NEGOTIATING
EAST/WEST & NORTH/SOUTH
BORDERS AND BOUNDARIES IN
AUSTRIAN ASYLUM POLITICS 2015-16

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Abstract

In the literature dealing with European migration policy a critical intersectional analysis that understands migration control in relation to nationalism is mostly missing. With my thesis, I aim to fill this gap and analyze shifts in the construction of the Austrian nation from summer 2015 to spring 2016 through a feminist lens. Over the course of half a year, Austrian asylum politics saw radical changes, from open borders policies and a rhetoric of humanitarianism to the initiation of the closure of the ‘Balkan route’, which was accompanied by a language of securitization. Through an interdisciplinary approach and working with Critical Discourse Analysis I look at governmental media work, policies and legal changes of that time to see how the borders and boundaries of the Austrian nation are (re)produced. Building on theoretical insights from feminist perspectives on nationalism, biopolitical theory and postcolonial studies and combining them with historical-materialist approaches within migration studies, I show how the legitimation of migration policy making builds on gendered, liberal and racialized tropes, figuring in the ‘economic migrant’- ‘war refugee’ binary. Fundamentally, I argue that across the transition the nation was coherently reproduced by the government, situating the Austrian nation on East-West and North-South axes. With a European context, I aim to demonstrate how discussions of migration policies work to differentiate Austria as ‘Western’ and thus morally superior from Hungary and the Balkans, and how this distinction revolves around the topics of smugglers and fences. I argue that for the formation and maintenance of ‘Austria’ with a global context fundamentally relies upon the racist (post)colonial mobilization of ‘Europeanness’ and ‘humanity’. As such, asylum politics are directly connected to national and supranational political agendas through gendered mechanisms intertwined with economic and racialized arguments and thus their analysis gives insight into modern European nationalism.
Declaration of Original Research and the Word Count

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of original research; it contains no materials accepted for any other degree in any other institution and no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

I further declare that the following word count for this thesis are accurate:

   Body of thesis (all chapters excluding notes, references, appendices, etc.): 28,834 words
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Signed ________________ Anna Wodička
# Table of Contents

Introduction: The long summer of migration and its abrupt end .................................................. 1  
1. Immigration control, nationalism and the Austrian case in literature ........................................ 8  
   1.1. European immigration control: On ‘governance’ and ‘management’ ................................. 8  
   1.2. The Austrian nation and the framing of immigration control ........................................... 12  
2. Theoretical Framework .............................................................................................................. 18  
   2.1. Feminist studies of the nation: gender and vulnerability ..................................................... 18  
   2.2. Global capital, migration, law and the nation ...................................................................... 23  
   2.3. Coloniality, biopolitics and racialization: ‘Civilization’ and death ...................................... 28  
3. Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 36  
   3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis .................................................................................................... 36  
   3.2. Key materials of the shift ...................................................................................................... 36  
      3.2.1. Chosen sources and party politics context .................................................................. 37  
      3.2.2. The four clusters of events .......................................................................................... 40  
4. Producing boundaries of the nation: The ‘war refugee’ - ‘economic migrant’ division .......... 44  
   4.1. Creation and background of the division .............................................................................. 44  
   4.2. The ‘war refugee’: on vulnerability and order ...................................................................... 47  
   4.3. The ‘economic migrant’: undeservedness and lack of authenticity .................................... 53  
5. Austria in EU and global politics – Negotiating East/West and North/South .......................... 62  
   5.1. Austria, Hungary and the Balkans: smugglers and fences ..................................................... 62  
      4.1.1. Smugglers: Balkan masculinity and the difference to border crossing helpers .......... 64  
      4.1.2. Fences: Depoliticization and national securitization ................................................... 71  
   5.2. The global scale: ‘Humanity’-security, white supremacy and colonial continuities .......... 79  
6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 89  
Appendix ......................................................................................................................................... 92  
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................... 94
Introduction: The long summer of migration and its abrupt end

“The Hungarian Premier Orban thinks, in contrast to us, that problems can be solved with razor wire. This is not a reception for those, who are in need of help and in fear of their lives.”
Werner Faymann, Chancellor, Austria, 05.09.2015

“The clear decision has been made that the times of waving though at the Western Balkan route have to stop. That means that the Balkan route has come to an end.”
Werner Faymann, Chancellor, Austria, 08.03.2016

If we look at the two quotes juxtaposed above – both official statements of the Austrian Chancellor on Austrian border policies – we can get a sense for the dramatic shift that the government has made from summer 2015 to spring 2016. The summer of 2015, commonly called the ‘long summer of migration,’ saw huge increases in the number of people who were travelling along the so-called Balkan route to seek protection, Austria was the first nation to open its border to Hungary and allow these people to freely travel through at the beginning of September 2015; just several months later, however, Austria was also the country that initiated the ‘closing’ of the route in March 2016. This shift in policy paralleled the rhetoric employed by the Austrian government. During that summer and through that September, the Austrian government was still drawing on humanitarian rhetoric to heavily criticize Hungarian asylum and border politics, not least of all the building of a fence along its Serbian border. Several months later, Austria established a system of fences itself, and, with the ‘closure’ of the Balkan route to cross helped to cement a whole network of militarized borders around Europe, as it facilitated border closings and controls all along the route.

I have followed the news about Austria’s changing position over this period with horror and

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1 All translations from German to English are done by me.
2 The Balkan route is a term used for the travel route from Greece, through the Balkans, Hungary to Austria. It was coined in 2015 which the increasing number of people seeking international protection in 2015, who took the route.
contempt. This political shift did not happen suddenly; it slowly spread over a span of nearly seven months. It showed in multiple events, including but not limited to legal changes, border policies and, most visibly, the way in which the government and media represented the Austrian nation, its borders, migration and specifically asylum. As I read about the introduction of the first fence at the Austrian-Slovenian border, about the introduction of upper limits for asylum applications, that the asylum law would be changed to give only ‘temporary asylum’, about the EU-Turkey deal, I held on to the hope that, at each point, the regime could not and would not get more repressive. And yet, it consistently did.

By March 2017, Austrian media statements about people on the move were so starkly different from those statements wrapped in humanitarian rhetoric that I read just six months earlier, it seemed surreal that this shift could happen in such a short time. I started my research from here. I wanted to know what might make a 180° turn such as this not only possible but acceptable. I wanted to know what discursive mechanisms allow the Austrian government to justify such changes without also losing its legitimacy, what mechanisms allow for the Austrian nation to continue to present its position and its political location coherently. In other words, throughout the changes in Austrian asylum politics and surrounding representations, how are the borders and boundaries of the Austrian nation (re)produced, and what does it tell us about the dominant construction of the nation?

To make sense of Austria’s national boundary drawing, it is important to see the shift not as isolated: Austria is part of a neoliberal capitalist world order, of the European Union, which has established an increasingly militarized border regime over the last few years.3 Austria is without question

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3 Especially noteworthy is the restructuring of FRONTEX, The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, from an EU agency mostly coordinating the border control efforts of member states to an agency focusing mainly on securitization of borders through push-backs.
situated in a world deeply entrenched with patriarchal and racist structures; its current form is build upon colonial histories. In addition to and apart from these wider structures influencing Austrian position, Austria was not alone in its move towards more repressive border policies; in reaction to the movement of people in 2015, varying degrees of right-wing politics and more explicit articulations of nationalism were and are on the rise all along the Balkan route. Despite this broader trend, the Austrian case is particularly interesting for the study of nationalism and asylum politics for three significant reasons: first, because of the rapidity of shifting dynamics in this nation; second, because of its geopolitical position, symbolically at the border between what is seen as Western Europe and what is seen as Eastern Europe; and third, as a country of transit as well as a country of destination for people seeking international protection.

Migration policy has widely been explained through approaches of ‘migration management’ and ‘governance’ (for international context see for example Betts, 2011; Hansen et al., 2011; Kunz et al., 2011; in the Austrian context for example Fassmann/Münz, 1995). Such approaches cut migrants out of the picture, while centering state structures and leaving the nation-state unquestioned. My research stands in opposition to such approaches of migration policy studies: instead of naturalizing the nation-state by accepting a ‘management’ approach, I will turn the gaze towards it. Following Liisa H. Malkki’s (1995) urge to see the study of the international refugee regime as an opportunity to illuminate the “wider national order of things” (516), my research takes up a denaturalizing and questioning position (517) towards the nation in the research of migration policy.

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4 On my use of terms: In my analysis, I am not interested in separating displacement from other forms of migration or differentiating ‘refugees’ from ‘asylum seekers’ from ‘migrants’. Rather than drawing on the legal and political distinctions, I am interested in the way such differentiations are discursively set up to give insight into the way the boundaries of the Austrian nation are drawn. As I am looking at the Austrian discussion in relation to asylum related policies, I refer to the migrants affected as ‘people seeking international protection’ or ‘people seeking asylum’. For paraphrasing or summarizing other authors’ work, I stick to their choice of terminology.
Building on the work of Craig Calhoun (1997), Anne McClintock (1993) and Étienne Balibar (1990), among others, I understand the ‘Western’ nation as embedded within capitalist relations of production and nationalism as a highly gendered and racialized discourse. I draw from feminist literature on nationalism and combine it with insights from historical-materialist migration studies and postcolonial studies, as well as biopolitical theory that focuses on racialization, in order to make sense of the way that nationalism is articulated in relation to migration policy.

In order to scrutinize Austria’s shift in migration policy, I work with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of textual material – including national government-issued press releases, policy papers, legal texts and to a limited extend media coverage – which helps us understand the shift of the Austrian government’s position and places the nationalist discourse within a wider context. My research is thus very much centered around the government’s position, being articulated through government officials and the official media channels of the two governing parties. With my focus on the construction of the Austrian nation’s boundaries over the course of a one-year period, I neither look at differences and nuances within the two governing parties, nor will I go into details about the ways in which opposition parties including the Right-Wing influence the discussion. My intentional focus on the government parties allows me to understand the shift performed by the most dominant players of the state and their narratives in more depth.

I have chosen four clusters of events to focus on in order to show the shift of the government’s position, including: 1) the death of 71 refugees in the lorry at the border between Hungary and Austria and the opening of the border to Hungary at the end of summer 2015, 2) plans for the first fence in Austria in November 2015, which was framed as ‘management system’ 3) the introduction of upper limits and legal amendments restricting family reunification and instating ‘temporary
asylum’ and the building of more fences in January and February 2016 and, finally, 4) the ‘closure’ of the Balkan route and the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016.

My main argument is that the transition in Austrian policy and positioning that I have outlined is legitimized through the construction of national boundaries through gendered and economic tropes, both of which are bound up in racialized arguments and surface through the constructed binary of the ‘war refugee’ and the ‘economic migrant’. These national boundaries are used furthermore to position Austria as distinct both from other European countries and from non-‘Western’ contexts within East-West and North-South coordinates. While the fluidity of border politics reaped very real impacts on the lives of people seeking asylum along the Balkan route, I do not view this shift as one that changed the underlying fundamentals of the Austrian nation. Rather, I see the whole period from summer 2015 to spring 2016 characterized by a nationalism that manages to position the Austrian nation as distinct from Eastern European as well as from non-European countries. In this light, the question that I posed at the beginning – regarding how significant national adjustments to migration policy are viewed as legitimate – is answered in so far as I show that the differences in the way the boundaries are constructed lead back to the same basis, and are thus not in fundamental contradiction. Although the tropes of the ‘economic migrant’ and the ‘war refugee’ are used in different periods of time, the construction of these tropes and thus the boundaries of the nation always rely on gendered, liberal economic and racialized mechanisms that situate the nation in a European and global context.

In chapter 1, I look at the way academia conceptualizes migration policy. I outline the ‘migration management’ approach and its flaws, and emphasize the importance of the use of approaches with focus on the labeling and instrumentalization of migrants. Pointing to the failure of existing research on migration policy to both utilize and examine the concept of nationalism I then turn
over to the Austrian case. After giving a brief historical account of Austria and its migration history, I give an account of the academic literature on Austrian migration policy and nationalism.

In chapter 2, I present my theoretical framework, which brings feminist theories of the nation and nationalism in conversation with approaches to the connection between global capital, migration, law and the nation, and theories on coloniality, biopolitics and ‘race’. In this chapter I lay the foundation for an intersectional approach to nationalism and migration policy, which I will use to make sense of my material.

In chapter 3 on methodology, I outline the method of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which guides my analysis. I introduce the textual materials of my research and give contextual information pertaining to the party-political landscape of Austria. Furthermore, I introduce in more detail the clusters of events around which the textual material that I draw from are centered.

In chapter 4, Producing boundaries of the nation: The ‘war refugee’– ‘economic migrant’ division, I define and work through the main tropes along which the boundaries of acceptance to the Austrian nation are produced and argue that the main lines are gendered and economic, with both bound up in racialized arguments. I describe the creation of the division between so called ‘war refugees’ and so called ‘economic migrants,’ and how this division is mobilized to legitimize state actions. I see those two figures, based on notions of vulnerability, authenticity and deservedness, as crucial tools to understand the way the Austrian nation is furthermore positioned within symbolic geographies, and which I outline in the next chapter.

In chapter 5, The global scale – Austria in East/West & North/South, I look at changes in Austrian policy and law, and the surrounding forms of representation during the ‘long summer of migration,’ along with its aftermath, all of which contribute to re-positioning the Austrian nation within a European and global context. In the first section, Austria, Hungary and the Balkans: On smugglers
and fences, I analyze the ways in which Austria is set in relation to other countries within Europe, particularly Hungary and the Balkans. I argue that the discussions of migration and migration policies work to differentiate Austria as distinct from the ‘East’ and describe how the legitimation of these shifts revolves around the two topics of smugglers and fences in gendered and economic terms. In the second section, I concentrate on the positioning of the Austrian nation along the axis of Global North – Global South and show that, for the formation and maintenance of ‘Austria,’ the racist (post)colonial mobilization of ‘Europeanness’ is fundamental. I argue that nationalism is prevalent throughout the whole period from summer 2015 to spring 2016, and that the seeming dichotomy of ‘humanity’ and ‘security’, these positions are fundamentally the same at their core, regardless of shifting rhetoric.

In my conclusion, I summarize my research, showing that in the discussion on migration from summer 2015 to spring 2016, nationalism and the multiple ways of boundary drawing is of crucial importance. I finally argue that an interdisciplinary approach towards nationalism is crucial to understand not only how the nation is constructed, but also to emphasize its relevance for the study of contemporary European migration and asylum policy.
1. Immigration control, nationalism and the Austrian case in literature

My approach to the nation as reproduced in the field of immigration control and asylum politics is interdisciplinary and crosses over various areas including besides gender studies, migration studies and nationalism studies also international relations and political science. To situate my research and show the importance of such an interdisciplinary approach, I will give an overview over the way immigration control is commonly discussed in the academic literature. First, I will look more generally at the way literature discusses immigration control and discuss the Eurocentric dehumanizing implications of such approaches. I will argue that the connection between migration politics and nationalism has often fallen short. In the second section, I will look more specifically at Austria and the main way immigration to Austria has been analyzed and framed in literature.

1.1. European immigration control: On ‘governance’ and ‘management’

Migration, and in particular also refugee movements and the policies and laws created in reaction to them have been described through various frameworks, focusing on the lived experiences, the implications for the countries of destination and origin or the underlying mechanisms of the control. In recent mainstream literature on immigration control, there is a wide tendency to talk about migration in terms of ‘governance’ and ‘management’. The focus of this mostly strongly eurocentric literature is on states, multilateral institutions and international organizations. One of the most known authors, Alexander Betts (2011) in his book *Global migration governance* gives a broad introduction into the arguments of the approach. He points out the wide variety of actors and the complex interplay of states and institutions beyond the state, which complicate the coordination and management of migration. The picture he paints of migration is one of South to North migration, of migration that needs to be dealt with, that needs to be managed by Northern
His arguments are very symptomatic of the field, as other authors such as Randal Hansen et al. (2011) and Rahel Kunz et al. (2011) are writing from with a similar approach of ‘governance’ and ‘problem solving’. Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud (2010) see migration management critically as the following:

First, it is a notion that is mobilized by actors to conceptualize and justify their increasing interventions in the migration field. This points to the role played by the agencies mentioned above and to the importance of their strategies and functioning. Second, migration management refers to a range of practices that are now part of migration policies, and that are often performed by the institutions that promote the notion; these include, for example, counter-trafficking efforts or so-called ‘capacity-building’ activities. And third, migration management relies on a set of discourses and on new narratives regarding what migration is and how it should be addressed. (1f)

The wide range of criticism (Georgi, 2007; Geiger/Pécoud, 2010; Rother, 2013) of the perspective of ‘migration governance’ fails in two main conceptual respects. First, it neglects individual migrants, migrant networks and other bottom-up structures and thus fails to see the agency, planning and strategies of people themselves. Among others, Stefan Rother (2013) has noted in response to the increasing popularity of those approaches “the almost complete absence of the migrants themselves as subjects rather than mere objects of the governance of migration.” (364) Such a state and institution centered perspective is thus conceptually prioritizing the interests of Northern structures of government and already linguistically cutting out migrants themselves from the center of discussion. To understand the importance of a certain abstract and technical terminology for such a perspective, it is worth to look outside of the discipline. For example, a very interesting study on the way in which a certain technical terminology shapes the scope of what is thinkable is Carol Cohn’s (1987) feminist ethnography of nuclear strategic analysts. She shows how the masculinist technocratic language used among the analysts allows to talk about nuclear weapons in a way that excludes discussion of death and suffering. Similarly, also James Ferguson (1990) shows in his book The Anti-Politics-Machine the importance of abstract,
technocratic language for the framing of events with the example of ‘development’. In the case of development projects that he is researching the language of the development discourse leads to a failure of recognizing real problems, while the projects can still be framed as success (67), and thus depoliticizes the projects, while their influence is strengthened. As in Cohn’s and Ferguson’s analysis, the state and institution centered scope of the ‘migration governance’ literature excludes thinking about migrants themselves and the effects of policies on their lives. Second, such literature of governance fails to see the ways in which those policies, shaped as they are through state structures, institutions and organizations are more than a mere technical response to migration, but themselves bound up in political interests and discourses beyond migration. The importance of the creation of certain discourses, “imaginaries” (Fortier, 2014) or “labels” (Zetter, 2007) around migration to justify certain immigration politics has been repeatedly emphasized by authors such as Anna-Marie Fortier (2012) and Roger Zetter (2007). For the case of forced migration, Roger Zetter’s (2007) has shown the way in which the refugee label gets formed, transformed and politicized. In his work he describes the way the refugee label changed within the last twenty years from a humanitarian discourse to a label that is increasingly driven by the need for management of globalized processes and migration patterns (172). He points out the strong connection to internal politics, arguing that the “claims to the refugee label are controlled by the draconian mix of deterrent measures and in-country policies and regulations. These new, and often pejorative labels, are created and embedded in political discourse, policy and practice.” (184) Understanding the shaping of immigration control based on this type of more critical approach allows us to see how certain discourses related to immigration not only legitimize control, but reproduce particular ideologies about the international order of things, nations and inclusion.

