SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA AND TURKEY: A COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

By

Ezgi Türker

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Matthijs Bogaards

Budapest, Hungary

June 2017

Abstract

In the social science literature, as a commonly accepted definition, the state is referred to as 'the monopoly of legitimate use of coercive power'. The scope and extent of coercion by the state has been researched extensively as part of the 'capacities of the state'. Yet, the interplay between state and civil society with respect to political violence is overlooked. Citizen-on-citizen political violence is the subject of this thesis.

I conduct a cross-regional paired comparison between Guatemala and Turkey in terms of citizen-led political violence in order to delve into the puzzle of persistent political violence in Turkey, despite the strong state. I argue that the characteristics of the culture of violence attributed to post-conflict societies are found in Turkey on the societal level. On the state level, I argue that the Turkish state compensates its weakness in civil society relations by relying on citizen-led political violence, whereas in Guatemala political violence is the result of both weakness of the state and the culture of violence. In order to establish my argument, firstly I assess the strengths of the two states by utilizing databases of Worldbank, World Values Survey and Latinobarometer. Then, I scrutinize the reports of local and international human rights organizations. As a conclusion, I find that the sociological approach to the culture of violence has explanatory power in explaining citizen-led political violence in Turkey.

Keywords: state capacity, culture of violence, political violence, Turkey, Guatemala

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

List of Abbreviations

AKP – *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* **(***Justice and Development Party)*

AP- *Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)*

CEH- *La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (Commission for Historical Clarification)*

CICIG- *Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala)*

FRG- *Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (Guatemalan Republican Front)*

IHD- *İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Associaton)*

MINUGUA- *Misión de las Naciones Unidas para Guatemala (United National Mission for Guatemala)*

PAC- *Patrullas de Autodefensas Civil*

PKK – *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* **(***Kurdish Worker's Party)*

RPP- *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)*

TIHV- *Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfi (Foundation for Human Rights in Turkey)*

URNG- *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Revolutionary National Guatemalan Union)*

Introduction

In the social sciences literature, as a commonly accepted definition, the state is referred to as 'the monopoly of legitimate use of coercive power'. The scope and extent of state coercion by the state has been researched extensively as part of 'capacities of the state'. State-led violence is analyzed and discussed under this framework. Following that, the weak, failed or collapsed states are considered to be prone to political violence in the forms of insurgencies, terrorism or guerilla activities, as well as citizen-led political violence since they do not have sufficient capacities for preventing atrocities through their coercive capacities in addition to the administrative, distributive and infrastructural capacities. Yet, the interplay between the state and civil society with respect to political violence is overlooked. This thesis addresses this problem by looking into citizen-led political violence in Guatemala and Turkey.

The lack of state capacity is considered to be one of the major reasons for a continuum of violence in several Latin American countries (Koonings and Kruijt 2004). The colonial past had created conditions that resulted in uneven distribution at the beginning of the state building process. "War making", which enabled "state making" in European states (Tilly 1985), did not work in the Latin American context. Most of the countries in Latin America suffered from intra-state conflicts such as insurgencies combined with increased organized crime, narco-trafficking and gang violence. Thus, the state-building process was not with external pressures of interstate wars as in the European context, but rather different mechanisms were at stake. In addition, the colonial past of the Latin America and Caribbean region has a significant influence on the state building process.

The structural roots of inequalities in the Americas, which pave the way to persistent levels of violence, can be traced back to colonial times. For instance, in Guatemala, the indigenous population of a variety ethnicities has been systematically discriminated by the Ladinos, who

have maintained power since the Spanish occupation by co-opting with the elites. Guatemala is not unique in terms of structural inequalities and issues related to these. The region has been described as having the most social, economic and political inequalities for decades. Related to these issues, these states have records of the worst crime and homicide rates in the world. Given these, in the Latin American context, especially Central American countries are considered to be weak if not failed. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have significantly low human rights records with a track of high crime rights. Considering the route of the drugs trade, these countries suffer from organized violence combined with corruption.

The factors leading towards failed or weak states also result in ineffective policies in the fight against criminal and political violence in the region, which leads to poor human rights records (Englehart 2009). The literature describes the measurements and explanations of weak or failed states in relation to violence and criminal records for region. Scholars argue that the states' inability to provide security and corruption perpetuates the existing weak state institutions despite capacity building efforts (Cárdenas 2010; Englehart 2009; Hendrix 2010; Richani 2010; Soifer 2012).

Despite different historical conjunctures and state capacities, Guatemala and Turkey experience similar atrocities. Being part of the Central American region, Guatemala suffers from a persistently weak state; plagued with corruption, incapable governments in policy implementation, poor human development scores, and severe political and social inequalities. In Guatemala, persistent violence is mostly attributed to the weak institutions and the legacies of the civil war that took place for forty years, which left traces on the society by creating a realm of violence. In Turkey, political violence cannot be contextualized in the same way in Guatemalan case since it is considered to be a 'strong state'. Despite the fact that Turkey also has issues and problems with respect to state capacity such as levels of corruption, politicization of the state institutions, and periods of political instability and terrorism, and insurgent actions

by Kurdish actors; Turkey is regarded as 'a strong state' with strong centralized administration and bureaucracy, high rates of economic growth and the state's ability to deliver political goods such as public health and education. The Kurdish conflict has been contained in the southeastern part of Turkey in the form of low-intensity internal conflict. Thus, it is puzzling that forms of citizen-led political violence found in Guatemala exist in Turkey. Hence, my research questions follow as: Why does the state's capacity to coerce co-exist with political violence by non-state actors? If the state capacity is able to explain the underlying causes of political violence, why do countries from two different regions with different state capacities experience similar forms of violence? What are the underlying causes of political violence in a strong state such as Turkey? These questions are delved into by relying on structural explanations. The hypotheses are established and analyzed are the following:

Hypothesis 1: The Turkish state is stronger in terms of the coercive, fiscal and societal dimensions of state capacity than the Guatemalan state.

Hypothesis 2: State strength is not necessarily a determinant of political violence.

Hypothesis 3: Turkey contains 'the culture of violence' which is attributed to post-conflict societies, although it did not experience a massive internal conflict.

My research design is based on Guatemala being the typical, while Turkey being the deviant case. By establishing a cross-regional paired comparative design, I analyze the causal mechanisms for understanding citizen-led violence in Turkey. By pairing the state capacities of two countries, I use the 'most-different-systems' basis of comparative research in order to understand how different state capacities leading towards a similar culture of violence. In line with my theoretical framework, I assess the state strengths of two countries based on the datasets of the Fragile States Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Development Indicators, World Values Survey and Latinobarometer in order to prove their strength or

weakness. I have grouped state capacity features under three dimensions: security, fiscal and societal dimensions. The security dimension entails the coercive and administrative/bureaucratic capacities. The fiscal dimension allows to assess and compare the extractive and distributive capacities of the two countries. Lastly, the societal dimension is related to what Mann (1984) refers to as the "infrastructural power" of the state, which is states' ability to penetrate society by providing social control, and preventing grievances and fostering tolerance.

In order to demonstrate the culture of violence in Turkey, I adopt the method of content analysis, analyzing newspapers, reports of NGOs, the United Nations and European Union. For the Guatemalan case, I utilize the reports of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Historical Clarification Commission, International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. For Turkey, in addition to these, I rely on reports and statements of the Human Rights Association, and progress reports of the European Council, which are released for the Turkey's European Union accession process of Turkey. Firstly, these report are to be analyzed for identifying the similarities in the two cases in terms of citizen-led political violence. Next, all of these sources will be analyzed to find aspects and patterns of the culture of violence can be observed in the countries day to day political violence.

I argue that, in order to understand citizen-led violence in Turkey, it is necessary to look into effects of state violence and terror. In the Guatemalan context, it is argued that the legacies of civil war and state violence altered the social fabric of society (Godoy 2006) which created a society with "the culture of violence" (Steenkamp, 2014). This term is mostly referred for post-conflict societies in which violence had left its mark on society. Major characteristics are indifference to or even tolerance of violence, reliance on violent measures and constant a feeling of insecurity and fear (Koonings and Kruijt 1999). I argue that, although Turkey did not

experience a civil war, or internal conflict *en masse*, the same way as Guatemala did, it shows the characteristics of the culture of violence and the state utilizes this culture of violence in order to compensate for its weakness in state-society relations.

Chapter 1.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

1.1. Theoretical framework

In the contemporary world, states are the entities that are responsible for delivering certain goods to citizens. In a normative sense, citizens and the state have a contractual relationship by which they agree bilaterally to comply with certain duties and responsibilities. States secure the livelihood of the citizens in return for compliance and obedience from the citizens. The most important duty of the state is to secure its own people (Rotberg 2003). On the other hand, citizens are required to obey the rules and regulations drawn by the legal framework of the state, in addition to the informal rules set by the norms and traditions of society.

The persistent issues such as sociopolitical conflict, poverty, and social and political inequalities reveal that the states are not functioning in the ideal way portrayed above. The international peace that was aimed by supranational and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations was partially achieved, as the interstate wars have been decreasing substantially after 1945. Interstate wars that have devastated unaccountable amount of lives is less common since then. It is replaced by "a third kind of war", which includes genocides, politicides, civil wars and ethnic conflicts (Holsti 1996). Internal conflicts are more prevalent now than previous times (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 563). This new form of conflict involves civilians as well as conventional state forces such as the military. It has become harder to "differentiate combatants and civilians" (Holsti 1996, 40). In the period between 1945 and 2007, there are 248 intra-state wars including civil wars, regional internal wars and communal wars with thousands of casualties, according to the Correlates of War dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). These indicate that not all states are able to provide their citizens with security, which leads us to the literature on the distinction between the weak, failed and collapsed states,

or rather an encompassing term: fragile states. In fragile states, one or more features of the state such as administration, distribution or provision of security do not function properly, which causes a variety of problems. One of the problems is the propensity for increased violence in terms of internal conflict, civil war, ethnic war, genocide as well as political violence.

There is a vast literature on internal conflict with different perspectives. One perspective searches for relations between economic inequality and conflict (Muller 1985), others focus on the effects of modernization and failure of the institutions to follow up (Huntington 1968). The significant amount of attention is devoted to nationalism and ethnic conflicts under the broader concept of conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In 1990s, with the rise of multiculturalism literature, the focus shifted towards the particularities of the societies in understanding conflicts in general.

A significant part of the theories devoted to internal conflicts relates it to the strength of the state capacity or assumes the relationship. It is argued that strong states with higher capacities are "sites of peace", relatively weaker states are "sites of domestic and international war" (Holsti 1996, 172). Hence, the stronger a state becomes, the lesser the insecurity that is related to conflict (Krakowski 2016, 97). The literature also supports the idea that the weaker a state is, the more political violence by non-state actors emerges compared to stronger states (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Kalyvas 2009; Sambanis 2004). The theories of political violence have different focuses in accounting for the causes. The states' ability to make "use of their authority to reallocate and deploy resources" is considered to be a preventive mechanism for potential political violence (Gurr 1991, 157).

There are different levels to study violence (Conteh-Morgan 2004, 9). The scholars from the discipline of psychology focuses on the micro level explanations by focusing on individuals, whereas the social sciences of sociology and political science focus more on macro level

explanations, by broadening the scope. Macro level explanations vary from exploring causes and effects of civil war to symbolic violence that prevails in everyday life. Study of violence also depends on the research interest. The research might focus on state violence such as revolutions, civil wars, genocides and internal conflicts, or it might delve into society based violence, insurgencies, terrorism or civilian violence. Yet, it is hard to demarcate the state and societal level explanation and as Conteh-Morgan underlines, it is more fruitful to consider political violence as "the result of multiple causation, or the combined effects of individual, social- structural, and global systemic factors" (Conteh-Morgan 2004, 9). Thus, different levels of analysis interact with each other since the levels are not isolated from each other. The Table 1 succinctly describes the explanations of political violence in the literature.

Table 1 Explanations of Political Violence

Variables	*Structural explanations*	*Conjunctural explanations*
Economic	Economic inequalities	Intermediate steps in economic growth
Social	Social cleavages	Rapid modernization
Political	Authoritarian regimes	Crisis of repressive apparatus
Cultural	Tradition of violent conflict	Rapid changes in the value system

Source: Della Porta (2005)

The literature on the relationship between state capacity and political violence is more concentrated on the correlational relation rather than delving into the dynamics perpetuating political violence. As Krakowski points out by the deviant case of Colombia, this line of research has a substantial amount of cases that could not be explained (Krakowski 2016, 98).

He argues that the state weakness argument is not sufficient to explain the continuum of political violence in Colombia since the coercive capacity of the state is not homogenous and unitary. It involves paramilitary forces and other non-state organizations, which he refers to as "the extra-ordinary violent capacity", which in fact perpetuates political violence, although it contributes to the coercive capacity of the state overall (Krakowski 2016, 110). Hence, for the weak states, it can be argued that the state capacity does not determine political violence on its own.

