WOMEN ACTIVISTS IN THE CZECH ANTI-ISLAM MOVEMENT: FROM COLOGNE TO #METOO

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINAL RESEARCH AND WORD COUNT

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of original research; it contains no materials accepted for any other degree in any other institution and no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

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ABSTRACT

As the 2015 'refugee crisis' unfolded in Europe, rather obscure anti-Islam groups came to the forefront and agitated against the welcoming of refugees in Czechia. They developed into a movement mixing the critique of Islam with racist ideas targeting Muslims and others. While these discourses often presented male refugees as potential Islamist terrorists at the onset of the crisis, the mass sexual assaults in Germany on New Year's Eve 2015/2016, for which male refugees and Muslims in general were largely blamed, increasingly led to the depiction of refugees, migrants and Muslims as young male sexual predators. Based on the qualitative analysis of online publications of - and on interviews with - five of the main women activists of the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement, the present work analyses how the Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement's nationalist discourses of inclusion and exclusion rely on gender and sexuality. Focusing on two events, the NYE assaults and the anti-sexist #MeToo campaign, this thesis tries to locate the role of sexism and sexual violence in these activists' discourses, and to understand the way the activists' gender comes into play to explain their involvement in the movement.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANO: Akce nespokojených občanů ('Action of Dissatisfied Citizens', 'ano' means yes in Czech) BPI: Blok proti islámu ('Bloc Against Islam').

ČSSD: Česká strana sociální demokracie ('Czech Social Democratic Party')

IvČRN: Islám v České republice nechceme ('We don't want Islam in the Czech Republic')

KDU-ČSL: Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová ('Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party')

ODS: Občanská demokratická strana ('Civic Democratic Party')

SPD: Svoboda a Přimá Demokracie ('Liberty and Direct Democracy')

SPR-RSČ: Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa ('Coalition for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia')

TOP 09: Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita 09 ('Tradition Responsibility Prosperity,' the 09 stands for 2009

ÚNK: Úsvit-národní koalice ('Dawn-National Coalition')

INTRODUCTION

In 2015, as hundreds of thousands of refugees¹ from non-European Muslim-majority countries were making their way towards Western Europe during what was called the 'refugee crisis', public opinion in European countries reacted in different ways. In Czechia, while there were people open to welcoming refugees, the crisis rather bolstered groups mixing nationalist and anti-Islam² rhetoric. Rather obscure Czech anti-Islam groups came to the forefront and pushed their discourses into the mainstream. While these discourses often presented male refugees as potential Islamist terrorists at the onset of the crisis, the mass sexual assaults in Germany on New Year's Eve 2015/2016, for which male refugees and Muslims in general were largely blamed, increasingly led to the depiction of refugees, migrants and Muslims as young male sexual predators. Thus, in many anti-Islam and Islamophobic discourses, refugees, migrants and Muslims were often lumped together and portrayed as inclined to sexism and sexual violence against women. While these discourses were not entirely new, they nevertheless took proportions unseen before in Czechia, a country with very few Muslims.

Considering the way issues of sexual violence had come into the news in the recent years, first in the wake of the mass sexual assaults on New Year's Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne, Germany, and then when the #MeToo campaign became a mass phenomenon in October 2017, I try to understand the way prominent women activists of the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement make sense of both

¹ I use the term 'refugee' (uprchlik) and 'anti-refugee' because it was the most widely used one in Czechia.

 $^{^{2}}$ I use the term 'anti-Islam' over 'Islamophobia' because that is how the selected respondents describe their point of view and I want to respect that. Thus, I will use anti-Islam to describe the movement and the general critique of Islam, and I will use Islamophobic whenever I assess that views and acts go beyond the critique of Islam. I will discuss the definition of Islamophobia in Chapter 3.

events. Indeed, while the first event bolstered anti-Islam / anti-refugee movements across Europe (and beyond) because refugees/migrants/Muslims were designated as the culprits, the second event rather showed that sexual harassment and sexual violence are widespread across countries and cultures, including in Czechia and Europe. Based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the selected activists' online publications and on interviews that I realised with them, I scrutinise the way they reacted to both events and the way they understand their involvement in the movement. My research thus contributes to a growing body of scholarship on the way nation, race, gender and sexuality are articulated together in discussions about refugees/migrants/Muslims, and it extends this discussion to Czechia, a country of the post-socialist Central and Eastern region, where this topic has not yet been extensively explored. Inspired by Sara Farris's concept of 'femonationalism' (2012, 2017), i.e the use of women's rights and feminism against Muslims and non-Europeans in Western Europe, I look at the way gender and sexuality are involved in discourses of exclusion of refugees/migrants/Muslims. Thus, my thesis critically analyses the way the selected activists are (re)producing discourses whereby the refugee/migrant/Muslim is endowed with a particular age, gender and sexuality, and even race, in the (re)production of negative generalisations. Moreover, by focusing on women activists, I intend to contribute to discussions about feminist and nonfeminist women's involvement in nationalist movements, and more precisely in right-wing nationalist movements such as the Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement.

In the first chapter, I briefly present the position of women in contemporary Czech society, the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement itself and the selected women activists. In the second chapter, I move on to locate my thesis within academic discussions on women, nationalism and feminism, where I focus on feminist scholarship and its tensions concerning the involvement of (feminist) women in right-wing nationalist projects. I then explain the methodology and research design of

my project in Chapter 3, where I lay out my theoretical framework and the tools I use in my analysis. In Chapter 4, I look into the activists' reactions to the mass sexual assaults in Cologne and at the way they 'sexualise racism', i.e. shape refugees/migrants/Muslims into a homogeneous group with an age, a gender and a sexuality. Finally, in Chapter 5, I link this sexualisation of racism with the #MeToo campaign and analyse the way sexism and sexual violence are racialised by the activists as the problem of this group of refugees/migrants/Muslims. In this last chapter, I also discuss the activists' gendered subjectivity to explain their political involvement.

CHAPTER 1 – THE CZECH SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT

The focus of the present work rests on some of the most prominent women actively spreading anti-Islam and anti-refugee views in the Czech public sphere. Although they differ in the way they focus on Islam, Muslims, migrants and/or refugees, I group these women together as involved in what I call the 'Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement', as I explain in Section 1.5. Moreover, despite differences between groups in the movement, I draw from the work of Cas Mudde (2007) to classify it as 'populist radical right' (Mudde, 2007, p.26). I do so based on the political programme ("Politický program Úsvitu a Bloku," 2016) presented by the largest, albeit short-lived anti-Islam / anti-refugee political coalition presented later in my thesis. Indeed, the programme corresponds to Mudde's definition (Mudde, 2007, p.22-26): being *radical*, as opposed to holding liberal democratic values such as the respect of pluralism and minorities; being *right-wing* through its acceptance of inequalities as natural; and being *populist* through its promotion of 'direct democracy' through referenda, and its demonisation of socio-political elites ("Projev na společné programové konferenci" 2016; "Politický program Úsvitu a Bloku," 2016).

In the present chapter, I first provide an historical overview of the emergence and development of anti-Islam and Islamophobic movements in Czechia. First, I briefly present the contemporary socio-political Czech context, with a special focus on women's position and on the populist radical right. Then, I look at the beginnings of anti-Islam and Islamophobic ideas in Czechia before 2015, at the development of the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement during the refugee crisis, and finally at the breaking up of the movement. Finally, I present the women activists featured in the present work.

1.1 Women and Politics in Contemporary Czechia

From 1948 to 1989, Czechoslovakia was under the dictatorship of the Communist Party and quotas ensured the participation of women in the hollow parliament. In 1986, 29% of these deputies were women, but the first free elections in 1990 marked a steep fall to 10%, a trend also observable in other countries after state socialism (Gyárfášová, 2002, p. 180). This virtual absence of women in Czech parliamentarian politics continued in the following decades, staying around 15% between 1996 and 2010, when it jumped to 21.5%, which corresponds to today's proportion ("Poslanecká sněmovna PČR," n.d.). Only three women occupied ministerial positions between 1992 and 2002, but it has since then improved to reflect the proportion of women in formal politics, women play an active role in society, including in numerous women's rights NGOs, and in some conservative groups and Churches (Hašková & Uhde, 2016, pp. 127-8).

When it comes to women's place in society, the post-1989 changes was paradoxical. Indeed, after the Second World War, women enjoyed an "emancipation from above", receiving rights from the state socialist regime while their movements were disbanded (Jechová, 2013). Thus, after 1989, Czech women maintained their proportionally strong, albeit subordinate presence on the labour market and kept their reproductive rights, but there was no strong women's movement challenging existing gender inequalities beyond formal legal equality (Havelková, 2002, p. 227). Finally, feminism was not only discredited by its association with the socialist regime (Hašková & Uhde, 2016, p.127), but it was also caricatured in the public sphere by images from Western radical feminism (Havelková, p. 228). As the dissident and first post-1989 president Vacláv Havel said, feminism was seen "simply as Dada" by 1989 (Havel, cited in Havelková, 2002, p. 244).

Despite some of the negative impacts of the post-1989 transformations, such as socio-economic hardships disproportionally hitting women, Czech women did not go through the same onslaught on their rights as women in other post-socialist countries (Verdery, 1994; Jusová, 2016, p.19). Moreover, the atheist tradition in the country meant that there was also no strong return of religion and discourses on so-called traditional values (Ádám & Bozóki, 2016, p.107). This also helps explain the relatively low level of homophobia in Czechia and the fact that the parliament allowed civil partnership for same-sex couples in 2006 (Jusová, 2016, p.22). Among the mainstream political forces, the weak Christian-Democratic party (KDU-ČSL) is the only one to systematically promote conservative views on gender roles and sexuality.

While the way most of the Czech population views questions of gender and sexuality makes Czechia somewhat of an outlier in the post-socialist region, the way the question of race has come to the forefront since 1989 is very much in line with the rest of the region. Thus, cultural and racial homogeneity is part of the nationalist narrative, the Czech assumed to be white (Jusová, p.8), while the Roma people are located outside the nation, and widely discriminated against (Ryvolová, 2016, p.159). As censorship fell, anti-Roma views became mainstream in the public sphere, and political forces routinely use anti-Roma rhetoric (Ryvolová, 2016).

In the 1990s, the main political force peddling anti-Roma rhetoric was the populist radical right party *Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa* ('Coalition for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia', hereafter SPR-RSČ) (Havelková, 2002, p.241). Fiercely anti-Roma, anti-communist and nationalist, the party did not focus on topics such as the family, women's roles or abortion (Havelková, 2002, p.242). It did talk about the importance of the family,

but it also advocated helping single mothers and explicitly defended the abortion right (Havelková, 2002, p.242). The SPR-RSČ's views on such topics, or rather lack of interest in them, is symptomatic of the Czech political scene. While the SPR-RSČ became the political party with the highest proportion of women deputies (27.9% compared to an average of 15%) when it gained 8% of the vote in 1996, it remained a one-man party around populist leader Miroslav Sládek (Havelková, 2002, p.225). When the SPR-RSČ fell apart at the end of the 1990s, the Czech populist radical right had to wait until 2013 to regain a place in parliament. Regardless of its absence in parliament though, the Czech populist radical right remained active in society, along with the extreme right³, and it increasingly addressed the topics of Islam and Muslim, as I explain in the following section.

1.2 The Rise of the Czech Anti-Islam / Anti-Refugee Movement

Despite the presence of anti-Islam views in 17th century Czechia (Mendel, Ostřanský & Rataj, 2007), modern anti-Islam sentiments in Czechia mainly appeared after 1989 (Mareš, 2015, p.77). There was sporadic anti-Islam rhetoric in the 1990s, mostly among extreme right organisations professing anti-Semitic and xenophobic views, but also among a wider array of political forces (Mareš, 2015, p. 77). These ranged from pro-Russian leftists supporting Moscow's alleged war against Islamist terrorism in Chechnya to pro-United States and pro-Israel conservatives and liberals (Mareš, 2015, p. 77).

The Islamist terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 and Western interventions in the Middle East made the topic of Islam more prominent in Czechia, with growing activism on the right of the political spectrum, from conservatives to extreme right groups (Mareš, 2015, p.

³ As Mudde (2007) explains, there are many issues with the taxonomy of political groups (pp. 32-59). Here, I use 'extreme right' to distinguish from the 'populist radical right', whereby the former is less focused on appealing to the masses in electoral competition and more elitist (Mudde, 2007, p. 49).

77). After 2005, several Czech-language anti-Islam websites were created and in 2009, the group *Islám v České republice nechceme* ('We don't want Islam in the Czech Republic', hereafter referred to as IvČRN) was founded on the social medium Facebook. (Mareš, 2015, p.78). More politicians started to use anti-Islam rhetoric after 2010, such as the current president Miloš Zeman and *Česká Suverenita* ('Czech Sovereignty'), the marginal political party of one of my respondents, Jana Volfová, (Mareš, 2015, p. 78).

Although most anti-Islam rhetoric focused on a general critique of Islam and responded to global events, it also targeted Islamic religious communities in Czechia, despite their small size. According to official data, the number of people considered as 'Muslim' (by origin or family tradition) ranges from 10,000 to 20,000, but only 3358 inhabitants claimed membership to one of the Islamic religious communities in the 2011 census (Český statistický úřad, 2011). These religious communities are mostly concentrated in Prague, Brno, and Teplice, and they came under pressure whenever trying to build mosques (Melichárek, 2011, pp. 33, 41). Thus, plans to build a mosque in Teplice were first rejected by the municipal council in 1996 after the protest of local Christian communities, and then for a second time in 2004, after many citizens expressed their opposition through a petition (Melichárek, 2011, pp. 41-42). In 2009 in Brno, plans by the local Islamic community to build a new mosque had to be postponed after they were met with local resistance led by the Christian-Democratic party (KDU-ČSL), as well as with a demonstration organised by an extreme right group (Melichárek, 2011, pp. 37-41).

Apart from this demonstration, extreme right groups and the populist radical right were not active in these events and were busier agitating against Roma people at the end of the 2000s and the beginning of the 2010s. This changed in 2013-2014, when populist radical right politicians such as Tomio Okamura and his party *Úsvit-národní koalice* ('Dawn-National Coalition', hereafter ÚNK) started to use anti-Islam rhetoric as well (Mareš, 2015, p. 78). Moreover, anti-Islam mobilisation grew online, especially on the Facebook group IvČRN, and its leader Martin Konvička, a university biology professor, gained greater media attention (Mareš, 2015, p. 78). After an Islamist terrorist attack in Paris in January 2015, IvČRN organised its first series of anti-Islam demonstrations in Czechia, with some success (Linhartová, 2016, p. 181).

Even if there were few groups actively agitating against Islam and Muslims before the 2010s, they could draw from an existing popular antipathy towards Islam and Muslims. Thus, in one of the first public opinion surveys realised in 2006, already three quarters of the respondents said that they did not think anything good about Islam and 60% of them expressed fear of it (Topinka, 2016, p. 229). Similar views came out of a larger survey from 2014, in which the majority of respondents rejected (25.5%) or rather rejected (36%) allowing Muslim families to live in Czechia (Topinka, 2016, p. 233). Thus, at the onset of the refugee crisis, there was already a wide array of sociopolitical groups expressing anti-Islam and Islamophobic views and they found a large resonance among the population.

In addition to these widespread anti-Islam sentiments, anti-Islam groups emerged in the late 2000s and early 2010s, especially coming to the forefront before and during the refugee crisis. While some of these political actors focused their critique on Islam as a set of beliefs and others used more open, Islamophobic rhetoric within larger discourses against Roma and immigrants, both discourses were often intertwined. Despite all the prior existence of these groups and these dicourses, it was mostly with the refugee crisis that these issues became important in parliamentary politics, in the mainstream media and on the streets.

1.3 The Refugee Crisis

Immediately before the so-called refugee crisis, the topic of refugees from Syria was not prominent in Czech politics, but it was already controversial. Thus, in early 2015, when the centre-left government coalition decided to welcome 15 Syrian families, it was criticised by other political parties (Mareš, 2016, p.158). During the spring and summer of 2015, the number of refugees making their way towards the European Union (EU) from Turkey and the Middle-East reached its peak, and over a million refugees arrived to the EU over the year (Georgiou and Zaborowski, 2017). At this point, the topic of refugees became particularly salient everywhere in Europe, and Czechia was not an exception. Although Czechia was not one of the refugees' destinations, nor was it on the refugees' route, the prospect of welcoming refugees through the EU's plans gave the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement a clear target.

In June 2015, as the refugee crisis unfolded, the IvČRN created the *Blok proti islámu* ('Bloc Against Islam', hereafter BPI) as a step towards becoming a political party. In September 2015, it then struck an alliance with the aforementioned populist radical right political party ÚNK, which had 14 deputies in the parliament since 2013. Together, they prepared for the 2016 regional elections with a common programme emphasising anti-Islam / anti-refugee views, in addition to nationalist and populist topics ("Politický program Úsvitu a Bloku proti islámu pro krajské volby 2016," 2016). In September 2015, the movement was further bolstered by the Czech government's ambiguous answer to the EU's countries' vote to distribute refugees across member states according to compulsory quotas.

Throughout the summer and in the autumn, the anti-refugee movement continued to mobilise both online and offline. While its demonstrations never attracted more than several thousand protesters, its message found a receptive ear among the wider public. Moreover, it was helped by many other people, including Czech president Miloš Zeman, who regularly made incendiary remarks against Islam, Muslims and refugees/migrants from Muslim-majority countries (Muhic Dizdarevic, 2016, p. 126). On November 17, 2015, he even granted the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement greater legitimacy by giving a speech at one of its rallies (Muhic Dizdarevic, 2016, p. 126). This rhetoric and activism was counter-balanced by some civil society groups and some politicians, including Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka, but there was nevertheless a further increase the public's opposition to refugees. Thus, between April 2015 and September 2015, the proportion of people in Czechia opposing taking in some refugees increased from 57% to 63% and the number of those refusing the EU's refugee quota plans jumped from 56% to 74% ("Průzkum: Češi by nejraději zavřeli…," 2015; see Appendix 1). Finally, this was accompanied by a sharp increase in public displays of anti-Islam, Islamophobic and anti-refugee sentiments in 2015, including verbal attacks on Muslims, real or supposed, as well as acts of vandalism against mosques (Muhic Dizdarevic, 2016, p. 118).

