

⁹¹² Ibid.

of factors, as: 1) the ‘grammar of conflict’ became normalized and incorporated into the everyday rhetoric; 2) the Ukrainian distal context determines that, similarly to Poland, the notions of ‘energy security’ and ‘energy sovereignty’ are frequently used interchangeably; 3) the Ukrainian energy policy is increasingly intertwined with its national security policy – and this trend is likely to proceed further, especially given the Russian – Ukrainian conflict that started in 2013.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the Ukrainian case reveals an uneasy maneuvering between different priorities of energy security in the system marked by a vast multiplicity of actors and interests. The specific distal context and a constellation of actors, which give leverage only to certain agendas, diminish the societal engagement and uphold the status quo, which resonates around centralized decision-making, traditional energy industries and sustenance rationale focused on the use of domestic energy resources. An in-depth analysis of the contestation processes that take place within the logic of subsistence illustrated these dynamics and pointed to a number of obstacles to the emergence of the emancipatory logic in the Ukrainian energy system. Firstly, approaches to energy security that call for more inclusive solutions remain marginal and are not communicated effectively through the domestic NGO sector. Secondly, there are technical barriers to the effective introduction of energy efficiency measures and development of renewables. Thirdly, the specific socio-historical factors signify that the general public is not only disengaged from the energy security debate and policy developments, but often also unwilling to take control over energy production (renewable energy solutions) and consumption (energy efficiency measures). Lastly, the current dynamics of the Ukrainian system means that the dismantling of energy monopolies is not only unlikely to happen, but a renewables boom would further uphold the monopolization of the renewable energy market. Despite all these

obstacles, the change in attitudes among the younger generation and their slowly developing interest in alternative energy solutions indicate that, similarly to other contexts, the emancipatory agenda could emerge in Ukraine through the intersubjective interaction of small-scale citizens' energy initiatives and green actors, who promote such projects. While all these insights are crucial for understanding the dynamics of the Ukrainian context, they also greatly aid in the conceptualization of the energy security logic of emancipation – as they point to the congruence of local factors that hinder its emergence on multiple levels.

The discussion of this chapter also showed that the dominant sustenance rationale also permeates the Ukrainian nuclear energy debate and policy. The latter show only elements of the risk logic, as although the rationale of prevention is reflected in the official rhetoric, the policy approach lacks clear strategies for risk alleviation and stays focused on the economic benefits of the cheap electricity from nuclear. This dominance of the subsistence logic is periodically overshadowed in the Ukrainian context only by the rise of the logic of war in the country's pipeline politics. The latter appears to be deeply embedded in the Ukrainian context and is likely to play an even greater role in the years to come – as it is closely linked to the general Ukrainian foreign and security policy.

CHAPTER V

THE ENERGY SECURITY LOGICS REVISITED: THE PURCHASE OF CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

The revolution here is from hierarchical to lateral power. That's the power shift. So increasingly a younger generation that's grown up on the internet and now increasingly distributing renewable energies, they're measuring politics in terms of a struggle between centralized, hierarchical, top-down and closed and proprietary, versus distributed, open, collaborative, transparent. This shift, from hierarchical to lateral power, is going to change the way we live, the way we educate our children, and the way we govern the world.

Jeremy Rifkin⁹¹³

INTRODUCTION

This thesis departed from a double challenge of addressing the undertheorized and narrow in analytical/methodological focus, yet conceptually rich and practice-oriented energy studies field, and the highly theorized security studies - with their continuous quest into the nature and dynamics of the security phenomenon. The opposite orientations of the two fields were utilized to show how theoretically-oriented security studies provide an analytical toolbox for the contextual research on energy security and how in turn more practice- oriented energy sphere constitutes good terrain for addressing some broader dilemmas of the critical security analysis. By adopting a contextual approach and interpretivist methodology grounded in hermeneutics, the thesis uncovered multiple energy security logics across the three analyzed cases and in the process made a number of theoretical, conceptual and empirical contributions. This final chapter constitutes a summary of the theoretical and empirical findings and the main argument of the thesis. It starts with revisiting the typologies of security logics/grammars⁹¹⁴

⁹¹³ Jeremy Rifkin, http://www.azquotes.com/author/12352-Jeremy_Rifkin/tag/renewable-energy

⁹¹⁴ Ciută, 'Conceptual Notes on Energy Security'; Corry, 'Securitisation and "riskification"'.

that served as an analytical point of departure for the fieldwork stage of the research vis-à-vis the variety of energy security logics uncovered in the three case studies. In the process, it is illustrated how an intersubjective operationalization of contexts not only allowed to grasp diverse security logics and their shifting interactions, but additionally uncovered the emerging energy security logic of emancipation. Since given the unique character of energy security phenomenon, the emancipatory agenda also manifests differently in the energy sector, this logic is conceptualized against the background literature on emancipation. In particular, the narrative highlights its analytical importance for the critical security studies debates on security and its logics, the concept of emancipation, immanent critique and relation between emancipation versus democratic politics and desecuritization. Subsequently, the chapter juxtaposes all energy security logics uncovered during the research in a two-fold manner. Firstly, the logics are compared on an analytical level in order to highlight distinct features of the emancipation logic vis-à-vis the rest of the typology and to illustrate how all four logics relate to each other. Secondly, the logics' occurrence patterns across the cases are outlined to demonstrate how different logics are linked not only in the theoretical, but also empirical terms – with all the resulting normative and policy implications for the domestic energy contexts. The thesis concludes by providing wider implications of this study for the critical security studies and the energy policy agenda.

ENERGY SECURITY & ITS LOGICS: THE STATE OF THE FIELD REVISITED

Corry noticed that although “...securitisation theory has been widely criticized on methodological and normative grounds, the Copenhagen School account of the specific logic of 'security' has hitherto not been challenged by a rival description of a dominant logic of

security”.⁹¹⁵ The analysis of energy security illustrates that looking for an alternative dominant security logic is misguided, as the energy contexts display multiple security logics that come to the fore of the public debate and policy agenda at different times – with their scope and diversity often exceeding what even the more inclusive classifications or typologies would suggest.⁹¹⁶ Therefore, not only the logic of risk, war and subsistence interchangeably shape local energy security affairs, but the conducted research shows that the emerging logic of emancipation increasingly plays a role in various empirical settings. Based on societal participation and gradual transformation of energy systems by individual prosumers,⁹¹⁷ the emancipatory logic in the energy sphere appears to be ‘growing out’ of the local areas of contestation given favorable contextual conditions.

In general terms, the analysis showed that all - war, subsistence and risk logics are present to different degrees in the three cases studied. However, whereas the war and risk logics might periodically rise and fall triggered by important developments in the energy sector (e.g. nuclear accidents or gas cut-off episodes), the local areas of contestation formed around the subsistence logic pull towards divergent trajectories as far as the meaning and priorities of energy security are concerned. Therefore, although growth, sustenance and environment might indeed constitute three dimensions of energy security that are reflected in all its logics,⁹¹⁸ the actual contestation over these aspects does not happen within the war or risk logic respectively, as the rise of the ‘grammar of conflict’ or the rhetoric of ‘calculation and precaution’ in the face of risks periodically overshadow incremental processes of contextual meaning formation. In the case of the logic of war ‘survival’ replaces ‘sustenance’ and aspects such as ‘growth’ or ‘environment’ are moved to the background. In the case of the risk logic all dimensions remain


⁹¹⁵ Corry, ‘Securitisation and “riskification”’, 240.

⁹¹⁶ E.g. Corry, ‘Securitisation and “riskification”’; Ciută, ‘Conceptual Notes on Energy Security’.

⁹¹⁷ The idea first developed by: Alvin Toffler, ‘The Third Wave’, *New York: Morrow*, 1980; Amory B. Lovins, *Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace* (Chicago, 1977).

⁹¹⁸ Ciută, ‘Conceptual Notes on Energy Security’.

very present – yet they are not prioritized one over the other. Therefore, the actual hierarchization processes that take place within the logic of subsistence, which was approached analytically as the main site of contestation over the competing meanings/priorities/practices of energy security, tend to push in two opposite directions. On the one hand, prioritization of the ‘sustenance’ aspect as reflected in the rhetoric of fulfilling societal needs and fueling economic growth that relies on energy consumption – even at the expense of environmental agenda, points to a strongly economic orientation that is typical for the subsistence logic. On the other hand, once this hierarchy becomes reversed and environmental aspect starts to set the frame of the energy security debate – other dimensions not only go down in the hierarchy, but become transformed in the process (See Graph 3).



Graph 3: Competing energy security dimensions across the logics

Therefore, sustenance is replaced by the idea of sustainable development, while attention to growth is minimized – with some voices even calling for the de-couplement of economic growth from energy consumption.⁹¹⁹ Once that happens, it sets a very favorable frame for reconsideration of the mainstream approaches to energy security and further diffusion of the centralized energy systems. Depending on the context, this shift is underpinned by the combination of: 1) growing societal ecological awareness; 2) effective incentive programs (e.g. to introduce energy saving measures or renewables on a wider scale); 3) and contextual susceptibility to participatory solutions that is often bound to ‘distal context’ – e.g. history of social engagement and participation in the democratic process. Crucially, shifting the agency and responsibility for energy security to the level of individuals is frequently accompanied by the rhetoric of social empowerment and liberation from the interests/agendas of energy monopolies. When analyzed in greater detail, both the reflexive practices of energy production and the accompanying rhetoric of this transition signify the emergence of the emancipatory logic of energy security.