In order to understand the dynamics and mechanisms causing citizen-led political violence, I include the societal level in the analysis of political violence to this theoretical framework. I argue that the strength of the state and state capacities cannot account for political violence on its own and a sociological approach is needed. For that reason, I adopt Migdal's (1988) *state-in-society approach*, which diverts from state-centric approach by highlighting the interplay between the state and society. The main point of disagreement is of state-centric approaches' tendency to underestimate the diversity and differences within the state and society (Migdal 1994).

According to this approach, the state autonomy and state capacity is defined in terms of the capabilities of the state, which is constituted by the capabilities of the state "to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways" (Migdal 1988). Migdal embraces Mann's understanding of state capacity with regard to relations with society. Mann (1984), underlines the penetration society under the concept of "infrastructural capacity", which is defined as "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm" (Mann 1984, 54). These capabilities are the factors that determine whether the state is strong or weak in policy creation and implementation. In line with the state-in-society approach, these capabilities are not only dependent on the states or decision-makers of the states but there is a

"mutually transforming quality of state-society relations" (Migdal, Kohli, and Shue 1994, 1). Hence, the relations between the state and society is emphasized.

The importance of the approach derives from the fact that focusing solely on the weakness of the state does not capture the overall picture. On the societal level, citizens also participate and contribute to the spheres of violence. This is what has been referred to as "the dark side of civil society" (Koonings and Kruijt 2004) or "the culture of violence" [1] (Steenkamp 2014). In this thesis, I prefer to use the latter.

By diverting from rationalist and instrumentalist explanations of violence and conflict, the term of culture of violence underlines the extension of state violence towards society. In societies where violence is unusually common and resilient, as Waldmann puts forward, "culture can explain the use of political violence" (Waldmann 2007, 593). Steenkamp articulates on the main premise of "the culture of violence" as societies who are exposed to extreme state violence or to a massive internal conflict show characteristics different than the societies with no such exposure (Steenkamp 2005, 253). In these societies, violence becomes part of societal life as an accepted norm and action by resulting in "a socially permissive environment within which violence can continue" (Steenkamp, 2005). In other words, this new culture perpetuates violence by infiltrating the ways individuals deal with their daily issues and problems. The

[1] In the literature, the concept of 'the culture of violence' has two resonations[1]. The literature on the Southern region of America focuses on the racial dimensions in addition to cultural attributes belonging to Southerners (I. Evans 2009; Gastil 1971; Lee et al. 2007). Violence analyzed in this part of the literature is concentrated on criminal, homicidal or forms of mob violence or lynchings (I. Evans 2009), which is referred to "a regional culture of violence" (Gastil 1971). The second part focuses on the emerging violence in post-conflict societies and the legacies of state violence or state terror in the forms of genocide, civil war or politicide. This conceptual framework is more relevant and useful for the analysis of political violence in this thesis.

indifference and normalization of violence combined with "tolerance to coercive methods" is widespread within society as previous exposure to violence and conflict leaves its marks on society (Waldmann 2007, 595). The social fabric of society is disrupted (Godoy 2002; Koonings and Kruijt 2004) in a way that it perpetuates and reinforces violence.

It should be noted that the concept of culture of violence does not have the assertion that a society is inherently 'violent' but rather there is a shift in the societal values over time due to the conflict and it endures in the post-conflict period. In other words, "violence becomes banal", (Steenkamp 2014, 117) by means of systematic exposure to state violence and exclusion. Thus, one should analyze the conditions and mechanisms –the effects of state terror or other historical processes- that led to the emergence of a society with these characteristics (Waldmann 2007, 594). For that reason, the cultural characteristics that are attributed to a society do not have any relevance in this sense. As a case in point, Godoy argues that violence that plagues Guatemalan society after the peace accords is irrelevant to Mayan traditions and culture (Godoy 2004). This change in societal norms happens in a predisposing regime in which the rule of law is undermined by weak state capacity.

There are certain characteristics that are related to the culture of violence. First and foremost, the citizens' constant feeling of insecurity and fear is ostensive (Godoy 2006; Koonings and Kruijt 1999, 2004). The persistent violence combined with the state's inability to cope with the atrocities results in "societies of fear" (Koonings and Kruijt 1999). The responsibility of the state to secure its citizens is replaced by self-serving security by the citizens (Godoy 2006). These materialize themselves in the forms of vigilante justice, lynchings and mob violence since the security and the justice system of the state do not serve citizens. They create their own criminal justice system in order to replace the nonexistent state institutions (Godoy 2004, 2006).

Waldman (2007) classifies the features of the culture of violence under three dimensions. Firstly, "structural indicators", which include the multiplicity, intensity and variety of violence. Secondly, "mental indicators" that relate to the collective "enemy" cognition by which the demarcation between 'us' and 'them' is created. Lastly, "lack of taboos and informal sanctions", which is related to impunity as well as normalization of violence (Waldmann 2007, 596–99). In other words, they are relatively more tolerant of violence (Waldmann 2007). Weak state capacities also reinforces the culture of violence by leading towards distrust among the citizens towards the state institutions (Koonings and Kruijt 2004). This facilitates the tolerance of physical coercion.

To conclude with, in this chapter, I summarized theoretical approaches to internal conflicts as well as political violence. With this theoretical framework, I underlined the relationship between state capacity and conflict as described in the literature and I problematized this relationship. I explained a different way of considering political violence with respect to the concept of culture of violence. Although in fragile states, there is more propensity to emergence of a sphere, which enables and reinforces violence, I argued that state capacity does not necessarily determinant of political violence. The relevance of this argument relies on the fact that in the following chapters, I argue that Turkey, as a strong state, compensates its weakness in state-society relations by relying on the features of the culture of violence, which perpetuates citizen-led political violence.

1.2. Conceptual framework

1.2.1. Definition of the state

Scholars do not have a common ground on the definition of the state, yet the Weberian definition of the state is the most often cited definition. According to Weber, "[A] state is a human community that (successfully) claims *the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical*

force within a given territory" (Weber 1991). Thus, states are the only entities holding the "right" to use violence (Weber 1991). Tilly adopts a similar definition. He defines states as "relatively centralized, differentiated organizations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory" (Tilly 1985). Yet, contradictorily, states are also considered to be main arbitrators and causes of human rights abuses (Englehart 2009). As Weber puts forward, the state and violence have an "intimate" relation (Weber 1991). The states' responsibilities and duties are twofold: external and internal. External duties are to protect the territorial boundaries and the inhabitants living within those boundaries. Internal ones are about protecting the state from the internal 'enemies', extracting resources for protection in general (Tilly 1985).

The state is more than its coercive power, but it is also an apparatus with functioning bureaucracy and administration, which is the legal-rational aspect of the state with the working bureaucratic machinery (Weber 1991). The legal aspect of the state is administered by the bureaucratic dimension of the state. The laws and regulations are enforced by the administration, which is required to be different from the executive. Mann (1984) also emphasizes the institutions and staff as part of the states by including them in his definition (Mann, 1984). In addition, by completing the Weberian definition, he contributes "the monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making" as part of the state definition (Mann, 1984). With the rule making and administration, the security and welfare of the citizens are established. A good administration requires resources (Weber 1991).

These definitions lack responsibility of the state, which comes the control or monopoly over violence. States are required to secure its citizens and deliver basic political goods to their citizens. This is especially relevant for the states that have records of civil war, extreme poverty conditions or social and political inequalities. These problems reveal incapacity of the states to

provide basic security to its citizens and functioning redistributive policies. This also constitutes their 'legitimacy' in maintaining their monopoly of physical force, which gives them "the right to rule" (Holsti 1996, 84–98). I define the state as *the sole entity that is responsible for and entitled to provide secure and safe living conditions to all inhabitants in a defined territory*.

1.2.2. Definition of political violence

It is essential to define and demarcate the boundaries of violence since it is a broad and elusive concept. In Kalyvas' words, it is "a conceptual minefield" (Kalyvas 2006, 19). There are different definitions for the concept depending on the discipline. As Della Porta highlights, political violence is a subject that "does not belong to the established, mainstream areas of research" (Della Porta 1995, 2). In order to capture the core of the concept of violence, it can be defined as "violence is the deliberate infliction of harm on people" (Kalyvas 2006, 19). This definition allows to capture different forms of violence with a broader meaning.

Political violence can be framed under social movements (Tarrow 1994), terrorism (Della Porta 2013) or as a form of collective action (Tilly 2003). Della Porta's defines political violence as "the use of physical force in order to damage a political adversary" (Della Porta 1995, 2). This rather broad definition encapsulates violence in different forms that is politically purposive. As Kalyvas (2006) puts forward, the intension of violence can be in different forms of such as "pillage, robbery, vandalism, arson, forcible displacement, kidnapping, hostage taking, detention, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, and desecration of dead bodies (Kalyvas 2006, 20), which also applies to political violence.

For the purpose of this thesis, I adopt Della Porta's definition of political violence. I narrow it to the level of citizen-led political violence, although I do not operate in individual level. By embracing Migdal's state-in-society approach, my analysis is on meso-level, which is the

intermediary level between micro-level and macro-level. I analyze political violence with respect to the interplay between the state and society.

1.2.2. Definition of state capacity

Despite the fact that in conflict related researches scholars rely on the concept of state capacity, the definition of the state capacity does not have a common ground in the literature since it is a difficult concept to define with multiple layers (Cárdenas 2010, 3; Englehart 2009, 167; Hendrix 2010, 273). Depending on the research topic, scholars adopt different definitions and measures (Cárdenas 2010, 274; Hendrix 2010). A significant amount of attention is given in two directions as 'fiscal capacity' and 'legal capacity' (Cárdenas 2010). Some scholars incorporate fiscal capacity by paying more attention to the provision of goods, fiscal capacities and redistributive policies of the states (Cárdenas 2010), others focus on the quality of the governance, the rule of law and the ability to establish the monopoly of coercion against internal and external forces in addition to fiscal capacities (Hendrix 2010, 274; Richani 2010, 436). Some scholars also add the "willingness" of the states to the abilities "to carry out government policy" (Englehart 2009) by highlighting agency of the states.

For the purpose of this thesis, I will adopt an inclusive rather than restrictive definition to capture the state capacities that interplay with society. The definitions that are provided above overemphasize the unidirectional relation between the state and society. Yet, in this thesis, I argue that the relation between the state and society is bidirectional as the state and society interact and influence each other. The capacities of the state are enforced and executed by the state, yet society also reacts to these capacities. Given that a state is low in one dimension of the state capacity, the social forces act accordingly. For instance, if the institution of police, which constitutes one part of the coercive capacity is insufficient or corrupt, clandestine forms of organizations emerge in order to provide the security provision for themselves. The crime rates or lynch rates might increase as the state who is the responsible apparatus to provide

security is incapable. Following this, instead of relying state-centric explanations of state capacities, I incorporate the approach provided by Migdal (1988), *the state-in-society* approach in defining the state capacity.

By incorporating this approach, in this thesis, state capacity is defined and measured in terms of *the states' willingness and ability to coerce and administer, to extract and distribute and to "penetrate society"* (Migdal 1988). The definition can be grouped under three dimensions: security, fiscal, and societal dimensions. The security dimension constitutes of coercive capacities and administrative/bureaucratic capacities including the enforcement of the rule of law; the fiscal dimension entails extractive and distributive capacities and lastly societal dimension indicates the penetration to society meaning to states' capacity provide social control and enabling the representation of society without excluding any groups (Migdal 1988).

The coercion and the rule of law is complementary and contradictory simultaneously in states with intra-state conflicts. Generally, the states themselves are the ones who abuse and exploit their 'ability to coerce'. For that reason, a state with high capacities are the ones who is able to hold 'the legitimate monopoly of violence' by enforcing and implementing the rule of law. The fiscal capacity and legal capacity will be combined in order to capture the interplay of two capacities. The legal capacity cannot be enforced without the fiscal capacities and vice versa. In order to create revenues, states have to extract resources from society. This ability to extract taxes not only from the poorer segments of society but also from the elites is enforced through good governance and necessary legal framework. On the other hand, the legal rules cannot be enforced without the administrative and bureaucratic capacity. For strengthening this capacity, resources pooled by the taxation is required (Tilly 1985; Weber 1991). Thus, it is necessary to include two dimensions of the state capacity in the definition.

1.2.3. Types of states

States vary in their capacity (Rotberg 2003, 2). To be able to analyze and compare different capacities of states, it is necessary to demarcate the boundaries of the types of states. As Table 2 demonstrates, types of states based on capacities can be clustered under three variations: strong, weak and failed/collapsed states (Rotberg 2003, 4). Although these types are also not homogenous and they have variations within the types, to put it succinctly, strong states are the ones that with the capacity to coerce by securing citizens from internal and external threats, extract for collecting resources, and redistribute via social policies. On the other hand, weak states have "a mixed profile" in terms of different features of state capacity. Lastly, failed/collapsed states are the ones who underperform in multiple dimensions of their capacities (Rotberg 2003, 4). These are the conceptual ideal states and thus, strong and failed/collapsed states are two extreme ideals of the state types. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive characteristics of the types of the states based on their capacities.

