

‘Non-interference’ with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Influence in Foreign Intrastate Conflicts

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Abstract

Chinese foreign policy has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, given its rapidly growing military power and economic integration with the international community. Among academics, one of the more contentiously debated aspects of its foreign policy is its principle of ‘non-interference.’ Literature thus far has been inconclusive regarding China’s adherence to this self-imposed principle. This paper attempts to contribute to this scholarly discussion by examining whether China adheres to the principle of ‘non-interference.’ It does so by examining if Chinese support for rebel organization leads to violence against civilians. This analysis stems from previous literature, which indicates external support from a non-democratic foreign patron leads to violence against civilians. The relationship is examined within the framework of the principal-agent theory. Given this theoretical foundation, I perform quantitative analysis of the hypothesis by adopting the general methodology of Salehyan et al. With zero-inflated negative binomial regression, I show that there is good empirical support that Chinese support for rebel groups leads to violence against civilians, at least in countries where China is involved.

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Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ANC	African National Congress
ARSA	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
COW	Correlates of War
CPB	Communist Party of Burma
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MID	Militarized Interstate Disputes (dataset)
NDB	New Development Bank
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
NSA	Non-State Actors in Civil Wars (dataset)
PRC	People's Republic of China
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program (dataset)
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
VNGO	Violent non-governmental organization
ZINB	Zero-inflated Negative Binomial

Introduction

In the past four decades, the People's Republic of China's (PRC) rapid development has attracted attention from policymakers and scholars the world over. This attention to China's growing economic and political integration into the international community has aroused both admiration and suspicion among observers. Among the topics of contention is the way China interacts with foreign states. Essentially, observers seek evidence regarding China's nature, and whether its behavior aligns with its official policies to see how China will behave once it becomes a great power.

Central to its foreign policy is the foundational principle of 'non-interference.' This principle was enshrined in official government foreign policy through the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1954. This policy calls for the "mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence."¹ Scholars evaluating Chinese foreign policy must look for evidence as to whether China is adhering to this formational principle.

This research paper seeks to provide a quantitative analysis of the PRC foreign policy of 'non-interference' vis-à-vis its activities in foreign states. The fact that there is no widely-accepted definition of interference in international relations scholarship has led to widely divergent analyses of the PRC's behavior. I address some of the previous literature, and propose that despite the lack of a widely-accepted definition for interference among scholars and policymakers debating the subject, we can observe baseline criteria that are indisputably negative and tangible. The baseline criterion I choose is one-sided intentional civilian killings

¹ Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction* (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2013., 2013), 7.

by rebel groups as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).² I use this baseline criterion because it is an unquestionably negative effect of interference. I employ datasets from the UCDP and the Non-State Actors (NSA) dataset.³ With counts of civilian killings as my response variable, I use Chinese support for rebel groups as my explanatory variable. Given the previous literature regarding the principal-agent framework, which suggests rebel groups who are supported by non-democratic foreign regimes are more likely to engage in violence against civilians, it is reasonable to think Chinese support for rebel organizations will have the same outcome.

My paper tests for this apparent correlation with a research question: *What is the relationship between Chinese support for rebel groups in foreign intrastate conflicts and the level of violence against civilians?*⁴ If, as I suspect, there is a relationship between these two variables, then this research will not only add to the existing principal-agent scholarship but will also contribute to the scholarly debate regarding the nature of Chinese foreign activities and its adherence to its policy of ‘non-interference.’

I establish my argument in the first chapter. This chapter will review some of the literature debating Chinese foreign policy and show some of the disagreements over Chinese activity and accusations of interference in the domestic affairs of foreign countries. Following that I describe, through scholarship of intrastate conflict and insurgencies, the importance of

² The definition of one-sided violence against civilians as used by the UCDP dataset is the deliberate and direct targeting of civilians by governments or non-state groups. Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, “One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data,” *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (March 1, 2007): 233–46, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307075124>.

³ “UCDP Dataset Download Center,” accessed May 20, 2018, <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/>; David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (August 1, 2009): 570–97, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709336458>; David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, “Non-State Actors in Civil Wars: A New Dataset,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30, no. 5 (November 1, 2013): 516–31, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213499673>.

⁴ While this paper looks at intrastate wars, readers are right to question why this paper does not focus on issues like the South China Sea or the issue of Taiwan. It is important to note that these issues, along with the issues surrounding Tibet and Xinjiang, are considered domestic issues from the Chinese point of view. This dynamic would not be conducive towards the aims of this research.

external support to rebel groups engaged in conflict. Furthermore, I connect external support to rebel group behavior through literature on the principal-agent relationship. Finally, I survey some of the literature on one indisputably negative effect of intrastate conflict: violence against civilians.

In the second chapter, I discuss the lack of consensus among scholars regarding the definition of "interference," and how this can be measured using the principal-agent framework and a baseline indicator of interference that is indisputable. This indicator is one-sided violence against civilians in foreign intrastate conflicts. Given the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, I use the findings to show the logical and theoretical basis for my research question and hypothesis. I explain how the findings of Idean Salehyan, David Siroky and Reed M. Wood in their article titled, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities," are central to the development of my hypothesis.⁵ Essentially, their investigation reveals evidence of a relationship between non-democratic support of rebel organizations and the amount of violence against civilians the groups engage in. Given that China is a non-democratic state, my hypothesis thus becomes: *Ceteris paribus, when rebel groups in an intrastate conflict are supported by China, those rebel groups are more likely to kill civilians.*

In the third chapter I explain how I adopt the methodology used by Salehyan et al. to assess my hypothesis,⁶ after which I explain the choice and parameters of the three datasets employed for statistical analysis of the hypothesis. I then explain why I perform the statistical analysis with the zero-inflated negative binomial regression instead of the method employed by Salehyan et al., who use a negative binomial regression. Using the same datasets as originally used by Salehyan et al., I discover that there is no statistically significant relationship

⁵ Idean Salehyan, David Siroky, and Reed M. Wood, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities," *INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION* 68, no. 3 (SUM 2014): 633–61.

⁶ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood.

between Chinese support for rebel groups and the level of violence against civilians. However, I propose using the same dataset, but limited to countries in which China has supported *any* rebel organization between 1989 and 2009. Surprisingly, a zero-inflated negative binomial regression on this new ‘limited-location’ subset of the original dataset shows a positive significant effect of Chinese support for the rebel groups on civilian killings. The result supports the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between Chinese support for rebel groups and civilian killings, but only in those countries in the limited-locations. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to discussing the results.

Finally, I review my contribution to the literature and conclude with some remarks on the outcome of this research. I then offer some suggestions for further research.

Chapter 1

China, Intrastate Conflict and the Principal-Agent Relationship

One cannot fully understand civil conflicts without noting the pervasiveness of external support for [rebel groups].”⁷

Understanding Chinese Foreign Policy

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) increasing economic, political and environmental global footprint has caused many to seriously evaluate its foreign policy. The radical shift in economic policy since the death of Mao Zedong, followed by Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “Reform and Opening,” has ushered in a new era of Chinese international presence. What had once been a hermit kingdom became a force that is inextricably intertwined with the international economic and political landscape. The greatest impact of this rapid change is on developing countries, especially those that are resource rich and eager for Chinese loans and infrastructure projects.

It is worth noting the degree to which Chinese interests abroad have changed in the period after the Reform and Opening, especially that which occurred following the end of the Cold War. China’s GDP grew from US\$178.2 billion in 1979 to US\$11,200 billion in 2016 (both current USD).⁸ As China’s growth necessitated further integration into the international

⁷ Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” *International Organization* 65, no. 4 (2011): 710.

⁸ “UNCTAD | World Investment Report 2017: Annex Tables,” accessed March 20, 2018, <http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx>.

economy, Chinese interests abroad—both economic and political—have increased dramatically. To fully appreciate this change, one noteworthy statistic shows Chinese FDI outflows in 2016, valued at US\$183.1 billion, were greater than the entire country's GDP at the start of the Reform and Opening period in 1979.⁹

China's recent history under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has many in the international community, and particularly in the West, concerned over what may become of the PRC's rise to great power status and role as leader in the world.¹⁰ While some of their concern comes from the authoritarian nature of the government in Beijing along with regular violations of human rights, many are concerned with how the PRC is engaging with others as their economic prowess grows and deepens its economic integration with much of the international community.

Their reaction comes at the heels of recent global initiative such as the Chinese-led Eurasian development strategy known as the Belt and Road Initiative. And it is through this massive initiative that China is increasing its integration into the global economy. Within the scope of this ambitious project, the Chinese have created institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) that appear to many as direct challenges to Western-led institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Through these projects and institutions, the Chinese government is conducting business with many who would otherwise be considered unsavory business partners by Western leaders.¹¹ Critics of China's global economic expansionism have pointed to the advent of Chinese engagement in 'debt-trap diplomacy'—

⁹ "UNCTAD | World Investment Report 2017: Annex Tables."

¹⁰ "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status on JSTOR," accessed May 29, 2018, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/20031702?casa_token=H1IC1xkz6-](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20031702?casa_token=H1IC1xkz6-8AAAAA:4hHlJl3UVW_A2rUgykxbBMhCWnkhPehLosFUwnDth27iTsAEYvGB90m8bEs1bq5mjxddWxTRWlr-atD6vh0E-I_8P7vQe17_KHfS8g-fWMydOnbJxiQ&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)

[8AAAAA:4hHlJl3UVW_A2rUgykxbBMhCWnkhPehLosFUwnDth27iTsAEYvGB90m8bEs1bq5mjxddWxTRWlr-atD6vh0E-I_8P7vQe17_KHfS8g-fWMydOnbJxiQ&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20031702?casa_token=H1IC1xkz6-8AAAAA:4hHlJl3UVW_A2rUgykxbBMhCWnkhPehLosFUwnDth27iTsAEYvGB90m8bEs1bq5mjxddWxTRWlr-atD6vh0E-I_8P7vQe17_KHfS8g-fWMydOnbJxiQ&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).

¹¹ Mingjiang Li, "Rising from Within: China's Search for a Multilateral World and Its Implications for Sino-US Relations," *Global Governance*, no. 3 (2011): 331.

the idea that the Chinese are engaging in unscrupulous lending practices in which they lend massive amounts of money to developing countries with no hope of repaying their debts, rendering them politically vulnerable to the whims of Chinese leaders.¹² Countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Pakistan, Laos, Cambodia and others have risked some political autonomy through deals made with Beijing. Nevertheless, all of this is being done in the namesake of ‘win-win’ diplomacy.¹³

Observers have increasingly pressed for knowledge and understanding of China’s record on foreign policy, particularly since the Trump administration has acted in ways that suggest a relinquishing of some of America’s leadership in a global market economy in favor of protectionism. At the same time, conversely, Xi Jinping leads China as it begins its ascent to global leadership. The consequences of these developments could potentially be profound for the international order as we know it. Yet, it is difficult to determine how this massive change will occur without understanding the true nature of China. In the field of international relations, scholars must do their best to understand how China has historically interacted with other nations in order to appreciate the meaning of China as a ‘new great power.’