1.4 Quarrel in the Movement

In 2016, the situation was promising for the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement, as public opinion increasingly leaned towards its views and several groups united forces around the BPI-ÚNK coalition. While this union gave them a voice in parliament with the ÚNK's 14 deputies, it also changed the nature of the movement from grassroots activism to 'professional' politics. In April 2016, financial problems and intestine disputes brought the alliance crashing down, with some of the leaders settling scores against each other in public (Mareš, 2016, p.160). The parliamentary party ÚNK even disintegrated as its deputies gradually left its ranks. Thus, in the October 2016 regional elections, a total of seven parties competed for the anti-Islam / anti-refugee vote, with only ÚNK's former leader, Tomio Okamura, managing to gain some seats with his new party ("Volby do zastupitelstev krajů v,"n.d.).

This electoral defeat was not only the result of the vote division, but also of the increased consensus among all political parties against the refugee quotas, which made the issue less salient. Moreover, the original anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement around Martin Konvička increasingly lost its political credibility as it organised a series of provocative happenings, such as a fake Ramadan celebration in July 2016 in front of the Brno mosque involving pork goulash, beer, and a female fashion show (Muhic Dizdarevic, 2016, p. 152). Not only did such events fail to attract large crowds, but they also turned the movement into a joke. Last but not least, the Facebook administration blocked the movement's main communication channel, the IvČRN page, which had reached 160,000 followers, and deleted it at the end of 2016 ("Cenzura na facebooku? Máme důkazy," 2017).

While 2016 marked the fall of the grassroots movement that had risen to fame from a Facebook group to a political coalition, the results were still significant: anti-Islam and Islamophobic ideas became part of the mainstream and the government adopted a harder line against refugees. While the leaders of the IvČRN lost momentum, the populist radical right vote went to Okamura's new political party *Svoboda a Přimá Demokracie* ('Liberty and Direct Democracy', SPD). Thus, despite having played a rather minor role in the rise of anti-Islam and Islamophobic ideas, Okamura ended up being the one collecting the gains, his SPD tying for third place with 11% of seats in the subsequent national legislative elections of 2017 ("Volby do Poslanecké sněmovny Parlamentu," n.d.).

1.5 The Respondents

As I show in further detail in the present section, the five women featured in this thesis play (or played) an important role in the Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement. I discuss the selection process more in detail in the chapter on methodology. My choice to classify all five activists as

belonging to one movement that I call the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement is in no way meant to erase the ideological differences between them, and I try to do justice to their particular views and their differences throughout this thesis. I present them as belonging to one movement, even if only three of them, Volfová, Samková, Hrindová were part of the BPI while Hašková and Hrušková were closer to the extreme right group *Národní Demokracie*.

Despite the distance that the BPI tried to keep with the extreme right, the BPI's leader Martin Konvička did on one occasion speak at a demonstration organised by Hašková, as she says in the interview. Moreover, Hašková says that she was part of Hrindová's group *Naštvané Matky* ('Angry Mothers') for a while. Thus, while Jana Yngland Hrušková is close to Hašková, speaking and singing the national anthem at her demonstrations, she is the only one who had no close relation to the BPI. Nevertheless, there is still enough common ideological ground between Hrušková and a group like the *Naštvané Matky* that both of them supported Okamura's SPD for the 2017 legislative elections. Thus, despite organisational differences, they have enough ideological similarities to be seen as belonging to one movement. In the present section, I briefly present the activists based on the interviews, unless otherwise indicated.

1.5.1 Eva Hrindová and the Naštvané Matky

She was born in 1966. Hrindová became known to the wider public in 2015 with the founding of the Facebook group *Naštvané Matky* ('Angry Mothers'), which now has over 40,000 Facebook followers. Already active in politics in the mainstream right-wing political party *Občanská demokratická strana* ('Civic Democratic Party', hereafter ODS) in the 1990s and 2000s, including as parliamentary assistant in the 2000s, Hrindová then left party politics and stayed active as a blogger, before losing interest in public affairs. She was drawn back into them through the anti-Islam activism of Martin Konvička on Facebook, with whom she was already acquainted. She

gained more visibility after February 2015, when she wrote a blog post calling for the union of 'angry mothers' against what she saw as the ills of the time, including Islam, leading to the creation of the Facebook group *Naštvané Matky*, now a registered organisation. She has more than 4,000 followers on Facebook (Hrindová, n.d.).

1.5.2 Jana Volfová

She was born in 1957. After 1989, she started in politics in the mainstream left-wing *Česká strana sociální demokracie* ('Czech Social Democratic Party', ČSSD) and was elected to the national parliament in 1998 as her party won the elections. In reaction to Prime Minister Miloš Zeman's (the current president) all-male 27-member strong cabinet, she protested by creating the women's shadow government and advocated for more female participation in Czech politics. In the late 2000s, disappointed by the EU accession, she left the ČSSD and was active in smaller anti-EU political parties, becoming the head of 'Česká Suverenita' ('Czech Sovereignty') in 2014. As mentioned earlier, this was one of the first parties to profess anti-Islam ideas and she attracted media attention by appearing dressed in a burqa in a television spot for the 2014 EU elections, in which her party gained only 0,13% of votes ("Volby do Evropského parlamentu v," n.d.). In 2015, she was involved in the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement and became the vice-president of the BPI, where she remains active. She has around a thousand followers on Facebook (Volfová, n.d.).

1.5.3 Lucie Hašková

She was born in 1992. Hašková started to organise demonstrations against the government and its migration policy in August 2015 because "she gave birth to a little boy and found out about the islamisation of Europe⁴". She started organising demonstrations in Prague almost every month,

⁴ All the material written by the activists and the interviews are in Czech and all translations are mine.

often in collaboration with the extreme right fringe political party *Národní Demokracie* ('National Democracy'). In her words, she was trying to unite all the "nationalist (*národovecký*⁵)" groups. She then founded the organisation *Za naši kulturu a bezpečnou zem* ('For our culture and safe land'), but was disappointed to see the continuous internal quarrels on the "nationalist (*národovecká*) scene". While she is still the organisation's head, she says that she stopped her activism in 2017 because of the lack of results and the pressures of opponents. She has almost 2,000 followers on Facebook (Hašková, n.d.).

1.5.4 Jana Yngland Hrušková

Born in 1959. As a singer, Yngland Hrušková had some success before 1989, but she then spent 23 years in Norway and Germany, before coming back to Czechia. Although she calls herself a 'celebrity' on her professional Facebook page, she actually became more famous for her involvement in the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement. She was not involved in politics before finding out "by coincidence" on Facebook that an anti-Islam / anti-refugee demonstration was taking place in Prague in 2015. She went and then later on the same day posted her first Facebook video in support of the movement. She started to pronounce speeches and sing the national anthem at the demonstrations organised by Lucie Hašková. In 2017, she announced her intention to run for president, before later on withdrawing and supporting the incumbent, Miloš Zeman. She describes herself as an "activist-patriot" (*aktivistka patriotka*). She has more than 6,000 followers on Facebook (Yngland Hrušková, n.d.).

1.5.5 Klara Samková

⁵ Hašková uses the word *národovecký* instead of the word *nacionalistický*. Although both words are translated in English as nationalist, *národovecký* is more about the 'people' and does not have the same negative connotation.

Born in 1963. She is a Doctor of Law and a practising lawyer. She got involved in politics after 1989 in the wake of the state socialist regime's fall and describes herself as a "political person" who was always active in some way. While she does not describe her political path in the interview, it is useful to say that she was in the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly between 1990 and 1992 as part of the Roma Citizen Initative, and actively advocated for the rights of the Roma population although she is not one of them ("Klara Samková," n.d.). In 2010, she became municipal councillor for the liberal right-wing TOP 09 party and wanted to run for president in 2013, falling short of the necessary number of signatures to do so ("Klara Samková," n.d.). She then switched to Okamura's populist radical right party *Úsvit* in 2014 and then got involved in the BPI in 2015 ("Klara Samková," n.d.). She has almost 17,000 followers on Facebook (Samková, n.d.).

CHAPTER 2 - NATIONALISM, WOMEN & FEMINISM

Considering my focus on the way nation, race, gender and sexuality intersect in discourses of the Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement, and on the way women and women's rights are involved in such movements, my thesis is anchored in previous discussions on gender and nationalism, on feminism and nationalism, and on women's involvement in nationalist movements. In the first section, I review the way feminist scholarship has dealt with the topic of gender in nationalism. I then review the way scholars have explored link between feminism and nationalism. In Section 2.3, I focus on scholarship on women's role in right-wing nationalist movements. Finally, I look at the way scholarship has evolved towards a more complex understanding of women and nationalism, especially in relation to the increase of anti-Islam and Islamophobic sentiments.

2.1 Heterosexist Nationalism and Women

Starting in the 1980s, the role of gender and sexuality in nationalist politics has come under greater scrutiny. George Mosse's (1985) groundbreaking contribution thus insisted on the way Western European nationalisms have gone hand in hand with the imposition of a particular gender and sexual order. Further feminist scholarship increasingly started to look at the way nationalist politics construct gender and sexuality. Among others, they have argued that nationalism's insistence on the reproduction of the nation has often bolstered the confinement of women in a childbearing and childrearing role (Iveković & Mostov, 2004; McClintock, 1993). Moreover, scholars have shown the way in which women figure in nationalist discourses as those (re)producing the boundaries of the nation, and even embodying them (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989; Iveković & Mostov, 2004). This often gives a political dimension to sexual violence, when men of different nations turn

women's bodies into physical and symbolic battlefields (Das, 1995; Žarkov, 2007). According to this logic, the national woman's body and sexuality are to be controlled and protected at the same time (Massad, 1995; Iveković & Mostov, 2004). This has led most scholars to see nationalism as intrinsically patriarchal and even "heterosexist", i.e. establishing a relationship of domination of heterosexual men on women and non-heterosexuals (Peterson, 1999).

Seeing the nationalist project as heterosexist does not mean that the aforementioned scholars fail to mention that women were and are part of nationalist movements (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989), but this contribution is mostly seen as limited to the private sphere of child-bearing and child-rearing, with women "relegated to mainly supporting roles" (Nagel, 2003, p. 159). Moreover, while the women can actively participate in the cultural and political life of the nation, they are seen as secondary, as "denied any direct relation to national agency" (McClintock, 1993, p.62). Finally, these works tend to underline the negative outcomes for these female participants. Indeed, Nagel claims that they often "find themselves once again under the thumb of institutionalized patriarchy once national independence is won" (Nagel, 1998, p.253) and Yuval-Davis remarks that "so-called 'national liberation' has often just brought further oppression to women" (2008, p. 113). In these works, the participation of women in nationalism is thus often depicted as rather secondary and/or self-defeating.

When these works do try to explain the paradox of women under nationalism as either passively or actively participating in their own submission, they do not usually provide satisfactory answers. Besides the widespread idea that these women are lacking 'consciousness' (Yuval-Davis, 2008, p. 119) or suffering from 'false consciousness' (Andrews, 2002), more recent works have brought new interpretations. Rada Iveković and Julie Mostov explain women's participation by their fragile position, a sort of 'double-bind' coercing women into conforming rather than "dangling unprotected between the borders of national communities" (2004, p. 14). While V. Spike Peterson does provide a more refined explanation, locating gender and nation within several "axes of power", she ultimately sees women's participation in the nation as the result of a "'rational'" calculus because "the 'success' of elite groups typically involves benefits for women within these groups" (1999, p. 53). Both arguments are unsatisfactory, though, with Iveković and Mostov's reproducing the problematic image of the woman victim and Peterson turning nationalism into a strategic choice, akin to Kandiyoti's idea of the 'patriarchal bargain' (1988). These ideas about consciousness, compulsion and strategy miss an important point about the way nationalism is deeply rooted in our understanding of the world (Billig, 1995, pp. 4-5), and that it is thus hardly surprising that many, if not most women conform to it.

2.2 Feminism and Nationalism

One of the ways in which the association of women with nationalism has been complicated was through the growing challenge of Western White feminism by Black Western and Third World feminists. Indeed, they challenged the way in which White women, feminists or not, participated in the oppression of Blacks in Western countries (hooks, 1981) and reproduced colonial discourses on Third World women as oppressed and submissive (Mohanty, 1984). Because White feminists insisted on the need of all women to fight 'patriarchy' above all, they were often at odds with feminists from colonial and post-colonial countries, who insisted on combating racism and gaining national independence (Yuval-Davis, 2008, p. 117). According to Yuval-Davis, this divide came from the fact that western feminists take their own national space for granted and their recognition within it for granted, unlike Third World women (2008, p. 117). Thanks to this growing challenge, more nuanced views of the link between nationalism and feminism appeared (Yuval-Davis, 2008, p. 118).

Thus, starting with Kumari Jayawardena's book 'Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World' (1986), the link between feminism and nationalism began to be increasingly discussed. It was followed by other works discussing the concept of 'feminist nationalism' with regard to nationalist struggles happening elsewhere in the world, including in the Western world, such as in Québec or Northern Ireland (West (ed.), 1997). Although West's volume underlines the emancipatory potential of nationalism for women, it does so only in the framework of anti-colonial nationalism. Indeed, she identifies only three contexts in which nationalism can be also be feminist: in the anticolonial struggle, in the former colonies fighting neo-colonialism, and in the quest for identity rights (West, 1997, pp. xxx-xxxi). Similarly, Herr (2003) sees the merits of feminist nationalism for the creation and maintenance of nation-states standing up to (neo-)colonialism, but only in the Third World. These works thus make a difference between 'good' kinds of nationalisms, such as anti-colonial nationalism, and 'bad' kinds, such as Western state-led nationalism. While they make some progress in nuancing the idea according to which feminism stands in opposition to nationalism, these works tend to discard the possibility of feminists to participate in 'bad', i.e. right-wing nationalism⁶.

Thus, looking at Western Europe, Gisela Kaplan (1997) sees the 19th century Italian *Risorgimento* and early 20th century Finnish nationalism as "the $only^7$ two examples in (western) European history where a confluence of feminism⁸ and nationalism has occurred" (Kaplan, 1997, p. 4). She then comments on the wave of countries granting the right to vote to women in the inter-war period, also mentioning Czechoslovakia, in the following way: "It is unlikely that *any* feminists of that

⁶ Albeit an imperfect term, I use 'right-wing nationalism' in contrast to the aforementioned 'good', anti-colonial nationalisms, to designate all nationalist movements which have a rather exclusionary or racist understanding of the nation.

⁷ Emphasis in citations is always in the original

⁸ While the use of the word 'feminism' and 'feminist' is disputable when discussing 19th century and early 20th century European politics, I use it here because Kaplan does.

period would have considered themselves nationalistic" (p. 20). Kaplan seems to forget that before 1918, many Central European women fought for both women's rights and national independence (for Czechia, see Malečková, 2016). While Central and East European examples might fall under the category of the 'good', anti-colonial 'state-seeking' nationalism, Kaplan also displays are refusal to link feminism with the interwar right-wing nationalism (Kaplan, p. 22). Kaplan is either unaware of the way in which some feminists collaborated with these regimes (for example, 'Latin feminism' under Mussolini (De Grazia, 1992, p. 249)), or is suggesting that feminists ceased to be feminists as soon as they engage in collaboration with right-wing forms of nationalism.

The absurdity of Kaplan's claims comes to light when looking at the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Indeed, it is hard to defend the thesis that those women active in Yugoslav feminist movements in the 1980s suddenly ceased to be feminists when they decided to side with right-wing nationalists during the war. However, there is still unease in associating feminists with these violent wars involving ethnic cleansing. For example, in the aforementioned volume edited by West (1997), Jill Benderly builds a narrative of women and feminists resisting the war in Yugoslavia (1997, pp. 59-74). When it comes to Croatian feminists who sided with right-wing nationalists, they are presented as having been forced by the circumstances to a position Benderly first calls "patriotic", only to finally grudgingly concede in her conclusion that it was "a sort of feminist nationalism, the patriotism of the victimized" (Benderly, 1997, p.71). Thus, Benderly only uses 'feminist nationalism' once in the text, and excuses it with notions of patriotism and victimhood. This idea of 'patriotism' is misleading, as it obscures, and excuses, women's (and men's) nationalism.

While all of these discussions did bring some long-awaited complexity to the issue of feminism and nationalism, the focus on 'good' nationalism fails to provide answers about feminists (and women in general) in right-wing nationalist movements, and the way feminism and right-wing nationalism can interact. Moreover, the focus on 'good' nationalisms lacks in critical engagement with the processes of inclusion and exclusion inherent to all nationalisms, and thus obscures the way in which state-seeking nationalism also engages in ethnic/racist exclusionary practices. In general, the incomplete picture of the involvement of women in nationalism is best explained by Dubravka Žarkov as the:

general feminist uneasiness with women's participation in the politics that can be characterized as right-wing: nationalist, racist, or religious fundamentalist movements, communal violence, or terrorist actions. It seems that the feminist discourse of male oppression of women is ill equipped for perceiving women active in right-wing political groups and militant movements (2007, p. 220).

Thus, there has been a lack of scholarly interest for the way in which women and feminists can be involved in chauvinistic, racist and/or imperial forms of nationalism, whether they are state-seeking or state-led, and a lack of scrutiny for the way many women condone, encourage and commit these things (Žarkov, 2007, p. 217). Finally, as I discuss further in Section 2.4, these works do not engage with the possibility that the link between feminism and nationalism could be challenging existing assumptions about nationalism as inherently heterosexist.

