Rising Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey:
To be or not to be European;
That is the Question

By

Ceren Çetinkaya

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of International Relations

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in

International Relations

Supervisor: Yoav Galai

Word Count: 17,001

Budapest, Hungary

2018

Copyright notice

Abstract

This thesis argues that the current tension between the EU and Turkey can be understood not only by looking at foreign policy choices of the actors but also by analyzing the domestic dynamics and collective identities, because these two dimensions keep influencing each other and drive Turkey's position away from the EU in the international area. Therefore, this research focuses on two dimensions; international and domestic, in the relations between the EU and Turkey to understand better the contemporary distance between them. While the former focuses on Turkey's everlasting membership process with an emphasis on the cultural differences in the discourses of both sides, utilizing the insights of critical constructivism, the latter focuses on how these discourses affected Turkey's national identity reconstruction. The reconstruction process from a European to a neo-Ottoman identity is analyzed via Gramsci's cultural hegemony concept to analyze the changes in the discourses, education, and popular culture more efficiently. Discourse analysis is used to show the representations of Turkish and European identities in the discourses of policy makers from both sides. In addition to this, critical visual analysis is used to analyze the scenes from two soap operas to show the representations of the European and Turkish identities in the popular culture.

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Yoav Galai, who always encouraged me for the better and made this thesis possible. I would like to thank all CEU family and the IR Department, for the opportunities they provided during this difficult process. I would like to thank my family and my friends, for their endless support all the time. But most importantly, I would like to express my thankfulness for Aylin İngenç, whose support I felt here with me in Budapest all the time even though we spent this time in different countries. Also, I would like to thank Özge Çakır for being the best partner in crime and a great shoulder to cry during all my library breakdowns. Last, but not least, I would like to thank Péter Boros with all my heart, not only for making this year amazing with his love and support, but also for teaching me to look at life from a new, more colorful perspective.

This thesis is dedicated to my precious family for their unconditional love and support.

Güzel aileme, sonsuz destek ve sevgilerini bir an bile olsun benden esirgemedikleri için…

Table of Contents

List of Figures

Introduction

Turkey, as the dominant other of Europe,[1] has been experiencing contradictions in its relations with Europe throughout the history, especially after the beginning of the new millennium. Walking in the streets under EU and Turkish flags waving together and visiting Europe one day without a visa has been a dream for every Turkish citizen since more than twenty years. However, along with this dream fading away, a governmental narrative aiming to create a neo-Ottoman society rather than a European one is starkly on the rise. A day of an average student who takes additional religion classes besides Ottoman language courses at school and then goes home to watch his/her favorite soap opera about the wars between glorious Muslim Turks and infidel Europeans, sounds like an ordinary day of a Turkish student for the last four or five years. But for policy makers and international relations researchers, there is so much to discover in this daily routine.

Research on identity has made significant contributions to international relations studies and to the effort analyzing the changing behaviors of international actors. The clash of different identities in one society or shared values of international actors can be driving factors for the strategic choices, as well as societies' inner structures. Therefore, it is almost impossible to understand world politics without analyzing actors through the vehicle of culture. The clash of different identities has always affected Turkish society and its foreign policy as it has affected Turkey's position in international system. Turkey has stuck between two identities; European and Muslim identities, ever since the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic. The secular republic project which seeks to achieve the level of contemporary Western civilizations was started in 1923 by the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The society and the state transformed through several revolutions like switching to Latin alphabet from Arabic

---

[1] Iver B Neumann, "Making Europe: The Turkish Other," in *Uses of The Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 39.

1

alphabet, clothes reforms abolishing the rule of wearing a headscarf in public for women, closing Islamic monasteries in the country or founding the new state on a secular system. With the new approach in the foreign policy of the new-born country, Turkey turned its head away from Middle Eastern countries and focused on relations with Western states. Students were sent to European countries, like France and England, to be educated and come back for the transformation of the country. However, it was not easy to erase the marks of Ottoman history which was based on Islamic leadership and the past which is perceived as glory with the victories against its infidel enemies all around the world. After the 1950s, policy makers tried to mobilize a neo-Ottoman based discourse to restructure the national identity, but they failed because of the military coups that happened when there was a threat to the secular state. During the Cold War, Turkey's self-assertion on its identity as European despite being the historical other of Europe[2] strengthened by the country's membership applications to NATO and to European Economic community. The terms "bridge" and "a window which is opened from the West to the East" identified Turkey's position in world politics and became a great example of Turkey's ambiguous identity during the Cold War.[3] Despite Turkey's aim to be a full member of the EU after the Cold War, prolonging negotiation between the Union and Turkey, and skeptical voices from within the Union about Turkey's accession with an emphasis on cultural differences, became the beginning for the change of Turkey's direction in international area.

The beginning of the new millennium, 2002, had led a turn in Turkey's domestic politics which has affected Turkey's position in international area later.[4] The victory of Justice and Development Party (AKP henceforth) has changed Turkey's Europe oriented identity in time. The party's self-assertion as Muslim liberals was a novelty and a hope for Turkish society, and

---

[2] Ibid, 39.
[3] Zeynep Arkan and Müge Kınacıoğlu. "Enabling 'Ambitious Activism': Davutoğlu's Vision of a New Foreign Policy Identity for Turkey," *Turkish Studies* Vol.17, No. 3. (2016): 386.
[4] Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu, "Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası: Yeni Osmanlıcılık Ve Türk Avrasyacılığı Ekseninde İnşa Edilen Bir Pragmatizm [Turkish Foreign Policy After the Millennium: Pragmatism Constructed in The Context of Neo-Ottomanism And Turkish Euroasianism]," *Alternatif Politika* 5 No:3 (2013): 305.

their commitment to the European Union full accession process was one of the most important reasons for their victory. Even though the "bridge" concept has remained the same to define Turkey's geopolitical and strategic location, the meaning of the "bridge" has a new concept with the AKP government, especially with the new foreign policy doctrine of Davutoğlu, put forward in his book, the *Strategic Depth*.[5] The new foreign policy objectives announced in this book has led to a reconstruction of the national identity of Turkey. This reconstruction process started with the effect of Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish politics with a strong emphasis on religion and the aim of being a leader in the region with equal external relations with all the neighbors.

However, after some point, the discourses and narratives of Turkish politicians spread to the system of education and popular culture as a hegemonic project by reframing the Turkish and European identities in the eyes of the Turkish society. In addition to Turkish politician's discourses, new populist and xenophobic stream in Europe, which appeared in reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis, with a strong emphasis on European values and Christianity of the Union transformed the Turkey-EU relations in another level; Turkey's transformation of its identity from European to neo-Ottoman has accelerated. The influence of neo-Ottomanism in the media and popular culture changed society's identity and image of Europe and turned Turkey's head away from being a member of the EU. The beginning of neo-Ottomanist discourses has become the beginning of a de-Europeanization process for Turkish society despite the aim of neo-Ottomanism was to develop good relations with the East as well as with the West.[6] These developments in society had led to a change in Turkey's role in the international area. Especially contemporary developments in Turkish Foreign Policy like Shanghai Cooperation Organization[7] (SCO henceforth) membership process shows that Turkey officially has turned

---

[5] Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth], (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001).
[6] Tüysüzoğlu, "Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası," 305.
[7] SCO is an Euroasian intergovernmental organization which was established on 15 June 2001. Currently it has eight member states, namely the Republic of India, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. For Further information: http://eng.sectsco.org/about_sco/.

its face to the East. But at the same time Turkey is still waiting in the backyard of the EU to become a member and continues its negotiations with the Union, even though it recently highlights its non-European identity through its close relations with other Muslim countries.

In light of these events, this research seeks to analyze the current changes in EU-Turkey relations by looking at the AKP government's hegemonic project which is based on neo-Ottomanism. This project started with the new foreign policy doctrine of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Davutoglu, and turned into an identity reconstruction process in time and challenged the EU's domination both in Turkish domestic and foreign policy; led to a de-Europeanization process for Turkey. This process is mutually constructed through the discourses of the two parties about Turkey's everlasting accession process and the cultural differences between the two actors. These discourses have echoed in the domestic realm and started an othering process for Europe in the eyes of Turkish society via different ways like the change in the system of education and popular culture. The main contribution of this thesis to the literature will be the analysis of the relations between the EU and Turkey with a focus on the Turkish government's hegemony's effect on Turkish national identity through discourse, education, and popular culture.

In the first chapter of the thesis, I will introduce the theoretical background of the analysis. Due to the importance of national identity construction process by defining the "other" in this research, the theories which take identity and cultural concepts into consideration will be used as a framework. There will be two different approaches to analyze the identity concept and its outcomes in this thesis. As Gramsci emphasizes, the nature of power in the modern world is also constructed in relation to political, moral, intellectual, cultural, ideological questions.[8] Although the hegemony concept of Gramsci does not focus on collective identity originally, according to Langman, collective identity can be seen as the primary locus of

---

[8] Robert W Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, No.2 (1981): 126-155.

hegemony.[9] Additionally, given the role of media and education in sustaining hegemony of governments in domestic politics, Yavuz argues that higher education, mass media and communications have played a very critical role in the reconstruction of Turkish identity.[10] Therefore I will use the Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony to be able to understand Turkey's identity change with a focus on the media, especially popular culture and education. [11] Since this research seeks to understand the influence of changed identity and the effect of discourses in world politics, the critical constructivist approach is the most suitable theory for this work[12] due to its particular focus on the social dimensions of international relations and the possibility of change through the discourse.[13] According to critical constructivists, key concepts in international relations are discursively constituted through representations and linguistic elements.[14] As Arkan and Kınacıoğlu argue, discursive practices and representation relocate Turkey in the world and led to a mutual construction of identities between the EU and Turkey.[15] Therefore discursive analysis will be used as a main methodology, additionally, critical visual studies will be used to help analyzing the scenes from the soap operas, analyzed in the fourth chapter.

The second chapter of the research will start with the definition of Europeanization, and then discuss the background of Turkey's Europeanization process historically. The work of Yılmaz and her division of Turkey's Europeanization process into three stages will be taken into consideration.[16] The thesis will generally focus on the last part of her division: de-

---

[9] Lauren Langman, "Identity, Hegemony and Social Reproduction," Presentation, Social Theory Forum, University of Massachusetts, Boston, (2011): 2

[10] M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 7, No.12 (1998): 19.

[11] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from The Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, Ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (N.Y: International Publishers, 1992), 26-27.

[12] Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, "Enabling 'Ambitious Activism," 383.

[13] Karin M. Fierke, "Constructivism". In *International Relations Theories,* 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2016), 188.

[14] Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 198

[15] Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, "Enabling 'Ambitious Activism," 385.

[16] Gözde Yılmaz, "From Europeanization To De-Europeanization: The Europeanization Process of Turkey in 1999–2014". *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 24, No:1 (2015): 87.

5

Europeanization process (2011-2014), although additionally considering the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 too, due to her work was written in 2015 and did not have the chance to cover the process until 2017. The rise of Neo-Ottomanism during this term with the new foreign policy doctrine of the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Davutoğlu will be analyzed as one of the main reason of this turn in Turkish Foreign Policy and in Turkish national identity. The consequences of this turn will be discussed with the results of a research of Economic Development Agency (IKV) where the changed attitude of Turkish society towards Europe can be observed clearly.

In the third chapter, following up on the results of the survey in the previous chapter, the discourses of EU and Turkish policy makers on Turkey's membership process will be analyzed. All these discourses will be used to show the constructive power of the discourses with focuses on cultural and identity differences in the EU-Turkey relations. The analysis of the discourses will be done to understand how they find place in Turkey's domestic realm and led to a change in Turkish national identity as a part of the hegemonic project of the government.

The fourth chapter is the chapter where the discourses in international area find place in the Turkish domestic realm with the hegemony of the government. In this chapter, the effect of the neo-Ottomanist policies on the society's Europeanization process will be discovered with a focus on the changes in the education and in the popular culture, as additional ways of identity construction after the discourses. The changes in the curriculum of high schools and the spread of religious schools will be shown in addition to the analysis of the two most successful[17] Ottoman themed Turkish soap operas: *The Magnificent Century (2011)* and *Resurrection: Ertuğrul (2014)*. The soap operas will be analyzed in terms of their way of framing Turkish and European identities as well as the different reactions they received from the government despite

---

[17] *AlJazeera Turk.* 2014, "Türk Dizilerini Rekoru [The Record of Turkish Series]", 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/turk-dizilerinin-rekoru.

their similar historical themes[18] to investigate how TV series reproduces discourses, representations, and identities.

