MAKING AND BREAKING REGIMES

RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ROLE OF ARMED FORCES IN REGIME CHANGE

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the impact of civil-military relations on transitional outcomes in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya during the Arab Spring 2011, and investigates why militaries would support democratization. The present research expands on the study of military behavior in domestic politics and sheds light on military activities beyond warfare and territorial security beyond combat. The analysis first constructs a sequential model of military decisions and outcomes to derive two hypotheses in the first step.

It is hypothesized that armed forces are more likely to defect and expedite regime change if they have a better relation to citizens than to the government (H1). Furthermore, assuming that democracy requires the high cost of civilian control by definition, armed forces are more likely to allow democratization when the benefits of democracy to their function and wellbeing outweigh the cost of civilian control (H2). Through constructing a two-dimensional framework that encompasses a polity-military and a citizen-military dimension, the analysis compares civil-military relations between the dimensions, within and across the cases.

The hypotheses are tested using empirical and formal modeling jointly with the purpose of completing the sequential model with utility functions for every decision path. The analysis finds that militaries not only matter in transitions, but that their decisions are decisive. Additionally, to support democratization, democracy has offer at least the same payoff as a defection, which should have the same utility as a military takeover, despite the high cost of civilian control.

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Acknowledgements

Working on this thesis would have only been half as enjoyable, had it not been for my supervisor, Matthijs Bogaards. I cannot thank him enough for his analytical insight, reading recommendations, his mentoring during the challenging times of this year, and his genuine engagement with this topic from start to end. I hope the working process of this thesis, including the brief period of campaign management, was as rewarding to him as it was to me. Vielen herzlichen Dank für die großartige Betreuung. I would furthermore like to thank Tamas Rudas for his methodological insights in all the courses I took with him through the two years (three). I did not take Survey Methodology with my MA-thesis in mind, but I found myself very glad that I did when I saw the state of my survey data. I hope that this is evidence that I took very extensive notes and paid attention, despite the unfortunate time of the course.

My gratitude further goes to my dear friend and favorite neighbor Vidita Priyadarshini for all the shared thesis-writing sessions, discussions and mutual reviews, late-night-procrastination walks. Likewise, thank you to Mirella Suga, Daniel Shaw, Claire Elliott, Marleen Bornat, Aisulu Boloteva, Raluca Toma and all the others with whom I shared long study-hours and writing marathons. I am especially thankful to you for keeping me from working on my birthday. Given that writing this thesis presupposes that I am alive-ish, I made a mental note to mention and thank Lika Mchedlidze specifically for sharing the most underwhelming ride in an ambulance with me. It was a needle-ridden unpleasant disruption of my studies, but I am thankful I shared that with you. Please stay healthy and keep your insurance card on you at all times.

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And last but not least, shukran ketir to my family in Germany and in Egypt. My parents, Eman and Shaban, who were always moderately eager to discuss the political developments in Egypt, and double-check my Arabic translations. Dankeschön to my siblings Mohamed, Sumeyya and Safa who moderated these political debates, and to my grandmother, and aunt for their endless support and live-updates from Cairo. See you at the next Revolution!

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Chapter 1:

Introduction

Seven years after the Arab Spring 2011, the democratic deficit in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) continues to persist: Egypt had a regime change towards democratic rule at first under Morsi but saw a military take-over in 2013 following widespread strikes and protests (ECSER, 2014). Libya descended into another presently ongoing civil war, while the Bouteflika-regime in Algeria persisted through the Arab Spring and is still presently in power. Only Tunisia successfully transitioned into a democracy. While there is agreement that armed forces played some role during regime changes of the Arab Spring (Makara, 2013), there is little consensus on the extent. In principle, civil-military relations are coined by a civil-military-paradox in democracies (Huntington, 1985; Janowitz, 1960) wherein incumbents need a strong military to safeguard their regime. But any military that is strong enough to protect a regime is also strong enough to threaten it. This thesis will investigate the role of militaries in regime change, and argue that active retreat or take over in the transitional process determines prospects of democratization.

While there is substantive research on why military regimes collapse (e.g. Agüero, 1995), there is comparatively little on why militaries voluntarily and actively retreat (Hoffman, 2011). This is the research gap that will be addressed in this thesis. The goal is to contribute a formal model on military interactions which, unlike previous existing approaches (e.g. Svolik, 2009, 2013; Roessler 2011), also accounts for citizen-military relations. Previous approaches to transitions furthermore focused on interactions between incumbent, opposition and citizens with the underlying assumption that militaries were either irrelevant, or part of the regime with politics taking primacy over military. In general, the control of armed forces by civilians is a fundamental prerequisite for democratization (Bruneau & Matei, 2008; Bland, 2001; Huntington, 1995). Hence, the process towards ensuring control is key to successful

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democratization and consolidation (Diamond, 1999: 113). However, this assumption often does not hold true for non-democratic regimes. This thesis therefore aims to build a framework of civil-military relations that does not presume civilian control to avoid conceptual overstretching (Sartori, 1970; Collier & Mahon, 1993). The present approach consequently breaks with previous research and posits that militaries are a separate agent of change with interests that do not always align with those of the incumbent regime. Militaries may defect from regimes that have come under existential threat and expedite changes through direct takeovers, or active retreats and handover to civilians. However, if democratization is not in the interest of the military, it will be thwarted.

Research Design and Hypotheses

This intra-regional comparison (Basedau & Köllner, 2007) focuses on military decisions following threats to regime stability. The two central research questions are:

RQ1: How do Civil-military relations Impact Transitional Outcomes?

RQ2: Why would Armed Forces support Democratization?

Given that existing concepts of civil-military relations do not capture nuances of civilian control, a new framework of civil-military relations will be built which divides civil-military relations into a polity-military-dimension and a citizen-military dimension. This reconceptualization is necessary because it cannot be assumed that citizens will have the same relation towards militaries as to the incumbent regime due to separating the military analytically from the regime.

Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria were selected for the empirical analysis, because they faced the same critical regime threat – the Arab Spring 2011 – resulting in different outcomes. The relevant timespan in the empirical analysis begins with the emergence of the same regime that was in power during the Arab Spring. For Libya, that would be the military

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coup of 1969 that brought Gaddafi to power. In Algeria, armed forces had cancelled elections in 1992 which constituted the prelude the Algerian Civil War. For Tunisia, it would be the 1987 coup that instated Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. Mubarak in Egypt took power 1981 after the assassination of Sadat.

In the initial hypothesis-building stage, a sequential formal model (Morton, 1999: 35f) will be derived from the outcomes and military decisions during the Arab Spring in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. Real-world events and interactions between agents will be 'translated' into an abstract symbolic set of assumptions that will be used to derive predictions (37). Formal modeling serves to isolate specific processes and differentiates between relevant and irrelevant components of a process (Martin, 2009). The goal of the inductive part of the analysis is to formulate a theoretical model that represents an abstract version of military decisions and outcomes that can be used as basis for application (Morton, 2009: 28).

The model will be *rational choice-based* in that it assumes that armed forces have goals and make choices to attain them (29). Based on this sequential model, two hypotheses will be derived. First, assuming that differences between military relations to polity and citizens determine decisions to defect or cooperate, it will be hypothesized that armed forces are more likely to defect and expedite regime change if they have a better relation to citizens than to the government (H1). To address the second research question of why armed forces would support democratization, it will be assumed that democratization goes at the expense of military dominance. Hence, armed forces are more likely to allow democratization when the benefits of democracy to their function and wellbeing outweigh the cost of civilian control (H2).

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Strengths and Limitations

This study has several strengths and limitations. Primarily, it is among the first that not only analyze various dimensions of civil-military relations comparatively, but also model the interplay of those dimensions. It also expands the scope of the literature on civil-military relations; they are not merely an active interaction during crisis but constitute a structural prerequisite to the viability of regimes. In addition, it contributes to the literature on strategic transitions which uses formal modeling and game theory such as Przeworski (1991), Gandhi and Przeworski (2007), and Colomer's (2000) work. Finally, it investigates to the puzzle of the persisting democratic deficit in the MENA-region and so-called Arab Exceptionalism (Stepan & Robertson, 2003; Lakoff, 2004) in that it applies a comparative approach to area studies.

This thesis also offers a methodological contribution; the joint use of empirical and formal modeling to investigate why armed forces would allow democratization bridges a general disconnect existing between the two approaches (Granato et al., 2010). Empirical observations on their own may be descriptive at best, while theoretical models often fall short in their utility (783). Specifically, current practices are ex post and overlook an agent's behavior and response, which in turn does not allow for predictions (784). This analysis demonstrates how both formal and empirical model can be used jointly for hypothesis building, testing and modifying. It also compensates for issues of existing and fragmented data that do not allow sophisticated inferences, given area-specific challenges of limited survey data availability. The empirical analysis outlines why militaries *did* or *did not* support democratization retrospectively, while the formal model constructs when and why armed forces *would* do so *ex ante*.

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Overview of the next Chapters

This thesis is structured in four chapters an introduction and a conclusion. Chapter 2, the theoretical framework, outlines the function and role of armed forces in non-democratic regimes for the purpose of building a new framework of civil-military relations. Chapter 3 builds the sequential formal model that serves as the theoretical basis for building the hypotheses. Chapter 4 contains the empirical and formal analysis of the cases. The formal model of military behavior will be completed at the end of the empirical chapter through information from the empirical analysis, which is followed by the discussion and conclusion in Chapter 6.

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Chapter 2:

Re-conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations for Non-Democratic Regimes

This chapter builds a new framework of civil-military relations in non-democratic regimes which serves as theoretical basis for the empirical and formal analysis of Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The developed framework is the main conceptual contribution to existing research, and outlines the function and role of armed forces in non-democratic regimes and developing countries. Central to this discussion is that the subjugation of armed forces under civilian control is crucial to the process of consolidation, regardless of regime type. This entails that control goes against military interests, which raises the question why militaries would voluntary allow democratization if it weakens them.

Present approaches to the role of armed forces and civil-military relations are unfortunately limited in three ways. First, much of the literature centers on Western countries. The United States are frequently taken as prima-facie case in civil-military relations (Feaver, 1999: 231). Previous characterizations of armed forces are also tied to their activities in armed conflict and limited to their role in foreign policy. Such external-focused definitions are coined by the realist traditions of IR before it focus shifted to Latin America and the domestic political role of militaries in democratization (Diamond & Platter, 1996). Lastly, as concepts are very often based on the United States or European Union, militaries are implicitly characterized as subordinate instrument to polities that become active only in times of severe crisis. This may be owed to minimum procedural definitions of democracy inherent to the analyzed regimes. The control of military by civilians that have been elected by the people is a fundamental prerequisite for democracies (Huntington, 1995; Kohn, 1997; Bland, 2001; Burk, 2002, Bruneau & Matei, 2008).

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There are of course varying levels of military dominance in both democratic and civilian non-democratic regimes (Croissant & Kuehn, 2015: 268). But regardless of specific functional differences in militaries and military dominance, the primacy of politics over armed forces remains unchallenged due to the underlying regime type of these analyses. Existing theories are historically and culturally tied to the American example (Schiff, 1995) and therefore continue to carry implicit assumptions about relations and role which do not apply for armed forces in non-democratic regimes. Consequently, interests of armed forces will not be the same as in democracies in other regime types and would have to be redefined accordingly. In non-democracies, the primacy of politics and full subordination of armed forces to that polity is not given. Assuming autonomy and independence of militaries without the primacy of politics constitutes a break with existing research and previous underlying assumptions about civil-military relations. Therefore the present framework will dissect and re-conceptualize domestic civil-military relations in a way that is applicable to non-democratic regimes to avoid conceptual overstretch in the analysis of military role beyond the Western hemisphere.

The Political and Economic Role of Militaries in Developing Countries

In developing countries armed forces play an ambivalent role in domestic politics. Under conditions of so-called Praetorianism (Perlmutter, 1969) modernization, unification and development in civilian governments comes to a standstill generating supporting conditions for excessive military intervention into politics (385). Civilian intervention into military and vice versa may be frequent due to dysfunctional and failing political structures and institutions (390). Low professionalization of armies in such states in turn exacerbates cooptation based on loyalty and political rule, rather than merit, which fosters mutual intervention (391).

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Power and force are central to the creation, defense and maintenance of all durable states (Gurr, 1988: 48). However, states involved in reoccurring violent conflicts are likely to develop institutions that specialized in coercion, and elites who specialize in the use thereof, reinforcing tendencies to apply force more frequently (50). Democratic regimes do not have the need to use coercive strategies in the face of challenges as they historically used non-coercive means more often successfully (54). Hence, the use of the coercive apparatus is central to the functioning of regimes with lower political capabilities. Foreign developmental aid and remittances to support economic growth in developing countries can thwart modernization because they enable autocrats to engage in repressive behavior that would not be possible in the absence of these funds; coercive measures to maintain authoritarian rule need to be financed somehow which unearned foreign income enables (Ahmed, 2012: 149, 154).

Furthermore, in developing countries the military is often the most technologically advanced element (Hopkins, 1966). Unlike local businesses that only compete with other local businesses, armed forces measure standards of their equipment with those of developed countries and possess technology that is often more advanced than the country's manufacturing standard (170). Military officers come into contact with their foreign competition and gain other perspectives that may play into officers' willingness to intervene into politics (170). In that, defense budget and economic development are interrelated. Defense expenditure ensures economic strength along with national security – if economies grow, potential allocations to defense can be bigger (Wang et al., 2012: 2105). Military industry positively impacts development through infrastructure like highways, airports and telecommunication which in turn fosters growth (2105). Civilian and military industries can cooperate with each other in that military industry can upgrade civilian industry through technology-transfer and privatization (2107).

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What are Civil-Military Relations?

Civil-military relations in their essence refer to the relationship between military and civilians. Militaries are a state-organized and uniformed armed service that possess a monopoly over weapons of war, and are legalized and legitimate instruments of the state (Croissant & Kuehne, 2015: 259). Civilians consequently are all non-military persons and organizations within society. Civil-Military relations and civilian oversight over armed forces are measured differently in research, depending on the underlying case. Military coups as dichotomous variable serve as a proxy for involvement into the political process (e.g. Albrecht, 2015). They indicate that militaries use their force against their regime, indicate overall military strength but also its inability to reach its goals through political means (Feaver, 1999: 218). Regardless of the specific circumstances leading up to coups, they are symptomatic of some political imbalances. Military compliance is used in democratic settings to assess the extent to which the will of civilians prevails in policy disputes (221). Other economic approaches tend to use military spending and foreign military aid as indicators of military strength and involvement into politics (Bove & Nisticò, 2014), or as assessment of defense burdens on countries (Albalate et al., 2012).

The default mode of civil-military relations in democracies is absolute primacy of civilian control over armed forces (Born, 2006: 125). Civilian control in turn is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic control and oversight (Born, 2006: 126). Typically, the executive branch exerts direct control and issues orders and guidelines. The legislative branch controls through supervision, budgetary allocations, giving permission to deploy troops abroad and passing laws concerning armed forces. The judiciary branch then monitors if the military abides by said laws.

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The Civil-Military-Triangle



Figure 1: Schematized Civil-Military-Triangle.

