Crisis? What Crisis? The EU, Migration and Neo-Liberal Humanitarianism

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Abstract

Studying migration management in the EU from a structural point of view is beneficial for our understanding of how the EU frames, reasons, and understands migration as a phenomenon. Due to the lack of stronger reform push and consensus in the EU regarding migration, it is forced to externalize its migration efforts onto its neighborhood (both to the East and to the South). However, the way it does so is characteristic of what we call neo-liberal humanitarianism. This is a structured frame of thought that through developmental action seeks to develop the areas of emigration (e.g. Libya) in order to create resilient local communities for the purpose of stemming migration while at the same time employing a humanitarian interventionist reasoning in order to legitimize growing intrusions into non-EUrope by framing the process in terms of saving lives and developing communities. This Foucault-inspired analysis does not criticize the EU per se, rather it seeks to understand how the structured reasoning of neo-liberal humanitarianism ignores contradictions created by its implementation that range from increasing reports on migrant abuse to questions of the effectiveness of developmental aid.
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Always to my family, without whom nothing would be worth doing.

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Chapter 1: Borders, Bodies and the EU: An Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The Mediterranean was always of special importance for EUrope. The great body of water bears symbolic cultural, historical, political, economic, and social significance in the minds and bodies of EUropeans. However, in the last twenty years, Mediterranean transformed from a body of water that constituted the identity of EUrope culturally and socially, to a body of water that has increasingly become securitized and that has become a space of death, a thanatopolitical mass where the exercise of sovereignty is often constructed as protection of civilization and protection of bare life. This is largely due to migratory flows coming from the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and also due to a certain reconfiguration of EUrope’s perceived role in the Mediterranean (which is dependent on the reconfiguration of EU’s identity and practices).

If we look 30-40 years back into the history of migration in the EU, we can see that migration was portrayed as something non-securitized, in the domain of interior affairs, but was later securitized as the European integration process became more intensive (Huysmans 2000). However, the last twenty years have not only brought about the securitization of migration in the EU (see “Literature Review”) but also an increase in humanitarianization of migration in EU (again, please refer to the “Literature Review”), which is the broad focus of this work. The transformation of EU’s foreign and security policy, following more concrete integration of its member-states, sought to create a more delineated and protected the external EU and Schengen border, namely at the service of its citizens. While this was happening, the

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1 I use this for the purposes of clarity. EU is not Europe, but it has significant discursive authority over the term. Therefore, EUrope serves a purpose of delineating a space of Europe that is EU.
2 Thanatopolitical, in the wider discussion on biopolitics, there is its productive side (that is, the beneficial side of biopolitically managing a population), but there is also its exclusionary side which produces death and, in the context of migration, death of irregular populations of migrants (Vaughan-Williams 2015). Thanatopolitical means directly the political instrumentalization of death (Kuljic 2013). For the purposes of this research, thanatopolitical borders would be borders of death.
developments in the EU’s socio-economic infrastructure (e.g. the creation of the Single Market and the Eurozone) have brought about increasing neo-liberalization of the bloc which, hand in hand with liberal democratic values, positioned the EU as a normative power (NPE) and a Hayekian utopian project.

External migration found itself at the center of this transformation. Although at first, external migration into the EU was almost a non-issue, today it seems that it runs the political engine of Europe and is increasingly framed in the duality of EU’s normative and humanitarian necessity to accept and help migrants and refugees, and its security imperative to protect its own borders. The puzzle of this research rests broadly here, in the way the EU acts towards migration as a humanitarian issue, but not really. We do not want to assess rhetoric vs. practice (e.g. norms vs. militarization of behavior of the EU towards migrants), rather- we seek to understand the transformation of EU’s approach to migration during the migrant crisis (2015-2017) by taking into account the humanitarian logic and the (re)production of humane subjects by the neo-liberal rationality operating within the EU (as visible in the EU’s discourse- please see “Methodology” for more details). In essence, we treat the EU’s response to the migration crisis as a result not of the crisis but of the neo-liberal-humanitarian rationality that informs the EU’s socio-political structure into which the migrant crisis was intertwined.

Therefore, the research question of this thesis is:” Can we understand these techniques, or this rationality of dealing with migrants in the context of the EU border management, not as a reaction to migration crisis but as a new way of neo-liberal-humanitarian production of border security and migration?”

The rationality underpinning EU’s approach to the refugee crisis is not the one of direct control, but the one of indirect control. Patrolling its borders in cooperation with the neighboring states, while also externalizing its migration policy in form of lucrative bilateral
treaties, is not an entirely new approach the EU applies to its migration policy but is the approach that has become the primary one given obvious political limitations of the internal asylum reform in the bloc (see Chapters 3 and 4). It is also a technique of governance of the EU which sees an increase in its power over its neighbors in general and closing of the space for refugees and migrants to seek legitimate ways to leave and seek a better life under the guise of humanitarian necessity and market logic. By investing more and outsourcing more, the EU is not only discursively shifting the scale of responsibility around it, but is also decentralizing its migration policy, externalizing it, and, above all, making it less visible, veiled by discourses of global aid donor and a bloc that helps develop areas from where migrants and refugees come. This externalization, in Foucault's words, is symptomatic of the "government of the society"- EU's economic intervention in the states for the purposes of developing them to decrease migration flows by creating a negative demand for migration in the countries of origin (Foucault 2008, 256).

The birth of humanitarian governance in EUope closely follows the restructuring of EU’s identity from the 1990s well into today. This restructuring is reflected in many ways, but for the purposes of this research, we will focus on how it is reflected in the changing nature of EU’s norms and its perception of borders. For EUrope, norms are essential. While being perceived as a normative power (see, for example, Manners 2002), EUrope has kept on maintaining a reputation as a global player whose power rests in soft skills, that is predominantly economics, diplomacy, and socio-cultural attractiveness. In terms of economics, EUrope’s model of neo-liberalism is closely connected to the norms of liberal democracy, both of which became predominant in the increasingly globalized world and were exported to the non-West. In order for these ideas to be acceptable, EUrope adopted a model of normativism which was to be exported, or spilled-over, into its non-Western neighborhood both in the south and in the east. However, this normativism was exported by the way of neo-liberal economic
associationism through which both EU and the neighbors incurred significant benefits. As evident in, for example, association agreements and EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), this associationism was entirely predicated on the will and ability of the neighboring states to adapt to EU’s regulations, rules, and norms. In that sense, EU’s official website for the ENP states the following:

Strengthening the state and societal resilience of the EU’s partners is a key priority in the face of threats and pressures they are experiencing, including the challenges associated with migration and mobility. The key principles of the revised ENP are differentiation amongst partner countries, flexibility, joint ownership, greater involvement of the EU Member States, and shared responsibility. Through the ENP, the EU offers partner countries potential greater access to the EU’s market and regulatory framework, standards and internal agencies and programmes. The EU provides its support to partners in the Neighbourhood region mainly through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), with over EUR 15 billion for 2014-2020 (European External Action Service 2016, emphasis mine).

Already in this quote we see EU’s discourse framed as cooperation on migration and mobilities affecting the neighborhood states rather than the EU, in addition to the exposed rationality of the ENP that seeks to bring the neighboring states closer to EU’s own standards, regulatory framework, and the market. This ENP mission stems from the early 2000s when the EU proposed to “remove the necessity for people in need of protection to come to Europe by creating procedures and infrastructures that enable the countries in the region of origin to offer effective protection to persons requiring international protection as soon as possible and as closely as possible to the countries of turmoil” (Schuster 2005, 4).

When it comes to borders, the same approach to migration is manifested. Because the EU needs neighbors, especially the ones across the Mediterranean (e.g. Libya) to help protect its external borders, the association agreements and partnerships were followed by extensive funding of border defense cooperation systems. These also worked well with the EU’s commitment to help stabilize and develop the countries in its neighborhood in order to stem the migration flows. As more migrants started crossing the Mediterranean in the 2000s and especially after the turmoil of the “Arab Spring”, a kind of humanitarian border regime was
developed whereby stopping the tragedies that happen while migrants try to cross the Mediterranean (e.g. a boat carrying more than 500 migrants capsizing off the coast of Italy in 2013) became EU’s policy priority. Humanitarianism and humanitarian form of governance of EU’s external borders is not the only discourse that is applied in the EU but has become to most conspicuous and influential one. In that sense, EU’s humanitarian missions do not only create a humanitarian space in the Mediterranean and they do not only emphasize the missionary duty of the EU to protect civilians from being smuggled, but rather, they establish a mechanism of control, of governance, of its borders that has ostensibly moral underpinnings. Perkowski (2016) writes:

Second, humanitarianism, human rights and security function as techniques of government. Security governs through biopolitical and disciplinary means, aiming to identify ‘risks’ and to pre-empt them, and to create a ‘buffer zone’ around Europe in which border controls are extraterritorialized. Humanitarianism has been referred to as the ‘management of undesirables’ and a ‘form of policing’, governing populations similarly to security discourses (2016, 332).

Therefore, a combination of factors starting from economic associationism (quid-pro-quo border management), coupled with EU’s perception of itself as a normative power and ultimately with the perception of EU’s neighbors as in need of developing, opened the way for the EU to perceive itself as a humanitarian force, a force for good.

How can we diagnose this and where is it present? If we look at the main strategies/agreements the EU signed before 2015 related to migration, we can see a steady increase in the discursive legitimization of financial management and cooperation as elements of EU’s border protection and the protection of migrant’s lives (please see the next chapter). Moreover, we see that these have become completely infused in the discourse of migrant protection and humanitarian intervention (legitimized by EU’s standing as a normative power). This indicates a kind of rationality of the EU governance which produces humanitarian technologies of power that are entirely based in the EU’s governing rationality, in its raison d’etre which Walters and Haahn (2005) treat as neo-liberal. That is- based on its functioning principle, the EU started
using its market potential and its reputation as the “global aid donor” to legitimize projects aimed at curbing migration under the guise of humanitarian ideals. Yet, as we will see in the next chapters, this often brought unintended consequences that often went against EU’s principles.

1.2 Methodology

Qualitative data available for analyzing the discourse of humanitarianization of migration in the EU abound and their sources are vast. In that sense, one can look both at media and EU statements, or political discourse from nation-states, in order to find important qualitative signifiers of the aforementioned phenomena. However, this research will focus on the EU level migration/border management and as such will analyze discourse on humanitarianization of migration coming from the EU level strategies and statements, in particular from the EU Global Security Strategy (2016). Furthermore, it will focus on official statements (e.g. Global Approach to Migration and Mobility from 2011 or statements/documents available on Frontex’ website) from EU, the Italy-Libya Memorandum of 2017, and the processes, statements, and regulations with regards to migration, humanitarian and developmental aid.