Energy emancipation & security logics

The cross-case comparison of the German, Polish and Ukrainian contexts shows that apart from the war, subsistence and risk logics, the logic of emancipation gradually emerges from the local sites of contestation and increasingly plays a role in them. The analysis highlighted a number of its characteristics, as situated actors (‘green energy’ activists, NGOs, civil movements as well as individual consumers): 1) talk about individuals as the ultimate referents of energy security – as opposed to states and big energy companies; 2) call for the ‘freeing people from the centralized energy systems’, ‘dismantling of oppressive energy

⁹¹⁹ E.g. Frank Dohmen et al., ‘Das War’s!’, *Der Spiegel*, 4 April 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-77855753.html>; ‘Energie: Jenseits von Öl Und Atom’, *Die Zeit*, n.d., sec. Wirtschaft, http://www.zeit.de/2004/25/85l_2fAtom.

monopolies', further democratization of the society through energy democracy' and 'change of the social-economic/political model into a more inclusive one, where people “have a say”'; 3) use the rhetoric of liberation, empowerment and social inclusion in relation to energy security solutions and put social inclusion at the top of energy security's dimensions; 4) engage in local projects and practices that embody the above rhetoric (e.g. citizens' collectives, joint investments at the level of municipalities, or production of renewable energy and implementation of energy efficiency measures by individual households); 5) in line with the statement that: 'Emancipation is a process rather than an endpoint, a direction rather than a destination',⁹²⁰ talk about long-term plans that often stretch decades from now.⁹²¹ Overall, this long-term planning and a firm belief in the possibility of societal transformation that will result in a better, more just and equal - as well as environmentally, politically and economically sound - energy solutions, represents a shift towards entirely different security logic. In a way, given its normative implications, it resembles what Booth and Wheeler described as *a transcender logic* – one of the three *a priori* logical positions defined in relation to their analysis of security dilemma. Booth and Wheeler's 'logics of insecurity' included: *the fatalist logic* - indicating that insecurity can never be escaped in international politics, *the mitigator logic* - assuming that insecurity can be ameliorated for a time, but not eliminated, and *the transcender logic* – underpinned by the idea that human society on a global scale can become what it wants to be, and is not determined.⁹²² In their own words:

“The transcender logic argues that systemic insecurity, including that deriving from the security dilemma, can be escaped if human society reforms or re-invests the structures and processes within which it lives, globally. The transcender logic assumes that this is not the best of all possible worlds. (...). Consequently, human society could do much better according to transcender logic, for human societies have the capacity to reject the oppressive insecurities that have dominated the global political condition by making appropriate political, economic

⁹²⁰ Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 189.

⁹²¹ See sections on the logic of emancipation in all three empirical chapters (II, III, IV).

⁹²² Booth and Wheeler, 'The Security Dilemma', 10.

and social changes”.⁹²³

Similarly, the emerging emancipatory logic that manifests both in the rhetoric and local energy security practices, is geared not only towards transforming the future design of the energy systems. Depending on the context, its goals might be more ambitious and aim at the holistic transformation of the domestic political and socio-economic settings through the democratization of the energy sphere. The following sections elaborate in greater detail what the energy security logic of emancipation entails, while unpacking its empirical manifestations vis-à-vis theoretical literature on emancipation.

ENERGY SECURITY & EMANCIPATION: CONCEPTUALIZING THE EMANCIPATORY LOGIC OF ENERGY SECURITY

Short history of emancipation

The concept of emancipation derives from Roman law, where it referred to the freeing of a son or wife from the legal authority of the pater familias.⁹²⁴ Latin *emancipare* means the action of setting free from slavery or tutelage,⁹²⁵ therefore the 'object' of emancipation becomes free from the authority or the control of others as a result of the 'act' of emancipation.⁹²⁶ The concept was used in this manner in relation to religious toleration in the 17th century, the emancipation of slaves in the 18th century and the emancipation of women and workers in the 19th century.⁹²⁷ These conceptualizations inspired by the struggles against particular oppressions – monarchical despotism, religious intolerance, ignorance and inequality – with time gave place

⁹²³ Ibid. 16–17.

⁹²⁴ G. J. J. Biesta, 'Toward a New "logic" of Emancipation: Foucault and Ranciere' (Philosophy of Education Society, 2008), 169.

⁹²⁵ Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 111.

⁹²⁶ Biesta, 'Toward a New "logic" of Emancipation', 169.

⁹²⁷ Ibid.

to emancipation as identified with political programs for a better world (based on liberty, progress, controlling nature, pursuing equality, and the perfectibility of humanity).⁹²⁸

Notably, the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory elaborated the concept of emancipation by equating it with the domination of nature and the need to be freed from its vicissitudes.⁹²⁹ Although Horkheimer initially argued that the emancipatory potential for a better life was already a part of the existing forces of production - yet remaining unrealized because it was mobilized for the benefit of capital rather than humanity - he later altered his understanding of the concept towards a 'reconciliation' with nature.⁹³⁰ Therefore, emancipation was no longer linked in the Marxist terms to material oppression and material empowerment exclusively, but a relationship to it became rather non-instrumental.⁹³¹ Horkheimer's work inspired some international relations scholars working with emancipatory approaches to security. Wyn Jones, for example, derived from his earlier work an assumption that emancipation does not refer 'to an idealized end-state that has yet to be reached, but to unfulfilled *potentialities* extant within the current order'.⁹³² Consequently, he understood emancipation 'as the more rational and purposeful utilization of already existing forces of production in order to bring nature under rational human control' in an ongoing and open-ended process.⁹³³ As McDonald noticed, by conceiving emancipation as 'a (strategic) process of freeing up' rather than 'a condition of being freed',⁹³⁴ Wyn Jones indirectly addressed one of the most prominent critiques of critical theory that the conditions for the realization of emancipation (e.g. Habermas 'ideal speech situation') are utopian and almost impossible to recognize analytically.⁹³⁵ If the emancipation is

⁹²⁸ Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 111.

⁹²⁹ Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, '1979', *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 1947, 54.

⁹³⁰ Adorno and Horkheimer, '1979'.

⁹³¹ Ibid.

⁹³² Wyn Jones in Columba Peoples, 'Security after Emancipation? Critical Theory, Violence and Resistance', *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (2011): 1118.

⁹³³ Ibid.

⁹³⁴ Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 76–78.

⁹³⁵ McDonald, 'Emancipation and Critical Terrorism Studies'.

always incomplete we can only work towards the removal of constraints (emancipatory change) rather than the realization of an ideal endpoint (emancipation).⁹³⁶ The emancipatory change could be then defined as steps towards the removal of arbitrary and oppressive structural constraints.⁹³⁷ In this respect, locating and analyzing what Wyn Jones called 'concrete utopias' becomes a more manageable task.

Wyn Jones has also argued that if critical security studies are to be concerned with human emancipation then they need to pay equal attention to the issue of liberation of individual human beings not only from military threats, but also non-military ones such as environmental threats, poverty and state-based oppression.⁹³⁸ This link between security and emancipation was developed further by Booth, who stated that whereas security means the absence of threats:

“...as a discourse of politics, emancipation seeks the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others. It provides a three-fold framework for politics: a philosophical anchorage for knowledge, a theory of progress for society, and a practice of resistance against oppression. Emancipation is the philosophy, theory, and politics of inventing humanity”.⁹³⁹

Security and emancipation are according to Booth two sides of the same coin, as: 'Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security'.⁹⁴⁰ While trying to elaborate further on the security-emancipation nexus Booth stated that a more effective way of explaining the relationship is to conceive security *as the means* and emancipation *as the end*.⁹⁴¹ Most recently he added that security and emancipation form in fact a kind of a virtuous circle: as the pursuit of security (understood as reducing the threats that impose life-determining conditions of insecurity on individuals and groups) promotes emancipation (freeing people from oppression and so giving them some opportunity to explore

⁹³⁶ McDonald, *Security, the Environment and Emancipation*, 55.

⁹³⁷ McDonald, *Security, the Environment and Emancipation*.

⁹³⁸ Ibid.

⁹³⁹ Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 112.

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁴¹ Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 115.

being more fully human), while pursuit of emancipation (reducing structural oppression) promotes security (opening up space in which people can feel safer).⁹⁴² The belief that it is the individual humans, not states, that should be the ultimate referent object of security, is a key assumption behind Booth's reasoning as he declares that it would be his aim:

“...to contribute to conceptualizing world security away from its nationalist and statist orthodoxies – which promote the idea of security *against* others – to an approach that conceives security as an instrumental value concerned to promote security *reciprocally*, as part of the invention of a more inclusive humanity”.⁹⁴³

Booth's concept of 'Emancipatory Realism' – although rooted in the Frankfurt School's notion of emancipation – also subscribes to the Kantian idealism as it propagates 'gradual reforms' as 'the only means of approaching the supreme political good'.⁹⁴⁴ As such, emancipation itself became a practice of resistance and 'a framework for attempting to actualize both nearer-term and longer-term emancipatory goals through strategic and tactical political action based on immanent critique'.⁹⁴⁵ ⁹⁴⁶ The latter aims to make visible the internal contradictions of dominant security arrangements in given contexts and to foster alternative visions of security that are often promoted by marginalized actors.⁹⁴⁷

Both the idea of inclusive solutions and immanent critique have been taken up by other scholars working with emancipatory approaches to security. Since the promotion of emancipatory agenda could take not only material, but also discursive form, McDonald propagated the vision of emancipation as freeing up space for dialogue and inclusion of marginalized voices to 'speak security'.⁹⁴⁸ In his work on the environmental change, he sought

⁹⁴² Booth in C. Peoples, 'Security after Emancipation?' 1116.