Civil-military relations are commonly understood as the relationship between military and civilians on all levels (Feaver, 1999; Croissant & Kuehne, 2015). Given that the term is broadly used and vaguely defined, this section provides a concrete breakdown of the levels or dimensions of civil-military relations. Civilians, as defined in international law, are all persons who are not members of armed forces (ICRC, 1977: Art. 50 §1, 2 and Art. 43 for armed forces). The definition of civilians encompasses para-military forces, such as the police, that may be organized like an armed force, but are not formally part of it. Civilians will be divided into three categories on two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the polity. Within the polity, it will be differentiated between incumbent ruler and opposing political elites in the government. Police forces are understood to be the executive of the civilian incumbent. Given that there are different party-systems within the spectrum of non-democratic regimes, this term is deliberately kept broad. It basically refers to any opposition within governing authorities, whether formal oppositional party or certain elites. The second subordinate dimension refers to the civilian society in a state (termed ‘citizens’).

Incumbent, opposition and citizens are all connected to each other, but demarked by their role in politics; incumbent and opposition rule over citizens. These relations have been subject of agent-centered approaches to regime change. Munck and Leff (1997), Higley and Pakulski (1999) and Colomer (1995, 2000) for instance conceptualize effects of interactions between incumbent and counter elites on transitional outcomes. Przeworski (1991) does the same but includes the interaction with the civil society. In relation to the figure above, these concepts describe the outer incumbent-counter-citizens-triangle. Since absolute primacy of politics in the regime dimension cannot be assumed for all non-democratic regimes, incumbent, counter and citizens alike have their own relations to the armed forces.

Military in domestic politics: leverage, arbitration and direct interference

While ideally uncommon in democratic regimes, militaries can be used in domestic politics horizontically within the regime, vertically towards subordinate citizens, or act on their own behalf towards either of the civilian groups. Horizontically within the regime, the military can be used by incumbent and political opposition to keep the other in check and ensure that either the incumbent does not take over, or that the counter elites do not gain too much power. Central to these regime-internal dynamics is that political power needs to be backed by a credible threat of violence (Svolik, 2009: 479). A core-conflict of interest in non-democratic regimes exists between the autocrat seeking to accumulate power, and the governing elites not wanting to be eliminated from rule (480), which ultimately influences regime survival. Armed forces are used as instrument of control by the ruling coalition to keep the autocrat in check and vice versa. These dynamics are illustrated in Table 1, pages 16 - 17.

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Vertically, armed forces can be used to control citizens. Incumbents, either in unity with the opposition, or on their own, can use armed forces to keep citizens in check through various forms of repression. Authoritarian regimes ensure their survival and stability through coercion. This can happen as low-intensity or high-intensity measures that are applied at

different times and have different purposes (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Low-intensity forms of coercion include but are not limited to surveillance of specific targets, harassment, attacks on opposition supporters and activists, detention, vandalism and passive acts such as blockage of buildings (58). High-intensity coercion on the other hand refers to coercive measures taken against imminent and highly threatening events, such as violent crackdowns on mass-protests (58). Repression is always risky, controversial and generally costly as officers and soldiers can decide to not crack down on civilians; it poses a particular risk to the chain of command both towards a regime and within a military force itself (60). The strength of such a multidimensional conceptualization of civil-military relations is avoiding conceptual overstretch through ensuring applicability to non-democratic regimes without the assumption of absolute civilian control over armed forces. The next sections will discuss the operationalization and measurement of government-military and citizen-military relations specifically.

By implication, citizens and counter elites can use armed forces in extreme cases to enforce change and oust the incumbent (Table 1, D). In absence of reliable political institutions and general praetorian conditions (Perlmutter, 1969), militaries can act as pressure group and influence policy decisions, or even take over and rule directly (Table 1 C).

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Table 1: Schematized Use of Militaries in Domestic Politics. Continued on next page

	A) Use of Military within the regime to keep incumbent or opposition in check. In principle, armed forces can be used by either of the two governing elites for control. The first figure schematizes use of armed forces to control or repress within-regime opposition, while the second figure shows a scenario in which opposition uses the armed forces to control the incumbent.
	
	B) Use of Military by Incumbent to keep Citizens in check with different measures of coercion. This can occur regardless of cohesion between incumbent and counter-elites

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	C) Armed forces may intervene into politics as pressure group. They can veto certain decisions, serve as arbitrators or take over and rule directly in the most extreme case. (Perlmutter, 1969)
	D) As citizens can hold positive attitudes towards armed forces while disapproving the regime, they can call on the armed forces to oust the regime. This is a simplified example of ouster of an incumbent by armed forces and unified opposition to the regime.

The Polity-Military Dimension

The Polity-military-dimension of civil-military relations encompasses relations between incumbent and armed forces and counter elites and armed forces, as well as legal regulations and informal practices including coup-proofing and cooptation. Unless specified otherwise, civil-military relations typically refer to affairs concerning the polity. The institution of military was created to protect a polity – but has also been given enough power to threaten it (Feaver, 1999: 214). This paradox exists regardless of regime type, but is debated with different concepts, terminology and variables. Civil-military relations are an important determinant of regime stability because they impact the overall effectiveness of the coercive

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apparatus. In democratic regimes, solutions to the civil-military paradox take form as either segregation of armed forces through professionalization, or through integration of armed forces. Transferred to a non-democratic context, the incumbent takes measures to safeguard power and survival regime at the expense of the power and functionality. Incumbents will try to co-opt armed forces (analogous to integration), while also coup-proofing against them which is comparable to integration, with the difference that it is not a bilateral process. Influence and power relative to the regime by the military is limited by the incumbent. At the same time the incumbent can still impose invasive measures onto the armed forces to limit their effectiveness. The vast majority of existing regime classifications and analyses of non-democratic regimes that addresses repression (c.f. e.g. Linz, 2000) typically treats armed forces as subordinate, obedient and integrated into the regime. Military coups and defections in non-democratic regimes however indicate that this is an oversimplification.



Figure 2: Schematized Polity-Military-Dimension of Civil-Military Relations.

Civilian control of armed forces can be analyzed through legal sources which indicate whether and in how far legal measures were undertaken to control armed forces, and which tasks they are ideally supposed to fulfill (Croissant et al., 2010). The primary legal source in this analysis to classify the general degree of civilian control will be constitutions that were

active under relevant regimes and after the Arab Spring, as well as available interim declarations. There are several reasons why constitutions serve as the primary source for the classification. On substantive grounds, the process of constitution making often reflects prior historical and political circumstances, and the prioritization of parties involved in the constitution making process. Comparing several constitutions across time in turn shows changes in extent of regulation as well as overall prioritization. On practical grounds, constitutions as well as their drafts and amendments are publically accessible and available online in English translations and their Arabic original versions for verification of the translation. Military doctrines or mission statements from armed forces which specifically outline their corporate identity, internal structure and range of tasks, were not made publically available on governmental websites or the websites of the ministries of defense in any case.

Legally stipulated civilian control alone is rather non-descript towards the nature of the government-military relation; there can be high levels of civilian control without hostile relations per se between the military and the incumbent per se. A proxy for the nature of this relation in the analysis will be coup-proofing versus cooptation. Coup-proofing paired with cooptation generally consolidates authoritarian regimes, and makes them instable concurrently (Albrecht, 2015: 660). The way coup-proofing works is that it only reduces the number of coups and coup attempts, but does not reduce the general coup risk during authoritarian rule; it is meant to buy time for the incumbents (660). It is rational for military elites in authoritarian regimes to maintain a credible coup threat to the autocrat – explicit warnings of coups may deter the incumbent from withdrawing resources from the military (662). When electoral contestation is absent, threatening defection disciplines political elites who in turn will strife to maintain and hold on to distributive practices (662). Threatening defection furthermore disciplines political elites who in turn will strife to maintain and hold on to distributive practices (662). Fiscal health is fundamental to the survival and maintenance

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of the armed force requires finances to pay recruits, supply arms and materials or otherwise it would disintegrate (Bellin, 2004: 144). It is therefore of crucial interest to maintain a stable financial income and therefore friendly relations to the incumbent.

In terms of concrete measures, autocrats may opt to keep armed in check through counterbalancing, when rival security forces, such as police forces are used to shift the monopoly of power away from armed forces (Bou Nassif, 2015: 253). Regimes can also create parallel militaries with the specific purpose of protecting the regime (Quinlivan, 1999: 141), and rely on security services for protection and controlling dissent (148). In some cases, governments arm the general population and create peoples' militia as extreme measure of demonopolization which can substitute the potentially unreliable regular forces and therefore offset risks of a coup (Carey et al., 2016: 59). Autocrats can go also go the opposite way and discourage coups through patronage and kinship. Material interests of the military elite can for instance be promoted (Bou Nassif, 2015: 255). Officers can be tied to the regime through economic incentives in exchange for their loyalty – this however creates rifts along rank lines especially if lower-ranking officers do not receive the same benefits and would be more prone to oppose the regime (255). The regime can furthermore guarantee positions in its cabinet to military personnel, or employ retired military officers (Bou Nassif, 2013). Another strategy is the fostering of shared aversions; commonly perceived threats and worldviews create strong relations from autocrat to armed forces across rank-boundaries. Rhe autocrat's rule is less likely to be threatened if there is a common enemy that increases cohesion among ranks (256). Cooptation can also begin with the recruitment. Ruling elites can recruit personnel entirely or partially from loyal communities (Makara, 2013: 342).

Co-opting and coup-proofing are not mutually exclusive, autocrats can employ both strategies simultaneously. In this analysis, coup-proofing measures that in any way inhibit the function and coherence of militaries and reduce their overall effectiveness (Quinlivan, 1999:

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155; Brown et al. 2016) will be characterized as 'hostile', while any measures that grant militaries privileges and positive economic incentives will be referred to as 'friendly' measures. If a regime employs both friendly and hostile measures, the overall relation will be characterized as 'neutral'. The source for determining the nature of civil-military relations is primarily secondary literature.

The Citizen-Military-Dimension

The Citizen-military-dimension remained largely under-conceptualized in previous research. In its essence, citizen-military relations concern affairs between armed forces and the civilian society. At the core of the Citizen-military-dimension is public opinion and citizen approval. Armed forces recruit their soldiers from the underlying population who, ideally, are served and protected by the armed force. Assuming independence of armed forces and limited primacy of politics over them has strong analytical implications for the Citizen-military-dimension within civil-military relations, as citizens may hold entirely different attitudes towards armed forces than towards a regime.



Figure 3: Schematized Citizen-Military-Dimension of Civil-Military Relations.

The way that armed forces respond to pro-reform movements from citizens can be determined by their links to society and their relation to the population specifically; if there is a strong link between the society and them, it becomes less likely that armed forces will use force against protests involving large parts of society (Lutterbeck, 2013: 33). When armed forces are made up of foreign mercenaries or security forces that are drawn from very specific tribes and minorities, overall societal linkage will be weaker if such forces are based on loyalty to a specific regime (32). A relation to the regime based on loyalty and patronage alone rather than professionality and meritocratic principles entails less legitimacy outside that particular regime and more opposition towards reforms threatening such regimes (33). For armed forces with stronger linkage to society based on general conscription on the other hand, opposing popular reform-movements comes at a much higher price and goes at the expense of popular legitimacy (33).

The citizens themselves play and important role in the encouragement of defection from regimes. During popular uprisings they can actively increase the political costs of crackdowns through emphasizing the immorality of attacking unarmed protesters, through media coverage of protests and crackdowns and raising international attention (Nepstadt, 2013: 338-339). Another measure to increase military costs of cracking down on protesters are future alliances to armed forces; if armed forces are subject to hostile measures from the current regime such as strict limitation of their budget, protesters can emphasize political gains from future alliances in new governments (339).

Previous case studies on the Arab Spring have made inferences about the nature of citizen-military-relations and citizens' attitudes towards armed forces from how militaries responded to them, but rarely with the use of actual public opinion data. This section will outline key-components of the citizen-military-dimension and their operationalization, and

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will furthermore discuss the limitations of using public opinion data from non-democratic regimes and from the MENA-region specifically.

Public opinion matters to armed forces because it impacts general function, effectiveness and legitimacy. Primarily, militaries recruit from the civilian society to maintain themselves. Generally, there are two main modes of recruitment for armed forces, although the majority mixes both. Recruitment is either voluntary or through conscription (Werkner, 2006: 83). In the specific case of the US Army, a voluntary recruitment system, military funding needs to be secured through a federal appropriation process; if members of congress do not find strong public military support, they will be less inclined to maintain or increase military funding (Leal, 2005: 124). In democratic regimes, civil society, media, NGOs, scholars, activists, pressure groups, exert direct and indirect control over the armed forces; their opinion therefore ultimately affects formation and policy regarding armed forces (Forster, 2006: 35).

Given the focus on public approval, the Citizen-Military dimension will be operationalized mainly through survey data on trust and confidence in the armed forces. As this information is publically available, it is safe to assume that armed forces also have access to similar information for their own purposes. For the empirical analysis, it is important to discuss the methodological drawbacks of using public opinion data from non-democratic regimes more generally, and the MENA-region more specifically. While it is primarily the survey questionnaire of the World Values Survey that will be discussed in this section, some of the reservations hold for other survey questionnaires that emulate the WVS. This section will discuss issues regarding data collection, consistency of surveys and items and metric invariance of measurement instruments.

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Globally used surveys, such as the WVS, typically presume that the relationship between items and theoretical constructs that are being measured remains the same everywhere (Ariely & Davidov, 2011: 273). Ariely and Davidov attempt to investigate the metric invariance of items measuring preference and perceived performance of democracy in the World Values Survey of 2000 using multiple group confirmatory factor analysis. While the researchers do found evidence of metric invariance in their analysis and concluded that the WVS is unproblematic, it is important to note that in the 2000-wave of the WVS, at least 20 out of the 36 countries in the wave – or sample of the present analysis– scored within the democratic range of 6 – 10 on the Polity-IV scale at the time of surveying. Despite the discussion on comparing democratic values in Muslim and Arab countries versus the West, the sample also only contained four Arab countries and four non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, almost half of them scoring a 6 on Polity-IV at the time of surveying. Given that the analyzed sample is non-random, unweighted and strongly biased towards democracies, model fit and significance of Ariely's and Davidov's findings are likely inflated.

Some areas in the world, most notably the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa remain underrepresented in global surveys, as do illiterate and rural parts of the population (Heath et al., 2005: 311). This might be because surveys are not suited for illiterate parts of the population, and because more rural towns are not readily accessible to researchers. Tunisia's rural towns furthermore are hardly connected to the capital via accessible public transport, an issue that is as present in Egypt, Libya and Algeria. Yet, given the existence of strong urban-rural cleavages across North Africa and persisting high adult illiteracy rates, this poses a serious limitation to the representativeness of samples. In the expansion of survey research beyond affluent western countries, coverage errors are not uncommon due to restricted availability and accessibility to population registers (Heath et al., 2005: 315). Sometimes surveys, such as the Afrobarometer, exclude areas with political unrest and armed conflict

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(316). The Pew Global Attitudes Survey specifically limits sampling to major cities such as Cairo and Tunis – which is likely due to the data collection via telephone interviews (Tab. 2, 312) which presupposes that respondents have certain infrastructure and living standards. This carries some implications for data on armed forces especially if there are differences across socio-economic backgrounds of respondents.

Public opinion data on countries in the Middle East has also not been collected consistently. Libya for instance was included for the first time in the most recent wave 2010-2014 of the World Values Survey and is only included once in the 2013-wave of the Arab Barometer. Algeria was covered in the fourth and sixth waves from 1999-2004 and 2010-2014, but skipped in the fifth wave from 2005-2009. Egypt on the other hand was covered in the last three waves, but not in all survey items. This complicates the analysis of country-specific trends over a time-span.