Table 2 Description of the types of states in terms of state capacities

	Characteristics
Strong States	Monopoly of violence of the state, capacity to extract, welfare policies, sites of peace, stable economy, high human development, high economic growth
Weak States	Violence, rebellion, economic instability, state violence, deep cleavages, exclusionary policies, high crime rates, imperfect social policies, problems in extraction and redistribution, high levels of corruption, flaws in human development
Failed and Collapsed States	Loss of monopoly of violence, intercommunal and intra-communal disputes and conflicts, alarming criminal violence levels, existence of warlords, informal economy, lack of social policies, privatization of social services, very low human development

Source: Authors' own aggregation based on Holsti (1996) and Rotberg (2003).

Chapter 2. Methodology

2.1. Methodology

2.1.1. Case selection

This research is based on binary comparison. I chose two countries from different regions; Guatemala and Turkey. Guatemala is situated in Central America in the Americas, whereas Turkey is a cross-road country between Europe and Asia. Yet, Turkey's region virtually shifts depending on the interests of the scholars and analysts, either in Middle Eastern region, southern Europe or Asia. In any case, the region is irrelevant in my analysis, thus this does not undermine the analysis.

The cases are selected on the basis of the independent variable of state capacity and the dependent variable of citizen-led political violence. Firstly, I decided to analyze Turkey based on my dependent variable. Since my research interest is related to relationship between state strength and citizen-on-citizen political violence, my starting point was Turkey being a strong state with political violence by citizens. Secondly, I focused on weak states based on the data of the Fragile States Index for comparison. The fact that Latin American countries have similar experiences as Turkey with respect to internal conflicts, military tutelage and economic policies, I narrowed down the cases into a universe of twenty-three countries in the region of Central America, Caribbean and southern Latin America.

In order to explain the puzzle of co-existence of political violence with the strong Turkish state, I designed a research that is based on Turkish case being deviant. Hence, in order to complete the missing part of my research design, I analyzed persistently weak states within the region of Latin America. I realized that weakest states are situated in Central American region with the

exceptions of Panama and Costa Rica[2]. This allowed me to narrow my focus in five cases: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Belize. According to CEH report of 1999, the Guatemalan state has been the weakest state in the region for decades (CEH 1999). Since the search for case based on the weakest state in the region, this resulted in Guatemalan and Nicaraguan state being persistently weak states with insufficient state capacities. Figure 2 also demonstrates the levels of fragilities of five countries since 2006 and it indicates that Guatemala and Nicaragua are the states that persistently weak. As the state fragility do not change rapidly over time, the lack of data for period before 2006 would not undermine the analysis, as the literature on Guatemala emphasizes its weakness. Lastly, since Turkey has experience in insurgency with respect to Kurdish conflict, Guatemala fits to the comparison with an experience in long-lasting civil war between guerilla forces of the UNRG and the Guatemalan military. The Nicaraguan conflict, which took place between the years of 1962 and 1990 is regarded as a revolution rather than a civil conflict. Guatemalan case is chosen as the typical case of weak state resulting in high levels and different forms of citizen-led political violence.

It is important to note that Guatemalan case demonstrates the aftermath of state violence for this analysis. State violence in Guatemala had different variations with respect to different organizations aiding the military aside from the parties involved in civil war. The death squads, civil patrols (PAC) and intelligence units constituted major part of counter-insurgency acts against the leftist guerilla. These organizations were sustained in lower degrees after peace accords were achieved, yet the legacy of state violence left its mark on society with different mechanisms. The organizations and citizen-led political violence show significant similarities

[2] One of the most fragile states in Latin America is Colombia ranked 27th in 2006 by the Fragile States Index. There are improvements in terms of state strength, as demonstrated by the Fragile States Index. In 2017, it is ranked as 69th, which is a significant amount of progress. Yet, the levels of narco-trafficking in Colombia combined with organized crime is peculiar to the country and it would intervene with the comparison of Turkey. Added to that, the analysis requires a state with persistent weakness. For these reasons, I decided not to include Colombia into my analysis.

with the Turkish case. For these reasons, I adopted a binary comparison between Guatemala and Turkey.

Figure 1 Comparison of Fragilities of Central American States.



Source: Fragile States Index

Lastly, Guatemalan case offers the opportunity to analyze reports of international actors such as CICIG and CEH. CICIG, an organization established in 2006 by United Nations and ratified by Guatemalan state in 2007, has the purpose of coping with widespread impunity and corruption in Guatemala. CEH, also an extension of the UN, was established for verification of the atrocities during the internal conflict and start the reconciliation process with recommendations for the government. In this case, the international organizations' involvement is important for data availability and reliability.

2.1.2. Method

This research is based on cross-regional paired comparison between two cases: Guatemala and Turkey. The rationale behind choosing a small-N comparison, instead of a large-N comparison is that it allows the analyses of similar "causal mechanisms" in different contexts. Large-N comparative researches enable the researchers for theory testing or theory generating analyses (Della Porta 2013). Yet, they result with a number of drawbacks such as "the reliability and the validity of the indicators", "the assumption of independence of units" and "the assumption of unit homogeneity" (Della Porta 2013). On the other hand, small-N studies allow researchers to analyze deeper causal mechanisms by in-depth case analysis. The binary comparison has more potential in explaining phenomena such as political violence, since it enables explaining puzzles coming from one case by pairing it with another case. In other words, cases complement and substitute each other in dealing with research puzzles "without losing the 'thick description' of the two national cases" (Della Porta 1995, 15).

Tarrow argues that paired comparison offers "a deep background knowledge" and "intimacy" in terms of the cases and it contributes to the process of "causal-process analysis" (S. Tarrow 2010, 243). It allows to search for specific causal mechanisms by singling out other potential variables and thus, increases the generalizability of the conclusions (Della Porta 2013). However, my main is not to reach out to "generalized truths" (Whitehead 2002, 203), but rather to delve into the mechanisms of citizen-led political violence in two countries. By establishing a research design that enables me to trace causal mechanisms in two countries, I explain persistent citizen-led violence in Turkey and Guatemala.

Firstly, in order to test my hypotheses, I assess the strengths of two states based on the different dimensions of state capacity grouped by me based on the requirements of the analysis. My first premise is that Turkey is a strong state, constituting "the deviant case" in my research design, whereas Guatemala as a weak state, being "the typical case" (Seawright and Gerring 2008,

296). The reason that Turkey is the deviant case is based on the premise that *strong states are less prone to contain citizen-led political violence*. I rely on the Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Development Indicators and United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime databases for my independent variable. The independent variable is state capacity and the dependent variable is political violence by citizens, as it is shown in Table 3.

Table 3 Research Design

	State Capacity (Independent Variable)	Political Violence (Dependent Variable)	Case
Guatemala	Weak	Yes	Typical
Turkey	Strong	Yes	Deviant

Secondly, for grasping the culture of violence in two cases, I analyze the reports of several human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, using the method of content analysis. For the Guatemalan case, I utilize reports of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and commentaries of the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) that was established for bringing peace and reconstruction in the post-conflict environment in Guatemala. For Turkey, I rely on reports and statements of the Human Rights Association and Foundation for Human Rights in Turkey. Firstly, these reports are to be analyzed for underlying the similarities in terms of legacies of state violence. Next, all of these sources will be analyzed to find aspects and patterns of the culture of violence. In addition, I use the data by Varieties of Democracy project, in order to demonstrate the level of political killings in two countries.

2.1.3. Limitations

Comparative research based on two cases has challenges. For political violence research, Della Porta marks three potential problems: the problem of generalizability, possibility of different approaches and region specific explanations (Della Porta 2013). Firstly, it is utterly hard to derive generalizable conclusions by relying on only two cases. The results that are achieved by the two cases might not apply to another context. Thus, it can be argued that certain explanations are reached for the specific comparison, yet conclusions might not travel to other contexts or cases. Secondly, the explanations are often provided with respect to relevant discipline. Hence, the study of the same phenomenon might be analyzed with different perspectives and paradigms, based on the discipline. Lastly, the binary comparisons have a potential of being "geography-oriented", which leads the explanations to be based on region-specific (Della Porta 2013). This is related to the first problem as it impedes with generalizable conclusions that warrant to be used in other cases.

In addition to problems and issues in terms of comparative research, in this analysis, I encountered several limitations. One problem was related to data availability of two countries. The data for period before the 1990s for Guatemala, as well as for Turkey for some indicators was not possible. In order to able to be able compare two cases, I had to rely on the data that is available for both cases.

Secondly, for Turkey, the reports of human rights organization are extremely useful but also disorderly. Given the fact that my dependent variable is citizen-led violence, it was not possible to find different data with a wider time period, since in most of the cases organizations do not differentiate firstly, the citizen-led violence from political violence; and secondly, they mostly focus on state-sponsored violence such as extra-judicial violence, arbitrary executions and armed conflict. Thus, for Turkey I utilized the statistics provided by IHD, from 1991 to 2015 and I did my content analysis based on annual reports of TIHV. The reason for that is although

the statistics IHD made it possible for me to distinguish citizen-led violence from other types, in their reports in which they narrate the incidents, they do not distinguish. On the other hand, TIHV, although they do not distinguish citizen-led violence from other forms in their statistics, they do differentiate them, in the narration of the incidents. Thus, I used two sources complementarily. This does not hinder the analysis since these organizations collaborate with each other and their methods are very similar. Another issue with respect to coding the human rights organizations is the fact that they only code the events in which the victims apply to the human rights organizations. In the reports, it is mentioned that they also look into news and external sources, but in fact, the numbers are underestimated. This does not impede with my analysis. Lastly, the statistics for citizen-led political violence for Guatemala was beyond my reach. For that reason, I could not analyze the numbers, and I had to rely on the analysis of human rights organizations.

2.2. Assessing state capacity

Depending on the definition of state capacity, the operationalization also changes. The assessments can be gathered under four dimensions: "coercive capacities", "extractive capacities", and "administrative/bureaucratic capacities" (Soifer 2012). As states' ability to deliver public goods are an important feature, Richani also includes "distributive capacities" into the measurement, in addition to ones above (Richani 2010). These indicators are not independent from each other as they interplay by contributing or hindering each other. In addition, Migdal adds another capacity, in order to capture " states' ability to penetrate society" (Migdal 1988). This capacity is about state-society relations, as well as the "horizontal legitimacy" of the state, which is refers to the relations of different parts of society within the state (Holsti 1996, 84–98). It is states' responsibility to ensure that citizens live free from exclusion, discrimination or even violence.

2.2.1. Coercive capacities

Coercive capacity includes security as this is the most important duties of the state (Soifer 2012). Since security is directly related to the military and the police in terms of external and internal conflicts, in the literature, in order to measure the coercive capacity of the state the indicators of military and law enforcement capacity are utilized (Cárdenas 2010; Hendrix 2010). Hendrix defines coercive capacity as "the state's ability to overcome the rebellious actions against its authority with force" (Hendrix 2010), whereas Richani refers to "the law enforcement ability of the state" (Richani 2010). Military capacity is typically measured with the share of military expenditures in revenues and personnel of the state and the latter is measured in terms of "the efficiency of law enforcement" and by the indicators of "the ratio of police to inhabitants and police corruption" (Richani 2010). For that reason, the GDP and revenues of the state are correlated with military expenditure.

It can also be considered as part of "the quality and coherence of political institutions" (Cárdenas 2010) since the police is part of the institutions of the state and its quality and ability to enforce administration is crucial for building state capacity. This is especially relevant in the Latin American concept where the corruption of the police is very high and the ratio of police officers to inhabitants is low, which forces the state to recruit non-state organizations such as private security companies or paramilitary groups to provide security. In countries with a record of organized crime, gang violence and narco-trafficking, the police as an institution is even more critical in fighting high crime rates and corruption.

2.2.2. Administrative and bureaucratic capacities

One of the fundamental dimensions of state capacity is administrative and bureaucratic capacities (Cárdenas 2010, 3; Hendrix 2010, 273; Soifer 2012, 591). Without the enforcement of the rules and regulations, all other capacities would not be functioning as these are part of the enforcement of "law and order" (Englehart 2009). This includes the rule of law, policy

implementation and good governance. It basically refers to the "professionalization of the state bureaucracy and its ability to provide legal protection" (Cárdenas 2010, 3). This definition entails the Weberian understanding of legal-rational aspect of the state institutions (Weber 1991). The more professionalized the bureaucracy and the administration, the higher capacity the state has. It is also possible to include the "quality and coherence of the political institutions" under this heading (Cárdenas 2010).

In measuring administrative capacity, Soifer highlights "census administration, national identity registration, voter registration and vaccination" (Soifer 2012). This enables to unpack the ability of the state to gather information. In the cases where internal conflict is highly likely, these information aid the state to gather intelligence on the communities. Thus, administrative capacity is related to states' "ability to collect and manage information" (Hendrix 2010). The surveillance and monitoring of the state are important aspects of these capacities and can be measured by the indicators above.