Explicitly, China’s foreign policy has largely remained consistent since the early days of the PRC’s establishment. The purpose of its policy of ‘non-interference’ is to reassure foreign countries of China’s intentions, as well as to ensure foreign respect for its own domestic affairs. The policy is frequently used in conjunction with rhetoric, part of which draws on

¹² Tara Francis Chan, “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy Reaches the Philippines, Which Is Likely to Accept Chinese Loans 1,100% More Expensive than Other Options,” *Business Insider*, accessed May 29, 2018, <http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy-hits-philippines-with-exorbitant-loans-2018-3>; Jon Connors, “Djibouti the Latest to Fall Victim to China’s ‘Debt Trap Diplomacy,’” accessed May 29, 2018, <http://www.atimes.com/djibouti-latest-fall-victim-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/>; hermes, “Chinese Port Project Could Land Myanmar in Debt Trap,” *Text*, *The Straits Times*, May 13, 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/chinese-port-project-could-land-myanmar-in-debt-trap>; “China’s Global Trade Plan Is Piling Huge Debt on Smaller Nations,” accessed May 29, 2018, <http://money.cnn.com/2018/03/05/news/economy/china-belt-road-debt-pakistan-laos/index.html>.

¹³ “China’s ‘Win-Win’ Cooperation: Unpacking the Impact of Infrastructure-for-Resources Deals in Africa: South African Journal of International Affairs: Vol 20, No 2,” accessed May 29, 2018, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2013.811337>.

mutually-shared histories with the Global South, of victimization through colonization, and by ‘othering’ the West.¹⁴ Aside from the foreign policy usage of this rhetoric, China's domestic policy is impacted by the continued narrative of China’s “century of humiliation”—roughly the period of time from the Opium Wars to the defeat of the Guomindang and the subsequent establishment of the PRC—to spur nationalism among the domestic masses. Furthermore, through the discourse surrounding the “century of humiliation”, China conjures an image of itself as a brother with former colonies, in shared subjugation to Western cruelty.¹⁵ Chinese officials extend this argument by asserting that the current international order was designed by Western powers for their benefit, and thus largely to the detriment of much of the developing world. This rhetoric has been particularly effective in countries that have been ostracized by the West, such as Sudan, Myanmar, Angola, Zimbabwe and North Korea.¹⁶ China has promoted itself both politically and economically while othering the West. From an economic perspective, the so-called “Beijing Consensus” has proven to be a viable solution for funding that some countries otherwise would not have been able to obtain through the Washington Consensus.¹⁷ China, the alternative power, has used these tactics to gain international support for a number of its own interests, not the least of which is recognition as the legitimate authority of China over Taipei.

To deter international criticism of its own authoritarian governance practices, the CCP attempts to control the normative discourse regarding the nature of interference and what actions constitute it.¹⁸ In doing so, the CCP equates revisionism with interference and

¹⁴ “China’s Foreign Policy Debates | European Union Institute for Security Studies,” accessed March 21, 2018, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/chinas-foreign-policy-debates>.

¹⁵ Orville Schell, “To Forget or Remember? China’s Struggle With Its Past,” *WASHINGTON QUARTERLY* 39, no. 3 (FAL 2016): 143–57.

¹⁶ Julia C. Strauss, “The Past in the Present: Historical and Rhetorical Lineages in China’s Relations with Africa,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 199 (2009): 777, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741009990208>.

¹⁷ Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (Foreign Policy Centre London, 2004); Yasheng Huang, “Debating China’s Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or The Washington Consensus,” *The Academy of Management Perspectives* 24, no. 2 (May 1, 2010): 31–47.

¹⁸ Julia C. Strauss, “The Past in the Present.”

maintenance of the status quo with non-interference. In practice, the CCP attempts to legitimize this claim by maintaining the status quo through support of foreign authoritarian regimes, with the expectation that those regimes will reciprocate by their recognition and support of the PRC.¹⁹ Yet it is the very support for these regimes that enables and emboldens their dictators to regularly commit crimes against humanity, and to have little concern for retaliation from the rest of the international community.²⁰

Absent from the scholarly analysis of Chinese foreign policy is a consensus among academics as to the exact nature of interference. There is no clear answer to the question of what ‘interference’ is, and therefore what types of actions exemplify interference. A thorough and rational discussion can only be accomplished when the parties have agreed on terminology. Chinese academics themselves seem unsure of the definition, and have sought practical flexibility with terms such as “creative/constructive involvement.”²¹ Furthermore, scant scholarship analyzes the perceptions of the natives within the society in which China is acting, about China’s interference. The lack of consensus on both terminology and actions has predictably resulted in a variety of different conclusions on the nature of Chinese interests vis-à-vis its policy of non-interference. Are scholars to analyze China’s foreign policy through the CCP’s conceptions of interference? Or should scholars analyze it through a different set of criteria? The criteria should include the viewpoint of nations that host the Chinese, as they will ultimately decide if China’s initial intervention has evolved into interference. China cannot be the sole party defining terms.

¹⁹ Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, *China’s Search for Security* (New York : Columbia University Press, c2012, 2012).

²⁰ Ian Taylor, *China’s New Role in Africa* (Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010, n.d.); Daniel Large, “China & the Contradictions of ‘Non-Interference’ in Sudan,” *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 115 (March 1, 2008): 93–106, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240802011568>; Jing Men and Benjamin Barton, *China and the European Union in Africa : Partners or Competitors?* (Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT : Ashgate Pub. Co., c2010, n.d.).

²¹ Chen Zheng, “China Debates the Non-Interference Principle,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 349–74, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow010>.

Interference is neither a static nor settled concept because of the variability in its definition, the variable application of the definition and, in what I believe to be the essence of the concept, the variable effects of said application rather than simply of the action itself. Therefore, in order to analyze whether an action should be considered interference, one should look at the effects of that action from the perspective of the party (country/population) on the receiving end of those actions. An old saying, of unknown origin, which illustrates my position, to wit, “it depends upon whose ox is being gored,” which means that a given action will be seen differently depending on the degree to which the self-interests of the involved parties are affected. Within the context of Chinese foreign policy, the CCP has endeavored to remain consistent in its rhetoric despite the smorgasbord of popular reactions to its activities in foreign countries.

Some scholarship maintains that the PRC has largely adhered to its principle of non-interference.²² However, research has recently demonstrated what appears to be the converse, that the PRC has, in fact, interfered in foreign intrastate conflicts throughout its history.²³ As evidence to support this, I note that since the inception of the PRC, the Chinese government has supported a number of organizations with revolutionary aims that ultimately disrupted the status quo in foreign countries. This support has included the offering of assistance to some of the ‘hardest’ revolutionary activity throughout the world, although primarily in its immediate periphery in places such as Vietnam, Korea, Indonesia, Laos, Malaya, Burma, and Thailand.²⁴

²² For discussions on China’s adherence to the principle of non-interference, see: Wang Jisi, ‘International Relations Theory and the study of Chinese Foreign Policy. A Chinese Perspective,’ in Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Studies on Contemporary China (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 481-505; “Re-Interpreting China’s Non-Intervention Policy towards Myanmar: Leverage, Interest and Intervention: Journal of Contemporary China: Vol 18, No 61,” accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670560903033901>.

²³ Mordechai Chaziza and Ogen S. Goldman, “Revisiting China’s Non-Interference Policy towards Intrastate Wars,” *CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS* 7, no. 1 (SPR 2014): 89–115.

²⁴ “138. Editorial Note - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976 - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” accessed March 18, 2018,

Motivation for this support largely stemmed from the competition for influence in the Third World between the United States and Soviet Union, as well as between the Soviet Union and the PRC. A comparative analysis of the interference by UNSC members in foreign intrastate wars shows that the PRC supported more violent non-governmental organizations (VNGOs) than any of the other UNSC members.²⁵ When the PRC intervenes on behalf of a VNGO, it does so by simultaneously interfering with the aims of the host government. Therefore, the idea that the Chinese invariably adhered to its principle of non-interference, even prior to fall of the Soviet Union and with assertions posited by scholarship, the facts on the ground would suggest otherwise.

While the interests of the PRC have always had a global aspect, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the massive growth of Chinese economy henceforth signaled a fundamental change in its global interests. Following the Cold War, the PRC became much more concerned with securing its economic interests abroad and acted accordingly. The idea that Chinese interests were globalized only after its integration into the global economy following the policy of Reform and Opening is a false narrative. Nevertheless, it is worth examining the nature of Chinese interference since the end of the Cold War.

Intrastate Conflicts

Throughout history, insurgencies and intrastate conflicts have taken horrific tolls on societies around the globe. The Chinese Civil War claimed approximately 7.5 million lives;²⁶ the Russian Civil War claimed nearly 7 million lives;²⁷ and the Taiping Rebellion resulted in

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d138>; Chaziza and Goldman, “Revisiting China’s Non-Interference Policy towards Intrastate Wars.”

²⁵ Chaziza and Goldman, “Revisiting China’s Non-Interference Policy towards Intrastate Wars.”

²⁶ Cao Shuji, “Zhongguo Renkou Shi (A History of Chinese Population),” *Volume 5* (2001): 832.

²⁷ “Highest Death Toll from a Civil War,” Guinness World Records, accessed November 23, 2017, <http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/highest-death-toll-from-a-civil-war>.

approximately 20 million deaths.²⁸ These conflicts aren't a thing of the past, as events of ongoing civil wars in Syria, Somalia, Iraq, the Philippines, and Libya—to name just some—are evidence to support this claim. The violence of these conflicts can split societies in ways that generally do not occur in the same manner as interstate struggles. In insurgencies and intrastate conflicts, the entirety of the clashes is within the borders of the state that is undergoing the civil war. This results in widespread destruction throughout countries, especially when urban guerrilla warfare is involved. One only needs to look at the aforementioned intrastate conflicts to see the extent of destructive havoc that is wrought. Additionally, through those examples we can see the importance that intrastate *guerre* has for the study of international relations, because in many cases outside actors become involved. Furthermore, the impact of violent engagements is at times not limited to the affected state, as they can create regional instability through, for example, refugee and violence outflows. These spillovers of violence are therefore a concern to regional and international actors, as they have the potential to threaten neighboring countries. Academics in several disciplines have attempted to determine the causes of intrastate conflicts.

Following World War II, literature that addressed the issue of insurgencies and intrastate conflicts increased substantially. The American military interventions in Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq further added impetus for the study in this field, with emphasis on counterinsurgency. David Galula, one of the more prominent scholars of counterinsurgency and one who has recognized the importance of the civilian population to the outcome of a conflict, suggests in his book *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, that protecting the people and winning their hearts and minds was an important aspect of winning a war, whether it be from the side of the insurgency or the counterinsurgency.²⁹ More recently, the US

²⁸ Shuji, “Zhongguo Renkou Shi (A History of Chinese Population).”

²⁹ David Galula and John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Warfare : Theory and Practice*, PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era (Westport, CT : Praeger Security International, c2006., 2006).