Discourse analysis is an excellent approach to this kind of data because it will allow the researcher to uncover both the indicators of the process of humanitarianization of migration and also the way neo-liberalism is discursively embedded in the EU strategies, deals, statements regarding its external borders and migration. With that in mind, this thesis will broadly focus on the EU migration and border control in the period in the last 15 years (2003-2018) and specifically on the period of the Syrian migration crisis (2015-2016/17). This period is crucial for analyzing the humanitarianization discourse and the neo-liberal approach underpinning it because it was the time when most of these discursive activities happened and when migration became a top issue in EU (recently, for example, the EU Council agreed that
the next EU budget will focus on defense, security, and migration thus indicating a strong financial orientation of EU on migration) (Zalan 2018).

We chose these specific sources because they allow us to stay concise in our analysis while also providing a detailed insight into how the EU framed migration through its strategies and statements. Because this thesis focuses on discourse analysis pertaining to EU migration and border control, having an EU-level discourse analysis contributes to the strength of the analysis itself and also to the empirical focus of the study (e.g. not nation-state level).

Therefore, this thesis falls in line with more interpretivist and critical approaches to data analysis. This is crucial for this thesis because its raison d'être is that if we can understand the percolation of neo-liberal rationality within the EU as a decision-making entity, then we can understand how discursively issues, migration and border control in this case, are framed and how these rationalities transform themselves in various discourses, such as humanitarianization. When we think of migrants as humane subjects that need “saving”, for example, we often forget about the fact that practices we utilize to include/exclude these subjects come from pre-established rationalities that inform our norms, identities, and thoughts. In that sense, these norms (e.g. the EU as a normative power in terms of liberal democracy and human rights) can often become products and carriers of these rationalities and can produce inadvertent consequences that undermine their humanitarian and developmental logic.

1.3 Literature Review

Studies in migration are a very prolific part of social sciences. From the first half of the 20th century until today, migration kept on fascinating researchers who studied its psychosocial and cultural effects (Park 1928), or its economic-developmental effects (Goodrich et al. 1937, Zimmerman and Smith 1930). However, with the dawn of globalization after the WWII, the often theoretically incoherent migration studies started being more systemic. Kurekova (2010)
describes the development of neo-classical theory of migration from the 30s onwards and states that this theory focuses on migration as a phenomenon driven by differences in returns to labor across markets (8). She describes micro and macro migration, where macro migration depends on micro/individual choices, but has its own social form, whereas micro migration studies localized and individualized choices (ibid, 11). As globalization expanded, there was a proliferation of theoretical approaches with regards to migration, some of which are world-systems approach or transnational migration. Wallerstein (1974) is credited as the father of world-systems theory which studies migration as a product of globalization and recomposition of capitalist markets (see also Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997 and Pellerin and Overbeek 2001)). Another crucial theoretical approach in migration theory is the one studying transnational social spaces (known as transnational migration, developed in the 1990s) which seeks to understand the socio-economic impact migrants make both at home and away (see Tsuda 2012, Schiller et al 1995, Kivisto 2010).

Much like other interdisciplinary social sciences (e.g. International Relations), migration studies still suffer from the multitude of divergent theoretical approaches. However, this multitude brings a vast theoretical-empirical richness to the discipline thus allowing it to expand our understanding of migration almost unlimitedly. Migration studies therefore mark intellectual-scientific forays from complex macro studies of world systems to very complex micro studies of border practices and their contestations by migrants (see Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013). One of the most interesting approaches to studying migration is critical migration studies.

Slowly from the 1990s, the studies of migration started being more critical with regards to traditional economic-oriented approaches and have developed ways to study migration by paying attention to its connection with states, NGOs, journeys, and technologies. This approach is broadly characterized as critical migration studies and also critical border studies because it
focuses both on studying the way migration is reconstituted by a variety of power-wielding actors and on how migration reconstitutes borders. In that sense, students of securitization such as Huysmans (2000) indicate how securitized and militarized technologies and processes moved migration from a home affairs issue in the EU to an issue of security. They also delve into securitizing practices and technologies, and means by which technologies of migration/border management helped the EU to externalize migration efforts (Andersson 2016, Léonard 2010). Migration studies also started focusing on migrant mobilities, their journeys and spaces of migration, inspired by ANT (actor-network theory). For example, Walters (2011) focuses on viapolitics, the way journeys and vehicles shape migrant experiences (see also Collyer 2010, Schwarz 2018). The shift to critical border studies also allowed a proliferation of Foucauldian-inspired research into humanitarianism, neo-liberalism and sovereignty with regards to border and migration management (see Bigo 2002, Walters and Andrijasevic 2010). This approach is novel and is interesting to us because it allows for studying the phenomenon of externalizing migration through the creation of “lines in the sand”, or diffusion of border practices away from actual borders (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009, Bialasiewicz 2012).

Recently, however, the issue of humanitarianization of borders became prevalent when studying the dichotomy behind humanitarian appeals (morality) and security framework of migration management. Fassin (2012) writes about the birth of the humanitarian government in the age where humanitarianism and morality are renegotiated politically and philosophically. Humanitarian government, for Fassin, weighs the tension between inequality and solidarity, domination and assistance, that is constitutive of all humanitarian reason. Vaughan-Williams and Little (2017) go along Fassin’s lines in writing about how humanitarianism involves politics of solidarity, but in an exclusionary sense where militaristic deterrence is used to save migrants. In the EU, the logic of prevention is similar, albeit it uses a humanitarian-developmental nexus to argue that stemming migration through development means protecting
migrants (Lavenex 2004, Bakewell 2007, Lemberg-Pedersen 2017, Garelli and Tazzioli 2017, Donini 2010). In that sense, the humanitarian-developmental nexus posits a system where developmental action is designed to stem migration for the purposes of politics of compassion.

This leads us to studying the governmentality as applied to migration management (Vaughan-Williams 2015, Walters 2011, Perkowski 2016). Inspired by Foucault’s account of governmentality, many researchers (see Bialasiewicz 2011 and 2012, Huysmans 2004, Pallister-Wilkins 2015, Walters 2010) have delved into understanding the biopolitics of migration. They researched how the extension of EUrope’s management of external borders focuses on non-EUropean territories and populations, thereby reconstituting them (see also Euskirchen, Lebuhn and Ray 2007). However, what is lacking in this approach to understanding migration management is a certain concreteness in treating humanitarian-developmental nexus systemically on the EU level, not as a localized and decentralized border-practice, but as a discursive system that establishes new relations between EUrope and non-EUrope. Furthermore, the empirical focus of such studies was always centered on one segment of EU governance, for example FRONTEX border managing practices or EU’s investments into externalizing borders. We want to take that and analyze it with regards to relevant strategies pertaining to migration in order to understand how they act together in a system of humanitarian-developmental thinking on migration. Therefore, we move away from looking into practices per se and try to understand the diffusion of humanitarian-developmental rationality (governmentality) applied by the EU on migration.

To that end, in the case of the EU, humanitarianization is an element of rationality that can broadly be positioned within EU’s political-economic structure. For example, Walters and Haahr (2005) write about the evolution of EU’s governance as a product of a neo-liberal governmentality. For them, EU’s governance is in its core (e.g. the Treaty of Rome)
conceptualized on accounts of freedom and liberty where citizens are subjects of the economic system of governance (2005, 45).

In that sense, we join Walters (2011), Samaddar (2016), Buckel and Wissel (2010), Pellerin and Overbeek (2001), Geddes (2005), in claiming that borders are becoming frontiers of poverty, coopted by humanitarian-developmental that de-center the relevance of neo-liberal subject-making in migration/border management by prefacing their intrusions with a humanitarian face and by emphasizing the positive developmental aspect of externalization of migration management (see also Castles 2009, Carling and Hernandez-Carretero 2011, Cuttita 2017). In that sense, the visibility of the neo-liberal logic in EUGS or the Italy-Libya Memorandum (2017) must be emphasized as it can contribute greatly to our understanding of how externalization of migration control and coopting it by ostensibly “good” discourses (e.g. human rights) creates consequences that undermine EU’s intentions and extend its overreach of non-EUrope, thereby redifining their relations.
Chapter 2: The Structure of Neo-Liberal Humanitarianism

2.1 Introduction

As aforementioned, this thesis delves into the migration crisis by taking a step back from studying humanitarian forms of government (or governance) and tries to understand EU’s humanitarianization of the migration crisis from the perspective of studying neo-liberal governmentality. We posit that EU’s way of dealing with migration is increasingly characteristic of neo-liberal humanitarianism, a system which uses humanitarianism and politics of care to legitimize increasing neo-liberal intrusion into non-EUrope. This creates a dissonance wherein EU’s humanitarian principles serve the purpose of legitimizing intrusion, thus undermining the entire idea behind EU’s humanitarian engagement with migrants. We analyze this below.

In the first instance, we try to introduce the idea that, while humanitarianism in the (neo)liberal age serves the purpose to legitimize (neo)liberal ideology (see Pallister-Wilkins 2018), it can also serve not only as its own cyclical form of governance (as Pallister-Wilkins argues) but also as a governmentality that is embedded in the neo-liberal system. In that sense, we use Michael Barnett’s Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism to posit that because we live in a liberal age of humanitarianism (as Barnett argues in his book, see below), the conjoining of humanitarianism with neo-liberal forms of governance has a counterintuitive quality (see below).

In the second instance, once the conceptual level unification of humanitarianism and neo-liberalism is completed, we try to understand it through EU’s discourse on the recent Migration crisis. This means putting the conceptualization of neo-liberal humanitarianism into the realm of the empirical.
2.2 Humanitarianization and Neo-Liberalism: Putting the Two Together

In the chapter called “Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border” of Ulrich Brockling’s, Susanne Krasmann’s and Thomas Lemke’s Governmentality, William Walters argues the following:

As we have already seen, the inscription of the humanitarian border into discourse involves a specific production of truth. Not unlike the production of truth in other domains, it is buttressed by various forms of modern expertise, principally medical, legal, and social, as we have seen, but also psychological and spiritual. But our case is qualitatively different from the production of truth concerning, say, industrial productivity or unemployment. For one thing, the production of humanitarian knowledge takes place in highly-situated ways, structured by the temporality of unfolding crises, moving in fits and starts which shadow the shifting geography of migratory control strategies. This is not the systematic gaze within which social and economic fields are mapped, on the basis of permanent statistical apparatuses and routinized reporting procedures. Instead, it is a knowledge which depends much more upon the work of ad hoc missions, delegations, and visits whose task it is to gather data and testimony in the field (Walters 2010, 152).

Walters argues that the production of humanitarian knowledge depends on the knowledge coming from various aspects of migration control (e.g. ad hoc missions). In that sense, for Walters, the production of humanitarian knowledge is localized, ad hoc, it is disconnected from a systemic approach to humanitarianism, and it is, above all, decentralized. Therefore, the production of humanitarian knowledge can never be a part and parcel of a systemic process because it is contained within the realm of political contestations and reproductions on the ground where humanitarian knowledge and practices are enacted and distributed. Consequently, Walters argues, because humanitarian practices are so fluid, they often cross-cut with certain tendencies, certain rationalities, such as the liberal one. Walters writes that many humanitarians think well before acting in any way that surpasses the provision of basic humanitarian necessities to migrants, in the case of his article in Maghreb, because they do not want to create the “pull factor” and encourage migrants to attempt precarious and often deadly voyages (Walters 2010, 154-155). Therefore, Walters’ argument for humanitarianism is that while it has its own core of what makes it humanitarian, it is at the same time a field of
governance that is so fluid that it cross-cuts with other fields of governance, such as the liberal one.