While the analysis of the mentioned work is useful, the connection between immigration policies
the (re)production of the nation are much less theorized. I agree to a certain extend with Christoph Reinprecht and Rossalina Latcheva (2016), who criticize methodological nationalism in migration studies, centering the nation-state as main category of analysis within the social sciences (2). But while research is often is contained within separated boxes of nation-states, the concept of nationalism and the importance of the nation in the shaping of border politics does not get sufficient attention.

The connection between European immigration control and nationalism is addressed by various authors. In 1951 Hannah Arendt (1973 [1951]) described the origins of totalitarian movements and linked antisemitism and imperialism to the capital accumulation of nation-states. Discussing racism, she pointed out the importance of an analysis of the racism of national states for understanding the criminalization and other framing of refugees. She thus links immigration and its control in Europe as one of the first authors to nationalism and racism (2, 10) and her influence shows in much of the later work.

Liisa H. Malkki (1995) gives a thoughtful summary of the genealogy of the study of refugees and the connection between displacement and “the national order of things” (495). She proposes to understand that displacement and movement “occur in the context of a system of territorial national states” and that it is useful to “contextualize the study of refugees in this national order of things […] instead of taking this order as given to such an extent that it becomes visible.” (Malkki 1995, 516). The importance of such an approach becomes clear for the context of the recent European situation with Fabiani Georgi (2007), who also theorizes about the connection between migration politics and nationalism. Even if the concept of nationalism is not at the core of his analysis, he sees migration control as legitimized through the fictive construction of national community (81).
As the nation-state serves as primary frame for solidarity, nationalism is allowing for the moral distinction between support for citizens and non-citizens (79).

To avoid seeing such an emphasis on the nation as disregarding wider structures, it is important to see the national level as connected to geopolitics. A good example of how questions of immigration control have been connected to geopolitical positioning is the work of Virginie Mamadouh (2012). For the context of France and the Netherlands she shows how the national political parties are taking influence in not only national, but local and supranational fields through the mobilization of different types of ‘invasion’ scenarios, which justify different policies on the various fields (395).

Having outlined the mainstream approach towards migration policy in a European context being so-called migration governance and migration management literature, while pointing out that the work connecting nationalism and immigration control remains rather peripheral and limited to certain contexts, I will now turn specifically towards the case study of Austria.

1.2. The Austrian nation and the framing of immigration control

In this section I will give a brief overview of the main authors and approaches to immigration control in Austria. After a brief look into basics of Austrian history as a nation and as a country of immigration and asylum, including the most important legal frameworks on an EU level, I will look at the most commonly cited authors writing on the topic and then proceed to more critical approaches. As I will outline, the connection between Austrian migration control and nationalism has rarely been subject of discussion. Due to this lack and the general lack of an analysis of immigration control with an intersectional theoretical framework, I hope to show that my approach offers a new perspective.

As a brief overview over the history of the state, the Republic of Austria was established in its
current frontiers in 1918, after World War I. In 1938 the Republic of Austria became integrated into Nazi Germany, supported by the majority of Austrian citizens, and after the end of World War II built as so-called Second Republic. The Austrian nation and nationalism was not developed simultaneously with the state, but manifested much late in the Second Republic (Beller, 2006; Bruckmüller, 2003). Rather, Peter Thaler (2001) the creation of the Austrian nation is an effort by national elites after World War II to change the manifested German national identity to an Austrian identity through historic images from pre-war times (2). My approach is similar to such an understanding of the Austrian nation as produced, but I do not aim towards a historical account, but want to show contemporary dynamics in nationalist discourses, based on the discussion of asylum politics.

Austria has a long tradition as country of immigration, emigration and transit. Due to the imperial history of the Habsburg Monarchy, the geographic position close to Eastern European countries at times of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain, and due to bilateral guest worker agreements after the second world war, Austria has seen a lot of migration in the 20th century. Since 1990, Austrian immigration laws have been increasingly tightened (Fassmann/Münz, 1995). As Herbert Langthaler and Helene Trauner (2009) summarize, the asylum system has since 1997 increasingly seen restrictions, which are meant to reduce the number of people applying for and receiving asylum.

The Austrian asylum system is not a solely national system. It is based on the Geneva Convention and the European Convention for Human Rights, as well as on EU guidelines (Langthaler/Trauner,

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5 For a more extensive overview over the history of the Republic of Austrian and its precedent territories see Steven Beller (2006).
On European and EU level there are agreements and conventions, which are entangled with national legislation. The two main ones in the field of border control are the Schengen agreement and the Dublin III Convention. The Schengen agreement (EUR-Lex 2009) is regulating border controls and entry conditions for third-country nationals and makes legal entry of people seeking asylum, for example with visa etc., impossible. To claim asylum, people have to cross borders without permission, which due to the geographic location of countries can happen only in the member states at the external borders. According to the Dublin III Convention (Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013), signed by all EU-members, a person can only apply for refugee status in one member state. The country through which a person first enters the EU, or in practice often where they are first registered, is required to handle the asylum claim. This means that any following country where asylum is claimed will generally return the person to the responsible state. Having set up this basic framework, I move now on the Austrian representation of migration policy in academia.

Despite the fact that Austria has been a country of immigration, Austria is usually not framed by politicians and citizens as country of immigration (Bauböck, 1996). This is in line borne out by the work of Leo Lucassen (2005), which shows that despite the migration numbers and facts that indicate otherwise, European nation-states tend to see themselves not as immigration nations (209). As he argues in the narratives of Western European histories “immigration just does not fit in […]

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6 The basic responsibility to handle claims of international protection and the principle of non-refoulement – the protection of persons from return to a country where they face persecution – are grounded in the Geneva Convention from 1951 and the European Convention of Human Rights. According to the Geneva Convention, refugees are defined as persons who cannot return to their country of origin due to “well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group […] or political opinion” (Goodwin-Gill 2014, 38). The European Convention of Human Rights is meant to protect human rights in Europe. Of special relevance in regards to international refugee protection law are Article 2, the right to life, Article 3, the prohibition of torture, and Article 5, the right to liberty and security (Council of Europe, 1950).

7 As the reception conditions, the detention practices, the chances for a positive decision on the asylum claim, as well as personal ties are very different for people in countries throughout the EU, people are trying to cross borders.
and the idea of stable and static national populations, disturbed only by occasional refugee movements, still has the upper hand” (198) In correlation to that framing of migration, Austria has a short history of the study of migration policy and the number of critical engagement with the topic remains until today very limited. In a well-researched history of Austrian studies of migration policy Berhard Perchining (2010) argues that it is the production of cultural homogeneity and nation-building in Austria since the 1970s, which lead to the suppression of and lack of funding for critical approaches to migration policy in the country, which is reflected in the academic literature until now (187).

The most prominent Austrian perspectives within the study of migration policy are those, which are in line with a governmental perspective on migration focusing on management of the labor market or demographics (193). The main authors working on the topic are since a long time Rainer Fassmann, and Rainer Münz, whose work follows the scheme of ‘migration management’ that I have outlined before. In their articles and books (such as in Fassmann/Findl/Münz, 1992) they describe migration to Austria in technocratic, economic terms and call for “coordinated migration policies of the industrial states of Europe” (78). Rainer Bauböck (1996) offers a more critical approach. In his historical analysis of Austrian migration policy, he argues that the main drive for the policies are security and economy and attests that since the Habsburg monarchy politics have made symbolic use of migrants (5). He states that “[p]olitical discourses which defined immigrants as outsiders have been instrumental in shaping the ideological profile of parties as well as the boundaries of an insecure national identity.” (5) Despite such important insights he does not move far from an approach of management, when he calls in his conclusions for solutions that evolve around “public security” (2004, 49) and prioritize the sustenance of a national welfare system (64). In a similar way the analysis of Christina Friesl, Katharina Renner and Renate Wieser (2010)
remains superficial, explaining rising racism and national pride as “fear of foreigners” and clings to the idea of a stronger democracy being able to react to such sentiments (31). Such analysis I see as fundamentally failing to understand the mechanisms and importance of nationalism in modernity, in as it does not reflect on the structural elements of nationalism such as its function within capitalism and the way it depends on gender and ‘race’.

Even if not directly connecting it to nationalism, in the last years a smaller number of authors have described migration policy and discussion of migration policy in more critical terms, mostly with their focus on either the sexist or the racist underpinnings of the discussion and drawing on insights from cultural studies. One of the earlier writings in that direction, is the discourse-historical work of Theo Van Leewan and Ruth Wodak (1999). In their rigorous close study of media discourse on immigration related rhetoric they show how particular framing of the nation is linked with migration policies. They show how a certain “emphasis on the humanitarian Austrian attitude justified the […] refusal to accept […] Romanian refugees, for though Austria is a traditional country of asylum, it is not a country to which ‘economic refugees’ might immigrate.” (125) Their work is a good example of how nationalist ideas work in relation to immigration control, although it lacks a closer look at the way the national boundaries are constructed in gendered, racialized and economic ways.

Other authors include among others members of the research group for critical migration studies [KritMi] such as Irene Messinger (2013), who works on the Austrian migration regime through looking at exclusionary marriage laws, Aleksandra Vederniak-Barsegiani (2015), who illuminates migration policies through the lens of Georgian migrants resistance and Assimina Goua and Ilker Atac (2012) giving a theoretical analysis of migration studies within political science in Austria. While studies such as these remain at the margins of (well-funded) Austrian academia, they offer
important insights in current forms of the Austrian migration regime. Nevertheless, they do not sufficiently account for the strong connection that I see between the discussion of immigration policies and the nation form. One author who makes this connection more visible is Paul Scheibelhofer (2011) who brings migration studies together with critical masculinity studies to describe how the trope of the “the Turkish Muslim man” (156) is used in the Austrian context. He argues that the new form of migration- and diversity management use this trope to criminalize and to justify mechanisms of exclusion (171f). What I miss in his analysis is a closer look at the economic aspect of those mechanisms of exclusion, which does not allow to see the way liberal notions shape the exclusion.

To summarize, most analysis of migration policy in academic literature follow the approach of ‘migration management’, which silences the function those policies and the discussion of migration fulfil for the construction of the nation and in relation to geopolitical constellations. Similarly, the literature on Austrian migration policy is often within a framework of ‘management’ and either not strongly connected to nationalism or not looking at racialization, gender and global capital together. In none of the literature on Austrian immigration control, I find the denaturalization of the “national order of things” that Malkki (1995, 516) called for applied in a satisfying way. Either because the nation form is completely ignored, or the approach lacks an intersectional analysis which includes the analysis of gendered, economic and racialized dynamics.

In the light of this gap, my research is meant to show the advantages and the depth of an analysis of migration policy that recognizes the intersectional way in which national borders and boundaries are (re)produced.
2. Theoretical Framework

I am arguing that a complex and interdisciplinary theoretical framework is necessary, as most bodies of literature standing alone are blind to aspects, that are crucial for the mechanisms of nationalism at play in Austrian asylum politics 2015-16 and migration control in general. In the following I will introduce the main concepts and ideas around three areas of research to establish the basis for my intersectional analysis. First, I will review literature on nationalism and especially focus on feminist authors who have pointed out the importance of gender and sexuality for the production of the nation. Second, I will look at authors who write about borders, nations and migration from a historical-materialist perspective and describe the importance of considering structures of global capital and labor for the analysis of the Austrian nation. In the third part I will focus on processes of racialization and their importance for the (re)production of the nation by looking at insights from biopolitical theory, black studies and postcolonial studies.

2.1. Feminist studies of the nation: gender and vulnerability

As a foundation for my conceptualization of the nation and nationalism, I build on Étienne Balibar (1990), Étienne Balibar & Emanuel Wallerstein (1991) and Craig Calhoun (1997). With Calhoun I understand nationalism as discourse and the nation as a construct which continuously has to be reproduced. In that Calhoun’s understanding, while building on Benedict Anderson’s nations as “imagined communities” (2006 [1983]), is in so far different as Calhoun looks closer at the pervasiveness and naturalization of nationalism and the ideological processes which allow for that. He argues that nations and their borders and sovereignty organize the modern world, and furthermore are also the basis to collective, cultural and personal identity (2,3). Calhoun does not talk about how formations resembling nations relate to nation-states, but he points out that modern nationalism goes beyond the geographic location of persons, stating that “membership in the
category 'nation' locates people in a complex, globally integrated world” (Calhoun, 1997, 7).

While I find Calhoun’s theory of nationalism very useful to analyze the processes with which nations are reproduced, other authors tackle the importance of capitalist relations of production for nationalism, that Calhoun is not explicit about.

Balibar and Wallerstein (1991) and Balibar (1990) also connect the capitalist nation form explicitly with racism. Balibar and Wallerstein (1991) argue that racism is as social relation fundamentally tied into modern social structures, such as the nation-state. Balibar (1990) describes the production of the ‘people’ and calls it a formation into a “community which recognizes itself in […]the state, [and] which recognizes that state as 'its own' in opposition to other states” (93) as being at the core of the national formation. In his understanding this production works through ideological interpellation and especially through the creation of ethnicity, consisting of language and ‘race’. He sees ‘race’ as being able to brush over social inequalities and fulfilling a nation building function, through the principle of exclusion of other people which allows the establishment of national similarity and community.

I will extend on the importance of racialization in specific connection to immigration control below.

Having introduced theorists who offer important insights into the construction of the nation, it is crucial to see how the ways in which mechanisms of nationalism have been explained have commonly overlooked the gendered and sexualized dynamics at play. Feminist authors, challenging the gender blindness of the study of nationalism, have shown for various contexts how ideas of inclusion to the nation, national obligations, threat and defense of borders are based on gendered and sexualized dynamics. In order to explain the strong presence of gendered arguments in the discussion of Austrian asylum politics, I will lay a special focus on such feminist theories of nationalism. Among the first ones to point out the connections are Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-
Davis (1989), who see women as central for ethnic and national processes in five functions: biological reproduction of the collective, reproduction of boundaries of groups, participation in ideological reproduction and transmission of culture, signification of difference and participation in national struggles (7). They thus make clear that the connection between women and nationalism is not reduced to child birth and marriage, but show the central ideological function in national consciousness.

Anne McClintock (1993) builds on their work, but formulates thoughts more specifically in relation to representation and agency. Pointing towards the assumed active role of men in nationalist agendas as opposed to female ones, she argues that “gender difference between women and men serves to symbolically define the limits of national difference and power between men” and that “[w]omen are typically construed as the symbolic bearers of the nation, but are denied any direct relation to national agency” (62) and shows how nationalism is (re)produced through the form of a spectacle (70). Another major contribution of her theorization of nationalism is the connection to the trope of the family, which allows the nation to establish what she calls “hierarchy within unity” (64) and to naturalize it. As a core argument from her and starting point for deeper thoughts on nationalist discourses, we can take the insight that “[n]ationalism is thus constituted from the very beginning as a gendered discourse, and cannot be understood without a theory of gender power” (63).

For the discussion of representation of migrants, Joseph Massad (1995)’s work on the importance of masculinity in relation to the nation offers an important twist to the theories outlined before. He shows how Palestinian nationalism changed the way of figuring the nation in gendered terms, by replacing the figure of the mother territory with a masculine staging of resistance. Agents of nationalist struggles are figured as masculine; the enemy threatening the nation is also figured as
masculine. Following Massad, Palestinian representations of the Zionist conquest works with metaphors of violence and rape: “Palestinians as the children of Palestine, portrayed as a mother. The Zionist enemy is clearly seen as masculine, and the wrong committed by this enemy against Palestinians is considered metaphorically to be of a violent sexual nature” (Massad 1995: 470-471). To understand the important distinction between 'proper' nationalist masculinity and the depiction of threatening 'other' masculinities as enemies of the nation, which is heavily present in the debate on migration to Europe, I am drawing on Joanne Nagel’s (1998) concept of “hegemonic masculinity” (247). While this difference is implied throughout Massad’s text, it’s not elaborated upon in full. Nagel describes that a “‘hegemonic' masculinity that sets the standards for male demeanor, thinking and action […] often stand […] in contrast to other class-, race- and sexuality-based masculinities” (247). Attributes contributing to a violent, 'pre-modern', 'deviant' masculinity, often in combination with constructions of uncontrolled sexuality, are thus a way of representing refugees as a threat into the nation. In his text about Israel's politics and representations concerning gay rights in Palestine, Jason Ritchie describes the importance of so called “checkpoints”, at which acceptance to the nation requires the fulfillment of specific notions of “acceptability” (557, 566). He states that queer Israelis have to fulfill their duty “as gatekeepers at a metaphorical checkpoint, where queer Palestinians are inspected, policed, and occasionally admitted into the fold of Israeli gayness as ‘victims’ of Palestinian culture but more often than not denied entry as excessively Arabs or insufficiently ‘gay’.” (Ritchie, 2010, 560, 561) The authors discussed in this section thus build a good base to understand the importance of gendered and sexualized tropes, language and figures in discussion around the Austrian nation. They collectively show that nationalism is reliant on symbolism bound up in femininity as demarcation of the nation and on deviant masculinity as threat.
In the discussion above notions of ‘victimhood’ and vulnerability are sometimes mentioned, but never fully developed. Looking at asylum politics, which have the need of protection at its core, the terms are of great importance. Dubravka Žarkov (2002), Elissa Helms (2015) and Cloé Lewis (2012) allow for important insights into the mechanisms of nationalist discourses. Žarkov (2002) describes victimization in the context of feminist activism in the area of former Yugoslavia as a common strategy of framing women as victims of war in opposition to violent men. She explains and problematizes how “the victim-status is transformed into the ultimate moral status” (6) and how being “granted victim-status” (12) defines the quality of the person in question.

Elissa Helms (2015) works on gender and nationalism in the context of the Balkans. In her text on assumptions based on gender, war and culture in the context of European migration politics Helms shows the gendered dimension of worthiness and victimhood. She argues that representations of migrants as exhibiting conscious decision making and desire for a life that goes beyond basic existential needs reduces the acceptance of a people coming to Europe to seek protection as worthy. Her arguments are similar to what Carolina Moulin (2012) has described as “gratitude” as precondition for protection (55). Building on the work of Liisa Malkki and Cynthia Enloe, Helms points out that notions of vulnerability and the deserving victim are feminized, while threat is tied to culturalist ideas of ‘other’ masculinity (2015).