⁹⁴³ Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 111.

⁹⁴⁴ Booth in C. Peoples, 'Security after Emancipation?' 1129.

⁹⁴⁵ A means of detecting the societal contradictions which offer the most determinate possibilities for emancipatory social change.

⁹⁴⁶ Peoples, 'Security after Emancipation?' 1129.

⁹⁴⁷ Nunes, 'Reclaiming the Political', 352.

⁹⁴⁸ McDonald, *Security, the Environment and Emancipation*, 41; McDonald, 'Emancipation and Critical Terrorism Studies'.

to identify the possibilities for the emergence of an emancipatory security discourse, which would constitute '... a framework of meaning about security that is concerned with overturning structures of oppression or exclusion, is radically cosmopolitan [and] is predicated on the rights and needs of the most vulnerable'.⁹⁴⁹ By shifting the attention to the ways in which certain voices are empowered or marginalized in 'speaking' security and how broadly the spaces for meaningful political contestation are drawn in different contexts, McDonald aimed to enable the 'subjugated' voices.⁹⁵⁰ The latter could articulate alternative definitions of 'core values' and means to protect them, but were not strong enough to influence dominant security practices within given community. As such, the immanent critique could be used as an emancipatory tool in the process of 'emancipation' accelerated by the agency of the 'emancipator'.

The emancipatory logic within energy security sphere closely relates to the above approaches and conceptualizations at various points. However, its practical and analytical consequences in the energy realm are often vastly different. The next section unpacks this argument at greater length in its attempt to conceptualize the emancipatory logic of energy security.

The emancipatory logic of energy security

The analysis of the three empirical contexts shows that the emancipatory logic of energy security can be identified in all of them – albeit to different degrees. This finding is quite puzzling as given its usual 'hard security' standing it would seem that energy security does not lend itself as easily as some other 'soft security' issues (e.g. environment) to the alternative understandings and interpretations of security. Therefore, the emergence of the emancipatory logic in the energy sector provides new insights into the conventional energy studies, which largely reject such option as well as adds a new quality to critical security studies, which tend to deal with

⁹⁴⁹ McDonald, *Security, the Environment and Emancipation*, 41.

⁹⁵⁰ Ibid.

emancipatory issues within the ‘soft security’ or ‘societal sector’. Moreover, due to the uniqueness of the energy security sphere the logic of emancipation follows here different dynamics – which at many points challenges critical studies’ assumptions regarding the nature of emancipation as well as its relation to the securitization/desecuritization mechanisms.

To start with, although it does not function as a political flag word, the emancipatory logic in the energy realm manifests itself both in the rhetoric and practice of different actors. Its main indicators across the cases include: 1) individuals becoming the ultimate referents of energy security; 2) reflexive and inclusive security practices (e.g. citizens' collectives, shared ownership of projects at the level of municipalities, or production of renewable energy and implementation of energy efficiency measures by individual households); 3) rhetoric of social inclusion, empowerment and liberation from the centralized energy system – with its narrow beneficiaries, interests and monopolies; 4) gradual democratization of the energy sphere as the main security mechanism.

Therefore, if to link the above indicators back to the theoretical debates in the discipline, it appears that calling for the diffusion of energy systems and basing the new model on the individuals as the ultimate referent objects of energy security, is partially in line with Booth's understanding of emancipation. It is therefore no longer the state or the major sub-state actors, such as large energy companies that are of primary concern, but the focus is shifted to the level of the individual. These individuals stop being mere consumers of energy, dependent on domestic providers and external suppliers, but in the process of producing and consuming their own energy become energy prosumers (simultaneous producers and consumers of energy). Diffusion of energy systems – from centralized ones towards participatory energy systems based on renewables - is often accompanied by the rhetoric of liberation and social empowerment. Therefore, numerous local actors talk about the 'dismantling of energy

monopolies' and 'freeing themselves from their power'.⁹⁵¹ Social empowerment here does not result from a legal process, but is a natural consequence of energy practices that cause individuals to gain control over their own energy security. Regaining control from larger actors, who are often perceived as 'oppressing forces' or even 'occupying powers' (See Chapter II), resonates well with Wyn Jones reading of Horkheimer on emancipation, who saw it as the liberation of individual human beings from suffering not only from military threat, but also from threats such as environmental threats, poverty and state-based oppression.⁹⁵² In the case of energy sphere, even when termed as 'energy revolution' (e.g. German case), energy transition is in fact a gradual process of liberation. This liberation is also of a dual nature – as becoming independent from energy monopolies not only shifts the power and agency back to the people, but the energy practices in which they engage – e.g. production of renewable energy or energy efficiency measures – simultaneously diminish environmental threats that the local communities face in the long run. Therefore, emancipatory practices in the energy sphere have both material and idealistic aspect to them, as gaining the ownership of the means of energy production leads to control over one's energy security in a way that is consistent with the environmental and wider social agenda. In this sense, 'emancipation' understood as giving away of the ownership (*ex: away; mancipum: ownership*),⁹⁵³ involves utilizing material means not for the benefit of capital, but for individual actors who produce and consume clean energy. The emancipatory logic of energy security relies therefore on the process of diffusion of the energy system, which once set in motion – has potentially far-reaching consequences for the environmental, political and social areas. Since virtually any individual can become involved in the transformation of the energy system, the entire socio-economic model changes, as wide social participation leads to the further democratization of the society. Especially the analysis

⁹⁵¹ Hans Josef Fell, Interview, 20 November 2012; Szwed, Interview; Greencubator, Interview.

⁹⁵² Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory*, 23.

⁹⁵³ Biesta, 'Toward a New "logic" of Emancipation', 169.

of the German and Polish cases show that multiple actors on the ground talk about 'energy democracy' that can be brought about by the gradual diffusion of the energy systems and a 'change of the socio-economic model into a more inclusive one', where people 'have a say'.⁹⁵⁴ Additionally, a number of actors who propagate the participatory energy model prioritize 'social inclusion' among energy security's dimensions when asked about the definition of energy security and relative importance of its various aspects.⁹⁵⁵ The inclusive and democratic rhetoric is also increasingly manifested in practice, as more and more individuals take part in the production of energy on their own or as a part of citizens' collectives and as they start to invest in the projects that extract and transport energy resources (See examples in the German chapter). In this sense, energy sphere indeed shows, following Aradau that "Emancipation is the concept that should be able to enact a radical 'democratization' of security. [As] emancipation radically tackles the concept of democratic politics and the issue of institutional authority in claiming a voice for the (...) 'security have-nots'".⁹⁵⁶ Similarly, Nunes notices that by embracing critique within emancipatory approaches we can move "...beyond the idea that 'security' is merely a representation of reality or a modality for dealing with issues. Rather, critique sets out to impact upon political actors' perceptions and actions, so as to pave the way for a reconstruction of security along more open, inclusive and democratic lines".⁹⁵⁷ The emerging rhetoric of liberation and social inclusion that accompanies energy transition in Germany, and that can be spotted to different degrees in the other two contexts, stands in a sharp contrast to the divisive and confrontational rationale underlying the logic of war that plays out in the pipeline politics and global distribution of fossil fuels. On the contrary, the language of the increasingly diffused energy systems with active prosumers is marked by the positive notion of energy security – one that is not divisive and exclusive, but that can be embraced by the

⁹⁵⁴ Chancellery of the Sejm, Interview; Szwed, Interview; demosEUROPA, Interview; SGGW, Interview.

⁹⁵⁵ E.g. Szwed, Interview; Fell, Interview; Greencubator, Interview.

⁹⁵⁶ Aradau, 'Security and the Democratic Scene', 397.

⁹⁵⁷ Nunes, 'Reclaiming the Political', 351.

entire humanity. In other words, as opposed to the realist-informed security logic that quite adequately grasps the dynamics of competition over energy resources, which due to the diminishing amount of fossil fuels became a zero-sum game – energy revolution based on energy efficiency measures and renewables indicates that one person's win does not equal another person's loss. In theoretical terms, this particular case of the positive notion of energy security mirrors Booth's argument about the promotion of the reciprocal security – as a part of the invention of a more inclusive humanity. As Booth noticed: “Outside the seminar room (...) the language trends describing what is happening have been moving away from the neat and orderly world of mainstream theory. The dominant traditional language of the subject remains sharp-edged, and is mostly a language of division and exclusion”.⁹⁵⁸ The widely perceived energy sphere shows us that this does not have to be the case, as positive notions of energy security that propagate inclusive solutions are already in place. Yet, since the emancipatory logic has to compete with other security logics in the energy sphere, its empirical manifestations indicate that ‘freeing energy for people’ is a long-term project. Therefore, in line with the statement that: ‘Emancipation is a process rather than an endpoint, a direction rather than a destination’,⁹⁵⁹ ‘green’ actors in different contexts talk about long-term plans – that often stretch decades from now.⁹⁶⁰ However, if Booth described ‘security’ as means and ‘emancipation’ as ends,⁹⁶¹ the sphere of energy indicates a reversed dynamic – as it is through social empowerment and emancipatory practices that individual prosumers achieve energy security. Energy security has a tangible element to it – energy output, therefore it is the very dismantlement of monopolies, removal of intermediaries and production of energy that make individuals ‘secure’ in terms of energy supply. Numerous actors on the ground additionally

⁹⁵⁸ Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991): 314.