But, can’t we take Walter’s argument and flip it on the other side? While agreeing with him in that humanitarianism is often localized, fluid, and decentralized, we must acknowledge that humanitarianism as a form of governance always acts within a certain context. That is, it cannot exist outside of the dominant socio-economic paradigm. In that sense, humanitarianism does not just interact with, for example, liberalism, it acts within it and as a part of it. Then, can’t we see humanitarianism not as its own system, but as a mechanism, of a certain systematized governmentality which is referred to here as neo-liberal humanitarianism?

Michael Barnett (2011) takes a different way to get to a similar perspective on humanitarianism, the one which is closer to our argument. In his historical study of humanitarianism, Barnett claims that, before anything, humanitarianism is a way of governing:

> Yet any act of intervention, no matter how well intended, is also an act of control. Humanitarian governance may have its heart in the right place, but it is still a form of governacne, and governance always includes power. The simulatenous presence of care and conrol has become intensified by the growing involvement of states and international organizations in humanitarian affairs over the decades (and in this respect reverses the standard observation that global governance enahnces the power of NGOs relative to states). It also results from the very nature of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism is partly paternalism- the belief that some people can and should act in ways that are inteded to improve the welfare of those who might not be in a position to help themselves (Barnett 2011, 12).

Therefore, the logic of humanitarianism always has a side of it that governs, a side of it that rests in the sphere of the political (see also Fassin 2012). For Barnett, humanitarianism is rather complex because of its changing nature. He identifies two types (emergency and alchemical) and three ages of humanitarianism: an imperial age of humanitarianism (late 18th century to WWII), an age of neo-humanitarianism (WWII to the end of the Cold War), and an age of liberal humanitarianism (end of the Cold War to the present) (Barnett 2011, 38-39). He also argues that humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartialty, and independence apply to both the emergency and alchemical humanitarianisms, where the emergency humanitarianism
advocates for provision of relief to those in immediate peril and alchemical humanitarianism advocates for saving lives at risk and addressing the root causes of suffering (Barnett 2011, 37-39). For the purposes of this work, we focus on the liberal age of humanitarianism.

After the end of the Cold War, the world ushered into the phase of reconstruction. During this phase, many factors that kept stability in the bipolar world order became destabilized. That is why the period after the Cold War was marked by wars in the developing and Third worlds (e.g. the fall of Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda). This opened a new way for humanitarianism to manifest itself. Whereas before it served a purpose of treading the delicate balance of the bipolar world by being neutral and filling out the “humanitarian gaps” in a world characterized by realpolitik, humanitarianism in the 1990s was politically unleashed, stimulated by growing financialization and gemination of humanitarian organizations and developmental NGOs (Chandler 2001, 681). David Chandler (2001) writes of humanitarian NGOs as organizations that increasingly developed political strands of humanitarianism starting in the 1970s and especially developing after 1989 whereby they framed developmental aims and struggles against Third World oppressive regimes in ethical and humanitarian terms (683-685). In Biafra, Nigeria in 1968, NGOs such as Oxfam broke away from ICRC’s (International Committee of the Red Cross) principles of neutrality and voiced political discontent with the conflict in Nigeria. This ultimately led, according to Chandler, to the creation of humanitarianism’s two strands which are “freedom of criticism” and denunciation, and “the right of intervention” (2001, 685). Humanitarian interventions became more commonplace especially in the 1990s and legitimized by the principle of humanitarian action (e.g. Kosovo, see Chapter 3). Neo-liberalism, humanitarianism and development intersect there, at the crossing between developing a stable democratic state (the idea that was prevalent in the 1990s) through market stabilization and reorganization, and through emphasizing human rights as the benchmark for whether a state is developed or not. In that sense, humanitarianism
could not be its own field of governance but could rather only participate as a mechanism within a matrix of power relations that had state building and development provision as their main focus.

Therefore, while humanitarianism was always close to the capitalist system of production (e.g. large donor-funded organizations providing help to the underdeveloped and poor) and has often served political interests (e.g. colonial civilizing missions, see Barnett 2011 and Lester 2002), in the liberal age humanitarianism slowly became indistinguishable from the neo-liberal knowledge production, where it helped project it and frame it in compassionate and caring terms. To that end, Donini (2010) writes the following:

In broad-brush terms, humanitarianism is about three C’s – compassion, change or containment. Traditionally, there were two ‘souls’ in the humanitarian ethos, one focusing on the universal values of compassion, and charity and the other on change and transformation of society. In Europe, these traditions are represented, for example, by the work of religious orders going back to the Middle Ages and the transformative message of the Enlightenment with its aspirations for justice and rights. In the last two decades, however, a third motivation has appeared – humanitarianism as containment. Containment itself can take two forms – the provision of a minimum assistance to ensure that crises do not spin out of control (and threaten the citadels of the North) and the deliberate incorporation of humanitarian action in the world ordering and security strategies of the North (Donini 2010, 223).

As we can see, because of humanitarianism’s plural ethos, evinced in the three-fold characterization above, its malleability and ability to adjust to overarching socio-economic systems is quite well-developed. But, if we can take it further, humanitarianism’s ethos is not only coopted by these systems, it plays a crucial role in shaping them both discursively and practically. Humanitarianism then cannot simply exist as an ideology or a mechanism to be coopted, rather, it is a system of thinking involved in a relationship with paradigms it exists in. In that sense, when humanitarianism and neo-liberalism are put together, we get a symbiosis of compassion and market logic. This closely resembles Barnett’s (2011) description of the evolution of humanitarianism (e.g. from imperial to liberal humanitarianism) which focuses on the plurality of dimensions (or eras) humanitarianism can operate in. In the next sub-chapter, we want to crystallize how the systematized way of governing with humanitarian face, with
the face of care, has developed from the translation of humanitarianism on to neo-liberalism and vice versa.

2.3 EU and Discourse: Neo-Liberal Projection of Humanitarianism

In “Neo-Liberal Regionalism and the Management of People’s Mobility”, Helene Pellerin and Henk Overbeek write about how neo-liberal migration policies reconstitute new regional hierarchies (Pellerin and Overbeek 2001). In that sense, these regional hierarchies create places of economic fixity from where migrants leave in search of the better future (2001, 154). Because they leave from places such as the MENA or deeper in sub-Saharan Africa, countries that are peripheral (e.g. Libya, Algeria, Tunisia) to the neo-liberal markets in Europe are becoming migrant-receiving countries while at the same time themselves being countries of emigration:

Both in the case of the Americas and in the case of Europe, what we can observe happening is a restructuring of regional hierarchies. Within this process certain countries or regions are gradually integrated into the OECD heartland (Mexico, Central Europe and possibly, in the long run, Turkey). These countries are themselves becoming destination countries for migrants from the outer layers of the emerging new regional geo-hierarchies, just as a decade ago the Southern European countries made the transition from being migrant-sending to migrant-receiving countries against the background of their integration into the hegemonic structures of the West (2001, 154).

While surely certain southern-European countries are still framed as migrant-receiving (e.g. Italy and Greece), EU’s increasing orientation towards extraterritorialization of migration and migration prevention indicates that non-EU countries are increasingly conceived of as destination countries but without the added benefit of "being integrated into the hegemonic structures of the West" (ibid). This process is followed closely and underpinned by an expansion of EU’s economic intervention into the spaces of non-EU countries either through Association Agreements or through a debundling of EU’s influence onto various NGOs, through various bilateral treaties, and through EU’s expansion of FRONTEX operations further away from the Mediterranean (Andersson 2014, Andersson, 2012, Geddes
2005). In that sense, the logic of reconstitution of regional imbalances of, for example, Northern Africa, follows closely the reconstitution of the EUropean socio-economic space but without integrating the non-EUropean spaces into its own structures. Therefore, as the EU expands more, the migration is recentered on to the nations outside its borders, where non-EUropean nations are taken for granted as bearers of externalized responsibility for migration. This development is crucial as it allows us to understand migration into EUrope as dependent largely on the EUropean economic currents and movements.

The logic of EU’s governance that broadly rests on “embedded neo-liberalism” (Walters and Haahr 2005) then tries to deal with the issue of migration by incorporating EU’s normative aspect (e.g. EU as a human rights beacon) and by extending its market reach on to the aforementioned regions/states. This is where humanitarianism comes into play. Because humanitarianism is so closely associated with a normative and moral aspect of governing, its integration into the discourse on migration is quite pertinent. Where EU constructs unconsciously the spatialities of migration by expanding and reconstituting its own market, its governing rationality is being applied on to the areas that are less developed and areas that are simultaneously the spaces of emigration and EU frontiers. This logic behooves EU to develop those areas and the humanitarian principle of care comes in as a legitimizing mechanism. Genuine humanitarian and normative concerns and genuine market concerns are put together. That is, the correlation between the two here brings the humanitarian and normative face with the managing rationality of neo-liberalism which projects non-EUropean spaces of emigration as in need of development in order to stem migration flows and protect lives.

For example, the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) is a mechanism established in 2005 and supplemented in 2011, whose main priority is ensuring human rights while:
The GAMM is an example of international cooperation at its best – taking account of the interests and objectives of all involved: EU, partner countries and migrants themselves. The agenda is balanced and comprehensive, aimed at four equally important objectives: better organising legal migration, and fostering well-managed mobility, preventing and combatting irregular migration, and eradicating trafficking in human beings, maximising the development impact of migration and mobility, promoting international protection, and enhancing the external dimension of asylum (European Commission n.d.).

Under GAMM, EU established multiple regional dialogue processes, such as the one between EU and Africa (that is, African Union) titled “the Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment and the Rabat Process (in the South) (European Commission n.d.). The focus of this regional dialogue is mainly to:

In line with the GAMM, those dialogues cover its four thematic priorities thus covering topics like regular migration intra-African mobility, the fight against human trafficking, the protection of migrants, the promotion of asylum and international protection, capacity building in border control, the maximization of the positive correlation between migration and development (which includes mitigating the impact of brain drain, enhancing the role of African diasporas in the development of their countries of origin, or helping African countries build up their capacity to manage migration flows) (European Commission n.d.).