In the conclusion, the findings of the research and future direction will be summarized.

---

[18]Selin Tüzün and Aygun Sen, "The Past as a Spectacle: The Magnificent Century," In *Handbook of Research on the Impact of Culture and Society on the Entertainment Industry*, ed. R. Gülay Öztürk, (Hershey: IGI Global, 2014), 182-202; Rengin Arslan, "Muhteşem Yüzyıl, Erdoğan'ın Tepkisiyle Gündemde" [The Magnificent Century is on the Agenda with the Reaction of Erdoğan], *BBC Türkçe*, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2012/11/121126_magnificient_century; William Armstrong, "What A TV Series Tells Us About Erdogan's Turkey". *The New York Times*, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/opinion/erdogan-tv-show-turkey.html.

CHAPTER 1 - Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The concept of change in international relations theories has been analyzed differently depending on an approach. While some traditional theories like realism or liberalism analyze the change without taking the driving factors behind into consideration, critical theories have analyzed the change by analyzing its determinants with different focuses like the focus on discourses or the focus on domestic changes. This thesis seeks to analyze the rise of neo-Ottomanism as a hegemonic project of the government which reconstructs Turkish identity, and its effect on Turkey's long-lasting Europeanization process. Since my research focuses on the change in two layers, one of them is the change of collective identity in domestic realm and the other is the change in relations between two international actors, Turkey and the EU, I will start to review the literature on theories which focus on the change in collective identity in domestic realm first, and then the effect of identity changes in international relations.

1.1. Robert Cox and His Debate on Critical Theories vs. Problem Solving Theories

The focus on change and identity in international area is not new in international relations theories. However, with the debate that Robert Cox started in his work, *Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*, in 1981 where he divided IR theories in two according to their ways of analysis, the concept of change and the theories' way to analyze it with different focuses became clear. He argues that, in conventional international theories, the tendency of taking the state into consideration without studying a society as a part of the state is common. However, despite the necessity of changing the state concept in the analysis to understand the international dynamics better, there are only a few attempts in IR theory to consider the state/society complex as the basic entity of international relations.[19] Therefore, in his work, he goes to a division between international relations theories according

to their purposes and methods of approaching international issues. In his division, problem solving theories in their analysis take the world as it is seen before trying to explain the change or the dynamics behind. As opposed to problem solving theories, critical theories seek to understand the driving factors or current international situations and changes in the international area. Even though both approaches take human activity as a starting point in analysis, critical theory asks how the existing order came about "by focusing on both past and continuity of historical change." [20]

In this thesis, two critical theories will be used to understand the driving factors behind the alterations both at the domestic and international level based upon the features of critical theories which aim to understand how the current order came about.

1.2. Gramsci and the Concept of Hegemony

Although Gramsci did not have a lot to say about international relations in his original works, Cox founds Gramsci's thoughts helpful to understand the meaning of international system.[21] According Hall, what makes Gramsci so important as a Marxist is that he was one of the first modern Marxists who recognizes that "interests are not given, but politically and ideologically constructed."[22]. Therefore, according to Gramsci, it is not just states and the state system that must be understood in terms of one another; so too must individuals and social forces.[23] His definition of state as a combination of political society and civil society where these two levels correspond through hegemony or direct domination,[24] result in a need for the analysis of civil society and culture.

CEU eTD Collection

---

[20] Ibid, 129.

[21] Robert W Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12 No:2 (1983): 162.

[22] Stuart Hall, "Gramsci And Us". In *the Hard Road to Renewal* 1st ed. (London: Verso, 1988), 167.

[23] Randall D Germain and Michael Kenny, 1998. "Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and The New Gramscians". *Review of International Studies* 24, No:1 (1998): 5.

[24] Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 12.

Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony which he sees as one of the ways of domination is one of the key works which takes the culture as an important tool to gain power. The concept of cultural hegemony basically refers to the creation of the domination of a group over another one by addressing the consent of the ruled group and implying their worldview to the culture rather than using a military force. It helps researchers to understand how ideas reinforce or undermine existing social structures via their imposition in the culture.[25] The hegemony is defined in Gramsci's own words as

> The 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.[26]

For Gramsci, hegemony appears in an agent when the ruling class establishes its cultural dominance to impose its worldview to the ruled class via justifying the acts in the social and political spheres, therefore, hegemony and consent are linked together and this link runs directly through the terrain of civil society.[27] Hegemony is achieved within the civil society by using the consensual means by a leading class when it spreads and universalizes its norms and values, thereby it establishes a political and ethical harmony between dominant and subordinate groups.[28] In the modern world, the nature of power is also constructed in relation to political, moral, intellectual and cultural questions: "The question of hegemony is always the question of a new world order."[29] As Gramsci emphasizes, the nature of power in the modern world is also constructed in relation to political, moral, intellectual, cultural, ideological questions.[30] His emphasis on the role of education and media[31] in shaping the intellectuals, and using these tools

---

[25] T. J. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," *The American Historical Review* 90, No:3 (1985): 568.

[26] Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 12.

[27] Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," 171.

[28] Germain and Kenny, 'Engaging Gramsci', 17.

[29] Hall, "Gramsci And Us," 170.

[30] Ibid, 170.

[31] Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 26-27.

as means of creating and sustaining hegemony to structure the consent of society created a new perspective in political studies with its focus on the cultural determinants.

Neo-Gramscianism, which is inspired by Cox, in its original sense does not offer a direct contribution to the identity concept in political science and international relations. However, according to Langman, collective identity can, indeed, be seen as the primary locus of hegemony given that Gramsci's historical bloc and self-conceptions and expressions of identity are not just cognitive but motivated.[32] She argues that religion and nationalism generally serve hegemonic functions.[33] Since Gramsci's consideration of state and society complexes as constituent entities of a world order, and the intellectual's role in a state to bind the members of a class and of an historic bloc together into a common identity,[34] the link between hegemony and collective identity is too important to ignore in this project due to its focus on hegemony and identity in Turkish domestic realm.

The collective identity construction process from Europeanization to neo-Ottomanization is mostly explained by scholars with a focus on Turkey's foreign policy objectives and its relation to identity. According to Günay and Renda Turkish elites used the concept and process of "Europeanization" to legitimize Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East.[35] Therefore, a redefinition of Turkeys identity as Muslim rather than European will directly affect Turkey's position in the Middle East. In other words, the identity reconstruction process is a reason to gain more power in the international area. Additionally, Alpan and Diez argue that Europe's transformative power on countries creates repercussion in Turkish politics, especially after the conservative government's policies, and it makes Turk seek for other advantages.[36]

---

[32]Langman,"Identity, Hegemony and Social Reproduction," 2.
[33] Ibid, 10.
[34] Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," 168.
[35] Defne Günay and Kaan Renda, "Usages of Europe in Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East," *Journal of Balkan And Near Eastern* Studies 16, No:1 (2014): 49.
[36]Başak Alpan and Thomas Diez, "The Devil is in the 'Domestic'? European Integration Studies and The Limits of Europeanization In Turkey," *Journal of Balkan And Near Eastern Studies*16, No:1 (2014): 2.

However, the reason for domestic identity change and Turkey's identity reconstruction process of neo-Ottomanization after a long-term of Europeanization process is considered as a result of hegemonic processes by different governments in the literature. According to Yavuz, higher education, mass media and communications have played a very critical role in the reconstruction of collective identity in Turkey given the role of media and education in sustaining the hegemony of governments in domestic politics.[37] Additionally, Saatcioglu emphasizes that the transformation of the society is not related to the EU's transformative power at all, it rather relates to the AKP government's urge for power consolidation. He explains the change between the first term and the last term attitudes of the government by focusing on Erdoğan's aim to improve his hegemony.[38]

The concept of Gramscian hegemony will be used in this thesis to explain Turkey's collective identity transformation based on the features of the concept which emphasizes the role of culture in power relations and restructuring collective identity within a state. The common sense in hegemony, which is generally connected to religion is so clear in the Turkish case. However, there is a lack of focus in the analysis of Turkey's education system and the change in the popular culture as the reasons behind de-Europeanization. Therefore, the concept of hegemony will be used to analyze the dynamics behind this transformation by taking the media, popular culture products in TV and educational transformations into consideration as the main tools for the transformation.

1.3 Change in the International Level and Critical Constructivism

This research seeks to explore the link between the changes in Turkey's domestic realm and international area. To do this, the effect of the discourses on Turkish state's new identity

---

[37] Yavuz, "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux," 19.
[38] B. Saatçioğlu, 'AKP's "Europeanization" in civilianization, rule of law and fundamental freedoms: The primacy of domestic politics," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 16, no.1 (2014): 87.

construction process and its identities' role in Turkey's relations with the EU will be analyzed using critical constructivism.

Constructivism in international relations has appeared as a challenge to mainstream theories.[39] Constructivists have located their critiques on the material assumptions of traditional International Relations theory and emphasized the social dimension of international relations via stating that international system is socially constructed and they highlight the possibility of change.[40] They concentrate on issues of identity in world politics, theorization of domestic politics and culture in international relations. Constructivists are interested in how the objects and practices of social life are "constructed" and especially those that societies or researchers take for granted as given or natural.[41] According to constructivists, as Fierke highlights, neither identity nor interests can be detached from a world of social meaning.[42] Therefore, identities are necessary to ensure at least a minimal level of predictability and order in international relations,[43] and constructivism treats identity as an empirical question which needs to be theorized within a historical context while neorealists argue that all actors in international arena have only one meaningful identity as self-interested states.[44]

Despite the general focus on the reflexivity of the society, which means the mutual constitution of actor and structure in the constructivist approach,[45] there are some distinctions between constructivists when it comes to focus on identity and research methodology. Critical constructivism emerged in the late 1990s and agreed with conventional constructivism in terms of intersubjective/social ontology, although it distinguished itself with its focus on discursive

---

[39] Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, No.1 (1998): 171.

[40] Fierke, "Constructivism," 188.

[41] James Fearon, and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism V. Constructivism: A Skeptical View," In *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications, 2002): 57.

[42] Fierke, "Constructivism," 191.

[43] Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 174.

[44] Ibid, 175.

[45] R.B.J. Walker, "World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism, Pluralism, Hegemony," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 7, No:2 (1981): 195.

construction of reality.[46] According to critical constructivists, the meaning of material reality is established through discourse, they aim to explore the myths and narratives associated with identity formations while conventional counterparts treat identities as possible causes of action without analyzing the formation process of those identities.[47] Given their understanding on the systems of meaning and representation, their methodology is more pluralistic than conventional constructivists, and they use post-positivist methods such as discourse analysis.[48]

Both traditional and critical constructivism as an approach on foreign policy have been used to analyze Turkey-EU relations by different scholars, especially with a focus on discourses of Turkish politicians. As Arkan and Kınacıoğlu argue, discursive practices and representation relocate Turkey in the world and led a mutual construction of identities among the EU and Turkey.[49] Additionally as Arkan points out, questioning Turkey's cultural belonging in Europe with a focus on religious differences in discourse resulted in increasing Euroscepticism in Turkey and led the spread in neo-Ottomanism both in the society and in the foreign policy.[50] Moreover, Aydın-Düzgit explains the discursive practices of Erdoğan after 2011 as the reason of the growing rift between Turkey and the EU.[51]

Building on these foundations, it will be argued in this research that Turkish national identity which is reframed domestically by the hegemony of the current government, has an effect on current relations between the EU and Turkey. As it can be seen in the literature review presented above, reconstruction of Turkish identity as neo-Ottoman caused a reframing of Europe in the eyes of Turkey and started the othering process for the EU. However, there is still a lack of research on the interaction between the EU's attitude towards Turkey and Turkish

---

[46] Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, "Enabling 'Ambitious Activism," 383.
[47] Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 184.
[48] Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, "Enabling 'Ambitious Activism," 384.
[49] Ibid, 385.
[50] Zeynep Arkan, "Imagining 'Europe': Constituting Turkey's Identity on The Path to EU Membership," *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie* 107, No: 2 (2016): 140.
[51] Senem Aydın-Düzgit, "De-Europeanisation Through Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of AKP's Election Speeches," *South European Society and Politics* 21, No:1 (2016): 46.

government's hegemony on identity building process. Due to the emphasis on discourse and narratives in this dissertation, critical constructivism will be used rather than conventional constructivism to understand the main dimension of the research: The concept of identity in international relations, and the focus on the discursive construction of social reality.[52]

1.4. Methodology

The methodology of the thesis is based on qualitative research, due to the research focus and materials will be used requires an interpretivist research. Since this thesis is interested in representations of different identities and their effects on international area, discourse as a dominant representation of reality plays an important role for this research to understand the situation where power is maintained by the aid of culture.[53] Therefore, this thesis is going to implement a discourse analysis of statements on Turkey's accession process coming from both Turkey and the EU policy-makers, especially during the de-Europeanization process (2011-2017).[54] The research will look at these statements within a framework of critical constructivist international theory, with a focus on the role identity in political discourses.