The final issue are specific inconsistencies in the WVS in the four cases of this analysis. Confidence in Armed Forces was only asked in the fourth wave of the WVS and with different answer-possibilities in Egypt; only the responses "a great deal", "quite a lot" and "not very much" were either asked during the interviews, or later reported in the documentation, as opposed to the six responses including "none at all", "don't know" and "no answer". At worst, this may have biased responses – at best, it complicates comparisons between similar items in the same survey or across countries. Additionally, some surveys included a "do not know" response, while others only had a "refused to answer". Ariely's and Davidov's critique of untested presumed invariance between items and measured concept remains relevant especially due to the Arabic version of survey questionnaires. Trust and confidence, which are key concepts to measuring public approval for armed forces, are synonyms in Arabic with identical connotations. The technical reports of the WVS in all four cases show that a distinction is made between trust and confidence in the English translation

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of the question which is not reflective of how the Arabic question was actually posed to the respondents.

These were specific examples of item and response inconsistencies. Observations of patterns in survey data for the specific cases in this analysis are therefore limited through their fragmentation, item and measurement variances as well as limited representativeness. These data-issues may not be as severe in other regions of the world. Nonetheless, approval of armed forces should ideally be inferred from survey data, rather than from military reactions towards citizens alone as other factors can play into the decision to not repress uprisings.

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Chapter 3:

Building the Sequential Model

Introduction

The point of departure of the empirical and formal analyses are military decisions during the Arab Spring in the four present cases. The research design of this analysis is loosely based on the framework for methodological unification of formal and empirical analysis proposed by Granato, Lo and Wong (2010). The key difference is that Granato et al. work with existing analogues taken from previous literature, while the goal here is to identify military interests in non-democracies without assuming full civilian control. Previous literature on military interests has either not adapted assumptions about armed forces to fit autocratic regimes, or implicitly assumed full civilian control of armed forces by incumbents. The goal of the empirical analysis it to outline why militaries *did* or *did not* support democratization retrospectively, while the goal of the formal model is to constructs when and why armed forces *would* do so *ex ante* building on findings from the empirical analysis in turn. The concept of the civil-military-triangle will be used analyze and compare transitional outcomes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Libya.

The next section will briefly summarize the outcomes of the Arab Spring and key-military decisions leading to these outcomes. Based on these decisions and outcomes, supplemented with information from previous coup attempts in the cases[1], a basic sequential model mapping military decisions and outcomes will be derived. Given that the first basic model is non-descript towards conditions under which either pathway is taken and which outcome is more preferential to armed forces, the empirical analysis will be conducted to derive utility functions that complete the sequential model. The empirical analysis will be

[1] See Thesis Annex 1 for complete overview of military coup attempts in the four cases since 1950. The overview was compiled by the author from the Marshall & Marshall (2017) and Powell & Thyne (2011) datasets and controls for independent verification of coup attempts and coding variance between datasets.

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structured according to the dimensions of the civil-military relations. Citizen-military relations were analyzed in a separate section and in comparison, rather than per scenario, in order to contextualize the observations. Given the highly fragmented data and limited availability of longitudinal data broken down per country, little inferences could have been made from cross sectional public opinion data per country alone.

Military Decisions and Outcomes I. Deriving the Sequential Model

The point of departure of the empirical and formal analysis are military decisions in response to a critical threat to the integrity and survival of a regime. Some regime types may be inherently more stable and therefore more robust to certain threats and durable than others (Tusalem, 2015; Levitsky & Way, 2013; Hadenius & Terorell, 2007; Geddes, 1999). The stability of regimes can passively be threatened through its own institutional design (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010), shifting international environments, foreign involvement through remittances and aid (Levitsky & Way, 2010), and economic crises amongst other factors (Merkel, 2010). Moderate active threats include regime-internal disputes between the incumbent and opposition, or the incumbent and the coercive apparatus. Severe and active threats to regime survival in turn encompass bottom-up challenges through mass uprisings and widespread popular disaffection. The Arab Spring posed a critical threat in several countries in the MENA-region. The next section recounts military responses to the Arab uprisings and their respective outcomes in all cases in preparation for the sequential model.

Military Decisions and Outcomes of the Arab Spring

When the Arab Spring Uprisings in Tunisia began after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi and spread fast through the country, the armed forces were deployed but did not take actions such as firing on demonstrators, or stopping them from torching police stations specifically (Bou Nassif, 2015: 80). Army Chief of Staff Rashid Ammar defected

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early from the regime (77-79). The end of Ben Ali's regime also brought the collapse of the security-apparatus in Tunisia (80-81).

In Egypt, Mubarak had initially relied on internal security services and the Ministry of Interior to quell the protests (Makara, 2013: 345). When they were overwhelmed by the size of the protests, the armed forces were ordered to intervene and repress the demonstrators. The army however refused these orders and defected from Mubarak, ultimately leaving him no choice but to leave (345). Turning against the protestors would have significantly damaged the military's reputation both in Egypt and Tunisia (343). A combination of counterbalance with security forces and high economic stakes for the Egyptian military prompted them to abandon Mubarak; with Egypt's security and political concerns shifting from foreign to domestic threats during the 1990s, investment into them declined in favor of strengthening the state security apparatus (346). In the summer of 2013, the Egyptian armed forces re-entered domestic politics following strikes in every sector of the economy that brought the country to a halt (ECSR Report, 2014). Former military Chief of Staff Abdel Fattah al-Sisi remained in power since.

Civil-military relations preceding the Arab Spring in Libya were complicated and vague. Some of the demands at the wake of the Arab Spring in Libya were information and accounting for the massacre that took place in 1996 at the Abu Salim Prison in Tripoli, which was notorious for human rights violations (HRW, 2006). Protests erupted following the arrest of Fathi Terbil, a lawyer representing the Abu-Salim Families. Unlike in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries in the MENA-region, the Arab Spring uprising in Libya quickly escalated into a civil war which ended 2013. After a failed transition negotiations and two coup attempts in 2013 and 2014, Libya remains in a state of civil war. Out of the four cases, Algeria is the only one that persisted through the Arab Spring uprisings. It is often argued that the experience of a prolonged and fairly recent violent conflict may have shielded Algeria from serious regime

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challenges (Gaub, 2014: 35). While the specific events were different, they have several stages in common. At first was the decision to either cooperate or defect. If the military cooperates, the regime ideally persists, depending on the magnitude of the threat. The defection can be successful or fail. In case of success, armed forces need to decide whether to take over and rule themselves, or to retreat and let regime change happen towards either democracy or autocracy, to simplify the outcomes. Table 1 below contains an overview of these stages in each row in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya during the Arab Spring and in Egypt in 2013 when the armed forces defected again, but took over power.

Table 2: Overview of Decisions and Outcomes of the Arab Spring

	ALGERIA 2011	**EGYPT 2011**	**EGYPT 2013**	**TUNISIA 2011**	**LIBYA 2011**
Decision	Cooperate	Defect	Defect	Defect	Fracture
Success?	(not applicable)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Divided
Retreat or Takeover?	(not applicable)	Retreat	Takeover	Retreat	(not applicable)
Regime Change or Persistence?	PERSIST	CHANGE	CHANGE	CHANGE	CHANGE
Direction of Change	No Change	Democracy	Mil. Auth Regime	Democracy	(failed state)

The Sequential Model

At the start of the sequential model is a critical event that threatens the persistence of the current regime. In this model, the military is assumed to be a risk-neutral agent who has interests and preferences, and undertake measures to maximize utility. The reason for this that coups in principle are a risky highly risky endeavor, yet they have been very prevalent in the MENA-region[2]. Under a severe threat, such as a widespread uprising, the regime calls on the

[2] See Thesis Annex 1 for overview of failed and successful military coups since 1950 in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya

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military to repress uprisings. In such a situation, an armed force can either decide to cooperate with the regime and execute orders, or decide to defect from the regime.

An armed force may defect because its own interests do not align with that of the regime anymore, or because cooperation with the regime either has not paid off in the past or is anticipated to not pay off in the future. In that defection, the armed force stages a coup that either succeeds or fails. If the coup fails, the regime persists. A successful coup will put an armed force into a position of power in which it can decide to retreat from the political process and allow for a regime change without direct involvement. This model does not assume that the ensuing regime change will automatically lead to democratization but posits that the regime change may go either way towards authoritarianism or democracy. Should the armed forces in this scenario however decide to take power and rule, it will result in a military authoritarian regime at first. The figure below illustrates the chain of events in a model.



Figure 4: Sequential Model of Military Decisions and Outcomes.

There are three underlying assumptions made in this abstraction. First, a military takeover will always result in a military autocracy at first. This of course does not exclude changes after an interim period. The second assumption is that after a failed defection, a regime will persist. The third and most important assumption is that of armed forces as unitary agents. The specific limitations thereof will be analyzed at a later stage specifically, but for the sake of simplicity the working assumption is that of a coherent and functioning armed force.

Deriving the Hypotheses from the Model

While the sequential model sketches out decisions and pathways, it conveys little information on which decision-path is more likely under what condition. The two-dimensional conceptualization allows comparison of relations between the government and the military, and the civilian society and the military. The first hypothesis focuses on the root node of the sequence, namely the decision to either defect or support the regime. It will be hypothesized that differences between Polity-military and Citizen-Military relations plays a crucial role in decisions to defect from the regime, or to support its survival. The first hypothesis will therefore be that:

H1: Armed forces are more likely to defect and expedite regime change if they have a stronger and friendlier relation to citizens than to the government.

Friendly relations to citizens means that armed forces have high citizen approval, while stronger refers to overall societal linkages. The second hypothesis presupposes that the armed forces defected successfully and therefore focuses on the "Win"-node in the sequence, from where armed forces can either decide to retreat or take over after they defected. H1 corresponds to the first research question of how civil-military relations would impact

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transitional outcomes in general. The second research question investigates why armed forces would support democratization specifically. Now focusing on the "Retreat"-node that leads to the terminal nodes of towards democracy and autocracy, it will be hypothesized that armed forces will allow democratization and therefore their subjugation under civilians, if it pays off against the severe cost of civilian control;

H2: Armed forces are more likely to allow democratization when the benefits of democracy to their function and wellbeing outweigh the cost of civilian control.

The following empirical analysis serves to extract information needed on the interaction of dimensions and the identification of general military interests and their prioritization. Given the availability of fragmented data, the analysis of citizen-military relations will be conducted separately and comparatively in chapter before the empirical analysis of civil-military relations. The little data that is available cannot be interpreted without contextualization within the region and comparison between the cases.

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Chapter 4:

Citizen-Military Relations in the MENA-region. The Soldier and the Survey

This section supplements inferences and observations of military behavior towards citizens with public opinion data. As data availability was limited, data on citizen-military relations could not be analyzed meaningfully without contextualization per scenario. This part of the analysis relies on country-specific data from the WVS and data on regional trends from the Arab Opinion Index[3] (AOI) of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha (Tausch, 2013)[4]. It is to date the largest project of its kind, covering twelve Arab Countries through face-to-face interviews with samples that represent roughly 85% of the Arab population in the MENA-region (57). Given that this survey was conducted by a local Arabic institute, issues of translation could be circumvented in the survey design. Unfortunately, the full datasets were not available publically yet. Libya was also not included in any survey and will therefore not be discussed here.

The combination of both sources has substantive, methodological and practical reasons. The Arab Opinion Index, although it excludes Libya, provides complete data from 2011 to 2017 and allows assessment of how views on armed forces and governments changed over time after the Arab Spring. This supports the explanatory power of the cross-sectional and country-specific data from the WVS. Of particular interest are items on government institutions, especially the comparison of confidence in armed forces versus the judicative, legislative and the executive.

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[3] See Thesis Annex 4 for compilation of all available WVS- and AOI-data on confidence in armed forces, police, government, judiciary, representativeness of parliament and political parties. All translations were verified by the author using the original Arabic versions.

[4] The specific English source that this paper uses was not available anymore at the time of the writing. Original Report of Arab Opinion Index 2011 in Arabic available here: https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/The_Arab_Opinion_Index.aspx

Given the association of the Arab democratic deficit with Islam, it is important to note that the perceptions of governmental institutions are always against the backdrop of generally positive attitudes towards democracy. Generally, there is little evidence for the influence of religious affiliation to Islam on attitudes on democracy, regardless of whether in the MENA-region (Tessler, 2002 and 2010), sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton, 2003), or even across Europe (Vlas & Gherghina, 2012). Using AOI-data, Tausch (2013) for instance finds very favorable attitudes towards democracy across all surveyed countries.

The Tunisian military as highly institutionalized force defected quickly from Ben Ali and showed sympathy to the demands of protesters. It is likely that the armed forces were especially sympathetic given that many of the conscripts come from the more economically depressed areas in the south of Tunisia and therefore share the same grievances as the demonstrators (Lutterbeck, 2013: 35). It was reported that demonstrators were seeking shelter from police forces behind military vehicles (35). Egyptian armed forces on the other hand were more hesitant in the initial stages about joining the demonstrators (37). While it is in principle a conscription-based, institutionalized and meritocratic force, favoritism and cronyism are present among the higher ranks (36). While not having committed abuses during the protests to the same extent as the police, whenever the Egyptian military did act, it was heavy-handed (38). Yet, it remained more popular than especially the police forces as they were seen as the regime's protection racket (c.f. Anderson, 2011: 5). Unlike the Tunisian military, the Egyptian military had much closer ties to their respective regime (Lutterbeck, 2013: 39) and therefore higher stakes in their defection.

The first wave of the AOI encompasses 16 192 respondents in total and was conducted shortly after the Arab Spring uprisings in May 2011[5]. Libya was not included in this survey.

[5] See Thesis Annex 4 Section 3 for translated country-specific data from the AOI 2011.

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Confidence in government institutions had been divided as of 2011. The report finds that there was most confidence in the armed forces with merely 16% of responses for little to no confidence across all countries (AOI, 2011: 45). Public opinion in Egypt and Tunisia as of May 2011 was very positive, while confidence in governments was more divided. Confidence in the armed forces was not as unanimously positive in Algeria, where 30% of Algerian respondents had little to no confidence in them. Attitudes towards the Government were divided with 43% stating that they had little to no confidence, while 48% had moderate to high confidence in the government.

In comparison to the rest of the MENA-region over time, Algeria stands out. Trends from the AOI from 2011-2017 show that across the MENA-region, the armed forces enjoyed the highest confidence in comparison to other institutions. In direct comparison to the executive, most notable the police, trust in armed forces is less divided. At the other end of the spectrum were political parties, which respondents across all surveys had least confidence in. Trust in governments remained divided across time. Longitudinal trends in the perception of representativity of the parliaments show little fluctuations after 2011, where uncertainty and non-response to that particular item was highest at 10% along with non-response and uncertainty about political parties. Responses about confidence in the police have little variation from that in the government. Out of the three branches, respondents had the highest general confidence in the judiciary. For the legislative, the original Arabic questionnaire distinguishes between the functions of the parliament and asks for confidence in general representation, performance and legislations. This might explain the gap between confidence in parliaments and political parties, which have been viewed very negatively in general with little improvement over the years. Cross sectional data from the WVS in Algeria in 2002 and 2014, Egypt 2001 and 2012, Tunisia 2013 and Libya 2014 have a similar pattern in confidence in the party systems.