Here, we can see that EU’s focus is actually to strengthen African states in the areas of migration, development, employability and border protection. Words such as “maximization” or phrases such as “positive correlation between migration and development” indicate that EU is trying to establish a systematized governing rationality in the areas covered by GAMM that would help model the development of participating states towards the EU-like principles based on a self-sustaining and self-managing rationality that is so essential to neo-liberalism. Its focus on managing migration and mobility is based on bringing together international migration and development where migration is treated as a root cause of many problems. Although Bakewell (2008) and many others (Deshingkar and Grimm 2005, De Haan 2007, Castles 2009, De Haas 2008) argue that such logic is detrimental because it views migration as a problem, instead of a benefit, the way EU and many other international organizations apply the neo-liberal developmental logic as a panacea is unchanging (1348-1349). We can see in its discourse that
the main goal of GAMM is to produce a more efficient system and a more developed system of border control, migration management, population management, and brain drain control. That is, the measures proposed by GAMM are an ideal symbiosis of humanitarian principle of care and aid, and the neo-liberal forms of control through teaching how to self-manage in order to stem migration, without questioning whether this preventive logic undermines the livelihood of people.

Humanitarianism as a part and parcel of the system of neo-liberal governmentality helps turn the human rights discourse, this normative aspect, into a form of humanitarian governance that channels the neo-liberal rationality by framing external EU investment and involvement with centers of emigration, the neighboring states and regions from where most migrants/refugees come from in terms of care. In that sense, the “production of satisfaction” (see Foucault 2008, 226) applied broadly here is nothing more than a technology of neo-liberal governance that is normatively legitimized by discourses of development, human rights and migrant protection, which was not created by the migration crisis but rather which informed EU’s view of and response to the migration crisis. Below, we present more closely how humanitarianism is intertwined in the EU with neo-liberalism.

EU’s interactions with humanitarianism have become institutionalized by the establishment of the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) in 1992. ECHO positioned the maturing EC (which became the EU the following year after the Treaty of Maastricht was signed) strongly in the matrix of global humanitarian relations by making it the world’s largest donor of humanitarian aid (Barnett 2011, 169). The explicit aim of ECHO was to position the then-EC at the “heart of the international humanitarian action” (Commission n.d.). The main reason for ECHO’s founding was to institutionalize and centralize scattered money flows related to humanitarian aid and to end the informality of relations the EU had with its partners (e.g. humanitarian NGOs) before ECHO (Mowjee 1998).
ECHO’s focus on humanitarian aid stressed the importance of providing humanitarian relief and emergency help to disaster struck areas and to strengthen local systems so as to make them more resilient towards emergency disasters in the future (European Commission 2007). That is, ECHO as a mechanism of humanitarian aid was generally concerned with relief and not with economic development. To that end, the largest humanitarian operations of ECHO are set in the most critical areas of the world: “The biggest relief operations currently supported by the Commission’s Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) are in Sudan (Darfur in particular) and Chad, the Middle East (Palestinian Territories and Lebanon), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sahel region, Afghanistan, Russia (Chechnya), Burundi, Liberia, Myanmar/Thailand and the Greater Horn of Africa.” (European Commission 2007)

However, ECHO’s focus has become increasingly related to developing “self-reliance” of refugees. While ECHO traditionally focused on humanitarian aid and relief, in the field of migration and internal-displacement its focus is turning towards development:

Finally, the European Commission has an important role in advocating for and enabling durable solutions for refugees and IDPs, especially with regards to fulfilling their right of return to their countries of origin. The EU recognizes that meeting the needs of refugees and IDPs requires targeted humanitarian aid (as distributed by ECHO) combined with sustainable development assistance. Together with its partners, the EU also advocates for the full recognition of the new opportunities and benefits for national and local economies which forcibly displaced people can create (European Commission 2018, my emphasis).

In that sense, while ECHO’s initial focus was not on development, rather on providing aid, with time ECHO and EU on the whole became aware of the role of development in organizing humanitarian aid. This is evinced in the fact that EU-level developmental investments went beyond EUR 50 billion in 2013 (EU + member states) with EU institutions accounting for beyond EUR 18 billion in 2016 (EU Commission 2018 and European Union 2018). In addition, where from 2007-2016 EU ODA (official development aid) increased by around EUR 50
billion, its humanitarian aid increased, for the same period (ECHO+EU Member States) by EUR 5 billion (European Commission 2018).

For example, in EU Commission’s communication called *Maximizing the Development Impact of Migration* (2013), the Commission insists on migration and its positive impacts on development (EU Commission 2013, 2). While the connection between migration and development is a new one, something the EU Commission repeatedly stresses, it is of crucial importance. To that end, the EU Commission writes that better managing migration, controlling it under the paradigm of good governance, can be beneficial for labor markets, migrant inclusion in those markets, and for host countries that can benefit and better regulate migration (EU Commission 2013, 4-5). This is also supported by Commission’s Issues Paper on development and migration:

> It is recognized that a development approach would have the potential of mitigating the negative costs and impacts that the presence of refugees, IDPs and returnees be it in camps, urban or rural settings may have on host countries and communities and could maximize their positive impact as potential development and economic contributors (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations n.d., 3).

Therefore, the Commission insists that migration must be recognized as an *enabling* factor for development, that development and migration agenda should be broadened (see also Lavenex and Kunz 2008), and that migration should be considered within the developmental context (EU Commission 2013, 5). This kind of development, however, does not directly serve the purpose of training migrants to add to EUropean markets by becoming a part of them. Rather, this kind of development seeks to develop non-EUropean spaces of emigration for the purpose of preventing migration into EUrope. The stimulation of the self-managing rationality is prefaced by the humanitarian concerns for migrants but essentially serves the purpose of preventing migration (or "Keeping them in their place", as Bakewell 2007 writes). Development and governance are the key words here. In that sense, without good governance
and control over migratory flows, there cannot be good action on development. With that in mind, the Commission writes:

Integrating immigration and emigration aspects into development strategies at all levels is a vital first step to promoting governance frameworks for maximizing the development potential of migration and mobility. However, progress remains inadequate, in particular at the level of partner country strategies, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (EU Commission 2013, 8).

Furthermore, the Commission states:

All states should engage in international dialogue and cooperation with relevant partners to identify shared priorities and strengthen bilateral and regional migration governance. Effective engagement of civil society in global, regional, national and local planning on migration and development must also be pursued. Donors and other development actors should effectively integrate migration and mobility issues into their development policies and instruments. Further evidence on the links between human mobility and development should be collected, and operational tools to support migration mainstreaming further developed (EU Commission 2013, 10).

Under the paradigm of international “dialogue and cooperation with relevant partners”, the EU Commission is presenting “multilateral coherence in migration governance”, that is- a systematized and globalized way, based on partnerships (not necessarily related to states), to govern migratory flows (EU Commission 2013, 9-10). This multilateral narrative is very important because it encourages global cooperation in the field of governance, that is- it encourages a standardized view of inter- and intra-governmental work on migratory flows. A crucial aspect of this logic is humanitarianism. Commission is well-aware of its international normative and legal obligations. As such, it is proud to stress continually and emphatically its commitment to providing sustainable conditions for safe passage, normative, ethical, and policy obligations of every level of EU governance towards the human rights of migrants. Yet again, we can see quite clearly the way development and governance have penetrated these normative and ethical standards. To that end, the Commission stresses its commitment to providing safe passage and safe conditions for migration to all migrants, especially the vulnerable groups (children and women) (EU Commission 2013, 5-6). Because the
Commission is fully committed to social and human rights of all migrants, something addressed not only in its regulations and communications but also in international normative and legal humanitarian standards (e.g. the Geneva Convention of 1951, UN Palermo Protocols on Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons etc.), it stresses “orderly and regular” migration (EU Commission 2013, 6). While the Commission’s dedication to normative and legal aspects of regulating migration is praiseworthy, it must be noted that it also works hand-in-hand with its developmental goals related to migration. The Commission stresses the nexus between regular and legal migration and development which contributes both to the notion that human rights are obtained through good governance, but also that market governing can be imposed through human rights. That is, because development is inherent to good governance frameworks, and because of EU’s commitment to human rights (which can, again, only be given if EU can control and govern migration routes), the orderliness, safeness and legality of continually expanding migration routes, the human rights discourse becomes a part and parcel of good governance-development nexus. That is, there can be no migration, no humanitarianism in EU anymore without the need for developmental logic of good governance and without an instant bundling of migration with good life, dignity and opportunity. This is important to understand because it will help us communicate with Chapters 3 and 4 more critically and will help us understand how this systemic logic underpins and normalizes externalization of EU’s migration policy and the deepening financialization and intrusion of EU’s mechanisms (e.g. FRONTEX) in the spaces outside of EU (namely, the topic of Chapter 3).

In the European Consensus on Development (2017), hereafter ECD, EU is insistent on cross-cutting approaches to increasing state and society resilience. Concerning migration, ECD states that managing migration behooves EU to use a more coordinated and systematized approach to problem-solving, where development and trade are conceptualized as policy
instruments (EU 2017, 18). This goes along with the Valetta Summit (2015) political conclusions which state that addressing the "root causes" of irregular migration from Africa to EU entails:

Our common response will focus on reducing poverty, promoting peace, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, supporting inclusive economic growth through investment opportunities and the creation of decent jobs, improving the delivery of basic services such as education, health and security. Rekindling hope, notably for the African youth, must be our paramount objective (EU 2015, 3).

That is, the Valletta Summit political conclusions, in addition to other documents reviewed here, achieve exactly what their creators wanted them to do. Discursively, they create a systematized image of how migration is best handled, that is- through binding developmental governance with peaceful and humanitarian goals. Economic growth and reduction of poverty are consistently the main characteristics of EU developmental policy (and are in line with UN Development Goals), but when we apply them to migration, they are automatically framed by the humanitarianized ideals of "living with dignity", "respect for human rights" and "delivery of basic services". The self-doubting logic has no place here because a liberal-minded dedication to absolute goals of progress is inherent to these strategies. This is also reified in the EUGS.

The EUGS, produced in June 2016, is a crucial document for EU’s external strategy and global relations. In that sense, EUGS is beyond a symbolic document, it is a document that reflects the character of EU in the world and its vision for and of that world. The language of EUGS is very diplomatic, albeit very clear in terms of what EU wants to see from the world. Words such as “resilience”, “development”, “strategic partnership”, and “political economy of peace” are most indicative of EU’s approach to its global power status (EU 2016). Furthermore, the ultimate goal of the Strategy is EUropean unity, that is- the unity of EU member states on the future of EU’s global relations, its position in that world, its vision of itself, and a way to think about how to make these visions a reality.
One of the most pertinent phrases of the Strategy is surely the “political economy of peace”. This phrase indicates EU’s commitment to creating peaceful and sustainable conditions for prosperity through economic stability and development:

The EU will foster the space in which the legitimate economy can take root and consolidate. In the midst of violent conflict, this means ensuring humanitarian aid access to allow basic goods and services to be provided. It also means working to break the political economy of war and to create possibilities for legitimate sustenance to exist. This calls for greater synergies between humanitarian and development assistance, channeling our support to provide health, education, protection, basic goods and legitimate employment. When the prospects for stabilization arise, trade and development – working in synergy – can underpin long-term peacebuilding (EU 2016, 31-32).