2.2.3. Extractive capacities

The capacity to extract is *the ability of the state to collect revenues from citizens*. Cárdenas (2010) regards this as part of the fiscal state capacity. Without the resources, states are unable to enforce good governance and provide public goods (Cárdenas 2010). Taxation is the typical assessment of extractive capacity as in working democracies, taxes constitute a significant amount of state revenues (Englehart 2009, 163; Migdal 1988, 8). In general, "GDP share of total tax revenues" and "GDP share of income tax revenues" indicate the extractive capacity (Cárdenas 2010, 4; Soifer 2012, 594). Soifer remarks that it is possible to assess the capacity to extract with "the share of population working in the formal sector of the economy" (Soifer 2012), in addition to indicators above. Extractive capacity is related to other capacities since a state has to first raise the resources necessary to distribute and this can be achieved only if the richer segments of the population pay their taxes (Cárdenas 2010, 2; Richani 2010, 449). If the

states cannot extract revenues from the upper classes and the elites, it hinders the capacity building altogether.

2.2.4. Distributive capacities

The distributive capacities are part of "the fiscal state capacity", which entails the states' ability to provide basic goods to society without excluding any segments. It can be defined as the states' ability to deliver the political to population homogenously. One way of measuring is to look into "social expenditures, including poverty reduction, education, and health services" (Richani 2010). As Cárdenas demonstrates, "the political and social inequalities" are related to distributive capacity (Cárdenas 2010). Hence, in assessing state capacity, along with extractive capacity, distributive capacity is indispensable.

2.2.5. Social control

The concept of social control requires attention since it is related to state-in-society approach mentioned in the theoretical framework. It suggests that social control is provided by society as well as the state. Migdal (1988) offers an understanding of society "as a mélange of social organizations" of which the state is one out of many organizations (28). In other words, this mélange conveys the idea that there is a combination of different autonomous groups that might establish social control and these groups are not necessarily homogenous "in their form and in the rules they apply" (Migdal 1988). Following that, the idea of the state being the only monopoly of social control can be contested given that social control might be given by different social groups. Thus, the capacities of the state are also dependent on the groups and organizations in society and on the autonomy that they have in creating social control, if the state fails to do so, as it is demonstrated with the case of Turkey in the analysis.

2.3. Assessing state capacity for political violence research

For the research of political violence, I will compare the state capacities of Guatemala and

Turkey based on the definition of *the states' willingness and ability to coerce and administer, to extract and distribute, and to penetrate society*. The reason for including 'the willingness' of the state relies on the fact that a state might have the capacity to prevent political violence but lack the incentives to execute the abilities. In order to assess the state capacities of two cases, I will use three dimensions, which gathers the aspects of the state capacities in the definition. Table 4 summarizes the variable and the indicators of the variables.

Table 4 Assessing State Capacity for Political Violence Research

	Security Dimension	***Fiscal Dimension***	***Societal Dimension***
	Coercive and, Administrative and Bureaucratic Capacities	**Extractive and Distributive Capacities**	**Capacity to penetrate society**
Variables	Control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, political stability and absence of violence	Tax revenues, healthcare and education, poverty alleviation	Voice and accountability, perception of the citizens on the state strength
Indicators	Level of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, enforcement of property rights, the police rate per population, the military expenditure	Adjusted net national income per capita, GDP, GDP shates of; tax revenue, government expenditure on public healthcare, government expenditure on education; poverty headcount ratio at $1,90 a day, GNI per capita, PPP	Voice and accountability, confidence levels on the judiciary, the police, civil administration, armed forces levels

*Author's own aggregation.

First, I will assess state capacities of the two cases based on the datasets available from Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Development Indicators, UNODC, World Values Survey, and Latinobarometer. Then, I will compare two cases in order to demonstrate that Guatemala is a typical case and Turkey is a deviant case. Guatemala constitutes a typical case

by which a weak state being incapable of fighting against political violence due to the ineffectiveness of the state and Turkey a deviant case by which the state is *unwilling* to tackle with political violence despite its strength and its usage of citizens as agents for establishing social control. In the next chapter, I demonstrate that Turkish state is a strong state compared to Guatemala, and in the last chapter I reveal the culture of violence in Turkey.

Chapter 3. State Capacities Compared

3.1. States capacities of Guatemala and Turkey

Guatemala as part of the Central American region is regarded as a weak state (Godoy 2006; Koonings and Kruijt 2004; Manz 2008; Ruhl 2011a) with respect to the security, fiscal and societal dimensions. The Guatemalan state is incapable of providing security to society, unable to tax the elites, and incapable of tackling with corruption. The indigenous community is systematically excluded them from the political sphere, which undermines the societal dimension of the state capacity. The state is not in the realm of failed states as Somalia or Sudan, yet it rings the bells of danger. According to the Fragile States Index, in 2007, Guatemala is ranked as 57th in the world, with higher number indicating higher state capacities.

Firstly, colonial past had legacies over the state and societal structure, which severely hindered the process of state building (van Reenen 2004, 43). It can be argued that structural discrimination and exclusion remained as the legacy of the colonial era until now, considering the segregation within society. The indigenous Mayan population is still being discriminated against and excluded from the political and social sphere, despite the fact that they constitute almost half of the population (Ruhl 2011b, 14). According to estimations, the severity of the conquest resulted in the destruction of the community that could be restored the levels in sixteenth century only after 400 years later (Briscoe 2009). Political and economic inequalities prevail in state and communal affairs, which reflects on the state capacity of the Guatemalan state (Manz 2008).

The democratization possibility of the state was obstructed by the CIA initiated coup progressive leftist Jacobo Árbenz in 1954. After this period, Guatemalan political scenery has been exposed to authoritarian rulers and military dictatorships. Briscoe argues that this undermined the possibility for "a gradual, democratic transition towards a more egalitarian

social and political structure" in Guatemala (Briscoe 2009). Shortly after, the civil war that prolonged for thirty-six years began in 1960. It started as a guerilla warfare in urban areas, and turning into one of the bloodiest civil wars in the world until peace in 1996. More than 200 thousand people lost their lives and according to estimates, 40 thousand villages were razed to the ground (Briscoe 2009, 4; CEH 1999) The prolonged internal conflict severely undermined the capacities of the state as most of the resources were devoted to internal conflict in the battle against the subversives. During the 1970s, the conflict spilled over to the highlands of Guatemala, while the warfare in the cities did not end. The issue here is that the indigenous people who are situated in the highlands were stuck between the military and guerilla (Godoy 2006). For that reason, the community suffering the most damage in the internal conflict was the indigenous people.

Guatemala has been suffering from fluctuating violence waves since its foundation but this was the major event that resulted in persistent violence (Manz 2008). The internal conflict contributed to the rooted structural problems in the state (Briscoe 2009). In 1996, with international humanitarian intervention for rebuilding the state capacity and reconciliation, the civil war ended. A United Nations mission, MINUGUA was established in order to help the transition period and allowed the representation of the rebellions the parliament. Significant steps were taken during the peace process such as diminishing the power and capacities of the military (Briscoe 2009). In 2007, the International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG) was established and ratified by the Guatemalan government. Yet, the conflict severely halted state capacity building and weakened existing state institutions. It is argued that although the transition seems to be a huge success, the reality is different as the Guatemalan state remains a weak state (Briscoe 2009).

On the other hand, Turkey, that as a nation-state emerged from the Ottoman Empire, exemplifies "a strong, modernizing state" (Barkey 2000, 87). Being the legacy of a collapsed

empire, the elites of the first republican era had built a strong administration and bureaucracy partly inherited from the Ottoman Empire (Heper 1988) and as Mardin (1973) argues, their first priority was to establish a strong state (Mardin 1973, 183). Atatürk who is the founder of the Turkish Republic, aimed for creating a "strong autonomous state", which is independent from societal pressures and able to protect itself (Barkey 2000, 88). Heper classifies Turkey as a "transcendental patrimonial state" with " the strong state tradition", in which the state is above everything with "the high ideals of duty, service and the sublimation of energies" (Heper 1985, 8). The most challenging dimension is with regard to the societal dimension. The Turkish state is strong in the administrative/bureaucratic and fiscal dimension, whereas it remained weak in the societal dimension. Civil society has been regarded as the sphere that the state should be protected by state elites and the perception has been to "perceive the state as vital for holding together the community" (Heper 1985, 16). The state remained as the only guardian of the country with the military and the state elites vis-à-vis social movements, civil society organizations and the political elites.

Although there is "the strong state tradition", Turkey has been experiencing unstable times from time to time with respect to several issues. Firstly, the four coups and coup attempts in 1960, 1980, 1997 and the most recent one in 2016 have left a significant mark on the state and state institutions. Secondly, the Kurdish insurgency that is the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military, which is still ongoing has demanded more than 40 thousand lives since mid-1970s. The Kurdish issue in Turkey is one of the biggest obstacles in the state-building process in Turkey.

The European Union has a significant effect on the Turkish state capacity. Starting with being part of the Customs Union in 1995, several reforms have been initiated. In the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the European accession process started with the decision of the European Council on Turkey's candidacy. Turkey was obliged to comply with several criteria, including the

Copenhagen criteria, which had economic and political conditions to be fulfilled by all candidate countries. This process resulted in several improvements in the administrative capacity, the economy and the human rights conditions of Turkey. Extensive legal reforms were initiated by the AKP government in 2002 in order to accelerate the accession process. In 2004, the European Council ruled decided that the Turkish state had fulfilled both the political and economic conditions in state capacity building and Turkey became a candidate country. Barkey argues that with the European Union accession process, Turkey is obliged to "undertake significant changes that that […] make the state smaller, more efficient, less repressive and intrusive and genuinely stronger" (Barkey 2000, 88). The conditionality of the European Union has significantly contributed to Turkish state capacity in all dimensions (Günay 2014, 220).

3.1.1. Security Dimension

As mentioned earlier in the conceptual framework, the security dimension is disaggregated into two levels: coercive and administrative/bureaucratic capacities. With respect to the overall security dimension, the Guatemalan state is weak and Turkish state is strong. Being one of the countries with the highest rates of homicides and organized crime, the Guatemalan state is not providing sufficient security to its citizens with continuously undermining of the rule of law (Ruhl 2011b, 2). The military constitutes one of the most significant parts of the security provision. The influence of the military was still decisive in the aftermath of the internal conflict (Briscoe 2009). The "exceptional powers" of the military have prevented the country from having a functioning democracy for decades (Briscoe 2009). Despite the proven atrocities inflicted by the military during the conflict, citizens still trust it as the "national stewardship" to provide them with security, which reveals the severity of the situation (Ruhl 2011b, 7–9).

The role and influence of the military is similar to the Turkish military. The Turkish state was founded on the premise of having an autonomous state. Being part of the coercive capacity, the military adopted a mission of having to "safeguard the interest and the role of the state" in

addition to the duty of protecting the state from external threats (Barkey 2000, 95). Thus, the military as an autonomous entity, embraced the responsibility and duty of securing the state's integrity in the domestic sphere. For that reason, the responsibility of the military in a way converges with the bureaucratic elites. Cook demonstrates that the political elites in Turkey are required to comply with "the ire of the military establishment and its collaborates among the state elite (Cook 2007). As a secular and modernizing country, the state elites strongly opposed any kind of politicization of state institutions. The military coups, which happened in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 were interventions of the military to prevent the politicization of the state institutions. Especially the 1980 military coup was a reaction of the military to end the escalated political violence between right-wing and left-wing supporters and prevent societal forces to intervene with state institutions and the state. There interventions were more about reacting to a crisis of the state and they were to "reequilibrate democracy aftermath a crisis" (Öniş 1998, 7). Thus, the military has been the ally of the state elites against the political elites who make the state vulnerable, and the position of the military is different from that in Guatemala.

One of the aspects of the coercive capacities of the states is the police. Table 3 demonstrates that Turkish has significantly higher rates of police. In Guatemala, the weakness of the state reveals itself in the form of "policing extensions" (van Reenen 2004). In these extensions, they complement police institutions by helping them in providing security (van Reenen 2004) as the police is not enough on its own. As *Figure 2* reveals, in Guatemala, policing is has different layers, in addition to the police that is part of the state (van Reenen 2004). Since the police is not sufficient to provide security by itself, on the one hand, private companies are hired and on the other hand, death squads are recruited in order to cope with security issues.

Table 5 Comparison of Guatemala and Turkey Based on Police Personnel

Rate per 100, 000 population										
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Guatemala	166,02	157,80	159,23	134,18	138,05	156,93	168,18	160,13	159,88	174,78
Turkey	481,67	488,81	488,75	474,11	483,76	488,62	516,60	513,73	504,03	504,92

Source: UNOCD (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime)

On the other hand, in Turkey, the police in Turkey is "policing by coercion" (Aydin 1995, 130). In other words, police is not responsive to society but rather enforces coercion. White and Herzog demonstrate that in Turkey, the police has been politicized, in as well as to the intelligence institutions and the judiciary (White and Herzog 2016, 559). Similar to Guatemala, in relation the Kurdish conflict, the state has relied on different mechanisms to deal with the Kurdish conflict in the region by recruiting local militias, which are referred to as "the village-guard" system (Belge 2011, 105). These paramilitary organizations of village guards were responsible for protecting the villages from PKK as the guerilla of the PKK were raiding villages for recruiting people to fight the Turkish state and for resources (Belge 2011, 105).