2.3 Women in Right-Wing Nationalist Movements

While the focus of women's and feminists' involvement in nationalism has mostly rested on these 'good' nationalisms, a growing body of work has come to complete the picture. Thus, while there is still too little written about women in right-wing nationalist groups, there has been compelling works on women involved in extreme right nationalist movements. Indeed, there has been groundbreaking scholarship exposing the full extent of women's past role in the extreme right,

such as Koonz (1986) on women in National-Socialist Germany and Blee (1991) on female members of the 1920s Ku Klux Klan in the United States (1991). While these authors do not deny the extent of women's subordination to men in these movements, they nevertheless show that these women were not simply inactive and submissive.

Concerning contemporary movements, the challenge to Western feminist views on women's involvement came from scholars from or working on South Asia. As Dubravka Žarkov underlines, these scholars showed already in the 1990s how female participants use nationalist movements' gender stereotypes to act in the public sphere and how they also participate in intercommunal violence, thus seriously questioning assumptions about violence being a male phenomenon and about women in such movements as being manipulated by men (Žarkov, 2007, p. 226). Finally, compilations of studies covering a wide array of regions and epochs have contributed to this critical reappraisal of women's role in (ultra)nationalism, and in right-wing politics in general (Baccheta & Power (eds.), 2002; Blee & McGee Deutsch (eds.), 2012).

Outside of feminist scholarship, scholars in the field of political sociology also started to gain an interest in gender, albeit only recently. Cas Mudde thus notes that the first publication on the topic of gender in what he calls 'populist radical right political parties' appeared in a major academic journal only in 2004 (Mudde, 2007, p. 90). While Mudde gives a good overview of the state of the field in mainstream academia, he largely dismisses the wide body of feminist scholarship as a "limited and largely homogeneous subfield" (p. 92) whose views are "highly ideological" (p. 113). He thus ignores the numerous debates among feminist scholars, including challenges to commonly-held assumptions about women as immune to the radical right.

In the last two decades, feminist scholars have thus engaged with the issue of women's engagement in radical right nationalist movements and mainstream scholars from different fields have gained interest. Albeit working more parallel to each other than together, they have started to challenge the image of the peace-loving, tolerant woman. They have also questioned previous assumptions about women's subjectivity and agency being limited to a feminist framework, and have rather moved towards an understanding that "nation, ethnicity, and womanhood are not mutually exclusive realms in women's lives and that women – feminist or not – do claim not only an ethnic diversity but also nationalism as *their own*⁹ project" (Žarkov, 2007, p. 218). The insights provided by the aforementioned scholarship are essential in order to understand the participation of women in groups such as the Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement.

2.4 Feminism, Nationalism and anti-Muslim sentiments

While they provide powerful insights on the relation between nationalism and gender, some of the previously cited classical works have to be revisited in order to incorporate the aforementioned insights on women, feminism and nationalism. Indeed, not only do assumptions about women's involvement in nationalism need to be revisited, but so does nationalism's alleged heterosexist essence. Indeed, recent contributions have questioned this absolute heterosexism, especially in the present Western context (but not only) marked by an increase in anti-Islam and Islamophobic discourses. Thus, analyses show how nationalist discourses focusing on the alleged sexism and homophobia of Muslims (and non-Europeans or non-Westerners in general) have led to more inclusive representations of some homosexuals and some women, so-called 'homonationalism' (Puar, 2007) and 'femonationalism' (Farris, 2012). These two concepts are particularly enlightening to understand contemporary changes in Western nationalism and their implications for views on gender and sexuality.

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⁹ All emphasis in citations are in the original

These works build on earlier scholarship from the 1980s, when scholars pointed out the way in which the stigma against biological racism in many Western countries gave birth to a 'new racism' (Barker, 1981) emphasizing cultural differences. In the context of advances towards gender equality and growing tolerance towards non-heterosexuals in some Western countries, those issues have been increasingly used against Muslims and other foreigners (Fekete, 2006). This is especially true for Muslims, who have been facing increased intolerance, so-called Islamophobia, in the context of a spiral of violence involving Western military interventions in Muslim-majority countries and Islamist terrorist attacks around the world (Green, 2015). Needless to say, many of these stereotypes such as the aforementioned one of the oppressed Third World woman (Mohanty, 1991) have a longer history and are rooted in early colonial discourses on Muslims and the Middle-East, such as 'orientalism' (Said, 1978).

In addition to 'homonationalism', the concept Jasbir Puar (2007) invented to explain how U.S. American nationalistic rhetoric became more open to some homosexuals in the face of the so-called 'War on Terror' targeting Muslims, Sara R. Farris came up with 'femonationalism' (2012). With this concept, she addresses the way the women's rights are increasingly used against Muslim and non-European men by various socio-political and economic actors in France, the Netherlands and Northern Italy. Farris shows how far right¹⁰ political parties, some feminists and neoliberals hold converging views attacking Muslim men as dangerous misogynists and presenting Muslim women as victims to be rescued (p. 4). Through such discourses, not only is racism gendered (the evil Muslim/foreign man vs. the rescuable Muslim/foreign woman), but sexism is also racialised (sexism is cast as the problem of foreigners, usually Muslims) (p. 75). While this makes the

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¹⁰ Despite my use of 'radical right populist' and 'extreme right', I use here 'far right' because Farris does.

Muslim/foreign woman somewhat acceptable, it demonises the Muslim/foreign man and labels him as the sexist, thereby erasing the white European man's sexism.

Although Farris' conceptualisation of femonationalism as a particular convergence of the far right, feminists and neoliberals is highly interesting thanks to its analysis of both political and socioeconomical dimensions, its idiosyncrasy makes it impossible to use in Czechia. Indeed, the rarity of strong feminist voices voicing Islamophobic opinions and the lack of an economical dimension (due to the quasi-absence of Muslims) makes an orthodox application of femonationalism in Czechia impossible. Nevertheless, I use her insights on the sexualisation of racism and the racialisation of sexism (Farris, 2017, pp. 73-77) to better understand the way in which the refugee/migrant/Muslim is represented in Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee discourses.

In my thesis, I draw from the aforementioned scholarship to better understand the role of gender and sexuality in nationalist (re)constructions of belonging and foreignness articulated by the Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement. Thus, these works help me understand the way the refugee/migrant/Muslim is gendered, racialised and sexualised, and the way his exclusion is built around issues of gender and sexuality. Finally, these works offer powerful insights to better understand the way in which women activists get actively involved in this movement.

CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY & RESEARCH DESIGN

The goal of my thesis is to understand how the Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement's discourses of national/ethnic/racial/religious inclusion and exclusion rely on gender and sexuality; what is the role of the issues of sexism and sexual violence in these discourses; and how the respondents make sense of their involvement. I show how the selected women activists in the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement establish differences with refugees/migrants/Muslims and Islam based on gender and gendered issues, with a special focus on sexism, sexuality and sexual violence. In order to do so, I use the theoretical insights provided by scholarship on nation, race and gender, and by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 2003; Wodak, 1997). For my analysis, I draw on material made publicly available on the Internet by the respondents and from the interviews I have realised with each of them. In the present chapter, I first discuss how I understand some of the key concepts used in the present work and explain how CDA helps analyse their (re)articulations. I then move on to explain how I selected the activists, how I collected the data and how I realised the interviews. Doing so, I also dwell on my positionality as the researcher.

3.1 Nation, Race and Gender

In my research, I take a constructivist approach to the nation, seeing it as a delimited, 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983), which is discursively constructed (Wodak et al., 1999) and in continual development (Hall, 1996). Importantly for this project, this belonging is seen as (re)produced through maintaining boundaries against 'Other(s)' (Barth, 1969). Moreover, the present work draws on feminist scholarship, which highlights the importance of gender and

sexuality in national identity (re)production, especially when it comes to setting and maintaining boundaries against 'Other(s)' (Mosse, 1985; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989).

While the nation is the prime analytical concept used in the present work, I follow the insights of Anthias & Yuval-Davis (1995), who make some distinctions between the concepts of nation, ethnicity, race, and religion, but insist on their contextual characters (p.3). Indeed, belonging to a nation can be based on ideas of ethnicity, race and/or religion (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1995, p. 4), just like members of a religious community can be racialised, i.e. presented as belonging to a race, regardless of actual beliefs (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1995, p. 53 & 55). For example, 'Muslim' was a nationality category for Slavic Muslims in Yugoslavia (Žarkov, 2001, p. 70) and so was 'Jew' in the Soviet Union (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1995, p. 4). Therefore, rather than accepting the existence of reified races, I look at "race' and "race relations" are ideological notions which are used to both construct and negotiate social relations" (Miles, cited in Kushner, 2005, p. 208). Thus, I scrutinise the way in which these different concepts are used, and sometimes used interchangeably, in discourses and practices of inclusion and exclusion, along with gender and class (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1995, p. 3).

In accordance with these theoretical insights, it is important to note that racism has undergone changes in the last decades. Thus, in many Western countries, the shift away from biological racism, discredited by colonialism and Nazism, has led to new forms of racism based on culture, often termed 'new racism' (Barker 1981, Solomos 1989). In her take on the issue, Verena Stolcke calls it 'cultural fundamentalism' and writes that it operates as a "rhetoric of inclusion and exclusion that emphasizes the distinctiveness of cultural identity" (Stolcke, 1995, p. 2), with culture "conceived as a compact, bounded, localized, and historically rooted set of traditions and values transmitted through the generations" (Stolcke, 1995, p. 4). While it does not mean that the idea of 'race' is completely discarded, nor that this 'new racism' avoids judgements of superiority and inferiority, it more often underlines the natural incompatibility of different cultures (Stolcke, 1995, p.4-5).

Drawing on these remarks on the multifaceted characters of race and racism, it is easier to analyse the way in which current stereotypes about Islam and Muslims constitute a form of racism called 'Islamophobia', a term that gained prominence after 1997 (Green, 2015, p.9). As Todd H. Green a leading scholar on the matter explains, Islamophobia as "hatred, hostility, and fear of Islam and Muslims, and the discriminatory practices that result" is not only about religion (Green, 2015, p.9). Indeed, he remarks that Muslims are often racialised (as Arabs in France, or Pakistanis in England) and thus targeted by Islamophobia whether they are religious or not (Green, 2015, p.28). Moreover, Islamophobia often treats Islam and Muslims as one culture and subjects them to the aforementioned 'new racism' or 'cultural fundamentalism'. I use this broad understanding of Islamophobia in my analysis.

I focus on the use of these concepts in combination with gender as dynamic processes (re)producing boundaries. Indeed, national, ethnic, racial and/or religious constructions delimit the boundaries of belonging by involving particular ideas on gender and sexuality (Peterson, 1999). Central to such constructions are ideals of masculinity and femininity, and male and female sexual behaviour (Mosse, 1985). This does not mean that gender and sexualities participate in such constructions on an equal footing, though (Peterson, 1999). Quite on the contrary, taking the example of national belonging, it has historically been heavily marked by ideals of masculinity and femininity, with men envisioned as leading the way, and often subjugating women and non-heterosexual men in the process (Nagel, 2003, p. 159). Thus, belonging does not only define ideals

of masculinity and femininity, and of sexual behaviour, but also relations of power between these gender and sexuality categories (Peterson, 1999).

While certain national ideas of masculinity have historically advocated for the protection, and even control of the nation's women by the nation's men, and the repression of non-heterosexuals (Mosse, 1985; Peterson, 1999; Nagel, 2003), this should not be seen in absolute terms. Indeed, as developments discussed in the preceding chapter have shown, national articulations of gender and sexuality differ depending on the context. Thus, the present work focuses on the way the nation, and other forms of belonging, are discursively (re)constructed through certain "notions of masculinity and femininity, and norms of (hetero)sexuality" (Žarkov, 2007, p. 8). The goal is to understand how discourses of national/ethnic/racial/religious inclusions and exclusions rely on gender and sexuality, what kind of hierarchies they are setting, and how the respondents situate themselves within this order.

3.2 Discourse

Considering the present work's understanding of the social world as largely constructed through discourses, I use the insights of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse the discourse, or discourses, in my selected material. CDA is an approach theorised and developed by Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak and, while it does not claim that the whole social world exists only through discourses, it does insist on discourses' importance in the (re)production of society (Fairclough, 2003, p.2). Although a discourse can be understood as a simple social interaction, like a political speech, I use it in the sense of a more or less coherent set of ideas expressed through texts, written or oral (Wodak, 1997, p.5). Based on the idea that discourses are constituted by – and also constitute – society, CDA also focuses on questions of power and ideology, on the way

discourses (re)produce and challenge power relations supporting particular ideological structures (Wodak, 1997, p.7).

Ultimately, the broader goal of such an analysis is to look at the way the texts serve difference, the universal and the particular, and ideology (Fairclough, p.40). Indeed, through their assumptions and claims, texts establish differences, such as social identities like 'Czech' or 'Muslim', for example. These claims also fight to establish what is particular and what is universal, trying to impose a hegemonic discourse on who the refugee is, for example (Fairclough, p.40-41). Finally, by establishing those differences and universals, these claims serve an ideology, whether nationalism, liberalism, or something else (Fairclough, p.41). To put it concisely, CDA aims to understand the ideological work 'done' by texts.

3.3 Selection

The activists were chosen according to their gender and online popularity. While the focus of this thesis is on female activists, two of the most prominent male activists are also briefly included in order to provide a comparison in the short quantitative analysis. Considering the importance of Facebook in diffusing anti-refugee material, this social media platform serves as the barometer of an activist's popularity. Thus, the activists were chosen according to their number of followers on Facebook.

In the preliminary stage, I found six women active in the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement enjoying a substantial following on Facebook (more than a thousand 'likes' or 'followers'). Unfortunately, one of them had to be left out because multiple Facebook bans and blockings left too little written material to analyse and she did not respond to requests for an interview. This left the five women presented in the previous chapter, who all met me for an interview. In addition to the online posts and interviews with the five women, I decided to also include into the quantitative and qualitative analyses the Facebook group page of the *Naštvané Matky*, because Eva Hrindová, is its founder and head.

Finally, the two male activists, Martin Konvička and Petr Hampl, were selected because they were the two main public figures of IvČRN and of the grass-roots anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement in general. Their online following also reflects this popularity, even though Martin Konvička's personal Facebook account was deleted in January 2016 (Cápová, 2016) and his following on his new Facebook page has not recovered. He now has a bit more than 2,000 followers, while Petr Hampl has almost 4,000.

3.4 Collection of Online Data

When it comes to the first body of material, I collected publicly available social media information from the selected women's Facebook accounts or blogs, depending on availability. While I focused on the personal accounts, assuming that I might find more personal comments, I made the pragmatic choice of choosing Hrušková's public page, because it is the one she uses to express her socio-political views. In choosing between Lucie Hašková's two personal Facebook accounts, I selected the one with the most activity during the selected period.

I selected the months of December 2015 and January 2016 in order to compare the saliency of the issue of sexuality, and more especially the issue of sexual crimes committed by migrants/refugees/Muslims before and after the mass sexual assaults in Cologne and elsewhere on New Year's Eve 2015/2016. For this timespan, I also included the two male activists, in order to make a comparison, albeit strictly for the quantitative analysis. I then looked at the way the selected women and the *Naštvané Matky* have reacted to the #MeToo campaign from its start in October 2017 to the end of February 2018, because reactions were sparse and sometimes belated.

For the quantitative analysis, I counted each of the selected persons' and the group's Facebook or blog posts published online in December 2015 and January 2016, and identified the topic of each of them. For all the posts on the topic of sexuality and sexual crimes, I collected the text from the post itself, the accompanying image, if any, and the text from the accompanying link, if any. For the qualitative analysis, I analysed all publicly available Facebook and blog posts on the issue of sexuality and sexual crimes posted online by the selected women and the *Naštvané Matky* in December 2015 and January 2016. This totalled 25 posts. I added the posts about #MeToo, although there was a lot less data available. For this particular event, the interviews were thus a crucial addition.

While public personality and group pages allow all users to access all of the content posted, personal Facebook pages let their owner adjust the level of privacy of each post. Since I am not 'Facebook friends' with any of the selected activists, I only have access to their publicly available content. While this somewhat restricts access to the selected activists' views, it does not hinder the present thesis's goal, which is to look at the kind of material diffused by the activists for the wider public. As the analysis of such personal pages show, the activists widely use their personal pages for public communication and post a lot of content without any privacy restriction. Moreover, the interviews with the selected women have aimed to complete the picture.

In addition to the issue of privacy, the use of Facebook as a source also has some pitfalls considering the present work's focus on controversial ideas. Indeed, some of the Facebook posts might have been removed by Facebook's administration because of their controversial character as breaching the platform's rules, and cannot be retroactively accessed. During the interviews, several of the respondents did mention having had content removed by Facebook and/or having seen their account temporary blocked (Hašková, Hrindová, Volfová). While none of the

respondents has mentioned removing content, Hrindová did say that she has become very cautious in what she posts to avoid being blocked.

3.5 Interviews

The five respondents were contacted through Facebook and I did not specify my department nor my university, considering the existing negative stereotypes towards Central European University as the 'Soros university' and towards gender studies. While George Soros is yet to become the 'boogie man' he is in Hungary and Slovakia, marginal groups gravitating around the Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement are starting to target him. Similarly, gender studies and so-called 'gender ideology' are increasingly attacked by right-wing groups such as the ones I am studying (Kováts & Põim, 2015). Thus, disclosing my academic affiliation right at the beginning could have either closed the door to me or radically changed interview dynamics. Of course, when one of the respondents asked for this information, as one of them did, I provided it and this did not create problems.

All the interviews were held in Czech and took place in April and May 2018 in Prague or Olomouc. The respondents showed readiness to talk with me and were forthcoming in agreeing on a meeting time and place. While I had asked for half an hour, the respondents were rather eager to talk and I was the one who had to put an end to them. The interviews thus lasted from 50 minutes (Volfová) to 150 minutes (Samková). For my research, I chose semi-structured interviewing, because it has two crucial advantages. First, it allowed me "to scrutinize the semantic *context* of statements" (Blee & Taylor, p.94), the way certain ideas fitted within the respondent's wider discourses, such as the way views on refugees/migrants/Muslims and Islam interact with those on sexism. Secondly,

the semi-structured interview enabled me to hear how the respondent made sense of her social world and her role in it (Blee & Taylor, p.95).