The arguments presented in this research are predominantly based on Turkish policy makers' discourses as President, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs due to their position in decision making process and their focus on identity and EU-Turkey relations in their statements. These discourses include speeches which they generally address to the public about the EU and Turkish. Besides Turkish officials' emphasis on Turkish identity and the EU accession process, the statements of the EU member states' policy makers on Turkish accession process after 2011 will be analyzed to show the parallelism and mutual construction of the attitudes towards each other. These speeches are selected according to their addressee which are the Turkish public

---

[52] Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, "Enabling 'Ambitious Activism," 383.
[53] Iver B. Neumann, "Discourse Analysis," In *Qualitative Methods in International Relations*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 70.
[54] Yılmaz, "From Europeanization to De-Europeanization," 87.

generally and can be followed via watching TV or reading newspapers. I will be using three online newspapers for the discourses analysis (Chapter III). The discourses that are analyzed are chosen from the de-Europeanization years (2011- 2017) of Turkey to see the transformation of Turkish identity and its impact on the EU-Turkey relations during this time. For the Turkish officials' discourses, I will be using Hürriyet Daily News by reason of it is an international branch of a Turkish Newspaper; Hürriyet. Moreover, its focus on Turkish Foreign Policy and discourses due to its Turkishness and the international language as English will help the readers of this thesis to read and understand the discourses that I use here clearly. Independent and The Guardian will be used for the discourses of the EU officials due to their high representativeness and their relatedness to the issue.

In addition to the discourse analysis, critical visual analysis will be used as a supportive method to analyze the scenes of two soap operas: *The Magnificent Century* and *Resurrection: Ertuğrul* in the 4th chapter. The images from the series will be used to show their representative power on identities, since they have the potential to shape what can and cannot be seen in politics,[55] and they are central to the cultural construction of social life lately.[56] They will be considered as affected from social conditions[57] and their representative power of new identity construction process will be discussed in detail. The soap operas as the main productions of popular culture in this thesis are selected according to Turkish society's average of watching TV series, which ranks the first in the world ranking, and the chosen soap operas' rating success.

Both speeches and television dramas are representations of social life; and they interact with one another in a variety of important ways. Therefore, this methodology is appropriate as it will allow for a combination of the methods to analyze two different data as official speeches

---

[55]Roland Bleiker. "Pluralist Methods for Visual Global Politics,*" Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43, No:3 (2015): 884.

[56] Gillian Rose, *Visual Methodologies,* (London: SAGE., 2001), 6.

[57] Ibid, 15-16.

and soap opera scenes and it will help to achieve an optimal level of understanding the general

framework.

CHAPTER 2 - Europeanization and Turkey

2.1. Definition of Europeanization

Europeanization is a concept that is used for explaining the domestic political practices of different countries which are affected by Europe, especially the European Union.[58] This term was used to explain the transformative power of the EU both in candidate and non-member states as well as the EU member states. Despite the term has different definitions in different fields of research like political science, anthropology, and economy, in general it refers to "the process of institution building at the European level in order to explore how this Europeanization process impacts upon the member states."[59] Europeanization is a process that comes with the enlargement policy of the EU, where the candidate countries transform their institutions and policies as the EU membership conditions asks for. The enlargement process has helped many European states to develop democracy and human rights, therefore the enlargement policy of the EU has been one of the best soft power foreign policy tools. However, there are national policy-makers and EU officials who do not want to expand the borders of the EU more due to the worries about unwanted migrants and their negative effects on overall identity as much as a negative impact on finance. [60] Turkey, as the historical other of Europe, included to the process with EU's enlargement policy after the foundation of the Union. However, Turkey's Europeanization process has fluctuated since the beginning and it still haven't been completed with a full membership of the country in the Union.

The process of Europeanization has the power to influence collective identity construction processes of countries with the promotion of shared values and European identity

[58] Juliette Tolay, "Turkey's Critical Europeanization: "For the European Union, Despite the European Union"?," In *History, Politics and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 1st ed., (Ankara: SETA, 2011), 197.

[59] Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse. "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization And Domestic Change," *European Integration online Papers* 5, No:15 (2002): 3.

[60]Tamás Szigetvári, "EU-Turkey Relations: Changing Approaches," *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 14, No:1 (2014): 35.

due to institutionalization processes take place in member countries. As Neumann argues, the collective self is predicated on certain key political ideas such as state or nation and these political ideas are used by the collective self as a basis for institutionalization in case of a political cooperation.[61] Collective identity construction power of the EU can be observed in its both top-down and bottom-up processes where the countries in process internalize the European norms and reconstruct their institutions. Therefore, the aim to create a common European identity in the member and candidate states has an impact on domestic policies and vice versa.[62] That is why, identity becomes one of the determining factors in relations between the EU and member or candidate states as it can be observed in the Turkish case.[63] Changes in the social structure and internal dynamics of the EU have an impact on Turkey's identity building process, just as the relations between the EU and Turkey have been influenced by this process as it can be observed today. Turkey found itself in a de-Europeanization process both in the political and cultural dimensions with the changes in the EU member states' discourses and in Turkish domestic politics via the hegemony of AKP government.

Since the Europeanization process itself has a transformative power on state identities with an emphasis on shared values, this thesis argues that de-Europeanization process is also effective on the reconstruction of collective identity in a country. 'Integration and exclusion are two sides of the same coin'[64] as it can be observed in today's EU. Therefore, the analysis of how integration and exclusion take place between agencies must be the question to be answered to understand these processes' possible consequences on related states and the Union. Therefore, in the following sections, background of Turkey's identity construction through

---

[61] Iver B Neumann, "Uses of the Other in World Politics". in *Uses of The Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 30.
[62] Nergiz Özkural Köroğlu, "Neo-Ottomanization Vs. Europeanization: Turkey-EU Relations," A*nkara Avrupa Calismalari Dergisi* 13, No:2 (2014): 115.
[63] Arkan, "Imagining 'Europe," 35.
[64] Ibid, 37.

Europeanization, then de-Europeanization processes will be covered with a focus on possible reasons behind this change.

2.2. Historical Background of Turkey's Europeanization Process

The relations between Turkey and Europe are as old as both sides' appearance in the international area due to their geographical closeness. Both sides have used each other for creation of a self for themselves, and "the Turk" remained as the dominant other in the history of Europe.[65] The origin of the Europeanization idea in Turkey is underlying the Ottoman Empire's regression period, where modernization/Westernization movements attempted to make the Empire great again.[66] According to the intellectuals of the Empire, the main reason for that regression period was the Empire's inability to catch up with the technological and political developments in Europe, thus Westernization attempts in Ottoman institutions started to take place to make the Empire regain its strength. Therefore, during the rule of Selim the Third, one of the 17th century Sultans of the Ottoman Empire, the first permanent embassy of the Empire was opened in London to follow closely the developments in Europe. However, this belated decision of the Empire could not stop the Empire's regression. During the 18th century, modernization processes of the Empire continued with the Tanzimat Reform Edict, which restricted the Sultan's rights for the first time and gave the Empire a democratic dimension. This era was followed by the Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856, which provided rights to the various minorities in the Empire. Nevertheless, these efforts failed to save the Empire, because it was already too late to start a modernization process. Therefore, these reforms became inefficient. This failure of the Empire shaped the identity and foreign policy decisions of the newly-born Republic later.

---

[65] Neumann, "Making Europe: The Turkish Other," 39.
[66] "Make America Great Again" The campaign slogan that is used by Donald Trump for the 2016 presidential campaign.

The Turkish Republic was established in 1923, and the ties between the Republic and the Ottoman past was tried to be demolished by the new government after the foundation. The Ottoman past became an "other" for the new modern Turkish society; it was identified with ignorance, corruption, and backwardness,[67] and the Republic aimed to complete its self-assertion as a European power. After the Republic's foundation, Europe no longer remained a rival to fight against, but became a role model to follow, therefore Turkey started to improve its relations with European countries, and ignore the Middle Eastern countries in its foreign policy until the 1950s. Especially during the Cold War era, neutrality seemed as an insecure choice for Turkish politicians in a bipolar world order as a young republic, therefore, Turkey chose its side by becoming a member of NATO in 1952 and thus, Turkish foreign policy became based on a pro-American approach.[68] After this membership, Turkey's Westernization process during the Cold War turned into a Europeanization process with Turkey's application for full membership in 1959 to the European Economic Community.[69]

Turkey's efforts for full membership continued with the 1987 application to the European Community; however, the application of Turkey got rejected with the Community providing four reasons for the rejection. Out of these four reasons, the last one was emphasizing cultural differences between the EU and Turkey as a reason for rejection, and hence cultural differences as an obstacle between the parties became an official statement.[70] As Neuman pointed out in 1999, Turkey as a primarily religious other was seen more as a cultural threat to Europe as it is used be seen even in the fourteenth century.[71] Despite this rejection in 1987, Turkey got the candidate status in 1999 with the Helsinki Summit and started official

---

[67] Arkan, 'Imagining Europe,' 139.
[68] Tüysüzoğlu, "Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası," 303.
[69] Szigetvari, "EU-Turkey Relations: Changing Approaches," 36.
[70] Yavuz, "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux," 35.
[71] Neumann, "Making Europe: The Turkish Other," 46.

21

negotiations with the EU for full membership in 2005.[72] However, the credibility of EU conditionality in Turkey's accession process was weakened after 2005 because of the EU's proposal for Turkey to have an alternative partnership status rather than full membership.[73] Since then, Turkey's accession process has not been completed, and thirteen years after the first negotiation, Turkey is still waiting to become a full member of the EU, despite its status summarized as "too big, too poor and too Muslim"[74] to join the EU.

Turkey's EU accession process is divided into three phases by Gözde Yılmaz.[75] According to her, the term between 1999-2004 is a progressing Europeanization process, during which Turkey received its candidate status and domestic change took place in line with EU demands for accession, and thus Turkey experienced reforms strengthening democracy and human rights in line with the Copenhangen Criteria.[76] The years between 2005-2010 are called selective Europeanization period, during which the government cherry picked some EU demands to comply with in the domestic realm, whereas left behind the rest of the EU priorities, which were not helpful on the domestic scene.[77] Additionally, this was the time when Eurosceptic voices started to rise domestically, following the weakening of EU credibility after 2005. And finally, Yılmaz calls the period of 2011-2014 as de-Europeanization process, which started with the AKP rule's doubled legitimacy by receiving 50% of all votes in the 2011 elections. During this term, domestic changes took place in contrast with EU demands for accession, like restrictions in the Turkish media and reforms of civil-military relations, through which the power of the military was weakened over politics.[78] In addition to the growing hegemony of AKP government in domestic politics, Syrian refugee crisis which started with

---

[72] Arkan, 'Imagining Europe,' 140; Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs. 2017. "History of Turkey- EU Relations.". Available at: https://www.ab.gov.tr/111_en.html.
[73] Yılmaz, "From Europeanization To De-Europeanization," 87.
[74] Statement of a former EU Commissioner: Frits Bolkestein. Szigetvari, "EU-Turkey Relations: Changing Approaches," 36.
[75] Yılmaz, "From Europeanization To De-Europeanization," 87.
[76] Ibid, 89.
[77] Ibid, 90.
[78] Ibid, 94.

the Syrian Civil War, created a tension between the EU and Turkey. The big number of Syrian refugees[79] who are hosted by Turkey and trying to reach Europe illegally created a social chaos, and the efforts of the EU seemed insufficient in the eyes of Turkish politicians and society. Especially after the coup attempt in Turkey at 15th of July and the domestic implications after it, sentences for thousands of military officers and arrestments of journalists under the name of being a member of FETÖ,[80] created suspicion about Turkey's democracy in the eyes of the EU. Turkish officials' emphasis on the Western powers as the supporters of the attempt raised the tension to the top level and parties' attitudes towards each other and stalemated Turkey's accession process.