The factors leading toward the weak capacity for security is multidimensional. The indicators of the security dimension also reveal the weakness of the Guatemalan state with respect to military expenditure, rule of law, government effectives, and political stability and absence of violence, whereas it demonstrates the strength of the Turkish state (See *Appendix A*). With the exception of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, Turkey is stronger than Guatemala. One potential explanation for that can be the escalated Kurdish insurgency, in addition to the political ineffectiveness of the coalition governments in 1990s, which is also revealed in the government effectiveness ranks for 1990.

Figure 2 Policing Extensions in Guatemala



Source: van Reenen, 2004

One of the reasons causing weakness in administrative and bureaucratic capacities is related to corruption. In analyzing the Guatemalan case, one cannot ignore impunity and corruption. According to the Corruption Perception Index of Transnational International, Guatemala stands as the 136th globally, which reflects the corruption levels in the country. As the Figure 4 reveals, the corruption levels of Guatemala are significantly higher than Turkey over time, although Turkey also has problems with corruption (White and Herzog 2016, 562). Transparency International ranks Turkey 75th in 2016 with the score of 41/100. One of the biggest issues in the candidacy of Turkey in the EU accession process is related to capacity building in administration and fighting the corruption (Soyaltin 2017, 2). The National Action Plan, which are strategies of Turkey in EU accession process has directions for Turkey in dealing with corruption. Extensive reforms and regulations have been adopted for tackling with corruptions since 2003.

Unlike Guatemala, as a result of the strong state tradition, Turkey has been strong in the security dimension. The administration and bureaucracy have been centralized and the state elites have

made sure that the state is free from societal pressures. The administration and bureaucracy in Turkey is centralized top-down through repressive instruments. The distinction between state and political elites has to be underlined since the 1950s after the first democratic multiparty elections of the Turkish Republic (Heper 1992, 181). The Democrat Party who was ruling after the elections until 1960 politicized state institutions in all spheres, which resulted in a "tyranny of the majority" (Heper and Keyman 1998, 265). Following that, state elites and the military intervened with a coup in 1960 to protect the state from political elites.

Figure 3 Comparison of Corruption in Guatemala and Turkey



Source: Varieties of Democracy Version 7.

When assessing the security dimension for Turkey, one has to mention the Kurdish insurgency[3]. The low-intensity conflict has been mostly contained in the southeastern part of Turkey as the region is highly populated with Kurds. The PKK was founded in 1974 as an ethnic leftist group. The 1980s and 1990s were especially marked by the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military. The coercive capacity of the state has been hampered with respect to this conflict, although it has not reached the Guatemalan civil war.

[3] For an extensive literature on the Kurdish conflict see: Kirişci, K., & Winrow, G. M. (1997). *The Kurdish question and Turkey: an example of a trans-state ethnic conflict.* Psychology Press.

3.1.2. Fiscal dimension

The fiscal dimension is constituted of the extractive and distributive functions of the state. Guatemala suffers from weak extractive and distributive functions resulting from neoliberal policies as well as the unwillingness of the elites to pay taxes. The burden of raising revenues is on the shoulders of the poorer segments and thus, the state is unable collect substantial taxes. Resources of the state are limited as Guatemala with 16.3 million citizens[4] is relatively a poor state with a Gross National Income of $7000, and ineffective governance, which are leading towards social policies that are not sufficient to decrease inequalities. The share of tax revenues constitutes 10.3% of the GDP, which is significantly low (Ruhl 2011b, 13) as the elites prevent taxes reforms in order not to pay their taxes (Briscoe 2009). The obstruction of the tax reforms has more than once added to the crisis of state legitimacy, which also increases the citizens' distrust of the state and state institutions (Briscoe 2009). The comparison of the indicators of fiscal dimension is provided in Appendix B.

Firstly, compared to Turkey, the Guatemalan state suffers significantly from low tax revenues, along with low GDP. Since revenues of the state is limited, the state cannot spend much resources on social policies such as public healthcare and education. Secondly, as part of the distributive policies, social policies such as healthcare, education or poverty alleviation are insufficient (Briscoe 2009, 10; Ruhl 2011a, 12). The share of expenditures on education constitutes only 2.8% of the GDP. The public health expenditure of the government is similar to education with a rate of 2.3% based in 2011. The most significant issue in Guatemala is with respect to poverty alleviation. The table reveals that the state is unable to alleviate poverty, especially compared to Turkey.

[4] Based on the Human Development Index data.

On the other hand, Turkey as a developmental state can be regarded as strong. Öniş argues that Turkey as a "highly centralized patrimonial state" is rather weak in some policy areas although it is strong to implement the policies (Öniş 1998, 4), and historically the strength of the state elites has a strong influence on the political economy (Öniş 1998, 19). Turkey's most definitive problems regarding the fiscal dimension are the influence of the centralized state over the economy and the taxation problem (White and Herzog 2016, 560). The table indicates that although there are issues with respect to extraction in Turkey, %20 of the GDP is constituted of tax revenues, which is significantly higher than Guatemala. Thus, it can be argued that the fiscal dimension of the state capacity is weak in Guatemala and strong in Turkey. The problems Turkey experience in terms of fiscal capacity, the IMF and later the European Union required Turkey to improve its fiscal capacity (White and Herzog 2016, 560) after the 2001 crisis.

3.1.3. Societal dimension

The societal dimension is about the relations between the state and the society. In the case of Turkey, the main weakness of Turkey is related to this dimension. Heper and Keyman argues that the Turkish state has two sides of the coin: it is strong with respect to the military and state institutions, and weak in terms of the unresponsiveness of the state to the civil society (Heper and Keyman 1998, 178). Historically, the legacy of a strong centralized state tradition was accompanied by the "weak civil society", which led to the inability of the Turkish state to penetrate society (Heper 1985, 16).

The main issue in the Turkish state-society relations has revolved around the "center-periphery cleavage" (Mardin 1973, 173). Heper argues that the periphery of the Turkish Republic has been regarded as "over defiant" with caution since the Ottoman Empire (Heper 1985, 98) and the inherited a strong state tradition that hampered the development and empowerment of the civil society. The strong centralized strong administration came along with the weak civil society (Heper 1985, 16) or is even "absent" in Turkey (Heper 1992, 178). Related to the

centralized administration and bureaucracy, society has been repressed in securing the secular nature of the state, Turkish identity and integrity of the state against the Kurdish nationalism, and lastly, especially after the 1980 coup, against the left-wing ideology. The labor unions and other civil society organizations have remained under the strict supervision of the state. As Karaman and Aras argue, civil society has remained weak vis-à-vis the strong state and state institutions (Karaman and Aras 2000, 42), which they refer to as "the crisis of civil society". The aim of creating a state that is free from societal pressures has resulted in a nonexistent civil society. For the Guatemalan case, the weakness of the state in the societal dimension can be observed in the Table 6. In addition to that, the similarities between the Guatemalan and Turkish state is also revealed.

Table 6 Societal Dimension

Societal Dimension	Guatemala				Turkey			
	1990	2000	2010	2015	1990	2000	2010	2015
Voice and accountability[1]	41,83	37,98	35,55	33,99	43,75	40,87	44,55	35,47

[1]1990 data are based on 1996 data due to unavailability.
*Based on Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Although having a strong and centralized bureaucracy, civil society remained weak and the state is not only unable to empower the civil society actors such as labor unions, voluntary organizations and nongovernmental organizations, it actually undermines their development (Karaman and Aras 2000, 43). Similar to Turkey, Guatemala is weak in terms of the societal dimension. Although peace was reached after the civil war, the reconciliation process which should be supported by the state has never achieved. The indigenous communities are excluded from political and economic sphere, and they are systematically discriminated.

Especially with respect to minority groups in Turkey, the social control aspect of the societal dimension remains weak. With the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the state embraced an ideology based on Turkishness, which led to the "denial of the existence and legitimate

expression of other cultures" (M. Muller 1996, 15). The Kurdish problem and issues related to different religious minorities such as Alawis derives from the denial politics of the Turkish state. This problem is relevant to the unresponsive nature of the state. The official language of the state is Turkish, and other dialects and languages were strictly prohibited until the EU accession process. In this sense, 'the Democratic Openings' should be emphasized as improvements that are with the pressures of the EU. Thus, it can be argued that the EU accession process contributed to the building of the societal dimension of the Turkish state capacity.

The confidence levels on state institutions of the judiciary, armed forces, and public administration reveal that in Guatemala, there is significantly low levels of confidence in the state institutions (See: Appendix B). This indicates that the Guatemalan state cannot penetrate society, by establishing good state-society relations. On the other hand, in Turkey, citizens seem to have confidence on most of the state institutions. With respect to confidence on public administration and civil services, Turkish citizens are less confident compared to other institutions. Yet, as the previous table has shown, Turkey has problems in terms of voice and accountability, which captures degree of citizens' voice in the government, and civil liberties.

Table 7 State Capacities of Turkey and Guatemala Compared

	Security Dimension	Fiscal Dimension	Societal Dimension
Guatemala	Weak (--)	Weak (--)	Weak (--)
Turkey	Strong (+)	Strong (+)	Weak (-)

*Based on assessment of the author on the basis of the measures provided in the table in Appendix C.

To conclude, Table 6, summarizes the state capacities of the two countries based on their dimensions. It can be argued that, although Turkey has several issues that needs to be resolved in terms of the capacity building, I have demonstrated that Turkey is a strong state overall with

three dimension. Only with respect to the societal dimension, it can be argued that it is *stronger* than the Guatemalan state. The weakness in state-society relations will be relevant in analyzing the culture of violence in Turkey. Overall, it can be argued that compared to the Guatemalan, Turkey is a strong state.

Chapter 4. Cultures of Violence Compared

As discussed in the theoretical framework, culture of violence refers to the alteration in the ways of citizens' dealing with daily problems, by creating *spheres of tolerance and indifference to violence, the idea of 'internal enemy', and impunity*, as a result of state violence and terror. The social control that a strong state is required to provide is taken by the initiatives of citizens. In the case of Guatemala, the literature suggests that social fabric of the society, especially of the Mayan community has disrupted and changed since they were the ones who were most exposed to violence. In order to explain citizen-led political violence in Turkey, I argue that the culture of violence has explanatory power. Citizens' right to live is not undermined by the state corps and/or insurgents, but also by ordinary citizens. There is a regime of violence, by which the social order and control is established and this clandestine form of social control is reinforced and celebrated by the state. Thus, I argue that Turkey has been a state in which political violence by non-state actors, specifically citizens, have been using violence as a means of establishing social control, as an extension of the state. The political killings which refers to killings by the state is demonstrated by Figure 4. This figure reveals that similarities between state violence in Turkey, as the variable of 'freedom from political killings' is related to state-sponsored violence since the 1900s. In significant similarity is that both two countries started to be shaken by state violence almost around same period. Political violence of the 1970s in Turkey can be observable from the sudden downward trend, as well as the civil war and state violence of authoritarian rulers in Guatemala from the 1950s. Also, in Turkey, state-sponsored political violence due to the coup of the 1980s is demonstrated with a sudden decrease in the freedom from political killings. In Guatemala, state violence is steady since 200, whereas in Turkey, there is a decrease starting from 2005. It is not coincidence that citizen-led political violence in Turkey, increased at the same period. IHD report on lynchings suggests that the

incidents accelerated after 2005. Given the fact the lynch attempts are highly political, I argue that this is due to replacement of state violence by citizen-led violence, in order to establish social control by compensating for weakness of the state in infrastructural capacity, meaning weak state-society relations.

In order to demonstrate this argument, I analyzed the incidents and brutalities recorded by human rights organizations in Turkey: Human Rights Association and Human Rights Foundation of Turkey. In addition, I looked into reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. I found that the indicators of the culture of violence, which have been detected in Guatemalan society can also be found within the Turkish society.

Figure 4 Freedom from political killings in Guatemala and Turkey



Source: Varieties of Democracy Project.