⁹⁵⁹ Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 189.

⁹⁶⁰ SGGW, Interview; Szwed, Interview; demosEUROPA, Interview; Greencubator, Interview; National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Interview, 26 October 2013.

⁹⁶¹ Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 115.

express the hope that achieving energy security through individual practices will change the way in which society thinks about energy security in particular and wider design of the socio-economic system in general.⁹⁶² Therefore, de-carbonization and decentralization of traditional energy systems can imply much more than a technical re-design of energy sector solutions⁹⁶³ – as the diffusion of the energy system based on renewables has a potential to empower local communities and lead to the democratization of the energy sphere.⁹⁶⁴ This is especially the case in the CEE region, where centralized political power is additionally strengthened by the Soviet legacy of keeping a strict division between the management of resources and societal relations – which impacts both the energy and environmental sectors.⁹⁶⁵ Thanks to their scalability and distributed character, renewables enable the individuals, cooperatives and local communities to invest and benefit from their development. Moreover, through shifting the responsibility for energy production to citizens, who become subject and sovereign rather than object of energy policy⁹⁶⁶ - they transform common beliefs regarding the possibilities of widely defined socio-political change that can be brought about by individuals. For this reason, there exist high hopes in Poland and Ukraine that democratization of energy will further democratize CEE societies – even if the current energy policies or political developments show centralist or authoritarian tendencies.

Energy democracy: Emancipation without emancipator?

This thesis followed an interpretivist research design and a contextual approach to security analysis to uncover the multiplicity of logics in the energy sector. Local manifestations

⁹⁶² Szwed, Interview; SGGW, Interview; demosEUROPA, Interview; Greencubator, Interview.

⁹⁶³ Kacper Szulecki and Kirsten Westphal, 'The Cardinal Sins of European Energy Policy: Nongovernance in an Uncertain Global Landscape', *Global Policy* 5, no. s1 (2014): 38–51.

⁹⁶⁴ Szulecki, Ancygier, and Szwed, 'Energy Democratization?'

⁹⁶⁵ P. Robbins, *Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction* (Oxford, 2004); Petr Jehlicka and Joe Smith, 'Out of the Woods and into the Lab: Exploring the Strange Marriage of American Woodcraft and Soviet Ecology in Czech Environmentalism', *Environment and History* 13, no. 2 (2007): 187–210.

⁹⁶⁶ Szulecki, Ancygier, and Szwed, 'Energy Democratization?'

of the emancipatory agenda were one of its major findings, which revealed that it is one of the energy security logics operating across empirical cases. However, giving voice to the multiplicity of actors and embracing a wide range of empirical sources uncovered a rhetoric and praxis of emancipation that is already in place— among other security logics in the energy sphere. In other words, the contextualized approach revealed the emancipatory agenda across energy contexts without having an *a priori* intention to do so.

That stands in sharp contrast to a number of scholars who intentionally employ immanent critique as a part of their research approach aimed at identifying possibilities for emancipatory change. McDonald, for example, in his analysis of emancipation and the environment uses immanent critique to free up space for dialogue and inclusion of marginalized voices that 'speak security' in order '...to identify immanent possibilities for the emergence of an emancipatory security discourse' in the environmental sphere.⁹⁶⁷ Such discourse according to McDonald "...constitutes a framework of meaning about security that is concerned with overturning structures of oppression or exclusion, is radically cosmopolitan; is predicated on the rights and needs of the most vulnerable; and wherein the means envisaged to achieve or preserve 'security' will not deprive others of it".⁹⁶⁸

The analysis of energy security dynamics in Germany, Poland and Ukraine shows that a similarly inclusive and cosmopolitan discourse aimed at energy liberation of individuals is already present in all three contexts to different degrees. Therefore, a broader contextual approach was able to depict that rhetoric and draw attention to it. However, the research undertaken did not carry the strong normative agenda that marks the work of McDonald on the environment – as similar attention was paid to other security logics that are at play in different contexts - and the very interaction between them.

The analysis confirmed that "...far from constituting an unrealizable, utopian vision,

⁹⁶⁷ McDonald, *Security, the Environment and Emancipation*, 52.

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid.

emancipation is in fact articulated and practiced in the everyday of world politics”.⁹⁶⁹ Moreover, emancipatory changes in the energy realm resemble what could be termed as ‘emancipation without emancipator’. Namely, they are brought about by the inter-subjective processes, where – given favorable local conditions – individuals drive emancipatory agenda on a wide scale. Despite the fact that ‘green’ actors often provide some guidance and expertise to such citizens’ energy initiatives, the whole process defies the ‘emancipator versus emancipated’ dynamics. In this sense energy emancipation falls into Biesta’s category of “new emancipation” as it implies: “... [That it] is not something that is done to people but instead is something that is done by people”.⁹⁷⁰ Whereas ‘old emancipation’ talked about lifting people from the workings of power and put the emancipator as a ‘master-explicator in a position above everyday world’, the ‘new emancipation’ no longer relies on a relationship of dependency as it starts from the assumption of equality – everybody is able to make a move.⁹⁷¹ As Biesta puts it: “That is not to suggest that society is equal. But what it aims to do is to take away from the logic of emancipation the idea that there is a fundamental, almost ontological inequality that only can be overcome through the interventions of the emancipator”.⁹⁷² Emancipatory logic in the energy sphere seems to follow this ‘new emancipation’ trajectory. Although a number of green political actors and activists across the three analyzed cases call for social empowerment in the energy sphere, their role is rather of a facilitating nature as emancipatory changes rely largely on grassroots movement and bottom-up citizens’ and municipal initiatives operating within given contextual conditions.

⁹⁶⁹ Ibid. 55.

⁹⁷⁰ Biesta, ‘Toward a New “logic” of Emancipation’, 175.

⁹⁷¹ Ibid.

⁹⁷² Ibid.

The emancipatory logic in the energy sphere also sheds some light on the recent debate about the relation between securitization versus desecuritization and emancipation. According to Aradau the concepts of desecuritization and emancipation are closely related as they both aim at establishing alternatives to certain social practices.⁹⁷³ Drawing on the work of Jacques Ranciere and Etienne Balibar, Aradau argued that whereas securitization instituted the politics of enmity and exceptionalism and is enacted through the non-democratic constitution of authority, desecuritization should learn the democratic politics of emancipation.⁹⁷⁴ As such, it should present the challenge to securitization by being inscribed institutionally and by creating relation that is not rooted in the exclusionary and non-democratic logic of security.⁹⁷⁵ In this sense, desecuritization could be seen as ‘a political choice of restoring democracy’ and the question of securitization versus desecuritization as the ultimate choice of the kind of politics that we want – one of the exceptional measures or one of the democratic politics of slow procedures which can be contested.⁹⁷⁶ However, linking ‘emancipation’ with ‘democratic politics’ meant for Aradau that ‘emancipation’ should not be simultaneously conflated with ‘security’ as the latter often implies exclusionary practices associated with militarization and ‘securitization’. Therefore: ‘When equated with security, emancipation becomes problematic as it can no longer envisage social transformations outside of the logic of security [...]. The struggle for security is re-styled as a struggle for emancipation, without any qualms about the relationship between emancipation and security’.⁹⁷⁷ According to Aradau the implications of ‘emancipation’ are yet to be fully realized regarding equality and democratic participation – with all the complexities of protest, resistance, violence and counter-violence of the politics of

⁹⁷³ Aradau, ‘Security and the Democratic Scene’, 397.

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid. 398–340.

⁹⁷⁵ Ibid. 398–340.

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid. 393.

⁹⁷⁷ Ibid. 398.

emancipation.⁹⁷⁸

The most obvious criticisms of the above argument challenge a number of assumptions regarding the nature of security that Aradau takes for granted. Assuming that security and emancipation operate under incompatible logics, exclusive and inclusive respectively, implies that the politics of security is always a zero-sum game achieved at somebody's expense – a deterministic view that overlooks numerous ways in which security is understood and practiced.⁹⁷⁹ Naturally, this argument mirrors a wider debate regarding the nature of security, yet here the consequences of equating security with exclusionary logic are made even more explicit when it comes to conceiving of the possibilities for progressive change. As McDonald noticed, the analytical consequence of this position implies that security has a meaning and logic that is fixed and problematic, whereas the derivative from the above normative consequence is that the normative progress can only be realized through resisting and ultimately escaping security.⁹⁸⁰ As Nunes put it: “By assuming the form of a damning verdict on the supposed logic of the security-securitization nexus, the contestation of security becomes synonymous with the refusal of security”.⁹⁸¹ Learning democratic politics of emancipation by desecuritization and decoupling ‘emancipation’ from ‘security’, as discussed earlier by Aradau, also serves that purpose. However, the analysis of energy security indicates that the emancipatory logic in the energy realm does not equal the desecuritization of the issue, but is rather synonymous with the transformation of the very meaning and practice of energy security.

The common assumption that we know what the logic of security is, leads to a conclusion that Aradau's argument contributes to our understanding of ‘how, in practice, can

⁹⁷⁸ Aradau, ‘Security and the Democratic Scene’.

⁹⁷⁹ João Nunes, ‘Emancipation and the Reality of Security: A Reconstructive Agenda’, in *Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics* (Routledge, 2015), 141–53; Matt McDonald, ‘Contesting Border Security: Emancipation and Asylum in the Australian Context’, in *Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics* (Routledge, 2015), 154–68.