Similar to Conny Oxford (2005) who shows how vulnerability in asylum procedures is based on ‘Western’ conceptions, Cloé Lewis also argues that in the asylum system” the (perceived) privileging of female vulnerability and victimhood bears a certain cost for women as well as men. “[…]his trend functions to portray migrants as defenseless victims of their ‘culture’ (or religion) and elides the various ways through which women express their agency.” (2012) Building on Melanie Griffiths (2012) research on vulnerabilities of rejected asylum seekers in detention centers,
Lewis argues that gendered ideas of vulnerability work to silence hardships not falling into stereotypical representations, including hardships of men (2012). Similarly, Jennifer Hyndman and Wenona Giles (2011) show how refugees waiting in limbo and asylum in general is feminized through descriptions of immobility and passivity while refugees on the move are “coded as part of a masculinist geopolitical agenda” (361) and thus subjected to securitization and control. And Pragna Patel (2014) explains how in the UK measurements justified with the vulnerability of people seeking protection actually produces vulnerability.

To conclude this section, based on the authors I have presented I understand nationalism as a discourse, that situated the nation within wider contexts and establishes external as well as internal hierarchies. The nation relies on constant (re)production, in which gender, sexuality and especially a gendered ‘Western’ understanding of vulnerability serve as important thresholds for the boundaries of the nation, being the inclusion into or exclusion from it. For the study of the representation of migration policy, I will draw on the outlined conceptualizations of vulnerability as femininity and victimhood. As a modern phenomenon, the nation fulfills certain functions within capitalist relations of production, including the production of community despite class differences and other forms of social inequality. To illuminate these economic dynamics more, I turn now to literature that connects the nation to capitalism and migration.

2.2. Global capital, migration, law and the nation

Global capital, global distribution of labor and globalization are at the core of contemporary border regimes and migration policies. As already mentioned above, some authors writing on nationalism (such as Hall et al. (1978) and Balibar (1990) connect the nation form with capitalist relations of production. In this section I will argue that the importance of such a framework is especially relevant in the context of international migration and immigration control. In the following I will
thus point out ways in which the connection of capitalism to the marginalization of migrants and the construction of national identity have been conceptualized to build a basis for analyzing the discussion of Austrian immigration control.

Stuart Hall et. al. (1978) argue that the nation-state is in its basis capitalist. Building on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, they state that the political level of the state is not a direct expression of productive forces, as it is to some point independent, but in the capitalist means of production the state gets established as commonsensical through forms of consensus in combination with coercion (209). They write:

[The state] reconstitutes class subjects as its own subjects: itself as ‘the nation’. The political-juridical domain establishes the central points of reference for other public ideologies. The ideological concepts of this sphere predominate over others: the language of liberties, ‘equality’, rights, duties, the rule of the law, the legal state, the nation, individuals/persons, the general will, in short all the catchwords under which bourgeois class exploitation entered and ruled in history’ becomes paramount. (206)

In another text, Stuart Hall (1986) makes the relevance of a Gramscian perspective for the study of racism even more clear. Apart from a call for historic specificity, and a non-reductive approach (23, 24), he sees racialization as connected to capitalism, through the “many ways in which capital can preserve, adapt to its fundamental trajectory, harness and exploit […] particular qualities of labor power” and the differentiated and racialized forms of exploitation that are the result (24). The concept of the nation if fueled, in his argument, by the quality of ‘race’ to brush over economic and political differences (25) and by its quality to “carr[y…] powerful cultural, national-popular connotations” (26).

In connection to immigration control the research of scholars as Sandro Mezzadra (2016), Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013), Nicholas De Genova give important insights. Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) argue that migration lies at the core of contemporary capitalism. Their work is far reaching by using the migration and borders as lenses to generally rethink conceptualizations of
labor and contemporary capitalism. De Genova (2016) argues that processes of bordering are central to the connection between the state and global capital (32). He further argues that

Europe’s borders, like all borders, are the materialisations of socio-political relations that mediate the continuous production of the distinction between the putative ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and likewise mediate the diverse mobilities that are orchestrated and regimented through the production of that spatial divide (45)

Building on De Genova’s research, I thus understand Austrian border policies, as well as the “purported ‘inclusion’ of ‘immigrants’ into the more elemental and fundamental ‘national community’” (2010, 54) as (re)producing national differences.

De Genova also talks about the notion of crisis and its mobilization using the term “border spectacle” (33) and describes how the “border spectacle of migrant ‘victimization’” (2015) for example in the link of migration in Mediterranean to human trafficking and slavery “the invocation of tragedy was cynically conscripted to supply the pretext for the fortification of various form of border policing” (2016, 35). He sees such a patronizing discourse presenting migrants as “purely passive ‘victims’ [which] inevitably contributes to the migrants’ racialization” (2015). He highlights the importance of ‘race’ for the discussion of capitalist structures’ influence on US American (2004) and contemporary European migration politics also in other moments, when he points out that the

borders of ‘Europe’ are simultaneously entangled with a global (postcolonial) politics of race that redraws the proverbial color line and refortifies ‘European’-ness as a racial formation of whiteness, and a comparably global (neoliberal) politics of transnational labour mobility and capitalist labour subordination that produces such spatialized (and racialized) differences, above all, to capitalize upon them. (2016, 45)

In this context, De Genova also brings important insight into the question of the dividing people seeking protection into various categories, or in the words of Zetter the “bureaucratic fractioning” of the refugee label (174), being the political and populist labeling of refugees to allow for better ‘management’ and with the result of restricted access to protection. As many authors have continuously pointed out, De Genova also reiterates that “all refugees resemble ‘migrants’. And
likewise, migrants are often ‘in flight’ (or ‘fleeing’) from various social or political conditions that they have come to consider intolerable, thereby actively ‘escaping’ or deserting forms of everyday deprivation, persecution or (structural) violence” (36). He concludes from that that the assumed tension lays the preconditions for policies and thus the split allows for governmental interventions (37).

As part of scholars analyzing the fractioning and labeling of migrants, such as already described above, Raia Apostolova’s (2016) work is especially relevant for the discourses in the Austrian context. She works on the ‘political refugee – economic migrant division’ and criticizes the scholarly consensus on the need to separate the economic from the political. Building on Ellen Wood and based on the case study of the Bulgarian asylum system, she argues that the division goes back to liberal thoughts which depoliticize the sphere of the economic (34) and mark it as non-violent, ignoring the coercion by economic structures and the labor market. She emphasizes that this abstract division has very real consequences, in the form of exclusion, violence at borders, detention, etc. (47)

In this entanglement of capitalism and migration control, processes of racialization and colonial legacies play an important role. These have been emphasized by authors such as Stuart Hall and Prem Kumar Rajaram (2015; 2016; forthcoming). Rajaram combines a critique of political economy with postcolonial theory, when he argues that political society has certain ideas of social order (reflecting capitalist structures). They are heavily racialized through the connection of certain forms of productivity and work with ‘race’. Rajaram analyzes the “link between capitalism as the production of surplus (value and population) and the radical externalization of migrants today” (2016, 6). In his talk at Corvinus University (27.02.2016), Rajaram discussed the way such notions of productivity and order work in imaginary geographies that establish Europe in relation to
migrants as a space of order and fullness against a space of lack/chaos of migration and argues that Europe is a place of colonial present, in which the control and foreclosing of agency of the other pertains. The importance of notions of ‘crisis’ and ‘spectacles’ for national boundaries that I have mentioned already by referring to Anne McClintock (1995) and DeGenova (2015), is also emphasized by Rajaram, who directly connects it to the described colonial and economic state structures that are guarded by the boundaries:

Reading the movement of people, or really any social phenomenon, as “crisis” puts a frame around a complex social process and effectively separates it historically, socially, and politically from other social processes, non-crises. It creates a series of dualisms, where the “crisis” is the less desirable mirror of a more orderly form of what is effectively the same phenomenon (mobility of populations). The refugee crisis is contrasted with orderly visa-enabled forms of migration. It is a crisis only with respect to the possibility and desirability of a more orderly form of the same. The depiction “crisis” is then an anxious one, based on fear. This suggests that “the refugee crisis” is about states, about their capacity to protect the territorial orders that they guarantee. This is a type of displacement, where the issue becomes an urgent state responsibility and therefore legitimizes the limited ethical and moral bases from which states make decisions about responsibilities. (Rajaram, 2015)

Within such a realization of the importance of political economy for the study of migration and immigration policies, some more concepts having to do with the way law is set up to sustain capitalist structures of production are useful. The effectiveness of a rights based approach has been criticized for example by Wendy Brown (1995), who argues that request of protection by the state will eventually always rebuild state power. In her critique of the capitalist underpinning of rights, Sally Engel Merry (2003) calls the human rights framework as setting international norms and agendas (66), as some forms of law and freedom are privileged over others. Political freedom is overprivileged over economic equality. More difficult to articulate economic deprivation as problem. The way human rights are set up, they create a certain agenda, that allows the prioritization of certain violations but not others. Naomi Mezey (2001) help to further understand how understanding of vulnerability is bound up in capitalist ideology She describes that for labor contracts freedom is often assumed, which would mean that, similar to Apostolova’s (2016)
argument, the sphere of economics is not seen as potentially producing (the right kind of) vulnerabilities. She argues that employer-employee relationships rather should be seen as “determined by legal coercion” (48), meaning that if we understand the sphere of economy as non-free and likewise violent, we have to question the hierarchies of vulnerability that are founded on the division between political and economic violence.

National immigration policies as well as legal frameworks must be understood within capitalist relations of productions. National orders guard the reproduction of the economic system through regulation, inclusion and exclusion of people, but also through liberal values and rights frameworks, connecting to ‘Western’ notions of civilization and guiding the fragmentation of legal statuses of immigration. For my research, I thus understand the Austrian nation and its inclusion as based (also and fundamentally) on capitalist mechanisms. In the next section I will describe how the nationalist agendas and immigration policies that I have described so far as gendered and liberal are also built on ‘Western’, racialized assumptions.

2.3. Coloniality, biopolitics and racialization: ‘Civilization’ and death
In this section I will talk about the importance of racialization and coloniality for the production of a national community in relation to the migrant ‘Other’. For postcolonial critique on concepts of European ‘civilization’ Edward Said’s (1978) theory of Orientalism is a main foundation. In his book of the same name he describes ‘Western’ patronizing and discriminating perceptions of the Arab world and Islam. With the term Orientalism he describes how the dominant ‘Western’ representations of Muslim and Arab cultures actually create 'the Orient', consolidate global power structures and construct an 'oriental Other' as a counterpart of the 'West', leading to the formation of a positive, 'Western' self (7).
Although Said's concept originally was geographically limited to the Arab world and his focus was on Islam, it can be applied to a wider field. According to Stuart Hall (1994) 'the West' and 'the Orient' do not have geographical borders. Rather, he suggests it is better to understand the terms as concepts, which can be applied to various regions, religions and social groups (138). Hall describes this discursive process as construction of the 'West' and the 'Rest'. Hall's concept of 'West' includes more than geographical components as he describes it rather as historical construct. The term relates to a specific type of society, which can be described as “developed, industrialized, urban, capitalist, secular and modern” (138).

Along similar lines, József Böröcz (2006) explains intra-European dynamics, especially between ‘Western Europe’ – ‘Eastern Europe’, as moral geopolitics with the term “the rule of European difference” (130). He criticizes the idea of moral superiority, or as he puts it, the formula “Europe equals goodness” (112) relies on “a hierarchical vision of the world, with ‘Europe’ always already at the top” (125, 126). He furthermore shows how this notions on ‘Westernness’ or ‘Europeanness’ are linked to coloniality, as this idea of ‘goodness’ could only be spread through the extension of European rule and concepts (126, 130).

While I find Böröcz’ analysis crucial to understand the internal hierarchization of ‘Europe’, the differences of an orientalist and balkanist are still significant. The balkanist discourse has a lot of similarities in the way the orientalist discourse the 'Other' is constructed as uncivilized, but differs as it revokes an image of the Balkan as a “bridge or a crossroads [...] between East and West”, attributed as “semicivilized”, as Maria Todorova describes (Todorova, 1997, 166), Helms sees the interaction between orientalism and balkanism as the following, adding a gendered lens to the perspective:
Multiple configurations of the east/west dyad can be seen to slip in and out of orientalism or balkanism into related – gendered narratives about modernity, civilizational progress, or race. Yet they ultimately tend to reaffirm and reproduce the notion of civilizational differences at east and west poles (Helms, 2008, 118).

Referring back to the centrality of gendered and sexualized mechanisms for nationalism, the work of feminist postcolonial scholars to emphasize the importance of gender for orientalist discourses is crucial. Although Said accounts for the importance of gender in orientalism, pointing out for example the specific negative stereotypes towards women, the lack of a theorizing that understands gender and sexuality as fundamental for orientalism has been criticized by feminist scholars. Following the argumentation of Meyda Yegenoglu, for the construction of 'Orient' the category of gender is not only a side effect, but at the very center of the construction (also Brunner/Dietze/Wenzl 2009: 14). She argues that the discursive construction of 'Otherness' works through cultural and sexual differentiation. Fantasy and desire thus are major elements in the re/production of colonial relationships (Yegenoglu, 1998, 2). Similarly, Ann Laura Stoler (2002) argues that sexuality is a salient marker of 'Otherness' and therefore a key figure in racist ideologies. Stoler sees gender specific sexual sanctions and prohibitions “demarcation[s] of positions of power” and also as prescription for “the personal and public boundaries of race” (42).

Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2010 [1988]) and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) both highlight the centrality of White ‘savior’ tropes in relation to women of color for the colonial reproduction of ‘Western’ dominance. Spivak (1988) famously described colonial relationships as “white men saving brown women from brown men” (93), and shows with this formulation not only the centrality of gender for colonial structures but also how women of color are passivized. Mohanty criticizes the homogenization and reductionist representation of women of the Global South as repressed and powerless (2010 [1988], 51, 68). She describes the interplay between defining the ‘other’ and the construction of the self as the following: “It is not the center that determines the
periphery, but the periphery that, in its boundedness, determines the center.” (69)

In the same direction, an explicit shift of perspective is offered by the work of Fernando Coronil (1996) and Gabriele Dietze (2009). Building on Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism, Coronil shows how the stereotypical representations of the ‘Orient’ are used “for the ethnocentric hierarchization of cultural difference” (1996, 56) and thus for the creation of ‘the Occident’, being the ‘Western’ world. Dietze (2009) emphasizes the importance of gender relations as marker for the hegemonic discourse of Occidentalism, when she defines Occidentalism as founded on neo-racist tropes, which are defined through ‘emancipation’ and enlightenment (24). In more direct relation to migration policy, Maggie Ibrahim (2005) argues in her study if Canadian immigration legislation, that the use of language drawing on ‘security’ and risk’ in relation to migration is a modern form of racism. She sees the intertwining of migration with illegality as laying the basis for criminalization (175) and the discussion of root causes of migration leading to an interventionist style of politics (171).

A lot of relevant scholarship which works on the way connections between nations, states, their sovereignty and regulations that hierarchize the way lives are conceptualized is based on Michel Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, either explicitly building on and expanding or modifying his thoughts. Foucault (2003) conceptualizes biopower and biopolitics in order to account for the addition of sovereign state power formerly operating only through the “right to take life or let live” (241) by a second mechanism, which he calls the “power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die” (241). He states that in modernity biopolitical forms of power gain importance. They are targeted towards the population and framed around the ‘survival’ or ‘health’ of the population. Thus, the active regulation of the reproduction of the nation including securitization as a means of protecting the society from (internal) dangers plays an important role for his analysis (246ff). In order to
understand how hierarchization of lives occurs along the lines of not only nationality, but 'race', Foucault's work on state racism is of great relevance. As he conceptualizes it, racism is inscribed into the mechanisms of the State, as in times of biopower, in which life is given such a great value, racism serves as a “break between what must live and what must die”(254). It is the mechanism that works as a way of „separating out the groups that exist within a population”(255), it is the “precondition that makes killing acceptable“(256) as it legitimizes it with the ‘survival’, the ‘purification’ and ‘strengthening’ of population (255).

A slightly different focus toward the connection of life/death and (nation) states is offered by Giorgio Agamben (1998), who specifically addresses the role of political life, citizenship and human rights in the production of hierarchies between lives. Agamben develops his figure of “Homo Sacer” and his notion of bare life – deprived from every political relevance – to understand modern biopolitics. He argues that the inclusion of bare life into politics constitutes the very core of sovereign power (6) and as specific to modernity, what we can see is the blurring of boundaries between bare life and political life (9), which leads to what he calls the “constant need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside” (131). His attempt is to account for the mechanism that allows to understand lives of refugees as less valuable than lives of citizens and how their killing can remain unpunished. He argues, similar to Brown, that as bare life in modernity is articulated as a right, and as its value is subject to declarations of rights and a juridical system, which are coupled to citizenship, human rights fail in the protection of life (131).

Several authors such as for example Benjamin Muller (2004) and Michalinos Zembylas (2010) are thinking contemporary European migration and asylum politics through such a biopolitical framework. Benjamin Muller (2004) has argued for the context of the UK that a biopolitical
approach is useful in being able to address the “diffuse networks of power in refugee politics among private and public actors, the increasing role of “biotechnology,” and some (re)solution to the globalization” (49). Zembylas criticizes through Agamben’s work the “liberal/humanitarian appropriation” (2010, 32) of people seeking protection.

A strong critique of the conceptualization of hierarchization of lives in biopolitical theory is by Alexander G. Weheliye (2008) emphasis on the fundamental importance of racialization for the process. While for example Agamben's work is very helpful for understanding the implications of the legal framework producing death or failing in the protection of lives, it lacks a substantial analysis of racializing mechanisms as well as of violence inherent in those dynamics of deprivation of political life. Weheliye therefore builds on Foucault and Agamben, but emphasizes the specific political violence that is necessary to produce bare life, or in his words “flesh”, the reduction of bodies to materiality, without individuality and boundaries that could be violated (70ff). Especially in his emphasis on the de-individualizing effect and implications of the violence of framing people arriving to Europe as 'mass' are relevant to understand the rhetoric around refugees which was produced in the context of Austrian policies and representations.

Weheliye uses insights from black studies, mostly drawing on Wynter and Spiller to shape biopolitical theory and to show the fundamental role of racializing assemblages in the construction of modernity and the importance and the level of insight we can gain from decolonizing notions of humanity (2008). His take on biopolitical theory is of great importance for the discussion of ‘Western’ nationalisms, because it insists on historical continuities and aims to explain how racializing assemblages are at the core of what is considered as humanity and who is considered human.
Weheliye shows how “racializing assemblages […] constructs race not as a biological or cultural classification but as a set of sociopolitical processes that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans” (12), as they translate physical body characteristics through politically violent processes into natural distinctions between humans. By setting whiteness as ‘humanness’, racializing assemblages exclude the possibility of recognition, as the difference is inscribed into the colonial way ‘humanity’ is set up. Following Dylan Rodríguez Weheliye argues that “white supremacy may be understood as a logic of social organization that produces regimented, institutionalized, and militarized conceptions of hierarchized ‘human’ difference” (12). Such a hierarchization of lives through white supremacy, economic exploitation and colonialism is, importantly set as “beyond the reach of human intervention” (25).