Army recognized the importance of external support in its manual on counterinsurgency, which says “access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies.”³⁰

The importance of outside support was not lost on the earliest leaders of the Communist revolutionary movement in China. Indeed, Mao Zedong was reliant on support from the Soviets from the time of his earliest political ambitions to the establishment of the PRC.³¹ Red China’s success and the subsequent realization of the importance of external support were manifested in its support for foreign insurgent movements. Chinese support for the Vietminh and the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) was crucial in sustaining the insurgency. Galula addresses this and remarked that until the PRC began supporting the Vietminh in 1950, “they had been unable to develop their forces and to stage large-scale operations...[and] would not have been able to raise a powerful regular army without Chinese aid.”³² The US military acknowledges the importance of external support to rebels in intrastate through their statement that, “access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies.”³³

Yet proper analyses of intrastate conflicts, including the decision for foreign actors to become involved in them, have been hindered by over-emphasizing the characteristics of the civil war rather than the qualities of the actors involved.³⁴ Recently, literature has addressed this method by first approaching research from an actor-centric standpoint.³⁵ However, this method has not proven sufficient, and further studies have gone past the simple

³⁰ U. S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth: <http://leav-www.army.mil>, “Army Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency,” November 30, 2006, <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=468442>.

³¹ Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (New York: Knopf, 2005).

³² Galula and Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 41.

³³ <http://leav-www.army.mil>, “Army Field Manual 3-24.”

³⁴ The shortcomings of the scholarship are discussed in Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups.”

³⁵ Michael G. Findley and Tze Kwang Teo, “Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor-Centric Approach,” *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 828–37, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00473.x>.

rebel/government dichotomy.³⁶ This dichotomy is limiting because there are intrastate conflicts in which more than one insurgent group can be simultaneously engaged with the government. Exploring this dynamic is crucial for proper analyses of external support for rebels, because foreign actors may choose to support some but not all the rebels. For example, in the intrastate conflict in Myanmar, China has supported the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) but not the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). We can see the same dynamic in the case of the Colombian civil conflict in which Cuba supported the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) but not the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). Therefore, it is important to understand what external supporters look for when supporting a rebel group, and at the same time attempt to understand the expectations of the foreign patron from the side of the rebel. This assertion supports the scholarly research of Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and David Cunningham, whose collaborative work claims “two things must happen [in the external support process]: (1) an external state must be willing to support the group (supply); and (2) the group must be willing to accept that support (demand).³⁷ These authors then employ what has traditionally been an economic theory, the principal-agent relationship.

In recent times, external support has been viewed under the theoretical framework of the principal-agent relationship. This relationship, and its importance to rebels in an intrastate conflict, is acknowledged, although not explicitly, in *US Army Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, which states countries from neighboring states and those from outside the region “seeking political or economic influence can also support insurgencies.”³⁸ The process of external support is accomplished through the principal-agent relationship. Understanding

³⁶ Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, no. 3 (2010): 493; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups”; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, “External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse.”

³⁷ Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” 711.

³⁸ <http://leav-www.army.mil>, “Army Field Manual 3-24.”

the principal-agent framework is necessary for understanding why foreign patrons decide to support rebel groups in foreign intrastate conflicts.

Principal-Agent Relationship

The principal-agent relationship was initially introduced to the field of international relations to examine international institutions and their relationships with the state. One of the seminal works on this issue was penned by Hawkins et al. in their 2006 book, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.³⁹ In their examination of the principal-agent relationship between states and international organizations, they recognize that states (the principals) seek international organizations (the agents) to delegate tasks through the logic of comparative advantage and specialization. They write, “Without some gains from specialization, there is little reason to delegate anything to anybody.”⁴⁰ By delegating a task to an agent, the principal expects that the return will be greater than what the principal could achieve with its own capabilities. This is not to say that the principal-agent relationship is without flaws or is not problematic. In some cases, states may delegate to an agent that is less competent or efficient than it would be if it had undertaken the task itself. There are cases in which principals have a nefarious objective; and in those situations, the principal has alternative reasons to delegate to an agent, such as when the principal wishes to eliminate traces of its role in the actions of said agents. This is less common among licit principal-agent relationships in which international organizations seek to improve governance. Nevertheless, any type of delegation, whether licit or illicit, is comprised of a principal and an agent, where there is a relationship in which the latter is acting on behalf of the former.

³⁹ Darren G. Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006, 2006).

⁴⁰ Hawkins, 13.

The principal-agent relationship as a phenomenon in international relations was evaluated by Byman and Kreps in their seminal examination of state-sponsored terrorism.⁴¹ These authors make some important observations when it comes to the principal-agent relationship, particularly when it comes to relationships in which actors engage in illicit activities. In the case of state-sponsored terrorism, they note, principals (states) may delegate to agents (terrorists) when the latter has special skills within the realm of unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare can have added benefits when it comes to effectiveness by allowing the attacker to penetrate deep into the target's defenses with few traces (if any at all) to the principal.

Delegation is also important as a means for the principal to garner credibility from its allies and its enemies, in ways that it would not normally be able to do on its own. For instance, if it cannot reasonably wage war on an enemy for a transgression, the principal may enlist the services of a terrorist organization to "punish" its enemy as a means of maintaining its credibility. This reasoning is further amplified when you consider that the attacked state may not have sufficient evidence to retaliate against the principal. In that case, the principal is spared from what otherwise would have been a costly attack, while simultaneously showing that it is an effective delegator and possibly a powerful actor in the international community. If the attacked state does, indeed, retaliate against the principal, then the principal is no worse off had they attacked directly. A risk calculation on the part of the principal will take these factors into consideration, when deciding whether or not to delegate.

Another reason for delegating terrorism, according to Byman and Kreps, is to ensure that the wishes of the principal will still be carried out even if the principal loses its power and influence.⁴² This can happen when both the principal and agent have policies and values that

⁴¹ Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, "Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism," *International Studies Perspectives*, no. 1 (2010): 1.

⁴² Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, 4.

are aligned so that the agent will continue to pursue a set of objectives regardless of the relative power of the principal, thus amplifying the power of the principal.

The importance of ideology is particularly significant when it comes to state-sponsored terrorism and other illicit activities. While principal-agent theorists generally posit that most licit principal-agent relationships are generally concerned with reducing transaction costs and creating higher economic utility on behalf of the principal, there are cases in which motivations for delegation have more to do with principles or ideas than with purely rationalizing economic value increases.⁴³ This is particularly the case when it comes to state-sponsored terrorism. According to Byman and Kreps, in “state support for terrorism, the ideological driver behind the relationship cannot be overstated.”⁴⁴

A well-known example of a relationship between a principal and an agent that shared ideological foundations is that of the Taliban’s support for Al Qaeda prior to September 11th. Al Qaeda, the terrorist group, was supported financially and militarily by the Taliban, the dominant regime in Afghanistan. For these reasons, the relationship was beneficial for the Taliban from a value standpoint. However, following the Al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya as well as the embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the U.S. government began pursuing Osama bin Laden and soon requested that the Taliban hand him over. The Taliban refused, incurring the displeasure of the U.S. while jeopardizing their relationship as well as the support the Taliban received from Saudi Arabia. Despite the Taliban’s precarious relations with the U.S., they continued to support Al Qaeda. The foundation of this relationship was a common belief in certain Islamic values. Taliban leadership felt that Al Qaeda’s promotion of Islamic fundamentalism abroad was in line with the domestic aims of the Taliban in Afghanistan. This relationship, nevertheless, ultimately

⁴³ Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, 5.

⁴⁴ Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, 5.

proved more problematic than was worth it for the Taliban following the September 11th attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by U.S.- led forces.

There are some important shortcomings of the principal-agent relationship as evidenced through the relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. For one, we can clearly see that delegating can sometimes create or reveal conflicts between the principals and the agents to whom they delegate. When delegation is ineffective or when the agent behaves in a manner unsanctioned by the principal, these are known as “agency losses.”⁴⁵ It was abundantly clear that this was the case for the Taliban and Al Qaeda because the Taliban demanded notification from Al Qaeda prior to undertaking any attacks—which they elected not to do in their preparation for the September 11th attacks. The repercussions for this ‘agency loss’ were massive for the Taliban.

One of the outstanding aspects of an illicit principal-agent relationship that is not readily evident in licit principal-agent relationships, according to Byman and Kreps, is the benefit of plausible deniability.⁴⁶ A traditional military attack is a clear provocation against one state by another with no deniability. Yet, when the attack is performed through an agent, the connection between the principal and the attack is not readily evident. Due to the lack of evidence, it becomes much more difficult to justify a retaliatory strike on the principal. One illustrative example cited by the authors was an attack by Saudi Hezbollah in Saudi Arabia that resulted in 19 American deaths. Despite U.S. government belief in the orchestration and supervision of the attack by Tehran, the U.S. was not able to establish Iran’s culpability. In the time it took to do so, political support for any retaliation waned considerably.⁴⁷ If Iran had not launched the attacks through a proxy, but rather attacked themselves, the likelihood that the U.S. would have

⁴⁵ Mathew D. McCubbins and D. Roderick Kiewiet, *The Logic of Delegation : Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process*, American Politics and Political Economy (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1991, n.d.).

⁴⁶ Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, “Agents of Destruction?”

⁴⁷ Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps.

retaliated is much greater. Thus, it was highly beneficial for the Iranians to delegate the attack to an agent.

Delegation is not limited to state-sponsored terrorism. Another instance in which the principal-agent relationship is important for international relations is external support for rebels in intrastate conflicts. In recent years scholars have begun to examine why foreign states will involve themselves in a conflict taking place within foreign borders. Understanding that international conflict has traditionally been understood through a state-centric lens, one that biases proper analyses of conflict and development of theories, they therefore seek to understand why a state will choose indirect military involvement through a proxy rather than a direct military attack. For example, why would the United States decide to invade Iraq in 2003 and remove Saddam Hussein from leadership, but not remove the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria? In both cases, the U.S. could have employed the services of the Peshmerga and other insurgent groups following the outbreak of civil war, even when the regimes used chemical weapons against civilians. Scholars have sought to explain the outbreak of conflict through a few theoretical lenses that I will briefly address.

Realism, perhaps the oldest theoretical camp suggests the outbreak of war is due to the structure of the anarchic and Hobbesian international order, in which states seek power and material wealth. Among the most notable of the Realist theories is that of the “security dilemma.”⁴⁸ The Liberals also suggest that states respond to an anarchic international system, but one in which the outbreak of conflict and the use of force is restrained by domestic and

⁴⁸For realist theories on the outbreak of international conflict, see: Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958>; Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York : McGraw-Hill, c1979, n.d.); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (University of Chicago Press, 1981); John J. Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacifier,” *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 5 (2001): 46–61, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20050250>; Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” *Survival* 35, no. 1 (March 1, 1993): 27–47, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339308442672>; Esther Visser and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “The Irrelevance of the Security Dilemma for Civil Wars,” *Civil Wars* 16, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 65–85, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2014.904986>; Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (October 1997): 171.

international institutions.⁴⁹ Constructivists, a group of scholars that emphasize deep-seated rules and norms that govern an actor's behavior, have also examined the outbreak of intrastate conflicts with theories like the 'societal security dilemma.'⁵⁰ Among all the theoretical lenses used by scholars to examine the outbreak of conflict, there are some that have also employed quantitative analyses. In the end, however, these theories largely focus on the state in international conflicts and have generally overlooked the dynamics that lead to the outbreak of violence in intrastate conflicts. The implications of this study effects not only understanding of conflict but the prescription of policy solution for conflict management and peace-building.