⁹⁸⁰ McDonald, ‘Contesting Border Security: Emancipation and Asylum in the Australian Context’, 154.

⁹⁸¹ João Nunes, ‘Emancipation and the Reality of Security: A Reconstructive Agenda,’ in *Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics* (London: Routledge, 2015), 143.

security be *unmade*?’⁹⁸² However, the energy sphere shows that it is through social emancipation that energy security is *made* – albeit within a distinct security rationale. Energy security presents a special case as it is due to the prior social emancipation in the energy field that individuals can engage in practices (e. g. energy-saving measures or production of renewable energy), which provide them with energy security. The fact that we are still talking about ‘energy security’ here and not just participatory solutions in the energy field, is confirmed by the individuals themselves, who often put ‘social inclusion’ and ‘social participation in the energy system’ as the prerogatives of their definition or their understanding of ‘energy security’ itself.⁹⁸³ If we are to take the assumption that ‘actors do speak security’ seriously, then both this rhetoric and practices across the three cases analyzed confirm the existence of another energy security logic at play. Within this logic there is no need for security trade-offs – as one individual’s security does not happen at the expense of the other. Consequently, the traditional assumption that security logic is one of ‘...discrimination [and] of creating hierarchies of subjects who need to be secured’⁹⁸⁴ is strongly contradicted. Emancipatory energy practices show that once we go down to the level of individual prosumers – there are no more hierarchies to be made among actors, who are capable of ‘securing themselves’. In this respect security among equals becomes possible. Thus, if Balzacq *et al* argued that ‘desecuritization seeks to transform the register of meanings which previously organized the interactions among people’⁹⁸⁵, the same can be said about emancipation in the sphere of energy. However, whereas Balzacq *et al* claimed that the transformative way of desecuritization derives from its ability to institute ‘a new intersubjective relation embedded in democratic politics, not security, values

⁹⁸² Thierry Balzacq, Sara Depauw, and Sarah Leonard, “The Political Limits of Desecuritization: Security, Arms Trade, and the EU’s Economic Targets,” in *Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics* (Routledge, 2015), 107–8. Emphasis added.

⁹⁸³ E.g. Dariusz Szwed, Interview, May 27, 2013; Greencubator, Interview, October 30, 2013.

⁹⁸⁴ Claudia Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7, no. 4 (2004): 401.

⁹⁸⁵ Balzacq, Depauw, and Leonard, “The Political Limits of Desecuritization: Security, Arms Trade, and the EU’s Economic Targets,” 107–8.

(e.g. equality, fairness, transparency, etc.)’,⁹⁸⁶ the sphere of energy shows that there is no contradiction between security and democratic politics as the latter might bring about the former. Therefore, against the statement that ‘Critical and feminist security studies function more as a ‘counter-securitization’ and not desecuritization, as this move leaves intact the logic of security that shapes social relations’⁹⁸⁷, emancipatory practices in the energy sphere indicate that social practices might be reshaped along different security logic altogether. One could then agree with McDonald that:

“...If we acknowledge that the meaning of security has changed and can change further; that it is understood in different ways in different political communities; and that the practices to flow from particular security discourses are related to the structure and logic of the discourses themselves, then the rejection of security is less obvious as a strategy for enabling progressive change”.⁹⁸⁸

Moreover, the emancipatory logic in the energy realm teases out the perceived theoretical tension between the idea that security has a mobilizing power politically and the view that security should be defined and practiced in positive, progressive terms.⁹⁸⁹ In the three analyzed cases – especially in the German, but also Polish context - energy security based on the diffusion of energy system indeed has a mobilizing political power, yet simultaneously the proclaimed ‘energy revolution’ is brought about by peaceful, evolutionary changes. Whereas there is no inherent violence underlying emancipatory agenda in the energy sector, there is a hope among local environmental and green energy circles that societal empowerment in the energy sphere will have far-reaching consequences also for other socio-economic and political sectors.⁹⁹⁰

⁹⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁷ Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene.”

⁹⁸⁸ Matt McDonald, “Contesting Border Security: Emancipation and Asylum in the Australian Context,” in *Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics* (Routledge, 2015), 160.

⁹⁸⁹ Matt McDonald, *Security, the Environment and Emancipation: Contestation over Environmental Change* (Routledge, 2011), 50.

⁹⁹⁰ *Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy* (Brussels: European Commission (EC), 2006); Szwed, Interview; demosEUROPA, Interview, May 24, 2013; SGGW, Interview, June 12, 2013; Chancellery of the Sejm, Interview, June 7, 2013.

The purchase of contextual analysis:

The energy security logic of emancipation & its transformative nature

Therefore, the energy security logic of emancipation challenges the poststructuralist essentialist version of security as it exemplifies another valid security rationale at operation. Its unique character owes to the complexity of energy security phenomenon itself, and as such, the logic often diverges from or contradicts assumptions regarding the nature of emancipation and its relation to security voiced in critical security studies. Firstly, since ‘security’ is expressed here in positive terms and is of reflexive nature – its relation to emancipation is a more complex one. If Booth saw security as ‘the absence of threats’ and emancipation as ‘freeing of people from physical constraints’,⁹⁹¹ in the energy sphere it is social empowerment that removes the technical barriers and that through individual energy practice leads to transformation of the very meaning of security. Secondly, a strongly practice-oriented energy field embraces the emancipatory logic that it is already in place – where normative agendas emerge from the congruence of contextual factors rather than being imposed by a circle of ‘emancipators’ or enabled by the empowerment of certain discourses by various scholars and analysts.⁹⁹² Thirdly, democratization in the energy sphere serves as the actual security mechanism – and as such cannot be equated with ‘desecuritization’ since energy security is *made* rather than *unmade* in this process.

All the above points illustrate the differences in the conceptualization of emancipation in the literature on the subject as opposed to one, which emerges from the practice of energy security and often escapes such conceptualizations. Consequently, they also highlight analytical purchase of the contextual approach to security analysis, as only the latter could account for such differences. In other words, it is the focus on contexts and their intersubjective

⁹⁹¹ Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991): 319.

⁹⁹² McDonald, *Security, the Environment and Emancipation*.

operationalization that allowed this thesis to depict the distinct emancipatory logic of energy security and recognize its transformative character. Such approach required a certain ‘sociological’ orientation that would not only embrace diverse security mechanisms and local factors, but also allow for the foregrounding of various actors and their respective agency – individuals included. To recall once more McSweeney’s quote from his *Security, identity and interests*:

“(...) A nation can only be mobilized for national security in peacetime if the majority of the people identify the state and its enemies as the highest expression of their own personal security and fear. But what drives the security project, and defines its content and appropriate instruments, is the internal logic of the state. In the name of the people, and of a philosophical conception of human nature rooted in a human ideal of liberty, solidarity and order, security was appropriated by the state and operationalized by its theorists and specialist agencies”.⁹⁹³

It was then the acceptance of the realist logic of security as timeless and universal that led to the centrality of state and its leaders in defining threats and responses to them – which in turn often resulted in the association of security means and tools with military action.⁹⁹⁴ Moreover, as McSweeney noticed, later attempts at the contextualization of security analysis - such as the CS framework - often retained the analytical focus on the state’s political elites for methodological rather than substantive reasons, as ‘(...) to pursue individual security as a subject in its own right would take one deeply into the realms of politics, psychology and sociology’.⁹⁹⁵ Therefore, challenging this status quo would require an openness to other security logics, embracement of diverse potential securitizing actors and a sociologically grounded methodological approach that could account for broader security dynamics. Prominently, Balzacq attempted to reformulate securitization framework towards more sociologically

⁹⁹³ Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 21. Emphasis added.

⁹⁹⁴ Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 579.

⁹⁹⁵ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Hemel Hempstead, 1991), 324; McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 57.

oriented one that would see all its conceptual elements as intersubjective.⁹⁹⁶ Invariably equating security with fear rationale could not take the analysis beyond the Copenhagen School's initial problems with context and single logic approach. Therefore, while conducting energy security analysis this thesis chose to approach the very security contexts in an intersubjective manner – so as to stay open enough to give voice to numerous actors, recognize diverse security mechanisms and grasp the multiplicity of security logics.


As a result, the logic of emancipation in the energy sector could be spotted across the cases. Crucially, approaching contexts through the prism of intersubjectivity also allowed to recognize its transformative character – and as such aid in the conceptualization of the energy security logic of emancipation. Therefore, if the three key elements of the local settings have been recognized as: distal factors, a constellation of actors and embeddedness of security mechanisms – then practical and normative consequences of the emancipatory logic operating between them could also be seen more clearly.

It could be then said that in case of the emancipatory logic individual prosumers (within shifted constellation of actors where they “have a say”) engage in reflexive energy security practices that lead to democratization of the energy sphere (security mechanism), which in turn influences political and socio-economic setting (‘distal context’). Simultaneously, distal context further enhances embeddedness of security mechanism (democratization of energy sphere) and strengthens given constellation of actors (that empowers individual prosumers) ([See Graph 4](#)). Furthermore, since via democratization of the energy sphere individuals not only regain control over their energy affairs, but might also realize the power of their own political agency – the emancipatory logic has a potential to transform the entire socio-economic setting.

It could be then said that the energy security logic of emancipation is transformative on two levels. Firstly, it transforms individuals' understanding of energy security as proper economic

⁹⁹⁶ Thierry Balzacq, *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (Routledge, 2010).

incentives might encourage individuals to engage in reflexive energy practice (e.g. production of renewable energy), which in the process changes their internalized understandings of what energy security is ‘all about’. As green energy propagators on the ground recognize that understanding of energy security transforms as a result of producing one’s own energy, they are more focused on facilitating conditions that will remove technical and economic barriers to the development of renewables.