The stabilization of conditions in states of emigration then becomes part and parcel of a new system of political economy. The self-regulating economic system of peace here is inherently connected to market logic and is supported by the politics of care. EU’s goals are praiseworthy, they just do not seem to work for the benefit of migrants since they treat emigration as a linear journey motivated by survival (see Chapter 3, in addition to Bakewell 2007, see also Crawley and Skleparis 2017, Crawley, et al. 2016). In order to ensure the creation of the political economy of peace, EU will act to promote societal resilience, self-reliance, and diplomatic cooperation (and integration). When it comes to migration, and bearing in mind what was written above, EU will dedicate:

A special focus in our work on resilience will be on origin and transit countries of migrants and refugees. We will significantly step up our humanitarian efforts in these countries, focusing on education, women and children. Together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return (EU 2017, 27).

Furthermore, EUGS states:

We must stem irregular flows by making returns more effective as well as by ensuring regular channels for human mobility. This European Union Global Strategy means enhancing and implementing existing legal and circular channels for migration. It also means working on a more effective common European asylum system which upholds the right to seek asylum by ensuring the safe, regulated and legal arrival of refugees seeking international protection in the EU. At the same time, we will work with our international partners to ensure shared global resilience – the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises (EU 2017, 23).
responsibilities and solidarity. We will establish more effective partnerships on migration management with UN agencies, emerging players, regional organizations, civil society and local communities (EU 2017, 28).

From these two paragraphs, we see a reification of a certain mentality. In that sense, the future approach of EU towards migration will inevitably be characterized by more humanitarian intervention that serves as a catalyst for labor market integration, mobility improvement, better management of borders, and a debundling of EU’s responsibility towards its own external borders. By stepping up neo-liberal humanitarian efforts (this will be more analyzed and elaborated in Chapter 3), EU essentially implies the creation of conditions for the political economy of peace, that is- an extension of neo-liberal market governance on to the currently unstable areas away from EU’s borders. This entails not only "education of women and children" or ensuring better human rights conditions, but also an increasingly decentralized control and intrusion into those societies (that is, the self-governed and market-disciplined body politic) by the EU. This "increasingly decentralized control" is essentially a process by which the operating logic of EU, its principles and norms, are transferred onto NGOs, "strategic partnerships", and ostensibly civil society (see Lavenex 2004, Christiansen, Petito and Tonra 2000, and Carling and Hernandez-Carretero 2011). Then, through this system of control, EU action away from its borders is legitimized through humanitarian necessity and through the positive aspects of creating sustainable conditions for development of peace. In reality, this entails an ever-greater standardization of governing principles espoused by EU away from EU.

We can clearly see how the end-product of the logic which is fully realized and developed in the EUGS can translate into decentralization and outsourcing of responsibility, under the banner of principled and humanitarian action.

2.4 Conclusion: Neo-Liberal Humanitarianism

This chapter strove to present humanitarianism as a tool of neo-liberal governmentality. That is, it did not try to understand humanitarian forms of governance per se, rather it tried to
present these through the prism of a different kind of governance, a neo-liberal one. With that in mind, this chapter tried to paint a broader picture of humanitarianism by understanding its historical development and the liberality of its logic in the post-Cold War era. After that, this chapter tried to present EU's ideas on humanitarianism as a both an event that comes together with development and that serves development as a tool of legitimization. The "there is no alternative” mentality behind EU's ostensibly principled approach to issues such as migration is well-entrenched today through a systematized discourse, evinced in multiple EU-level strategies and communications, that seeks to present development and economic stability as guarantors of human rights and to present human rights as inherent in development and economic stability.

This is not really evident in the contemporary studies of humanitarianism, nor of neo-liberalism. The reason why this is important is because it helps us understand the entanglement of humanitarian reason with the neo-liberal one and its cooptation by the latter. That is, it helps us understand better the humanitarianness of neo-liberalism and its increasing intrusion into ever-widening spectrum of policy areas in EU. From climate change to migration, from welfare policy to defense, EU's strategies increasingly converge on to same principles revolving around the image of a self-reliant, successful and dignified individual. Furthermore, it also helps us understand and underscore EU’s approach to an increasing externalization and intrusion into non-EUropean societies and states by teaching those societies EU-inspired self-governance techniques (for more information see Chapter 3). In the next chapter, this thesis steps away from exclusively conceptual understanding of humanitarianism-as-neo-liberalism and tries to present it through more case-based and empirical examples. It focuses on FRONTEX operations and the EU-Libya Memorandum to see this mentality in action.
Chapter 3: The System in Action: Externalization of EU’s Migration Policy in the Age of Neo-Liberal Humanitarianism

3.1 Introduction: From EUrope into non-EUrope

Externalization of EU’s migration policy has become one of the most significant elements of the EU’s managing of its borders. In the last chapter, we established a connection between humanitarianism, socio-economic context (i.e. neo-liberalism) and EU’s style of governance to conclude that while EU’s discourse is rich in humanitarian concern for migrants, the actions that it takes reflect a neo-liberal managing rationality which uses the humanitarian discourse to legitimize the creation of an increasingly interwoven system of intrusions into non-EUrope. This system is not an end in itself. We do not argue that EU consciously wants to neo-liberalize areas around it to protect itself from migration, rather we argue that this process is unconscious and often produces unintended consequences that undermine it.

In the next sub-chapter, we investigate the logic of neo-liberal humanitarianism more closely by paying attention to externalization, which we argue is the most prominent mechanism of this system. Because in neo-liberal humanitarianism we construct migration as a duty to save, opportunity to develop and responsibility to control, all of which are elements that enable an agile humanitarian-developmental nexus, we legitimize externalizing action no matter how strong it went against EU principles, respect for sovereignty of states and humanitarian concerns it creates.

The second sub-chapter takes the conclusion of the first one further. With that in mind, the next sub-chapter tries to present externalization of migration practices as one of the most important and visible mechanisms by which the neo-liberal humanitarian mentality is
manifested. We present technologies of externalization (institutional and cooperative, through bilateral agreements) which are framed under the framework of resilience as processes that help migrants, states they come from and also that help the EU. However, this logic has yielded unexpected consequences which undermine their humanitarian and developmental credibility. Through these technologies, EU has opened a sphere of action wherein the development of non-EUropean spaces of emigration is a mechanism of a) keeping migrants there (i.e. stemming or stopping migration) and more importantly b) paternalistically (that is, through politics of care) producing and creating new migration spatialities where the creation of “orderly zones” of migrations are also creations of “orderly migrants”.

3.2 Externalization and Neo-Liberal Humanitarianism: An Introduction

The propensity of neo-liberal humanitarianism towards externalization is clearly visible in the relative autonomy both humanitarianism and neo-liberalism have vis-à-vis each other. Neo-liberalism is not only a socio-economic paradigm, it is a system of making meanings and a system of structurally disciplining and reconstituting economic subjects (see Foucault 2008, Lemke 2001). Its raison d’etre is essentially connected to market logic and the release of markets from state-centered regulation approaches and the creation of free entrepreneurial subjects. That is, neo-liberalism produces knowledge and disciplines thought. Much like neo-liberalism, humanitarianism is a field of governance which is intricately connected to the socio-economic paradigm it operates in. Because humanitarianism is a form and a field of governance, it can be both localized and decentralized humanitarian scape of action (much like Walters 2010 argues, see Chapter 2) but it can also be conjoined in a systemic way of thinking about humanitarian action, it can be an agent in a governing system (e.g. Cold War neo-humanitarianism or post-Cold War liberal humanitarianism). Because, as we argued in Chapter 2, humanitarianism and neo-liberalism became more activated in the 1990s, the rapidly changing post-Cold War order embraced developmentalism and humanitarian intervention.
The interventionist ethos of humanitarianism and the developmentalist-regulative ethos of neo-liberalism became conjoined for the mission of helping to stabilize and develop states. In Europe, for example, this reconstitution was most visible during the Yugoslav wars. Humanitarian intervention became institutionalized most clearly in the case of NATO’s bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1999), during the Kosovo War, which was characterized as necessary to prevent a humanitarian crisis. The necessity of humanitarian intervention was best summarized by then-President of France Jacques Chirac, who said: “France considers that any military action must be requested and decided by the Security Council [but] the humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to a rule, however strong and firm it is.” (Caplan 2006, 23, parentheses in original, italics mine).

That is, humanitarianism was finally politically articulated as a duty to protect, a responsibility in a state of exception which surmounts easily the bureaucratic-political obstacles of any system (the bombing of FRY was not approved by UNSC, for example). Humanitarian intervention and Donini’s (see Chapter 2) classification of the new humanitarian ethos of containment go together hand-in-hand. Because humanitarianism became so open to militaristic intervention during the 1990s, it became more feasible as a political agent.

With that in mind, we must ask ourselves whether humanitarian intervention is solely connected to militaristic interventions? The answer to this question would be no. Because humanitarian intervention is not explicitly defined as a militaristic intervention (see Roberts 1999) and because of humanitarianism’s developmental ethos, it can also be part and parcel of economic and developmental projects. Herein lies the connection between humanitarianism and neo-liberalism, between market re-ordering governmentality with a human face and an ethically legitimized militaristic externalization. Within this connection we see the imbrication of the two aspects of neo-liberal humanitarianism and the conjoining of their relative autonomies. We have humanitarianism with its ostensibly apolitical and agile principles, and
its triple-sided ethos (see Chapter 2), and then we have neo-liberalism with its governing rationality and the creation of subjects through economically developed, and expanding, spaces of freedom (see Walters and Haahr 2005, Foucault 2008, Read 2009). This symbiosis has become fully developed in the last 10 years because of humanitarian crises the Continent faced. In 2013, when a boat transporting more than 500 migrants capsized near the Italian island of Lampedusa, the necessity of humanitarian intervention has become paramount. EU Commission President Barosso stated, upon visiting the island, the need for protecting migrants by addressing the root causes of migration (Barosso 2013). From then on, the quick integration of developmentalism, aided by unmitigated humanitarian discourse, was most clearly reified in the infamous mechanism of neo-liberal humanitarianism, that is- externalization of migration control. This is the focus of the next sub-chapter.

3.3 Discourse in Place: Externalization as a Mechanism of Neo Liberal Humanitarianism

Externalization is defined more generically in terms of the external dimension of the Union’s migration and asylum policy (Lemberg-Pedersen 2017, 35). Lemberg-Pedersen argues that already in GAMM (2005), EU realized that it cannot manage its border alone, rather that it needs help of the third parties to manage migration (Lemberg-Pedersen 2017, 35). He further states that there is a dichotomy in the way EU deals with migration:

The EU’s discourses seem to oscillate between two framings of the preemptive rationale behind its transnational border control. Representative of this oscillation is how the Danish EU Presidency of 2012 framed EU externalization as ‘contributing to better the fundamental rights of irregular migrants and those in need of international protection. At the same time, however, the Danish Presidency also invoked analogy likening migrants to the mounting water pressure of rivers, by saying that the union must be ‘working upstream in countries of origin and transit’, since this will ‘help stem the flow of illegal migration and secondary movement to the EU’ (Lemberg-Pedersen 2017, 35, apostrophes in original).