One of the premier scholars on the subject of external support for rebels in intrastate conflicts is Idean Salehyan. Through his examinations of this phenomenon he employs the principal-agent theory. He starts by making an important distinction: in many cases, "external support for rebel groups is quite prevalent, and recognizing that support is properly understood as *indirect interstate* (emphasis original) conflict promises to open new doors for international relations scholars."⁵¹ This reconceptualization is important for not only understanding the principal-agent relationship in external support for rebels in intrastate conflicts, but also for understanding the nature of international conflict in the post-Westphalian international order.

⁴⁹ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 93, no. 4 (December 1999): 791–807, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2586113>; Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (December 1986): 1151–69, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400185041>; Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict," *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (ed 2001): 391–438, <https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180151140612>; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace," *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (ed 2001): 469–85, <https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180151140649>.

⁵⁰ Paul Roe, "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'?", *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 2 (1999): 183; Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Dynamic and Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict," *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (02/01/2011 2011): 511; Ali Bilgic, "Towards a New Societal Security Dilemma: Comprehensive Analysis of Actor Responsibility in Intersocietal Conflicts," *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 1 (January 2013): 185–208; John Richard Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," no. 4 (1996): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1996.0057>.

⁵¹ Idean Salehyan, "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations."

Salehyan first shows that while direct war between states is becoming less common, as other scholars attempt to show,⁵² that does not necessarily mean that levels of international conflict are decreasing. For example, Iran and Israel have not had direct interstate conflict, yet Iran has continued to support Hamas and Hezbollah in its fight against Israel as a means of waging indirect interstate conflict. In another acute example of indirect interstate conflict, South Africa and Mozambique engaged in a type of indirect international conflict as the South African government supported Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), while the Mozambique government supported the African National Congress (ANC) and its paramilitary wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). These countries were not directly engaged in interstate war yet were able to support violent groups in opposition to the states' opponents. These indirect interstate conflicts are not difficult to encounter, and in fact constitute a greater portion of the total number of conflicts than direct interstate conflicts.⁵³ Therefore, in order for scholars to have a more thorough understanding of the nature of conflict, it is reasonable for them to study the nature of external support and the accompanying principal-agent relationship.

Like state-sponsored terrorism, the motivation behind principal delegation towards agents engaged in intrastate conflict is to cut costs and reduce culpability. Traditionally, direct conflict with a state has heavy financial costs and loss of human lives. Additionally, there are indirect costs that come with attack, such as condemnation from the international community. This condemnation can lead to economic sanctions or even foreign intervention.⁵⁴ Given these concerns, states have few options at their disposal, according to Salehyan: "they can do nothing, attack with their own forces, entirely delegate conflict to a rebel organization, or pursue a

⁵² Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force," *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (ed 2001): 215–50, <https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180151140568>.

⁵³ Idean Salehyan, "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations."

⁵⁴ Scott Sigmund Gartner, "The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach," *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 1 (February 2008): 95–106, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055408080027>.

blended strategy where conflict occurs through direct and indirect means.”⁵⁵ Once a state weighs the costs of direct interstate conflict against waging indirect interstate conflict against a rival, the costs associated with delegating the violent engagement to a rebel organization can appear to be much less than directly launching an attack.

Aside from a regime seeking to reduce the obvious initial costs of waging a direct interstate conflict, it may also seek to delegate for other advantageous reasons. An invading force is unlikely to have the same local knowledge of the population and terrain that a domestic group has. Additionally, a foreign force is unlikely to have the same legitimacy as a domestic force, and therefore may not be tolerated by the local population. This factor further complicates post-war costs, such as governing a foreign population that is unwilling to be subjugated by a foreign regime, some of whom may decide to wage an insurgent war against the occupying force. Given these costs, delegating conflict to rebels in foreign intrastate conflicts can be a highly attractive alternative.

Partially delegating to an agent has its advantages, as well. It is possible that a regime will utilize a domestic group to weaken its opponent prior to launching a direct attack. Or, the state can employ the violence of a rebel force at the same time as launching its own attack to maximize short-term damage. A foreign state may also choose to delegate post-conflict tasks like assuming the responsibility of governing the territory. In any of these cases, the state is using an agent to shift some of the burden of its soldiers and utilize the advantages of domestic rebels. These advantages are not to imply that delegation cannot have significant costs.

The concept of agency loss, as described earlier in the state-sponsored terrorism principal-agent relationship, is also of concern to principals considering delegating conflict to foreign rebels. There are several primary reasons that delegation to an agent should be preceded by a cautionary pause. First, the principal may have difficulty knowing the nature and interests

⁵⁵ Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” 503.

of the agent due to lack of accurate information about the rebel group. A state may overestimate the fighting quality of the rebel group or their ideological commitment. Second, it is possible that the principal may give up tactical or strategic control to the agent that otherwise would have been available to the principal with a direct attack. Third, rebels may squander the financial and military support, or may not commit fully to the fight as expected by the principal. Finally, the agent may turn against the principal. These reasons represent either *adverse selection*, in which the principal chooses poorly, or *agency slack*, when the agent does not behave in accordance to the agreement between the principal and the agent.⁵⁶ Through either *adverse selection* or *agency slack*, the position of the principal may worsen in the long-run.

A principal can employ a few methods to reduce or prevent adverse selection or agency slack by the agent. When it comes to preventing adverse selection, the principal can seek an agent that has similar cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious, or ideological ties. A principal may also send a scout to report on the state of the potential agent during selection as well as during the time of the conflict. Principals can also put substantial effort into training the agents to reduce the possibility of agent slack. Finally, principals can use the stick method, that is, the principal will punish the agent through a variety of channels such as banning use of the principal's territory, reducing financial or military aid, or completely abandoning the agent. All of these "stick" methods become less effective, however, if there are multiple principals.

The power of influence of the principal over the agent is at its greatest level when the agents are isolated. This notion is supported by the findings of Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, which show that the more principals an agent has providing support, the less likely the agent will be responsive to the demands of a single principal.⁵⁷ In other words, if the agent has only one principal, and is heavily reliant on that principal, it follows that the principal has the

⁵⁶ Idean Salehyan, "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations."

⁵⁷ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse."

greatest level of influence over the agent. This is important when considering Chinese support for pariah regimes that are effectively shunned by the rest of the international community, such as in the cases of North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Angola. Economic and political sanctions on these regimes create further reliance on external patrons like China, and thereby give those patrons greater influence over the pariah regimes. Furthermore, in the case of multiple principals, the agent may play the principals against one another to create more favorable conditions of support.⁵⁸

Is China, however, engaging in indirect intrastate conflict? Or are they merely protecting their economic and political interests in foreign countries, interests that aren't as nefarious as subjugating said foreign regimes?

It could be argued that operating through a rebel group is in fact a safer way to conduct conflict than sponsoring terrorist organizations, thereby making support for a rebel organization more likely. This can be particularly true if a foreign government supports the regime that is fighting against the insurgency, especially if the regime grants the supporter special access to markets and natural resources in exchange for military and financial assistance.

Attacks on Civilians

Aside from attacks on governmental or other rebel forces, rebels, in some circumstances, have the propensity to attack civilians. In some cases, these attacks by combatants are intentional. They do this to create an atmosphere of fear, to loot resources, and to punish people that are believed to have acted against their interests of the attacking rebel group. Rebel violence towards civilians, however, does not always occur and when it does, does not always happen to the same degree. For example, the insurgent group Frente Farabundo Martí para la

⁵⁸ Idean Salehyan, "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations," 502–3.

Liberación Nacional (FMLN) went to great lengths to win the support of the civilian populations, while on the other hand the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) routinely killed and tortured civilians through methods such as summary executions, crucifixions, systematic rape, and so on. Winning support of the civilian population is demonstrated to be a crucial aspect in determining the outcome of an intrastate conflict.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, some rebels may brush off the importance of popular support when alternative and easily accessible resources are readily available. If the rebels do not ascertain any value from the civilian population, then they may in turn decide that terrorizing them can reduce or eliminate any resistance they might offer.

Rebel groups require funding, especially when those groups are planning for rebellions.⁶⁰ Scholars have shown that resources that can be easily looted can also lead to an increased likelihood that rebel groups will alter their behavior and organizational structure.⁶¹ When natural resources or illicit activities are not sufficient for sustaining the fighting capacity of the rebel group, the group will have to either rely on the local population for support or accept the support of a foreign patron. If a rebel group accepts the support of a patron, they will gain resources but lose a certain degree of autonomy due to the need to behave in accordance with the interests of the principal. Foreign patronage, therefore, gives a principal significant sway over an agent.

The methods through which rebel groups secure funding greatly affects how the group will behave and how successful it will become. Illicit activities and easily accessible resources in general may attract fighters that are less than interested in the cause and more interested in

⁵⁹ Anthony James Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (University Press of Kentucky, 2006); Anthony James Joes, *Victorious Insurgencies: Four Rebellions That Shaped Our World* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010).

⁶⁰ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 563–95, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064>.

⁶¹ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse," 636.

the easy access to funding. These opportunistic fighters are more likely to commit crimes against humanity, as documented by Weinstein on the cases of Mozambique and Uganda.⁶² On the other hand, rebels with poor funding are more likely to only attract fighters that are truly committed to the goals and ideas of the group. Fewer resources also mean greater reliance on the civilian population. When an external actor offers resources that are greater and easier to attain than that available from the local population, it is not surprising that the rebel will opt for the more cost-efficient option. As external state sponsorship is one of the most common means for rebels to secure resources, as most insurgencies have or are alleged to have at least one foreign patron,⁶³ there is a risk that the rebel group will rely on the foreign patron rather than the local population. It is argued that when a rebel group does not rely on the local population, there is a much greater likelihood that the group will purposefully target the civilian population. On the other hand, when a rebel group must rely on the local population, violence is much less likely and the relationship between the group and the local population is generally benevolent.

One scholar, Hannah Arendt, authored a seminal scholarly piece on wartime violence. Her argument, essentially, is that violence against civilians is rational if it helps rebels in attaining their goals.⁶⁴ One way this may help a rebel reach its goal is if attacking civilians leads to a weakening of the position of their opponent.⁶⁵ Another way attacking civilians may benefit a rebel is if the attack creates an opportunity for the conflict to end more rapidly.⁶⁶ This line of

⁶² Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion : The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2007., n.d.).

⁶³ Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch, and Salehyan, "It Takes Two."

⁶⁴ Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York : Harcourt, Brace, c1970, n.d.).

⁶⁵ Lisa Hultman, "Battle Losses and Rebel Violence: Raising the Costs for Fighting," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 2 (April 6, 2007): 205–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550701246866>.

