

**FIDESZ'S NATIONAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL:
GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF A DOMESTIC POPULIST
GOVERNMENT**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the interactions of populists in government with external factors. It analyzes the rhetoric of Hungary's governing populist party, Fidesz, to assert that there is a multi-directional influence between their national discourse and the international arena in which it operates. The international environment in which Fidesz operated from 2014 to 2018 played a key role in the radicalization of the party towards an increasingly illiberal stance. Furthermore, Fidesz's increasingly internationalized discourse has global repercussions. Orbán perpetrates a populist rhetoric that is easily diffused to other national contexts. This international populism is affecting Hungary's relations with actors like the EU, US, and Russia and providing an opportunity for transnational cooperation between Fidesz and other right-wing nationalist parties.

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*“It is only a question of time, and we shall prevail not only in Hungary,
but in the whole of Europe; indeed, we shall prevail in the entire Western
world.”¹ –Viktor Orbán, 2017*

INTRODUCTION

On May 24, 2018, former political advisor to President Trump and alt-right nationalist, Steve Bannon made a trip to Budapest to congratulate Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, on his recent electoral victory. Bannon, who has connections with various far-right leaders like Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen, praised Orbán as the “Trump before Trump,” declaring that he is “the most significant guy on the scene right now.”²

Viktor Orbán’s party, Fidesz, has gained significant international recognition from more than just Steve Bannon in recent years. The last election was extensively covered by major news outlets, including *BBC*, *Reuters*, *The Washington Post*, and the *New York Times*. In May of 2018, *The Guardian* published an article in which it asserted that “Orbán’s overwhelming electoral victory has arguably made him the continent’s main political challenger to France’s Emmanuel Macron, who’s been building his profile as Europe’s pre-eminent liberal democratic voice.”³ Viktor Orbán’s authoritarian turn has come under increasing criticism by the European Union and leaders like Macron and Merkel for its flagrant disregard of democratic institutions like the rule of law and an independent media. But how is this mid-sized country, with negligible military

¹ All subsequent speeches will be taken from Kormany.hu
Viktor Orbán, “speech at the 27th Congress of Fidesz” (speech, Budapest, Hungary, November 12, 2017), Kormany.hu.

² Patrick Kingsley, “How Viktor Orban Bends Hungarian Society to His Will,” accessed May 31, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/world/europe/viktor-orban-hungary.html>.

³ Milan Nič, “Brexit Is Boosting Viktor Orbán’s Ability to Disrupt the EU | Milan Nič,” the Guardian, May 2, 2018, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/02/brexit-boost-viktor-orban-ability-disrupt-eu>.

capabilities and an economy that makes up less than 1 percent of the EU's GDP,⁴ becoming such a contentious actor in world politics?

The recent election, which centered on a “Stop Brussels” and “Stop Soros” campaign, are only the latest exploits in Orbán's self-proclaimed “illiberal democracy.” Viktor Orbán, who came to power in 2010, represents a strong nationalist turn that seems to be spreading within Europe and the United States. He advocates for the return of strong nation-states; he lambasts international institutions and actors like the European Union and George Soros, arguing that they represent a post-nationalism that disregards average citizens and threatens ethnically and religiously homogenous nations. His exclusionary populist rhetoric has slowly moved from the fringes to the mainstream, with countries like Poland, Austria, and, most recently, Italy all electing populist far-right parties to govern. It seems like what was once a small nation of ten million Magyars is becoming a source of international contention.

Following the most recent April election, in which Fidesz secured a new two-thirds majority mandate, it seems that there is a high probability that this international contention may continue to become more of a mainstay in the European arena and around the world. Given that Viktor Orbán was one of the first right-wing populists in Europe to successfully hold control of the government and is determined to export his illiberal democracy model to other nations, it is worth understanding how his discourse has been instrumentalized in the movement. It is evident that in the last years, a rightward radicalization has occurred within the Hungarian government; but, given how focused Orbán's narrative has focused onto international relations, how much of that radicalization has been influenced by external factors? And how much international impact

⁴ “Share of Member States in EU GDP,” accessed May 30, 2018, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170410-1>.

does this domestic rhetoric really have? This thesis hopes to delve into Viktor Orbán's domestic rhetoric to understand its internationalization and how the leader has begun to assert this narrative at a global level. To understand the actual implications on Hungary's external relations, this research aims to disentangle Fidesz's national in the international.

I.1 Research Question and Thesis Statement

In accordance with the previously published research, this thesis intends to contribute to the study of populist parties in government and look at how the international environment interacts with domestic populist parties in government. The first part of this thesis will be devoted to taking an in-depth look at the rhetoric of the Fidesz government in Hungary from the period of 2014 to the recent 2018 elections. It will start by asserting that Fidesz's rhetoric has radicalized during this period and that this rhetorical shift is, in part, a result of international influences.

After establishing this radicalization of the party, the thesis will then attempt to answer the research question: *How has this populist nationalist rhetoric of Fidesz affected relations between Hungary and other international actors?* This research intends to look at the external events and actors that played a significant role in the discourse of Fidesz during that period and how their interactions have played a part in the radicalization of the rhetoric. While it will not claim causal relationships, this thesis will contextualize the international environment in which Fidesz operated during the period of 2014 to 2018 to better understand the implications of external actors on this regime. It will then argue that Fidesz perpetrates a type of nationalist rhetoric that is increasingly incorporating international elements; as a result, this transnational populist rhetoric can easily be diffused to other national contexts and provides an opportunity for international populist cooperation.

I.2 Contributions to the Existing Literature

This thesis aims to contribute to both the study of populist radical right parties and the limited research on transnational populism. While there is a plethora of information on populism in domestic contexts, this thesis intends to focus on the transnational elements. Since populist movements tend to operate in a national context,⁵ there is limited research on the foreign influences on domestic populist governments and the concept of transnational populism. Overall, by taking the time to contextualize what this thesis argues to be a dangerous radicalization of the ruling party in Hungary, this research plans to demonstrate how the national and the international are exerting multi-directional influences on one another to create a radical right phenomenon.

I.3 Methodology

Before explaining the methodology for the research, it is important to understand the significance of Hungary's Fidesz party as a case-study. As outlined in the introduction, Hungary has received increasing international media recognition in recent years as its charismatic leader has become an outspoken critic of liberal democracy. Fidesz represents both a distinctive and a comparable case in its ability to be classified. Researchers argue that populism is becoming a central part of contemporary politics around the world,⁶ and both the United States and Europe have seen elections of populist leaders in the last three years. It is argued by some that Hungary was one of the first to witness this recent global trend of right-wing populist popularity in the polls.⁷ Understanding the radicalization of Fidesz and the journey the party has taken to its current position in the international trend could prove useful in curtailing the movement in comparable

⁵ Kaltwasser and Taggart, "Dealing with Populists in Government: a framework for analysis," 206.

⁶ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism*, 2 .

⁷ Cas Mudde, "Orbán's Hungary Is Not the Future of Europe," *The Guardian*, 10 April 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/10/orban-election-hungary-europe-future-past>

countries like Poland. On the other hand, Fidesz proves to be a distinctive case in its situation. It may be a populist radical right party, but it started as a mainstream liberal party; thus, the party has not encountered the same domestic and international opposition that confronts many radical parties. In fact, as a member of the European People's Party, Hungary has arguably received fewer negative repercussions at the European level on issues that have clearly violated liberal democratic principles of the European Union, when compared to a country like Poland.⁸ Thus, the case of Hungary is exceptional enough that it warrants individual analysis and attention. This thesis intends to do justice to Hungary's exceptional circumstances while identifying transnational trends in a way that allows for future comparative studies.

This thesis aims to assert that Fidesz rhetoric has radicalized. To thoroughly assert this case, it will use the published English translations of speeches and statements of Viktor Orbán on the government website *Kormany.hu* to perform a content analysis of the discourse from 2014 to 2018. This research recognizes that translations limit the effectiveness of a content analysis; however, the statements are published by an official government source and seemingly reflect the sentiment represented by the government on the occasion. This analysis follows the trend of other academics in representing the discourse of the political party Fidesz through the oration of Viktor Orbán, given that he is both the Prime Minister of Hungary and has been the party leader since 1993.⁹

To fully understand the radicalization of Fidesz since they most recently became the party in government, this research would ideally look at the rhetoric from 2010 to 2018. However, it will focus on the rhetoric of 2014 to 2018 in its content analysis for two reasons. First, English

⁸ Agnes Batory, "Populists in Government? Hungary's system of national cooperation," 285.

⁹ Agnes Batory also chooses to use Viktor Orbán's speeches and statements as an accurate representation of Fidesz's party rhetoric. See "Populists in Government? Hungary's 'system of national cooperation,'" 288.

translations of released statements by Orbán during his 2010 term are not available on the government website. Second, Agnes Batory has already completed an analysis with similar research goals for the earlier period;¹⁰ therefore, to avoid redundancy and to allow more thorough research of the recent election, this thesis will work off the existing analyses of Fidesz rhetoric from 2010 to 2014. To perform the actual discourse analysis, all of Orbán's statements provided by the government for the period of 2014 to 2018 were catalogued by year. A representative sample of statements was chosen from each year, considering foreign and domestic addresses, as well as choosing patterned speaking events like the annual state of the nation address, national holidays, and regular appearances on the weekly radio show *180 Minutes*. Furthermore, speeches that received international recognition were analyzed because of their relevance to this thesis's second objective. On average, each year had around 75 statements released and at least 25 percent of each year's statements were closely analyzed to attempt a representative sample of the discourse. Through a precise definition of radicalization and a methodical content analysis of Fidesz discourse, this thesis will attempt to fulfill its first objective.

One research objective of this thesis is to contextualize the foreign factor in the radicalization over the last four years and look at its international implications. It is unreasonable for this thesis to address every single potential external actor or event that could have played a role in the radicalization of the party's rhetoric. To choose a relevant number of actors to evaluate, this thesis will contextualize the government's relations with those international actors that are referenced frequently in the rhetoric. Furthermore, it will consider events that had major international recognition and are potentially relevant to Hungary's external relations. This thesis will not attempt to argue direct *causation* for the radicalization of Fidesz's rhetoric based on these

¹⁰ Ibid, 288.

external factors. It serves to *contextualize* the external elements that have interacted with this populist government to better understand the multi-directional influences that Hungary and its international counterparts have on one another. This framework for analysis will be further explained in the transnational diffusion section of the theoretical chapter. However, it is important to note that the scope of this thesis will barely touch on the domestic factors of Fidesz's radicalization during this period, which are clearly relevant to creating a full illustration of the situation. This is done to allow for a more thorough analysis in an area that is less inundated with existing research but also limits the ability of this thesis to make any direct causal statements.

I.4 Structure

This thesis is structured into five main chapters. The first chapter will serve as the theoretical framework for this thesis, touching on all necessary terms and concepts. The second chapter will provide relevant historical background on Fidesz and the radical right in Hungary, giving a brief overview of the rhetoric of Fidesz from its years in opposition until the end of its 2010-2014 term. The third chapter will detail the results of the discourse analysis of the 2014 term until the most recent elections, mapping out the trends to identify the increasingly international elements of Fidesz's discourse and how the external environment played a role in shaping it. After the analysis results are explained, Chapter 4 will look at the concept of international populism and show how Orbán's language is easily diffused to other national contexts. The fifth chapter will contextualize this radicalization of the rhetoric at the international level, looking at the changing relations that have occurred with the EU, US, and Russia. It will use this analysis to evaluate the possibility of transnational cooperation. Finally, the conclusion will look at opportunities for further study. It will provide a brief overview of how the case of Hungary can be categorized in a

way that would make a useful comparative study of a party like PiS in Poland, and it will look forward to the future of Hungary and its relationships within the EU.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter serves as the framework necessary to carry out an analysis on the radicalization of the rhetoric of Fidesz. To create clarity and precision in the research, this chapter will outline the current literature on populism, justifying the decision to approach populism as a discourse. It will then summarize the relevant academic literature on populist parties in government. For the sake of even more precision, it will look at the typology of *populist radical right parties*, as outlined by Cas Mudde, and assert that Fidesz in 2018 has radicalized to the point of being considered a *populist radical right party*.¹¹ After asserting a detailed approach to the populism, this chapter will focus on the concept of radicalization in discourse, providing a detailed definition based on the work of both Cas Mudde¹² and David R. Mandel.¹³ It will then briefly look at the concepts of transnational diffusion and transnational populism to create a methodologically-coherent framework for this analysis.