Externalization of migration control, however, is not a process that is only connected to externalizing asylum centers or processing centers outside of Europe, rather it is a process by which there is also an externalization of EU’s governing rationality, of EU’s border knowledge
and border practices. While the goal of externalization is not militaristic intervention per se, rather it is the protection of, in this case, migrants from drowning in the Mediterranean, its unexpected consequence, and the one which is ultimately reified under the principle of necessity of humanitarian intervention, is an interventionist export of patrimonial neo-liberal governmentality. Moreover, this process is also connected to the reconstitution of the Mediterranean as the EUropean border (see Raeymaekers 2014), something that Pallister-Wilkins identifies as a product of EU’, states’ and private actors’ externalizing efforts (Pallister-Wilkins, The Tensions of the Ceuta and Melilla Border Fences 2017, 63). In the next part of this sub-chapter, we focus more clearly on how externalization works. We start by mentioning the framework of resilience and the way the technologies of externalization are embedded in it.

Resilience became one of the most visible aspects of EU’s foreign and security policy. Under this framework, increasing the stability and development of states according to an EU blueprint are a part of a missionary-like commitment to its neighborhood. As a discursive frame, resilience channels the externalizing logic of neo-liberal humanitarianism in a way that precisely reflects the systemic capability of EU of intruding into non-EUrope. In its year-on review of EUGS, the European Commission states the following:

The European Union adopts a transformational approach to resilience, aimed at protecting rights, building political participation, fostering sustainable development and security. We aim to do so in a manner that enables states and societies to withstand, adapt, recover and respond to shocks and crises if and when they arise (European Union 2017).

Furthermore, in the video-overview of EUGS one-year after its publication, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for foreign and security policy and the Vice-President of the European Commission, emphasizes:

We have set up migration compacts with some key countries: we are investing in growth and security in countries of origin and transit so that less people will risk their lives in dangerous journeys. Almost one fourth of the world’s population lives in fragile states or societies. This year we have focused on preventing many of these fragile
situations from turning into new wars, new humanitarian disasters, new refugee crises; this is what we call resilience (European Union 2017).

When the review of the EUGS refers to resilience, it does so with the ethical intention of preserving stability of EU neighboring states in order to prevent death, tragedy and the destabilization of European borders. When High Representative (HR) Mogherini refers to setting up migration compacts with some key countries (please see below), she does so in the spirit of positive multilateral cooperation and an idealistic construction of multilateral world.

What is the inadvertent consequence of these compacts, of these agreements? It is precisely the core of neo-liberal humanitarianism, that is- the reshaping of borders and countries to fit EU’s agenda on migration. By this we mean the following. The reshaping of borders and countries to fit EU’s agenda on migration follows Bakewell’s (2007) logic, wherein he describes EU’s incentivization of localized development to prevent migration (i.e. protectionist developmentalism), which actually undermines development:

While it may be realistic to expect that improved economic conditions will change the pattern of migration and may even reduce the net outflow of people in the long term (for instance, drawing on the experience of Ireland, Italy and Portugal), many of the policy statements about migration suggest that investing in development is a means to reduce migration. They are phrased in terms that suggest sympathy for those who are forced to leave their homes on account of poverty to search for opportunity elsewhere. They use the technical language of migration management to ensure the legal movement of people under the control of states. The trouble with this virtuous circle is that it assumes that all the actors involved have a common view of the ‘good’ ends to which the process leads them. It operates on the assumption that the normal and desirable state for human beings is to be sedentary. However, all the evidence suggests that, as people get more opportunities to move, they take them up in ever larger numbers (Bakewell 2007, 1350).

Bakewell looks into preventive developmentalism and concludes that its logic goes against its intentions because it forcibly tries to stimulate development by making people move less. In that sense, in its desire to secure proper and dignified conditions of life, preventive developmentalism overemphasizes the prevention of migration which creates a counterintuitive result- if mobilities are going to secure people good conditions of life (by allowing them to develop elsewhere), then why do we use development to stymie that? Therefore, the reshaping of borders and countries to fit EU’s conception of development with
regards to migration has a real weight in terms of its effect on the livelihood of people in non-EUrope that is- it keeps them down for the sake of providing them ostensibly good life (see also Chapter 2, also De Haas 2009). Fassin (2011) argues this as well, albeit from a different perspective (the one which analyzes state bureaucracies). Fassin writes that because there is the need to control spaces of emigration and to develop them, there is a greater need to establish more effective administrative apparatus in the countries of emigration (for this, see also Dijstelbloem and Dennis 2015) in order: “to control immigration and hunt down the undocumented, to adjudicate the refugee status and guard the detained aliens” (2011, 218). Therefore, the inadvertent consequence of the reshaping of borders and countries with regards to EU’s agenda on migration is the development of an opposite effect whereby people are disincentivized (the core of preventive developmentalism) to move while at the same time bureaucracies are externalized to perform that same function (i.e. disincentivizing people to move).

This is manifested in the two technologies of externalization. Frontex (institutional one) is the most visible technology in terms of its intrusions into the non-EUrope. For example, Lemberg-Pedersen (2017) writes:

A prime example of such extraterritorialization in the EurAfrican context is the Frontex Agency, tasked with patrolling the EU’s external borders. Many of its operations, such as HERA II and III in 2006-2007 took place in, and reterritorialized, Euro-African borderscapes. Thus, the HERA operations targeted boat migrants seeking to reach the Canary Islands from the north-west African shores, where they would be able to apply for asylum in Spain. To counter this movement Frontex deployed Spanish helicopters, naval vessels from Italy, Portugal and Spain and aircrafts from Finland and Italy in the territorial waters of Senegal, Cape Verde and Mauritania, where Spain played a leading role. Exposed to the full political-economic power of the EU, the three West African countries had little choice but granting the Union “remote control” over their territories, leading to extraterritorial patrolling (Lemberg-Pedersen 2017, 36-37).

What Lemberg-Pedersen describes here is not just Frontex’s mandate to interfere as “upward in the streams of migration” (2017, 35) as possible, rather this paragraph describes the extension of Frontex’s mandate into sovereign territories and its imposition, EU’s imposition, of a managing rationality on to the West African states (see also Bialasiewicz 2012). Frontex
operates at the frontend of a militarized and neo-liberalized system, where one of its main purposes is to develop research and technologies to protect and manage EU borders (see Article 37 of EU Regulation 2016/1624; EURLEX 2016), develop rapid\(^4\) response teams (of up to 1,500 border guards) and help coordinate EU state activity with regards to borders. Regulation 2016/1624 states:

The Agency should have the necessary equipment and staff at its disposal to be deployed in joint operations or rapid border interventions. To this end, when launching rapid border interventions at the request of a Member State or in the context of a situation requiring urgent action, the Agency should be able to deploy, in the Member States, European Border and Coast Guard teams from a rapid reaction pool which should be a standing corps composed of border guards and other relevant staff. There should be a minimum of 1,500 border guards and other relevant staff in the pool. The deployment of the European Border and Coast Guard teams from the rapid reaction pool should be immediately complemented by additional European Border and Coast Guard teams where necessary (EURLEX 2016, article 29).

The language of both the resolution 2016/1624 and Frontex’s website is absolutely unclear to what extent Frontex goes to manage and protect EU’s borders, yet it is inundated with humanitarian concerns, especially with the rights of migrants and their dignity and respect for the principle of non-refoulement. However, this human rights ethos is immediately supplanted by the ethos of intervention, the ethos of technology developments, and the ethos of security (see for example, Léonard 2010, Carling and Hernandez-Carreter 2011, in particular see Campesi 2014):

The EU military operation was presented as one of such bolder steps. It opened with the dispatch of five warships, two submarines, three planes, three helicopters and two drones and ignited a polarized debate about the “migration crisis” in the Mediterranean. Issued in the aftermath of yet another tragic shipwreck in which about 900 migrants were lost at sea, the Operation was presented by EU authorities as an intervention to “save” migrants from perilous waters and from pitiless traffickers and smugglers, and as a “response”—indeed the humanitarian response to the migration crisis in the Mediterranean (Garelli and Tazzioli 2017, 2).

Because the EU is the one who decides on the exigency of the situation and the extent to which phenomena, such as migrant smuggling, occur, it can easily deploy rapid intervention forces

\(^4\) Please also note that the word rapid is mentioned more than 100 times in the regulation 2016/1624.
intended to save and protect migrants while at the same time activating a systemic logic of neo-
liberal humanitarianism that pinpoints problems with border controls and migrant safety, and
then exercises its logic upon spaces of emigration. EU is the primary arbiter who can, upon
assessment, introduce interventions, developmental projects, and training missions into spaces
of emigration for the purposes of “saving” and “protecting” migrants, “empowering” local
communities, and exerting a stabilizing force on to a destabilized region.

This is clearest in Frontex’s training missions that form the core of its border protection
activities. Frontex trains and helps equip border guards of both EUropean and non-EUropean
countries to standardize its treatment of migrants, especially children (see regulation
2016/1624, especially Article 36), thus making it easier to control and manage borders while
also respecting fundamental human rights principles. This contributes to resilience of borders
both on the territory of EU as well as on territories of non-EU neighbors. But, above all, the
training missions participate in the diffusion of EU knowledge and principles in border
management on to the non-EUrope (see Euskirchen, Lebuhn and Ray 2007). In principle, this
is good since a big part of EU training is also on fundamental human rights and how to respect
them, but we can also see that training operations are part and parcel of the system of
humanitarian-developmental re-articulation of EU’s relations with its neighbors (see ibid) and,
as some claim (Jones and Johnson 2016) a re-articulation of sovereignty. In that sense, we try
to understand this redefinition below in the discussion on ostensibly technical EU training
missions in Libya.

The most criticized EU training mission is surely the one with the Libyan Coast Guard,
started in 2016 but contemplated since the very foundation of Frontex (Floris 2017). It is
established firmly on the principles of building Libya’s border resistance, funding development
on ground and training, and funding, personnel of both the migrant centers in Libya and its
coast guard (Palm 2017). The training of the Libyan Coast Guard took part over a 14-week
period in the Fall of 2016 on the EUNAVFOR MED (European Union Naval Force in the Mediterranean) ships, where Libyan officers received training in fundamental human rights, in boarding and searching ships, putting out fires, and learning about borders in international law (Floris 2017). As we can see, the training process is long and arduous, there were even complaints of Libyan guard’s protests over unpaid salaries (ibid), and is conceived of as something contributing to the improvement of migrants’ lives. Because EU externalizes migration management, and in this case in Libya, the training of officers represents something much more than mere training. It represents a technology in a system of migration management that outsources EU’s responsibility for its borders, but it also makes, and this is most important, EU’s decision-making power extended on to Libya and its borders.