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Opinions on the armed forces versus the police were divided in Algeria in both waves, in Tunisia and Libya after the Arab Spring. Only Egypt in 2001 shows considerably higher confidence in the police than in the military, although comparability is heavily limited due to inconsistent survey responses. The question on confidence in Armed Forces was also not asked in 2012. The survey data alone has moderate explanatory if not evaluated with the polity-military dimension.

While the presently available data does not allow more precise examination of oscillation in attitudes per country per year, it demonstrates that respondents differentiate between the armed forces as such, and the regime, and that they generally hold more favorable attitudes towards them, except in the case of Algeria. Regional data furthermore demonstrates that this is a constant pattern across the region, rather than a post-Arab Spring spike.

From a descriptive analysis of cross-sectional country data and regional trends alone, several things emerge. Respondents clearly distinguish between the armed forces and the government, sometimes along with the police. Armed forces have in almost all cases, except for Algeria at all available points in time and in Egypt in 2001, been viewed more favorably by respondents than any other governmental institutions. It is however likely, that military approval may have been evaluated by entirely different criteria by respondents in each country, which has not been captured adequately by neither WVS nor AOI questionnaires. In general, despite limited possibilities of statistical analysis, this basic description of survey trends shows that treating armed forces and regimes as monolithic unit would obscure an important aspect of civil-military relations which would not emerge from the analysis of polity-military relations alone. Respondents can be strongly opposed to the regime, but place much confidence in the armed forces. The next section compares both dimensions against each other and derives military interests to supplement the sequential model introduced in the beginning of the analysis.

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Chapter 5:

Empirical and Formal Analysis of Civil-Military Relations

Introduction

The analysis of polity-military relations in the following section reviews the historical background of the regimes that were in office during the Arab Spring to shed light on the role of armed forces in the nation building process – if they had any – and to determine the nature of the relation to the incumbent. The historical background will therefore focus on measures that were undertaken by incumbents to co-opt militaries or measures to weaken them. The historical background will be supplemented by a brief analysis of civilian control in relevant constitutions until the present[6] to highlight which legal measures were in place to control armed forces and whether they changed over time. Information from both will be used to determine the general level of civilian control using the criteria and indicators proposed by Croissant et al. (2010)[7].

The figures in this section schematize the behavior of armed forces in relation to citizens and counter elites to the incumbent regime during the Arab Spring. It will briefly recap common features and differences in the trajectories of civil-military relations before focusing on relations during the Arab Spring. The armed forces played a key role in the nation-building processes in Egypt and Algeria, which marks their general entrance into the political sphere. Libya and Tunisia became independent from colonial rule through negotiations that did not involve the military. The militaries in Egypt and Algeria both have been involved economically, albeit to a larger extent in Egypt than in Algeria. Consequently, both enjoyed friendly to neutral relations to their respective incumbent through cooptation and economic privileges. The Tunisian armed force never had substantial economic stakes and remained

[6] See Thesis Annex 3 for full listing of relevant articles in constitutions, including references
[7] See Thesis Annex 2 for full classification of civilian control across relevant arenas in domestic politics.

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tightly controlled by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, at the expense of their function and effectiveness. Economic involvement of Libyan armed forces nor their specific expenses is not known. While they played some role in the creation of the Jamahiriya under Gaddafi, polity-military-relations deteriorated after failed coup attempts.

Cooperation and Regime Persistence: The Algerian Military's Non-defection

Algeria is the only one out of four cases that did not undergo a major regime change in 2011. Rather, the Arab Spring paved the way for many constitutional changes in Algeria (Ferdiou, 2015: 137), despite the absence of a full-blown revolution. The regime needed to handle new social dynamics that have emerged in the creation of reforms. Hence, the constitution making process was strongly influenced by the Arab Spring (137) reflected in the addition of Articles 178 – 194 specifically on the conduct and monitoring of elections (Algeria Const. 2016).

As the Algerian military played a key role in its independence the nation-building process, the military's nationalist narrative of the armed forces is intertwined with the war of independence (Cook, 2007). It derives much of its legitimacy from its role in ending colonialism, external aggressions and realizing the national will of independence (28).While it was not the officers of the Armée de Liberation Nationale (ALN), but the Moujahideen who fought the French, it was important to then-commander in chief Boumédienne to maintain that the ALN played a crucial role in the war (29). The importance of the armed forces to the maintenance of the nationalist narrative was later reaffirmed through the military coup of 1965, which installed Boumédienne's regime (30).

The trajectory of military involvement in domestic politics in Algeria generally shows a tactical retreat from a position of direct governance before Bouteflika due to the role in nation building, towards arbitration and involvement as pressure group at present. Under

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Boumédienne, Algeria's second president after its independence from France, the army was restructured and served as basis of his rule but without actually governing (Bishara, 2017: 7). Boumédienne's successor Benjedid in turn built up and modernized the military, but was forced out of office during the military coup of 1992, when the army cancelled the parliamentary elections to prevent a victory by the Islamic Salvation Front Party (7) and later installed Bouteflika as president of the republic in 1999 (Mortimer, 2006: 155). Economically, the interests of the Algerian military were strongly intertwined with the country's oil resources, which often went at the expense of the general Algerian society (20). Members of the Algerian military were able to benefit from new sources of rent following the partial liberalization of the Algerian economy in the 1980s (Cook, 2007: 20). The Algerian armed forces furthermore maintain specific units focused on the maintenance of public order and surveillance of society (22). Over the decades the arenas of internal security and foreign policy became domains of the armed forces exclusively (22).

Overall, civilian control of the military in Algeria can be summarized as ambiguous[8]. In the initial phases of rule, Bouteflika's ties to the armed forces received scrutiny given his involvement in the 1965-coup; it was frequently questioned how much independence he really had from the armed forces (Mortimer, 2006: 162). In 2002, several army officers gave diverging accounts in the press. While some stated that there is general discontent in the Ministry of defense, others reaffirmed the authority of the president as the chief of staff (164). Prior to the 2004 presidential elections, the army's Chief of Staff reiterated that the military institution will remain neutral and not endorse any candidate (164-165). The army's way back into politics however was barred through a legislative change in 2004 that prohibited soldiers, police and other police forces to vote in their barracks (165). Civil-military relations have

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[8] Please refer to Thesis-Annex 2 for complete classification in different arenas of domestic politics

remained ambiguous since then; while they it is influential as pressure group on its own, it remained somewhat subordinate to the regime (Gaub, 2014: 36).

Legally, the military may not have many entitlements de jure – de facto however, they installed the incumbent which to a certain extent guarantees the representation of their own interests. They exert some influence on political competition because they can endorse certain candidates (Robbins and Tessler, 2012); when Bouteflika ran for re-election in 2004, the armed forces refrained from endorsing him like they used to, or any other candidate in the race for that matter (1260). Bouteflika's relation to the armed forces became more strained, given that he had been governing more independently that anticipated by the military establishment (1261). There is little direct civilian influence on recruitment, as the Algerian army is conscription-based. On the other hand, the military claims some domains security policy making, but not entirely without civilian oversight.

The general task of the Algerian army changed from mere territorial defense to a permanent mission to safeguard the country (Algeria Const. 1989, Art. 25 and Const. 2016, Art. 28). Civilian oversight changed in the two more recent constitutions. While initially the president was merely the head of the Higher Council of Defense (Const. 1963, Art. 66), the administrative organ of the armed forces, the parliament was given power to determine rules for and the general use of the Armed forces in overseen by civilian authorities in the two constitutions that followed the war in Algeria in 1992[9] (Const. 1989, Art. 122 §27 and Const. 2016, Art. 140 §26). In all three constitutions, the military task revolves around safeguarding specifically the independence and territorial integrity which was proclaimed as a sacred permanent and continuous mission of constant relevance (Const. 1989, Art. 61, and Const. 2016, Art. 75). Constitutionally, the Algerian armed forces cannot be deployed outside their

[9] The constitution of 1989 was suspended with the war, reinstated at the end of it in 1996 and amended through to 2008

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territory, hence their role is exclusively limited to domestic politics and security (Gaub, 2014: 35).

Broken down along the dimensions of the civil-military triangle, citizens posed a moderate challenge throughout the Arab Spring towards the incumbent, as did opposing elites who were pushing for economic reforms. The relation between armed forces and citizens remained ambivalent. The armed forces however exerted some pressure on the incumbent, as they often did in politics, but without defecting. In this case, the Algerian military decided to cooperate with the regime.



Figure 5: Civil-Military Relations in Algeria 2011.

In absence of strong differences between the relation towards citizens and towards the incumbent, this points to a perceived guarantee of future interests (denoted as 'pgi') as one of the first military considerations. The perceived guarantee of future interests, against the backdrop of the previous analysis, can be broken down into the following elements:

$$pgi = REL_{Gov} + MIL_{Ef} + REP_{GOV}$$

REL_{GOV} denotes future relations to the incumbent, which should be neutral at worst. What ideally follows from the governmental relation is the representation of military interests (REP_{GOV}) within said government. Both, governmental relation and representation are not synonymous. Democracies may be entirely civilian and have neutral relations to their armed forces without ensuring representation of their interests. An example is the downsizing of armed forces in democracies. Downsizing in principle reduces military effectiveness, but does not entail hostility towards the military per se. The last component is military effectiveness (MIL_{Ef}). Ensuring their own function and wellbeing is an important consideration for armed forces as measure of self-preservance. In this case, the military saw some guarantee of their future interests within the current regime, which they had installed, and therefore no real need to even consider a defection. The Tunisian and Egyptian militaries on the other hand saw this guarantee threatened through the continuance of the Ben Ali regime, and through Mubarak's successor.

The costs and benefits of defection then need to be weighed against the costs and benefits of cooperating and maintaining the regime. These potential benefits of continued cooperation (B_{GOV}): include the guarantee of military interests (gi) through the incumbent, the maintenance of government relations and military effectiveness in its consequence; the more hostile polity-military relations were, the lower the benefit of continued support. Lastly, based on the previously analyzed cases are economic interests of the military elites (econ). Formalized, the benefits of continued cooperation to a military are:

$$B_{GOV} = gi + REL_{GOV} + MIL_{EF} + econ$$

The maintenance of the regime against popular uprisings comes mainly at the costs of repression. The cost of repression can be broken down into the human and moral costs (C_{HM})

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of gunning down unarmed protesters, the cost of internal cohesion of the apparatus (MIL_{Coh}), reputational costs to the military (MIL_{Rep}) and future alliances to citizens (fal).

$$C_{CIT} = (C_{HM} + MIL_{Rep} + MIL_{Coh}) + fal$$

The reputational costs of repressing citizen is public approval, which is very likely to decline when armed forces harm civilians. A secondary consideration are also future alliances with citizens that can benefit political representation of military interests, even if armed forces are not directly present in the government. But repression also comes at the cost of internal military cohesion; under the assumption that their own relatives and friends have joined the protests, soldiers may be especially reluctant to open fire and decide to defect instead. Executing risky and high-profile repressions therefore are likely to lead to internal differences. An additional cost that needs to be substracted from BGOV it the cost of civilian control (C_{CON}), which will be discussed in more detail for Egypt and Tunisia. Therefore, the military utility of cooperation can be expressed as:

$$U_{COOP} = (B_{GOV} - C_{CON}) - C_{CIT}$$

Algeria did not experience uprisings in the same magnitude as in the other cases, therefore the cost of repression was low. Civilian control through the government would have also not come as extraordinary cost. Hence, the Algerian military derived the utility from cooperation, even with civilian control and cost of repression.

Defection, ouster and retreat: The Egyptian Military against Mubarak

The Arab Spring in Egypt on the other hand, the protests were more widespread and posed a severe threat to the Mubarak regime; both citizens and opposing elites directly challenged Mubarak. Citizens generally had very favorable views and a lot of confidence in the armed forces over the years. The Egyptian military entered the political arena with the 1952 anti-monarchic coup by the Free Officers Movement under Gamal Abdel Nasser. In principle, the role of the armed forces had been

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running the country more than fighting wars since then (Abou El Fadl, 2015: 261). Hence, the Egyptian military maintains an interest in the maintenance of its autonomy in security and foreign policy through a romanticized nationalist account of the abolishment of the monarchy 1952 (Cook, 2007: 28). Against the backdrop of several failed coup-attempts against Nasser, Sadat relied on quick rotation in the higher ranks of the military establishment as a divide-and-rule-tactic, along with some counterbalancing through security agencies (Bou Nassif, 2015: 260). Sadat also encouraged economic participation from individual military officers and guaranteed that these activities would be free from monitoring, a trend that Mubarak continued after taking office 1981 (260).

Mubarak relied on the distribution of patronage and building parallel security institutions (Makara, 2013: 345). As a means of counterbalance, the Ministry of Interior became increasingly important during Mubarak's rule, which the military openly resented (Bou Nassif, 2015: 261). The expanding military role within domestic politics in Egypt is evident all constitutions that had been active at least since the constitution of 1971, the relevant constitution under Mubarak's rule which had been amended and valid until 2011. The 1971 constitution had assigned the role of safeguarding from terrorism specifically to the state (Egypt Const. 1971, Art. 179), which did not appear in the newer constitutions and is likely to have facilitated the proclamation and continued extension of the state of emergency in Egypt following the assassination of Anwar Al Sadat.

The armed forces became an essential pillar of the regime with little to no oversight from civilian authorities and largely undisclosed budgets and expenditures (Mühlberger, 2015: 11). While the cabinet itself was demilitarized under Sadat, administration and bureaucracy remained largely militarized with posts of regional governors, business, management and strategic infrastructure, such as the Suez Canal, headed by former military men (11). Higher ranking military men were furthermore endowed with higher salaries, access to special hospitals, clubs and resorts (Al-sayyid, 2015: 57). In the early 1980s, the National Service Projects Organization and Egyptian Organization for Industrial development were combined which reserved a significant portion of commercial and industrial sectors for the armed forces (Cook, 2007: 19). Through its involvement in sectors including manufacturing of weapons and electronics, infrastructure, agribusiness, tourism and security, the Egyptian military

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became the most important economic actor (19). Simultaneously, the economic activities were government subsidized, which on one hand was advantageous for the armed forces, but also affected state finances negatively (19). Later governmental trend towards privatization in the 1990s exacerbated this problem as the military declared all of its economic assets to be off-limits (20).

Civilian control in Egypt is generally moderate to low and has been mostly accomplished through cooptation. The minister of defense has to be a military officer, a separate Defense Council regulates the military budget with hardly any civilian moderation. Furthermore, Egypt's bureaucracy remained militarized and while the president remains commander in chief and oversees organizational matters, the fact that they are former military officers somewhat diminishes civilian control.

The armed forces did not have openly hostile relations to Mubarak per se, however their future interests did not align anymore. In general, towards the end of Mubarak's rule, there was a growing rift between the armed forces and the incumbent due to the military establishment's resentment of the likely new civilian leadership headed by Gamal Mubarak and his business clique (also Anderson, 2011). The military perceived this as threat to the guarantee of their future interests given that Gamal would have been the first civilian head of state. From the military's point of view it have also meant the loss of their economic privileges (57-58). Field Marshal Tantawi, Mubarak's last minister of defense, expressed his opposition to the liberal economic policies adopted by Mubarak's cabinets since the 1990s (58). The relation of the armed forces towards the incumbent became more or less ambivalent.

Mubarak was ousted when the armed forces sided with the demonstrators and counter elites. Through Mubarak's successor, the military saw little guarantee of their general future interests and economic privileges, had they continued to support Mubarak and his son by extension. The cost of repression of the popular uprising would have outweighed the benefits of backing the regime by far. The Egyptian military in principle has very high economic stakes and a largely friendly relation to Mubarak.