1.2 Populism

As the term *populism* becomes increasingly prevalent in political campaigns, media, and academic research, finding a precise definition becomes essential to using the term for analysis. Populism itself is a multi-faceted concept; it has developed in waves since its 19th century origins in Russian and American agrarian movements.¹⁴ The concept has been used in different geographic regions and in combination with different ideological approaches; it seems, at most, that “there is

¹¹ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge New York Melbourne Madrid Cape Town Singapore: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

¹² Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*.

¹³ David R. Mandel, “Radicalization: what does it mean?” in *Home-Grown Terrorism: understanding and addressing the root causes of radicalisation among groups with an immigrant heritage in Europe*, (IOS Press, 2009), 101-113.

¹⁴ Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda,” 4.

a general agreement in the comparative literature that populism is confrontational, chameleonic, culture-bound and context-specific.”¹⁵ In addition to its various contextual applications, social scientists have developed divergent working definitions for analysis of these cases.

The current main research approaches include populism as a thin-centered ideology, a discursive style, and a type of political mobilization, and each has its own implications for research.¹⁶ The ideological approach, which is first attributed to Cas Mudde, is the most predominant method currently; it looks at populism primarily as set of ideas that emphasizes a Manichean outlook on ‘the people’ as inherently virtuous and sees a constant antagonism between them and the “corrupt elites” that control the government for their own gain. It focuses on this antagonism and claims that society is divided into these two homogenous groups.¹⁷ In a very similar respect, populism as a discourse also holds that populism takes a Manichean outlook on society, arguing that there is an antagonism between the virtuous people and the evil elite.¹⁸ The major difference in this approach is that it identifies this populism as a rhetorical tool that is used by politicians in opportunistic times.¹⁹

The two approaches also hold distinctive implications for research methodology. Those who approach populism as an ideology often employ qualitative content analysis of party documents and literature.²⁰ On the other hand, the discursive approach looks at the instances and progression of populist rhetoric; so, it can use both qualitative content analysis and quantitative

¹⁵ David Arter, “The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? The Case of the True Finns,” *Government and Opposition* 45, no. 4 (October 1, 2010): 484–504, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2010.01321.x>. 490.

¹⁶ Gidron and Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism,” 5.

¹⁷ Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” 543.

¹⁸ Gidron and Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism,” 6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

analyses to look at frequency and intensity of populist rhetoric being employed.²¹ The two approaches are often conflated with their similar definitional approaches, but they do employ different research methodologies and allow for distinctive analyses of populist parties.

1.2.1 Populism as a Discourse

After outlining the two main approaches to the study of populism, this thesis finds that approaching the case of Fidesz is most appropriately done when treating populism as a discourse. Specifically, this paper will use the following definition of **populism**:

“a discourse centred around the nodal points ‘the people’ and the ‘elite,’ in which the meaning of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ is constructed through a down/up antagonism between ‘the people’ as a large powerless group and ‘the elite’ as a small and illegitimately powerful group. Populism is a claim to represent ‘the people’ against an illegitimate ‘elite’, and constructs its political demands as representing the ‘will of the people’”²²

While this definition by Benjamin De Cleen attaches the discursive style and the antagonism between the elites and the people, this research will also assert that the *discourse is presented in a Manichean tone, adding a moral element that assigns inherent virtue to the people and evil nature to the elites*, drawing upon the definition of Kirk Hawkins.²³ This thesis recognizes that both the ideological and discursive style are almost identical in definition, but chooses to use the discursive approach for research implications. Since one of the objectives of this research is to analyze how the rhetoric of Fidesz has radicalized since 2014, it is necessary to be able to evaluate how the

²¹ Moffitt and Tormey, “Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style,” 385.

²² De Cleen, “Populism and Nationalism,” 5.

²³ Hawkins, “Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective,” 1043.

discourse has shifted. Populism approached as a discourse will allow the analysis to go beyond qualifying whether Fidesz rhetoric is populist or not but also to monitor the intensity of the populism over time. It allows the research to look at how populist elements have qualitatively changed and to do a content analysis for comparative value. Furthermore, as researchers like Zsolt Enyedi and András Bozóki have verified in their work, Fidesz does not always adhere to populist sentiment in their policies.²⁴ Therefore, by approaching the party through a discursive approach, we can eliminate the question of what constitutes ideology and if Fidesz truly adheres to said ideology, focusing solely on what Fidesz is presenting itself as in the discourse.

1.2.2. Populists in Government

The field of populism studies is vast; this section briefly intends to narrow down the scope of this research to a much smaller sub-sect of populism analysis for the sake of precision and later comparison. As will be discussed in the next section, this thesis focuses on right-wing populist parties. However, populism can also be evaluated from both the demand and supply side. This thesis will look at the supply side of populism, looking at the actors that provide the rhetoric. Furthermore, this paper will look at the supply-side of populism when the actors are in government. Only a small amount of literature has been devoted to this arrangement, given that the number of populists in government has historically been more of a fringe phenomenon. However, as the introduction of this thesis asserted, actors like Fidesz and PiS are becoming more prevalent at the

²⁴ Bozóki argues that Fidesz's domestic policies only benefit a very specific ethnonational definition of the people, often marginalizing the poor and minorities like the Roma community. Enyedi argues that Fidesz espouses anti-elite rhetoric, but employs policies that benefit the country's wealthy citizens greatly and awards government positions to party loyalists.

András Bozóki, "Broken Democracy, Predatory State, Nationalist Populism in Péter Krasztev & Jon Van Til eds. *The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2015), 15.

Zsolt Enyedi, "Paternalist populism and illiberal elitism in Central Europe", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 21:1, 14.

international level and populism seems to be moving into mainstream of politics, making this a topic worth examining.

To look at a comprehensive system of analysis of populists in government, this thesis recommends looking at the framework designed by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser and Paul Taggart in the March 2016 publication of *Democratization*.²⁵ In this special issue, they create a framework for looking at the external and domestic actors that interact with populists in government and attempt to make recommendations for how to restrain the illiberal tendencies of these governments.²⁶ While their research goals vary slightly from the objectives of this thesis, they provide a few key insights. First, they outline the fundamental antagonism between populism and liberal democracy, which has become a key component of Viktor Orbán's regime. According to Kaltwasser and Taggart, "liberal democracy is a complex political regime...that tries to find a difficult balance between respecting majority rule on the one hand and protecting fundamental and protecting fundamental rights," which can be interpreted by populists as undemocratic, given its advocacy for independent and unelected institutions.²⁷ As a result of this disagreement, leaders like Orbán can justify their distaste for liberal democracy in a way that still presents itself as democratic. Furthermore, Taggart and Kaltwasser explore why external actors become involved in what is a national context of populism. They postulate that external actors respond to domestic political agendas for two reasons: first, populism can target external actors in its discourse; and second, "the domestic success of populist actors is perceived to have an impact on international organizations in which other governments have an interest."²⁸ Orbán's tendencies to attack both

²⁵ Kaltwasser and Taggart, "Dealing with Populists in Government: a framework for analysis."

²⁶ Ibid, 201.

²⁷ Ibid, 202.

²⁸ Ibid, 207.

international actors like George Soros and organizations like the European Union supports their argument. External actors have become a significant part of the Hungarian domestic narrative, and international attempts at intervention have likewise increased.

In addition to the work of Kaltwasser and Paul Taggart, Agnes Batory's analysis of the Hungarian government from 2010-2014 serves as a framework for this research. Featured in the same special issue of *Democratization*, Batory looks at how populism has impacted Hungary's political system by analyzing Orbán's rhetoric and looking at the response of external actors like the EU.²⁹ The aim of this thesis is slightly different than Batory's work; it plans to address the interaction between Orbán and the external actors mentioned in his discourse instead of looking solely at the responses of those actors to the domestic rhetoric. It will argue that Orbán's language and international actors are affecting one another; the domestic narrative is both influenced by the external *and* influential on the external. Nevertheless, it will draw heavily on the work of Kaltwasser, Taggart, and Batory when analyzing Fidesz rhetoric and its external implications.

1.2.3. Populist Radical Right Parties

To typify Fidesz and allow for future comparative analysis as well as support the notion of significant radicalization, this thesis argues that Fidesz fits Cas Mudde's definition of a *populist radical right party*.³⁰

Mudde proposes multiple definitions of **populist radical right parties**, but this thesis will follow the maximum definition: "*political parties with a core ideology that is a combination of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism*"³¹ This definition is very deliberate in its word choice; instead of labeling these parties "radical right populists," Mudde uses the term *populist radical*

²⁹ Agnes Batory, "Populists in Government? Hungary's 'system of national cooperation,'" 283.

³⁰ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

³¹ Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 26.

right (PRR) to emphasize the nativist core of the ideology of these parties;³² populism is merely a sub-type of the radical right and more a way of communicating nativist and authoritarianism sentiments.³³

The assertion that Fidesz fits this categorization is not without controversy. In both of Cas Mudde's volumes on PRR parties,³⁴ he chose not to classify Fidesz as such, labeling it instead as a borderline case³⁵ because of a lack of nativism at the party's core. However, recent literature has shifted in the direction of labeling the party as such. In a 2015 *Washington Post* article, Mudde argued that many claim Fidesz is a mainstream party that implements a radical right strategy because Hungary ruled by a true radical right party like Jobbik would look considerably worse, pursuing EU withdrawal and openly aligning with Russia.³⁶ Considering the recent shifts in the rhetoric (including an anti-Brussels election campaign³⁷) and Hungary's eastward turn toward Russia, this research will assert that a Hungary under Jobbik may arguably not be much worse than Fidesz. This research will follow the example of András Bozóki and label Fidesz a PRR party.³⁸

This classification is significant because it provides typological evidence that Fidesz's rhetoric has undergone a radicalization. This serves as corroboration with the results of the discourse and will allow the analysis to move beyond *whether* the rhetoric has radicalized to *why* it matters at the international level.

³² Ibid, 24.

³³ De Cleen, "Populism and Nationalism," 10.

³⁴ See *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (2007) and *The Populist Radical Right: A reader* (2017)

³⁵ Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*.

³⁶ Cas Mudde, "Is Hungary Run by the Radical Right?," *Washington Post*, accessed May 26, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/08/10/is-hungary-run-by-the-radical-right/>. *The Washington Post*, August 10, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/08/10/is-hungary-run-by-the-radical-right/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a62710386a51

³⁷ Some scholars, including Mudde, have argued that nativist rhetoric is opportunized for election purposes. Given that chapter 3 argues that this anti-migrant rhetoric has been predominant in the discourse since 2015, this thesis finds no issue with analyzing a campaign year.

³⁸ András Bozóki and Zoltán Ádám, "State and Faith: Right-Wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary," *Intersections* 2, no. 1 (April 5, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v2i1.143>.