In that sense, while EU outsources responsibility for migration management to Libya, human rights violations and mistreatments cannot be connected with EU, however, through that technology of knowledge production, EU retains the power to control and standardize the way in which borders in the Mediterranean are managed. That is, it controls borders by emitting power in a systemic but decentralized way. Andrijasevic and Walters (2010) call this the “international government of borders”. They write that the new international governance of migration uses ostensibly technical tools (such as training missions) to governmentalize border and migration management in, what they call, the age where governance is “a complex of schemes which govern through the elicitation of state agency and the regulated enhancement and deployment of state capacity.” (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010, 980). Here Andrijasevic and Walters pinpoint an important problem. Because EU wants to leave its borders open, it needs to support integrated border management techniques. The training missions are an important aspect of standardization of this kind of knowledge. But the problem produced by this is that trainings are not just technicalities, they are political tools by which the integration of border guards across the Mediterranean behooves more EU action to keep the system in
place. That is, EU’s training missions help conduct the way non-Europe conducts its borders, which ultimately produces a new kind of migration management. The assistance provided by EU to Libya with regards to migration helps us see more clearly the problems of EU’s neo-liberal humanitarian action.

EU-Libya relationship largely rests on EU’s involvement as a stabilizing factor within Libya. In that sense, EU is very actively involved in initiatives that are meant to ensure the self-reliance of Libyan authorities and local communities with regards to migration. Consequently, “EU-Libya Relations” section of EU’s central website states the following:

The EU main priority regarding migration is to protect migrants in Libya and support local communities to cope with the challenge. The EU’s support to Libya on migration focusses on programs that facilitate access to basic services, support to host communities by providing employment opportunities for both the local population and for migrants, and assistance and protection to vulnerable migrants. It also aims at helping to improve living conditions in detention centers and at disembarkation points, as well as assisting voluntary returns of stranded migrants to their countries of origin and support the evacuation of those in need of international protection (EU Commission 2018).

As we can see, the EU-Libya relations with regards to migration reflect EU’s priority in terms of preventive developmentalism and support for resilience of the local population with the aim of also helping migrants. While this rationality in itself is praiseworthy, the flipside of it is that EU cannot really control the developments in Libya like this. Helping to improve living conditions in detention centers when many of the detention centers are illegal and hidden can only backfire on EU (see Morone 2017 and Lemberg-Pedersen 2017). For example, the Human Rights Watch reported that: “Conditions at migrant detention facilities remained abysmal. Officials and militias held migrants and refugees in prolonged detention without judicial review and subjected them to poor conditions, including overcrowding and insufficient food. Guards and militia members subjected migrants and refugees to beatings, forced labor, and sexual violence.” (2017). Descriptions such as these are constantly advanced by human rights organizations who insist that EU needs to do more in order to prevent abuse, theft, smuggling,
and degradation, yet EU’s logic itself produces indirectly and unintentionally such results. For example, as Libya is the only North African country without an asylum system, the systemic protection and rights of asylum seekers cannot be guaranteed (Klepp 2010, 4). In addition to that, forced returns of migrants intercepted by FRONTEX on their Mediterranean journey often stand in contradiction to the principle of non-refoulement, especially when we take into consideration that they are often bereft of their right to an impartial asylum procedure (Klepp 2010, 8).

The same rationality is applied in the second technology of externalization (cooperative one); the EU-approved Italy-Libya Memorandum. With Libya, the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation, signed in early 2017, was hailed as a pivotal moment because it saw EU start more actively managing the problem of migration (this Memorandum came soon after the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016). However, the problem with the Memorandum itself is connected to the complex situation in Libya and with the fact that Libyan law does not distinguish between refugees and asylum seekers. This means that Libya is not a party to Geneva Convention, and all “illegal immigrants” entering the country (basically all individuals entering Libya without a permit) are jailed (Toaldo 2017). Furthermore, Toaldo writes:

This is not really an EU-Libya deal, rather the EU endorsement of a bilateral memorandum of understanding between Italy and the Presidency Council of Libya headed by Faiez Serraj. This is one of three Libyan rival governments together with the House of Representatives in Tobruk (which labeled the memorandum as illegitimate) and the unrecognized and Islamist-leaning National Salvation Government in Tripoli. Angela Merkel had raised concerns over the reliability of the EU’s interlocutor, given that Serraj’s government hardly controls even its own capital. The memorandum contains three main elements: first, it restarts full implementation of the 2008 Friendship Treaty between Italy and Libya which already included a big chapter (and funding) on migration containment; second, it boosts support to the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard in order to rescue as many migrant boats as possible in Libyan territorial waters; third, it provides funds to improve healthcare in the detention centers where migrants are locked once they are rescued by the Libyan Coast Guard. The memorandum does not mention respect of international conventions (it only refers to International Customary Law), nor does it establish an independent monitoring mechanism (Toaldo 2017).
The Memorandum clearly outlines a process with which EU intends (in cooperation with Italy) on developing Libyan resilience in order for it to be able to manage its migration. However, what it also includes heavily is the investment in “local communities” in order to build their own resilience for the purposes of reducing emigration rate and dismantling the smuggler’s business model (European Council 2017). Although it cannot be said with certainty how the investments are distributed and utilized (since there is no monitoring mechanism), given the complex situation in Libya, its unreliability with regards to protecting migrants, and the complexity of “local communities” in the state, the neo-liberal humanitarian logic is affirmed in every step of the Memorandum. The Memorandum states that the Parties commit to “eliminating the causes of irregular immigration”, and that they will support the countries of origin in their strategic development projects:

The Parties collaborate to propose within three months from the signature of this memorandum, a wider and more complete view of Euro-African cooperation, to eliminate the causes of irregular immigration, in order to support the countries of origin of immigration in the implementation of strategic projects for development, raise the level of tertiary sectors to improve life standards and health conditions, and contribute to the reduction of poverty and unemployment (Uselli 3-4, see Palm 2017).

What Frontex actions and the Italy-Libya Memorandum tell us is that the reality of the EU’s approach to migration can be seen as mutually exclusive from the developments on the ground. If EU is setting up a way of dealing with migration through bilateral agreements that outsource the responsibility for migration while at the same time increase EU’s oversight of migration management activities of non-EUropean countries, then the concept of migration management is redeveloped in the age of neo-liberal humanitarianism to become increasingly a method of exporting knowledge practices (e.g. training missions), economic influence (e.g. investment) and direct interference with sovereignty (e.g. rapid interventions by Frontex). This rationality is applied by default, where the logic of humanitarian-developmental nexus is not at all questioned; the contradictions it creates (e.g. supporting humanitarian interventions while at the same externalizing migration to countries where migrant rights are not recognized) and the
effectiveness of its developmental ethos (investing and developing areas for the purposes of keeping migrants there a sustainable strategy?) are considered to be relative in comparison to their perceived benefit (see Campesi 2014, Vassallo Paleologo 2014, Pallister-Wilkins 2015, Easterly 2003). Therefore, migration management is not only securitized in this sense, it is also reproduced as part and parcel of a new form of EU’s relationship with its neighborhood, the one that inherently posits its neighborhood’s increasing dependency on EU with regards to territorial integrity.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter overviewed the capacity of neo-liberal humanitarianism to act systemically, with its own mechanisms (e.g. externalization) and technologies (e.g. institutional) of migration management. Most importantly, however, this chapter debated how neo-liberal humanitarianism reproduces dependencies and reshapes spaces of emigration for the purposes of serving migrants and stabilizing transit countries. In the last ten years, EU has redeveloped the relationship it has with its neighborhood to growingly reflect what EU sees as its own interests and problems. In that sense, through technologies available, EU has established a system of relations with its neighbors that has no alternative and that conditions our perception of migration as an enabling factor for redeveloping local communities and for reimagining political and borderscapes in countries where migrants come from.

We also included in this chapter a debate on the concept of resilience which serves to frame these neo-liberal humanitarian intrusions in a way that ascribes to EU an almost missionary role. EU is intent on increasing the resilience of states around it but it does so in its own terms, where states seemingly join voluntarily but are reshaped in the process to mirror EU’s concerns.
Chapter 4: Crisis? What Crisis? The Production of Migration in the System of Neo-Liberal Humanitarianism

4.1 Introduction

Hitherto we argued for a system of dealing with migration management with its mechanisms, frames and technologies. This system is a product of the imbrication of neo-liberal governance and humanitarianism, that is- it is a dual system. In the one hand, this system is productive, which reflects neo-liberal governance, because it actively produces migration through governance. In the other hand, this system is also a system of care that seeks to prevent death and improve livelihood (in order to stem migration) by inviting more regulation and intrusion into non-EUrope We outline this more closely below. In this chapter, we insist on looking at neo-liberal humanitarianism as being a far more complex system of intrusions that produce contradictions (e.g. the ones described in Chapters 2 and 3) but that also produce opportunities (e.g. production of migration as an opportunity for development). In that sense, we do not want to simply criticize neo-liberal humanitarianism for it being neo-liberal, rather we present it as a complex system of thought that must be studied intently. After that, we address two important problems with neo-liberal humanitarianism.

4.2 Productive Lines, Destructive Lines

Where we in chapters 2 and 3 write that migration is viewed as an opportunity to develop non-EUrope by EU, we also acknowledge that this view inherently draws more migrants into EUrope because it centers the power on EUrope. To that end, Samaddar (2016) writes:

Refugees will provide child labor, semi-slave labor, intense work conditions, encamped labor market, and a deregulated labor market. Without this capitalism cannot survive today. Global capitalist economy is fast moving from the old aid strategies towards making the needy self-sufficient, which means making them resilient, market-enabled actors. This is one of the modes of European transition from a liberal union to a neo-liberal empire. The present crisis will be a great occasion of a neo-liberal
restructuration. *This will once again prove that neo-liberalism survives by making virtues out of crises. Crisis is its mode of existence* (Samaddar 2016, 104, italics mine).

Therefore, the migration crisis is a part and parcel of the neo-liberal system which seeks “virtues” in it (i.e. opportunities). To put it more concisely, the systemic production of migration invites two contradicting phenomena; the first one is the prevention of migration through alleviation of poverty, the second one is the creation/production of poverty by preventing migration. In that sense, where EU implements training missions, developmental goals, resilience of non-Europe and strategic partnerships in order to create developed spaces to stem migration (Chapter 3), it is also involved in a system of producing borderlands that do not benefit migrants by putting them down and systematically intruding into spaces where they come from (Chapter 3, see also Hansen and Jonsson 2011). This is important to acknowledge because it adds further credibility to viewing neo-liberal humanitarianism as a system and not just a practice consisting of humanitarian governance and neo-liberal governance.