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

Figure 6: Civil-Military Relations in Egypt 2011.

The perceived threat to a guarantee of future interests weighed especially heavy for the Egyptian military given that it ultimately defected depite very high economic stakes. The utility of military defection and expediting regime change (U_{DEF}) therefore will be formalized as:

$$U_{DEF} = pgi + (C_{CIT} - B_{GOV}) + econ$$

The utility of defection needs to be higher than that of backing the government.

Defection, ouster and hostile takeover: The Egyptian Military against Morsi in 2013

Under Morsi, there were attempts undertaken to bar the Egyptian military from politics as exemplified in the legal analysis of constitutions. While the Egyptian military did not aim to exert day-to-day control, it refused subjugation under civilian oversight and monopolized key decisions (Brown, 2013: 52). Other political forces geared their actions towards the military to seek accommodation with them (52). Much of the infrastructure of the previous authoritarian system, such as a quasi-state of emergency, remained in place and were

deeply entrenched in laws and institutions that political rivals dealt with each other using these practices (52-53). The armed forces reclaimed political power when the high command claimed that no one else came up with a better alternative and additionally intervened in the constitution making process of the March 2011 declaration by amending certain parts of the 1971 constitution (54). In July 2013, they took over and ousted Morsi (57). The expanding military role within domestic politics in Egypt is evident all constitutions that had been active at least since the constitution of 1971, the relevant constitution under Mubarak's rule until 2011.

Between the constitutions of 2012 after the Arab Spring, and the constitution of 2014 following the military coup, the jurisdiction of the military judiciary drastically expanded. Initially, civilians could not stand trial before a military court except in crimes committed directly against military personnel (Egypt Const. 2012, Art. 194). Civilians as of now can stand trial for crimes against personnel and conscription as well as damages to military facilities (such as hospitals or schools), barracks, factories, equipment including vehicles and ammunition, documents and public funds (Egypt Const. 2014, Art. 204). Articles, such as Article 8 that prohibited interference of armed forces into political affairs and prescribed neutrality to the armed forces in the constitution of 2012, are entirely absent in the new constitution. Instead, the additional explicit criterion of military service or proof of legal exemption was introduced for presidential candidates (Egypt Const. 2014, Art. 141). A key difference from the constitution of 1971 to the newer constitutions is the military budget; while the oversight of the military budget had not been outlined in the constitution in place under Mubarak, it was explicitly assigned to the National Defense Council (Egypt Const. 2012, Art. 197 and Const. 2014, Art. 203). A new addition in the 2014 Constitution to the budgetary regulation is that the military budget is to be incorporated as single figure in the state budget (Art. 203).

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Before establishing the military utility of a take-over after defection versus a retreat, the cost of civilian control (C_{CON}) needs to be defined first. The cost of civilian control is formalized as the sum of military autonomy (MIL_{AUT}), meaning decision making power and reserved positions in the cabinet, and overall military power (MIL_{POW}), which refers to troop size and strength. Effectiveness (MIL_{EF}) will be considered separately, given that autonomy and power do not always translate into how effective a military is (Collier, 2006).

$$C_{CON} = MIL_{AUT} + MIL_{POW}$$

When militaries take over, they at the least remove civilian control. However, it also comes at the combined cost of repression of citizens and, relations – especially benefits – to the incumbent regime since a coup is by definition hostile towards the previous government. The cost of taking over (C_{TO}) will therefore be formalized as the combined costs of repression, benefits of cooperating with the incumbent regime and military effectiveness, given that armed forces are not always politically equipped to rule and would need to redirect resources to fulfill their extended role as ruler. This is derived from the literature on the professionalization of armed forces where extended rule of militaries is generally not in their interest (Geddes, 1999).

$$C_{TO} = C_{CIT} + B_{GOV} + MIL_{EF}$$

The benefits of taking over (B_{TO}) on the other hand include guaranteed representation of military interests, economic benefits for elite ranks and the removal of civilian control.

$$B_{TO} = (gi + econ) - C_{CON}$$

In the utility of a military take-over after a retreat, not only would the cost of taking over outweigh the benefits of cooperating with the government. It should ideally also be higher than the utility of the defection. Therefore the utility of a military takeover will be formalized as follows:

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$$U_{TO} = C_{TO} - B_{TO}$$

Therefore, if a defection without further action is expected to be less useful to attaining military interests than a military takeover despite its drawbacks, armed forces will be more likely to also assume power after they defect. Egypt saw a hostile takeover in 2013 after it ousted the incumbent Morsi.

Strikes and protests by civilian society that brought the country to a halt and posed a threat to the function of the regime. As former institutions were in place, opposing elites exerted direct and indirect pressure on the incumbent, using the armed forces as leverage. Relations of the armed forces towards the citizens remained mutually friendly and armed forces continued to receive high public approval. However, the relation to the incumbent changed from ambivalence during the ouster of Mubarak to hostility, as the military resisted subjugation. Restarting at the beginning of the sequential model, the military chose to defect, defected successfully and found that a hostile takeover, despite the cost of repression had higher utility to them than continued support of the Morsi-regime.



Figure 7: Civil-Military Relations in Egypt 2013.

Defection, ouster, retreat and Democratization: Tunisia after Ben Ali

In Tunisia, relations of the military to the incumbent regime were openly and mutually hostile and culminated in a quick defection from Ben Ali during the uprisings. Ben Ali came to power through a blood-less coup d'état in November 1987, deposing former president Habib Bourguiba on the grounds of his declining health (Angrist, 1999). Bourguiba was hailed as the founder of the independent modern Tunisian state (Bou Nassif, 2015: 67). At that point in time, Ben Ali had his power base within the armed forces, which Bourguiba had actively tried to keep out of the political arena (Ware, 1988: 589). Following the formation of a new cabinet, Ben Ali promoted several military officers within the armed forces and into governmental positions, such as the Ministry of Interior (592-593). Ben Ali created the Council for National Security tasked with the collection and analysis of intelligence on domestic and foreign policies to safeguard state security – headed by former military staff entirely (595).

In the initial time of his rule, Ben Ali had been under public scrutiny due to his affiliation with the armed forces (593). Under Bourguiba, armed forces were required to be a professional and technocratic force which also suffered from deliberately limited budget (594). At that time, it was feared that the military would participate in socio-political affairs – however, due to Bourguiba's strict isolation of armed forces, the military establishment had little political experience (596). Additionally, military personnel was not given the rights to political association as a means of personal control, furthermore hindering future political participation (596). Their role was strictly limited to the defense of the nation and its sovereignty, which Ben Ali maintained rather than using the military as instrument of domestic politics (597).

The power center shifted to the ministry of interior – specifically the police. His regime had been Ben Ali maintained his regime through severe repression by heavy policing

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(Sadiki, 2002: 59-60). The use of excessive policing had been justified with exaggerated paranoia about a fundamental Islamist threat arising through the Islamic Tendency Movement, the precursor of the Ennahda Party (68). The security apparatus furthermore had several reservations about the military establishment; the military was seen as direct competitor to the ministry interior, given that despite Bouguiba's dislike for armed forces, more funds were allocated to them than to the police (70). Simultaneously, the Tunisian police became unpopular due to their heavy-handed repression as in the 1984 Intifadat Al-Khubz (Arabic, "Bread Uprising"), while the Tunisian military enjoyed more popularity (70).

The dynamics of this competition and polity-military-relations changed for the worse May 1991 with the alleged coup plot by then-minister of interior Abdallah Quallal (70). Then-army captain Ahmad Amara had confessed to attending a meeting in Barakat al-Sahil to plot the overthrow of Ben Ali and the installation of Sharia Rule (70-71). The confession of the Barakat al-Sahil-plot however was extracted under torture, which was not evident to the public and was perceived by the military as trap by the security establishment (73). Following the Barakat al-Sahil-affair, the budget of the Ministry of Interior was increased while the military budget was capped (73). This imbalance persisted until the end of Ben Ali's rule, and the Tunisian armed forces withdrew entirely from domestic politics.

The isolation of the military was also reflected in laws; the first constitution after independence from France was amended five times through 2008 and only assigned the 'sacred' task of defending the homeland to the military (Tunisia Const. 1959, Art. 15). It proclaimed that the president of the republic is also the Commander in Chief (Art. 44) and that the president can appoint higher military officers upon recommendation from the government (Art. 55). Further tasks, civilian oversight or a basic organizational structure were not outlined in the constitution. The Decree Law of 2011 that was active after the ouster of Ben Ali similarly only prescribed that the president commands the armed forces and that

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appointments to military positions can only happen in consultation with the prime minister (Tunisia Decree Law 2011, Art. 9 §1).

At the onset of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, the relation of the incumbent to the people is openly hostile, as is the relation to counter elites, which in turn were unified with citizens. As the military entertained friendly relations to citizens and Ben Ali's opposition, a defection from the regime had more leverage. Tunisia however democratized.



Figure 8: Civil-Military Relations in Tunisia 2011.

Democracy and autocracy entail different costs and benefits for militaries. Democracy by definition excludes economic privileges, which militaries could maintain and receive under non-democratic rule. Autocratic rule on the other hand comes at the cost of repression, which is not the case for democracies. Common in both of these outcomes as opposed to the military takeover is the cost of civilian control; both regimes require military subjugation to function ideally, although militaries can expect more leeway in autocracies. The cost of allowing regime change towards autocracy (C_{AUT}) is therefore the combined costs of civilian control

and repression, while the benefits (B_{AUT}) are the perceived guarantee of future interests and economic privileges:

$$C_{AUT} = C_{CON} + C_{CIT}$$

$$B_{AUT} = pgi + econ$$

The utility of autocratic rule to armed forces is therefore the difference between the costs and benefits of autocratic rule:

$$U_{AUT} = C_{AUT} - B_{AUT}$$

Based on the empirical analysis, the military cost of allowing democratization (C_{DEM}) will therefore be formalized as the sum of the cost of civilian control, which will be set higher in democracies, and the economic benefits to higher military ranks, which are by definition not possible in full democracies.

$$C_{DEM} = (1.5 \times C_{CON}) + econ$$

Once again, military effectiveness is not included in this equation because Tunisia and Libya exemplify that democratic rule may even improve effectiveness of armed forces despite limitation of their power and size. The military benefits of democracy (B_{DEM}) will be conceptualized as the sum of potential future guarantee of military interests, an expected beneficial relation to the incumbent regime without economic benefits to higher ranks and future alliances:

$$B_{DEM} = pgi + (B_{GOV} - econ) + fal$$

The military utility of democracy (U_{DEM}) will be simply the difference between military costs and benefits of democracy:

$$U_{DEM} = C_{DEM} - B_{DEM}$$

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In post-Ben Ali Tunisia, subjugation under civilian cost came with little costs to armed forces, given that they had been under civilian control and active outside the political arena anyway. The most recent constitution of 2014 demonstrates how civilian control was legally regulated; it explicitly prescribes complete political impartiality to the armed forces (Tunisia Const. 2014, Art. 18) and prohibits any political participation through forming or joining unions or going on strikes (Art. 36). The main responsibility of the armed forces remained the protection of the nation with the addition that they also have support civil authorities under certain legal provisions (Art. 18). While the nature of civilian oversight had not been outlined more closely in the preceding constitutions, the present constitution proclaims that it is mandatory for the president, who remains commander in chief (Art. 77), to preside over governmental meetings dealing with issues of defense, the protection of the state and its territory (Art. 93). The president furthermore has to consult the head of government before appointing and dismissing military personnel in senior ranks (Art. 77).

In this specific case, the differences in civilian control remain largely legislative in that it was outlined explicitly. In practice, the strict separation of politics and military did not change much beyond improvement through protection from hostile measures affecting the function of the military establishment. Even if the Tunisian military had been in a position to intervene into politics and to assume power after ousting Ben Ali, they would have risked citizen approval and therefore future alliances. This was not the case in Egypt, where civilian control would have put the high economic stakes at risk, and would have made a drastic difference in law and practice. For Tunisia, an alternative to autocracy had a higher potential of future representation and better prospects for the wellbeing of the military through clearer regulations of the budget and less arbitrary counterbalance.

Similarly, Gaddafi left the Libyan armed forces dysfunctional and in dire need for restructure and a formally established monopoly anyway. While the Interim Constitutional

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Declaration that was instated throughout the Arab Spring in Libya from 2011 to 2013 did not outline the role of the armed forces beyond that all citizens have a duty to defend their homeland (Art. 9) – which may have been due to the ongoing armed conflict (Art. 77), the final draft of the Libyan Constitution of 2017[10] strictly subjugates armed forces under civilian rule (Libya Draft Const. 2017, Art. 178) and command of a civilian president (Art. 106). In the new constitution, article 178 imposes complete political neutrality on all armed forces, prohibits them from participation in the transitional process and general politics. Article 179 further prohibits any obstruction of state institutions, undermining of the constitutional system and interference with rights and freedoms of citizens. While in the constitution of the Kingdom of Libya politicians could be awarded military ranks (Libya Const. 1951, Art. 126), armed forces presently cannot run for political candidacy. Military personnel however is allowed to vote (Libya Draft Const. 2017, Art. 178). Military subjugation under democracy is therefore likely to be advantageous and would come at little to no additional costs.

Defection with Complications: The Fracture of Libyan Armed Forces

However, not every defection is successful, as past failed military coups and Libya in 2011 demonstrate. The Libyan military fractured facing the decision to defect or cooperate. This is symptomatic of its highly strained relation to Gaddafi, and his political system. In terms of constitutional and legal clarity, Libya under Gaddafi was the vaguest out of the four cases (Buera, 2015: 105). Libya's governance structure, most notably political parties and a parliament, was dismantled through the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) that ruled under so-called 'revolutionary legitimacy' (105). The criminalization of political parties and establishment of a de-facto one-party rule via the Green-Book-philosophy and a specific law

[10] Libyan Draft Constitution of 29 July 2017. Retrieved from: http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/draft-constitution-libya-29-july-2017 (Arabic)

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stifled political movements (106), in addition to legally prescribed limitation of the competences of political leading positions (107).

Parliaments under Gaddafi were portrayed as misrepresentation that excluded the masses from power (Gaddafi, 1980[11]: 5) and therefore dismantled. Political parties were criminalized as "modern dictatorial instrument of governing" and "rule of a part over the whole" (10), as they are a form of rule over non-members of the party" (11). The political system was to be organized in basic popular congresses formed around syndicates or unions and people's committees that are connected to the General People's Committee and the General Secretariat of the General People's Congress (26-29). Society has to supervise its own adherence to laws (39) and deviation from laws should be "dealt with through a democratic revision rather than by force" (42). In general, society is organized in tribes that serve as natural social umbrella that provides "by virtue of social tribal traditions […] collective payment of ransom, collective fines, collective revenge and collective defense" (95).