1.3 Radicalization

To understand how Fidesz rhetoric has radicalized in the last four years, it is necessary to deal briefly with the literature on radicalization. This thesis will build on Mudde's definition of *radical*: "opposition to some key features of liberal democracy, most notably political pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities."³⁹ It will combine that definition with one from outside of the study of populism. In David Mandel's 2009 article "Radicalization: What does it mean?" he explores the various conceptions of the term, outlining its historical sense and its contemporary connection to terrorism studies.⁴⁰ While he acknowledges that the word is commonly associated with terrorism studies or "what happens before the bomb goes off?", he argues for a simpler definition that can be attributed to both violent and non-violent groups.⁴¹ His definition of *radicalization* is "a (positive) change in the degree of extremism expressed by an individual or group."⁴² His definition maintains that radicalization is relative; it is evaluated as an extreme in comparison to what is defined as normative and the status quo.⁴³ Building upon this notion as well as Mudde's definition, this research will define **radicalization** as "*a change in the degree of extremism in expressing opposition to the core features of liberal democracy,*" with the aforementioned status quo being a liberal democratic governing system. With this working definition, this thesis will aim to understand Fidesz's radicalization and its international implications.

³⁹ Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 25.

⁴⁰ David R. Mandel, "Radicalization: What does it mean?", 104.

⁴¹ Ibid, 110.

⁴² Ibid, 111.

⁴³ Ibid, 105.

1.4 Transnational Diffusion and International Populism

To understand the international implications of Fidesz rhetoric, it is important to develop a framework for the transnational phenomenon. The concept of transnationalism is highly ambiguous; so, this thesis will draw upon the work of Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow to analyze the diffusion of ideas from Hungary to other arenas. Tarrow and Tilly have developed a concept called **contentious politics**, which they define as “*an interaction in which actors make claims bearing on other actors’ interests.*”⁴⁴ These politics can be communicated through different mechanisms; this research will focus on the concept of *transnational diffusion*, where a form of contention is framed in a way that it can be easily transplanted from one place to another.⁴⁵ This thesis will use this concept of transnational diffusion to argue that Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric is a form of contentious politics, given that he claims to speak on behalf of the Hungarian people. It is important, however, to note one of Tilly and Tarrow’s key points on the diffusion of contention. They delineate what is a circulation and diffusion from the concept of causation; they assert that no complex outcome can ever be attributed to a sole causal mechanism.⁴⁶ This research contextualizes the international environment in which Fidesz rhetoric has shifted, but it is not inferring simple causation. The domestic demand side of this rhetoric is not being addressed in this thesis, and it is a crucial part in the development of the party. This research *does* argue that the international arena played a role in the discourse shift from 2014 to 2018 and that the rhetoric has had an influence on international relations. However, the international arena did not play the *only* role and Orbán’s rhetoric is not the *single* causal reason for the diffusion of this language.

⁴⁴ Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, Second revised edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 7.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 31.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 33.

In addition to the concept of transnational diffusion, this thesis will look at Benjamin De Cleen and Benjamin Moffitts' concept of transnational populism. Populism often occurs in a domestic setting, given the "people" are often defined around some concept of "the nation."⁴⁷ However, De Cleen differentiates between what he calls "transnational populism" and "international populism."⁴⁸ Transnational populism involves creating a cohesive will of the people that moves *beyond* borders. This involves moving past the national context to create a unified transnational people that supersedes the nation. International populism, on the other hand, involves cooperation between nationally organized populist movements.⁴⁹ Building on this concept, this research will assert that this transnational diffusion of radical right ideas is moving in Europe and the United States and that Orbán uses these *transnational concepts* in his rhetoric to create a prime opportunity for *international populism* to occur.

⁴⁷ Benjamin Moffitt, "Transnational Populism? Representative Claims, Media and the Difficulty of Constructing a Transnational 'People,'" *Javnost - The Public* 24, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 409–25.

⁴⁸ De Cleen, "Populism and Nationalism," 20.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 19.

CHAPTER 2: FIDESZ'S IDEOLOGICAL JOURNEY

2.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter intends to look at how the rhetoric and ideology of Fidesz shifted from its conception in 1988 until 2014. This chapter serves as a base for two reasons: one, it illustrates that the concepts of nationalism and populism have been present in the discourse for some time. Second, it aims to serve as a base of comparison for the rhetoric of Fidesz's 2014 to 2018 term. Radicalization is relative; therefore, it is essential to have a standard from which to measure. It will start with a brief introduction of Fidesz's transition from a classical liberal party to a national conservative party. It will then succinctly outline the rhetoric from Fidesz's time in opposition to illustrate that Fidesz and Orbán, as its leader, has perpetuated populist and nationalist sentiments for many years. Next, this chapter will take a brief look at the discourse analysis performed by Agnes Batory on Fidesz's time in office from 2010 to 2014 to see how much of the discourse has included similar sentiments of populism, nationalism, and "others" that threatened the Hungarian people during this term.

2.2 Fidesz's Ideological Shift

Fidesz, (Hungarian: Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége), meaning Alliance of Young Democrats, was founded in 1988 by a group of students. Originally a classical liberal party, Fidesz's self-proclaimed original philosophy was "liberal," "radical," and "alternative."⁵⁰ However, following a large electoral loss in 1994, the party began to undergo a rightwards shift. While the exact timeframe of transition is contested among scholars,⁵¹ it is agreed upon that Fidesz

⁵⁰ Edith Oltay, *Fidesz and the Reinvention of the Hungarian Center-Right* (Budapest: Századvég K, 2012).

⁵¹ András Bozóki argues that 1998 marks a turning point in the rise of "the New right," while István Hegedus asserts that this shift occurred in the early 1990's. Oltay, *Fidesz and the Reinvention*, 125.

entered government in 1998 as a conservative center-right party.⁵² At the time, Fidesz was already extremely critical of the socialist party; they argued that the post-communist transition had been too peaceful and left many politicians from the former regime in power. As a result, they developed a strong anti-elite position, adopting a confrontational attitude towards those they saw as opposition to their idea of a new “civic Hungary.”⁵³ To support this new vision of Hungary, the party started to utilize national symbols and historic legacies; Fidesz’s contemporary nationalist rhetoric can be traced to this initial purpose of uniting the electorate behind what they classified as a competing version of the Hungary espoused by the liberal parties.⁵⁴ By using the tripartite colors and taking actions like moving the Holy Crown from the National Museum to parliament,⁵⁵ they tried to equate Fidesz with the nation. After successfully merging these identities, they then hoped to assert that “the homeland cannot be in opposition,” (Orbán, 2002) and claim to represent the true will of the nation.⁵⁶ Despite its more moderate tone, the party’s early foray into conservatism already displayed elements of anti-elitism and nationalism. The party made a rapid transformation from liberal to conservatism, and the elements of populism and nationalism have been embedded for some time.

2.3 Viktor Orbán before 2010

While the ideology of Fidesz shifted at an early stage, its longtime de facto leader, Viktor Orbán, has arguably possessed a Manichean outlook since early in his political career. One former member of Fidesz, István Hegedüs, who served as a member of parliament from 1990 to 1994,

István Hegedüs, interview by the author, Budapest, Hungary, April 29, 2018.

⁵² Oltay, *Fidesz and the reinvention*, 9.

⁵³ Ibid, 127.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 127.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 128.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 129.

remembers Orbán's Manichean outlook in his early years of leadership: "he started to think about [the liberal intellectuals, journalists, and the Free Democrats]-because of political competition- as the number one enemy...he started to think in black and white. Friends and enemies."⁵⁷ During his early years, Orbán exhibited a disdain for what he deemed the "corrupt elite", which ranged from the domestic Hungarian left all the way up to the European Union.⁵⁸ In 2007, Orbán proclaimed that "a strong Hungary built upon the feeling of mutual responsibility begins when politics are not used to serve the will of the those in power but as an instrument to promote the welfare of the people."⁵⁹ Orbán became a strong influence in the party in its early days, and as a result, the party became guided by his anti-elite sentiments.

Furthermore, while his party has only recently been typified as far-right, Viktor Orbán dabbled with radical right tendencies in his early years. One of the first radical right parties in Hungary, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (*MIÉP*), was founded by István Csurka in 1993.⁶⁰ Long before the financial crisis of 2008, Csurka avowed "that there are secret services cooperating all over the world, financed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, with George Soros manipulating...in the background."⁶¹ These conspiratorial exclamations, which labeled Csurka as an extremist, called attention to Orbán during his first term in office, when Csurka accused the United States of perpetrating 9/11. Orbán refused to dissociate from him,⁶² and some speculated that he was moving farther right ideologically.

⁵⁷ István Hegedüs, interview by the author, Budapest, Hungary, April 29th, 2018.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Oltay, *Fidesz and the reinvention*, 7.

⁶⁰ Sabrina P. Ramet and Roger Griffin, eds., *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, Post-Communist Cultural Studies (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1999).

⁶¹ Ibid, 143.

⁶² "Perspective | Trump Loves a Strongman, so of Course He Fawns over Hungary's Viktor Orban," Washington Post, accessed May 28, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/trump-loves-a-strongman-so-of-course-he-fawns-over-hungarys-viktor-orban/2018/05/25/a10bff28-5f64-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html.

2.3 Fidesz from 2010 - 2014

In 2010, Fidesz re-secured its place in government. It not only secured a solid national victory but also a two-thirds majority in Parliament.⁶³ The years leading up to the election were plagued by policy failures of the MSZP party and corruption scandals; politics in Hungary had become polarized into what many have called a “cold civil war” between the left and right parties.⁶⁴ Amidst such a hostile domestic environment and following a particularly brutal hit from the global financial crisis, Fidesz continued to successfully utilize a rhetoric that identified a clear “us” vs “them” dichotomy. Its self-definition of the nation, or “us”, was described as “good Hungarians:” those who ascribe to the party’s views on “work, home, order, family, and the feeling of security.”⁶⁵ This precise ethnonational definition of “the people” was portrayed in opposition to the “them,” or the enemies of the Hungarian nation. For Orbán and Fidesz, given the corruption of the last administration and the economic crisis, the “others” were both the MSZP party and external actors like the European Union and global capitalists.⁶⁶ In a populist and nationalist sense, these “others” in Fidesz rhetoric were framed in a vertical and horizontal dimension; given the global foundation of the economic crisis, the multinational corporations, banks, and bureaucrats at the European level not only represented an elite force that was disconnected from the people, but also an outsider that was interfering in the sovereignty of the nation: “we are building a country where the people do not work for foreigners...a country where no one can force others’ interests onto the Hungarian people” (Orbán, 2013).⁶⁷

⁶³ Agnes Batory, “Populists in Government?”, 288.

⁶⁴ Bozóki, “Broken Democracy,” 8.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 14.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 15.

⁶⁷ Batory, “Populists in Government?”, 290.

Furthermore, in addition to national and populist sentiments, an authoritarian element can be seen in the rhetoric and policies of Fidesz during this period. Some scholars make a sound argument that the illiberal turn in the party was a response to the unsuccessful reforms of the liberal government in the early 2000's;⁶⁸ regardless, Fidesz's "system of national cooperation," introduced in 2010,⁶⁹ is a prime example of its authoritarian turn. This system, made up of "policies combining statism, economic nationalism, crony protectionism, and neoliberalism,"⁷⁰ emerged as their alternative to liberal democracy that they claimed had failed the Hungarian people since the transition from communism. Through its guiding conservative principles, this system served as the backbone of Fidesz's authoritarian rhetoric during the period: "we want to organize a work-based society...we must break with liberal principles." (Orbán 2014).⁷¹

2.4 Chapter Conclusion

This section provided relevant historical background on Fidesz and Viktor Orbán. Its aim was to demonstrate that populism and nationalism were prevalent in the party's identity long before 2014, and that radical right global conspiracy theories were around long before Fidesz took control of the government. It highlights the rhetorical shift of Fidesz in the 2010-2014 term, when Orbán began to openly flout liberal democratic ideals and started to internationalize his discourse by vilifying global elites in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis. This section raises the question of why these radical narratives and populist elements have long been present in Hungary but are only now warranting international attention. One plausible possibility builds on Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow's concept of the "movements of the crisis."⁷² Following the Great Recession, a

⁶⁸ Bozóki, "Broken Democracy," 4.