The importance of biopolitical frameworks recognizing the relevance racialization for the study of modern nationalism becomes clear when Weheliye argues the following: “the incorporation, production, and politicization of zoe (mere biological life), as opposed to bios (“full” human existence) forms the core of political modernity and increasingly comes to define the scope of state power, particularly in the legal state of exception” (2008, 33). Thus we can see the racialized production of bare life, the legislation of life and death as at the center of the modern nation-state. Immigration policies together with enslavement and colonialism among other manifestations are thus constitutive of modern terror (37).

Sabine Broeck and P. Khalil Saucier (2016) offer a slightly different take on the discussion of European immigration policies and ‘race’. In their analysis of contemporary European borders they bring together migration studies and studies on coloniality and Black social death together to argue that the construction of Europe has to be read not as “culmination of a history of progress in need of constant watch and defense, but as colonialis product which guards its comparative wealth
and guarantees of freedom carefully, sheltered by broad mass approval of its hegemonic white citizenry” (25). Following from that they argue that the representation of Europe as “haven of universal rights, which are being heralded as an exceptional achievement” (25) is supporting this colonial narrative of progress.

Summarizing the section on coloniality, biopolitics and racialization in relation to Austrian nationalism, I understand Europe as a colonial project and European nationalisms as building on colonial and Orientalizing tropes, placing Europe as civilized and a space of order against an uncivilized non-European context. Racialization, as a system of social processes which hierarchize lives, is a fundamental part of the justification of exclusion and death to guard the wealth of a few.

To account for Austrian nationalism in relation to asylum politics, I am bringing together all three sections of theory that I have been describing so far. As became clear throughout the introduction to the main thoughts, some of the blocks of literature recognize the multiple entanglement of ‘race’, gender, political-economy and mobility control. As described above, for example historical-materialist and postcolonial perspectives have been thought together in relation to nationalism and migration (for example Hall, 1986) and so have feminist nationalism studies and postcolonial theory been fruitfully combined (for example McClintock, 1995). While all three bodies of literature are usually not combined, I see the importance of an intersectional analysis of border politics to account for mechanisms at play. As in the case of the Austrian discussion of migration and migration policies I see economic, gendered and racialized processes simultaneously present, and I find the insights from all three fields of importance to understand the way boundaries of the Austrian nation are (re)produced.
3. Methodology

3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

I will draw on Critical Discourse Analysis to analyze a heterogeneous body of material, consisting of official governmental statements, policy papers, legislative texts and a selection of media representations in print media, all of which concern the most relevant developments in relation to asylum politics of the last year (and which are specified below).

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) refers to a critical engagement with linguistic practices in relation to social practices, and understands text as a site where power relations are (re)produced. It is important to note that there are various methods within Critical Discourse Analysis, which have a slightly different focus and different ways of approaching the material, but have the commonality of understanding discourse within a wider political and social field. I am following Norman Fairclough’s (2013) suggestion to pay close attention to the textual elements themselves, the position of the actors influencing the meaning production and the wider societal current and interdiscursive elements (5). Such a broach approach is particularly useful for my research focus, as part of my empirical material are non-textual elements (e.g. border closings, fences), which through Fairclough’s method, are already integrated into the analysis. The main point of CDA, and the reason why I chose it, is though no a particular set of methods, but rather a perspective which is invested to understand the way discourse is in interrelation with sociopolitical structures of power.

3.2. Key materials of the shift

As my aim is to understand the shift of the Austrian government’s position, I will focus mostly on press releases, policy papers and legal texts officially issued by the government, all of which relate to the national level. Concretely, that means that I will use press releases by ministers, government
parties and national police issued in the time period of my clusters, while the legal and policy texts in my clusters will come from the official government side. Since, providing an analysis of material within a wider context lies at the core of CDA, it is important to understand official statements and policy/legal changes on the national level in interplay with dominant media representations. In the following section I will first provide a closer look at the chosen sources, situating their significance within the Austrian political landscape. Afterwards, I will provide a description of these clusters of events, around which my analysis is structured.

3.2.1. Chosen sources and party politics context
The press releases are all publicly accessible via the Austrian Press Agency’s Original Text Service (APA-OTS). For my research, I have entered the key words related to the chosen events in the search engine and then selected all those press releases that were issued by either one of the governmental parties (The Social Democratic Party of Austria [Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich] – SPÖ and the Austrian People’s Party [Österreichische Volkspartei] – ÖVP), the Parliamentary Directory [Parlamentsdirektion], the Federal Press Office [Bundespressedienst] or the Ministry of Interior [Innenministerium], including the police force management [Landespolizeidirektion].

During the period I am analyzing, the government was a coalition between the two Austrian parties with the most votes after the parliamentary elections of 2013: The Social Democratic Party and the Austrian People’s Party, which existed in the present government coalition under the leadership of a chancellor from the Social Democratic Party, Werner Faymann. The coalition between these strongest parties has been existing since 1945, the end of the fascist regime and the second world war, with the exception of two short periods in which one of the parties was a in a coalition with the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria. Although the economic and social situation in Austria is
insofar stable, as the level of wealth is relatively high, in recent years the political rhetoric has been strongly influenced by the growing right-wing, represented in parliament by the Freedom party, and reaching for example in the last presidential election in 2016 46.2%.

For the research on Austrian asylum policies, I have chosen to analyze the government’s position and rhetoric instead of focusing on the whole party political spectrum or differences between the parties or important politicians as I find that the major shift in the law, policies and rhetoric as a whole is striking. It is, however, still important to briefly underline the differences between the parties in order to be able to better situate their press releases The Social Democratic Party is a center left party, which has its origins in the Socialist Party, and which traditionally focused on topics related to workers’ rights, welfare benefits and employment, and on social problems, including living conditions, and women’s and minority rights. It has since seen a shift towards more a centrist and middle-class oriented program, appearing in many areas of government action, notably so in their approach towards asylum and migration politics. The Austrian People’s Party is a center right party rooted in Christian democracy. While presenting itself as a socially progressive party for ‘all’, its main characteristics include a liberal economic line, heteronormative family values and a general conservatism.

I consciously exclude the two main oppositional parties: the Freedom Party of Austria [Freiheitliche Partei Österreich] – FPÖ, a right wing – populist and nationalist-conservative party and the Austrian Green Party [Die Grünen], a green politics focused center-left party, even though the statements of these two parties have strongly influenced the debate. For my research, I am less interested in the concrete and distinct actors and voices of the shift, and more so interested in the discursive construction of the nation and the overall gendered and economic tendencies of argumentation. For these reasons, I only choose the main governmental line, while the interactions
and interdependencies among the different parties in the context of the discussion of migration remain a topic for further research.

In addition to the press releases, I use articles and videos of three main Austrian news outlets – Der Standard (left-liberal line), Die Presse (classical liberal line), Die Kronenzeitung (populist, tabloid press) – which I have selected based on their positioning within a left-right-scheme. I do so in order to be able to cover a broad spectrum of positions despite the small number of outlets. I look at 2-3 articles per outlet for each cluster which are covering the legal and policy changes my research is centered around, and use them to contrast the governmental rhetoric and policies in order to get a sense of the parallel/diverging changes in media representation and information that is not included in official press releases.

In order to structure the research, I focus on 4 clusters of events, which are significant in considering the major shifts in Austria and which I will expand upon within the following chapter: 1) the death of 71 refugees in the lorry at the border between Hungary and Austria and the opening of the border to Hungary in August 2015; 2) plans for the first fence in Austria in November 2015; 3) the building of more fences and legal amendments in February 2016; and, finally, 4) the ‘closure’ of the Balkan route and the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016.

Due to the density of events I cannot include all important events of the year into my core empirical material. I have chosen those events which were most strongly connected to Austrian active policy making. For example, even though the meeting of the European Council in Brussels on December 17th, 2015, in which stronger securitization of external EU borders and the hotspot system were introduced, was heavily discussed in Austria, it is not of the same importance for the shift as those events which were initiated by the Austrian government, such as the ‘closure’ of the Balkan route, or policies on the national level. In addition to the specific chosen Austrian events, I use further
developments on a national, regional and European level to contextualize my material of focus. I start from the debates and shifts I am looking at and analyze how those debates are bound up in gendered, classed, racialized and nationalist mechanisms; and how this analysis speaks to the respective literature within the respective fields. My analysis will mainly rely on critical discourse analysis, but I want to be clear that my perception is heavily informed by personal memory of the events and the reactions and by my experiences gained through political work connected to migrant solidarity and no border movements. This background contributed strongly to my critical understanding of the European border regime, as I have talked to a lot of people directly affected and seen the consequences of the regime on their lives. As CDA literature makes clear, such political stances are not a limitation to a research approach (Fairclough, 2010, 252), rather they can inform a critique of sociopolitical structures of power.

An interdisciplinary approach is especially important because of the way nationalism, capitalism and various levels of government and communication are entangled. The logic of inclusion and exclusion, the boundary drawing and border making in the context of asylum politics cannot be reduced to legal or economic aspects, but must take into consideration various means of representation. The changes in the field of asylum politics, in which such dynamics find expression, allow for more insight into the interplay of legal, economic and representational levels in the construction of the capitalist European nation.

3.2.2. The four clusters of events

In the following section, I will provide a short description of the four chosen clusters. I see these four periods as the most critical and as defining points. However, it is important to note that the
shift from summer 2015 to spring 2016 revealed itself throughout the whole period in a much more diffuse and gradual way than my segmentation can portray.  

The lorry accident and the opening of borders to Hungary (August 27th – September 5th 2015)

On the 27th of August 2015 a lorry with 71 dead refugees was found on the motorway from Budapest to Vienna, just inside the Austrian territory. The horrible incident provoked many and varied reactions from governmental representatives and was widely discussed in the local and international media, mostly in humanitarian rhetoric and through the blaming of smugglers for the deaths. Embedded within a wider debate about the increase in numbers of asylum seekers in Europe, the incident provided a point of entry for the discussion of questions about safety, security, vulnerability and rights claims, the establishment of refugee status in Austria and the European Union, and the relationship between EU member states and their migration and asylum politics. Shortly after, and couched in similar rhetoric, the opening of the border to Hungary was framed in clear demarcation from Hungary, and within a humanitarian discourse.

‘Fence light’ in Spielfeld (November 2015)

After the reinstatement of border controls at the southern border of Germany in the second half of September 2015, the Austrian government revealed in November 2015 plans for a fence at the border to Slovenia. The most interesting aspect of the discussion was the naming, in which the term ‘fence’ was avoided by the government and instead terms such as ‘migration management system’ and ‘gate with sideparts’ were used. At the same time plans for legal amendments that

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8 In the appendix I provide a condensed time line of the main events.
increasingly restricted access to international protection and reduced the social services guaranteed in and after the asylum procedure, were made public.

*Upper limits, daily quotas, more fences and legal amendments (January - February 2016)*

In January 2016, upper limits were passed, which limit the number of people accepted to asylum procedures in Austria to 37,500 for 2016, and to 127,500 altogether until 2019. Furthermore, in February 2016 daily quotas for asylum seekers entering the country (80 asylum applications per day) were established and the plans for 12 new fences at the southern borders of the country were revealed. Further, the parliament passed several legal amendments, which established ‘temporary asylum’ and restricted family reunification, among other changes.

*The ‘closing’ of the Balkan route and the EU-Turkey deal (March 2016)*

At the beginning of March, the Austrian government initiated the ‘closing’ of the Balkan route – the closing of all borders along the main travelling route (Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria) – arguing that only a strict barrier to pass would deter people from moving to Europe in the first place. The EU-Turkey deal which came into force in March 20th was justified in a similar manner. This is an agreement that is meant to stop proactive movement by sending people who arrive in Greece back to Turkey in exchange for resettling certain numbers directly from Turkey. The EU-Turkey deal was made at the same time with the establishment of so called hotspots, reception centers at the margins of the EU territory, where people are supposed to stay for the whole time of their procedure and, following a positive asylum decision, are supposed to be relocated according to an EU wide quota system.

Having introduced my material, methods and described the relevant events and context, I have set up the basis for the analysis. In the following two chapters, I focus on the textual material
surrounding the described clusters of events in order to understand how boundaries of the nation are drawn.
4. Producing boundaries of the nation: The ‘war refugee’ - ‘economic migrant’ division

In this part I will work out the main tropes along which the acceptance to, and the exclusion from, the Austrian nation are produced, arguing that the main lines are gendered and economic, both being bound up in racialized arguments. I will describe the creation of the division between so-called ‘war refugees’ (‘Kriegsflüchtling’) / ‘refugees’ and so called ‘economic migrants’ (‘Wirtschaftsflüchtling’) and how the division has been used in Austrian debates on borders, migration and asylum during the period from summer 2015 to spring 2016. As a starting point, I use Apostolova’s (2016) analysis of the division between the economic and the political in the context of current European asylum politics as part of a liberal economic ideology, which frees the economic sphere from violence, assigning the potential for violence to the sphere of the political, and thus, restricting worthiness of protection from those categorized as ‘non-economic’ (36).

I will start with a short introduction to the use of the terms ‘economic migrant’ and ‘war refugee’ in Austria, providing a brief overview of the use of these terms. Then I am going to show the way in which both categories are bound up in gendered and economic argumentations about vulnerability and authenticity, which, together with liberal economic, ideas form the core of dominant notions of deservingness and inclusion to the nation.

4.1. Creation and background of the division

The term which I translated as ‘economic migrant’ from German is ‘Wirtschaftsflüchtling’ literally meaning ‘economic refugee’. The difference in the use and the implicit meaning of the term ‘Flüchtling’ in German and ‘refugee’ in English is striking. While the English term ‘refugee’ carries a certain recognition of the legitimacy of asylum claims of a person, the German ‘Flüchtling’ does not carry this connotation, which makes the term flexible to use also in combination with
‘economic’. The English term ‘economic migrant’ is used in a very similar way to the German ‘Wirtschaftsflüchtling’, which is why I use ‘economic migrant’ in the following. Historically, as Ruth Wodak (1996) points out in her trajectory of Austrian immigration related rhetoric, the German term ‘economic migrant’ [Wirtschaftsflüchtling] was established and gained popularity in the context of the fall of the Iron Curtain and the rise of migration from countries of the former Eastern bloc to Western Europe, including Austria. As she suggests, the argument that Austria was a ‘traditional country of asylum’, in combination with the emphasis on the humanitarian Austrian attitude, has justified the “refusal to accept […] Romanian refugees, for though Austria is a traditional country of asylum, it is not a country to which ‘economic refugees’ might immigrate.” (125)

It is important to clarify that neither the terms ‘economic migrant’ nor ‘war refugee’ has an actual legal basis, nor do they reflect the realities of people. In the Geneva Convention, which is at the basis of the Austrian asylum legislation, fleeing from war is, strictly based on the Convention, not sufficient of a reason to be granted refugee status⁹ and neither are economic reasons. The interpretation of the Convention has changed though based on context and time, and the application in the asylum system is dependent on respective national guidelines. De Genova (2016) reiterates a point regularly made in the literature when he says that, “all refugees resemble ‘migrants’. And likewise, migrants are often ‘in flight’ (or ‘fleeing’) from various social or political conditions that they have come to consider intolerable, thereby actively ‘escaping’ or deserting forms of everyday deprivation, persecution or (structural) violence” (36). While ‘economic migrant’ could be a term used for all people migrating for reasons of work and study, it is used specifically in the context of

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⁹ According to the Geneva Convention, refugees are defined as persons who cannot return to their country of origin due to “well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group […] or political opinion” (Goodwin-Gill, 2014, 38).
increased numbers of people seeking international protection. It is significant that in nearly all the statements from the government and media, references to either the ‘war refugee’ or the ‘economic migrant’ are made.

The way ‘economic migrant’ has been mobilized across the whole spectrum of political parties in Austria changed: Before summer 2015 ‘economic migrant’ was used mostly by far-right wing parties and conservative media in Austria. The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) has used the term since 2003 and more frequently since 2012\(^\text{10}\). For the governing center parties and mainstream media there was a significant change in the years 2014-2016. Already, during fall and winter 2015 there was a major rise in the number of uses; in the period from June 1\(^\text{st}\) 2014 to June 1\(^\text{st}\) 2015, the term ‘economic migrant’ was used 246 times according to the archives of the Austrian press agency, in the period from June 1\(^\text{st}\) 2015 to June 1\(^\text{st}\) 2016, it was used 1044 times. The most exceeding concentration of its use was in September 2015, with 170 uses, and January 2016, with 204 uses. Both times coincide with the Austrian government’s announcement of legal policy changes, which increasingly restricted access to the Austrian asylum system; the first being the building of a first fence at the border between Austria and Slovenia, the second the introduction of daily and yearly quotas of asylum seekers. January 2016 is of specific interest, as the Austrian chancellor, Werner Faymann, first used the distinction between ‘economic migrant’ and ‘political refugee’ explicitly in connection to announcing the government’s plans, when he argued that a “strict distinction between economic migrants and Convention refugees” (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2016, 12.01.) and the latter’s rejection already occurring at the border would allow for a significant decrease in the numbers of people. The argumentation surrounding ‘economic migrants’ was common during the times after the fall of the Iron Curtain, as I have outlined before, and has from then until 2016

\(^{10}\) According to my research in the database of the Austrian Press Agency, retrievable: https://www.ots.at/.
mostly been used by far right-wing parties and media. A major shift in the use is when the chancellor Werner Fayman started to use the term for official justification of a legal change in January 2015.

As the legal changes at that time established ‘temporary asylum’, meaning the revision of legal status every three years even in those cases where people were granted refugee status, we can see how the figure of the ‘economic migrant’ is used to prevent proper examination into how legal statuses are (not) given. This is in line with the rise of the legal status of subsidiary protection as status. Subsidiary protection is meant to grant an initially one to two years of protection (with more restricted rights, in comparison to the refugee status), to those who face serious threats to their life in their country of origin, but do not fulfil the requirements of individual persecution of the Geneva Convention. The increasing numbers of people granted subsidiary protection, as well as ‘temporary asylum’ are part of the watering out of legal protection due to the lack of proper examination and the increasing precarity that comes with it. The legitimization with the figure of the ‘economic migrant’ in mainstream communication is telling about the way hierarchies of vulnerability are fundamental to this process of fragmentation. A look at the ways in which the term “war refugee” functions in reference to “economic migrant” demonstrates the nuances and exclusions of the term and the way it is embedded in wider discussion.