⁶⁶ Alexander B. Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War," *International Security* 30, no. 4 (April 1, 2006): 152–95, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.30.4.152>.

thought thus implies that civilians are targeted for the purposes of affecting the rebel's opponent.⁶⁷ It also suggests that civilians will be targeted if they are seen as disloyal.⁶⁸

Salehyan, Wood and Siroky have developed a theory showing some of the ways in which different types of support determine how rebels interact with civilians. More precisely, they show how different *types* of external sponsors, or principals, affect rebel behavior towards civilians. Based on empirical evidence, they show through statistical analysis within the framework of the principal-agent relationship that external support for rebel groups leads to greater intentional civilian killings perpetrated by the rebel groups. Furthermore, "foreign sponsorship has a noticeably larger and more significant effect [on the level of violence against civilians] than natural resources alone."⁶⁹ In fact, the number of civilians intentionally killed by rebels doubles when they are supported by foreign entities. They show that the number increases even further when the external supporter is a non-democratic government. They explain that this is due to that fact that autocratic regime behavior is not restrained by domestic institutions like human rights organizations that are more prevalent in democracies

Based on these findings, within the logic of the principal-agent theory, it is reasonable to believe that if China, a non-democratic (authoritarian) regime, sponsors a rebel group in a foreign intrastate conflict, it is likely there will be violence against civilians.

⁶⁷ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2006, n.d.); Reed M Wood, "Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians," *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 5 (2010): 601.

⁶⁸ Laia Balcells, "Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence in Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 3 (June 1, 2011): 397–422, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711400865>; Hultman, "Battle Losses and Rebel Violence."

⁶⁹ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse," 650.

Chapter 2

Concepts and Hypothesis

*“Violence against civilians is unfortunately a common feature of civil war. Conflict environments offer numerous opportunities and incentives for rebels to exploit or harm civilians.”*⁷⁰

Conceptualization of the Problem

This research aims to use the theory developed by Salehyan, Siroky and Wood within the principal-agent framework, to see if China interferes in the domestic affairs of foreign states. Certainly, it can be argued that foreign direct investment into a foreign economy can be considered interference—but if it is something that potentially benefits the locals, the act is essentially not controversial nor interesting. Therefore, it makes sense to search for something that is negative. But determining whether an act or policy is negative is quite difficult to determine and is highly controversial. For example, Chinese support for Robert Mugabe would be argued by many scholars and Western observers to be negative because of Mugabe’s history and propensity for human rights violations. The same is true for Omar al-Bashir and Kim Jong-il. But the Chinese response to these accusations of interference are that their actions are in line with their policy of non-interference because they are actively supporting the government that is maintaining, or at least attempting to maintain, stability in their domestic affairs.

Even some scholars would agree with this notion, suggesting that Chinese financial and military support (in terms of weapons, logistics, and training) benefits a regime due to the

⁷⁰ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, 637.

regime's increased ability to conduct decisive victories over rebels or maintain a police force that prevents insurgent activity.⁷¹ In this sense, it is as though the Chinese and their supporters consider negative interference to be something that results in regime turnover or a loss of stability that increases the probability of conflict to be interference. Yet, there have clearly been instances in which China has sided with the international community to the detriment of a regime. One example of this was the Chinese support in the UN for sanctions against North Korea.⁷² While these sanctions were short-lived, it revealed Chinese willingness to go violate their own definition of interference. These divergences again take us back to the problem of defining interference.

Defining interference, as mentioned earlier in this work, is something that should stem from the perspective of the native population to whom an action is directly affecting. And while interference can affect different populations in different ways, there are some effects that can be considered universally negative. One such effect of an action, or interference, which could justifiably be considered negative, is civilian deaths. Violence against civilians is first and foremost considered negative by the local population, therefore rendering any action from an external actor, which leads to such a result, negative. Secondly, evidence of such an effect can hardly be defended. In a sense, when it comes to measuring tangibly negative effects of interference, violence against civilians is the lowest common denominator. This ultimately addresses the problem of the lack of clarity as to the definition of interference. Being the lowest common denominator, this indicator marking the negative effects of interference is the baseline that allows all observing parties to come to a consensus. Arguing against this baseline would be pointless, and perhaps even politically dangerous. By using violence against civilians as an

⁷¹ "Re-Interpreting China's Non-Intervention Policy towards Myanmar: Leverage, Interest and Intervention: *Journal of Contemporary China*: Vol 18, No 61."

⁷² "China Upholding UN Sanctions Against North Korea, Trade Figures Show," *Bloomberg.Com*, November 24, 2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-24/china-upholds-un-sanctions-against-north-korea-trade-data-show>.

indicator of negative interference, an effect that surely cannot be defended by any observer, it is reasonable that I can conduct a useful analysis of Chinese foreign policy and contribute to the ongoing debate.

Hypothesis

Based on Salehyan et al.'s logic, foreign sponsorship, especially by a non-democratic regime, creates an atmosphere in which rebels are more likely to engage in violence against civilians. If the Chinese are sponsoring rebel groups within a foreign intrastate conflict, there is a high possibility, based on previous research, that Chinese support leads to violence against civilians. This violence against civilians is the lowest common denominator from which to search for tangibly negative interference. This is because it is not a matter of debate whether violence against civilians is a negative phenomenon. For the purpose of analyzing Chinese foreign policy, this will be the metric against which I will determine whether China is interfering in the domestic affairs of foreign countries. Based on the previous research and this logic, my research question thus becomes:

What is the relationship between Chinese support for rebel groups in foreign intrastate conflicts and the level of violence against civilians?

Based on the literature reviewed, I must make a few theoretical assumptions to perform this analysis. First, by removing a rebel's dependence on the civilian population for support, an external supporter thus provides a means for the rebel to disregard the population. Second, if the external supporter of a rebel is a democratic state, then it is not likely that the rebel will

engage in civilian abuse.⁷³ Conversely, if the supporter is an autocratic state, like China, the rebel is more likely to commit war crimes against civilians. This is because autocratic states are usually not concerned with safeguarding human rights, especially if their troops are not directly involved in the war. Additionally, human rights organizations do not have the same restraining effect on autocratic regimes as they do for democratic regimes. Autocratic regimes do not have to answer to human rights organizations at home or abroad. Therefore, an autocratic supporter's benefactors will unlikely be reprimanded for civilian casualties. Given the principal-agent framework, we can expect high civilian casualties in a foreign intrastate conflict if an autocratic state, such as China, interferes to support a rebel in that conflict. My hypothesis is the following:

Ceteris paribus, when rebel groups in an intrastate conflict are supported by China, those rebel groups are more likely to kill civilians.

⁷³ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse."

Chapter 3

Quantitative Analysis: Methods, Data and Results

Data

Because I am basing my methodology off the research performed by Salehyan et al., I will use the same three datasets they used in their research.⁷⁴ The first two are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) of the Uppsala University International Peace Research Institute, the first being the data External Support Dataset (Disaggregated/Support Level) while the second being the One-sided Violence Dataset.⁷⁵ The third dataset is the Non-State Actors in Civil Wars (NSA) data set as developed by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan.⁷⁶ The NSA dataset is useful for this research because it disaggregates wars to the level of rebel organization, which is my unit of analysis.⁷⁷ Such a disaggregation allows for analysis of each rebel organization individually, even when there are multiple rebel organizations in the same country and conflict.⁷⁸ Taking the same approach as the authors enables me to steer clear of potential problems they identified, such as, "overaggregation associated with lumping all opposition groups together as 'rebels,' which ignores meaningful variation across organizations in terms of foreign funding, abusiveness and other features of interest."⁷⁹ This contrasts with aggregate research designs

⁷⁴ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood.

⁷⁵ "UCDP Dataset Download Center."

⁷⁶ Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch, and Salehyan, "It Takes Two"; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, "Non-State Actors in Civil Wars."

⁷⁷ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse," 644–45.

⁷⁸ It is worth mentioning that the commonly used Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data from the Correlates of War (COW) project is problematic for quantitative analyses of intrastate conflict because it uses a limited definition of international conflict. From the COW data, we can see that the emphasis is on recognized state militaries, something that is clearly insufficient for the aims of this research or any research investigating conflict with VNSOs.

⁷⁹ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse," 644.

that observe country/conflict-years.⁸⁰ This dataset permits examination of the behavior of rebel groups towards civilians in intrastate conflicts within the context of their relative strength, territorial control, organizational structure, as well as the type of foreign patron's support.

The UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset provides counts of people killed by rebel organization per year. The definition of one-sided violence according to the UCDP criteria is “the use of armed force by government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths per year”⁸¹ and specifically excludes “deaths by siege or infrastructure damage as well as deaths from battlefield error, negligence, or crossfire...[and] excludes ‘collateral damage’ and other incidental violence.”⁸² In essence, this definition leaves us with counts of civilians that are “deliberately and directly targeted by governments or non-state groups.”⁸³ The strict criteria of this definition are conducive to the purpose of this research because they rule out accidental deaths that would potentially skew the results of statistical analyses.

The last dataset I use, particularly when performing statistical analysis on Chinese support, is the UCDP Disaggregated External Support Dataset to observe Chinese support for rebel groups engaged in intrastate conflict. Between the NSA dataset and the UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, I match the corresponding data on rebel groups and add a binary indicator that shows the presence of Chinese support. Within the overlapping temporal limits of the three datasets, there are a total of 1,007 observations.

The overlapping temporal limits of these three datasets begins in 1989 and ends in 2009. The timeframe within these limits is significant for this analysis of Chinese foreign policy, because it covers the period from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the explosion of Chinese economic growth and increased expansion into world markets, and through to the beginning of

⁸⁰ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, 644.

⁸¹ Eck and Hultman, “One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War,” 235.

⁸² Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, “External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse,” 645.

⁸³ Eck and Hultman, “One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War,” 235.

Hu Jintao's reign that ushered significant Chinese integration into the Southeast-Asian and African economies. It is worth noting that while the Cold War period was a time when rebels could count on either US or Soviet support by adopting either a pro-democracy or pro-Marxist platform, the period following the Cold War forced many rebels to engage in illicit activities such as drug or resource smuggling.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, external supporters continue to remain the most popular avenue of support for rebel groups in intrastate conflicts.⁸⁵ Therefore, the temporal bounds of the merged datasets do not prevent proper analysis of the hypothesis.

There are nine control variables that will be included in the statistical analyses. Based on theories presented in existing literature, I adopt the same control variables utilized by Salehyan et al. Of these theories, one of the more significant findings is that rebel groups who have access to lootable resources are more likely to engage in one-sided violence against civilians.⁸⁶ Because the presence of such resources theoretically has a similar effect on violent rebel groups as does the presence of foreign support, it is therefore necessary that I control for the presence of them. LOOTABLE RESOURCES is a binary indicator that shows if easily looted resources are present in the zone of conflict. Data for this control variable comes from datasets that quantify the presence of gems and drugs.⁸⁷ I use the data that Salehyan et al. have already extracted from literature on the presence of resources.

⁸⁴ Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (August 2010): 415–29, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000286>; Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War"; Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars : Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford, Cal. : Stanford University Press, 1999, n.d.).

⁸⁵ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse."

⁸⁶ Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*.