⁶⁹ Batory, "Populists in Government," 289.

⁷⁰ Bozóki, "Broken Democracy," 14.

⁷¹ Batory, "Populists in Government," 291.

⁷² Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 209.

political opportunity arose for Fidesz to capitalize on the demand side of populism and assert these concepts into domestic mainstream politics. However, this demand was not just present in Hungary;⁷³ as a result, a movement of crises began, triggering populist reactions around the continent. With this circulation of anti-elitism came the possibility of diffusion of language from one national context to another, as well as the opportunity for cooperation at the international level.

⁷³ See Hanspeter Kriesi and Takēs S. Pappas, eds., *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession* for extensive examples of populist parties that capitalized on crisis rhetoric following the global financial crisis of 2008.

CHAPTER 3: FIDESZ RHETORIC FROM 2014 - 2018

3.1 Chapter Overview

The last chapter aimed to illustrate that populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism are not new concepts in the rhetoric of Fidesz; instead of trying to concretely pinpoint when these became elements of the rhetoric, these sections simply illustrate that these concepts are not novel to the Hungarian domestic discourse. In this chapter, the aim is to illustrate the trends in the rhetoric over the last four years in an internationally-contextualized manner to see how external actors became more prevalent in the domestic rhetoric, as well as how Orbán's conception of the national within the international has shifted. This chapter shows the specific trends in Fidesz rhetoric and identifies how this radicalization has created an opportunity for the diffusion of an international populist language and transnational cooperation.

3.2 Fidesz from 2014 to 2018

3.2.1 Summary of Key Findings

After performing a qualitative content analysis of Viktor Orbán's speeches from 2014 to 2018, some general trends and key shifts were established. The next sub-sections will take a year-by-year analysis, after the key findings are articulated. The first finding is (1) *during this period, the issue of migration went from being a periphery platform to a dominant and securitized issue.* Second, (2) *the language in which Orbán uses to frame his enemies has become more openly hostile and conspiratorial.* Finally, (3) *the way in which Orbán frames the Hungarian nation in relation to the international and European context has shifted.*

3.2.2 Migration rhetoric

In 2015, Hungary faced an influx of migrants unlike anything it had seen in over 50 years. After confronting over a 300 percent increase in asylum applications (the highest in Europe per

100,000 citizens),⁷⁴ the country's governing party decided to construct a border fence with the neighboring country of Serbia. They ignored international condemnation and rejected the European Commission's proposal on a new quota system; the ensuing rhetorical escalation that occurred between Hungary and the EU represents a significant change in both Fidesz's domestic rhetoric and its relationship with other nations.

To fully understand the gravity of the Fidesz's current migration rhetoric, 2014 serves as an important foil to the drastic changes in 2015. Fidesz and its leader have continually maintained an anti-immigrant sentiment. In a 2014 European Council press conference, Orbán denounced migration, advocating that "the EU must make it clear that we want to stop migration, meaning that we do not regard migration as a process that can or should be well-managed or supervised, but it must instead be stopped."⁷⁵ However, despite this long-time opinion, his interactions with other leaders in 2014 displays a level of respect and civility. In July of 2014, when asked on the national radio show, *180 Minutes*, if he thought immigration was the main point of conflict between himself and newly-appointed Commission President Juncker, he responded "I wouldn't call it a conflict...I think immigration is a bad thing. Europe doesn't need migrants."⁷⁶ This is significantly contrasted with the same Prime Minister, who would declare "war" on Brussels over the concept of migration and national identity, only four years later.

Not only did Fidesz's language during this period become more severe, but it began to make the concept of migration a securitized issue. Orbán asserts that migrants present an

⁷⁴ Attila Juhász et al, "Refugees, Asylum, and Migration Issues in Hungary," PoliticalCapital.hu, December 20, 2017.

⁷⁵ Viktor Orbán, "Press Conference following the Session of the European Council" (speech, Brussels, Belgium, June 27, 2014), Kormany.hu.

⁷⁶ "Prime Minister on Kossuth Radio's '180 Minutes' Programme," Kormany.hu, July 18, 2014.

<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-interview-on-kossuth-radio-s-180-minutes-programme>

economic, cultural, and physical threat to the nation. He makes an argument that migrants “contribute to rising unemployment,” are a “threat to our common values and to our culture,” and that “states with large numbers of illegal immigrants experience dramatic increases in crime.”⁷⁷ On a regular basis, Orbán equates migration with a security issue, arguing that immigrants are mostly Muslim and thus threaten the Hungarian Christian culture of the country. Following a string of terrorist attacks that plagued European cities in 2015 and 2016, Orbán began to exploit the palpable fear in the public and drew a connection between migration and terrorism: “the reason we do not want to become an immigrant country is not only because that would bring with it terrorism and crime, and would expose our womenfolk and daughters to danger, and because our cultural identity too would weaken and gradually evaporate.”⁷⁸

While Orbán had long maintained that migration was a negative phenomenon, the frequency in which he presented this narrative also drastically increased from 2014 to 2018. Out of the twenty-four speeches published by the office of the Prime Minister for the year of 2014, eight speeches were coded for this research. Of the representative sample of eight speeches coded, only 37.5 percent of them mentioned the topic of migration. 2015 saw the peak of the migration influx to Hungary and Fidesz’s rhetoric predictably followed that trend; of the speeches coded in 2015, 85 percent of them featured migration discourse. However, even though the number of asylum seekers in Hungary dropped drastically to a little over 2,000 in the first half of 2017 (compared to 177,000 in all of 2015),⁷⁹ this securitized migration narrative remained just as

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on Kossuth Radio’s ‘180 Minutes’ Programme,” Government, accessed May 26, 2018, <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-kossuth-radio-s-180-minutes-programme20180304>.

⁷⁹ Attila Juhász et al, “Refugees, Asylum, and Migration Issues in Hungary.”

prevalent. From 2016 to 2018, 85 percent, 77 percent, and 94 percent⁸⁰, of the coded speeches, respectively, featured migration rhetoric. Viktor Orbán even admitted in the 2018 election that migration was the core of Fidesz's platform:

*“Migration is the rust which would slowly but surely consume our country. It would first do so materially, because we have to spend money on migrants, there will be nothing from which to support families and pay pensions. It would then consume the security of our everyday lives, and finally our culture. This is why the defence of the country and the fight against migration form the core of our message.”*⁸¹

So why does a country that has virtually no influx of mass migration continue to perpetuate this narrative, despite the lack of physical threat? Through the securitization of the issue, Orbán not only justifies taking drastic action at the domestic level, but also gains an opportunity to criticize the “elites” that are allowing mass migration. He explained to an audience in June 2017 that he would have tolerated George Soros's liberal agenda until the man began to support migration in Europe, arguing that “this is no longer a matter of ideology or politics, but a matter of national security. And when it comes to the security of the Hungarian people, Hungarian families and Hungary, their security today and tomorrow, for us there can be no compromise: there can be no excuses, no philanthropic prattle, no liberal nonsense.”⁸²

Migration is a topic that allows Fidesz to create a narrative that is easily diffused to other national contexts through his vilification of European elites as the driving force behind the refugee crisis:

⁸⁰ These percentages are based only the speeches that were chosen for analysis.

⁸¹ Csermely, “Both Votes for Fidesz!”

⁸² Viktor Orbán, “speech at the closing of the National Consultation” (speech, Budapest, Hungary, June 27, 2017), Kormany.hu.

“an absurd coalition which compromises a network of human traffickers employing tens of thousands of people and business interests worth billions of euros, a multitude of human rights activists paid by extremely influential businesspeople and some leading politicians in the European Union [are] transporting into Europe people who were forced or decided to leave their homelands.” (December 2015)⁸³

Not only does he blame a list of international actors that are easily diffusible in other national contexts, but he creates a key opportunity to find new allies through framing migration in an increasingly divisive debate. Just as Orbán once delineated those who were for “civic Hungary” and those who were holding on to a socialist past,⁸⁴ he begins to dichotomize “immigrant” and “non-immigrant” countries: those who care about their national sovereignty and safety versus those who will allow their country to fall to the dredges of multiculturalism and terrorism. He draws a line in the sand, ultimately hoping to find closer relations with countries that share his anti-immigrant, critical tone of the European Union. What started as a difference of opinion has turned to a harsh criticism of the supranational institution; for Orbán, new demarcations have been drawn in Europe that defy the East and West divide. “A new fault line has appeared: between immigrant and non-immigrant countries,”⁸⁵ and those on the opposite side are automatically delineated into Orbán’s list of global adversaries.

⁸³ Viktor Orbán, “Speech at the 5th Meeting of the Hungarian Diaspora Council” (speech, Budapest, Hungary, December 2, 2015), Kormany.hu.

⁸⁴ Oltaý, *Fidesz and the Reinvention*, 125.

⁸⁵ Viktor Orbán, “speech at the national event commemorating the 500th anniversary of the beginning of the Reformation” (speech, Budapest, Hungary, October 31, 2017).

3.2.3 Orbán's Enemies

One of the key elements of both nationalism and populism is the antagonism between two groups: the “us” and the “them.” While nationalism takes a horizontal approach and the populism addresses a hierarchical conflict, both rely on a fundamental exclusionary definition. To understand this aspect of Fidesz’s rhetoric, it is necessary to address those he frames as an enemy and how the language around them has shifted in the last four years. As Chapter 2 established, Orbán seems to look at the world through a dichotomy, with those that agree with him serving the “national” interest and those that oppose him being “anti-national,” regardless of their argument.⁸⁶ Therefore, when an actor, domestic or international, opposes his viewpoint, they are thereafter included in the narrative as opposed to the national interests of Hungary. Interestingly, Orbán’s list of enemies has not significantly changed in the last four or even eight years. It may have increased its scope, but the main perpetrators remain the EU, the global elites, and the left. However, the narrative has seen an increase in hostility and conspiratorial tones towards his enemies; he has begun to connect both domestic and international enemies into one global conspiracy. Moreover, he has gotten more bold and precise with the accusations he makes; what was once the “left” or “the global elites” is now articulated in specific names of organizations and people that he sees as a threat to the nation.

The European Union, which Orbán has criticized since before the country was even a member, became a more prominent part of the rhetoric from 2014 to 2018 under the frequent epithet of “Brussels.” This sobriquet is used before 2014, but became increasingly recurrent after 2016. This identifier is very strategic; in the wake of the Brexit referendum and considering his increased international criticism, Orbán has been forced to walk a very thin line. Fidesz has always

⁸⁶ Attila Juhász et al, “Refugees, Asylum, and Migration Issues in Hungary.”

represented a euro-alternative message; they preach the importance of EU membership but advocate for a “Europe of nations” that is opposed to centralized decision-making at the supranational level.⁸⁷ In the wake of British mobilization to leave the EU, Orbán was forced to find a way to provide a narrative that delineates the actual supranational institution from the people he views as a threat. The identifier “Brussels,” gives Orbán a way to do just that; he can assert a negative perception of the “European elite” or “bureaucrats in Brussels” that he argues are against the will of the people, while dissociating linguistically from the notion of the European Union. He says on numerous occasions that “the European Union is in itself a great success,”⁸⁸ making a clear demarcation between his support of the EU as an idea and what he perceives to be the undemocratic elites that use the institution to destroy the concept of nations. This identifier became increasingly relevant in the past four years, culminating in the “Stop Brussels” slogan that inundated the 2018 election campaign. This elucidation between the EU and Brussels not only involves more of the international in the national narrative for Hungary but also allows for cooperation with likeminded member states that want to reassert their national sovereignty.