Turkey's de-Europeanization process will be the main period for the analysis of this thesis. However, I will take de-Europeanization process from 2011 till 2017 rather than 2014 to be able to explore the effect of Syrian Refugee Crisis on the relations and Turkey's collective identity construction after the 15th of July 2016 coup attempt. The next section will be the introduction and discussion part for the term neo-Ottomanism and its emergence in Turkish politics as a new identity construction process in terms of its effect on the Turkey's EU membership process.

2.3. Neo Ottomanism in Turkish Politics

Neo-Ottomanism is a world-view that is constructed based on a selective reading of Ottoman administrative practices and aims to achieve a greater political engagement via religious, cultural and ethnic identity within the region, which used to be under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.[81] According to Yavuz, neo-Ottomanism in Turkish politics has two faces.

---

[79] There are 5,654,807 registered Syrian refugees in Turkey according to the 17 May 2018 update of UNHCR. For further information: (UNHCR), United. 2018. "UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response". UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224.
[80] FETO- (Fethullah Gulen Terrorist Organization) an Islamist-based terrorist organization which is accused as being the head of the attempt by the Turkish government
[81] Yavuz, "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux," 24.

One of them is the re-invention of the Ottoman past as a Turk-made era and a great achievement of Muslim Turks that should be remembered; the other one is a vision to make Turkey a regionally dominant and industrialized country, despite not taking into consideration the civic and democratic features of the country. [82]

Neo-Ottomanism as a political ideology is not a new concept for the Turkish state. Its origins appeared in Turkey under the rule of Turgut Özal (1989-1993) with the aim to have an effective foreign policy out of Europe too by using the Turkish culture and shared past and values. His aim with then President of Republic Süleyman Demirel was to address the Turkic-speaking world from the Great Wall of China to the Adriatic[83] and to live in peace with different cultures due to their contribution to the civilization.[84] However, because of the bad reputation of Ottomanist ideas in the eyes of Turkey, this attempt did not last long and disappeared until the AKP government's rule.

The new millennium became a turn both in Turkish domestic politics and in Turkish foreign policy. 2002 general elections of Turkey resulted with the victory of conservative-democrat Justice and Development Party (AKP). The governing party presented itself as a voice for the conservative religious working class that the traditional elite had excluded and victimized from the beginning. The leader of the party and contemporary president of the Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan defined himself as a street fighter from Istanbul's tough neighborhood Kasımpaşa and emphasized that he is not one of the elites that the republic used to have in the past, he was from the society itself like an ordinary citizen. Despite their elections campaign based on EU membership promises,[85] in time, Turkish Foreign Policy took another

---

[82] Ibid, 23.
[83] Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. 2000. "Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Süleyman Demirel'in Türkçe Konuşan Ülkeler Devlet Başkanları VI. Zirve Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma [The Speech of the President of Turkish Republic in the Turkish Speaking Countries Summit]."
[84] Cihan Daban, "Turgut Özal Period Turkey Foreign Policy," *The Journal of Social Economic Research* 17, No:3 (2017):84.
[85] 'Ak Parti Seçim Beyannamesi' [AKP Election Manifesto]. Ankara.2002. Pg: 92.

direction towards the East and the reason of it is seen as the new foreign policy doctrine of the former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu's book: *Strategic Depth*.[86]

The piece of Davutoğlu, *Strategic Depth*, became a new doctrine for Turkish Foreign Policy during the time when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs and became the mainstay of the change.[87] Davutoğlu promoted a multi-dimensional foreign policy to fill the power vacuum in the region by using the historical and sociocultural advantages of Turkey and transforming it into a center country.[88] Davutoğlu aimed to strengthen the country's bridge role by being a center country due to its unique location's advantage which allows Turkey to become a natural mediator between Eastern and Western civilizations.[89] He highlighted the importance of assuming a new identity and position for Turkey in order to achieve its full potential and become a leading actor in the region.[90] Therefore, multiculturalism and good relations with the neighbors are promoted as they used to be promoted during the Özal era. However, religion was introduced to the neo-Ottomanist discourse by the AKP government and Davutoğlu with references to Qur'an and addressing the Sunni Muslim audience as brothers and sisters.[91] Despite the focus on historical depth, identity, shared cultural and religious values in the new foreign policy doctrine, Davutoğlu claims that this is not a neo-Ottomanist approach.[92] However, this statement of Davutoğlu is pragmatic due to the emphasis of Ottoman past would may create a negative impact both in Turkey and in the region since the Ottoman past was structured as the other of modern Turkish state for decades.[93]

This neo-Ottoman concept of Davutoğlu is not just a turn in Turkish Foreign Policy, but it is also an identity transformation project, just as Europeanization and it has a direct impact

---

[86] Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth], (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001).
[87] Nergiz Özkural Köroğlu, "Neo-Ottomanization Vs. Europeanization: Turkey-EU Relations," 112.
[88] Tüysüzoğlu, "Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası," 298.
[89] Szigetvari, "EU-Turkey Relations: Changing Approaches," 38.
[90] Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, "Enabling 'Ambitious Activism," 387.
[91] Arkan, "Imagining 'Europe',"140.
[92] Özkural Köroğlu, "Neo-Ottomanization Vs. Europeanization: Turkey-EU Relations" 113.
[93] Tüysüzoğlu, "Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası," 306.

of Europeanization.[94] This project overstepped its limits, which first aimed to establish the same level of communication with Eastern and Western powers and to gain more power in the region. However, with its domestic implications, it started to re-invent tradition: The Ottoman Empire was glorified and used in new conditions for new purposes.[95] His neo-Ottoman project turned into a hegemonic project with its focus on Ottoman past and identity; and found a place in the Turkish education system and media. Moreover, both parties' tradition to create a self for themselves by defining the other through cultural differences is still a valid way of identity constructions. As Said explains in his seminal work, *Orientalism*, othering process via creating an imaginary identity for the other is more like a sign of power rather than a real discourse about the other,[96] and representations through discourses, traditions or institutions are the ones which make the other visible.[97] Both Turkey's and the EU's emphasis on identities in the discourses and narratives lead to a representation of their others; and a process of orientalism is still an issue in the relations. Although this time, we experience an Eastern type of orientalism, which creates an imaginary Europe in the eyes of the Turkish, and more broadly in the Middle Eastern societies, to enable a strong self-assertion of Turkish identity. This process of Turkey can be observed in the discourses of officials and in the popular culture products like historical dramas which are framing Europe as weak, infidel and unfair while presenting Ottoman Empire as the strong, real believer and fair Empire.

The representations of Europe and the EU on the Turkish side have been created through the narratives and institutions under the project of neo-Ottomanism and thus created a distance between these two sides. While Europe's representation as a Christian unity is created by

---

[94] Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, "Enabling 'Ambitious Activism," 394; Özkural Köroğlu, "Neo-Ottomanization Vs. Europeanization," 112.
[95] Inventing Traditions is a concept which was developed by Eric Hobsbawm and explained as 'the traditions as a process of formalization and ritualization, characterized by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition.'
Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," In *the Invention of Tradition*, 21st ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1.
[96] Edward W Said, *Orientalism,* (New York: Vintage Books., 1979), 6.
[97] Ibid, 22.

discourses of Europe Union officials on the cultural differences between the EU and Turkey, the impact of collective identity transformation process in Turkey also played an enormous role in the distance between two parties. Therefore, the next section will present a research on Turkish society's changed attitude towards the EU as a preparation section for the following chapters where the possible reasons of this change will be analyzed.

2.4. Turkey's Trust in the EU in Numbers

The Economic Development Agency of Turkey (IKV henceforth) is a non-governmental research organization that works on Turkey-EU relations. The organization has been doing annual researches since 2015 to measure the perception and support of Turkish society towards the EU. According to the data of IKV, while Turkish Society's support for the EU membership is increasing year by year, the hope for it is decreasing. The support of Turkish society for EU membership increased from 61.8% to 78.9% in three years (from 2015 to 2017).[98] However, 62.1% of the people say that their belief in the possibility of full EU membership is decreasing.[99] The most important part of the IKV research, which is worth mentioning in this thesis, is the part which explains the reasons that people give for their decreasing support for the EU membership. The most common reason for the participants of the survey is the doubt that the EU membership will harm Turkish culture and identity (25.2%), while the second (24.6%) and the third (23.5%) most common reasons are the beliefs that there is no future for the EU in general anymore and the EU's approach to Turkey has double standards.[100] These doubts were not developed by the society itself suddenly, in contrast, there are some concrete reasons that are worth to analyze. In the following chapters, the possible

---

[98] İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (İKV), "Türkiye Kamuoyunda AB Desteği ve Avrupa Algısı 2017 [The Perception of The EU and Support for The EU in Turkish Public Opinion]". *Türkiye Kamuoyunda AB Desteği ve Avrupa Algisi*, Istanbul: İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Yayınları, 2018, 21.
[99] Ibid, 25.
[100] Ibid, 30.

reasons of these survey results will be discovered by the analysis of policy-makers' discourses and the AKP's hegemony in the domestic media and education.

CHAPTER 3 - Reconstructive Discourses in the EU-Turkey Relationship

The historical relationship between the EU and Turkey which started due to their geographical proximity, evolved into a relationship of constructing the "self" by identifying the "other" in time in terms of religious and cultural differences. After the foundation of the European Union and the beginning of Turkey's accession process, these differences turned into official obstacles in the relation of the two countries, as displayed in the previous chapter. The construction of the self and the other has been done with discourses most of the time. The discourses of Turkish government have become a part of the government's hegemonic project with Davutoğlu's neo-Ottoman concept: identity construction by focusing on the EU and redefining Turkish identity as Muslim rather than European. Therefore, this chapter will analyze the two side's attitude to Turkey-EU relations in the last six years with an emphasis on Turkish officials' discourses to better understand the identity building project as a part of hegemony.

The discourses analyzed in this chapter are the discourses between 2011-2017, which is the period called the de-Europeanization process, in order to understand self-identity construction of parties and their interaction with each other better. Discourses, which emphasize culture, identity, and representation of the other are analyzed to explain how discourses and identities were mutually constructed, since the discursive spaces are one of the realms where social and political issues shape everyday consciousness.[101] Politicians' public speeches were chosen for analysis because they were easy for the public to hear every day via TV and they have more effect on society than official texts. Therefore, they place society as the center of collective identity construction and its influence in the international area. First, the examples of the EU member state policy-makers' discourses and attitudes towards Turkey's EU membership process in the last years will be given, then the discourses of Turkish officials which reconstructed the relations with the EU will be analyzed chronologically. They show

---

[101] Yavuz, "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux," 21.

Turkey making increasing overtures to the Muslim east, partially because of EU rejection, but also because of Turkey's increasing wish to play a role among the Muslim countries.

3.1. Growing Objection to Turkey's Accession in the European Union

Turkey's EU membership process has always been contradictory within the EU owing to Turkey's geographical location between the Middle East and Europe and its Muslim identity. Turkey's everlasting EU membership process has found supporters in the EU member states, however, there were some countries and officials who think that Turkey does not belong to the EU due to its different culture. In 2009, the former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy spoke for the majority position in Europe, and said that: "Turkey may one day enjoy a privileged relationship with the EU, but full membership is out of the question. Turkey is not European – geographically or culturally."[102]

Sarkozy's emphasis on Turkish culture which is different than the European identity and his full refusal of Turkish accession to the EU shows how important European identity is in the membership process. The discourse gives the message that no matter the negotiations between two parties, the EU and Turkey, and fulfilled requirements, Turkey's full accession to the EU is impossible because of a reason which is almost impossible to change; culture. But this discourse is not enough to understand the reaction of the union as a whole, because the full membership process was still on the agenda with the support of different EU countries.