Unlike in Algeria and Egypt, the Libyan military had no involvement in the nation building process; Libya was declared independent through UN-negotiations and became a monarchy thereafter (Seton-Watson, 1980). After coming to power through a military coup, Gaddafi sidelined and divided armed forces under his rule through the creation of armed militia (Carey et al., 2016). Since its independence in 1951, Libya has had two separate institutions with a monopoly over the use of forces, which were the classical army and the Special Forces tasked with the protection of the regime (Mattes, 2004: 1-2). Additionally, several institutions including the police and local security fighters had access to weaponry (2). Along with the dismantling of the parliament and party system via the Green Book, the

[11] Specific publication date of this scanned copy uncertain, but estimated to be in the 1980s. The Green Book/Al-Kitab Al-Akhdar, retrieved from: https://archive.org/details/TheGreenBook_848

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idea of an army defending the country on behalf of the people was rejected (4). The positions in the existing security apparatus were occupied by relatives of Gaddafi, members of his tribe and allied tribes (7-9). Civil-Military relations turned openly hostile after two failed coups against Gaddafi; a decline in oil revenues in 1975 and radical economic reforms caused internal disputes over government expenditures, which culminated in several coup attempts followed by purges (Anderson, 1985; Deeb, 1990).

The military thereafter was deliberately neglected, priority and privileges given to parallel elites and paramilitary forces connected to Gaddafi through tribe and family (Barany, 2011: 30). Additionally, the Libyan military was kept ineffective through confusing distribution of units in the country (Anderson 2011: 6) in addition to the overall de-emphasis of their role through the Green Book. The Libyan military was kept underfunded and subverted (Gaub, 2014: 231). Since Libyan society was fractured along tribes and region, these cleavages were strongly present the military (Anderson, 2011: 6). Additionally, until the uprisings 2011 the armed forces had only rarely been used to quell protests and generally had very little combat experience (Gaub, 2014: 233). The Libyan military basically became a nuisance to Gaddafi (Gaub, 2013).

Libya during the Arab Spring does not quite fit into the Civil-Military-Triangle. First, there was no de-facto opposing elite, given that the parliament was dissolved under Gaddafi. Secondly, while the assumption of armed forces as unitary agent held true for all other cases, the Libyan military fractured along rank-lines into a faction supporting the incumbent and into a faction opposing Gaddafi. In this case, the direct arrow between citizens and Gaddafi denotes that civilians directly participated in combat against pro-Gaddafi troops.

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

Figure 9: Civil-Military Relations in Libya 2011.

The empirical analysis of the four cases, and the consideration of previous attempted coups in the same countries show that two factors stand out in determining this probability. First is the coherence of the armed forces – smaller isolated groups of army officers with little alliances who attempted coups tended to fail. Second is the magnitude of the threat to regime survival. It is safe to assume that defections are more successful when the regime destabilizes facing critical threats. Libya demonstrated that probability of a successful defection is higher if both conditions are present. Therefore, the probability of winning is conditional upon military coherence (MIL_{COH}) and a the presence of a critical threat (THR) larger than 0:

$$P\ (win \mid MIL_{COH} + THR > 0)$$

The probability of a successful defection plays into the expected utility of defection, although this consideration was negligible in Egypt and Tunisia, where the threat to the regime was fairly severe.

Findings I: The Military Role in Making and Breaking Regimes

Previous literature established that civilian control of armed forces is a necessary condition for democratization. The post-Arab Spring constitutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya indicated – regardless of the present state of political affairs – that there were active efforts undertaken to subjugate militaries under civilian control and to limit their political influence. The draft constitution of Libya, in contrast to previous decentralization of militaries, even re-establishes a monopoly over armed forces. The Egyptian military upon re-entering the political sphere, expanded and consolidated its role in domestic politics through the 2013 consolidation. The analysis additionally found that civilian control generally goes at the expense of military power and autonomy, while it does not necessarily impact general effectiveness.

The protests 2011 in Algeria did not have the same magnitude as in the cases of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The Algerian military decided to back Bouteflika facing a comparatively moderate challenge from citizens. Given that the military installed an incumbent of their choice, the military perceived some guarantee of their future interests. The formal analysis found that the cost of repression can be broken down into citizen approval, military reputation, military coherence, and potential future alliances in case of regime change. At the time of the Arab Spring, the military's relation towards the incumbent was ambiguous to somewhat friendly, given economic privileges of army staff. Survey data indicated that citizens' trust towards the Algerian military was ambiguous in comparison to the other countries with available data. Therefore, the benefits of cooperating with the incumbent, which encompass guarantee of interests, favorable relations to the incumbent, economic privileges for army members and military effectiveness, outweighed costs of repression. The Algerian army was furthermore subjected to moderate civilian control with some domaining in public policy, which lowered the cost of civilian control in case of

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cooperation. Hence, the military saw a better payoff in cooperating than in defecting and decided accordingly.

The Egyptian military on the other hand saw more utility in defecting from Mubarak than cooperating, despite very high economic stakes. The threat to the regime was more severe due to the magnitude of protests, which entails a higher cost of repression. Additionally, the Egyptian military had very high approval from the general population. Relations to Mubarak were not hostile, but backing Mubarak entailed succession by his son Gamal Mubarak. The military saw their future interests in jeopardy. With the cost of repression outweighing the benefits of backing Mubarak, the military ultimately defected. With good relations to the citizens and strong societal linkage through general conscription, the prospects of future alliances that would ensure the representation of military interests prompted the military to retreat after defecting in 2011. Approval by the general population remained high throughout the transitional period and Mohamed Morsi's time in office. The dynamics between the incumbent and the military however changed for the worse, with the armed forces resisting civilian subjugation. Both citizens and the opposition exerted direct and indirect pressure through the military on the incumbent, until the Egyptian military ousted Morsi in June 2013. Due to moderate to low civilian control of the military since at least Mubarak took office and high economic stakes, the military would have had much more to lose through democratization and control. As Egyptian military had been involved in the nation building process and in politics since Egyptian independence, and given the militarized administration, it is safe to assume that they were more adept at ruling; a military takeover would not have impacted military effectiveness.

Tunisia's military on the other hand was actively kept out of politics by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, had little economic stakes, no role in the nation building process, and was under high civilian control through Ben Ali. Invasive coup-proofing measures, such as

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limited budgets and counterbalance with the police, rendered the relation to the incumbent hostile. Citizens however had high approval of the armed forces especially in comparison to the security forces and Ben Ali. During the Arab Spring, the military defected as it saw no benefits in backing Ben Ali. The magnitude of protests increased the cost of repression. The military retreated from the political arena following the defection, which may have also been due to political inexperience and inability.

The analysis determined that the cost of democratization to militaries, by definition, encompasses the cost of civilian control and economic privileges, while the benefits included perceived guarantee of military interests especially through future alliances with citizens, and favorable government relations albeit without economic privileges. Regime change towards autocracy requires repression and civilian control, albeit with more leeway and to a lesser extent. Militaries can also perceive a guarantee of their interests in autocratic regimes with economic privileges. The decisive difference between the utilities of autocratic versus democratic regime changes are the costs of repression, which is ideally none in democracies, and the extent of civilian control, which is higher in democracies. The cost of repression would have been very high for the Tunisian military, while civilian control had little to no drawbacks or additional costs. Therefore, the military retreated, allowed democratization, and remained under civilian control.

Libya 2011 and past failed coups demonstrated that not every defection is successful. The failed coup attempts in 1993 and 1975 were launched from factions within the military following regime internal disputes, rather than existential threats. Gaddafi's relation to the military deteriorated following these attempts. Simultaneously the top ranks were occupied by members of his family, tribe and allied tribes. The threat to the Gaddafi-regime was severe during the Arab Spring, however the military fractured during its defection due to internal divisions along tribal cleavages beforehand. Therefore, the probability of a successful

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defection or coup was determined as conditional upon the cohesion of the military establishment, and the presence of a critical threat to the regime at the same time. Libya does not fit well into the sequential model, but contributes information on the preconditions of successful defection. While Libya is presently in the transitional process, the formal model suggests that democratization is likely in the long-term, not only because the military establishment would not be able to intervene. Civilian control under non-democratic rule hindered the military's effectiveness and subjected it to arbitrary intervention. Only higher ranks received benefits, although economic stakes could not be determined due to lack of data (cf. SIPRI, 2017). In this case, democracy may even be beneficial in the restructure of the Libyan military into a professional armed force due to monopolization of the military and clear legal stipulation of civilian control. For both Tunisia and Libya, democracy would furthermore provide some representation of military interests in politics.

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Findings II. The Military Utility of Democracy. Completing the Sequential Model



Figure 10: Completed Sequential Model with Military Utility of Decisions and Outcomes.

In the previous chapter, the empirical analysis was used to break down specific military interests and to derive utilities of outcomes for armed forces. The figure below contains the same sequential model introduced at the beginning of the analysis with the addition of military utilities at the respective nodes (see Figure 10). Democratization presupposes that defection is more preferable to the military than continued cooperation with the incumbent, and that the probability of a successful defection is higher than failing it. A defection comes with three potential outcomes. Under the condition that armed forces retreat, a transition towards either democracy or autocratic rule can happen. If the military takes over, it will generally end in a military regime or a militarized autocratic regime. The military takeover is assumed to be the least preferable outcome because it reduces overall military

effectiveness and comes at a higher cost of repression. Because defection includes this outcome, the utility of a defection has to be at least the same as that of a takeover.

Democracy and autocracy entail different costs and benefits for militaries. Democracy by definition excludes economic privilege, which militaries could maintain and receive under non-democratic rule. Autocratic rule on the other hand comes at the cost of repression, which is not the case for democracies. Common in both of these outcomes as opposed to the military takeover is the cost of civilian control; both regimes require military subjugation to function ideally, although militaries can expect more leeway in autocracies. It is therefore assumed that civilian control comes at a higher cost to militaries in democracies. Democracy therefore becomes more preferable to an armed force if its overall cost is lower than that autocratic regimes despite the higher civilian control. Therefore, sorted by preference

$$[(U_{DEM} \geq U_{AUT}) \geq U_{DEF} \geq U_{TO}] > U_{COOP}$$

To support democratization, democracy has offer at least the same payoff as defecting from a regime. Defection in turn has to offer at least the same payoff as a military takeover, the least preferred option. A military takeover as the worst in case needs to offer more benefits that continued cooperation under the incumbent regime.

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Chapter 6:

Conclusion and Outlook

This thesis analyzed the impact of civil-military relations on transitional outcomes in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, and investigates why militaries would support democratization. The present research expanded the study of military behavior in domestic politics and shed light on military activities beyond combat. By focusing on the Arab Spring in four Arabic countries, it contributed to research on the Arab democratic deficit by demonstrating how armed forces have thwarted democratization, or contributed to it. This intra-regional comparison also went beyond a description of the non-democratic status-quo; it tracks the circumstances which lead to and consolidate autocratic rule with military involvement, as well as how it deteriorates. In summary, it demonstrated how military decisions can make regimes, or break them.

The analytical framework constructed a two-dimensional concept of civil-military relations that not only distinguished between military relations to governing elites and the civilian society, but also allowed comparison thereof within and across cases. It was hypothesized that militaries are more likely to defect and expedite regime change if they have a stronger and friendlier relation to citizens than to the regime. The findings from Tunisia and Egypt support this hypothesis; in both countries, citizens had very favorable views towards the armed forces. Repression posed a risk to internal cohesion against the moral reprehensiveness of opening fire on unarmed civilians, bears reputational damage and can cost future political alliances. These costs of repression therefore generally increase with the magnitude of anti-regime protests. Egypt and Algeria however indicate that the perceived guarantee of military interests also plays a major role in the decision to abandon an incumbent, even if economic stakes are high, and even if relations to the incumbent are not hostile.

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The evidence furthermore supports hypothesis 2, that armed forces are more likely to allow democratization when the benefits to democracy to function and wellbeing outweigh the cost of civilian control. Defection from regimes generate three simplified possibilities. The military can decide to take over, resulting in a military or militarized authoritarian regime, or it retreats allowing change either towards democracy or autocracy. Democratization presupposes that democracy has a higher utility to the military than autocratic rule and direct takeovers. Civilian control is a necessary condition for democratization at the expense of a military's power and autonomy. If militaries were subject to little civilian control and have a history of political involvement, civilian control, and democracy by extension, come at a bigger loss to militaries. Egypt's and Algeria's militaries were both involved in nation building, intervened into politics, had neutral to friendly relations with the incumbent, economic privileges and were subject to only moderate control, which entails very high costs of democratization. The armies in Tunisia and Libya were neither involved in the nation building process, had openly hostile relations to the incumbent which negatively affected their effectiveness and little to no economic privileges.

This confirms the initial assertion that militaries play an important role in regime change and democratization. Civil-military relations not only matter before and during transitions, they are in fact decisive to their outcomes. The finding that militaries actively decide to cooperate with incumbents is both old and new. It is fairly established that opposing elites in autocratic regimes undergo some calculus as to whether to cooperate with the incumbent, or to abandon them. The novelty of this finding however is that militaries undertake similar cost-benefit-calculi. Hence, the cooperation of a military with its regime is neither guaranteed, nor constant.

This approach has several substantive and methodological strengths. The two-dimensional conceptualization into a polity-military- and a citizen-military dimension

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removes assumptions about the primacy of politics over military and underlying regime type. The framework can be applied across a variety of regime types, maintaining a concrete definition of what civil-military are while avoiding conceptual overstretch. This analysis showed how treating militaries and their regimes as a singular analytical unit, as common in prior literature, conceals vital information about the demise of non-democratic regimes. Disregarding the relations of an incumbent to their military understates the inherent instability of non-democratic regimes. A core-strength of this conceptualization is therefore that it offers a new perspective on the dynamics of regime change that made sense of the vastly different Arab Spring trajectories.

The comparative design with joint use of formal and empirical analysis combines the advantages of high analytical precision in qualitative case studies with the generalizability to a multitude of cases through abstraction. Frequently used terms and concepts, such as costs of repression, were broken down through the abstraction ensuring analytical precision despite, or precisely, because of abstraction. Formal modeling is generally used to sketch out relations that cannot readily be captured through conventional correlational analysis. This analysis provided a concrete example of how formal modeling can be used to build empirically testable hypotheses which can in turn be used to complete the formal model at the point of departure.

Another strength of this analysis is the combination of sources, such as datasets, survey data, and legal texts. The supplementation of secondary literature on civil-military relations and coup proofing measures through legal documents increases the accuracy of statements about civilian control in non-democratic regimes. Constitutions are publicly available unlike specific decrees, mission statements or doctrines. The combination of these sources enables longitudinal development of legal regulations concerning armed forces across time, gives indication about the quality of the civil-military relations as well as demonstrate how much they deviate from the law, while ensuring comparability across cases and regime

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types despite the qualitative approach. Furthermore, while authors often discuss attitudes of citizens towards their regimes and the militaries during the Arab Spring, they rarely used survey data to substantiate these claims in the past for the sake of transparency. While the findings through the survey data are strongly limited due to their fragmentation, the mere use of it gave insight into methodological and practical challenges of conducting surveys in autocratic regimes in the developing world. It further highlighted diminished metric variance in the WVS, as well as linguistic considerations specific to surveying in Arabic.

These findings point to several avenues for future research. They indicate that the Arab democratic deficit may have much more to do with civil-military relations than previously assumed, as militaries may not only take action against citizens but also against their own regimes. In line with Carothers (2002), these findings furthermore point to the consolidation of civilian control as important benchmark of democratization, beside the first free elections. The two-dimensional framework in combination of different data sources and the joint use of empirical and formal modeling can aid in the assessment of the role of civilian society in determining coup-risk. Present studies (e.g. Belkin & Schofer, 2003) focus on the polity while neglecting the general population. As this framework shows a potential exit-strategy out of military-based autocratic rule, concepts, such as Praetorianism, can be augmented beyond static descriptions. This approach, due to its broad applicability, may further generate new insights into cases beyond the Arab World, like Thailand or Pakistan which are known for reoccurring military interventions. A nuanced analysis of the coercive apparatus and the monopoly of force of the military furthermore improves accuracy of indices such as the State Fragility Index (Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2016), or the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018) which consider coercive capacities in their assessment of stability or consolidation across regimes. Lastly, the study points to the need for further research of the role of militaries in constitution making and transitional rule.