4.1. Guatemalan Context

Guatemalan society has experienced an internal conflict that reached to the level of genocide. According to the Commission for Historical Clarification, which was sponsored by UN in order to account for past atrocities and initiate a reconciliation process, communities that were

affected by the conflict were almost exclusively the indigenous people, the Mayan community. The Guatemalan state has adopted discriminatory measures since colonial times (Godoy 2006, 42) and the discrimination was also reflected during the conflict since the indigenous community is one that suffered the most. The military, combined with paramilitary organizations such as civil patrols (PACs), adopted scorched-to-earth tactics by razing villages to the ground, forcing communities to leave and massive killings (Godoy 2006, 43). According the CEH report, at the time of peace accords, the result was: 200 thousand dead, 450 thousand disappearances, 1.5 million internally displaced and 430 villages being wiped off the map and most of these victims were indigenous communities. As Nelson puts forwards, Mayan were killed "because they challenged the structures controlling land and labor" (Nelson 2009, xviii). The most significant issue with respect to the internal conflict in Guatemala is the fact that violence caused by the guerilla accounts for 3%, whereas 93% of the brutalities were resulted from the army actions (CEH, p. 42).

The peace accords, supported by UN, brought about the end to the internal conflict and peace. By establishing a party, the guerilla, UNRG, was incorporated into the parliament and given the chance for participation. Yet, it could not bring about the end to neither legacies of the paramilitary organizations nor citizen-led violence. In fact, decreased state violence was substituted by "new forms of violence" (Godoy 2006, 44) such as lynchings, mob violence and criminal organizations. Manz notes that after peace accords in 1996, "everyday violence has reached epidemic proportions" (Manz 2008, 151). Godoy also underlines the fact that violence by the state diminished after peace, yet was "replaced by the hand of non-state actors" (Godoy 2006, 7). These new forms of violence are related to criminal activities as well as political violence (Benson, Fischer, and Thomas 2008, 39). The attacks and assaults on journalists, intellectuals, opposition leader, and human rights defenders are mostly political in nature. The examples of killing of Bishop Gerardi Conedera and the Rosenberg case, which proved the

clandestine links of the business elites, politicians and the impunity in Guatemala are some of examples.

4.2. Turkish Context

Citizen-led political violence in the Turkish case is more widespread than it is researched. Citizens, whom the state favors vis-à-vis the minorities such as the Kurdish people, Alawis, or any form of oppositional groups, are exposed to violence, in the name of protecting the state and the nation. Scholars often refer to the period between 1971 to 1980, when talking about political violence in Turkey. Order and stability was replaced by anarchy, resulting from the deep cleavages between left-wing and right-wing forces combined with weak polarized coalitional governments. The 1970s, was tainted with the most widespread and massive scale political violence in Turkey, as Sayarı (2010) refers to as political terrorism. Second half of the 1970s caused more than 5000 deaths only, in addition to trauma of polarization and violence.

The forms of violence are worth listing. The first spark of events started with the student protests about the higher education system, Vietnam War and US involvement in Turkey (Sayari 2010, 199). Soon after these protests were replaced by urban warfare between leftist groups such as DEV-GENÇ (Revolutionary Youth) and ultranationalist groups belonging to *Idealistic National Hearts* (Ülkü Ocakları). They are referred to as 'Ülkücüler' (Idealists) or Greywolves. The streets, public spaces such as universities and neighborhoods were considered to be "liberated zones" (Sayari 2010, 210). Death squads, assassinations and kidnappings were widespread. Civilians such as journalists, human rights activists and political party members were murdered for ideological reasons all over the country (Sayari 2010, 204).

The legacy of violence in Turkey can be attributed to the 1980 coup, in addition to this period of anarchy. The 1980 coup, brought Turkey records of torture, thousands of detainments and imprisonments, and forced disappearances. Bozarslan marks that the military was applying

more violence "as a response to uncontrolled violence created by society" (Bozarslan 2009, 15). Although the coup significantly decreased citizen-led political violence (Sayari 2010, 210) by destroying all civil society elements, violence erupted in different forms and degrees in the 1990s. Accompanied by state violence, political violence by citizens took the form of collaborating with the state. What is left from the 1970s and the post-coup period is the trauma of the anarchy and the legacies of state terror[5], as I will demonstrate now.

The ongoing low-intensity civil war between PKK and Turkish state is another line of thinking about political violence in Turkey. Although the conflict itself started with what might be called as ethnic consciousness, the Kurdish issue in Turkey is highly politicized. Thus, it is beyond ethnicity. State violence in the forms of extra-judicial violence, arbitrary executions, forced disappearances and destroyed villages traumatized society. The culture of violence that I demonstrate in this chapter is related to who the Turkish state regards as the 'other'.

4.3. Spheres of tolerance and indifference to violence

One of the most significant aspects of the culture of violence is the tolerance and indifference to violence, in broader terms, the "trivialization of violence" (Waldmann 2007, 596–99). Citizens rely on violent means in resolving their problems and "violence becomes normal pulse" (Manz 2008, 154). The effects of state violence disrupt the social fabric of society and society becomes "militarized" (Godoy 2006, 34). One of the reasons of the persistence of violence can be related to this characteristic of the culture of violence since it perpetuates existing violence by preventing possibilities of non-violent resolutions.

[5] To the best of my knowledge, there are not many scholarly research about the 1980 coup and state violence in those periods. The coup was able to create a regime of intimiditation, which enabled the silencing of the majority. Thus, it is an extremely hard topic to conduct research, although state violence is often implied. Also, as Bozarslan highlights, there are not any field research about the traumatic experience of 1980 coup (Bozarslan 2009, 16)

In Guatemala, militaries scorch-to-earth counter-insurgency operations during the internal conflict resulted in the habituation to acts of violence. By relying on the ethnographic research that she conducted in the highlands of Guatemala, Godoy (2006) argues that the communal norms and values were exposed to "rupture" and were substituted with militarized values and norms. The Mayan communities' ability to connect via "language, dialogue and shared understanding of the meaning and purpose of life" changed into reliance on violence (Godoy 2006, 34). From state violence, an "uncivil society" emerged, which is nurtured and reinforced by right-wing parties (Koonings and Kruijt 2004, 11). This "uncivil society" was characterized by "a tendency to resolve disputes through direct violence" (Manz 2008, 153). Thus, the fight against the internal conflict turned itself into an enforced change in societal norms and values of the societies, which materialized in different forms of violence such as lynchings, mob violence and vigilante justice. Although in post-conflict literature, lynchings and mob violence are attributed to petty crimes and considered to be related to criminal justice, Godoy emphasizes the significance of the capacity of these actions for the "political empowerment of the victims as agentive movement" (Godoy 2004, 637). Given the fact that these atrocities are also politically motivated in nature (Godoy 2004, 639), she contends that violence is a way of victims to change themselves from victims into agents. Thus, the new violence was emerging not only from the weak state capacities, but also from the alterations on the societal level.

For the Turkish case, Gambetti (2007), when analyzing the lynch attempts, emphasizes the difference between Guatemalan and Turkish incidents. She argues that in Turkey, the perpetrators are not the victims, meaning that violence is applied by the communities that did not experienced the effects of internal conflict, and the brutalities happened in regions remote from the conflict zones, differently from Guatemala (Gambetti 2007, 6). Hence, she claims that it is hard to argue that the culture of violence in Turkey is similar to Guatemala. I argue that, the legacies of state terror do not only effect the victims, but also it infiltrates with the minds of

the perpetrators or with the individuals who are sympathetic to the perpetrators. The characteristics of the spheres of tolerance and indifference to violence in the Turkish case are inversed in a way that the tolerance and indifference applies on the perpetrator side. For instance, "the extraordinary indifference of the public" to the Sivas Massacre of 1993 is highlighted by the 1993 report of TIHV (14). In the Sivas events, 37 Alawi intellectuals were burned as result of a sabotage during an event in a hotel in Sivas, and security forces, police and gendermarie did not intervene for seven hours, allowing hundreds of people to shout "Give them to us!".

This horrifying incident was not unique in Turkey. Tolerance and indifference towards violence works in favor of the social forces that are supported by the state with respect to ithe "rhetoric and discourses" of the state that target certain segments of society (Gambetti 2007, 9) such as the Kurdish people in Turkey. Violence towards these groups, such as the Kurdish, Roma people, Alawi and leftist and/opposition leaders and members are systematically exposed to political violence. The reports of TIHV, revealed that most the incidents of civilian conflicts are based on ideological divisions and assaults and violence towards minorities, and in most of the cases the perpetrators are either from MHP or they are affiliated with MHP which is the ultranationalist conservative party in Turkey. In other words, the Turkish state utilizes the tolerance and indifference of society in order to establish social control, which explains the reason why citizen-led political violence emerges in the regions remote to the conflict.

4.4. The idea of 'internal enemy', fear and distrust

In societies with the cultures of violence, the idea of internal enemy or subversion is especially utilized by the states, when they want to consolidate their power by inflicting fear and distrust. Based on this concept, the actions and operations are legitimized and they become unquestionable. The supposed 'internal enemies' are under constant surveillance and they are exposed to violence. In the Guatemalan case, these internal enemies were the guerilla, leftists,

opposition and the indigenous communities. Similarly to Guatemala, in Turkey, these are Kurdish minority, Alawis, Roma people and leftist/opposition members.

In Guatemala, during the civil war, the Mayan people were accused of collaborating with the guerilla and for that reason, the military adopted counter-insurgency tactics that destroyed the villages and communities. The indigenous people, the opposition, human rights activists, community leader and journalists were pronounced as the subversives that the Guatemalan state needs to cleanse itself. After the peace accords, although there was some degree of improvements, the rhetoric of 'security and order' did not change. In society, the idea of 'subversives' who were to be blamed for the violent history of Guatemala was maintained. This reveals itself in Efraín Ríos Montt's ability to run for presidential elections with right-wing political party, FRG, despite his records of massive human rights violations related to his term in the army during the civil war. By feeding on people's feelings of fear and insecurity, his promised to bring about the security and peace and paradoxically he was voted for by the poorest indigenous people, who were affected the most during the civil war.

Manz demonstrates that in relation to the disruption of social fabric; fear, distrust and insecurity was inflicted on society, in addition to "betrayal among one's fellow villagers" (Manz 2008, 153). The different counter-insurgency tactics of the military, especially the PACs, relied on intelligence units, which forced the communities to become informants and put their fingers to their fellow citizens (Godoy 2006, 32). Thus, considering the duration of the civil conflict, in the aftermath of the conflict, mistrust lingered and contributed to a rupture of the social fabric and it created a society of fear (Koonings and Kruijt 2004, 14). Godoy highlights the fact that lynchings that accelerated after peace, were partly caused by fear and insecurity (Godoy 2004, 628). According to an Amnesty International report (2002), officials and Voluntary Civil Defense Committees, which are the continuation of the former PACs, were targeting the human rights defenders by accusing them of being "subversive" or part of the guerilla, which makes

them "legitimate targets" (Amnesty International 1997, 29). Hence, the idea of internal enemies, combined with fear and insecurity is part of the Guatemalan culture of violence.

On the other hand, in Turkey, the internal enemies have been historically the Kurdish, Alawi, the left-wing, who are to be blamed for problems of Turkey, as well as human rights defenders. Parallel to Guatemala, paramilitary organizations including village-guard system, were established in 1985, in the southeastern region of Turkey, in order to fight against the Kurdish insurgency. For the subversives of the left-wing, the paramilitary organization of Greywolves was in charge, who were responsible for the significant amount of political violence in the 1970s. As in Guatemalan case, these internal enemies were creating political instability, they were considered to be against to the integrity of the Turkish state. In the events registered by TIHV since 1991, under the heading of civilian attacks, most of the brutalities have been between the MHP supporters on the one side, and Kurdish, Alawi, Roma or the left-wing or those thought to be leftist one the other side. These incidents are separated from the armed attacks and they are based on citizen-led violence with political aim of establishing social control in line with what they perceive as Turkish state ideology. In addition to the segments mentioned above, TIHV and IHD reports reveal that journalists, teachers and human rights defenders are also considered to be enemies of the state (See: Appendix B), significantly similar to Guatemala.

The idea of internal enemies inflicts fear, security, and even paranoia on Turkish society. Fear and insecurity in Turkish society have double sided. One side is related to the victims of state terror in the aftermath of the 1980 coup which brought severe restrictions to the left, and human rights were massively violated. As Gambetti succinctly puts forwards, the feelings of fear and insecurity is revealed by the equation of: "liberal= intellectual=pro-EU/US=collaborator=traitor=imperialist=pro-Kurdish/minority=divider=anti-Atatürk" (Gambetti 2007, 19). The supporters of the Kurdish cause, or even who are sympathetic to the

Kurdish cause are considered to be against the integrity of the Turkish state. In the reports, aside from human rights violations by the state, the citizen attacks are marked with systematic infringement of citizens' right to live, based on the perception of the 'internal enemy'. The other side of the coin is with respect to perpetrators of these incidents. State violence in terms of the internal conflict, combined with extrajudicial violence, forced disappearances, and arbitrary executions, left its traces on the society with constant reference to the internal enemies (See: Table 8). This led to a constant feeling of insecurity, which is also reinforced by systematic 'state of emergency' (OHAL) conditions in Turkey. This distorts the perceptions of the ordinary citizens, increasing the possibility to blame the 'subversives'.