The first part of my interview guide mostly involved biographical and general questions, which enabled me to learn more about the respondent while also building rapport (Yow, 2005, p.72). Thus, I started with a broad question, inquiring about the respondent's curriculum vitae, then moving on towards more precise questions about her engagement in social and political affairs and her usage of social media for activism. In the second part, I then moved into the topic of gender inequalities in the Czech public life. Finally, in the last part, I dove into more controversial matters, asking about my respondent's involvement in the movement, and their views on refugees/migrants/Muslims and Islam. This last part involved more intervention on my part. While the objective was no to debate, but rather to let my respondent express her views, I often felt compelled to draw attention to some contradictions and to express disagreement. Despite this and as far as I could determine, my respondents and I managed to keep a constructive and peaceful atmosphere.

3.6 Positionality

Despite the rather good atmosphere kept in the interviews, I must make some remarks on power dynamics. As a Western white male, I enjoy many privileges, including what I perceive as a certain deference in countries of Central and Eastern Europe such as Czechia. However, while I might have had gender and country of origin working for me in my relations with the respondents. I felt age and status worked in the respondents' favour. Indeed, as a younger man talking to the four respondents aged over 50, some of them with quite some political experience, I was sometimes patronised. Only the younger respondent, Lucie Hašková, who is in her early twenties, seemed less

confident, especially when I challenged her views. Furthermore, language might have also played a role, as all the interviews were in Czech, which is not my native language, thus giving the respondents a further advantage. Finally, since I was the one in need of the respondents' cooperation, it also gave them leverage. Thus, while there were certain power dynamics, I argue that it was a rather balanced, "two-way process" (Brannen, 1988, p. 554).

CHAPTER 4 - NYE IN COLOGNE: GENDERING AND SEXUALISING RACISM

In this chapter, I show the way in which the selected activists have reacted to the large-scale sexual assaults on New Year's Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne and elsewhere in Germany¹¹. Indeed, refugee/migrant/Muslim men were quickly accused of being the culprits and I analyse how the selected activists addressed such a case of sexual violence, especially in relation to gender, race and sexuality. In this chapter, I briefly present the way the Czech mainstream media reacted to the NYE assaults, the way the activists did, and finally the way in which they represented and recontextualised the events in their anti-Islam / anti-refugee discourses. I thus analyse the way the selected women activists have represented the NYE assaults online in January 2016 and I complete the picture with the statements collected during the 2018 oral interviews.

In the present thesis, I analyse the role of gender and sexuality in the establishment of difference, linked with processes of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, I look at the way the NYE assaults are recontextualised to (re)construct a universal image of the refugee/migrant/Muslim as a young man with a particular sexuality wreaking havoc in Western Europe and threatening (White) Czech/European women. In this chapter, I thus analyse how the activists shape this catastrophic image of Western Europe, how they present the refugees/migrants/Muslims as a homogeneous group of dangerous young males, how they gender (and racialise) the victims, how they racialise the refugee/migrant/Muslim, and how they endow him with a particular, 'Muslim sexuality'.

¹¹ I hereafter refer to the sexual and non-sexual assaults committed in Cologne and elsewhere on New Year's Eve 2015/2016 as the 'NYE assaults'.

Throughout the chapter, I show how this establishment of differences is linked to the activists' ideological agenda.

4.1 The NYE Assaults

In early January 2016, reports about mass sexual assaults on women in Cologne and other German cities during the New Year's Eve celebrations started emerging and often designated male refugees/migrants/Muslims as the culprits. While it is beyond the scope of the present work to analyse in detail the way the NYE assaults were shaped into an event that could be easily referred to in Czechia, an overview of online articles from the mainstream Czech media provides some clues. Thus, while the online portal of the liberal newspaper Lidové noviny titled its January 6 article "'We won't allow violence in Germany,' Merkel condemns the NYE assaults on 90 women" (",Násilí v Německu nedovolíme.' Merkelová," 2016) and the website of the public Česká televize titled a January 7 article "Sexual assaults in Germany: the police checked a hundred men on NYE – mainly Syrians" ("Sexuální útoky v Německu: Policie," 2016), other media were much more explicit. Indeed, on January 5, the popular daily Mladá Fronta Dnes wrote, "Gangs of foreigners groped women and robbed, the government is terrified" (Bělka, 2016) and the tabloid Blesk wrote "Arabs and Africans groped German women in groups! There are about 100 victims" ("Arabové a Afričané o Silvestru," 2016). Thus, while some mainstream media showed a bit of restrain, others were quick to publish sensationalist articles pointing their fingers at refugees/migrants/Muslims. This was bolstered by accusations that the German authorities and public media had covered up the events, as some Czech media reported on January 8 (e.g. "O silvestrovském násilí jsme informovali ...," 2016).

4.2 Timing and Frequency of Online Reactions

While the NYE assaults were first reported in Czechia on an online portal on January 4 ("Kolín nad Rýnem čelil na," 2016), where "immigrants" (*přistěhovalci*) are identified as the culprits, the first post from the selected activists is a blog entry by Jana Yngland Hrušková on January 5 (05/01). Others reacted on January 7 or later. The most active were the *Naštvané Matky*, who wrote eight posts linked to the events, out of 27 posts written between January 5 and January 31, 2016. In January, Yngland Hrušková also mentioned the NYE assaults regularly in her blog posts, in five out of 12. Eva Hrindová and Lucie Hašková each wrote three posts linked to the NYE assaults, while Jana Volfová only reacted once. While it is not technically possible to have a full overview of Klara Samková's blogging activity, she did post twice on the NYE assaults. This rather modest activity is in stark contrast with the two selected men, Martin Konvička and Petr Hampl, who posted 35 and 14 times respectively in reactions to the events, and it is difficult to understand why. A wider analysis would be necessary to see whether this gendered difference in focus was only true for the NYE assaults or whether it concerns the issue of sexual violence in general.

When it comes to the period immediately preceding the NYE assaults, from December 1, 2015 to January 5, 2016, none of the selected activists published a lot of material on Facebook dealing with the issue of sexual crimes and sexuality. Thus, this gendered bias in the coverage of the issue of sexual violence, visible in January 2016, does not appear beforehand. Out of the 255 Facebook posts published in December 2015 and early January 2016, there are only two focusing on sexual violence and one on sexuality, one December 12 post from Petr Hampl and two posts by the *Naštvané Matky* from December 11 and December 30. Apart from that, sexual violence and sexuality is mentioned in longer posts, but only in passing: in three other posts by the *Naštvané Matky* (2015b, 2015c, 2016a) and in all three blog posts by Yngland Hrušková (2015; 2016a;

2016b). While sexual violence by refugees/migrants/Muslims, or their sexuality, did not seem to have been prime focuses before the NYE assaults, they were nevertheless routinely mentioned, often in long lists of alleged crimes by refugees/migrants/Muslims.

Overview of the Frequency of Online Publications by the Activists on Sexual Violence and

Activist	12/2015 &	Posts before NYE assaults	Posts after NYE assaults	sexual crimes and sexuality	Posts about sexual crimes and sexuality before NYE assaults	NYE assaults
Petr Hampl	144	78	66	15	1	14
Lucie Hašková	90	56	34	3	0	3
Eva Hrindová	66	26	40	3	0	3
Jana Hrušková	15	3	12	12	3	5
Martin Konvička	125	4	121	38	-	35
Naštvané Matky	101	74	27	16	5	8
Klara Samková	-	-	-	-	-	2
Jana Volfová	24	14	10	1	0	1

Sexuality, and on the NYE Assaults – December 2015 – January 2016

4.3 Chaos in Germany and Western Europe

In the activists' representations of the NYE assaults, what happened is more often portrayed as a process, an ongoing situation affecting Germany and other Western European countries, than as the events of one night. Thus, the rather imprecise way in which the event is described contributes to placing the NYE assaults within assumptions about the impact of the refugee crisis, and more generally non-European migration, on Western Europe. In these narratives, sexual violence is only

one element among others, but it is already present in several posts before the NYE assaults became international news.

Thus, a December 28 post preceding the NYE assaults published by the *Naštvané Matky* presents Sweden as "the dream of many migrants", which is now crumbling under the weight of refugees and immigrants (2015c). The post talks about 'no-go zones'¹² with Sharia law and about Swedish citizens buying firearms as the police is overwhelmed. In short, "Sweden is going towards anarchy, slowly but surely" (Naštvané Matky, 2015c). In this narrative of decay, sexual violence is only one element among others, and the post thus only mentions that "the number of rapes increased by an incredible 1472%" (Naštvané Matky, 2015c). While the post does not precise who the rapists are, it is implied that refugees/migrants are responsible and the reference to Sharia law suggests Muslims. analyse this collectivisation racialisation of that these are Ι and refugees/migrants/Muslims later on. Interestingly, the Naštvané Matky do not feel compelled to explain what they mean by 'no-go zones' (no go zóny) and 'Sharia law', as if their audience is already familiar with these terms evoking criminality and religious fundamentalism.

On January 3, before news about the NYE assaults emerged, Yngland Hrušková (2016a) also writes about Germany in such apocalyptical terms and extends the problem to other countries. She thus writes that the Germans "don't want to learn from events in Paris or from the situation in Sweden or Belgium." (Yngland Hrušková, 2016a). After the NYE assaults, she calls sexual harassment by "Arabs and North Africans" "a daily occurrence in Germany, Belgium, France and Sweden" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016d). In the same blog post, Yngland Hrušková places sexual

¹² This term was coined in 2006 by U.S. American scholar Daniel Pipes to describe allegedly dangerous urban zones in France, usually inhabited by people with an immigration background, and where the authorities were said not to be in full control (Pipes, 2015). While Pipes regretted having invented this term in 2013 after a visit to these zones, which he found rather normal (Pipes, 2015), it is now widely used in anti-immigration and anti-Islam discourses.

violence within a longer list of evil deeds by migrants/refugees/Muslims in Western Europe, such as "rape, kill, injure, sell drugs, rebel, etc." (2016d). In another blog post, she writes about the "wild deeds (*zvěrstva*) that are nowadays a daily occurrence in Europe" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016e) and later again she writes about "the whole European tragedy" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016i). In her words, refugees/migrants/Muslims are wreaking havoc across (Western) Europe by committing many crimes, including sexual ones.

In the interviews, the aforemonetioned 'no-go zones' come back in nightmarish visions of Western Europe. Thus, Volfová talked about having been harassed in "no-go zone" in Sweden for not wearing a burqa, and later on said "look at those no-go zones, it's not only in Sweden, it's everywhere" (Volfová, ,018). After mentioning that she lived in Norway, Yngland Hrušková explains that "in Norway, where a lot of those migrants, they just... they do drug delicts, they kill, in Oslo, right by the train station, these are just no-go zones" (Yngland Hrušková, 2018). Further on, she talks about Muslim men committing gang rapes in Sweden and describes the country as the "rape capital (*sic*) of the world" because of refugees/migrants/Muslims (Yngland Hrušková, 2018).

In addition to recontextualising the NYE assaults as part of a greater, terrible process, they also sometimes seem ongoing. Thus, Volfová's online reaction has no time nor place, and she uses the present: "it is completely obvious that Arab-looking men are sexually assaulting women" (Volfová, 2016). Similarly, in a January 17 post accompanying an article about some of refugees in Cologne distancing themselves from the assaults and publicly apologising, Hašková (2016) uses a similar representation: "Rape, steal, attack, kill.. Then make some stupid banner, give women some roses and all will be forgiven". There was no murder during the NYE assaults and it suggests they reframed within crimes that are larger narrative of committed a by migrants/refugees/Muslims. Thus, the representation of the NYE assaults without any temporal details helps recontextualising them in this narrative of continuous chaos.

In other reactions, the activists do not draw such a picture of chaos in Europe. Thus, Eva Hrindová and Klara Samková rather write and talk about Muslims and Islam in broader terms. Also, contrary to narratives of continuity, a January 17 post by Hrindová (2016) rather presents the NYE assaults as a "breaking point (*zlom*)", a special event that forces her opponents to change their mind. Similarly, the January 7 post on the NYE assaults by the *Naštvané Matky* (2016b) presents them as possibly the beginning of something bigger: "FEAR IS SPREADING IN GERMANY – WOMEN'S FEAR OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT, FEAR THAT IT WAS ONLY THE BEGINNING". The suggestion that the NYE assaults might be followed by other similar events and the insistence on the extraordinary and/or original character of the event is used to give it a wider scope and to warn about recurrences. In both cases, this representation is used to press for political action against refugee/migrants/Muslims in Czechia, as I show later.

While many of the selected activists draw gloomy portraits of the situation in Western Europe, sexual violence is not always a central element and often only figures within a longer list of problems brought about by refugees/migrants/Muslims. The issue of sexual violence becomes more salient in such narratives after the NYE assaults and it is sometimes presented as something new requiring political action. Before and after the NYE assaults, the activists' posts are often about more than just about Western Europe and foresee dire consequences if Czechia were to welcome refugees/migrants/Muslims. This, in return, is used in the Czech context to denounce Czech politicians and activists favourable to welcoming refugees (Hašková, 2016; Hrindová, 2016; Naštvané Matky, 2016b; Yngland Hrušková, 2016c).

4.4 The Dangerous Young Male Refugee/Migrant/Muslim

Within this wider recontextualisation of the events on New Year's Eve in Germany as a symptom of widespread problems in Western Europe and as a potential threat for Czechia, there is the central assumption that refugees/migrants/Muslims are a homogeneous and united group of dangerous young men. In representations of the NYE assaults, the attackers are designated interchangeably as "migrants" (Hrindová, 2016), "Muslim migrants" (Hrindova, 2016), "refugees" (Naštvané Matky, 2016b), "illegal immigrants" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016h), "illegal people" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016c), "illegal refugees" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016h), "young horny men" (Volfová, 2016), "immigrants" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016i), "Muslims" (Hrindová, 2016). This wide array of terms used interchangeably, sometimes in the same texts, are made to represent more than just refugees who recently arrived to Western Europe and the NYE assaults and are thus recontextualised in wider discourses on Muslim and non-European migrants, and their descendants.

In many posts talking about refugees/migrants/Muslims, the male gender is assumed rather than specified. In Czech, the generic masculine is widely used and it sometimes hides assumptions about the all-male character of the group (Valdrová, 2016, p.274). The usage of the generic masculine to designate refugees/migrants/Muslims thus needs to be scrutinised, but this assumed male gender is sometimes obvious. Thus, it is clear Hrindová is talking about men when she writes in reaction to the NYE assaults "Muslims in Europe are led to violence towards women by their upbringing. Islam leads them to despise women [...] migrants from Islamic countries do not have respect for women" (2016). In fact, in all the reactions to the NYE assaults, only Jana Volfová (2016) specifies the gender of the culprits and racialises them, writing about "Arab-looking men". Thus, throughout the reactions, the male gender is more often implied because of the topic of (sexual) assaults against women than made explicit.

Moreover, in the NYE assaults' representations, the way the culprits were generally portrayed in a rather abstract way contributes to creating this image of a homogeneous group of refugees/migrants/Muslims. This is not only done when terms are used interchangeably, as in Hrindová's jump from "Muslims in Europe" to "migrants from Islamic countries" (2016), or when the respondents jumped immediately from the NYE assaults to Islam in the interviews (Hrindová, 2018; Volfová, 2018; Samková, 2018), thus presenting all refugees/migrants as Muslims, and linking all Muslims to the refugees/migrants. Moreover, most reactions establish collective guilt by neglecting to use any determiners of quantity (such as 'some', 'many', 'a few') to talk about the attackers, thus reinforcing the image of the united and homogeneous group of dangerous young male refugee/migrant/Muslim.

In my interview with Hrindová (2018), she made similar broad generalisations and answers to my question about Muslim men by saying that "they are dangerous," but she was more nuanced when talking about the NYE assaults. Indeed, she talked about Muslims' sexual frustration as a cause of the assaults, but said that Muslims in Czechia are unlikely to behave like that (Hrindová, 2018). She contrasted them with Muslims brought up under the "strict form of Islam" in Muslim-majority countries (Hrindová, 2018). While she went on to make sweeping generalisations about all Muslims in 'Muslim' countries, it nevertheless shows that she does sometimes make nuances, at least in the interview, thus breaking up this idea of *the* refugee/migrant/Muslim.

When more precise figures about the NYE assaults are given, they help create an image of a largescale criminal and even terrorist organisation. Thus, Yngland Hrušková, writes about the NYE assaults as "MINIMUM 10 000 illegal immigrants organised a common 'ACTION'" or "10 000 refugees organise and commit criminal acts" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016i). This is similar to the thesis in the article shared by Klara Samková on her blog on January 19 (Samková, n.d.), in which the mass sexual assaults are analysed as an attack by the so-called Islamic State. In the interview, Lucie Hašková also described the NYE assaults as a "terrorist attack" (Hašková, 2018). This link between sexual assault and terrorism is also expressed in a pre-NYE assault post by the *Naštvané Matky* (2015d) in which youg male Afghan refugees are described as "men in an active fighting and sexual age". Such appraisals link the refugees/migrants/refugees to the wider issue of terrorism and portray them as a united, dangerous group capable of mobilising to reach common goals.