⁸⁷ Päivi Lujala, "Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 1 (February 1, 2009): 50–71, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708327644>; Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore, "A Diamond Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (August 1, 2005): 538–62, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277548>; Halvard Buhaug and Päivi Lujala, "Accounting for Scale: Measuring Geography in Quantitative Studies of Civil War," *Political Geography* 24, no. 4 (May 1, 2005): 399–418, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2005.01.006>.

The binary indicator FIGHTING CAPACITY is included to show whether the fighting capacity of a rebel group in relation to its opponent is high. This is because studies have shown that strong rebel groups are more likely to protect the local population and encourage loyalty,⁸⁸ evidence that is in addition to studies showing that when a rebel group faces an equally capable or stronger opponent, the said rebel group is more likely to attack civilians.⁸⁹ This information comes from the NSA dataset.

TERRITORIAL CONTROL is a binary indicator that shows whether a rebel group has at least a moderate level of control over a certain territory. This indicator is included because studies show that violent groups are less likely to engage in violence against civilians in areas where they have high levels of territorial control.⁹⁰ Other studies have shown that in areas in which a rebel group has a low level of control, the group is more likely to use violence against civilians.⁹¹ This data is provided in the NSA dataset.

The conflict environment is controlled through three variables. The variable WAR controls for conflicts in which the number of battle deaths is more than one thousand per conflict year. The reason for using this variable stems from the literature that indicates intense conflicts lead to more violence against civilians.⁹² The variable DURATION controls for the number of years from the start of the conflict. The last environment control variable is GOVERNMENT ONE-SIDED VIOLENCE (logged value plus 1 to account for zeros), which controls for one-sided violence against civilians perpetrated on behalf of the government. This is important because literature shows the more a government perpetrates violence against civilians, the more rebels will also engage in violence against civilians.⁹³

⁸⁸ Reed M Wood, "Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians."

⁸⁹ Claire Metelits, *Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior* (NYU Press, 2010), <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/10938>.

⁹⁰ Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*.

⁹¹ Balcells, "Continuation of Politics by Two Means."

⁹² Reed M Wood, "Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians."

⁹³ Reed M Wood.

The dummy variable DEMOCRACY is included because literature shows that the type of regime that is supporting a rebel group tends to influence the likelihood of violence against civilians.⁹⁴ Using the Polity IV data, regimes that have a score of 6 or higher are indicated.⁹⁵ I also control for the size of the population in the country in which the conflict is occurring with the variable POPULATION. This variable is measured using the natural log of the total population.⁹⁶

I cover three of the explanatory variables that Salehyan et al. explore in their research because it pertains to the framework within which I create my hypothesis. They are therefore worth a brief mention here. In models employed by Salehyan et al., there are some different iterations of the variables for support. SUPPORT is a binary variable that indicates whether foreign support is given to a rebel group. NUMBER OF SUPPORTERS represents the sum of foreign patrons for a single rebel group in a year. DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT is a binary variable that indicates whether at least one of the foreign patrons is a democratic regime. The last of their explanatory variables that I examine is PERCENT DEMOCRATIC, which is used to show what percentage of the supporters are democratic in cases where there are multiple supporters.

The explanatory variable in my models is CHINA SUPPORT. This is a binary indicator showing whether or not China supported a rebel group within an intrastate conflict. This information comes from the UCDP External Support Dataset. The presence of Chinese support is matched with the receiving rebel organization.

Given the nature of the data and the hypothesis I am testing, the question of the direction of causality between the variables and how, given the ambiguity of the causal direction, the

⁹⁴ Lisa Hultman, "Attacks on Civilians in Civil War: Targeting the Achilles Heel of Democratic Governments," *International Interactions* 38, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 164–81, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2012.657602>.

⁹⁵ Hultman.

⁹⁶ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse," 648.

statistics should be approached, is necessarily raised. This problematic is articulately addressed by Salehyan et al.:

Principal-agent theory suggests that foreign sponsors impose constraints on the behavior of the rebels they support, and that they work hard to select appropriate agents. This suggests an endogenous relationship, with the causal arrow between abuse and sponsorship running both ways. Researchers often treat endogeneity as a statistical nuisance and try to model it away through appropriate lags or instrumental variables. For us, this is less of a concern, since endogeneity is central to our theoretical argument and we explicitly expect both processes to be at work. Therefore, we seek to show correlational evidence that democratic sponsors are associated with less abusive rebel groups.⁹⁷

Simply put, evidence of a relationship between the two variables is sufficient for this research and does not necessarily require a causal direction.

Methods

Because my methods are largely based on the work of Salehyan et al., I will briefly explain the rationale behind their methodology. The authors test for the relationship between the response variable of civilian killings—a time-series cross-section of rebel groups with annual counts of civilians killed—with explanatory variables of representing foreign support (group-year).⁹⁸ Literature shows that count-data is better modeled by a Poisson model instead of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. To account for substantial overdispersion in the response variable, the Poisson model can be generalized to a negative binomial model, which is what Salehyan et al. used. They account for within-group correlation by using robust standard errors clustered on the insurgent-government dyad.⁹⁹ As discussed earlier in the literature review, their findings

⁹⁷ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, 646.

⁹⁸ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, 648.

⁹⁹ Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, 648.

were in line with their hypothesis that foreign support for rebel organization, particularly from non-democratic countries, leads to violence against civilians.

The regression results in the original paper are replicated in Table 1. The columns of NB1, NB2 and NB3¹⁰⁰ correspond to Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 in the Salehyan et al. publication.¹⁰¹ As was analyzed in their paper, the regressions show a positive and statistically significant relationship between SUPPORT and the response variable. The results for the variable DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT suggest non-democratic external support positively and significantly influences the level of violence against civilians. PERCENT DEMOCRATIC offers a similar result.

The quantitative analysis methods in my thesis will follow the multiple regression framework illustrated above. The control variables here will be the same as in the Salehyan et al. publication, yet variables related to foreign support will be omitted. Instead, we focus on the CHINA SUPPORT dummy variable which specifies China's involvement in the conflicts. Some limitations of the original work make it worthwhile to consider some modifications of the methods used by the authors.

Warnings from R indicate that the convergence criteria may not be fully met. This implies that negative binomial model might not be the optimal choice in our problem. Indeed, the histogram of the response variable shows that there are excessive zero values in the data (approximately 70% in the response variable). This is problematic because, while negative binomial regression assumes that the data is over-dispersed, it does not do the same for excessive zero observations. When there is a significant difference between the numbers of

¹⁰⁰ Note: the NB1, NB2 and NB3 used here are merely descriptive values and have nothing to do with the NB1 and NB2 functions in Stata. The columns NB1, NB2 and NB3 in this paper correspond to the results of the negative binomial model presented in Table 1 of: Salehyan et al. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, 649.

¹⁰¹ For layout reasons, regression of the Model 4, Model 5 and Model 6 in the original paper, which were also replicated successfully, were not listed in the thesis. For details about them, please contact the author Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, 649.

expected and observed zero-counts in the data, a negative binomial regression should not be used.¹⁰² In this case, there are far more zero-counts than are allowed by the distributional assumptions of the Poisson model (negative binomial regression is a Poisson-gamma distribution mixture model, but with a variance that is much greater than is allowed by Poisson distribution). This was most likely the reason why I was warned about convergence in the results. In sum, negative binomial distribution produces a severe underfitting of the zero-counts and is not the best fit for this data.

To redress the issue of high zero-count and over-dispersed count outcome variables, I employ a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression. The ZINB regression is based on the zero-inflated model, which assumes that zero outcome is the result of two different processes. In the ZINB model there are two tests of the data: the first is a logit model that models which of the two processes the zero-value is caused by; the second is a negative binomial model that can model the count process.¹⁰³ The ZINB model expresses the count as a mixture of the two tests. In the case of my research, the ZINB model assumes that there are two processes that cause the number of civilian deaths: one process that results in zero civilian deaths, which explains why the excessive zeros in the response variable; the other process is one that models the number of civilian killings with a negative binomial model.

The goodness of the fit of ZINB model is shown in Table 1. This table shows a comparison of the negative binomial models (NB1, NB2 & NB3) and the ZINB models (ZINB 1, ZINB 2 and ZINB 3) using the same variables that were used by Salehyan et al. As we can see from looking at the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information

¹⁰² Joseph M. Hilbe, *Modeling Count Data*, 1 edition (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 173.

¹⁰³ “Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression | Stata Data Analysis Examples,” *IDRE Stats* (blog), accessed May 30, 2018, <https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/dae/zero-inflated-negative-binomial-regression/>.

Criterion (BIC) statistics, the comparative fit of the ZINB models is lower and therefore better than the negative binomial models.¹⁰⁴

Though the coefficients of the ZINB models in Table 1 are different from the coefficients in the negative binomial models as produced by Salehyan et al., the two most important explanatory variables (DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT and PERCENT DEMOCRATIC) regarding the *type* of support remain negative and statistically significant. Both models suggest there is a positive relationship between non-democratic supporters of rebel organizations and the level of violence against civilians. Given that the relevant explanatory variables are the same and the better fit of the ZINB model to the data, I will proceed with an analysis of Chinese support using ZINB regression.

Using ZINB regression, I check for a relationship between rebel groups that receive external support from China and whether they kill civilians. Table 2 shows the findings of the ZINB model alongside the results of a regular negative binomial regression.

Results

The ZINB regression in Table 2 reveals that the coefficient for the CHINA SUPPORT variable—the binary measure indicating whether a rebel organization received support from China—is positive but not statistically significant. This is likely due to large fluctuation among relatively few observable data counts. The large standard deviation also indicates there is relatively large uncertainty associated with the relationship. In sum, given the available data and the limitations of this regression model, there is no evidence to suggest that Chinese support for rebel groups has any relationship to the level of violence against civilians that the supported rebel group engages in. The results of this regression do not prove or disprove the

¹⁰⁴ For explanations as to why I use the AIC and BIC statistics as indicators of the fit of the models, see: Hilbe, *Modeling Count Data*, 116–22.

hypothesis. Though I have shown that the negative binomial regression is not the best fit for the data, the negative binomial regression (NB1 and NB2) in Table 2 also does not reveal a statistically significant relationship between the explanatory and response variables.

The coefficients for the control variables of the ZINB models in Table 2 are similar to the results of the negative binomial models used in the paper of Salehyan et al. The coefficients for the variables TERRITORIAL CONTROL and POPULATION SIZE are noticeably different. The coefficients for TERRITORIAL CONTROL are negative and significant in the negative binomial regression, but not statistically significant in the ZINB regression. The coefficients for POPULATION SIZE are mostly positive and statistically significant, which contrasts with the coefficients in the ZINB regression, which shows no statistical significance.

Given the small number of observations in which the PRC supports a rebel organization, I propose refining the dataset so that it is better representative of the conditions (i.e. cultural, military tactics, economic etc.) of the location in which China is offering support to rebel organizations. This concomitantly lowers the total number of rebel organization/conflict-year observations from 1007 to 277. In this situation, I hone the dataset to include only conflicts in countries in which China has supported a rebel organization within the temporal bounds of the dataset. The countries in this newly formulated “limited-location” dataset are India, Myanmar, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Vietnam and Niger. This smaller dataset is more “experimental” in the sense that they better control for confounding variables that are inherent in differences among countries.