4.5. The effects of impunity

Impunity constitutes major part of the culture of violence. Waldman refers to impunity as "lack of taboos and sanctions" (Waldmann 2007, 596), which affect the trust of citizens. While the existence of the idea of internal enemies creates mistrust among citizens, impunity lowers trust and confidence of citizens to state institutions. There is two dimensions of impunity, deriving from the state capacity definition that I adopted. On the one hand, impunity may arise due the states' lack of capacity in terms of the security dimension, which encapsulates the coercive and administrative/bureaucratic capacities of the state, as in Guatemala. On the other hand, the state might be *unwilling* to tackle with violence, despite having the necessary capacities. Turkish case is a good example of this kind.

"In Guatemala, impunity reigns", as written in the 2002 report of Amnesty International. The "immunity and impunity" (Koonings and Kruijt 2004, 18) of the responsible organizations and individuals, who partake in massive human rights violations during the internal conflict remain as important issues in Guatemala. This issue of immunity, contributes to the "climate of fear and distrust", and distorts citizens' perception of peace. What citizens refer to as peace, is actually living with the military and its representations every day, as Green (Green 1995)

demonstrates in her anthropological work in Guatemala. The PACs, who were responsible for atrocities in the highlands of Guatemala, were not brought to justice (Fumerton and Remijnse 2004, 53). In fact they were compensated for their 'services for the state and the country' (Amnesty International, 1997). The former patrol members occupied the main national airport and roads, demanding that they should be compensated for the hard work that they put during the war times against the subversives (Human Rights Watch, 2002). This impunity perpetuates the culture of violence, by undermining reconciliation process of the victims, and leaving trauma of victims unhealed. The report of Human Rights Watch (2002) underlines that "there is a possibility that it [Guatemalan justice system] would deter political violence in near future", if it can tackle impunity.

In Turkey, impunity is related to the Kurdish conflict, but also it applies to political violence in daily lives. State terror of the 1980s and 1990s with respect to the extra-judicial or arbitrary killings, forced disappearances, unknown murders, and atrocities related to paramilitary organizations are not punished and in fact rewarded with impunity. IHD's report on "Ethnic Lynchings", demonstrates that the minorities, leftists and members from opposition are exposed to continuous political violence. Although the report is framed under ethnic lynchings, it is not only based on ethnicity, but it reveals the culture of violence combined with impunity. It is demonstrated that during the incidents, the law enforcement agencies do not interfere on time, and in most of the cases, the victims are being detained instead of the perpetrators. The victims are accused of disrupting 'the social and public order', and perpetrators are usually not punished. As in the case of Guatemala, this also contributes to the culture of violence by creating a reward mechanism for perpetrators, and machinery of fear for the victims.

Table 8 Violations of right to life in Turkey, 1999-2009

Year	Unsolved Murders	Extra-judicial killings/ as a result of torture/ by vigilantes/ suspicious and under detention	Killings during armed conflicts	Torture and brutality	Detained	Arrested
1999	212	205	857	594	50318	2105
2000	145	173	147	594	35007	1937
2001	160	55	92	862	44181	2955
2002	75	40	30	876	31217	1148
2003	50	44	104	1202	12406	1196
2004	47	47	240	1040	9711	774
2005	1	89	496	825	2702	621
2006	20	130	345	708	5560	1545
2007	42	66	424	678	7197	1440
2008	29	65	432	1546	11002	2387
2009	29	65	432	1546	11002	2387
2010	18	108	141	1835	7718	1923

Source: IHD (Human Rights Association).

Although, the justice system in Turkey is relatively stronger than Guatemala, impunity and the effects of it reveal to be similar. It creates an environment of fear on behalf of the victims and a reinforcement mechanism for the perpetrators. In Turkey, impunity leaves its mark on society similar to the case of Guatemala. The state establishes social control by almost 'subcontracting' citizens in order to compensate for its weakness in societal dimension. Impunity is an unofficial way of allowing this mechanism. The case of Ali Ismail Korkmaz, who was beaten to death during the Gezi protests in Turkey by civilians with the help of civilian police, reveals the collaboration of the state institutions and the perpetrators. The footage of the incident went missing immediately after his death, which severely undermined the prosecution process. It should be noted that this incident is not necessarily related to the AKP government, but there is pattern in establishing social control by relying on citizens' violence on other citizens which is

political in nature, and the state enables this by creating an environment of impunity and immunity.

To conclude with, in this chapter, I argued that when compared with Guatemalan society, Turkey is shown to have the characteristics of the culture of violence. Spheres of tolerance and indifference to violence, the idea of internal enemy combined with fear and distrust result in a society that is plagued with citizen-led political violence. In Guatemala, the persistence of such environment in society is as a result of weak state and the legacies of the state violence. The significance is that in the Turkish state, although the culture of violence affect society altogether, usually the citizens, who embrace the ideology of the state act as if they are subcontracted by the state in order to establish social control.

Conclusion

In this thesis, by conducting a paired comparison, I delved into sociological explanations of citizen-led political violence in Guatemala and Turkey. The puzzle that led to this research is related to the premise of strong states being less susceptible to internal conflict, as well as political violence. The drive for this research emerged from the puzzle of the existence of similar forms of citizen-led political violence in Turkey and Guatemala, despite the former being a strong and the latter being a weak state.

In order to analyze two cases, I demonstrated the strength of the Turkish state vis-à-vis the Guatemalan. Firstly, I aggregated the indicators for state capacity specifically political violence research under three dimensions: security, fiscal and societal. Based on these dimension, I utilized databases of the World Governance Indicators, World Development Indicators, and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Values Survey, and Latinobarometer, in order to compare two cases. I demonstrated that the Turkish state is indeed strong, and Guatemalan is weak.

In order to scrutinize similar forms of political violence, I did content analysis on the reports of several human rights organization, both local and international. I analyzed the sides involved in the conflict, forms and reasons of political violence, in order to understand the pattern. In line with my research, I found that the culture of violence, which is mostly attributed to the post-conflict settings as in the case of Guatemala, is also found in Turkish society. The characteristics of the culture of violence are constituted of 'the spheres of tolerance and indifference to violence, the idea of 'internal enemy' and the effects of impunity'. Based on the analysis, I argued that Turkey shows the characteristics of the culture of violence as in Guatemala.

The significance of this research relies on the fact that in Turkey, the state utilizes the culture of violence of society, in order to compensate for its weakness in state-society relations. In Guatemala, the culture of violence manifests itself on the side of the victims, whereas in Turkey, it is manifested on the side of the perpetrators. The societal dimension, which is relatively weaker than other dimensions of the Turkish state, is compensated by citizens, in order to establish social control. This is related to state-in-society approach that I adopted in the analysis.

There are several limitations to this research. Firstly, the conclusions that I arrived are not generalizable, thus they are region-specific. Secondly, relying solely on the reports of human rights organizations reveals only the tip of the iceberg. As Nordstrom and Robben elaborately put forward, the "emphasis on how people come to grips with life under siege, on the experience, practice, and everydayness of violence, makes attention to fieldwork conditions necessary" (Nordstrom and Robben 1995, 3). For exposing the wider frame, further research, especially ethnographic and field research is needed.

Appendices

Appendix A

Security Dimension	Guatemala				Turkey			
	1990[1]	2000	2010	2015	1990[1]	2000	2010	2015
Population, total (millions)	9,16	11,69	14,73	16,34	53,99	63,24	72,31	78,67
Military expenditure (% GDP)	1,5	0,8	0,4	0,4	3,5	3,7	2,5	2,1
Rule of law	11,96	18,18	16,59	15,38	48,33	50,24	59,24	55,29
Government effectiveness	34,15	35,12	28,71	24,52	30,84	59,02	64,59	62,50
Regulatory quality	42,65	47,06	48,80	47,60	59,31	56,86	60,29	64,42
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	16,91	19,32	19,91	23,81	10,63	20,29	18,48	9,52

*Based on Worldwide Governance Indicators and World Development Indicators.
[1]The indicators of the rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and political stability and absence of violence/terrorism are based on 1996 due to lack of data availability. For these indicators, numbers are based on the percentile rank.
[2]Based on 1993 data.

Fiscal Dimension	Guatemala				Turkey			
	1990*	2000	2010	2015	1990*	2000	2010	2015
Population, total (millions)	9,16	11,69	14,73	16,34	53,99	63,24	72,31	78,67
Adjusted net national income per capita	733,30	1430,76	2347,89	3280,31	2574,39	3871,48	9426,86	8375,03
GDP (current US$) (billions)	17,65	19,29	41,34	63,79	150,68	266,57	731,14	717,88
Tax revenue (% of GDP)	6,9	10,1	10,4	10,9	20,0	36,6	20,5	21,8
Poverty headcount ratio at $1,90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)	38,0	10,1	11,5	9,3	1,6	1,7	0,8	0,3
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)	3,27	4,74	6,34	7,53	6,03	9,21	16,39	19,74
Public expenditure on health (% of GDP)	1,57[1]	1,91	2,38	2,33[2]	1,76[1]	3,11	4,41	4,19[2]
Public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	1,67[3]	-	2,80	2,95	3,37[3]	2,59	-	-

*Based on World Development Indicators.
[1] Based on 1995 data.
[2] Based on 2014 data.
[3] Based on 1993 data.

Appendix B

	TOTAL	Guatemala			
Confidence in police		**1996-2000**	**2001-2005**	**2006-2010**	**2011-2015**
A lot of confidence	6	6	5,6	4,4	6,67
Some confidence	16	23,75	12,8	16,4	15
Little confidence	37	43	34,4	36,2	38,67
No confidence at all	40	27,25	47,8	43	40,67
(N)	**17,12**	**866**	**964,2**	**976,2**	**987,67**

*All cells are based on percentages.

Source: Latinobarometer

	TOTAL	Turkey				
		1989-1993	**1994-1998**	**1999-2004**	**2005-2009**	**2010-2014**
Confidence: The Police						
A great deal	39	30	37	38	44	38
Quite a lot	34	32	35	33	34	37
Not very much	14	23	14	13	13	15
None at all	13	15	14	16	9	10
(N)	**12,599**	**1,011**	**1,871**	**4,535**	**3,6**	**1,582**

*All cells are based on percentages.

Source: World Values Survey

	TOTAL	Guatemala			
Confidence in the judiciary		**1996-2000**	**2001-2005**	**2006-2010**	**2011-2015**
A lot of confidence	5	5,75	5,4	3,6	6,33
Some confidence	20	29	14	22	16,67
Little confidence	42	43,25	36,4	44	44,00
No confidence at all	33	22	44	30,4	33,33
(N)	**16,651**	877,5	945	929,2	929,33

*All cells are based on percentages.

Source: Latinobarometer

	TOTAL	Turkey				
		1989-1993	**1994-1998**	**1999-2004**	**2005-2009**	**2010-2014**
Confidence: Armed Forces						
A great deal	62	59	71	61	66	45
Quite a lot	25	32	23	25	22	31
Not very much	7	7	4	6	7	15
None at all	6	2	2	8	5	9
(N)	**12,617**	**1,016**	**1,884**	**4,544**	**3,606**	**1,568**

* All cells are based on percentages.

Source: World Values Survey

	TOTAL	Guatemala			
Confidence in the armed forces		**1996-2000**	**2001-2005**	**2006-2010**	**2011-2015**
A lot of confidence	12	9,75	7,8	8	22,00
Some confidence	22	27,75	19	25,2	23,67
Little confidence	35	40,25	32	37,2	32,33
No confidence at all	31	22,5	45,6	29,8	22,67
(N)	**16,819**	**876,25**	**946,4**	**942,8**	**965**

*****All cells are based on percentages.

Source: Latinobarometer

	TOTAL	Turkey				
		1989-1993	**1994-1998**	**1999-2004**	**2005-2009**	**2010-2014**
Confidence: The Civil Services						
A great deal	17	20	15	16	19	15
Quite a lot	45	30	53	45	45	45
Not very much	23	36	19	20	23	28
None at all	15	14	13	19	13	12
(N)	**12,356**	**1,004**	**1,856**	**4,507**	**3,452**	**1,536**

*****All answers are based on percentages.

Source: World Values Survey

	TOTAL	Turkey				
		1989-1993	**1994-1998**	**1999-2004**	**2005-2009**	**2010-2014**
Confidence: Justice System/Courts						
A great deal	33	3	7	3	15	5
Quite a lot	38	4	7	4	15	7
Not very much	17	3	4	2	5	3
None at all	17	1	2	3	3	2
(N)	**17**	**11**	**20**	**13**	**39**	**17**

*****All cells are based on percentages.

	TOTAL	Guatemala							
		1996	**2001**	**2005**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2013**
Confidence in public administration									
A lot	4	7	3	2	7	3	5	2	6
Some	21	34	16	20	19	22	20	17	18
Little	45	52	54	40	34	48	47	46	41
None	30	6	28	38	41	26	29	35	35
(N)	**7,327**	**869**	**958**	**970**	**880**	**906**	**908**	**880**	**956**

*****All cells are based on percentages.

Source: Latinobarometer

Appendix C

Civilian victims of Citizen-led Political Violence in Turkey

	Civilian Victims of Political Violence											
Years	Students		Local administration		Journalists		Political actors (Labor union leaders and members, party leaders and members)		Other (including, artists, civilians, teachers, workers)		Total	
	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured
2002	0	48	0	11	0	28	6	96	1	26	7	209
2003	0	99	0	9	0	66		19		15		222
2004	2	36	1	10	0	36	22	386	3	81	28	535
2005	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
2006	N/a	0	0	10	0	29	0	13	0	0	0	52
2007	1	68	2	6	4	20		36	4	131	11	261
2008	0	115		1	0	6	1	27	1	16	2	165
2009	0	111	3	5	2	10	4	152	27	284	36	562
2010	0	84	1	5	0	7	0	54	0	53	2	203
2011	1	43	1	0	0	2	0	65	38	114	40	224
2012		25	1	2	0	3	0	0	67	358	68	398
2013	1	111	0	0	0	3	2	59	74	311	77	481
2014	0	197	N/a	N/a	5	8	5	123	19	154	29*	482*
2015	2	88	N/a	N/a	3	5	1	16	18	233	24*	342*

Source: IHD annual statistics on human rights violations.