This collective, negative representation of refugees/migrants/Muslims is also helped by a war-like or dehumanising vocabulary. Thus, Lucie Hašková talks about those "invaders" (2016), Jana Yngland Hrušková writes about "this almost two-million strong army of gangsters" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016k), "raiding hordes" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016j) and "occupiers" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016n), and Eva Hrindová mentions the "invasion of a barbarian culture" and "pure barbarism" (2016). In the interview, Hašková (2018) also used the word "hordes" to describe the refugees/migrants. There are also comparisons with animals, such as when Jana Yngland Hrušková talks about "this blood-thirsty pack" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016d). She had written something similar in December 2015: "refugees from Islamic countries" "move around in packs, like wild animals" (Yngland Hrušková, 2015). She also writes about their deeds as "zvěrstva", wild deeds, or atrocities committed by wild animals (Yngland Hrušková, 2016i). In those examples, the refugees/migrants/Muslims are presented as a dangerous group likened to a military force, and is thus a security threat, and this threatening image is enhanced by dehumanising comparisons with 'wild animals'. Moreover, by being portrayed as a group, they are ridden of individuality and presented as a faceless collective. In their recent analysis of the way media from several European countries portray refugees Chouliaraki & Zaborowski show the way in which the refugee is 'securitised' as a threat and make a link between representations of refugees as individuals or as

one collective, with the former creating a more positive image of the refugee than the latter (2017). Indeed, they argue that the way most European media talk about refugees as one group contributes to shaping them as the faceless 'Other' (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017, p. 625). In the past, this collective, faceless 'refugee' identity without history has been analysed by Liisa Malkki (1996) as supporting humanitarian discourses but also as a risky representation. Indeed, when the refugee has no history, he/she risks being represented as in the present European context: as danger, instead of fleeing from danger.

The representation of migrants/refugees/Muslims as a homogeneous group of dangerous young men helps applying the principle of collective guilt for the NYE assaults and other crimes. Thus, in her aforementioned Facebook post, Hašková (2016) portrays all refugees as the very same people who committed the crimes. She writes: "Rape, steal, attack, kill.. Then make some stupid banner, give women some roses and all will be forgiven" (17/01). According to her, there is no difference between the NYE culprits and those asking for forgiveness. In the same post, she attacks those Czechs who "want to help someone who will then execute them for it" (2016). Once again, the refugee who will be helped is the same one who will kill. In her blog post from January 18, Jana Yngland Hrušková leaves no doubt about the conclusions to draw: "The collective guilt of the refugees is undeniable" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016i). In both cases, such a logic is used to subsequently attack Czechs willing to welcome refugees/migrants/Muslims.

While the NYE assaults are mostly represented as the deeds of a homogeneous group of young male refugees/migrants who had recently arrived in Germany, these refugees/migrants are often referred to as Muslims, and the representations often draw in all Muslims by referring to Islam. Thus, the explanations often lump together refugees, migrants, whether they have recently migrated or not, and all Muslims, and endow them with an age, a gender and a religion. As I show

in section 4.6 this group is even racialised in many interpretations of the NYE assaults and endowed with a particular sexuality, as I further explain in section 4.7. Before getting there, I first show in the following section how this homogeneous group is presented as threatening the European/German/Czech woman.

4.5 The Czech / European Woman as Victim

In the activists' discourses, it is often the European, German or Czech woman who is standing face to face with the young male refugee/migrant/Muslim, and she is often presented as a (potential) victim of sexual violence. Even before news of the NYE assaults emerged, Yngland Hrušková claims (2015) that if Czechia takes "refugees from Islamic countries", "we will live in fear. Women will not be able to come back home from the night shift by themselves. Young girls will be attackable anytime and anybody can be stabbed on the street by anyone". Although she does not make the sexual character of the threat explicit, the gendering (and ageing) of the victims of assault implies it. In another blog post, that I analyse further below, she claims that women's rights in Europe, allegedly already conquered, will be lost if refugees/migrants come (Yngland Hrušková, 2016a). After news of the NYE assaults emerged, Yngland Hrušková explicitly cites women as a reason for Czechia not to welcome refugees, writing that "we cannot expose our girls to this risk" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016d). She asks what would happen in Czechia if the country were to accept refugees and uses a gendered example: "How are our women going to go to work on the night shift, or home from the afternoon shift? Who will accompany them? A patrolman? Each of them separately? And a pepper spray will not save her from an attack by 5-10 illegals" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016h). The context of the NYE assaults and the gendering of the potential victims both suggest that the assault is implied to have a sexual character.

The use of 'our' to talk about women is also present in the January 17 post by Eva Hrindová (2016), in which she writes that "Anyone who welcomes refugees today is behaving irresponsibly and prepares a world full of danger and violence for our daughters and granddaughters". The use of 'our girls', 'our women' and 'our daughters and granddaughters' is reminiscent of the way in which women have often figured in nationalist narratives. Indeed, as Ivekovic & Mostov (2004) write, "The 'Other's' men are collectively seen as sexual aggressors, 'our' women are objects of their temptation" and "It is the collective 'our' women that represents the potential national tragedy" (p. 12). Therefore, there is also a call for the nation's men to "fight 'for the sake of our women and children' or to 'defend their honour'" (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989, p. 10). But women are not to be protected as people, as individuals, but rather as the female members of the nation, who act as the collective embodiment of its symbolic boundaries (Farris, 2017, p. 71).

These ideas about women's symbolic role in also linked with the gendering of the whole nation as female. Thus, in the article reposted on her blog by Klara Samková, the question about the NYE assaults is "Who groped Germany?" (Samkova, n.d.). In this case, the individual women who were assaulted are replaced by the metaphor of the nation gendered as a woman, in this case a violated one (Anthias & Yuval Davis, 1989, pp. 9-10). A similar move is made by the *Naštvané Matky* (2015c] in their December 28, 2015 post on alleged problems with refugees/migrants/Muslims in Sweden. Accompanying it is a picture of the Swedish flag with a text describing immigration as "an involuntary and forced marriage", whereby the "Swedish land" (feminine in Czech) is presented as the woman and immigration is a man she has to love "even if he beats her and treats her badly" (See Appendix B). Once again, the nation takes the form of a woman and, this time, it is a battered wife mishandled by her refugee/migrant/Muslim husband.

Further writings by Yngland Hrušková after the NYE assaults go on to underline that "Women who were attacked will suffer from psychoses and phobias" and then further talks about all women, writing that "Women are at the mercy of invading hordes" and that "It is such a desperate situation, it brings one to tears. Yes, German women are crying. Several women have already written to me about their fear" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016i). This gendering of fear is also visible in a January 7 post by the *Naštvané Matky* (2016b) which is headed "FEAR IS SPREADING IN GERMANY – WOMEN'S FEAR OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT, FEAR THAT IT WAS ONLY THE BEGINNING". Further in the post, the women are called 'German women' but otherwise 'women' in general or even 'women in Germany' are presented by the selected activists as the victims, or potential victims of sexual assaults by migrants/refugees/Muslims. The women are often presented as passive ('at the mercy') and as suffering ('crying'). Once again, such a depiction of women reproduces ideas depicting the nation's women as a collective whole, a metaphor of the nation, and not as active individuals (Farris, 2017, p. 71).

In addition to this collective and metaphorical representation, the victimisation of women, described as either violated or in danger of being violated, is tightly link to calls for action, which sometimes suggest gendered roles. While some of the calls to protect 'our women' and 'our daughters and granddaughters' are not particularly gendered, the January 17 post by the Eva Hrindová (2016, see Appendix D) reacting to the NYE assaults makes a clear call directed towards women and men in different, gendered roles. Thus, accompanied by the picture of a man chasing after a woman is the following text:

CZECH WOMEN WILL NOT BE GAME!! Muslims in Europe are led to violence on women by their upbringing. Islam leads them to despise women. CZECH WOMEN SAY NO! They won't let themselves be groped and raped by frustrated Muslims just in order to show how they understand other cultures. WE WILL DEFEND OURSELVES! We are 50% of society and with this 50% force we will elect politicians who will defend us from the invasion of Czechia by a barbarian culture. Wise women elect strong politicians, not weaklings who hide behind multikulti! (2016, see Appendix D)

In this post, the author speaks on behalf of all Czech women and mixes their alleged claims of Czech women with her own anti-Islam conclusions. Thus, while it is obvious that Czech women do not want to be sexually harassed or go through mass sexual assaults, Hrindová shapes these claims as deriving from assumptions about 'Muslims in Europe' and Islam and thus links defence against sexual violence with defence against Muslims and Islam. Moreover, intercultural understanding and multiculturalism are misrepresented as an acceptance of sexual violence.

While the claims are broad, the call to action is rather precise; Hrindová uses the events to disqualify politicians who do not share her views and appeals on women to elect strong politicians (2016). This post is particularly interesting because of the ambiguity about the gender of the 'politicians', 'strong politicians' and 'weaklings', all designated with the generic masculine in Czech. As Elissa Helms explains on the example of Bosnian politics, the exclusion of women from politics can be based on the assumption of politics as a "male realm" and the gendering of the politicians is thus often implied, sometimes through the generic masculine in gendered languages such as Serbo-Croatian or Czech (Valdrová, 2013, p.165). In Hrindová's call, the way in which women are strictly represented as acting through the ballot box suggests that they have to elect male politicians. In the interview, she did not see a problem with the current low level of female representation in Czech politics and she underlined that she does not see herself as a politician but rather sees her role as supporting politicians or parties. Despite these words and even if she has

herself stood for office in the past, it seems here in this post (2016) that Hrindová sees women solely as an electoral force who needs to elect strong politicians, i.e. men standing up for the nation and protecting 'us', Czech women, against Islam. While Hrindová says that the women will defend themselves, it seems like they will do so by choosing the 'right', 'strong' men. Thus, the contrast between strong politicians (for the nation, against Islam) versus weaklings ('hiding behind multiculturalism'), plays on strength values typically associated with masculinity in nationalist discourses and is ultimately linked to the men's capacity to protect women (Mosse, 1985, pp. 23-4; Helms, 2013, pp. 229-30).

As a final remark concerning this section on the position of European women as victims, I must underline the almost complete absence of refugee/migrant/Muslim women in the selected written material. They only rarely come up as forcefully veiled or as the explicit or implicit victims of stonings, but otherwise, they are completely absent. While it might seem rather logical concerning the fact that most texts react to the NYE assauls, which were recontextualised in a narrative of (sexual) attacks by the dangerous young refugee/migrant/Muslim male on the (White) German (or European, or Czech) woman, this noteworthy absence does not only show how the refugee/migrant woman is erased in order to bolster the image of the threatening young male, but also how in general Arab/Muslim women are described in older Orientalist, and newer Islamophobic discourses as passive and lacking agency (Scott, 2007, p.58; p.125). Contrarily to what Farris observes in her analysis of 'Femonationalism', the Czech activists do not often talk about Muslim women as victims to be rescued, especially not in the context of the refugee crisis. Even in other contexts, and during the interviews, Muslim women mostly make an apparition as passive victims of the veil or of stoning, with the notable exceptions of Kurdish women fighting against the 'Islamic State' and Iranian women protesting against the headscarf, mentioned by Yngland Hrušková (2018).

4.6 Culture, Religion, Ideology, Race, Nature?

As shown in the previous section, the selected activists often accompanied their representations of the NYE assaults with various explanations that draw on different discourses. Thus, in order to explain the NYE events, the activists often insist on Islam as a religion or as a culture, on culture in general, and less frequently on race. Despite the rare explicit references to race, I nevertheless argue that the respondents are shaping a gendered, sexualised and racialised group of refugees/migrants/Muslims, especially through the use of interchangeable terms, as shown above, and the mixing of explanations. For example, in a January 17 post, Hrindová (2016, see Appendix D) posts: "Muslims in Europe are led to violence on women by their upbringing. Islam leads them to despise women." In this case, upbringing and religion are intertwined and used interchangeably to explain the events as the violent behaviour of all Muslims in Europe towards women. Hrindová (2016) goes on in the same post, jumping to talking about 'migrants':

Migrants from Islamic countries do not have respect for women and this is not just some detail or a marginal cultural difference. They are led to this from birth on [...] It is a fundamentally different relation to women and it is pure barbarism. What kind of society is it, where women have to veil themselves in order not to be exposed to sexual violence? It is absolutely incompatible with our way of life.

She does not make a difference between culture or religion; both seem to dictate the alleged violent behaviour of (implied male) refugees/migrants/Muslims. This insistence on upbringing also comes

up in the interview, in which Hrindova (2018) explained why she thinks that Muslim men are dangerous. She saw this as the result of their upbringing in "Islamic families" in which "these women, these mothers don't have the same influence than in ours (*u nás*)" and "these little boys [...] are led to believe that they are more than the mother" (Hrindová, personal communication, April 21, 2018). She probably referred to the same ideas expressed in the article reposted on Samková's blog on 'Muslim sexuality' (Samková, n.d.), where the NYE assaults are linked to upbringing according to Islamic rules, which allegedly say that even very young boys rule over their mothers in the absence of the father, resulting in a negative attitude towards women (Hora, 2016). Thus, while this upbringing might be related to cultural explanations, the respondents link it first and foremost to Islam.

In the interview, Volfová mentioned a series of reasons to explain the NYE assaults and religion is also present:

"If thousands, tens of thousands of young, horny (*nadrženi*) men come to you to Europe, who naturally do not have wives, and maybe need this sex, I get that. And also they have this feeling that they are superior people (*nadlidi*), they are those who should be ruling, then for them simply... and also they are in a group, and now even if Islam forbids alcohol, of course they break this ban, just like all young people break it, then this simply happens. But that this happens, and that this massive raping takes place, this is of course terrible.

According to her, in addition to Islam, there are also some 'natural' causes, such as the assumed heterosexual desires of young men without women, alcohol, young age, and group dynamics. This naturalisation of the male (hetero)sexual desire also comes up in the words of Eva Hrindová (2018), who expresses some understanding for the way Muslim men feel teased by European women. Thus, in the interview, Hrindová (2018) talks about Muslim migrants/refugees as young

men who had problems with sex, but it was alright as long as they were in "these Muslim countries", while

now they come and here everywhere, there are, on billboards, on television, this popculture is simply disgusting, like it is now, and now these girls go around dressed like that, like, on the streets... well then, like, we cannot be surprised afterwards... I don't excuse it, right? Only it doesn't surprise me that it's like that.

In this extract, she points out the way European popular culture represents women and the way women dress, probably implying in a sexualised way, to present sexual violence as the natural reaction of naturally sexually frustrated men.

Volfová also used this assumption about men's natural sex drive and mixed it with assumptions about Islam and Muslims. In Volfová's words, Muslims' alleged feeling of superiority over non-Muslims instilled by Islam is a key ingredient to explain the NYE assaults. Further in the interview, she extended this idea to Muslims who were born in Western Europe to explain the radicalisation of second- and third-generation Muslims: "when the imam tells them every week that they are superior, that they are those who should be ruling this world, and that the others are their slaves, and they see that those slaves wear better clothes, have a better job..." (Volfová, 2018). Thus, in her words, all refugees and migrants are Muslims who think that they are superior, and this also extends to all the offspring of Muslim migrants in Western Europe, who are presented as all going to the mosque and listening to a homogeneous religious discourse.

When I asked her whether all Muslims are the same, she avoided answering directly but cited the example of Morocco, "where women were relatively free", and Indonesia, which "was a pleasant country before Islam", as proofs that all Muslim communities are or are becoming the same. She explained her views by explaining that Islam is not a religion, but an ideology and "this ideology

is monstrous, it forces those people to be like that all the same, to be like they are" (Volfová, 2018). She repeated that later in the interview, saying that sexual violence committed by Muslims "is because of ideology, I refuse 'religion', because it really forces them to it" (Volfová, 2018). Thus, although she acknowledged differences between Muslim-majority countries, these are only temporary, because she presented Islam as an ideology that is forcing itself on every Muslim everywhere in the same way. These ideas correspond to what Green (2015) defines as one of Islamophobia's pillars: the view of Islam as "monolithic and static" (p. 12).

This view that Islam is not a religion, but rather an ideology is often repeated in the interviews, not only by Volfová, but also by Hrindová, Hašková and Samková. The latter was the one insisting the most on this idea during the interview, refusing almost any talk about differences among Muslims and Muslim communities on the ground that Islam is an ideology with clear dogmas, and should be judged not on the basis of practice, but on the basis of theory (2018). She thus asked: "How can you defend an ideology in which there is gender inequality before the law [...] It simply is like this, it is one of Islam's fundamental doctrines" (K. Samková, 2018). She further developed her view of Islam as an ideology when I pressed her to explain which Muslims she is talking about, when saying that Muslims requested an exemption from secular law:

Samková: I am talking about Islam as a whole and, like, about its... long-term strategy.

Me: Do you think Muslims think the same? About that?

Samková: Because they have a unifying ideology.

Me: Sure, but, for example, like, a person from Kazakhstan, or from Indonesia, or from Morocco...

Samková (interrupting): He has a unifying ideology. He has a unifying ideology. And this unifying ideology gives him his life's framework. Naturally it can differ if the chador or

the burqa will be worn. And if Shiite or Sunnite rituals will be respected, but the framework stays the same.

Me: Yeah, but Sharia is only applied in several countries, not in all Muslim countries. This means...

Samková (interrupting): You are profoundly mistaken [...] These pressures for Sharia to be applied are evident, and they are everywhere, in all countries where Muslims are (K. Samková, personal communication, May 15, 2018).

When I further explained that many Muslims in Kazakhstan do not fast during Ramadan, contrary to religious rules, she said that these people are violating their own rules and she became quite assertive, saying: "AGAIN! We are talking on the level of general ideas. And if the general idea gives me orders, then I can't expect that they won't respect them" (Samková, personal communication, May 15, 2018). In this discourse about ideology, the literal interpretation of Islam becomes sufficient to shut down any discussions about the way Islam is practised and to treat all Muslims as potential representatives of this literal interpretation, i.e. threatening.