However, during the de-Europeanization era in Turkey between 2011-2017,[103] the negative voices in the EU about Turkey's membership process got stronger due to the changes in Turkish domestic politics and suspicions about Turkish democracy. Although the common

---

[102] Tariq Ramadan, "Turkey Is Part of Europe. Fear Keeps It Out of the EU," T*he Guardian*, 2009. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/aug/06/turkey-eu-membership.
[103] See 2.2.

action plan[104] between the EU and Turkey during the Syrian refugee crisis seemed a positive step between the relations of two sides, contradictions between Turkey's demands from the EU and the EU's conditions for support raised the tension between two sides and led to a showdown. Opening the borders to Syrian refugees for their migration to Europe has become the weapon of Turkish President Erdoğan for the crises of Turkey-EU membership talks, and negotiation between the two parties lost the support from the core members of the EU, like Belgium. Belgium's prime minister, Charles Michel said that "Turkey is asking a lot and I don't accept a negotiation that at times represents a form of blackmail."[105] Moreover, the Turkish President's claim that the Netherlands are Germany's remnants and accusing Germany of being fascist with its cancellation of AKP party rallies in Germany and the Netherlands, raised the tension between Turkey and the EU, and some of the EU member states asked for the ending of accession talks. [106] While Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz said that the EU "must at least freeze the accession negotiations",[107] The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, pointed out that Turkey is not a part of Europe categorically while speaking at a televised election debate with her rival, Martin Schulz. She said that

> The fact is clear that Turkey should not become a member of the EU.
> …Apart from this, I'll speak to my colleagues to see if we can reach a joint position on this so that we can end these accession talks[108]

---

[104] EU-Turkey Statement & Action Plan is an agreement that the European Council and Turkey reached in 2016 and aimed at stopping the flow of irregular migration via Turkey to Europe. For further information: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan.

[105] Jennifer Rankin and Rowena Mason, "EU Leaders to Meet Turkish Prime Minister as Refugee Deal Falls Short," *The Guardian*, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/17/cyprus-sticking-point-eu-turkey-deal-refugees.

[106] *Independent*, "Turkey Threatens Ending EU Refugee Deal Amid Diplomatic Crisis with Germany and the Netherlands," 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-eu-refugee-deal-end-germany-netherlands-dutch-diplomatic-crisis-recep-tayyip-erdogan-a7633526.html.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Pasha-Robinson, Lucy, "Turkey Will Never Become EU Member, Says Angela Merkel," *Independent.* 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-german-chancellor-angela-merkel-eu-member-president-recep-erdogan-nato-a7927861.html.

After this speech in 2017, the relation between the EU and Turkey was tarnished and recovery process for the negotiations is still ongoing despite Turkey's attempt to create a new identity as Muslim rather than European. However, Turkey's identity reconstruction process started even before 2017 with discourses as a part of the government's hegemonic project.

3.2. Discourses on Turkish Identity and the EU membership process from Turkish Officials

Turkey's everlasting EU membership process has led to a rise in the anti-European voices in Turkey. The EU has been criticized for applying double standards on candidate members and being discriminatory by Turkish officials.[109] Especially after the refugee crisis, Turkish officials expressed their criticism of the EU's immigration policy and the Union's attitude towards Islam, by claiming that the EU cannot go beyond being a Christian Club. Negative discourses on Turkish accession from some of the EU member states and highly slow membership processes of Turkey is making it lose its hope of the full accession. At the same time, Turkey felt devalued, and activated national pride with the idea of "being better and more European than the Europeans".[110] This critical attitude of the Turkish government has challenged the EU domination in the Turkish domestic realm which was structured by previous governments, and this attitude is reflected in discourses on a new hegemonic process which transforms Turkish identity into a neo-Ottoman way.

Turkish officials' discourses on the EU membership process, especially President Erdogan's, do not directly include negative comments on the EU. However, the way they are constructed hides some messages about the new objectives of Turkish Foreign Policy, and they are clearly transforming Turkish identity from a European to a Muslim Middle Eastern identity. The neo-Ottoman identity construction project which gained momentum with the Davutoğlu's book, *Strategic Depth*, has continued in the discourses of state officials. The general addressee

[109] Tolay, "Turkey's Critical Europeanization," 203.
[110] Ibid, 206.

of these speeches has been either Turkish society or Muslim countries to be able to settle Turkish officials' "Muslim" emphasis and to have new supporters beside Turkey to its challenge to the EU.

Erdoğan, the current President of Turkey, made a statement on the EU membership process of Turkey in a TV program which was televised on January 2013, and said that Turkey did not lose its hope about the membership process. However, the rest of his statement includes a tendency of Turkey to turn its foreign policy direction to the East:

> There are five million Turkish people who are currently living in Europe. But when the membership process is not going well, I, as the Prime Minister of 75 million people, am looking for other advantages.
> …If we get into the SCO, we will say good-bye to the European Union. The Shanghai Five - former name of the SCO- is better, much more powerful than the EU.[111]

SCO is the organization which is known with its clear stand against NATO and more generally being against the spread of Western values. A discourse which highlights the power of SCO from the top state official of a country which is a member of NATO, is a clear indicator of a strong transformation in the foreign policy. Moreover, Erdoğan justifies this statement by saying that the process is not going well because the EU is detaining it, is an accusatory statement towards the EU and gives the impression that the EU forces Turkey to take a stand with the Eastern powers.

Turkey's urge to build new relations does not appear only with the SCO, but also with Muslim countries, and Erdoğan emphasizes the importance of religious unity with them frequently.

> Only we can solve our problems. I speak openly; foreigners love oil, gold, diamonds, and the cheap labor force of the Islamic world. They like the conflicts, fights and quarrels of the Middle East. Believe me, they don't like us. They look like friends, but they want us dead, they like seeing our children die. How long will we stand that?
> …The only condition to overcome the crisis in the Islamic world is unity, solidarity and alliance. Believe me, we can resolve every problem as long as we are united. Islamic countries, which have

---

[111] *Hürriyet*, "'Şangay Beşlisi'ne Alın AB'yi Unutalım' [Accept Us in Shanghai Five and We Will Forget About The EU]," 2013, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/sangay-beslisine-alin-abyi-unutalim-22448548.

developed economically recently, have been experiencing the biggest humanitarian and political crisis in their history simultaneously.[112]

In this speech, Erdoğan addresses to the Arab world under the name of COMCEC,[113] which is an Islamic cooperation organization. The request for unity by Erdoğan leads a clear polarization in the speech as can be seen. The construction of "us" and "them" has a clear aim: While he is drawing an image of the Western powers as the ones who only care about money and do not hesitate to fight for it, he is emphasizing a strong Muslim unity which can fight against cruel Westerners; and he puts Turkey on the same side as Muslim countries, not with Europe.

The Turkish leader's address to the world outside of Europe is not limited to the Middle East. Erdoğan also addresses Africa, especially the countries where the Muslim population is dense, to call for unity and get support as a Muslim brother, as Davuoğlu's doctrine on active foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East suggests.

It is not important whether they accept us or not. We keep up with our work. We are testing Europe. Will Europe be able to digest and to accept Turkey, whose people are Muslims? If you oppose Islamophobia, then you must admit Turkey into the EU.[114]

According to Erdoğan, in this discourse, his thesis claiming that the EU is a "Christian club" will be justified if Turkey is rejected. His emphasis on the religious differences between the EU and Turkey during his visit of Djibouti is an indicator that Turkey is trying to justify its claims on the EU by taking the Muslim world behind. Also, highlighting that Turkey does not need EU membership at all, and this accession process is just a test for the EU about their attitudes towards the Muslim world gives the message that if you do not accept Turkey as a

---

[112] Addressed to the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (COMCEC). *Hürriyet Daily News*, "Foreigners Don't Like Muslims, Only Their Money: Turkish President Erdoğan," 2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/foreigners-dont-like-muslims-only-their-money-turkish-president-erdogan-74893.
[113] COMCEC is one of four standing committees of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The committee of COMCEC convenes annually at ministerial level in Istanbul under the Chairmanship of the President of the Turkish Republic. For further information: http://www.comcec.org/en/comcec/about-comcec/.
[114] *Hürriyet Daily News*, "If EU Opposes Islamophobia, It Must Accept Turkey as Member: Erdoğan", 2015.

member Turks do not lose anything, but Europe will gain the enmity of the whole Muslim world.

Erdoğan is not the only one whose discourses are constructed in a neo-Ottoman sense than European. Davutoğlu, the Prime Minister of Turkey (2014-2016) after his position as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-2014), emphasized Turkey's aim in the Middle East as a leader frequently. During one of his speeches at a congress of his ruling Justice and Development Party in Diyarbakır, he said that,

> We aim at a new Middle East,
> …Against the tyrants in Syria we want a new Middle East that Turks, Kurds and Arabs build it together in everywhere. [115]

and emphasized that Turkey will continue representing Islam, with the crescent on its flag. He presented Turkey's role in the Middle East as opposed to the foreign policy of the new-born Turkish Republic in the 1920s and 30s and focused on Turkey's power and leadership in the union process of the Muslim world and the fight against the cruel, as we see in Erdoğan's speeches.

Erdoğan's speeches after the coup attempt of July 15th, started to give more impression of Turkey's power and ability to survive in the international area on its own to the outer world, especially Western countries. During one of his speeches in an AKP party rally in 2017, he addressed his supporters and said,

> If you're honest, make your statement and we will finish the job. We don't need you (the European Union),
> …They do not accept us. But have they put an end the process? No. They are still wasting our time. But we are being patient.[116]

---

[115] Şenyüz, Selçuk, and Faruk Balıkçı, "PM Davutoğlu Wants A New Middle East for Turks, Kurds, Arabs," *Hürriyet Daily News*, 2015. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pm-davutoglu-wants-a-new-middle-east-for-turks-kurds-arabs-77427.

[116] Erdoğan addressed to provincial representatives from his ruling Justice and Development Party. *Hürriyet Daily News,* "Turkey Does Not Need EU, Erdoğan Says,"2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-does-not-need-eu-erdogan-says-120782.

The tone of the statement shows that Turkey is running out of patience about the issue, and the EU is the one who does not accept Turkey as a member and wastes Turkey's time. Erdoğan's strong sentence "We do not need you" and after his emphasis on the EU has not put an end to the process shows that the EU is benefiting from the chaos with the chaotic process.

3.3. Objectives of the Discourses

As can be seen clearly in the discourses presented, the ones which come from the Turkish officials are presenting Turkey's power and common culture with the East due to the shared religion: Islam. Erdoğan's emphasis on Turkey as already a strong and independent country without the EU gives the message that the EU needs Turkey to justify its existence in the international area as a fair organization. The addressees of all these discourses are either Turkish society or other Muslim countries, which is a proof that Turkey's effort to form an alliance lies in the East. Therefore, Turkey is complaining about the EU to these addressees as a representative of all Muslim countries which is excluded from the Christian Union. In all the discourses in general, the EU is accused of being discriminatory and unfair against Muslims in its relations with Turkey.

The discourses itself are not the only place where the government's hegemony on identity transformation takes place. It is possible to see the reflection of these discourses in education and media, especially on the popular culture products like soap operas. The next chapter will be analyzing how these discourses as hegemonic nation building project found their place in the areas of education and media.

CHAPTER 4 - The Shift Towards Neo-Ottomanism in Education and Popular Culture in Turkey

The process of new identity construction started in the international level with the discourses and new foreign policy doctrines of the government, but it did not take a long time to observe the same shift in the identity of the society. These discourses reflected on daily life and found a place in the education and popular culture, and the government's hegemonic project of Neo-Ottoman identity construction led a shift in Turkey's Europeanization process. As can be seen in Gramsci's hegemony concept, using hard power might not always be the best possible way to gain power, but power can be gained by winning consent, and different platforms like education or media may become constitutive elements of civil society. [117] Education system and media can be tools which the dominant class develops to uphold its hegemony in civil society by being reflective on the achieved consensus,[118] and they have the power to shape a generation. The reason for the changed attitude of the government through a new identity construction process found a place in the society can be observed as the effect of changed education system and media.[119]

4.1. Education System and Neo-Ottomanism

Hegemony at the level of culture requires various people in charge for socialization like teachers, parents, religious leaders, and mass media to control and colonize the desires and identity of the society.[120] Therefore, in the case of a government's hegemony in domestic realm, "the monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than the monopoly

---

[117] Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks*, 1971.