Tables 3 and 4 both contain coefficients of statistical regressions that were performed with the limited-location dataset. Table 3 shows the results of the coefficients for the variables used in Salehyan et al. We can see that almost all the explanatory variables that had statistical significance in their original work do not retain the statistical significance in the limited-location dataset. The sole exception is SUPPORT in NB3. Additionally, WAR and REBEL

VIOLENCE(t-1) are the only control variables that are statistically significant. The ZINB models in Table 3 show the explanatory variable SUPPORT as statistically significant in all cases. The DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT and PERCENT DEMOCRATIC, alternatively, are not. The fluctuation in the data are probably the cause for the marked change among the variable coefficients in Table 3.

Table 4 contains the coefficients for the variables vis-à-vis the presence or absence of Chinese support using the limited-location dataset. Again, the negative binomial and ZINB regressions are compared. The interesting finding in this model shows the explanatory variable CHINA SUPPORT as positive and statistically significant in ZINB 2. This suggests that within the data provided by the limited-location dataset, the presence of Chinese support has a statistically positive relationship with the level of violence against civilians, supporting the hypothesis.

My hypothesis, according to the quantitative analysis represented in Table 4, which analyzes the limited-location dataset, receives good empirical support. There is a positive correlation between Chinese support for rebel organizations and violence against civilians from 1989-2009. This is in line with the theories promulgated by Salehyan et al., which suggest that autocratic regime support for rebel organizations leads to violence against civilians, and after whose research this analysis is modeled. However, these results are by no means intended to be an exhaustive test of their theories.

There were, however, some contradictory findings in the results of my analysis of the control variables within the limited-location dataset when compared with those of Salehyan et al. The discrepancies among control variables may be explained by either the different statistical regression techniques employed or the dataset parameters, or both. Therefore, this is not an exhaustive test of Salehyan et al.'s theories. Nevertheless, I still contend that ZINB regression is better suited for the data than negative binomial.

The first point of difference in the findings of this case study versus the findings of Salehyan et al. is the role of lootable resources in shaping rebel behavior, measured in LOOTABLE RESOURCES. In contrast with the statistically insignificant findings of Salehyan et al., my findings, as demonstrated in Table 4 column ZINB 2, indicate that lootable resources have a positive and significant effect on civilian killings. These findings fall in line with Weinstein's theory mentioned earlier in the text, which suggest that lootable resources lead to insurgent violence against civilians.¹⁰⁵

The coefficient of the control variable WAR is positive and statistically significant, indicating that violent wars with over 1,000 battle deaths is positively correlated with rebel-perpetrated civilian killings per year. This is not surprising given the literature on battle intensity and violence against civilians. One possible interpretation of this result, given the parameters of the data, is that the PRC tends to support rebel organizations that are involved in countries where there are high-intensity conflicts.

The coefficient of the control variable GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE is positive and statistically significant, which is in line with the findings of Salehyan et al. TERRITORIAL CONTROL is positive but without statistical significance. This result does not offer any support for theories that suggest territorial control is negatively correlated with violence against civilians.

FIGHTING CAPACITY is negative but is also not statistically significant. This contrasts with the findings of Salehyan et al., which suggest that rebel groups with moderate to high fighting capability is positively related with rebel violence against civilians. This may be due to the fact that Chinese support rebel organizations in conflicts and countries where the violence is generally at a lower level, a finding that could potentially indicate a lower fighting capability of the rebel organization.

¹⁰⁵ Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*.

The control variable POPULATION SIZE is negative and statistically significant. This is at odds with the findings of Salehyan et al. and suggests that countries with smaller populations experience more instances of violence against civilians.

DEMOCRACY is positive and statistically significant, which suggests that one-sided rebel violence against civilians is likely to be higher in countries with democratic regimes. This supports the theory that suggests ideological links between democratic governments and the civilians they represent, creating an incentive for rebel organizations to attack civilians.¹⁰⁶ Salehyan et al. did not come to such a conclusion, as their results do not show any statistical significance for this control variable.

DURATION is positive but not statistically significant, which falls in line with Salehyan's et al.'s findings. The lagged response variable REBEL VIOLENCE (t-1) is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that violence against civilians is more a function of the groups 'type' than changes in the conflict environment.

¹⁰⁶ Hultman, "Attacks on Civilians in Civil War."

Conclusion

Observers around the world are increasingly scrutinizing China's foreign policy, and its ascent to great power status. This analysis attempts to contribute to the understanding of China's nature through its activities abroad, and whether those activities have negative effects. In Chapter 1, I presented some of the academic literature that investigates this phenomenon, and discussed whether those activities are nefarious and therefore 'interfering.' Having chosen to examine Chinese activity in the context of foreign intrastate wars, I briefly reviewed some of the literature on intrastate wars and insurgencies. Utilizing this literature, I revealed the importance of external support for rebel organizations. Following that, I highlighted some of the literature that examines foreign external support through the principal-agent framework. This framework is critical to the development of the hypothesis and research methodology, because it posits that there can be an influential relationship between a foreign external supporter (principal) and a rebel organization (agent). Lastly, I reviewed some of the literature on violence against civilians. I chose this violence as a measure of the negative effects of Chinese interference.

In Chapter 2, I developed my theoretical argument and laid the groundwork for my methodology based on the literature reviewed in the previous chapter. I explained why I chose the findings of Salehyan et al. to guide my hypothesis, which is: *Ceteris paribus, when rebel groups in an intrastate conflict are supported by China, those rebel groups are more likely to kill civilians.* I explained why the methodology they used is appropriate for answering my research question. By answering this question, I not only used a case study to test their findings, but also looked for indisputably negative evidence of Chinese interference.

Chapter 3 begins with an explanation of the datasets and why they are relevant for this research. Following that, I went into detail on how exactly I employed the methods used by

Salehyan et al. for my research. I made some adjustments to their methods, and demonstrated why their choice to use the negative binomial model was not the best for the data. Instead, I chose to use the ZINB model. I also made some adjustments to the dataset by controlling for environmental factors that differ among countries that may be skewing the results. I did this by limiting the observations to locations (countries) in which China has supported a rebel organization at any time within the temporal bounds of the dataset (1989-2009). The results indicated that the hypothesis receives good empirical support, which is to say that there is a positive relationship between Chinese support for rebels and violence against civilians in the countries that China is involved.

This research is by no means an exhaustive study of either the principal-agent relationship as it pertains to external support in intrastate conflicts, or of Chinese foreign policy. Rather, it is meant to provide a case study for each within the context of the scholarly debate. Critics of this research will rightly point out data limitations, and consequently the findings. The data can only roughly account for the presence of support and does not reveal the extent of the support. The lack of this information forces analyses to treat rebel organizations that are wholly funded by foreign patrons the same as insurgent groups that receive very little support. Additionally, the temporal constraints of the data prevent a truly contemporary understanding of Chinese foreign policy given the data available ends in 2009. Updated datasets would greatly benefit academic research on Chinese foreign policy and intrastate conflict.

In the future, a worthwhile contribution to these debates would result from an examination of Chinese support to foreign regimes, to see if that support leads to increases of human rights violations, particularly in autocratic contexts. Further research on Chinese foreign policy could also pay attention to the flow of money backed by the CCP to candidates or parties in democratic countries. A quantitative analysis of this phenomenon may reveal surprising

results on the influence Chinese money can buy in the domestic politics of foreign states.¹⁰⁷

The growing power of China demands greater insight into its foreign policy, an assertion confirmed by the findings of this paper.

¹⁰⁷ Anne-Marie Brady's recent investigation into this phenomenon within the context of New Zealand's domestic politics is a good starting point such an analysis. Anne-Marie Brady, "Magic Weapons: China's Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping," Wilson Center, September 18, 2017, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/magic-weapons-chinas-political-influence-activities-under-xi-jinping>.

Appendix

Table 1

Global Conflicts Model Comparison						
	NB1	ZINB1	NB2	ZINB2	NB3	ZINB3
rebbest						
SUPPORT	0.462 ⁺ (0.262)	0.176 (0.225)	0.648* (0.278)	0.339 (0.230)	0.658* (0.275)	0.300 (0.227)
DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT			-0.573* (0.281)	-0.546* (0.161)		
PERCENT DEMOCRATIC					-0.853* (0.381)	-0.565* (0.216)
WAR	2.069* (0.365)	1.239* (0.208)	2.090* (0.364)	1.251* (0.215)	2.130* (0.380)	1.259* (0.219)
LOOTABLE RESOURCES	0.310 (0.238)	0.0278 (0.195)	0.308 (0.234)	0.00513 (0.180)	0.375 (0.234)	0.0544 (0.193)
GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE	0.171* (0.0647)	0.130* (0.0518)	0.155* (0.0632)	0.110* (0.0469)	0.141* (0.0639)	0.109* (0.0486)
TERRITORIAL CONTROL	-0.618* (0.280)	-0.113 (0.247)	-0.564* (0.276)	-0.0271 (0.248)	-0.570* (0.272)	-0.0559 (0.241)
FIGHTING CAPACITY	1.621* (0.405)	1.250* (0.300)	1.501* (0.402)	1.099* (0.279)	1.467* (0.407)	1.129* (0.287)
POPULATION SIZE	0.126 (0.0796)	0.0196 (0.0819)	0.150 ⁺ (0.0778)	0.0517 (0.0834)	0.163* (0.0800)	0.0512 (0.0870)
DEMOCRACY	0.310 (0.307)	0.286 (0.311)	0.218 (0.304)	0.171 (0.292)	0.201 (0.311)	0.187 (0.308)
DURATION	0.0249 (0.0215)	-0.0242 ⁺ (0.0144)	0.0231 (0.0212)	-0.0276* (0.0140)	0.0203 (0.0213)	-0.0283 ⁺ (0.0148)
REBEL VIOLENCE(t-1)	0.00292 (0.00231)	0.0000226 (0.0000542)	0.00295 (0.00243)	0.0000178 (0.0000487)	0.00295 (0.00236)	0.0000209 (0.0000523)
Constant	-0.748 (1.383)	3.620* (1.385)	-1.074 (1.352)	3.187* (1.390)	-1.290 (1.374)	3.162* (1.450)
Inalpha						
Constant	2.858* (0.145)	0.111 (0.151)	2.853* (0.144)	0.0765 (0.143)	2.852* (0.144)	0.0886 (0.143)

inflation						
SUPPORT	-0.514*		-0.620*		-0.580*	
	(0.235)		(0.254)		(0.249)	
DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT			0.284			
			(0.266)			
PERCENT DEMOCRATIC					0.263	
					(0.383)	
WAR	-0.833*		-0.851*		-0.834*	
	(0.220)		(0.223)		(0.222)	
LOOTABLE RESOURCES	-0.317		-0.335		-0.340	
	(0.245)		(0.245)		(0.247)	
GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE	-0.0683		-0.0605		-0.0618	
	(0.0488)		(0.0501)		(0.0505)	
TERRITORIAL CONTROL	0.261		0.238		0.228	
	(0.275)		(0.281)		(0.285)	
FIGHTING CAPACITY	-0.512		-0.481		-0.478	
	(0.325)		(0.328)		(0.331)	
POPULATION SIZE	-0.0771		-0.0893		-0.0886	
	(0.0769)		(0.0754)		(0.0755)	
DEMOCRACY	-0.501 ⁺		-0.470 ⁺		-0.477 ⁺	
	(0.292)		(0.282)		(0.284)	
DURATION	-0.0160		-0.0160		-0.0146	
	(0.0205)		(0.0203)		(0.0204)	
REBEL VIOLENCE(t-1)	-0.0275*		-0.0272*		-0.0273*	
	(0.00455)		(0.00444)		(0.00447)	
Constant	4.177*		4.371*		4.357*	
	(1.310)		(1.303)		(1.295)	
Observations	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007
AIC	4811.0	4296.9	4810.7	4290.2	4810.0	4294.0
BIC	4869.9	4409.9	4874.6	4413.0	4873.9	4416.8
chi2	224.5	392.6	206.9	471.9	193.4	413.2