The aforementioned ideas about Islamic upbringing and Islam being an ideology are thus all (re)producing the idea of a monolithic Islam, and when differences are acknowledged, they are presented as temporary deviations. Thus, the image of Islam remains one of radical Islamism, in which Muslims are either born and raised, or towards which they are all striving. While the figure of the imam is mentioned on one occasion, it is usually Islam itself doing all this, forcing all 'Muslims' to behave in a certain way, as though it was a supernatural force and as though 'Muslims' had no agency of their own

In many of the aforementioned examples, the concepts of culture, religion and ideology are often mixed to get to the same conclusions that refugees/migrants, presented as being all Muslims, are

too different (and dangerous) to be let into Czechia/Europe. Such explanations can be summarised as cultural, they seem to perceive religion (or ideology, as some argued) as defining every Muslim's culture, and they thus correspond to the aforementioned "cultural fundamentalism" (Stolcke, 1995). In these cases, Islam is reified, not as a series of beliefs, but rather as a homogeneous culture rooted in all Muslim-majority countries. This culture is presented as so distinctive that it is leading to unbridgeable cultural differences between all Muslims, regardless of their country of origin and their actual religious beliefs, and all Czechs (or Europeans).

While these authors insist on religion and culture, Yngland Hrušková (2016c) slips into more traditional forms of biological racism by seeing nature as the source of "these illegal people"'s alleged evil character and by specifically glossing over religious differences. Thus, reacting to the NYE assaults, she writes about "these illegal people" that "there is only evil in them, nothing else" and states that "maybe 10% of these illegal people who are in Germany are maybe are (sic) relatively normal, but it still means that 900 000 people are evil by nature. These people do not respect life, any values" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016c) She reiterates this theory in a later blog post by stating that "90% of them ["immigrants"] are life-threatening" (Yngland Hrušková, 2016h). In the interview (2018), she repeated similar ideas, explaining attacks committed by refugees/migrants/Muslims in Germany by saying: "It's already in them, they are born that way" and she then goes on to explain that she means all of those migrants from Africa, Christians and Muslims: "the fact that they steal, sell drugs, rape women... It never has anything to do with Islam, they are simply criminals". She then used as a 'proof' the high number of Blacks and Hispanics in U.S. American prisons, compared to Whites or Chinese. By linking migrants from Africa with African Americans and expressing the belief about inborn qualities depending on skin colour and/or origins, Yngland Hrušková expresses views typical of biological racism.

While this is true that the activists do sometimes make some nuances and that the concept of cultural fundamentalism often better captures their views than that of classical racism, I argue that 'cultural racism' fails to fully capture the way in which the activists shape refugees/migrants/Muslims as a homogeneous group. Indeed, the way they are strictly identified with 'Islam', which acts as a kind of genetic essence, and the way all those coming from Muslimmajority countries or descending from people coming from Muslimmajority countries are described as "Muslims', regardless of their actual faith, creates the migrant/refugee/Muslim as belonging to a race. In this process, 'migrant' or 'refugee' become a code words for 'Muslim', and also the other way around, 'Muslim' for 'migrant'.

In the interviews, this kind of slippage between culture/religion or immigration/refugee status on the one hand, and race on the other hand becomes more apparent. Except for Hrušková Yngland, who openly refers to skin colour in her texts as well, Volfová (2018) only did so once in the interview, claiming that a "white man" gets convicted for raping, while "Muslims or refugees" do not. This racialisation of the Muslim and the refugee as non-White also applies to the migrant. Thus, in the interview, when Hašková (2018) told me that it is not all migrants that are targeted by anti-Islam / anti-refugees politicians, I replied that that billboards in support of president Zeman read 'No to migration', to which she objected that I am playing with words, and that "any Czech understood it as it was meant, considering the situation as it is, or as it is in general in the world". Indeed, it is obvious that they are not talking about all migrants, and this was also specified by Yngland Hrušková (2018) when I asked her which migrants she was talking about: "those migrants who come on boats, not those Chinese, Russian, Ukrainian migrants". In this case, I argue that slogans against Muslims and Islam, against migration and against refugees are a form of racism that targets a group interchangeably called 'refugees', 'migrants' and/or 'Muslims' in a process of

racialising, gendering and sexualising the young brown, and sometimes also black men. Finally, as Herbert J. Gans (2017) underlines when he extends the concept of racialisation to refugees, there is also a class aspect, and it comes out in my interviews, when the activists talked about young men as an economic burden (Volfová 2018; Hašková, 2018; Yngland Hrušková, 2018) (pp. 350-1). In the Czech context, this feeds into aforementioned existing racial divisions between the Czech, implying White Czechs, and the Roma people, who are standing outside the national community. Not surprisingly, during the 'refugee crisis', in September 2015, locals called the police on a group of Roma teenagers walking on a road, mistaken as refugees (Beran, 2015). In a way, the racialised refugee/migrant/Muslim joins the Roma at the bottom of the national hierarchy in such discourses.

4.7 'Muslim Sexuality'

In these explanations of the NYE assaults based on culture, religion and/or race, sexuality plays an important role and is often used as another 'proof' of the Otherness of the refugees/migrants/Muslims, who are endowed with a special, 'Muslim sexuality'. Thus, in addition to explanations of the NYE assaults that naturalise young men's (hetero)sexual frustration, the activists also provide explanations based on the alleged particular sexual life of Muslims. While the NYE assaults provide the occasion to diffuse these ideas, they are already present in some of the material published before news of the NYE assaults emerged. Thus, this idea of 'Muslim sexuality' comes to add the dimension of sexuality in gendered and racialised (re)presentations of refugees/migrants/Muslims.

In an article reposted by Klara Samková on her blog (n.d.), the NYE events are thus explained by a Czech woman who converted to, and then repudiated Islam, as the result of "Muslim sexuality" (Hora, 2016). Interviewed by a journalist, this woman talks about the sexual frustration coming from the necessity to save money for a dowry before marrying and thus have sex, about Islamic religious rules regulating sexual relations in the marriage, about the wife's obligation to satisfy the husband's sexual needs, about the husband's right to resort to sexual violence against the wife, about the relationship of Muslim men towards non-Muslim women, and other things. (Hora, 2016). During the whole interview, the main idea is not only that sexual life according to a fundamentalist Islamic interpretation is misogynistic and violent, but also that all Muslims follow these alleged rules. Thus, not only does it reinforce the idea of Muslims as an homogeneous group, but it also endows them with a particular, homogeneous sexuality.

While Hrindová (2018) made some nuances in the interview between the tendency to sexually assault of Muslims from "these Muslim countries" and Muslims in Czechia, she nevertheless made broad generalisations about Muslims' sexual frustration, implying young Muslim men, as deriving from Islam. As examples, she cited parties organised in Afghanistan for sexually frustrated young men, during which they have sex with young boys dancing dressed up as girls and a video she saw on the Internet that she mockingly describes as representing a "Muslim man" in such dire sexual frustration that he is kissing and cuddling a doll (Hrindová, 2018). She concluded her narrative of Muslim sexual frustration by explaining that when these men come to Europe and see a woman without a veil, they think she is a "whore" (*děvka*), and she added "This is... a total impossibility to have these culture function side-by-side" (Hrindová, 2018). In these examples, Hrindová creates the image of a deranged male sexuality leading to 'deviant' practices, such as child prostitution and fetishism, and this becomes a reason to conclude that these men cannot come to Europe. Sexuality is thus not only used to establish an immutable difference between refugees/migrants/Muslims and the local (European) culture, but also to buttress calls against immigration.

As shown in this example, the Islamic veil also plays a role in constructing the image of the Muslim male as endowed with a particular sexuality. Indeed, her claim that Muslim men think that a nonveiled woman is a whore (*děvka*) is part of a wider narrative presenting the veil as a tool protecting women from Muslim men's sexual assaults. Thus, in her January 17 post reacting to the NYE assaults, she writes that she refuses "to tolerate a culture where a woman has to veil herself in order not to tease the man" and asks "What kind of society is that where women have to veil themselves in order not to be subjected to sexual violence?" (2016). While the veil is often presented as imposed on women in the activists' examples about Islam's alleged persecution of women (Volfová, 2018; Samková, 2018), Hrindová rather presents it as something that a woman puts on to protect herself from Muslim men's sexual aggression (2016). It thus becomes yet another way to contrast the refugee/migrant/Muslim men's threatening (hetero)sexuality with the Western sexuality where, it is suggested, women's clothing is not under scrutiny and cannot arouse male (heterosexual) aggression. Interestingly, she is drawing from orthodox Muslim explanations of the veil as signifying "modesty and sexual unavailability" and as a protection from male heterosexual desire (Scott, 2007, pp. 153-4), but she is twisting it by erasing similar arrangements in the Western world and by assuming that sexual availability, for refugees/migrants/Muslims, means a licence to sexually assault. By focusing on Muslim men's perception of the veil, or lack thereof, on women, Hrindová provides an interesting spin-off to contemporary (Western) discourses on the headscarf and the veil, which often focus on Muslim women's sexuality and its control by women's kin, and less on the way other 'Muslim' men see it (Scott, 2007; Partridge, 2012).

In addition to ideas about Muslim's men (hetero)sexual frustration, homosexual child prostitution and fetishism, a post from before the NYE assaults published by the *Naštvané Matky* (2015d, see Appendix C) writes about zoophilia in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Commenting on the large numbers of young male Afghan refugees coming to Europe, the group cites a journalistic report:

Islam doesn't ban only premarital sex, but also homosexual relations and masturbation. Afghan and Pakistani young men who don't have money to buy a wife or to maintain a pubescent male sex slave don't have the possibility to be sexually active. And so the alternative sexuality targets sheep and goats (Naštvané Matky, 2015d, see Appendix C).

The post is illustrated with the picture of a goat and a text saying: "Sexual relations with goats are normal in Afghanistan. How are Afghan refugees going to deal with that in Europe?" The post then goes with the Naštvané Matky's (2015d) own voice to say that "The very fact that these are men in their active fighting and sexual age arouses fear, especially among women who have learnt about the position of women and non-Muslim women in the Muslim world". The association of Islam and Muslims' with such 'deviant' and criminal sexual practices is also present in a post from January 3, 2015, in which the *Naštvané Matky* (2016a) cite the words of a Czech blogger stating a series of reasons not to be a Muslim, including "11. The paedophilic desires of Mr.Muhammad disgust me 12. I consider zoophilia to be criminal" old (2016a). In this case, the blogger is most probably referring to Islam's prophet Muhammad's marriage with Aisha when she was a child and he is suggesting that Muslims consider having sex with animals normal. Yngland Hrušková (2016j) also underlines that Czechs do not take 9-year-olds as wives in a blog post where she draws many comparisons between Czechs and Muslims. In these writings, in addition to the aforementioned practices of endowing refugees with a gender, an age and a homogeneous culture shaped by religion, the refugees are presented as a clear sexual (and military) threat, which is proven by (presumably) European women's fear. Even though some of the examples in this section are located in a country, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, they are still presented as linked to

Islamic rules and are often lumped together with general portrayals of Muslim men, which are all represented as sexually frustrated and/or deviating from (hetero)sexual norms. Moreover, references to Muhammad's early marriage to Aisha as a proof of Islam's approval of paedophilia also work to highlight the 'Otherness' of 'Muslim sexuality'. This use of sexuality in establishing differences with the 'Other' is highlighted by Edward Said in his book *Orientalism* (2003) in which he shows how particular images of the 'Orient''s sexual life, 'Oriental sex', were part of the construction of the Orient as different from the Occident (2003, p. 190). In these imagined contrasts from the 19^s century, the Orient is the region of sexual liberty in contrast to the institutionalisation of sex in the Occident (Said, 2003, p. 190). In the 20^s century, Western popular culture reproduced such stereotypes, among others presenting the Arab man as an "oversexed degenerate" (Said, 2003, pp. 286-7). Thus, through sexuality, the dangerous young refugees/migrants/Muslim is further differentiated and excluded from the West with its presumably 'sane' sexuality.

These ideas have been further developed in the contemporary context by scholars looking at the way recent Islamist terrorism and Western governments' military interventions in Muslimmajority countries have brought about similar and new, sexualised images of the Arab and/or Muslim man (Puar, 2007; Richter-Montpetit, 2007). Thus, Jasbir K. Puar (2007) scrutinises the way Western discourses on the Islamist terrorist have involved not only a racialisation of religion, shaping 'the Muslim' as a race, but also a process of sexualisation, in which the terrorist is sexualised as a pervert (p.38). She writes that this "sexual deviancy is linked to the process of discerning, othering, and quarantining terrorist bodies" (Puar, 2007, p. 38). Thus, this sexualisation is not only about ridiculing the terrorist, but also about socio-political processes of inclusion and exclusion, whereby the association of terrorism and sexual threats work to universalise the image of the dangerous refugee/migrant/Muslim, and thus exclude him. As it appears in the Czech women activists' words, a similar process can be observed concerning the refugee/migrant. Indeed, not only is he gendered and aged as the young man, but his assumed Islamic faith is turned into an inborn quality, a race, and he is sexualised as sexually frustrated and deviant. The comments on zoophilia and (homosexual) paedophilia are thus closely linked to this image of the refugee/migrant/Muslim as an "oversexed degenerate" and present him as sexually threatening. Indeed, they naturalise the refugee/migrant/Muslim's sexual drive and thus lead to questions such as those asked about Afghan refugees in Europe, described as "men in an active fighting and sexual age": "Where and on whom will they satisfy their sexual needs?" and "Should we also be afraid for goats?" (Naštvané Matky, 2015d, see Annex C). It is accepted that those men have this sexual drive that needs to be satisfied not with, but on something or someone, and the only remaining question is about the victims. The answer is already provided in the post: women, presumably White European ones.

Thus, such discourses about 'Muslim sexuality' sexualise the refugee/migrant/Muslim not only as deviant, but also as dangerous. Indeed, while his zoophilia might be subject to mockery, and even his paedophilia, the real goal is not to caricature him, but rather to present his sexuality as both different and threatening. He is presented as naturally endowed with a sexual drive that will be, or is problematic in Europe. Without goats or young male sex slaves, European women are his designated victims. While posts before news of the NYE assaults suggest problems to come, the reactions afterwards draw a logical link between the sexualised refugee/migrant/Muslim and sexual violence. Finally, by establishing the refugee/migrant/Muslim's sexual 'otherness' as dangerous, the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement is often doubly securitising the refugee/migrant/Muslim (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017): first as a terrorist, and secondly as a sexual predator.

As I have shown in this chapter, the reactions to the NYE assaults were recontextualised in anti-Islam / anti-refugee discourses in order to (re)produce the image of the dangerous, homogeneous group of refugees/migrants/Muslims wreaking havoc in Western Europe. In these discourses, the culprits are gendered as male and endowed with a young age, and they commit all sorts of crimes, including sexual crimes, with local (European) women as their prime victims. In order to explain the NYE assaults and these crimes in general, the activists resort to different sorts of discourses, which often essentialise and racialise the refugees/migrants/Muslims by presenting them as holders of certain immutable and/or inborn cultural or religious characteristics. The result is to present the refugee/migrant/Muslim as endowed with certain immutable characteristics, including a threatening 'Muslim' sexuality, that turn him into a double security threat: as both a terrorist and a rapist.

CHAPTER 5 – #METOO, THE RACIALISATION OF SEXISM & THE ACTIVISTS

In this chapter, I contrast the way in which the selected activists have reacted to the NYE assaults with their reaction to the #MeToo campaign and to the wider issue of sexual violence. While refugee/migrant/Muslim men were quickly accused of being the culprits during the first event, the second event rather showed how widespread sexual harassment and sexual violence. Thus, by comparing the reactions to both events, I analyse the way in which the activists address and explain issues of sexual violence, especially in relation to race and/or religion. In this chapter, I first briefly come back on what the #MeToo campaign was, how it was represented in the Czech mainstream media, and how the activists reacted. Then, I look at the way these written and oral reactions to the #MeToo belong within larger discourses racialising the issue of sexism, and even sexual violence, by making them the problem of the refugee/migrant/Muslim. Finally, in the last section, I briefly explore the way the selected activists position themselves within these discourses.

5.1 #MeToo from Hollywood to Czechia

In mid-October 2017, the U.S. American #MeToo campaign against sexual violence spread from Hollywood to the rest of the world through social media (Seales, 2018). While the MeToo initiative started in 2006, it only gained greater prominence when revelations about repeated sexual assaults by famous producer Harvey Weinstein prompted Hollywood actresses to share their stories of sexual harassment and sexual violence online, and to invite others to do so as well (Seales, 2018). It provoked a mass reaction on social media, with people, mostly women, talking about all sorts of experiences, from sexual violence to daily occurrences of sexism. Many Czech women also reacted to the movement and used social media to share their experiences. The campaign showed the prevalence of sexual violence, sexual harassment and sexism in all societies and social classes. In Czechia, the media widely reported on the story and gave a voice to Czech women and men sharing their experiences as victims of sexual violence and sexual harassment. In the first days of the movement in mid-October 2017, the online versions of mainstream media reported on the story on a rather matter-of-fact way. The liberal Lidové noviny called on readers to share their experiences (Kabátová, 2017), and the public television's website Česká televize highlighted that the Czech Euro-Commissar Věra Jourová taking part in the campaign ("Hashtag #metoo zaplavil sítě," 2017). Despite the rather neutral or sympathetic tone of most articles, there were already some dissenting voices in those first days though, such as a commentary by journalist Mirka Spáčilová (2017) of the popular daily Mladá Fronta Dnes accusing the Hollywood actresses of hypocrisy. She writes "While brutally raped little girls from the Third World don't have a place where they can complain and Roman Polanski is forgiven for having sex with a minor, Hollywood is offended by the fate of adult women who always had the possibility to choose if they want to go for their career or to the police" (Spáčilová, 2017). Thus, an alternative narrative of the hypocritical Western actresses pitted against the 'real' victims, young girls in non-Western countries, already emerged in the early days of the movement in Czechia.