[118] Stuart Hall, "The Rediscovery Of 'Ideology': Return of The Repressed in Media Studies," In *Culture, Society and The Media*, online ed. (London: Routledge, 1982). 57.

[119] Yavuz, "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux," 19.

[120] Lauren Langman, "Culture, Identity and Hegemony: The Body in A Global Age," *Current Sociology* 51, No:3-4 (2003): 226.

of legitimate violence"[121] as Gellner explains the importance of education for nation building processes. A turn from Europeanization to neo-Ottomanism in Turkish case must be observed in the society's identity transformation with the hegemony and monopoly of the government on education. Discourses of policy makers from both sides influence the society and bilateral relations, however their echoes in the education can shape the future generations and transform the collective identity of a society.

Turkey after the foundation of the modern Republic always followed a Western style education system to support Turkey's orientation to the West. Islamic monasteries were shut down, mixed classes where girls and boys are educated together put into force and girls were encouraged to have an education as boys do. The focus on religion in education was decreased while the duration of scientific classes was increased. The same Western type system has continued until today, however in the last decade a couple of changes have been made which aims to increase the religious education and the awareness of the Ottoman past. Erdoğan's statements on the youth and education system to shape the next generation made this aim clear. His statement in 2012 as "We will raise a religious generation."[122] gives a clue about the future of Turkish education beforehand.

In 2012, one of the most effective moves in the change of the education system was made by the government: Imam hatip secondary schools, which were constantly seen as a threat to secular structure of Turkey and shut down and opened again and again, were returned to the education after 15 years of break and spread all over Turkey very fast. [123] Erdoğan explained the aim of these religious schools as to raise a pious generation that will work for the

---

[121] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing., 1996), 34.

[122] *BBC,* "Anger at Plans to Boost Religious Teaching in Turkey," 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30375569.

[123]Imam Hatip: Religious schools which are designed to trains prayer leaders and preachers where the mixed-sex education is not given. (Nazif Muhtaroğlu, "İmam Hatip Schools". *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, 2018, Accessed May 20. http://oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e1046?_hi=0&_pos=237).

construction of a new civilization. [124] His speeches after this act have emphasized Turkey's Ottoman history and domestic achievements over Western ideas and influences , and his recommendation on Ottoman Turkish education in high schools became a policy decision quickly. This decision has made Ottoman Turkish a compulsory course for the curricula of Religious Vocational High Schools and elective course in all other types of high schools in 2014.[125] This change in the curricula had support from the people who think that these courses will reconnect the Turkish Youth with their Ottoman Cultural heritage while others criticizing the government by accusing it trying to destroy the modern education system and Atatürk's language reform.

Reforms in Turkish education continued with changes in the curriculum of high schools. In July 2017, Charles Darwin's theory of evolution excluded from science lessons in secondary schools.[126] Additionally, the government doubled religious teaching in regular schools to two hours per week.[127] This compulsory teaching frustrated the citizens who support a Western oriented education without an emphasis on religion. However, these acts are justified by the government saying that "We are doing whatever our citizens say."[128], and showed the emerging populist attitude of the government besides Islamization.

All these reforms that are based on religion and Ottoman culture in the Turkish education system aim more than a revolution in education. According to Yazan and Üzüm, making Ottoman language as a high school course is one of the significant manifestations for new national identity construction of the government; it is the orientation of current government

---

[124] Daren Butler,"With More Islamic Schooling, Erdogan Aims to Reshape Turkey," *Reuters*, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-erdogan-education/.
[125] Bedrettin Yazan and Melike Üzüm, "Ottoman Turkish in The High School Curriculum: Current Language Planning Discussions in Turkey," *Current Issues in Language Planning* 18, No.3 (2016): 265.
[126]Lizzie Dearden, "Turkey to Stop Teaching Evolution in Secondary Schools as Part of New National Curriculum," *Independent*, 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-evolution-secondary-school-education-national-curriculum-recep-tayyip-erdogan-regime-a7804016.html.
[127] *BBC*, Anger at Plans to Boost Religious Teaching in Turkey", 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30375569.
[128] Said by Education Minister Ismet Yilmaz at an opening ceremony for a school mosque (Butler. 2018. Reuters).

neo-Ottomanist ideals and reimagining Turkey as the continuation of the Ottoman Empire.[129] Batuhan Aydagul, director of Education Reform Initiative[130] said: "What we see now is a 'national and native' identity being constructed in education."[131] These new reforms that are differed from the Western type of secular education with a strong focus on religion and Ottoman Past seems like effective on Turkish society if we look at the change in the popular culture and the interest of the public in new themes in popular culture products.

4.2. Media and the Popular Culture in Turkey

Popular culture in 21st century should not be seen only as an entertainment tool, but also as a mirror for the social processes due to its reflectiveness and interaction with the society. Therefore, in this section, two examples of popular culture products will be analyzed as a part of the Turkish media to illuminate the link between the shift in the popular culture and collective identity reconstruction as the hegemonic project of the government. The reason why the products of popular culture are considered as data in this research is clear: I agree with Neumann and Hexon who argue that the way a large number audience interprets of responds to a text or a movie should provide a good evidence about collective beliefs in a state, society or political movement. Also, popular culture does not only reflect the cultural values, but it can also give a clue about an ongoing political process.[132] Therefore, considering the popular culture not as only means of entertainment but also as a concept which should be taken seriously by politicians would be beneficial. As Duncombe and Bleiker argues, popular culture unites "us" through narratives that shapes who we are and what separates us from the "other", and they focus on the axis between emotions and visuality like how television and film can offer different

---

[129] Yazan and Üzüm. Pg: 279.
[130] Education Reform Initiative is an independent think tank in Istanbul.
[131] Butler, "With More Islamic Schooling, Erdogan Aims to Reshape Turkey".
[132] Neumann, Iver B. and Daniel H. Hexon, "Introduction: Harry Potter and The Study of World Politics," In *Harry Potter and International Relations*, 1st ed. (Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 14-15.

messages that create identities.[133] Even though formation of national identity has been framed as a top-down process that results from the efforts of the national elite, with the spread of mass media and popular culture, the national identity is now also reshaped through informal means and commercial networks as tools for the hegemonic project of the government.

This section seeks to observe the reflection of neo-Ottomanist discourses in Turkish popular culture as a part of Turkish society's de-Europeanization process. In order to analyze the de-Europeanization process of Turkey, the importance of popular culture in identity building process, especially in Turkish case, will be discussed in the following section. Then, two soap operas, *the Magnificent Century* and *Resurrection: Ertuğrul*, that are the examples of contemporary neo-Ottomanist Turkish popular culture will be described and compared in terms of the government's response and their way of framing the Ottoman Empire and Europe. In the last section, a possibility of a new kind of Orientalism, or Eastern type of Orientalism, which presents the othering process of Turks against Westerners in the opposite way of Said's Orientalism,[134] by framing Europe as weak, infidel and cruel will be discussed.

4.3. Turkish Soap Operas: More Than an Entertainment Industry

Soap operas are important products of the popular culture and generally they have the feature of reflecting the time's social facts and politics. Their effect on Turkish society is too much to ignore in this thesis due to Turkish society's interest in TV shows which is bigger than in any other social activity: According to the Turkish Statistical Institute report in 2015, 94.6 percent of Turks say that watching television is their favorite activity.[135] Moreover, the Radio and Television Supreme Council announced that Turkish citizens watch TV for 5.5 hours a day

---

[133]Constance Duncombe and Roland Bleiker, "Popular Culture and Popular Identity," *Popular Culture and World Politics Theories, Methods, Pedagogies, (*E-International Relations Publishing, 2015): 42.
[134] Said, *Orientalism.* New York: Vintage Books.
[135] *BBC Türkçe*, "Türkiye dokuz saat uyuyor, sosyalleşmek için TV seyrediyor [Turkey sleeps 9 Hours in a Day and Watches TV to Socialize]," 2015. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/12/151204_tuik_zaman_uyku.

on average, and it makes Turkish society the world's biggest consumers of television shows.[136] Given the length of the soap operas in Turkey, which are not less than two hours, watching a series in the evening is more than an entertainment, it is a family ceremony for Turkish society. Therefore, the effect of themes and changes in TV serials on society are too much to ignore. The effect of Turkish soap operas is not limited with the Turkish society. TV series of Turkey have been highly popular both in and outside of Turkey and recently they are assumed as the soft power of Turkey in other countries, especially in the Middle East.[137] According to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Turkish soap operas have ranked second after the US in global TV series sales and hit higher than $350 million in foreign syndication,[138] while being the most glamorous export of Turkey since 2002. The representation of values and role models of the East differentiates in Turkish soap operas from the Western and covers the existing gap in the markets of the Middle East. While the TV series are being an effective tool for the international promotion of Turkey, the values they sell abroad are shaping the profile of the country.

4.4. The Effect of Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Media and Popular Culture

The new doctrine in the Turkish Foreign Policy, that can still be named as neo-Ottomanism despite the denials from Davutoğlu, has changed the media and the popular culture of Turkey following the change in the discourses of Turkish politicians about Europe and their emphasis on the Ottoman past. Neo-Ottomanism, as mentioned in the previous chapters, is a concept where the emphasis on Ottoman culture and traditions is highly intense. Slogans like "The grandchildren of Ottomans" are used to remind the society of their past that was ignored mostly until the 21st century. However, with the AKP government, the Ottoman past came alive

---

[136] *CNN Türk*, "Türkiye, TV Izlemede Dünya Birincisi [Turkey Ranks First at TV Watching in the World]," 2017, https://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/turkiye-tv-izlemede-dunya-birincisi.
[137] *AlJazeera Turk,* "Türk Dizilerini Rekoru [The Record of Turkish Series]," 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/turk-dizilerinin-rekoru.
[138] *Daily Sabah,* "Turkish TV Series Exceed $350 Million In Exports," 2018. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/2018/01/04/turkish-tv-series-exceed-350-million-in-exports.

in the society and became influential in every part of the society's daily life, including soap operas.

Since 2010, Turkey's new generation of history-themed series have been centering on Ottoman history and more than 15 TV series and several movies with Ottoman theme were shot. But two of them were successful enough to get the attention of the government, even being successful at creating polemics in politics, and showed that how popular culture can be utilized as an effective tool in world politics for nation building purposes. Moreover, the data that I will provide in the following sections makes it clear that the export of Turkish soap operas switched from a love-themed TV series to the Ottoman theme soap operas, where we can clearly see the growing interest in Ottoman idea in the 21st century, especially in the Middle Eastern countries. The conqueror role of Turkish soap opera continues with the "Ottoman Empire: The conqueror of the world" theme and it keeps influencing the region while reshaping the societies.

The Magnificent Century (2011) and *Resurrection: Ertuğrul* (2014) are the two Turkish soap operas in which the two different "glory" periods of the Ottoman Empire are presented. Despite their similar historical themes, the former has been criticized strongly by AKP government while the latter has been supported by the government explicitly. Nevertheless, the reason of both supports and critiques of the government is about the faithfulness of the series to the original "glory" and "tradition" of the Empire. The government's way of glorifying the past to create a new national identity is an example of inventing tradition[139] as its way of referencing to the Muslim-Turk past is formalized and ritualized via media to serve the hegemony of the government. Moreover, the common point of the two series is the presentation of "Europe" in a very different way than the society used to see. Representations of Western

---

[139] Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," In *The Invention Of Tradition*, 21st ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press., 1983), 1-14.

and Eastern characters and their relations with each other are indicators of the currently ongoing de-Europeanization process' effect on the society.

In general, there is an othering processes in the soap operas where Europe is de-framed. The presentation of European characters and countries destroyed the idea of Europe which had been constructed by the former governments of Turkey since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Difference on "us and "other" are generally based on religious differences like presenting a war and parties as Muslims versus Christians rather than focusing on two states' or nations' rivalries. Also, both projects are presenting Europe as infidel, arrogant, reveler and coward; while presenting the Ottoman Empire and sultans as believers, decisive, hard-working, and fair. The emphasis on Islamic values like jihad and martyrdom are at the center of every war scene.