In addition to the EU, Orbán has always maintained “the left” as an enemy, previously connecting the former MSZP government to corruption and the country’s communist past.⁸⁹ However, the 2008 global recession allowed Fidesz, then in opposition, to capitalize on the crisis rhetoric and blame the foreign elites and institutions for working against the average hard-working Hungarian.⁹⁰ During the period of 2014 and 2018, a perceived collusion emerges in the narrative

⁸⁷ Viktor Orbán, “speech at the 26th Congress of Fidesz- Hungarian Civic Union.” (speech, Budapest, Hungary, December 13, 2015).

⁸⁸ Viktor Orbán, “presentation at the 26th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp.” (speech, Tusnádfürdő, Romania, July 25, 2015).

⁸⁹ Batory, “Populists in Government,” 290.

⁹⁰ Hanspeter Kriesi and Takēs S. Pappas, eds., *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession*, Studies in European Political Science / ECPR (Colchester, United Kingdom: ECPR Press, 2016).

that allows Orbán to connect his established opponents into one overarching global conspiracy. Ambiguity in the enemy disappears, and he mentions Brussels, the Hungarian left, the European elitist left, foreign NGO's, human rights activists, and George Soros as enemies of the nation. Fidesz's conspiracy can be best illustrated by a quote from one of Orbán's speeches:

“Today an empire is threatening us once again. We stand in the way of a plan which seeks to eliminate nations, and seeks to create a Europe with a mixed population. We stand in the way of a financial and political empire which seeks to implement this plan – at whatever cost. Let's not beat about the bush: in order to implement the “Soros Plan”, across the whole of Europe they want to sweep away governments which represent national interests – including ours. In recent years Soros's NGOs have penetrated all the influential forums of European decision-making. They are also present in the backyards of some Hungarian parties.”⁹¹

This notion of collusion developed from 2016 to 2018, becoming increasingly extreme and conspiratorial. In 2015, Orbán mentioned George Soros and the Soros Foundation a handful of times, choosing to refer to him not by name, but as one of Hungary's “famous -or infamous- sons.”⁹² In 2016, Soros becomes the predominant source of Hungarian opposition⁹³ and a strong proponent of the promotion of migration; by 2017, Soros wants “to see one million migrants coming from a cultural background settled in Europe every year;” he “operates an extensive mafia

⁹¹ Viktor Orbán, “speech at the 27th Congress of Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union.”

⁹² Viktor Orbán, “speech at the 26th Congress of Fidesz- Hungarian Civic Union.”

⁹³ “Prime Minister on Kossuth Radio's ,180 Minutes' Programme,” Kormany.hu, May 20, 2016.

<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-180-minutes-20160520>

network [that] is threatening Europe's peace and future."⁹⁴ In mid-summer 2017, George Soros's face appeared on billboards and newspapers around Budapest, with the slogan: "Don't let Soros have the last laugh." One of the biggest developments in the last four years is the instrumentalization of George Soros as a scapegoat for Hungary's political and international problems. Because of his financial success, he plays a key role in Orbán's encompassing conspiracy; Soros funds the corrupt European and Hungarian leftist elites and has become the face of the foreign global elites that Orbán warns are seeking to take control of Hungary's domestic arena.

In addition to vilifying Soros, the rhetoric around Fidesz's enemies has also grown to include specific politicians and academics. Orbán refers to Martin Schulz, a German politician, as "comrade:" "a genuine Brusselite" who spouts "anti-Hungarian bile."⁹⁵ In the wake of Poland being criticized for its violation of the rule of law, Orbán spoke of Commissioner Frans Timmerman as "the grand inquisitor" that seeks to "weaken, to destroy, to break national governance,"⁹⁶ at the request of George Soros. Domestically, Orbán's most drastic move came in wake of the recent election, when he supported a pro-Fidesz magazine, *Figyelő*, that published a list of 200 NGO workers and reporters that were labeled Soros's "mercenaries."⁹⁷

In addition to creating a global conspiracy that encompasses a very specific list of enemies, Orbán has begun to use military vernacular when speaking about his opponents. What was once "a hope that Brussels will listen to and understand our reasoning"⁹⁸ has become "what should

⁹⁴ Orbán, "speech at the closing of the National Consultation."

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Viktor Orbán, "speech at the 28th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp" (speech, Tusnádfürdő, Romania, July 22, 2017), Kormany.hu.

⁹⁷ Lili Bayer, "Soros-Funded Foundation Questions Future in Hungary," *Politico.eu*, April 20, 2018.

<https://www.politico.eu/article/george-soros-funded-foundation-questions-future-in-hungary-viktor-orban/>

⁹⁸ Viktor Orbán, "speech at the conference 'Five Years of Governance'" (speech, Budapest, Hungary, May 29, 2015).

Hungary do? Should it enter into battle with Brussels...Hungary has decided...we must fight.”⁹⁹

In addition to this declaration of war against the European elites, he describes the results of the national consultation on migration as a “weapon” against Brussels.¹⁰⁰ At a press conference before a meeting of the European Council in 2016, he warned that he would “repel the arrows” and “point bayonets” at other European leaders to “put up a fight.”¹⁰¹ He paints a narrative where the antagonism between Fidesz and its enemies is becoming more hostile. He articulates that he is “harnessed up, saddled up, and prepared” to “advance to battle” against those that oppose his ethno-nationalist view of the world.¹⁰² His use of war language to describe a precise list of enemies in his global conspiracy shows a clear shift to the extreme; Fidesz through the voice of Orbán has certainly radicalized in this regard.

This radicalization has serious implications at the international level; a catch-all global conspiracy allows Orbán and his allies to disregard any opposition as corrupt and power-hungry. Not only does this prove as a valuable rhetorical tool against the EU, it provides another opportunity for other nations to join the narrative and cooperate with Hungary in the “war on Brussels.”

3.2.4 Fidesz’s National in the International

Throughout Viktor Orbán’s speeches, there seems to be an increasing presence of international actors as enemies of the people. A concurrent trend that certainly connects to this increased hostility is the shifting narrative on Hungary’s position in the European and international

⁹⁹ Viktor Orbán, “address in Parliament before the start of daily business” (speech, Budapest, Hungary, October 3, 2016).

¹⁰⁰ Viktor Orbán, “press conference after the announcement of referendum results” (speech, Budapest, Hungary, October 2, 2016).

¹⁰¹ Viktor Orbán, “doorstep statement before the meeting of the European Council” (speech, Brussels, Belgium, December 15, 2016).

¹⁰² Orbán, “ceremonial speech on the 170th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution” (speech, Budapest, Hungary, March 15, 2018).

arena. This sub-section argues that Fidesz has become emboldened by the migration crisis and increased global presence of right-wing populist parties.

In his infamous 2014 “illiberal speech,” Viktor Orbán himself pointed to what he saw as a pivotal moment for the global order; he argued that the 2008 financial crisis has brought a decisive transformation to the “global regime,” much like the world wars and 1990.¹⁰³ Because of what he describes as a failure of liberal democracy to protect the average people, his new self-proclaimed priority is to “develop a state that is capable of making a nation successful.”¹⁰⁴ He argued the concept of liberalism is no longer capable of achieving this goal, citing Russia, China, Turkey, Singapore, and India as examples of successful illiberal regimes that represent a shifting global trend of governance.

Fast forward to the year 2015, in which Europe faced a major migration crisis. After coming out against many of the EU and Western countries’ proposed solutions, Orbán acknowledged that he was isolated in his viewpoint: “In earlier years Hungary was a black sheep of the Union, and in most cases remained alone. Nowadays we are still a black sheep.”¹⁰⁵ However, as the migration crisis worsened and more countries voiced their opposition to the idea of a quota system, Fidesz began to exude a sense of comradery. By the end of 2015, Orbán regularly referred to the Visegrád Four (V4) as a solidarity movement within the EU, referring to them as allies.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Orbán, “speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp” (speech, Tusnádfürdő, Romania, July 26, 2014).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Peter Csermely, “Viktor Orbán: We should not use only the language of strength,” kormany.hu, June 3, 2015. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-we-should-not-use-only-the-language-of-strength>

¹⁰⁶ “If We Do Not Protect Our Borders, Tens of Millions of Migrants Will Come,” kormany.hu, September 4, 2015. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/if-we-do-not-protect-our-borders-tens-of-millions-of-migrants-will-come>

As Orbán started to feel more encouragement from other nations like Poland, Slovakia, and Czechia, he started to openly push his agenda beyond Hungary's borders:

*“So Hungary has gone beyond merely protecting its own community; we have also entered the European arena because we have seen the threat as a European threat, and stated in the European arena what we think about this phenomenon. This was a difficult decision, and we had to consider a great many things. It is obvious that if you go out in the sun, you will get a tan, and if you step into the limelight, everyone will be watching you, and this requires skills which go beyond the traditional Hungarian diplomatic skills, which aim at mere survival.”*¹⁰⁷

Following the migration crisis, 2015 became what Orbán proclaimed a pivotal year for the global realignment,¹⁰⁸ and a marked a transition of Hungary to a “key country” on “the stage of world politics.”¹⁰⁹ This 2015 shift was proceeded by a 2016 that only emboldened the Prime Minister's claims. Following the Brexit campaign and the U.S. election, it seemed the party's nationalist claims were becoming a part of the political mainstream. Fidesz was not shy in hiding their pleasure at the rise of populist nationalist movements in Europe and America, and many party members were quoted after the Trump election, saying that the geopolitical landscape had shifted and that the new administration offered them a strategic opportunity.¹¹⁰ Orbán himself spoke of

¹⁰⁷ Orbán, “Speech at the 5th Meeting of the Hungarian Diaspora Council.”

¹⁰⁸ Viktor Orbán, “State of the Nation Address” (speech, Budapest, Hungary, February 28, 2016).

¹⁰⁹ “Prime Minister on Kossuth Radio's ,180 Minutes' Programme,” Kormany.hu, May 20, 2016

¹¹⁰ Rick Lyman, “After Trump Win, Anti-Soros Forces Are Emboldened in Eastern Europe,” The New York Times, March 1, 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/world/europe/after-trump-win-anti-soros-forces-are-emboldened-in-eastern-europe.html>

the U.S. election as “not just an election, but the beginning of a new era... we are living in an era which is gradually moving away from the world we once knew.”¹¹¹

Riding an emboldened wave of self-righteousness, Orbán declared in January of 2017: “2017... will be a year of rebellion; I believe that over the past two weeks this claim has been confirmed. The European nations – now I’m talking about those in the European Union – will rebel against Brussels.”¹¹² After a slew of national elections, Orbán proved to be partially right. While the French election outcome was not favorable for him, the Dutch Party for Freedom acquired the second highest number of votes in the parliamentary elections, and the Austrian government formed a governing coalition between the far-right Freedom Party of Austria and the conservative People’s Party. Furthermore, Andrej Babiš, of the FNO, proved victorious in the Czech elections, prompting Orbán to speak of possible cooperation and future alliances.

Following what seemed to be a turn right in many national elections, Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric again started to expand its scope. Instead of merely speaking out for Hungary and Europe, the Prime Minister begins to speak on a global cooperation: “We are in a majority – in an overwhelming majority. It is only a question of time, and we shall prevail not only in Hungary, but in the whole of Europe; indeed, we shall prevail in the entire Western world.”¹¹³ As the leader began to see a growing trend, he began to assert himself as a global power to be reckoned with. Part of this power dynamic is his cooperation with the V4. In January of 2018, Orbán asserted that

¹¹¹ Orbán, “speech at 6th meeting of the Hungarian Diaspora Council” (speech, Budapest, Hungary, November 30, 2016).