5.2 Timing and Frequency of Online Reactions

While some of the activists reacted to the campaign on social media, most of them did not react at all. Part of the explanation might be that the campaign did not take the same proportions in Czechia

as in the United States and other countries. The exception were the *Naštvané Matky*, who posted seven times in relation to the campaign. The earliest reaction came on November 16, a month after the start of the movement in the United States, and was followed by two other posts on November 19 and 23. The #MeToo campaign was then mentioned in an article reposted by the group in early January and then the group posted twice in support of the group of French women from the cultural sphere who published an open letter denouncing the campaign's alleged excesses, on January 11 and 15, 2018. Klara Samková was the only individual reacting to the movement, reposting an article denouncing the campaign's alleged excesses on February 3, 2018.

5.3 The Racialisation of Sexism and Gender-Based (Sexual) Violence

In a way remindful of the process described by Said, in which images of the Orient serve to shape the Occident (2003), the respondents often make comparisons with the Czech, or European context to highlight the distinctiveness, and often inferiority, of refugees/migrants/Muslims,. They thus create a discourse of 'Self' and 'Other' in which the 'Self' is positively contrasted with the 'Other's negative characteristics. In the comparisons and contrasts, the topics of gender relations, sexuality and gender-based violence occupy an important place. While the activists do not deny the existence of sexism and/or sexual violence in Czechia, they qualify it differently and often relativise it. Moreover, during discussions of the #MeToo campaign denouncing the universal problem of sexual harassment and sexual violence committed by men against women, the comparison with sexual crimes committed by refugees/migrants/Muslims sometimes come up, showing the way in which these problems are racialised. Thus, in addition to the sexualisation of racism, as I have shown in the preceding chapter in relation to the NYE assaults, there is also a certain racialisation of sexism in the activists' discourses. Indeed, as I show here in the following sections, sexism, gender inequality, sexual harassment and gender-based (sexual) violence are described mostly as the refugees/migrants/Muslims' problems and the images of the misogynist refugee/migrant/Muslim man and of the oppressed refugee/migrant/Muslim woman are pitted against the image of (greater) gender equality in Czechia.

5.4 Sexism

In the interviews, the comparisons between the Czech (or European) 'Self' and the refugee/migrant/Muslim 'Other' often involve the idea of gender inequality. As I have shown before, they are often based on an essentialised view of Islam as intrinsically sexist. Just like Samková (2018) described gender inequality as "one of Islam's fundamental doctrines" and further states that "the ideology [Islam] says that the woman is an inferior being". Jana Volfová (2018) said that "in Islam the woman does not have equal opportunities, if you have to wear a burqa, and you have to, and it's not like... there are Islamic states where you even have a Sharia police". In these cases, gender inequality, misogyny and Islamist practices such as the imposition of the burqa are presented as inherent to Islam.

In these representations of Islam as misogynistic, there is not always a comparison, but difference is sometimes underlined, as in Hrindová's (2016) January 17 post on the NYE assaults claiming that "Islam leads ["Muslims in Europe"] to despise women". She then insists on the difference, stating that "It is a fundamentally different relation to women and it is pure barbarism [...] absolutely incompatible with our way of life" (Hrindová, 2016). In this post, there is a contrast between Islam and Muslims, which are misogynistic, and Europe, who is presumed not to be. Moreover, this there is a clear conclusion to draw from such a statement about 'barbarism' and 'incompatibility': refugees/migrants/Muslims cannot be let come and/or stay in Europe.

This idea of sexism being intrinsic in Islam is contrasted to the situation in Czechia. During our interview, while Samková (2018) strongly denounced gender stereotypes in Czechia, she refused to liken them to gender stereotypes among Muslims, because the Czech stereotypes "are not a question of ideology". In both examples, the cultural or ideological roots of problems in Czechia are erased while the cultural or ideological character of refugees/migrants/Muslims' behaviour is underlined.

A more direct comparison came up in the words of Lucie Hašková (2018), who contrasted Czech men and refugee/migrant/Muslim men in the interview. She said that the male refugees going to Europe leave their wives behind with the children and asked:

but where are those women and children? They die there? That's why I appreciate our men, because... here, who simply... the man protects his woman, right? ... Here, like, for the man, his woman is holy, because she is a being he loves. And there it's completely the opposite. There, woman is simply a piece of furniture (L.Hašková, personal communication, May 11, 2018).

In this excerpt, not only does Hašková portray refugees/migrants/Muslims as misogynist, but her words come back to a previous point I made, on the way nationalist ideology insists on men's capacity to protect women, and it is here contrasted with the refugees' 'failed' masculinity (Mosse, 1985, pp. 23-4; Helms, 2013, pp. 229-30).

In discussion about issues of gender in Czechia and in Europe in general, the activists often present gender equality as either unimportant or more or less attained at home, and they sometimes contrast it with the aforementioned image of the misogynistic refugee/migrant/Muslim. In other cases, when gender inequalities in Czechia are underlined, they are presented as evolving, in contrast to the intrinsically misogynistic and backward Islam.

Thus, despite acknowledging the numerous gender stereotypes she had to face in her activism as a young woman, Lucie Hašková (2018) said in the interview about gender inequalities in Czechia that "it seems exaggerated to me when someone discusses it so much, right? I think it's the least problem afflicting us" (Hašková, 2018). Thus, while gender stereotypes are a problem, they are a minor one, not worthy of the same attention as the nationalist, anti-Islam / anti-refugee activism in which Hašková is involved.

In her interview, Hrindová (2018) presented gender equality as "more or less gained" and says later on about men-woman relationships that "because we live in Europe, or here in the Western world, then we have brought all of this into some kind of civilised form" (Hrindová, 2018). Thus, gender relations in Czechia, here presented as belonging to the Western world, have reached a civilised form, according to her, and I presume that she links this statement with our previous discussions of refugees/migrants/Muslims.

The idea that gender equality has been reached in Czechia / Europe is also visible in a January 3^{ad} blog post by Yngland Hrušková (2016a), in which warns against refugees: "they will practices their habits from the Middle Ages in all impunity and legality. Cutting off hands, stoning, etc. Women will be simple servants. Not to talk of female genital mutilation. How long was the fight for women's rights in Europe? And now everything will be lost". In this case, women's rights in Europe are presented as already fought for, not as an ongoing process, and as in danger of being lost because of refugees/migrants/Muslims. In the interview, when I asked her if Czech and Muslim women are different, she answered without hesitating: "Of course, I think so, because we are very emancipated" (Yngland Hrušková, 2018). This is reminiscent of insights from Third World feminists such as Mohanty, who insist that White women can only assert their emancipation on the backdrop of 'the oppressed Third World woman' (Mohanty, 1984, p.353).

When it comes to Jana Volfová (2018) and Klara Samková (2018), they are rather critical of the state of gender (in)equality in Czechia, but they still present it as an ongoing, positive development, contrasting the present situation with what they experienced earlier and within a historical frame. Thus, they make references to improvements over their life time and to historical events, such as witch-burning during the Christian Inquisition. In contrast, Islam is presented at stuck at this same Middle-Age stage (Volfová, 2018), or as potentially threatening the progressive march of gender equality in Czechia (Samková, 2018). Thus, in both cases, the idea is that Czechia is getting close to fixing its gender inequality problems and does not want to import new ones, embodied by the refugees/migrants/Muslims.

5.5 Sexual Harassment

Building on those constructions of the civilised, gender equal, or evolving 'Self' as different from the backward, misogynistic refugee/migrant/Muslim 'Other', the activists often build the image of the refugee/migrant/Muslim as a sexual predator. For example, when writing about sexual harassment, Yngland Hrušková draws such a comparison in very clear terms:

Our boys turn their heads when they see a pretty girl, invite her for a coffee or whistle. But this is all. They do not shout 'You whore' on Wenceslas square [a central Prague square] as it happens on a daily basis in Germany, Belgium, France and Sweden, when Arabs and North Africans harass there women at every step. In the metro, at the train station, on the street, and just everywhere they have access. They touch them, they rob them, they insult them. It's a great psychological burden for women to go through that every day. And still people defend them [the "Arabs and North Africans"]. Apparently we can't all put them in the same basket. But we must, because this has never happened in Europe before. And what happened on New Year's Eve in Germany and in other countries in Europe is simply their SIGNATURE!!!! (08.01)

In such an excerpt, the good Czech boys showing a healthy heterosexual interest to women is contrasted with the Arabs' and North Africans' aggressive and criminal behaviour. Not only are those "Arabs and North Africans" essentialised on the basis of their origins, and possibly on the basis of the origins of their parents or grandparents, and gendered as men, but their deeds as well as the NYE events are presented by Yngland Hrušková as new and foreign for Europe, thus erasing Europe's sexism.

In her January 17 post reacting to the "violence against women in Germany", Eva Hrindová's proclamations also draw this kind of contrasts. She writes in the name of Czech women: "We don't want violence, chaos and civil war in Czechia. We don't want a return to the Middle-Ages. We want calm and a normal life, that a woman doesn't have to be afraid to come out on the street in a skirt!" (17.01) While the contrast is not as clear as in Yngland Hrušková's blog post, insisting more on an image of Czechia that has evolved since the Middle Ages, there is still the idea that refugees/migrants/Muslims are backward and would import problems that Czechia does not have, thus perturbing the Czechs' "normal life", including encroaching on women's right to wear skirts (17.01). In such a post, in addition to the apocalyptic language, there is the assumption that women in Czechia are currently never afraid to wear skirts. As if sexual harassment would only appear with the arrival of refugees/migrants/Muslims.

In the interviews, the respondents reacted differently to my question about the #MeToo campaign. Except for Hašková (2018), who was barely aware of the campaign, and Samková (2018), who expressed support for it, the three other activists first discarded it as the hypocrisy of some Hollywood actresses going after famous men long after having slept with them to get a role. Jana Volfová (2018) called the movement a "stupidity" (*hloupost*), Yngland Hrušková (2018) an "embarrassment of the biggest calibre" and Hrindová (2018) a "hypocrisy of the highest caliber and really terrible" after laughing as a reaction to the question. When further discussing the wider issue though, most of them did acknowledge that sexual assault is an issue, but saw sexual harassment such as physical contacts as not worthy of attention. Hrindová (2018) naturalised the way men "chase" after women and says that it is up to women to set boundaries. On my question on the difference between Czech men's "chasing" after women and Muslim men, she said that Czech men, "when you let them know that it's enough, than it's enough" (Hrindová, 2018). Thus, for Volfová, Yngland Hrušková and Hrindová, #MeToo is discarded as the hypocrisy of Hollywood actresses, and seems to have had little impact on the way they perceive issues of sexual harassment and sexual violence.

5.6 Gender-Based (Sexual) Violence

As I have shown in the way the refugees/migrants/Muslims' are presented as dangerous young men, including through their sexuality, the issue of gender-based (sexual) violence comes up regularly when they are represented as a threat. In this process of racialisation of sexism, sexual violence is presented in a particular way when committed by refugees/migrants/Muslims, such as in a story that came up twice during the interviews. Both Yngland Hrušková (2018) and Hrindová (2018) told me the story of an Irish female teacher who was allegedly raped by six Algerian men in Prague in early April 2018¹³. As my respondents said, she met one of the men in a bar and the two of them went to the man's hotel room, where he called in his five other friends to collectively rape her. As Eva Hrindová said:

¹³ The story was widely reported in the Czech media and the allegations correspond to the respondents' descriptions ("Soud poslal do vazby cizince, kteří znásilnili turistku v hotelu v Praze," 2018).

of course they committed a crime and they have to be punished, but I ask myself if this Irish teacher did not fall on her head, like... Nowadays, when no one can say that he/she doesn't have enough information about the fact that these Arab men function a bit differently than those European ones. To go with an Arab man, alone, to HIS room, it seems to me very risky (2018).

In addition to blaming the victim, she draws this conclusion about Arab men functioning "a bit differently" than European men. In my interview with her, Jana Yngland Hrušková (2018) also used this crime to make a comparison, saying: "I don't know if Czechs do such a thing, or Belgians, or Poles, no... they rape, yes, but always from those six, five boys, there will be...: 'guys, drop it". Thus, according to her, rapists do not have a race or a religion, but gang rapists do. She further develops this view that group rape is a 'Muslim' thing, when, during our discussion of sexual violence, she answers to my question whether there is a difference between Czech men and Muslim men in the following way:

Certainly, I think, yes. Of course there are also brutes, of course I wouldn't say that no one raped here ($u n \dot{as}$), but I don't know for example about any group rapes like in Sweden, 5, 6, 10, when that woman just ends up in the psychiatric hospital... simply, basically the end for that woman, and then 20 others are looking, those are films, here ($u n \dot{as}$), unimaginable. Here ($u n \dot{as}$) people rape and kill, but it's a different scale, and if he rapes her, then if she goes and reports it, then they will lock him up. There is also domestic violence, I don't want to say at all that white boys don't kill, are not paedophiles, are not... I don't know what, we're everything. But here it's about this per cent, on a hundred inhabitants, how many there is of what. For example, Sweden, about Sweden it is known that it is ... rape capital

of... world¹⁴. Over there per capita, a terrible number, masses of this raping (Yngland Hrušková, 2018)

When I suggested that Sweden might have a high number of rapes because of their campaigns to encourage victims to report rapes, she objected "No, no, no, it's because of migrants. These are the migrants that rape there, in this horrible way" (Yngland Hrušková, 2018). In this extract, this contrast between a 'normal' rape and the 'refugee/migrant/Muslim' rape comes up once again. In addition to insisting on the difference in numbers, this way of qualifying those rapes differently is a way to resolve the tension between the fact that both Czech men (or White, European men) and male refugees/migrants/Muslims are responsible for gender-based (sexual) violence.

This tension is also resolved by claims that gender-based (sexual) violence by refugees/migrants/Muslims is covered. Thus, Yngland Hrušková (20180 also a difference between acts of sexual violence according to race by saying that "white boys" get denounced and convicted, and she contrasted it with a story of a Muslim man who was accused of rape in Prague but was released. Similary, Volfova (2018) said about the NYE assaults that a "white man" get in trouble when he rapes, while "Muslims or refugees" get covered. Finally, another way to differentiate between Czech men and refugee/migrant/Muslim men is to claim that gender-based (sexual) violence is not even considered a crime among refugees/migrants/Muslims. Thus, the article on 'Muslim sexuality' (Hora, 2016) reposted by Klara Samková underlines that in Europe, if a man sexually assaults a woman "society doesn't adore him for it. Whereas for a Muslim, yes, because he showed his strength and showed to the woman where she belongs. And mainly, here (*u nás*) it's a criminal act". Similarly, Jana Volfová (2018) said in the interview that people convert to Islam in European prisons because "if they lock you up for domestic violence, and if you convert to

¹⁴ Italics indicate here the usage of English in the original statement.

Islam then you become a hero if you beat your wife". With such statements, the activists not only underline an alleged difference in the way Muslim men treat women, but they also claim that Islam and/or Muslim societies accept this gendered-based (sexual) violence.

This kind of contrast between refugees/migrants/Muslims' sexual behaviour and the Czech and/or the Western one comes back in some of the reactions to the #MeToo campaign. Thus, by representing the campaign as the hypocrisy of some Hollywood actresses going after famous men long after the alleged sexual crimes, the activists better recontextualise it for their own messages. Indeed, the Naštvané Matky do it twice, first in a November 16, 2018 post, where the group asks "And where are those artists with #MeToo signs?" to accompany an article on the rise of sexual assaults on Alexanderplatz in Berlin, which is attributed to refugees/migrants/Muslims (16/11). In a similar way, the group accuses the Hollywood actresses solidarity against sexual violence during the Golden Globes Awards of being hypocritical, writing: "They should come express support for women who are really sexually harassed - those who were gang raped in the last days or those who were sexually assaulted by Pakistani sexual (sic) gangs in Rotherham" (09/01). In both posts, the group thus accuses the #MeToo campaign of ignoring the 'real' sexual violence, i.e. the sexual violence committed by refugees/migrants/Muslims. This is the same kind of narrative developed in an article posted by another respondent, Klara Samková, in which a Czech sexologist acknowledges the problem of sexual violence but focuses on a critique of the #MeToo campaign (Fifková, 2018). Among others, she accuses those leading the #MeToo campaign of being 'pseudofeminists' and 'neo-Marxists' who have run out of progressive topics and who are not interested in real topics, like the "life of women in the European no-go zones and the application of Sharia law" (Fifková, 2018). By bringing the topics of refugees/migrants/Muslims and Islam into #MeToo, they do not try to show a potential blind spot of the campaign, but rather to question the importance and reality of the kind of sexual violence condemned by #MeToo: the everyday, ubiquitous cases of sexual harassment and sexual violence, not only in public, but also in private. One of the rather different way in which the issue of sexual violence is treated in all of the collected material is reflected in December 11 post published by the *Naštvané Matky* (2015a). While it resembles contemporary feminist messages proclaiming that the rapist is always responsible for the rape¹⁵, the accompanying text brings the reader back to the issue of Islam:

Three fifths of people think that women are sometimes responsible for rape. My dears – this is only a small step from forced veiling and punishment for infidelity. Just a little bit from adopting Sharia. This is nonsense! For God's sake, people – only a rapist is actually responsible for rape. And infidelity is no one's business, so it is nonsense to punish her. And a woman can go around dressed as she wants because guys are not animals that would blame a woman's attractivity for their bad manners. At least for now... (Naštvané Matky, 2015a).

Interestingly, this post uses the assumed distaste of the reader for Islam in order to challenge Czech stereotypes on rape. Indeed, it claims that Czech people agreeing with the idea that women might sometimes be responsible for their own rape are close to Islamic practices. At the same time, the post reiterates the idea that the treatment of women according to Islam is worse by adding a link about an Afghan woman who was stoned to death for having fled with her male lover. It also issues a warning by saying that Czech men cannot blame women's looks for their misbehaviour "at least for now..." This post thus challenges the idea that Czech society is *far* better than 'Muslim' societies, but at the same time it does reinforce stereotypes on Islam and Muslims. Finally, it does

¹⁵ For example, see a August 2, 2017 post by the Czech organisation *Konsent* fighting against sexual violence (Když to nechce, tak to nechce, 2017)

issue a veiled warning about possible changes in the future linked with threats represented by refugees/migrants/Muslim and Islam, which are present in this post and throughout the group's Facebook page.