The lines in the sand (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009) produced by EU are shapeshifting elements in the new relationship of EUrope with non-Europe. Neo-liberal humanitarian creation of investment initiatives and more regulated border regimes then hardwires not only borders between EU and non-Europe but also creates landscapes of regulation which are conditioned by its logic in such a way that they beseech more systemic intrusion (see also Chapter 3). This produces the relative instability of these borders (i.e. lines in the sand), thus allowing EUrope to extend deeper into non-EUrope. These landscapes also project EUrope as an arbiter and a helper, that is- a space to which people strive to. In that sense, because of the reproduction of the need for regulation for the purposes of development, there will be more EU-level regulation of non-EUropean spaces of emigration, there will be also a stronger decentralization of EU Law in these areas, and there will be a stronger pull factor with regards to migration (see De Haas 2007). We wrote in Chapter 3 that EU’s interventions are decentralized, where the humanitarian paradigm of EU intervention into, for
example Libya, is there, but EU essentially has no responsibility under EU Law for what happens to migrants in Libya. Yet, we must acknowledge the fact that EU is both declaratively and practically invested in trying to prevent these things. It seems like EU as an actor who is aware of its normative and ethical obligations (we also mentioned this in Chapter 2) is unsuccessful, despite its best efforts, in trying to prevent negative consequences of neo-liberal humanitarian action. For example, in one instance we have grave human rights issues that, due to externalization, cannot be blamed on EU (see Marischka 2006), while on the other hand we also have a system that actively seeks to produce migrant agency/autonomy and give them space to be, put more dramatically, masters of their own fate (for agency of migrants see Schwarz 2018, Walters 2015, Papdopoulos and Tsianos 2013).

To that end, where neo-liberal humanitarianism produces agency of migrants (by empowering them through development), it also can take it away (by interfering with natural mobilities of people). Therefore, the idea that neo-liberal humanitarianism produces autonomies, agencies and sovereignties of migrants and non-EUropean states in an increasingly decentralized regime of humanitarian market reconstitution is not just a possibility, increasingly it is a reality. With that in mind, we do not only have the inherent problem of EU humanitarian intervention (protecting migrants at sea vs. degrading them outside of EUrope), but we also have an institutionalized set of ideas that act in a way which presents this behavior, this rationality, as something that is *sine qua non* for helping migrants and resolving issues of migration. The benefit of studying migration management structurally, through the paradigm of neo-liberal humanitarianism is then related to understanding precisely this contradiction which unveils deep complexities in this framework of thought. We want to help migrants, yet what we do by helping them in this way is intruding into non-EUrope and often going against our own norms.
Migration then is produced under neo-liberal humanitarianism as an opportunity to expand governance onto non-EUropean areas for the purposes of integrating those areas not in the EU market, but rather in the standardized system of developing global economic relations whose main undercurrent is the idea of neo-liberal resilience to shocks. In this paradigm migration needs to be prevented and migrants helped, although in reality it often works in opposite ways.

4.3 Reflecting on Neo-Liberal Humanitarianism

In the first instance, the problem with neo-liberal humanitarianism is such that we cannot view EU’s migration management as necessarily and only a product of this kind of rationality. With that in mind, it would be relatively easy for anyone criticizing neo-liberal humanitarianism to posit that it emerged as a full-fledged system not only because of the combination of the interventionist and developmentalist ethos of humanitarianism with the governing market logic of neo-liberalism, but also because of the real policy issues within the structure of the EU. For instance, the EU has severe issues in reforming the Dublin regulation\(^5\) given that not all EU member states agree on how its reform should be conducted. Hungary’s opposition to taking any migrants in is related to a culturalist approach to EU which frames Muslim migrants as “invaders” of Europe (Staudenmaier 2018). Hence, any hopes of pursuing the general reform of the Dublin Regulation are quenched. Therefore, the push for externalization developed more strongly because of the inability of EU’s Dublin system to be reformed. In that sense, the weakness of the neo-liberal humanitarian argument can be put to

\(^5\) The Dublin III Regulation (2014) is an EU regulation which delegates EU member state’s responsibilities for asylum processing. In that sense, it explicitly states that asylum applications can only be processed by the member states where asylum seekers first come (e.g. Italy or Greece, or Malta). There were calls during the migration crisis to establish a relocation scheme in order to lessen the burden on first-entry countries’ asylum systems, but these have failed due to the unwillingness of states such as Hungary or Slovakia to accept migrants (esp. Muslim migrants) (Ammirati 2015).
test if the Dublin Regulation undergoes a reform which would see an increase in EU’s direct responsibility for the well-being of migrants.

However, this work never stated that the neo-liberal humanitarian rationality is the only one present with regards to migration management in EU. We merely ascertained that given the current conditions, this rationality is emphasized. Consequently, the neo-liberal humanitarian paradigm does not hinge on the policy-level developments in EU per se, rather, it frames the way policy-level developments in EU are established. We saw calls for externalization of migration long before the migration crisis of 2015-2017 and as such, the neo-liberal humanitarian tendencies were part and parcel of EU’s thinking on migration. For example, Tony Blair, then-PM of the United Kingdom, called for establishing external asylum processing centers outside of EU borders already in 2003, citing humanitarian concern as the main reason for why EUrope needed to externalize asylum processing (Klepp 2010, 8). That is, even if the Dublin Regulation were to be reformed, the logic of neo-liberal humanitarianism would not be diminished, perhaps it would even be strengthened since more states would be directly involved with trying to control migration.

In the second instance, the argument for neo-liberal humanitarianism seems slightly exaggerated because it rests largely on the conception of EUrope as a post-colonial empire whose moves and policies inherently create dependencies on non-EUrope. That is, this position seemingly takes away the autonomy and agency of non-EUropean actors to cooperate with EU, even if on EU’s terms, willingly and independently. For example, Gaibazzi, Bellagamba and Dünnwald (2017) write that EU’s externalization of migration needs to be looked at from a EurAfricanist perspective:

EurAfrican has a different meaning for us [from the one used pan-Europeanist expansionist projects of the earlier 20th century]; yet we deliberately employ this term also to recall the legacy of asymmetric relationships and (imperial) imaginations informing in complex ways the current border and migration management strategies in the Euro-African space. Europe’s externalization of border and migration
management toward Africa writes a new chapter in a long history of intertwined and concomitantly unequal trajectories between the two continents, ones marked by exchanges and mutual appropriation and fascination, as well as by stark power inequalities, colonial domination, exploitation and racial discrimination. Indeed, what we seek to draw attention to is the ‘entangled history of uneven modernities’ (11, parentheses mine).

That is, the Eur-Africanist perspective on the entanglement of Europe and Africa with regards to migration management seeks to view this entanglement from the perspective of historically embedded relations and bricolages of spatial and temporal contexts that affirm the view that the border between Europe and Africa is not just a border but a political space where EUrope and Africa negotiate through cooperation and entanglement. If we go back to our discussion of neo-liberal humanitarianism, we can see that, unlike with the Eur-Africanist perspective, the relationship between EUrope and non-EUrope is a bit more straightforward and that its dynamics are controlled from the EUropean power-wielder. However, this does not mean that we do not consider the Eur-Africanist perspective as something implausible. To us, this perspective is a product of a productive system of thinking about EUrope and non-EUrope.

Still, the problem remains because we view EUrope as the main arbiter and power-wielder when it comes to migration management in the Mediterranean, thus taking away autonomy of non-EUropean states and non-state actors in their negotiations with EU. This is emphasized in the discussion of the former problem. Therefore, because of EU’s internal dynamics, it is forced to give concessions, invest money, and externalize its border and migration management away from its borders. This is a genuine problem because EU is vulnerable here and its vulnerability can be used by generally authoritarian leaders in its neighborhood. For example, in its relations with Libya before the revolution, EU was effectively forced by the Gaddafi regime to undertake much of the externalizing effort itself. Gadhafi knew very well that it was in EUrope’s interest to stem migratory flows through Libya which meant lucrative deals and bargaining power. His regime refused to reform Libya’s problematic law to meet international standards in order to be have an upper hand in negotiating
with EU (Morone 2017,137-138). In that sense, while EU was the more powerful player, Gadhafi’s regime still realized that the crux of the work in externalization rested on Libya, thus giving them more power. The same things happened more recently with EU-Turkey migration statement (March 2016), where Turkey gained large concessions in return for its acceptance of irregular migrants and EU was criticized for negotiating such a deal because of multiple human rights issues resulting from the fact that Turkey doesn’t recognize refugees outside of Europe (Haferlach and Kurban 2017).

4.4 Conclusion

Neo-liberal humanitarianism as a systemic rationality operating in the EU to deal with migration might in its core be a manifestation of beneficial positive thinking. In that sense, where neo-liberal humanitarianism sees a problem of underdevelopment, it tries to solve it, it earnestly tries to undo the causes and effects of wars, humanitarian crises, and ecological disasters. However, because of the way it is set up it creates contradictions that often undermine its efforts and that resemble historical colonial practices. This agenda of externalizing migration, financializing development of non-EUropean sites of emigration, and multilateral cooperation for resilience is effectively reconstructing regional balances and impinges directly on the livelihoods of people in non-EUrope (see Hallaire 2017, and Pallister-Wilkins 2017). The system within which it operates takes the issue of migration and recreates its meaning, defining it as an opportunity to resolve deeper societal issues, to rebuild states so that they fit the frame of resilience and stability (see Chapter 3).

This view of the migration crisis helps us delve deeper into the reconfiguration of neo-liberalism and humanitarianism for the new age, where aid and development will no longer serve the purpose of helping disaster-struck areas or helping build community resilience against ecological disasters, rather in this era aid and development will try to redevelop communities
to be resilient self-managing units that are *productive* in the system of global neo-liberal relations without understanding that its effects are often counterproductive.
Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to understand the systemic rationality EU applies when dealing with border and migration management. We call this rationality neo-liberal humanitarianism and argue that it is a dual system where relative autonomies of neo-liberalism and humanitarianism are conjoined to yield an outlook on migration as an enabling factor for development, as an opportunity for stabilizing states of emigration (e.g. Libya). This outlook is then prefaced by humanitarian discourse of protecting migrants and saving their lives by preventing them from undertaking dangerous journeys in the Mediterranean.

However, this system is often detached from the ground developments. In that sense, because EU thinks and acts in the way neo-liberal humanitarianism requires it to, it externalizes migration efforts through technologies of FRONTEX and bilateral agreements that are framed in terms of strengthening regions and producing resilience. Yet, this logic is often counterproductive because it creates humanitarian problems. The logic of humanitarianism is undermined and the logic of developmentalism is undermined when both yield something opposite. In that sense, where human rights are often found breached (e.g. in Libya) and where preventive developmentalism is employed to improve living conditions only to keep people in place, the logic of neo-liberal humanitarianism is undermined. However, the problem arises in the fact that EU finds no other alternative to improve its record.

This is due to the fact that its own asylum system cannot be reformed, thus forcing it to externalize migration and border management efforts, but it happens also because EU is stuck in a system of thought that, given the current conditions, is the one it deems most effective, despite obvious practical conditions. This, we believe, is the contribution of this thesis to the academic debate on migration.
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