4.2. The ‘war refugee’: on vulnerability and order

From summer 2015 to spring 2016 the discussion and argumentations around the acceptance of people into the national territory and into the asylum system have changed, while throughout the whole period a specific understanding of vulnerability is in the center of the debate of border

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11 For a detailed account over the rising use of subsidiary protection in the Austrian asylum system see for example UNHCR (2015).
policies. If we use Ritchie’s concept of checkpoints (2010, 2557) we can understand performance of a certain form of vulnerability as serving the function of a checkpoint for acceptability and access to the nation. A checkpoint has to be understood as more than a singular point of entry, checking in Ritchie’s words is a constant checking against “the field of signs and practices’ in which the nation-state is represented” (557). Looking at this checkpoint allows us thus to understand the way the boundaries of the Austrian nation are set up better.

The required display of vulnerability in relation to Austrian asylum politics comes with the trope of the ‘war refugee’. During the time after the lorry accident the government statements and media reports show a strong reference to the figure of the ‘war refugee’. This reference is made, first, through listing the supposed reasons for flight as connected to war, for example when the Social Democratic Party published in reaction to the accident: “Such tragedies must not be repeated. We have to do everything so those who are fleeing war and violence find protection and help.” (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2015, 27.08.). Second, such reference to the figure of the ‘war refugee’ is made through the stating of the nationality of people as being Syrian, which became at some point synonymous with being able to legitimately claim asylum, as in the case of the media articles, reporting that “victims supposedly originate from Syria” (DerStandard, 2015, 28.08.) or “the victims seem to be from Syria – with one of the men there was a Syrian identity card found” (KRONE, 2015, 28.08.).

The construction of the ‘war refugee’ who has legitimacy to cross borders and claim asylum is done through various processes and at various times. Mostly this comes in to play still in 2015, while from the beginning of 2016, with the increased tightening of laws, international agreements and the rise of physical barriers at the border, the figure of the ‘war refugee’ is mentioned much less, or rather only in distinction from ‘economic migrants’. While I do not attempt to tease out all
of the nuances between the two governing parties, it is worth mentioning that the decrease of the use of the ‘war refugee’ trope, or rather the increased use of the distinction between ‘economic migrant’ and ‘refugee’ happened earlier for the conservative party within the government. While the Social Democratic Party’s rhetoric after the tragic incident in August 2015 fully used this notion of ‘war refugee’, the conservative coalition party, the People’s Party was, already at that moment, drawing on the distinction between ‘war refugees’ and ‘economic migrants’, as in the following example: “As a Christian-social movement it is self-evident for us to provide support where it is necessary, while at the same time distinguishing between real refugees and emigrants for economic reasons” (ÖVP Bundesparteileitung, 08.09.2015).

When the Minister of Interior stated in relation to the opening of borders with Germany, the ways in which the legitimacy of movement and (temporary) settlement of people relied on gendered logic:

The treatment of the situation from sides of the Austrian police is a central question in this matter […] If the people do not want to be registered […] and there is the danger of violent escalation, because they want to move on to Germany […] our police officers will not block them. We are fighting against smugglers and not against families and children (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2015, 4.09.)

The formulation “families and children” implies women and children, potentially including men, but not mentioned as men, while smugglers are implicitly male. Similarly, the Kronenzeitung uses women and children with reference to worthiness of protection for their argumentation:

The border security from now on will consists […] of a secured core part at the border crossing in Spielfeld, which comes with a modern management system, in order to allow orderly crossing and no ‘dangerous pressure situations’ arise, of which especially women and children need to be protected. (Kronenzeitung, 13.11.2015)

These quotations show how the opening of the borders was legitimized through the feminization, infantilization and thus construction of a supposed vulnerability of the people seeking asylum. The
acceptance as worthy refugees to the Austrian asylum system is bound up in vulnerability and victimhood.

Using Žarkov’s (2002) analysis of nationalism and the trope of ‘victimhood’, demonstrates our example while still “the victim-status is transformed into the ultimate moral status” (2002, 6) and “granted victim-status” (2002, 12) defines the quality of the person in question, victimization in the Austrian asylum politics does not only operate along the lines of sex. Still, the connection that Žarkov recognizes between victimhood and moral recognition, can be equally found in the Austrian case. When the Federal Press service writes “It cannot be the case, that people, who are fleeing war and terror to save their lives, in the end lose it through the hands of criminals” (Bundespressedienst, 2015, 28.08.) it becomes clear that the acceptance of the entry of refugees into national territory in the statements is connected to their victimhood produced by ‘criminals’ in what De Genova called a “border spectacle” (2016). Such a criminalization of smugglers, as in this example shown, individualizes and shifts responsibility for vulnerability in connection to travelling from states, not just European states and their border policies, but also non-European states such countries of origin or transit.\(^{12}\) Furthermore, such a definition of refugees through terms of vulnerability also silences the vulnerabilities that are produced by the state and capitalist economy after the border crossings for example in asylum procedures and with precarious legal statuses and the ongoing vulnerability of people who need to sell their labor power (Rajaram, forthcoming). The close connection to criminality of smuggles reminds of a trafficking discourse, which emphasizes the supposed lack of agency of refugees, represents them solely as victims, and even implies that smugglers forced them into their traveling. If the state took responsibility for the way EU wide agreements such as the Dublin III Regulation cause such dangerous traveling

\(^{12}\) I will elaborate on the figure of the smuggler and the way it is used in chapter 5.1.
conditions, it would talk about itself and those legal frameworks instead of shifting the information towards smugglers.

Going back to Žarkov's criticism of the continuous definition of “masculinity through power and femininity through vulnerability” (Žarkov 2002, 13) that remains trapped in binaries, I see it equally problematic to continuously define refugees solely through terms of vulnerability. Žarkov argues that the main problem in this construction is the blindness towards the active role of women in the (re)production nationalism and ethnicity (2002, 13f). In Austrian border politics, I think it is possible to draw the argument even further to problematize what is silenced through the coupling of vulnerability and deservedness. Building on Ritchie’s “passing through the checkpoint” (Ritchie 2010, 562) as conforming to a certain norm to become a victim worthy of inclusion (563), in the discussion about smugglers and refugees, 'passing' means the confirmation of the discourse of the criminal smuggler on the one side, and the delegitimization of so called ‘economic migrants’ on the other. As Ritchie notes, 'passing' includes a privatized and depoliticized notion of rights (2010: 560). Referring to Helms (2015) and Moulin (2012), we can understand this depolitization as connected to the requirement of a passivity, which does not go beyond basic existential needs. Thus, in our example, 'passing' as vulnerable and a ‘worthy victim’ requires the non-questioning of national and state politics and the subscription to a role of gratefulness and passivity. With Rajaram (talk at Corvinus University, 27.02.2016) I understand the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion as foreclosing the agency of ‘others’ as a precondition for acceptance as a colonial mechanism, as I see them built in orientalist notions of the passivity of non-European migrant ‘others’. Or, in the words of De Genova, representation of people as “purely passive ‘victims’ inevitably contributes to the migrants’ racialization” (2015).
The analysis of the use of the ‘war refugee’ trope show that while used a lot in my first cluster of analysis for the legitimization of opening borders, it is also strongly used in the discussion around the first fence, that was built in November 2015.

The People’s Party describes the fence as the following:

> through the new border management system an orderly border crossing is made possible, dangerous situations are defused – that is in line with the interests of refugees, the task forces and the population. At the same time the clear signal is sent that Austria is protecting and controlling its borders (ÖVP Parlamentsklub, 13.11.2015)

Also the Social Democratic Party combines in their rhetoric the vulnerability of people with the argumentation for the need of security for the Austrian population. They call for ‘“security and order’ for the entry of refugees, but also law and order for the resident population [and state that] ‘We will take care that the arriving are assisted with food and winter clothing. That is good and right.’” (SPÖ-Parlamentsklub, 13.11.2015). Such a framing positions Europe as a ‘space of order’ against ‘uncontrolled masses of migrants’, as Rajaram (‘Crisis and Victims’, 27.02.2016) has argued. Additionally, I find the connection to notions of humanity and humanitarianism remarkable.

The figure of the ‘war refugee’ is often mentioned in connection to humaneness and humanity, as in the following statement by the Federal Press Service: “The right to asylum demands a humane treatment of refugees and every European country has to respect that” (Bundespressedienst, 2015, 04.09.). Repeatedly references to medical and humanitarian care are made (for example Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2015, 04.09.). That means, parallel to the construction of the vulnerability of the people seeking asylum, the establishment of Austria as morally advanced, in the sense of Böröcz’s “European normative superiority” (2006, 125). Such a focus on the ‘humanitarian support’, instead emphasizing the lack of medical care for people who have been forced to live in precarious conditions due to the European migration regime, depoliticizes and dehistorizes (Malkii, 1996) the situation and disconnects it from what ultimately gives it shape –
migration policies. Through the production of a desirable Austrian nation, the state form including the borders and its protection through policies are coproduced.

To understand the nuances and exclusions of the ‘war refugee’ and the specific way in which it is constructed, it is important to see its functions not isolated, but as part of the binary in opposition to the ‘economic migrant’, which I will show in my material in the following.

4.3. The ‘economic migrant’: undeservedness and lack of authenticity

The figure of the ‘economic migrant’ is built in opposition to the figure of the ‘war refugee’. A lot of the defining elements of the figure mirror the traits assigned to the ‘war refugee’, although some characteristics become explicit by looking closer at the way the expression ‘economic migrant’ is used. While in the beginning of the period that I am looking at – the opening of the borders and the rather free travelling of people across borders – the trope of the ‘war refugee’ was heavily used, several months later, from January 2016, and with legal changes and the increasing building of fences, the use of the ‘economic migrant’ becomes dominant. The figure of the ‘economic migrant’ is characterized by a lack of authenticity, a lack of the right kind of vulnerability and/or a connection to criminality which come together in the undeservedness of protection or inclusion in the nation of those labelled with this term.

In opposition to ‘war refugees’ who are framed as authentic by complying to ‘Western’ and liberal norms of vulnerability, ‘economic migrants’ are constructed as ‘solely’ driven by the search for economic improvement, without authentic reasons for flight. While their economic vulnerability is recognized, it is not seen as on the same level as vulnerability produced through political persecution (by non-‘Western’ perpetrators). We can understand the binary between the ‘war

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13 I will describe the further implications of such rhetoric of ‘humanity’ in chapter 5 in connection to the East-West and North-South positioning of the Austrian nation.
refugee’ and the ‘economic migrant’ as an expression of a hierarchization of vulnerability.

Such a notion of authenticity is bound up in stereotypical assumptions about ‘refugeeness’. As one politician of the Austrian People’s Party, Helmut Kohl, states in an interview:

The question of economic migrants is completely clear. One always forgets that a big percentage of immigrants comes with faked papers and that a big part comes under the pretense of another nationality, that a big part comes to improve their life. (DerStandard, 2016, 12.01.)

The idea of authenticity is not only connected to a lack of agency in choosing the country of destination, but it is additionally assumed that criteria for authenticity are generalizable and readable, as Malkki (1996) describes in her history of the construction of ‘the refugee’ category. Authenticity, as in authentic narratives that asylum seekers are supposed to present when they state their asylum claim, are framed as incompatible with the agentic desire for improvement of one’s economic situation. Economic motivation is seen in a derogative way, which allows the speakers to distance themselves and look down on so called ‘economic migrants’. The assumed lack of authenticity becomes not only clear based on the supposed corruption by the economic sphere, but also when analyzing the language used in the statement. While I will discuss the direct and indirect criminalization that is implied through such corruption in more detail below, the use of certain wordings as ‘fake’, or ‘pretense’ is also relevant in the process of a denial of authenticity.

Having discussed the supposed lack of authenticity, the term ‘economic migrant’ is furthermore connected to vulnerability and agency. Agency, as (unconsciously) planning to improve one’s standard of living through migration and as choosing the country of destination is portrayed as in contradiction to vulnerability. In that we see the clear difference to the figure of the ‘war refugees’, which complies to the notion of vulnerability as victimhood (Helms, 2016; Malkki, 1996; Moulin 2012), includes gratefulness and humbleness, in the sense of satisfaction with survival, without
aspiration to improve one’s standards of life by choosing in which country to claim asylum and without demand or possession of anything beyond being alive and basic sustenance.

As already mentioned, the classification of ‘economic migrants’ is implied by statements such as “wanting to improve their standard of life” (DerStandard, 2016, 12.01.) Strategic planning, which would include the choice of a country of destination for an asylum claim a good “social system as incentive” (for example SPÖ Pressedienst, 2016, 12.01.) is implied to denote a lack of vulnerability. The trope of the ‘social system as incentive’ is very popular and appears in nearly all my researched materials after January 2016. This shows particularly in quotes like the following:

“We have to send clear signals that the time of welcome culture is over. The biggest problem is that now all people, even war refugees, for economic reasons want to go to Austria, Germany and Sweden, although they travel through safe third countries before […]. We need measures like temporary asylum, restrictions on family reunification as well as a reform of the basic income, which are all pull-factors for refugees.” (ÖVP Bundesparteileitung, 2016, 12.01.)

Through such a construction a causal relationship between social welfare systems and the number of people coming to Austria ‘solely’ for economic reasons is established. Instead of recognizing that for everybody – whatever reasons for leaving their country of origin – who is claiming asylum in a country the welfare system is essential as it regulates access to health care, language classes, housing and basic assistance during the process of acclimatization to a new society, arguments as the one presented assume that ‘truly vulnerable’ people don’t plan strategically, but only ‘economic migrants’ would – shamefully – do so. Thus, in a similar way to authenticity, economic motivations also seem to be in a contradiction with vulnerability, as they are considered as too much of agential and strategic thinking. As Malkkii (1996) argues, passivity is part of the definition of “refugee authenticity” (390) which reduces people to archetypical figures instead of seeing them as political and historical subjects (398). Apart from authenticity, vulnerability is bound up in liberal conceptions as what is considered as violence. As Apostolova (2016) shows,
the ideal-typical conception of the European liberal state and its migration regime are here to convince us that the social has two parts. One is marked by political violence only and the authentic refugee escapes that. The other part is constituted by economic relations that are political-violence-free. (36)

Thus, the ‘economic migrant’ is set in opposition on various levels with a ‘Western’ liberal framing of vulnerability, that is free of economic elements or considerations. As the liberal market economy is not seen as a space of vulnerability and coercion, but as a space where free agents can freely sell their labor, the ‘Western’ liberal understanding of vulnerability excludes the ‘economic migrant’ (Mezey 2001). Furthermore, the figure of the ‘economic migrant’ is used in the statement by the Bundesparteileitung above not only to justify the restriction of access to the welfare state based on liberal notions of vulnerability, but also for the introduction of ‘temporary asylum’. This shows how even if the ‘Western’ requirements for vulnerability are met, if a person is falling into the ‘right’ category of the established hierarchies of vulnerability, it does not translate into acceptance, but remains limited to time restricted, precarious ‘protection’.

This supposed lack of vulnerability of ‘economic migrants’ is discursively constructed connection migration to – a threatening form of – masculinity. Not only are ‘economic migrants’ sometimes explicitly mentioned as “consisting mainly of young men” (Kronenzeitung, 2016, 15.01.), also this is done though positioning the created group in a certain relation to others. The described feminization and passivation (Hyndman/Giles, 2011) of ‘war refugees’ is thus put in opposition to a masculinization of ‘economic migrants’, evoking either for the first, tropes of vulnerability and the need for protection or, for the latter, tropes of threat and the need for defense and border protection. Such distinction works along the lines of masculinity and femininity are common for nationalist argumentations, Massad (1995) shows as much in his analysis of Palestinian nationalism, when he asserts that while “the enemy threatening the nation is […] figured as masculine” (470), while the vulnerability of the Palestinian people is constructed through tropes
of feminization (471), which is in line with the research of Anthias/Yuval Davis (1989). The gendered dimension is further elaborated upon by Conny G. Oxford (2005), who argues that the reasons for flight that are considered as an authentic asylum claim are embedded in a heavily gendered ‘Western’ understanding of persecution. They show how asylum claims which support ‘Western’ assumptions about FGM (Female Genital Mutilation) are more widely accepted than asylum claims which do not confirm ‘Western’ stereotypes. As Oxford (2005) shows, what counts as ‘proper’ vulnerability is decided upon based on a eurocentric understanding not only of vulnerability, but of society and values at large, meaning a certain performance of agency as well as compliance with gender performance expectations.

Another important characteristic of the figure of the ‘economic migrant’ is the connection to crime. In the Austria discussions, migration is often connected to criminality, as for example the declaration of the “Managing Migration Together Conference” shows. In this conference, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Interior of Central Europe and the Balkans came together to discuss migration. Among other topics, discussed was “the risks of crime, violent extremism and terrorism, which may spread as a consequence of irregular migration” (Declaration: Managing Migration Together, Vienna, 2016, 24.02.). The way the topics are combined in panels sets up the connection to crime. Such an establishment of the connection to criminality is especially the case for so-called ‘economic migrants’ becomes visible especially looking at newspaper articles on the topic:

Hundreds of thousands of economic migrants, consisting to a vast extent of young men, and the lack of critical engagement with the religion and culture of the huge number of asylum seekers and the potential consequences of this, have turned Europe into what it is today: terrorized, destabilized and unsafe. (KRONE, 2016, 15.01)
In combination with the already mentioned gendered tropes, criminalization serves to delegitimize claims and question the deservingness of people, through the establishment of a connection to illegitimacy.

While for the ‘war refugee’ a rhetoric drawing on ‘humanity’ and feminization was employed, the ‘economic migrant’ appears in context of abstract, technocratic language. In sharp contrast to the beginning of the period of my research in which statements like “The government sends a clear signal against agitators who talk about people fleeing as if they are worth nothing. Every human life is worth being rescued.” (Bundespressedienst, 2015, 28.08.) are uttered by the Federal Press Service, several months later the mentioning of ‘lives’ gets very rare. Terms like “inflow of refugees” (Bundespressedienst, 2016, 12.01.) and “stream of refugees” (SPÖ Pressedienst 2016, 14.01.) to just mention a few, show how instead of concrete human beings, especially families, women and children, the language in which ‘economic migrants’ are embedded is impersonal and abstract and avoids talking about ‘lives’. Terms like ‘stream’ are what Costas Gabrielatos and Paul Baker (2008) describe as “‘quantity’ or ‘group’ collocations […] expressed through emotionally charged metaphors” (19) is a discursive strategy to create notions of burden and threat. Weheliye (2008) has rightfully argued how the de-individualization of people arriving to Europe by describing them as ‘mass’ constituted an act of political violence that reduces bodies to materiality and thus establishes a biopolitical hierarchization of life (70).