4.5. The Magnificent Century: The Glory of the Past

The Ottoman concept trend in TV series started with "The Magnificent Century", which sparked a debate among historians and a discussion in politics. The theme of the series is based on the life of Sultan Suleyman, who is known as the Magnificent or Lawmaker Suleyman, and victories of the Ottoman Empire in the reign of Sultan Süleyman, which lasted 46 years. Besides the victories, stories about the fights for the throne and plots among Hürrem Sultan and the other women drew the attention of society. This soap opera also focuses on the relationships among the members of the imperial household, especially romantic entanglements, and rivalries. Throughout the 4 seasons of the soap opera, the great achievements of the Ottoman Empire, both in domestic and international area and the idea of being the leader of all the Muslims were presented constantly.

Wars with the Crusaders and the presentation of Christian enemies as cruel, unfair and lazy was one of the main concepts of the soap opera. For instance, the 26th episode of the series

is centered around the Battle of Mohacs, which was fought between the forces of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Ottoman Empire and resulted with the Victory of the Ottoman Empire. During the 4th episode while the king of Hungary, II. Lajos (Louis), was portrayed in his fancy palace and having fun with different women, Sultan Süleyman was shown while he was working hard on the strategies just before the war between the parties (See Figure 1.). However, despite the weak image of the European powers and focus on the wars among Muslims and Christians, an emphasis on domestic peace in the Empire was strong. The way of framing the Empire in this historical fiction soap opera as a multicultural environment where people from different nationalities lived in peace aims to show that how fair the Islamic rule and reign of Sultan Suleyman was.

1. Figure: Two different scenes from the forth episode of the Magnificent Century where we see the representations of Sultan Süleyman (on the left) and Hungarian King II. Lajos (on the right).

Besides the heroic narratives in the soap opera, the emphasis on the harem and the sexual life of the Sultan who can have a girl from the harem anytime he wants, annoyed the government and led to explanations from Erdoğan like "We do not have such ancestors!",[140] while

---

[140]Rengin Arslan., "Muhteşem Yüzyıl, Erdoğan'ın Tepkisiyle Gündemde [The Magnificent Century is on the Agenda with the Reaction of Erdogan]," *BBC Türkçe*, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2012/11/121126_magnificient_century.

criticizing the wrong focus of the soap opera. He added that the Ottoman Empire was not made up of fights for the throne and harem. Besides Erdoğan, the Minister of Family and Social Policies, Sema Aliye Kavaf, argues how it is shameful to present the glory empire, which governed three continents for 600 years, in such a way[141] while the deputy prime minister of its time, Bülent Arınç, says that Ottoman Sultans are also historical values of Turkey and they should be protected by the law as Atatürk is protected.[142] Negative responses to the soap opera about its wrong presentation of the Ottoman past were more than just discourses, legal steps were also taken to vindicate the magnificence of the Empire. Although the producer's explanation on the series is clear, about the show as a historical fiction soap opera, the critiques from the conservative government did not disappear. AKP gave a bill of law to the Parliament where they asked for a sanction for the *Magnificent Century* in 2012, although the soap opera lasted until 2014 with a big rating success.

No matter what the government officials said, the flashiness of the series and the presentation of the past in such a glorious way had an illusory effect and made audiences addicted to the serial. Also, the theme of "conquering the world", and the idea of "being more powerful than any other country" triggered the nationalistic urges of the society. The series was the most expensive Turkish television drama ever made[143] and it was exported to 52 countries, including the USA, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and various Middle Eastern and Balkan countries, and reached about 350-400 million viewers.[144] Also, according to the data from Turkey's Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 2015, the series had reached 400 million people in nearly 60 countries, despite the length of episodes which exceeds 2 hours for each. Despite the critiques from the government by saying that the serial does not reflect the real glory of the

---

[141] *Milliyet,* "Harem Genelev Gibi [Harem is Presented like a Brothel]," 2011, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-harem-genelev-gibi--magazin-1335606/.
[142] *Milliyet,* "Arınç'tan 'Muhteşem Yüzyıl' Çıkışı [The Magnificent Century Reaction from Arinc]," 2011, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/arinc-tan-muhtesem-yuzyil-cikisi-siyaset-1336199/.
[143] Tüzün and Şen, "The Past as a Spectacle: The Magnificent Century," 64.
[144] *AlJazeera Turk*. 2014. "Türk Dizilerini Rekoru".

Empire and it is just an object for magazine, the serial had a historic success, and it already imposed back the ideas of palace culture and empire, political Islam, and martyrdom both to Turkish society and other parts of the world.

4.6. Resurrection: Ertugrul: Where the Glory Starts

The other soap opera which has the Ottoman Empire theme is Resurrection: Ertuğrul. It is a historical adventure series which is based on the history of Muslim Oğuz Turks. It takes place in the 13th century and narrates the foundation of the Ottoman Empire with a strong emphasis on the harmony of Turkishness and Islam. It centers around the life of Ertuğrul Bey, the father of Osman I, who was the founder of the Ottoman Empire. The series is in its 4th season now and every season describes different periods of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, but it mainly narrates the medieval campaigns waged by Turks against the Christian enemies in every season. Despite the similarity of the themes between the Magnificent Century and Resurrection: Ertuğrul, the latter has received the support of the conservative government with its emphasis on the harmony of Turkish identity and Islam.

The very first episode of the series starts with Suleyman Shah's tribe and their difficult living conditions. The tribe's need to move somewhere else was the beginning of the foundation and expansion of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, in the first episode, the process of othering Europeans by drawing Suleyman Shah's tribe as "us" and the Crusaders as "the Other "starts with the scene where Ertugrul Bey rescues some prisoners from the Crusaders. The prisoners are hosted in Suleyman Shah's tribe nicely and "Turkish hospitality" is emphasized many times by different characters by treating the guests with a great respect. In the following three episodes the emphasis on Turkish hospitality continues by not excluding the guests despite the guest's identity, who were actually the ancestors of Seljuq Dynasty and can easily become a trouble tribe.

2. Figure: A scene from the 103rd episode where the Turkish Muslim (Kayı tribe) warriors are praying before a conquest.

This soap opera is a mix of strong themes, which are related to the establishment of an expansionist state that will rule with justice, as well as the Islamic concepts of unity, jihad, martyrdom, patience and hope, which is combined with a hatred for the Crusaders and their spies from within the tribe. The quote from the 97th episode of the series makes the idea of jihad and faith as well as the idea of glory and the leader of the world: "We do not fight for treasures or plunder, we fight for god's sake and for the order of the world." The given message to the domestic audience is highly clear and effective in the series. The representations of Muslim Turk warriors in the series while they are praying before the war (See Figure 2.) promotes the justification of war: Islam as the leader of the world order. The show captures the Muslim nationalism expressed by President Erdogan who, during the referendum, spoke of a bitter "struggle between the crescent and the cross".[145]

---

[145]William Armstrong, "What A TV Series Tells Us About Erdogan's Turkey," *The New York Times*, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/opinion/erdogan-tv-show-turkey.html.

3. Figure: Davutoğlu's (On the left) visit to set of Resurrection Ertuğrul and shaking hands with one of the main characters of the series, the father of Ertuğrul (On the right).

Contrary to the Magnificent Century, Resurrection Ertuğrul has had the support of AKP government from the very first episode. The visit of erstwhile Prime Minister Davutoğlu to the movie set (See Figure 3.), or the channel that the series has been televised, TRT the national Turkish broadcaster, for four years highlights the link between the soap opera and the government. The explanation of İbrahim Eren, deputy director general of the country's national public broadcaster TRT, demonstrates that the series is planned as a nation structuring process: "The series aim to strengthen the nationhood sentiment of Turkish people by teaching the audience how the Turkish state came into existence, through a combination of history and quality entertainment." [146] Between the screen credits and the episode, the statement of "The source of inspiration of the story and characters in the series is our history" and its loaded tagline "A Nation's Awakening" are sure signs of the aim of the series. Despite the different comments on the soap operas by the government, the aim of the discourse has been the same; to sanctify

[146]*Daily Sabah*, "Turkish History-Themed Series Diriliş Ertuğrul Enjoyed In 60 Countries," 2017, https://www.dailysabah.com/cinema/2017/03/15/turkish-history-themed-series-dirilis-ertugrul-enjoyed-in-60-countries.

the Ottoman past and to impose it on the society. In the cases of these two series we see the usage of media to impose an ideology on the society and the development of hegemony. While Resurrection: Ertuğrul is directly related to the idea of the invention of tradition, given the way of self-assertion[147] of Turkish identity both in the soap opera and in the supportive discourses of policy makers; the case of Magnificent Century is indirectly linked to the same idea since the reaction of the government still has the aim to aggrandize the idea of Ottoman culture and impose it on the society. Despite the difference between the presentations of the past, in both cases the usage of Ottoman Empire both in the stories in the soap operas and in the discourses of officials serve the same thing; Reconstruction of Turkish identity with a focus on religion.

4.7. De-Framing Europe: Another Dimension of Orientalism?

The rising effect of neo Ottomanism both in domestic politics and in the popular culture of Turkey is changing Turkey's position in the international system. The efforts of the government on changing the negative image of the Ottoman Empire in the eyes of the society and reminding the forgotten identity is not limited to foreign policy. Reframing Turkish identity is quite visible in popular culture, especially in the new of soap operas. Presentation of Turkish identity in a neo-Ottoman sense causes a de-framing European identity process in the popular culture indirectly, and it creates a process of othering for Europe in Turkish society.

The process of othering is not a new term in the world politics. Throughout the history this process is used to serve political interests of communities. In the case of Turkey, we see the opposite way of othering than we used to see in famous studies, such as Said's *Orientalism*.[148] In these soap operas, rather than observing an East perception of the West, we watch the West in the eyes of Muslim Turks that is quite different than Europe in Turkish society's dreams, where the EU is always introduced as highly civilized and the defender of the

---

[147] Hobsbawm, *The Invention of Tradition,* 14.
[148] Said, *Orientalism*, 1979.

oppressed. While the Europeans or basically the people from any other part other than Ottoman territory are presented either as unfair infidels or as weak people who serve the Empire, rulers of the Ottoman Empire are framed as a believer, strong and fair enough to keep the territories as peaceful homes for the multicultural society. The representation of the Eastern and the Western characters aims a projection of the original Oriental thoughts, where the Orient is seen as a place with full of harems and lustful girls and needed to be civilized by the West. The representation of the Hungarian king with different women rather than working on the war strategies, or the representation of the conquered non-Muslim territories where the non-Muslims and Muslims live in peace under the rule of Ottoman Empire are the examples of the Turkish-oriented implementations of Orientalism.

As discussed in the previous sections, Arab world has been the biggest market for Turkish TV series[149]despite the sharp change in the themes of Turkish soap opera and the presentation of Europe. The reason for the huge demand of the new Ottoman themed soap operas from the Middle Eastern countries is not clear, but whether the effect of the feeling of having the past glory back from a TV screen can be asked as another research question. But it is possible to say that it seems neo-Ottoman call of Turkey already influenced the Middle Eastern countries. The common way of framing Europe in the recent Turkish soap operas is more than a coincidence; it is a way of imposing a new identity on the society while creating an Eastern style of Orientalism for the West. Moreover, while they are changing the image of Europe in Turkish society, their fame in Europe reshapes Turkish perception in the eyes of Europeans too and adding new challenges to Turkey's EU accession scenario.

---

[149]Menese Tokyay, "Arab World Remains Biggest Market for Turkish TV Series," *Arab News*, 2017.
http://www.arabnews.com/node/1197036/media.

Conclusion

There has always been a distance in the relations between the EU and Turkey due to Turkey's everlasting membership process and the actors' different cultural structures. However, these relations saw various contradictions within the last few years and the distance between the parties increased significantly. This research focused on two dimensions; international and domestic, in the relations between the EU and Turkey to understand better the contemporary distance between them. While the former focused on the everlasting negotiations between the parties and the emphasis on cultural differences about Turkey's full membership process in the discourses of both sides, the latter analyzed Turkey's national identity reconstruction towards a neo-Ottoman identity rather than a European one after a long period of the EU membership process. I argued that these two dimensions keep influencing each other and put Turkey's position even further away from the EU in the international area. I used critical constructivism to understand the change in EU-Turkey relations and found out that discourses are highly important in this case and led to a redefinition of the two parties' identities, mutually constructing each other. Moreover, I found out that the overly long process of Europeanization in Turkey pushed Turkish decision makers to look for other advantages in the international area, like focusing on the East by using the geographical and historical proximity to other Muslim countries. In addition to critical constructivism, I utilized the Gramscian hegemony concept to analyze the domestic dimension and identity change of Turkey and found out that education and popular culture are as important as the discourses. Turkey's othering process of the EU in discourses and popular culture challenged the domination of the Europeanization in the domestic realm. Moreover, Turkey's redefinition of its national identity as Muslim and Neo-Ottoman changed Turkey's image in the eyes of Muslim countries as much as European countries. Therefore, domestic dynamics of Turkey affected its international position and put a distance between the EU and Turkey.