¹¹² “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán Interviewed on the Kossuth Rádió Programme ‘180 Minutes,’” Government, accessed May 26, 2018, <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-interviewed-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-180-minutes>. Kormany.hu, January 13, 2017. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-interviewed-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-180-minutes>

¹¹³ Orbán, “speech at 27th Congress of Fidesz.”

the EU axes were shifting from a Germany-France dimension to a Germany-V4 axis,¹¹⁴ due to a Brexit-induced realignment.¹¹⁵ With this boost of confidence, the Prime Minister's list of allies and enemies seemed to move beyond Europe's borders. As of March 2018, Orbán had boasted of similar interests with Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, Austria, Bavaria, the United States, Australia and Japan.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, following the publication of the United Nations' *Global Compact for Migration*, Orbán began to condemn the organization, pulling it into his globalist conspiracy theory: "We understand that George Soros's organizations have not only installed themselves in Brussels and Budapest, but also in New York, at the UN."¹¹⁷

By chronologically following the progression of Orbán's discourse on the international environment in which he operates, it is evident that the events of the last four years have emboldened him in a way that makes him believe that his position in the world order has shifted. Fidesz's leader feels a sense of comradery with like-minded governments and celebrates his seemingly accurate predictions on a shifting world order. Immediately following the 2018 Hungarian election, Orbán told a reporter that "the size of one's army, gross national product or territory" are no longer the most important thing.¹¹⁸ He now contends that, despite its size, Hungary is becoming the leader of an international movement against liberal democracy and globalization. This move from the nation to Europe and finally, the world, is becoming increasingly extreme.

¹¹⁴ "Interview with Viktor Orbán on Polish public television TVP."

¹¹⁵ Viktor Orbán, "press conference after his talks with Chancellor of Austria Sebastian Kurz" (speech, Vienna, Austria, January 30, 2018).

¹¹⁶ "Prime Minister on Kossuth Radio's „180 Minutes" Programme," Kormany.hu, March 2, 2018.

<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-kossuth-radio-s-180-minutes-programme20180304>

¹¹⁷ Orbán, "State of the Nation" (speech, Budapest, Hungary, February 18, 2018).

¹¹⁸ "Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on ECHO Television – His First Interview after the Fidesz-KDNP Election Victory," Government, accessed May 26, 2018. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-echo-television-his-first-interview-after-the-fidesz-kdnp-election-victory>

<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-echo-television-his-first-interview-after-the-fidesz-kdnp-election-victory>

3.3 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter served to provide a detailed discussion on the three main findings of the discourse analysis. The migration rhetoric, internationalization of Orbán's enemies, and Fidesz's shifting self-image of itself in the international context have all developed in a context that goes beyond the country's borders. By creating an extreme discourse and delineating clear enemies of the nation, the party has made a sharp dichotomy between countries they see as potential partners and those that they see as a threat to their version of the nation. But, beyond international influences on the formation of Fidesz's domestic rhetoric, why does what Orbán *thinks* about the world order matter for international relations? Chapters 4 and 5 will illustrate that there are real world implications for this language and mindset. Chapter 4 will look at actual manifestations of transnational diffusion of the language Orbán uses, and Chapter 5 will address shifts that have occurred in Hungary's relationship with external actors, looking at the likelihood of international cooperation.

CHAPTER 4: ORBÁN'S INTERNATIONAL POPULISM

4.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter intends to explore one of the international implications of the rhetoric of a domestic populist government. Because of the international component that Orbán so often employs in his discourse, there is an easy potential for mimicry and circulation of the same ideas. This section will first explore the concept of transnational populism and then look at specific themes that arise in his language. It will demonstrate their diffusion among other populist parties in Europe and around the world.

4.2 Transnational Concepts

As was seen in previous chapters, Orbán's enemies have become increasingly externally linked in recent years, and he now seems to advocate for exporting his ideology to other parts of Europe and the world. One of the impacts of his outward-looking rhetoric is that it is creating a discourse that can easily be transported or tweaked to fit other national contexts. As Benjamin De Cleen and Benjamin Moffit have argued, transnational populism is a new theoretical concept, given that populism so often is employed in a national context.¹¹⁹ Orbán's rhetoric is extremely nationalistic and Hungary-specific; yet, some of the core themes can be recycled in other countries and are being seen in other populist governments in Europe and the United States. While Orbán is considered by some (including himself)¹²⁰ to be a pioneer of this brand of populism, this section in no way implies that there is a direct causation between his rhetoric and these recurring themes

¹¹⁹ De Cleen, "Populism and Nationalism," 19.

¹²⁰ "Interview with Viktor Orbán on Polish Public Television TVP," Government, accessed May 26, 2018. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-viktor-orban-on-polish-public-television-tvp>. Kormany.hu January 3, 2018. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-viktor-orban-on-polish-public-television-tvp>

in various countries. Rather, it argues that there is a circularity in these themes and the brand that he has established for himself in Hungary is part of a transnational diffusion of ideas. Tilly and Tarrow, who deem this transfer of ideas as *transnational diffusion*, argue that the post-2008 financial crisis Europe has become an arena for these movements and ideas; with many countries facing similar economic struggles and instant electronic communication available, the spread of contention towards the status quo has the ability to swiftly diffuse across the continent and world.¹²¹ These transnational concepts allow Fidesz and others to create a type of *international populism*, that is based on individual national identities that unite against a common enemy. However, Orbán is not creating a new *transnational identity*; he simply uses a rhetoric that unites different nations against the same global “leftist threats.”¹²² Despite the nation-specific elements, his electoral success provides incentives for others to emulate his narrative.

4.3 Orbán’s brand of international populism

4.3.1 Protection of physical borders

During the migration crisis, Hungary faced an inundation of people pouring across its physical borders; as a result, the country erected a fence that sealed its border with Serbia, as well as a rhetoric that has revolved around “first and foremost...the protection of external borders.”¹²³ However, even in the first half of 2017, when the border was adequately secured and the number of asylum seekers in Hungary dropped by 91 percent to a mere 2,217 people,¹²⁴ this narrative of defending the borders remained critical to the party’s identity: “the migration pressure on

¹²¹ Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 209.

¹²² De Cleen, “Populism and Nationalism,” 22.

¹²³ Viktor Orbán, “Those Who Are Overwhelmed Cannot Offer Shelter to Anyone,” Kormany.hu, September 3, 2015. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/those-who-are-overwhelmed-cannot-offer-shelter-to-anyone>

¹²⁴ Attila Juhász et al, “Refugees, Asylum, and Migration Issues in Hungary,” PoliticalCapital.hu, December 20, 2017.

Hungary's borders will not end within the next few years. There are hundreds of millions of people standing ready to follow."¹²⁵ Despite a lack of continued material threats in Hungary, the idea of excluding outsiders by physically closing the borders has become a common theme in his speeches and other right-wing rhetoric. UKIP, Britain's United Kingdom Independence Party, created a similar narrative during the Brexit campaign. Nigel Farage, who led the party until 2016, unveiled a campaign poster in the weeks leading up to the referendum that featured a line of non-white migrants. It was captioned: "we must break free of the EU and take back our borders."¹²⁶ Interestingly enough, the controversial photograph used by the UKIP movement was the same one used by the Fidesz campaign in 2018 to represent their anti-migrant, euroskeptic platform. This obsession with physically separating the nation from outsiders plays well into the migration crisis narrative and fits Tarrow and Tilly's "movements of the crisis" theory.¹²⁷ The leaders of UKIP and Fidesz both capitalize on the idea of a migration crisis, despite the fact that neither really faces a material threat, because they see positive feedback from the electorate.

Furthermore, this concept of physically protecting borders has crossed the Atlantic, even though the United States did not see mass movements of refugees at its borders in 2015. One of Donald Trump's most popular promises in the 2016 presidential election campaign was to build a wall on the Mexican-US border. After a positive demand-side response in Europe, it is not surprising that this narrative gained strength outside of the continent. The electoral success of Trump and Orbán, as well as the positive outcome for UKIP in the referendum has only further

¹²⁵ Viktor Orbán, "speech at the ceremonial swearing-in of new border guards," (speech, Budapest, Hungary, January 12, 2017).

¹²⁶ Stewart and Mason, "Nigel Farage's Anti-Migrant Poster Reported to Police," *The Guardian.com*, June 16, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants>

¹²⁷ Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 209.

reinforced that this rhetoric is successful; thus, emulation in other right-wing parties has become a viable possibility and a reality.

4.3.2 International Enemies

Chapter 2 outlined how Orbán frames the enemies of Fidesz in his rhetoric. One of the most important findings of the discourse analysis found that Orbán's enemies have become increasingly interconnected in a global leftist conspiracy that he perpetrates and adds to as he responds to the external environment. His enemies include Brussels, George Soros, Europe's left-wing elite, and global capitalist interests.¹²⁸ These antagonists, like the EU and those labeled as the global elites, become easily transferable from one national discourse to another. Given the economic and social ramifications of the financial crisis of 2008 and the migration crisis of 2015, many European countries have felt the demand from their electorates and can benefit from a supranational scapegoat like the EU. Austria's Freedom Party, Britain's UKIP, France's National Front, and the Dutch Party for Freedom have all employed similar anti-EU rhetoric in their discourse, arguing for a return of authority from the EU to the member nations.

While global elites and the EU both represent easy scapegoats for far-right parties, one of the most noteworthy enemies that has developed in Fidesz rhetoric is George Soros. Soros seems to be the holy grail of scapegoats for both Hungary and many other national contexts. In the Hungarian milieu, Soros represents everything that Orbán claims to protect the people from. As a successful financier that amassed a fortune shorting the British pound in the 1990's, Soros represents unfettered capitalism. Furthermore, his Open Society Foundation has been the target of much of Orbán's critiques, playing well into the narrative of outside global elites meddling in the

¹²⁸ Viktor Orbán, "speech at the 26th Congress of Fidesz- Hungarian Civic Union."

affairs of Hungarians and promoting a failed liberal democratic approach to governance. Furthermore, George Soros is Jewish, which plays into the historic anti-Semitic sentiments that still linger in parts of the population.

Soros as a global Jew who uses his massive fortune to interfere in politics and bend the EU to his will is a narrative that plays into the electorates of many European countries, as well as east and west of the continent. In Macedonia, the former Prime Minister has called for a “de-Sorosization” of society; Jaroslaw Kaczynski of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party has backed measures to regulate Soros-funded organizations, and the Romanian government has blamed anti-government protests in 2017 on George Soros and his financial influence.¹²⁹ Similar movements have begun in Serbia, Bulgaria, Slovakia and even in Georgia, where nationalist groups have marched against the Open Society Foundation.¹³⁰ This narrative moves easily from context to context, given that all politicians can benefit from a catch-all boogeyman.

Even long before President Trump took office in the United States, Soros represented the idea that money runs Washington; politicians and the right-wing media have inserted him into countless outlandish conspiracies. Most recently, Republican Senators even called on the Secretary of State to investigate government funding that goes to Soros’s organizations.¹³¹

Soros has become a fungible scapegoat, fitting well into the anti-elitist, anti-Semitic, nationalist rhetoric of parties around the world. This diffusion of a common enemy has created an

¹²⁹ Rick Lyman, “After Trump Win, Anti-Soros Forces Are Emboldened in Eastern Europe,” *The New York Times*, March 1, 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/world/europe/after-trump-win-anti-soros-forces-are-emboldened-in-eastern-europe.html>

¹³⁰ Thea Morrison, “Ultrnationalist Georgian March Holds Anti-Soros Protest Rally,” *GeorgiaToday.com*, February 23, 2018.

<http://georgiatoday.ge/news/9232/Ultrnationalist-Georgian-March-Holds-Anti-Soros-Protest-Rally>

¹³¹ Emily Tamkin, “Who’s Afraid of George Soros?,” *Foreign Policy* (blog), accessed May 26, 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/10/whos-afraid-of-george-soros/>. *ForeignPolicy.com*, October 10, 2017.

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/10/whos-afraid-of-george-soros/>

opportunity for transnational cooperation, but also serves as a substantiation for parties' respective conspiracies. After Viktor Orbán ran a successful election campaign centered around vilifying George Soros, other right-wing parties not only feel emboldened to incorporate the same strategy, but also can use this sense of comradeship to avow that what they are asserting has a base in reality.