Thus, while the activists acknowledge that there are gender-based problems in Czechia during the interviews, they often contrast them with problems among refugees/migrants/Muslims. Thus, in addition to seeing many differences between the level and quality of sexism, sexual harassment and gender-based (sexual) violence, there is the tendency to answer general questions about sexual violence by going towards the topic of refugees/migrants/Muslims and Islam. For example, when I asked Hrindova (2018) about the tendency to blame rape victims in Czechia, she starts by talking about the provocative dressing and irresponsible behaviour of some women, and goes on to tell the aforementioned story of the Irish woman who was raped by six Algerian men in Prague. Similarly, while Yngland Hrušková (2018) acknowledged the seriousness of the problem of unreported sexual crimes, she then started telling the aforementioned story of a young "Iraqi-Iranian, something like that" who allegedly raped a nurse in a Prague hospital, but who was let go "just because he was a Muslim". In both cases, the workings of the racialisation of sexual violence come to light within the context of discussions on the issue: discussions tend to intersect with the issue of race and to go towards the topic of the racialised refugee/migrant/Muslim sex predators.

5.7 Positioning Women and Gender in the Anti-Islam / Anti-Refugee Movement

Finally, in addition to the analysis of their anti-Islam / anti-refugee discourses, I briefly analyse the way the respondents position themselves in the movement, especially when it comes to questions of gender, such as feminism and motherhood. As mentioned in the historical context, feminism does not have a good reputation in Czechia, and it is often ridiculed and/or associated with the state socialist period. Thus, apart from Jana Volfová, who played a role in the Czech feminist movement in the 1990s and early 2000s, I did not expect the respondents to show any inclination towards the word. Surprisingly, Hrindová (2018) and Samková (2018) also called themselves feminists. Moreover, all but Hašková (2018) linked the discussion of feminism to the question of refugees/migrants/Muslims. In the present section, I explore the way feminism and gender relations play into the way the respondents' explain their involvement and position themselves in the movement.

5.7.1 Feminism and Islam

When I talked to Volfová (2018), she underlined her contribution to the issue of women's participation in politics and thus answered to my question whether she considered herself a feminist by saying: "I was always a feminist, but I don't like the word feminist" and by explaining how the group FEMEN¹⁶ and other "radical" feminist groups have tarnished feminism's reputation. She contrasts this 'radicalism' with her support for equal opportunities for men and women, and later linked this conviction to her anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement. saying "in Islam the woman does not have equal opportunities... if you have to wear a burqa, and you have to" (Volfová, 2018). She then mentioned a personal experience of being in a "no-go zone" in Sweden and being verbally attacked by men, presumably Muslims, for not wearing a burqa (Volfová, 2018). Later on, she explained the involvement of women in the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement in the following way: "we perceive this from this feeling, we have our children, our grandchildren, what we see in Germany, we don't want that here" (Volfová, 2018). Thus, while Volfová used the broader idea of equal gender opportunities to explain her opposition to Islam and cites a personal unpleasant

¹⁶ The feminist group FEMEN started in Ukraine in 2008 and became more international recently. It is famous for the way its female activists show their breasts and use their bodies in public stunts and protests.

experience, she also went back to the idea of woman's maternal role to justify women taking a certain socio-political stand.

Despite her feminist identity, her anti-Islam / anti-refugee involvement leads her to starkly criticise Czech feminists. Thus, in her only public Facebook reaction to the NYE assaults, she targeted Czech feminists, whom she accused of hypocrisy for not denouncing the assault (Volfová, 2016). This topic of feminists' inadequate activism in relation to Islam and/or refugees/migrants/Muslims is also reflected in the interviews with Samková and Yngland Hrušková. While Samková (2018) first criticised Czech feminists for not doing enough to tackle gender stereotypes hindering the conciliation of family and work, she later on came back to the topic when discussing Islam. She thus exclaimed that she did not "understand at all how it is possible that Czech feminists and feminists in general defend Islam! [...] How can you defend an ideology in which there is gender inequality before the law?" Similarly, Yngland Hrušková (2018) suggested in the interview that there "isn't really any feminism" in Czechia, because otherwise it would be fighting against "those burqas" and she concluded that "these feminists now only take care of those migrants who are coming". Thus, both of them take for granted that 'real' feminism would be opposed to Islam because of Islamic clothing practices or because of Islam's alleged inherent gender inequality.

5.7.2 Motherhood and Gender Roles

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As the leader of a quintessential example of a movement using "political motherhood" (Werbner, 1999), I was not surprised when Hrindová (2018), presented herself as an "anti-Islamist and anti-feminist". Neither was I surprised when she further on said that she is against feminists because they "belittle motherhood" and explained her recent political involvement through references to motherhood (Hrindová, 2018). Thus, she talked about the foundation of her *Naštvané Matky* group as something "spontaneous, a coincidence" and she insisted that they are not a group of mothers,

nor a women's movement, adding that half of its members are men (Hrindová, 2018). She then told me the name is a "brand, because it symbolises something, it symbolises some stand by the mother whose children are in danger. And the same can also be felt by men, right?" (Hrindová, 2018). She went on to say it was obvious that it should be about mothers, because children are being taken away¹⁷, because of "this Islam which enslaves women", and because of the war in Ukraine affecting children in the war zone. Thus, all of these socio-political themes are linked to - and turned into - maternal concern by Hrindová and give the group a particular right to get involved in the public sphere. Interestingly, Hrindová seems aware of the symbolic might of motherhood and seems to be using it strategically to have a greater weight in public affairs.

Considering these words, I was taken aback when she later on claimed to be a feminist, adding that she is "not like they are presented today. I am not a submissive woman who doesn't want her voice to be heard" and that she is simply for equal rights for women, which she sees as more or less attained. On the contrary, she says, she claims that women need to "be able to function in a natural way: that is, with a male partner and a child" and she later on says that changes in gender relations in Czechia (or Europe?) are going too far. She later explains that her disapproval of "social changes" in women's gender role is the "reason why [she gets] involved because [she] would like to have other opinions about women's consciousness in this public sphere". Of all the respondents, she was thus the only one with strong opinions about 'natural' gender roles akin to those expressed by 'anti-gender movements' (Kováts, & Põim (Eds.), 2015). Thus, looking at the views of Hrindová and the Naštvané Matky, it is possible to compare them to what Koonz calls women's 'backlash conservatism' in post-Cold War U.S.A. and Italy. As she writes: "While

¹⁷ She is referring to the case of Eva Michaláková, a Czech immigrant living in Norway whose two sons were taken away by the Norwegian social services, and whose calls for help to the Czech public and politicians in 2015 turned her into a symbol for various right-wing and conservative groups.

rhetorically exalting motherhood and family, [these women] broke out of the 'feminine' stereotype they endorsed" and "could privately take advantage of feminism while publicly deploring its influence" (Koonz, 1997 p. 235). While she is able to navigate the world of politics and she shows awareness about the way the upbringing of women hinders their political participation, she does not believe that anything should be done about it.

When it comes to Lucie Hašková, she also names motherhood as a key reason to get involved in the socio-political sphere. She thus mentions the birth of her son together with news about the "Islamisation of Europe" to justify her involvement in the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement. When I ask more about her involvement in politics, she goes back to motherhood, saying "Maybe I can't explain it to you, as a man, right? But a woman is simply afraid for her child, right?" and she then goes on to talk about her patriotic Slovak grandfather and her duty "to do the same, for my child, once again". Later on, when I ask her about her interest in Islam, she mentions a "the first video that she saw" in which some "Islamists" were burning new-born children and adds that "For a mother who just gave birth to a child, it's a terrible sight. It forced me, it just..." before adding that you cannot generalize about all Muslims, "of course". Moreover, when explaining the goal of her organisation Za naši kulturu a bezpečnou zem ('For our culture and safe land'), she says its goals are to defend "national (národní) interests", to unite the "nationalist (národovecká) scene" and also "to defend the traditional family, to conserve what our ancestors left us". Thus, in Hašková's explanations, motherhood is also tightly linked to her involvement in the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement, even though it is also part of wider nationalist convictions. Moreover, considering her rather 'progressive' views gender roles later expressed in the interview, including support for paternal leave, it is hard to understand what she means by the idea of the traditional

family. It seems more like an attachment to the idea of tradition, as a banner held up within nationalist rhetoric, than a real programme.

Thus, in the interviews, many nuances were shown in the activists' words on feminism and gendered topics such as motherhood came up to explain involvement in the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement. Despite Hrindová and Hašková both referring to motherood as central reasons for their involvement, Hrindová makes it central to her public image and seems to be using it consciously to gain some weight in the public sphere, while it seems more of a private affair for Hašková. Thus, Hašková does not seem to make it part of her political message, from what I could see in the collected material. Moreover, as seen in the words of Volfová (2018), or in some calls made in blog posts by Yngland Hrušková (2016i), motherhood can sometimes make appearances in political discourses, as a reason to justify involvement or political action. When it comes to Samková, she does not touch on such topics and focuses more on her 'expert' voice, resorting to legal arguments against Islam, including its alleged inherent legislative misogyny.

5.7.3 Nationalism, Feminism and Power

While involvement in the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement has helped those women come (back) into political affairs, the last question to answer is the position they have gained in doing so. When it comes to the four older respondents, they already had a certain position in the public sphere and the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement became a platform to continue their existing socio-political activities. For Hrindová, it was a bigger move, as she was not known to the largest public, and for Yngland Hrušková it was a transition from the cultural field to political activism. The biggest transformation was perhaps for Lucie Hašková, who was not only young, but a total newcomer on the extreme right political scene when she decided to get involved in the summer of

2015. Moreover, it seems like she reached a respectable position on this political scene by herself and despite all obstacles, including gender stereotypes from fellow activists.

All these stories belie the idea that these women would have been only playing secondary roles or were being manipulated by men. On the contrary, the tale of their involvement is rather one of intense and passionate engagement. Moreover, as the numerous excerpts show, their rhetoric is far from gendered stereotypes on tolerant and peace-loving women. Based on the collected material and the interviews, I consider the women activists of the Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement as representing a form of Czech femonationalism. While only three of them do declare themselves feminists and only one of them sees feminist beliefs as her prime reason to get involved in the anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement, it is to be understood within the Czech context, where feminism has a bad name. Thus, when scrutinising the actual opinions of the activists on gender roles, the image of a rather mainstream liberal feminist propaganda should not lead to the shortcut that the movement is antifeminist per se. Nevertheless, the fact that these women are deliberately playing down any possible misgivings about gender issues because of this atmosphere in the movement.

Based on the interviews, it seems like the activists are ready to talk a lot more about these issues in such a semi-private setting than to write about it publicly online. Indeed, almost all of these women showed some level of understanding of existing gender inequalities in Czechia, but few felt the need to do something about it or to use their voice to tackle them. When I suggested to Jana Volfová that she might not want to publish information about sexual violence in Czechia, she was countered with the argument that she had introduced legal changes against domestic violence as a deputy and that she had helped set up two shelters for battered wives. Without wanting to belittle those achievement, it is still noticeable to underline that, while these women's engagement against Islam and refugees is very public, their feminist, or pro-women views and engagement are a lot less. Perhaps I received part of the answer at the end of the interview with Jana Volfová, when a fellow activist of the BPI joined as I was leaving, and he commented on one of my questions about feminism that "feminism is just like Nazism"...

While many of the claims made by the activists and presented in the present work might raise eyebrows, it is nevertheless important to consider these views as genuine in order to honestly engage with these activists' involvement in the movement. Indeed, as feminist standpoint theory argues, one needs to find a balance between acknowledging the respondent's words as representative of her own location and experience on the one hand, and critically assessing the respondent's position of power and the truth claims on the other hand (Andrews, 2002, p.61). Thus, while I accept the activists' discourses against Islam and refugee/migrant/Muslims as located within their particular social and personal contexts, I nevertheless question the way in which the activists have been, according to me, misusing their relative position of power in society to engage in what is often hateful propaganda against a group of persons.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I looked at the ways the Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement's discourses of national/ethnic/racial/religious inclusion and exclusion rely on gender and sexuality. Doing so, I focused on the issues of sexism and sexual violence in these discourses through the study of online material pertaining to two important events that triggered many discussions on these issues: the 2015/2016 New Year's Eve mass sexual assaults in Cologne and elsewhere and the 2017 #MeToo campaign. Through the qualitative analysis of online material published by prominent women activists of the Czech anti-Islam / anti-refugee movement on these events and of interviews that I realised with each of them, I showed the way in which the activists often articulate discourses gendering racism, i.e. focusing negative views on men, and racialise sexism, i.e. present sexism as the racial 'Other''s problem.

When it comes to the NYE assaults, the activists thus often (re)produce the image of the dangerous, homogeneous group of refugees/migrants/Muslims wreaking havoc in Western Europe. In these discourses, the culprits are gendered as male and endowed with a young age, and they commit all sorts of crimes, including sexual crimes, with local (European) women as their prime victims. In order to explain the NYE assaults and these crimes in general, the activists resort to different sorts of discourses, which often essentialise and racialise the refugees/migrants/Muslims by presenting them as holders of certain immutable and/or inborn cultural or religious characteristics. The result is to present the refugee/migrant/Muslim as endowed with certain immutable characteristics, including a threatening 'Muslim' sexuality, that turn him into a double security threat: as both a terrorist and a rapist.

When it comes to #MeToo, the interviews proved fruitful to better understand the role of sexism and sexual violence in these articulation of 'Self' and 'Other'. Thus, while they activists did not deny the existence of sexism and/or sexual violence in Czechia, they qualified it differently and often relativised it. Moreover, during discussions of the #MeToo campaign denouncing the universal problem of sexual harassment and sexual violence committed by men against women, the comparison with sexual crimes committed by refugees/migrants/Muslims sometimes come up, showing the way in which these problems are racialised. Thus, in addition to the sexualisation of racism, as I have shown in relation to the NYE assaults, there is also a certain racialisation of sexism in the activists' discourses. Indeed, the activists often present sexism, gender inequality, sexual harassment and gender-based (sexual) violence as mostly the refugees/migrants/Muslims' problems. Thus, they pit the images of the misogynist refugee/migrant/Muslim man and of the oppressed refugee/migrant/Muslim woman against the image of (greater) gender equality in Czechia.

Finally, I also touched on the activists' gendered subjectivity to explain their political involvement. As they explain it, their feminist beliefs and/or gender issues such as Islam's alleged systemic misogyny did come into play, alongside with the idea of motherhood. Nevertheless, it is hard to fully understand the extent to which these ideas are presented by the activists as symbolic meanings to make sense of their anti-Islam / anti-refugee views, and also the full workings making them present different issues in public. Thus, while I argue that their activism can be seen as a form of femonationalism, whereby their own feminist beliefs are rather played down as support for the idea of gender equality, more research is necessary to better understand the way woman's gender and woman's belonging to the nation interact, and make her invest her energies in a particular political movement.

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
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APPENDIX

A. "View of public opinion [in Czechia] about the welcoming of refugees from countries afflicted by an armed conflict – time comparison" ("Proti přijímání uprchlíků je téměř," 2017)



Dark blue: "Yes, we should accept them and let them settle here"

Light blue: "Yes, we should accept them until they will be able to return to their country of origin"

Red: "No, we shouldn't accept refugees"

Grey: "Doesn't know"

B. Post by the *Naštvané Matky* (December 28, 2015) with a long text on Sweden's problems with refugees/migrants/Muslims, starting in the following way before listing all the alleged issues.

"Sweden – the dream of many migrants. Sweden (10 million inhabitants) took up this year more than 160,000 migrants. AT ONE POINT long time ago, there as a safe social state called Sweden, where people only rarely locked their doors..."



ABOVE: "Many Swedes look at mass immigration like an involuntary and forced marriage: the Swedish land is forced to take a man without having a choice, but it is nevertheless expected from her that she will love such a husband and respect him, even if he beats her and treats her badly. And on top of that, her parents (the government) tells her that she has to be warm-hearted and solidary to him.

BELOW: "SWEDEN AND IMMIGRATION"

C. Post by the Naštvané Matky (December 30, 2015)



ABOVE: "Sexual relations with goats are normal in Afghanistan" DOWN: "How are Afghan refugees going to deal with that in Europe?" D. Post by Eva Hrindová (January 17, 2016) with the following comment:

"We won't yield! I refuse to accept that I have to tolerate a culture who treats women as inferior beings. I refuse to tolerate a culture in which a woman must veil herself in order not to arouse men. Islam does not belong in Europe and whoever is ready to tolerate Islam - even after the violent deeds in Germany – is not competent to influence the course of society :-)"



ABOVE: "CZECH WOMEN WILL NOT BE GAME!! Muslims in Europe are led to violence on women by their upbringing. Islam leads them to despise women. CZECH WOMEN SAY NO! They won't let themselves be groped and raped by frustrated Muslims just in order to show how they understand other cultures.

Je nás ve společnosti 50% a silou 50% si zvolíme politiky, kteří nás ochrání před invazí barbarské kultury do České republiky. Rozumné ženy volí silné politiky, ne slabochy, kteří se schovávají za multi-kulti!

> NAŠTVANÉ MATKY Eva Hrindová - BPI

BELOW: "WE WILL DEFEND OURSELVES! We are 50% of society and with this 50% force we will elect politicians who will defend us from the invasion of Czechia by a barbarian culture. Wise women elect strong politicians, not weaklings who hide behind multi-kulti!"

E. Post by the Naštvané Matky (January 9, 2018) with the following comment:

"Hollywood celebrities are playing solidarity. They found themselves a theme (MeToo) and are moved by themselves. They should come dressed in these black clothes to support women who are really sexually harassed, such as those who were gang raped in the last days or those who were attacked by Pakistani sexual (*sic*) gangs in Rotherham.

Hypocrisy, stupidity and fanatism are uniting all women in black on the red carpet."