Graph 4: The energy security logic of emancipation within an intersubjective context.

Therefore, if McSweeney noticed that security was appropriated by the state and the logic of the state was internalized by its theorists and specialist agencies,⁹⁹⁷ then a sociologically grounded approach points to individuals who might ‘internalize’ an entirely different logic. However, just as the realist logic of the state derived from a historical experience and a practice of international politics often marked by confrontation and conflict, the internalization of the emancipation logic might come about through the experience of positive, inclusive and reflexive energy practice. Secondly, once that happens the individuals themselves can lead to the further cross-sectoral transformation of the system.

⁹⁹⁷ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 21.

The strength of this transformative potential varies as more centralized political and energy systems appear more challenging – yet, the possibilities for metamorphosis are also higher in such contexts. Therefore, in Germany where social empowerment within the energy sphere is taken more for granted (favourable distal context, strong embeddedness of security mechanism, and a constellation of actors with regards to renewables that gives strong standing to the culture of prosumers), the emancipatory logic is strong and can be spotted both in rhetoric and energy practice. On the other hand, in contexts such as Poland and Ukraine, which are less conducive to the rise of the emancipatory agenda, the energy security logic of emancipation manifests mostly in rhetoric – yet, the recognition of its transformative potential is also higher. Due to the Soviet legacy of centralized political authority and social disengagement from the political life and management of resources, especially the actors in Poland expressed the hope that democratization of the energy sector could not only change the way in which Poles understand energy security, but also result in social empowerment that could transform the entire political and socio-economic context.⁹⁹⁸ Similar, yet more marginalized voices have been raised in Ukraine, where context hinders the rise of the emancipatory logic due to high technical and socio-economic barriers.

This gradual decrease in the occurrence of the emancipatory logic, as the analysis moves from the German to the Polish and then to the Ukrainian case, might partially owe to the fact that German actors actively promote the democratization of the energy sector via a network of green NGOs in the neighboring states. The emancipatory logic is therefore marked here by a strong transnational and cosmopolitan character. However, the energy security logic of emancipation cannot be simply equated with the liberal diffusion of norms. Firstly, as the logic mutates and manifests differently in different empirical contexts – it has a more far-reaching scope and consequences than any international agenda could hope or aim for. Hence, it is ultimately its

⁹⁹⁸ demosEUROPA, Interview; SGGW, Interview; Szwed, Interview; Chancellery of the Sejm, Interview.

‘transformative’ rather than ‘trans-national’ character that defines the logic of emancipation. Secondly and consequently, the eventual normative goals of the emancipatory logic are defined and created locally. Therefore, they can neither be imposed by the international or national actors, nor is it sensible to formulate a distinct normative agenda outside of empirical energy contexts.

Emancipation versus other security logics

The emancipatory logic of energy security appears then to be one of the security logics operating in the energy realm and, as such, it shapes and embraces contextual understandings and practice of energy security and might come to the fore of public policy agenda and mainstream debate at various times. It is not to claim, however, that this is either the new dominant logic or the only energy security logic worth paying attention to. Corry questioned the critical security studies project on the grounds that it aims at changing the dominant culture of security instead of identifying a new existing security logic.⁹⁹⁹ The analysis of the energy sphere illustrates that security as emancipation is well present there, although it is one among several competing security logics. The critical security studies criticized the Copenhagen School for reifying the wrong notion of security that does not address the needs of most of the world’s population and argued that security should be seen in terms of emancipation.¹⁰⁰⁰ If anything, the analysis of the three cases shows that security dynamics are highly contextual and complex as diverse security logics compete within the same context. Consequently, just as security does not simply equal the Schmittian logic of exclusion and exception, it cannot be equated only with emancipation. The analysis of energy sphere illustrates a number of points. Firstly, ‘the basic account of security hinging on an emergency threat-defence modality

⁹⁹⁹ Olaf Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification’: Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change,” *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 40, no. 2 (2012): 240.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

concerned with 'survival' and existential threats'¹⁰⁰¹ is challenged in the energy sphere and indeed there is nothing inevitable about the Schmittian logic of security capturing the essence of security in a universal and timeless sense.¹⁰⁰² Secondly and consequently, if some have argued that it is difficult to employ security in an emancipatory way in the context of societal questions as 'the security formation in this field is a conservative one with strong roots in a 'vulgarised' Hobbesian version of the human condition',¹⁰⁰³ energy realm shows that it is not always the case, as emancipatory energy practices both derive from socio-economic contexts and have further transformative effects on them. For these reasons, more attention should be paid to the specific local dynamics when determining what security logics guide them.

In the broader terms, the above findings strongly confirmed the need for the contextualization of security analysis. As Trombetta pointed out: 'A de-contextualized, self-referential approach to security underestimates two aspects: first, different contexts can have different logics and practices of security; (...) Second, the logic of security itself can change, as new principles, actors, capabilities and threats gain relevance and different security discourses emerge'.¹⁰⁰⁴ The analysis of energy security field indeed, in line with Trombetta's argument, showed the multiplication of actors and interacting security logics, which manifested to a different degree in different contexts. However, the adoption of a highly contextualized approach had even more profound implications than Trombetta would imply. Namely, the analysis illustrated that the very energy security logics are *contextual*. This means that firstly, the same triggers will not invoke the same logics across different contexts, and what is seen as a security issue in one domestic setting could be not perceived as such in another – even in relation to the same development, threat or risk. Secondly, not only new threats and discourses

¹⁰⁰¹ Corry, "Securitisation and 'riskification,'" 240.

¹⁰⁰² McDonald, *Security, the Environment and Emancipation*, 36.

¹⁰⁰³ Jef Huysmans, "Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 1 (2002): 60.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Maria Julia Trombetta, "Rethinking the Securitization of Environment: Old Beliefs, New Insights," in *Understanding Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (Routledge, 2010), 142.

transform security logics, but the same security logic might mutate, play out differently and have diverse normative and policy implications depending on the context. The energy security logic of emancipation illustrated that point – as although it was present to the highest degree in the German context, its transformative character was exhibited in the national settings of the post-Soviet space.

THE ENERGY SECURITY LOGICS REVISITED

The table below summarizes four energy security logics that were identified across the analyzed cases (See Table 2). The first three logics (the logic of war, the logic of subsistence and the risk logic) have been conceptualized in the first chapter based on the two typologies reviewed,¹⁰⁰⁵ whereas the fourth logic - the logic of emancipation, was detected to different degrees in all contexts under investigation.

In general terms, the analytical blueprint from which the thesis departed greatly aided in the systematic analysis of the three empirical contexts. The German, Polish and Ukrainian cases showed complex dynamics of contextual logics of energy security that differed in their underlying rationale, rhetoric invoked, an aspect of control in relation to energy security, policy actions that followed and the main manifestation of the logic. Based on the distinctive features of the three logics, the study was able to uncover the logic of emancipation in the energy sector, as it clearly differed from the other *a priori* conceptualized propositions across all of the above reference points.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification’”; Felix Ciută, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?,” *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 2 (2010): 123–144.

Table 2: Energy security logics – rethinking the typology

	Underlying rationale	Rhetoric	Control	Action	Manifestation	Nature of security	Value of security
Logic of war	Survival	Grammar of conflict	Centralized	Policy moves above ‘normal politics’	‘Zero-sum’ energy game	Absence of war/ winning the war	Exclusive negative
Logic of subsistence	Sustenance	Utility of trade-offs	Unequally shared among stakeholders	Hierarchizing energy security dimensions	Establishment of energy security priorities	Fulfilment of needs	Exclusive positive
Risk logic	Prevention	Calculation & precaution	Lack of control/ attempting control	Strategies for alleviating risk	Precautionary measures in place	Manageability of risk	Inclusive negative
Logic of emancipation	Self-reliance	Empowerment & liberation	Diffused	Reflexive practice of energy production	‘Energy democracy’	Self-made safety	Inclusive positive

Therefore, whereas the logic of war was underpinned by the ‘survival’ rationale, which was replaced by ‘sustenance’ in the logic of subsistence, and ‘prevention’ in the risk logic, the primary drive behind the logic of emancipation is that of ‘self-reliance’. This shift happens through regaining control over one’s own energy affairs by the local actors. Hence, if the logic of war was mainly concerned with control over globally diminishing energy resources and the subsistence logic implied that multiple actors aim to control diverse aspects of widely defined energy security, the control within the logic of emancipation becomes diffused. It could be said that within the logic of emancipation control collapses, but only at the level of the state and energy monopolies, as it is gradually dispersed and regained at the level of individual actors, who become responsible for their own energy security. Their practices of energy production and consumption that happen in a circular manner imply that energy security is ultimately

becoming a ‘self-made safety’. It is also of a reflexive nature, as since prosumers become secure due to their own energy practice, the distinction between threatening actors and referent objects of security becomes blurred – similarly to the risk logic. However, in the risk logic ‘energy’ becomes a ‘security’ issue due to our own actions in a negative sense of the process, due to man-made hazards, such as the construction of nuclear energy power plants or terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure. Such hazards imply that every individual actor within a given context is vulnerable to them, which points to the inclusive character of contemporary global risks. On the other hand, in the logic of emancipation ‘energy’ becomes a ‘security’ issue due to our own actions – in a positive sense of the process. Here, favorable contextual factors coupled with the agency of energy prosumers lead to energy security that is conceptualized and manifested in the inclusive, positive and not threat- or risk-dependent way. The entire process is accompanied by the rhetoric of empowerment and social liberation and the ultimate empirical manifestation of the logic of emancipation is the gradual democratization of the energy sphere.