4.3.3 National Exceptionalism

One of the key components of Orbán's definition of the Hungarian nation is that it is exceptional from every other country. He still flouts the country's European ties, but he creates an identity of exceptionalism that allows him to advocate against what he sees as erroneous European and Western trends, like liberalism and pro-immigration policies. Orbán's definition of exceptionalism includes economic, cultural, political, and historical elements. Economically, Orbán argues that his "system of national cooperation" has made the country a distinct success story.¹³² Furthermore, he argues that Hungary's long history of fighting for its freedom from the Austrians and later the Soviets,¹³³ as well as surviving a thousand years and having the highest standards of "literature, music, and fine arts" has truly created a unique Hungarian identity¹³⁴ that he must protect through his own exceptional form of governance: illiberal democracy.

While Orbán jokingly refers to the concept of "Hungary-first, and then everyone else,"¹³⁵ he compares the country's status on numerous occasions to the idea of American exceptionalism, which has become a key component of the rhetoric of Donald Trump. The President of the United States ran for office on a platform of "Make America Great Again" and "America First," and his

¹³² Viktor Orbán, "The next year will be about hardworking people" (speech, Budapest, Hungary, February 28, 2015), Kormany.hu.

¹³³ Viktor Orbán, "ceremonial speech on the 170th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848."

¹³⁴ Viktor Orbán, "Hungary and the United States are political allies" (speech, Budapest, Hungary, November 14, 2014).

¹³⁵ Viktor Orbán, "speech at the closing event for the National Consultation."

policy decisions since entering office also reflect this sentiment. Trump has reinstated tariffs on China's steel and aluminum imports and pulled the U.S. out of the Paris Climate Agreement, arguing that these international agreements are not in the best interest of the people of the United States.

In addition to Trump and Orbán, UKIP has promulgated the idea that their membership in the European Union has reduced the country to “a star on someone else's flag,”¹³⁶ The fact that “Britain is a remarkable people” who, according to the party manifesto, changed the world with their Industrial Revolution and speak a language that is the most widely used in the world, makes this degradation unacceptable.¹³⁷ While both UKIP and Fidesz exert a level of exceptionalism, these two concepts of the nation mean something different for EU relations. UKIP's assertion is that they have historically been too great to let an institution like the EU hinder them, while Orbán delineates Hungarian exceptionalism from “the British, who do not precisely know whether they are European or not.”¹³⁸ He asserts that “for a Hungarian, this is not a question. If you are Hungarian, you are European.”¹³⁹ His version of the exceptional nation promulgates a far more precarious rhetoric than UKIP; he makes it clear that he wants to export his illiberal views to the rest of Europe. Instead of choosing disengagement, he is opting for a rhetoric of confrontation, which has the potential to be far more divisive.

All three parties advance a narrative of national exceptionalism, which allows them to rationalize what they see to be exceptional actions. In the case of Hungary, this allows for fundamental changes to the constitution, a migration policy that is the antithesis of the EU position,

¹³⁶ “The UKIP Manifesto 2015,” UKIP.org, 61.
<http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2015>

¹³⁷ Ibid, 61.

¹³⁸ Orbán, “presentation at the 27th Bálványos.”

¹³⁹ Ibid.

and his “illiberal democracy.” In the UK, this is the mandate for leaving the European Union; for Trump, it is the rationale for pulling out of international agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Again, while all three advocate for exceptionalism, the UK and US pursue policies of disengagement. Orbán uses his discourse to confront the European identity, and thus, his narrative presents a divisive ideational dilemma that has the potential to fracture the European Union.

4.3.4 Cultural Christianity

Populist parties often engage in a moral, Manichean framing of the world, and this research has established that Orbán’s rhetoric is no exception: his speeches are riddled with the concept of morality. With this idea comes a constant reference to Christianity, mostly concerning migration. In his framing of the nation and Europe, he includes the concept of a cultural Christianity. Cultural Christianity, as defined by the Prime Minister himself, is a “culture that has developed out of Christianity. A faith-based knowledge and sensibility.”¹⁴⁰ While he acknowledges that the number of people that practice Christianity in Europe, and especially in Hungary, is declining, he asserts that a distinctive culture has formed around it. This vague definition of Christianity allows Orbán to create a clear ethno-national conception of what is Hungarian.¹⁴¹ With it, he can delineate between who he sees a threat to the country by who violates the Hungarian Christian identity; for example, he asserts on a regular basis that he is anti-migrant because migrants are Muslim and Hungary is a Christian nation.¹⁴²

This idea of a Christianity as part of the national identity is also seen in Poland. While Poland is a more religious country and does have a strong Catholic history, the concept of cultural

¹⁴⁰ Viktor Orbán, “Speech at Christian Democrat International’s conference on interfaith dialogue” (speech, Budapest, Hungary, February 16, 2018), Kormany.hu.

¹⁴¹ Bozóki and Ádám, “State and Faith.”

¹⁴² Viktor Orbán, “Those Who Are Overwhelmed Cannot Offer Shelter to Anyone.”

Christianity has also become a political tool. In the mid 2000's, a campaign against homosexuality became a part of the Law and Justice Party's discourse; they argued that homosexuality was not part of Poland's traditional Catholic identity and used it as a talking point against the European Parliament's resolutions on homophobia in Poland.¹⁴³

This politicized Christian identity has been a rhetorical tool for both Hungary and Poland against the European Union, but it also has implications for international relations. When Orbán speaks on Fidesz's obligation to protect Christian culture, it goes beyond Hungary. He asserts that "Europe and the European identity is rooted in Christianity."¹⁴⁴ As Chapter 2 illustrated, the way Orbán frames Hungary within the international arena has shifted in the last four years; he is now more than the savior of Hungarian Christianity, but also carries the burden to stop the "Islamization" of Europe. Not only can other political parties recycle the rhetoric of cultural Christianity as a tool against the EU or to justify anti-immigrant sentiment; this idea of a cultural Christianity can be a uniting force for Fidesz and other far-right parties. He even said in 2018 that "we must clearly state that we stand in solidarity with those Western Europeans and leaders who want to save their homelands and Christian culture,"¹⁴⁵ implying that he sees this Christian culture as a commonality over which to create international relationships.

4.3.5 Rejection of Political Correctness

Another recurring theme in the rhetoric of Viktor Orbán is his rejection of political correctness (PC), which he deems a form of "political oppression; because those who [do not share the same outlook are] branded, shamed, blacklisted."¹⁴⁶ He argues that political correctness is a

¹⁴³ Agnieszka Graff, "Looking at Pictures of Gay Men," 585.

¹⁴⁴ Viktor Orbán, "Those Who Are Overwhelmed Cannot Offer Shelter to Anyone."

¹⁴⁵ Viktor Orbán, "State of the Nation" (2018).

¹⁴⁶ Viktor Orbán, "speech at the 6th meeting of the Hungarian Diaspora Council."

tool of the elite to oppress people like him by labeling them xenophobic and racist for their rejection of multiculturalism and migration. However, he is not alone in asserting this. In December of 2016, following the successful Brexit campaign and the election of Donald Trump, Orbán declared that “the era of political correctness is coming to an end...we have managed to knock away the American leg of this form of intellectual oppression.”¹⁴⁷

Looking at the U.S. presidential campaign, it is not surprising that Orbán declared the concept dead in the last weeks of 2016. Trump ran on a platform that specifically opposed what he saw as the language of the corrupt media and the political elites: “I think the big problem this country has is being politically correct... I don’t have time for political correctness.”¹⁴⁸ This sentiment has been echoed by politicians like the Polish President Andrzej Duda and UKIP’s Nigel Farage. Furthermore, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) Party states in their party manifesto that the “harmful phenomenon of political correctness” is allowing political parties to accrue too much power.¹⁴⁹

But why is this rejection of what is “politically correct” a core part of the leaders’ rhetoric? Politicians like Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán are popular because they cater to the “silent majority:” those who feel that the political class is “*so busy finding a solution to the situation of immigrants that it has forgotten about the white working class.*”¹⁵⁰ A rejection of what is PC condones talking about topics like migration in a way that allows for open xenophobia and

¹⁴⁷ Orbán, “6th meeting of the Hungarian Diaspora Council.”

¹⁴⁸ Chris Caesar, “Perspective | Trump Ran against Political Correctness. Now His Team Is Begging for Politeness.,” Washington Post, accessed May 26, 2018 .
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/05/16/trump-ran-against-political-correctness-now-his-team-is-begging-for-politeness/>. *The Washington Post*, May 16, 2017.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/05/16/trump-ran-against-political-correctness-now-his-team-is-begging-for-politeness/?utm_term=.b06991a1525c

¹⁴⁹ “Manifesto for Germany: The Political Programme of the Alternative for Germany,” *Afd.de*, 10.

https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/04/2017-04-12_afd-grundsatzprogramm-englisch_web.pdf

¹⁵⁰ Orbán, “Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University.”

exclusion of those that do not fit their limited definition of “the nation.” It fits well into the anti-immigrant narrative, validating the radical right’s argument that they are close to “the people” and are not disconnected like the elitist politicians who advocate for minorities at the cost of the majority.

4.4 Chapter Conclusion

This section aimed to identify five rhetorical tactics that arise frequently in Fidesz discourse to understand the international implications of this domestic populist government’s language. Viktor Orbán successfully constructs an exceptional identity that is unique to Hungary and appeals to his electorate; however, he also uses international enemies and transnational concepts that easily diffuse across far-right parties. Not only is a lot of his rhetoric highly imitable, but it also opens the door to the possibility transnational unity against common opponents. The next chapter of this thesis will deal with the possibility of cooperation, given the implications of this party’s rhetoric on its relations with the EU, US, and Russia.

CHAPTER 5: TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION

5.1 Chapter Overview

Thus far, this thesis has argued that Fidesz's rhetoric has undergone a radicalization that has international implications. Chapter 3 outlined the trends, highlighting the increased internationalization of Orbán's rhetoric as he developed his view of Hungary within the world order. Chapter 4 looked at one of the implications of his rhetoric: a highly imitable type of international populism that has been diffused to numerous national contexts. Both chapters referred to a *possibility of transnational cooperation*, and this chapter aims to assess the likelihood of this kind of collaboration. In order to effectively gauge this possibility, it will first look at how relations have shifted in the last four years between Hungary and the EU, US, and Russia.

5.2 Shifting Relations

Orbán's rhetoric regularly refers to a new global alignment that is currently occurring, and Chapter 3 traced his logic through the rhetoric. But is there actually cause for concern? In Kaltwasser and Taggart's framework for dealing with populists in government, they talk about external actors that often respond to domestic populists, including transnational civil society actors, international federations of political parties, foreign governments, and supranational institutions.¹⁵¹ As Fidesz's rhetoric has radicalized, relations have shifted between Hungary and all four of these external interventionists in a way that is changing how the country is perceived internationally. Transnational civil society actors have been seriously hindered by a new foreign NGO law that was introduced in 2017. The atmosphere has become increasingly hostile towards the workers, and many have been featured in the pro-Fidesz Figyelő's list of Soros's soldiers. In

¹⁵¹ Kaltwasser and Taggart, "Dealing with Populists in Government."

fact, one of Budapest's biggest NGO's, the Open Society Foundation, announced in early May of 2018 that they will be moving their office to Berlin because of the oppressive atmosphere in Hungary.¹⁵² Given that transnational civil society actors have thus far been unsuccessful in stemming Hungary's populist tide, it is important to look at the effectiveness of the other three types of potential interventionists. The rest of this section will deal with the effectiveness of foreign governments, supranational institutions, and international party federations by evaluating shifting relations between Hungary and the EU, US, and Russia.