This thesis offers several potential contributions to the literature. Firstly, the thesis pointed out that identity and shared values are as important as cooperation in international relations. Secondly, this thesis showed the interaction between the domestic and international structures and found out how the hegemony of a government can lead to a sharp change in a society's identity and in turn influence the country's position in the international area. As can be seen in the EU-Turkey case, Turkey's search for new advantages in the international area led to a change in its national identity, which occurred through the hegemonic project in the domestic realm. In addition to this, redefinition of the national identity in the domestic realm led to a relocation of Turkey's place in the international area, which is even further away from the European Union. Thirdly, the relation between the EU and Turkey was analyzed by showing the importance of society and culture due to the society's role in the government's hegemonic project and identity reconstruction process. Lastly, the research showed how popular culture plays a constitutive role in relations between two international actors through its effect on identity construction processes.

To conclude, this thesis hopes to serve as a source for studies on identity in international relations with a focus on Gramscian hegemony. Moreover, it is crucial to acknowledge the importance of the focus on popular culture's place in national identity building as a part of hegemonic process; and its reflectivity in the changing international conditions. Due to the limited time and word count, this research could not focus more on the change in popular culture with more data and could not find the chance to compare two different terms of Turkey's Europeanization process and their effects on the popular culture one by one. Therefore, this research is open to be carried further.

Bibliography

Al-Jazeera Turk. "Türk Dizilerini Rekoru [The Record of Turkish Series]", February 21, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/turk-dizilerinin-rekoru.

Alpan, Başak, and Thomas Diez. "The Devil is in the 'Domestic'? European Integration Studies and The Limits of Europeanization In Turkey" *Journal of Balkan And Near Eastern Studies* 16, no. 1 (2014): 1-10.

Arkan, Zeynep, and Müge Kınacıoğlu. "Enabling 'Ambitious Activism': Davutoğlu'S Vision of a New Foreign Policy Identity for Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 17, no. 3 (2016): 381-405.

Arkan, Zeynep. "Imagining 'Europe': Constituting Turkey's Identity On The Path To EU Membership," *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie* 107, no. 2 (2016): 134-146.

Armstrong, William. "What A TV Series Tells Us About Erdogan's Turkey". *The New York Times*, May 5, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/opinion/erdogan-tv-show-turkey.html.

Arslan, Rengin. "Muhteşem Yüzyıl, Erdoğan'ın Tepkisiyle Gündemde" [The Magnificent Century is on the Agenda with the Reaction of Erdoğan], *BBC Türkçe*, November 27, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2012/11/121126_magnificient_century

Aydın-Düzgit, Senem. "De-Europeanisation Through Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of AKP's Election Speeches" *South European Society And Politics* 21, no. 1 (2016): 45-58.

BBC Türkçe. "Türkiye dokuz saat uyuyor, sosyalleşmek için TV seyrediyor [Turkey sleeps 9 Hours in a Day and Watches TV to Socialize]," December 15, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/12/151204_tuik_zaman_uyku.

BBC. "Anger at Plans to Boost Religious Teaching in Turkey," December 8, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30375569.

Bleiker, Roland and Duncombe, Constance. "Popular Culture and Popular Identity." *Popular Culture and World Politics Theories, Methods, Pedagogies,* edited by Federica Caso and Caitlin Hamilton, 35-44. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2015.

———. "Pluralist Methods for Visual Global Politics," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43, no. 3 (2015): 872-890.

Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse. "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization And Domestic Change," *European Integration online Papers* 4, No:15. (2002): 1-20.

Butler, Daren. "With More Islamic Schooling, Erdogan Aims to Reshape Turkey," *Reuters*, January 25, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-erdogan-education/.

Buzan, Barry, and Lene Hansen. *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

CNN Türk. "Türkiye, TV Izlemede Dünya Birincisi [Turkey Ranks First at TV Watching in the World]," April 4, 2017. https://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/turkiye-tv-izlemede-dunya-birincisi.

Cox, Robert W. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method" *Millennium: Journal Of International Studies* 12, no. 2 (1983): 162-175.

———. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,"*Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (1981): 126-155.

Daban, Cihan. "Turgut Özal Period Turkey Foreign Policy" *The Journal Of Social Economic Research* 17, no. 33 (2017): 77-96.

Daily Sabah. "Turkish TV Series Exceed $350 Million In Exports," January 4, 2018. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/2018/01/04/turkish-tv-series-exceed-350-million-in-exports.

Dearden, Lizzie. "Turkey to Stop Teaching Evolution in Secondary Schools as Part of New National Curriculum" *Independent*, June 23, 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-evolution-secondary-school-education-national-curriculum-recep-tayyip-erdogan-regime-a7804016.html.

Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. "Rationalism V. Constructivism: A Skeptical View" In *Handbook of International Relations*, 52-72. London: SAGE Publications, 2002.

Fierke, Karin M. "Constructivism". In *International Relations Theories,* 187-204. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1996.

Germain, Randall D., and Michael Kenny. "Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and The New Gramscians" *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 1 (1998): 3-21.

Gramsci, Antonio, Quintin Hoare, and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. New York: International Publishers, 1971.

Günay, Defne, and Kaan Renda. "Usages of Europe in Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East" *Journal of Balkan And Near Eastern Studies* 16, no. 1 (2014): 47-67.

Hall, Stuart. "Gramsci And Us". In *the Hard Road To Renewal* 1st ed. (London: Verso, 1988)

———. "The Rediscovery Of 'Ideology': Return of The Repressed in Media Studies," In *Culture, Society and The Media*, edited by Tony Bennett, James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, Janet Wollacott. 52-86. London: Routledge, 1982.

Hobsbawm, Eric. "Introduction: Inventing Traditions" In *the Invention of Tradition*, 1-14. Twenty-first edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Hopf, Ted. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory" *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 171-200.

Hürriyet Daily News. "Divisive Language In EU Helps Rise Of Extremism: Turkish FM," April 27, 2018. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/divisive-language-in-eu-helps-rise-of-extremism-turkish-fm-130775.

———. "If EU Opposes Islamophobia, It Must Accept Turkey as Member: Erdoğan" January 24, 2015. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/if-eu-opposes-islamophobia-it-must-accept-turkey-as-member-erdogan-77379

———. "'Şangay Beşlisi'ne Alın AB'yi Unutalım' [Accept Us in Shanghai Five and We Will Forget About The EU]," January 26, 2013. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/sangay-beslisine-alin-abyi-unutalim-22448548.

———. "Turkey Does Not Need EU, Erdoğan Says," October 13, 2017. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan.

Köroğlu, Nergiz Özkural. "Neo-Ottomanization Vs. Europeanization: Turkey-EU Relations" *Ankara Avrupa Calismalari Dergisi* 13, no. 2 (2014): 111-131.

Langman, Lauren. "Culture, Identity And Hegemony: The Body In A Global Age". Current Sociology 51, 3-4 (2003): 223-247.

———. "Identity, Hegemony and Social Reproduction," Presentation at Social Theory Forum, Boston: University of Massachusetts, 2011.

Milliyet. "Arınç'tan 'Muhteşem Yüzyıl' Çıkışı [The Magnificent Century Reaction from Arinc]." January 7, 2011. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/arinc-tan-muhtesem-yuzyil-cikisi-siyaset-1336199/.

———. "Harem Genelev Gibi [Harem is Presented like a Brothel]." January 6, 2011. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-harem-genelev-gibi--magazin-1335606/.

Muhtaroğlu, Nazif. "İmam Hatip Schools" *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, Accessed May 20. http://oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e1046?_hi=0&_pos=237.

Neumann, Iver B. "Discourse Analysis" In *Qualitative Methods in International Relations*, 61-77. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

———. "Making Europe: The Turkish Other" In *Uses of The Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation*, 39-63. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1999.

———. "Uses of the Other in World Politics" In *Uses of The Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation*, 1-37. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.

———., and Hexon, Daniel H. "Introduction: Harry Potter and The Study of World Politics." In *Harry Potter and International Relations*, 1st ed. 1-23. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006.

Osborne, Samuel. "Turkey Threatens Ending EU Refugee Deal Amid Diplomatic Crisis With Germany And The Netherlands," *Independent*, March 16, 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-eu-refugee-deal-end-germany-netherlands-dutch-diplomatic-crisis-recep-tayyip-erdogan-a7633526.html.

Pasha-Robinson, Lucy. "Turkey Will Never Become EU Member, Says Angela Merkel," *Independent,* September 3, 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-german-chancellor-angela-merkel-eu-member-president-recep-erdogan-nato-a7927861.html.

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. "Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Süleyman Demirel'in Türkçe Konuşan Ülkeler Devlet Başkanları VI. Zirve Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma [The Speech of the President of Turkish Republic in the Turkish Speaking Countries Summit]." Last modified April 4, 2000. https://tccb.gov.tr/konusmalari-suleyman-demirel/1718/4128/cumhurbaskani-sayin-suleyman-demirelin-turkce-konusan-ulkeler-devlet-baskanlari-vi-zirve-toplantisinda-katilmak-uzere-azerbaycana-hareketinden-once-esenboga-havaalaninda-yaptiklari-aciklama.html

Ramadan, Tariq. "Turkey Is Part of Europe. Fear Keeps It Out of The EU," *The Guardian*, August, 6, 2009. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/aug/06/turkey-eu-membership.

Rankin, Jennifer, and Rowena Mason. "EU Leaders to Meet Turkish Prime Minister As Refugee Deal Falls Short," *The Guardian*, March 17, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/17/cyprus-sticking-point-eu-turkey-deal-refugees.

Rose, Gillian. *Visual Methodologies*. London: SAGE Publications, 2001.

Saatçioğlu, Bige. "AKP's "Europeanization" in civilianization, rule of law and fundamental freedoms: the primacy of domestic politics" *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 16, no. 1 (2014): 86–101.

Said, Edward W. *Orientalism.* New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

Szigetvári, Tamás. "EU-Turkey Relations: Changing Approaches" *Romanian Journal Of European Affairs* 14, no. 1 (2014): 35.

Şenyüz, Selçuk, and Faruk Balıkçı. "PM Davutoğlu Wants A New Middle East for Turks, Kurds, Arabs," *Hürriyet Daily News*, January 25, 2015. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pm-davutoglu-wants-a-new-middle-east-for-turks-kurds-arabs-77427.

Tolay, Juliette. "Turkey's Critical Europeanization: 'For the European Union, Despite the European Union'?." In *History, Politics and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, edited by Kilic Bugra Kanat, Kadir Ustun, Nuh Yilmaz, 193-210. Ankara: SETA, 2011.

Tüysüzoğlu, Göktürk. "Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası: Yeni Osmanlıcılık Ve Türk Avrasyacılığı Ekseninde İnşa Edilen Bir Pragmatizm [Turkish Foreign Policy After the Millennium: Pragmatism Constructed in The Context of Neo-Ottomanism And Turkish Euroasianism]," *Alternatif Politika* 5 no. 3 (2013): 295-323.

Tüzün, Selin, and Sen, Aygün. "The Past as a Spectacle: The Magnificent Century," In *Handbook of Research on the Impact of Culture and Society on the Entertainment Industry*, edit. R. Gülay Öztürk, 182-202. Hershey: IGI Global, 2014.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response". UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response. Accessed May 31, 2018. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224.

Walker, R. B. J. "World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism, Pluralism, Hegemony" *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 7, no. 2 (1981): 195-227.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 7, no. 12 (1998): 19-41.

Yazan, Bedrettin and Üzüm, Melike. "Ottoman Turkish in The High School Curriculum: Current Language Planning Discussions in Turkey," *Current Issues in Language Planning* 18, no. 3 (2016): 265.

Yılmaz, Gözde. "From Europeanization To De-Europeanization: The Europeanization Process of Turkey In 1999–2014." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 24, no. 1 (2015): 86-100.