Especially visible is the close link between an abstract language, the delegitimization of claims through drawing on the figure of the ‘economic migrant’ and the proposal of migration policies in the example of the discussion of upper limits in January 2016. A detailed analysis of the press

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14 The term ‘refugee’, in German ‘Flüchtling’ has as described above not necessarily a positive connotation. This means the expression above – “inflow of refugees” – includes ‘economic migrants’.
releases of the Austrian People’s Party – who use such discursive strategies stronger than the social democratic coalition partner – on the topic of upper limits shows that people themselves are never mentioned\textsuperscript{15}. Instead the focus of these statements is built on terms such as “capacity oriented borders”, “carrying capacity”, “flow of refugees”, “stricter asylum procedures”, “border management”, “decrease of the attractiveness of Austria as country of origin”, “migration to Austria” and “reduction and regulation” (ÖVP Parlamentsklub, 2016, 19.01.). Such language serves to draw boundaries to human suffering, by drawing attention to the national technocratic and legal procedures. Furthermore through the use of metaphors of ‘natural disaster’, human agency and political policies are taken out of the discussion (Gabrielatos/Baker 2008, 22).

As mentioned in all the elements I have described before – authenticity, vulnerability, criminality – the compliance with dominant liberal ‘Western’ expectations is important. Such a compliance has been described by various authors for the asylum procedure: Using the example of undocumented migrants who try to improve their status by collecting evidence for ‘civic engagement’ Sébastien Chauvin and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas (2014) show that ‘deservingness’ is not solely a legal category, but can be worked towards and achieved through the fulfillment of social expectations and performing a certain kind of participation in society. Thinking through the notion of deservingness in the example of the Austrian use of the term ‘economic migrant’ in relation to border policies, it becomes apparent that it is bound up with the acceptance of global hierarchies, in a material – economic and political – as well as in a moral sense, bound in civilizational tropes and discourses of modernity. In the Austrian example, deservingness is connected to a lack of critique of ‘Western’ policies and bound to the assumption that persecution

\textsuperscript{15} Except for mentioning that “there would be thousands of homeless refugees in Austria” (ÖVP Parlamentsklub, 2016, 19.01.), which can be read not only as a concern about the people, but more (and rather) as a concern about the Austrian population and the threat that homeless refugees would potentially pose to it.
is done by perpetrators from the Global South or ‘the Balkans’, rather than to ‘Western’ influence or the global capitalist system.

Additional to the lack of reflection on international division of labor and its consequences for people’s lives, the discussion also shows the lack of reflection on Austria’s positionality within the EU, which ignores the material wealth of Western European states, which would allow for the reception of people. Recurring statements by the government saying that Austria is surrounded by as such framed ‘safe third countries’ when arguing for stricter border policies, show how the notion of ‘economic migrant’ works through delegitimization and the accusation of a lack of the right kind of vulnerability, in relation to migrants who make through ‘strategic’ decisions shows first, how vulnerability does not translate to protection, and second, how the ‘economic migrant’ is used as a means to shifting responsibility for reception and protection from the Austrian state to other countries.16

As Roger Zetter (2007) argues in his conceptualization of the refugee label, the contemporary labelling supports such attempts of ‘migration management’ through the fractioning of the label. He argues that “the process of bureaucratic fractioning […] reproduces itself in populist and largely pejorative labels whilst, on the other, by legitimizing and presenting a wider political discourse of resistance to refugees and migrants as merely an apolitical set of bureaucratic categories.” (174)

Such fractioning includes the division between refugees and ‘economic migrants’. Based on Zetter we can thus understand the framing as ‘economic migrants’ as a highly political restructuring of the access to protection in Austria, in the service of national interests in relation to the regulation of migration. With Apostolova (2016) we can see how such a fractioning of the label does not follow arbitrary lines, but goes back to the ideological traits of classical economic liberalism. As

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16 I will expand on the function of this in section 5.1 on the positioning of Austria within the EU.
Etienne Balibar and Emanuel Wallenstein (1991) argue, the (re)production of nations functions to brush over class differences and holds in place an international division of labor. In the case of Austria, the separation of ‘economic migrants’ from refugees serves as a way to successfully brush over the ‘Western’, and also specifically Austrian, economic and political role in the creation of reasons for flight. That means global structures of exploitation which are part of the reason for people to migrate are brushed over with nationalist articulations of (un)deservedness of inclusion to the nation. Furthermore, with Weheliye (2008) we can see that the hierarchization of lives inherent in the dehumanizing language around the ‘economic migrant’ is at the center of the modern European nation-state (37), as it defines the scope of state power (33), or in the worlds of Foucault “the power to divide between “those who must live and those who can die” (Foucault, 1976).

By deconstructing the notion of ‘economic migrants’ and the underlying assumptions of deservingness, I have showed ways to analyze the function a certain racialized nationalism is serving. I have shown how the discussions around the ‘economic migrant’ and the ‘war refugee’ are most commonly connected to the discourses of authenticity and bound up in gendered and liberal terms of vulnerability and deservingness, with the result of a discursive construction of an incompatibility of an agential critique of one’s own economic condition with being a ‘real refugee’. I have argued that the use of the term is symptomatic of a general strategy of delegitimization through the construction of a false dichotomy with the aim to reduce numbers and create boundaries of deservingness and potential inclusion into the nation. Bound up in racialized, argumentations, the labeling as ‘economic migrant’ naturalizes exclusion based on the lack of recognition of global structures of capitalist economy.
5. Austria in EU and global politics – Negotiating East/West and North/South

In this chapter I am looking at the way the changes on the level of policy and law and the surrounding forms of representation during the ‘long summer of migration’ and its aftermath position the Austrian nation within a European and global context. The reaction to the increased number of people coming to claim asylum in Europe illuminates the institutional structure of the EU and the way Austria is working within it. In the first part I focus on the ways Austria is set in relation to other contexts within Europe, particularly Hungary and the Balkans. I argue that the discussions of migration and migration policies work also to differentiate Austria as distinct from the ‘East’ and describe how the legitimation for the shifts revolves around the two topics of smugglers and fences in gendered and economic terms. In the second part I concentrate on the positioning of the Austrian nation on the axis of Global North – Global South. I argue that for the formation and maintenance of ‘Austria’ the racist (post)colonial mobilization of ‘Europeanness’ and ‘humanity’ are fundamental.

5.1. Austria, Hungary and the Balkans: smugglers and fences

Throughout the whole period from summer 2015 to spring 2016, the EU plays a very important role in the statements about Austrian asylum politics, although the concrete forms of reference are changing. In this chapter I will look at changing discourses about EU countries in relation to nationalism. At the beginning, we can roughly observe the tendency of the dominance of a call for a common European solution and the rejection of nationally limited plans including fences on national borders. Statements by the Federal Press Service and the Ministry of Interior at the end of summer 2015 repeatedly call for common acting on a European level. For example: “We have to
develop suggestions together [...] we have to solve the task fast and in solidarity. ¹⁷" (Bundespressdienst, 2015, 27.08), or, “Europe has to wake up. Now is the time of the Europeans, not the time of nationalists.” (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2015, 04.09). Later throughout fall and winter 2015/2016 the general tendency shifts to a national policy focus. While the call for tighter securitization of the external borders of the EU remains present throughout the whole period of my research, starting from the first fence in November 2015, in Spielfeld at the Austrian-Slovenian border the ‘failing’ of the securitization of external EU borders is named by the parliament’s general administration office as a reason for “the need for national solutions” (Parlamentsdirektion, 2016, 17.02). The Austrian People’s Party’s formulation sums up the general tendency: “as long as we have not found a solution on a European level, Austria has to continue to defend its national interests” (ÖVP Parlamentsklub, 2016, 09.03).

As the relation between the call for EU and national reactions is shifting, the justifications for the changing position is usually made in connection to two reappearing main topics: smugglers and fences. Craig Calhoun’s (1997) conceptualization of the function of nationalism is useful to understand that even if the way of talking about the European context is changing, and even if the appeal is not only to national but to supranational structures, at the core of the argumentation still lies a nationalist positioning of Austria. As mentioned, Calhoun not only talks about how formations resembling nations relate to nation-states, but he points out that modern nationalism goes beyond the geographic location of persons, stating that “membership in the category 'nation' locates people in a complex, globally integrated world” (Calhoun 1997: 7). Authors such as Liz Fekete (2016), Annastiina Kallius (forthcoming) and Rajaram (2016) describe the importance of the larger context and especially the European scale for the shaping of Hungarian migration

¹⁷ All translation from German are mine unless otherwise noted.
policies and furthermore identity. In the following I will look at the recurring themes of smugglers and fences to show how negotiations of the European context were formulated for the Austrian case, as it plays out in the reproduction of symbolic geographies as well as of the nation within the European East-West coordinate system.

4.1.1. Smugglers: Balkan masculinity and the difference to border crossing helpers

I am looking at smugglers to illuminate broader question of nationalism, EU and border politics, because as the way discourses about migration become centered around smugglers points to the externalization and criminalization of mobility. Furthermore, the discussion around the figure of the smuggler shows mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion to the nation-state, and also how internal and external hierarchies such as the relation to Eastern Europe are navigated.

The figure of smugglers plays an important role in a lot of the Austrian government’s communication on its asylum politics. Although it is mobilized throughout the whole period of my research for the justification of policies and the shifting of national responsibility to ‘criminal individuals’ as smugglers are presented, it is most important in the first cluster of events after the deadly lorry accident at the end of August 2015. In discussion of the smuggler the Austrian nation is positioned in a certain way that relates it to wider structures, in the sense of Calhoun (1997).

The debate following the tragedy is an interesting example of how nationalist discourses are connected to the discourses of broader configurations, such as the EU. The debate simultaneously engages in Austrian nationalism and nationalist rhetoric on the EU level, while posing questions to the internal organization of the EU as such.

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18 In March 2016, the Social Democratic Party explicitly mentions smuggling as the reason for a nationalist agenda: “If there is no clarity [at the external borders of the EU about who is entitled to enter to Europe] we have to get active at the national borders to stop people smuggling all along the Balkan route” (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2016, 01.03).
Following the incident, the Austrian government as well as NGOs and volunteers strive to frame refugees as vulnerable. In opposition to the figure of the vulnerable refugee, the archetypal figure of the smuggler is created and becomes integral to the discussions. How ‘the smuggler’ is put into focus immediately after the incident, is shown in the first statement that the Social Democratic Party gives in reaction to the tragedy:

That smugglers let up to 5019 people die a painful death in a lorry makes one speechless and angry and shows that it is important to tackle the crime of human smuggling with which criminals profit from the suffering of other people by all means available under the rule of the law. (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2015, 27.08.)

Instead of talking about legal frameworks such as the Dublin Convention – which makes safe travel for people seeking protection within the European Union impossible and forces people to rely on smugglers for travelling – the media focus and focus of governmental statements is centered on the smugglers driving the lorry, but also on smugglers in general. As the statement above shows, the reaction to the accident does not provoke reflection on state actions in form of border controls and Dublin deportations, but on the contrary, it is instrumentalized for the justification for more shielding state actions. The analysis makes clear, first, how the threat of smugglers, presented as male, single, and opportunistic and criminal, to both the nation and the vulnerable refugee becomes a legitimation for increased border controls and works to shift state responsibility for the death of the refugees to smugglers. Second, and most importantly for the positioning of the nation in a European context, it shows that the nationality of the smugglers plays an important role in this; for those of European origin, the emphasis on their Eastern European (often Balkan) origin, presents smugglers not only as guilty, but explicitly as external threats to the Austrian nation as well as an internal “other” to the EU. I will outline both ways of construction in the following.

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19 At that time the exact number of victims was not clear yet.
Concerning the first set of constructions, the smugglers are characterized through tropes of ‘deviant’, violent masculinity and through the connection to economic profit making. The Minister of the Interior calls smugglers “criminal” and “not interested in the well-being of refugees, and that they are taken to a safe place, but […] only interested in making profit” (Mikl-Leitner 2015, 27.08). While at odds with qualitative research which show that the reality of smuggling shows not only those people who capitalize strongly on the travel of people, but also smuggling works through often family networks, friendships and other personal networks (f.e. Hermann, 2006 and Kyle&Dale, 2001), this quote gives insight into how the twofold justification works. In a very similar way to the construction of the ‘economic migrant’ that I have outlined in the chapter above, gendered arguments allow for the framing as threat to the nation. The smuggler is constructed as ruthless towards people and a threat to the state and the nation – as the wording in the statements such as “criminals” and “torturous” (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2015, 27.08.) – shows. In all statements only the masculine version of the word ‘smuggler’ is used, additionally the gender of the suspects as male is repeatedly pointed out. This is an example of how the notion of threat is heavily connected to a specific form of deviant masculinity I have described using Massad (1995) and Nagel (1998) before. The generalizing victimization of people seeking asylum in Europe and travelling through smugglers across borders, through the figuration as passive, strongly recalls discourses of human trafficking. This happens through the heavily used notion of the ‘war refugee’ in the discussion on the incident, mostly through pointing out the (Syrian) nationality of the victims, their feminized vulnerability and, most of all, through an ascribed lack of agency. Through the link of migration to discourses of human trafficking, border policies fighting the constructed ‘crime’ is allowed. Similar to what DeGenova describes for the instrumentalization of the countless maritime
deaths in the Mediterranean, “the invocation of tragedy was cynically conscripted to supply the pretext for the fortification of various form of border policing” (De Genova 2016, 35).

To move to the second big aspect, the discussion of the smuggler shows not only how gendered and economic arguments work in the construction of danger to the nation, but it shows how those work in dynamics between national and EU discourses, in the sense in which Calhoun describes them. The nationality of the smugglers was of great importance throughout the entire discussion surrounding the incident. At first, the local police chief emphasized that the nationality of the smugglers was not yet known. From the time that the suspects were detained, he then repeatedly identified them as “Bulgarian with Lebanese origin” and “Afghan with Hungarian papers”, while simultaneously pointing out that the nationalities of those being held in detention indicated a “Bulgarian-Romanian trafficking organisation” (Kronenzeitung 2015, 28.08). Apart from drawing on representations of Eastern Europe as place of criminality, these statements are an example of how the threat to the nation was always explicitly located beyond the nation’s borders. It was also critical within this discussion to emphasize that the death of refugees was always explicitly located beyond the nation’s borders. It was also
and “before they entered the country” (Kronenzeitung, 2015, 28.08). The repetition of the statement that the people died before they crossed the national border to Austria, and that the blame for these deaths must be placed not on Austria where people have ‘only’ been found dead, but elsewhere, as done by media and police statements of that time, ultimately shifts responsibility from national politics to ‘the East’. As outlined before, the Dublin III Convention in an earlier section, the legal framework which forces people into hiding from registration and travelling through smugglers. Through the set up framework of so-called Dublin-transfers (deportations within Schengen to the country of registration), EU countries establish very precarious conditions for people who are crossing borders. The statement of the Austrian government wanting to place
the blame for the death elsewhere but on Austrian silences the impact EU agreements and national Dublin-transfer practices have in the causation of death.

The emphasis of the location of death as outside of the Austrian territory, the call for drop-in centers at the external borders of the EU and the focus on the non-Austrian origin of the smugglers show that this incident did not provoke any reflection on current asylum politics, or, in other words, there was no acknowledgement that the need for smugglers is a product of the EU border regime. Rather the incident was used in a way to further legitimize the shift in responsibility from Austrian and EU policy to the smugglers themselves.

This important positioning of smugglers in specific places, as well as the identification and location of death always before reaching Austria, are also examples of how, following Calhoun, nationalist discourses locate people in a complex world. Nationalism not only employs mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion into the nation-state, but also always navigates and manipulates internal and external hierarchies. Anne McClintock uses the metaphor of the family to describe how nationalism naturalizes “hierarchy within unity” (1993, 64). Her metaphor is not only relevant for understanding the construction of the nation and its internal struggles, but also helps to see how member states are hierarchized and Eastern Europe serves as an internal Other within the EU. So while the EU is a political formation that is founded on some sense of unity and positioning against the external space of the non-European “Other”, in the discussion hierarchies between Austria and Hungary are simultaneously reproduced.

McClintock's trope of the “Family Tree of Man” (1993, 66) and Böröcz’s analysis of “European moral geopolitics“ (2006, 122) is helpful in illustrating these complex navigations on a national, EU and global level. Eastern Europe, and in this case particularly the Balkans, is figured as a space in-between; it is not quite European, not quite modern (Todorova, 2009, 18), yet still set in
opposition to non-European countries, those countries of origin for the refugees. These non-
European countries are as uncivilized, backward, and ‘racially different’ nations contrasted through
the government and media representations. The smuggler committing “crimes against human
dignity” (Bundespressedienst, 2015, 28.08.), through the emphasis on assertions such as they are
“still being suspected in Romania or Bulgaria” (KRONE, 2015, 28.08.) gets portrayed in line with
‘Western’ imaginations of Balkans. As Helms (2008) argues, gendered representations play an
important role in the construction of orientalist and balkanist figures (93). Balkan masculinity in
the figure of the “ruthless” (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2015, 04.09.), “criminal” (SPÖ
Pressedienst, 2015, 27.08.) smuggler is set in opposition to the Austrian nation, including the
Austrian migration policies, which allows a national pride in the protection of ‘war refugees’ and
victims. Women, are analyzed to be at the core of orientalist and balkanist discourses, by countless
authors for the context of Muslim far East (Yegenoglu, 1998; Dietze, 2009; Brunner/Dietze/Wenzl,
2009) and by Todorova (2009) and Helms (2008) for the Balkans. In the example of the discussion
of smugglers and refugees, it is not women, but gendered representations in the form of
vulnerability, victimhood and agency – such as in statements which repeatedly mention the age
and gender of those, “on which criminals capitalize” and which need to be “helped and protected”
by Austria (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2015, 27.08.) – a which serve to distinguish the ‘West’ from the
‘East’ and position Austria as ‘Western’ and essentially “good” (Böröcz, 2006, 112).

Another way of mobilizing a progressive idea of the Austrian nation in the period of my research
is in the distinction between smuggles and border crossing helpers. It is important to mention that
in past cases the Austrian government took harsh measures against people who were helping to
cross borders without financial benefit. In 2014, in the so-called ‘Smuggling trial’ of 2014 several
people (without Austrian passports) were found guilty of smuggling in trials lacking evidence and
drawing on racist argumentations. Seven people, most of them themselves in the midst of asylum procedures, were found guilty for human smuggling. The trial received a lot of critique, as the accused were helping friends who had just newly arrived to Austria with accommodation and transport, and without charging money. One year later, in the summer of 2015, the Austrian government presents itself as being able to distinguish between smuggling and support in border crossing for Austrian citizens to differentiate the Austrian nation from Hungary. As one example, the Ministry of Interior writes in a press release at the beginning of September:

Under the title ‘Convoy Budapest-Vienna, replacement bus service for refugees’ people are called in social media to transport refugees in private means of transport from Budapest to Vienna. The police points out that participation in this action is punishable and advises against it. In Hungary Austrians, have already been arrested for this reason. Also in Austria there might be serious consequences for such action, ranging from petty offences to felonies. The police offers are obliged to notify the authorities or the public prosecutors. (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2015, 04.09.)