5.2.1 The European Union

Hungary's relations with the European Union have eroded significantly within the last four years; a migration crisis followed by external events like the British choice to leave the European Union have only emboldened Viktor Orbán's anti-EU sentiments. In fall of 2017, Hungary remarkably rejected the European Court of Justice's ruling on mandatory refugee relocations, a first in EU history that demonstrates how much the ruling government is willing to flout the institution's fundamental principles.¹⁵³ By looking at the EU as a supranational tool of interference, it is evident that the institutional set up of the EU makes it much more difficult for it to exert influence following accession in the EU than before. After membership is official, there is no longer a feasible way to strictly enforce Copenhagen criteria.¹⁵⁴ Before entering the European Union, Hungary was forced to meet certain democratic criteria. However, the recent ECJ ruling

¹⁵² Marc Santora, "Soros Foundations Leaving Hungary Under Government Pressure," accessed May 31, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/world/europe/soros-philanthropy-hungary-viktor-orban.html>.

¹⁵³ Lili Bayer, "Hungary Says Refugee Ruling 'Raped' EU Law," POLITICO, September 6, 2017, <https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-says-ecj-ruling-on-refugee-quotas-has-raped-eu-law-asylum-seekers-italy-greece-relocation-scheme/>.

¹⁵⁴ Batory, "Populists in Government," 298.

only further highlights the incapability of the institution to compel member states to practice what they deem to be acceptable behavior.

Within the EU, international party federations exist. Fidesz is currently a member of the European People's Party (EPP), which provides an interesting dilemma for intervention in the domestic populist government. The EPP and Fidesz have a symbiotic, albeit uncomfortable, relationship. Fidesz's membership has often precluded the party from proper EU critique. Given that the EPP is the strongest party in the European Parliament, the party has historically been obliged to defend Fidesz to some extent.¹⁵⁵ On the EPP's side of the relationship, Fidesz provides an additional 12 seats of influence within the parliament. By heavily critiquing the party and losing a strategic member, the EPP not only risks a loss of influence, but also a future in which Fidesz attempts to create its own strategic block within the EU. Both the European Union as an institution and the EPP are in a precarious situation. They clearly do not approve of Hungary's illiberal turn, but they lack real institutional enforcement mechanisms. The Commission's most recent attempt to reign in the Prime Minister included proposing a long-term budget that ties funds to the maintenance of democratic standards; however, Hungary simply responded that they would veto the new budget, which must be approved by unanimity. It is clear that as tools of intervention, the EU and the EPP do not seem to be adequately equipped. Thus, relations between Hungary and the EU continue to worsen.

5.2.2 The United States

While there is still scarce evidence that actual diplomatic relations between the United States and Hungary have improved in the last year, it is no secret that the current US administration

¹⁵⁵ Jennifer Rankin and Shaun Walker, "EU Centre-Right Bloc Accused of Sheltering Hungary's Orbán," the Guardian, April 5, 2018, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/05/eu-centre-right-bloc-accused-of-sheltering-hungarys-orban>.

provides a more favorable international presence for Fidesz than the previous one. While US-Hungary relations are far less prominent than EU-Hungary relations, the US formerly provided a critical voice to the illiberal regime of Orbán. From 2011 to 2014, Hungary was criticized by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and the US expelled some senior government officials from the country.¹⁵⁶ The Trump administration, however, has been mostly silent in response to developments in Hungary; instead, they chose to send a high-level state department official to Budapest in May of 2018 to “usher in a new era of accommodation between the Trump administration and the Orbán government.”¹⁵⁷ As a foreign government that had previously criticized the administration, the US will most likely not be a viable tool of intervention in the near future.

5.2.3 Russia

One foreign power that has the potential to interfere with Hungarian domestic politics is Russia; in recent years, some influential ties have pushed the two countries closer and encouraged Hungary towards an even more illiberal status. Orbán has, on numerous occasions, admonished the international sanctions against Russia and made it clear that he hopes to strengthen ties between the two countries. Some have argued that there is even an “authoritarian diffusion”¹⁵⁸ occurring, given that Orbán has openly emulated Putin’s style of governance and Russian propaganda sources like *Russia Today*, have perpetrated the same narrative of George Soros as the mastermind of 21st century mass migration.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, there seem to be financial aspects to this relationship as

¹⁵⁶ Batory, “Populists in Government,” 297.

¹⁵⁷ Conley and Gati, “Perspective | Trump Loves a Strongman, so of Course He Fawns over Hungary’s Viktor Orban.”

¹⁵⁸ Aron Buzogány, “Illiberal Democracy in Hungary: Authoritarian Diffusion or Domestic Causation?,” *Democratization* 24, no. 7 (November 10, 2017): 1307–25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1328676>.

¹⁵⁹ Dalibor Rohac et al, “Populism and Its Russian Love Affair,” American Enterprise Institute, January 2017, 14. <http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Populism-in-Europe-and-Its-Russian-Love-Affair.pdf>

well; Hungary has been historically energy-dependent on Russia, and has recently awarded a Kremlin-owned company to build a 12 billion euro- nuclear power plant. While the EU is seriously hindered in its ability to intervene and the United States has chosen to look away, it seems Russia and Hungary are moving ever closer.

5.3 Transnational Cooperation

This research has thus-far followed the research of Benjamin Moffitt in agreeing that Orbán creates an *international populism*, which is differentiated from *transnational populism* by its cooperative status between individual populist contexts.¹⁶⁰ Moffitt examines how difficult creating one homogenous transnational “will of the people” can be; this research argues that Orbán’s ethno-national definitions makes the prospect of creating a transnational definition of “the people” unlikely. However, his rhetoric provides an opportunity for two possible “transnational coalitions,”¹⁶¹ As Tarrow and Tilly point out, these types of coalitions have become more prominent since the advent of international institutions like the EU, since they create an arena in which countries are encouraged to interact with one another. The first coalition is the Visegrád Four, a cooperation that started in 1991 but became significantly more prominent in the wake of the migration crisis. It was after Orbán’s statements in 2015, declaring a joint V4 stance on migration, that he boldly asserted that he intended to export his model all over Europe. With a solid V4 cooperation already in place, parties like the FPÖ in Austria have recently announced the possibility of joining the cooperation¹⁶² to form the second plausible transnational coalition: a new euroskeptic party. Following the 2018 election, Fidesz’s relationship with the EPP is flimsy at

¹⁶⁰ Benjamin Moffitt, “Transnational Populism?” 215.

¹⁶¹ Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 209.

¹⁶² Matthew Karnitschnig, “Austria’s (Not so) pro-European Government,” POLITICO, December 18, 2017, <https://www.politico.eu/article/austrias-not-so-pro-european-government/>.

best. There has been open debate over Fidesz's position within the EPP, and Human Rights Watch has called for the party to be expelled after its controversial 'Stop Soros' legislation recently went to parliament.¹⁶³ Furthermore, government sources in Budapest have recently been quoted, saying that Orbán hopes to create a new euroskeptic block to fill the void left by Britain's departure.¹⁶⁴ With similar transnational sentiments being echoed around the continent and countries like Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, and Austria all similarly disenfranchised with the EU's establishment, a populist transnational coalition is a plausible prospect.

¹⁶³ Shaun Walker, "Hungary to Criminalise Migrant Helpers with 'Stop Soros' Legislation," the Guardian, May 29, 2018, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/29/hungary-criminalises-migrant-helpers-stop-george-soros-legislation>.

¹⁶⁴ Milan Nič, "Brexit Is Boosting."

CONCLUSION

C.1 Thesis Summary

This purpose of this thesis was to examine the rhetoric of Viktor Orbán to argue that his domestic populism has been shaped by interactions with external actors and has international implications for relations within Europe and the world. It used discourse analysis to show how Orbán's views on Hungary as a nation in the global order has shifted. Chapter 4 argued that Orbán uses transnational concepts to espouse an international populist language that has easily diffused to other national contexts in Europe and the United States. Furthermore, by evaluating the shift in Hungary's relations with major world actors, Chapter 5 attempted to answer the plausibility of transnational cooperation based on national commonalities and shared enemies. This research has attempted to look at the interaction of domestic populist governments with the international arena and understand why one national leader, Viktor Orbán, presents such a serious threat to international relations. This conclusion will conclude with two final sections: recommending further study and looking forward.

C.2 Further Study: The Case of PiS in Poland

One of the biggest concerns for external actors that this thesis explored was the potential for Orbán's actions to be imitated and emulated by other leaders. Given that Fidesz is arguably labeled populist radical right now, there are a multitude of similar national contexts in which similar rhetoric has the potential (and is already in many cases) to manifest. One recommendation for further study is a comparative study of Poland's Law and Justice Party (PiS).

In 2015, the president of Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) ruling party, Jarosław Kaczyński, made a speech in which he proclaimed "Orbán gave us an example...the day will come when we

succeed, and we will have Budapest in Warsaw.”¹⁶⁵ With verbalized intentions to imitate the work of Fidesz, it seems reasonable that the case in Poland would be an ideal comparative case study for future research.

In addition to the party’s open emulation of Fidesz, the country itself provides an interesting congruence with Hungary in many ways. Two former communist countries that acceded to the EU in 2004, Poland and Hungary have both been chastised by the institution for their degradation of the rule of law and interference with independent media. As Chapter 4 affirmed, Fidesz and PiS assert similar xenophobic rhetoric and have long criticized the EU for trying to usurp their national sovereignty. While this thesis cannot allocate adequate space to properly typify PiS as a populist radical right party, there are certainly similar sentiments in the rhetoric of the two parties, and they both fit the distinctive classification of being populist parties in government.

Given the similarities between the two parties, future comparative studies could yield insightful results. Furthermore, Poland provides an interesting case in which the mimicry has moved beyond the behavior they once emulated; many argue that the illiberal measures implemented by Fidesz in the last eight years have been done by PiS in only three.¹⁶⁶ However, due to different positions at the European level, with Fidesz being a member of the prevailing European People’s Party (EPP) and PiS being in the much smaller Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (ACRE), Law and Justice has faced harsher criticism and been forced to

¹⁶⁵ Neil Buckley and Henry Foy, “Poland’s New Government Finds a Model in Orban’s Hungary,” *Financial Times*, January 6, 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/0a3c7d44-b48e-11e5-8358-9a82b43f6b2f>.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

succumb to concessions at the supranational level in recent months.¹⁶⁷ The two parties are not completely interchangeable (one need only look at their relationships with Russia); however, Poland's PiS provides an interesting case for future comparative study, as well as a worrisome strategic partner for international cooperation with the Fidesz party.

C.3 Looking Forward

This thesis has presented an increasingly topical debate that holds relevance far beyond the last four years. With the recent national election in Hungary, Fidesz secured four more years in power. The EPP is threatening expulsion and Hungary is only intensifying its anti-immigrant, anti-EU rhetoric. As Chapter 5 established, the four main potential international interventionists in this increasingly authoritarian domestic sphere have thus far been ineffective. On a positive note, there are some small signs that seem to indicate a slight moderation of the radical right-wing trends in Europe. Jarosław Kaczyński, president of Poland's PiS, recently agreed to make amended changes to its legal system after having Article 7 invoked against them.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, the V4 has recently shown some fissures in its euroskeptic unity with Slovakia choosing to respect the recent ECJ ruling on refugee relocation.¹⁶⁹ However, despite these small concessions, Orbán has yet to blink. Until the European Union can find a way to hamper Hungary's efforts, an increasingly illiberal populist trend is bound to continue within the nation and abroad.

¹⁶⁷ Aleksandra Wróbel, "'80 Percent' Chance EU Spat Will End Soon, Says Poland's Kaczyński," POLITICO, April 4, 2018, <https://www.politico.eu/article/80-percent-chance-eu-spat-will-end-soon-poland-jaroslaw-kaczynski-pis-judicial-reform/>.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Lili Bayer, "Hungary Says Refugee Ruling 'Raped' EU Law."

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