The analysis of the empirical cases also highlighted the differences in security mechanisms through which different logics of energy security come about. The logics of subsistence and emancipation appeared to operate and emerge via incremental processes within domestic sites of contestation and as such to be often ‘intertwined’ at various points. The subsistence logic was then a dominant logic focused on the economic factors, where different dimensions, understandings and interests of energy security were continuously re-negotiated. The analysis revealed that a shift in its typical hierarchies and prioritization of the environmental aspect of energy security set a favorable ground for the emancipatory logic to rise. The latter could emerge via gradual democratization of the energy sphere that depended on the interplay of the bottom-up citizens’ initiatives in the domestic contexts and the promoted ‘green’ agenda of the transnational networks of actors.

On the contrary, the logics of war and risk appeared to ‘rise and fall’ often triggered

by important developments in the regional or global energy sector. The logic of war would resemble here the mechanism of ‘securitization’ albeit in the way described by Guzzini, as it was often ‘contingent in its prompting or indeterminate in its effect’ and highly dependent upon history and ‘circles of recognition’ for the collective identities of a country¹⁰⁰⁶ (distal context). It was therefore the congruence of factors that could bring this logic into play – in a non-linear process, often marked by multiple centres of legitimacy (e.g. media versus political elite versus civic organizations), and followed by diverse outcomes (e.g. rhetoric only in the case of Germany, or ‘grammar of conflict’ followed by urgent policy moves in the case of Poland). The same could be said about the mechanism that generated the risk logic across different empirical contexts. If Corry described the mechanism of ‘riskification’ as ‘a construction of conditions of possibility of harm (risk) to a governance-object’ that would lead to the ‘legitimation of precautionary measures’,¹⁰⁰⁷ then elements of this mechanism could be detected in the empirical cases studied. However, similarly here, ‘riskification’ followed a non-linear trajectory with multiple voices and non-determined ‘performative’ effects – as they often involved only the rhetoric of precaution. The analysis also strongly indicated that the mechanism of ‘riskification’ was more likely to play out in its full spectrum if it reflected the totality of risks in the energy sector – more in line with Ciută’s total security logic and Becksian risk society dynamics.

In general terms, it should be noted that although a congruence of factors might periodically bring certain energy security logics to the mainstream policy agenda in the conducive contexts (e.g. war logic in Poland or risk logic in Germany), the given logic often operates to some degree in the background and rarely completely disappears from the ‘radar’. The empirical analysis also suggests that despite a number of elements of the respective security logics at play, their impact varies – and often does not lead to permanent or tangible outcomes. The next section scrutinizes in greater detail the occurrence patterns of all four logics of energy

¹⁰⁰⁶ Stefano Guzzini, “Securitization as a Causal Mechanism,” *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (2011): 5.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Corry, “Securitisation and ‘riskification,’” 247.

security across the cases.

The energy security logics in empirical contexts: a cross-case comparison

Based on the intensity of their occurrence in the rhetoric and practice, Table 3 juxtaposes all energy security logics uncovered in the three empirical cases. The degree to which each logic manifests across energy contexts illustrates certain interdependencies between the logics as well as some patterns that have both analytical and policy implications.

Table 3: Occurrence of energy security logics across the analyzed cases

	Logic of war	Logic of subsistence	Risk logic	Emancipatory logic
Germany	Low	High	High	High
Poland	High	High	Medium	Medium
Ukraine	High	High	Low	Low

To start with, as the logic of war implies division and confrontation and manifests itself through the ‘grammar of conflict’ and ‘survival’ policy mode that usually involves some sort of an ‘external adversary’, not surprisingly, in the European context this logic was often triggered by the crises related to the gas supplies from Russia. The analysis of the three cases illustrated that once triggered, the war logic has a tendency to periodically dominate and overshadow other security logics – most commonly the logic of subsistence. When that happens the sustenance is replaced by the survival rationale as the economic considerations are put to the second plan and zero-sum thinking dominates the immediate policy agenda. The Polish context was a case in point here, where in the aftermath of the Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006, its domestic energy policy was criticized for the ‘ideologized’ character – with economic agenda

and opinion of energy experts being put to the second plan and with politicians deciding on alternative energy supply routes in a way that resembled ‘country war defence preparations’.¹⁰⁰⁸ Due to contextual factors this logic also manifested strongly in Ukraine, but was of marginal significance in Germany – where despite strong ‘grammar of conflict’ expressed across media outlets in the aftermath of the gas cut-off episodes, neither significant attempts at diversification of supply occurred nor did the perception of Russia as a reliable supplier changed. The detailed analysis of the German case showed that the intersubjective dynamics of distal factors (historical and socio-economic) and a traditional constellation of actors (that gives leverage to energy businesses) are not conducive to the logic of war. The German response to the gas crises was therefore a matter of perceptions and ‘business as usual’ conducted by energy companies in the area of the country’s pipeline politics. From the analytical point of view, it could be said that – as the earlier discussion already indicated – although the war logic competes with other logics it does not ‘intertwine’ with them as closely as, for example, subsistence and emancipatory logics do in the energy sphere, but rather rises and falls periodically. The Ukrainian case was a certain exception here, as the ‘grammar of conflict’ became entrenched in the mainstream debate on the Ukrainian energy security.

Not surprisingly, the sustenance rationale that underpins the subsistence logic, which oscillates mainly around economic dimensions of energy security – was highly visible in all contexts studied. The analysis of the domestic sites of contestation illustrated that the hierarchizations of different energy security aspects tend to push towards two opposite directions – either emphasizing economic growth fueled by energy consumption or highlighting a broader humanistic approach to energy security and environmental agenda. These competing trends were visible in the mainstream debates, official documents and as expressed by actors on the ground during the interviews. Particularly the analysis of the German and Polish contexts

¹⁰⁰⁸ Stanisław Bieleń, “Deficyt Realizmu W Polskiej Polityce Zagranicznej,” *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, no. 3/4 (t. 38) (2008): 9–29; Adam Grzeszak and Marek Ostrowski, “Taniec Na Rurach,” *Polityka*, 2006.

suggested that once a typical hierarchy of energy security priorities reverses, giving more weight to ‘sustainable’ goals as opposed to the basic economic orientation, the entire frame of the energy security debate changes. Moreover, such shift sets a favorable ground for the emancipatory logic to emerge in the energy sphere – although the contextual manifestations of the logic vary.

The three empirical contexts displayed different mutations and degrees of the emancipatory logic in their domestic energy spheres. As such, each case aided in the logic’s conceptualization by providing diverse empirical insights to the analysis. Firstly, the German case manifested a high degree of the emancipatory logic that was present both in the rhetoric of social empowerment/liberation from energy monopolies and in the energy practice of the local citizens’ energy initiatives. The German context illustrated then the multi-layered dynamics of the high emancipatory logic in the energy sector. Secondly, the logic manifested primarily in the rhetoric of the ‘green’ NGOs and activists in Poland – albeit civic energy initiatives have been steadily growing there. The Polish context also demonstrated how the emancipatory logic has the power to transform not only the local energy system, but also the entire socio-economic model via shifting the agency to the individual actors in the post-Soviet states with a traditionally centralized political authority. Although such hopes were voiced much more prominently in Poland than in Ukraine, the Ukrainian energy context - with its gradual attitude changes among the younger generation and emerging local energy initiatives - could become more prone to the emancipatory agenda in the future. Crucially, the Ukrainian case also aided in the conceptualization of the logic by highlighting a number of technical and socio-historical obstacles to its development, and as such by pointing to the conditions that must be in place for the emancipatory logic to emerge in the energy sector.

Some counter-intuitive findings also proved the purchase of the contextual approach to energy security analysis – as some expected security logics were not reflected in the empirical

material whereas others appeared to be operative instead. The Ukrainian context might serve as an example of the former, as despite the legacy of the Chernobyl disaster, the risk logic appeared to be nearly non-existent in relation to the Ukrainian nuclear energy policy and debate. The detailed analysis of the Ukrainian case illustrated that the combination of distal factors - historically determined perceptions of Russia that shift the focus towards domestic energy resources and specific socialization process that results in societal disengagement (feeling of powerlessness) - combined with the typical constellation of actors (big industry lobbyists and centralized decision-making) largely explain this phenomenon. On the other hand, the Polish context – with its commonly perceived conservatism in the area of energy solutions – manifested a significant degree of the emancipatory agenda – both in the rhetoric used and in the emerging practice of the local bottom-up initiatives. Such findings highlight the analytical advantages of utilizing a contextual approach and illustrate how the latter makes it worthwhile to analyze even the ‘obvious’ cases.

Table 3 also points to certain patterns in the security logics’ occurrence – suggesting that some logics are closely related not only in the theoretical, but also empirical terms. Firstly, high energy security logic of war and high logic of emancipation do not seem to operate in the same contexts within the same time frame. Secondly, the level of intensity of the risk and emancipatory logics seem to correlate within the same domestic settings closely. In general terms, whereas the risk logic manifested only partially in Poland (rhetoric in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident) and was largely absent in Ukraine, in Germany it followed what could be seen as a full mechanism of ‘riskification’. Namely, the rationale of prevention was taken to the extreme in the post-Fukushima context and – reflecting the totality of risks in the global energy system – led to the policy change as a strategy for risk alleviation. The accelerated nuclear phase-out could be then clearly seen through the prism of the manageability of risks. The way in which the risk logic played out also gave an additional push to the German transition

to renewable energy and to the gradual diffusion of the centralized energy system.