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Thesis Annex I: Overview of Military Coup Attempts since 1950

This annex contains an overview of failed and successful coup attempts in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya since 1950. The data was compiled from the dataset by Powell and Thyne (2011, hereafter referred to as PT11), containing coups from 1950 to 2010, and from the dataset by Marshall and Marshall (2017, hereafter referred to as MM17) which contains coups from 1946 to 2016. These datasets were publically available, covered the longest time-spans and were most similar in their coding rules and key definitions. Unless specified otherwise, the target of all military coups listed here was the executive authority of a regime by illegal means of forceful seizure (cf. PT, 2011: 250, 251). Further adverse regime changes with military involvement were supplemented through the Political Instability Task Force's State Failure Problem Set (2017, hereafter referred to as PITF17). Unless supplementing the MM17 coup-data, PT11 data will only be included if the authors independently verified the coup attempt.

The use of multiple datasets minimizes potential underreporting of alleged coup plots and coup attempts. Successful coups can easily be detected, defined and demarked from other irregular power transfers. This does not hold true for attempted coups or alleged coup plots, given that especially coup plots do not always receive media coverage in non-Western countries or are made public by government institutions. For the same reason, Powell and Thyne cross-referenced their observations with 14 other datasets which cover different time-spans. However, PT11 do not adjust for variation in coding; some of the cross-referenced datasets include revolutions as perpetrators, others even political parties. The final dataset therefore includes cases that do not meet PT11's definitional criteria of a coup. This overview however controls for coding variations and only considers coups by military or military-affiliated perpetrators (such as former high ranking officers in political positions) targeting the executive authority of a state by illegal means, which also includes defections. For the sake of completeness, defections during the Arab Spring and information on historical contexts from the empirical analysis of the thesis were supplemented.

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Coup Attempts Egypt, 1952 – 2013

DATE	EVENT	COUP SUCCESS	PERPETRATORS	ADVERSE REGIME CHANGE	NOTES	DATASET
23 July 1952	Coup d'état	Yes	Gen. Mohamed Naguib, Gen. Gamal Abdel Nasser	Yes	**Coup abolished monarchy**	MM17, PT11
16 January 1953	Alleged coup plot	No	25 Army officers	No		MM17, PT11
27 February 1954	Coup d'état	Yes	Gamal Abdel Nasser	(not in dataset)	Removal of Mohamed Naguib, regime-internal difference	PT11
28 April 1954	Plotted coup	No	16 Army officers	No		MM17
14 November 1954	Plotted coup	No	Gen. El-Hodeiby Naguib (Muslim Brotherhood)	No		MM17
5 March 1958	Plotted coup	No	Ahmed Mortada el-Maraghi, Hussein Khairy, Mahmoud Namek	No		MM17
29 August 1965	Plotted coup	No	Sayed Kotb, Yusuf Hawash, Abdul Fattah Ismail	No		MM17
27 August 1967	Plotted coup	No	Shamseddin Badran, Abbas Radwan, Lt.Col. Haridi, Osman Nasser, Salah Nasr	No		MM17
13 May 1971	Plotted coup	No	Vice President Gen. Fawzi Ali Sabryi	No		MM17
11 February 2011	Coup/defection	Yes	Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi	(not in dataset)	**ARAB SPRING 2011**	PT11
3 July 2013	Coup d'état	Yes	Gen. Abdul-Fattah El-Sisi	No	**Sisi overthrows Morsi.** Not coded as adverse regime change by MM17	MM17

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Coup Attempts Tunisia, 1962 – 2011

DATE	EVENT	COUP SUCCESS	PERPETRATORS	ADVERSE REGIME CHANGE	NOTES	DATASET
19 December 1962	Attempted coup	No	Capt. Kbair Maherzi, Com. Salah Ben Said, Lashar Chirati, Habib Hidni	No		MM17, PT11
7 November 1987	Coup d'état	Yes	Gen. Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali	No	**Ben Ali overthrows Bourguiba**	MM17, PT11
May 1991	Alleged coup plot	No	Unknown	No	Barakat al-Sahil Plot	MM17
7 September 1991	Alleged coup plot	No	Unknown	No		MM17
2011	Coup/defection	Yes	Gen. Rachid Ammar	(not applicable)	**ARAB SPRING 2011**	--

Coup Attempts Libya, 1969 – 2011

DATE	EVENT	COUP SUCCESS	PERPETRATORS	ADVERSE REGIME CHANGE	NOTES	DATASET
1 September 1969	Coup d'état	Yes	Muammar Al Gaddafi, Free Officers Movement	No	**Coup abolished monarchy**. Not coded as adverse regime change by MM17	MM17, PT11
December 1969	Plotted coup	No	Col. Adam Said Hawaz, Col. Mousa Ahmad	No		MM17, PT11
5 August 1975	Plotted coup	No	Maj. Abdel Fattah Yunis, Maj. Meheishi, Maj. Bashir Hawwadi	No	Regime internal dispute, relations to military begin to deteriorate	MM17, PT11
October 1993	Attempted coup	No	Maj. Addel Salem Jalloud	No	Regime internal dispute	MM17, PT11
15 February – 20 October 2011	Partial defection	Not applicable	unspecified	Yes	**ARAB SPRING 2011**	PITF17

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Coup Attempts Algeria, 1964 – 2011

DATE	EVENT	COUP SUCCESS	PERPETRATORS	ADVERSE REGIME CHANGE	NOTES	DATASET
30 June 1964	Attempted coup	No	unspecified	(not in dataset)		PT11
19 June 1965	Coup d'état	Yes	Col. Houari Boumedienne, Col. Tahar Zbiri, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, Col. Sael al-Boublider, Col. Ahmed Boudjenane	No	**Houari Boumedienne overthrows Ahmed Ben Bella**	MM17, PT11
15 December 1967	Attempted coup	No	Col. Tahar Zbiri, Abdel Aziz Zerdani	No		MM17, PT11
11 January 1992	Coup d'état (main target: cancellation of elections, ouster of president)	Yes	Unspecified, Algerian Armed Forces	Not applicable	**Military intervention into politics, triggered war**	PITF 17, PT11

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Thesis Annex II: Full Breakdown of Civilian Control in all Cases with Indicators

The classification of the degree of civilian control over armed forces in the analysis of this thesis was based on the indicators in Croissant et al.'s (2010) paper. The classification is categorical in terms of high, moderate and low civilian control. Croissant et al. divide civil military relations along different policy arenas (954). The arena of elite recruitment encompasses rules and criteria concerning the recruitment, selection and legitimization of office holders (957). Military influence on elections, positions in the cabinet and veto-powers are assessed in this arena. Internal military organization concerns all decisions regarding force size, equipment, and fiscal decisions – referred to as hardware (959). Military software on the other hand encompasses military doctrines, education, recruitment and retirement (959). The militaries of Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya do not have a publically available doctrine as of time of writing. In the cases of Egypt and Algeria, nationalist narratives of the military regarding the role in nation building were substituted for official doctrine.The public policy arena focuses on the three stages of agenda-setting, formulation and adoption in policy making (957). Full civilian control over this arena means that civilians decide over legislative matters alone without military intervention or domaining (957). Domaining means that armed forces claim a reserved area for themselves that is generally outside civilian oversight (see Merkel, 2004). Influence on the state budget in general or the military budget concern this arena. Lastly, the arena of internal security concerns domestic law and order (Croissant et al., 2010: 958). The main criterion is that, although internal security can be a military task, civilians have the capacity and right to direct and oversee any military implementation (958).

To complete the full classification, information was obtained through the secondary literature of the case studies and through the legal analysis (see ANNEX III). This constitutes the first application of Croissant et al.'s original classification scheme, given that it has not been used further by the authors nor in the general literature. The arena concerning national defense against external security threats (958) was disregarded in this analysis, given that the thesis focuses on military behavior in domestic politics only. Within the theoretical framework of the thesis, Croissant et al.'s coding scheme can be embedded into the polity-military dimension. Some indicators of the original classification were excluded or summarized here, if they were not applicable to the regimes at hand, or if information was not available across all cases. The categories "ambiguous", "unknown" and "none" were added by the author.

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Full breakdown of Civilian Control in under relevant regimes in all cases. Continued on next page.

ARENA	INDICATOR	ALGERIA Bouteflika	EGYPT Mubarak	EGYPT Morsi	TUNISIA Ben Ali	LIBYA Gaddafi
RECRUITMENT	Reserved representation for military personnel in cabinet	Not de jure. De facto, indirectly through installation of Bouteflika	Yes. Minister of defense has to be from the military	Yes. Minister of defense has to be from the military	No guaranteed positions in cabinet	Yes, for family, tribe-members and allies
	Influence on political Competition	Moderate. Military endorses candidates	Moderate. Military endorses candidates	De facto yes. De jure military required to remain neutral	None	None
	Veto-Power in government formation and dissolution	None	None	De jure no, de facto dissolution by coup.	None	None
INTERNAL MILITARY ORGANISATION	Civilian influence on decisions in military hardware (force size, equipment, finance and technologies)	Reporting of expenditures not transparent since 2006 (cf. SIPRI, 2017)	Moderate to low. Defense Council regulates military budget and expenditures	Moderate to low. Defense Council regulates military budget and expenditures	Yes. President controls finances of the military	Expenditures never officially reported, only estimates available (cf. SIPRI, 2017)
	Civilian influence on decisions in military software (doctrine, education, recruitment, retirement)	Moderate. Military has publically available doctrine. Military creates own narrative. Recruitment general conscription-based	Low to none. Military doctrine not publically available. Military creates own narrative. Recruitment and conscription under military jurisdiction	Low to none. Military doctrine not publically available. Military creates own narrative. Recruitment and conscription under military jurisdiction	Recruitment general conscription-based	Informal
PUBLIC POLICY	Influence on budgets and state finances	Moderate/ambiguous. Military claims some domains	Moderate. Military claimed domain without civilian oversight	Moderate. Military retained domains without civilian oversight	None	None
	Authority in public administration	Ambiguous	Yes. Administration and Bureaucracy militarized	Yes. Military reclaimed power	None	Unknown
INTERNAL SECURITY	Separation of Police and Military	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Ambiguous through people's militia and

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						collective self-defense
	Military influence on security policy making	Yes	Yes. Institutionalized participation through Security and Defense Councils	Yes. Institutionalized participation through Security and Defense Councils	No	Informal influence likely
	Civilian oversight over military security operations	Yes. President commander in chief. Higher Council of Defense consults president. Parliament determines rules for use of armed forces	Moderate. President is commander in chief. National Defense Council tasked with security strategy, headed by president	Moderate to low. Active resistance to civilian oversight	Yes, president commander in chief	Yes, through Gaddafi
	Civilian influence on defense policing	Yes. President commander in chief. Higher Council of Defense consults president. Parliament determines rules for use of armed forces	Moderate. President is commander in chief. National Defense Council tasked with security strategy, headed by president	Moderate to low. Active resistance to civilian oversight	Yes, president commander in chief	Yes, through Gaddafi
	Civilian oversight over defense activities	Yes. President commander in chief. Higher Council of Defense consults president. Parliament determines rules for use of armed forces	Moderate. President is commander in chief. National Defense Council tasked with security strategy, headed by president	Moderate to low. Active resistance to civilian oversight	Not outlined in relevant constitution but yes, likely due to Ben Ali's absolute control over military	Unknown
OVERALL LEVEL OF CIVILIAN CONTROL	Cumulative Evaluation	Moderate	Moderate to Low	Moderate	High	Ambiguous

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Thesis Annex III: Legal Analysis of Military Role Across Constitutions

This annex contains the overview of legal regulations of civil-military relations on the polity-military dimension. Constitutions were used as the main source because they were publically available and because English translations are usually available. The accuracy of the translations was verified by the author. The legal analysis of civil-military relations was conducted for the purpose of classifying legally stipulated civilian oversight over armed forces for Annex II, and to track changes in these regulations over time. Libya presently does not have a ratified constitution – instead, the most recent draft constitution of 2017 was analyzed.

The regulations were divided into several categories by the author. Identity and understanding refers to proclaimed duties of the armed forces as well as characterization or corporate identity, if available. The category 'military role in politics' encompasses articles that regulate the involvement of armed forces in legislative or judicial processes. 'Chief of Staff' contains information on who can command the armed forces. The category 'organization' contains information that was given in the constitutions about the internal structure of armed forces and military courts. 'Tasks' contains information on the official purpose of armed forces. Lastly, the category 'civilian oversight' was introduced to collect articles for the analysis of civilian control in the previous annex. Unless relevant, as in the case of Libya, articles on the monopolization of the armed forces were not included. Emergency powers of incumbents were also not included here, which were given in all cases.

The key observation of the legal analysis is that all constitutions after the Arab Spring in the countries that have undergone regime changes demonstrate an attempt at excluding the military from political affairs, prescribing neutrality and impartiality and explicit criminalization of undermining institutions.

Direct links to the constitutional texts are in the footnotes under each table.