The police department of Vienna also writes on the same topic that they want “to point out the consequences of such planned behavior for the participants also in view of the Hungarian legal situation.” (Landespolizeidirektion Wien, 2015, 06.09.). In both examples, the language used for Hungary differs fundamentally from that used for Austria. For Hungary, it is pointed out that (Austrian) people have been already arrested and implicitly stated that the legal situation is (too) harsh towards ‘Western’ border crossing helpers. For Austria, the Ministry of Interior only talks about the possibility of consequences and “advises against it”. Border crossing helpers are addressed as “private means of transportation”, not as criminal smuggling networks, as in the ‘Smuggling trial’, or in the case of the lorry accident, in which from the beginning profit making and criminality of the (non-‘Western’) smugglers was assumed. As critique of Orientalism as pointed out for decades and Helms makes clear also for the context of the Balkans, representations of ‘the West’ and ‘the East’ are heavily related to discourses of modernity and civilization (2008, 118). In the statements on border crossing helpers, the emphasis on ‘humanity’ and the recognition
of vulnerability and human pain is used by the Austrian institutions to distinguish the nation as more civilized, in contrast to what is framed as a repressive, backward Hungary, lacking “European solidarity” (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2015, 04.09.) and not living up to the “the strength of Europe and its great answers” (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2015, 05.09.). The discussion is thus bound in in a discourse „interrogating Hungary’s EU worthiness‘ because of doubts regarding is essential „Europeanness‘ in terms of a moral geopolitics of goodness in human rights“ (124) and reinstating the ‘Westernness’ of the Austrian nation through white ‘Western’ savior tropes, building on depoliticizing and victimizing tropes of philanthropy and humanitarianism (as described also by Malkki [1996] and Mohanty [2010]).

4.1.2. Fences: Depoliticization and national securitization

Similar to the discussion of smugglers, the discussion of fences, particularly the differences in the framing of the Hungarian fence and the Austrian fences and the different use of language illuminate intra EU dynamics and points to technical anti-politics.

The rhetoric used to talk about this first fence at the Austrian border differs vastly from the Austrian discourses describing the fence at the Hungarian-Serbian border only several weeks previously, which was, first, openly called a (razor wire) fence by the Austrian government, and, second, described as an inhumane barrier for people’s right to have access to international protection. At the end of August 2015, the Austrian government clearly showed their rejection of the Hungarian government’s act of building physical fences in statements such as “walls and watchtowers are not the solution” (Bundespressedienst, 2015, 27.08), as announced out by the Federal Press Service in August 2015 in the context of discussing future plans for national migration policies, and by the Austrian People’s Party when they state that “Razor wire fences around Austria and waves of fear are in any case no solution.” (ÖVP Bundesparteileitung, 2015, 05.09.). Only a few months later,
in November 2015, and after the reinstatement of border controls at the Southern border of Germany through the German government, the Austrian government revealed a new ‘migration management system’, a system of physical barriers and policies, meant to ‘regulate’ the movement of people from Slovenia to Austria. The plans included around 4km of wire-mesh fence close to the border crossing at Spielfeld. People waiting to enter the country were supposed to receive bracelets in various colors. Color codes on a big display were meant to show waiting times. A razor-wire fence was held in reserve, close to the border, in order to be able to react to an increased number of people arriving. At the same time with the ‘management system’, plans for legal changes, which increasingly restricted the access to international protection and reduced the social services guaranteed in and after the asylum procedure, were made public. For example the Social Democratic Party strongly condemns the fence built on the Hungarian-Serbian border in the following words:

The Hungarian Premier Orban thinks, in contrast to us, that problems can be solved with razor wire. ‘This is not a reception for those who are in need of help and in fear of their lives’, the chancellor criticizes the Hungarian treatment of those people ‘who managed with their last power to flee from war to Hungary.’ (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2015, 05.09.)

The language drawing on the graphically explicit and symbolically laden expression “razor wire” is meant to create a negative image. This negative image towards Hungary is strengthened through the use of the trope of the ‘war refugee’, as described above. The vulnerability of people seeking asylum is used as justification for the need of protection and potential inclusion of migrants into the nation – at the time of this discussion borders to Germany where mostly open and the Austrian government counted on most of them moving on and thus being eventually included in another nation –, while at the same time serves the function to distance Hungary from the nation of Austria. The discussion around the establishment of the Austrian ‘management system’ in November 2015 on the other hand is expressed in a very different language. The analysis of one article introducing
the plans, show abstract, technocratic language drawing on words like “wave breaker”, “technical barriers”, “waiting zones” and “guidance system” (Mediengruppe Österreich, 2015, 07.11.) Also in other statements government representatives and media workers use terms such as “border concept” (ÖVP Parlamentsklub, 2015, 13.11.) or “border crossing point” (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2015, 13.11.) instead of talking about a razor wire fence. The implications of such vocabulary that draws on a discourse of rationality and neutrality, while hiding the political calculations in such decisions on border politics, are thus what Ferguson’s (1990) calls an “anti-politics-machine”. For his case of development projects language leads to a failure of recognizing real problems, while projects can still be framed as success (67), and thus depoliticizes the projects, while bureaucratic structures are strengthened. In Austrian asylum politics, technocratic language similarly contributes to the distraction from political questions such as the consequences of Austrian border policies for people on the move, while the legitimacy for state actions is strengthened.

The vast differences in the way the Hungarian and the Austrian policies are discussed show especially in the way sovereign actions are considered legitimate or not. While discredited for Hungary, for the Austrian borders government officials repeatedly evoke the problem of a loss of control, which could only be re-established through certain kinds of action: “of course the situation is out of control. It is wrong to think that creating more housing [for asylum seekers] would help to re-establish control. […] It needs border security at the external borders, and if that fails, more and more states will try to secure the situation at their borders themselves.” (Sebastian Kurz, Foreign Minister, in Servus TV 2015, 12.11.). The language used by the Minister is a language of crisis. As I have outline above, Prem Kumar Rajaram (2015) explains the notion of the ‘crisis’ is something “fabricated” (2015) and internally as well as externally useful in connection to state
control, as it “effectively separates it historically, socially, and politically from other social processes, non-crises” (Rajaram, 2015).

Similar to the use of the depoliticizing technocratic language that I have discussed before, I see the phrasing of “more and more states”, which would “try to secure the situation at their border themselves” by the Foreign Minister through the evoking of the notion of a ‘crisis’ as a move which naturalizes the actions of a state in connection to control over the state territory. By placing orderly migration, through the established ‘management system’, in opposition to other forms of entry, illegality is produced (Rajaram 2015). Maggie Ibrahim (2005) argues that such an intertwining of migration with illegality is the first step in a process of criminalization (175). In the case of people seeking international protection, the entanglement of entry and illegality is particularly noteworthy, since under the Geneva Convention, which is the basis of asylum law, theoretically people should not be considered illegal once they have claimed asylum. Through the notion of crisis and the creation of illegality, interventions against mobility in the form of fences thus not only gets legitimized, but is naturalized as the national and only logical reaction to a created sense of loss of control.

Further statements about the fence show how the urge for control is repeatedly phrased in the trope of the ‘war refugee’ and thus in terms of vulnerability – framed as the vulnerability of various groups –, which needs to be answered with measures ensuring security. The Austrian Peoples Party lists “security of the Austrian population, of our executive forces and of refugees” (ÖVP-Parlamentsklub 2015, 13.11) as the three groups which need security. The Social Democratic Party formulates the issue at stake even more in terms of vulnerability of people seeking protection. They call for “enable[ing] an orderly, controlled and humanly reasonable (sic!) border crossing” and state, that [i]t is about controlling entry and providing the people with food, appropriate
clothing and, if necessary, medical aid” (SPÖ-Pressedienst 2015, 13.11.b). Repeatedly, women and children are named as the reason for the introduction of the ‘management system’: “A dangerous situation for women and children, on which in bigger groups there is often a lot of pressure, can thereby[through the erection of the fence] be prevented” (SPÖ-Pressedienst 2015, 13.11.a). In this way, which I have described detailed in the chapter on ‘war refugees’, this works as a way to convey vulnerability using feminization and infantilization:

The entanglement of vulnerability and the need for control becomes especially clear in the following statement:

A management system, which should guarantee a controlled and safe border crossing for refugees, is being constructed. It is not about reducing the number of people entering the country, but it is about enabling an orderly and – more than everything else – a safe entry. For us it is clear: Whoever is seeking protection from war and persecution should find it. […] In the long run we have to get to grips with the issues there on the spot, while simultaneously providing care for refugees as early as possible and distributing them equally between all EU member states. (SPÖ-Pressedienst 2015, 13.11.a)

The mechanism at work is similar to what Patel (2014) shows in her work on gender-based violence and immigration policies in the UK. The described vulnerability, which is produced to a great extent by institutional structures, is used as an argument to legitimize border control and measures, which have further negative effects on the groups initially described as vulnerable. As in the case of Patel’s description of the reinforcement of racist stereotypes through the particular framings of vulnerability, also in the case of the building of this fence, the ascribed vulnerability of people was dependent on the compliance to the rules provided by the state: the confirmation of a passivity and acceptance of the state procedure, as similar to the mechanisms at the work in the trope of the ‘war refugee’.

While I showed that for the first fence, the so called “fence light”, the trope of the ‘war refugee’ is of great importance, the discussion of fences shifts from January 2016 with the introduction of new plans for restrictions of access. At the beginning of March 2016, the government initiated the
‘closing’ of the Balkan route – the closing of all borders along the main travelling route (Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria), arguing that only strict barriers to passing through borders would deter people from moving to Europe in general. A main step toward this closing was the conference entitled “Managing Migration together” held on February 24th, 2016, that the Austrian Ministry of the Interior organized and in which ministers of the interior and foreign ministers of countries along the Balkan route were invited to write a joint declaration to react to “current challenges in the field of migration” (Bundesministerium für Inneres 2016, 23.02). While in the discussion about the first fence, security was still discussed as an important issue for citizens as well as for people seeking protection, in the third and fourth cluster of events in the period I am researching, there is a much clearer criminalization of migration, established through a link to the figure of the ‘economic migrant’ and terrorism. One part of the description of the conference reads as follows: “In the conference one panel deals with topics which are centered around internal security, as, for example, border management, the fight against smugglers, and extremism. The second panel addresses topics which particularly involve foreign policy such as measures to address root causes of forced migration, cooperation with third countries or information in countries of origin” (Bundesministerium für Inneres 2016, 23.02). In those few words, a lot of the underlying assumptions of a ‘management’ and ‘security’ framework come to light. In the listing of the first panel border management is mentioned together with a fight against smugglers. As I have pointed out in the previous section with the focus on the figure of the criminal smuggler, the government shifts responsibility for the violations of the rights of people in flight from their countries of origin and fails to reflect on the impacts European border policies have on individuals, forcing them to rely on smuggling networks to apply for asylum. The listing of extremism as topic in this panel establishes a direct connection between migration, religion and (assumed) criminality.
Furthermore, parts of the Joint Declaration make clear that the connection is made particularly with respect to terrorism. The document cites two texts as the basis on which to focus thematically on extremism: the Vienna Declaration of 20 March 2015 ‘Tackling Jihadism Together’, and the SEECP\(^{20}\) Joint Statement on Terrorism, Tirana from 24 May 2015, two papers written by Foreign Ministers to develop strategies against international terrorism. Furthermore it also expresses an awareness of “the risks of crime, violent extremism and terrorism, which may spread as a consequence of irregular migration “(Declaration: Managing Migration Together, Vienna, 2016, 24.02.), which directly establishes the connection. Concerning topics of the second panel of the conference, we can understand the problematics of the set up through Ibrahim (2005), who argues that within the shaping of immigration policy, the search for answers to the root causes of migration lays the basis for an increase in what she calls an interventionist style of international relations (171). Her work shows that such a “notion that host states, countries which are threatened by influx of migrants, can socially reconstruct the regressive-migrant producing countries hearkens back to an imperialist worldview” (171), in that the orientalist idea of ‘Western civilization’ is built based on the dichotomic difference to the ‘non-‘Western’ uncivilized other’ (171; see also Said, 1978). As she further points out, such a production of ‘the West’ as knowledgeable is the basis for imperial “rule and manage[ment]” (171). \(^{21}\) The third listed field, being the spread of information in countries of origin, assumes that the flight of people could be stopped if Northern countries would only spread information about the difficulties of gaining asylum in the destination countries. At the core of a statement such as this lies the trope of the ‘economic migrant’ and thus the denial of

\(^{20}\) SEECP is short for South-East European Cooperation Process, a regional co-operation initiative in the course of which leaders and ministers of 13 countries meet regularly.

\(^{21}\) I will discuss this in more detail in the next chapter.
legitimate reasons for flight and migration and the accusation that migrants would only aspire to economic promises of Austria.

In government rhetoric, the human security of people seeking international protection which was prevalent in the discussion of the first fence in November has been displaced by a state-centered discourse of fear centered around national financial resources and border security. In both the differentiation from Hungary in September 2015 and in the discussion of the Austrian fences centered around security in Fall 2015 and Winter 2015/16, nationalist agendas are brought forward. To understand how this shift was justified and normalized, it is important to look at the discourse and the exact wording in the discussion. At this time, the term ‘economic migrant’ was increasingly mobilized. January 2016 is of specific interest, as the Austrian chancellor, Werner Faymann, first used the distinction between “economic migrant and convention refugee” (SPÖ Pressedienst, 12.01. 2016) explicitly in connection to announcing the government’s plans, when he argued that a strict division between them and the rejection of ‘economic migrants’ already at the border would allow to significantly lower the numbers of people coming to Austria. As I have argued in more detail before, the chancellor’s statement was unexpected, as the term ‘economic migrant’ has until then been used mostly only by far right-wing parties such as the FPÖ in attempts to delegitimize asylum claims during the previous years, as I also have laid out above.

Recalling the notion of the ‘economic migrant’ – and the particular framing of authenticity, vulnerability and deservingness – it becomes clear that various economic discourses play an important role and that the split between ‘war refugees’ and ‘economic migrants’ is used for a certain reason. Such a fractioning of the “refugee label” as described by Zetter (2007) serves the legitimization of securitization, (re)produces national boundaries and global economies as non-violent and natural and, based on that, redraws boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. It is the
increased use of the term of the ‘economic migrant’ that allows the Austrian government to shift their national agenda to fences without felt incoherency with statements earlier, differentiating Austria from Hungary and justifying various forms of securitization at various times. The way the trope of the ‘economic migrant’ is set up shifts the focus of the discussion and transforms people’s movement to Austria into the abstract task of national “border management” (Parlamentsdirektion, 2016, 11.02.).

To summarize, through examining the use of the figure of the smuggler and the changing rhetoric around fences I have shown the way the discussion of asylum politics happens in strong relation to the nation. While the concrete form of drawing connections to the European level is changing and national policies gain importance throughout the months of my research, the nationalist references situating the Austrian nation as ‘Western’ against non-‘Western’ Hungary and the Balkans is recurring. The nation is thus placed within a certain idea of ‘Europeaness’, but also on certain coordinates within Europe, establishing East-West hierarchies. The shift towards more nationally centered policies is justified through the different uses of gendered and economic arguments, which exemplifies the centrality of gender and neoliberal ideology for nationalism.

5.2. The global scale: ‘Humanity’-security, white supremacy and colonial continuities

In this section I am going to look at the way the Austrian nation is positioned in relation to the Global South. Similar to the way nationalism is facilitated through differentiation from the Balkans, as described in the last section, Austrian nationalism is also driven in relation to non-European. I see these negotiations as situating the nation within a Global North – Global South axis, mostly
through discourses of humanity and security, which eventually lead to the elevation of the nation through racist, colonial tropes.

The discussions are pervaded by what is framed as “the conflict between righteous self-defense and the superior moral stance of humanitarianism” (Gagyi et al., 2016), to use the words of Gagyi et al., who describe it for the Hungarian context. This “superior moral stance of humanitarianism” (Gagyi et al., 2016) shows especially in the first half year of the period, especially in the time around the opening of the borders at the end of summer 2015. Even if humanitarianism is not directly referenced, notions of ‘humanity’ and ‘helping’ are heavily present. Throughout late fall 2015 and winter 2015/2016 the invocation of ‘security’ becomes dominant, although references to the summer and ‘humanity’ remain important. In relation to ‘humanity’, Europe and particularly Austria is framed as ‘safe haven’, “offering help” (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2015, 27.08.), “being in solidarity” (Bundespressedienst, 2015, 27.08.), guaranteeing “asylum as an indivisible human right” (Bundespressedienst, 2015, 28.08.), “the health of and supply for refugees as first priority” (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2015, 04.09.) and in general “humane treatment” (Bundespressedienst, 2015, 04.09.). I have already described the establishment of moral superiority of the Austrian nation through balkanist and anti-Hungarian rhetoric. The rhetoric of rights and ‘humanity’ serves a similar purpose of elevating ‘Westernness and the Austrian nation.

As described in the section on the notion of ‘war refugees’, the need for Austria to give “protection and help” (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2015, 27.08.) to people is usually argued through their gendered vulnerability, while, as I have pointed out in the section on the ‘economic migrant’, the refusal of access to national territory and protection is legitimized through supposed economic motivations and the agential behavior of people seeking asylum. This shows how the tropes of ‘helping’ and ‘saving’ and thus the deservingness of inclusion into the nation is very limited, and conditional on
the compliance to ‘Western’, capitalist standards of vulnerability. Authors such as Mohanty (2010; 2013) and Spivak ([1988] 1993) have pointed out, how such gendered saving tropes are colonial, as they offer no reflection on structures of dominance which are producing oppression, but rather use an essentializing and victimized notion of women of color as foil against which to produce Westernness, or to use the term of Coronil (1996) “Occidentalism” is produced through the representation of the ‘Other’. In this case the trope of the ‘war refugees’, as “people who made it with their last ounce of strength to flee from war” (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2015, 05.09.), are the foil against which the Austrian nation can be presented as savior. The mechanism at play is similar to what Böröcz (2006) describes as the instrumentalization of Romanies in the process of establishing “geopolitics of moral goodness” in Europe, which makes Romanies passive victims through the representation of France as benevolent savior (115). Similarly also Broeck and Saucier argue about the ‘good’ intentions of the anti-racist work they analyze and identify it as using migrant struggles as a “tool for the psychic transformation, which will eventually lead to symmetry for the Italian and reorganization of the human, but not the Black African” (34). Building on Böröcz and Broeck/Saucier, I see the establishment of Austrian national identity through ‘goodness’ as only possible through the use of victimized refugees, so through the availability of non-white people. Furthermore, such a representation as ‘helpers’ shows the situation as isolated and heavily ahistorical, without any reflection on the processes which produced and reproduces global structures of violence and inequality in the first place. As Broeck and Saucier (2016) state, it is absolutely necessary to move from such a “benevolent, almost proto-abolitionist feeling for the victims of such violence […] towards a Black critique of the white subject’s position whose well-being has been conditional […] on just such practices of abjection” (32). Broeck and Saucier help
us thus to understand how a depoliticized humanitarian rhetoric is not only different, but actively preventing a critique of ‘Western’ ‘civilization’ as violent.