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 2

Global Conflicts Model Comparison w/ China Support Variable

	NB1		ZINB1		NB2		ZINB2	
rebbest								
CHINA SUPPORT					-0.295	(0.590)	0.0922	(0.511)
WAR	2.054*	(0.353)	1.257*	(0.200)	2.025*	(0.344)	1.260*	(0.195)
LOOTABLE RESOURCES	0.290	(0.238)	0.0127	(0.187)	0.289	(0.238)	0.0161	(0.192)
GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE	0.191*	(0.0669)	0.139*	(0.0517)	0.192*	(0.0666)	0.139*	(0.0515)
TERRITORIAL CONTROL	-0.533*	(0.268)	-0.107	(0.249)	-0.472 ⁺	(0.267)	-0.122	(0.279)
FIGHTING CAPACITY	1.580*	(0.397)	1.253*	(0.301)	1.553*	(0.400)	1.261*	(0.303)
POPULATION SIZE	0.149 ⁺	(0.0792)	0.0272	(0.0785)	0.153 ⁺	(0.0791)	0.0258	(0.0813)
DEMOCRACY	0.230	(0.308)	0.258	(0.302)	0.193	(0.318)	0.270	(0.335)
DURATION	0.0253	(0.0228)	-0.0211	(0.0134)	0.0251	(0.0229)	-0.0212	(0.0135)
REBEL VIOLENCE(t-1)	0.00304	(0.00232)	0.0000231	(0.0000559)	0.00308	(0.00236)	0.0000233	(0.0000563)
Constant	-0.876	(1.372)	3.582*	(1.377)	-0.909	(1.369)	3.596*	(1.409)
lnalpha								
Constant	2.864*	(0.145)	0.118	(0.154)	2.864*	(0.145)	0.120	(0.154)
inflate								
CHINA SUPPORT							0.323	(0.412)
WAR			-0.853*	(0.221)			-0.829*	(0.224)
LOOTABLE RESOURCES			-0.288	(0.250)			-0.308	(0.250)
GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE			-0.0731	(0.0490)			-0.0739	(0.0488)
TERRITORIAL CONTROL			0.212	(0.266)			0.180	(0.274)
FIGHTING CAPACITY			-0.469	(0.327)			-0.436	(0.337)
POPULATION SIZE			-0.0985	(0.0810)			-0.101	(0.0810)
DEMOCRACY			-0.385	(0.297)			-0.344	(0.297)
DURATION			-0.0169	(0.0212)			-0.0169	(0.0212)
REBEL VIOLENCE(t-1)			-0.0279*	(0.00471)			-0.0280*	(0.00469)
Constant			4.207*	(1.379)			4.216*	(1.379)
Observations	1007		1007		1007		1007	
AIC	4811.5		4301.7		4813.3		4305.1	
BIC	4865.6		4404.9		4872.3		4418.1	
chi2	236.2		429.6		236.6		424.1	

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 3

Model Comparison of Salehyan et al. variables within limited-location dataset

	NB1	ZINB1	NB2	ZINB2	NB3	ZINB3
rebbest						
SUPPORT	1.296 (0.877)	0.511* (0.124)	1.159 (0.947)	0.575* (0.173)	1.930+ (1.154)	0.683* (0.202)
DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT			0.225 (0.465)	-0.133 (0.150)		
PERCENT DEMOCRATIC					-0.798 (0.711)	-0.296 (0.186)
WAR	1.489+ (0.897)	0.267 (0.311)	1.539+ (0.911)	0.233 (0.336)	1.405 (0.904)	0.237 (0.338)
LOOTABLE RESOURCES	0.786 (0.700)	0.256+ (0.144)	0.772 (0.713)	0.216 (0.167)	1.053 (0.765)	0.254 (0.157)
GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE	0.182 (0.123)	0.127* (0.0465)	0.188 (0.123)	0.124* (0.0464)	0.130 (0.128)	0.110* (0.0462)
TERRITORIAL CONTROL	2.158 (2.175)	0.0289 (0.189)	2.220 (2.096)	-0.0663 (0.273)	2.034 (2.362)	-0.0539 (0.235)
FIGHTING CAPACITY	2.230 (3.285)	-0.678 (0.510)	2.605 (3.623)	-0.989 (0.780)	1.010 (3.977)	-1.320 (0.887)
POPULATION SIZE	-1.449 (1.848)	-0.979* (0.307)	-1.239 (2.060)	-1.165* (0.394)	-1.974 (2.073)	-1.387* (0.453)
DEMOCRACY	8.934 (6.320)	3.933* (1.054)	8.347 (6.796)	4.453* (1.153)	10.50 (6.888)	5.267* (1.384)
DURATION	-0.0346 (0.0566)	0.0121 (0.0125)	-0.0387 (0.0554)	0.0140 (0.0125)	-0.0397 (0.0568)	0.0101 (0.0128)
REBEL VIOLENCE(t-1)	0.0107* (0.00439)	0.00286* (0.00107)	0.0107* (0.00440)	0.00283* (0.00104)	0.00993* (0.00403)	0.00279* (0.00100)
Constant	22.11 (32.41)	19.76* (5.356)	18.38 (36.22)	23.12* (7.076)	31.18 (36.39)	26.89* (8.032)
Inalpha						
Constant	2.470* (0.268)	-0.842* (0.171)	2.469* (0.269)	-0.846* (0.171)	2.462* (0.266)	-0.858* (0.173)

inflation						
SUPPORT	-0.972 (0.744)			-1.139 (0.820)		-1.251 (0.823)
DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT				0.268 (0.400)		
PERCENT DEMOCRATIC						0.480 (0.542)
WAR	-2.455* (0.702)			-2.479* (0.691)		-2.459* (0.679)
LOOTABLE RESOURCES	-0.641 (0.520)			-0.673 (0.535)		-0.806 (0.632)
GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE	0.0294 (0.0804)			0.0421 (0.0800)		0.0545 (0.0775)
TERRITORIAL CONTROL	-0.177 (0.611)			-0.182 (0.611)		-0.273 (0.592)
FIGHTING CAPACITY	-3.236* (1.440)			-3.155* (1.446)		-2.914+ (1.497)
POPULATION SIZE	-0.516 (0.447)			-0.486 (0.455)		-0.443 (0.449)
DEMOCRACY	-0.488 (1.403)			-0.525 (1.431)		-0.719 (1.455)
DURATION	-0.0200 (0.0353)			-0.0197 (0.0356)		-0.0109 (0.0356)
REBEL VIOLENCE(t-1)	-0.00985* (0.00280)			-0.00988* (0.00278)		-0.00972* (0.00279)
Constant	13.37+ (7.904)			12.81 (8.010)		12.13 (7.823)
Observations	277	277	277	277	277	277
AIC	1406.5	1228.5	1408.3	1229.7	1407.5	1228.0
BIC	1450.0	1311.8	1455.5	1316.6	1454.6	1314.9
chi2	43.78	10620.7	44.40	.	50.45	.

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 4

Model Comparison with China variable within limited-location dataset

	NB1		ZINB1		NB2		ZINB2	
rebbest								
CHINA SUPPORT					0.140	(0.660)	0.513 ⁺	(0.298)
WAR	1.723 ⁺	(0.944)	0.329	(0.306)	1.776 ⁺	(1.025)	0.461 ⁺	(0.263)
LOOTABLE RESOURCES	0.301	(0.509)	0.174	(0.132)	0.300	(0.513)	0.217 ⁺	(0.124)
GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE	0.130	(0.115)	0.126 [*]	(0.0443)	0.136	(0.116)	0.141 [*]	(0.0521)
TERRITORIAL CONTROL	2.729	(2.662)	0.102	(0.188)	2.731	(2.683)	0.144	(0.172)
FIGHTING CAPACITY	3.322	(3.492)	-0.448	(0.514)	3.384	(3.585)	-0.340	(0.453)
POPULATION SIZE	-1.161	(1.711)	-0.904 [*]	(0.328)	-1.168	(1.713)	-1.001 [*]	(0.366)
DEMOCRACY	8.137	(6.035)	3.676 [*]	(1.119)	8.273	(6.134)	4.365 [*]	(1.439)
DURATION	-0.0424	(0.0583)	0.0116	(0.0154)	-0.0435	(0.0585)	0.00485	(0.0171)
REBEL VIOLENCE(t-1)	0.0125 [*]	(0.00418)	0.00316 [*]	(0.00113)	0.0123 [*]	(0.00413)	0.00294 [*]	(0.000937)
Constant	18.11	(30.12)	18.91 [*]	(5.704)	18.14	(30.16)	20.21 [*]	(6.169)
lnalpha								
Constant	2.495 [*]	(0.261)	-0.809 [*]	(0.160)	2.495 [*]	(0.262)	-0.848 [*]	(0.157)
inflate								
CHINA SUPPORT							0.0425	(0.505)
WAR			-2.541 [*]	(0.630)			-2.527 [*]	(0.689)
LOOTABLE RESOURCES			-0.496	(0.498)			-0.498	(0.500)
GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE			0.0441	(0.0833)			0.0447	(0.0845)
TERRITORIAL CONTROL			-0.529	(0.586)			-0.537	(0.586)
FIGHTING CAPACITY			-3.846 [*]	(1.334)			-3.849 [*]	(1.328)
POPULATION SIZE			-0.576	(0.418)			-0.580	(0.423)
DEMOCRACY			-0.411	(1.321)			-0.380	(1.390)
DURATION			-0.0279	(0.0353)			-0.0279	(0.0353)
REBEL VIOLENCE(t-1)			-0.0102 [*]	(0.00281)			-0.0101 [*]	(0.00268)
Constant			13.87 ⁺	(7.424)			13.92 ⁺	(7.476)
Observations	277		277		277		277	
AIC	1407.9		1230.4		1409.9		1230.8	
BIC	1447.8		1302.9		1453.4		1310.5	
chi2	46.86		.		47.34		.	

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$

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