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Tunisian Constitutions, 1959 – present

	1959 – 2008[12]	Decree Law 2011-2014[13]	2014 – present[14]
IDENTITY AND UNDERSTANDING	ART. 15: defense of homeland sacred duty	Not outlined	ART. 9: protection of unity and integrity of country sacred duty, conscription
MILITARY ROLE IN POLITICS	Not outlined in constitution	Not outlined	ART. 18: Armed forces required to remain completely impartial ART. 36: Armed forces cannot join and form unions, or go on strike
CHIEF OF STAFF	ART. 44: President is Commander in Chief of Armed Forces ART. 55: President appoints high military upon recommendation of government. May be delegated to Prime Minister	ART. 9 §1: President commands armed forces. Appointment to military positions in consultation with Prime Minister	ART. 77: President is Commander in Chief of Armed Forces, chairs the National Security council and is responsible for national security and defense ART. 78: President, after consulting head of government, appoints and dismisses persons in senior military positions
ORGANISATION	Not outlined in constitution	Not outlined	ART. 110: Military courts deal with military crimes
TASKS	Not outlined in constitution	Not outlined	ART. 18: responsible for protecting the nation. Have to support civil authorities with legal provisions DECREE 75671[15]: Minister of Defense implements military policy, maintains and restores order using military, fights natural disasters, supports social+econ. development
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT	Not outlined in constitution	ART. 9 §1: President commands armed forces	ART. 93: Mandatory for President to preside over meetings of Council of Ministers on issues of defense, protection of state and territory

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[12] Constitution of Tunisia 1959, amended 2008: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/tn/tn028en.pdf
[13] Decree law instated 23.03.2011, provisional organization of authorities: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/tn/tn052en.pdf
[14] Constitution of Tunisia 2014, English Translation: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf
[15] Fact Sheet of Tunisian Ministry of National Defense, DECREE 75671 of 25.09.1975: http://www.defense.tn/index.php/en/site-map/contacts

Egyptian Constitutions, 1971 – present

	1971 – 2011[16]	2012 – 2013 [17]	2014 – Present[18]
IDENTITY AND UNDERSTANDING	ART. 58: defense of nation sacred duty, conscription obligatory ART. 179: state safeguards from terror ART. 180: belongs to people	ART. 8: defending nation sacred duty and honor ART. 194: belongs to the people	ART. 86: defense of nation is sacred duty and honor, conscription mandatory ART. 141: Presidential candidates must have served in the military or been legally exempted ART. 200: belongs to the people
MILITARY ROLE IN POLITICS	Not outlined in constitution	ART. 8: Military is a Professional and Neutral Institution that does not interfere in Political Affairs	Not outlined in constitution
CHIEF OF STAFF	ART. 143: appointed by President ART. 150: President is Supreme Commander of Armed Forces	ART. 195: Minister of Defense appointed by President from military officers	ART. 152: President is Supreme Commander ART. 200: Minister of Defense appointed by president from military officers
ORGANISATION	ART. 182: National Defense Council ART. 183: Military judiciary in accordance with Constitution	ART. 194: Independent Supreme Court. Civilians cannot stand trial except for crimes directly harming armed forces ART. 193: National Security Council ART. 197: National Defense Council	ART. 152: National Defense Council ART. 200: Supreme Council of Armed forces ART. 204: Independent Military Judiciary with extended jurisdiction. Civilians can stand trial in cases of assault against personnel, facilities, barracks, equipment, vehicles, documents, secrets, public funds, factories, weapons and ammunition, or crimes regarding conscription ART. 205: National Security Council
TASKS	ART. 148: President can declare war and state of emergency ART. 180: protection of country, territorial integrity and security Art. 182: Defense Council strategizes security and safety	ART. 194: protection of country, preservation of security and territory ART. 193: Security Council tasked with strategy, crisis management, identification of threats, addressing them on popular and official levels ART. 197: Defense Council regulates Military Budget	ART. 200: protection of country, preservation of security and territory ART. 205: Security Council tasked with strategy, crisis management, identification of threats, addressing them on popular and official levels ART. 203: Defense Council regulates military budget incorporated as single figure in state budget
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT	Not outlined in constitution	Partial, through civilian members of Security and Defense Councils	ART. 153: President appoints civil and military personnel

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[16] Constitution of Egypt 1971, amended through 2008, English Translation: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=189854, suspended by Interim Constitutional Declaration of SCAF, 2011: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=297156

[17] Constitution of Egypt 2012, English Translation: http://www.egyptindependent.com/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated/ . Suspended by Military Coup

[18] Constitution of Egypt 2014, English Translation: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf

Algerian Constitutions, 1963 – present

	1963[19]	1989 – 1992, reinstated 1996 – 2008 [20]	Replacing modified constitution of 2008, 2016 – Present[21]
IDENTITY AND UNDERSTANDING	ART. 8: popular army at the service of the people under the orders of the government ART. 56, 57, 58, 59: government in turn controlled by Front of National Liberation Party	ART. 61: every citizen has duty to protect independence of country and territory ART. 62: duty to defend country sacred and permanent, service mandatory ART. 73: if presidential candidate born before July 1942, must prove participation in Algerian War of Independence. If born after, must prove non-collaboration of parents with France	ART. 75: every citizen has duty to protect independence of country and territory ART. 76: duty to defend country sacred and permanent, service mandatory ART. 87: if presidential candidate born before July 1942, must prove participation in Algerian War of Independence. If born after, must prove non-collaboration of parents with France
MILITARY ROLE IN POLITICS	ART. 8: participates in economy, social activities, and in politics via parties	Not outlined in constitution	Not outlined in constitution
CHIEF OF STAFF	ART. 38: President is Supreme Chief of Armed Forces ART. 46: Presidents appoints all civil and military posts	ART. 77: President is Commander in Chief of Armed Forces, responsible for national defense ART. 78: President appoints military posts	ART. 91: President is commander in Chief of all armed forces, responsible for national defense ART. 92: President appoints military posts
ORGANISATION	ART. 66: establishment of Higher Council of Defense ART. 67: overseen by president, minister of defense, interior, foreign affairs each, two other appointed members and president of the committee of national defense	ART. 25: National People's Army as organizational focus of country's defense	ART. 28: National People's Army as organizational focus of country's defense
TASKS	ART. 8: territorial defense	ART. 25: permanent mission to safeguard independence and territory	ART. 28: permanent mission to safeguard independence and territory
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT	ART. 40: President head of Higher Council of Defense	ART. 122 §27: Parliament determines rules for and use of Armed Forces by civil authorities ART. 173: Civilian High Council of Security shall be established to consult president on matters of national security	Art. 140 §26: Parliament determines rules for and use of Armed Forces by civil authorities

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[20] Constitution of Algeria 2008, English translation: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Algeria_2008.pdf
[21] Constitution of Algeria 2016, English translation: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Algeria_2016.pdf?lang=en

Libyan Constitutions, 1951 – present Draft Constitution

	1951 – 1969[22]	1975 – 2011 Green Book[23]	2011 – 2013[24] Interim Constitutional Declaration	2017 – present[25] Final Draft Constitution
IDENTITY AND UNDERSTANDING	ART. 15: defense of homeland sacred duty	Not outlined	ART. 9: Every citizen has duty to defend homeland and combat regional, factional and tribal tendencies	ART. 9: Defending the state, its unity and independence duty of every male and female citizen Art. 177: State has monopoly over creation of armed and security forces
MILITARY ROLE IN POLITICS	ART. 133: Armed forces are not allowed to (physically) enter Senate or House of Representatives	None. Defense via tribes, society supervises its own conduct	Not outlined	ART. 178: Armed forces to observe complete neutrality, have no role in the transition of power and are prohibited from political interference. Members of the Army are allowed to vote, but not to run for political candidacy Art. 179: Army prohibited from undermining constitutional system and state institutions, obstructing their activity or restricting rights and freedoms of citizens
CHIEF OF STAFF	ART. 68: King is Supreme Commander of all armed forces	Not outlined	ART. 77: National Transitional Council is highest authority on matters of security of territory and safety of citizens	ART. 106: President is Supreme Commander of armed forces
ORGANISATION	ART. 68: Armed forces consist of Army and Security Forces ART. 149: Martial courts subject to law	PART III, p. 94-95: Society shall be organized in tribes providing protection	Not outlined	ART. 133: Establishment of Military Judiciary competent with offenses committed by military persons as defined by law ART. 178: Organization in ranks
TASKS	ART. 68: protection of sovereignty, safety and security of territory	Not outlined	Not outlined	ART. 179: maintaining security of homeland, unity and territorial integrity, support security agencies
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT	ART. 126: Members of Parliament may be granted military ranks, medals or decorations while in office	Society supervises itself	Not outlined	ART. 178: armed forces to remain subject to civilian authority

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[22] Constitution of Kingdom of Libya from 1959, suspended with Gaddafi's Coup in 1969, English translation: http://www.libyanconstitutionalunion.net/constitution%20of%20libya.htm
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[25] Final Draft constitution, Arabic Original and English translation retrieved from http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/draft-constitution-libya-29-july-2017 and https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/libya-constitution-%E2%80%93-chapter-ten

Thesis Annex IV: Available Survey Data on Military Approval in the MENA-Region

Word Values Survey Data

QUESTION WORDING: "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?"

"--" indicates that item or answer was not included in survey. Egypt was included in the fifth wave of the WVS, however all government-related items were excluded in that survey. Tunisia and Libya both were included the first time in the fifth wave.

Algeria

COUNTRY: ALGERIA 2002 (WVS, n = 1 282)	MILITARY	POLICE	JUDICIARY	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
A great deal	31.1%	25.4%	--	17.2%	6.6%	2.2%
Quite a lot	26.1%	37.6%	--	33.7%	22.5%	15.0%
Not very much	15.1%	18.3%	--	20.3%	26.1%	25.8%
None at all	15.1%	13.3%	--	23.3%	33.0%	47.2%
No answer	--	--	--	--	--	--
Don't know	8.7%	5.5%	--	5.6%	11.7%	9.8%

COUNTRY: ALGERIA 2014 (WVS, n = 1 200)	MILITARY	POLICE	JUDICIARY	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
A great deal	29.8%	24.8%	17.9%	13.9%	7.5%	7.9%
Quite a lot	24.0%	27.6%	22.1%	20.0%	11.3%	14.1%
Not very much	27.8%	29.2%	33.7%	31.8%	26.2%	26.2%
None at all	12.4%	13.2%	15.3%	21.8%	37.0%	31.6%
No answer	5.9%	5.2%	11.0%	12.5%	17.9%	20.2%
Don't know	--	--	--	--	--	--

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Egypt

COUNTRY: EGYPT 2001 (WVS, n = 3 000)	MILITARY	POLICE	JUDICIARY	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
A great deal	19.8%	50.3%	--	16.3%	28.8%	11.4%
Quite a lot	37.3%	37.2%	--	37.0%	36.6%	29.6%
Not very much	42.9%	7.5%	--	23.1%	20.6%	25.2%
None at all	--	5.1%	--	11.4%	10.4%	14.7%
No answer	--	--	--	--	--	--
Don't know	--	--	--	12.2%	4.5%	19.1%

COUNTRY: EGYPT 2012 (WVS, n = 1 523)	MILITARY	POLICE	JUDICIARY	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
A great deal	--	11.1%	17.5%	7.9%	3.9%	3.5%
Quite a lot	--	39.2%	36.9%	31.8%	21.4%	16.4%
Not very much	--	25.6%	21.6%	30.5%	33.9%	34.3%
None at all	--	23.3%	23.6%	29.6%	40.3%	44.6%
No answer	--	0.2%	0.3%	0.2%	0.5%	1.3%
Don't know	--	--	--	--	--	--

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Tunisia

COUNTRY: TUNISIA 2013 (WVS, n = 1 205)	MILITARY	POLICE	JUDICIARY	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
A great deal	28.1%	28.2%	21.0%	6.6%	2.4%	0.9%
Quite a lot	31.8%	30.9%	26.4%	11.2%	3.5%	2.2%
Not very much	23.7%	23.9%	27.9%	29.4%	23.5%	27.9%
None at all	11.2%	12.3%	17.9%	45.1%	59.9%	59.7%
No answer	--	--	--	--	--	--
Don't know	5.2%	4.7%	6.8%	7.6%	10.7%	9.3%

Libya

COUNTRY: LIBYA 2014 (WVS, n = 2 131)	MILITARY	POLICE	JUDICIARY	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
A great deal	29.9%	32.7%	31.7%	13.2%	6.9%	2.9%
Quite a lot	19.5%	22.5%	21.4%	9.3%	6.7%	3.1%
Not very much	28.9%	27.3%	27.7%	31.8%	26.8%	23.0%
None at all	16.1%	12.7%	13.4%	37.6%	46.9%	60.7%
No answer	1.1%	0.9%	1.3%	1.2%	1.8%	1.8%
Don't know	4.4.%	4.0%	4.5%	6.8%	11.0%	8.6%

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Arab Opinion Index 2011, Trust in Governments versus the Military 2011 in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia

Reference: *AOI (2011). Arab Opinion Index 2011/Mu'shar el Araby 2011. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. (Translated from Arabic by author) Retrieved from: https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/The_Arab_Opinion_Index.aspx*

COUNTRY: ALGERIA 2011	MILITARY	GOVERNMENT
High Confidence	16%	5%
Somewhat high	45%	43%
Somewhat low	12%	23%
No confidence at all	18%	20%
Do not know/ no response	9%	9%

COUNTRY: TUNISIA 2011	MILITARY	GOVERNMENT
High Confidence	70%	14%
Somewhat high	26%	33%
Somewhat low	2%	19%
No confidence at all	1%	21%
Do not know/ No response	1%	12%

COUNTRY: EGYPT 2011	MILITARY	GOVERNMENT
High Confidence	81%	36%
Somewhat high	11%	43%
Somewhat low	3%	4%
No confidence at all	2%	5%
Do not know/ No response	3%	11%

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Arab Opinion Index 2011-2017, Regional Trends of Government and Military Approval (without Libya)

Countries included in the Arab Opinion Index: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauretania, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia. The Arab Opinion Index represents around 85% of the Arab population in the MENA-region. The sample size from Egypt constitutes the largest proportion of the total sample size, given Egypt's population density. The margin of error is +/- 2-3% in all rounds for individual countries. Sampling was randomized, multistage, stratified, and self-weighted clustered. Interviews were conducted face-to-face. As datasets and specific numbers of observations per item were not publically available yet, this overview with percentages was compiled and translated by the author from English and Arabic reports. The item "parliament" refers to perceived representativity of parliaments by the respondents. Note that "Trust" and "Confidence" are synonyms in Modern Standard Arabic and across dialects.

TOTAL, 2011 n = 16 192	MILITARY	JUDICIARY	POLICE	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
High Confidence	49%	24%	21%	18%	11%	5%
Somewhat high	28%	33%	34%	29%	22%	18%
Somewhat low	8%	17%	21%	19%	21%	20%
No confidence at all	8%	18%	19%	25%	36%	40%
Don't know/ no answer	7%	8%	5%	9%	10%	17%

TOTAL, 2012/2013 n = 20 372	MILITARY	JUDICIARY	POLICE	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
High Confidence	52%	23%	28%	23%	17%	9%
Somewhat high	27%	41%	38%	34%	31%	18%
Somewhat low	10%	18%	19%	19%	23%	20%
No confidence at all	7%	14%	13%	20%	14%	40%
Don't know/ no answer	4%	4%	2%	4%	6%	9%

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TOTAL, 2014[26] n = 26 618	MILITARY	JUDICIARY	POLICE	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
Trust greatly	51%	23%	29%	22%	14%	7%
Trust to some extent	29%	39%	38%	33%	27%	22%
Do not trust to some extent	10%	19%	17%	20%	22%	26%
Do not trust at all	8%	15%	14%	24%	33%	39%
Don't know/ no answer	3%	4%	2%	3%	3%	6%

TOTAL, 2015[27] n = 18 311	MILITARY	JUDICIARY	POLICE	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
Trust greatly	58%	25%	32%	22%	17%	7%
Trust to some extent	25%	39%	38%	34%	29%	21%
Do not trust to some extent	9%	19%	17%	21%	23%	29%
Do not trust at all	6%	15%	12%	21%	28%	39%
Don't know/ no answer	2%	2%	1%	2%	3%	4%

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[26] 2014 English summary retrieved from: https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/The_2014_Arab_Opinion_Index_In_Brief.aspx
[27] 2015 English summary retrieved from: https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/News/Pages/The_2015_Arab_Opinion_Index_Results_in_Brief.aspx

TOTAL, 2016[28] n = 18 310	MILITARY	JUDICIARY	POLICE	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
High Confidence	59%	24%	34%	24%	16%	8%
Somewhat high	28%	41%	38%	31%	28%	23%
Somewhat low	7%	18%	15%	20%	23%	24%
No confidence at all	5%	14%	12%	23%	29%	41%
Don't know/ no answer	1%	3%	1%	2%	4%	4%

TOTAL, 2017/2018[29] n = 18 310	MILITARY	JUDICIARY	POLICE	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	PARTIES
High Confidence	68%	26%	36%	22%	14%	5%
Somewhat high	22%	42%	39%	33%	28%	23%
Somewhat low	6%	17%	15%	21%	23%	24%
No confidence at all	3%	12%	9%	22%	31%	41%
Don't know/ no answer	1%	3%	1%	2%	4%	4%

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[28] 2016 Arabic report with summary of 2015-findings available here: https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/art43.aspx
[29] 2017-2018 English summary retrieved from: https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/News/Pages/ACRPS-Releases-Arab-Index-2017-2018.aspx

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