The close correlation between the degrees of the risk and emancipatory logics' occurrence across contexts might suggest that the logic of emancipation appears to be 'growing out' of contexts where the rationale of prevention plays an important role. The fact that both logics embrace a variety of actors – individuals included, seems to be crucial here, as it is the individual local actors who are directly affected and who are motivated to ultimately bring about the systemic change from within. In a way such progression from the risk to emancipatory logic resembles Ulrich Beck's argument about the possibilities of 'ecological enlightenment'.¹⁰⁰⁹

Beck argued that: “The exposure of scientific uncertainty is the liberation of politics, law and the public sphere from their patronization by technocracy”, as in the risk societies “new” social movements, which do not obey the traditional state or class boundaries will challenge the prevailing techno-economic order and emancipate humanity from its grip.¹⁰¹⁰ Beck believed that unavoidable catastrophes that occur in contemporary societies would – with the help of the “sensationalist greed of the mass media” - expose the hazardous nature of the contemporary techno-economic order and lead the social movements to challenge it.¹⁰¹¹ He called such a far-reaching transformation ‘ecological enlightenment’ – an emancipatory project aimed at the democratization of society that should be fought out at both the micro and macro levels.¹⁰¹² Such radical democratization could be achieved by: firstly, realization on the part of the society that the current governmental structures are losing their power as diverse monopolies are breaking-up and the societal transformation changes the role, scope, and institutional expression of politics;¹⁰¹³ and secondly, democratization of the techno-economic

¹⁰⁰⁹ Ulrich Beck, “From Industrial Society to the Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and Ecological Enlightenment,” *Theory, Culture and Society* 9, no. 1 (1992): 97–123.

¹⁰¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 109.

¹⁰¹¹ *Ibid.*, 116.

¹⁰¹² *Ibid.*, 118.

¹⁰¹³ Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992), 232; Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 82.

development that would empower societal actors so that they no longer depend on the judgement of experts.¹⁰¹⁴

The emancipatory logic that manifests in the three cases studied does not go as far as Beck's argument, yet it closely follows the aims of the above trajectory – especially in the German context. Firstly, it is the social movements or local citizens' initiatives that (often accompanied by the vivid media debate) bring about the change – starting mostly from the micro level. Secondly, local practices that contribute to the diffusion of energy systems aim, more or less explicitly, at the democratization of the society in the energy sphere and at empowering the so far marginalized groups. Thirdly, the whole process leads to the dismantling of energy monopolies, but to some extent also political monopoly over energy policy course – which in turn becomes more diversified and embraces a wider set of actors. Moreover, promotion of energy efficiency measures and renewables often involves the efforts of the local 'green' actors' to educate the society about the consequences of the shift. As a number of interviewees stated, these efforts have in mind to change the way in which we produce, but also think about energy security. In the process, and in line with Beck's argument, society gradually becomes less reliant on the judgment of experts as it regains control over its energy production and consumption.

Having said that, although in Germany the shift to renewables and rise of the emancipatory logic could be related to going away from the 'risks of nuclear energy', it is not necessarily the case in other contexts. Although green actors promoting renewable energy solutions in Poland or Ukraine tend to be anti-nuclear, the emancipatory agenda in these contexts is often 'imported' or 'spills over' from other locations – and has different domestic implications. The analysis showed that there exist strong links between green energy and environmental activists from Germany, Poland and Ukraine – with the former sharing their

¹⁰¹⁴ Beck, *Risk Society*, 228–31.

experiences of ‘Energiewende’ on a regular basis. Through workshops, conferences open to the public or translation of the German publications, progressive ideas reach a wider audience in the CEE region and influence the developing debate on alternative approaches to energy security that is taking place among the Polish and (to a lesser degree) Ukrainian green energy circles.¹⁰¹⁵ The existence of the transnational networks of ‘green’ actors is in line with what Beck would say about the “new” movements that are not confined to state borders. These transnational networks surely influence domestic constellations of actors. However, it is the combination of such constellations and the distal factors that ultimately determine the degree to which the emancipatory logic can manifest in a given context and what form it can take. Therefore, although a cross-case comparison suggests a pattern of its gradual demise – from high in Germany, through medium in Poland to a low one in Ukraine – the logic mutates and has diverse normative and policy implications in different energy contexts. Despite its cosmopolitan character it is fully fledged in Germany, but present mostly in the rhetoric and slowly emerging bottom-up citizens’ energy initiatives in Poland and Ukraine. From the analytical point of view, the analysis of the three contexts indicates that the higher the risk logic in the domestic setting in relation to the ‘total’ risks of nuclear energy, the stronger the correlation between the risk and emancipatory logics’ empirical occurrence.

CONCLUSION

Implications for critical security studies & energy policy agenda

To conclude, the research conducted showed that security is indeed a contextual phenomenon and that one-fits-all frameworks and approaches cannot grasp its empirical scope and complexity. The contextual analysis of the German, Polish and Ukrainian cases revealed a complex dynamics of security issues’ construction. The uncovered energy security logics

¹⁰¹⁵ And this influence is often strengthened by the western financial and technical support for the local NGOs.

proved to be driven by the diverse underlying rationales, employ different rhetoric and policy means, permeate all levels of actors, and manifest and interact differently depending on the specifics of the contexts within which they operate. The analysis also illustrated that different logics come about via different security mechanisms - either triggered by key developments in the energy sphere or through the incremental processes that mark domestic sites of contestation.

As such, the thesis not only illustrated that the realist logic is only one of the security logics at play - and that there is nothing certain about its dominant position or endurance, but in the process uncovered the ‘transformative’ logic of emancipation to be operative across different energy contexts. The discovery of the energy security logic of emancipation brought a number of important analytical and empirical insights. Firstly, detecting an additional security logic in the energy sector challenged both the theoretical frameworks based on a single logic approach and some existing typologies of the security logics/grammars. Secondly, it provided new analytical insights and conceptual clarity to the conventional energy studies, which remain focused on the state level technocratic energy policy. Thirdly, the analysis recognized that - given the uniqueness of the energy security field - similarly the logic of emancipation in the energy sector exhibits uncommon characteristics, which led to an alternative conceptualization of this logic against the existing literature on emancipation. Subsequently, the argument elaborated how the ‘transformative’ energy security logic of emancipation deviates from the critical security studies approach, immanent critique as well as from the emancipation/desecuritization argument.

From the empirical point of view, the emerging emancipatory agenda across different energy contexts proved to have important normative and policy implications. The analysis scrutinized the emerging bottom-up democratization processes in the local energy sectors – with all their triggers, obstacles and potential for further development. An in-depth study of the variety of actors and interests that operate within specific historical, political and socio-

economic backgrounds, pointed to the practices that work on the ground level. As such, it aided in the understanding how to build concrete agendas and local policy strategies for the development of citizens' energy initiatives in different national settings. The policy insights gained could be then crucial for the effective promotion of renewables and energy efficiency measures in line with the EU climate protection goals across the CEE region. In broader terms the analysis of the diverse security logics driving local gas politics and nuclear energy programs additionally unpacked in detail the significant historical and socio-economic factors that influence them and that favor certain actors, interests and policy solutions, while hindering others. Grasping this nuanced picture could be equally helpful while trying to enhance mutual understanding or forge successful co-operation across these issue areas in the region.

The theoretical and policy contributions aside, this thesis tackled the shifting contextual understandings of the phenomenon of energy security. As we moved away from the state-centric logic of war, through the complex contestation processes within the logic of subsistence, and the totality of global risks towards the logic of emancipation – not only the possibility of technical re-design and diffusion of the centralized energy systems emerged, but the very transformation of the meaning of energy security. The analysis of the three energy contexts showed how among the competing rationales of survival, sustenance and prevention, that of self-reliance gradually appears. Consequently, the rhetoric no longer resembled conflictual power struggles, utility of trade-offs or calculation and precaution in the face of the possibilities of harm, but transformed into the calls for empowerment and liberation. Such shift implied the transfer of agency towards individual users and retaking control over their own energy security that started to be conceived of in the positive and inclusive terms. As we moved down from the 'anarchy' of international players competing over depleting fossil fuels, through the changing hierarchies within the logic of subsistence to the lateral power of the bottom-up civic energy movements, we simultaneously shifted from the 'we versus others' towards 'security among

equals'. This shift – although one among many possibilities and logics – has potentially far-reaching consequences not only for the energy security agenda, but through the decentralization of energy systems and gradual diffusion of power and control, for the multi-layered dynamics of the entire political and socio-economic models.

It could be said in conclusion that, at the very least, the emergence of the energy security logic of emancipation shows that the reality often escapes the determinism and pessimism of the mainstream theoretical approaches to security and that indeed “...far from constituting an unrealizable, utopian vision, emancipation is... articulated and practiced in the everyday of world politics”.¹⁰¹⁶ Although the sphere of energy security constitutes only one of the security areas, its cross-sectoral character implies that the energy security logics not only frequently reflect our reasoning about security more broadly, but can also influence and transform it further – with all its far-reaching consequences for the domestic empirical contexts.

¹⁰¹⁶ McDonald, *Security, the Environment and Emancipation*, 55.

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