In the later phase of the period I am analyzing, the references to current humanitarian actions are decreasing while the references to previous ‘humanitarian achievements’ are going up. Typical statements include the note that “Austria has especially in the last year proven its readiness to help” (Bundeskanzleramt, 11.02.2016) or that “we have done a lot for admission, support and integration of refugees.” (ÖVP Parlamentsklub, 2016, 16.03.) While adding then that “[i]t is important to take up politics of humanity. But now it is also necessary to strictly keep the upper limits based on our capacity.” (ÖVP Parlamentsklub, 2016, 16.03.) Such an argumentation allows for the moral justification of securitization and reproduction of superiority. Broeck and Saucier describe the discourse in which the discussion of securitization is happening as the following:

Europe is […] constituted as white homogeneous borderland of post-Enlightenment democracy that has to respond to contradictions, differences, and an aggressive impact from without; and not as a social, cultural, physical and virtual space for which enslavism and colonialism have acted as, and produced constitutive contradictions within. (Broeck/Saucier 2016, 27)

This allows that even in situations, in which people are cut off from access to international protection, the mere negotiation of a situation, including previous humanitarian support is enough to establish national pride, as in the following statement by the chancellor in the context of the closure of the Balkan route: “I am proud that we helped. Now we have the right to demand the order that we did not have in the time of the emergency measures.” (SPÖ Pressedienst, 2016, 14.03.)

This punctual support (in a very limited understanding of support) is thus deemed to be sufficient to fulfill the understanding of “moral responsibility” (Parlamentsdirektion, 2016, 16.03.). I argue that this is possible, as underlying the discussion of migration politics is a hierarchization of lives, which centers the Austrian population to an extent that even the humanitarian interventions seem to function mostly in order to reproduce national pride. Such a hierarchization of life, or in the
words of Foucault, the division between “those who must live and those who can die” (Foucault, 1976), is established along racialized markers of nationality. Securitization as in the case of the building of the Austrian border fences and the initiation of the closure of the Balkan route can be understood as the effort to improve the ‘health’ or the ‘chances of survival’ of a certain population, as it is part of the active regulation of the reproduction of the nation, to think with Foucault (1976). State racism, as the “precondition that makes killing acceptable“ (256) legitimizes death with the ‘survival’, the ‘purification’ and ‘strengthening’ of population (255). It is important to understand Austrian whiteness in this context not only as marker of skin color. Rather, as Weheliye (2008) convincingly shows, we have to understand it as the mechanism according to which value of life is distributed (144).

The references to the ‘survival’ of the national population show also as in the language used, for example in the repeated reference to the erection of fences decided in February 2016 as “emergency solution” (Parlamentsdirektion, 2016, 17.02.). As mentioned earlier, the fabrication of ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’ allow for highly disproportionate interventions, such as the introduction of daily limits for asylum applications (De Genova, 2016; Rajaram, 2015).

The way human rights are functioning in the whole discussion is telling. Taking into consideration that asylum politics build on international legal frameworks and notions of rights, the rare naming of rights in the phase of increased securitization from Winter 2015 on is notable. If rights are mentioned, the statements from January 2016 follow primarily this logic:

Due to its presentable and humane course, Austria is a magnet for all refugees. But now the limit of capacity for admission has been reached and there must be actions taken, says Josef Cap with regret and emphasizes that he wants to protect human rights. (Parlamentsdirektion, 2016, 17.02.)

22 Death in this context has to be understood not only as literal death, as in the cases of people drowning in the Mediterranean Sea, but also refers to the (lack of) actions which potentially lead to death, such as deportations or restriction of access to accommodation.
Although there is an international framework of rights, including the Geneva Convention and human rights in place, which are supposed keep certain standards for minorities, the quote exemplifies the limits of the enforceability and liability of the legal frameworks. As Merry (2003) argues, the Eurocentric form of human rights is part of the reason why they are not guaranteeing protection. As one of the main reasons for that she sees the privileging of some forms of freedom, including political freedom, over others, such as economic freedom. As described before, if we look at the argumentation of the Austrian policies which restrict access to asylum applications the figure of the ‘economic migrant’ is heavily mobilized. The way ‘Western’ shaped rights frameworks are set up to largely ignore (capitalist) economic violence, they make the articulation of certain problems nearly impossible, while prioritizing some violations in line with dominant ‘Western’ understandings of vulnerability. Even if human rights and the Geneva Convention do not actually play a central role in the way asylum law and border policies are discussed from summer 2015 until spring 2016 in Austria, I find it important to see how the way the rights frameworks are set up in a ‘Western’, classed, gendered and racialized way, are part of the reason, why they fail. Using the reference to the commitment to human rights in a statement as the one quoted above then fulfills again the function of portraying Europe, and especially Austria, as “haven of universal rights, which are being heralded as an exceptional achievement” (Broeck/Saucier, 2016, 25) and are thus supporting a colonial narrative of ‘Western’ progressiveness.

Another way in which the Austrian nation is reproduced as ‘Western’ is through the repeated statement concerning the capacity to solve problems in countries of origin. The capacity to ‘solve’ either as in when the government talks about the “solution of the refugee question” (Bundespressedienst, 2015, 27.08.) and “the task” (Bundespressedienst, 2015, 27.08.), or in when
the government names the “solving of the reasons for flight at ‘the source’, thus in the countries of origin” (Parlamentsdirektion, 2016, 20.01.) and states that “[w]e have to target the causes, otherwise nothing will change.” (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2015, 05.09.) Ibrahim (2005) argues that within the shaping of immigration policy, the search for answers to the root causes of migration lays the basis for an increase in what she calls an interventionist style of international relations (171). She argues that the notion that “host states that are threatened by a high influx of migrants can socially reconstruct the regressive-migrant producing countries goes essentially back to an imperialist worldview” (171).

I will give two detailed examples, by each of the parties in the government and from different moments in the period I am researching, to show the connections between ideas of ‘humanity’/security and moral superiority, imperialist and racialized policies and the ‘war refugee’ – ‘economic migrant’ binary. The first statement is by the Austrian People’s Party in reaction to the opening of borders at the beginning of September 2015:

> It is not about handling symptoms, but tackling the causes in the affected regions is necessary […]. As Christian-social movement it is self-evident for us to support where it is necessary and distinguish at the same time clearly between real refugees and emigrants for economic reasons. The general secretary calls the fight of causes on the spot through protection zones, reception camps in the countries of origin and the international actions against terrorism. […] Now it is Europe’s time to show what it can. And Europe are all of us. What we need now is tempo and action instead of delays and empty promises. We need an immediate special summit; we need to strengthen the external borders without delay and we need a reorganization of the Dublin-Regulation. (ÖVP Bundesparteileitung, 2015, 05.09.)

Under the title “Austria goes in the right direction in the refugee question. Head of government defends national means of border securing as wakening call” (Parlamentsdirektion, 2016, 16.03.), the following part is the Social Democratic Party’s position on the EU-Turkey agreement and the ‘closure’ of the Balkan route:

> ‘Humanity and order connect’, Joseph Cap (S²³) emphasizes talking about the Federal government’s maxim for migration politics. In opposition to the FPÖ, which does not offer any solutions, the government under

²³ The (S) indicates that the politician is an official of the Social Democratic Party.
Faymann works on an approach in line with human rights with allows the orderly handling of refugee movements through secured Schengen borders and fair distribution. The agreement with Turkey is for [Joseph] Cap in this relation necessary, even if he rejects a possible joining of Ankara to the EU. As Hannes Weninger (S) confirms, last year Austria has proven humanity and know-how and he wishes to see the continuation of such strong common government politics for the best of the population as well as for those people, in need of protection and help. ‘If countries of the European Union look away, we will see this refugee crisis turn into a European crisis’, Harald Troch (S) states. In February, the EU woke up, also thanks to the Austrian policies. Mottonen (S) sees need for action of the Union in the current Syrian peace negotiations in Geneva, where the EU should appear stronger in the interests of civil society, and concerning economic cooperation with the countries of the crisis-ridden region. [Joseph] Cap and his colleague from the same fraction, Nurten Yilmaz mention the pacification of the conflict regions as basic requirement to end the suffering of refugees. Until then the people in need of protection need possibilities to legally reach the EU, Yilmaz states. (Parlamentsdirektion, 2016, 16.03.)

We see in both examples the call for harsher border policing. Also in both examples Europe and Austria is referred to as capable of ‘solving’, as active, capable, full of know-how, and as space of order. Notions of ‘humanity’ and ‘rights’ are thrown into the statements, while references to the (imperialist) pacifying mission of Europe outside of the European territory are made. The “suffering of refugees” and the division between ‘war refugees’ and ‘economic migrants’ are used in both statements as legitimization for the measures taken. In the second statement, the situation for people arriving in Europe is directly connected to the Austrian population. Both times the center of the attention is on the portrayal of the party and the nation as ‘managing’, while the topic of migration and the people affected by migration politics appear only as the topic through which the nationalist sentiment is reproduced. European nationalism and modern state power, which relies on such a hierarchized differentiation of humans through immigration policies can thus be understood with Weheliye (2008) as following the logic of white supremacy (12, 37).

The tendency to externalize border controls and to shift the control of people to the margins of the EU, as it is heavily visible in both of the statements, shows in a lot of the policies of the whole period from summer 2015 to spring 2016; in all the fences and especially in the system of the so-called “hot spots”, reception camps mostly on Greek islands, where the whole asylum procedure is supposed to be held (DerStandard, 2016, 07.03.), before any applicants can be transferred via
the EU relocation scheme to various EU countries. But additionally, it is very important to point out that not all such fences and polices are built and implemented on (the border of) the territory of the EU. The externalization of borders, happens in multilateral agreements, as the EU-Turkey deal, but is also ongoing in financial, military and political cooperation between the EU and African states. The network of policy frameworks and agreements for border ‘management’ outside of EU territory facilitated by European and EU governments and semi-independent institutions such as FRONTEX and the ICMPD (International Center for Migration Policy Development), as described by Maribel Casas Cortes, Sebastian Cobarrubias and John Pickles (2010). Broeck and Saucier (2016) make clear, this way of externalizing European borders through cooperations leading to systems of detention centers and militarization of f.e. African borders should not be seen as new, but rather as continuity of European history of colonialism in the contemporary form of what Nicholas Mirzoeff calls “empire of camps” (Nicholas Mirzoeff in Broeck/Saucier, 2016, 31).

What the discussion of the statements in connection to humanity and security has shown is that before and after the shift to more repressive policies we always see certain form of nationalism, based on white supremacy and an elevation of the Austrian nation as (Western) European. Racism is particularly important for nation building, as Hall (1986) has shown, because ‘race’ has the quality to brush over economic and political differences (25) and because of the way it can “carr[y…] powerful cultural, national-popular connotations” (26).

The humanitarian arguments at the beginning are part of “European exceptionalism” Böröcz, 2006, 126), that is meant to reinstate the nation as morally superior, through tropes of humaneness, ‘goodness’ and saving’ of victimized. In the period of increased securitization Europe, and especially Austria, is presented as a space of order and civilization. Both the use of ‘security’ and
‘humanity’ go back to the same core and are two sides of the same medal. Both discourses need “flesh without agency”, in the terms of Broeck and Saucier (2016)24, meaning both discourses do not recognize people seeking asylum as agential nor engage in hierarchical conversation, rather they keep them in a passive position, utilizing them to advance the Self’s position, which only serve to advance subjects’ position. As I have shown in this section, both the discourse of ‘humanity’ and the discourse of ‘security’ are two sides of a biopolitical regime that guards “guards its comparative wealth and guarantees of freedom carefully, sheltered by broad mass approval of its hegemonic white citizenry” (Broeck/Saucier, 2016, 25). Both are grounded in a ‘Western’ European nationalism and both thus rely on the distancing from non-European other through orientalist tropes. In the following concluding chapter I will bring my argument of the constantly underlying nationalism of the Austrian government rhetoric argument back to the tropes of the ‘war refugee’ and ‘economic migrant’ and highlight the conclusions for future study of nationalism and immigration policies.

24 In their example, they compare FRONTEX and anti-racist movements to argue how in both cases white ‘Western’ subjectivities and identities are strengthened through representations of refugees.
6. Conclusion

I began this project by talking about the slow and steady shift that gradually transformed the rhetoric around Austrian asylum politics from one of ‘openness’ and ‘humanity’ to one of ‘security’ over the course of only half a year. Considering textual materials around the main events within this chronological time period, I have analyzed the (re)production of the nation’s boundaries in order to understand how, despite this rhetorical shift, the nation was coherently reproduced by the government. I argued that the main reason for Austria’s seamless reproduction is grounded in the consistent, underlying nationalist discourse which – despite differing rhetoric – has remained fundamentally the same at its core.

I have shown how national boundary drawing happens on two conceptual levels. First, it happens through the construction of the ‘deservedness’ of protection and access to the nation through the tropes of the ‘war refugee’ and the ‘economic migrant’. These two figures are bound up in gendered, economic and racialized tropes, and used to legitimize the policies of the Austrian government across the transition in rhetoric. The ‘war refugee’ is constructed as vulnerable and deserving, while the ‘economic migrant’ is constructed as undeserving on the basis of gendered, Eurocentric and liberal economic standards. I have shown how increasing use of the term ‘economic migrant’ is in actuality part of a strategy of delegitimization through the construction of a false dichotomy, and with the aim to reduce numbers while exclusion from the nation is naturalized.

Second, boundary drawing happens through the positioning of the Austrian nation within East-West and North-South coordinates. In boundary drawing that differentiates the Austrian nation from Eastern Europe and the non-European context, the two figures of the ‘war refugee’ and the ‘economic migrant’ play an important role, as they are used to justify state actions and in framing the ‘self’ in relation to other countries. For the discussion of Austria’s East-West positioning within
the EU, I have given the example of two recurring topics around which these dynamics are visible: the figure of the smuggler and the public discussion around fences. The framing of smugglers and fences shows how the Austrian nation is situated in symbolic geographies and juxtaposed with both Hungary and the Balkans, nations which carry stereotypical ‘Western’ representations as ‘the East’. I have shown how the nation is thus lodged within a certain idea of Europeaness and constitutive of the establishment of East-West hierarchies. In the section on the global scale of Austrian positioning, I have shown how statements in connection to humanity and security are based on a certain form of nationalism, which is based on white supremacy and the elevation of the Austrian nation as decidedly (Western) European. I have shown that humanitarian arguments are an exceptionalism that is meant to reinstate the nation as morally superior. In the period of increased securitization, Europe - and especially Austria - is presented as a space of order and civilization. I have shown how the use of both ‘security’ and ‘humanity’ are two sides of the same coin, and identified the importance of gendered, economic and racialized mechanisms in this boundary drawing.

My work offers a critical and nuanced approach to the study of migration policy. Rather than naturalizing the nation-state form and exclusionary mechanisms, as done through mainstream ‘migration management’ approaches, I use the study of migration policy to shed light on the way that the nation is set up and its boundaries are drawn. My combination of feminist literature on nationalism, historical-materialist approaches to migration studies and postcolonial and biopolitical theories on racialization demonstrates how gendered, liberal economic and racialized mechanisms intersect in the construction of the nation. My combination of feminist literature should be read as an appeal to advance our understanding of the modern European nation and reshape the studies of nationalism. By bringing nationalism into the picture, this research offers
deep insights into the context of European and Austrian literature on immigration control, where nationalism is all too often only superficially theorized or overseen completely. While my work does not substitute thorough historical analysis – which might for example compare the Austrian reaction to refugees of 2015/2016 to the nation’s reaction to refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s – it does offer a useful interdisciplinary framework for the research of the Austrian nation in relation to present-day migration.

While the two quotes with which I started this thesis may appear quite different at first glance, a closer, more critical look at these shifting rhetorical strategies uncovers how nationalist discourses strongly related to supranational political agendas are present at all stages and statements pertaining to migration politics. From the closure of the Balkan route to now, Austria has changed its law to enable a state of emergency based on numbers of asylum applications. The nation has continued to tighten its laws and government official have officially called for a closure of the Mediterranean route, which will undoubtedly increase the number of people dying in the sea while trying to cross borders to Europe. The securitization of the state is of critical importance at this moment, and will continue to be important into the future. In the context of the European Union, in which most member states follow an increasingly racist course, the Austrian case is neither singular nor unique.

In the context of the European Union, in which most member states follow an increasingly racist course, the Austrian case is neither singular nor unique. Thus, understanding the mechanisms of Austria’s initial shift, and its relationship to the underlying mechanisms of modern European nationalism, is a crucial step towards developing tools for critical interventions.
Appendix

Timeline of events around Austrian migration politics, summer 2015 – spring 2016

August
27th 71 dead people found in lorry on Austrian highway (Parndorf, close to Hungarian border) and reinstatement of border controls Austria-Hungary

September
2nd dead body of Alan Kurdi found - picture gets worldwide attention
4th March of Hope: hundreds of migrants walking in protest from Budapest to Vienna
5th Austria opens its borders to Hungary, busses transport people across borders
13th Thomas De Maizière (German Minister of Interior) reinstates border controls in the South of Germany

Oktober
22nd Johanna Mikl-Leitner (Austrian Minister of Interior) calls for “Fortress Europe”

November
13th plans to built “fence light”, migration management “gate with side parts” in Spielfeld, at the border to Slovenia revealed

December
17th meeting of the European council in Brussels: decision to secure external borders of EU and insert hotspots

2016
January
4th Sweden starts intensive controls (f.e. forces transportation companies to control documents of passengers)
20th Plans for daily quotas of asylum seekers and legal amendments established

February
16th planning of 12 new fences at Southern/Eastern borders
19th daily quotas for entry of asylum seekers in Austria in place
26th legal amendments: temporary asylum and restrictions in family reunification in Austria are introduced
March

8th  ‘Closure’ of the Balkan route
20th  - EU-Turkey deal

April

28th  emergency state law passed, setting a maximum quota of people who can apply for asylum in a year
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