*Police and military members are excluded from the data of 2014 and 2015. In 2015 the incidents in Diyarbakır, Urfa and Ankara are excluded since they the killings happened because of the terrorist acts of ISIS and TAK.

*In 2005 the statistics did not differentiate between the civilian attacks.

Reference List

Amnesty International. 2002. *Guatemala: Guatemala's Lethal Legacy: Past Impunity and Renewed Human Rights Violations.* Last access on May, 2017 from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR34/001/2002/en/

Amnesty International. 1997. Guatemala: State of impunity. Last access on June, 2017 from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr34/002/1997/en/

Aydin, Ahmet Hamdi. 1995. "A Comparative Study of Police Organisation and Legitimacy in England & Wales and Turkey: The Case for Centralisation and Decentralisation." Ph.D., Ann Arbor, United States. http://0-search.proquest.com.seyhan.library.boun.edu.tr/docview/301485409/abstract/9A9CB862233D43C9PQ/1.

Barkey, Henri J. 2000. "The Struggles of A 'strong' state." *Journal of International Affairs; New York* 54 (1): 87–105. http://0-search.proquest.com.seyhan.library.boun.edu.tr/docview/220693248/abstract/B716EAD7B5534057PQ/1.

Belge, Ceren. 2011. "State Building and the Limits of Legibility: Kinship Networks and Kurdish Resistance in Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43 (i): 95–114.

Benson, Peter, Edward F. Fischer, and Kedron Thomas. 2008. "Resocializing Suffering: Neoliberalism, Accusation, and the Sociopolitical Context of Guatemala's New Violence." *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (5): 38–58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27648119.

Blattman, Christopher, and Edward Miguel. 2010. "Civil War." *Journal of Economic Literature* 48 (1): 3–57. doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.3.

Bozarslan, Hamit. 2009. "Bir 'Bölücü' ve 'Birleştirici' Olarak Şiddet." *Toplum ve Bilim* 116: 6–20.

Briscoe, Ivan. 2009. "A Criminal Bargain: The State and Security in Guatemala." FRIDE. http://fride.org/descarga/WP88_Guatemala_state_ENG_oct09.pdf.

Cárdenas, Mauricio. 2010. "State Capacity in Latin America." *Economía* 10 (2): 1–45. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25800045.

CEH. 1999. "Guatemala: Memory of Silence." Guatemala City: CEH: Commission for Historical Clarification. https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (4): 563–95. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3488799.

Conteh-Morgan, Earl. 2004. *Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts*. New York and London: Routledge.

Cook, Steven A. 2007. *Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Della Porta, Donatella. 1995. *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2013. *Clandestine Political Violence*. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Englehart, Neil A. 2009. "State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights." *Journal of Peace Research* 46 (2): 163–80. doi:10.1177/0022343308100713.

Evans, Ivan, ed. 2009. "Introduction." In *Cultures of Violence*, 1–26. Lynching and Racial Killing in South Africa and the American South. Manchester University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt155j9kj.4.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” *The American Political Science Review*.
Fumerton, Mario, and Simone Remijnse. 2004. “Civil Defence Forces: Perus’s Comites de Autodefensa Civil and Guatemala’s Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil in Comparative Perspective.” In *Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America*, edited by Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt. London ; New York: Zed Books.
Gambetti, Zeynep. 2007. “Linç Girişimleri, Neoliberalizm ve G Güvenlik Devleti” 109: 7–34.
Gastil, Raymond D. 1971. “Homicide and a Regional Culture of Violence.” *American Sociological Review* 36 (3): 412–27. doi:10.2307/2093082.
Godoy, Angelina Snodgrass. 2002. “Lynchings and the Democratization of Terror in Postwar Guatemala: Implications for Human Rights.” *Human Rights Quarterly* 24 (3): 640–61. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20069623.
———. 2004. “When ‘Justice’ Is Criminal: Lynchings in Contemporary Latin America.” *Theory and Society* 33 (6): 621–51. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4144904.
———. 2006. *Popular Injustice : Violence, Community, and Law in Latin America*. Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2006.
Green, Linda. 1995. “Living in a State of Fear.” In *Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*, edited by Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius C. G. M. Robben, 105–27. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Günay, Defne. 2014. “Europeanization of State Capacity and Foreign Policy: Turkey in the Middle East.” *Mediterranean Politics* 19 (2): 220–37. doi:10.1080/13629395.2013.817754.
Gurr, Robert Ted. 1991. “Theories of Political Violence and Revolution in the Third World.” In *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, edited by Francis Mading Deng and I. William Zartman, 153–89. Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution.
Hendrix, Cullen S. 2010. “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict.” *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (3): 273–85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20752162.
Heper, Metin. 1985. *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Beverley, North Humberside : Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Eothen Press ; Distributed in the U.S.A. by HumanitiesPress.
———. 1988. “The State and Politics in Turkey.” *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 12 (2): 96–102. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43384219.
———. 1992. “The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy.” *Comparative Political Studies* 25 (2): 169.
Heper, Metin, and E. Fuat Keyman. 1998. “Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34 (4): 259–77. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283977.
Holsti, K. J. 1996. *The State, War, and the State of War*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations 51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Human Rights Watch. Guatemala: Political Violence Unchecked. Guatemala Mission Findings. August 18-22, 2002. Retrieved on May , 2017 from http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/guatemission.htm
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Insan Hakları Derneği [Human Rights Foundation]. 2010. *İhd İstanbul Şubesi 2005-2010 Yillari Arasinda Gerçekleşen Etnik Linç Olaylari Raporu.* Accessed on May, 2017 from http://www.ihd.org.tr/ihd-istanbul-subesi-2005-2010-yillari-arasinda-gerceklesen-etnik-linc-olaylari-raporu/

Insan Hakları Derneği [Human Rights Foundation].1995-2015 *Annual Human Rights Violations Reports*. Last accessed on June, 2017 from http://www.ihd.org.tr/td_d_slug_2/

Insan Hakları Derneği[Human Rights Foundation].1994-2015 Annual Statistics of Human Rights Violations. Last accessed on May, 2017 from http://www.ihd.org.tr/sample-page-2/

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

———. 2009. "Civil Wars." In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, edited by Carles Boix and Stokes. http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199566020-e-18.

Karaman, M. Lutfullah, and Bulent Aras. 2000. "The Crisis of Civil Society in Turkey." *Journal of Economic & Social Research* 2 (2): 39. http://it.ceu.hu/vpn.

Koonings, Kees, and Dirk Kruijt. 1999. *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America*. Zed Books.

———. , eds. 2004. *Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America*. London ; New York: Zed Books.

Krakowski, Krzysztof. 2016. "State Capacity and Violence in Civil War: Counterintuitive Evidence from Colombia." *Politologická Revue (Czech Political Science Review)*, no. 1: 97–116. http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-9a66ae56-753a-44a4-b9b0-86a1b0a822cb.

Lee, Matthew R., William B. Bankston, Timothy C. Hayes, and Shaun A. Thomas. 2007. "Revisiting the Southern Culture of Violence." *Sociological Quarterly* 48 (2): 253–75. doi:10.1111/j.1533-8525.2007.00078.x.

Mann, Michael. 1984. "The Autonomous Power of the State : Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results." *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie* 25 (2): 185–213. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23999270.

Manz, Beatriz. 2008. "The Continuum of Violence in Post-War Guatemala." *Social Analysis* 52 (2): 151–64. doi:10.3167/sa.2008.520209.

Mardin, Şerif. 1973. "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus* 102 (1): 169–90. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024114.

Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States : State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press.

———. 1994. "The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles of Domination." In *State Power and Social Forces*, 7–37. United States of America: Cambridge University Press.

Migdal, Joel S., Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue. 1994. *State Power and Social Forces : Domination and Transformation in the Third World*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge [England] : Cambridge University Press.

Muller, Edward N. 1985. "Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence." *American Sociological Review* 50 (1): 47–61. doi:10.2307/2095339.

Muller, M. 1996. "Nationalism and the Rule of Law in Turkey: The Elimination of Kurdish Representation during the 1990s." *International Journal of Kurdish Studies* 10 (i–ii): 9–44.

Nelson, Diane. 2009. *Reckoning: The Ends of War in Guatemala*. Duke University Press.

Nordstrom, Carolyn, and Antonius C. G. M. Robben. 1995. "Introduction." In *Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*, 1–23. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Öniş, Ziya. 1998. *State and Market: The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective*. Yayın No 583. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University.

Reenen, Piet van. 2004. “Policing Extensions in Latin America.” In *Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America*, edited by Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, 978-1-84277-444-1-1-84277-445–48. London ; New York: Zed Books.

Richani, Nazih. 2010. “State Capacity in Postconflict Settings: Explaining Criminal Violence in El Salvador and Guatemala.” *Civil Wars* 12 (4): 431–55. doi:10.1080/13698249.2010.534630.

Rotberg, Robert I. 2003. “Chapter 1 - ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators’ [in] State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror.” In *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, edited by Robert I. Rotberg, 1–25. Cambridge, Mass: World Peace Foundation. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk/secure/link?id=875521ab-3166-e611-80c6-005056af4099.

Ruhl, J. 2011. “Guatemala: A Failing State?” *Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center*, July. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/whemsac/12.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. “What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (6): 814–58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149797.

Sayari, Sabri. 2010. “Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22 (2): 198–215. doi:10.1080/09546550903574438.

Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. 2008. “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options.” *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 294–308. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20299733.

Soifer, Hillel David. 2012. “Measuring State Capacity in Contemporary Latin America.” *Revista de Ciencia Política, Vol 32, Iss 3, Pp 585-598 (2012)*, no. 3: 585.

Soyaltin, Digdem. 2017. “Public Sector Reforms to Fight Corruption in Turkey: A Case of Failed Europeanization?” *Turkish Studies* 0 (0): 1–20. doi:10.1080/14683849.2017.1314185.

Steenkamp, Christina. 2005. “The Legacy of War: Conceptualizing a ‘Culture of Violence’ to Explain Violence after Peace Accords.” *Round Table* 94 (379): 253–67. doi:10.1080/00358530500082775.

———. 2014. *Violent Societies : Networks of Violence in Civil War and Peace / Christina Steenkamp*. Rethinking Political Violence. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tarrow, Sidney. 2010. “The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice.” *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (2): 230–59. doi:10.1177/0010414009350044.

Tarrow, Sidney G. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1985. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter Evans, Theda Skocpol, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 169–91. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. http://it.ceu.hu/vpn.

———. 2003. *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Türkiye İnsan Hakları Derneği. [Human Rights Foundation of Turkey]. *1999-2014 Annual Human Rights Reports.* Last access on June, 2017 from http://tihv.org.tr/category/tihv_yayinlari/yillik-insan-haklari-raporlari/

Waldmann, Peter. 2007. “Is There a Culture of Violence in Colombia?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19 (4): 593–609. doi:10.1080/09546550701626836.

Weber, Max. 1991. “Politics as a Vocation.” In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 77–128. International Library of Sociology. Social Theory and Methodology 4. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

White, David, and Marc Herzog. 2016. “Examining State Capacity in the Context of Electoral Authoritarianism, Regime Formation and Consolidation in Russia and Turkey.” *Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies* 16 (4): 551–69. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1242891.

Whitehead, Laurence. 2002. *Democratization: Theory and Experience*. Oxford Studies in Democratization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Datasets

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Laura Saxer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, and Jeffrey Staton. 2017. “V-Dem Codebook v7.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Sarkees, Meredith Reid, and Frank Wayman. 2010. “Resort to War: 1816 - 2007.” Washington DC: CQ Press.

The Fund for Peace. Fragile States Index. (http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/)

The World Bank. World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators)

Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016

UNODC Statistics. Crime and Criminal Justice Database. (https://data.unodc.org/)

Worldwide Governance Indicators (www.govindicators.org).